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Introduction

The dilemma of modernity is to resolve the problem as to how a community of persons can both relate to one another and nevertheless preserve their freedom. If people are taken to be aboriginally independent from each other such that their interconnections to each other are both extraneous to themselves and do not affect their essential nature then freedom would just be the scope for expression, without interference, of this basic character of the person. Agents would not simply be unique individuals to the extent that only qua specific individuals could such persons have conscious interests and aims but would in addition be individuated or atomised individuals in the following sense, their minimal ontological attribute (that is the determinacy which enables them to be the kind of things they are) would subsist and be unaffected by their interrelations with others.

It will be demonstrated below that it is possible to make the normative assessment that individuals and only individuals count and yet to reject the premise that generalised, atomised individuality constitutes an accurate description of the ontology of persons. It will further be shown that the standard of freedom which is predicated upon self subsistent atomised individuals, the liberty to act upon one's immediate or spontaneous desire is unable to distinguish itself from the purported opposite of it, the coercive enforcement of personal domination over others, which a proponent of freedom of choice would regard to be wrongful. Both the arbitrary exercise of freedom to choose to do that which one is disposed to and the despotic subjection of others to the capriciousness of one's commands will be illustrated to be disruptions, and not mere interruptions, of the process of seeking justification for action through the regressive provision of reasons. Whereas assessing the adequacy of the norm of

the liberty to act in line with one's given inclinations may appear to be to appraise the norm of freedom as doing what one will from the perspective of a benchmark or standard of appraisal separate from it and thus to beg the question as to why such a principle for adjudicating the sufficiency of other norms to fulfil their purpose should be resorted to, it will be shown that the vindicatory function of reason giving does not merely constitute the intrinsic norm of arbitration between valid and illicit action with regards to the prescriptive advocacy of free choice as the standard for permissible behaviour but also constitutes the ground of possibility of the normative domain itself. The critique of freedom as acting in accordance with one's disposition will thus be immanent. Individual self determination will thus be validated as the singular and sufficient standard of free action. This will demonstrate that a collectively self determining polity which abolishes the market and constrains negative liberty within a narrow ambit can nevertheless be a legitimate, free society. It will be shown that the preservation of the freedom of association, political participation and expression of thought from the possibility of democratic abrogation is necessary for collective autonomy to exist and is thus not an extraneous limitation upon it. The principle of individual self determination will appear to be inconclusive in adjudging between thoroughgoing collective self determination and the extension of negative liberty and the advancement of the market, as at this point in the progression of the argument each of these incompatible prescriptive conceptions of the good society will appear to instantiate the ideal of a free polity. This will be demonstrated to not be the case.

The existence of the market could logically be rendered congruent with the maximal extension of negative liberty possible and the abolition or the radical abrogation of directly imposed domination of persons. The market economy will be shown to be consonant with the mediation of human relations by commodities, or the subjection of our objective dependence upon each other to the impersonal dynamic pertaining to a domain of things. The intercession of a sphere of objectivity between persons will be shown to enable the replacement of direct relations between persons by the interposition of the domain of things. While this allows for the elimination of direct compulsion, it will be demonstrated that the dominion of things over persons constitutes an abortion of the regressive process of reason giving analogous, in a

manner normatively meaningful, to the violent subjugation of another to one's will. Commodity fetishism will thus be revealed to be a variant of authoritarian rule over society. The governance of civil society and the market by a neutral state which adopts an impartial view and thus allows the pursuit of the fulfilment of multiple contradictory conceptions of the good life will be shown to be consonant with the sway of commodities over persons and will thus be demonstrated to be consistent with the authoritarian imposition of commodity fetishism upon society. Both the market economy and the liberal state will thus be shown to be inimical to genuine freedom as individual autonomy. Collective self determination will at this point in the unfolding of the argument already have been proven to be the only valid form of manifestation of a social order adjudged to be legitimate in terms of the standard of freedom as individual self determination.

Persons on the market appear to be equally endowed with the ability to voluntarily engage in the formation of contracts with other persons similarly capacitated to enter into agreements. The market economy seemingly enables voluntary cooperation between individuals thus rendering the coercive character of the state subjectable to constraint such that it would only compel persons to act in accordance with contractual agreements which had been freely entered into by them. Due to the operation of the market the liberal state need not inflict a general collective goal upon the populace under its dominion in order to impose a unitary order upon a chaotic social plurality. The liberal state operates as the guarantor and regulator of, but not as the active agent which establishes, the spontaneous coordination of uncoerced interaction which is enabled by market exchange. It is this aspect of the operation of a market economy which establishes the deceptive but illusory guise of the market being not merely in conformity with but the condition of possibility of freedom for all. Whereas it will be illustrated below that the market economy renders liberal governance possible it will also be shown that this should not be conflated with providing the enabling preconditions for genuine freedom for all.

The semblance of uncoerced and thus consensual agreement between equal parties will, at this point in the argument be revealed to be a sham. Once the surface form of voluntary consent is

stripped away the process of contract formation will be revealed to rest upon a vastly imbalanced relation of dependence such that this disproportion of reliance perpetually enables the renewal of tacit conditions implicitly incorporated into virtually every employment contract such that rather than genuinely constituting a meeting of the minds between equivalent parties a specific class of persons will be subjected to extortion by another determinate social stratum of individuals. The reality of indirectly forced work will be demonstrated to be the content of the form of free and consensual contractual agreement.

While the market appears to allow the integration of interpersonal affairs in the absence of the enforcement of an overall collective purpose upon persons it will be demonstrated that the market economy merely enables social coordination without the pursuit of an intentional aim. The domains of purpose and intentionality will be delineated and it will be definitively shown that the sphere of purposiveness is of greater expanse and encompasses the narrow confines of the boundaries of consciously sought goals. It will be shown that the idea of an intrinsically purposive phenomenon which does not require a subject to accord it its teleological status is an internally coherent notion. The objection that the actualisation of this notion would violate the precepts of the unidirectionality of the temporal sequence and thus of causality itself will be shown to be dependent upon a specific understanding of the instant as a discrete unit within a series and it will further be shown that this understanding of the sequential nature of time does not exhaust the range of plausible descriptions of unidirectional temporality. An alternative understanding of temporality to that which disallows the existence of objectively purposive entities will be shown to be the more preferable since it allows for the existence of genuinely individuated things and the consistency of the specific understanding of unidirectional temporality with immanent teleology will be proven. The material instantiation of the conceptual configuration of an entity considered under the aspect of being an integrated totality will be demonstrated to be the principle of singularisation and thus the substance of certain kinds of things. Capitalism will be shown to operate as a self regenerating system of processes and will thus be demonstrated to be a manifestation of a material concept and an objective purpose. The telos of capitalism will thus be imposed on all, utilising the productive capacities of persons as mere means to its self fulfilment.

Chapter 1:

This dissertation will be an exploration of the salience of the immanent unfolding of various arguments, as such it will attempt to elucidate two dichotomous positions. It will be an exercise in the speculative construction of a putative ideal liberalism as the antipathetic position against which a Marxian critique of the capitalist economy which requires the abolition of the market, commodities and money will be developed. As such the opponent of the Marxist standpoint elaborated in this text is not any particular liberal but rather the adherent of the necessary conclusions which one must arrive at from the premise that a good society is one which minimises the obstructions that stand in the way of individuals conducting their affairs in a way in which they so wish. ¹

Marx recognises that man as a political animal has hitherto taken the form of men as dominated or despots. It will be demonstrated that his quest to transform the chains of subjection into bonds of liberty, to salvage the freedom of all, as individuals subject only to their own wills, through the institution of collective self determination, delineates the parameters of the principal normative problem confronting Marx as well as providing the broad outlines of a workable solution to this dilemma. Marx identifies the only adequate means for reconciling freedom with mutual dependence, namely, democratic control over our social relations.

As will be illustrated below, the reproduction of society is predicated upon an organisation of production processes which, while it appears to, does not function as a sum of multiple discrete acts of production and exchange, but rather as a self sustaining metabolic process which perpetuates the relations between its constituent parts and thus maintains itself as the whole it

¹ The liberal conception of freedom will be taken as having been exemplified by the following quote "The essence of liberty has always lain in the ability to choose as you wish to choose, because you so wish to choose, uncoerced, unbullied, not swallowed up in some vast system; and in the right to resist, to be unpopular, to stand up for your convictions. That is true freedom, and without it there is neither freedom of any kind, nor even the illusion of it." Berlin I, *Freedom and its Betrayal*, Chatto & Windus, Random House, 20 Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, 2002, p.103-4.

is. Once it is recognised that human metabolism with nature is merely apparently fragmented into independent private production processes, it is possible to perceive that capitalism constitutes a system which imposes a corporate purpose upon society as a whole. With this conclusion being reached, it may be discerned that a Rousseauian-type resolution to the dilemma of the conciliation of dependency and freedom is the only kind of viable solution to this problem. The freedom of each as individuals is only truly attainable through the purposive collective mastery over the means of labour.

In order properly to appreciate the inadequacy of what, for the purposes of this dissertation, will be considered the main alternative to democratically self-determined social control of the means of production (as a resolution to the problem of synthesizing liberty and mutual reliance) it is necessary to briefly rehearse the arguments in favour of this putative alternative .

As a mode of coordinating human interaction the market appears as a unique breakthrough in human history. Whereas, our mutual reliance on each other has hitherto taken the form of subjugation and domination where some are coerced into fulfilling the goals of others, this need not be the case under generalized commodity production. Universal trade thus seems to constitute the adequate solution to the dilemma of modernity, how to render our dependence on each other compatible with the freedom of all. Liberal egalitarianism sought to, and in many countries has succeeded in, nullifying arbitrary privileges or forms of subjugation which attach to particular social stations. The ancient regime in Europe, which consisted of strictly demarcated relatively impermeable hierarchical strata, in which members of the lower orders owed specific obligations to their superiors, has been abolished. The proliferation of contractual interactions, which appear to be wilfully and freely entered into by independent subjects due to the convergence of interests, was rendered possible through the progressive elimination of the domain of relations of direct subjugation. Even arguably the staunchest critic of capitalism, Karl Marx, recognized that in the sphere of commodity exchange independent private property owners are not constrained by relations of personal dependence and so appear to voluntarily interact with each other. The sphere of exchange operates as a domain in which all parties reciprocally recognize each other as unique individuals with distinct purposes

and, as such, treat each other as persons deserving of respect and not as mere means. Entering into a contract with another requires a co-ordination and, indeed, a synchronization of wills such that the unilateral imposition of one's intention upon another is rendered unviable in the context of legitimate contract formation. The potential for un compelled cooperation latent in the functioning of any fully developed market has thus often been understood as a necessary precondition to secure for all a zone of non interference in which others may not infringe. The full realization of negative liberty seems to appear on the horizon of mankind with the emergence and entrenchment of markets across the globe².

As opposed to all hitherto existing hierarchical societies, which were unified through the imposition of a corporate good, the market enables economic affairs to be separated from the governance of society, and so allows for the aggregation of the diverse pursuit of distinct and often contradictory conceptions of the good life. In all previous non market based societies, consistent, as opposed to sporadic, prioritisation of the interests of the individual as against the collective purpose would have led to chaos. The market thus allows for the primacy of the right over the good. Furthermore, since the market enables viable interaction among people without the political realm subsuming all human relations within it, the existence of generalised trade is conducive to the emergence of a domain of voluntary association which does not operate purely according to the laws and norms of the market itself. In short, the market is a precondition for the rich associational life which characterizes civil society.

As alluded to above, the dawning of the age of the market is a necessary precondition for the autonomisation of civil society and the economy as distinct from the state. As the concentration of the capacity for coercion in a single institution, the state innately forms a threat to the liberty of its subjects according to proponents of liberal freedom and the market as the enabling condition thereof. Indeed, while the existence of multiple variants of tyrannical rule which could impinge upon the sphere of individual freedom of choice is, to different

² "The decisive step which made peaceful collaboration possible in the absence of concrete common purposes was the adoption of barter or exchange." Hayek, F. A , *Law, Legislation and Liberty Volume 2 : The Mirage of Social Justice*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 109, 39 Store Street London 1976

degrees, consistent with the acquisition of independence by the sovereign power vis a vis civil society, the formation of a distinct political sphere is nevertheless essential for the proper functioning of the market. In order for the full culmination of the latent potential inherent in the market to realize negative liberty for all, the state must be rendered equidistant from all of its subjects, who, in order to enter into binding agreements, are themselves reliant upon the mediation of the state. This identical relation to the state is conducive to the formulation of general and impartial laws which do not confer particular privileges upon specified categories of persons. The kind of state which governs society according to the rule of law and the market may thus enter into a mutually symbiotic relationship in which the norm immanent to both, the realisation of the principle of equal liberty for all, is reinforced.

Since generalised trade is the overall composite of multiple acts of exchange, it appears to have no single unified purpose. As such, it is not merely relatively hospitable to a plurality of agents seeking a multitude of ends, but it may also serve as the terrain on which at least some social goods may be imposed. While some consider the unbridled play of the market as itself desirable and would regard any regulation of it by the state as impermissible, the lack of an overall teleological character to the market means that this is not the case or need not be the case for all market based societies. While certain collective ends will be incompatible with the sustainable operation of the market and others will violate the tolerant ethos towards diversity which the market either promotes or allows, polities may seek to attain various aims which are, in the long term, in conformity with the functioning of a market mechanism. While the market may be taken to limit the range of options for democratic collective self determination, it does not enforce alien ends upon a society which would constrain the types of goals which a collectivity could give itself. It is in this sense that the market appears as neutral vis a vis the realisation of democratic decisions. Not only may the market and the rule of law successfully reconcile freedom and dependence but they also allow for the accommodation of Rousseau and Hayek's differing conceptions of the good society. There is thus in principal no contradiction between negative liberty and appropriate forms of popular governance over societies.

From within the parameters of this framework of understanding, exploitation proper, operating through equivalent exchange and reciprocal contract formation, cannot be apprehended. Since the entering into of a contract is an instantiation of the concordance of will and interest between independent and thus equal parties, the possibility of exploitation of a party to such a contract by the other party is ruled out a priori. Only forms of ersatz exploitation, in which there is an extreme lack of symmetry between the terms of any given contract, clearly favouring one party at the expense of the other, may be acknowledged by an adherent of this perspective. Any particular contract may contain terms so egregious that it cannot feasibly be regarded as exemplifying the convergence of reciprocal interests, and so approximating the character of exploitation. The existence of exploitation under the conditions of genuine legal equality and, so, of legitimate contract formation, may arise contingently in any particular instance in which a contract is entered into, but cannot constitute a necessary precondition for the existence of generalised exchange and of the ubiquitous character of the existence of the contractual form of social interaction, according to consistent adherents of this perspective.

As has been established, this point of view is unable to encompass the reality of exploitation. Since inequality thus manifests itself as a vast distributional array of income and, as all individuals acquire this income from various revenue sources, the contingent, and thus, ultimately temporary convergence of individual interests, aggregating to constitute interest groups, which may prove to be more or less durable, is the form in which social agents present themselves within the limits of this perspective. Society is thus held to be composed of individuals amassing to form interest groups with varying degrees of persistence. The existence of classes as inherently relational entities sustained by the overall processes which sustain society as the unified entity it is, is thus also occluded both by the atomisation of individual through the operation of the market and by political theories which take the appearance of the independent, produced by the functioning of the market, existence of individuals from each other as reality.

As the above described surface appearance of capitalism presents society as an aggregative multiplicity of indeterminate size composed of private individuals interacting with each other,

these individuals have logical priority over the relations into which they enter. This requires that such persons have the ontological character of self sufficient entities. They could theoretically withdraw from all of their economic relations while continuing to survive and are thus independent in a thorough-going sense. This is a sham. Various mistakes of judgment would have to be made in order to reach this conclusion. Although one may sever any particular social connection which one has and continue to survive one cannot legitimately deduce from this that an individual could cut all of their ties while still abiding as viable living things except in rare and exceptional cases . While it is possible that certain persons may be in a position to utterly detach themselves from all others, this possibility is itself the result of specific social conditions and, furthermore, such persons constitute an anomaly and so overall and on average may be treated as insignificant for the purposes of discerning the nature of inter-human dependence. Finally, it is possible that someone who treats persons as self subsistent totalities has made a category mistake. It is a valid premise - for prescriptive purposes - that only individuals have interests and self defined purposes and therefore, with regard to normative issues, only individuals count. The notion that some social good distinct from the various particular goods of all and every member of a given society exists should thus be rejected. One cannot extrapolate from this feature of the normative domain to characteristics concerning a radically heterogeneous sphere of enquiry, namely, the nature of human social bonds. At this point, we have a tentative reason for suspecting that the market cannot reconcile freedom and mutual dependence since the adherents of this view must, as illustrated above, mistake the character of dependence.³ Indeed, supporters of the market understand it as serving the purpose of the harmonisation of freedom, not with general reliance but with external relations between individuals. There is either a conflation made between such extraneous, accidental and, so, potentially evanescent, connections and

³ I am not making the same mistake in the inverse direction which I have accused my opponents of making. I am not illicitly amalgamating the 'is' and the 'ought' or attempting to derive the character of what ought to be from what is, instead I am suggesting that we have pertinent reasons for rejecting a specific understanding of what ought to be since it is predicated on a defective understanding of what is.

necessary dependence upon each other or, as is more likely, the existence of this form of vital reliance is unacknowledged and unrecognised.

The fallacious form of deceptive independence which seemingly characterises the self supporting subjects of civil society and the market, is not a mere veil concealing the true shackles of personal dependence binding such persons together, although it is this also, as the optional character of social interchange on the market and within civil society enables individual subjects of civil society to at least potentially escape from personal relations of immediate subjection. Even if it were to be shown that no example of civil society existed which was devoid of the direct dominion of some over others, this would not alter the fact that every actually existing civil society should be understood as the latent instantiation of its ideal form.

