The performance of South African Socially Responsible Investments: a comparative analysis of listed equity by Davin Olën 2488595 A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management in Finance and Investment In the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, Witwatersrand Business School at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Supervised by Professor Odongo Kodongo i Plagiarism Declaration I, Davin Olën, a duly registered student at the University of the Witwatersrand’s Business School, who is enrolled in the programme Master of Management in Finance and Investment in 2021, and who is allocated student number 2488595, do hereby declare that: I. I am aware of the definition of plagiarism as detailed within the Plagiarism Policy of the University of the Witwatersrand and I acknowledge that the commission of the act of plagiarism is not permitted for any academic activities at the University, including the submission of a research dissertation. II. I confirm that the research dissertation submitted herewith is solely of my own making, with the exception of work referenced in accordance with the relevant referencing styles. III. I further confirm that I have utilised the correct conventions in making reference to academic and other works within this research dissertation. IV. I further also confirm that the University of the Witwatersrand may enact disciplinary measures against myself should this research dissertation be found to be in contravention of the Plagiarism Policy of the University of the Witwatersrand or any of the University rules and regulations flowing from or related to the Plagiarism Policy. _________________ Davin Olën 3 January 2022 ii Preface and Acknowledgements To Masetle, for showing me how to care for others and Bab, for letting me practice. iii Key Terms Socially/Sustainable (and) Responsible Investment (SRI); Environmental, Social and Governance factors (ESG); COVID-19 pandemic; ESG Ratings, Johannesburg Stock Exchange; Fama and French Three-Factor and Five-Factor asset pricing models. Abstract In recent years, Sustainable and Responsible Investments (SRI) have undergone significant advancements in terms of both assets under management and investor attention. Concomitantly, the metrics which inform SRI methods, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors, have increasingly been incorporated within global investment approaches. This shift in approach suggests a permanent alteration to investing practices for some authors and investment houses. For South Africa, however, there is not yet consensus regarding the long- term comparative financial performance of securities focussing on SRI, considering the purported benefits of SRI’s incorporation within dominant investment approaches. In an attempt to address this lacuna, the following research dissertation unpacks the South African understanding of SRI and evaluates the comparative performance of portfolios constructed from rated ESG securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This research piece commences with an overview of recent global SRI developments followed by an evaluation of SRI as applied within South Africa alongside the country’s legislative framework. Provided with the relevant background, this research dissertation constructs a set of nine portfolios of equities listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, based on both the security’s Bloomberg ESG Disclosure score and market capitalisation. Utilising the Fama and French Three- and Five-Factor asset pricing models, this research dissertation then gauges the financial performance of the constructed portfolios from May 2009 until April 2021 in terms of portfolio alpha values. Finally, this research dissertation reports that portfolios constructed from highly rated ESG companies with small and medium market capitalisation provide statistically significant positive alpha values at the 5% limit. For highly rated ESG companies with a large market capitalisation, statistically significant positive alpha values are identified at the 10% limit while a portfolio of medium rated ESG securities with the same market capitalisation report positive alpha values with significance at the 5% limit. A number of factor tests are further undertaken in order to determine the pricing accuracy of the two models in consideration. It is concluded iv that both the asset pricing models considered fail to explain the excess returns of the constructed portfolios at the 5% level of statistical significance. v Table of contents Chapter One: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 7 1.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 7 1.2. Research problem and purpose .............................................................................................. 17 1.3. Key research question ............................................................................................................ 19 1.4. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................ 19 1.5. Research significance and study contribution ....................................................................... 20 1.6. Chapter division ..................................................................................................................... 21 Chapter Two: Literature review ............................................................................................... 22 2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 22 2.2. The theoretical underpinnings of SRI and financial performance ......................................... 22 2.2.1. Overview ....................................................................................................................... 23 2.2.2. Theories supporting the outperformance of highly rated ESG firms ............................ 25 2.2.3. Theories supporting the underperformance of highly rated ESG firms ........................ 28 2.3. The Socially Responsible Investment framework of South Africa ....................................... 29 2.3.1. Developments before the UN-PRI ................................................................................ 29 2.3.2. Subsequent developments following the introduction of the UN-PRI .......................... 34 2.4. ESG Factors, as applied in contemporary South Africa ........................................................ 38 2.5. Measures of ESG performance .............................................................................................. 43 2.6. Consideration of existing Socially Responsible Investment literature and the social movements driving the approach’s growth ........................................................................... 48 2.6.1. Overview ....................................................................................................................... 48 2.6.2. COVID-19 and ESG factors ......................................................................................... 49 2.6.3. Further empirical evidence ............................................................................................ 51 2.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 54 Chapter Three: Methodology ................................................................................................... 56 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 56 3.2. Measures of ESG performance .............................................................................................. 56 3.3. The selection of financial performance measures ................................................................. 60 3.3.1. The FF3 ......................................................................................................................... 61 3.3.2. The FF5 ......................................................................................................................... 63 vi 3.4. Datasets.................................................................................................................................. 65 3.5. Portfolio formation and factor construction methodology .................................................... 68 3.5.1. Portfolio formation ........................................................................................................ 68 3.5.2. Factor construction methodology and factor accuracy ................................................. 71 3.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 75 Chapter Four: Data analysis and discussion ............................................................................ 76 4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 76 4.2. Descriptive statistics on portfolio ESG and excess returns ................................................... 76 4.3. ESG portfolio regressions ...................................................................................................... 87 4.4. Portfolio factor loadings ........................................................................................................ 90 4.5. Factor spanning tests ............................................................................................................. 94 4.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 99 Chapter Five: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 100 5.1. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 100 5.2. Further research ................................................................................................................... 103 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 105 1 List of Abbreviations B/M Book-to-market Bloomberg Bloomberg Limited Partnership BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CRIII Committee on Responsible Investing by Institutional Investors in South Africa CRISA Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa CSR Corporate Social Responsibility ESG Environmental, Social and Governance Factors Eurosif European Sustainable Investment Forum FF3 Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Model FF5 Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor Model FSC Financial Sector Charter FSCA South African Financial Services Conduct Authority FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange GEPF South African Government Employees’ Pension Fund GGA South African Good Governance Academy Non-Profit Organisation GHG Greenhouse Gasses GRS Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) HML High Minus Low INV Investment JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange JSE ALSI Johannesburg Stock Exchange All-Share Index King I King report on Corporate Governance (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 1994) 2 King II King report on Corporate Governance (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2002) King III King report on Corporate Governance (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2009) King IV King report on Corporate Governance (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2015) KLD Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. ratings LHS Left-Hand Side MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International OLS Ordinary Least Squares OP Operating Profitability P1 Portfolio 1 P2 Portfolio 2 P3 Portfolio 3 P4 Portfolio 4 P5 Portfolio 5 P6 Portfolio 6 P7 Portfolio 7 P8 Portfolio 8 P9 Portfolio 9 UN-PRI United Nations’ Principles of Responsible Investment RHS Right-Hand Side RobecoSAM Robeco Sustainable Asset Management SRI Socially Responsible Investment SEC Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States of America 3 SMB Small Minus Big SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regression UNEP-FI United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative U.S.A. United States of America USD United States Dollar WML Winners Minus Losers 4 List of Equations Equation 1 Sharpe ratio ............................................................................................................ 61 Equation 2 FF3 ......................................................................................................................... 62 Equation 3 Construction of the Small Minus Big FF3 Factor ................................................. 