i THE CONTRADICTORY STATE: SOUTH AFRICA’S VARYING APPROACHES TO ITS ENERGY POLICY _____________________________________________ by Ashley Nyiko Mabasa 1278916 Supervisor: Prof Michelle Williams March 2021 A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Labour and Economic Sociology ii | P a g e ABSTRACT This research report addresses two main questions: firstly, do South Africa’s environmental and energy policies contradict each other in terms of building a sustainable and green developmental state? Secondly, is there any clear policy coordination within the State’s departments? The research is an analysis of the state’s energy policies addressed by the National Development Plan (2011), Integrated Resource Plan Energy policy (2010) Carbon Tax Bill 2018, and the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2018/2019. These policies show the link between strategies for development and the mitigation and adaptation of programmes for building a green developmental state. This research report adopted a qualitative research method to explore South Africa’s varying approaches to energy policy. The study uses several policy discussion documents drawn up by numerous departments of South Africa’s national government: namely, the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources; Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries; Department of Trade Industry and Economic Development; and the National Treasury. Policy produced by the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources’ Integrated Resource Plan (2018) fail to show amply the urgency and necessity for the so-called ‘just transition’ required for labour in the radical shift from fossil fuels (decarbonisation) to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the local electricity industry, especially for ESKOM, the country’s electricity supply utility. iii | P a g e South Africa’s economy was developed within the mineral energy context: coal has, therefore, played a significant role in its previous industrial development. After a period in which almost no attention was paid to climate change the South African government has succeeded in drafting policies which seek to mitigate the current deficiencies of the present economy for the requirements of the global climate crisis: the decarbonisation of the fossil fuel economy. However, the government has currently not provided adequate follow-up leadership for these policies and, in addition, they have proved contradictory. As a result, progress has been detrimentally slow in implementation. Fundamentally, the state has not succeeded in guiding vital economic activity by providing subsidies to the manufacturers and consumers of clean technologies. There is, therefore, a need to coordinate policies and have a coherent implementation system. This study, therefore, provides an evaluation of the SA energy policy, which should be better framed by a concern for reducing inequality in labour issues that provide a just transition towards developing a green economy with a consistent and rational implementation system to replace the current paralysis and gridlock. iv | P a g e ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Professor Michelle Williams who contributed immensely to my intellectual and academic development. Her support, guidance and encouragement continue to inspire me. Professor Williams’ work on climate change, democracy and development state continues to inspire me to frequently ask questions to those at the helm of the status quo – the state political leaders. Thank you, Prof Williams, for always believing in me! I would like to thank my mother Annah Mamayila Ngobeni. She remains pillar of strength. Your unwavering love and support mean the world to me. Thanks to my sisters, Cathy, Masana, my Philis and my late sister Winnie and special thanks to my partner Sbonelo Ntshanga for your enormous support. Deepest gratitude to Prescilla Masisi for the sacrifices she made for me from an early age of my life, thanks for your support and guidance. I will always be indebted and many thanks to my sister Mbali Hlophe. thanks for always believing in me and always be the first to remind me of my potential. You always support me in whatever I do, thank you so much! I would also like to convey special thanks to my brother Dr Themba Masondo and Phindile Kunene for all the selfless sacrifices you have made for me. There is no amount of words that can describe my gratitude and appreciation for your guidance and support. Thanks to Dr. Ben Scully, Prof . Sarah Mosoetsa, Ndumiso Mokako, Khwezi Mabasa, Mbuso Nkosi, Dr. Thabang Sefalafala, Siyanda Mngadi, Themba Makamu, Musa v | P a g e Malabela, Lucus Zulu, Precious Banda, Siphiwe Masuku, Thankyou Makhuvele, Jafta Kolisang and Smaga Musawenkosi Mahlangu. Many thanks are also due to the Emancipatory Future Studies (EFS) at the University of the Witwatersrand. Thank you for allowing me in your Masters Emancipatory Future Studies Research Core and intellectual guidance. I would like to thank Prof Vishwas Satgar, Sarah Mosoetsa and again Michelle Williams for your kindness and support. vi | P a g e DEDICATION Mhani Annah Mamayila Ngobeni vii | P a g e Copyright Notice The copyright of this research report rests with the University to which it was submitted. No portion of the text derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author or University (as may be appropriate). Short quotations may be included in the text of a thesis, dissertation or academic article for purposes of illustration, comment or criticism, provided that full acknowledgement is made of the source, author and University. viii | P a g e DECLARATION I declare that this report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university. _______________________________ Ashley Nyiko Mabasa (1278916) ______day of 20 April 2020 ix | P a g e TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ iv DEDICATION...................................................................................................................................... vi DECLARATION................................................................................................................................ viii ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS ................................................................................................. xi LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................... xiii Figure 5.1 ESKOM’s average electricity tariffs in comparison to the inflation rate (2008 to 2017). .................................................................................................................................. xiii LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................. xiii 1. CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND SOUTH AFRICA’S ENERGY POLICY .............................. 1 1.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................... 9 2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 9 2.2 Approaches to Developmentalism ............................................................................................. 9 2.3 The Emergence of the Developmental State ........................................................................... 14 2.4 Fossil Fuel Development ........................................................................................................... 18 2.5 Transition to a Renewable Energy Regime for Global Development .................................. 21 2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 24 3. CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 26 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 26 4. CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA’S COAL, GAS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 31 4.1 The Start of the Global Energy System ...................................................................................... 31 x | P a g e 5. CHAPTER 5: CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 56 5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 56 5.2 South Africa’s Energy Policy ................................................................................................... 59 6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 97 7. REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 100 xi | P a g e ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS ANC African National Congress AEB Atomic Energy Board ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa CEF Central Energy Fund COP21 21st Conference of the Paris Accord (climate) DMR Department of Mineral Resources DMER Department of Mineral and Energy Resources DoE Department of Energy DEAT Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism DTI Department of Trade and Industry ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission (formerly ESCOM) GHG Greenhouse Gas IDC Industrial Development Corporation IEP Integrated Energy Plan ILO International Labour Organisation INEP Integrated National Electricity Programme IPP Independent Power Producers IPAP Industrial Policy Plan Action IPPC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IRP Integrated Resource Plan ISCOR Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas MIGDETT Mining Industry Development and Employment Task xii | P a g e Team MPRDA Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions NIPF National Industrial Policy Framework NDC Nationally Determined Contribution NDP National Development Plan NERSA National Energy Regulator of South Africa NPC National Planning Commission PMG Parliamentary Monitoring Group RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme REIPPs Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers SASOL South African Synthetic Oil Liquid SIPs Strategic Investment Projects SLP Social and Labour Plan SMMEs Small-to-Medium and Micro Enterprises SWHs Solar Water Heaters WMO World Meteorological Organisation UCOR Uranium Enrichment Corporation UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change xiii | P a g e LIST OF FIGURES Figure 5.1 ESKOM’s average electricity tariffs in comparison to the inflation rate (2008 to 2017). LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 :The strategic policy documents examined in this study. Table 5.1. ESKOM Power Stations confronted with challenges from 2008 to 2019. Table 5.2. The IRP 2018 draft commitment to reduce the use of coal for producing electricity by 2030. 