DEMOCRACY
 POPULAR
 13 ? 15 JULY 1994
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 HISTORY WORKSHOP
 DEMOCRACY, LIBERATION AND THE VOTE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FIRST
 DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. THE MATLA TRUST VOTER EDUCATION SURVEY
 Susan Booysen
 Depanmeni of Political Studies
 Rand Afrikaans University
DEMOCRACY, LIBERATION AND THE VOTE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S
 FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION: THE MATLA TRUST VOTER
 EDUCATION SURVEY
 SUSAN BOOYSEN
 Paper prepared for the History Workshop, University of the Wilwatersrand,
 13-16 July 1994
 ABSTRACT:
 This case study of the Matla Trust Voter Education Research project analyses voting-related
 attitudes in the run-up to South Africa's 1994 election. The study was aimed at the
 empowerment of voters. Empowerment is defined along the lines of the motivation and the
 skills to participate in the election. The research methodology used, was qualitative focus
 groups and a major, quantitative, baseline attitude survey. The latter was designed to reflect
 the attitudes of the whole of the S,n.ili African electorate. It was unique in that it did detailed
 regional and demographic companions. The research illuminates the meaning which South
 African voters attached to, and feelings they had about, voting, elections and democracy. The
 study also identifies the "demographic fault lines" in empowerment to vote and to participate.
 The paper first investigates the extent of motivation to vote and reasons for voting.
 Motivation was high, also well before the election. The reasons for voting shed light on the
 meaning attached to democracy and voting. They also give important information on the
 expectations the voters have of a new government. The research showed systematic
 demographic disempowerment in terms of voting skills. Whilst indications are that these were
 overcome in a largely successful April 1994 election, continued work is required to advance
 empowerment for wider political participation. The paper also provisionally investigates some
 implications of this case study for the deepening of democracy in South Africa.
 FRAMEWORK:
 1. Voter education, empowerment, and the Matla Research Project
 2. Research methodology
 3. Expectations and anticipation of the elections
 4. Disempowerment and the challenges to voter education
 5. Assessment of participation outcomes
 6. The implications for democracy
 Notes, References, Appendices
 Copyright, Matla Trust
I. VOTER EDUCATION, EMPOWERMENT, AND THE MATLA RESEARCH
 PROJECT1
 The success of South Africa's 1994 election could not he taken for granted. Inevitably il
 would he the much vaunted liberation election. But in the approximately eighteen months
 prior to the election there was ample evidence th?t voters had become weary of the long and
 frustrating transition, and that their expectations were being tempered by violence. The mood
 of the electorate had two major currents: anticipation and expectations versus
 disempowerment through lack of motivation, feelings of fear, and through the absence of
 voting skills.
 The voter education challenges for the purposes of this research project were identified on
 two levels. The process had to start with an assessment of both the motivation and the skills
 to vote.2 The tasks would be. first, to prepare the electorate by teaching voting skills, both
 ballot literacy and process knowledge, and to facilitate identity document dissemination.
 Second, the task would he to help nurture a high voter turnout. This would help ensure the
 legitimacy of the elections. The motivation to participate builds on the empowerment1 skills.
 To achieve a high turnout it would be necessary to motivate voters who were unsure whether
 they would vole, as well as to reassure the uncertain turnouts who had specific constraints.
 Motivation for participation equally is a form of empowerment. Through participation voters
 express their needs and potentially become aware of how governments act (or do not) on
 these needs. We therefore talk about a mutually strengthening, symbiotic relationship between
 motivation to vote and equipping people with voting skills.
 These voter education challenges could only be met if voter education agencies themselves
 were empowered through thorough research. Such research would have to identify the
 feelings and needs of the electorate. It would also have to be specific and detailed enough
 to enable voter educators to develop detailed and targeted strategies for empowerment and
 motivation. It was in this context that Matla Trust commissioned Research Initiatives, in
 cooperation with Marketing & Media Research and Decision Surveys International, to
 undertake a major three phase research project. This project used a combination of qualitative
 and quantitative research methodologies to identify the possible stumbling blocks in the way
 of successful elections.
 This paper therefore presents a case study of voting-related attitudes and skills in the run-up
 lo the 26-29 April 1994 South African election. The Malla Voter Education Research Project
 is unique in that it did detailed and systematic regional and demographic analyses of issues
 affecting the empowerment of voters. It is also one of the biggest voter education surveys
 conducted in preparation lor the election. It informed the work of both Matla Trust (the most
 prominent of the South African voter education agencies) and the broader Independent Forum
 for Electoral Education (IFEE) '
 The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, it hopes to promote an understanding of the
 "uncertain voters", of their concerns, fears and feelings about voting. It is important to
 understand how these relate to the mood in the country. Second, the paper works towards
 a detailed understanding of how motivation to participate and voting skills relate to the
 empowerment of the South African electorate. Third, the paper assesses some implications
 of this case study for the further extension of democratic political participation, and for the
deepening of democracy in South Africa. (The details and dynamics of the election itself, and
 the details of voter education activities which were undertaken on the basis of this research
 data, fall outside the ambit of this case study.)
 The paper focuses on the two major parts of the Matla Voter Education Research Project.
 First, it reports on the qualitative findings of the focus groups conducted in' late 1992. These
 groups concentrated on the uncommitted5 voters who were uncertain voter turnouts. Their
 feelings and motivations were the subject for in-depth analyses. Understanding the extent and
 possible reasons for abstention among the uncommitted voters was an important objective.
 The uncertain voters, for instance, had major misgivings about voting. Closer to the election
 motivation of the voters, in general, built up and both specific expectations and a mood of
 great anticipation emerged. This is also elaborated.
 Second, this paper focuses on the 8000 Voter Education Baseline Survey. The objective of
 this phase of the research project was to facilitate a detailed understanding of voter
 empowerment differences between regions, and between a variety of demographic groups
 within each of the regions. Possible abstention because of lack of ballot literacy, confusion
 about the voting process, or lack of facilitating identity documents, had to be countered.
 Apart from the detailed comparisons, the survey would also provide the authoritative national
 picture of the electorate.6 Precise targeting for voter education programmes could flow from
 such detailed understanding. Special attention is given to demographic facets of motivational
 and skills disempowerment, especially along the lines of gender, age education, and level of
 urbanisation. We investigate, for instance, whether women, either the young or the old,
 people from less advantaged formal education backgrounds, or from n? :! areas, were
 systematically disempowered in terms of potential participation in the election. Detailed
 information is provided on how the voting issues of intention to vote and varying motivations
 to vote, belief in secrecy of the ballot, access to the mass media, ballot literacy, and the
 possession of identity documents were affected by demographic characteristics.
 The relevance of the Matla research data extends beyond the challenges of conducting
 legitimate elections and empowering the new electorate for voting. The research also focused
 on what the election and voting meant to the new electorate. In the analysis of reasons why
 people wanted to vote, or why they wanted to abstain, information was derived which could
 assist in the further development of democracy in South Africa. It indicates the close
 association in voters' minds between liberation-democracy-equal rights on the one hand, and
 the improvement of social conditions on the other hand. The data could leave no political
 party or government in doubt about the extent of action required to advance and develop
 democracy in South Africa. In the current phase of South Africa's transition we have
 achieved voting and procedural democracy. For the further development of democracy, there
 are two broad requirements. First, people need to experience an improvement in their social
 and economic lives. The Matla research data helps define the parameters of what South
 Africans expect their votes to signify to a new government. Second, there needs to be
 empowerment for continuous participation, beyond the act of voting. To achieve this, the
 teaching of the skills to participate in the new system of government, as well as the
 dissemination of issue knowledge, are required.
 The rest of this paper first elaborates on the research methodology of the project, then
 assesses the motivation for voting and meaning attached to the process, and after that
addresses the nature and extent of obstacles to empowerment and participation. In conclusion,
 some of the implications of this research project for ihe development and consolidation of
 democracy in South Africa are considered.
 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: FOCUS GROUPS AND BASELINE SURVEY
 The Matla Trust Voter Education Research Project extended from 1992 into 1994. The
 analysis employed an eight region specification of South Africa (the regional demarcations
 at the time of Ihe research).7 Where directly comparable data from other surveys were
 available, these are referred to in this paper.
 The two crucial phases of the Matla project were the qualitative focus groups (October to
 December 1992) at the beginning of the research, and the quantitative baseline national
 survey at the culmination of the project (June 1993-March 1994). The 1992 focus groups
 provided an in-depth understanding of the major reasons why some black South Africans who
 would qualify to vote were either reluctant or declared a determination not to vote.