62 Equation 4 Construction of the High Minus Low Factor ........................................................ 63 Equation 5 FF5 ......................................................................................................................... 64 Equation 6 Construction of the Small Minus Big FF5 Factor ................................................. 64 Equation 7 Construction of the Robust Minus Weak Factor ................................................... 65 Equation 8 Construction of the Conservative Minus Aggressive Factor ................................. 65 Equation 9 Griffin’s average absolute alpha value .................................................................. 73 Equation 10 Construction of 𝐴𝑠2𝑎𝑖/𝐴𝑎𝑖2 ............................................................................... 74 Equation 11 GRS statistic ........................................................................................................ 74 5 List of Figures Figure 1 Total signatories of the UN-PRI and USD assets under management ...................... 10 Figure 2 UN-PRI Signatories per assets under management and geographic area .................. 11 Figure 3 UN-PRI Signatories headquartered in South Africa ................................................. 12 Figure 4 BRICS UN-PRI signatories and excess returns ......................................................... 13 Figure 5 Bloomberg and Refinitiv ESG rated companies ....................................................... 58 Figure 6 Annual JSE companies with a Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score and annual average Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score for rated companies .......................................................... 66 Figure 7 Average number of equities included per portfolio ................................................... 82 Figure 8 Cumulative returns of constructed portfolios ............................................................ 86 6 List of Tables Table 1 Studies on South African ESG financial performance ............................................... 14 Table 2 Left-Hand Side portfolio characteristics ..................................................................... 70 Table 3 Factor variables’ definitions ....................................................................................... 72 Table 4 ESG scoring per annum .............................................................................................. 78 Table 5 Portfolio ESG scoring ................................................................................................. 79 Table 6 Portfolio excess returns ............................................................................................... 82 Table 7 Portfolio alpha results ................................................................................................. 87 Table 8 Factor loadings for the FF3 ......................................................................................... 91 Table 9 Factor loadings for the FF5 ......................................................................................... 93 Table 10 Factor spanning test results ....................................................................................... 97 Table 11 Summary statistics of regression intercepts .............................................................. 98 7 Chapter One: Introduction 1.1. Introduction From the initial months of 2020,1 the way in which the world did business was severely disrupted, and business practices were forced to change. As the latter months of 2020 ensued, asset managers, investors, and businesses suffered the effects of volatile and erratic market values globally, possibly most poignantly illustrated by the lowest oil prices in history during March and April (IMF, 2020). Resulting economic projections saw the World Bank (2020) estimate a global recession equivalent to that of the Second World War. Markets reacted in concert and global investors faced the loss of billions of Dollars, Euros, Pounds, Rands, Yen, and Yuan while global market prices plummeted (Löwen et al., 2021). However, despite the hostile investment environment faced in 2020, there was an increase in the demand for financial products with Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) approaches and characteristics, or investment products that integrate Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors within their investment processes (Adams & Abhayawansa, 2021; Broadstock et al., 2021; Jessop & Howcroft, 2021; Mans-Kemp & van Zyl, 2021; Mascotto, 2020).2 Globally, 2020 was a remarkable year for SRI-orientated assets and SRI assets headquartered in the United States of America surpassed 35.3 trillion United States Dollars in 2020, a more than 30% increase from 2016 (GSIA, 2021).3 Growth was not limited to the U.S.A. as SRI assets saw growth across the majority of regions, with Canada experiencing the most growth in assets during 2019 and 2020, totalling 48% (GSIA, 2021). Second to Canada, a 42% growth in the ESG related assets was reported for the U.S.A., a 34% growth for Japan as well as a 25% growth in the Australasia region (GSIA, 2021). Beyond the latest growth trend, Socially Responsible Investment approaches have received growing amounts of investor attention (Adams & Abhayawansa, 2021; Yan et al., 2018). SRI includes a number of divergent investment approaches and the field is known for its erratic terminology as no unified global definition exists (Richardson, 2008; Sherwood & Pollard, 1 COVID-19, or SARS-COV-2, was first recognised by the World Health Organisation during the final months of 2019 (Engelhardt et al., 2021). Following the zoonotic virus’ discovery, it quickly spread globally and caused considerable market instability in its wake (Engelhardt et al., 2021). 2 Hereinafter, Environmental, Social and Governance factors are also referred to by the commonly utilised acronym “ESG” depending on the context of the piece. Socially Responsible Investments are hereinafter also referred to according to its commonly utilised acronym “SRI” depending on the context of the piece. Both topics are detailed in subchapter 2.2 of this research. 3 Hereinafter, the United States of America is referred to by the acronym “U.S.A.” and the United States Dollar is referred to by the acronym “USD”. 8 2018). Nevertheless, as subchapter 2.4 unpacks, this research utilises of the South African and European interpretation of SRI. Thereby, SRI refers to the incorporation of ESG factors within investment approaches and is utilised as an instrument for SRI approaches (Eurosif, 2014; Louche & Lydenberg, 2006). The escalation in SRI investing has extended ESG Factors’ role in investing practices while undoubtedly making the matter more commonplace during 2020 (Zhan & Santos-Paulino, 2021). This spectacle is further evidenced by the ESG integration trend of most of the largest asset management funds (Madhavan et al., 2021; Soler-Domínguez et al., 2019). Some examples of recent ESG factor integration include BlackRock Financial Management, the Vanguard Group Incorporated, Amundi Group, AXA Group S.A., Credit Suisse Group AG, and Fidelity Investments Incorporated (CFA Institute, 2020a). SRI asset growth has continued into 2021, yet 2020 seems to have solidified the field within mainstream investing and has established ESG investing attention globally (Mans-Kemp & van Zyl, 2021; Quinsee, 2021; Ricketts, 2020). In contrast to the recent growth, ESG factors’ inclusion in mainstream investment approaches have been criticised widely before the pandemic as an isolated phenomenon prompted by the U.S.A.’s bull market (Stevens, 2020).4 Equally, SRI have been critiqued for being a ‘feel-good’ investment that sacrifices returns and, therefore, are contrary to fiduciary responsibilities (Payne, 2021). In the pandemic’s wake, however, ESG factors seem to increasingly demonstrate a permanent alteration in investing practice that may not necessarily detract from fund performance (Broadstock et al., 2021; Stevens, 2020). The existing growth in SRI follows a long-term trend evidenced by the U.S.A. and Europe, which both saw significant increases in ESG assets under management, totalling 618 billion USD from 2010 to 2019 (Zhan & Santos-Paulino, 2021). During this period, the amount of global sustainability orientated funds also increased from 1304 to 2704 (Zhan & Santos- Paulino, 2021). The U.S.A. had particularly noticeable increases in the number of funds with an SRI focus increasing from 55 in 1995 to more than 333 in 2012 (Munoz et al., 2014). However, 2020 magnified the prior trend as sustainable investment funds enjoyed a doubling of inflows in 2020 in comparison to 2019, a ten-fold increase in comparison to 2018 in the 4 For an overview of the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian influences and origins on SRI, see Sherwood & Pollard (2018). For an overview of later resurgences, including how SRI developed as part of the Quakers’ unwillingness to invest in so-called “sin stocks” see Heese (2005). 9 U.S.A’s markets (Hale, 2021). In total, sustainable investment inflows amounted to one-quarter of net investment inflows in the U.S.A. during 2020 (Hale, 2021). The recent surge in the variation of mainstream investment practice is particularly noteworthy as it suggests a redirection of investment behaviour that is no longer determined solely by investment risk and returns (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). SRI achieves this extension by broadening the considerations of investors to include non-financial criteria (Renneboog et al., 2008). To evaluate the appropriate non-financial criteria, ESG factors are utilised to determine the viability of an investment within an investor’s portfolio (Renneboog et al., 2008). Such approaches have been termed widely and some expressions include Socially- or Sustainable and Responsible Investing, Impact Investing, Social Investment, Social Finance, Ethical Investing, Green Investing, and ESG Investing (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018; Viviers & Eccles, 2012). While there are some variations in the aforesaid approaches, South African studies most commonly make reference to the term Socially Responsible Investing (Viviers & Eccles, 2012).5 In this context, SRI is characterised as an approach to investment that incorporates ESG factors as part of the investment process (Viviers & Eccles, 2012). Some proponents of SRI suggest that the abovementioned investment approaches can consider factors beyond purely financial metrics in achieving investment objectives and without sacrificing returns (Heese, 2005). Accordingly, ESG factors serve to measure the extent to which firms can evaluate their investment choices, since SRI approaches are concerned with the sustainability of investments and therewith the eligibility of a potential investment (Bhana, 2018; Bollen, 2007; Giamporcaro, 2011; Sherwood & Pollard, 2018).6 Supporters argue that sustainable business practices are rewarded on the market because the accompanying costs and business risks that sustainable organisations face are less, leading to more profitable returns and lower levels of comparative volatility, all while investors still meet their requisite fiduciary responsibilities (Broadstock et al., 2021; Mascotto, 2020; Payne, 2021; Schoenmaker & Schramade, 2019).7 Beyond the growth of SRI in recent years, ESG practices are also argued to intensify returns and minimise the overall risk of a managed portfolio (Adams & Abhayawansa, 2021; Broadstock et al., 2021; Quinsee, 2021). However, despite the proposed 5 In the interest of clarity, the two terms “Socially Responsible Investment” and “Environmental, Social and Governance Factors” are detailed further in subchapter 2.2 below. 6 Hereinafter, Socially Responsible Investment is also referred to by the acronym “SRI” alongside the full reference. 7 An overview of the suggested benefits that SRI companies have in comparison to their alternatives is discussed in subchapter 2.2 below. 