1 | P a g e 1. CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND SOUTH AFRICA’S ENERGY POLICY 1.1. Introduction This research report explores the post-apartheid South African government’s different policy approaches to the state’s energy policy since the climate crisis has become a concern to activists, scholars, and various states around the world. For most of the twentieth century, the developmental agendas of many countries were based on the burning of fossil fuels, despite the growing evidence that burning fossil fuels are detrimental to the natural environment. The German Institute for Economic Research has pointed out that the annual costs of climate change from the mid-century to 2019 was about USD $2 000 billion (DIW, 2004). The renewable energy represents a move away from fossil fuels production to mitigate global climate change needs by the reduction of carbon dioxide in energy production. The call for the so-called ‘just transition’ by South Africa's trade unions, social movements and political parties to enable change to low carbon and climate resilient energy production is essentially an attempt to address the consequences of the shift of energy production compatible to climate change. Different social groups – activists, scholars and policy makers, for example – have rallied to seek an adaptation for energy production within contemporary societal conditions. In 2010, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) at the United Nations (2018; p 3) refers to a ‘Just Transition’ as a conceptual tool in which trade unions capture the difficulties of the transition in to a low-carbon and climate resilient economy by emphasising the necessity of public policy to increase the benefits and lower hardships 2 | P a g e for workers and communities in the shift from carbon-intensive energy to low carbon- intensive energy – as facilitated by renewable energy. Significantly, therefore, the ILO concedes that the transition from carbon-intensive energy to low carbon-intensive production should increase benefits to the workers rather than further impoverish them. 3 | P a g e 1.2 The South African Response to Climate Change and Alternative Energy With growing scientific evidence and pressure from civil society, the South African state has started to embrace renewable energy from early years of the post- democratic state in 1994. However, it has done so without shifting away from its reliance on coal, which has often led to contradictory policies from different government departments. In this research report, it can be seen that the different ministerial departments in South Africa represent a contradiction in their policies for the shift from a coal-intensive energy system to a renewable energy system. These inconsistent policies are the focus of this study specifically in relation to the following South African departmental policies: • Department of Energy and Mineral Resources. Integrated Resource Plan (2011 and 2019); White Paper on Energy Policy (1998); Mineral Petroleum Resource Development Act (2002); Renewable Energy Policy (2003); and the Integrated National Electrification Programme. • Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries. National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011); and National Climate Change Strategy (2004). • National Treasury: Carbon Tax (2019). • Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development: Industrial Policy Action Plan (2010/2018). 4 | P a g e It is currently considered imperative that the world must respond to development that is accountable to the current global climate crisis. The United Nations has convened several climate summits to prompt member states about the need to devise an alternative vision, alternative development, and activism to enable climate justice (Angus, 2010). These decisions entail that climate change is not a phenomenon solely experienced by South Africa but is a global phenomenon that must be managed as the risks associated with climate crisis are “weighed against security threats, economic fluctuations, human rights debates, and geopolitical posturing” (Burch et al, 2014: p 15). The policy inconsistencies in South Africa, however, have hindered the progression of adaptations towards climate change via renewable energy. Furthermore, the SA government's policy contradictions not only illustrate how South Africa's state is not decisive and committed about tackling the climate change by transformation of energy production from the fossil fuel to renewable energy but, it also exhibits the South African government’s incapacity to construct cohesive and coordinated state institutions. This has resulted in the slow pace of the implementation of the renewable energy sector in post-apartheid South Africa. The literature review in this research, therefore, demonstrates the South African government’s ambivalent approach towards renewable energy does not offer an opportunity for a convincing paradigm shift – from carbon-intensive energy to renewable energy. 1.3 Research Rationale 5 | P a g e The rationale for this research is primarily evidenced in the data that several departments of the current SA government have been drafting policy documents that propose adaptation to climate change. These policies include the following departments and their documents: • Department of Environment and Tourism. The 2004 policy document: National Climate Change Response Strategy for South Africa; • Department of Trade and Industry. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (2009); • Department of Minerals, Resources and Energy. The Integrated Resource Plan (2010); and • The Office of the Presidency. The National Development Plan (2011). These various policies from several of government departments assert a developmental and industrialisation objective while also proposing mitigation and adaptation processes towards climate change. This research contributes to an understanding of the diverse government department policies and the way in which this lack of cohesiveness across state institutions becomes an impediment to renewable energy projects. This research further suggests that contradictory policies are implemented which have led to undesirable outcomes, and that some departments, such as National Treasury, are more powerful than others. If the state is serious about its climate change commitments it is imperative to align its different department policies to tackle climate change since without clear policy planning, direction and coordination it can lead to policy inconsistencies, which then creates tough conditions for the state to deal with the overall consequences of the 6 | P a g e carbon emission issue. This study contributes to understanding the challenges encountered through the policy contradictions of South Africa’s energy production in moving from high carbon intensive (coal and fossil fuel) to its failure to implement a consistent renewable energy approach. 1.4 Research Questions To understand the contradictory state approach, this research is guided by the following questions. 1. What is the current South African state's approach to renewable energy? 2. How do the policies contribute to, or contradict the establishment of renewable energy? 3. The policies are: o Department of Energy and Mineral Resources: White Paper on Energy Policy 1998, Mineral Petroleum Resource Development Act 2002; Renewable Energy Policy 2003; and Integrated National Electrification Programme; Integrated Resource Plan 2011 and 2019; o Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries: National Climate Change Strategy 2004; and White Paper on National Climate Change Response 2011; o National Treasury: Carbon Tax 2019; and o Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development: The Industrial Policy Action Plan 2010/2018. 7 | P a g e 1.5 Outline of this Research Study Chapter 2 provides a literature review by locating the themes of the ‘developmental state’, ‘fossil fuel capitalism’ and the ‘just transition globally’ within current South African state in the literature. The chapter shows how the South African government needs to rethink the aspects of developmentalism and integrate systematic pathways to achieve success. The chapter also discusses South Africa’s attempts at building a green developmental state. For further conceptual clarity, the proposals are made for future systematic pathways for building the developmental state based on renewable energy. Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach of this research. This research used the qualitative document analysis approach by which the author analysed documents from different government departments. This chapter shows how the documents are thoroughly analysed, for example, the Integrated Resource Plan and Carbon Tax. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the historical development of South Africa’s coal and gas industries and locates the emergence of coal globally and locally within different industrial eras. The chapter also traces the nuclear discourse in South Africa historically and currently. Chapter 5 explores different government departmental policy documents and shows the contradictions and similarities. In doing so, this chapter also presents the analysis of the Integrated Resource Plan, Mineral and Petroleum Resource Act, 2002; Industrial Policy Plan Action, Carbon Tax; the National Development Plan (2011); the South Africa National Climate Change Response (White Paper) (2014). Then a 8 | P a g e discussion follows on the contradictions between these Departmental policy documents. Chapter 6 concludes the research report and sums-up the research discussions. 1.6 Conclusion This study contributes to the energy debate around the so-called ‘just transition’ in South Africa by focusing on the energy policies in the various government departments. These particularly include the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources; the Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development; and the National Treasury. In the chapters that follow, the contradictions of the energy policy will be investigated insofar as they concern the following SA government initiatives: • the National Development Plan; • the Industrial Policy Action Plan; • the Carbon Tax; and • Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002. The formulation, objectives and contradictions of the above-mentioned energy policies will be assessed in this research to provide insight into the impact certain energy policy contradictions that have so far impeded the building of a socially and ecologically just energy policy transition for South Africa. 9 | P a g e 2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction This literature review intersects with the plethora of literature on development, the developmental state, fossil fuel capitalism, and energy. These different themes in the literature relate to this research when they specifically focus on South Africa's developmental state and the development renewable energy in the 21st century. 2.2 Approaches to Developmentalism There is no consensus in defining the term ‘development’ as it is a contested concept. Clearly, the definition of development must reflect the social context. However, ‘social democratic’, and ‘socialism’ have different models as does ‘social formation’ in the sense of the development of society under capitalism. Hence, Evans (2010, p. 37) clearly defines development as a constantly changing concept. Evans (2010, p. 37) contends that a state’s developmental failure or success is linked to epistemology in that development is driven by the knowledge of its previous production and a reflection on the social formation of that period. In the 21st century, different theories within development studies have emerged that try to analyse why Third World countries remained underdeveloped while Western countries developed. In different periods, various theories of development have emerged. These are: • The Modernisation Theory (Rostow, 1960); • The Dependency Theory (Frank, 1966, Santos, 1971); and • World System Theory (Wallerstein, 1987). 