 The planning and implementation of the focus groups:1
 This phase of qualitative research focused on voters who had no strong party identification
 and were not motivated to vote. The objective was to gain an in-depth understanding of
 possible abstention in the election. The focus therefore was on Ihe uncommitted, changeable
 (swing) voters.
 A total of 24 focus groups were conducted with uncommitted voters. Like focus groups
 generally, these groups entailed in-depth, qualitative analyses of group discussions of six to
 eight people. The participants were carefully selected, using a recruitment questionnaire.
 Considerations in recruitment were gender, age, employment status, race, language, urban
 versus rural, and voter intention. The rural groups were drawn from the then Lebowa and
 Gazankulu areas, and the Orange Free State, and the urban groups from
 Johannesburg/Soweto, Durban and surrounding areas, and Cape Town and Paarl. Each of
 the focus groups was demographically compatible, for instance gender homogenous, as well
 as age and social status compatible. In the recruitment interview potential participants were
 only told that the discussion would focus on socio-political issues. This was to ensure that
 they would not "rehearse" issues (an important consideration in focus group research). The
 focus groups were conducted by experienced moderators employed by DSI. The moderators
 were demographically similar to the participants. The moderators were all experienced and
 underwent thorough briefings. They used a structured discussion guide with specific time
 allocations for particular sections. The discussion guide was developed out of team
 workshops from August to October 1992 (see Appendix I for the themes that were dealt
 with). The discussions lasted just over two hours, and participants received a small
 remuneration.
 The planning and implementation of the baseline survey:
 The Baseline Survey entailed the individual, personal interviewing of respondents, using a
 structured questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for a list of question themes). There were also
 certain questions where respondents were asked to give spontaneous answers. These were
 recorded by the interviewers. The quantitative research method of this stage of the research
process was essential, because the researchers wished tu draw detailed comparisons between
 regions. It was also the appropriate research methodology, because we had to get the
 authoritative picture, representative of the total South African electorate.
 A number of challenges had to be overcome to bring the baseline survey to fruition. There
 was no single set of reliable data from which the sample could be drawn. Rural black South
 Africans in the past were only, marginally, surveyed for commercial concerns. There were
 few precedents to use to gain a representative sample for election issues.9 Great care had to
 be taken to include this rural population in the sample, in proportion to its estimated size in
 the overall population. Field workers had to go to great lengths to ensure access, often in
 difficult and dangerous circumstances. Because of high levels of illiteracy and sometimes
 divergent cultures, the formulation of questions also demanded great care. The problems
 were overcome through many months of team work between Malta, Research Initiatives,
 Marketing & Media Research (MMR) and Decision Surveys International (DSI).
 The interviews were conducted by trained DSI interviewers, wherever possible in the
 respondents' homes. Interviewers received detailed briefings before the start of fieldwork.
 Field supervisors did daily checks on the interviews and a minimum of 20% were back-
 checked. Continuous monitoring ensured uniformity of approach. All interviewers were
 selected and assigned to be demographically compatible with the people who were to be
 interviewed.
 A standard, structured questionnaire was used for all interviews. The response of each
 individual was entered on a separate questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated into
 English, Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and Afrikaans, and the respondents were interviewed in their
 home languages, or in the language of their choice. The questionnaire was extensively piloted
 and refined prior to the start of the fieldwork.
 The sampling procedure started with the universe being defined as all men and women aged
 17 years or older, who were South African citizens and would qualify to vote on reaching
 18 years by the time of the election. The sample was an area stratified random sample. In
 a few areas where conditions on the ground (especially violence) made it impossible to
 conduct a random sample, sampling was done by the quota method. This was necessary in
 parts of the East Rand and the Vaal Triangle. In such cases, respondents would be
 interviewed around their places of work. Within the specified parameters, the sample was
 drawn by an independent research consultant, who also assisted in determining the
 appropriate weights. The margin of error for the current analysis was estimated at 3%
 maximum for national level analyses. On the regional level it would be 6-7% maximum.
 Interviews with a total of 8004 South African voters were used for this analysis. The
 interviewing was done in the period from mid-July until the end of August 1994. By race
 diversification, 4652 interviews were conducted with African voters, 1600 with coloured
 voters, 800 with Indian voters and 1600 with white voters. Some measure of proportionality
 was maintained in deciding the number of interviews in racial sectors. Caution had to be
 taken that each sector would remain big enough to be analysed. To illustrate the regional
 spread of interviews, among Africans 952 interviews were conducted with PWV voters, 581
 in the Northern Transvaal, 375 in the Northwest, 382 in the Eastern Transvaal, 382 in the
 Western Cape, 752 in the Eastern cape, 379 in the Orange Free State, and 849 in Natal. All
regions and racial sectors were weighted to the appropriate proportion of the population in
 that region. In drawing the sample, it was also ensured that it would reflect the national
 population in distribution between metropolitan, urban and rural.
 Data interpretation was facilitated through a large number of research team workshops,
 which dealt with issues ranging from defining data runs, to detailed analyses and report
 designs. The final research report was presented at a Matla Trust March 1994 media
 conference.
 In the interpretation of data the four South African race groups were analysed separately.
 Preliminary analyses showed racially diversified trends, for instance very different needs for
 voter education or feelings about elections. Ignoring these differences would have meant
 equalising divergent trends and ignoring specific needs. Within race groups we further
 distinguished between a variety of demographic categories, including gender differences, age
 and income groups, and different levels of formal education.
 Much of the current paper's data interpretation will be substantiated through the provision
 of tables and diagrams. However, the regionally diversified analysis implies the usage of a
 very large number of tables or diagrams. Consequently, only key ones are incorporated into
 this paper, in Appendix 2 (diagrams) and Appendix 3 (tables). Table and diagram numbers
 are indicated in the text. Although these diagrams and tables facilitate more detailed
 understandings, the reading of the text does not depend on the simultaneous scanning of the
 tables.
 3. MOTIVATION TO VOTE AND WHAT THE VOTE MEANT
 From early on in the research project there was evidence that the new South African
 electorate had high levels of anticipation and were highly motivated to participate in the April
 1994 elections. They clearly felt highly empowered on the motivational level, even if they
 were still lacking voting skills. There were political, demographic and race variations, but
 the large majority had little doubt that they would participate.
 The Matla research findings on the levels of motivation to vote and the reasons why people
 thought it would be important to vote provide useful information on the meaning attached to
 voting. It tells us why turnout was high in the April election. Simultaneously, it informs us
 on the expectations of the voters -- and therefore on what their demands on the new
 government would be. These are the expectations and demands that the South African
 government will have to act on in order to give substance to "the vote". It is this government
 action or inaction that will help establish or undermine trust in and legitimacy of
 representative democracy.
 This section first analyses the Matla Focus Group findings on reasons why even politically
 uncommitted voters, in the early pre-election period of November to December 1992, were
 determined to bring out their votes. This determination emerged, despite otherwise highly
 ambivalent feelings and in some cases even a fear of voting. The section then assesses
 national trends in the Matla Baseline Survey on vote intention, and briefly compares these
with two comparable survey studies. Following thai, it investigates regional, demographic
 and race sector variations in motivation and reasons lor voting.'"
 THE FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH ON MOTIVATION AND VOTING
 "The coming of elections would be like the time when the bird is being set free ..." These
 words conveyed the general feeling about elections among participants in the focus groups.
 Equally remarkable, is that sentiments like these were expressed despite the focus group
 participants not being committed political party supporters, and despite the fact that they also
 harboured many fears, cynicism and confusion regarding the elections (see Section 4).
 Focus group participants talked about participation in elections in terms of "costs"
 (disadvantages, fear) and "benefits" (blessings, gains). The "costs" (Section 4) could stand
 in the way of participation in the elections. The "benefits" could drive them to participate,
 despite adverse conditions. A high proportion of focus group participants at that 1992 stage
 thought that the costs of voting outweighed the benefits. The costs and the benefits at that
 stage, however, still existed side-by-side, without being specifically weighed up against each
 other. In the focus groups the same people would sometimes talk about their great
 anticipation and expectations, and their fears and doubts about elections. These contradictions
 probably were largely the result of the fact that elections were still more than a year away,
 disempowerment because of lacking voting knowledge and skills, and the often despondent
 mood of that period in South African history.