10 benefits, there is not yet any consensus regarding the comparative performance of ESG- orientated investment strategies, creating uncertainty for potential SRI investors. Moreover, the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (2020a)8 suggests that there exists “an active debate on the performance of funds focussed on SRI/ESG investing” which is further developed below. The global trend towards incorporating SRI can further be inferred from the increasing number of signatories and total assets under management within the United Nations – Principles of Responsible Investment or UN-PRI (PRI Association, 2021a).9 Established in 2006, the UN- PRI includes six principles committing signatories to integrate ESG factors within their investment practices (PRI Association, 2020). While the UN-PRI does not represent all global SRI, it accounted for 80 trillion USD in SRI assets under management in 2019 (CFA Institute, 2020a). From Figure 1, the significant growth in both signatories and assets under management can be recognised. 2020 is particularly notable as the UN-PRI experienced an increase of 29% in signatories, while assets under the management of signatories increased by 21% to more than 100 trillion USD in total. More recently, the association has confirmed its 4000th signatory with 110 trillion in assets under management during June 2021 (Segal, 2021). Figure 1 Total signatories of the UN-PRI and USD assets under management The growth in ESG is also not limited exclusively to the West. In 2019, China reported a total of seven billion USD in assets managed by 95 sustainability centred funds, most of which had been launched less than five years prior (Zhan & Santos-Paulino, 2021). Figure 2 below illustrates the division of assets and signatories to the UN-PRI by region. It illustrates that while 8 Hereinafter referred to as the CFA Institute. 9 Hereinafter, the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment are also referred by its common acronym “UN-PRI” or “PRI”. Further detail thereon is provided in subchapter 1.2 below. 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Number of Assets Number of Signatories 11 there has been growth in other regions, the UN-PRI signatories are more noticeable in Europe and North America. Figure 2 UN-PRI Signatories per assets under management and geographic area Despite many funds being western controlled, South Africa has not been isolated from the trend. From the establishment of the UN-PRI in 2006, South Africa featured two signatories, The South African Government Employees Pension Fund, and Momentum Metropolitan Life Limited.10 Figure 2 illustrates the comparative growth in UN-PRI signatories in the South African context (PRI Association, 2021b). As of June 2021, the UN-PRI has a total of 64 signatories headquartered in South Africa and, parallel to the global trend, there has been a noticeable increase in signatories from 2018 onwards (PRI Association, 2021b). From 2018 to 2020, signatories of the UN-PRI which are headquartered in South Africa grew from 45 to 60 as illustrated in Figure 3 (PRI Association, 2021b). In addition to UN-PRI signatory growth, South Africa has been a “pioneer in promoting corporate governance reform” in its own capacity as well as the country’s history of economic exclusion provides specific urgency to redress social inequalities, further pressing the need for the application of SRI (Ducastel & Anseeuw, 2020; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). 10 The Government Employees Pension Fund would later contribute significantly to the establishment of South African SRI, and the matter is further detailed in subsection 2.3.2 below. Hereinafter the fund is referenced using the acronym “GEPF”. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Assets under Management PRI Signatories Europe North America Other Regions 12 Figure 3 UN-PRI Signatories headquartered in South Africa As Figure 3 illustrates, the increase in South African SRI funds mirrors the global developments evidenced by Figure 1. Further sources suggest that South Africa hosts 53 funds with a ‘high’ sustainability rating according to Morningstar as South African funds incorporate ESG factors into their investment practice. Examples include Coronation (2020), Ninety One (2021), Old Mutual (2021b), Prudential Investment Managers (2021), and Stanlib (2021). Yet, a smaller number of funds are specifically dedicated to ESG investing (Citywire, 2020). Some specific funds include a Morgan Stanley Capital International, or MSCI, indexed fund specialising in South Africa ESG Capital Leaders, as well as the Mergence (2021) SRI Fund, and the Novare (2021) South Africa Impact Fund (Citywire, 2021; Du Plessis, 2019).11 Other South African ESG oriented funds have also been introduced from the inception of the COVID- 19 pandemic, such as the Sygnia S&P Global 1200 ESG ETF and the Old Mutual ESG equity fund (Madjarova, 2021; Old Mutual, 2021a). In the context of BRICS,12 South Africa is also a notable UN-PRI signatory, particularly when comparing the performance of UN-PRI funds in the BRICS environment (Tripathi & Kaur, 2020). While considering BRICS UN-PRI signatory performance from 1 September 2007 until March 2019, Tripathi and Kaur (2020) find that South African signatories outperformed the market to the greatest extent when measured by excess return alpha values. Among the BRICS countries, South Africa also boasts some of the highest overall ESG performance and more than three times that of China’s performance (Garcia et al., 2019). Figure 4 below illustrates 11 Hereinafter, Morgan Stanley Capital International is abbreviated as “MSCI”. 12 An emerging economies association, BRICS is a commonly used acronym for: “Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa” (Garcia et al., 2019, p. 298). 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 13 the BRICS UN-PRI signatories and the excess returns identified by Tripathi and Kaur (2020) (PRI Association, 2021b). Figure 4 BRICS UN-PRI signatories and excess returns In addition to the UN-PRI, other asset managers increasingly pressure firm boards to consider ESG factors. For example, Coronation Fund Managers distributed requests to 89 South African listed firms to increase their consideration of ESG factors in board decisions, followed by meetings regarding firm ESG performance (Buthelezi, 2021). The approach of putting pressure on South African listed company boards to consider ESG factors in their business practices is further sanctioned by an extensive legislative framework in South Africa (Kitsikopoulos et al., 2018; Mans-Kemp & van Zyl, 2021). Mirroring the increasing investor affinity towards ESG approaches, companies are internally integrating ESG aspects in business strategies (Raman et al., 2020). Companies with sustainable business practices are also reported to enjoy increased consumer spending, especially in the business-to-consumer sectors (Raman et al., 2020). Despite the growing South African interest in SRI, findings regarding the impact of ESG integration on risk-adjusted returns is less clear in the country, delaying possible further investment. Principally, Schoenmaker and Scharamade (2019) posit that companies which have sustainable and responsible business practices are less prone to financial volatility and have higher levels of sales growth over the long term. Contrariwise, Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2011) propose that portfolios with an SRI focus provide less volatile negative returns with the same performance as conventional funds. Several international studies have also found a positive correlation in the comparative ESG issuer’s impact on performance during the early 2000s, while other studies suggest that this impact has disappeared following the global 0 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,004 0,005 0,006 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Brazil Russia India China South Africa ESG signatories Excess returns 14 financial crisis of 2008 (Gerard, 2019). As of 30 November 2020, evidence from 1175 U.S.A. large-cap strategies tend to propose alternative findings (Payne, 2021). Over a period of one year and three years, the U.S.A.’s Large capitalisation, highly rated ESG companies have outperformed their non-ESG counterparts while providing similar returns over the five year period (Payne, 2021). Further, when considering the Sharpe (1994) ratios over the same periods, ESG integrated funds outperformed all periods, indicating better risk-adjusted returns (Payne, 2021). Yet, these findings do not suggest consensus in academic literature, since wide disparities in findings prevail regarding the performance of ESG related investments. In the global context, a greater portion of research has proposed positive interactions for company financial- and ESG performance, yet the matter is far from settled (Viviers & Eccles, 2012). Meta-analyses of global ESG funds’ financial performance have been performed by Dixon- Fowler et al.(2013) as well as Friede et al. (2015). Both findings suggest that the majority of studies indicate SRI market outperformance. Contrariwise, a similar literature review by Revelli and Viviani (2015) finds that SRI portfolios provide no comparative benefits or detriments to ordinary investments. While still contested internationally, there exist numerous studies considering the financial performance of ESG investments for developed markets (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). Comparative studies on the performance of ESG investments in the South African context, on the other hand, are particularly lacking (Chetty et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2019; Viviers & Eccles, 2012). The incongruent and insufficient findings regarding ESG performance on the JSE introduce the purpose of this research. Of the studies performed on South Africa, Table 1 indicates some of the varied findings regarding ESG and financial performance. Table 1 Studies on South African ESG financial performance ESG Outperformance Inconclusive or ESG underperformance Duncan (2018), Johnson et al. (2019), Demetriades and Auret (2014), Mutezo (2014, p. 210), and Tripathi and Kaur (2020) Chetty, Naidoo and Seetharam (2015), Chawana (2014), Horn, de Klerk, and de Villiers (2018), Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), Gladysek and Chipeta (2012), and Viviers et al. (2008) 15 As illustrated in Table 1, Johnson et al. (2019), Demetriades and Auret (2014), Duncan (2018), Mutezo (2014), and Tripathi and Kaur (2020) find positive correlations between firm financial and ESG rating performance. Equally, other studies like Horn, de Klerk and de Villiers (2018), Chetty, Naidoo and Seetharam (2015), and Gladysek and Chipeta (2012) find no correlation. Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) find that South African Sustainable and Responsible mutual funds do not provide any statistical benefit to their conventional counterparts. Similarly, Du Toit and Lekoloane (2018) find no relationship between the JSE SRI index and firm financial performance while Chawana (2014) reports that the JSE SRI Index underperforms conventional South African market indexes. Considering these divergences, Johnson et al. (2019) suggest that research over periods that extend beyond six years may yield more definitive results as the benefits of ESG-orientated approaches purportedly come to the fore over lengthier periods. Considering the lack of conclusive findings in the existing literature and the recent growth in the field, a study that examines the comparative profitability of SRI is particularly relevant to determine the viability of SRI, especially so following recent capital inflows and market developments (Folger-Laronde et al., 2020). Examining periods of market crisis also tend to uncover challenges that remain hidden during boom periods (Díaz et al., 2021; Herringer et al., 2009). Subsequent to the initial influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, a revaluation of ESG performance could explain whether ESG is posed to play an increased part in the future of South African markets (Díaz et al., 2021). While ESG performance has been subjected to numerous studies globally, a conclusive result on such funds’ comparative performance in South Africa over the long term is still outstanding and this research aims to fill this lacuna (Folger-Laronde et al., 2020; Friede et al., 2015). The identified research gap provides newfound opportunities for analysis to consider the maturation of the field, especially given the case in comparison to prior years’ research and recent developments. As the role of ESG factors has provided mixed results regarding fund returns in the past, this study is well poised to investigate developments following the capital inflows of 2020. The inclusion of 2020 within the period of evaluation may shed new light on the performance of highly rated ESG stocks in the South African market, gauging the principles underpinning their suggested returns (Madhavan et al., 2021). Accordingly, this research makes use of an extended period of evaluation, consisting of 12 years from 2009 to 2021, to address existing divergences in findings. 