10 | P a g e These dominant theories were part of the surge of developmentalism in the twentieth century and its epistemological justification for that development. Rostow's 5-stage theory argues that there are five stages of development from a traditional society and it concludes that what induces development is the take-off stage of high mass- consumption (So, 1990, p. 29). In this regard, Rostow had argued sixty years ago that for the Third World to develop, it needs a stimulus package to restructure its technology innovation and to support entrepreneurship (Rostow, 1960, p. 4). For Rostow, a Five-stage Theory of Development begins with take-off stage which results in industries expanding and which then allows for reinvestment in new production. This requires manufactured goods, leads to urbanisation and a new class of entrepreneur will then emerge to support the private sector: all boosting development. Rostow's (1990) Five-stage Theory of Development is based on fossil fuel energy data which suggests that high mass consumption can be an indicator of the country's development. The weakness in Rostow's theory is the failure to recognise that industrially-led development relies on the expropriation of natural resources and the environment. In later decades, other researchers (Frank, 1987; So, 1990) have acknowledged a Dependency Theory (as influenced by the World System Theory) which emerged in the context of Latin America’s economic stagnation, the rise of unemployment, currency devaluation, and the decline in terms of trade. This arose owing to Latin America’s development strategy of state protectionism of the local markets and import substitute industrialisation. However, the Dependency Theory attributes development 11 | P a g e through the promotion of a degree of protectionism of local markets and import substitution industrialisation. Ignoring the socio-cultural history of less developed countries led to the Modernisation Theory of development in 20th century. This assumes that Third World countries are in the early stages of development by reflecting on the experience of Western countries. Put differently, Williams (2014, p. 4, citing Gerschenkron, 1962), has argued that Third World development is due to its distinctive experiences - for example, most of the countries in the Third World experienced colonialisation which altered their path of development. However, Frank’s (1966. p. 17) argument, premised in the Dependency Theory, believes that Third World countries are underdeveloped because of the exploitation by Western countries of the market relations between them (metropolis) and the Third World countries. Furthermore, the Dependency Theory argues that development studies fail to adequately account for economic relations between the metropolis and the economies of their colonies with their social-historical mercantilist and capitalist modes of production, however, the development studies do not embrace the contradictory relationship between the metropolitan and colonial economies. Moreover, the developmental state literature is a contradiction of the Dependency Theory inasmuch as it suggests – often with note to newly industrialising countries in East Asia – that market relations at an international level simply cannot explain the variation between the ‘periphery’ and the ability of some ‘peripheral’ countries (such as South Korea) to semi-industrialise and even fully industrialise their development. The difference lies in 12 | P a g e the state’s form, which is, in turn, shaped by class structure (Evans, 1989a: Freund, 2019). The Dependency Theory emerged as the result of the failure of the Economic Commission of Latin America’s developmental strategy of the state to protect domestic markets and industrialisation via Import Substitute Industrialisation (or ISI). However, Chibber (2014) in studying India, rejects So’s (1990) argument of protectionism as a mode of development, concurs with Chibber’s (2014) that protectionism and ISI can account for the underdevelopment of the Third world countries. So (1990) had argued that protectionism and ISI can be non-developmental when the state protects its domestic markets to the extent that it results in the domestic market not competing and lacking in technological innovation, which makes domestic markets inadequate for developmental programmes. Furthermore, Evans (1983) states that within the framework of the Dos Santos (1970) and Frank (1966) argument for Dependency Development and the metropolis-satellite structure, the development of the Third World countries can happen with the ‘triple alliance’ model when international capital, local capital and the state forge an alliance. In this case, the Dependency Theory notes that the state must facilitate development by: • demonstrating entrepreneurial initiatives; • implementing a clampdown on the urban working class to minimise the labour unrest; and • lobby the international capital to invest in their industrialisation. 13 | P a g e Conversely,(Parenti (2015) argues that industrialisation needs to be guided by the state in 21st century development, which, in the case of the energy industry, must be done by euthanising the fossil fuel industry to transform it to clean energy by the state exercising its relative autonomy over the capital. Many twentieth and twenty-first-century researchers have tried to understand why Third World countries are underdeveloped compared to First World countries, but few have highlighted the consequences of fossil fuel capitalism in the development of the least economically developed countries. Both the Modernisation and Dependency Theories have failed to link industrialisation to climate change and twentieth century industrialisation was highly dependent on the burning of fossil fuels. Immanuel Wallerstein (1969) acknowledges that the Dependency Theory and Modernisation Theory are not adequate tools for the interpretation of developed and underdeveloped states because they negate "cyclical rhythms and secular trends of the world economy as a whole" (1990, p. 201). The World System scholars view underdevelopment as the result of geo-politics whereby there are unequal power relations between core and peripheral states. Williams (2014, p. 4) concurs with his contention that underdevelopment happens because of a country’s structural location within the world economy. So (1990, p. 202) citing Wallerstein, argues that during the Seventeenth century the core countries (France and Britain) increased their share of the total market and increased their concentration of the capital. This reduced their costs by improving their techniques of cereal and textile production, which resulted in boosting the productivity 14 | P a g e of the core countries in Western Europe and led to the displacement of production from Southern and Eastern Europe. In this respect, Wallerstein recognises the state as the main factor that led to the development of these now developed countries. In addition, another reason argued by So (1990) is that Wallerstein’s analysis identifies colonisation as a cause of underdeveloped states (So, 1990). However, while colonisation gave core countries the advantage of creating new markets and protected their manufacturers –not all imperial countries in East and Southern Europe managed to create new markets although they both had major empires. It appears, therefore, that World System researchers acknowledge the relevance of globalisation in terms of Third World underdevelopment, but the research also overlooks how geopolitics affected Third World countries for resolving energy – environmental conflict. Perhaps World Systems Theory of the twenty-first-century development needs to be amended to incorporate the ecological limits in interpreting twenty-first century development. 2.3 The Emergence of the Developmental State By the 1980s, East Asia's economy was steadily expanding and diametrically opposed to the expectation of the Modernisation, Dependency and World-System Theories (Williams, 2014). This has resulted in different authors, Chalmers Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Castells (1992) and experts from the World Bank (1993) studying the growth of the East Asian economies whereby the model of its development has been extensively discussed. In his book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Johnson (1982) discusses how Japan's development was considered as that of a capitalist developmental state due to the structure of the state itself, and its 15 | P a g e efficient, flexible policy process and ability to develop and implement economic strategy. Nevertheless, much research in the literature on the developmental state have focussed on constructing the Weberian ideal of the bureaucratic state with appropriate and effectively functioning state institutions. This study’s review, therefore, stresses the developmental state institutions but also picks up on the analysis on the 21st- century developmental state from Williams (2014) and constructs South Africa's green developmental state as a substitute for its ‘mineral-energy complex.’1[1] Chibber (1995) contends that the fiasco of building a developmental state in India as opposed to South Korea can be attributed to the South Korean state’s capacity to facilitate its rising domestic middle classes better. In a developmental state, it is the state that focuses on catching-up with industrialisation by building state capacity (which is relatively autonomous from capitalist influences at the same time as being able to discipline capital). Fine (2013, p. 171) citing Castells (1992, pp. 56-57) defines the developmental state as: A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growth and structural change in a productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy. Fine (2013, p.171) Evans (1992) agrees with Castells (1992) that a state in development needs to have the principles of fighting corruption and augmenting relative autonomy embedded in 1[1] the name given to the high carbon emission developmental institutions which were the basic unit of South Africa's economy,. 16 | P a g e its developmental goals. Moreover, Fine (2013, p. 171) has provided an argument following White’s (1998) contention that there is a requirement for the democratic developmental state to consider consensus, strong state institutions, participatory democracy, international environment and social structure with social relations, social class and gender. Additionally, Fine (2013) and White (1998) pre-empt the contention by Williams (2014) that the contemporary or 21st century developmental state must contradict the twentieth century developmental state that was shaped by fossil fuel and carbon intensive industries which were ecologically detrimental. In his book, Twentieth- Century South Africa. A developmental history, Bill Freund (2019) contends that the basis of South Africa's developmental state from the 1920s to 1940s was embedded in the building of its energy industry concentrated in coal-intensive operators like ESCOM, SASOL and the state’s steel company ISCOR. These high carbon emission developmental institutions were the basic unit of South Africa's economy, now characterised as the ‘mineral-energy complex’. Fine (2013) argues that South Africa's developmental state had sprung up around its fossil fuel mining history and can be traced back to the advent of mining in the 1870s. The state has since been central in leading South Africa's development in the twentieth century by monopolising the energy and steel industrial institutions. South Africa’s developmental phase from the 1920s to the 1940s was supported by the Mineral Energy Complex. 