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Non-Anthropocentrism and Extrinsic Value in  

African Environmental Ethics 

 

 

 

Name: Julia Huysamer 

 

Student Number: 1624460 

 

Supervisor: Prof. Edwin Etieyibo 

 

 

 

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the 

Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 

of Master of Arts, Philosophy. 

 

Johannesburg, March 2022 

 
  



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HONOUR PLEDGE  
  

  

  

  

I …………………………………………………………..(full name), a registered student at the  

University of the Witwatersrand with student number…………………………, pledge that  

the assessment task that I am submitting as part of ....................................... (course code) 

is entirely my own work, except where I have indicated that I obtained information from 

other sources, such as books or internet sites (where allowed). I pledge that I have not 

consulted with anyone else, including other students, while completing the assessment 

task or copied information from any source without referencing it.  

  
I acknowledge that if I am found to have cheated in any way or plagiarised other people’s 

work, I will be subject to disciplinary action, which may lead to suspension or expulsion.  

  
  

Signed     

  

  

Date      



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Introduction 

Anthropocentrism is characterised by human-centeredness. In terms of environmental ethics, 

an anthropocentric ethic is one which prioritises human goods over the good of non-human 

entities, or which defines what is good through a human lens or standard (Kopnina, H., 

Washington, H., Taylor, B. et al, 2018).  As a result, moral worth is allocated or assigned 

according to whether or not something brings value to humans. The implication is that 

nonhuman nature is extrinsically valued. Specifically, it is given instrumental value according 

to how it can be used for the end goal of humanity. From this, Etieyibo draws out two key 

points in terms of the type of value which is attributed to elements of the natural kingdom: 

“[H]umans are (1) the single and most important bearers of intrinsic value or (2) 

individual nonhuman organisms/ nonhuman nature possess no intrinsic value.” (2018: 

165)  

This conclusion is based on the assumption that humans have some intrinsic value. In 

contrast to this, I will argue that neither humans nor non-human nature needs to be assigned 

intrinsic value in order for the resulting environmental ethic to be non-anthropocentric. This 

goes against the first point, by denying the intrinsic value of humans entirely. It also goes 

against the second point, by suggesting that an ethic which gives no intrinsic value (or which 

is gives extrinsic value) to nonhuman organisms or nature need not be anthropocentric. I will 

argue that elements of traditional African worldviews such as communitarianism, Ubuntu and 

Maat point toward a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic which allocates contributory 

extrinsic value to both humans and non-human nature.  

 

An important distinction for this paper is the difference between three key types of value 

which can be attributed to humans and non-human nature. The first distinction is between 

intrinsic and extrinsic value, and the second is between two types of extrinsic value – 

instrumental and contributory extrinsic value. Instrumental value is ascribed to objects which 

are useful in fulfilling certain roles or completing valuable tasks. In other words, it is a value 

attributed to things which are means toward some greater end. A traditional example of 

instrumental value is that of money. Money is valuable because it allows people to achieve 

things which they value. For example, money may allow someone to pay for life-saving 

surgery. Here, the money itself is only valuable insofar as it can be used as a tool to acquire 

something of greater value. Instrumental value is ascribed to something in relation to 

something else, where one relatum has a greater value than the other. To use the previous 

example, the value of the money is less than the value of the life-saving surgery. This is 



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because the value of the means (money) is derivative from the value of the ends (life-saving 

surgery). Extrinsic value is importantly related to context, for example, the cultural context 

might determine aesthetic standards whereby something is judged to be beautiful.  

Instrumental value is a specific type of extrinsic value, but it is not the type of value I would 

like to accord to humans and other beings in this project.   

 

A second type of extrinsic value which is important to the current argument is contributory 

value. This type of value is ascribed to objects which are part of a greater whole. 

Contributory value holds between things being related, but the relata can have equal worth or 

worth can be placed on the relation itself. It is possible either that the constituents of a whole 

have no value individually or that the value of the whole is greater than the sum of the value 

of its parts. For example, the value of a piece of art could be greater than the value of its 

individual brushstrokes. However, this is not the same as instrumental value. Not only do the 

individual brushstrokes make up the aesthetic value of the artwork, but the artwork as a 

whole is what gives the brushstrokes value. This multi-directional value is different from the 

uni-directional value involved in instrumental value. In this project, I will defend the thesis 

that the principles of Ubuntu, personhood, vital force and Maat point toward humans and 

non-human nature having contributory extrinsic value.  

 

Finally, intrinsic value is attributed to that which is valuable in and of itself (Taylor, 1971). 

Intrinsic value need not involve any type of relationship, since the object of value can be 

valued for its own sake. Accordingly, intrinsic value is not contextually bound. For example, 

a hedonist would see pleasure as the sole locus of intrinsic value (Taylor, 1971). Pleasure is 

valuable, not because of what it is useful for, but for itself. Most of the current literature 

which argues for the non-anthropocentrism of African environmental ethics does so by 

attempting to show that both humans and non-human nature possess intrinsic value. While I 

find this strategy convincing, I will present an alternative way to defend the same conclusion, 

further strengthening this position against its critics who primarily argue that African 

environmental ethics is anthropocentric. Instead of arguing for their intrinsic value, humans 

and non-humans could be said to be extrinsically valuable if we take African thought as 

strictly communitarian.  

 

If all beings are valuable because they help to achieve the ultimate communal good, then 

African thought is not anthropocentric. In this case, there is no distinction between the way in 



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which humans and non-human nature is valued. This stance is compatible with both strict 

communitarianism, ethics of nature relatedness, and the idea of holism whereby everything in 

the universe hangs together, sharing and transferring vital force. It is also in line with the idea 

of duties which ensure that humans and non-human nature are treated with care and respect.  

I will argue that ascribing extrinsic value to all beings is both in line with African thought and 

a plausible argument for the non-anthropocentrism of African philosophy in general and 

African environmental ethics in particular.  

 

The work of this dissertation can be read in both a descriptive and normative light. The 

distillation of an African environmental ethic from the current body of literature is a 

descriptive task. This task has resulted in my stance that an African environmental ethic is a 

non-anthropocentric one. Because an African environmental ethic is non-anthropocentric, it 

can make an important contribution to current environmental debates, and could be a viable 

ethic on which to base environmental legislature, especially during a climate and resource 

crisis. Behrens describes the “untapped wealth of indigenous [African] knowledge and 

wisdom” (2010: 193) which could add significant value to eco-philosophy as a whole. The 

application and use of an African environmental ethic would be a normative task, but it is not 

undertaken here. Such work has been done elsewhere, for example through the proposal to 

establish ecovillages globally, based on the ethics espoused by Cheikh Anta Diop and the 

Songhaï Centers set up by Godfrey Nzamujo (Verharen et al., 2021). Rather, the possibility 

of this application is part of the motivation for specifying the ethic, and is one reason why 

this is an important task.  

 

Before the main body of the argument is presented, a qualification needs to be made 

regarding my use of the term “African philosophy”. There are questions around whether the 

term “African philosophy” can accurately be applied to a group of philosophies which may 

have very little in common. The converse of this is the argument that what characterises one 

type of African thought may not be representative of the whole of Africa. For example, ideas 

which may stem from a certain part of West Africa could not be described as “African 

philosophy” because they do not apply to other parts of Africa. In other words, thoughts and 

ideas within Africa and stemming from a traditional African context are varied, so to label 

them as African philosophy would be to homogenise these philosophies under a banner 

which does not accurately describe or connect them.  

 



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The response to this problem is two-pronged. On one hand, the label of African philosophy 

need not be homogenising, because it could include different specific and heterogeneous 

African philosophies under one banner. To draw from the analogy made by Etieyibo (2021), 

a Zulu dress may not be the kind of garment worn in every part of Africa, but it is still an 

African dress. In the same way, thoughts labelled as “African philosophy” need not be 

representative of all African thought to be considered African. On the other hand, it is 

important to note certain striking similarities between philosophies from across the African 

continent. One such similarity which will be briefly explored in this dissertation is the 

parallels between the Ancient Egyptian concept of Maat and the Bantu concept of Ubuntu. 

This is one of many patterns of thought which occur in different parts of Africa, but which 

mirror each other in their core principles, and support the idea that African philosophy is tied 

together by many common threads of thought which are found throughout the continent 

(Behrens, 2006). These two points support the use of the label of “African philosophy” under 

which this dissertation is written.  

 

My research will build on the current literature by presenting an alternative way in which to 

read African philosophy as non-anthropocentric. Instead of arguing that animals and non-

human nature have intrinsic value, I will argue that they have extrinsic value. However, I will 

also extend this argument to humans. The key difference between my account and the general 

trend in the literature is the claim that all beings have extrinsic, rather than intrinsic value. 

This approach avoids the difficulties of explaining the intrinsic value of animals, land and 

other elements of the environment, which seem to be treated as means toward some greater 

end in certain traditional practices. There is a gap in the current literature surrounding 

whether or not African philosophy is anthropocentric. Taking both humans and non-human 

nature to have extrinsic value will add to the current discussion around whether or not 

African philosophy is anthropocentric, as well as providing an alternative strategy to defend 

the idea that it is non-anthropocentric.   

 

To begin with, In Section 1 I will discuss the main trend in the literature, which is the idea 

that African philosophy is non-anthropocentric because of the extension of intrinsic value 

beyond humans, and including the rest of the natural kingdom. Specifically, I will look at 

how the idea of vital force is used to attach intrinsic value to humans and non-humans alike. 