 In describing their expectations of a democratically elected government, the focus group
 participants used extremely rich, flowing language. Some of the images that were called up
 were: "jubilation", "happiness", "black victory", "progress", "significant change", "a better
 future for my children", "election of my ideal leader", etc.
 Some quotations demonstrate the mood: "It will be like a wild bird set free" (middle class
 coloured man. Cape Town); "Maybe elections will make us sleep at night ... Maybe God
 will help us" (older African woman, Lebowa); "I will be mad with happiness, I's even break
 down all these shacks" (African working class man, So we to). Such expectations were
 present, in varying degrees, in all the focus groups.
 The major anticipated "benefit" of voting was found in the positive expectations of a
 democratic government. Three kinds of positive expectations emerged: The prospect of
 democracy, choice, participation and citizenship; the prospect of a black, broadly sympathetic
 government in power; and the prospect of specific material benefits, or improvement in
 social conditions, accruing from a new government, e.g. education, food, housing.
 In the first category an English-speaking coloured man from Cape Town, said: "An election
 will mean I will be a South African, not just a person." In the second category, a typical
 statement: "We shall vote to get ourselves a government that will give us a new life"
 (African working class man, Soweto), and "Maybe someone will tell the government about
 us and something would be done" (African male farm worker, OFS). In the third category,
 there were elaborate group discussions. An African woman from Gazankulu had no doubts:
 "I'll vote for Mandela. He will give me a job". Or, "People are starving. Maybe the new
government will help provide us with something to eat" (African man, Gazankulu), and
 "Maybe it will make blacks own farms too ... It might also bring luxury like better housing
 and jobs, better salaries as well" (African woman, Lebowa). It was mainly coloured and
 Indian participants who cautioned against expectations being too high. According to this
 Indian man, Durban: "An election will not bring immediate change. It will take around ten
 years to make this country really stable again."
 THE BASELINE SURVEY RESEARCH ON EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
 MOTIVATION
 As South Africa moved closer to the election, there emerged a clear, widespread commitment
 to vote. The political mood in the country changed. Violence and often agonizing
 negotiations persisted. But as the advent of the elections drew closer. South Africa's new
 electorate increasingly showed a determination to vote. They were also very clear about why
 they would want to vote. The determination was especially pronounced for African voters.
 Later in the election campaign, as showed in subsequent surveys, the commitment to vote
 amongst coloured and Indian voters rose."
 In this section I analyse this enthusiasm for, and expectations of, elections, as expressed in
 the quantitative components of the Matla Baseline Survey. In doing this, we should bear in
 mind that high motivation to vote could still fail to become translated into legitimate election
 outcomes. For instance, high levels of spoilt ballots could make people feel that they "had
 been cheated", or many who want to vote could be turned away because of a lack of identity
 documents, or many could still abstain because they fear intimidation, violence, the effects
 of "known voting", or because of a lack of voting skills (see Section 4).
 Vote intention:
 From the baseline research, conducted in July to August 1994, it became clear that South
 Africa was potentially going to see a typically high liberation election turnout. A large
 majority of African (83%) and white (85%) voters declared that they would vote "if the
 election took place tomorrow". Small majorities of coloured (50%) and Indian (55%) voters
 wanted to vote at that stage. (See Diagram 1, Appendix 2.)
 The potential for an even larger turnout was indicated by the fact that, in addition the above,
 11% of African voters did not rule out the possibility that they might vote. This applied to
 31% of coloured, 22% of Indian, and 7% of white voters. Only 6% African and 8% white
 were determined that they would not vote. The corresponding percentage for coloured voters
 was 19% and for Indian 23%. Considering the respective sizes of racial sectors of the
 electorate (African 72%, coloured 9%, Indian 3%, and white 16%) a high percentage poll
 could be expected.
 These turnout findings can usefully be compared to subsequent surveys which were conducted
 by other research agencies. Different timing of the research, different samples and sample
 sizes, varying question formulations, and progress with voter education and party political
 campaigns help account for the differences. Changing trends also reflect the changing overall
 mood in the country. For instance, the research by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy '
 (IMPD, early March 1994), implemented in conjunction with the Human Sciences Research
Council, found that 84% of African, 77% of coloured, 65% of Indian, and 76% of white
 voters definitely intended voting. Additional percentages said they miglu. CASE (April 1994)
 tracking research for the Independent Forum for Electoral Education found that 86% of
 Africans intended voting, compared to 81% of coloureds at that stage. These findings differ
 from the Matla Baseline Study mainly in the area of coloured vote intention (which rose
 closer to the election). The Matla Baseline Study's findings on reasons for possibly not voting
 had indicated the potential for this consolidation. The HSRC (1994:3), on the basis of a 2286
 February 1994 poll, safely estimated that between 66% and 93% of the voting population
 would vole.
 A regional comparison of vote intention among African voters in the Matla Baseline Survey
 showed that in all regions large percentages of African voters wanted to vote, generally
 ranging from 80-percent upward. The two exceptions were the Eastern Transvaal and Natal
 (74% in each case) (also see the analysis of reasons for not wanting to vote, Section 4). The
 regions with the highest African vote intention were the Western and the Eastern Cape, 95%
 and 93%, respectively. In Natal there was a high uncertainty factor. A total of 20% said they
 were not sure whether they would vote or not. (See Table 1, Appendix 2.)
 A demographic and regional comparison of vote intention mostly showed a mutual
 reinforcement between different demographic components of disempowerment. As alluded
 to in the Introduction, the most disempowered in terms of voting skills and motivation tend
 to be the reinforcing demographic categories of women, older people, those with lower
 education, and predominantly in rural areas. In most regions gender strongly differentiated
 between those who intended voting or not. The gender gap in most regions was around 10%.
 A drastic aggravation was the Eastern Transvaal, where 23% more men than women declared
 that they intended voting. There were varying trends regarding age and vote intention. In the
 Northern and Eastern Transvaal, as well as the Free State and Natal, the two younger age
 groups were much more likely than the 50+ year-olds to want to vote. Education fairly
 consistently discriminated between those who wanted to vote or not. In all cases but the
 Western and the Eastern Cape, and the Northwest (in this case around 6%), those formally
 educated up to Standard 4" would be at least 10% less likely to vote. The level of
 urbanisation made a big difference in intention to vote in the OFS, Natal and the Eastern
 Transvaal. The greater the distance from the metropolitan areas of the country, the less likely
 the voters in these regions were to say that they would vote."
 Reasons for voting:
 A preliminary comparison of reasons for wanting to vote showed divergent trends between
 African, coloured, Indian and white voters. The five top reasons given by African voters
 were: freedom, equal rights or democracy; more jobs; better living conditions; to gel a
 government of choice; and to end apartheid or discrimination. There were some similarities
 between the motivations of coloured and Indian voters. For coloured voters the top three
 motivations were a belter life for their families, followed by equal rights or democracy, and
 then peace. Peace was the most important consideration for Indian voters, followed by a
 better life for their families and democracy/equal rights. White voters appeared to be driven
 by a very different dynamic. First came citizen duty, then to get a government of their own
 choice, and a better life for their families. The fourth most important white motivation for
 voting was to "prevent black government". (See Table 2, Appendix 3.)
10
 Across all regions, African voters most consistently stated reasons related to the achievement
 of freedom and democracy. In reply to the question "What is the most important reasons why
 you want to vote?" (a follow-up question after respondents had indicated that they wanted to
 vote in the election), 48% of African voters mentioned reasons related to the achievement
 of freedom, democracy and power.
 Not far behind the democracy/liberation answer, was "material improvement" - explicitly
 given as the most important reason to vote. A total of 37% spontaneously cited reasons,
 either specific or general, that were related to better material conditions. Peace and order
 reasons were mentioned by 8% of the African voters, and citizen duty by 5%.
 Coloured voters, in about equal proportions mentioned freedom/democracy and material
 improvement, with the latter slightly more prevalent. For Indian voters, democracy
 considerations were also the most important. This was the case too for white voters, albeit
 with a different meaning attached. Citizen duty rated very strongly for whites.