Civil society and the market potentially allow for the abolition of multiple forms (except, arguably, for those necessary for the existence of the enforcement of general and impartial lawful directives issued by the liberal state) of hierarchic subjugation, without this in turn necessarily culminating in the destruction of civil society itself. The deceptive plausibility of the notion that the market transfigures our yoke of enthrallment and submission, replacing them with the garland chains of liberty, exists because the market has either promoted or allowed the abrogation of numerous forms of bondage and does not require any particular form or personal dependency.

This could lead one to conclude that even if it has been demonstrated that the market and liberal state failed to secure the adequate realisation of the reconciliation of liberty and dependency, they are sufficient in obtaining for all the only attainable and meaningful form of freedom possible, i.e. the end of subjugation to other persons. Rather than constituting manacles confining the exercise of our freedom, objective bonds of dependence, whatever they should happen to be, may merely be regarded as the unalterable prerequisites for the existence of any society.

Since 'ought' implies 'can', if the nature of these bonds was truly unchangeable, then they would not amount to an ethically objectionable fault capable of correction, but would instead merely be a precondition for the normatively informed efforts to rectify other really existent

contingent deficits in the constitution of society. If such were the case, then it would be utterly appropriate to adopt a stance of sheer disinterest towards these objective social bonds as mere matters of fact which do not pertain to issues concerning the normative assessment of the character of any given society. If this scenario should prove to obtain to human sociality, then it would be fitting to maintain the previously described indifference to our objective ties with regards to the problem of reconciling freedom with dependence.

The reconfigured quandary would now be: “how can freedom be harmonized with accidental and thus alterable relations which humans enter into?” The problem in this form virtually posits its own solution. The attainment of liberty in any particular domain of human life would just be the extension of voluntary cooperation into such a domain which was once characterised by relations of compulsion, and, while the objective social bonds would not be of direct interest for the expansion of liberty as against coercion, this does not mean that they may be disregarded.

In any particular case, it would need to be demonstrated that particular modes of compulsion do not form part of the necessary conditions for individual life in society. The denaturalization of heteronormativity as an immutably given fact of humanity, necessary for the propagation of our species, is an example of a relevant demonstration that a particular unwarranted mode of interaction does not fall within the bounds of the objective conditions of both social and individual existence.

It would, however, not be appropriate to remain neutral to any harm befalling individuals due to the existence of objective dependency if it could be demonstrated that such harm could be ameliorated. The common presupposition undergirding the above described two scenarios, is that the objective conditions of sociality, which are irreducible to the interactions of ontologically self subsistent persons, are fixed in all of their determinacies. This rigid and inflexible character may be imputed to the above described objective conditions by a proponent of the market but that does not mean that this putative feature of dependence has either been demonstrated or disproven.

At the level of indeterminacy which the argument has at present reached, we may, since the issue is as yet unresolved, provisionally posit as an as yet unsubstantiated possibility, that while a permanent attribute of objective dependency is its irreducibility to contingent relations, its other qualities are modifiable and so are potentially conducive to human mastery and thus to collective democratic control. If this were to be established, it would to some extent mitigate the claim that the market has the potential to actualise the most complete form of freedom.

One, would, nevertheless still be entitled to maintain that, while mastery over the conditions of social existence is genuinely attainable, this just is not what desirable freedom is about. Freedom is instead independence from the subjection to the alien will of another. Since the market is the only form of social coordination which renders this outcome possible, or at least which enables the asymptotic approximation of this ideal end point, even if it were to be established that the market is incompatible with mastery over the conditions of sociality, this does not amount to a demonstration that the market inadequately instantiates liberty for all, since the collective supremacy of individuals over objective social bonds is not what freedom is about. Should mastery over dependency indeed prove to be incompatible to the market, this would merely indicate that collective control over our objective bonds would be inimicable to freedom.

A liberal could claim that the thoroughgoing social self determination of democratic control over objective dependency would, despite appearances, not be the realisation of freedom, but rather, destructive of and so repugnant to it. This type of dominion over society could, to the extent that it amounted to a general control over social relations, lead to the prohibition of some forms of voluntary interaction between consenting adults by a democratic majority. General control over social relations may thus radically reduce the scope for negative liberty. To the extent that some collective decision is reached which contradicts one's own view on some matter, then, regardless of whether one participated equally in the process culminating in the particular decision, there is no true sense in which one can be said to be (even) nearly acting in accordance with one's own will. On any matter with regards to which majority opinion is constitutive of a compulsory directive binding on all, then true equal liberty, as freedom of

choice for all, is extinguished in relation to this issue. For the very reason that mastery over the social bond would more adequately institute the principle of collective self determination than less comprehensive forms of self government, which could be compatible with the existence of an autonomous civil society, an all encompassing, unmitigated, self determination reveals itself as the illusory freedom of all, while suppressing the liberty of each. This may further be regarded as the retrogressive negation of the suppression of personal subjugation, as all are now subjected to the particular wills of accidental majorities.

If the critique of comprehensive self determination is taken to suggest that such an all embracing democracy would interfere so extensively in the affairs of all persons that the existence of a protected zone of non interference in which each could exert their freedom of choice would be nullified, of the negative assessment of all inclusive self determination is postulated as logically requiring that the shield of reciprocal equal non interference be obliterated, then this critique is predicated upon an implicit unwarranted premise.

The illegitimate presumption, from which this evaluation proceeds, is that the principle of self determination lacks reasons internal to itself for securing some guaranteed form of negative liberty for all. This is not, however, the case. As Charles Taylor has ably demonstrated⁴, in order for self determination to be what it is (qua self determination) there are certain forms of individualised freedom of choice which must remain impervious to collective decisions.

A society whose members are denied the freedoms of expression, association and unrestrained individual political participation, cannot meaningfully be said to genuinely give itself its own purposes and rules, as will be illustrated below, and so cannot be self determining in a substantive sense.

For the purposes of establishing the nature of self determination, the character of any putatively self governing community should be regarded as exhausting itself as the aggregation of persons of which it is composed. Since we are engaging in a prescriptive enquiry, the corporate good of social self determination must be reduced to the particular interest which all

⁴ Taylor

members of such a community have in participating as equals in the process of collective decision making. The 'self' of the polity determining itself should thus not be understood as a communal essence transcending the opinions and properly expressed decisions of the individuals who make it up. Self determination thus just is equal participation of all in collective decision making such that all have the opportunity to equally contribute to the formulation of the overarching aims to be pursued by society as a whole and to the rules binding on all. The degree to which a self governing collectivity exists as a "transindividual entity" is limited to "the precise extent that individuals decide and act together, and not separately."⁵

To attempt to coercively enforce the diminution of the plurality of competing views regarding issues to be collectively decided upon, would constrain the degree to which the equal participation of all could be realized, and, to the extent that, even if in general terms the nature of the polity would be immutably prescribed, since even broaching specific alterations to its character would be prohibited, the extent to which such a society would deserve the appellation of self determining would be greatly attenuated. For this reason, whenever compulsory rules which curtail the ambit of free expression are imposed upon the members of a given society then, notwithstanding that the promulgation of such rules may have been the culmination of a procedurally proper democratic decision making process, the self determining character of such a society would be gravely undermined. In order to prevent this, or at least to attenuate the extent to which encroachment upon freedom of expression may diminish the self determining character of a given society, some guarantees in the form of binding rules must constrain the degree to which any given majority can impinge upon any individual's freedom of expression. Such a guarantee would constitute an individual right to a sphere of non interference vis. a vis. freedom of expression as against the collective.

In order for a society to properly give itself its own character in a substantive sense its members must, on average, and overall, be minimally self determining in a precise manner. They must regard themselves as participants in a mutually shared project and so, in a sense, minimally constitute themselves as agents shaping the form of their communal life. There is thus a sense

⁵ Hudson, P, *Liberalism, Democracy and Transformation in South Africa*, in *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, Volume 27, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis, 2000, p. 96.

in which collective self determination is parasitic upon individual self determination to the extent that for a community not to have a fixed, given nature over against the individuals which compose it, the members of a self governing polity must perpetually give themselves the character of active agents in a common undertaking.⁶ In order to legitimately sustain such a self conception, participation in political processes, for all members of society, should be voluntary and should not be subject to arbitrary restrictions upon either particular persons or classes of persons. In order to be self determining the members of a society must not be compelled to contribute to political decision making in a particular way, or at all. A necessary consequence of this is that individuals should have the opportunity to align themselves with positions shared by determinate groups and to attempt to sway others to their respective views. A further corollary of this is that all members of a society should have the opportunity to associate with whomsoever they choose for any purpose whatsoever, since this may have some relevant impact on the formation of groups expounding particular political views, or as to how an individual or individuals participate in the process of decision making in some other sense. The protection of the freedom to choose with whom to associate, or how to engage in politics, do not thus amount to extraneous limitations upon the self governance of any society, but rather require the safeguard of being guaranteed as a consequence of the immanent positing of the prerequisites for self determination to be what it is. Indeed, enshrining the freedom of expression, association and of free political participation ought to be “unassailably entrenched.”⁷ Establishing an immutable ambit of negative liberty according to various precise delineations is thus essential for self determination.

While an advocate of thoroughgoing self determination would not necessarily regard mere freedom of choice as good in itself and so worthy of protection per se such a person should be committed to ensuring that certain forms of negative liberty endure. The specific contours of the sphere of freedom of choice, under conditions of general self determination, enable individuals to give themselves their own character in accordance with the principles of reasonableness. The necessity to guarantee the protection of the rights to freedom of

⁶ Hudson, p. 96.

⁷ Taylor 1992 ‘The politics of recognition’ 59; 60

association, speech and of political participation are thus revealed as deriving from the dependence of collective self governance upon individual self determination. Self determination and freedom as negative liberty may thus be brought into partial concordance with each other.

Although it has been established that the thoroughgoing self determination of all individuals over their objective social bonds would not, if it was to be genuinely self determining, abolish any sphere of non interference, this is not, as it was provisionally purported to be, an adequate response to the objection that this form of social rule curtails genuine freedom. The critique did not claim, and cannot legitimately be taken to require, that thoroughgoing self governance would utterly extinguish the preconditions for any negative liberty whatsoever, but merely that the scope of individual freedom of choice would be profoundly diminished by the coming into existence of this mode of governance.

Bearing in mind that a constrained variant of an ambit of non interference is reconcilable with self determination does not amount to a sufficient defence against the above described criticism of mastery over the social bond as the realization of freedom, an alternative apologetic strategy will be employed in order to buttress the core claim of this argument from the relevant critique. The validation of self determination as the only adequate manifestation of freedom will be achieved by demonstrating that liberty, as the discretion to spontaneously act upon one's desire, which is the form of independence guaranteed by the infinite or rather indefinite extension of the domain of non interference, is an incomplete and inadequate instantiation of freedom. Whereas acting in accordance with one's volition in contrast with the subordination of the will to an external authority are incompatible with each other, it will be illustrated that the apparent opposition between the arbitrary exercise of one's volition, in accordance with whatever happens to be one's contingent disposition of the moment, and subjection to another, are not predicated upon contradictory principles. Freedom of choice, as spontaneously acting in accordance with one's desires in an unfettered manner, will thus be revealed as insufficient to the normative task of distinguishing the principle of freedom from the logic of authoritarian dominion. As such it will fail to establish a valid reason for preferring

freedom, as non restraint, from domination. Since this notion of freedom will be demonstrated to be internally deficient (in relation to its capacity to maintain itself as distinct from its opposite, unwarranted obedience to authority as unfreedom) this very deficiency suggests that only a more comprehensive ideal of freedom which subsumes negative liberty as an internal moment in the logical unfolding of the requirements of its own concept could adequately sustain the distinction between freedom and authority. The demonstration that the ideal of collective self determination is not reducible to, but nevertheless requires, a particular manifestation of the unconstrained freedom of choice indicates that self determination is a viable candidate for the more expansive notion of freedom capable of vindicating the opposition between freedom and authority. The correctness of this claim will be exhibited below.

Houlgate identifies a defining feature of unfettered choice as the opportunity to revise one's course of action after it has been decided upon.⁸ If freedom means anything it means the freedom to change one's mind. The faculty of volition, the capacity to choose, is distinct from and is not absolutely determined by or committed to, its particular choices.⁹ The determinate character of that which I desire is thus not generated by cognition or volition but rather is dependent upon "circumstance, chance or nature."¹⁰ "The content of one's will – what it is one wills – is not 'intrinsic to self determining activity itself.' Such 'freedom' is thus, in fact dependent on a content and material given either from within or from without."¹¹ Houlgate successfully demonstrates that merely unrestrained and unreflective action does not give itself its own character and is thus is not a genuine form of self determination, but is dependent upon an alien other for the character it has. Furthermore, from the perspective of a proponent of the self determining will, doing as one wants appears as mere arbitrariness. Since unconstrained freedom of choice is externally determined (and so dependent and also arbitrary) it should not be accorded any intrinsic value.

⁸ S. Houlgate, *An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Second Edition)*, Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, Massachusetts USA, 2005, p. 184.

⁹ Houlgate, p. 184.

¹⁰ Houlgate, p. 184.

¹¹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Nisbit, H. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.66 – 67.

This appears to demonstrate the point at issue namely that negative liberty is an inadequate determination of freedom in itself and only acquires any normative worth to the extent that it is essential to self determination. It is not good in itself but only has derivative value. If this argumentative strategy were to be adopted it would be based upon a *petitio principii*, a circular argument. The perspective of self determination would be presupposed in order to determine whether self determination, or sheer choice better instantiated the ideal of freedom. The conclusion to the enquiry is thus implicitly given in the premises. The argument outlined above explains why mere negative liberty by itself appears valueless to the proponent of self determination, but this begs the question against the exponent of negative liberty. In response to the above negative assessment of freedom of choice, its exponent could argue that the extraneous determination of the character of the will does not amount to an external, imposed constraint upon it. From within the framework of this perspective, a mistake is made by the proponent of self determination as opposed to the adherent of negative liberty. External influence and so 'dependence' in a broad sense is conflated with authoritarian domination over another. While coercion of another is a form of 'dependence', this does not mean that all forms of dependence amount to forceful restriction.

Negative liberty and despotic authority exist in an antagonistic relationship to each other both in thought and in reality. In order to arbitrate between these two positions it will be demonstrated that the perspective of negative liberty cannot sustain itself and so must pass over into the advocacy of self determination. The critique of the normative defence of negative liberty will thus be immanent to it and will not proceed from an external point of view.

In his exposition of Hegel's conception of individual liberty as rational self determination, Patten recognises that the operation of unconstrained desire as immediate disposition to action is factually antithetical to both the application of coercion and the "contentment to have his concerns settled for him by another"¹² (that is to take something on another's authority). The sheer facticity, the observable existence of the inimical character of freedom and the two modes of manifestation of authority, seems to provide sufficient warrant for the plausible

¹² A. Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, 1999 p. 69

intuition that freedom and authority are counter-posed and irreconcilable to each other.¹³ This is, however, not the case. Patten demonstrates that in terms of their conceptual determinacies, arbitrary volition and the nature of authoritarianism are sufficiently similar, in their salient characteristics, that they cannot be treated as conceptually distinct. The spurious opposition of the two concepts which appear to be determined against each other collapses into notional indeterminacy. This conceptual implosion arises due to the minimal ontological determinacy of arbitrary volition, which is a basic characteristic which it must possess in order to be the type of thing it is. This feature of unconstrained choice has been previously encountered in the course of the argument. It is the characteristic of external given determinacy, acquired by chance, which renders the specific choice of an indeterminate will concrete. The significance of the externally given character of an arbitrary choice will not be to demonstrate that negative liberty is deficient with regard to the foreign criteria of self determination. It will rather be illustrated that the precise manner in which the determinacy of givenness is shared between the concepts of authority and freedom of choice does not constitute an indifferent shared conceptual background against which the opposed notions can be differentiated from each other, but rather threatens to undermine this very distinction.

Patten compares the concepts of authority and arbitrary choice against a backdrop of a process of reason giving as the necessary condition for the justification of actions.¹⁴ Why should we adopt this authoritative norm as opposed to some other? Patten's answer is that the application of this norm generates results which are in accord with the common sense intuition that taking something on authority is more properly classified as more akin to subjection than to complete freedom.¹⁵ He thus ultimately appeals to a putatively widely held belief, or possibly an ungrounded bias, in order to validate his contentions. This weakens his argument and ensures that his criticisms cannot be considered to be an immanent critique. It will be demonstrated that the norm of reason giving justification is not extraneous to the prescriptive identification of the wrongfulness of coercion. If it is to escape from uninformative tautology

¹³ Patten, p.64.

¹⁴ Patten, p. 69.

¹⁵ Patten, p. 69.

then condemnatory statements, impugning compulsion, must implicitly be predicated upon the process of justification described by Patten. Let us proceed.

An adherent of negative liberty wishes to assert that coercion contravenes the principles of justice, since it is upon just such an affirmation that his prescriptive defence of negative liberty rests. If his response to the question ‘Why is this so?’ was merely that one’s freedom had been impinged upon, then, rather than vindicating the intuition that coercion is blameworthy he would have merely lapsed into tautology. There must be some other tacit basis for holding that coercion is illicit and which would thus validate support for freedom as negative liberty. Rather than an extraneous standard, such a norm would constitute the keystone holding the entire system of thought together. Due to the foundational nature of this norm to the perspective itself, a critique of this normative model from the standpoint of this standard or benchmark would be immanent, and the whole structure would thus crumble without support. The exertion of force in principle, that is by its very nature, annuls processes of justification through reason giving. Compulsion is not persuasion and so any putative reasons provided for an act of force do not alter its character as disruptive of the above described process. Force or coercion could thus be rendered legitimate on two related grounds, if such compulsion negated or mitigated the impact of a prior act of force, by reversing the termination of the process of justification, or if an act of compulsion cleared away some more serious obstacle to the continuation of the process of reason giving than it itself is.

