

I. INTRODUCTION AND STUDY BACKGROUND

1. INTRODUCTION

This study owes its foundation to the emergence of global civil society as a major player in global governance. The specific focus of the study was to investigate the nature and conditions under which global or trans-national civil society advocacy organisations are crafted and how they operate in the exercise of social power¹ in global and national political arenas. The study uses a case study approach and studies the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). The *GCAP 2006 Report*, claims that GCAP is the 'biggest ever' global effort against poverty. According to this report, GCAP is 'an international alliance of organisations, networks and national campaigns formed to pressure world leaders to act on poverty and hold them accountable for commitments they have made regarding debt, trade and aid.'² The principal question that this research sought to investigate was: *how has GCAP been crafted and maintained as a global civil society advocacy alliance around issues of debt cancellation and development aid?*

This research report utilises theoretical guidance from various research on advocacy networks. Specifically, Keck and Sikkink (1998), *Activist Beyond Borders; Advocacy networks in international Politics* and James and Malunga (2006) *The Rise and Pitfalls of Civil Society Networks in Malawi* offer insightful theoretical frameworks employed in the study. The study therefore uses a theory testing approach as shall be explained in details under the methodology section of this chapter.

This introductory chapter contextualises the background of the study, the rationale, objectives, and the methodology. The chapter will briefly deal with issues around the crafting of GCAP as an advocacy network which, in my view, has been able to elicit quite some interest not only from activists but also from the academic community. Under the methodology section of this chapter, I discuss the processes and methods employed in carrying out the study and thereby answer critical questions of what was done, why, and how it was done.

¹ Social power is defined in this study as 'power based on the capacity of voluntary civil society organisations to mobilise and organise people for voluntary collective action of various sorts' (Wright 2007:3).

²See also Hasan Suroor (2005), 'Mandela joins anti-poverty campaign' in *The Hindu* (online edition), Friday, Feb 04, 2005 at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2005020401761300.htm&date=2005/02/04/&prd=th&> on a similar claim.

1.1. STUDY BACKGROUND

1.1.1. Global Civil Society in Global Governance

The last few decades have witnessed the emergence of global civil society as a major player in global governance and development (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; O'Brien, *et al*, 2000; Brown *et al*, 2001). This has been through mobilising citizens in pressuring multilateral governance institutions and the rich countries (Milani and Laniado, 2006) for better support on developmental issues such as poverty eradication, environmental conservation, human rights, gender, etc. This phenomenon is a cause–effect spiral, generated by the forces of globalisation,³ the growth of civil society, as well as increases in spaces for advocacy and activism within the global governance arena (Batliwala, 2002; Evans, 2005; Salamon *et al*, 2003). Global civil society networks have been critical levers at the centre of this phenomenon.

James and Malunga (2006:3) argue that global civil society alliances and networks will ‘continue to rise in prominence given the global shift towards debt relief and aid.’ Miller (2005) asserts that ‘networks are the most important organisational forms of our time.’ Church (2003) adds: ‘the formal network has become the modern organisational form’ (cited in James and Malunga, 2005). Indeed, global civil society networks today holds a great clout in the international governance arena, and as Evans (2005:2) holds, due to their ‘ability to seize oppositional imaginations, [they are] potentially the most promising political antidotes to a system of [global] domination increasingly seen as effectual only in its ability to maintain itself in power.’

There are two competing arguments to explain this growing role of global civil society networks in global development and governance processes. One such argument is that:

this is not simply a response to political lobbies or to an increased scale of organisation. It also emerges from a shift in the understanding of development processes [...] as there has been a shift towards a more rights based approach to development, more prominence has been given to civil society roles in raising, advancing, and claiming the entitlements of different social groups. When people and human dimensions are defined as the core of development, then social exclusion

³ Globalisation in this study refers to the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world. This has been occasioned by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and people across borders. It embodies a complex interplay of individual autonomy, responsibility and participation and a growing global consciousness and emerging sphere of shared values and ideas (Anheier *et al*, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002).

itself becomes a facet of under-development and social networking a development asset. [...] This gives CSOs [civil society organisations] a vital role as participants, legitimizers, and watchdogs of policy as well as collaborators in ... development... (Loewenson, 2001:4).

Another view argues that indeed, years of mounting and sustained pressure from civil society has come to bear upon global governance institutions such as the Bretton Wood's sisters (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations organisation (UN), etc. (O'Brien *et al*, 2000). Since the turn of the last century and even before, there have been increased calls for the global governance institutions and developed countries to do more in helping developing countries in fighting poverty and especially in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is the background against which this study on GCAP as a case study of a global civil society advocacy alliance advocating for the ideals of a more just and equitable global order was done.

1.1.2. Study Aims

This research aimed at using a case study approach in critically analysing the politics and dynamics of crafting a global civil society advocacy alliance. Specifically, the study aimed to:

- a) Identify, analyse, and document GCAP's experiences, strategies and challenges in trans-national networking and advocacy.
- b) Generate knowledge on recent developments in global civil society networking and advocacy.

The report analyses GCAP by focusing on two of its critical features: advocacy and networking. The inquiry sought answers to the following set of questions:

- a) How has GCAP managed to craft an advocacy agenda that appeals to its broad based support/membership/affiliations to enable these to coalesce around it?
- b) What competing forces, cleavages and ideological coherences are present in GCAP? This entailed exploring the issues of the North-South divide; who sets the agenda, and makes the decisions that count in the campaign?
- c) What implications do these competing forces and/or coherences have for GCAP's long-term existence and advocacy agenda? Are there sufficient synergies to keep the different actors within GCAP together in the campaign? I.e. what are the possibilities of maintaining GCAP as a broad based international advocacy alliance overtime?

- d) What significant contribution, if any, did GCAP bring to international development agenda and to the existing knowledge on trans-national civil society advocacy networks?

1.1.3. Study Rationale

Despite their growing visibility in advocacy, and a significantly increasing importance in global governance and development, global civil society advocacy networks have featured as a subject of social science inquiry only in very recent years (Evans, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). As Price (2003), and Keck and Sikkink (1998) observe, the academic community came late to the party of paying attention to a subject that activists had been developing for some time. A close look at global civil society advocacy networks however, reveals many complexities and interesting phenomena for social scientific inquiry.

Scholars and activists have predicted and empirically demonstrated the utility of global civil society advocacy networks in global governance and development. They also acknowledge that networks, both as normative ideals and as empirical reality have not lived up to the expectations they provoke (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Evans, 2005). Indeed, due to their diversity, flexibility and dynamic creativity, networks are paradoxical, incoherent, fragmented and with a lot of intellectual confusion. This makes them unstable, volatile, and difficult to co-ordinate and can result to ‘collaborative inertia’ and not necessarily ‘collaborative advantage’ (Ashman, 2001; Church, 2003; Fowler, 1997; Naidoo, 2006; Østergaard and Nielsen, 2005).

This study described in this thesis was an effort to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on global civil society advocacy networks. It used GCAP as a case study in unpacking such paradoxes in global civil society advocacy networks. In doing this, it tried to answer the question of how GCAP has managed to keep afloat despite its broad constituency with potentially conflicting agenda and approaches. It also tried to demonstrate that global civil society networks are far from coherent organisational forms. As such, it is hoped that the study has generated knowledge that sheds light on recent developments in the organisation and operations of trans-national advocacy networks especially on development aid and debt cancellation; two issues that GCAP has been most visible on.

1.1.4. Why GCAP?

GCAP is one of the recent actors in the trans-national civil society advocacy arena. Because of its rich hues in the diversity of its constituent parts, and its organisation, it presents an

important opportunity to explicate the paradoxes and experiences in the crafting, organisation and operations of a global civil society advocacy network. Moreover, as GCAP is only about three years old, it provides opportune data for a 'modest' study. In addition, majority of the activists within GCAP were accessible to me through CIVICUS (as GCAP is hosted by CIVICUS), where I work. These activists together with a couple of other critics served as key informants in the study.

Another factor influencing the choice of GCAP was its orientation to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which epitomises high level involvement with multilateral governance institutions especially the United Nations Organisation (UN), the G8, the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and individual countries. As such, this offered promising analysis within the subject of my study: Global civil society advocacy alliances and networks in global governance and development.

Undeniably, the adoption of the MDGs by the UN General Assembly on September 8th 2000 arose as a global response to the reality of appalling levels of poverty in much of the developing world. This was attributed, *inter alia*, to two closely related issues: poor quality and quantity of development aid, as well as, a resulting debt burden on the developing countries. Added to this, are unfavourable terms of trade between the developed and the developing countries. These factors have consigned much of the developing world, especially Africa, to what is seen by many development practitioners, activists and even politicians, as unacceptable levels of dependency and underdevelopment that the former British Prime Minister (Tony Blair) while referring to Africa's underdevelopment, termed a 'scar on the conscience of humanity.'

Moreover, towards the end of the last millennium, there was a resurgence of the 1950's economic development thinking that developing countries needed a 'Big Push' to escape from the poverty trap. This found favour with the likes of Jeffrey Sachs, Tony Blair and many development actors including the World Bank (Easterly 2005; Sachs 2005). Easterly (2005:3) wrote: 'The Big Push has returned to favour in the development policy-making community, after half a century of exile.' Indeed, Easterly further argued that '2005 [wa]s shaping up as the Year of the Big Push. Part of the motivation is the international effort to meet the eight Millennium Development Goals.'

1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section focuses on research methods used in this study. It covers the methodologies, the nature of research instruments, and sampling used in the study. The section will not deal with the findings from the data gathered and the analyses thereof as these will be dealt with in details in chapters three and four of this report. I therefore only discuss the research design, approach, methods and instruments of data collection and analysis.

1.2.1. The Research Design

This research was a qualitative study and attempted to have a greater understanding of the nature of the study phenomenon (global civil society advocacy networks) from the perspective of the actors within GCAP as a specific unit of analysis, as well as from trans-national advocacy networks in general. A reading from Strauss and Corbin (1990:17-27), 'Basic Considerations' in *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and techniques* greatly helped me in the choice of qualitative methods. Two principle factors were considered in choosing qualitative methods: 1) the nature of my study: I was interested in the intricate details of a phenomenon that would not be easily quantifiable; 2), While research has been done on global civil society advocacy networks, and, arguably there are many published works on trans-national networking generally, and GCAP in particular, I felt that qualitative methods could help me uncover, understand, and gain novel and fresh slants on the subject. In doing this, the study had to be exploratory. It carefully looked at specific aspects of the study phenomenon. It is these that have informed the theorising and explanations of why certain phenomena have happened the way they have in GCAP.⁴

1.2.2. The approach

This study used case study approach both in its narrower sense, i.e. GCAP as a unit of analysis, but also as a research method. My choice of a case study approach was in recognition of Yin (2003:2) postulation: to do an empirical inquiry of a complex social phenomenon within its real-life context especially because of the many overlaps in the boundaries between the GCAP as global advocacy network (a unit of analysis for this study) and the general study phenomenon: global civil society networking and advocacy. A case study approach therefore, enabled me to give enough attention in observations, reconstructions of the chains of sequential interactions and events (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), in my analysis. As such, in this thesis, I attempt to give intensive, macro, as well as

⁴ See for example Keith F. Punch (2000:33-9), *Developing Effective Research Proposals*, California, Sage Publications for a detailed discussion on explanations and theorising in research.

contextual and holistic descriptions and analyses of GCAP, not only as single unit, but also as part of bounded system of global civil society networking phenomenon.