In Section 2 I will discuss the counter-argument which has been made, that African 

philosophy is anthropocentric because of the extrinsic, specifically instrumental, value which 



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is given to non-human nature.  This is based on the practices of ritual animal slaughter, 

taboos and totems. Section 3 will explore the ways in which the principles of Afro-

communitarianism, including strict communitarianism, personhood, Ubuntu and Maat, point 

toward the extrinsic value of humans. Tying these two previous points together, in Section 4 I 

will look at how the extrinsic value of nature together with the extrinsic value of humans puts 

the two on a level moral playing field, and can be the basis of a non-anthropocentric 

environmental ethic. Finally, Section 5 will deal with two possible objections to my 

argument, as well as responses in defence of my stance.   

 

1. Intrinsic Value of Non-Human Nature 

1.1.  Intrinsic Value 

Taking both humans and non-human nature as intrinsically valuable is one way in which to 

argue for the non-anthropocentrism of African environmental ethics. The attribution of 

intrinsic value means that something is valued for its own sake, and not for what it is able to 

produce, add toward or make possible. In the context of environmental ethics, attributing 

elements of the environment with intrinsic value is a solid basis for a non-anthropocentric 

ethic. This is because the value of an element of nature is not valued in human terms, or for 

the benefit which it might provide to humans. Instead, it is valued for its own right, despite 

the context in which it is placed. Non-human nature then becomes a moral subject and holds 

its own moral weight irrespective of any relation to humans. As a result, nature is not used 

and abused for the sake of human gain, and humans are not morally superior to non-human 

nature when it comes to moral decisions.  

 

There are various ways in which to explicate intrinsic value. Taylor outlines five different 

ways in which to understand intrinsic value: 

(i) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it is sought or desired 

for its own sake, or as an end in itself.  

(ii) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it has value and that its 

value depends on its nature rather than on its consequences or its relation to 

other things.  

(iii) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it would have value 

even if it were the only thing existing in the universe.  

(iv) To say something has intrinsic value is to say that there is an objective, non-

natural property inhering in (belonging to) it.  



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(v) To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it has non-derivative 

value.  (Taylor, 1972: 441) 

Some have suggested that pleasure, virtue and knowledge, among other things, may be 

described as valuable in at least one of these ways (Ross, 2001). Traditionally, Western 

philosophers have taken humans to be intrinsically valuable. This is the basis for concepts 

such as human rights, which protect people from actions which would fail to recognise their 

worth. For example, the right to healthcare protects people from untreated disease and injury, 

by recognising that health benefits the wellbeing of humans, who are intrinsically valuable. 

Intrinsic value, then, can be variously specified as well as variously applied to concepts, 

properties and objects, including people.  

 

The concept of intrinsic value is also tied to individualism. Gyekye explores the relational, 

social and communal nature of African ethics, which stands in contrast with the 

individualistic nature of Western ethics. This relational ethical approach is based on the needs 

and nature of humans: “The natural sociality or relationality of human beings would – and 

should – prescribe a social ethic, rather than the ethic of individualism” (Gyekye, 2010: 29). 

The ideas of holism, relationality and mutual dependence which exist in African ethics go 

against Taylor’s descriptions of intrinsic value. On the first and third points, valuing 

something (i) for its own sake or (iii) giving value to it even if it were the only thing existing 

in the universe both have individualistic undertones. To value something in isolation without 

considering its context is out of place in an African ethic, in which individual elements hang 

together in a societal nexus (Teffo & Roux, 2002). To take an individual out of this nexus is 

to strip it of both the societal standards through which value is measured, as well as the 

setting in which that value is realised. This applies to human society as well as to elements of 

the natural kingdom.  

 

Point (v) has a similar implication. For a person to have (v) non-derivative value is for that 

value to be self-produced outside of the context of a community. Taylor himself discounts the 

description (iv), arguing that value is not the right kind of thing to be described as a property. 

His argument is based on the fact that intrinsic value, unlike other properties, is a non-natural 

property, since it cannot be determined through empirical means whether an object has this 

property. On the other hand, an intuitionist account of value requires that an object’s value is 

an essential property. I will not expand on or defend Taylor’s position here, but rather take it 

as a note of caution against the use of the fourth description. The description of valuing 



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something for its nature (ii) comes close to the idea of vital force giving intrinsic value, 

which I take to be the most promising way in which to ascribe intrinsic value either to 

humans or to non-human nature, or both, within the context of African environmental ethics.  

 

1.2.  Vital Force and Intrinsic Value  

In most of the current literature, humans and non-human nature are said to have intrinsic 

value and this value is assigned or conferred on them through the idea of vital force. The 

force thesis, as outlined by Tempels (1959), is a metaphysical worldview whereby beings are 

imbued with vital force. Beings do not have the same amount of force. Rather, there is a 

hierarchy or chain of force in the universe. God is the apex of this hierarchy, as the ultimate 

source of vital force. Lower down are spirits and ancestors, humans, animals, plants and 

inanimate objects (Teffo & Roux, 2002:196). Existence and force are intimately intertwined: 

“Force is the nature of being, force is being, being is force” (Tempels, 1959: 51). Force is the 

essence of something’s being, which is in line with Taylor’s description of something having 

intrinsic value based on its nature, rather than intrinsic value being a non-natural property.  

As an essential characteristic of all animate and inanimate objects of the universe, force plays 

a connecting role, and is a kind of common denominator. Force is not a homogenising idea: 

“forces may differ in their essence; thus we have divine, celestial or terrestrial, human, 

animal, vegetal, and material or mineral forces” (Ikuenobe, 2014: 3). Though forces 

themselves may differ in essence, they are the common essence of all human and nonhuman 

beings. If force is used as a standard for moral consideration, then this consideration is 

extended beyond humans, animals and even plants. This idea is attractive, since it gives 

intrinsic value to all beings, including non-human nature, and even to inanimate objects, such 

as elements of the natural landscape.  These types of arguments are made by Etieyibo (2017) 

and Tangwa (2005), but their specifics will be discussed in Section 4.1.  

 

A possible problem with using vital force as a determining factor for moral worth is the idea 

that the moral consideration might vary in degree in line with the degree of force. If this is 

true, then Horsthemke (2017) points out that humans would still be considered morally 

superior to the rest of the natural kingdom. Humans would still be subordinate to sprits, 

ancestors and god, because they have a greater degree of force, but this can still be seen as 

anthropocentric. This hierarchical structure points to anthropocentrism because of the close 

connection between humans and the divine. Not only is nonhuman nature lower on the 

hierarchy of vital force, but Horsthemke argues that the hierarchy itself centres humans. The 



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divine is seen in relation to humans, since spirits and ancestors were humans who reached a 

certain level of personhood in their mortal lives. Similarly, nonhuman nature is seen as the 

environment for the sustenance and existence of humans (Mbiti, 1969). Horsthemke 

concludes that the ontological hierarchy based on vital force means that “[humans] have 

moral responsibilities and duties first and foremost to God, then to the ancestors and their 

fellow humans, and only thereafter, indirectly, to the rest of creation” (2017:125). In other 

words, the ontological hierarchy creates a parallel moral hierarchy. The lower moral status of 

the natural kingdom, together with the centring of humans within the hierarchy, leads to a 

picture of African morality which is decidedly anthropocentric.  

 

However, there are possible responses to this problem, one of which is Etieyibo’s (2019) 

response to Horsthemke. Etieyibo denies that the ontological hierarchy implies or 

necessitates a parallel moral hierarchy. Accordingly, it is not the degree of vital force, but 

rather the possession thereof which has moral implications and gives intrinsic worth. In the 

same way, anthropocentric worldviews may take the possession of rationality to be the 

indicator of moral worth. Since humans are the only known beings to possess rationality, this 

is anthropocentric. However, humans have differing degrees of rationality. Despite this, they 

do not have different degrees of moral worth. This analogy shows how possession of an 

attribute is a good indicator of moral worth, and the degree to which the attribute is displayed 

is not as important a factor. This argument is in line with Etieyibo’s argument, which is the 

most plausible strategy to argue for the intrinsic value of human and non-human beings, with 

the implication that African philosophy is not anthropocentric. In this thesis, I will take 

Etieyibo’s response to the force problem, and other arguments which base moral worth on 

force, as sufficient to allow vital force to be a marker of moral status, without the implication 

of anthropocentrism. In contrast to Etieyibo’s view, I will argue from the standpoint of 

extrinsic, rather than intrinsic value, presenting an alternative position which can be used in 

the case that the intrinsic position fails.  

 

Within Western literature on environmental ethics, there are various standards to determine 

what has intrinsic value, and accordingly what can be treated as a moral subject. Two of the 

main views within Western environmental ethics allocate moral status according to the ability 

to feel pain, and sentience. Both of these approaches display a narrowness which leads them 

to exclude plants, natural features such as rivers, as well as superstructures such as 

ecosystems. Bentham (1780/ 1983) and Singer (1975) take sentience to be the essential 



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characteristic which determines moral consideration. This is helpful for animal ethics, 

because it allows animals which cannot express rationality to be morally treated. However, 

unlike the use of vital force as a criterion for moral treatment, this works well for animals, but 

is difficult to extend to the rest of nature. A plant could arguably display some degree of 

sentience through newly-researched tendencies such as crown shyness, whereby trees of the 

same type do not grow too close to each other to block out sunlight, and chemical root 

communication through soil organisms (van Dam & Bouwmeester, 2016). However, the 

same cannot be said of a natural feature such as land, or a macrostructure such as an 

ecosystem. Soil and ecosystems both contain sentient beings, but do not have a shared, 

“group” sentience which would allow them to be morally considerable on their own. Basing 

moral consideration on vital force solves this problem of narrowness, because even non-

sentient elements of nature have vital force and are the subjects of moral consideration.  