16 As implied above, the divergence of existing findings regarding the South African market further motivates this study and, considering the context of recent market developments following the impact of COVID-19, it provides a directive to consider market changes in the study’s evaluation which are yet to be considered in an academic study. The lack of consensus also pinpoints the absence of sufficient literature on the topic and motivates an overview of performance. The disparities in findings regarding existing South African literature further provides an opportunity to address existing criticisms of prior studies.13 Specifically, this research is one of the first in the South African context to consider the CFA Institute (2020a), Johnson et al. (2019) and Garcia, Mendes-Da-Silva and Orsato’s (2019) suggestion that ESG performance studies make use of extended periods of evaluation. Schoenmaker and Scharamade (2019) suggest that over the short run there is little variation in the comparative profits of ESG- orientated businesses. As supported by Johnson et al. (2019), extending the period of investigation may therefore unlock unrecognised benefits of ESG-orientated approaches as the effects may manifest over longer periods, given the focus on long-term value creation of ESG- orientated firms. The approach echoes the conclusions of Viviers et al. (2008) who compare South African Responsible Investment fund performance to that of the market and find that while local Responsible Investment funds underperformed, they demonstrate continually increasing performance over the period examined. The finding is further advanced by Tripathi and Kaur (2020), who suggest that positive results are yet to be uncovered in further studies, given the recent growth in the field and the increasing availability of data. Correspondingly, Akiniolire and Smit (2003) and Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Bansal (2016) further suggest that longer periods of evaluation provide for more adequate measurements of ESG fund performance as the benefits of long-term, value-orientated, approaches are only visible over extended periods. Accordingly, this research undertakes a comparative overview of listed firm ESG and financial performance for the period 2009 to 2021. This period is primarily relevant due to the two collective surges experienced in ESG investing in South Africa in late 2008 and 2020, as well as the general trend in its growth during this period (Mans-Kemp & van Zyl, 2021). The first surge in ESG investing followed after the global financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 followed by the subsequent surge in 2020, which is discussed above (Adams & Abhayawansa, 2021; Payne, 13 An analysis of existing literature regarding South Africa’s SRI performance follows in Chapter Two. 17 2021). The inclusion of a significant period under evaluation starting also recognises the period constraints of existing studies, as identified by the CFA Institute (2020a). This extended period of evaluation therefore uniquely satisfies the research requests for longer periods of scrutiny by Akiniolire and Smit (2003), Garcia et al. (2019), and Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Bansal (2016). An extended period of evaluation also poises the study to include the two most significant periods of growth of SRI funds and the transition of SRI to more mainstream investment practice, which is another consideration suggested by the CFA Institute (2020a). In the South African context, having the portfolio formation date in 2009 is also particularly relevant. From 2009, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange14 required companies listed with the exchange to adhere to the requirements of the King report on Corporate Governance which includes integrated reporting, allowing for comprehensive ESG rating analysis (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2009; Herringer et al., 2009).15 Additionally, the suggested timeline for the research allows for historic comparisons into ESG research performance in the South African market over the long term as the evaluation considers 12 years. The outcome of the research contributes towards the ongoing debate regarding the financial performance of portfolios constructed from highly rated ESG equities subsequent to the introduction of the reporting requirements mandated within King III and their specific performance during the market turmoil experienced during 2020. The findings of prior South African studies and foreign ESG studies are utilised throughout the research piece to articulate SRI conceptually and to deepen the logic behind its usage. Collectively, the inclusion of both the extensive period under consideration, covering both the aftereffects of the financial crises in 2009 and 2020, uniquely positions this research to contribute towards clarifying the existing uncertainty regarding the contemporary financial performance of SRIs in South Africa. 1.2. Research problem and purpose Subchapter 1.1 examines the growth which ESG-orientated investments have shown in recent years and especially following the initial months of 2020, despite the continued uncertainties regarding comparative performance. In light of the existing inconclusive literature on the topic, 14 Hereinafter the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is referred to as the “JSE”. 15 Hereinafter, the King reports on Corporate Governance are referenced in the order in which the reports are published. The first King report on Corporate Governance is therefore referred as ‘King I’ while the remaining reports are designated in the same order. 18 the motivation for the study flows from the consideration of the increase in SRI-orientated assets under management globally and within South Africa. The inconclusive findings of the existing literature are critiqued for several reasons. Some main criticisms include the fact that contributing studies tend only to consider aspects of ESG or consider ESG fully over brief periods, both of which undermine the possible benefits of SRI (CFA Institute, 2020a; Garcia et al., 2019). For example, Chetty, Naidoo and Seetharam (2015) consider Corporate Social Responsibility and firm performance while Demetriades and Auret (2014) consider social performance and return on equity. In both studies, the Environmental and Governance factors of ESG are excluded. Insofar as it relates to risk-adjusted performance, South African ESG research tends to only evaluate performance over a short duration on the JSE (Johnson et al., 2019). Duncan (2018) and Mutenzo (2014), for example, both find ESG outperformance, but only consider 2013 until 2017 and 2004 until 2010 respectively. Johnson et al. (2019) find no outperformance of highly rated ESG firms but also only consider 2011 to 2016. Existing literature is also yet to consider the impact of the market developments experienced during 2020 on the performance of highly rated ESG equities in South Africa. Additionally, existing studies are critiqued for not accounting for firm size in ESG scoring. While larger firms tend to have higher ESG performance in line with greater reporting resources, some studies on ESG and financial performance have been criticised for not recognising this size bias (Boubaker et al., 2018; Demetriades & Auret, 2014; Du Toit & Lekoloane, 2018). Therefore, to address the existing lacuna, this study undertakes a long-term evaluation of highly rated SRI equities’ performance, including both the aftereffects of the global financial crisis and 2020 within its period of analysis. To address this gap, this study considers twelve years from May 2009 until April 2021 within its analysis, totalling 144 months of evaluation. It is suggested that the extended period of evaluation better allows for the long term benefits of ESG to come to the fore, as purported by Akiniolire and Smit (2003), Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Bansal (2016) and Schoenmaker and Schramade (2019). Further, the study also extends the consideration of specific aspects of ESG to ESG scoring entirely, where many existing studies merely consider one aspect of ESG scoring. Bridging the knowledge gap, this research, therefore, transcends the evaluation of individual ESG components and considers the matter more holistically, over a significantly lengthier period which includes both the influence of COVID-19 and the aftereffects of the 2008 and 19 2009 global financial crisis. The study further also accounts for firm size in its portfolio formation process. Accordingly, this research’s purpose is to analyse the performance of JSE listed equities based on their ESG scoring. In this research, the ESG scores of equities are measured according to Bloomberg ESG Disclosure scores. Bloomberg ESG Disclosure scores are utilised for two main reasons which are detailed in Chapter Three of this research. Briefly, the Bloomberg ESG Disclosure score database is a commercially available scoring metric that has some of the most extensive South African company data available for the entire period under review for this study. Additionally, the Bloomberg (2020a) ESG Disclosure score makes use of publicly available information, which ensures transparency in the findings of this research and allows for this research to be compared with further research as the approach is determinable, unlike privately utilised datasets. Utilising the scoring provided by Bloomberg, this research investigates the comparative performance of highly-rated South African ESG equities and their risk-based returns to that of their lesser rated counterparts. The study further contributes towards existing literature by including the market developments of 2020 on ESG funds in comparison to the market and provides a long-term risk-adjusted evaluation that includes this impact. In evaluating the outcome of the investigation, this study juxtaposes the validity of the reasoning of rated, ESG- orientated equities in producing superior market performance. Therefore, this study uniquely provides a long-term comparison of ESG-orientated equities’ financial performance in order to appraise whether the investment approach provides any comparative financial benefits, as ESG proponents suggest. 1.3. Key research question This research’s key research question relates to the comparative performance of a set of portfolios of highly rated ESG equities to that of non-highly rated ESG equity portfolios listed on the JSE, and is detailed below: How have South African highly rated ESG equities performed relative to non-highly rated ESG equities on the JSE for the period 2009 to 2021, when accounting for firm size in terms of market capitalisation? 1.4. Hypotheses 20 For statistical tests, the hypotheses make use of alpha values generated from the Fama and French ([1993]2015) Three and Five-Factor models as discussed within Chapter Three below.16Acknowledging the aforementioned, the hypotheses of this research are formulated as follows: HN: Highly rated ESG portfolios constructed from the considered JSE-listed companies perform as well as medium and low rated ESG portfolios constructed for the period 2009 to 2021. HA: Highly rated ESG portfolios constructed from the considered JSE-listed companies show higher abnormal returns relative to medium and low rated ESG portfolios constructed for the period 2009 to 2021. 