 There were meaningful demographic variations. A regional and demographic comparison
 of motivations to vote show that certain demographic groupings of voters were much more
 inclined to name material or social condition reasons. Among the African voters, these
 tended to be women, older, rural, lower education and low income voters. In the PWV, as
 in other regions, it would predominantly be men, of the younger age groups, with higher
 education levels, and living in the clearly metropolitan area who cited
 freedom/democracy/equal rights. In a mostly rural region like the Northern Transvaal, the
 achievement of better living conditions emerged as strong rival for explicit freedom
 motivations in the overall regional results. The Northwest, the Eastern Transvaal and the
 Eastern Cape were other regions which provided substantiation of the gender-age-education-
 urbanisation demographic trend. These trends were not strongly pronounced in the Western
 Cape. The Orange Free State and Natal were the two regions where the improvement of
 social conditions, including the creation of jobs, ranked higher than direct liberation
 motivations. The demographic trends still held.14
 These spontaneous replies, where respondents could use their own words and emphases to
 describe their most important motivation to vote, shed light on the magnitude of election
 turnout (also see Section 5) and on the meaning attached to democracy and voting. The focus
 groups discussions provided graphic detail on he meaning attached to the vote. No absolute
 separation between liberation, on the one hand, and improvement of social conditions on the
 other, should be deduced from the dual categorisation of motivations to vote. The two are
 closely related. The mentioning of "achievement of power", "getting rights", or "having a
 sympathetic government" does not exist in a vacuum. They have liberation connotations, and
 relate to substantive social conditions. For instance, the importance of achieving power lies
 in the difference this power should make to people's lives. These dynamics will continue to
 shape the post-clcclions climate in South Africa.
11
 4. OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES OF LACK OF MOTIVATION AND
 DISEMPOWERMENT
 Important problems had to be overcome to ensure consistently high motivational and skills
 empowerment. This section deals with findings on the obstacles of, first, the lack of
 motivation and, second, the lack of appropriate voting skills as these emerged in the Focus
 Group and Baseline Studies. One has to bear in mind the interactive, symbiotic relationship
 between voting skills and motivation. More voting skills would help ensure a higher level of
 motivation to vote; a high motivation could serve as the encouragement to acquire the
 necessary voting skills. Together, voting skills and motivation impart the empowerment for
 participation through voting.
 Voting skills disempowerment included the fear of violence, low levels of possession of
 identity documents, confusion about politics and voting processes, doubts about ballot
 secrecy, and the lack of ballot literacy. While only some of these challenges were in the
 direct ambit of voter education functions, voter education agencies could, through a process
 of educating about both secrecy of the ballot, and the procedures and security measures
 around campaigning and voting, help reduce the "costs" of voting.
 The research reported on in this section strives, first, to give an in-depth picture of the fears
 and feelings of disempowerment, and second, to specify the extent and dimensions of
 disempowerment of South Africa's new voters in the period leading up to the election. As
 in the previous section, I report on both the 1992 Matla Focus Groups and the 1994 Matla
 Baseline Survey. Two, diverse sets of research data were generated. The Focus Group
 analysis deals with the "uncertain voters", and the Baseline Survey with a sample
 representing the total South African voting population.
 THE FOCUS GROUP RESULTS ON OBSTACLES
 The biggest problems that were identified in the 1992 voter education research were the
 "mood of the period" and confusion about politics and voting. A mood of despondence,
 because of the protracted transition and the high incidence of violence, was undermining the
 anticipation to vote. Fear appeared to be a bigger deterrent than lack of knowledge. At that
 early stage it became clear that to ensure high participation, voters would have to be
 reassured about anonymity of voting, as well as personal safety and protection at the time
 of voting. Many of these reassurances, however, would only be credible in specific
 circumstances and closer to the election.
 The mood among the uncertain voters:
 The mood among the uncertain voters (a large proportion of the electorate at that stage)
 reflected both disillusionment with change up to that time and an impatience for more
 change. The four major issues on the minds of these uncertain voters were violence (political
 and criminal), the economy and unemployment, racial injustice, and education. This mood
 related to the immediate social conditions of the participants. A brief analysis provides vivid
 contrasts with the expectations of elections outlined in Section 3.
12
 There was a possibility that ongoing violence could alienate these voters from the election
 process. They strongly resented what they often saw as ongoing, self-interested power
 struggles between the ANC and the IFP. These struggles were seen to take precedence over
 the people's concerns about their own lives. African and Indian voters increasingly were
 wondering about their future. In the words of two African working class men from Durban
 and Johannesburg: "We are talking about the new South African and yet we are still killing
 each other. This confuses me. I don't know where we are going" and "People are always
 talking about the new South Africa. I don't see any change for the better".
 The economy was the second most prevalent issue on the minds of the uncertain voters. It
 aroused discussion in every focus group. The economy was equated with unemployment, and
 associated with crime, hunger and starvation, poor education and lack of housing. Despair
 characterised the mood on the economy, especially among the African participants. The
 words of this African man from Gazankulu and working class woman from Soweto were
 typical of the mood expressed: "Presently I own nothing, I won't be able to own anything
 ... I will have to toil until my dying day" and "We are losing hope ..."
 Signs of a potential change in the mood emerged in the fact that voters largely associated the
 lack of progress in politics and social life in South Africa with continuing white dominance
 of politics. There was a low-key but potent resentment of whites throughout the focus groups.
 "Things have changed, but I still do the same job, I'm still treated as a black. So the changes
 have no meaning" (African middle class woman, Johannesburg) or "When a black meets a
 white, all a black has in mind is fear, because these two nations are enemies" (female
 African farm worker. Orange Free State). These are experiences that convey a sense of the
 association of lack of political and social progress with ongoing white domination.
 A profound sense of continued racial-economic disempowerment came from African women
 (at its strongest in rural South Africa). Related, workplace themes were that whites do not
 pay much, exploit farm labour, and get better jobs on lower qualifications or less experience.
 For instance: "The white man just watches as the black man sweats, he just stand there and
 at the end of the day he gets more money" (African working class woman, Durban), or "The
 ordinary labourers have to pay for the big bosses" (coloured woman, Paarl).
 The focus group research showed a strong association between hope for a better future and
 hope for an improvement in education. It was also especially the women who continuously
 talked about their hope that better education would at least help to ensure a better future for
 their children, even if they themselves could not benefit.
 Issues in "getting out the vote" of the uncertain voters:
 The uncertain voters had serious fears and doubts about two election related issues. Would
 elections lead to death, intimidation, loss of property? Secondly, will elections have a real
 effect on their lives? At the time of the research these sentiments were particularly strong
 among African voters, both women and men, rural and urban, and from all socio-economic
 classes. It was clear that among African voters there was not a commitment to abstain (such
 determination was much stronger among coloured voters), but there were forces, here
 referred to as "costs", which at that stage were inhibiting their commitment to vote.
13
 The research identified the four major "costs" in the voting process us l'eur of violence anil
 intimidation; confusion about parties, policies and the democratic process; cynicism about
 the fairness of the electoral process and the prospects lor change; and a lack of voter
 education.
 FEAR was the most salient aspect of the uncertain voters' reluctance to vote. Women often
 expressed these fears: "If I vote for somebody, you may find that a lot of people may die
 because of my vote" (African working class woman, Soweto) or "I would be fearful to vote -
 - 1 am afraid to die" (woman farm worker, Orange Free State). The rural African focus
 groups had strong fears about violence, intimidation, and revenge because of "wrong" voting.
 Urban African focus groups were simultaneously most excited and most fearful of elections.
 In eight of the eleven African urban focus groups there was substantial support for
 abstention, should conditions of violence and intimidation not improve.
 The focus group participants expressed a widespread belief in the absence of a climate of free
 political activity. When they were asked to react to a fictitious radio announcement that
 "South Africa's first democratic election has just been agreed to", many (and overwhelmingly
 women) associated the announcement with images of violence and death ("killings",
 "murder"), mayhem, rampages, intimidation, victimisation, revenge and destruction of
 property. Women's reaction to the announcement included: "When we hear of an election,
 we think of death", "There will be war. And many people will die", "Intimidation is the first
 thing that comes to mind", "The violence will be on a large scale".
 The participants were convinced that intimidation could make them change their votes. This
 African middle class man from Soweto said: "I would vote for a party to avoid being
 victimised, for the sake of our children ... what would YOU do?" Or, this working class
 woman from Soweto: "(Intimidation) can make me change my mind or stop me from voting
 to save my life". There was also a fear that election could bring intimidation TO
 PARTICIPATE, for instance: "There will be children toyi-toying in the street, looking for
 those who are not going to vote, and next thing a stone is thrown through your window"
 (African working class man, Durban).