17 | P a g e According to Mkandawire (2001), the developmental state may take two routes: ideological and structural. In terms of ideological, this embraces the mission of enhancing the rates of accumulation and industrialisation. By and large, Mkandawire (2001) places a disclaimer that developmental states must not be only based on economic performance as it is likely to render the idea meaningless. Instead, the spirit of a developmental state must be based on building sustainable and steadfast economic growth to provide transformation in the productive system – both domestically and internationally (Mkandawire, 2001). Mkandawire (2001) further argues that the developmental state needs to be consistent with a democratic system and he has emphasised that the lack of a coherent ideological approach on development as a nationalist project can be attributed to the failure of that particular developmental state. Moreover, he has noted that that the lack of an ideology for development is the reason for the cultural rejection of development by African leaders and their followers (2001, p. 295). By the same token, the World Bank capitalises on the lack of an ideological approach in African countries for the developmental state through its Economic Development Institute which has trained senior African government officials (United Nations Institute for Development and Economic Planning, IDEP) as policymakers in non-interventionist, neo-liberal approaches (Mkandawire, 2014). This, therefore, implies that African countries must produce their own epistemological understanding and relevant institutions which will train the policymakers to reflect on their distinct economic and ecological peculiarities. However, according to Meckling (2018), industrial policy under the developmental state can be used as a tool for climate crisis mitigation and for taking developmental 18 | P a g e route. This can occur when the industrial policy alters the economic composition of its fossil fuel sectors to enable for paradigm shifts in the politics of directive or regulation. Furthermore, in terms of carbon energy, the developmental state can become a counterbalance to political forces by establishing rational authority in state institutions to discipline the carbon-intensive firms. In this regard, the developmental state must provide subsidies to the manufacturers and consumers of clean technologies. The section on the developmental state will be inadequate for this research without concentrating on the energy industry under capitalist mode of production. Since 1870s the South African energy industry has been transforming under unique developmental circumstances from the coal industry to oil, and now there is the prospect of factoring in renewable energy. 2.4 Fossil Fuel Development One emphasis of the developmental state, then, is to address the negative consequences of this sort of capitalist mode of production: unemployment, poverty, and inequality. Engels (1848) historically claimed that capitalism intends to revolutionise its production to boost its productivity. This entails that the capitalist mode of production always develops itself to adapt to the constant changes in society. Moreover, Satgar (2017, p. 55) has more recently shown that the capitalist mode of production transformation over 500 years (in this case, mercantile accumulation which took place from the 1400s until 1800s in the West) was followed by the monopoly industrial accumulation, which occurred from the 1750s to 1980s; and the 19 | P a g e contemporary techno-financial accumulation, which began globally from 1973 and has lasted until the present. Foster (2018) has argued that capitalism has always had an opportunistic relationship with nature. In his paper ‘Marx, value, and nature’ Foster (2018) uses Marx’s abstract to put forward an argument that all human society under the capitalist system rests on the free appropriation from nature, which it is found in material resources and labour. This statement by Foster (2018) highlights the fact that it is in substantial relations and labour. In addition, Foster (2018) contends that humans cannot survive without the appropriation of nature and production. Foster’s (2018) assertion, therefore, agrees with the Anthropocene argument that attributes environmental degradation to human action. However, Foster’s (2018) argument also diverges from the same Anthropocene argument by arguing that people have a mutual relationship with nature because human nature appropriates from nature and reproduces from nature. Altvater (2006) has described fossil energy as “a thick energy source”. As earlier argued by Satgar (2017, p. 55) that capitalism depends on accumulation, Altvater (2006) adds that the capitalist mode of production is premised on the consumption of limited fossil fuel deposits at and at the same time fossil fuel boosts globalisation. Equally, the fossil-fuel regime driven by capitalist forces has been harmful to human nature and the environment because of solar radiation. Furthermore, Altvater (2006) has unequivocally argued that fossil fuels are harmful towards nature, for instance, the ‘greenhouse gas effect’, ozone layer depletion, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, the disappearance of tropical rain forests, and so on. Foster (2018) also contends that 20 | P a g e the capitalist mode of production has expropriated the environment and is therefore at the heart of fossil fuel capitalism because in producing work using fossil fuel energy the atmosphere absorbs greenhouse gases and subsidises the accumulation of the capitalist system. The conundrum is that while the fossil fuel industry has been at the heart of boosting the foundation of the democratic system in many states, at the same time it can also be attributed to undermining the democracies of other states. Williams (2017) notes that the carbon-intensive sector, particularly the coal and oil industries have has consequences for the democratic system. To generate electricity, the coal industry once had a large number of workers concentrated in the mining areas near industries sourcing coal, who were used in the transportation of coal as well as for distributing coal and generating electricity out of coal. Williams (2017, p. 232) has pointed out that labour unions were established as a consequence of the large number of workers required in the coal industry and this has resulted in making political claims for labour in a democratic system. Conversely, the shift from coal to oil was accompanied by further consequences for the democratic system. It has been argued that: The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the 21st century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies. (Foster, 2018) Foster’s (2018) argument, therefore, agrees with the one made by Williams (2017, p. 235) that the ‘geopolitics’ of oil has subsequently resulted in anti-democratic 21 | P a g e tendencies mostly in oil- producing countries such as Venezuela, the Middle-East and several African states. However there are differences in each: the state that depends on coal makes it easier for the workers to organise and mobilise to make their political demands, while the state depending on petroleum companies has fragmented labour power due to the fact that its technology demands less labour. Mitchell (2009) has suggested that oil-flow production involves less workers and the oil pipelines were invented and planned as the way forward for reducing the capacity of humans to interrupt the flow of energy. In addition, the oil transportation uses ports, unlike coal which uses the railways, and it has been argued (Mitchell, 2009) that the oil tankers can leave the ports without workers and this, therefore, phases-out the power of local forces to control sites of energy. However, should a labour protest occurs the oil tankers can be re-routed to transport supplies elsewhere. 2.5 Transition to a Renewable Energy Regime for Global Development Jacklyn Cock (2007, p. 50) has succinctly highlighted that renewable energy is a source of energy that is clean, affordable and safe. Cardoso Marques et al (2012), however, have pointed out that the renewable energy provides for two advantages insofar as development is concerned. The first advantage being that renewable energy has huge possibility for environmental preservation that is clean. The other advantage is that renewable energy will result in the decarbonisation of some currently installed productive capacity based on the burning of the fossil fuel and, in the short term, this may not be beneficial for economic development. 22 | P a g e Newell and Mulvaney’s (2008) paper ‘The political economy of the “just transition’ trace the history of the concept ‘just transition’. These researchers argue that the concept was developed in the 1980s by the US trade union movement in response to a new emerging tendency of regulations to prevent air and water pollution, which had led to the closure of industries considered to be the cause. Furthermore, the social movements in Britain, particularly the Trade Union Congress, have consistently campaigned for fossil fuel industries to restructure to low carbon. Whereas South African trade unions, such as National Union of Metalworkers (NUM), while consistently campaigning for the shift to low carbon industrial development have also voiced a sense of anxiety about the social impact of restructuring one of the world’s most carbon-intensive economies. For them, renewable energy brings an adaptation towards climate change which could be detrimental to jobs in society. Williams (2018, p. 241) has alluded to the fact that coal will remain the "primary energy source" because coal continues to have a crucial role in the space around the power of labour and the democracy. However, Williams (2018 p. 241) also contends that it is necessary to have an alternative energy in the mix which will be socially owned and particularly suitable: like renewable energy. Stephens (2019, p. 4) contends that renewable energy has the possibility of strengthening the construction of the developmental state. For him renewable energy can provide both a direct benefit for mitigation towards the climate crisis and also intensify the democratisation process in which the communities, labour, state, and capital can be involved in the ownership of renewable energy. In these notions, therefore, it is becoming increasingly clear that renewable energy quickens the transformative potential of moving away from fossil fuel reliance. 23 | P a g e Hein Marais (2018) provides a different argument from Ashley's (2018) that of creating climate jobs as a way of exercising hegemony over the society to buy into the idea of mitigating the climate crisis. Marais (2018) contends that the universal basic income grant can facilitate the process of transition from coal-intensive to renewable energy. Climate change mitigation will affect the status quo of current employment and will undoubtedly result in significant disruption the oil, gas, and petroleum industries. Of course, some trade unions in South Africa such as National Union of Mine workers have been sceptical about just transition and shedding jobs in the coal mines. However, Newell and Mulvaney (2012, p. 3) contend that just transition intends to take appropriate steps to protect jobs in carbon-intensive industries. Amongst the measures envisaged for unavoidable job loss, are adequate support for the sectors affected by decarbonisation through compensation and retraining for many new employment opportunities. Some scholars have proposed that the state has the responsibility of building a social and ecological just transition society. Newell and Mulvaney (2012, p. 2) have postulated that government has a steering and enabling role in the degree of support it gives to those affected by access to clean energy. It needs to intervene in the competing powerful interests at centre of renewable energy production in a sustained effort to transition to less carbon-energy consumption. However, Newell and Mulvaney (2012, p. 2) have also pointed out that in academic circles the term ‘just transition’ is derived from ‘socio-technical transition’ in the 24 | P a g e literature. They further contend that the term ‘socio-technical transition’ refers to “deep structural changes in systems, such as energy that involve long-term and complex reconfigurations of landscapes with technology, policy, infrastructure, scientific knowledge, and social and cultural practices towards sustainable ends” (2019, p. 2). Finally, Stephens (2019, p. 4) has presented another interesting argument: for a just transition to take place it is necessary to have a need for resisting fuel-based energy system – this resistance includes resisting fossil fuel-based technologies and other institutional and cultural norms. In addition, Stephens (2019, p 4) contends that resistance methods against fossil capitalism include efforts to delegitimize the fossil fuel industry and stop investments in infrastructure that continues to rely on fossil fuel. In this case, Stephens (2019, p. 4) proposes a radical method of resistance towards fossil fuel capitalism; namely, to allow a just transition process. 