Could the posited antagonist to this line of reasoning not legitimately object to the claims made in the previous paragraph, that an alternative basis exists for maintaining that the forceful subjugation of another to one’s will exists in the form of Kant’s humanity formula of the categorical imperative, that one should treat humanity in oneself and others as an end in itself? One of the features “that make us distinctly human” are our “capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to pursue our own ends.”¹⁶ The injunction to respect humanity in ourselves and others is thus equivalent to an ethical imperative to treat the capacity for autonomy, in ourselves and others, as an end in itself. To employ the humanity formula as a

¹⁶ Johnson, Robert, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed) , URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-moral/>.

normative political principle is thus to recognise that the unethical character of coercion arises not because it impinges upon one's capacity for arbitrary choice, but because it curtails the extent to which one may act as an autonomous agent. Should this argument be resorted to by the proponent that mere freedom of choice is genuine liberty, in order to support this view, then the point at issue would have been conceded.

Does the spectre of tautology not still haunt us? Are we not in danger of falling back into it at the very point at which we seem to have escaped it? If one was to ask what renders the process of reason giving wrongful, would we not be required to give an answer which would be the first step along the path on infinite regress or to affirm that the cancellation of the process of reason giving is wrongful because it disrupts the process of reason giving? It appears that we are caught between the frying pan of infinite regress and the fire of tautology, yet unlike the uninformative tautology previously encountered we have here arrived at a self legitimating norm. The process of justification through reason giving is just what any prescriptive act is about. To abort the process of reason giving is thus to assault, to call into question, the entire domain of normativity. Whether or not one intends to do so, the intrinsic logic of one's actions is to deny the reality of the validation of actions according to 'ought' based criteria. It is to certify through one's actions that the actuality of ideals is fallacious. If we wish to assert any other norm to be true then we must hold this standard to be authoritative. In Kantian terms that this norm be valid is the condition of possibility for itself and for all other standards. The dilemma we face is being thrust into the abyss of pre-normativity, into the void of groundlessness where we are forced to make the supreme arbitrary choice, that between the existence of normativity or its absolute extinction. Yet the sham alternative does not in actuality appear as an open ended option for us.

Since we are always already making value judgments, even if this is done opportunistically, we are already caught in the net of normativity. Whereas from a non human perspective or a divine intuition, the domain of normativity may indeed be groundless or grounded in a way which is beyond our comprehension, the very fact that such a point of view is unattainable for

us means that we must treat the above described standard as self validating. The decision between the existence of normativity and its abolition has always already been made. Although it may rest on air we have arrived at what for us appears as a firm foundation for normative judgments.

If the constitutive wrong is to disrupt the process of seeking justification for one's deeds, then it appears that we are all essentially wrongdoers since if we do not stop at some necessarily arbitrary point, then we would be stuck in the interminable task of providing justificatory reasons for actions as opposed to actually acting. Are we left in the unsatisfactory position of either keeping our hands clean by failing to act while infinitely formulating reasons for the impeccable deed, or must we sacrifice our pristine virtue and, in the immortal words of Luther, "sin boldly"?¹⁷ This dilemma is illusory since, when we temporarily suspend the process of justification, we in principle remain open to the continuation of the process itself and do not adopt an attitude of indifference or hostility to the need for this process of justification, which renders the normative domain possible. An interruption of the process does not annul it. In short, provisionally stopping at a given reason for the purposes of action does not implicitly seek to replace the domain of reason giving, of what ought to be, with the spurious adequacy of facticity as sufficient 'reason' for action. The wrong of disrupting the process of justification does not lie in transitorily suspending it. The very existence of the domain of the 'ought' is instead impugned when the process of reason giving is terminated by affirming, through one's deeds, the priority of facts as sufficient reasons for action over, ultimately superfluous, justificatory reasons. Both coercion and an arbitrary choice have this structural characteristic, as a constituent feature of the types of action which they are, as will be illustrated below, and thus the proponent of freedom as freedom of arbitrary choice lacks the resources to distinguish what renders compulsion illegitimate and a free action permissible.

¹⁷ M. Luther *'Let Your Sins be Strong: A letter from Luther to Melancthon, Letter no. 99, 1 August 1521, from the Wartburg (Segment)'*, in Project Wittenberg, August 2010, viewed on 10 December 2012, <http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/wittenberg-luther.html#sw-sinsbe>

As previously demonstrated with regards to freedom as unrestrained arbitrary choice, since an agent's indeterminate volition does not produce the character of the distinct content of what is chosen, but rather acquires this specificity from a pre-given range of options or from what such an agent is externally disposed, through natural and social influences, to desire. The source or cause of the particularity of the choice thus lies outside of the agent itself. As such, as formally shown, the agent does not give itself its own character and so cannot be considered to be comprehensively self-determining and so, on Houlgate's account, is not acting in a genuinely free fashion. As previously detailed, this applies an extraneous criterion to the assessment as to whether the arbitrary exercise of volition constitutes an adequate expression of freedom. A proponent of the view that spontaneously acting in accordance with one's disposition is a free act in the full sense of the term is thus entitled to be indifferent to the above-described critique.

Patten delineates two senses in which acting out of one's desire renders an agent dependant upon externally given immediacies.¹⁸ The causal origins of an action outside of the agent are not in themselves relevant to determining whether the agent is acting freely. The salient issue in ascertaining whether an action deserves the appellation of being free is the precise role accorded to the above-mentioned immediacies in the "practical deliberation" as to the validity of actions.¹⁹ In this regard Patten identifies a common feature which coercion, taking something on authority and an arbitrary choice have in common. "First, in each case, the agent allows, or is compelled to accept, "the determination of some external agency or mechanism to be a sufficient reason or justification for his action."²⁰ Forceful imposition of alien purposes in contravention to the intentions of another and freely making a capricious, externally determined choice would thus both terminate the process of seeking justification for one's actions, and since this is the basis for maintaining that compulsion is illicit, the positing of such a distinction has been rendered unwarranted, from within the framework of this perspective. Acting in accordance with whatever happens to be one's disposition, as a definition of what an act must be in order to be free, is inadequate to do the work which it is meant to. It cannot provide reasons as to how freedom and subjection to authority differ in a normatively

¹⁸ Patten, p. 70.

¹⁹ Patten, p. 70.

²⁰ Patten, p. 70.

significant way. The preference for freedom over authority would thus not tell us anything of prescriptive importance, but would, quite appropriately, have been rendered a product of arbitrary choice.

The liberal ideal of a society in which all are at liberty to do whatever they like, to the extent that this is consistent with the rights of others to do likewise, cannot be premised upon the contraposition between freedom and unwarranted authority unless liberty is conceived of as individual self determination and not as mere capriciousness. Although the classical liberal notion of freedom has failed to provide relevant distinguishing marks which would render it distinct from its purported opposite, and so has proven its inadequacy as a viable ideal for the purposes of distinguishing valid forms of polity from their wrongful counterparts, a proponent of individual autonomy, at least on an initial assessment of the matter, appears to be entitled to advocate the standard liberal model of the good society. On a superficial assessment of the matter, there appears to be nothing in principle which would prevent civil society from functioning in conformity with, and indeed, from providing the most extensive and so adequate measures to prevent the erosion of individual autonomy. While the enforcement of binding contracts which enables the voluntary interaction of independent persons on the market may be fulfilled by various undemocratic, or not wholly democratic states, it may also potentially be performed by a properly constituted constitutional democracy. Negative liberty as mutual non interference by individual citizens in each other's affairs, and by the state in those matters which pertain to private persons, is, on this perspective, not justified as enabling individuals to act freely in terms of their given desires but is rather, validated since it allows, or opens up the possibility for, even though it cannot guarantee, a wide scope in which agents can operate as individually self determining without the illegitimate interference of some external authority. A democratically governed market based society would thus allow the manifestation of individual autonomy through negative liberty as well as in the form of collective self determination. It is thus possible, as previously discussed, to harmonise negative liberty and collective self determination on the basis of negative liberty.

On this defence a civil society governed by a democratic state, conforming to the rule of law, could be understood as providing adequate institutional safeguards for the enabling conditions which allows all persons the opportunity to fully express their capacity for individual autonomy. The standard liberal model thus appears to instantiate, and indeed to best exemplify, the type of polity which would harmonise cooperation between individuals and their freedom, freedom here conceived as the capacity for the individual to give itself its own character. Since in the ideal realisation of civil society, the autonomy of all is respected by each citizen, as well as by the state itself, the injunction that the humanity in each person be treated as an end in itself seems to have been conformed to by the institutional characteristics of this type of society.

While the interaction between persons within civil society in the market may take the form of capricious exchanges, in which an individual spontaneously acts upon their given desires, the guarantee of negative liberty gives people the opportunity to structure their voluntary cooperation with each other in a manner conforming to the requirements of autonomy. Furthermore, while the fact that contracts prove binding upon those who enter into them, will not necessarily lead to the form of practical deliberations, as to the justifiability of actions engaged in, required for complete self determination, it will at least encourage prudential considerations to trump the instant gratification of desire. This in turn could, but need not, encourage the cultivation of modes of comportment and reasoning which are supportive of the kind of self discipline necessary for the full realisation of self determination. While the liberal conception of liberty has been refuted, it seems as if this has merely allowed the classical liberal ideal of the good society to be validated on more secure grounds.

An important consequence of demonstrating the unviability of arbitrary choice as a norm of freedom, is that, while this internally coherent norm appears to merely constitute the more suitable justificatory standard for the authoritative liberal archetype of the good society, at the very least, this alternate ultimate criterion for validity does not rule out the previously alluded to conception of comprehensive self determination as violating the underlying benchmark of permissible social orders. Collective mastery over our social bonds would, as illustrated above, radically compress the scope of the ambit of reciprocal non-interference. If acting in accordance

with one's given disposition could constitute a genuinely anti-authoritarian conception of freedom, it would be able to legitimate the prescriptive claim that only a society which instantiated maximal lack of constraint upon the actions of all, would be justified. Democratic dominion over objective dependence, notwithstanding that it would have to allow for a truncated sphere of lack of constraint upon freedom of choice in order to be genuinely self determining, could only be a negation of true liberty and a thoroughgoing form of totalitarian despotism, if freedom just meant arbitrary choice.

Since collective self determination is a process in which the capacity for individuals to formulate their own purposes is respected by democratically allowing for equal input into the dynamic culminating in a collective decision, which is binding on all, it is properly understood as an aggregatory manifestation of the individual autonomy which freedom is. It is unnecessary to posit society as a subject in itself, a kind of super-individual, with purposes transcending those of its constituent members, in order to render a common project, in which society is shaped according to shared intentions, possible or justifiable. The only normative, as opposed to actually existent, character of society which would transcend the discrete nature of the individuals who make it up, would be the conscious and continuous positing of the union of such individuals by the distinct persons who constituted it. In short, since each would count for one in terms of equality of opportunity to participate in decision making processes, collective self determination would not constitute a form of freedom over and against individual autonomy but would instead be an instance of it.

Once collective self governance is understood as a mode of realisation of individual self determination, then the necessity to render the freedoms of association, of speech and of political practice unassailable is essential for the control of each, over their social ties, in order to be the expression of individual self determination which they are. Whereas negative liberty is merely compatible with a sclerotic, hollowed out variant of collective rule, self determination requires a suitably attenuated instantiation of unconstrained choice in order to exist at all.

At present, those advocating both archetypes of the good society can plausibly claim that their particular desired model is a legitimate form of social order, when judged against the only

remaining viable norm of freedom, individual self determination. The norm of individual self determination appears as inadequate to adjudicate between two diametrically opposed prescriptive conceptions. This incapacity to arbitrate between these contradictory visions of the good society does not occur, as it has previously, due to the standard of comparison being extraneous to either one or both of the competing perspectives at issue. Rather, in this instance, the indeterminate result arises as both civil society and the market, as well as control over the social bond, appear to be valid means to institute generalised individual self determination across society.

This inconclusive outcome requires that we pose a different but related query to the material at hand. Since attempting to ascertain which of these models fails to instantiate freedom does not produce a result, we should instead ask “Which of the two archetypes of society best realises generalised individual self determination?” While the neutral state favouring no particular version of the good life merely maintains the impermeability of those boundaries into the private affairs of its citizens which should not be infringed upon can only directly realise individual liberty in the form of an attenuated version of collective self governments, it may nevertheless be argued that by withdrawing the rights to non interference from political deliberation it provides a more adequate bulwark for the protection of negative liberty, and guarantees a necessary precondition for individual autonomy more adequately than the mastery over dependence.

Since mutual control over our objective social bonds has not been established, any enquiry as to whether the rule of law or the protection of, and only of, the three freedoms specified previously, in the context of complete self determination, would prove more enduring and so more effective as a safeguard for individual autonomy, is speculative and so cannot generate a decisive conclusion to the problem. It is however pertinent that since collective self determination is a type of generalised individual self determination, it is only necessary to remove the guarantee of the said freedoms from the ambit of majority decision-making in order to preserve the minimal prerequisites for individual self determination. There thus seems no good reason to prefer the one ideal social order to the other, in this regard.

While a liberal social order would merely provide conditions which may allow many persons to act autonomously collective self government would itself be a form of generalised individual self determination. Neither collective command over objective social bonds nor liberal governance of the market can guarantee that most citizens will act in an individually self determining manner. Collective self government would, however, provide all of its citizens with the particular option of participating in general individual self determination or not .In contrast to this specific alternative in which the stakes are clear, to be self determining or not, a liberal citizen is exposed to an indeterminate menu of arbitrary decisions in which acting autonomously would be merely one choice among others. Constraining the range of decisions to the issue of participating in democratic self rule or not would render collective control over social life more conducive to individual autonomy than liberal governance.

There is further a democratic deficit inherent to systems of political representation in which the populace does not in reality govern itself but delegates the responsibility for rule to elected persons. These representations are meant to “stand in” for the people in the domain of political decision making. The withdrawal of the individual’s concern to specific matters, specified as that persons private interest, requires the retreat of most agents active engagement from the public administration of society as a whole. The corollary of the expansion of the domain of negative liberty throughout civil society and the market is thus the diminution of the capacity for general participation in collective governance. This necessitates that the allocation of the management of communal affairs be allotted to a specific section of the population. The representative character of liberal democracy, as well as the bureaucratic stratification of its governing institutions, are thus the correlative consequences of the comprehensive extension of non interference throughout the range of human interactions. The neutral state which adopts a stance of impartiality towards competing conceptions of the good cannot thus constitute a directly democratic organ of rule, and thus also fails to adequately instantiate collective self determination. There is no corresponding defect in the essential nature of democratic administration of dependence which would prevent it from allowing the populace to truly manage its own affairs.

When contrasted with the liberal democratic governance of civil society and the market, collective control over our social bonds proves itself to be in greater accord with the prescriptive norm of individual self determination than the liberal alternative.

Hitherto the argument has proceeded at a high level of abstraction in order to assess the normative sufficiency of the conceptions of two mutually opposed notions of the minimal determinacy of freedom, as well as assessing the prescriptive sufficiency of two archetypes for a free society. It has been demonstrated that while the notion of liberty as acting in accordance with one's spontaneous disposition is not false per se, since a definition is not, and cannot be true or false, it is nevertheless insufficient to ascertain the reasons as to why the authoritarian imposition of one's will over another would be illicit, while the exercise of one's liberty would not. The only remaining candidate for delineating the nature of freedom, individual self determination, proved able to identify the substantive reasons for the wrongfulness of coercive acts, and provided a basis for explaining why these reasons do not apply to free deeds. It was thus definitively proven that one of the competing conceptions of freedom could provide the foundation for prescriptive claims concerning the nature of a good social order. Whereas it initially appeared as if this would not alter the assessment that a liberal democratic polity is the sole potential realisation of a free society, on further reflection this proved not to be the case. Both thorough-going collective self determination, and the standard liberal model, were shown to be valid versions of the types of society which would function consistently with the standard of individual self determination. The norm of freedom was thus shown to not rule out a polity in which mastery over our interconnection to each other was attained.

Indeed, mastery over our social bonds was illustrated to be a preferable form of free society when the criterion of optimality, with regard to the degree to which individual autonomy would be realised, was employed. At a prior point in the argument it was asserted that the core problem of modernity was to reconcile our dependence on each other with freedom. The governance of civil society and the market by the rule of law appeared to provide the definitive solution to this dilemma, since they seemed to allow independent individuals to freely enter into relations with each other. All forms of social interaction thus appeared to correspond to

the benchmark of valid social engagement, voluntary cooperation. The form of the contract appeared to constitute a means of codifying and rendering, through the mediation of the state, free agreements as binding upon those who wilfully entered into them. While the precise character of our social interrelations with each other was not explored at the level of abstraction at this point in the argument, it was illustrated that the liberal archetype of the good society was predicated upon a notion of self sufficiency, vis a vis the individual, which could not truly obtain in reality. It was thus provisionally postulated that since its understanding of actual existence was defective, the prescriptive ideal of the good society, advocated by the proponent of free cooperation on the market, would in all likelihood, have deleterious consequences for the inhabitants of the misrecognized actual world.

It will be illustrated below, that once we descend from the stratosphere of the level of indeterminacy in which the argument has thus far proceeded, and encounter the concrete content of the character of our social interconnection with each other, we will be forced to revise our assessment of civil society and the market.

Chapter 2:

Whereas the appearance of independence was previously demonstrated to be fallacious, the conditions of possibility which would explain the emergence of this illusory form of existence of objective interconnection were left unexplored. Once the prerequisites for the beguiling but spurious display of self subsistence by individuals in their market transactions are explored, it will become apparent initially, that as opposed to either allowing or being conducive to the emergence of self determination, the operation of the market is antithetical to individual autonomy. The tentative conclusion previously reached that liberal democratic market based societies are admissible instances of, although not the ideal manifestation of, a kind of political community which functions in accordance with the norm of freedom as individual self determination must thus be revised. At a further point in the argument the veil of seemingly voluntary cooperation on the market will be torn asunder to reveal beneath this, the alien purpose of accumulation foisted upon all.

Marx employs a holistic methodology in his examination of the capitalist economy. Such a mode of enquiry is predicated upon the premise, that for any entity to exist as a thing distinct from its environment, and thus as having the character of being genuinely singular, such an entity cannot be a mere aggregate, a sum of self subsistent components, which, as a corollary of their self subsistent character, enter into external relations, that is relations which do not alter or constitute the specific essences of the discrete things.