1.5. Research significance and study contribution An elaboration on the reasoning behind SRI investments alongside a combined evaluation of SRI fund performance provides a necessary assessment of the merits of the field in light of recent market developments. The study, therefore, provides fresh and current perspectives regarding security ESG ratings and risk-adjusted returns for a period of 144 months. The inconclusiveness of existing studies, coupled with the lack of sufficient literature on the topic within the South African context, motivates this research analysis of ESG-fund performance, especially so considering recent capital inflows following the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, this research contributes to the existing field in three distinctive aspects. Firstly, this study furthers existing findings by including an analysis of recent market developments faced during and subsequent to the initial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Secondly, this study subjects SRI assets to an extended period of evaluation as requested by the CFA Institute (2020a), amongst other studies, to allow for the anticipated long-term benefits of SRI-orientated companies to come to the fore (Akiniolire & Smit, 2003; Garcia et al., 2019; Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana & Bansal, 2016). Finally, this study also accounts for firm size in its portfolio formation process to recognise the possibility of size bias in evaluating firm ESG and financial performance (Boubaker et al., 2018; Demetriades & Auret, 2014; Du Toit & Lekoloane, 2018). 16 Hereinafter, the Fama and French ([1993] 2015) Three- and Five-Factor models are referred to as FF3 and FF5 respectively. 21 1.6. Chapter division This research is set out in a chapter format. The first chapter introduces the study and is concluded within this subsection (1.7). Chapter Two furthers the introduction of Chapter One by presenting SRI in South Africa. Chapter Two briefly develops SRI conceptually and situates the matter within the market context. Further, Chapter Two considers the status quo of ESG in South Africa, the South African position in comparison to global markets and the findings of existing firm ESG and financial performance studies in South Africa. The subsequent chapter (Chapter Three) develops and introduces the methodological approach that this research utilises in evaluating ESG scoring and equity performance. Chapter Three then provides an overview of the measures utilised within the study to evaluate the performance of a security in terms of the security’s ESG rating and risk-adjusted returns. Thereafter, Chapter Three details the application of the measures to the datasets and explains the portfolio formation process the study utilises. Provided with the results gleaned from applying Chapter Three’s methodological approach, the penultimate chapter (Chapter Four) examines the information flowing from the methodology detailed in Chapter Three. Chapter Four provides a descriptive analysis of the data introduced in Chapter Three followed by the results gleaned from the portfolio regressions. Chapter Four also provides a set of factor spanning tests in evaluating the factor models’ ability to price the portfolios. Finally, Chapter Five summarises the findings from the study and concludes the research piece. Chapter Two follows directly below. 22 Chapter Two: Literature review 2.1. Introduction Chapter Two broadly considers SRI’s development, the scope of its application and existing literature on its comparative performance. Commencing with the theoretical considerations which Chapter One introduced, the following subchapter (2.2) provides an overview of the financial theories which support SRI, followed by an explication of the theoretical benefits and detriments of ESG-orientated firms. The subsequent subchapter (2.3) develops South Africa’s Sustainable and Responsible Investment background from the country’s context. Subchapter 2.3 focuses on the most notable regulatory documents applicable within the South African context, as informed by their international counterparts in some instances. Subchapter 2.3 highlights the important role which the four King codes and the UN-PRI have in maturing the South African SRI market (Viviers & Els, 2017). The subchapter (2.3) further contextualises the role of sustainable development as one of South Africa’s SRI underpinnings as established by the King reports (King IV, 2015; Locke, 2019). Given the overarching framework, subchapter 2.4 then examines the South African interpretation by determining the scope of SRI and unpacking four common approaches in its application. The subchapter (2.4) then details the ratings utilised to determine ESG factor company performance and current challenges regarding its application. Provided with the nature of SRI in its application, subchapter 2.5 explains the ESG ratings metrics and methods which can be employed to evaluate and integrate a security’s ESG performance within investment approaches. Subchapter 2.6 then considers the recent momentum SRI has been experiencing. Alongside the increase in SRI funds, a parallel increase in the role of ESG in the financial market can also be observed (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2019). Therefore, subchapter 2.6 considers findings on SRI fund performance and literature thereon. As introduced within Chapter One, it is established that although company ESG score and company performance have been subjected to several studies from 1970, there still exists no consensus on performance in South Africa (Friede et al., 2015; Jain et al., 2019). Collectively, these subchapters lay the foundation for the empirical portion of the study which is introduced with the methodology in Chapter Three of this research. Still, to adequately appreciate the empirical findings of the following chapter, the following subchapters must first develop the topic. 2.2. The theoretical underpinnings of SRI and financial performance 23 2.2.1. Overview As Chapter One introduces, there are several different proposals and approaches which suggest that firms with higher ESG ratings provide financial outperformance (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). Duncan (2018) suggests that companies committed to ESG practices have distinguishable characteristics and benefits, including better use of resources and lower staff turnover levels, greater access to markets and lower costs of capital. Contrariwise, Becchetti et al. (2015) posit that an increased role afforded to stakeholders in ESG companies lead to inflexibilities when faced with negative productivity shocks, increasing stock return volatility and divergence from market dynamics. Since SRI approaches are adaptable, individual investors can tailor SRI approaches to suit a specific investment strategy. This flexible approach would, in turn, also impact the possible benefits of SRI (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Accordingly, this subchapter considers the theoretical underpinnings of SRI (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Sherwood and Pollard (2018) identify the impact of SRI approaches in four schools of thought: the Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories, the Material Information Theory, and the Universal Owner Theory. In what follows below, a brief overview of the role of ESG in these theories is provided. Given the focus of this research, the theories are only developed insofar as they relate to SRI practices broadly. Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention that there exists significant variance among the individual theories which do not find specific attention within this research (Dahlberg & Wiklund, 2018). Provided with the positioning of SRI approaches within existing investment theories, an overview of the guiding framework and application follows in the next two subchapters (2.3 and 2.4). Possibly the most appropriate theories to consider first in this research would be the Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories. Both theories have received significant attention in financial and economic literature and corporate governance debates tend to be framed within the ambit of either of the two theories (Tirole, 2006). In the context of SRI literature, the theories have also been used widely as a theoretical departure point (Eccles et al., 2014). The Shareholder Theory is often characterised in referencing Milton Friedman’s (2007) The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. As the title suggests, a business’ social responsibility only extends to the business’ shareholders, or those holding a claim to the ownership of the corporation (Friedman, 2007). Applied within the context of SRI, shareholder 24 theory would support the integration of SRI approaches should SRI ultimately yield an increase in the value of a security (Dahlberg & Wiklund, 2018; Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Contrariwise, the Stakeholder Theory develops in antithesis (Freeman, 2008). The Stakeholder Theory characterises ‘stakeholders’ as any entities which are impacted by the operations of a firm (Dahlberg & Wiklund, 2018; Wijnberg, 2000). Fundamentally, the theory suggests that corporations are best suited to consider all stakeholders in their operations and the approach maximises the value of all stakeholders in the process, rather than benefiting shareholders exclusively (Dahlberg & Wiklund, 2018; Freeman, 2008). For SRI, the Stakeholder Theory supports the consideration of all stakeholders who are impacted by the decisions of a business, regardless of the impact the decision may have on the share value (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). ESG approaches that consider wider objectives that benefit stakeholders, rather than exclusively shareholders, would find support in this theory (Dahlberg & Wiklund, 2018). Additionally, approaches that standardise the weigh-up of various stakeholders’ interests in corporate action would also find support in the Stakeholder Theory (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Another crucial theory that influences the adoption of ESG factors in investing is the Material Information Theory (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Material information is regarded as any information which could influence the value of an investment, a firm’s financial statements is one example (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2018; Saad & Strauss, 2020). Since increasing numbers of investors require disclosure regarding ESG factors in their investment processes, ESG factor information is becoming progressively more material (Saad & Strauss, 2020; Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Typifying this development in the understanding of materiality is the U.S.A’s Securities and Exchange Commission (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018).17 As ESG factors’ prominence in research and investment practice increased, so did the need for access to ESG related information. In the U.S.A., this increase resulted in lobbyists prompting the SEC to regulate the disclosure of ESG information as part of existing material information requirements for investment decision making (Saad & Strauss, 2020). Accordingly, the SEC (2010) published the “Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change”. Three years following the SEC’s publication, the European Union enacted a similar disclosure requirement: “Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 17 Hereinafter referred to by the acronym ‘SEC’. 