I sought to consider not just the insider views and perspective of GCAP, but also documented views of other relevant actors, researchers and commentators. As a result, what I offer in my report is a result of multi-perspective analysis: one that clearly links the general issues of global civil society advocacy networks to GCAP as a particular case of investigation and identifies what is applicable or not for GCAP. In contributing to knowledge I tried to verify existing knowledge in the field of the scholarship on global civil society advocacy networks using GCAP, thereby either confirming or challenging existing theories in their conclusions and generalisations, precision, and verification (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

1.2.3. Methods of Data Collection:

The study used multiple research instruments and sources (triangulation) to ensure validity and reliability of my analysis. As such, the study tried to create empirical constructs to test past theories on trans-national civil society advocacy networks by using both primary data and secondary data sources. This was in recognition that single forms of data collection and data sources might leave gaps and raise questions of objectivity, validity, and truthfulness. The primary methods of data collection consisted of: a) In-depth key informant interviews with identified participants either in the form of face to face, telephone or through email (unstructured) interviews; b) Non-participant and participant observation in GCAP's activities; c) Informal chats and volunteered information from people involved in GCAP; and d) Documented information in websites, newspapers etc. The information collected through these methods was also corroborated with secondary sources mainly from books and journals. Below, I discuss the details of how these methods were utilised.

A) In-Depth Key Informant Interviews:

On the whole, in-depth key informant interviews were administered either face-to-face, by telephone or emails. I was able to carry direct interviews with ten participants. The study also benefited from informal talks and email exchanges with more than five⁵ other participants who were unavailable for formal interviews. Two of these gave written (and some published)

⁵ Key among these include Joe Cressy, formerly of Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada who graciously shared his thesis on Celebrity advocacy in Make Poverty History Campaign; Patrick Bond, a leading Researcher on the subject and a critic of GCAP who shared with me, two of his publications that offer a critique of GCAP; Irfan Mufti, GCAP Manager; and to some extent Sarah Gregory GCAP mobilisation coordinator and May-i Fabros, Media Officer for GCAP Philippines.

work. These included a thesis by Joe Cressy, (May 2007), *Celebrity advocacy: A Participatory Analysis of the Make Poverty History Campaign*, and Patrick Bond's (2006) original manuscripts for, *Looting Africa: The Politics of Exploitation*.

Specifically, the following interviews were done: 1) one face to face interview with the founding Chair and still one of the three Co-Chairs of the GCAP's International Facilitation Team (IFT); 2) two telephone interviews with two other Co-Chairs of the IFT, one representing the Funders Group within GCAP and the other representing the Feminists Taskforce (one of the thematic task forces within GCAP); 4) one face to face interview with a former GCAP Mobilisation Officer; 5) one face to face interview with former CIVICUS MDG Campaign Manager⁶ who has since moved on to serve as GCAP Web and New Media Manager; 6) one face to face interview with former GCAP Senior Manager; 7) one face to face informal chat, and later an email interview and telephone exchanges with the coordinator of GCAP Kenya Coalition; 8) one telephonic chat and an email interview with the Director – of Uganda Debt Network, a grassroots organisation who are members of GCAP Uganda national coalition; 9) one telephonic interview with the Co-ordinator of GCAP Malawi national coalition; and 10) one informal chat and later a face to face interview with GCAP Africa Secretariat Policy consultant. In a number of cases, follow-up interviews were done either through emails or telephone.

i) Instruments of Data Collection:

A non structured instrument of data collection was used. This was an interview schedule organised thematically under the following headings: a) GCAP's origins and identity; b) GCAP's architecture and resources; c) GCAP's strategies and activities; d) Environmental scan of opportunities and threats for GCAP; e) Accountability and Legitimacy of GCAP; and f) Implications for the future of advocacy. While these provided for broader questions, further follow-up questions and probing unfolded in the course of the interviews or analyses and sometimes required follow-up interviews to clarify issues. As such, it was important to maintain flexibility. For the face to face and the telephonic interviews, an audio recorder and note taking were used to capture data which I later transcribed. For field observations, notes were taken while an open ended interview schedule was used for email interviews. This allowed respondents to comment from their personal view points and experiences without

⁶ CIVICUS is the host organisation for GCAP.

limiting them to any preconceptions that would have occurred had a closed ended or pre-coded questionnaire been used.

ii) The Study Site and Sampling Criteria:

Because GCAP's presence is in more than 100 countries, and is presented more as a space for interaction and advocacy at the local and global level, no spatially demarcated site(s) were identified for data collection. Rather, the study pursued actors within GCAP at the global level as well as at the regional and national (grassroots levels). As it was not possible to collect data from each of the actors involved in GCAP, a sampling frame was developed to help in taking the study forward. Given the fact that the study was qualitative in nature, and needed informed views from the actors within GCAP as well as experts and critics on the matter, non-probability purposive sampling was used. I therefore consciously chose to concentrate on the activities of the international facilitating office (secretariat) in Johannesburg. However, it was of necessity, to reach out to the other constituent parts and structures of the GCAP.

Purposive sampling also ensured that the global North-South divide and other dynamics within GCAP were consciously observed so as to unearth as much as possible, the nuances within the GCAP 'family'. The study therefore chose participants from the Southern countries that had 'benefited'⁷ from the activities that GCAP is campaigning on as well as from those that have not 'benefited'. This form of sampling was useful for this study because of GCAP's particular nature and structure. As such, the range of participants in this study that I formally interviewed included individuals who physically engage or work with GCAP from South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, France, Netherlands, Uganda, Uruguay and Canada and represents nationalities of these countries and drawn from the different structures within GCAP.⁸

As is the case in purposive sampling frames, a need for extra sampling arose in the course of interviewing and the desk review, and thus the sampling was adjusted to reflect more of a snowball sampling technique to allow room for collection of required data and information. This explains the inclusion of an interview from GCAP Africa secretariat which represents a second tier within GCAP's three tier structure.

⁷ Citation marks are used because it is difficult to attribute benefits like debt relief purely to GCAPs' advocacy activities.

⁸ See chapter three which deals with the GCAP structures in greater details.

B) Observations:

Both participant and non-participant observations were also used in data collection. These were either formal (planned) or non formal. Besides the many non formal interactions and observations, I specifically did the following formal observations on GCAP's activities: a) One observation on GCAP's International Facilitation (IFT) support team between the 28th of April to April 30th 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa on new staff induction meeting that doubled up as a preparatory meeting to the May 2007 meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay; b) Two events (a training/capacity building workshop and a GCAP poverty requiem choir performance) during the CIVICUS World Assembly in Glasgow, Scotland between the 23rd to 27th May 2007; and c) a workshop presentation by GCAP Africa Policy consultant between September 17 – 18th 2007 in a 'Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Africa-Asia NGO Network Workshop' in Nairobi, Kenya, (a workshop co-organised by JICA, GCAP Kenya, and Tokyo International Conference on Africa's Development (TICAD)).

My choice for the use of observation research methods was informed by the fact that it would enable me to get holistic insights into GCAP's nature and operations, and aspects of organisational as well as human behaviour within GCAP actors which formal interviews and documented sources could not reveal. This therefore complemented the deficiencies of the other data collection methods by 'reveal[ing] nuances and subtleties that other methodologies miss' (Fraenkel and Wallen, 1993:394). As some of the observations were done early in the process of developing the proposal for this research, some of the observations memos and data gathered in these observations not only shaped the framing of the study but also proved invaluable in this report.

C) Document Analysis:

This research also utilised document analysis both as a method of data collection and analysis. The documents analysed included various primary documents related to GCAP. These included news articles, media and press releases e.g. after G8 summits, and other major mobilisations, various reports like the annual *GCAP 2006 Report*, documents from GCAP Website such as reports of outcomes of various GCAP international meetings referred to as GCAP Declarations or communiqués e.g. GCAP Johannesburg Declaration of September 2004, the Beirut Declaration of 2006, the Madrid communiqué and the Montevideo Declaration of 2007.

The study also endeavoured to get documented views from GCAP's targeted audience i.e. G8 leaders and policy makers working for multilateral governance institutions especially through their own press/media releases and documented media coverage, research articles, policy documents etc. On the whole, document analysis offered an opportunity to recollect GCAP's past and in a way acted as a check on the validity and reliability of the views collected through interviews.

D) Literature Review:

Secondary data review on the main themes and issues of the study phenomenon (trans-national civil society networking) as well as unit of analysis (GCAP) from journals and books was also done. Specifically, Keck and Sikkink (1998), *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy networks in International Politics*; James and Malunga (2006), *The Rise and Pitfalls of Civil Society Networks in Malawi* offered much of the theoretical framing of research while articles from *Voluntas* volume 17 of 6 December 2006, and the *Global Civil society 2004/5 Yearbook* among others, offered more contemporary theoretical frames and debates. Chapter two of this thesis (Literature Review) deals with these theoretical frames and debates relevant to the study subject in greater details.

1.2.4. Methods of Data Analysis

Qualitative data analysis techniques were utilised and included discourse/conversation analysis, text analysis, and content analysis. All the tape recorded interviews were transcribed and manually coded into themes, categories and sub-categories linked to the broader objectives of the study. As a starting point, the same thematic framework used for data collection was also used in the categorisation and analysis of data. However, considering that these forms of analysis were based on the assumption that a relationship exists between the subject under investigation and my own cognitions and intentions and those of the study participants (Eagle, 1998), more nuanced themes emerged from the analysis of the interviews.

Procedurally, collected data was organised into logical and consistent themes/codes/classifications as well as sub-themes that corresponded with the research questions. Through coding, I was able to selectively attach meanings and tags to words, phrases, events and situations that defined and are relevant to GCAP and trans-national civil society advocacy networks. While the realm of trans-national advocacy networks is a fairly new area in academic scholarship, some work has already been done in the area. As such, this study

borrows heavily from past frameworks in the literature, and uses a theory testing approach as opposed to theory building approach. Mine, is therefore, a deductive approach. I explored patterns within GCAP and compared and tested them against existing theories and frameworks. Out of observed commonalities with past networks studies, I was able to either confirm or disagree with existing frameworks as either capable or not, of explaining developments within GCAP. These, defined as findings, are discussed according to the analysis framework drawing upon the interviews and linked to the theoretical and conceptual framework provided in the literature review. These are dealt with in chapters three and four of this thesis.