2.6 Conclusion This literature review unpacks the term ‘development’ and how the concept has been contested. The Modernisation Theory has analysed development according to the country’s social formation premised on a five-stage scheme. This review has shown how development, led by the state, emerged in East Asia by defying the expectation of the dominant theories of development at the time. However, the East Asian development states promote fossil fuel-led development and this is, therefore, currently blind to the ecological implications. The review also shows how fossil fuel has been central to the development of capitalism by supporting productivity. In addition, the literature also shows the 25 | P a g e proposed systematic pathways of 21st century development in a developmental state which promotes renewable energy. For example, Uruguay’s development is based on renewable energy instead of fossil-fuel, and currently 90% of their electricity is generated from renewable energy. Uruguay’s renewable energy regime has been led by a democratic government at national level as the government played an important role in transition from carbon intensive energy to renewable by investing 3% of its annual GDP in renewable energy development. 26 | P a g e 3. CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction This chapter outlines the post-apartheid approach to renewable energy in South Africa. Davis (2014, p.14) argues that the intention of research is to determine the approach and applied methodology. It may be worth noting that the South African State’s approach to energy and their budding contribution to global climate justice by the reduction of greenhouses gas is linked to the policies and governance of diverse state departments. An examination of these policy documents and their proposals is made in this study by using a qualitative research approach rather than a quantitative analysis method to gather data. 3.2 The Research Design The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research approaches have been broadly discussed in the literature. It has been noted that a qualitative research technique: is not concerned with numerical representatively, but with the deepening of understanding of a given problem. The objective of the qualitative research is to produce in-depth and illustrative information in order to understand the various dimensions of the problem under analysis. (Queiros, Faria & Almeida 2017, p. 370). The above authors go on to argue that qualitative research focuses on the meanings, motives, aspirations, beliefs, values and attitudes, which correspond to a deeper 27 | P a g e space of relationships, processes and phenomena that cannot be reduced to the operationalisation of variables (Queiros, Faria & Almeida, 2017, p. 370). The main disadvantage of qualitative research approaches is that their findings are not generalisable to the entire population “with the same degree of certainty that quantitative analyses can” (Atieno, 2009, p.17). Conversely, quantitative research method focuses on the gathering of data that can be quantified and generalised to the traits of the wider population (Queiros, Faria & Almeida, 2017) It is also less time- consuming because it uses statistical software packages to analyse data. However, Queiros, Faria and Almeida, (2017, p. 370) have argued that qualitative research “focuses on objectivity and is especially appropriate when there is the possibility of collecting quantifiable measures and variables and inferences from samples of a population”. The qualitative research method, therefore, is an appropriate instrument to study the state’s policy towards renewable energy in South Africa. Therefore, the point of departure for the choice of qualitative research is that the method is appropriate to answer the research question that requires an exploration of variety, experience and perception rather than a quantification. Furthermore, the qualitative research concentrates on the insider standpoint and gives an in-depth description and understanding of the various departmental energy policies. The qualitative research method assists in gathering thorough details of vast information on the state approaches to energy as opposed to the quantitative method which relies on substitution on the grounds of large sample size. A qualitative research approach then, is more useful in this study to examine the natural setting and offer a holistic understanding of all South African energy policies. 28 | P a g e The qualitative research techniques used in this research included document analyses to gather data from four departments that have established renewable energy and its power relations as the drivers of the green developmental state. The following entities chosen on the basis of their policies are: • The Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development; • The Department of Energy and Mineral Resources; • The Department of Environmental Affairs and Fisheries; and • The National Treasury. 3.3 Documentary Analyses As previously mentioned, the documents analysed for this study were valuable research instruments to gather the data in terms of “[q]ualitative document analysis or review of document” (Greenstein, Roberts & Sitas, 2003, p. 65). However, Silvar (2012, p. 140) also contends that the disadvantage of using document analysis as a research tool is that it is not universally recognised. Other researchers have defined documentary analysis as: [T]he systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents both printed and electronic material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research document analysis [it] requires that the data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge. (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). Since documentary analysis relies on collecting and analysing documents this research also involved a comprehensive examination of documents and reports from the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of Energy. Other documents closely reviewed were sourced via the websites of the four entities above (Department of Energy and 29 | P a g e Mineral Resources; Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development; and National Treasury). Strategic documents were also sourced from the National Archives of South Africa at Pretoria. All the policy documents analysed are shown in Table 3.1 below. Table 3.1 The strategic policy documents examined in this study Departments Policy Documents National Planning Commission 1. National Development Plan 2011 Department of Energy and Mineral Resources 1. Integrated Resource Plan (2011/2018/2019) 2. 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy. 3. Mineral Petroleum Resource Development Act 2002. 4. Renewable Energy Policy (2003) 5. Integrated National Electrification Programme (2012) Department of Trade, Industry and Economic Development 1. Industrial Policy Action Plan Action (2010/2018) Department of Environmental Affairs, Forestry and Fisheries 1. National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011) 2. National Climate Change Response Strategy (2004) National Treasury 1. Carbon Tax (2019) The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) was also used to access several parliamentary bills and records. These were accessed in the minutes of the Energy Portfolio Committee meetings of state departments in relation to energy policy. They were as follows: • Electricity Regulation Amendment Bill, 2006. • National Energy Bill, 2008. • Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006. mhtml:file://C:/Users/29134854/Desktop/FINAL%20MA/AM%20Contradictory%20State.mht!https://pmg.org.za/bill/495/ mhtml:file://C:/Users/29134854/Desktop/FINAL%20MA/AM%20Contradictory%20State.mht!https://pmg.org.za/bill/372/ 30 | P a g e • Energy Regulation Act of 2006. • Carbon Tax Bill discussion. • Carbon Tax Draft Bill 2019 The purpose of this study’s literature review, however, is to trace the development strategies of the 20th century based on the fossil fuel capitalism and carbon-intensive energy policy within South Africa as well as in the international context. The review of the literature enhances an understanding of the historical context of South African society that has undergone political transformation from apartheid to democracy. The study’s focus is on the concepts of developmentalism of the 20th and 21st century that included the developmental state, modernisation, dependency theory, and just transition. mhtml:file://C:/Users/29134854/Desktop/FINAL%20MA/AM%20Contradictory%20State.mht!https://pmg.org.za/bill/609/ 31 | P a g e 4. CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA’S COAL, GAS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 4.1 The Start of the Global Energy System This chapter discusses the periods before, during and after the Industrial Revolution and covers the manifestation of the energy system as a major driver of a series of industrial revolutions around the world. The suggestion that society is not static, but always undergoes a constant transformation to improve the productive forces was made in the Communist Manifesto (1848) as follows: “Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacturers no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production” (Marx and Engels 1848 translated in 2009, p 39). In pre-industrial times, before the discovery of coal, Europeans had used wood to generate energy, which was then an abundant resource, and therefore, by being plentiful it was not incentivising to mine coal (Miller, 2005). Coal was used as a domestic heating fuel in some parts of the Roman Empire, particularly Britain around 1700s (Landels, 1978, p. 32). However, coal was not as easily accessible as wood, which was still mainly used to generate energy, since the wood and coal replaced water wheels coal became dominant. During the expansion of the Roman Empire BC into AD, the Romans were exposed to mining in France and Britain. Although German coal was mined from the 10th century2coal was restricted locally and used only on a small scale for domestic 2 As mentioned, the 1025 Charter of the French Priory of St Sauveuren-Rue (Schobert, 1987) 32 | P a g e purposes (Miller, 2005) at that time. Consequently, coal had to be rediscovered in Europe in the Middle Ages. However, it was not until about the 13h century that the industrial use of coal was established in Europe (Miller, 2005). Coal particularly became perceived as good fuel for iron forges and for metalworking by the village blacksmiths for its slow burning properties, similar to charcoal. The commercialisation of coal2[2] started when it was marketed in Europe at a more reasonable price than charcoal. In the 1700s, the invention of the steam engine helped Britain to technologically improve textile and metallurgical manufacturing with steam power: the steam engine was based on coal. This set in motion what is now referred to as the ‘First Industrial Revolution’ which dates from 1750 – 1850 in Britain. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, p. 321) have argued that European society before the industrial revolution had relied on organic sources of energy such as human power, wood, and animal (horse)power. They further note that in pre-industrial revolution times, society was therefore dependent on the fertility of the earth’s surface: particularly the forests from which the wood was taken. Another source of energy relied on the vagaries of wind and waterpower that were directly linked to time and place. In the Eighteenth Century, however, Britain started to run out of forests, but as coal availability was in abundance the new technologies allowed it to tap for the “first time in a prolonged and systematic way the vast reserves of subterranean fossil fuels that the world has been drawing on ever since to sustain its continuous growth of population and production” (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007, p. 321). 2[2] The World Coal Institute (2010) in its report ‘The coal resource. A comprehensive overview of coal’ defines coal as a fossil fuel. As a combustible, sedimentary and organic rock. 33 | P a g e In the first industrial revolution, therefore, Belgium, England and France became significant coal mining centres (Miller, 2005). Initially, the coal was used close to the areas where it was mined. Miller (2005) makes the argument that since coal was commonly mined in bulk it required high transportation costs. Under the rise of a capitalist society people had to move to the cities because those controlling the means of production wanted their labour force to be located near mines and factories. However, when wood became scarce (mostly in cities) coal became an alternative means for generating energy. Later in this first industrial revolution, it was discovered that coal could also generate a gas. In other words, coal was not only limited to fuel combustion but could be used to generate gas as another source of energy. Consequently, a manufacturing gas industry was established to use the power of coal gas (Miller, 2005). In 1810, the British government legislated an Act of Parliament to encourage the formation of industries to supply coal gas to London (Miller, 2005 citing Elliot, 1981). This Act was meant to regulate the gas industry in London and ushered in support to the gas industries for the production of gas as a supplementary energy source from the coal industry. Malm (2013, p. 6) explains that Britain was the first economic system to be driven by the development of the capitalist mode of production and this type of production spread to other “advanced capitalist countries” in the following decades of the 19th century. The significance of coal is that capitalism in Europe began by being linked to fossil fuel development and it continued to develop as such when Europeans started to convert coal to gas for fuel energy in the transport and textile industries. 34 | P a g e Since the first industrial revolution is intrinsically related to the use of coal, the spread of industrial manufacturing techniques from England to Germany, and later to France and the United States were able to benefit rapidly as they were larger suppliers of coal. Coal, therefore, became the essential energy source in this era of global development. In the 1800s, most users of the coal in Britain purchased coal for heating homes for instance and also for cooking their meals. Malm (2015, p.18) has asserted that the use of coal for domestic reasons in Britain could have fostered the rise of its fossil economy as coal was used for manufacturing salt, soap, lime, ale, bricks, glass, copper, pottery and other commodities. Globally, coal use expanded from generating shifting from sourcing coal for cooking to the manufacturing sector. This raised coal consumption in the 1800s; particularly when the iron industry in the mid-1800s. Britain iron industry consumes about 10% to 15% of all coal, surpassing the use of coal by domestic household (Nef, 1966). In terms of functionality, therefore, coal has been used in different ways; from producing electricity to petrol. However, converting coal to fuel resulted in the universalization of coal, which raised the coal consumption. Malm (2015, p. 18) characterises the process of turning coal to fuel as source of mechanical energy and ‘“rotary motion”. By the end of nineteenth century (from 1870-1914) electric power was considered central to the second industrial revolution in Britain. This was defined by the transformation of the chemical industry and internal combustion engine (Rosenberg, 1998, p. 8). In the Second Industrial Revolution, the use of energy expanded as several pioneering industries (the oil, steel and electricity sectors) saw the importance 35 | P a g e of increasing their productivity. This second phase of development of new technologies resulted in the establishment of mechanical public transport and airplanes and led to the exit of the horse and cart and steam engine trains. 4.2 The Development of the Coal Energy System in South Africa Since coal had become an important global commodity it was, therefore, critical for the development of the world’s economy. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century coal accounted for about 30% of primary energy globally and 40% of global electricity production (Schernikau, 2010, p. 3). Consequently, South Africa’s industrial development and modes of production were first organised around energy production sourced from coal. South Africa’s economy has been dependent for decades on coal energy, and therefore coal’s development has been central to the country’s development. The coal industry in South Africa has its origin in the late 19th century, initially inland in the colony of Natal where rail connections linked mines to Durban and to the Witwatersrand area. Freund (2019, p. 179) notes that coal was important for fueling trains and ships. In addition, coal was intrinsically linked to the mining sector, as electrification was necessary for the big mining corporations. By 1948, the gold mines were using 59% of the electricity produced in South Africa (Freund, 2019, p. 177). In 1973, several decades later, the demand for coal increased after global oil price rose overnight. In this case, the 1973 Oil crisis led to high demand of a coal, however, there was a concern of price fixing in the coal industry however, the regulation of coal price 36 | P a g e was put into place to avoid price fixing scheme. (Freund, 2019, p. 178) The termination of price fixing for coal was set up by stages with the Coal Resource Act of 1985. Up to 94% of South Africa’s energy source has been generated through the combustion of coal in the past over decades.Currently, South Africa’s coal resource holders are Coal of Africa, South 32, Firestone Energy, Anglo American, Exxaro, and Glencore (Schernikau, 2016, p 134). The large coal reserves are found in the Waterburg district of Limpopo and also in Mpumalanga. Until recently, Europe was the main consumer of South Africa’s coal; however, this began to change when Asia’s demand for coal (Schernikau, 2016, p. 134). In 2006, coal exports to Europe accounted for about 75% or 50 million tons of South Africa’s total exports in comparison to about 30% in 2015 (Schernikau, 2016; 134). Currently, the development of the energy system in South Africa is complex and multifaceted. Coal is used for electricity production and has played critical role as fuel in the country’s steel and cement production. In 2010, a report from the World Coal Institute (2010) stated that coal was then a rapidly growing energy source compared to gas, oil, nuclear, hydro-energy and renewable energy. To date, coal in South Africa continues to be the dominant energy source up to the third decade of the 21st century. However, it has been suggested in a discussion document ‘Energy Accounts for South Africa 2002 – 2009’ that the South African energy sector would remain dominated by coal as a key resource only until 2020. 37 | P a g e In terms of South Africa’s experience, the Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR) was established in 1928 and started operating at Pretoria in 1934. In due course, ISCOR consumed larger quantities of coal, hence, ISCOR established its own coal mines such as Grootgeluk mine, which also produced coal for ESKOM and supplied 3 990 MW Matimba power station; Matimba is the largest dry-cooled power station in the world. Williams (2018) (cited in Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee 1996) has made the argument that South Africa’s mineral resources; namely, gold, diamonds, coal and the steel industry have shaped South Africa’s economy for the past 140 years. In such a ‘mineral energy mix’, coal has been the predominate mineral resource that has shaped South Africa’s economy and social structure. In 1878, the discovery of the Vaal River coalfield in South Africa by George Stow (who was a geologist commissioned by the Orange Free State Volksraad to find diamonds and gold) led to exploitation of the first coal deposits in South Africa.3[3] Stow, nevertheless, was fascinated by the value of the coal. He found further funding from the diamond-mining sector at Kimberley when he met Sammy Marks a “remarkable industrial pioneer” (Freund 2019, p. 50). Marks had become successful in the diamond industry, but when the introduction of water pumps in Kimberley by Cecil John Rhodes in the late 1800s resulted in a rapid demand for fuel in Kimberley, Marks ventured into an association with Stow in 1880 with the intention to exploit coal for energy production. In 1882 they established Bedworth Colliery, which produced 360 tons of coal in the first year and a further 720 tons in 1884. 3[3] Stow surveyed the northern part of the Orange Free State (Freund, 2019) and although he discovered coal near the junction of the Vaal and the Taaiboschspruit Rivers, the Orange Free State Volksraad terminated further funding of Stow because he failed to discover diamond and gold rather he discovered coal which Orange Free State Volksraad deemed as a useless metal. 