25 information by certain large undertakings and groups”. However, as subchapter 2.3 develops below, South Africa’s mandated reporting framework had been established before both the European Union and the U.S.A. during 2009. The legislative recognition of the value of ESG factors by the European Union, South Africa and the U.S.A. has a notable impact on today’s financial marketplaces. Sherwood and Pollard (2018) recognise two key effects of non-financial company information disclosure. First thereof is the benefit of the information in guiding investor choices (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). Second, and as an effect of information disclosure, the policies requiring company compliance also incentivise corporations to reconsider their approaches to ESG factors in their business operations (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). The final theory which this research considers is the Universal Owner Theory. The Universal Owner Theory is typified by a factual scenario in which sizeable investors find themselves diversified to such an extent that the investors are incentivised to address systemic risks (Hawley & Williams, 2007). Typically, large institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios in most asset classes, spanning sectors, markets and geographies (Hawley & Williams, 2007). As such, some institutional investors, like Norges Bank Investment Management, USS Investment Management Limited and Federated Hermes Investment Management propose that investment performance becomes centred on the performance of the economy at large (Hawley & Williams, 2007). In this environment, investors are tied to wide arrays of social and environmental factors and are hard placed to diversify away from systemic risks. Such investors would, therefore, be better placed to mitigate risk through changes to the real economy (Hawley & Williams, 2007; Quigley, 2020). This is particularly relevant within the context of SRI, as it suggests that SRI investment is economically driven through the consideration of externalities (Quigley, 2020). In addition to the theories supporting ESG factors, there are several proposed benefits and challenges in terms of individual SRI orientated assets. The following two subsections unpack the theoretical outperformance provided by ESG-orientated firms, followed by the theoretical underperformance of ESG-orientated firms thereafter. Subchapter 2.3 then unpacks the South African application of SRI. 2.2.2. Theories supporting the outperformance of highly rated ESG firms There exist a few proposals which suggest that firms with higher ESG ratings should have financial benefits in comparison to their alternatives. Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013), condenses 26 the alleged benefits into four common arguments, each of which then supports companies’ adherence to ESG principles. The four main arguments relate to green innovation, value generation, social legitimacy, and stakeholder groups. In the remainder of this subchapter, these benefits and detriments are unpacked, followed by the South African application thereof in the ensuing subchapter (2.3). Innovation is widely recognised as a distinctive factor in enabling a firm to gain a competitive advantage within a market and increase its profitability (Bain & Kleinknecht, 2016; Klomp & Van Leeuwen, 2001). As a first proposition, Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013) argue that companies exhibiting positive environmental strategies and performance tend to display greater levels of innovation and operational efficiency. Essentially, as pollution is considered a waste of potential resources, greater levels of pollution translate into greater costs to firms, therefore, firms with greater levels of innovation tend to utilise resources more efficiently and thereby decrease operational costs and pollution (Christmann, 2000). Examples of innovation that consider ESG factors include energy consumption improvements, more efficient waste recycling and more environmentally friendly product design and packaging (Chouaibi & Chouaibi, 2021). Each of these examples contributes towards the reduction of a corporation’s environmental pollution or make more efficient use of production resources (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995). The increased efficiency of resource use and the innovation which led to its development, in turn, provides a corporation with a competitive and financial advantage (Chouaibi & Chouaibi, 2021; Dangelico, 2016). The second point raised by Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013) considers how a company’s focus on ESG factors may serve as an indicator of a long-term orientation towards value generation, organisational risk mitigation and strategic leadership (Hart, 1995; Sharma, 2000; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Schoenmaker and Schramade (2019), from a converse perspective, suggest that ESG factors assist investors to consider company prospects, pivoting away from short- term metrics and towards sustainable value creation. Equally, the reasoning of both Dixon- Fowler et al. (2013) and Schoenmaker and Schramade (2019) suggest that an emphasis on ESG factors indicate that a firm enjoys managerial focus on organisational risk management, which translates into a long-term perspective in company management and more effective firm leadership. Aragón-Correa (1998) evaluates this reasoning when considering the strategic proactivity of 105 firms insofar as it relates to environmental factors. The outcome of the study suggests that firms with strong organisational and management capabilities tend to exhibit a 27 strategic, proactive focus on environmental factors and enjoy competitive advantages in organisational structure and characteristics (Aragón-Correa, 1998). Thirdly, firms that integrate ESG factors may enjoy higher levels of social legitimacy and benefits to their reputation (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Hart, 1995). In a broad sense, ethical corporate behaviour increases firm reputation for both investors and the public, this position similarly holds for ESG-factors (Maung et al., 2020). Gregory et al. (2014) evaluates firm Corporate Social Responsibility or CSR activity, and find a positive relationship with firm reputation, in concert with the findings of Brammer et al. (2006) as well as others, including Antunovich et al. (2000).18 Reputational benefits and social legitimacy, in turn, may lead to competitive advantages for a corporation. Three notable advantages which this research considers are the lower cost of obtaining capital, increased firm attractiveness to potential employees, and higher firm sales (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Turban & Greening, 1997; Zhang et al., 2020). Although considered indirectly in most studies, explicit evaluations of the cost of capital and a firm’s reputation have documented notable results (Maung et al., 2020). One recent evaluation is performed by Cao et al. (2015) whereby large firm reputation in the U.S.A. is positively related to a company’s cost of equity. Gregory et al. (2014) similarly find that improved CSR performance leads to better growth prospects over the long term and decreased cost of capital. Cheng et al. (2014) find that both social and environmental factor disclosure contributes towards reducing capital access limitations. The established social legitimacy of a firm also affords it the benefit of attracting more quality employees and higher employee retention (Cao et al., 2015; Turban & Greening, 1997). Greening and Turban (2000) consider the phenomenon in light of Social Identity Theory. The theory posits that the social alignments of a person, including employment, influences a person’s concept of self (Dutton et al., 1994). Regarding ESG factor considerations, organisational approaches to social and environmental matters can particularly influence a corporation’s image and the attractiveness of the corporation to potential applicants (Turban & Greening, 1997). In turn, the perception of the norms and values that a corporation espouses affect an organisation’s attractiveness for potential employees and influence potential 18 Some additional studies which support the finding include Bear et al. (2010) as well as Zhu et al. (2014). Hereinafter Corporate Social Responsibility is referred to by the acronym “CSR”. 28 employees to be proportionally more likely to search for employment opportunities at socially responsible firms (Turban & Greening, 1997). The third significant impact of social legitimisation which this research considers is increased firm sales (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013; Hart, 1995). Literature on the topic suggests that firms with better reputations regarding ESG performance tend to enjoy greater consumer support (Russo & Fouts, 1997). However, more recent findings suggest that beyond additional consumer support, firms with high ESG performance tend to enjoy less volatility in sales (Patel et al., 2021). The last point raised by Dixon-Fowler et al. (2013) regarding ESG-orientated firm benefits also relates to greater consumer support. While bearing in mind Instrumental Stakeholder Theory, the consideration of ESG factors allows corporations to recognise and address the requests of wider stakeholder groups more directly (Jones et al., 2018). Thereby including wider stakeholder groups and increasing levels of trust and further performance benefits (Jones et al., 2018). As the theoretical benefits of ESG-orientated firms have been developed in this subsection, the following subsection considers the theoretical detractors to ESG firm financial performance, whereafter subchapter 2.2 concludes. 2.2.3. Theories supporting the underperformance of highly rated ESG firms In contrast to the above subsection (2.2.2), there are also challenges raised to proponents of ESG-orientated firms relating to financial performance. Contests regarding the benefits above relate firstly to the expense of incorporating environmental and social externalities onto firm balance sheets (Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). In such instances, incorporating environmental and social externalities are either higher than its purported benefit or the action internalises negative externalities, harming a firm’s balance sheet (Haigh, 2012; Todaro & Smith, 2011). Additionally, ESG-orientated firms are critiqued for being vulnerable to negative production shocks, which increase stock return volatility because increased stakeholder orientation by management limits management’s responses to production shocks (Becchetti et al., 2015). Others suggest that SRI orientated fund results are linked to specific sectors and that returns tend to be sector-specific rather than related to ESG factor performance (Soler-Domínguez et al., 2019). Still, further literature suggests that ESG factor interpretation is connected to specific cultural and social considerations which attenuate ESG factors’ indications, or the capabilities 29 of SRI portfolio managers rather than ESG fund outperformance (Rehman et al., 2016; Silva et al., 2018). Contrariwise, Payne (2021) argues that ESG-focused firms are considered to be more adaptable to business shifts and that this perception motivated ESG fund inflows during 2020. Collectively these disparities in the existing literature on SRI mandate the evaluation of SRI in practice and give rise to the foundational motivation of this research. Chapter Three of this research develops an approach that empirically evaluates the potential financial benefits of ESG integration. However, to test the validity of the theories mentioned above, the application of SRI must first be surveyed. South Africa has developed an advanced framework for ESG investing with the implementation of the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa and the existing King reports (King IV, 2015; Locke, 2019; Mans-Kemp & van Zyl, 2021; Viviers & Els, 2017).19 The King III report is particularly relevant for the development of SRI in South Africa as its requirements are mandated by the JSE, necessitating listed companies to issue annual integrated reports which detail companies’ ESG factors (Solomon & Maroun, 2012). These legislative pieces underscore the South African approach to SRI and are introduced in the following subchapter (2.3). Provided with the relevant legislative framework, the subchapter thereafter (2.4) considers SRI’s application. 