 

Some of the benefits of using vital force as a marker for moral consideration in an 

environmental ethic include its wide application, as well as its equalising and connective 

roles. Vital force equalizes a heterogeneous array of elements, including the divine realm, 

people, sentient and non-sentient elements of nature. It also connects these elements through 

their common vitality, as parts of a whole, closed system of vital force. Sentience and pain, 

while they are a common property in both humans, animals and possibly some forms of 

vegetation, do not play the same connective role, because they are not the basis of community 

in the same way that vital force is the basis of mutual respect and community within the 

framework of Ubuntu. This makes vital force a more emotive, stronger basis for 

commonality, especially with its connection to the divine. The recognition that animals may 

feel pain in a similar way to humans may cause humans to respect animals more and treat 

them better, and the same is true for sentience. On the vital force basis, animals and nature 

are not only respected and well-treated because of a common property or capacity, but rather 

because they form part of the same divine web of being. This is clearly a much closer form of 

connection, and it makes vital force a stronger criterion for moral consideration than either 

the capacity to feel pain and the property of sentience. The allocation of intrinsic value to 

both humans and non-human nature is one way in which philosophers have constructed a 

non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. African environmental ethics specifically can 

explain this intrinsic value, and resultant moral consideration, through the idea of vital force. 

While I agree that vital force is a good indicator of moral status, I believe that it points 

toward extrinsic rather than intrinsic value.  



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2. Extrinsic Value of Non-Human Nature 

2.1.  Types of Extrinsic Value 

 Two types of value which are important for this project are instrumental and contributory 

value. Ethical frameworks which give non-human nature instrumental value are largely 

anthropocentric. On the other hand, I will argue that an ethic which gives non-human nature 

contributory value can be non-anthropocentric. Traditional African practices, especially ritual 

animal slaughter, the adherence to taboos and the protection of totems, point toward non-

human nature being extrinsically valued. I will argue that the type of extrinsic value revealed 

by these practices is contributory, rather than instrumental.  

 

2.1.1. Instrumental Value 

Instrumental value is the kind of value discussed above through which objects are valued 

insofar as they facilitate the achievement of some more valued outcome.  Valuing non-human 

nature instrumentally is typical of anthropocentric viewpoints. This is the basis of the view 

that African environmental ethics is anthropocentric, as argued by Horsthemke (2017). 

Horsthemke (2017) holds that African thought is characterised by moral anthropocentrism. 

This is because the respect and duties due toward non-human nature is indirect, and 

ultimately benefit humans. Morally right actions and moral value are judged in human terms. 

Horsthemke argues that the anthropocentrism of African thought is seen in both its 

communalism and in African religion. In African religious systems, practices such as animal 

slaughter seem to value the animal only in as far as its slaughter benefits humans, for 

example by forming a connection to the divine realm. Animals are not valued as ends in 

themselves but rather as means toward some greater good, which clearly demonstrates the 

concept of instrumental value. This greater good is based on human benefit, which shows the 

anthropocentric nature of an African environmental outlook, according to Horsthemke 

(2017). Any practice which takes nonhuman nature as instrumentally valuable must be 

anthropocentric if the ends are those of humans. This is because they would have the two 

defining characteristics of anthropocentrism, as outlined by Etieyibo (2018): first, that 

humans are the only and most important bearers of intrinsic value, and second that nonhuman 

nature has no intrinsic value. Taking nonhuman nature as instrumentally valuable and 

humans as intrinsically valuable is the mark of an anthropocentric environmental ethic.  

 

Western ethics are also often presented as anthropocentric due to their centring of human 

values and the view of non-human nature as instrumentally valuable. Of course, colonialism 



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is one way in which African and Western environmental ethics have come into contact. 

Ikuenobe (2014) explores the ways in which colonialism disrupted the deep connectedness 

between humans and nature, and replaced it with a capitalist, Western mind-set of utilisation 

and division. On Ikuenobe’s account, colonialism and capitalism have replaced the close 

connection and recognition of dependence on nature with a separation from nature and 

consumeristic attitude toward natural resources.  For example, “[b]y getting rid of their herbal 

mode of healing, [Africans] did not see any need for leaves, plants, roots and bark of trees 

and the need to preserve them. Thus, they have sought to destroy or exploit them for 

economic gains” (Ikuenobe, 2014: 18). This demonstrates the disconnect from nature and 

capitalistic attitude associated with a Western society, which has spread to Africa as a result 

of colonialism. The idea of exploiting natural resources for economic gains clearly shows the 

instrumental value attached to nature. Natural resources are seen purely as means towards a 

greater end, that of economic gain, which is purely based on human benefit. Ikuenobe 

presents a practical example of how extrinsic, specifically instrumental value, when attached 

to nature, results in an anthropocentric environmental ethic.  

 

However, an anthropocentric worldview does not necessarily imply that nature is disregarded 

or treated poorly. As Opke and Oti note, “[t]hat everything exists for man, in the African 

sense, does not imply aggressive dominance or subjugation over the rest of nature… In fact, 

reverence for all creation is an essential part of the moral order of the universe and 

determines everything that happens to or befalls humanity” (Opke & Oti, 2019: 106). Many 

traditional practices benefit the environment tangentially or as a by-product, despite being 

anthropocentric in nature. For example, taboos protect land and nature from human influence 

and could be read as conservational (Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010). However, the main aim of 

the taboo is to protect humans from the wrath of spirits. The key premise of the viewpoint 

that African environmental ethics is anthropocentric is that humans and non-human nature 

are valued differently, with humans being the only locus of intrinsic value.  

 

From the above argument, it is clear that an African environmental ethic can be characterised 

by anthropocentrism, without its being harmful to the environment. However, there are two 

reasons why this is not the view I will take, which are normative and descriptive respectively. 

Firstly, it is more likely that an anthropocentric worldview would result in disregard for the 

environment. This is the normative point, because I will defend the stance that an 

anthropocentric viewpoint should not be used when it comes to an ethic which informs 



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environmental choices. The non-anthropocentric nature of African environmental ethics 

makes it apt for application to current environmental decisions, in the face of a global 

environmental crisis. This is part of the motivation for examining African environmental 

ethics, in order to explore the ways in which it can contribute toward the global 

environmental discussion. Secondly, and most importantly, a close examination of the 

literature on African environmental ethics reveals that it is better characterised as non-

anthropocentric. The specific characterisations vary, and include Tangwa’s eco-bio-centrism 

as well as Metz’s ethic of nature relatedness. The basis for my argument is traditional African 

practices, ethics and metaphysics, which point toward both humans and non-humans having 

contributory value, resulting in a non-anthropocentric ethic framework.  

 

2.1.2. Contributory Value 

In order to explain contributory value, it is useful to set up specific vocabulary to distinguish 

between the parts and the whole. Let the state of affairs be the single contributory event or 

object, which partially constitutes a scenario of intrinsic worth. For example, the state of 

affairs would be the existence of an individual paintbrush stroke, while the scenario is the full 

painting. As noted by Bradley (1998), a state of affairs which has contributory extrinsic value 

could have no intrinsic worth, or it may have some intrinsic worth, but less than the overall 

intrinsic worth of the whole state of affairs. Simply defined, contributory value is ‘[t]he value 

a constituent has in virtue of contributing to the whole” (Bradley, 1998: 120). Contributory 

value is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, because it depends on the circumstances in which the 

object of value is placed. The value of a paintbrush stroke outside the context of a painting is 

different from that within the context of the painting.  

 

An important distinguishing aspect of contributory value which differentiates it from 

instrumental value is the multi-directional nature of the value it creates. Not only does the 

paintbrush stroke give the painting aesthetic value, but the paintbrush stroke is made more 

valuable in the context of the painting. The same cannot be said for goods which have 

instrumental value. Objects which have instrumental value have a one-directional relationship 

of value conferral with the scenarios of greater worth which they bring about. For example, if 

a key is used to open a lock then it is instrumentally valuable. With no lock to open, the key 

becomes value-less, but the lock does not lose value without the key, because there are 

different instruments which can be used to achieve the same end of opening the lock. The 

lock gives the key value, but the key does not give the lock the same value. This is one way 



15 

 

in which the fine difference between the two types of extrinsic value which have been 

discussed, contributory and instrumental value, can be pulled apart. This distinction is also 

important to consider when applied to the context of environmental ethics, as will be further 

explored in Section 4.  

 

The fact that contributory value can be applied to objects which also have intrinsic value, 

shows the compatibility between my view and the traditional view, whereby both humans 

and non-human nature have intrinsic value. On one hand, the constituents (non-human 

nature) can have intrinsic value, but less than that of the overall good of the human and non-

human community as a whole, which is in line with the traditional view. On the other, the 

constituents (non-human nature) need not have intrinsic value, and only the overall good of 

the community to which they contribute has intrinsic value. There is a third possibility, 

whereby even the overall good of the community has only extrinsic value, perhaps to the 

individual constituents themselves. This is a more radical stance which cancels out the need 

for intrinsic value entirely through creating a kind of value loop. Any of these three stances is 

compatible with the idea of humans and non-human nature having contributory extrinsic 

value, but I will argue in favour of the second view.  

 

Applying contributory value to non-human nature is not linked to an anthropocentric ethic in 

the same way as the application of instrumental value does. This makes it a way in which 

non-human nature can be said to have extrinsic value, without the ethical framework 

immediately becoming an anthropocentric one. As a result, the line between instrumental and 

contributory value of non-human nature parallels the line between an anthropocentric and a 

non-anthropocentric ethic respectively, which makes the distinction a crucial one to explore. 

Those who have argued for the anthropocentrism of African environmental ethics have 

pointed toward several traditional African practices which show that non-human nature is 

valued instrumentally. While I agree that these practices show an extrinsic, rather than an 

intrinsic, value being attached to non-human nature, I believe that it can be better understood 

as contributory extrinsic value.  