38 | P a g e In 1880 the Sammy Marks coal company expanded by acquiring two new mines; namely. Cornelia and Central. However, coal production then slowed due to of the outbreak of the First Boer War between 1880 and 1881. In August 1897, Marks incorporated Vereeniging Estates Ltd (VEL) to add to his monopolistic ownership of mines (Freund, 2019). In 1910, VEL signed a contract with Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company to supply coal. Many years later in 1950, 60% of Vereeniging Estates Limited was sold directly to the South African Electricity Supply Commission (Escom, now ESKOM). Hence, ESKOM has relied on coal power, since the acquisition of VFPC, to the present. The coal electricity generation began in 1890 when the Kimberley Municipality commissioned its 300Kw power station (Energy Research Institute, 1980, p. 26). The Victoria Falls Power Company (VFPC) was one of the first companies supplying South Africa with electricity and by 1915 the VFPC had built four power stations dependent on coal.4[4] By 1969, South Africa and Japan made a small-scale export coal deal (Marquard 2006, p. 109). It then became essential for coal resources of the Eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga Province) to get to Richards Bay. Richards Bay was created as a new port on the Zululand coast (facing east, towards Asia) for the purpose of exporting eastern Transvaal coal. However, by 1975, the shortage of coal in South Africa led to the establishment of the Patrick Commission, (from 1970 to 1975) to devise new forms of regulating coal. The role of then Department of Mines (later Department of Mines 4[4] VFPC power was meant to be based on a hydroelectric source. This intention was replaced by coal but still limited to hydroelectric facilities which were built in the 1930s. 39 | P a g e and Industry) in this Energy Supply Commission became the key factor in changing policy for the country’s entire energy sector. In later decades, owing to the depletion of South African gold mines, the country’s electricity consumption rapidly shifted to the state-owned entities (SoEs) of ESCOM, SASOL, and ISCOR. Therefore, under the apartheid government from 1948 to 1994 there was inconsistency of state energy policy (Freund, 2019). At this time, energy planning was supported as the rudimentary solution to the apartheid State’s energy policy challenges. Freund (2019) adds that not much happened due to lack of capacity and data – insomuch as the planners met but the plan never happened. Freund (2019, p.181) believes, therefore, that the costly expense of energy and the problems involved in resolving energy policy with the government’s conflicting desires “greatly reduced the potential of South Africa’s developmental state” (Freund 2019, p.181). Freund (2019, p.181) further argues that the character of South Africa developmental state is heavily linked to its carbon footprint, and despite the disintegration of the nascent developmental state from the 1970s, the carbon footprint remained. From 1940s onward, and in contention to this argument, however, there were consistent energy policies evidenced by massive expansion of coal stations centralised by ESKOM which pushed other producers (such as local municipalities) out of the energy business. This energy supply was supplemented with coal from SASOL reserves and by nuclear energy from 1950S. Overall, however, the pattern was consistent, as there was extensive multi-year planning which included a special capital projects fund with ESKOM reporting to a single authority in the state. 40 | P a g e Williams (2018) has contended, therefore, that coal was a significant mineral in South Africa’s developing economy. Using the barometer of value-added to the overall mining output, Williams asserts that its production and value as a commodity outperformed platinum, which ranked second, with gold as third. Williams (2018, p. 241) further contends that coal’s value-added rose to 22.5% in 2013 from 17.4%t in 1993, while platinum’s value added came in at 21% and gold at 18.5% in 2013 (from 51.1% in 1993). Coal’s contribution to the economy rose from R37 billion in 1993 to R51 billion in 2013, whereas gold dropped from R115 billion to R31 billion in the same period (Stats SA 2015) and coal was the third largest export earner. Besides export, South Africa continues to be dependent on coal production, which is combusted to produce electricity. However, since it has been scientifically proven that burning of coal contributes to causing the climate crisis this has now entailed addressing the challenges caused by the emission from coal fired power plants (Williams 2014, p, 135). As argued earlier, the developmental history of coal internationally and locally has been crucial in carbon intensive energy production. Coal contributed immensely to South Africa’s industrialisation. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the history and the importance of coal when conducting the study on South Africa’s energy policy. The developmental history of coal can also be linked to the history of nuclear and gas energy. A discussion of the development of nuclear energy in South Africa is essential as it locates South Africa’s government as well as its nuclear energy policy position. While, nuclear energy has been part of South Africa’s energy system. However, Freund (2019) has suggested that nuclear energy in South Africa failed to find economic 41 | P a g e viability in the context of contributing to the developmental state. Initially, the apartheid government used its nuclear know-how to threaten liberation movements such as ANC with nuclear weapons, consequently there was no nuclear technology development. Then in 1970s the South African government’s nuclear energy power plan at Koeberg failed to integrate nuclear energy to the heart of mineral energy complex and, to date, this remains part of South Africa’s contemporary nuclear energy discourse. 4.2.1 The development of nuclear energy in South Africa In the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear energy was the epitome of modernity (Grandin, Jagers & Kullander 2010, p. 26). In those two decades ample energy was assured for many, despite some anxiety about waste and safety which later inhibited the enthusiasm in the decade to follow: the 1970s. Two disasters halted the building of nuclear energy in many countries: the 1979 disaster at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, USA; and the 1986 nuclear power station disaster at Chernobyl, Ukraine, USSR (Grandin et al, 2010, p. 26). Both disasters ignited the issue of safety: in the 1979 disaster at Three Mile Island the nuclear power plant melted and released radiation; whereas the 1986 Chernobyl disaster saw the nuclear power station explode, resulting in about instant 4 000 deaths and the release of a huge radiation plume over Northern Europe (World Health Organisation, 2012). However, while both accidents led to some nuclear plants becoming decommissioned around the world there was less impact in southern Africa. One researcher has pointed out that the response of the South African nuclear industry to the Chernobyl accident was to reassure the “public about the safety of Koeberg” (Fig, 2006, p. 463). The then 42 | P a g e government took advantage of the accident to educate South Africans about the severe potential dangers of nuclear energy. Grandin (2010), however, notes three advantages for nuclear energy: • it is a reliable base for electricity; • has high capacity; and • demands little material for building and fuel for operation. Grandin (2010) then finds that nuclear energy has a less detrimental impact on the environment. For South Africa, uranium mineral resources have been significant for the global generation of a nuclear energy source. In 1977, the report released by the Department of Planning and the Environment argued that South Africa had been an essential producer of Uranium since the 1950s, and that the mineral was exported due to a lack of nuclear facilities in South Africa. As a result South Africa became the major exporter of energy in Africa (Department of Planning and the Environment, 1977, p. 79). Fig (2006, p. 467) has revealed that local gold mining firms had a clandestine agreement with the United States and United Kingdom to extract uranium from the gold mines and mine dumps. This export deal to the US and UK lasted for about 10 years and these countries used it to manufacture bombs. Marquard (2006, p.197) further explains that South Africa became involved in world nuclear affairs after the discovery of its uranium reserves in the 1940s. He describes how various prime ministers in South Africa (initiated by Jan Smuts in the 1940s) used the country’s uranium reserves as leverage to advance global nuclear technology 43 | P a g e and expertise. Marquard (2006) highlights how Prime Minister Jan Smuts played a significant role in the preliminary round of nuclear diplomacy. After Smuts’ death in 1950, an agreement was reached to combine a Development Agency as a cooperative uranium procurement agency established by the United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom to buy all of South Africa’s uranium production (Newby-Fraser, 1979, p. 24). The apartheid government that followed then established the nuclear structure through the notion of the so-called ‘nuclear establishment’ (Marquard, 2006, p. 198). The term nuclear establishment was used to refer to the collection of state agencies whose main purpose was to develop and endorse nuclear technology in South Africa. The intention of these government nuclear organisations in South Africa was to monitor the uranium exploration as a manufacturing process on behalf of the State. Marquard (2006) has pointed out that from the beginning, this was done through a Uranium Research Committee which was set up in 1948 by the Atomic Energy Board. This board was established in terms of the Atomic Energy Act (35/1948) which stipulated the powers of the board as regulators and supervisors of all features of Uranium production, nuclear energy and nuclear technologies. In the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Board’s functions were extended from regulation into a research programme to investigate numerous facets of nuclear technology. Thereafter, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) was established to split the strategic elements of the nuclear programmes – energy and nuclear technology (Marquard, 2006). The fundamental role of UCOR was also to augment research in building of the “Y-Plant” (Marquard, 2006, p. 199). The Y-Plant was a 1970 pilot project 44 | P a g e for the use of extensive technology in South Africa and was then prolonged beyond the 1970s to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium (Hofmänner, 2002, p. 313). In essence, the South African government’s intention was to use uranium for weapon exploration rather than for energy generation. However, in the late 1970s, the nuclear programme expanded to produce nuclear fuel for ESKOM’s new nuclear plant. However, ESKOM was involved in a sequence of inquiries in the late 1950s and therefore mandated a series of committees to investigate the viability of producing nuclear power in South Africa from the next decade. This involved ESKOM, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), and the nuclear establishment (Marquard, 2006). From 1958, ESKOM was also represented on the Atomic Energy Board (AEB). In 1969 ESKOM developed its independent nuclear engineering division which started to build Koeberg nuclear power station in the 1970s. Marquard (2006) has also alluded to the substantial involvement of the IDC in the 1950s and 1960s for inventions and developing nuclear power in South Africa with ESKOM and AEB. South Africa’s first nuclear power plant, situated in Koeberg north of Cape Town, was begun after the South African government signed a contract with a French consortium in 1976 (Rennkamp & Bhuyan, 2016, p. 3). The construction of the Koeberg power plant was envisioned by the electricity planners of the 1960s, who had identified the need to construct a power station in the Western Cape due to its rapid energy demand (ESKOM, 1996). Koeberg was also aimed at reducing the Western Cape’s dependency on the supply of electricity from the ESKOM’s coal-fired power stations located in distant Mpumalanga (then E Tvl) Province. Long distance supply lines were inefficient, and a solution was for the government to build 45 | P a g e 1 800 MW of nuclear capacity at Koeberg. In 1967, the government purchased the Duinefontein site on which the Koeberg plant was to be constructed (Marquard, 2006, p. 94). This site was identified by the AEB because, at the time, Escom (now ESKOM) had no expertise on nuclear energy. However, in June 1967 Escom indicated a desire to be involved in the building project and wrote to the Council which raised concerns over the Nuclear Safety asking for a joint discussion on the building of a nuclear station in the Western Cape (Marquard, 2006, p. 94) In 1969, Jan Haak, the then Minister of Economic Affairs, had remarked that the government was to embark on a process of building nuclear power plants in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Natal (Financial Mail 28/3/1969, cited in Marquard, 2006). It was reported that Escom had been excluded from the discussion and headlined as ‘Energy for next Century’. Jan Haak’s announcement stated that he believed coal was not going to be sustainable. The announcement, clarified in the Financial Mail (28/3/1969, cited in Marquard, 2006) reported Haak had said, “Escom needs to build up generating capacity from its present 7 000 MW to 62 000 MW by the turn of the century, and when new power stations are added, they will almost be nuclear” (Financial Mail, 28/3/1969 cited in Marquard, 2006). In 1969, Escom’s desire to participate in the building of the nuclear power plant and the proposal by AEB to build an additional generating capacity of 62 000 MW led to an agreement with the AEB concerning the jurisdiction of nuclear power in which Escom would only build and operate nuclear power plants and the AEB would license them to international standards through its innovative division (which developed into the Council for Nuclear Safety) (Newby-Fraser, 1978, p. 128; Marquard, 2006, p. 216). 