1.3. STUDY LIMITATIONS

The practice of doing research is always limited to some extent. Despite the fact that a lot of effort was put into ensuring that all respondents in terms of their spread as planned in the proposal were interviewed, this was not possible. In many instances, despite the best of the efforts get to some of the proposed respondents, five of the planned formal interviews never happened. This was particularly so with two critics of GCAP. Another was the failure to get any of the celebrities involved in the alliances campaign especially in 2005 for an interview. As shall become evident, in chapter four, managing celebrities is not easy.

I was however able to compensate for these shortfalls somewhat from a thesis done on celebrity involvement in GCAP as well as media briefings and other published articles on websites. This allowed me to get data on events, and statements, that would have otherwise escaped me. Further, the analysis of such documents offered me unique (albeit somewhat subjective) insights and orientations to some of past experiences within GCAP and even validate and corroborate some of the views and information collected from other sources. The downside to this, however, was that these sources, while providing rich insights and reconstructions, also presented already analysed and packaged perspectives of either the reporters or the editors. As such, the validity of, as well as reliability, of some of the piece might be challenged, considering that it has already been put through some value disposition lenses in choosing what to include in the report and what to leave out, and cannot therefore guarantee against biases.

While the areas covered in this thesis cut across many levels and issues relating to global civil society advocacy networks, this research report provides only a snapshot of a global civil society advocacy network and cannot claim to be an exhaustive study of all the highlights of

the complexities of the entire global civil society advocacy networks. Moreover, while not ruling out generalisation for the entire sector, the findings directly relate to GCAP as the main interviews concentrated on GCAP albeit with generalisations sometimes.

Further, while the portraits of both GCAP in particular as well as trans-national advocacy networks constructed within the report reflect some dualism of both simplicity and complexity, they however cannot be representative of all the realities within GCAP and global civil society advocacy networks in general. While efforts have been made to ensure that obvious biases were eliminated in this research, the report is a reflection of the views of those interviewed, documents and literature reviewed as well as my own analysis, which is limited to only particular aspects of civil society trans-national networking and advocacy. A completely different range of participants and data sources for this study might have yielded some points of departure from what this study documents as evidenced at times by the different view point and contestations between different participants in this study. There are however, also many points of consistency just as there are contradictions. These are the complexities within global civil society advocacy networks that I intend to highlight rather than attempt to construct portraits that artificially represent realities as if they were neat pictures without any inconsistencies, tensions, or points of contradiction. I hope that this will give a deeper insight on the paradoxes that are global civil society advocacy networks.

1.4. CONCLUSION AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

This introductory chapter has outlined what this thesis is about and tried to offer a comprehensive contextual background to the study and the methodology used in the study. Under the study background, I have brought forth arguments that made this study an interesting subject for social scientific inquiry; that global civil society has become a major player in global governance. I have argued that despite their visibility and importance in global governance and development, global civil society networks have remained outside the remit of social science research until recently. I have submitted that the study uses a case study approach and studies GCAP, the ‘biggest ever’ global effort against poverty (GCAP, 2006) in unpacking paradoxes in global civil society advocacy networks. I have argued that evolution and operations of GCAP as an advocacy network elicited quite some interest not only from within the activists community, but the academia too. I have also submitted that the research report utilises theoretical guidance from various previous researches on advocacy

networks that offer insightful theoretical frameworks in the framing of the identities and paradoxes of trans-national civil society advocacy networks.

The chapter has also outlined and justified the research design and methodology used in the study. Specifically, I have argued that the research being a qualitative study attempts to have a greater understanding of the nature of the study phenomenon from the perspective of the actors within GCAP as a specific unit of analysis as well as trans-national advocacy networks in general. Methods of collecting data as well as analysis have been discussed and justifications for the same offered. A framework for the next three chapters (the main body of this research report) has also been outlined.

Chapter two of this report is dedicated to the discussion on existing literature on global civil society alliances and networks and provides a general background to the contextual framework within which GCAP exists. The chapter illustrates the main issues related to the problem of perceptions of various issues involved in trans-national networking for advocacy. The chapter also traces the processes through which trans-national alliances and networks have evolved. Most importantly, the chapter provides cases of reference to which results of my research are used to deduce conclusions either based on a mirror image of the past research findings on trans-national civil society advocacy networks or to challenge them.

Data presentation, analysis and discussions constitute Chapters Three and Four of this report. Chapter Three specifically deals with GCAP's evolution and operations with specific references to motivations for its formation, structure/architecture, and resources that GCAP uses in its antipoverty advocacy activities. Chapter Four identifies and discusses the paradoxes and challenges in crafting and maintaining GCAP as an inclusive broad based trans-national advocacy network. It also looks at the strategies that GCAP has utilised in its work and argues that they are, of necessity, informed by the loose nature of the alliance besides other considerations. Chapter five is the concluding chapter and summarises the implications of findings on existing literature on trans-national civil society advocacy networks. It also raises possibilities for future research in the field of trans-national civil society advocacy networks especially in GCAP.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0. INTRODUCTION

A good interplay between concept specification and theory is crucial in any research because ‘proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory’ (Kaplan, 1964: 53). At the same time, a good theory is needed to arrive at the proper concepts. This chapter therefore, presents and discusses literature and theories on global civil society advocacy alliances and networks relevant to the theoretical framing of this study. The section begins with definitions and discussions of key concepts in the study. Additionally, it operationalises the conceptual and theoretical issues employed in the study.

2.1. DEFINITIONS AND DISCUSSION OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

A) Civil Society

Understanding the concept of civil society forms a primary building block to understanding its ‘global’ manifestation. As will be highlighted in the course of this discussion, the difference between the two is quite blurred. The concept of civil society, due to its various historical legacies and ideological framings, and its youthful usage, is uniquely imprecise and fuzzy. As such, it is an extremely complex and contested concept (Heinrich, 2005; Keane, 2004 cited in Munck, 2006).

The literature cited below, though not exhaustive, demonstrates diversities and some of the contestations in the conception of civil society. This section therefore looks at some of the work done on the conceptual description of civil society. It begins by mapping out different definitions of civil society. It then dwells on global civil society and attempts to adapt a working definition relevant for the study. The section concludes with a discussion on the emergence of global civil society in global governance.

While this research is not about the origins of civil society as concept, it is important to trace the ideational positions that informed the development of the concept and its manifestation as a social reality. According to Seligman (1992:3), ‘works of writers as diverse as Ferguson and Marx, Hegel and Adam Smith, de Tocqueville and Gramsci are all invoked in contemporary “rediscovery” of civil society.’ In illustrating some of these contestations in conceptions, two dissimilar views of the concept of civil society were contrasted and a working definition synthesised out of them. These views are reducible to the following:

1. For some, civil society is seen as intertwined in a hegemonic historic bloc. Civil society serves as a stabilizing, conservative force that ensures popular consent to the state (Katz, 2006; Bond, 2006; Price, 2003); and
2. For others, civil society is a transformative anti systemic force of counter hegemony in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres.

Within the first view, the concept of civil society is arguably traceable in contemporary socio-political discourse to the writings of Antonio Gramsci (1971), who locating civil society between the state and the economic realm wrote:

When the State trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only the outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks [...] The massive structures of modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were, the “trenches” and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position.¹

For Gramsci, there is nothing as a civil society independent from state and corporate power. Rather, for him, civil society is intertwined in a hegemonic historic bloc (Price 2003:581) in which civil society serves as a stabilizing, conservative force. It includes a whole range of non-coercive institutions: - non-state and non-market structures and activities like trade unions, schools, professional, educational and cultural associations, political parties, and churches (Katz 2006; Bond, 2006).

Within the counterview, political and economic logic occupies a central position in the conception of civil society and sees civil society as a counter-hegemonic project. Perhaps, this is best articulated by Polanyi (1944) *The Great Transformation*. Here, civil society is seen as a challenge to neo-liberal economic hegemonies. Held and McGrew (2003), and Evans (2005), arguing along the lines of Polanyi’s concept of ‘countermovement’² posit that global civil society, especially in its trans-national advocacy networks manifestation, is part of a counter-hegemonic project opposing the late twentieth century neo-liberal globalisation

¹ Gramsci, A.(1971:238, 243 as cited in Bond, P., 2006:360) ‘Civil Society on Global Governance: Facing Up to Divergent Analysis, Strategy, and Tactics’ in *Voluntas* (2006) 17:359–371.

² Polanyi in *The Great Transformations* (1944) sees social movements as an active, countervailing force against market excesses. He argues that attempts by market to encroach on and embed the society (economic liberalism), came along with political repression which inspired resistance in the form of a countermovement. The countermovement is a self-defensive measure on the part of society to mitigate the disruption caused by economic change. This self defensive measure can take different forms including the new social movement that emerge to resist the disembedding of the economy from the society.

agenda pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions which has caused a lot of socioeconomic turmoil in the developing world.

The above opposing views form an important baseline in appreciating some of the contestations on the idea of civil society even within GCAP itself. Contrasting the two views also helps in bringing out important elements of competing ideas and power games in trans-national civil society advocacy work.

Beasley-Murray (2002:71-2), argues that the emergence of the concept of civil society in the social scientific discourse is a product of the globalisation process. He posits:

... in our current era of globalisation [...] civil society is conceived as the terrain on which closed states and political societies are forced to open to democratising initiatives within the context of a global shift in forces. [...] Hence, civil society is a fluid space, in which international non-governmental organisations operate.

While this view has an inherent bias in looking only at ‘the global’ as the focus of analysis and, indeed, looks at civil society as limited to international non-governmental organisations, this definition captures an interesting attribute of civil society by bringing in the idea of ‘fluid space’ that this research endeavoured to explore.

In the last one and half decades, various leading academic institutions especially in the developed world have devoted substantial resources in the study of civil society. A pioneering project in this regard is the Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project (CNP) of Center for Civil Society Studies at the John Hopkins University. Salamon *et al* (2003:1), state that CNP has, in the last decade, made major efforts in ‘document[ing] the scope, structure, financing and role of the non profit sector for the first time’ in more than 40 countries in various parts of the world. This has raised public awareness of a sector of society which had hitherto been relatively neglected.