2.3. The Socially Responsible Investment framework of South Africa 2.3.1. Developments before the UN-PRI Before further unpacking the contemporary South African approach to SRI, it is crucial to briefly develop the concept from its historic origins. Accordingly, subsection 2.3.1 develops a chronological synopsis of some of the most relevant global and local developments which shaped South Africa’s understanding of SRI. As such, this subsection (2.3.1) commences with an analysis of the Sullivan Principles, followed by the King codes and the relevant legislative and other provisions applicable to the South African investment environment.20 The pieces considered in this subchapter (2.3) collectively shape the South African understanding of SRI and form the foundation for SRI’s application. Provided with this subchapter’s (2.3) overview, 19 Hereinafter, the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa will also be referred to as “CRISA”. The code is introduced and unpacked within subsection 2.3.2 below. 20 While it is commonplace to refer to each of the King Committee reports on Corporate Governance in South Africa simply as the “King codes”, for this research each of the relevant codes are referenced by full name on their introduction and within the List of Abbreviations, followed by the shortened name thereafter (King IV, 2015). 30 the following subchapter (2.4) plots temporal trends in South African SRI and details its application. Thereafter, subchapter 2.4 motivates the reasoning for the study before subchapter 2.5 provides an overview of ESG performance measures. Subchapter 2.6 considers recent developments following 2020 and Chapter Three sets out this research’s methodology thereafter. This subsection (2.3.1) approaches South Africa’s interpretation of SRI by unpacking the main regulatory documents forming South Africa’s SRI framework. The subsection (2.3.1) commences with South Africa’s initial influence on SRI globally, followed by the King reports on Corporate Governance in South Africa (King IV, 2015). Particular focus is provided to the King III report on Corporate Governance in South Africa and the CRISA since these measures are recognised as being the most significant contributions in developing SRI in the country (Viviers & Els, 2017). The significant impact of the King reports is chiefly because the reports developed South Africa’s corporate social responsibility environment, which includes sustainable governance (Kloppers, 2018). The King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa (2015), which is the body that created the King codes, suggests that there are three fundamental consequences from the King reports which have reorientated South African corporate thinking. Firstly, the King reports reinforce a drive towards shareholder orientated, inclusive capitalism, which focuses on “holistic value creation” (King IV, 2015). Secondly, the reports promote integrated reporting and collective value creation, a concept founded in ESG reporting (King IV, 2015). Thirdly, and in support of the first two outcomes, the reports mandated a change of direction towards the creation of long-term sustainable value in capital markets (King IV, 2015). Nonetheless, the impact of the reports becomes clear as the development of SRI in South Africa is unpacked. Insofar as South Africa is particularly relevant to the development of Sustainable and Responsible Investing, an adequate introduction would be the Sullivan Principles (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Kloppers, 2018; Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). As signalled above, South Africa played a notable role in developing Sustainable and Responsible Investment practices internationally (Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014; Kloppers, 2018). Particularly so in the U.S.A. following the introduction of the Sullivan Principles of 1977 (Heese, 2005; Sherwood & 31 Pollard, 2018).21 The Sullivan Principles developed as a collection of six principles which companies and banks in the U.S.A. were encouraged to recognise, should they have business operations in South Africa (Sullivan, 1984). The principles were aimed at pressuring South Africa’s apartheid government to implement just and equitable racial policies within the country’s economy (Sullivan, 1984). Funds that committed to the principles were required to divest from South African institutions which did not adhere to the Sullivan Principles’ requirements for fair and equal treatment of all employees, amongst other requirements (Grossman & Sharpe, 1986; Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). The Sullivan Principles had significant application in the U.S.A. and had a global impact since several companies from the United Kingdom and Scandinavia also withdrew business from South Africa (Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014). In total, more than 100 Multinational Corporations divested from the South African market until after apartheid (Alexis, 2010; Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014). The implementation of the Sullivan Principles also accounts for one of the first instances of negative screening in an investment portfolio (Sherwood & Pollard, 2018). From the inception of the practice, negative screening has been recognised as limiting the integration of stocks in a portfolio and the accompanying benefits of diversification, both of which are a clear restriction to portfolio optimisation for investors, considering the advice of Markowitz (1952) (Grossman & Sharpe, 1986). While negative screening is considered in detail in the following subchapter (2.4), it is noteworthy to recognise at this stage that the comparison of investment performance would shortly follow the introduction of the Sullivan Principles. Lashgari and Gant (1989), for example, find that Sullivan groups of investments outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial average over the period 1977 to 1983. Interestingly, research regarding the measurement of SRI fund comparative performance seems to be approximately as old as some of the funds themselves. Shortly after South Africa’s first democratic elections during April 1994, the first King report was issued and titled the King report on Corporate Governance22, or King I (1994). The first King report served as South Africa’s preliminary domestic report on companies’ non-financial 21 Taking their cue from the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Global Sullivan Principles further developed SRI’s background in 1999 (Alexis, 2010). The principles aimed at directing multinational companies to subscribe to socially responsible business practices on the global market (Alexis, 2010). 22 The “King report on Corporate Governance” is commonly termed “King I” and is referred to as such in what follows below (King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 1994). 32 and regulatory practices (Foster, 2020; King I, 1994). King I established the acceptable governance standards for listed companies on the JSE, as well as for South African banks, and some parastatals (Viviers & Els, 2017). The most significant contribution of King I, for this research, is that it emphasised that good governance required an integrated approach with wide considerations, including both social and environmental factors (Foster, 2020, p. 147). Subsequently, the Reconstruction and Development Programme categorised a framework of socio-economic policies in response to apartheid (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 1994). Collectively, the King I report and the Reconstruction and Development Programme provide investors with the first set of criteria to consider in their investment analyses which are not related to financial information (Viviers & Els, 2017). The South African SRI framework matured further in 2002 with a follow-up King Report, or King II, and the country hosting a World Summit on Sustainable Development (King II, 2002; United Nations, 2002). As the name suggests, the summit highlighted the role of sustainable companies and resolved to develop investment policies to increase and incentivise investments in cleaner production programmes with greater environmental efficiency (United Nations, 2002). The King II (2002) report included provisions regarding risk management and company sustainability by linking corporate social responsibility to good governance (Kloppers, 2018). The King II (2002) report further introduced the triple bottom line concept to corporate governance by incorporating both environmental and social factors into company measurements, alongside existing financial metrics (King II, 2002). Insofar as the matter relates to this research, the King II report focuses on an inclusive reporting approach for business activities, extending beyond financial performance to environmental and social aspects (King II, 2002; Kloppers, 2018). King II would become the de facto benchmark for South African corporate governance and would form part of the listing requirements of companies on the JSE (Eccles et al., 2008). A number of the requirements set out in King II (2002) are further codified in the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (Kloppers, 2018; Viviers & Els, 2017). Shortly after the introduction of King II, the publication of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003 would take place and the Act is also considered a contributing piece of legislation regarding SRI (Eccles et al., 2008). Act 53 of 2003’s contribution is not aimed particularly towards Responsible Investment practice, yet the Act provides guidelines to investors on promoting South African economic empowerment and socio-economic development (Eccles et al., 2008; Viviers & Els, 2017). Act 53 of 2003 also catalysed the development of the Financial Sector Charter, which has a noteworthy influence on South 33 African Responsible Investment (Moyo & Rohan, 2006). The charter provides investors with guidance on transformation targets in the financial services sector, concerning corporate social investment, as well as black ownership, procurement and human resources (Moyo & Rohan, 2006; Viviers & Els, 2017). Later, during May 2004, the JSE introduced the Sustainable and Responsible Investment Index to serve as a measure for investors to identify companies that had integrated Sustainable and Responsible Investment principles into their business practices (Heese, 2005). The basis of the qualifying criteria for the index was modelled on the triple bottom line requirements of King II and provided a comparative benchmark between socially responsible companies and their alternatives (Gladysek & Chipeta, 2012; King II, 2002; Viviers & Els, 2017). The availability of the published information also assisted analysts in considering integrated reports (Herringer et al., 2009). The greater ESG information on the South African market and the comparative decrease in its cost had contributed significantly to the factors’ inclusion in investment analysis and the development of the South African approach to SRI (Viviers et al., 2008). The fact that the JSE (2021) itself established the index is also particularly notable. In comparison, the majority of markets have their indexes managed and their listed firms rated by rating agencies (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006). The JSE SRI Index, on the other hand, assesses participating companies’ performance itself, primarily by using the companies’ sustainability and integrated reports (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006). Given the longstanding bond between the JSE and the Financial Times Stock Exchange, or FTSE, the JSE SRI Index was an adaptation of the FTSE4Good Index to the South African market (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006).23 However, the JSE SRI Index did not exclude any sectors from its eligibility criteria and was guided by an advisory committee that revised and directed its methodology for constituent companies (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006). The non-exclusionary approach was intended to motivate participation in the index (Sonnenberg & Hamann, 2006). Therefore, to form part of the JSE SRI Index, companies were requested to comply with a list of criteria based on different ESG related factors, should a company meet the minimum requirements of each field, then the company would be ranked among other constituents (Du Toit & Lekoloane, 2018). Utilising the FTSE Russel ESG rating methodology, the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index replaced the JSE SRI Index in 2015 (JSE, 2021). The revised index instituted 23 Hereinafter the Financial Times Stock Exchange is referred to by the acronym “FTSE”. 