 Who would be responsible for intimidation? In the minds of the focus group participants
 virtually no-one escaped suspicion. The main suspects, in the words of the participants: the
 seniors in our village, Zulus, the IFP and homeland leaders, employers, white farmers, the
 (NP) government, the ANC, whites, those who live comfortably, etc. The most common
 source identified was the (then) Government, the state and ethnic actors. Inkatha was often
 spontaneously singled out.
 There was a widespread fear among African voters about "talking politics to strangers", for
 instance in a taxi, or on the train, or while walking home or to the shops. This applied
 especially to African women and to men in the urban areas. These were some of the
 reactions to the focus group question: "Would you talk politics to strangers?": "We are
 scared to death of doing that", "I will be dead if I talk to the IFP", "We just pray for a safe
 journey when we travel with strangers", "If I differ from her, she might trace me after that
 with a whole mob of her friends and she can kill me", "He or she might belong to a wrong
 political organisation ... the one that kills people ... The one called Inkatha".
14
 The focus group voters had mixed feelings about the secrecy of their votes. Whilst some
 feared that their ballots could be identified after the election (for instance by regional
 governments), many situated secrecy in the social context of voting. While the vote itself
 may be secret, the "society is politics" and "everybody knows" who you normally support.
 The mere act of casting a vote would mean that it would not be secret, they surmised.
 CYNICISM about the value of the individual vote, the fairness of the electoral process, and
 the ability of a new government to change things, were indications of the second major
 potential obstacle to high electoral participation. These concerns were fairly widespread.
 Uncertain voters would need reassurances that each individual vote would count, that the
 elections process would not be corrupted, that a new government would be able to solve
 social problems and thereby make a difference, and that violence would decrease with the
 installation of a new government.
 .Urban African and coloured focus group participants were more likely to emphasise the
 importance of their individual votes than rural African or Indian participants. "You may find
 that the person who is wanted by the majority just needs one vote to win ... then maybe we
 can have peace" (African working class woman, Durban), or "My vote will carry back to
 the government, it will help to change things in South Africa", said a coloured working class
 woman from Paarl.
 Cynicism prevailed around possible fraud and corruption in elections. Corruption, rigging
 the vote, and bribery were the major concerns. On the one hand, there were those who said
 that they would only vote if they could be guaranteed that the election would be free and fair.
 On the other hand, there was an acceptance of unfairness as an inevitability. Examples of
 fraud in Namibia, Angola and elsewhere in Africa permeated the focus group discussions on
 the "free and fairness" of the forthcoming South African elections. "Fraud and cheating is
 something that one will never be able to avoid", said an African working class man from
 Durban.
 Cynicism about whether a new (interpreted as black) government would be a "responsible"
 government regularly emerged as a factor which could discourage participation. Uncertainty
 about whether a new government could make a difference was weighed up against possibly
 unsafe conditions at the polls: If a new government would not be more responsible or capable
 than the old NP government, why risk going to the polls? Women were somewhat more
 cynical about the ability of a new government to make a difference than the men in the focus
 groups. They feared nepotism, corruption and lack of caring by politicians. Among rural
 Africans the cynicism was often linked to experiences with the bantustan governments.
 Others spoke more generally: "New governments promise many things, and yet these
 promises do not happen" (female OFS farm worker), or "People have been suffering. So now
 ... they put into their pockets what they have lost over the years" (African middle class
 woman, Durban).
 Participants were particularly cynical about a new government's ability to bring an end to
 violence, especially if some political groupings could possibly refuse to accept election
 results. There were doubts about the Zulus, the white right-wing, and "those who lose the
 election".
15
 CONFUSION about parties and their policies emerged us the third potential obstacle to high
 participation. It was especially the African (both rural and urban) purticipants who said they
 would abstain, unless they become better informed about party policies and programmes.
 Whilst they identified violence as a major factor preventing party political access to the
 voters, they did not exonerate the parties from this responsibility. As this African middle
 class man from Soweto said: "I see no reason why people would not want to vote if they are
 well informed ... But they are not well informed." An Indian woman from Durban related
 voting and information to trust: "If they don't prove themselves, and give us something to
 vote for, I'll never vote."
 The LACK OF VOTER EDUCATION featured fairly low-key among potential reasons for
 abstaining, at least at that stage of the process. The discussions indicated that whilst there
 was a major need for voter education, most of the participants did not identify this as a
 potential reason for not voting.
 The "voting day" discussions sometimes centred around specific reconstructions of what the
 process around voting stations would be like: "There are boxes which say PAC or IFP or
 ANC. You can put your paper in any of these boxes. You will have ticked alongside the
 party you want and your name will be there" (African informal housing man, Soweto), or
 "It is only the guards who will know who you voted for" (African working class man,
 Durban). A mock ballot exercise in the focus groups created much advice and discussion,
 despite moderators urging participants to quietly "cast" their own votes.
 THE BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS ON OBSTACLES
 Why would significant numbers of voters not want to vote in an election with the historical
 significance of the first truly democratic election in South Africa?" The Matla Baseline
 Survey showed that there was no single, simple answer. But many of the answers centred
 around the "confusion factor". Because of not knowing enough about wh.il was happening
 in politics and transition in South Africa, many voters felt left-behind. Tin. > lost, or never
 gained, interest in voting. A further element of confusion was directly related to the voting
 process. Many of the abstainers said they "Don't know enough about voting and elections".
 The analysis below shows the extent to which many doubted the secrecy of their ballots, did
 not have identity documents, and spoilt their ballots in mock voting.
 The demographic groups in the South African voting population who fell most disempowered
 on the different dimensions of the "confusion factor" are identified below. The demographic
 disempowerment analysis in this section focuses on gender, age, education and levci of
 urbanisation. These are analysed in relation to identity documents, ballot secrecy, and low
 access to the mass media. Mock ballots are analysed in terms of regional and level of
 urbanisation differences.
 Reasons for not wanting to vote:
 Foremost among the reasons given by the African voters who said that they would not vote,
 was the fact that they did not understand what was going on in politics in South Africa, then
 followed "personal reasons" (like age, religion), not knowing enough about elections and
 voting, and not understanding enough about political parlies and their policies. In the tilth
16
 place was the lack of identity documents. The lack of understanding of what was going on
 in politics in South Africa was consistently stated as a major reason in all of the regions. A
 total of 58% of the African voters in the Western Cape who indicated that they would not
 vote, gave the lack of identity documents as their reason. This compared with the 17% of
 the African voters in Natal (the second highest intended regional abstention) who mentioned
 lack of ID as the deterrent to voting. The fear of violence at this stage did not rate among
 the top reasons in any of the regions. All indications are that the climate in the country with
 regard to voting had started changing. (See Table 3, Appendix 3.)
 The 19% of coloured voters who at that stage intended abstaining were mostly motivated by
 a lack of understanding of politics, followed by a lack of interest, or apathy, and not
 knowing enough about parties and policies. For PWV coloured voters a lack of trust in
 political parties and leaders was the most important reason. For Indian voters (23% of whom
 did not want to vote at that stage) "just not interested" was the most important reason, trailed
 by not understanding what was happening in politics in South Africa, and personal reasons.
 The Natal Indian voters overwhelmingly gave this lack of interest as their reason, but for
 PWV Indian voters it was the combination of not knowing enough about elections, too much
 fighting between political parties, and the feeling that individual votes would not make a
 difference. White voters who wanted to abstain were driven by personal reasons, a lack of
 trust in parties and politicians, and the feeling that their (white) votes would not make a
 difference amidst the large number of black voters."
 Despite smaller differences, we therefore see a large measure of convergence in reasons for
 not wanting to vote in all major race sectors of the South African voting population.
 The identity document proWnr
 The Matla research showed that identity documents could be a major disenabling factor in
 the election, especially for African, but also for coloured voters. A total of 11% of African
 and 10% of coloured voters did not have any of the documents that would entitle them to
 vote. These (official) identity documents included "homeland" ID's, South African travelling
 documents, the old "passes", etc. 2% of coloured and 3% of African voters reported that
 they did not have any identity documents at all. Of those who lacked official identity
 documents, 9% of African and 7% of coloured voters did have birth or baptismal certificates.
 (Indian and white voters had no virtually identity document problems.) (See Diagram 2,
 Appendix 2.)
 A regional comparison of African voters demonstrates the diversity of the identity document
 problem in the run-up to the election. The regions worst affected were the Northwest, the
 Eastern Cape and the Eastern Transvaal. Between 11% and 16% of these voters only had
 birth or baptismal certificates as their form of identification. Following these regions, 6%
 of African voters in the Western Cape and 4% in the Eastern Cape had no identity documents
 at all. (See Table 4, Appendix 3.)