The CNP describes civil society as ‘institutions that occupy the social space between the market and the state’ (Salamon *et al*, 2003). It further notes that:

The existence of such institutions is by no means a new phenomenon...[they] ... have long operated in societies throughout the world, the product of religious impulses, social movements, cultural or professional interests, sentiments of

solidarity and mutuality, altruism, and, more recently, government's need for assistance to carry out public functions.³

Noteworthy here, is that while the CNP's description is fairly comprehensive in terms of what constitutes civil society, and is 'conscious of the distinctive civil society development paths in developing and transitional societies' (Munck, 2006:327), it has a bias in looking at only the organised institutional forms and leaves out the less organised and informal actors that occupy the Beasley-Murray's idea of 'space'. Further, the CNP definition interchangeably uses the terms 'non-profit sector' and 'civil society'. As Heinrich (2005:219) argues:

This [is] conceptually unsound, as the two terms denote quite different phenomena and use different perspectives, with the non-profit sector being grounded in economic and social policy debates, and civil society being rooted in democratic political and social theory.

Another of the initiatives studying the civil society is the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) project. Recognising the different viewpoints in operationalising civil society, Heinrich (2005:217), argues that the CIVICUS CSI project tries to bridge different viewpoints and defines civil society as 'the arena in society between the state, market and family where citizens advance their common interests.' For Heinrich (2005:213), CSI's attempts at combining different aspects captured in proceeding works, is an attempt at empiricism and inclusiveness. This, according to Heinrich (2005:219), helps in not only 'captur[ing] the essence of most existing conceptualisations of civil society, but also passes the test of theoretical grounding and resonance in the broader field of empirical political sociology.' He further notes that arguably, this conceptualisation also:

successfully integrates ... two ...contending schools of civil society theory, namely de Tocqueville's liberal conception of associational life ... and Gramsci's notion of civil society as the site of struggle for [...] hegemony [...] and] corresponds closely to the orthodox operationalisation of social capital, [...]—thereby strengthening its conceptual grounding in the field and rendering cross-fertilization [of these different views in research] possible.⁴

³ Salamon et al (2003), *Global Civil Society: An Overview*, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA.

⁴ Heinrich, V.F. (2005:219), 'Studying civil society across the World: Exploring the thorny issues of conceptualisation and measurement' in *Journal of Civil society Vol. 1 No. 3.* 211–228, December 2005. Heinrich notes that Tocqueville argues that 'civil society' is a forum in which habits of 'heart and the mind' are nurtured and developed. Tocqueville sees civil society as the institutions, the relationships and the norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's interactions as informal web of solidarity (social capital) that binds the society together for collective action.

B) Global Civil Society

Similar to civil society, global civil society concept is a hotly contested one and its normative definition has been evolving overtime (Anheier *et al*, 2005). Globalisation as a concept and process plays a critical part in the definition of global civil society (Beasley-Murray, 2002). Wild (2006:5), states that the term global civil society ‘emerged in the latter half of the 20th century, and over the last two decades it has become something of a buzz phrase in academic and political circles.’ Munck (2006:326), posits that ‘the academic study of [...] “global civil society” took a leap forward with the emergence of the Global Civil Society Yearbook from the London School of Economics (LSE) Centre for Civil Society at the turn of the century.’ The Yearbook projects the spread of the concept of ‘global civil society’, as a reflection of an underlying social reality in modern day international relations. In global civil society, there has emerged a sphere of supranational social and political participation. Here, citizens groups and individuals engage in dialogue, debates, negotiations and confrontation with each other and with various governmental actors – international, national, and local – as well as business world, trades unions, charities, think tanks and international commissions (Anheier *et al*, 2001).

The LSE project describes global civil society as ‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state and the market and operating beyond the confines of national politics and economics’ (Anheier *et al*, 2001: 171; Wild, 2006:5). In later adaptations, the LSE Centre for Civil Society indicates that ‘global civil Society is diverse, creative and chaotic [...] often unpredictable, and sometimes very powerful’ (Anheier *et al*, 2005:1). They offer the definition of global civil society as ‘the realm of non-coercive collective action around shared interests and values that operates beyond the boundaries of nation states’ (Anheier *et al*, 2005). In doing this the Yearbook reiterates the Gramscian ideas in locating global civil society as a non-state and non-economic arena of social interaction. In bringing out the value of non-coercion as a defining feature of global civil society, it further incorporates an element of Gramscian views of its voluntary yet pacifying function.

According to the definitions offered by LSE and Wild (2006) above, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are the most visible of the global civil society actors. However, INGOs are not in themselves, the sum total of the parts that make up global civil society. Other component parts include social movements, trans-national advocacy networks,

etc. Moreover, as Munck (2006:330) observes ‘many of the INGOs are almost exclusively northern in terms of their social base, their cosmology, and their politics’. For Munck (2006:330), this raises important questions of whether, ‘in their Western perspective masquerading as [a global] one...these NGOs “represent” global civil society in any meaningful way.’ Munck (2006:327), further criticizes the selectivity in the normative operationalisation of the concept of global civil society adopted by the LSE project for its ‘general emphasis on the “civil” rather than the “uncivil” elements of civil society [... *this clearly shows*] a political choice’ [*My emphasis*].

The same line of criticism is adopted by Wild (2006) who posits that, the normative questions on global civil society emanate from the plurality and extraordinary heterogeneity of organisations that occupy this space as well as their often profoundly contradictory views on any given issue. Wild (2006) is critical of the selective operationalisation of global civil society as a progressive concept that advances positive values, while in reality global civil society can be ‘illiberal, anti-democratic and violent as well as liberal, democratic and peaceful’ (Wild 2006:2). According to the description above, oppressive, authoritarian, and intolerant elements such as Al Qaeda, are part of the civil society.⁵

A significant observation important to this study is that global civil society is not made up of one homogenous ideology, interest, groups, or purpose.⁶ Rather, it is made up of many, and often competing ideologies and interests, with each group manifesting diversity and a ‘share of irresponsible nihilists’ as well as possibilities for reforming current global governance system to benefit all humanity.⁷ This all inclusive approach is used by the CSI project in its conceptualisation. As Heinrich (2005:218) argues:

Civil society’s norms relate to a society’s underlying principles of public life, such as tolerance, social justice or equity. [CSI] approaches [...] empirically investigate the extent to which specific norms and interests are present in civil society, rather than—as is the case with most normative—theoretical work—employing these norms as criteria for defining civil society’s boundaries, which, for example, would lead to excluding a priori any intolerant practices from the realm of civil society.

⁵See Evans, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2003; Wild, 2006 for similar arguments.

⁶See Welch and Nuru, 2006:89; Ballard *et al*, 2006:398.

⁷ See Ballard (*ibid*); Held and McGrew (*op cit*); Evans, (*op cit*):6; Welch and Nuru, (*ibid*).

However, many scholars have stuck with the qualification of the positive values as defining global civil society. Price (2003:580), for example, states that global civil society includes ‘self-organised advocacy and development groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest [and] eschew the deployment of armed violence for their ends [...]’ Further, Kaldor (2003), and Keane (2004), also see global civil society as ‘based on universal moral norms and values that [...] eschews all that smacks of self-interest and the merest hint that force might play a role in progressive social change’ (cited in Munck 2006:327). However, for Heinrich (2005:213), the choice of whether to include or leave out those actors who practice negative values is contingent upon the goal of a research project. For him,

empirical accounts of civil society tend to use an inclusive concept of civil society, [while] normative–theoretical work, which aims to advance what civil society should look like, conceptualizes civil society as an ideal type, carrying a certain set of values and norms, such as civility [...], public good orientation [...], or internal democracy (Heinrich, 2005:213).

C) The Transformation of Civil Society into Global Civil Society:

Having discussed the concepts, I now turn to locating the transformation of ‘civil society’ into ‘global civil society’. According to Taylor (2004:1), global civil society ‘is a catchall term for NGO’s and social movements of all shapes and sizes operating in the international realm.’ In his view, these have existed in one form or another for generations. The transformation of civil society from a local (national and grassroots) actor to a global actor is best understood within the global governance and globalisation processes. Munck (2006) argues that while INGOs have existed for a long time, the early 1990’s was the time when civic transnationalism really came of age (Falk and Strauss, 2003 cited in Munck, 2006). Munck argues:

Exponential growth in the number of INGOs and major international conferences followed in quick succession: Rio 1992 (environment), Vienna 1993 (human rights), Cairo 1994 (population), and Beijing 1995 (women) and the Copenhagen Social Development Conference the same year [...] from then, there was a ‘presence of civil society—albeit mediated by its NGO “representatives”— [...] felt in the global decision-making arena’ (2006:326).

For Pianta (2001:174), this was a ‘point of no return for the visibility, relevance, and mobilisation of civil society’ with what started off as a series of meetings parallel to the official inter-governmental meetings eventually acquiring a dynamic and a currency of its own from the mid-1990s.

The influential Report of the Commission on Global Governance (1995) took the concept and utility global civil society in global governance a notch higher when it argued that to be ‘an effective instrument of global governance in the modern world, the United Nations (UN) must [. . .] take greater account of the emergence of global civil society.’⁸ This call served as a founding statement of the then modest view of an emerging trans-national civil society role.

D) Towards an Operational Definition of Global Civil Society

In view of the foregoing discussions on civil society and global civil society, this study offers a spatial level differentiation as the distinguishing feature between the two. While civil society may act locally or within national boundaries, global civil society operates trans-nationally. In this context, local civil society organisations with trans-national linkages, connections, or partnerships, are also part of global civil society movement (Batiliwala, 2002). In deed, in today’s globalised world, given the great connectedness of people and the associations to which they belong, it is difficult to draw a line between civil society and the global civil society. In many instances, civil society occupy a territorial continuum running from local to national to global, creating a trans-national social space (Milani and Laniado, 2006). GCAP follows such crystallisation given its different strata at the national and trans-national levels.⁹

Furthermore, there are two important issues relevant to this research to note from the foregoing discussion on the conceptualisation of civil society and global civil society: a) the Western (Northern) perspective of global civil society alluded to by Munck (2006); and b) the element of ‘civility’ argued by LSE, and Wild (2006) among others. The conceptions that leave out violence best epitomise the interests for this study as it will only be concerned with the ‘civil’ elements of global civil society (where GCAP supposedly belongs) and avoids the ‘uncivil’ violent ones.

On the whole, this research sought to employ the ideal normative–theoretical conceptualisation of global civil society as exhibiting a certain set of positive values and norms. It also recognises that global civil society reflects an underlying social and political reality that manifests itself within a supranational space. Within this space are contestations

⁸ Commission on Global Governance (2005:253), *Our Global Neighbourhood*, OUP, Oxford, UK.

⁹ See Chapter Three of this Report for a detailed discussion on the structure of GCAP.

by actors of various political, social, and economic persuasions. Empirical evidence discussed in Chapter Four of this report reveals that the concept of global civil society remains contested in GCAP. For some, it serves as a stabilizing, conservative force that ensures popular consent to historic hegemonies. For others it is a transformative counter hegemonic force in the global economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. Both views are important in framing the discussions in this research. This is especially in seeking answers to the question of what role GCAP has played in either the perpetuation or transformation of hegemonic conditions by advocating on MDGs, debt relief and aid issues. As Evans (2005:8-9), has argued:

exaggerating the transformative power of those groups whose efforts to build anti-systemic global networks do appear grounded in a vision of equity and dignity is as bad a mistake as pretending that the anti-globalization movement is innocent of sinister and reactionary projects [...] the current hegemony [...] is supported by a full array of cultural and ideological machinery, as well as a very solid set of coercive instruments.