A compositional whole has the characteristics described above, it is, and is, only the sum of its parts. As such, it may prove difficult to differentiate from its environment or background. Since the whole lacks a precise character and the parts are indifferent to their connection to each other, as well as to the whole, any answer to the question as to whether some entity formed part of the whole, whether some 'gathered up' plurality forms a part of an aggregate, or merely forms the background to, or environment of, this composite, cannot be definitively answered and is, thus, indeterminate. An aggregative multiplicity thus lacks intrinsic principles determining its scope, and, also, is devoid of an imminent grounding, which would definitively distinguish itself from that which it is not. It is for this reason that an aggregate or composite fails to unite itself as a genuine singularity or one.

Due to this indistinct character, arising as a result of the absence of an intrinsic source of singularisation, a composite can only be individuated from without, by a subject. Since no 'bringing together' process occurs in the world itself, a 'gathering up' can only be performed from a particular point of view, and so, must be done by a person.

There is a sense in which an aggregate can, in actuality, constitute a not merely subjective individual thing. This can occur when some entity, which exists as a whole in itself (in some sense) acts upon a composite to either incorporate it into itself, or, in some other manner, to imprint the characteristic of being a unitary structure upon a compositional plurality. We are entitled to consider South African society as a singular thing since it is governed by a unitary state. When we refer to the South African economy, we are implicitly ascribing to the whole of all market events which take place in South Africa, the form of an aggregate which has had the shape of being a singular thing imposed on it, as all of the aforementioned occurrences do take

place in South Africa, a singular entity in its own right. The degree of arbitrariness in delineating separate national economies arises due to the indeterminate, and so indistinct nature of any composite.

The indefinite configuration of an aggregative multiplicity generates an analogous indeterminacy in time to that which exists in relation to composites with regards to space. Any answers to the enquiries as to whether any particular aggregate has ceased to exist, or as to when some composite came into existence, is of necessity vague. Is an aggregate an ephemeral, fleeting thing which when one of its constituents stops being part of it itself ceases to exist? It is apparent that the very indefinite nature of the component parts of an aggregate produces its indistinct nature in relation to its durability. If we cannot definitively discern whether something belongs to an aggregate, then we are not entitled to declare with definiteness when it has either started to or ceased to so belong. An aggregate can have an abiding character and a discernible duration through time foisted upon it as a consequence of having acquired the attribute of being a genuine singular thing. The South African economy exists as long as South Africa does. Whether a component of a composite plurality is itself an aggregative multiplicity is a singular thing or not is indeterminable.

Any particular compositional whole may thus be composed of an in principle indeterminate array of aggregative pluralities. This type of multiplicity would acquire an additional mode of being indeterminable, in relation to the environment in which it appears, as well as to its constituent parts. The indistinct and permeable barriers which would inexactly differentiate the scope of existence of a fragmented composite, in time and space, would be rendered even less precise. If it cannot conclusively be ascertained whether an entity composed of a plurality of things is itself a singular whole, and thus one individual part of a greater composite multitude, or whether, since it is a fractured multiplicity, the extraneously ascribed boundaries delineating the individual character of the aggregate should be disregarded, thus rendering the singular constituent of a larger whole into multiple parts of this more expansive aggregate, then it is indeterminable whether the above described complex would in actuality be a distinct part of a broader aggregate, or should more properly be considered to be a number of different

constituents of the greater whole. Since the putative parts of such an aggregate would, in a manner analogous to the composite as a whole, lack an inherent attribute enabling them to constitute themselves as singular things, they have the character of being discrete entities extraneously stamped onto them by a subject.

While the conception of the extension of an aggregative multiplicity across any spatial scale to include any type of object is not internally inconsistent, this conception of an infinite aggregate relegates the existence of actually singularised phenomena to an illusory appearance. Singularity would not genuinely form a constitutive characteristic of any entity but would merely be a relational and so an ultimately arbitrary externally imparted determination of some aggregates. The field of classification of types of aggregate thus bifurcates into logically possible pure composites and pluralities composed of genuine individuals which are objectively constituted as such.

It is possible to further distinguish between types of whole, which in actuality have the quality of constituting aggregates, whose parts are really distinct from each other when temporal succession is abstracted from or which exist as aggregates at any point in time. Any collection or bunch would thus constitute an aggregate. All dynamic aggregates, the constituent components of which will continue to behave as self sufficiently differentiated from, and so not intrinsically connected with each other over time, would also be static aggregates, but the reverse would not hold true. In our actual experience of the world, we posit various collections of entities which, for whatever reason, we take as being able to individuate themselves. A grouping or bunching together captures an actually existing component of our intuition as to what reality must be like; that the relevant types of things genuinely exist as singular, and that many of them exist or could exist. For the purposes of apprehending these attributes, it is appropriate to disregard the temporally enduring character of the particular things under discussion, as well as treating as irrelevant the relational qualities which the entities might possess.

This illustrates an ontologically determinate attribute of aggregates, the parts thereof are essentially indifferent to their relations to one another, or to the existence of the composite as

a whole. In short, the essential character of the parts is unaffected by any connection which they enter into.

A dynamic aggregate is one whose parts display this characteristic of indifference consistently over time. The constituent components of a dynamic aggregate subsist, if they are to persist at all, in an utterly neutral manner as pertains to their relations to each other, as well as to the aggregate as a whole. Since what they are, in essence, is not altered by their interconnections or their relation to the whole, each of the constituent components of the multiplicity must be capable of retaining their minimal specific ontological character, that differential determinacy which renders entities the types of things they are, regardless of whether they continue to form part of a given aggregate or not. Relative to each other, and to the whole of which they are part, they must display the essential attribute of atomicity, they must demonstrate complete self subsistence and total independence with regard to each other.

As will be illustrated below, it is possible for individuated entities to connect with each other in configurations which do not operate as dynamic aggregates. Since the component parts of these types of wholes, in actuality, differentiate themselves from the rest of the world, and thus do not merely subsist as singularities in the mind of a subject, we would be entitled to provisionally approach this type of unified plurality as a static aggregate. At any point in time, but not over time, each of the parts would have the capacity of individuating itself, regardless of its place in the whole. This feature of all of the parts taken singly is adequately apprehended by treating the whole as if it were a static complex of mutually external things at any point in time. For the purposes of emphasising their singular character, the parts may be treated as logically prior to, and distinct from their relation to each other, and to the whole itself.

It is precisely this attribute of non-aggregative, unified totalities, that they may accurately be described as static complexes, that renders organ transplant possible. The heart, which has been removed from the body, nevertheless continues, for a more or less limited duration, to exist as a functional heart. The difference between a dynamic aggregate and the kind of unities, to be discussed below, cannot be discerned when the successively self maintaining systems are considered statically, or as if perpetually at rest. Whereas heuristically regarding integrated

wholes as demonstrating the features of static aggregates allows us to comprehend the self singularising characteristic of the parts of these wholes, the fact that such unified totalities are constituted as being static aggregates should not be conflated with regarding them as dynamic composites, persisting in aggregative form through time. The temporal quality which distinguishes dynamic multiplicities from integrated totalities, just is the absence of an abiding aggregative property presenting itself in relation to the latter. A heart cut off from the body eventually withers away and ceases to exist as a heart.

As a notion, the concept of a unity or totality is the diametric opposite of the idea of an aggregate or composite. At any point in time, an integrated unity is composed of discrete parts, which exist as distinct from each other and are thus separable from the whole of which they are a part. Such unified totalities may, as illustrated above, be legitimately described under the aspect of being the static aggregative wholes which they are. This is the only feature which integrated unities and dynamic complexes have in common. Whereas an aggregated plurality of things is devoid of an intrinsic, and thus objectifiable mode of self specification, which would enable it to set itself apart from the remainder of reality, an integrated unity possesses just such a principle of individuation as its specific principle of existence. Unlike a dispersed composite of entities, a totality is not dependent upon an external subject to convey upon it the singular form of being a specific thing. It also does not require the imprimatur of an extraneous singularity in order to be objectively individuated. Indeed, it is only the existence of wholes which are not reducible to the sum of their parts, which enable dynamic aggregates to actually coalesce and thus to overcome their fundamentally discontinuous nature, in order to acquire the character of being a non-subjectively united singular thing. Integrated unities are thus a prerequisite for really existing singular aggregates.

While at any precise moment the parts of an integrated unity appear to exist logically prior to their combination, and so seem to be detachable from this collective whole, over some suitable duration this is exposed as not being the case. The parts of a dynamic aggregate are unaffected by their interrelations, such that what they are in essence is not impacted upon by what they are connected to, or by the fact that they are the constituent components of some whole. In

contrast to this, the parts of an integrated structure are not self subsistent but rather acquire the unique character which, in part, defines them through their connection to each other and the unified whole itself. We have already encountered a representative exemplification of an entity which only derives its differential attributes by being integrated within a broader whole. Whereas aggregates are not in themselves individuated, and are characterised by the absence of definite boundaries, those conglomerations of things located within objectively singular entities themselves acquire a manifest form of individual existence. Consider the case of the South African economy, for certain purposes such as policy formulation, this dynamic aggregate should be taken to exist as particularised and delimited. While some singularised aggregate might continue to exist as a composite outside of a whole, it would not exist as this specific individuated complex of things.

A further aspect of the individuated aggregate which substantiates a quality which they would not possess unless subsumed under a greater whole, is the characteristic of being determinately temporally defined. An example of a part which is deprived of its determinate character when it is severed from the whole, of which it is a part, is the heart. The fact that the cardiac muscle can only retain its character as a heart, or as a non decrepit piece of flesh, for a transient length of time when cut from the body, graphically illustrates that some parts can only maintain their specific features when attached to wholes.

There is thus a precise sense in which wholes, as unified totalities, may legitimately be regarded as existing prior to their parts. Hegel did not consider entities whose determinacies would be radically altered by ceasing to be integrated into unitary totalities to be parts, since he took this to imply that such entities could subsist as what they were separate from the unities in which they inhered. In order to accentuate the differential particularity of those types of things, which can only maintain themselves as what they are by subsisting within a unified totality, Hegel referred to 'party' of this kind as "moments". He thus reconceptualised integrated structures as the holistic unfolding of processes. This emphasises the distinct temporally sequential character of integrated totalities as opposed to dynamic aggregates.

As a static composite at any instance in time, the constituent moments in the unfolding of the capital process appear as separate parts abiding discretely from each other on the market which seems to function as an additive composite. The aggregative sum of total wealth thus appears, in capitalist societies, as an “immense collection of commodities”.²¹ The market camouflages the true nature of exchange with the spurious semblance of appearing as a dynamic agglomeration, in which independent persons regularly emerge out of their solitude and isolation in order to consensually trade the goods which they possess, acquiring one commodity in exchange for the alienation of another.²² It has been previously illustrated that the component parts of the market do not have the requisite self sufficiently atomistic character which would enable the economy to genuinely function as a composite over the course of time. The precise explanation as to why the market should masquerade as a multiplicity of discrete entities which persists as such, when it is not in fact, in essence, a dynamic aggregative whole will be provided below.

While the argument has not yet reached the point where it will explicate the precise reasons for the fallacious mode of appearance of the market, it has already provided adequate means to delineate the general conditions of possibility for the economy to don its disguise.

As previously demonstrated, the moments of an integrated unity are detachable from a unified totality and so acquire the potentially deceptive attribute of being discrete singular things. Similarly the parts of dynamic aggregates have the quality of abiding in their essential nature when set apart from each other. In the case of dynamic aggregates, this quality does not prove to be fleeting and ephemeral, lasting only in the moment, or for a brief passage of time as holds true for the moments of integrated structures but rather endures over time. The static and dynamic attribution of aggregative status to some whole are thus, as previously shown, conceptually distinct with radically different consequences for the type of totality under consideration arising, depending on which kind of composite nature is ascribed to the totality in question. To confound the property of being a static aggregative whole with the quality of

²¹ K. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, Trans Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books Ltd, 27 wrights Lane, London, England, 1976, p. 125.

²² Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 178.

dynamic aggregation would logically lead to the misapprehension of a unified whole as a dynamic composite.

The prior demonstration has definitively shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, the economy cannot be a complex of discrete things. It does however, as do most entities existing in the world, possess the attribute of being an aggregative whole when its persistence over the course time is disregarded. This enables, but does not require, the emergence of the deceptive shape of appearance of the market. At this level of abstraction it was only possible to explain, in general terms, the manner in which the illusion that the market endures as an aggregate could come into existence. At the current stage of indeterminacy of the discussion, elaborating upon the reasons why the market should systematically appear as a dynamic aggregate, would have been premature. The 'how' but not the 'why' of the phenomenon in question has thus been explored.

In his letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, Marx proceeds from the notion that the total labour of any given society should not be understood as a composite of discrete performances of work. If society were to operate in this manner, then the particular sites of production and points of exchange (the parts) would precede the total social expenditure of time engaged in productive work (the whole).

Despite appearances, Marx maintains that the economy is not an aggregative sum of distinct acts of production and exchange. If any social form were to have these characteristics, its existence would prove ephemeral since it could not ensure that the goods produced would be in the proportions necessary to ensure the perpetuation of the social form over time. It is logically possible for the indefinite character of aggregates to go all the way down. An initial analysis of the claims adduced in the letter would discern that Marx appeals to common sense in the form of a child's judgment in affirming that a nation which ceased to work, and that "the amounts of products corresponding to the differing amounts of needs demand different and quantitatively determined amounts of society's aggregate labour."²³ Marx takes himself to have

²³ Marx, K, '*Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann In Hannover*, Source: MECW, Volume 43, p.67, accessed from Marxist internet archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11.htm

demonstrated that a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of the subsistence of society is the “necessity of the distribution of social labour in specific proportions” which is thus a law which may “change its form of manifestation” but as a “natural law of human existence” “cannot be abolished at all.”²⁴

A superficial assessment of the assertions affirmed as factual would demonstrate that Marx has merely maintained that the distribution of social labour must be recurrently apportioned in specific quantities in order to ensure the survival of society as the whole which it is. In order to consistently adhere to this position, that the total distribution of social labour is allotted, in any sense, and does not merely emerge through the random agglomeration of uncoordinated and discrete acts of independent agents, Marx must tacitly posit the existence of society as a totality, rather than as existing as a dynamic aggregate. Rather than showing this to be the case, Marx merely presupposes that society exists as a unitary totality and that it sustains this unified form over time (this is, however merely the logical consequence of maintaining that society is an integrated structure and is not a dynamic aggregate. If the first claim is held to be true, then Marx is entitled to assert the second as its corollary and, given these presumptions, he concludes that the quantity of total social labour must be allocated according to a broadly delineated range of magnitudes in order to effect the perpetuation of any particular type of society as a unitary entity. Since Marx has failed to provide a convincing argument substantiating the implicit prior postulate which he must have taken to be self evidently true, he has begged the question against an opponent who would reject his silent premise. Marx’s argument may or may not be intuitively regarded as plausible by any person, but is, in either case, unconvincing, to his putative opponents as he has not supplied good reasons for taking it, his argument, to be true. The progression of our discussion has sufficiently advanced to the point such that it is able to provide the adequate resources which are necessary to enable the substantiation of Marx’s argument.

The field of classification of wholes consisting of individuated parts is exhausted by the dichotomy between unified totalities and agglomerations of pluralities which persists as such

²⁴ Marx, K, *Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann In Hannover*, Source: MECW, Volume 43, p.67, accessed from Marxist internet archive, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11.htm

through time. In order for a dynamic aggregate to retain its character as, and thus to exist as, the type of thing which it is, its constituent components cannot merely be genuine singular entities but must also be self subsistent, relative to both each other as well as to the composite which they are part of. At a prior point in the argument it was shown that human individuals are not adequately independent of each other to constitute sufficiently self subsistent singularities in order to be appropriately indifferent to their interrelations in order to constitute a dynamic aggregate. A constellation of persons, such as the economy, interacting with one another across an expanse of time thus cannot form a mere composite but must rather, in some yet to be specified sense, comprise an integrated totality. While Marx's claim that the total social labour must be allocated within a determinate proportional range in order for society as a whole to sustain itself, has not as of yet been definitively demonstrated, it has been shown that the reference to society as a whole maintaining itself as the type of thing it is, demarcates an entity which could plausibly exist, and thus the allotment of social labour has been demonstrated to be a process which could plausibly occur. The credence with which we approach Marx's claim that overall social labour is, in some sense, apportioned before being employed is augmented if we consider that, in order for society to exist as an integrated unity, in any precise manner, then total social labour would have to be distributed prior to its application. Once it has been established that an agglomeration of persons cannot constitute an aggregate, and thus that society must function as a unified whole, then Marx's tacit premise pertaining to his contention that the distribution of total labour operates as a natural law, the exact manifestation of which is subject to change but which cannot be abrogated, has been substantiated.

This argument does not provide any guidance for the demarcation of the boundaries of the totality which has, in some manner, distributed its overall labour in terms of its requirements. It has concomitantly also failed to generate criteria capable of delineating some unitary constellation of persons from another. This was not necessary in order to supply that validatory argument which proved able to vindicate Marx's tacit premise, that some society, however circumscribed from another group of persons, forms a totality and not a composite.

Since the economy appears to be the confluence of multiple, mutually, indifferent acts of production, exchange, circulation and consumption of goods both material and immaterial, a partisan of this model of the functioning of the market may legitimately contend that the onus of demonstrating their case should be borne by those contending the reverse of this. Such a proponent of the aggregative conception of the market might also plausibly maintain that the onus has thus far not been satisfied. It has merely been established that those combinations of persons which manifest our objective social bonds of dependence upon one another cannot be actualised as dynamic aggregates, but must rather acquire the character of being integrated structures. It has thus merely been shown that if the economy involves our mutual reliance upon one another then, and only then, would the market, despite deceptive appearances, not constitute a composite multiplicity of things.