 "Demographic disempowerment" only manifested itself to some extent with regard to the
 possession of identity documents. Except for Natal and the Northern Transvaal, there were
 consistently more women than men who either Only had birth or baptismal certificates, or
 had no identity documents at all. The gender gap was generally around 4%. Different
 dynamics operated with regard to age. In contrast with other facets of voter empowerment.
17
 where ihe older voters were at a disadvantage, it was the young (17-24 years) who lacked
 identity documents. The extreme case was the Eastern Cape, where 48% fewer of the
 youngest than Ihe oldest age category only had birth or baptismal or no identity documents.
 In the other regions these discrepancies varied from 24% in Natal to 38% in the Northwest.
 Level of education failed to distinguish clearly between those with and without appropriate
 identity documents. Generally it was the voters on the mid-levels of education (Standards 5-8)
 who were least likely to have appropriate ID's. The general trend, with a couple of minor
 exceptions, was that the more rural voters would have fewer valid identity documents. This
 trend was the strongest in the Eastern Cape, the Northwest and the PWV (the latter with a
 limited number of rural voters).
 Uncertainty about ballot secrecy:
 Whereas doubt about the secrecy of the ballot was not regularly volunteered as the most
 important reason for possible abstention, there were significant numbers of voters who either
 were not sure or believed it would be possible for others to find out who they had voted for.
 In conditions of violence or intimidation the absence of a belief in secrecy could deter people
 from voting.
 The belief in ballot secrecy was the highest among African voters, followed, in this order,
 by white, Indian and coloured. 20% of coloured voters were not sure whether the ballot
 would be secret or not. (See Diagram 3, Appendix 2.) Regionally among African voters,
 doubt about secrecy was the highest in Natal and the Eastern Transvaal - the two regions
 with the largest proportions of voters who indicated that they would not vote. In Natal 22%
 were not sure whether the ballot would be secret or not (a further 5% thought the ballot was
 definitely not secret) and in the Eastern Transvaal 14% were not sure (with 4% more
 believing the ballot would definitely not be secret). The highest belief in the secrecy of the
 ballot was found in the Northern Transvaal (89%) and the PWV and OFS (85%). Around
 30% of coloured voters in all sampled regions had some doubts about ballot secrecy. (See
 Table 5, Appendix 3.)
 Belief in ballot secrecy consistently across the regions went down with gender changing to
 female, increasing age, lower education, and moving out of the metropolitan and urban areas.
 Gender disempowerment was most pronounced in Natal. 81% of men and 66% of women
 believed in the secrecy of the ballot. In the Eastern Transvaal the gender gap was 89% versus
 75%. Gender differences in other regions ranged from 2% in the PWV to between 4% and
 9% in the rest. The age category of 50 years or older consistently emerged as disempowered
 in relation to the two other age categories used for analysis (17 to 24, and 25 to 49 years).
 Natal and the Eastern Transvaal again stood out - in Natal approximately 20% fewer of this
 age group than the two other groups believed that their votes would be secret. In the Eastern
 Transvaal the gap was 11% and 15%, respectively. The Northwest and the Western Cape
 had similar trends. The impact of education on empowerment trends was small in the cases
 of the PWV, the Northwest, the Western Cape, and the OFS, and big in the remainder of
 the regions. Well over 20% of the lowest education group (Standard 4 or lower) in Natal did
 not believe in the secrecy of the ballot, with the discrepancy in the Northern Transvaal and
 the Eastern Cape also very high. 17% more of those in the mid-education category, and 13%
 more of the voters in the high education category (Standard 9 plus) believed in ballot
 secrecy. It was only in some of the regions that the level of urbanisation made a difference
 to empowerment - it did especially in the Eastern Cape and Natal. In the Eastern Cape 20%
18
 fewer of the rural than the urban and metropolitan voters believed in the secrecy of their
 ballots. In Natal the discrepancy was around 14%, and in the PWV 11%.
 This demographic analysis pointed to likely lower voter turnout in a number of regions.
 Looking at the demographic distributions in the regions, it would be the regions with more
 of the lower educated, higher ages, less urbanisation, and more women where lower turnouts
 could be expected.
 Low access to the mass media:
 A demographic analysis of the level of access to the mass media shows significant differences
 among the major gender, age, education and urbanisation categories." Given the gender,
 age, education and urbanisation gaps in empowerment to vote, more equal trends with regard
 to exposure to the mass media would improve chances of empowerment through access to
 voter education and political information. However, differential access and exposure, in line
 with the already existing gaps, would further reinforce disempowerment. The general finding
 from this part of the analysis was that discrepant exposure levels indeed tended to reinforce
 the prior demographic inequalities. The information analysed in this section is based on
 answers to the question: "Where do you get your information about what is happening in
 politics in the country?" (See Table 6, Appendix 3.)
 It was only with regard to access to the radio that African women sometimes fared slightly
 better (and not statistically significant) than men. Across all regions, men were more (and
 often much more) exposed to political information on television and in newspapers. This
 correlates with men generally having higher levels of education than the women. The regions
 with the largest gender gaps were most of the "Northern belt" of South Africa - the
 Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal and the Northwest -- plus the Eastern Cape. The
 older the voters, the more disadvantaged they were in terms of access to mass media sources
 of political information. Large age gaps existed between the 50+ age group and the other
 two age categories. In the majority of regions, the 24-49 year olds had the most access, both
 to television and to daily newspapers. The gap between the older and the mid-category often
 was well over 30%, and in the case of the Northwest and access to television, the gap
 between these two age groups was 54%. It was only in the Northern Transvaal that people
 with the lowest of the three levels of education had significantly less access to radio than the
 better educated. Radio would be the mass medium with by far the best reach among those
 in need of voter education. The voters with a Standard 9+ education had up to 50% in the
 Eastern Cape, 48% in the Northern Transvaal, and 46% in Natal, more access to television
 than those with a Standard 4 or lower education. Obviously (because of the close association
 between literacy and formal education), the gap with regard to newspaper access would be
 large between the lowest and highest educated. These gaps went up to 81% in the case of the
 OFS, and 73% for the Northern Transvaal and the Northwest. In most other regions this gap
 was around the 60% level. The trend with regard to level of urbanisation was commonly
 that radio was the best medium for the rural areas. The exposure gap opened up on access
 to television and was huge on newspaper usage.
 Spoilt ballots:
 The major indication of voting disempowerment, and need for ballot literacy voter education,
 was obtained through the mock ballot analysis. Because the ballots were completely
19
 anonymous, only national trends, regional comparisons, and level of urbanisation analyses
 could be done.
 There were high rates of spoilt ballots, ranging from 4% to 10% in the different regions. The
 rate was 10% nationally for African voters, and 9% for Indian voters.18 The biggest single
 reason for spoilt ballots among African voters was illiteracy -- 4% of the respondents
 indicated to the interviewer that they could not read or write, and thus could not complete
 the ballot. It is possible than many illiterate voters nevertheless managed to cast their mock
 ballots. Another 4% of African voters made mistakes in voting, including more than one
 cross, the cross not in the right block, signed their names, or even wrote "I don't know how
 to vote". Similar percentages of coloured, Indian and white voters made these mistakes. (See
 Table 7, Appendix 3.)"
 A regional comparison showed that the largest ballot spoilage problem occurred in the
 Northern belt: the Northern Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal and the Northwest. In these
 three regions, as well as in Natal, rural voters were also much more disempowered than
 urban and (where applicable) metropolitan voters. In the Northwest, rural spoilage rates went
 up to 28% of mock ballots cast (and 14% spoilage in the urban areas of the Northwest). In
 the Eastern Transvaal the rural rate was 22% (compared with 15% urban) and in the
 Northern Transvaal 20% (compared with 2% urban spoilage). Natal and the Eastern Cape,
 two regions in which some other voter education problems have already been identified, had
 relatively low rates of spoilage (10% and 8% rural spoilage, respectively). (See Diagram 4,
 Appendix 2.)
 The regional breakdowns also show that illiteracy in the rural areas was the major reason for
 spoilage in the high-spoilage-regions of the Northern and the Eastern Transvaal. The
 Northwest was the only region where "genuine spoilage" was particularly high.
 In this section we have seen the potentially huge disempowering effect of confusion - of not
 understanding what is going on in politics in the country, or of not knowing enough about
 voting and elections. Certain demographic groups, for instance women, or, generally, older,
 less educated, or more rural people, have even more intense experiences of disempowerment.