As such, this research sought to establish where, within the continuum of ideas in conceptualisation of global civil society GCAP and its constituents would fall. Further, the research sought to ascertain conditions under which global civil society may either by design or default act as a pacifying agency in the maintenance of the hegemonic status instead of a counter-hegemonic force. Here issues dealt with include co-optation and policy demands framings, which are dealt at length in Chapters Three and Four of this report.

This study also sought to trace the emergence of trans-national networking for advocacy within global civil society actors. Evans (2005), argues that within the spaces for these contestations, different sets of groups of actors including activist and civil society organisations have over the years come to rely on global networking to link them with others and as well as issues and seize opportunities to leverage their work and influence.¹⁰ This study therefore conceptualised civil society alliances and networks as political spaces for

¹⁰ For example, Evans (2005:36) argues that ‘global neo-liberalism is not just a structure of domination it is also a set of ideological and organisational structures vulnerable to being leveraged by oppositional movements. Global neo-liberalism’s aggressive efforts to spread the dominion of market logic make it easier for diverse movement to mount a common program. As the gap between the formal hegemony of global neo-liberalism’s ideological program and its substantive manifestations grows more stark – most obviously in the case of “democracy” – shared opportunities for leveraging these ideological presuppositions increase.’

contestations and struggles, spaces in which differently situated actors negotiate, formally or informally- the social, cultural, economic, and political destinies.

E) Global Civil Society Advocacy in International Governance Process

There is less contention on what advocacy is. Roche (2005), notes that advocacy includes public campaigning and awareness rising and/or more private strategies of lobbying, research, documentation and policy influence. This study uses the concept of advocacy to refer to activities of policy analysis, cooperation, engagement, lobbying, boycotts, and awareness building (Karl *et al*, 1999). While this study uses advocacy and campaign interchangeably, the two are not synonymous. Advocacy may include campaigning. The term campaign is used in this study to indicate a type of advocacy activity. A campaign according to Keck and Sikkink (1998:17) is a ‘set of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse, principled network develop explicit visible ties and mutually recognised roles in pursuit of a common goal and generally against a common target.’ In a campaign, core actors mobilise others and initiate the task of structural integration and cultural negotiation among the groups in the network. Campaigns manifest some centralisation at least of ideas in mobilisation for actions in the arena of struggles that networks work on. Keck and Sikkink (1998:x), explains that at the core global civil society campaigns goal, is to ‘multiply the voices [...] by overcoming ... deliberate suppression of information’ thereby helping reframe international and domestic debates, changing their terms, their sites, and the configuration of participants.

Advocacy is a power game. It is about the power of different players to effect changes to hegemonic situations by contesting and engaging the dominant forces in global governance (Munck, 2006; Kartz, 2006). Reminiscing on the increasing power of the role of global civil society in this power game, Munck (2006:327), captures the words of Nicanor Perlas who, in the wake of the “Battle for Seattle” in 1999, declared: ‘it was global civil society as the third force that actually determined the outcome of the WTO talks in Seattle’ (Perlas, 2000:1 cited in Munck, 2006). Many scholars attribute this power to careful targeting and leveraging abilities of trans-national advocacy networks.

For advocacy to work, ‘target actors must be vulnerable [...] to material incentives or to sanctions from outside actors, or [...] sensitive to pressure because of gaps between stated

commitments and practice.’¹¹ Edwards (2005), argues that through advocacy, global civil society advocacy has in effect politicized the development process. This has led to the conception of development as fundamentally, a political process and all actors involved in it have a political role to play. This has called for global civil society to:

look and operate beyond the pigeon holes of the current development paradigms. In their quest for justice for all, and in seeking to make possible what seems impossible, CSOs need to take a stand and therefore be partisan against that which they propose to change.

To refuse to do so is in essence, an endorsement of the status quo.¹²

Along with the politicization of development process, the 1990s also witnessed the numerical growth of global civil society advocacy networks.

F) Trans-National Networking and Alliance Building in Global Civil Society Advocacy

This section maps the concepts of networks and alliances within global civil society. It starts by providing a brief definition of these terms and then tries to trace their formation.

This study uses the terms alliances and networks interchangeably while acknowledging this is an over-simplification as there are inherent differences between them. The bottom line, however, is to appreciate their similarities in the ‘centrality of values or principled ideas, [and] the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the employment of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:2).

Networks are defined as loosely organised groups of organisations that share values and ideologies and function primarily on the basis of information exchange (Østergaard and Nielsen 2005). Church *et al* (2002:12), make an important qualifier to what constitutes a network. For them, ‘a network can be called a network when the relationships between those in the network are voluntarily entered into, the autonomy of participants remains intact and there are mutual or joint activities.’ Networks are therefore voluntary, and facilitate some form of collaborative action, while the organisational autonomy of members remains intact, but pursue a common objective.¹³ Church *et al* (2002), make a useful distinction between

¹¹ Keck and Sikkink (1998:29), *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks International Politics*, Cornell University Press, Cornell.

¹² Mati (December 2006), ‘Civil society strengthening efforts in gear in Nairobi: Workshop on leading edge NGOs in the next decade,’ in CSI E-Newsletter, Issue No 9, December 2006, available online at http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Enewsletter_December2006.htm.

¹³ Keck and Sikkink (1998:8).

networks and networking, namely, that networks are a structure or architecture whereas networking connotes the active participation in activities together with other network members. The network concept stresses fluid and open relations among committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialised issue areas. For Keck and Sikkink (1998), advocacy networks get their name from the fact that they plead or defend causes of others and their actions cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of self interests on the matter.

Alliances on the other hand, are defined as more organised groups of organisations that share common concerns, synchronise efforts and resources and have a well-defined understanding about how they will work together (Ashman, 2001:5; Fowler, 1997:112-14). It is this definition that the study applies and draws from GCAP's statement of itself as an alliance, and will become evident in Chapters Three and Four.

Kelly (2002) and Hudson (2001) argue that global civil society networking for the purposes of trans-national advocacy is a fairly recent phenomenon in development work. However, trans-national advocacy networks themselves are not a new phenomenon. They have for long existed in the world with examples found as far back as the nineteenth in the century campaign for the abolition of slavery (Keck and Sikkink 1998). What is phenomenal about them in the contemporary context has been the dramatic increases in their numbers, sizes, professionalism, the speed of operations, density (concentration on certain issues and geographical areas), and complexity of their international linkages. This proliferation has been attributed to a broader cultural shift and 'the creation of a new kind of global public'¹⁴ which has been aided by cheaper air travel, and revolution in electronic communication technologies like emails and internet that have speeded information flow and simplified personal contact among activists especially through international conferences that have provided foci for greater connections (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Salamon *et al*, 2003).

For Salamon *et al* (2003), recent breakthroughs in information technology¹⁵ and literacy have opened opportunities for communication and association within and across national boundaries. Over the years, politically conscious and educated individuals in different parts of the world faced with repressive political regimes and limited economic opportunities, have

¹⁴See Sidney Tarrow (1992:184), 'Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings Through Action', in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*.

¹⁵ See also Keck and Sikkink *op cit* (1998:21).

become exposed to different opportunities elsewhere. This has awakened them to the reality that the circumstances they face are not unchangeable. They have come to see in civil society organisations, vehicles to transform their societies. These have become social and political entrepreneurs and formed organisations and networks to translate their sentiments into effective social action both domestically and trans-nationally. This phenomenal change, dubbed as ‘global associational revolution’ (Salamon *et al*, 2003:1) has stimulated interest from academics, policy-makers, the international aid system and civil society practitioners alike. Some scholars of this phenomenon have posited that ‘the rise of the civil society sector may, in fact, prove to be as significant a development of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as the rise of the nation-state was of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’¹⁶ Others suggest that civil society ‘has the potential to make an important mark on the twenty-first century’ (Heinrich, 2005:212).

In explaining this ‘associational revolution’, scholars and activists have argued that in the last two decades, serious aspersions have been cast on the ability of the state to cope with developmental problems of our time.¹⁷ They argue that despite continuing to create unresponsive bureaucracies, and absorbing escalating shares of national income, the state has remained grossly inefficient, resulting to failures in traditional social welfare policies. The market was then prescribed as the ‘magic bullet’ for solving these socio-economic problems in the typical Adam Smith doctrine of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market.¹⁸ The resulting crisis of the state scenario led to a near blind faith in market-oriented economic policies¹⁹ as the panacea for social and economic progress.

Two factors contributed to the push for the neo-liberal economic doctrine around the 1980. These were: a) the emergence of free-market fundamentalist governments in Britain and the United States; and, b) the disintegration of the state-run command economy in the former Soviet Union (Ellwood, 2002:19). The formula for economic progress advocated by the administrations of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US called for drastic reduction in the role of state in the economy and development. Instead, government was to take a back seat to corporate executives and money managers. Neo-liberalism (as this

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See for example Ellwood 2002; Held and McGrew 2003; Salamon et al 2003.

¹⁸ Adam Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations* argues that competitive struggle for self-betterment between firms in a free market economy would lead as if by an invisible hand’ to economic efficiency and lowering of prices of commodities to their “natural” levels, which correspond to their costs of production.

¹⁹ These have been variously referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’ or economic neo-liberalism zealously promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions from the late 1970’s and 80s.

school of economic development came to be known) advocated for the spread of free trade in goods and service and the deregulation of world financial markets. This called for extension of free markets to ‘more and more areas of life; creation of state unburdened by ‘excessive’ intervention in the economy and social life; and the curtailment of the [social] power of trade unions’ (Held and McGrew, 2003: 100).

What these policies failed to acknowledge and advise then, was that markets, by themselves, might not engender social development because of their profit motive.²⁰ The ensuing cataclysmic effects on the global political and social economy and world-wide financial meltdown of the 1990s led to severe attacks on these policies even from some of its most ardent advocates. The resulting realisation that development challenges cannot be addressed by markets or by states alone, led to a search for ‘middle way’²¹ between sole reliance on the market or state to cope with public problems and development. Civil society organisations, because of their unique combination of private structure and public purpose, have surfaced as the third player offering alternatives in these developments.