34 a set of minimum requirements for listing which were revised in 2018 to form the current JSE Responsible Investment Index (JSE, 2021). Globally, the United Nations launched the Environmental Programme Finance Initiative Report in 2004, which defined the phrase “Environmental, Social, Corporate Governance analysis” (Gilbert, 2010; UNEP-FI, 2004). Shortly thereafter in April 2006, the United Nations’ Environmental Programme Finance Initiative, or UNEP-FI, and Global Compact collectively established the UN-PRI (Gilbert, 2010; PRI Association, 2020; UNEP-FI, 2020). As discussed briefly in the first chapter, the six principles of the UN-PRI were developed by investor groups, governmental organisations, and representatives of civil society following the United Nations’ Secretary-General’s call for the creation of a sustainable financial system (PRI Association, 2020). Institutions that become signatories of the UN-PRI are required to adopt ESG issues into their investment approaches and support sustainable finance (PRI Association, 2020). The PRI’s contribution is particularly significant as it developed a global foundation and forum for initial consensus on best practice, collaborative action and institutional engagement (Louche et al., 2015). The UN-PRI acted as a consolidating force towards a standardised definition of Responsible Investment and crucially assisted investors by regularising ESG characteristics in investment analysis (Louche et al., 2015; PRI Association, 2020). The UN-PRI is further detailed in the following subsection (2.3.2) followed by the subsequent King reports. Subchapter 2.4 then considers the application of ESG factors in contemporary investment practice. 2.3.2. Subsequent developments following the introduction of the UN-PRI South Africa’s GEPF (2010) was one of the first 60 UN-PRI (2020) signatories in 2006. In contrast, the total number of signatory funds extended beyond 3000 in 2020 (PRI Association, 2020). For South Africa, the GEPF’s support is particularly important as it is the largest institutional investor on the African continent (Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014; Wildsmith, 2006).24 After becoming a signatory, the GEPF (2010) also established the South African PRI network. The South African PRI network promoted the PRI regionally and contributed towards the creation of uniform ESG policies in the South African investment environment – most notably thereof the CRISA (GEPF, 2010; Locke, 2019). Given the GEPF’s significant holdings, the fund weighed in to have reforms within the investment environment (Locke, 24 A number of other South African Pension Funds have followed the lead of the GEPF and require asset managers to be PRI signatories before allowing any engagement (Locke, 2019). During the first half of 2020, global PRI signatories increased by 28% (CFA Institute, 2020, p. 3). 35 2019; Viviers & Els, 2017). The efforts led to 19 South African investment managers becoming signatories of the PRI in 2006 and numbers have more than tripled subsequently to 60 South African signatories at the beginning of the second quarter of 2021 (Giamporcaro, 2011; PRI Association, 2021b). Viviers and Els (2017) posit that alongside the King reports, the PRI has had the most significant impact on the South African SRI environment. The PRI has had similar international success and more than 500 signatories notably joined the PRI during 2018 (Rust, 2019). The King III report, or the 2009 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, is the successor and necessary development from the second report’s recommendations (King III, 2009; Kloppers, 2018). As with components of the second report, the JSE mandated that listed companies comply with recommendations of the third King (2009) report, among them the publishing of detailed ESG factors as part of a company’s integrated reporting requirements (Solomon & Maroun, 2012). The requirements led to significant increases in the value and amount of reporting on ESG related matters of JSE listed companies (Solomon & Maroun, 2012). The greater availability of SRI information also assisted investors by decreasing the challenge of sourcing ESG information from companies, laying a foundation for more uniform and understandable ESG reporting (Herringer et al., 2009). Therefore, 2009 forms the year of commencement for this study’s empirical portion due to the contributions of additional listing requirements by the JSE in standardising ESG reporting, and the increased availability of ESG data. The provision ensures that adequate data on available funds are incorporated from the commencement of this research’s analysis and onwards. The third King (2009) report further led to the development of the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa, or CRISA, which is aimed at assisting investors in analysing investments that promote sustainable development (Foster, 2020; Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014; King III, 2009; Locke, 2019).25 The CRISA is modelled on the UN-PRI and is also backed by the GEPF (CRIII, 2011; Giamporcaro & Viviers, 2014; Locke, 2019; Moikwatlhai et al., 2019). At the time of the CRISA’s launch, 30 other South African institutions were already signatories of the PRI (Locke, 2019). The CRISA would support investors by detailing how to analyse investment strategies that promoted ESG factors (Foster, 2020). The CRISA is founded on a set of five principles which are articulated further into 17 practical recommendations (CRIII, 2011). Expressing ESG factor 25 For an analysis of each of the CRISA Principles, see Locke (2019). 36 importance, the foremost principle requires that an “institutional investor should incorporate sustainability considerations, including ESG, into its investment analysis and investment activities” (CRIII, 2011, p. 10). Collectively, the principles attempt to shift investor attention away from short-term profit-seeking and increase the role of ESG in investment analysis (Foster, 2020; Locke, 2019). Even so, the inclusion of ESG factors within investment analysis does not imply a shift away from returns towards a philanthropic role, but rather a movement “From short-term capital markets to long-term, sustainable capital markets” (Eccles et al., 2008; King IV, 2015). While the CRISA parallels the approach of King III, CRISA is non-binding and does not form part of the reporting requirements mandated by the JSE’s application of the King III report (Foster, 2020, p. 150). The CRISA does nonetheless impact South African investment law, possibly the most notable amendment is to Section 28 the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956.26 Section 28(2)(c)(ix) of the Pension Funds Act has been amended to require a fund’s board to “consider any factor which may materially affect the sustainable long-term performance of the asset including but not limited to, those of an environmental, social and governance nature”. Mutatis mutandis, the recognition of ESG factors within the Pension Funds Act reflects the requirements set out in principle one of the CRISA (Foster, 2020; Moikwatlhai et al., 2019). Additional calls for further legislation encouraging the use of SRI by investment funds also persists, yet no further legislative guidance has been published at the time of this research (Herringer et al., 2009). Nevertheless, by the inclusions made to Section 28 of the Pension Funds Act, South Africa’s retirement fund regulation remains at the forefront of encouraging ESG investing (Geral, 2019). The weight of the requirement set out within Section 28 of the Pension Funds Act has also recently been increased as the South African Financial Services Conduct Authority, or FSCA (2019), which has published a guidance note requiring pension funds that do not apply ESG factors to either rectify their approach or provide reasons for the lack of ESG factors’ inclusion. The King IV (2015) report, or the fourth King report on Corporate Governance in South Africa also necessitated a noteworthy approach towards compliance. The fourth report extends the scope of King III and incorporates more recent international developments (King IV, 2015). While King III focuses formally on for-profit companies, King IV (2015) harmonises the principles of King III and extends the principles’ application to non-profit seeking companies 26 Hereinafter, the Pension Funds Act, 24 of 1956 is referred to as the “Pension Funds Act”. 37 (Esser & Delport, 2018). The streamlined approach of King IV, in turn, also supports a shift towards an “apply and explain” approach, further promoting a movement away from mere formal compliance. King IV is designed to complement the CRISA and makes direct reference to the CRISA’s principles to ensure a cohesive framework for institutional investors (King IV, 2015). For Pension Funds, King IV further provides sector-specific guidance in concert with the Pension Funds Act (King IV, 2015). However, despite the extensive global and local frameworks that this research has discussed above, SRI has some theoretical and conceptual concerns which remain unanswered (Capelle‐ Blancard & Monjon, 2012). Cadman (2011), for example, identifies three key conceptual challenges facing SRI globally. Firstly, there exists a lack of an overall analytical framework to evaluate institutional quality, leading to divergence in approaches and ratings (Cadman, 2011). Secondly, the lack of a standardised approach from which stakeholders can contribute towards company governance further complicates comparative rating allocations (Cadman, 2011). Finally, a divergence exists between internal and external interest groups’ participation in SRI decision-making and their weigh-up is yet to be formalised (Cadman, 2011). For South Africa, initial challenges in incorporating ESG criteria include the affordability of ratings, the lack of relevant SRI skills in the country and fewer SRI asset classes and funds (Heese, 2005; Herringer et al., 2009; Viviers, 2007). Collectively these challenges give rise to lesser opportunities in SRI within the country and inhibit the potential growth of SRI approaches (Heese, 2005; Herringer et al., 2009; Viviers, 2007). Further, Herringer (2009) recognises similar challenges in South Africa to that of its global counterparts including the lack of an overarching definition of SRI or an adequate benchmark for its measurement. These challenges are further developed in the following subchapter (2.4). As a result of inadequate benchmarks, Giamporcaro (2011) suggests that institutions are unwilling to commodify environmental aspects into the local investment market. Additionally, short-term performance benchmarks have been identified as inadequately recognising ESG aspects and undermining long-term financial performance (Moikwatlhai et al., 2019). Empirically, the unwillingness of shareholders to invest long-term in highly rated ESG companies is observed by Moikwatlhai et al. (2019), who suggests that the outcomes of the PRI and the CRISA are yet to be fully realised. In summary, this subchapter (2.3) develops the South African approach to SRI led by the King Reports on Corporate Governance in South Africa, the CRISA and the UN-PRI (King IV, 2015, 38 p. 33; Viviers & Els, 2017). Following the fall of Apartheid, the first King report sets the foundation for corporate governance which King II develops by introducing the triple bottom line and integrated reporting (Esser & Delport, 2018; King I, 1994; King II, 2002). Subsequently, King III refines the work of King II and sets out the ESG reporting requirements of South African companies (King III, 2009; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). Due to King III’s importance in establishing ESG reporting, i