 Does the apparent success of the April 1994 South African election (see Section 5) mean that
 voters now are empowered to take a full and active participative role in representative
 democracy? The research and specific conditions in the April elections caution against such
 assumptions. First, the success of participation in the election depended on extensive
 assistance at the voting stations, as well as very flexible ballot acceptance rules. Second,
 voting is one of the "easiest" forms of political participation. There are clear definitions of
 what this form of participation requires, everybody is motivated, and the circumstances are
 very special. South Africans across the board are not yet equipped for ongoing participation
 in the processes of representative democracy. Many skills remain to be leamt for this
 democracy to closely reflect their expectations and needs. In addition, widespread and
 ongoing processes need to be adopted to empower ordinary South Africans with the political
 information which could prevent them from receding into the disempowerment of political
 confusion.
20
 5. ASSESSMENT OF PARTICIPATION OUTCOMES IN THE ELECTION
 Two major aspects of the overall success story of the South African election were that the
 turnout was high, and that the rate of spoilt ballots was low. Also, the interaction between
 the two factors, and the peace and good will that reigned on the four voting days, cannot be
 underestimated. This short section assesses the voter education dimensions of the election
 outcome.
 In a modest way, this research project facilitated Matla Trust activities in campaigning for
 conditions which would provide maximum assistance to inexperienced voters at the polls. It
 also assisted in the choice of the most appropriate mass media for disseminating voter
 education information, and in targeting voter education materials at the demographic groups
 who most needed voter education. In pointing to the devastating effect that violence could
 have on the election, the project also emphasised the need for dissemination of information
 on the rights and protection of voters going to the polls. In many cases it was the inputs of
 the major voter education agencies that secured these user-friendly processes. Assistance
 inside voting stations, by Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and party political
 officials, was also lobbied for by voter educators. Politics-free zones around voting stations
 further helped ensure peace of mind.
 Voter education programmes had a significant input into addressing the voter education
 needs. The challenges of voter empowerment were taken up by organisations specifically
 created to conduct voter education, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, civic and
 community organisations, foreign government institutions, the South African government and
 various state department and parastatals, business organisations, political parties, churches,
 universities, and others. Voter education activities took a variety of forms, ranging from
 extended and systematic mass media campaigns, to community and workplace based mock
 elections and plays. In addition, informal, person-to-person voter education is not
 quantifiable, but was hugely important.
 It remains difficult to estimate how many voters were reached by voter education. It is even
 more problematic to assess the success of voter education. One indication was provided by
 a CASE tracking study for IFEE (CASE/IFEE, 1994). Estimates were, for instance, that
 around 11,2 million adult Africans saw some specific voter education television
 advertisement. A total of 8,8 million people (not diversified by voter status) saw some of the
 series of IFEE television advertisements. Similarly, it was estimated that 9,8 million people
 heard IFEE radio advertisements. In studying newspaper penetration, it was estimated that
 79% of African newspaper readers and 81% of coloured newspaper readers were reached by
 voter education (the percentages of African and coloured voters reached would be
 substantially lower).20
 Ballot spoilage:
 The level of spoilage of the ballots in the April election was extremely low. Of the more than
 20 million votes cast, only 1% was spoilt. A comparison of the Baseline Survey (with a
 margin of error of 3% nationally) and the election outcome, point to a dramatic change in
 levels of ballot literacy. This constitutes strong circumstantial evidence that voter education
 and empowerment had been largely successful.
21
 The total number of votes that was rejected (spoilt ballots), nationally in South Africa, was
 193 081. This amounted to 0,98% or 1%, of the total number of votes cast (IEC statement,
 5 June 1994). The spoilt ballot rates did not vary much between the provinces: 0,6% for the
 Eastern Cape; 0,7% PWV; 0,9%.Northern Transvaal; 1,1% Orange Free State and Northern
 Cape; 1,2% Western Cape, Natal and Northwest; 1,3% Eastern Transvaal.
 Level of participation:
 An exact calculation of the level of participation in the 25-29 April 1994 election is
 impossible. South Africa neither had a voters roll nor even fairly precise information about
 the number of voters. The estimates of the number of voters generally ranged from 22,5 to
 24 million. At least 20 million of these voters had voted for the first time in legitimate
 national elections.
 All indications, albeit subjective, are that the level of voter participation in the election was
 over 80%. Based on a voting population of 22,7 million, the percentage poll was 86,9%. If
 the voting population is set at 24 million, the percentages poll changes to 82,2%.
 Based on the. low estimate of a national electorate of 22,7 million, the regional percentage
 polls range from the highest of 93% for the Northern Cape to the lowest of 83% for Natal.
 The percentage poll for the different regions, based on a 22,7 million electorate, was (with
 Baseline Survey findings, based in some cases on somewhat different but mostly comparable
 regional boundaries, in brackets): 83% Natal (74%); 85% Eastern Transvaal (74%), 85%
 Orange Free State (84%) and 85% Northern Transvaal (84%); 87% PWV (83%); 89%
 Western Cape (95%); 90% Eastern Cape (93%); 91% Northwest (89%); and 93% Northern
 Cape. Should it be assumed that the actual size of the electorate was 24 million, and that the
 proportions of voters per region remain the same, the percentage polls for each of the regions
 would be 78% Natal; 81% Eastern Transvaal, Orange Free State and Northern Transvaal;
 83% PWV; 85% Western Cape; 86% Eastern Cape and Northwest; and 89% Northern Cape.
 The percentage poll range on this upper estimate of the electorate therefore is 78% (Natal)
 to 89% (Northern Cape). Whatever therefore the estimates of the size of the electorate, the
 average national turnout was over 80%, and well over 80% for most of the individual
 provinces. The national average poll was significantly reduced by the low poll in Natal,
 which constitutes approximately 20% of South Africa's total population.
 6. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
 This case study focused on dimensions of empowerment of the South African electorate. It
 explored the level of voting skill empowerment that was indicated before the historic April
 1994 election, and pointed out how different regions and demographic groups appeared
 systematically disempowered. It also investigated extent of empowerment through motivation
 to vote. The fairly extensive analysis of both motivation for abstention and for voting shed
 light on areas to bear in mind in future work to consolidate democracy in South Africa.
 Furthermore, the analysis of reasons for voting present us with useful information on what
 democracy and the act of voting meant to the new South African electorate. The Matla Trust
 Focus Groups and Baseline Survey provided a sound assessment of the meaning which South
22
 African voters attached to their votes -- of what they hoped to achieve by casting their votes
 in the election. The attainment of freedom, equal rights, and democracy had an acute
 importance to them. The meaning of these concepts did not end with the casting of a ballot
 and the installation of a new government. Many voters directly articulated vast social needs,
 like housing, education for themselves and their children, better living conditions in general,
 or jobs. Their wish for liberation had specific content. The Matla Baseline Survey provided
 us with concrete information on the diversity and the distribution of these needs. The study
 also informs us, in much detail, on what the needs of different demographic groups, within
 regions and race, are. In addition, it familiarises us with important details of the expectations
 directed at the new South African government. In these respects, the Matla research has
 direct relevance for our understanding of the social dynamics which are bound to shape the
 post-election milieu.
 South Africa's transition thus far, with the aid of voter education programmes and research,
 has set the base for the ongoing development of democracy. Through the empowerment of
 voters and the generally high levels of turnout, South Africa has taken the first steps towards
 democracy. The first test for the procedures of democracy, the 1994 election, was largely
 passed. Voters have gained a large measure of confidence in their own ability to cast votes
 and to be part of this democratic process. Voter education initiatives took notable steps to
 address various demographic disparities: Yet, the entrenchment and continued acceptance of
 the "rules of democracy" still have to be proven. Similarly, voting is only one small form
 of political participation- For democracy to become entrenched and to have a daily meaning
 for ordinary people, democracy education for other forms of political participation is also
 required. Voting is the easiest form of political participation. Further skills training and
 ongoing information to counter political confusion are called for.
 The high turnout in the South African election should be seen as the starting point for a
 process of deepening of democracy in South Africa. Potentially far-reaching empowerment
 took place through the act of voting. It is important that this existing empowerment be further
 harnessed into an ability of continuous involvement. Democracy in South Africa can only
 become consolidated if the vote becomes a precursor to having access to information as well
 as the skills for ongoing presentation of demands.