Other scholars use international relations theories of realism and constructivism as well as theories of collective action to explain the emergence of global civil society advocacy alliances and networks.²² They argue that for long, and especially after the mainstreaming of the ideas of the market as the panacea for the problems of development, views on national and global social, economic, and political development discourse, remained a two sector game of politicians and business (Lindenberg, 2001; Putnam, 1998). The private sector and state were better organised through multilateral governance institutions. As such, they had hegemonic if not united authority to dictate policies to the developing countries. In these circumstances, it became apparent to activist that the changes they sought would not emerge

²⁰ See Joseph E. Stiglitz (2006:xiv), *Making Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice*, Allen Lane, Penguin group, UK and US; Joseph E. Stiglitz, (2002:: 73-74, 254), *Globalization and its Discontents*, Penguin Book.

²¹ Salamon et al (2003:2) argues that this middle way is best epitomised by ‘Prime Minister Tony Blair’s emphasis on a “Third Way” in the U.K., Gerhard Schröder’s “New Middle” in Germany, and strategies emphasizing empowerment of the poor and “assisted self-reliance” in the developing world. French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s summary declaration: “Yes to a market economy, no to a market society”.’

²² Examples of works on this are: 1) Price and Reus-Smit (1998) *Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism*, In *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 4(3): 259–294; 2) Price, R. "Reversing the gun sights: trans-national civil society targets land mines" in *International Organisation* 52.n3 (Summer 1998): 613(32) Thomson Gale; 3) Price, R., (2003), *Trans-national civil society and advocacy in world politics*, in *World Politics* 55 (July 2003), 579–606, John Hopkins University; and 4) Keck, M and Sikkink, K (1998: 203) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks In International Politics*, Cornell: Cornell University Press

spontaneously. To challenge these institutions and their hegemonic authority and statuses, civil society organisations and activists saw the need to reach beyond their own immediate organisational families and formed alliances and networks to act collectively in solidarity with one another (Lindenberg, 2001). In this process, while not completely writing off the role of markets and other actors, the centrality and strategic role of the state in development has been underscored by a significant majority of civil society activists. Civil society advocacy alliances and networks have therefore emerged as a countermovement.

According to Salamon *et al* (2003), other external factors have contributed to the growing visibility of civil society in global governance. However, in my view, some of them are best seen more as effects of the growing visibility rather than causes in themselves. Salamon *et al* (2003), argue that liberal elements within the Catholic Church, Western (Northern) charitable foundations, as well as multinational corporations and multilateral governance organisations in more recent years, have come to recognise the need to engage citizen energies to implement their development agenda. As such, these institutions have helped by providing crucial financial and human resources to support civil society in its advocacy role. As a result, the earlier focus on the state (1960s and 70s) and the market (1980s) that excluded the civil society has given way to a more interactive view in social and governance process where the associational realm plays more critical roles (Edwards 2001). Arguably, the shift in the perceived role of civil society especially in helping develop social consensus in management of global political economy²³ can also be seen as an effect of sustained pressure from global civil society actors on these institutions. The jury is still out on whether these are genuine consultative efforts or just efforts to co-opt certain elements within the global civil society to help in the neo-liberal interests.²⁴

To be effective in engaging with the global governance institutions, global civil society actors network so as to multiply channels of access to advocate policy changes and even instigate for institutional changes in the principles of international interactions. Price (2003) argues that activists often draw powerful support from network linkages that not only strengthen the particular organisation, but may also have a broader impact in invigorating the civil society

²³ See Rick James (September 2002:4), *What makes coalitions effective? Lessons from Malawi*, INTRAC available online in <http://www.intrac.org/docs/Ops38.pdf>. Loewenson (2001:4) *Strategic Alliances in Health: The role of civil societies*, WHO Discussion paper No. 1 CSI/2001/DPI available online (http://www.who.int/civilsociety/document/en/alliances_en.pdf).

²⁴ See Patrick Bond, (2006:2, 96), *Looting Africa*; Patrick Bond, (2007:50), 'Perils of elite Pacting', in 'G8 Club Governance' for such arguments.

sector. Global civil society has indeed become a challenge to the finality of the nation state in international affairs and their views are continuously sought on many issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:32). Where it is not sought, civil society has, on its own, pushed to be heard. Indeed, we cannot understand some key outcomes in world politics today, without taking account of the influence of trans-national civil society actors (Evans, 2005:3; Held and McGrew, 2003:123; Price, 2003:591).

2.2. PROBLEMATISING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY NETWORKS

While acknowledging the important role of civil society in addressing governance and development challenges, it has also been stressed that civil society has its own limitations and thus, is not the panacea for development and governance (Welch and Nuru, 2006). In their advocacy work, global civil society organisations face a number of organisational challenges related to legitimacy, representation, accountability, structures leadership, mobilisation abilities as well as demonstrating impacts (Hudson, 2002; Khagram *et al*, 2002; Price, 2003).

The basic questions relating to these issues are: 1) what right do these organisations have to contribute to the shaping of global governance agenda? 2) Who do they represent? 3) How are they accountable to their constituencies? Price (2003:587), holds that global civil society activists derive their legitimacy from three principal sources: 1) expertise i.e. many of the leading activists are experts and are viewed as providers of objective knowledge on the issues they advocate: 2) moral influence i.e. activists are viewed by the public as being morally right in the purposes for which they pursue, and: 3) a claim to political legitimacy i.e. the acceptance of the role of activists in bringing information and moral concerns to light, such as representing affected communities (for example, the poor), in institutionalised global governance processes.²⁵

Another thing worth noting is that the emergence of trans-national advocacy networks has come hand in hand with a flush of enthusiasm for CSO networks as effective vehicles to push for changes in international governance. This wave of enthusiasm, while a good thing especially in ensuring funding and support, has also led to unrealistic expectations. However, some scholars and activists have argued that this blind optimism is ending and in its stead, disappointments and frustrations have set in as new realities of the 21st century. In deed, it is impossible for such networks to meet all expectations from their different stakeholders. Sometimes threats and tensions have come from the fact that donors and some supporters

²⁵See also Paul Nelson in Khagram, et al (2002:312–13).

have tended to ‘hijack’ the motive for these networks to fulfil their own agenda (James and Malunga, 2006; Taylor and Naidoo, 2004; Munck, 2006).²⁶

There are so many cleavages in global civil society networks especially between the Northern and Southern actors. While joint North/South coordination has played a critical role in shaping alliances, tensions remain over access to funding and decision-making. Northern NGOs have played a key role in financing Southern actors but at the same time, have tended to keep a distance from radical groupings within the domestic sphere.²⁷ Added to this is the fact that global civil society advocacy networks are often amorphous, loose, and non hierarchical in structure. They unite diverse but like-minded groups and do not have any clear leadership and have a great variety of tactics, approaches and goals. This is a potentially problematic scenario characterised by mistrust and ‘the hegemony of some parts [*Northern*] of civil society over other parts [*Southern*].’ (Chomsky 1999, *emphasis added*).²⁸ Not surprisingly, such relationships can produce considerable tensions. Given this scenario of unequal relations between the North and the South as presented in the literature, this study sought answers to critical questions of whether global civil society is a necessity for the Southern organisations and activists and what benefits Southern civil society activists get from networking with the Northern activists and organisations. Specifically it sought to establish whether networking with Northern groups and activist, is the only way to create political opportunities for the Southern civil society organisations to challenge hegemonic status at the global governance arena. The study also sought to establish how GCAP has grappled with such issues within itself and what such issues portend for GCAP.

Another challenge for global civil society advocacy networks has to do with demonstrating and determining direct impacts of their advocacy work primarily due to methodological drought in the field of advocacy impact assessment²⁹ (Roche, 2005; Kelly, 2002; Chapman and Wameyo, 2001). It is also in part, due to the complex nature of advocacy interventions.

²⁶ For example, Taylor and Naidoo (2004), argue that ‘we are now past the “magic” phase of global civil society, a new realism has set in, with events wiping away the naivety of the 1990s to some extent. Munck (2006:331), adds, ‘we are now “taking global civil society seriously” in terms of moving beyond abstract typologies to construct its politics [...] we are probably in an era of paradigmatic transition in all realms.’

²⁷ Attributed to Lorna Gold from a presentation titled ‘leading edge NGOs in the Next Decade’ October 2006.

²⁸ Cited in Rucht, D. *Social Movements Challenging Neo-liberal Globalization* available online: http://www.wz-berlin.de/zkd/zcm/pdf/dieter_rucht_social_movements_challenging.pdf

²⁹ While this study is not focused on GCAP’s impacts, a mention of how global civil society networks effectively influence other actors and their impacts is important to understanding the frames of the struggles that they indulge in.

Each campaign or action is a unique, complex, and multivariate interplay of causal relationships of many actors in many activities, strategies, targets, and outcomes, making a deterministic causation hard to ascertain as it is not easy to “control” for other factors in the process (Kelly, 2002; Lieberman, 1992). It is also difficult to determine a single consistent set of actions that leads to specific outcomes and neither can one have a single consistent theory to explain the different interplays.

Arguably therefore, a change in policy is likely to be a result of many different variables. The decision by the World Bank or IMF to cancel debts of some of the highly indebted countries, for example, cannot in anyway be attributed to the work of any single advocacy alliance. Recent events at the World Bank and the IMF in embracing change have definitely have had an impact on issues of debt cancellation and aid. However, whether this change is a reaction to lobbying pressures or was driven by an internal desire to change, devoid of the civil society advocacy, is difficult to determine. In deed as Price (2003:593), argues:

trans-national activism may be insufficient to produce change without the opportunity provided by [targeted players...] Numerous accounts of the successes or failures of activism interestingly point to the important role of conjunctions of changes in [...] governments [*and institutions*] as facilitators of, or insurmountable obstacles to change (Price, 2003:593. *Emphasis added*).

Given the fluidity and complexity of advocacy, it is not easy for networks to mobilise resources and support for their advocacy work. To counter this, *plausible association* arguments to explain causality have become inevitable.

Morrissey (2000, cited in McGee and Norton, 2000:69) has identified a useful structure of ‘fluid’ indicators to help in such determination. These are:

a) *Process indicators* - who participates, at what level and with what capacity? While this way of measuring of impacts can be dismissed as non-consequential, there is value in knowing how much support is being generated by a particular campaign.³⁰

b) *Developmental indicators*-how have different capacities and relationships been built for the pursuance of GCAP’s mission?³¹

³⁰ In this regard, the critical questions for the study to answer were on GCAP’s identity, memberships, supporters, targeted audience, architecture, accountabilities, and the relationships with other global social movements (already covered under subsection (a) and (b) of the questions above).

³¹ The critical questions in this case were on GCAP’s strategies, actions, goals as well as other resources. The question of externalities (e.g. global governance institutions processes and actions for example the UN Millennium Declarations influence on GCAP’s work will also be analysed.

c) *Impact indicators*-how has GCAP's anti-poverty advocacy influenced global policy and development? Specifically, critical data on volume of aid for development as well as debt cancellation in the last two and half years were sought in answering this question. This was used as proxy indicator to determine whether GCAP's effort to lobby for withdrawal of aid conditionalities and debt cancellation have resulted to any positive results.