 

2.2.  Non-Human Nature in African Environmental Ethics 

Three practices which demonstrate the extrinsic valuing of non-human nature are those of 

ritual animal slaughter, taboos and totemism. Ritual animal slaughter places the value of the 

sacrifice’s outcome over the value of the animal’s life or lack of suffering. This is difficult to 



16 

 

square with the attribution of intrinsic value to the animal involved, and rather suggests an 

extrinsic value. Taboos are “pedagogical tools aimed at inculcating desirable behaviour” 

(Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010: 122). They can be cashed out as avoidance rules, especially 

relating to non-sentient elements of the environment, such as areas of land and rivers. 

Another way in which taboos are realised is through restrictions on the use of totem animals. 

Totem animals have a symbolic and symbiotic relationship with a clan, which involves 

respect and care (Irele & Jeyifo, 2010). Horsthemke argues that although African morality is 

anthropocentric, it includes and promotes “respect toward the nonhuman (animal and natural) 

world” (2017: 120), which is seen through things like the protection of totem animals. 

Taboos and totem practices, while they may have positive and conservational impacts on the 

sentient and non-sentient elements of the environment, are performed because of the fear of 

retribution from the spirit world. The motivation behind these practices is arguably self-

preservation, which points toward the extrinsic value of the non-human nature involved.  

 

2.2.1. Ritual Animal Slaughter 

In some African cultural groups, animals are slaughtered as part of rituals including 

initiations, weddings, funerals and various celebrations. Similar ritual animal slaughter has 

been attributed to cultural groups across Africa. Archeological evidence dating back to at 

least 5200–3800 BC suggest that the Middle Pastoral groups of the Messak, now the Libyan 

central Saharah, held regular feasts which included ritual cattle slaughter (di Lernia et al., 

2013). The Pakot people of West Central Kenya undertake sapana and related initiation 

rituals which involve the slaughter of steer cattle (Schneider, 1957). The Xhosa-speaking 

people traditionally slaughter a cattle or goat slaughter as part of the umkhapho mourning 

ritual, as well as slaughtering either an ox or a cow for the celebratory umbuyiso ritual (van 

Heerden, 2002). These are a selection of African cultural and religious ceremonies which 

include ritual animal slaughter, but they serve as a demonstration of how widespread these 

practices are, not only across the geographical locations within Africa, but also across a large 

span of time. This is the basis for my including them as a common traditional African 

practice, from which the ethical attitude toward animals can be distilled.  

 

Etieyibo (2018) describes this slaughter as a way of connecting the human and the divine 

through nature. In a much-quoted passage, Tangwa describes the closeness between humans 

and the environment in traditional Nso thought: 



17 

 

“[T]he distinction between plants, animals, and inanimate things, between the sacred 

and the profane, matter and spirit, the communal and the individual, is a slim and 

flexible one” (Tangwa, 2004: 389)  

In the practice of ritual animal slaughter, the animals play an important role, as they are given 

the ability to bridge the divide, however slim, between humans and the divine. The animal 

takes on qualities which are above the human capacity to hold, even sometimes being 

described as the embodiment of spirits or ancestors (Taringa, 2006). Sacrifices can be made 

to god, as well as to ancestors and spirits (Horsthemke, 2017). This means that the animal is 

not treated as a moral subject in its own right, or not as a moral subject equal in consideration 

to those who benefit from the slaughter. In other words, it is not attributed intrinsic value, 

because it is not protected from pain and harm for its own good. Instead, the ceremony is 

conducted for the benefit of the humans involved, or for the god, spirit or ancestors receiving 

the sacrifice.  

 

One aspect of these kinds of rituals which is especially indicative of the prioritisation of the 

outcome of the slaughter over the animal’s life or lack of suffering is the central role of pain 

in some rituals. In some cases, the animal must exhibit pain in order for the ritual to be 

considered successful, and “[t]he types of animals used are those that make the most noise 

whilst dying, generally cattle or goats, as the crying animal indicates the ancestors’ approval” 

(Rudnick, 2003: 57). This directly demonstrates the fact that the ancestor’s approval of the 

sacrifice is valued above the animal’s pain. With this in mind, it becomes difficult to claim 

that ritual animal slaughter is compatible with the recognition of the intrinsic value of 

animals. This type of treatment is more in line with an extrinsic value of animals, since their 

wellbeing is not prioritised over all else.  

 

Despite Etieyibo’s claim that such ceremonies “forge some linkage between the material or 

physical and spiritual worlds” (2018: 175), it is not clear that this gives intrinsic value to the 

animals involved. Rather, the focus is on the humans in communion with the spirit realm, and 

the animals are mere means in the situation. The animals may benefit from the eventual 

communal good. For example, if appeasing the ancestors means that a plague is avoided, then 

the animals and natural kingdom reap the benefits of this sacrifice. The greater communal 

good then, the avoidance of the plague, does not only benefit humans, but also non-human 

nature. However, this does not seem to be the main goal, and is more like a happy accident, 

or unintended positive consequence that stems from the real purpose of the sacrifice by 



18 

 

chance. For the animal being sacrificed, it is not clear that the greater good is in line with the 

individual good, as it would probably die in both circumstances. Etieyibo claims that such a 

reading of sacrificial slaughter fails to recognise the symbolism of the slaughter over the 

practice itself, but the symbolism cannot fully outweigh the practice itself. Any cruel practice 

could be defended through the use of symbolism, but this does not excuse the effects of the 

practice on the beings involved. The practice of ritual animal slaughter is more consistent 

with animals having extrinsic, rather than an intrinsic, value.  

 

2.2.2. Taboos  

Animals are not the only consideration when it comes to environmental ethics, and taboos are 

one way in which the attitude toward non-sentient elements of the natural environment can be 

extracted. There are various taboos set in place in a range of traditional African communities, 

especially to do with the land and the spaces which cannot be occupied or trespassed upon by 

humans. These are areas which are protected and inhabited by spirits of various descriptions. 

Chemhuru and Masaka (2010) discuss the ways in which environmental taboos can be drawn 

upon to distil the environmental ethic of the Shona people of Zimbabwe. These taboos 

include restrictions on the use of certain natural resources. Importantly, the taboos are based 

around the belief in supernatural forces and their protection of certain sacred areas.  

Chemhuru and Masaka examine these taboos, and use them to draw out an environmental 

belief system. One important finding is the conservational consequences of taboos: “Shona 

environmental taboos transcend simple prohibitions on certain sacred sites, plants and 

nonhuman animal species, pools and rivers, among others and enforce a desirable and 

sustainable use of the environment” (2010: 122). The outcome of these taboos is clearly 

beneficial to the environment, because of the conservation of resources and the protection of 

areas of land which can sustain animal and plant life, and protect them from human 

interference. The taboos have a similar effect to modern heritage and conservation sites.  

 

However, these positive results may not be intentional, and could instead be a by-product of 

the taboo. The taboos may not point toward the intrinsic valuing of the land, plants and 

resources which they protect. Instead, it has been argued that the reasoning behind these 

actions is the avoidance and fear of retribution from the supernatural realm, which includes 

natural disasters, disease and death. This is the point on which Horsthemke (2017) focuses in 

order to show that the traditional taboos in African cultures are anthropocentric. Taringa 

(2006) explores the ways in which nonhuman nature is treated with reverence and respect 



19 

 

without it having intrinsic value. Through the example of protection of sacred land, Taringa 

shows how good treatment of nature is a result of fear of divine punishment or retribution. 

The end concern is the protection of the humans from the negative impacts of the spirits, 

rather than the protection of the environment for its own sake. Horsthemke points out that “if 

people act predominantly out of fear of invoking the anger of the spiritual world, then this 

will hardly open their eyes and minds to, say, animal’s inherent value” (Horsthemke, 2017: 

131). The focus of the people adhering to the taboos is their own wellbeing, and even if the 

animals are seen as intrinsically or inherently valuable, this is overshadowed by fear and self-

preservation. Although the taboos may have outcomes which benefit the natural world, this 

does not necessarily mean that the taboos point to an intrinsic valuing of plants, nature and 

land.  

 

The purpose of taboos has also been analysed, in order to establish whether or not these 

taboos value non-human nature as being imbued with intrinsic value, and being moral 

subjects as ends, rather than means. I believe that Horsthemke puts forward a convincing case 

in arguing that taboos do not display an intrinsic valuing of the elements of nature they 

concern, because of the relation to spirits and ancestors which should not be disturbed or 

angered.  Where my opinion differs from his is that I take this as a contributory, rather than 

an instrumental form of extrinsic value. Accordingly, Horsthemke finds the lack of intrinsic, 

or inherent, value accorded to elements of the environment demonstrative of an 

anthropocentric ethic. In contrast to this, I will argue that taboos which point to the extrinsic 

value of nature might be part of a non-anthropocentric ethic in which all elements of the 

system, including humans, are extrinsically valued. Disturbing the spirits would lead to a lack 

of social harmony and it would detract from the communal good. Together with this, a safe 

and functioning ecosystem is essential to the communal good as well, especially if non-

human nature is included in the idea of community.  