 Through their participation in this research project, either as focus group participants or as
 respondents in the baseline survey, thousands of South Africans helped to set the course for
 a democratic government and the substantive development of democracy in South Africa. The
 broader project for the entrenchment of democracy in South Africa has to continue.
23
 NOTES
 1. My (banks to Matla Trust for the permission to share this information with a
 broader community. Whilst I played a big part in the whole research project, a large
 team of people contributed. My special thanks to a number of people who, in the
 process of this research, broadened my insights: Jos Kuper, Kim Kruger and Carrol
 Moore. The current author did the research upon which much of this paper is based
 as a part of Research Initiatives. Research Initiatives was commissioned by Matla
 Trust for the three phase voter education research project. The second partner in
 Research Initiatives was C. Charney. He was part of the research team referred to
 above, and focused on the voter education analyses of the phase 2, an overview
 survey. This was an interim, preparatory stage of the research process, and is not
 incorporated into this paper. The framework for analysis and interpretation in the
 current paper remains the sole responsibility of the current author.
 2. The major "voting skills" addressed in the research project are "ballot literacy"
 (the knowledge and skills of how to complete and cast a valid ballot), the possession
 of identity documents, and knowledge about the secrecy of the ballot. The major
 motivation issues addressed are vote intention, and the reasons for wanting to vote,
 or intending to abstain.
 3. Empowerment in this paper is used to refer to programmes, processes and
 strategies designed to facilitate participation and possession of skills on an equal basis
 to all demographic groups, including along the dimensions of gender, age, education
 and level of urbanisation. In addition, empowerment entails being equipped with the
 information and knowledge that make people feel they know what they are
 participating in, and why they are doing it.
 4. A later follow-up evaluation study was done by CASE for the Matla Trust, using
 a much smaller sample, with a view to providing a further national overview of
 progress with voter education efforts (see CASE/IFEE, 1994).
 5. "Uncommitted" in this paper refers to those voters who in recruitment for the
 focus groups said that they do not know for certain which political party they would
 vote for. There was also a control question in the recruitment questionnaire. This
 question was used to "sift out" potential participants who, despite their answers to the
 first question, had strong party political views. "Uncertain turnouts" simply mean
 those voters who may end up not voting.
 6. Phase 2 of this research project, an overview survey of limited size and objectives,
 is not analysed in this paper. This phase served as preparation for the Baseline Survey,
 which is extensively analysed in this paper.
 7. The subsequent changes to the boundaries of the regions/provinces mainly entailed
 adjustments to the Northwest and the Western Cape. The Northern Cape region, with
24
 a very small voting population, was created out of these two regions. The boundary
 adjustments for other regions were either minor or none.
 8. Focus groups is a suitable research methodology in cases where one wishes to
 explore motivations, feelings and values which underlie, for instance, voting
 behaviour. It facilitates deeper insights into people's thinking. Homogeneity in the
 composition of the groups is essential in order to get spontaneity in the discussions.
 9. One of the first, truly national samples was used also in 1993 in a poll conducted
 by the Department of Constitutional Development in a survey of constitutional issues.
 Subsequently, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) also started using
 appropriate national samples. Many of the well-known public surveys, for instance
 those conducted by Markinor or MMR for the Argus company in the past used either
 very small rural African samples, or only African metropolitan samples. These
 particular Markinor surveys were done for commercial concerns. They therefore
 concentrated on areas where tbe "buying power" would be. It is not known to what
 extent private party political polling, or other'government department polling projects,
 employed truly national samples.
 10. This section presents a brief overview of the major issues that emerged from the
 research. It cannot hope to do justice to the complex and diversified findings of the
 total research project. The ownership of research rests with Matla and the final report,
 incorporating summaries of the first two phases of the project, are available from
 Matla Trust.
 11. See the series of surveys conducted by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy
 and the Human Sciences Research Council, 1994.
 12. Standard 4 was taken as the cut-off point for the lowest category of education,
 because "standard 4 or higher" indicates the likely level of being literate.
 13. As noted in the section of research methodology, tables and diagrams
 summarising the details of the demographic trends are not included in the current
 paper, purely because of constraints of space. The reading of arguments in tbe text
 does not depend on additional information in table form. Additional tabular
 information can be checked with the author.
 14. This phase of the research did not explore all dimensions of the possible reasons
 for these regional differences. It only deals with reasons related to empowerment and
 voting. Possible additional reasons could lie in the particular political culture, and
 political and socio-economic experiences in the regions. These could be useful themes
 for further research.
 15. The proportion of voters who intended to abstain was referred to in Section 3.
 This section deals with their motivations.
25
 16. Detailed regional demographic analyses of (be African voters' reasons for not
 wanting to vote were not performed, because the number of cases became too small
 for statistically valid analyses.
 17. No separate analysis is being done of the ordinary patterns of exposure to the
 mass media, because such analyses yield commonsensical data. Those trends which
 are interesting with regard to the African voters are included in this current section
 of the analysis.
 18. The Indian spoilage was largely attributable to these voters either making more
 than one cross, or writing on the mock ballot that they had not yet made up their
 minds (or something similar). In the context of access to media, etc. the Indian voters
 were not considered as seriously in need of voter education.
 19. The eventual election criteria for ballot validity were very flexibly defined. Some
 ballots which therefore were counted as "spoilt" in this research project would have
 been accepted in the election's ballot counting. It was largely in response to voter
 education research that the flexible criteria were set.
 20. The sample in this study was fairly small (1600 African and 400 coloured), and
 the regional and rural bases sometimes not very representative.
26
 REFERENCES
 Original research for Matla Trust, conducted by Research Initiatives, in co-operation in
 Marketing & Media Research, and Decision Surveys International.
 Supplementary sources:
 Community Agency for Social Enquiry/IFEE. 1994. Empowering the Nation: A national
 survey of vokr education amonp African and Coloured voters. Johannesburg: Westro.
 Human Sciences Research Council. 1994. Political Update. Ad Hoc Issue, No. 1. Pretoria:
 HSRC.
 Independent Electoral Commission. 6 May 1994. Statement: "The final results of the 1994
 election". Released from Gallagher Estate.
 Institute for Multi-Party Democracy. 1994. Launching democracy: Fifth Report.
 Johannesburg/Pretoria.
 Research Initiatives. 1992. The minds and feelings of the swing voters. Research report for
 Matla Trust. Johannesburg.
 Research Initiatives. 1993. Towards the First Election: Voter Education and Turnout-
 Research Report for Matla Trust. Johannesburg
 Research Initiatives. 1994. The first election: Baseline Survey Report. Research Report for
 Matla Trust. Johannesburg.
27
 APPENDIX 1: THEMES OF DISCUSSION GUIDE AND QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
 ]
 THEMES IN THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE
 Mood:
 How participants feel about things happening in South Africa, also prompted to talk about
 the economy.
 The election:
 * Fictitious radio announcement, followed by a question on what the election means to them.
 * Do they think they would vote in this election? Why? Or, why not?
 * Do they think that voting in an election can help to change things in South Africa? In their
 lives? How?
 * Mock ballot exercise. Pretend that this is voting day ...
 * Do you believe that your vote will be secret? It this was a real election, would you worry
 about somebody finding out who you voted for?
 * Do you believe there will be intimidation? Will this stop people voting or make them
 change their votes?
 * Do you ever talk politics to strangers? Probe.
 THEMES OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
 Demographics:
 Details were supplied on gender, age, race, nature of housing, level of urbanisation, home
 language, level of education, employment, religion, number of people in household, number
 of wage earners, and income.
 Specific voter education items:
 * Respondents were asked whether they had any of a specified range of identity documents.
 * Regarding ballot secrecy, the question was asked whether the person thought anyone else
 could find out who they had voted for (even if the person did not tell them).
 * The respondents were asked to complete a mock ballot form. These were completed
 anonymously, and "cast" into a mock ballot box.
 Motivation to vote:
 * The respondents were asked whether they personally would vote (or not) if the election
 took place "tomorrow".
 * Thereafter they were asked, depending on their answer to the first question, to identify
 the most important reason why they want to vote, or do not want to vote.
28
 Access to the mass media:
 * The voters were asked where they get their information about what is happening in politics
 in the country. They were also probed about other possible ways in which they also get
 information.
 * They were also asked how often they watch television, listen to the radio or read
 newspapers.
 * There were also probed on which particular media were being used.
 * Media credibility was assessed by asking the respondents which of each of the three media
 typed they trust and believe.
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