46 | P a g e Escom then proceeded to establish its own Nuclear Power Engineering Division in its Mechanical Engineering Department (Marquard, 2006; 216 citing the Escom Annual Report, 1969, p. 64). In 1976, Escom’s contract was signed with a French Consortium to build the Koeberg power plant in May 1974, when Valery Giscard d’Estaing was elected as the president of France (Van Vuuren, 2017). At the time, the apartheid government, fearing an imminent trade embargo, gave the French private sector consortium of Framatome- Spie Batignolles-Alsthom a lucrative $1 billion contract to build South Africa’s nuclear power station at Koeberg (Van Vuuren, 2017, p. 229) Early in 1980s, the construction was delayed due to sabotage by ANC underground guerrillas (Marquard, 2006). The political liberation forces of the ANC had argued that the building of the nuclear power plant would have a severe environmental impact and that South Africa was not economically viable for nuclear power, given that the deal included an R800 million export credit agreement with a French bank (Financial Mail, 17/12/1976, cited in Marquard, 2006). It is worth noting here, that at that time, South Africa’s apartheid government did not intend to opt for nuclear energy as an alternative to the generation of coal-intensive energy due to environmental detriments, but because of the presumption that coal would run-out and as a consideration of energy security for the Western Cape. According to Freund (2019, p. 176) uranium extraction lacked a developmental ethos in South Africa and instead was regarded as an expensive folly. Therefore, the SA reserves of uranium did not lead to building the developmental state in South Africa, 47 | P a g e and did not contribute to functions that could work effectively in the global economy. Freund (2019) has further stressed that South Africa had mixed success as a development state: it managed to break reliance on raw materials via massive industrialisation; yet was not a globally competitive manufacturer and so, perversely, relied on raw material exports for forex rather than the manufacture. However, Freund (2019) believes that some concrete success in making technology made South Africa a good trading partner, rather than just a customer for very expensive material. In the same breath, Freund (2019, p. 176, cited in Marquard 2006, p. 210) states that nuclear power had the potential to become the heart of the mineral- energy complex had it been more economic, but adds that there was probably no sense of “departure from the defining core complex itself” which is the coal (2019, p. 176). Since the construction of Koeberg, the South African government had not considered constructing another nuclear power plant until 2010. In 2010, the former government of President Zuma recommended an energy plan that nuclear energy should represent 13% of South Africa’s energy mix by 2030. However, to achieve this, the country would need to budget R1 trillion for eight new nuclear plants (Hofstatter, 2018, p. 42). This received numerous critiques in 2016 as the National Treasurer questioned the building of nuclear energy which would add 9 600 megawatts to the power grid at a time when ESKOM had already spent over R300 billion on two new mega coal power stations. The next section critically discusses the history of gas energy in South Africa. Gas has been used to supplement coal and nuclear energy production. 48 | P a g e 4.2.2 The Development of Gas Energy in South Africa The Development Bank of South Africa (2016) has referred to natural gas as a ‘combustible gas’ which is formulated with methane along with different quantities of other high alkanes, ethane, propane and butane, nitrogen, hydrogen sulphide, and carbon dioxide. The formation of a gas varies; however, organic matter is converted to form natural gas in broadly the same ways that other fossil fuels (namely, oil and coal) are formed; great heat and compression break down the carbon bonds in organic material over time through a thermogenic process to create fossil fuel (Merven, 2017). The advantage of natural gas, however, is that it causes minimal damage to the environment due to its “superior environmental performance” (Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 2005, p. 5). Therefore, gas has increasingly become a fuel option for modern energy usage. Gas is linked to the thermogenic process to create fossil fuels, as gas is linked with oil; although oil is in the shallow deposit, whereas gas is found to be in a deeper deposit (Merven, 2017). Natural gas can also be produced by biogenic methane and the biogenic methane is produced by methanogenic microorganisms found in the intestines and in landfills (Miller, 2005). In other words, this is one of the ways of generating natural gas. For instance, the eThekwini landfill gas to electricity project was the first such application in South Africa. In terms of the history of piped gas, around 500 BC the Chinese began to use crude bamboo ‘pipelines’ to transport gas that seeped to the surface and this gas was used to boil sea water to get drinkable water. In 1897, the Cape Gas and Coke company in 49 | P a g e Cape Town introduced gas to South Africa (DMR, 2005). Other gas plants followed in Port Elizabeth, Kimberley, Grahamstown and eventually in Johannesburg in 1892. According to Daniel and Lutchman (2006, p. 492) the oil industry comprises three main components: • upstream activities which include exploration and production; • the midstream process in the form of pipelines and the tanker farms; and • the downstream function, which comprises refining and retailing. It is generally understood, that South Africa’s energy sector is made up of four fuel components – oil, natural gas, electricity (nuclear and non-nuclear generated), and petroleum. However, Daniel and Lutchman (2006, p. 500) assert that the later acquisition of natural gas for processing into liquid fuels is another significant component of South Africa’s energy strategy. South Africa generates downstream gas through producing synthetic or bituminous oil from coal rather than from crude oil (Daniel & Lutchman, 2006). However, as South Africa’s natural gas has been limited historically it has also played a very limited role in South Africa’s economy (Merven, 2017, p. 13). The construction of the pipeline from Mozambique in the early 2000s was therefore vital for South Africa’s energy industry, as South Africa’s only natural gas resource was solely located on the offshore field south of Mossel Bay. The construction of the Mozambique-South Africa pipeline was meant to explore the production of liquid fuel. South Africa has only limited supplies of synthetic gas from its South African Oil Liquid (SASOL) power 50 | P a g e plants (Secunda and Sasolburg power plants) where SASOL’s synthetic gas is the by-product of the coal-to-liquid process (Merven, 2017). 4.2.3 History of SASOL, PetroSA and Egoli as the ‘wedge’ of gas energy South Africa’s SASOL company was commissioned in 1950 as a state-owned corporation and began its liquid fuel production in 1955 (Freund, 2019, p. 65). Freund (2019) explains that by 1948, the Smuts government had built the institutional foundation for a developmental state and SASOL was then instrumental in building the National Party’s developmental state. However, according to Sparks (2012, p. 31) the formation of SASOL was due the pressure that the apartheid government received from the international community. For him, the SASOL process ensured that the apartheid government survived the international oil boycott. However. Freund (2019) argues that SASOL was formed well before South Africa faced any significant international boycott Hence, in later years, it was certainly seen as strategic in this sense, but much of the initial impetus was to build a local chemical industry by, essentially, processing coal. Today, SASOL produces synthetic gas sourced from coal, and then liquid fuels and chemicals from gas (Sparks, 2012). SASOL then sells the gas they extract as pipeline gas, either hydrogen-rich gas or methane-rich gas. However, gas remains limited in the economy and its increased demand can presently be sourced from the potential gas fields offshore the West and East coasts, within South African territorial waters 51 | P a g e (Merven,, 2017, p. 13). Daniel and Lutchman (2006, p. 500) regard SASOL as the world’s leading it is oil from coal processing company with pipeline gas as a by-product and one of South Africa’s natural gas ventures. Furthermore, in 2004 the South African government, through SASOL, formed a joint venture with the Mozambican government to build an 865 km gas pipeline for the supply of the natural gas from the Pande and Temane onshore fields in Mozambique to SASOL’s plant in Secunda (DoE, 2005). The aim of this gas pipeline is to pump about 120 million gigajoules a year of a gas to contribute to the South African natural gas energy supply (an increase from 1.5% to about 4% . Two other companies have played significant roles in South Africa’s history of gas: Metro Gas (now renamed Egoli Gas), and PetroSA, (previously known as Mossgas and Soekor). Metro Gas has been distributing gas in Johannesburg since 1905 (DMR, 2005), whereas, PetroSA was formed in 2002 (by merging Mossgas and Soekor). PetroSA, now a state-owned company, was established through the Central Energy Fund (CEF) in 1992 (DMR, 2005; Marquard, 2006) after the merge with Mossgas (which had started off-shore gas-mining operations in the 1980s as an attempt to generate electricity from gas.5[5] In 1950s the Central Energy Fund was created to develop energy policy, in fact was supposed to assist the implementation of renewable energy via its operational support. 5[5] In 1992, the gas-to-liquids production had begun, but the off-shore gas mining of what became Mossgas started in the 1980s. 52 | P a g e Their initial task was to table the White Paper on Energy Policy (White Paper Renewable Energy, 2003; p 8).which was approved in 1998. Then the CEF reported directly to the Minister of Minerals and Energy. The CEF was tasked to deal directly with regulation and production of the entire energy industry which includes: nuclear ener