 

2.2.3. Totems  

Another way in which taboos are implemented is the respect for and protection of totem 

animals. Totemism is a connective, embodied metaphor between a clan and an animal, 

whereby the members of the clan honour and appropriate characteristics of the animal (Irele 

& Jeyifo, 2010). For example, an animal might embody grace, which is appreciated and 

adopted by the clan who holds this animal as its totem. The relationship between the clan and 

its totem animal is one of respect and community, which comes with certain duties and 



20 

 

taboos in order to maintain it. Animals are seen as connective in many different ways. As 

discussed above, animals are able to connect the human and the divine through ritual animal 

slaughter. Animals also serve as an intermediary between humans and nature (Lévi-Strauss, 

1962). They share many of the attributes and capacities of humans such as sentience, co-

operation, hunting, mating et cetera, but they are also more part of the natural world than 

humans are. Because of this, through connecting with an animal as a totem, humans are also 

more connected to the environment around them. The practice of totemism has many other 

practical functions, including the verification of belonging to a certain clan and the choice of 

an appropriate spouse based on whether the totem animals were compatible (Irele & Jeyifo, 

2010). This demonstrates the integration of totem animals into everyday life, and the ways in 

which these symbols play a functioning role in the community. It also underscores the 

argument that non-human nature could be included in the idea of community, through both 

the connective and the practical roles of totem animals.  

 

The adherence to totem animals is also protective, in a similar way to the taboos surrounding 

non-sentient nature. Clan totem animals are protected from being killed and consumed except 

in cases of self-defence, and violations of these taboos affects “not only the life of the 

violator but his/her very being as well as the entire community” (Tangwa, 1996: 189). For 

example, people belonging to the vaera Nzou clan cannot eat elephant meat, because their 

clan totem is the elephant (Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010). This is similar to the taboos around 

land protection, in that the failure to adhere to this taboo is believed to result in disease.  

In this specific case, such a transgression “invites illness or the loss of the offender’s teeth” 

(Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010: 123). African metaphysics does not separate the divine from the 

ordinary, and spirits operate in the same plane of existence as humans, which allows their 

wrath to be physically expressed (Wiredu, 1987). This is important to keep in mind, because 

it makes the fear of divine retribution a very real fear of tangible physical consequences. The 

protection of animals through totemism is in some ways similar to the modern protection of 

endangered species, as it recognises their worth and the role they play as parts of a wider 

natural community. Through totemism, animals are protected, recognised for their positive 

attributes, and allowed to play symbolic and practical roles in the community, which points to 

their having contributory value as parts of this community.  

 

 

 



21 

 

2.3.  Non-Human Nature and Contributory Value 

Contributory value seems to be more in line with African environmental ethics and African 

ethics more generally than instrumental value, because of its emphasis on relationships and 

holism. This is especially true when one considers the themes of personhood, Ubuntu and 

Maat, all of which emphasize a connectedness and interdependence between the various 

elements of the universe, both human and non-human.  

 

Ritual animal slaughter can be read in the light of contributory, rather than instrumental 

value. The goals of ritual slaughter are to connect humans to the divine. A lack of connection 

between humans, spirits and ancestors goes against the ideals of communalism. Ancestors 

especially are a part of the community, and play a crucial role in moral decision making 

among other aspects of everyday life (Menkiti, 2004). To abandon the practice of ritual 

animal slaughter would be to sever an important communal connection, which is likely to 

have negative consequences. The anger of spirits and ancestors could also be realised through 

natural disasters or disease (Chemhuru & Masaka, 2010). This does not only negatively affect 

humans, but also impacts the wider community including animals and nature. Natural 

disasters especially can destroy all kinds of fauna and flora. This is one example of how a 

communal good, framed as something like safety, flourishing or wellbeing, can be shared by 

humans and non-humans alike. Accordingly, the animal slaughter is a way for that animal to 

contribute toward a wider communal good, rather than simply an instrumental use of that 

animal to achieve a human end. That animal itself would have been negatively affected by 

the wrath of the spirits in the absence of ritual slaughter. Ritual animal slaughter is a way of 

connecting humans to the divine realm through sacrifice.  

 

Similarly, taboos and totems which protect elements of the natural environment may point 

toward a dual form of contributory value. On the one hand, employing totems instils an 

appreciation and respect for different animals, in recognising their positive attributes and 

physically enacting the connective metaphor of totem traditions. In the same way, taboos 

which protect land connect the land to the divine realm of the spirits through the spirits 

protection thereof, which also translates to an honouring and elevation of these natural 

features. The respect, recognition and togetherness which taboos and totems create support 

the widening of the community beyond humans to include the rest of nature. This also allows 

both animals and plants to be valued for their contributions toward the community of which 

they are a part. In this way, the symbolism surrounding both restrictive taboos and totemism 



22 

 

are connective, and draw animals and nature closer to humans via the divine. On the other 

hand, the symbolism surrounding taboos and totems means that non-human nature is drawn 

into everyday communal life. The rules of the community, such as which forests can be 

entered into and which people can be married, are drawn from taboos and totems. This means 

that metaphorically, nature plays an active role in the community through these traditions. 

Through totems and taboos, humans connect with nature via the divine, or the fear of divine 

retribution.  

 

Each of these elements of traditional African religious and cultural practices points toward an 

extrinsic value of non-human nature. However, unlike those who argue that African 

environmental ethics is anthropocentric, I believe that this extrinsic value is better 

characterised as contributory extrinsic value, and not instrumental extrinsic value. If the idea 

of community is extended beyond humans, as has been suggested by several authors as 

discussed in Section 4.1, then ritual animal slaughter, the enactment of protective taboos and 

the recognition of totem animals are all ways in which non-human nature contributes toward 

the greater communal good. Through ritual animal sacrifice, humans connect with the divine 

via nature, and the adherence to taboos and practice of totemism connect humans to nature 

via the divine. Animals, plants and other elements of the environment are essential parts of 

this community and their value as parts of a whole system is clearly in line with the idea of 

contributory value. Further, if it can be shown that humans are also extrinsically valued, then 

this together with the extrinsic value of nature is a promising basis through which to construct 

a non-anthropocentric ethic.  

 

3. Extrinsic Value of Humans 

While it has been argued that non-human nature is assigned extrinsic value, the idea that 

humans have extrinsic value is more controversial. Authors who present an African 

environmental ethic as anthropocentric have often done so by highlighting the instrumental 

value of non-human nature. For example, the moral duties owed toward the natural world 

would be a result of its connection to the human and divine, making these duties indirect 

(Horsthemke, 2017). As an illustration, animal slaughter could be seen as anthropocentric 

because the end goal is to connect the human to the divine. While the animal is valued, this 

value is derived from the connection it allows humans to make, rather than for itself. A 

similar extrinsic valuing of humans might lead to very negative consequences, which is 

perhaps why it has not been explored as an option in the literature. For example, the practice 



23 

 

of slavery is arguably based on the idea of slaves as instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, 

valuable. A slave is purely used for economic gain, and is not valued for their own worth as a 

person. However, while it is evident that the instrumental value of either nature or people is 

harmful to them, it is not clear that contributory value has the same consequences.  

 

I will argue that contributory value is actually the type of value attributed to humans, through 

a close study of Afro-communitarianism and how it points toward the communal good as 

intrinsically valuable, as well as strict communitarianism, processual personhood, Ubuntu 

and Maat, all of which point toward humans being valuable as parts of a greater community. 

Each of these ethics instils a great respect toward and care for fellow human beings, unlike 

the instrumental value framework. In the same way that nature is seen as valuable because of 

its contribution toward the communal good, these elements of African ethics and metaphysics 

suggest that humans are seen in much the same light. The upshot of this, which will be 

discussed in Section 4, is that the similar valuing of both humans and non-human nature is 

characteristic of a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic.  

 

3.1.  Afro-communitarianism & Intrinsic Value  

Afro-communitarianism is a lived worldview which clearly demonstrates the high value 

placed on the communal good, rather than on the individual. This fits with the view that 

individuals within a community have contributory value, because they are not the locus of the 

intrinsic value, although they are essential to the realisation of this value. Metz describes 

Afro-communitarianism as “the view that harmonious communal relationships merit pursuit 

either as ends in themselves or at least as an essential means to some other end such as 

vitality or wellbeing (Metz, 2007; Gyekye, 2011)” (Cordeiro-Rodrigues & Metz, 2021: 61). 

The description of relationships, vitality and wellbeing as ends conforms to Taylor’s first 

definition of intrinsic value: “To say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it is 

sought or desired for its own sake, or as an end in itself” (Taylor, 1972: 441). The goals of 

Afro-communitarianism are variously specified, but a common term associated with it is 

harmony, specifically social harmony where “[s]ocial harmony is for us the summum 

bonum—the greatest good” (Tutu, 2000: 35). This description of social harmony points 

toward its being intrinsically valuable, as it is valued as the ultimate goal toward which the 

community strives. The idea of the communal good being intrinsically valuable is reflected 

across the literature: “one often has a reason to pursue harmonious or communal relationships 

as an end, not merely as a means to some other perceived value” (Cordeiro-Rodrigues & 



24 

 

Metz, 2021: 61). These descriptions clearly position the social, or communal, good as 

intrinsically valuable.  

 

Whether the relationships themselves or the greater communal value is taken as an end, they 

are realized by the individuals within the community. This type of extrinsic value given to 

individuals within a community cannot be described as instrumental value, although it is 

clearly a form of extrinsic value. If the individuals within the community were only 

instrumentally valued, then they would not be of any value once their purpose had been 

completed, for example once the community had achieved a certain degree of wellbeing or 

harmony. In contrast, the individuals are not only the source of this harmony but also the 

experiencers of it. They are essential to communal harmony not as mere instruments, but 

rather as contributors who have some value over and above their contribution.  

 

The individuals and the community are tied up in a way that prohibits the individuals from 

being labelled as instrumentally valuable. Although the communal good has intrinsic value, it 

cannot exist in isolation. Drawing from Taylor’s description, the communal harmony or 

wellbeing cannot be valuable “even if it were the only thing existing in the universe” (1972: 

441), because communal harmony needs a community of individuals in which to be realised. 