While determination of impacts is difficult, it however needs to be mentioned that this study was set against a backdrop of certain assumptions. The starting point was that it acknowledges that GCAP has influenced the international finance institutions and rich countries especially the G8 during the Gleneagles 2005 meeting because promises on debt cancellation and aid³² were 'extracted' from them. The basic logic was that it cannot be taken for granted that GCAP never had a hand in the shifts to debt cancellation after the G8 Gleneagles meeting. That this happened after GCAP's formation, and was already campaigning at the G8 meeting doorsteps, inside conferences, and sometimes, even in the G8 conference rooms cannot be ignored. It is in turn, these outcomes that interest the study to look at the actors, processes, and strategies that feed into GCAP advocacy.

Therefore, while the study is cognizant of the fact that a solid attribution to GCAP's campaign in these outcomes cannot be solidly argued, it acknowledges that GCAP is an integral part of global civil society and that even prior to GCAP, there had been a cumulative process in the campaign for debt cancellation that also contributed to this shift. Acknowledging such cumulative effect, Price (2003:583), argues that global civil society's influence in global governance involves several steps is a process that includes:

- (1) agenda setting—identifying a problem of international concern and producing information;
- (2) developing solutions—creating norms or recommending policy change;
- (3) building networks and coalitions of allies; and
- (4) implementing solutions-employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms.

In deed, trans-national advocacy networks today constitutes a powerful theoretical and empirical force in contemporary liberal international relations theory (Price, 2003:580) and has led to an improvement of transparency and, to some extent, the accountability of global

³² These promises were that the G8 would cancel the debts owed to IMF and the World Bank by the highly indebted poor countries as well as increase development aid to the tune of \$50 billion per year by 2010. (See Naidoo, K. (2007) on From a whisper to a whimper: Reflections on the G8 Summit in *E-Civicus*: www.civicus.org/new/contents/deskofthesecretarygeneral68.htm)

institutions, and in mobilising public awareness and political engagement (Wild, 2006). The important thing to note is that change occurs as a result of advocacy despite the inability to directly demonstrate it and as Albert Einstein once said, ‘not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted’ (cited in Roche, 2005:v). Therefore, the principal idea here should be not to lose sight of the fact that, GCAP has indeed, had some influence on these outcomes.

2.3. CONCLUSION

The discussion in this chapter explored several issues worth reiterating. This chapter has presented literature on global civil society alliances and trans-national advocacy relevant to the theoretical framing of this study. These included the operationalisation of concepts of global civil society, trans-national networking, and advocacy that are central in this report. It has demonstrated the contestations inherent in the conceptualisation of civil society. It also attempted to explain the ‘associational revolution’ and the attendant recognition of the role global civil society networks play in global governance and development.

The chapter has underscored the inherent structural, resources and capacity constraints of individual organisations to meet the challenges of development and governance that have necessitated the formation of alliances and networks to pool resources confront and transform their collective challenges into strengths and opportunities. It highlighted that trans-national alliances and networks have their own organisational challenges. The chapter has implicitly argued that despite these challenges global civil society will still need to network if they are to remain effective and relevant in current global development and governance context. The chapter has also alluded to complexity as feature of networks and laid the theoretical frameworks that the next two chapters use in analysing GCAP.

III. A CARTOGRAPHY OF A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY ALLIANCE

3.0 INTRODUCTION

The official GCAP website (www.whiteband.org) introduces GCAP as ‘an alliance of trade unions, community groups, faith groups, women and youth organisations, NGOs and other campaigners working together across more than 100 national platforms.’ GCAP calls for action from the world’s leaders to meet their promises to end poverty and inequality. It also calls on concerned citizens to join it in pressuring their leaders and decision makers to act on poverty. GCAP can therefore be seen in light of what Ballard, *et al* (2006) refers to as a politically and socially directed collective, involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within which it is located. This chapter documents and analyses the origins of GCAP and motivations for its formation, the evolutionary path it has travelled, and its operations with specific references to its structures and architecture.

Two parallel but critically essential tracks are used in this analysis: 1) a chronological narrative of the origins and evolution of GCAP, and 2) a thematic analysis of the evolution of GCAP. To do this, the chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part deals with the chronological narrative and begins by looking at the origins of the GCAP alliance. The second part identifies the role of MDGs and other motivations in the evolution of GCAP. The next part maps the evolution of GCAP. Part four maps the structures and the relationships between different actors in GCAP. In analysing the development and architecture, this chapter will consider the effects the structure of GCAP has had on its operations and decision-making process.

3.1 THE FIRST LIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF GCAP

This study delved into the question of what informed GCAP’s origins. Quintessentially, the study sought to establish how, methodologically, the conceivers and strategists of GCAP went about building a consensus for its establishment.

There is a degree of contestation over the exact origins of GCAP which reflects varied emphasis on the roles played by Southern and Northern civil society actors in GCAP. It is generally acknowledged that the evolution of GCAP was preceded by discussions among

different CSOs (the most prominent organisations being Oxfam, CIVICUS, ActionAid) and the newly formed United Nations Millennium Campaign (UNMC) who felt the need to utilise ‘civil society pressure on the UN and governments to make them take seriously, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).’¹ UNMC therefore started negotiations on the need to explore the possibility of campaigning for the achievement of the MDGs. A series of discussions and events on these, led to the emergence of GCAP.

A view popular among the original architects of GCAP, places Southern activists and CSOs based in the global South at the centre of its origins. This view, that is part of GCAP’s official narrative, states that GCAP’s formation was triggered by a workshop, involving ‘33 key Southern civil society organisations and networks (predominantly African), from youth, labour, media, human rights, health, education, environment, development and the women’s movements’² in December 17-18, 2003. This workshop was hosted by Graca Machel of the Foundation for Rural Development (FDC) in Maputo, Mozambique, and co-organised by CIVICUS and financed by UNMC, Oxfam and ActionAid. The representation in this meeting was quite diverse and included notable figures like Salil Shetty, the Director of UNMC (convening) and a former CEO of ActionAid International; Kumi Naidoo of CIVICUS (co-convening); Leonor Briones of Social Watch Philippines; Patricia Garce of Social Watch El Salvador. Others included Marina Ponti of UNMC, Joseph Warungu head of BBC’s Network Africa, as well as representatives from the following African CSO networks: AWEAPON (Uganda), ANCEFA (Senegal), MWENGO (Zimbabwe), Arab NGO Network for Development (Beirut), ActionAid, Oxfam among others.³

The purpose of the Maputo workshop, according to a report of the same meeting, was to build on the dialogue and initiatives that UNMC ‘had already begun with local Governments, Parliamentarians, youth and other key stakeholders, mainly in Europe on Goal 8.’⁴ Specifically, the meeting sought to ‘critically assess the rationale for civil society engagement

1 Valot, H. (2007), interview on 06/09/2007, Johannesburg. (Tape recorded). Valot is the former CIVICUS MDG Campaign Manager and currently GCAP Web and New Media Manager. He has been at the GCAP since it started; Uvanga, T. (2007), interview on 13/10/2007, Johannesburg. (Tape recorded). Uvanga served as GCAP Namibia coordinator in 2006 before taking up consultancies as GCAP Africa (a regional continental structure within GCAP) Policy Consultant.

2 Available from a report of the Maputo meeting; Shaping the Millennium Campaign: Strategy Brainstorming Workshop with Southern CSOs available on the GCAP website: <http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/reports/ift/maputo-2003/IFG%20Maputo%20Report%2C%20December%202003.doc>. Hereinafter, this document is referred to as the *Maputo report*.

3 As shall be seen later in the discussions on the structure of GCAP, some of these networks that operate trans-nationally in different regions were to take up the role of regional support structures for GCAP.

4 *Maputo Report (Op cit)*.

in the Millennium Campaign [and to] brainstorm on the key elements of the campaign strategy including campaign focus, objectives, methods and structure, particularly in the South, and agree on follow-up actions.’⁵

Three months after the Maputo meeting (March 2004), another meeting was held in Reading UK, for Northern based networks and CSOs. In September 2004, CIVICUS hosted the founding meeting that brought together activists from both the South and North who had met earlier in Maputo as well as in Reading. Naidoo states that this meeting was challenging as a lot of preparatory work had to be done beforehand to try to develop a set of demands that everyone could agree on. While this was not easy, the meeting succeeded in capturing all the demands in a two page advocacy agenda that came to be known as the Johannesburg Declaration.⁶ GCAP was subsequently formally launched in January 2005 at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre. The event was attended by President Lula of Brazil, who expressed his support for the campaign. The overwhelming message at the launch was one of hope and belief, that GCAP would make an impact in the fight against poverty.

There is a second view held by a section of people within and outside of GCAP, and is not radically different from the previous one. This argues that ‘GCAP came out of activities of an alliance of Northern CSOs like the Oxfam, ActionAid, and others’ who, according Theo Uvanga, the GCAP Africa Policy consultant, ‘came together to lobby the International Finance Institutions (IFIs:- IMF and the World Bank) as well as the G8 countries to make good their promises to end poverty.’⁷ The same view is shared by Hodkinson (2005) who writing about the United Kingdom’s Make Poverty History⁸ noted:

in September 2004, the Make Poverty History coalition was officially launched as the UK mobilisation of an international coalition, the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (G-CAP), led by Oxfam International, ActionAid and DATA the controversial Africa charity set up by U2 frontman, Bono and multi-billionaires, George Soros, and Microsoft Bill Gates, the worlds’ second richest person with a fortune of just under \$50 billion.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Naidoo, K. (2007), interview on 10/10/2007, Johannesburg. (Tape recorded). Naidoo is CIVICUS Chief executive and one of chief architects of GCAP. He has been the Chair of GCAP international facilitation team (IFT) since GCAP’s inception.

⁷ Uvanga (*op.cit.*)

⁸ Make Poverty UK was the name given to the GCAP national coalition in the UK in 2005.

While views like those of Uvanga and Hodkinson above, are not uncommon, and cannot be easily dismissed, many documented accounts of the process of GCAP's evolution do not support this view. However, the heavy presence of representatives from these organisations (especially Oxfam and ActionAid) in GCAP's structures and operations⁹ including substantial funding of GCAP activities right from the Maputo meeting cannot obscure their contributions to the evolution of GCAP. Moreover, GCAP sought to campaign on issues at the centre of both Oxfam and ActionAid's own campaign. It is however clear that initial talks and ideas for GCAP were discussed between chief executives of CIVICUS and UNMC. They then further sought strategic alliances with leading Southern based organisation like Social Watch and activists like Graca Machel in taking the idea forward. In doing this, they needed the financial support of Northern organisations. Indeed, there are therefore, convoluted roles between the Northern and Southern organisations and activists in the evolution of GCAP. The significant thing to note here is that the contestations on origins of GCAP serve as a pointer to the contestations in the framing of the policy demands that it advocates.