The premise, from which the argument will proceed, that for the human species to survive objects of nature must be purposefully transformed into useful goods, that is labour must be performed, is genuinely self evident. It may further be admitted, that, in order to produce goods, which may be put to radically different uses as compared to each other, as the contemporary outcome of industrial production, heterogeneous kinds of productive work must be performed. If it is further conceded that the various dissimilar labour processes require inputs of produced, useful objects in order to take place and that this, in turn, is necessary for a market economy to exist then Marx's conclusion that a "social division of labour..." "...is a necessary condition for commodity production, although the converse does not hold", follows from these premises.²⁵ As labour is essential to the survival of the human species as well as to the individuals who constitute it, and since the economy may be incompletely but nevertheless accurately described as a manifestation of a social division of labour, it cannot operate as the cumulative sum of discrete acts, but rather forms a unified totality.

Our lack of mastery, as the human species, over the irreducible dependence on one another has, through the advance of the argument, revealed itself to be the absence of collective dominion over the complex, but interconnected and unified web that is the mutual reliance of

²⁵ Marx Capital: A Critique of Political *Economy*, p. 132.

the various instances of performance of human labour upon each other. Rather than existing as separate strands, placed neatly next to each other in parallel and so never touching, the threads of our lives interweave to form a complex configuration. This arrangement, as an integrated whole, just is the social division of labour in the form of “an organisation of production which has grown up naturally, a web which has been, and continues to be, woven behind the backs of the producers of commodities”²⁶.

Since we are always already caught in the sticky stands of our interlaced interdependence upon each other, the suggestion that we are not truly free but are trapped in a seemingly natural phenomenon of our own making appears to be eminently plausible. The only means to disentangle ourselves is to take on responsibility for the intertwining of our lives, to take on the role of ‘pattern giver’ to the organisation of production, that is to the always already unified division of labour.

The conscious collective regulation of production would not imprint the character of a social totality upon mutually distinct individuals, pursuing their unique life plans while reciprocally abstaining from interfering in one another’s affairs. Rather, this, the collective self determination of all, would seize control of a spontaneously emergent totality which presently imposes its overarching form upon our interrelations with each other. An important objection to thorough-going self determination, that it would enforce a common direction for the whole of a community upon every member of such a polity is thus rendered moot. The directionality of a complex division of labour emanates from the very character of the organisation of production as an integrated whole. It constitutes a minimal ontological attribute of the division of labour. Collective command over this blind process would merely subject it to democratic control. If it is our fate to occupy social totalities, and the features of polities which render them integrated unities intimately impact on the forms which our lives take, then the scope of self determination is grievously compromised if it does not extend to defining the character of the configuration of collective totalities. The process in which the progression of the argument

²⁶ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p.201.

undermines the legitimacy of the putatively cogent claim of a democratic state governing a market economy and a civil society has thus commenced.

A further reason for considering the market economy to be an integrated unity may be apprehended by interpreting Marx's demonstration that overall surplus value, and thus total profit, cannot originate in exchange as a quasi transcendental excavation of the conditions of possibility which explain the actuality of a given datum, the existence of positive total profit, which is not nugatory, that is equal to zero. To sell dear and buy cheap is, or may be, an adequate explanation for any discrete instance of profit making, however since the inputs of processes culminating in sales are commodities purchased on the market, or in Marx's terms as all "sellers are buyers and buyers are sellers",²⁷ all, or at least the overwhelming proportion of, profits would be counter balanced and thus negated by losses. If profits were exclusively derived from disproportional acts of exchange then, if the market operates as an agglomeration of discrete acts, and not, in some sense, as a totality, then the disproportionalities should cancel each other out producing an overall result of no net profit acquired on the level of society as a whole. Exchange of equivalent ratios of value also produces negligible, if any, profit since "where equality exists there is no gain".²⁸ This entitled Marx to conclude both that the given fact of positive total profit cannot arise, or be significantly augmented through, the circulation of commodities and money but must originate in production, and that the potential for overall profit, or in Marx's terms "social surplus value," must constitute a total amount which precedes its distribution, its "division among capitalist revenues".²⁹ Latent total profit, or overall surplus value as the undivided form of capitalist revenue, be actuated as a unified quantum as a prerequisite for its apportionment thus rendering the existence of non negligible general social profit possible.

If people are, in their initial condition, distinct from each other, such that this constituted their natural state, then interaction with each other can logically only take one of two forms. Either the volitional capacities of individuals are subjected to the imposed dominion of another's, or

²⁷ Marx, *Capital: A Critic of Political Economy*, p. 265.

²⁸ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 261.

²⁹P. Mattick, 'Class, Capital and Crisis' in Taylor and R Bellofiore (eds) *The Constitution of Capital: Essays on Volume 1 of Capital*, Palgrave Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England 2002

several others' alien purposes, or the synchronisation of our interactions is attained through consensually agreeing to cooperate with one another. The market economy appears to institute a social form which operates according to the premises that self subsistent agents freely enter into uncoerced accords and thus appears to confirm that the quintessential attribute of the human individual is to be self sufficient in relation to his fellow individuals. It has been shown that the impression that individuals can enter into free agreement, while being otherwise isolated from each other, must be fallacious. We are instead interlinked through labouring in a particular branch of an interconnected social division of labour.

The general precondition permitting the erroneous façade of individuals as appearing as radically discrete from each other, has been demonstrated to be the fact that integrated totalities also are static aggregates of distinct things. The conclusion that a unitary organisation of production constituted a composite, persisting as such through the course of time would, of necessity, be predicated upon the conflation of the significance of the static and dynamic aggregative properties of wholes. The exact conditions allowing irreducibly social production processes to take the form of private labour has hitherto not been discussed.

Marx has identified the adequate condition enabling our immutable connection to each other, arising from objective dependence upon each other, to manifest itself in the inverted and thus perverse form of a "relationship of reciprocal isolation and foreignness."³⁰ The existence of private property, together with a correlative sphere of mutual non interference enforced by a public authority such as the state, are only able to exist as we are able to tacitly express our reliance upon each other through the mediation of external things which can be owned as private property, yet which can also be alienated and become the property of another.³¹

Although, in a market economy labour is performed in a private and independent manner, for example, for a specific firm, this labour does not produce either all of the goods necessary to sustain the lives of all of the individuals engaged in this particular work, nor concomitantly are sufficient goods produced to ensure the survival of the dependants of the labourers, nor are all

³⁰ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 182.

³¹ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 182.

of the components necessary for the maintenance of the continuation of the production process provided by this ongoing process itself. Any given production process is, thus impossible if regarded as being an independent, singular entity.

A production process may only take place over a sufficiently extended duration in the context of the above described social division of labour in which both essential inputs to the production process, as well as the requisites for the subsistence of the workers employed in the aforesaid process, are supplied by other nodes, whether individuals or enterprises, in the web of production. This illustrates the reciprocal dependence of the production processes upon each other, and demonstrates that a market economy can only function due to the existence of a division of labour.

It is only the existence of regular sales of essential input goods which permits production to occur privately. The recurrent cycle of purchase and sale thus renders the widespread dispersal of private ownership of property together with the continuous production necessary for the continuous survival of society conciliable. The ubiquity of purchase and sale has thus allowed both the expansion of the market, as well as the potential diminution of relations of direct personal domination and subjection.

The attribute of the commodity which enables the flow of the continuous supply of goods, in a more or less uninterrupted fashion, is that commodities exchange with each other or against the general equivalent, money.³² In order to be able to purchase those commodities, which are required for the continuation of some production process, the goods emanating from the production process must themselves be successfully proffered for sale on the market.

Such products must therefore have the attribute of being useful to others and not merely to their immediate producers, and must also have the distinctive characteristic of commodities of having the capacity to replace, or rather to take the place of some other equivalent which has a completely heterogeneous material form to the good in question. In Marxian terminology

³² Marx's derivation of the form of existence of a social product as money will not be discussed in this dissertation since it is irrelevant to our purposes. Either the reality of money or the commodity will be taken as indicating the existence of the other.

goods must have use values which enables them to exchange against each other to have exchange values.

Marx correctly discerned that in order for a production process to persist over an expansive duration of time, the goods emerging from this process must not merely be imprinted with the character of being commodities. Rather they must have been produced in order to be sold, as this is an essential prerequisite for ensuring, or at least optimising the possibility, that the necessary inputs which enable the continuation of the given production process will be procured through purchase.

While a private producer is not directly subordinated to another person but rather is able to go about his business without arbitrary interference, and thus theoretically has the right to freely dispose of his property in any way he sees fit, should such a person cease to produce use values which may adequately serve as the support for commodities to exchange against each other, then the production process which lies within the purview of this individual's volitional command would cease to function. The overwhelming majority of persons engaged in production have no option but to produce commodities.

Marx recognised that the general emancipation from personal domination was facilitated, and indeed could only occur due to the contemporary form of appearance of irreducibly social labour as discrete and private labour processes. Individuals are thus able to appear as "persons who are independent of each other"³³ Contrary to the apparent justification of the notion that human beings exist as self subsistent individual entities which enter into indifferent relations with each other, which the very existence of the market economy appears to corroborate, Marx has demonstrated that the seemingly independent person is a contingent historical product, and that the production processes engaged in by such agents are merely modes of expression of the apportionment of total social labour. Persons are able to exist independently of each other, and thus the abolition of dependency (in the form of domination) has been rendered possible only as a result of the mediation of the essential articulations between the plurality of

³³ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 182.

labour processes, which constitutes the social division of labour through alienable commodities. The materialisation of the social bond as a world of things interceding between people has, as its corollary, the potential abrogation of personal subjection. Commodity fetishism thus enables the attainment of the end of direct despotic rule over others. As the existence of the market is predicated upon the inability of agents to directly posit their association with each other, but rather agents require the interposition of commodities in order to seemingly establish their, in actuality logically prior, social interrelations, such persons are not necessarily directly bound to any other. This allows for the theoretical termination of all direct personal connections and thus of direct relations of domination. In short the intercession of the commodity renders possible the end of all direct relations, and thus also enables the dissolution of direct dominion and subjection. The mediation of the objective social bond by the commodity form is thus both compatible with, and thus may in particular circumstances prove to be an enabling condition, of various forms of liberation from those types of social subjection which are manifestations of direct domination. The comprehensive advancement of negative liberty and the subjection of society to commodity fetishism are sufficiently congruent to be virtually synonymous with each other.

The final veil concealing the sham character of the independent individual has thus been ripped away. Rather than the attainment of maximal negative liberty constituting the culmination of a process rendered possible by the logical priority of individuals over their social relations, it is revealed as the corollary of an unfree form of production. There appears to be scant basis for referring to the private production of commodities as unfree, for it has previously been conceded that “commodity producers are free individuals who are not subjected to the personal domination of anyone. They own their individual consciousness and will”.³⁴

Whereas indirectly social production purports to be properly private, and only to acquire a social dimension after the production of commodities has reached its completion, the very fact that it is commodities which are intentionally produced, is an encroachment of the social

Carrera, I: *Knowing Capital Today. Using Capital Critically*, trans, Kosloff, L, Imago Mundi, Buenos Aires, 2007 p50

domain into the private sphere itself. The commodity is both the extrusion of the social domain, which improperly impinges upon the realm of private affairs, and the constitutive precondition which enables the execution of private acts of production seemingly isolated from each other. As Carrera recognises it is compulsory for the seemingly independent producer to attempt to reconstitute its social bond in the form of commodities offered up for sale, while the type of use value produced is in principle utterly discretionary, in fact the objects flowing forth from any production process must genuinely satisfy some social need and must receive the imprimatur of being commodities.³⁵

The significance of a multiplicity of acts of production in which people impose their purposes upon compliant material is thus reversed. Human mastery over the immediate process of production is revealed in its unified form to constitute “a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite”.³⁶

It has been demonstrated that in order to be normatively differentiated from authoritarian command, freedom must be regarded as the equivalent of individual self determination. The capacity for freedom, which is taken to correspond to the potential for self determination, of commodity producers is, thus acutely compromised in the context of commodity production. Since the character of the fundamental social role which enables liberty to be instantiated, in a fallacious form, is externally imparted upon all those who engage in commodity exchange as a merely given facticity and thus the proportion of commodities are induced to passively allow “social and natural processes ... to count as a sufficient guide to what... (they)... should do”³⁷.

This is the equivalent to being coerced to subject one’s will to the authority of another in two senses. One’s nature, either as subject to another or as commodity producer, is extraneously provided to oneself, and thus one cannot give oneself one’s own purpose and character in a thoroughgoing sense. As a corollary of this, and of greater normative importance than the mere

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 175.

³⁷ Patten, p. 70.

fact of lack of mere self determination, is that one is impelled to “stop at what is given,”³⁸ and thus encounters a seemingly impervious obstacle to the process of reason giving.

Commodity fetishism cannot thus be justified since it disrupts the process of justification itself. This abortion of the provision of reasons to vindicate actions is not merely a provisional interruption, and so is directly isomorphic to the termination of prescriptive reasoning which is inflicted upon the recursive procedure of justification by acts of compulsion. The homology between authoritarian coercion and the mediation of our social bonds by commodities extends to the cardinal attribute which renders violent dominion over another wrongful. The elevation of extraneous but contingently given facticity, that is features of the world which could be otherwise, to a ‘sufficient reason’ for action, just is the aspect of coercion which renders it illicit. It is in this precise regard that commodity fetishism is identical to coercively imposed command over another and as such should be considered to be a form of authoritarian rule, a type of domination which is enforced in the absence of a dominating subject.

It has previously been demonstrated that the intercession of commodities between ourselves is conducive to the promotion of the beguiling but deceptive illusion that we are genuinely independent of each other, and thus that the market economy is a dynamic aggregate constituted by the accidental relations of discrete, and so separable entities. It has further been illustrated that this form of appearance of the market economy is erroneous. One’s capacity to give oneself one’s own character is, to some extent, dependant upon an accurate assessment of the situation confronting oneself. The wrongfulness of lying arises as a consequence of the deceitful provision of misinformation, culminating in the deformation of the justificatory process of reason giving. An analogous distortion is induced by the fallacious but convincing appearance of unalterability, which the self perpetuation of commodity fetishism encourages. This particular form of distortion of the process of reason-giving is particularly egregious, as it fosters a further misrecognition pertaining to the very nature of individuals, as well as to the constitution of our connections to each other.

³⁸ Patten, p. 65.

At a prior point in the argument it was demonstrated that only individual self determination, and not freedom as acting in accordance with one's immediate disposition, could meaningfully maintain itself as conceptually distinct from its opposing pole, and thus was the only candidate worthy of the appellation of the standard of freedom. It was then illustrated that thorough-going self determination constituted an aggregation of and was thus a manifestation of individual autonomy, and so, although it curtailed negative liberty, was a society which accorded with the above described norm of freedom. It originally, but erroneously, appeared as if contrasting the democratic governance of a market economy, consistent with the rule of law, with the comprehensive mastery over dependence with regards to the adjudicatory touchstone of freedom as individual self determination, would produce an inconclusive result. Although it was recognised that the extension of negative liberty as reciprocal non interference, did not itself constitute the actualisation of individual self determination, it was provisionally postulated that the flourishing of the freedom of choice, and of consensually binding contractual agreements, did not preclude individual autonomy. It was further recognised that liberal governance provided adequate (and possibly the optimal) safeguards for protecting individual freedom of choice, and thus the essential condition of possibility for individual self determination from the capriciousness of potentially transitory majority decisions which could threaten to impinge upon the ambit of negative liberty and thus the scope for autonomy. It was further recognised that a deflated and enfeebled variant of collective self determination, the democratic state governing civil society in accordance with the rule of law, was consistent with the thorough-going entrenchment of negative liberty as a foundational principle of any given polity. It was for these reasons that the arbitration between the relevant prescriptive archetypes was adjudged to be indeterminate.

A cursory examination of the social form of a society which exemplifies the norm of negative liberty, suggests that it would be in conformity with the more adequate standard of individual self determination. This is not the case. As has been demonstrated, a superficial assessment would fail to discern that the abrogation of direct dominion over oppressed subordinates only enters the domain of practical achievability due to the subsumption of previously or potentially contiguous human relations under the mediation of the interrelations between material goods.

In short, the elimination of personal oppression is rendered possible through the dissolution of relations of personal reliance upon each other. These are not truly annulled, however, but are rather refracted through the domain of alienable objects to appear as the dependence of distinct production processes dependence upon commodities originating from multiple external sources. This has facilitated or at the very least, enabled the extension of negative liberty. Since negative liberty is not a thorough-going instantiation of freedom, its extension is not intrinsically worthwhile, however if it had been adequately demonstrated, as initially appeared to be the case, that this advancement was conducive to greater individual self determination then the potential continuous augmentation of an already enlarged sphere of mutual non-interference would have proven to be of auxiliary value when assessed according to the standard of freedom.

The derogation of direct dominion and the concomitant progression of negative liberty are, however predicated upon the extension of commodity fetishism throughout the economic domain. The claim that the governance of civil society in accordance with the principle of negative liberty could also exemplify, or at least allow for the flourishing of individual self determination, is fatally impaired due to the dependence of mutual non-interference on the mediated and indirect character of economic relations, and thus, upon the intercession of the world of commodities in order to express human social bonds.

The manifestation of reciprocal dependence upon each other in the form of the interposition of commodities between persons is inimical to, and so inhibits the attainment of self determination in either its individual or collective guises. To have the character of commodity producer imposed upon oneself is akin to having one's potential to give oneself one's own character violently constrained. This is primarily due to the termination of the process of justificatory reason-giving which is both the cause of the wrongfulness of personal compulsions as well as what commodity fetishism has previously revealed itself to be. The integrity of the normative domain is impugned whenever the contingent existence of things is permitted to arrogate to itself the role of sufficient ground for action, which may only properly be accorded to reasons arrived at through a retrogressive enquiry into the sources of justification.