The community itself is the seedbed of the communal good: “[f]or Afrocommunitarians, the 

way one communally relates to others is the moral standard by which to evaluate one’s 

actions and character and thus formulate moral principles” (Cordeiro-Rodrigues & Metz, 

2021: 61). The relationship between the extrinsic and the intrinsic good in this situation is not 

one-directional, as is the case in which the extrinsic good is an instrumental good. Instead, 

the two are interrelated and co-dependent in a way that suggests a form of contributory 

extrinsic value.  

 

To use the previous analogy of money, the relation between money and the object which it 

buys is different from the relation between a single paintbrush stroke and the whole artwork. 

As soon as the money has been used as an instrument to achieve a greater good – buying the 

object of value – it is no longer valuable itself. This is a one-directional relationship, since the 

object gives the money value through allowing it to be used. The money does not give the 

object any more value than it already has. On the other hand, a paintbrush stroke is still 

valuable as a part of the whole artwork, because removing it would affect the overall 

aesthetic. The brushstroke’s value is dependent on the artwork, but the artwork’s value is also 



25 

 

partially dependent on the brushstroke. The multi-directional nature contributory value fits 

the relationship between the individual and the community better than the unidirectional 

nature of instrumental value. Afro-communitarianism then not only presents the communal 

good as intrinsically valuable, but also supports the idea that individuals within a community 

have contributory extrinsic value.  

 

For individuals, human and non-human alike, to be extrinsically valuable, they must 

contribute toward something with greater value. Afro-communitarianism suggests that the 

communal good could be this greater good. Many of the descriptions of the communal good 

position it as intrinsically valuable, and humans are extrinsically valuable through their 

capacity to realise this good. The specification of the communal good is left open, as it is 

outside the scope of this dissertation. The benefits of this flexibility in terms of specifying the 

communal good are further explored in Section 5, where I consider objections to my position. 

Aspects of Afro-communitarianism are found in various philosophies across the continent. 

These include ideas of strict communitarianism, personhood, Ubuntu and Maat, each of 

which share the core values of holism, interdependence and interrelatedness. These are rich in 

meaning to draw upon in distilling an African environmental ethic, and especially useful in 

exploring the ways in which humans have contributory extrinsic value.  

 

3.2.  Strict Communitarianism  

Within Afro-communitarianism, there are different views as to the relative strictness of this 

communitarianism. The two main viewpoints are strict and moderate communitarianism. 

Strict communitarianism is distinct from what Gyekye (1997) calls “moderate 

communitarianism.” According to strict communitarianism, the community takes preference 

over the individual (Famakinwa, 2010). On the other hand, moderate communitarianism 

gives equal weighting to both the individual and the community. For example, if Action A 

benefits the individual but Action B benefits the community at large, then a strict 

communitarian would take Action B. Gyekye argues that these actions should not be in 

conflict, since the communal good is what is good for the individual. To demonstrate, he 

draws upon the image of a Siamese crocodile with two heads and one stomach. The crocodile 

heads (individuals) should not fight over which one chews the food, because they are both 

nourished by it since they share a stomach (community). The analogy points toward the 

cohesion between individual and communal goods upon which moderate communitarianism 

is based.  



26 

 

 

Molefe (2017) outlines problems with each of these positions. For the strict communitarian, 

the prioritisation of the community over the individual may come at the expense of the rights 

of the individual, since “individuals will be sacrificed on the altar of promoting the 

communal good” (2017: 4). This can have unwanted consequences, such as stripping a 

person of her autonomy (Gyekye, 1992). If the communal good is always seen as the 

prevailing good, then individuals cannot choose which goods to pursue. Molefe (2017) 

discusses how the agent’s obligations to her community can deny her autonomy in fulfilling 

her own projects. For example, investing time and money in projects of self-perfection or 

personal achievement at the expense of the projects of the wider community This stands in 

stark contrast to ideas of Western Liberalism - in a rights-based, individualistic system, the 

autonomy of the individual as one of its most important characteristics for which rights aim 

to protect. And as Cobbah remarks, “The roots of the Western concept of human rights lie in 

liberalism” (Cobbah, 1987: 312). As such, it is not likely that this individualistic framework 

is appropriate for an African context. What is clear from the foregoing then is that the 

problem faced by strict communitarianism comes from the Western Liberal camp, which 

points toward the harms of the communal good being less valuable than that of the 

individual.  

 

For the moderate communitarian, it is not clear that the communal good and the individual 

good are always in line. As a result, it is difficult to weigh up conflicting goods, especially if 

the two are said to be equally valued. This is a significant problem for the moderate 

communitarian, and it has been widely argued that the stance of moderate communitarianism 

fails as a result (Famakinwa, 2010; Táíwò, 2016). Although the details of these arguments are 

outside the scope of this dissertation, I believe that pointing toward its fundamental conflict is 

enough ground to take the stance of strict communitarianism over moderate 

communitarianism. There is also substantial research in support of the idea that African 

societies are of the strict communitarian mould. Politicians including Léopold Sédar Senghor 

and Kwame Nkrumah have linked the idea of communalism to that of socialism, since both 

take the individual as subordinate to the community. Accordingly, socialism has sometimes 

been seen as a fitting framework for African countries, because it is in line with strict 

communitarianism. I will not defend the link between strict communitarianism and African 

ethics, but will rather take this research as sufficient to frame African ethics as strict 

communitarianism.  



27 

 

 

Strict communitarianism points toward the extrinsic value of humans, because it places a 

higher value on the community than it does on the individual. Gyekye’s primacy thesis 

outlines the idea that not only is the community superior to the individual in terms of moral 

decision-making, but that the community itself is partly constitutive of the person 

(Famakinwa, 2010). The good of the community takes preference over the good of the 

members of this community. This can be framed as the communal good having intrinsic 

value, while the good of the members has contributory value. Afro-communitarianism’s 

emphasis on the communal good as intrinsically valuable is supported by strict 

communitarianism, which adds that individual members of the community are the locus of 

contributory extrinsic value.  

 

Humans are extrinsically valuable because they are necessary components through which to 

achieve the final good, which is the communal good. One example of the communal good is 

Metz’s idea of harmonious relationships (Metz, 2011), where harmonious relationships refer 

to the inextricable link of all beings or entities or simply a harmony in the relation of human 

and non-human entities, including animals. Harmonious relationships are the end goal, and 

the ultimate good, and the community members are the means toward that end, and so are 

extrinsically valued. The type of extrinsic value which best describes the humans in this 

context is contributory extrinsic value. The good of the community takes into account the 

good of the members of that community, so each member’s goals add toward the communal 

good. Whatever the ultimate communal good is, it cannot be achieved without the 

cooperation of members of the community. In other words, humans make up the community, 

and they are the components through which this communal good is achieved. 

 

3.3.  Personhood & Ubuntu 

The extrinsic value of humans can be understood as valuing humans not individually or in 

and of themselves, but rather as a part of a larger whole. Humans are extrinsically valued in 

two senses. First, their value is derived not from themselves, but from certain kinds of 

relationships in which they participate. The relational value of humans is seen in ethics such 

as Ubuntu, whereby a person’s humanity is bound up with the humanity of others. Mbiti 

describes Ubuntu through the maxim “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” 

(1970: 141). This highlights both the interconnectedness of members of the community as 

well as the importance of their relationships which make up individual identities. Not only is 



28 

 

the communal good the intrinsic good, as discussed through strict communitarianism, but the 

identities of the individual members themselves is formed by and inclusive of the 

community.  

 

This has both an ethical and a metaphysical dimension. On the ethical side, humans are not 

valued as isolated parts or individuals, but rather their value is intimately tied up with their 

community. Personhood is importantly related to value, because the status of being a person 

is built on the standards of living an ethical life, and achieving moral greatness within the 

community. Through the process of becoming a person, “the community plays a vital role as 

catalyst and as prescriber of norms” (Menkiti, 1984: 172). The community sets the standards 

and norms for personhood, as well as socialising individual members into the understanding 

these standards and norms. It is also the arena in which personhood is achieved, since it is 

within the community that moral decisions are made and actions taken. Accordingly, the 

community plays a vital role in determining and even constituting the value of a person. A 

person is a person within a context. Since the moral value is attached to personhood, and 

personhood is attached to the context of community, the value of a person is tied up with the 

community.  

 

Different communities may have different standards and norms of personhood. Further, they 

have different means through which this personhood is achieved, or at least worked toward. 

These include different rites of passage, different cultural expectations of the types of 

relations that constitute mutual recognition of personhood, and different standards of moral 

excellence. This does not point to the kind of isolated, individualistic notion of intrinsic 

value. The close connection between the value and its context suggests a type of extrinsic 

value. To use the analogy of puzzle pieces, each piece has contributory extrinsic value which 

depends on its being part of the right puzzle and within the context of other pieces. In the 

same way, the ideas of personhood and Ubuntu give value to people which is intimately tied 

up with and at least partially determined by their community context. A human may be 

considered a person within one context, but another community may have different standards 

and norms and thus see that human qua person differently.  

 

On the metaphysical side, the community is at least partly constitutive of the individual. 

Drawing again on Mbiti’s description of Ubuntu: “I am because we are, and since we are, 

therefore I am” (1970: 141), this makes it clear that a person’s “I” is made up by the 



29 

 

community’s “we”. Humans’ identities are shaped by their communal context, not only in 

terms of personhood, but also in terms of personality and character. This further highlights 

the point that intrinsic value does not capture the type of moral weight given to persons 

within the context of personhood and Ubuntu. Together, the ethical and metaphysical 

components of personhood and Ubuntu do not imply that humans should be intrinsically 

valued. To value people intrinsically would mean valuing them individually and in and of 

themselves, in a way that does not fully encapsulate the connectedness to the community and 

the role which the community plays in their being valued as human persons or humans qua 

persons. For example, if happiness is taken to have intrinsic value, then it is always better to 

have happiness than not to have it, despite the context. It is valued in and of itself, rather than 

the relational value which characterises extrinsic goods. Based on the principles of Ubuntu 

and personhood, the value of a person cannot be singled out or separated in this way, because 

people are intimately intertwined with their communal contexts. With reference to both the 

idea of strict communitarianism as well as that of personhood and Ubuntu, it is the nexus of 

relationships which is the most valued aspect of these situations, rather than the individuals in 

this relationship. As a result, humans can be said to have extrinsic value, specifically 

contributory value.  