The process of reason-giving is disrupted whenever a person, who for this very reason cannot be autonomous, is compelled to allow the mere givenness of the accidental character of an organisation of overall social production to count as sufficient reason for action as we must in order to survive under conditions of commodity fetishism. Whereas the liberal state is able to extirpate personal domination, since it requires the mediation of interpersonal relations by things, it is not a suitable agent capable of abolishing the impersonal domination of our mutual dependence, manifesting itself in the material form of interconnection between things. Just as one remains under alien guidance or external direction when the function of one's understanding or conscience is delegated to a pastor or book,³⁹ so one fails to emerge from socially "self imposed tutelage,"⁴⁰ and so society, as a constellation of individuality, may be said to remain in self-incurred immaturity when either other persons or objects usurp the grounds of supplying reasons for action for potentially autonomous subjects. The commodity form has now appropriated this role for itself, with falsely independent persons and spuriously self sufficient private enterprises falling under its subjection. The dawning of enlightenment has thus not yet commenced. Our capacity to utilise our understanding without the guidance of another has for the most part been rendered defective as a consequence of the durability of the intercession of commodities between ourselves. Since commodity fetishism promotes the impression that the liberation of individuals from their fetters of despotic dependence is due to the ontological attribute of the individual as self sufficient, and as logically prior to its relations, the interposition of commodities between people has proven conducive to the deterioration of our ability to apprehend our true nature. The inadequacy of our understanding to perceive the truth of things renders the process of justificatory reason-giving inherently defective, and our aptitude to operate as self responsible agents discerning how we ought to act is, although not by any means abolished, negatively impacted upon and thus diminished.

³⁹ I. Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?', in *Practical Philosophy* trans Gregor, MJ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1798, 1996 p.126.

⁴⁰ *ibid*

Commodity fetishism is thus antipathetic to self determination. A polity in which either individual self determination has become ubiquitous, or, one in which commodity fetishism holds sway over our social relations, are mutually exclusive to and so incompatible with each other. The opposites are in principle non-reconcilable. As definitively demonstrated above, the authoritarian antipode of individual self determination is repugnant to the normative standard of freedom, and should thus be prescriptively assessed as an improper and wrongful form of social interaction.

Since commodity fetishism is conceptually counterposed to freedom, in a manner directly homologous with coercion, it must properly be regarded as constituting a variant of authoritarian rule over individuals. Whereas contractual relations appear to facilitate voluntary cooperation, and commodity producers are seemingly accorded full control over their capacity for volition, this is not the case. The production of goods as commodities is a contingent, but within the bounds of contemporary society, peremptory imperative, categorically foisted upon all. The production of commodities constitutes a precondition for personal survival.

Notwithstanding the formal definition of the right to property as the legal entitlement to either properly utilise some specified thing in a variety of ways, or to misuse it in actuality, on the vast majority of proprietors of production processes, or rather of the objective prerequisites which enable such production processes to occur, while being formally capacitated to use their property as they see fit, are not in actuality socially empowered to mismanage the utilisation of the means of production in order to produce goods which are not fit to fulfil the function of commodities. The options of either failing to produce use values per se, or of producing use values which do not serve as the basis for exchangeability are choices without substance, sham alternatives which are in reality nonexistent.

Since the despotic mastery of generalised commodity production over society is coterminous with the reciprocal indifference of each to all, that is the reign of thoroughgoing negative liberty, the liberal state which deploys its capacity for violence only in the restrained manner of ensuring that consensually agreed upon contracts are binding upon the parties which enter therein, merely presents the façade of the guarantor of freedom but is instead the protector of

the of the mastery of things over human social relations, and thus over persons themselves. When the surface appearance of the market economy is penetrated, it stands exposed as a mode of social coordination which is utterly inimical to individual self determination, and thus to freedom per se. It is therefore illegitimate to defend the extension of negative liberty even as an instrumental good which enables, but does not ensure, the expression of individual autonomy.

It has been previously illustrated that in order to preserve the preconditions for the autonomy of all, it is adequate to safeguard the freedoms of association, expression and political participation. It may appear as if the defence of negative liberty beyond this point is excessive to, but by that very fact sufficient for, the shielding of the prerequisites for freedom from harm. The illusory appearance that the protection of a superfluous ambit of negative liberty is consistent with the safeguarding of individual self determination has been definitively demonstrated to be false. Mastery over dependence and thus the elimination of commodity fetishism has proven itself to be the only social form which may legitimately be considered to accord with the standard of individual self determination, and thus to genuinely warrant the description of being a free society.

Chapter 3:

Whereas it may be conceded that a market economy is not reconcilable with the normative standard of freedom, as properly conceived, it may nevertheless be legitimately maintained that the market is historically unique in two senses which render it preferable to all previously existing modes of coordination of total social production.

The first of these has already been alluded to but has not been exhaustively detailed. Whereas producers, such as serfs, were compelled to labour beyond the duration necessary in order to secure for themselves the means of subsistence (by such practises as legally imposing upon unfree persons the obligation to perform duties upon the land belonging to their lord), within the ambit of the market, coercion, arising for any purpose other than holding to account the recalcitrant party to a contract, which was properly and consensually entered into, and

enforced by any individual other than a properly delegated representative of the democratic and liberal state empowered to utilise force in accordance with the tenets of the rule of law, is proscribed and thus to directly impose the requirement that persons work for oneself is impermissible. It has already been conceded that the market economy could potentially provide the basis for the abolition of the direct domination of some persons by others. It has thus already been accepted that the forcible infliction of the necessity to labour for another, could at least in principle, be terminated without threatening the operation of the market economy. It thus appears as if the substance of the point that, under a market economy, a person cannot be compelled to labour for another, has been conceded. This is not the case.

A superficial examination of Marx's conception of exploitation under capitalism, would suggest that what is at issue is the veiled lack of fairness pertaining to the distribution of the products of labour, whether use values (goods) or value per se, between workers and capitalists. This interpretation of the notion of exploitation would assert that workers are not paid sufficient amounts corresponding to the wealth which they produce. While the working class may be systematically cheated out of that which it is due, each individual worker would have freely entered into an employment contract on this understanding, and thus, while this economic system operates in an unjust manner, it does not require the existence of coerced labour to continue to operate.⁴¹

It will be illustrated below that this interpretation of Marx is erroneous, and that capitalism is premised upon indirectly forced work in which a determinate class of persons are continuously induced to subject their own volition to the wills of others.⁴²

It is important to nevertheless re-emphasise that individuals are not actually compelled to accept the yoke of perpetual subjugation to the capricious purpose of a specific other individual. It is in this precise sense that the exponent of the market economy is correct, all individuals are free of each other qua precise persons. If, and only if, the meaning of liberty is exhausted in the notion that one is not violently forced to obey another, can a member of the proletariat be said to be

⁴¹ What is Capitalism Adam Buick and John Crump 1987 Page 12

⁴² The Alternative to Capitalism – Adam Buick and John Crump 1987 Page 3

free. Persons are not, or at least need not be, in a submissive relationship to those who previously arrogated to themselves the vaunted position of superiority on an array of spurious grounds, such as those of race, sexual orientation, nobility of birth, gender and numerous others, to those of supposedly lower rank. The market can accommodate this version of a thorough-going egalitarianism, and for this reason, permits the negation of directly imposed or forced labour.

A proponent of the market economy would be entitled to maintain that even though a specific stratum of persons delineated in some sense may, through circumstances outside of their control, be compelled to recurrently but for a delimited and definite duration, subject themselves to obey the reasonable commands of others, then, this does not constitute a regression to illicit forms of domination, but is, perhaps an unfortunate, variant of the expressions which binding, voluntary agreements may take. It will be demonstrated below that the conditions which induce persons to temporarily concede their capacity to perform labour to the use of another, arises due to the impersonal dominion of commodity fetishism over society, and⁴³, as such, is a consequence and manifestation of the authoritarian abrogation of autonomy.

Under conditions of generalised commodity production, individuals are mutually reliant upon each other, as it is only through the development of a complex social division of labour that they are able to obtain the prerequisites for their survival. For the purposes of this discussion, it is merely necessary to accept the self evident posit, that, overall and on average, an isolated person would not be self reliant and that under current circumstances persons are predominantly dependent upon access to commodities in order to satisfy their subsistence needs. While exceptions may exist, they do not alter the total picture and may thus be disregarded. The proprietors of the material means which enable production processes to continue over an expansive time are assured access to a self renewing supply of commodities. These commodities may be traded for others through consensual transactions on the market

⁴³ The 'impersonal dominion of commodity fetishism over society' just is the isomorphism of commodity fetishism with the logic of the violent disruption of processes of reasoned justification while acknowledging that this is not imposed upon individuals through the actions of another person.

and the aforementioned proprietors are guaranteed that, barring loss of access to ownership over the means of production, their survival requirements will be secured. This illustrates that the necessary condition enabling one to survive without subjecting oneself to another's command is that one must be able to, on a recurrent and continuous basis, exchange commodities for money, and ultimately for other commodities, on a sufficient scale on the market, and that in order to be empowered to do so, proprietorship over the means of production and thus control over and practical ownership over the process of production, is a prerequisite for this.

Those individuals who lack proprietorship of the means of production are not assured of a steady stream of alienable commodities which could be regularly sold in order to ensure the perpetual supply of the conditions for survival for such persons. This implies that a scission exists between the survival and luxury needs of that specific group of people, which does not own the means of production, and those objects of use adequate for satiating those needs. Such a gap does not exist for a person who is capable of trading the always readily available commodities at their disposal for the use values which would satisfy their needs. That determinate class of persons, which is devoid of access to possession of a self rejuvenating stock of commodities as a consequence of being dispossessed from the means of production, is stripped of any possibility of independently sustaining their own existence, and are thus subjected to absolute poverty, "poverty not as shortage but as total exclusion of objective wealth."⁴⁴

Both the proprietors of the means of production and the proletariat are detached from their mutual dependence to each other, and both groups of persons are subjected to the interposition of material objects as a requirement of seemingly establishing their, in actuality preexistent, social bonds. The members of both classes of persons are thus severed from direct interrelations with each other. This mutual isolation and alienation from direct dependence manifests itself in diametrically opposite forms for the proprietor of the means of production,

⁴⁴ K. Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundation of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, 1973, Trans Martin Midous, Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London, England p. 295.

as compared to a proletarian reduced to absolute poverty. A member of the capitalist class, as owner of the means of production, is accorded a sham self subsistence in the form of the assured access to a continuous and self regenerating supply of commodities.

While commodities in actuality mediate between persons, the capitalist appears as master over the goods produced in the production process which he seems to control. Rather than being reliant on any other person, the capitalist is imbued with the seemingly natural attribute of being thorough-goingly independent, and as having commodities subject to his volitional control. Whereas we are aware that he must perform his function as overseer of a production process, from which commodities of necessity emerge, and as such is not truly autonomous, the existence of the capitalist does appear assured regardless of the contingent economic relations which he may enter into. The capitalist's economic interconnection with others does not necessarily, (within a strictly delineated range, the emergence of which is only possible due to the prior existence of commodity fetishism and thus of objective, non-accidental human interdependencies), impact upon his capacity to maintain himself in a seemingly self subsistent fashion. The false form of sham atomicity may be bestowed upon the capitalist through the command over a process which exudes commodities, which is granted to the capitalist as proprietor over the means of production. The illusory appearance of independent individuality is thus potentially reinforced through the precise character of the capitalist's relationship to commodity fetishism. The capitalist is genuinely granted the boon of an attenuated form of self sufficiency, which may thus create the impression that singular persons are comprehensively self-subsistent and independent, in accordance with their fundamental nature. The capitalist is, at least in principle, able to stand aloof from his contingent economic relations, which thus, again within a circumscribed ambit, appear as distinct from his essential character as a self-subsistent commodity producer. Qua proprietor of the means of production, and concomitantly as commodity producer, the capitalist is thus able to exist distinctly from, at least certain, of his relations with other economic agents.

The non proprietors of the means of production are not transfigured into independent economic agents, whose constituent character is assured, and who can thus be unaffected by

their relations to other such economic agents. The working class as a whole is rendered reliant upon the proprietors of the means of production for its survival as the proletariat as a class is denuded from objective wealth and the means of ensuring its continued existence. The form of actualisation of mutual dependency under commodity fetishism is thus, that reciprocal reliance upon each other is polarised into the dichotomous antipodes of the attenuated self sufficient independence of the proprietors of the means of production, (objective dependence manifests in an inverted form, as absolute self-subsistence in relation to the capitalist class) and the asymmetrical reliance of the class of proletarians upon the owners of the means of production (material mutual interconnection here takes the reverse form of its opposite as well in the shape of sheer, disproportionate dependence of some on others).

The self regeneration of a supply of commodities which imputes upon the capitalist the status of being a relatively self subsistent economic agent, is itself dependent upon the continuous emergence of commodities from a production process. The continuous emanation of an adequate quantum of commodities requires the persistence of the particular production process under discussion, which in turn depends upon the collective exercise of labour. The production process is thus also a labour process, a thread in the intertwined web that is the division of labour. While the proprietor of the means of production is thus not reliant upon any individual proletarian, such a person must purchase and employ the ability to labour of those who are both legally entitled to sell this innate capacity, and are thus the profferors of the commodity labour power who could be free legal subjects.

Overall and on average, the sellers of labour power, must either be deprived of the capacity to trade any other commodity for the general equivalent, money, on the market, or, must merely be able to exchange sufficiently trifling quanta of commodities over a duration of time, that they are, for all intents and purposes, rendered reliant upon the sale of labour power in order to survive.⁴⁵

The system of production in which the worker constitutes a part of the means of production, owned, as a constituent part of the means of production, by a proprietor of the production

⁴⁵ Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* p. 272.

process, will not be considered since it is precisely the extension of negative liberty to all, and thus the abolition of direct subjugation, which is being compared to collective self determination. A proletarian may thus not be directly coerced to provide labour for any particular member of the capitalist class, yet, since they are deprived of a self renewing supply of commodities, proletarians must, on a recursive basis, attempt to exchange their capacity to work with some capitalist, in order to acquire sufficient money to purchase adequate goods whose use would satisfy the subsistence requirements of such a person and their dependants.

In order for the production process to sustainably exude commodities out of itself, each proletarian must labour for a sufficient length of time to cover the total expenditure of their wages or salaries. They must also labour for an adequate length of time that the proprietor of the means of production is able to sustain the lifestyle to which he has become accustomed, and finally must, in addition to the above, work for an appropriate length of time in order to encompass the costs of the outlay expended upon the means of production themselves. If any profit is to be made, the excess labour of the proletariat must prove adequate to account for this, as well.

To gain the opportunity to engage in the labour necessary to cover the total costs of the means of subsistence, the profferor of labour power must exchange this commodity on the terms that labour in excess of this necessary amount will be performed. The reason that such unfavourable contractual conditions may be imposed upon the proletariat, is as a result of the unilateral relation of dependence that pertains between the proletariat and the proprietors of the means of production. Whereas the proletarian is, on average, over a sufficiently extended duration of time, dependent on procuring some employment from a capitalist firm in order to procure the prerequisites for their survival, a member of the capitalist class is not, or need not be, similarly reliant upon any particular employee. "Where capital rules . . . the workers absolute labour time is posited for him as condition of being allowed to work the necessary labor time, i.e. of

being allowed to realise the labour time necessary for the maintenance of his labour capacity in use values for himself.”⁴⁶

The actualisation of absolute poverty renders the optional character of the pursuance of contractual agreements between members of the working and capitalist classes nugatory or void for the proletarian. To fail to acquire the means of subsistence does not constitute a viable option. Whereas the attenuated self sufficiency of the proprietor of the means of production is a practical actuality, the mutual independence and equality of commodity owners conceals the previously described relationship of asymmetrical reliance when the commodity which is exchanged is labour power. In Marx’s terms, “equally matched commodity owners” do not confront each other, rather “through the mediation of this sale and purchase it disguises the real transaction, and the perpetual dependence which is constantly renewed by presenting it as nothing more than a financial relationship.”⁴⁷

It is precisely the imbalance in the degree of dependency between those who own the means of production and those who do not, which enables the recurrence of the regular renewal of contractual agreements which, tacitly, stipulate that necessary labour may only be engaged in on condition that surplus labour, for the proprietors of the means of production, is performed by the individual proletarian. The voluntary and consensual semblance which attaches to the contractual agreements, which allows capitalist accumulation to constitute a self renewing process, is thus spurious. Hidden beneath the outer shell of free agreement is the reality of extortion, the silent but implicit stipulations necessarily incorporated into employment contracts unilaterally favour one of the parties to the disadvantage of the other. “Capitalist production therefore reproduces in the course of its own process the separation between labour-power and the conditions of labour. It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the conditions under which the worker is exploited. It incessantly forces him to sell his labour-power in order to live, and enables the capitalist to purchase labour-power in order that he may enrich himself.”⁴⁸ Although surplus labour is not coercively extracted from the proletariat,

⁴⁶ Marx, *Grundrisse* p. 533.

⁴⁷ Marx, *Capital A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 162, 1062, 1064.

⁴⁸ Marx, *Capital A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 723

the inequality of dependence between the capitalist class and the proletariat, which is the constant context of contract formation, renders the silent requirement that surplus labour be performed the equivalent of a forcible imposition. "It is no longer a mere accident that capitalist and worker confront each other in the market as buyer and seller. It is the alternating rhythm of the process itself which throws the worker back onto the market again and again as a seller of his labour-power and continually transforms his own product into a means by which another man can purchase him. In reality, the worker belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist. His economic bondage is at once mediated through, and concealed by, the periodic renewal of the act by which he sells himself, his change of masters, and the oscillations in the market-price of his labour."⁴⁹

Wage labour is thus not the voluntary performance of services for another in exchange for pay, it is rather indirectly forced work. The systematic exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist class is not predicated upon relations of direct dominion. It, however, has as its enabling condition, the authoritarian subjection of social dependence to the mediation of the domain of commodities. The actualisation of the reciprocal reliance of all upon each other under conditions of commodity fetishism bifurcates into the antithetical poles of partial self subsistence of the proprietors of the processes of production, and the asymmetrical dependence of the proletariat upon the capitalist class. These diametrically opposed forms of actualisation of the objective social bonds can each only exist as a consequence of the existence of the other. This imbalanced relationship, which advances the interest of one class of person at the expense of the other, is concealed by the very interposition of commodities between persons which is its condition of emergence. The very absence of direct compulsion enables the generalised imposition of surplus labour through extortion, arising from asymmetrical reliance of the proletariat upon the capitalist class, to appear as the contingent outcome of consensual agreements.