 

3.4.  Maat  

The concept of Maat is closely related to that of Ubuntu, and the two are often discussed in 

conjunction (Gutierrez, 2015). Both are lived philosophies, which share core principles of 

moral excellence and unity. Although she was a goddess within the ancient Egyptian 

pantheon, Maat is described more as a concept, an underlying cosmic and moral principle of 

balance and harmony (Karenga, 2003). The fact that Maat is better represented as an idea 

than an embodied goddess is seen in the sparseness of depictions of Maat in the form of a 

goddess, reflecting the abstract nature of Maat (Mark, 2016). Part of the principle of Maat is 

living life in such a way that one’s early actions reflect the regularity and harmony of the 

cosmic movements and cycles (Mark, 2016). This points toward the peace and connectedness 

between humans and the natural world, extending even beyond the confines of the earth, to 

include the cosmos.  

 

Maat is also related to truth and justice, and the most well-known mythical story of the 

goddess is her role in the journey to the afterlife, as discussed by Karenga (2003). To 

summarise the myth, the deceased heart is placed on a scale and weighed against Maat’s 



30 

 

ostrich feather. If the life they have lived follows the principles of Maat, and have been just 

and honest, then their heart will be lighter than the feather and they will continue to the 

afterlife. If not, their heart is consumed by a monster and they cease to exist. This story 

shows the parallels between the concepts of Ubuntu and the achievement of personhood, and 

the ancient life principle of Maat. The processual nature of personhood is similar to the 

continual striving to uphold the principles of Maat through living an honourable and balanced 

life. The focus is also to be a good part of the greater whole, but Maat especially extends this 

idea of wholeness beyond the human realm. The idea of mirroring the universe in one’s 

actions and interactions shows the emphasis which is placed on the unity of existence, and 

the way in which humans hold value in relation to other elements of creation.  

 

The pillars of Maatian ethics bear strong resemblances to the ideas of Ubuntu and 

personhood, and also point toward an extrinsic value of humans. This is especially true of the 

relational nature of the ethic, as well as the focus on building character within a community:  

Maatian ethics, as a way of life, a cooperative project of moral living, is informed by 

the central concepts of location, tradition, relationality and character. The essential 

thrust is to locate oneself in a definite moral community and tradition, to extract from 

both community and tradition grounding and guidelines for living a full and 

meaningful life in relationship and responsibility, and to cultivate the character or 

ethical substance to achieve this. (Karenga, 2003: 268, emphasis in original).  

These ideas of relationality and character have clear parallels with the concepts of holism, 

interdependence and processual personhood. The community is the seedbed for the growth of 

a moral person in much the same way as it is within the context of Ubuntu. The community is 

a space of determining moral laws and standards, as well as the context in which these laws 

and standards are enacted. The focus on relationship and responsibility further tie the 

individual to the community, making their moral standing a function of their interactions with 

the community.  

 

Karenga relates Maatian ethics to Fanon’s three key moral questions: those of identity, 

authenticity and moral potential. Each of these questions points toward an extrinsic reading 

of moral value. In terms of identity, the question posed is “who am I-in-community?” 

(Karenga, 2003: 268). The concept of self is not as a stand-alone being, but rather as a being 

defined by the connection to and place within the community. This speaks to the role of 

community as partially constituting one’s identity. The self and the community are intimately 



31 

 

intertwined and enmeshed, and one cannot have value without the other. That the borders of a 

person’s identity are blurred and overlapping with the wider community means that they are 

not valued in isolation or of their own accord but rather as parts of a whole. To value a person 

intrinsically involves delineating that person’s identity, and the Maatian ethic makes this a 

difficult task by highlighting the inseparability of a person from their community.  

 

On the question of authenticity, Fanon explores the community’s role as the evaluator of 

moral goodness. Karenga words the question as “does my self-definition coincide with my 

practice and my community’s evaluation of me?” (Karenga, 2003: 269). To fulfill the values 

of Maat in life, these values must be both determined and measured by the community. 

Goodness and moral worth is weighed up in the context of community and to the standards 

which the community has set. To live according to the principles of Maat is to live according 

to those principles in the eyes of the community. The myth of weighing one’s heart against 

Maat’s ostrich feather after death shows that one’s moral worth is determined by the degree 

to which one has lived by Maatian principles. Accordingly, moral worth is closely tied to and 

determined by character. Character itself is determined by the evaluation of the community. 

The tie between moral worth and the community is firmly established by the community’s 

role as evaluator of character. This supports the extrinsic worth of humans, because their 

moral worth is determined with respect to their embodiment of communal values, and the 

degree to which they have served to benefit the community through their character.  

 

Third, on the question of moral potential, Karenga describes how this is realized within the 

context of community: “given who I am, based on my rootedness in family and community 

and given the standard of Maat by which I and others measure me, am I doing all that is 

worthy of me?” (Karenga, 2003: 269). Moral character is developed through embeddedness 

in the community, and interactions with various members within this community. The 

potential to become a morally excellent person is intimately connected with the community 

itself. As a result, one’s moral standing cannot be measured in isolation or abstraction from 

one’s community, in line with the discussion of Ubuntu and personhood. This points toward 

humans having contributory value, since they cannot be morally evaluated outside the context 

of their communities. To use the artwork analogy, it would not make sense to judge the 

aesthetic value of a single paintbrush stroke. Instead, the mark must be evaluated within its 

context, and judged by how it adds to or detracts from the overall aesthetic of the artwork. 

According to Maatian ethics, a person’s identity is partially constituted by their community, 



32 

 

their moral worth is judged by the community, and the moral potential is realized within the 

context of community. All these factors point toward humans having extrinsic contributory 

value.  

 

4.  The Resulting Non-Anthropocentric Ethic 

Up to this point in the dissertation, I have argued in favour of two key premises. In Section 2, 

I drew upon the practices of ritual animal slaughter, the adherence to protective taboos, and 

the lived metaphor of totem animals to show how non-human nature has extrinsic 

contributory value. In Section 3, I explored both Afro-communitarianism and strict 

communitarianism to show that the communal good is intrinsically valued. Further, an 

analysis of the elements of Afro-communitarianism, namely personhood, Ubuntu and Maat, 

revealed that humans also have contributory extrinsic value. In this section, I will use these 

premises to construct an argument for the non-anthropocentrism of African environmental 

ethics. Firstly, I will explore similar ways in which African environmental ethics has been 

portrayed as non-anthropocentric in the current literature, as well as developing the concept 

of extending the community beyond humans, which has been referenced throughout the 

dissertation. Secondly, I will show how through the two premises – that both non-human 

nature and humans have contributory extrinsic value – we can conclude that African 

environmental ethics is non-anthropocentric.  

 

4.1.  Non-Anthropocentric Ethics & Intrinsic Value    

The connection between Afro-communitarianism and environmental ethics in African 

philosophy is not new, and has been widely explored in the current literature, but is generally 

framed in terms of intrinsic rather than extrinsic value. Etieyibo (2017) makes the link 

between Ubuntu as a form of communitarianism and how it can be extended to apply to non-

human beings. Ubuntu promotes humane relations which are cashed out as “embracing the 

values of caring and sharing” (Etieyibo, 2017: 639). The implications of this attitude are very 

different from the Western capitalist and consumerist attitude, especially with respect to the 

environment. Important aspects of communalism, such as taking the projects and interests of 

others as one’s own, collaborating rather than competing and having concern for the group 

rather than the individual, result in an environmentally friendly, non-anthropocentric ethic 

when applied beyond humans. Etieyibo explores the idea that “our beingness commands us to 

behave in certain ethical ways” (2017: 638), which speaks to the valuing and good treatment 

of non-human nature as a part of fulfilling the standards of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is ripe in 



33 

 

meaning to be used for the construction of an African environmental ethic, and this is 

generally explained through (i) the need for good treatment of members of the community 

due to their intrinsic value, relating to vital force and personhood and (ii) the inclusion of 

nature within this community, recognising the intrinsic value of plants, animals and features 

of the environment and treating them accordingly. Combined, these two premises result in a 

non-anthropocentric African environmental ethic based on intrinsic value, through the 

extension of the community beyond humans.  

 

Similarly, the interdependence between the individual and the community, which is a key 

aspect of strict communitarianism, fits well with a non-anthropocentric, environmentally 

focused worldview. These ideas are based on the mutual dependence and recognition of the 

vital force within both humans and non-human nature. Vital force is the marker of moral 

worth, and Ubuntu provides a means and a motivation for the recognition of non-human 

nature as valuable and apt for inclusion in the community. This, as noted by Etieyibo, makes 

it an ideal basis on which to build an environmentally sustainable ethic. This may be limited 

in that humans seem to have a different type of community with each other than they do with 

animals, suggesting different levels of community and closeness. The idea of differing 

degrees of community is further explored by Metz (2017). 

 

Metz’s African modal relationalism also draws parallels between communitarianism and 

environmental ethics. Metz presents a hierarchy of moral status based on the degree to which 

a being can be part of a communal relationship. The problem with this worldview is that it 

has strong anthropocentric undertones. The standard for community is the community 

between humans, which immediately sets the idea of value up in human terms. The problem 

with making community the standard for value is that it excludes certain aspects of the 

environment completely. For example, it would be difficult for a person to be in community 

with a plant or even an ecosystem, and even more so for something like an atmosphere. 