Chapter 4:

⁴⁹ Marx, *Capital A Critique of Political Economy*, p. 723

In response to the argument detailed above, the proponent of the market economy may attempt to deny the logical consequences of the authoritarian subjection of society to commodity fetishism and of the correlative systematic extortion of surplus labour from the proletariat by pointing to the sui generis attribute of the market, which, even though directionally orientated to the extent that its character as a totality is maintained over the course of time, is not, as distinct from all previous unitary organisations of production, a teleologically oriented social form.

It is precisely this feature of capitalism, not of the absolute absence of collective purpose but its unique capacity to organise production without necessarily positing either an overall social aim or the necessary pyramidal ordering of social strata in terms of rank, which enables it to prove conducive to the autonomisation of civil society from the state. Since the market does not appear to require a general collective purpose in order to operate, its functioning renders the elimination of a conscious corporate end possible. While not a sufficient condition for the appearance and development of a neutral state capable of adopting an impartial stance to a variety of potentially contradictory instantiations of the good life, the existence of the market economy, as the historically singular form of actualisation of a complex, integrated division of labour, which can continue to sustain its operation without depending upon the imposition of a social goal upon society, is the condition without which the emergence of indifferent collective authority could not occur. In order for negative liberty as reciprocal non interference to become a reality, such a form of impersonal and objective governance of public affairs would be essential. It has been previously demonstrated, however, that the comprehensive extension of negative liberty is not of normative value in itself but could only be of derivative worth if it had been shown that it was suitable to the promotion of individual self determination.

Since liberal governance necessarily corresponds with commodity fetishism, it requires the curtailment and distortion of self determination, of either an individual or a collective sort. The proponent of the market economy is thus attempting to defend an untenable position. The notion that either acting in accordance with one's immediate dispositions or the validation of mutual non interference as safeguarding the potential for self determination, could provide

justifiable arguments in favour of the liberal state, the market, and civil society have been refuted. Negative liberty is thus not an adequate ground for affirming the abolition of a teleologically oriented collectivity. The only possible manner in which such an argument could proceed, would be by committing a petitio.

If one were to affirm a specific political arrangement as free on the basis that it maximized the scope of the ambit of negative liberty enjoyed by all, and thus endorsed the absence of the obligatory pursuit of a collective social end or goal, this would be consistent, however, the premise upon which this reasoning is based has been definitively discredited. If one were to both support the lack of general collective purpose on the basis that this enables the maximal realisation of negative liberty, and was also to advocate thorough-going negative liberty as it would allow a society to exist without the existence of a collective goal, then this argument would be circular and invalid.

The shared pursuit of a democratically determined objective just is what collective self determination, (which has been demonstrated to be a mode of manifestation of individual autonomy), amounts to. The exclusion of variants of collective purpose, which would establish direct relations between persons as pertaining to issues concerning the apportionment of labour, by the market, rather than enabling the freedom of all, precludes the possibility of genuine collective self determination. Rather than the absence of a collectively determined and intentionally prescribed purpose, which would be binding upon all members of a polity, empowering all to pursue their particular, distinctive conceptions of the good life and thus maximally extending the scope of negative liberty and so concomitantly allowing for the paramount attainment of individual freedom possible, the lack of a shared project, formulated through the completion of a process in which all may, in principle, participate equally, which could transcend the mediation of our dependence on each other by the realm of mere objects, instead signifies the continued confinement of society itself, as well as of all those who compose it, within the narrow parameters of the cage of impersonal authoritarian rule of things over persons.

The non-existence of an injunction, compelling the populace of a liberally governed community from jointly engaging in the pursuance of a common objective, does not emancipate a particular class of such persons, the proletariat, from being induced to carry out indirectly imposed surplus labour, (that is work in excess of that necessary to reproduce the equivalent quantum of commodities which could be exchanged for the corresponding supply of goods required to satisfy the subsistence needs of those performing the work and their dependants), for a distinct stratum of the population, namely, those who own the means of production and thus obtain access to an ever renewing source of tradable products.

While the apparent normative advantage which appears to be accordable to that type of society, which is genuinely devoid of a collective purpose, has been shown to be nugatory, it will be demonstrated below that either a corporate purpose is imposed upon all those trapped within the overarching logic of commodity fetishism and capital accumulation, without their consent, or, at the very least, that there are good reasons for supposing that the ordinary operation of the capitalist system foists an alien end onto all who fall under its sway.

In order to illustrate that capitalism, considered as a unitary dynamic perpetuating itself as the overarching organization of production which it is, constitutes an aimless mechanism, which is nevertheless an end oriented process, as will be asserted below, it is necessary to show that the notion that an intrinsically purposive type of thing, an innately teleological entity, which does not require that an agent intentionally ascribe an aim to an object in the manner of its use, or depend upon a subject to externally impress the attribute of being purposive onto the form of an artefact through its design and manufacture, is not conceptually self contradictory, and that there is a sufficiently convincing postulate which would logically require the positing of the actual existence of internally purposive entities in order to adequately address the widespread intuition that these kinds of things do not subsist in reality. In short, it will be crucial to demonstrate that the concept of purpose is not reducible to that of an end agent imputed to an object by an agent, and that we are legitimately entitled to maintain that entities which accord with the description of being objectively teleological are actually existent things.

An artefact is a product of the alteration of given objects in accordance with a preconceived notion as to the form of the finished product. An object of art acquires its teleological structure by instantiating the design of the completed entity. This reveals the minimal requisite property, the necessary ontological determinacy, for something to manifest a purpose through the character in which the whole of the entity under discussion relates to its parts. An object can only acquire the predicate of being purposive, by either having the nature of fulfilling some end attributed to it by a subject, or, in some yet to be specified manner, constituting itself as an inherently teleological entity, by embodying the concept of the entire structure of the thing as a whole.

As recognised by Kant the basic condition for a thing to actualise a purpose is that the overall form of the entity, as a configuration, must antedate the integration of the parts into the structure as a whole. The distinct constituents as regards their “being and their form” as parts must only be “possible through their reference to a whole”.⁵⁰ The instantiation of a teleological entity, just is, the subordination of its parts to the conceptual shape, or, as previously described, to its notional configuration or its ideal structure.

The configuration of the whole does not merely precede the parts in some sense, but is the cause of them, and thus is logically antecedent to its components in a more comprehensive sense than a mere integrated totality. An individuated aggregate would still be a composite of a plurality of discrete entities even if it ceased to constitute a part of some singularized whole, whereas if some agent had designed an articulated structure containing an agglomerated multiplicity, then the aggregative plurality would forfeit “its being and form” as the part of a unitary totality which actualizes the character of a concept.

The configuration of an artefact does not subsume its component parts, the holistic form of an object produced in conformity with a plan, does not cause its parts but is rather the effect of distinct things being ‘gathered up’ or their being ‘brought together,’ in some sense, by an agent in the process of the manufacture of a product. The existent aspect of the thing as a united totality is not the originary source of the constituent parts as components of a whole which

⁵⁰ | Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. JH Bernard, Dover Publications, ink, Minneola, New York 2005, p. 163.

realises a conceptual configuration. The ideational form of the completed object is not present in the whole merely on account of the type of totality which it is, the end ascribed to an object of art through use or design is not intrinsic to it, but is imprinted on it externally - it is given its teleological character.

The conceptual contours of the finished article are apprehended by a subject as a mental image of the composition of the unitary arrangement of components to form the completed product as an integrated whole. In short, the conceptual configuration of the whole of the thing which conveys upon the parts their character as components, is not extant in the entity itself, but precedes the coming into existence of the artefact as a completed article of manufacture, and initially subsists as separate to the as yet non-existent finished product in the shape of the whole object. The form of the totality is thus not the cause of the parts, as the thing itself, but only in the shape of the completed thing which is imprinted on the parts.

Purposiveness is subjectively stamped onto an entity from without and thus we may legitimately describe an artefact as an externally teleological arrangement of parts. The parts qua distinct things precede the existence of the object as a whole which is produced through the bringing together of the parts. The gathering up of the parts is the cause of the coming into being of the entity as a unitary thing, the form of the whole structure is itself the causal origin of the gathering up process. The whole does not causally precede its parts, merely its form as distinct from the thing in its aspect as totality does.

This is not to suggest that the whole does not in some sense exist prior to its parts, it is not being claimed that all entities which are not intrinsically teleological are dynamic aggregates, nor is it being purported that objects which have had an external purpose imprinted upon them are mere composites. It has, in actuality, been demonstrated that at least one sort of unitary totality exists. Manufactured articles are integrated wholes since the whole, in a precise manner, as a mental image or design, is logically prior to the parts.

The difference between intrinsically and extraneously teleological entities is not a contrast between a type of totality and a sort of dynamic aggregate, rather the distinction is one which

exists wholly within the ambit of the domain of integrated unities. Both variants of teleological things are examples of unitary totalities.

The ontological predicate of a purposive thing is to be comprehensible under a concept which determines “all that is to be contained in it,”⁵¹ insofar as an entity is stamped with its teleological character by an external agent and is thus a manufactured article which is produced through the mediation of a “rational cause distinct from the matter ... whose causality (in the collection and combination of the parts) is determined through its idea of a whole”.⁵² Whereas the conceptual cause of the purposive character of an object of art is separate from the matter of the entity itself, the notional configuration of an intrinsically purposive thing would just be the thing itself in its aspect of being an integrated totality.

The originary, causal source of the arrangement and combination of the parts is, as opposed to an artefact which has its end extraneously imprinted upon it through design at some point in time prior to the completion of the production process, and thus to its existence in the guise of a finished article is, or need not be separable from, and so need not necessarily precede in time, the entity in question as a unitary totality. The form of the whole does, or at the very least, need not, pre-exist the thing itself as an enabling condition structuring the arrangement of the parts, rather the shape of the entity which conveys upon the components their distinct pattern of relating to one another is the unitary totality in the guise of the conceptual configuration of itself. That is, the holistic aspect of an entity functions as the form or shape of the thing as a whole in the process of giving the parts their organized structure.

Since they constitute the constituent elements of a static aggregative multiplicity, the parts of an intrinsically purposive thing are, at any moment in time, causally prior to the successive instantiation of the entity as a whole. An essential attribute of the immanently teleological structure is thus that its “parts should so combine in the unity of a whole that they are reciprocally cause and effect of each other’s form.”⁵³ The organized arrangement which an

⁵¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 163

⁵² *ibid*

⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 164.

immanently purposive entity is, must thus “bear itself alternatively as cause and effect”⁵⁴ in its respective aspects of being a static multiplicity of distinct and separable parts, and as a dynamic whole⁵⁵ which persists as such over a duration of time such that “one part reciprocally depends upon the maintenance of the rest.”⁵⁶

Kant properly identifies the self regenerating characteristic of organic beings as exemplifying intrinsic or natural purpose. He delineates three characteristics of organisms; they are productive of their generic kind, or in other words they reproduce themselves; they regenerate the specific arrangement of their parts over time and thus the various aspects of the organic entity as a composite of distinct, independent units, as an integrated whole and as the subsisting relations between its parts are both cause and effect of each other; an organism has as an essential attribute, the phenomena of maintaining the configuration of components which it is, or as Kant aptly puts it “A tree produces itself as an individual,”⁵⁷ the final differential feature of an organism is that it incorporates that which is external to it into itself.⁵⁸ In the process of assimilation of alien objectivity into the organism, extraneous things which do not function according to the immanent logic of self preservation and self generation of the organism have the requisite conditions of the self reproduction over time of the arrangement, which the organism is, imprinted or enforced upon them from without. Since they do not instantiate the immanent purposiveness of an organism, if the self regeneration of the organism through time genuinely constitutes an innate purpose, then the nutrients and other material incorporated into the body of the living being which lack the organism’s purpose have this foisted onto them and thus, from the perspective of an assimilated thing, the immanent purpose of the organism appears extraneous, as an external end imposed upon the entity through the process of assimilation into the self maintaining structure that is the body of an organism. The alien object undergoing assimilation is, thus, utilised as a mere means for the

⁵⁴ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 162.

⁵⁵ It will be illustrated below that Kant’s failure to distinguish between his two guises of a naturally purposive thing led him to the erroneous conclusion that an immanent teleological entity violates the principle of the successive and thus non-simultaneous character of cause and effect..

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment* p. 161.

⁵⁸ *ibid*

preservation of the life of an organism. Since an organism as embodying a natural purpose is the cause of its own complex structure Kant characterizes it as an, “organized and self organising being.”⁵⁹

Kant ultimately relegates the notion of a self organising being which is its own product and whose members are “reciprocally purpose and means”⁶⁰ to a mere subjective principle which serves to organize the multiplicity of experience in the absence of synthetic a priori laws, in a manner which generates coherence in the form of always provisional guiding principles. Since teleological organization, for reasons to be outlined below, cannot genuinely constitute an attribute of entities considered distinct from how we perceive them to be, the ascription of the characteristic of immanent teleology to organisms does not provide genuine information as to the true nature of organisms. Judging organisms to be innately purposive is, according to Kant, merely an aspect of the subjective imposition of order and regularity upon the chaotic multiplicity of that domain of things to which transcendental enquiry does not extend a necessary lawful character.⁶¹

Kant contends that the dogmatic deployment of a natural purpose is inexplicable, by which he means that the employment of the concept of an object as truly instantiating its ideational configuration, in its aspect of being a dynamic totality is unwarranted. Treating the notion of intrinsic teleology as a heuristic device informing our asymptotic ascription of an ever more complete coherence to the empirical regularities, which cannot in principle be derived from the laws rendering experience possible discovered by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*⁶² is on the other hand permissible. With regard to the necessity that “we must be assured first of the objective reality of this concept, because otherwise we could subsume no natural thing under it,”⁶³ Kant maintains that the guarantee proffered by the concept of natural purposiveness is wanting. It is thus only fit to serve as a “guiding thread” for our “study of nature.”⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 44

⁶⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 166.

⁶¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 181 and 182.

⁶² *ibid*

⁶³ *ibid*

⁶⁴ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 182.

The unidirectional sequential nature of causality in which, in any instant cause precedes effect, and not vice versa, is referred to by Kant as the “ever progressive series” of “effective causes,” the (nexus effectivus).⁶⁵ Kant held that the nexus effectivus underlies a mechanistic conception of nature, and that the notion of an immanent purpose which is the cause of itself is contrary to the principle of effective causality since it abolishes the unidirectionality of cause and effect such that an organism qua effect of itself may, with “equal propriety be termed the cause.”⁶⁶ Rather than allowing for the aspect of an organism as a whole to be both the cause and effect of its parts, Kant therefore maintained that these two states of affairs were mutually exclusive, alternative descriptions of reality such that the consistent application of a mechanistic explanatory framework would rule out the possibility of an actualised existent natural purpose. Implicitly recognising the ontological character of a static aggregative plurality, which is to be a multiplicity of discrete things which are logically separable from each other and can thus subsist as what they are, as distinct from the whole of which they are components, Kant held that the notion that the whole should cause its parts was irreconcilable with the effective causality of mere mechanism. Kant rejects in principle the “mixing up of disparate principles”⁶⁷ as negating the possibility of formulating an internally consistent judgment and thus he, in contrast to Hegel, rejects the notion that immanent teleology could be irreducible to, but need not contradict, mechanistic processes.

Kant explicitly refers to the sequence of time as a series, and thus implicitly articulates an atomistic notion of time as composed of an unfolding, continuous, progressive order of discrete instants, each moment following but not infringing upon the next.⁶⁸ The separability of portions of time is in such a tacit understanding, emphasised at the expense of duration, and thus the capacity of an adherent of this understanding of the nature of time to comprehend phenomena which have the attribute of continuity, as a determining characteristic which renders them the type of things which they are, is rendered void. The notion that a cause may not be exhausted

⁶⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 163.

⁶⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 163.

⁶⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 168

⁶⁸ I am not assessing whether this notion of time is consistent with the understanding of temporality described in Kant’s first critique.

in an infinitesimal instant, but may continue to exert itself over some length of time, is disallowed by this conception of time as a sequence of brief moments, each abruptly erupting and then just as rapidly subsiding before the emergence of the other.

This conception of temporality does not enable the recognition of dynamic, unitary totalities, but rather reduces the sequential duration of all entities to a chain of static aggregates, strung together like beads on a string.

If time is treated as fundamentally continuous, but as also being divisible into arbitrarily determined but equal fractions of an infinite whole, then a cause need not be held rigidly apart from its effect, which can, thus, act upon it, even though the cause as originary source of its effect exists prior, that is, at a preceding portion of the duration of time, to its effect. This notion of temporality does not undermine its unidirectional character. Unidirectionality and an atomistic understanding of the passage of time are not synonymous, and thus the concept that an effect cannot precede its cause but can act upon it, and thus serve to perpetuate it, can be rendered an adequate description of, at the very least, our ordinary experience of the sequence of events.

By failing to acknowledge this, Kant distorts his account of causality such that he fails to conceive of the notion of an entity which is its own cause, or of an effect which acts upon the original causal source of itself. With the above described notion of time we are able to recognise that at any arbitrarily defined moment in time, the parts of an entity may be the cause of it as a whole, however, one may also consider the aspect of the whole as appearing prior to the parts at some duration of time, considered as a constituent of a larger ambit of the temporal sequence. This enables us to preserve both the idea of an integrated totality, as well as the notion of a static aggregative composite. The notion of time, which is the logical premise of Kant's rejection of the actuality of intrinsic purposiveness, is a notion of temporality without duration, of time without time.