These are all things which could be valuable to the wider community extrinsically, but which 

are difficult to value in terms of community and the ability to commune. Further, Metz’s 

position overlooks community between non-human nature, such as symbiotic relationships 

between plants and animals, which could be seen as relationships of community.  

 

There are striking similarities between Metz’s view and that of Behrens’ (2010) African 

Relational Environmentalism, which holds that the interrelatedness of humans and nature can 



34 

 

be used as the basis for a non-anthropocentric ethic. This stance is related to, but distinct 

from Holism, which ascribes value to the collective community of both humans and nature. 

This is similar to my stance, but a nuanced distinction can be drawn between them, in that my 

stance values the good of this community, and not the community itself, intrinsically. 

Behrens notes that basing an environmental ethic on interrelatedness need not give nature 

intrinsic value, since it “does not necessarily imply valuing nature for its own sake” (2010: 

471).  However, he also notes that nature cannot be valued only as a result of the instrumental 

good which it provides to humans, if the ethic is non-anthropocentric. This means that an 

extrinsic value, other than instrumental value, is suitable for this kind of relational ethic. 

Behrens explores this value through the idea of harmonious relationships, which is reflected 

in Metz’s later paper, but also faces the same problem that Metz’s view faces, since it is 

difficult to conceptualise relationships outside the context of living beings. However, Behrens 

contends that  

“[f]orests, ecosystems and rivers may not be capable of being objects of human 

concern in quite the same way, but their protection, integrity and health may be 

instrumentally important for the well-being of many living things, including human 

beings” (2010: 476). 

In suggesting the ascription of instrumental value to non-sentient elements of nature, one is 

not sure of what to make of Behrens’ argument that African Relational Environmentalism is 

non-anthropocentric or whether he moves away from the notion of a non-anthropocentric 

African environmental ethics. This highlights two problems with relational or communal 

ethics. First, they ascribe value based on a human sense of relating and second, the account 

seem to run into the problem of properly accounting for the intrinsic value of those elements 

of nature which cannot be part of relationships as we understand them. My extrinsic value 

framework avoids both of these problems.  

 

Tangwa’s (2004) eco-bio-communitarianism makes a similar link between the two topics. 

Eco-bio-communitarianism emphasises the “recognition and acceptance of interdependence 

and peaceful coexistence between earth, plants, animals and humans” (Tangwa, 2004:389). 

Here, the community of beings extends beyond the human and divine. Tangwa describes eco-

bio-communitarianism as a philosophy of “live and let live” (2004: 389) which involves the 

respect and peaceful coexistence with or between humans and non-human nature. The 

interdependence between humans and non-human nature points toward their being part of the 

same community, a community which extends not only beyond humans, but also beyond 



35 

 

plants and animals to include elements of nature such as the earth, or the land itself. Behrens 

(2010, 2017) calls this extended community the “biotic community”, and draws parallels 

between familial relations and the relations between members of this community. That all 

these elements are in a relationship of community suggests that they all share the same 

intrinsic value, in a similar way in which humans recognise the intrinsic value of other 

humans through communal relationships which underpin Ubuntu and build one’s 

personhood.  

 

Maat has also been tied to non-anthropocentrism. The Maatian ethic and ontology has been 

variously characterised as demonstrating eco-bio-centrism (Hornung, 1999, 2001), or 

cosmotheism (Assmann, 1996). From Diop’s writing, Verharen et al. (2021) draw out his 

hypothesis that ancient Egyptian ethics is eco-bio-centric, as supported by Erik Hornung 

(2001) and Ian Assmann (2002). Elements of Ancient Egyptian creation stories also point 

toward this lack of anthropocentrism. The emergence of Gods from nature, rather than the 

emergence of nature from God, as typically seen in Western, anthropocentric creation myths, 

shows the centrality of nature as a creative force, rather than the superiority and power of 

humans being centred (Verharen et al., 2021). The idea of cosmotheism stems from the myth 

that humans are a product of light or the divine, in the same way that other elements of the 

environment share this divinity. This idea bears striking similarities to the vital force thesis. 

In both cases, elements of the natural kingdom contain divine forces within them, which 

connects them to a greater whole and gives them value relative to this wider community. The 

principles of Maat stipulate that “humanity’s ethical mission is to promote a universal 

harmony that includes humans, other life forms and the earth’s inorganic features” (Faulkner, 

2005). This is in line with both the idea of eco-biocentrism as well as the contributory 

extrinsic value of humans and nonhuman nature. The end goal being the promotion of 

harmony is in line with its being intrinsically valued. This harmony is not only between 

humans, but also clearly extends to the rest of the natural kingdom, echoing the idea of 

Ubuntu which extends the community beyond humans.  

 

Once the non-human elements of the environment are included in the idea of community, the 

communal good can be specified in a number of different ways. I will not try to present a 

concrete communal good toward which the community strives for two reasons. Firstly, to 

specify a communal good from a human perspective could fall into the trap of 

anthropocentrism, which is exactly what this ethic aims to avoid. Secondly, the flexibility of 



36 

 

leaving the communal good open to interpretations allows for different communities to have 

different final goods at different times. This type of flexibility is seen elsewhere in African 

philosophy, especially to do with the specification of goods. For example, the ideas of 

personhood and what constitutes a person is often left as a flexible notion to account for the 

different standards of personhood in different communities, and to allow for the evolution of 

these standards through time. One example of the communal good is Metz’s idea of 

harmonious relationships (Metz, 2011), where harmonious relationships refer to the 

inextricable link of all beings or entities or simply a harmony in the relation of human and 

non-human entities, including non-human animals. Whatever the communal good, it must 

cater for both human and non-human members of the community.  

 

Elements of Afro-communitarianism, including Ubuntu, personhood, vital force and Maat 

have all been drawn upon to construct non-anthropocentric environmental ethics based on the 

recognition of intrinsic value beyond humans. This shows that these concepts are apt for the 

formation of such an ethic, but also that the current literature has only focused on an ethic 

based on intrinsic value, rather than exploring extrinsic value. An extrinsic value argument 

could reinforce the idea that even different readings of African ethical concepts come to the 

same conclusion, which strengthens the core claim of both approaches: that African 

environmental ethics is not anthropocentric. Whatever the ultimate communal good is, it 

cannot be achieved without the cooperation of members of the community. In other words, 

humans are the means through which this end is achieved. The communal good has intrinsic 

worth, and is the end toward which communitarian societies strive. The literature supports the 

idea of extending the community to include animals, plants and non-sentient natural 

elements, especially through ideas of Ubuntu, cosmotheism and vital force.  

 

4.2.  Non-Anthropocentric Ethics & Contributory Extrinsic Value 

I have defended the premises that non-human nature is extrinsically valued (Section 2), and 

that humans are extrinsically valued (Section 3). I will now tie the premises together, and 

show how the conclusion that African environmental ethics is non-anthropocentric, based on 

contributory extrinsic value, flows from them. This differs from the approach taken in the 

literature, which focuses on intrinsic value (Section 4.1), but it comes to the same conclusion.  

 

My argument follows a similar line of thought to the view that African environmental ethics 

is non-anthropocentric based on the claim of intrinsic value of beings or entities. To 



37 

 

demonstrate this, I will consider the argument that Ubuntu recognises a common vital force, 

which indicates common intrinsic value, between humans and nonhuman nature. Etieyibo 

(2017) explains vital force as the metaphysical dimension to Ubuntu’s ethical dimension. The 

viewpoint based on intrinsic value shows that African environmental ethics is non-

anthropocentric because humans are not the only locus of intrinsic value. Rather, the moral 

playing field between humans and non-human nature is even, because both are intrinsically 

valuable. As a result, non-human nature is not treated as only instrumentally valuable, and to 

be used toward a human end goal. This goes against the hierarchical structure of being, 

whereby humans have a different and more important type of value than nonhuman nature 

does. Since both humans and nonhuman nature share the same type of vital force, they share 

the intrinsic value which it confers, and are presented as moral equals. In my view, a parallel 

argument can be made in favour of extrinsic value.  

 

On one hand, I have argued in line with Horsthemke (2017) that non-human nature has 

extrinsic value in that it benefits the greater community through traditional practices such as 

ritual slaughter, totemism and taboos. Unlike Horsthemke, I see this as contributory, rather 

than instrumental extrinsic value. On the other hand, I have argued that Afro-

communitarianism and elements thereof including Ubuntu, personhood and Maat, point 

toward the contributory extrinsic value of humans. Their value is less than, and derived from, 

the value of the community as a whole, which can be extended beyond humans to include the 

natural realm. I have also looked at various arguments in favour of considering nonhuman 

nature as a part of the notion of community which permeates African thought. Combining 

these three ideas levels the moral playing field through the locus of intrinsic value being the 

communal good, where the community goes beyond humanity, or the good of humans. 

Humans and non-human nature have contributory value in that they have some input toward 

this final good, but neither is valued purely as a tool to achieve this good, as instrumental 

value would entail.  

 

The idea that eco-bio-communitarianism and African environmental ethics in general is non-

anthropocentric ethic has been explored in terms of giving humans and non-human nature 

intrinsic value, but it is made more powerful by the fact that it can accommodate humans and 

non-human nature having extrinsic value. To explore further the non-anthropocentric ethic 

which is drawn from the idea that both humans and nature have contributory value, it is 



38 

 

useful to compare this new ethic to a typical anthropocentric environmental ethic in 

diagrammatic form.  

 

 

 

Figure 1 shows a typical anthropocentric ethic, which includes a hierarchical relationship 

between humans, who are valued intrinsically, and nature, which is valued instrumentally, as