An initial reason for rejecting the conception of temporality which supports Kant's repudiation of natural purpose, is that this understanding of the sequence of time as a series of discontinuous, discrete instants in which the moments of time do not impinge on each other, requires the abjuration of the notion that the actualisation of the concept of an integrated totality is

attainable. The attributes of static aggregative multiplicities are thus inflated to the extent that the characteristics of composite pluralities would be expanded to occupy the entire conceptual space of the unification of separate things into the component parts of wholes. The subsistence of unitary wholes, persisting as integrated totalities over time, would thus be rendered an impossibility. All phenomena would thus be reduced to being nebulous agglomerations of ever more infinitesimally divisible constituents, which, would themselves lack the attribute of being abiding unities. The cost of treating the temporal flow as a succession of discrete instants is thus the forfeiting of the potentiality for the actual, as opposed to the merely extraneous, individuation of distinct entities, such that the only accurate characterisation of reality would be a description of it in terms of an absolute plurality, in which the form of constituting an individuated thing would, of necessity, be arbitrarily and externally imposed upon some randomly delineated domain of mere multiplicity.

Either the implicit, underlying apprehension of time as an atomistic chain, which rules out the possibility of innate purpose, must be abandoned, or any notion of the real manifestation of a singularised thing, which in order to exist as such would of necessity have to constitute an integrated unity maintaining this character over time, must be renounced as misleading. If the instant is a discrete phenomena, entire to itself, then it is the only thing which is an individuated unity. If the reality of any integrated whole, and thus of any genuine individual, is to be conceded, then the structure of temporality may be unidirectional but not atomistic, and thus the logical plausibility of the possible actualisation of entities displaying immanent purpose, as configurations which exemplify the phenomena of effects impacting not merely upon the factors which caused them, at a prior point to their own existence, but have since ceased to do so, but rather which also act upon the determinants which continue to cause them but which nevertheless preceded, as cause, the emergence into reality of the effect which contemporaneously impacts upon it. The conditions of existence of singularisation, rendering possible the manifestation of individuated entities, are thus identical to the characteristics of the nature of temporality which enable the potential for the actualisation of intrinsically purposive things to be a real possibility.

The ideational structure of the thing may be taken to precede its parts, as the aspect of the whole at any point in time, provided that the parts in question are understood as pertaining to those which will be existent at some subsequent point, and the parts may legitimately be described as causally preceding the whole if the equivalent, but inverse, procedure regarding the status of the parts and wholes, respectively caused by each other, is employed. Since the ideational arrangement or configuration of an immanently teleological thing is not merely extraneously ascribed to it by a subjective assessment, it may accurately be comprehended as being objectively teleological. For similar reasons, an organic being which is, for that very reason, an exemplification of intrinsic purpose, may be properly regarded as also instantiating an objective, that is a not merely a subjectively attributed purpose. The instants, in the notion of time which render this account of the causality of an objectively purposive totality viable, are not treated as radically distinct from each other in this conception of causality, rather the very order of the sequence itself impacts upon the precise quality of what counts as a cause of something else, at any given instant.

Unlike Kant, Hegel perceives that the corporeality of an organism, in its guise as integrated unity, just is, immediately identical with its conceptual configuration, and further that the immediate instantiation of the ideational structure of the organism is that characteristic of a living thing which enables it to persist as the kind of thing it is, through time, and thus serves a homologous function to those which have been traditionally designated to the notion of substance, “the concept” thus “constitutes its substance”.⁶⁹ “Since the concept is immanent in it, the purposiveness of the living being is to be grasped as inner, it is present in it as a determinate concept, distinguished from its externality, pervading it thoroughly and self identical”.⁷⁰ As early as the *‘Phenomenology of Spirit’* Hegel recognised that the simplicity of an organic entity, that is, its character of not being constituted of a multiplicity of disjointed parts, as well as its correlative attribute of constituting a unity, arose through the immanence of the conceptual structure of the corporeal totality of the embodied organism, “the actual is the same as its Notion only because the immediate as purpose, contains the self or pure actuality

⁶⁹ GWF Hegel *The Science of Logic*, p.681.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

within its self. The realised purpose, or the existent actuality is movement and unfolded becoming; but it is just this unrest that is the self; and the self is like that immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result.....the self is the sameness and simplicity that relates itself to itself.”⁷¹

Rather than distinguishing itself from its environment, and thus abiding as the unitary entity which it is, over the course of a span of time, as immutable and unalterable, the sameness of a living being, as a singular unity, is only ever re-established as an always already realised process and as this very process itself. The life process, is all that an embodied organism is, which thus, itself accords to the living individual, which it is, the characteristic of sameness or of abiding as self-identical over the course of time and is thus the intrinsic principle of singularisation innate to the kind of totality which an organism is. According to Houlgate, for Hegel, “A living organism continuously produces and renews both itself as a whole and its constituent parts. Indeed the two processes are one and the same: the organism renews and preserves its whole self precisely through renewing its parts”.

The substantial ground of an organism which accords the distinctive, persisting determinacy which constitutes it as the unique thing which it is, is not a separate substrate distinct from the entity in its aspect as a whole, but just is the process of perpetuating the system of processes, which is the entity itself⁷². The perpetuation of the system of processes which the entity is, just is the relationship between parts and whole which is continuously renewed. The concept of this type of organic entity, whatever type it should be, need not be abstracted from the thing itself, since it just is the dynamic unfolding of its own instantiation over time.

The concept, qua substance of an organic organism, pervades and is nevertheless distinct from the external objectivity of its parts, when these are considered as independently existing as distinct from each other, that is, when the aggregate of parts is considered as a static composite, when the precise qualities of the entity which arise only over a duration of time have been discounted. It is, thus, in the precise sense defined above, simple in nature, and is

⁷¹ GWF Hegel *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans AV Miller, Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, 1977. p12.

⁷² Houlgate *Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History*, p. 161.

the cause of itself. As such the dynamic concept, or concept as self-sustaining process, of an organic organism, displaying its fundamental feature of being an intrinsically objectified purpose, adequately instantiates the unique qualities of a substance, despite not being an immutable substrate.

While the components of an organism are separable as a statically considered aggregate, qua constituents of a totality which continuously renews itself as the processes which it is, they are intrinsically bound together such that their interconnection gives them their distinctive character. Any accurate characterisation of an organism in terms of the interactions of independent entities would, therefore, fail to adequately explain the character of an organism as the dynamic whole or life process which it is. This is to treat the living individual as if its conceptual configuration did not constitute it as the type of thing which it is. A description of a living organism in terms of its chemical or mechanical composition or attributes thus does not exhaust the determinacies which are properly attributable to the entity in question qua organic unity.

Since mechanistic accounts of the functioning of a life process do not successfully capture the ontological attribute which renders this life process what it is, a mechanical apprehension, or any type of explanation which does not discern the immanence of the ideational form of a unitary whole, which is generated and objectified in the very realisation of this concept through the maintenance of the dynamic processes which constitute the minimal characterisation of what being alive is, of an organic thing, underdetermines the nature of a living individual.

The progression of the argument has demonstrated that the notion of an objective purpose that need not be subjectively ascribed to an object is not a contradiction in terms. It was then shown that a candidate for being the instantiation of immanent teleology existed in the form of the continuous self reproduction of the life processes of organic organisms. Rather than being merely attributable to the imputation of an agent, the notion of a conceptual arrangement which was objectively actualised in the world, and which continuously regenerated itself was illustrated to be, barring objections, a provisionally valid apprehension of the perpetual self reproduction of an organic thing as well as of its incorporation of extraneous entities into itself.

The apparent refutation of both the concepts of an immanent purpose and of an objective ideational arrangement, as violating the principle of the unidirectionality of causality, was itself refuted. Since it was shown that this objection does not invalidate the principle of some innately teleological structure causing itself, with regards to all unidirectional conceptions of time, but merely renders the realisation of immanent purposiveness as contrary to causality on an atomistic understanding of the sequence of moments in which each instant is completely distinct from the moment which succeeds it in the sequence of instants. An alternative unidirectional model of temporal duration which was both unidirectional and nevertheless allowed for an effect to impact upon its cause was then briefly outlined. It was further demonstrated that if any genuine individuated unity is to exist, then only the understanding of time as non-atomistic, which allows for the existence of immanently purposive entities, would be a conception of temporality which could accommodate the existence of dynamic totalities, and thus, the actuality of singularised phenomena. The principle challenge to the concept of natural purposiveness was thus adequately answered.

It was then illustrated that the operation of life processes constituted the principle of individuation of organic wholes, and thus established these entities as the self individuating totalities which they are. As the requisite condition which enables the unification of an organic being as a whole, and which allows a living individual to persist as such through a duration of time, the material or objective concept, which subsists through, and just is its continuous instantiation, was shown to operate as the undergirding substance of organisms. The process of life was demonstrated to be simple, unitary and self caused, but was also illustrated to not constitute a separate substrate from that which it grounded. It has thus been definitively demonstrated that a complex system of processes may perpetuate itself as objectively possessing the attribute of being immanently purposive.

The requisite resources to characterise capitalism as a self regenerating system of processes have already been provided by the prior unfolding of the argument. The market economy is an integrated totality which persists as such over time and is not, as it appears, a mere dynamic aggregate. The various production processes, which constitute the division of labour, may be

regarded as assimilating external objects, which do not as of yet function according to the principles of commodity production, and altering their nature such that they may adequately operate as the bearers of exchange value. Furthermore, the performance of labour is not intrinsically stamped with the directionality of expanding the self renewing supply of commodities which is available to the capitalist class. If it is shown that capitalist accumulation as a whole can be properly categorised as being intrinsically teleological, then this too may be regarded as a moment of the unfolding of assimilation, as an organic totality imposing its purpose onto persons who are not merely indifferent to it, but as conscious subjects, potentially have alternate aims of their own. The total process of the production of commodities continuously produces things in the identical conceptual shape of, at least some of, their inputs.

To use Hegelian terminology, the presuppositions of a process of commodity production are perpetually posited anew in the form of commodities, at least some of which will constitute the requirements of the next cycle of commodity production. Most importantly, the specific conditions which the proprietors of the means of production, and those devoid of access to a self renewing store of commodities confront, are also continuously reproduced such that, overall and on average, the relation pertaining between the classes of persons in question subsist continuously over all of the recurrent cycles of commodity production. The asymmetrical relation between proletarians and the capitalist class is thus sustained as unalterable by the very process of capitalist accumulation itself for as long as the capitalist system continues.

The system as a totality thus functions in a manner directly akin to an organism. It is an integrated whole consisting of a precise configuration of relations which persist through time as the continuous renewal of these interconnections, while incorporating external objectivity into this logic of self perpetuation. The concept of capital as the simple, unitary and self caused substance of capitalist society is not simply a subjective ascription to the organisation of production, it is rather its minimal ontological determination, its intrinsic purpose and its substantial ground which enables it to individuate itself as the type of thing it is.

Rather than lacking a corporate aim, the capitalist system is merely characterised by the absence of a subjectively determined collective purpose. The objective teleological end of capitalism is imposed on all and thus, those conceptions of the good life which are not in accord with this purpose are aprioristically disallowed by the functioning of an apparently neutral market economy. The ultimate culmination of the logic of commodity fetishism is thus the authoritarian imposition of an alien purpose upon all. Whereas the objective teleology of capital accumulation is innate to the organic self replication of the capitalist system, since we are capable of giving ourselves our own purposes, it is an alien end which is foisted upon humanity as a whole and upon all of the persons which compose it at any given time.

There are definite textual indications that Marx perceived that the operation of capitalism, as conceptualised by him, functions in a manner directly analogous to the self perpetuation of an organism, as the self-perpetuating system of processes and of interconnections between its parts which it is.

Marx clearly understood that capitalism was a self regenerating configuration, which through the course of the intersecting processes of exchange and accumulation which the market economy is, continuously reproduces itself as the structure of interrelations which it is. This is achieved through the recurrent positing, and thus the perpetuation, of the separation of the capacity to labour from the conditions which allow this potential to be actualised. It is the dispossession of the proletariat from the means of production which, as illustrated at an earlier point in the development of the argument, is the prerequisite of the imposition of tacitly extortionate terms upon the members of this class, in the process of contract formation, as regards to the entering into of employment agreements. The superficial appearance of the consensual character of contract formation thus conceals a sufficiently disproportionate relationship of dependence between the proletariat and the proprietors of the means of production as to constitute a form of economic bondage which is not, directly, coercively enforced. The structural pattern of relations that the capitalist order of production is, as an integrated whole, is thus continuously regenerated, as discerned by Marx. "The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected process, i.e. a process of

reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer.”⁷³

The inversion between the worker utilising the means of labour as a means to fulfil their purposes to the reversal of this, with the labourers taking the position of means in a self renewing and self expanding labour process, is shown by Marx to directly pertain to the immediate production process considered as a moment in the unfolding of the overall “life process” of capitalism. Marx ascribes the designation of being a “life process,” which was deployed by Hegel in order to describe a living structure which is objectified independently of an agential attribution through the self maintenance of the continuation of its own instauration, to the productive consumption of the use of the potential to perform labour, which is the purposive transformation of material that is labour itself, by the dead labour ossified in the means of production in their aspect of functioning as fixed capital, an essential component in the unfolding of the process of the self expansion of value. “The means of production are at once changed into means for the absorption of the labour of others. It is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, but the means of production which employ the worker. Instead of being consumed by him as material elements of his productive activity, they consume him as the ferment necessary to their own life process, and the life process of capital consists solely in its own motion as self valorising value.”⁷⁴

The notion that value preserves its character throughout a series of interconnected processes, in Marx’s account of the valorisation process, suggests that Marx understood self valorising value as a dynamic, objective concept which maintained itself as simple, unitary and self caused through the cycles of the capitalist reproduction process, and it is, thus, precisely the self expansion of value which enables the capitalist system to integrate and individuate itself as the totality which it is. This suggests that, for Marx, self valorising value is the principle of individuation and the self-moving substance of the capitalist organisation of production as a whole. Just as, according to Hegel, the conceptual configuration of an organic organisation is its

⁷³ Marx, *Capital :A Critique of Political Economy*, p 724

⁷⁴ Marx, *Capital :A Critique of Political Economy*, p425.

substantial ground which conveys upon the living individual its precise character, and so is “the power over processes, it infringes upon the latter, permeates them as their universality,” so is capital, in its aspect of being self valorising value, “a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialised in it...Capital is the all dominating economic power of bourgeois society.”⁷⁵

The conclusion that “in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs which it still lacks, is thus unwarranted.”⁷⁶

Although Marx did not extrapolate from the nature of capitalism, and the subjection of all social process to the objective concept of capital, to the realisation that the capitalist organisation of production is intrinsically teleological, and thus that the capitalist mode of production imposes an alien purpose upon all, we are entitled to affirm that the subordination of all elements of society to the organic system of capitalism just is the dominion of all by the objectively teleological end of capitalist accumulation.

Conclusion:

The development of the argument of this dissertation has demonstrated that, when adjudicated against the normative standard of the reconciliation of freedom and dependency, the liberal democratic governance of the market and civil society by a neutral state fails to instantiate liberty for all.

The conception of freedom, as acting, without obstruction, in accordance with one’s spontaneous dispositions was illustrated to be ethically inadequate for the purposes of

⁷⁵ Marx, *Grundrisse Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Notes)* p107.

⁷⁶Ibid p278.

meaningfully delineating an act of freedom from one enforced by authoritarian coercion. The mere freedom of choice did thus not provide an adequate moral standard for discerning the particular wrongfulness of despotic dominion. Individual self determination was thus demonstrated to be the only candidate with a true claim to be the norm of freedom.

This did not of itself vindicate a thorough-going collective autonomy, which would require the abolition of the market economy in order to exist, as the singular manifestation of a properly free society but, as opposed to the benchmark of unrestricted arbitrary decision as liberty, this form of social structure was not rendered illegitimate per se by the norm of individual autonomy.

It was further proven that in order for a self determining society to be the thing it is, the ambit of negative liberty as pertaining to the relative freedoms of political participation, expression and of association, must be safeguarded from the vagaries of democratic, majoritarian decision making. Thorough-going self determination was thus shown to be able to accommodate a restricted and attenuated scope for negative liberty.

Commodity fetishism was demonstrated to be a wrongful, authoritarian imposition of a form of rule upon all members of society, which is akin in its normative deficiency to the direct and coercive compulsion of persons by others. Although it was also shown that the indirect mediation of objective relations of reliance upon one another by a domain of things is the enabling condition for the potential elimination of all direct relations between persons, and thus of the abolition of the direct dominion of some over others, this did not alter the essential nature of the intercession of commodities between persons as disrupting the process of reason-giving justification, and so as impugning the sphere of normative evaluation per se.

Since the liberal governance of society and the concomitant expansion of civil society and the extension of the market economy depend upon commodity fetishism in order to be actualised, it is, therefore, possible to extrapolate from the inherent wrongfulness of commodity fetishism, and its inconsistency with freedom as individual autonomy, to the incompatibility of the market economy, and the neutral state which adopts an impartial stance towards multiple conceptions of the good life with freedom as individual self determination.

It was then demonstrated that underlying the appearance of voluntary and consensual free agreement as the basis for contract formation, a grossly asymmetrical relationship of dependence between the proprietors of the means of production and the proletariat rendered employment contracts a form of extortion. This was shown not to be an accidental feature of any specific contract, but was demonstrated to be systematically endemic to the very operation of commodity fetishism itself. The consensual appearance of contracts, specifically those pertaining to the employment of the proletariat, was illustrated to be deceptive and erroneous.

While it was conceded that under capitalism only an intentional project, which was congruent with the logic of the market (and which would thus have the innate end of the perpetuation of capitalism imposed on, and thus constraining it), could be pursued by society as a whole, this was not taken to definitively demonstrate that capitalist society is devoid of a corporate purpose. The notion that the sphere of purpose was broader than that pertaining to intention was validated, as the conception of an objective purpose was shown to be both consistent and defensible against an objection which appeared to refute the possibility of intrinsic teleology. The specific requirements for an integrated totality to be innately purposive were outlined and it was subsequently shown that the functioning of the capitalist system accorded with these conditions. It was thus demonstrated that under capitalism a corporate purpose is foisted upon all without the democratic consent of the members of said society.

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