3.2 FACTORS FOR GCAP'S FORMATION

Thus far, it is clear that GCAP owes its origins to the MDGs agenda. The architects of GCAP however, did not have it easy in making true their vision. The Maputo meeting was very challenging because, while the MDGs provided an opportunity for GCAP's development, there were heated debates and contestations around MDGs.¹⁰ What followed were two days of intense dialogue between proponents and opponents of the MDGs.¹¹ These contestations continue within and outside of GCAP to date. Below, I illustrate some of these contestations and how they have impacted on the nature of GCAP and the framing of its advocacy agenda.

The expectations of the participants of the Maputo meeting were varied and ranged from optimism to scepticism about the MDGs and the UN system's seriousness in pursuing the Goals. Their contestations on MDGs are distinguishable at two levels: a) on the value of the MDGs as a developmental policy initiative; and b) on the viability of organising civil society actors to campaign around MDGs, given their minimalist nature. At the one end of the spectrum were activists fundamentally opposed to the MDGs. Such activists saw their endorsement of the MDGs agenda as a betrayal of previous development commitments

⁹ For example, between 2005 and 2006, Oxfam GB had seconded one of its staff members Owen James as a Senior Campaign Manager in GCAP.

¹⁰ Naidoo (*op cit*); Valot (*op cit*)

¹¹ Valot (*ibid*); Maputo Report (2003:3)

especially for the global South.¹² They argued that while MDGs and poverty reduction consensus was a good tool for leveraging of public opinion in favour of aid, and debt cancellation, they were weak in programming and may in fact, misdirect efforts (Chambers 2006). They saw in MDGs, a distraction of attention from the underlying root causes of poverty and injustice – the ‘sins of commission’ – and foster a return to a charity approach which favours donors’ results-based management.¹³ Peggy Antrobus of the feminist economics network, DAWN had already renamed the MDGs as ‘*Maximum Distraction Gimmick*.’¹⁴ Bond *et al* (2005), warned:

GCAP’s promotion of the already watered-down [MDGS] could draw away energy and resources in many Third World countries, from organic struggles and organisational imperatives. If GCAP is successful, we foresee a tsunami of distraction, flooding out the diverse local struggles that could instead if nurtured carefully, support a genuinely bottom-up, internationally-linked, networked fight against injustice.¹⁵

The cynicism with the MDGs as a developmental policy is based on past experiences. The history of development is littered with many examples of toxic wastes of ‘well-meaning’ development initiatives¹⁶ that have left things worse in the past. Therefore, MDGs would not be taken at face value. As Duda (2007:36) states, ‘the road to hell is paved with good intentions similar to the MDGs; that is where many poor countries debt burdens came from, previous attempts to achieve development.’ He therefore argues:

12 Valot (*ibid*); Maputo Report.

13 Gold, L. (October 2006) ‘Leading Edge 2005: Key Findings and challenges for TROCAIRE’ (conference paper presentation), in ‘The leading edge NGOs in the next decade conference, (October 26-27, 2006), Nairobi, Kenya (unpublished).

14 Antrobus, P. (7 March 2005), ‘Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World,’ a Keynote address at the Ford Foundation Launch of the UNRISD Report, Ford Foundation, New York, UNRISD, available online at www.unrisd.org; See also Bond, P. (2007), ‘Perils of Elite Pacting’ (ed.) (2007) in *G8 Club Governance: Power and Politics in a Global World*, *Critical Currents* no. 1, May 2007, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala. Available online at http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdf/filer/critical_currents_1_contents/critical_currents_no1_article5.pdf. Accessed on 04/09/2007.

15 Bond, P., Brutus, D., and Setshedi, V. (June 17, 2005), ‘When White Band Spells White Feather: How Glo-Bono-Phonies and Trojan Horse NGOs Sabotage the Struggle Against Neoliberalism,’ in *Counterpunch*, available online at: <http://www.counterpunch.org/bond06172005.html>. Retrieved 04/09/2007.

16 UNESCO (2007), ‘Social Development: From Research to Policy to Action,’ a Concept paper for a meeting ‘From Research to Policy to Action’ Nairobi, January 22-24 2007. For example, Duda (2007) also argues that such initiatives include The 1960s UN’s first Development Decade that resulted in rising dictatorships in the name of economic nationalism, the 1970s second decade of development that resulted rising debts besides others that have reinforced the view that only Europe can transform the ‘developing’ world. Bissio (2002) argues that 1990’s have been called ‘the decade of broken promises,’ since an ambitious agenda was established by the different summit meetings convened by the UN, yet those commitments have not been met (<http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/mdg/bissio.htm>).

MDGs reek of ‘development discourse’ [and] present[s] a very serious challenge ... as ‘development’ has managed to earn itself... a very negative reputation in the world...especially so with the so called ‘underdeveloped’ world... The ‘redevelopment’ strategies that were implemented in the ‘underdeveloped’ nations in the early 1990s offer a good example as they were seen as launching of an assault against the resistance that development and economy were facing in the South (Esteva, 1992:16)...Thus the MDGs can be seen as a strategy to push ‘development’ into the corners of the ‘underdeveloped’ world, which have been resisting it, or have uncovered its hidden agendas and now are trying to resist it [quotation marks in original text].¹⁷

To date, certain activists remains outside the fold of GCAP and have continued to question the essence of the existence of GCAP. In the group are activist and academics like Weldon Bello of the Focus in Global South, Patrick Bond, and organisations like the Jubilee South. This is not a criticism that GCAP is unaware of. Martyn stated that there is indeed:

A need to dissect and deconstruct who these critics are, how many they are, what they stand for and how many are influential in their own right. We also need to ask ourselves for example: how many of the mainstream feminist organisations are part of GCAP?’,¹⁸

Many of this study participants within GCAP admitted that there are a few of the well known anti poverty initiatives that are not within the GCAP fold and called for dialogue to try to synchronise strategies and ensure coherence in the approaches. However, they also noted some level of aloofness remains from the fiercest critics of GCAP making it difficult to dialogue.¹⁹

Despite the pessimism about the MDGs, key figures within GCAP have argued that they offer a starting point for campaigning against poverty. The critical question to ask of the Maputo meeting is why was there such enthusiasm among GCAP proponents, when there was already so much scepticism around MDGs? Naidoo argues that, while the MDGs did not inspire much civil society support in the early 21st century:

¹⁷ Duda, T. (2007), ‘Evaluating the Millennium Development Goals: an African Perspective’ in *OSSREA Bulletin* Vol. IV. No2, p.33-45 (June 2007) available online at

<http://www.ossrea.net/publications/newsletter/jun07/OSSREA-Bulletin-June-2007.pdf>. Accessed on 3/12/2007.

¹⁸ Martyn, R. (2007), interview on 21/08/2007, Johannesburg. (Tape recorded). Martyn is a former Mobilisation Officer at GCAP (in 2006/2007).

¹⁹ This view was expressed by Martyn (*ibid*), Katsuji (*op.cit*), Naidoo (*op.cit*), and Valot (*op.cit*).

the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks in the US and the ensuing war on terror, shifted the global agenda so much, that Roberto Bissio of Social Watch (Uruguay), observed: “we might have dismissed the MDGs in 2000, however, in the current war on terror environment [...] the Millennium Declarations and MDGs read like a revolutionary manifesto.”²⁰

The December 2003 Maputo meeting therefore, came at a time of great concern as MDGs and poverty eradication were sidelined in global agenda by the security concerns of certain Northern countries. Under the circumstances, while some of the GCAP strategists agreed that the MDGs were too minimalist, they also felt the need, within the changing global agenda, to bring together a diversity of civil society leaders to collectively push for a development agenda that world leaders had agreed to three years earlier.

It took more than a year before GCAP had the opportunity to make the MDGs a rallying point for global civil society. The year 2005 offered these opportunities for advocacy. According to GCAP report 2006, GCAP was ‘conceived as [a] direct response to the opportunity (and challenge) presented by the congruence of three major international events taking place in 2005.’²¹ These events were the ‘G8 Gleneagles summit (July 2005), the Millennium + 5 Summit in New York (September 2005) and the WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong (December 2005). In addition, the Beijing +10 and the Cairo +5 were scheduled for the same year.’²² These were opportunities that advocates wanted to use to remind the IFIs, G8 countries as well as other countries of their commitments to the poor through the Millennium Declarations and the need to continue devoting resources to development other than to the war on terror.

GCAP architects as well as academic commentators also argued that the MDGs, despite their weaknesses, had strong points as well. Duda (2007) for example, points to the fact that MDGs

20 Naidoo (*op cit*). These views first came to my attention when I did the first ‘formal’ observations of a GCAP staff induction and preparatory meeting on 28th April 2007, just a week before the Montevideo meeting.

21 GCAP, *GCAP 2006 Report*, 2006:7

22 *Ibid*. The G8 Gleneagles summit was coming at a time when UK under Blair was the chair of both the G8 (a grouping of world’s richest economies) and the EU. Blair had promised to use Britain’s position in these grouping to put Africa’s development and the eradication of poverty on the global agenda. The Millennium+5 UN General Assembly Summit was to discuss the progress towards the achievement of MDGs. The Beijing +10 was a high level event of the 49th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) that met on February 28 to March 11, 2005. The objective of the session was to conduct a ten-year review and appraisal of the ‘Beijing Platform for Action (an outcome of fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 1995). The review was to identify achievements, gaps and challenges in implementing the Beijing Platform for Action (http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/1665.html). The UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo Egypt was to review and appraise the ICPD programme of Action (<http://www.un.org/popin/icpd2.htm>).

acknowledged the importance of the context within which development takes place and has been happening in the past.’ For him, this was indicative of recognition that global exigencies²³ would need to be addressed if the MDGs were to be realised.²⁴ This observation is well captured in both the Montevideo and the Beirut Declarations which note the purpose of GCAP’s existence as to ‘fight the structural determinants and causes of poverty and challenges the institutions and processes that perpetuate poverty and inequality across the world.’²⁵ In the end, a general consensus emerged that achieving Goal 8 (developing a global partnership for development) would be a critical component for the achievement of the other Goals.²⁶

Armed with knowledge of both the weakness and strengths of MDGs, participants of the discussions on the formation of GCAP opted for a critical approach in creating political opportunities for campaigning against poverty. They tailored GCAP to be, in the words of Valot, ‘a critical response to the MDGs in the sense that they were now not only asking for achievement of MDGs, but MDGs, plus.’²⁷ This position was to be reflected in the Johannesburg Declaration of September 2004, which asserted that ‘efforts to tackle poverty and deliver sustainable development, as pledged in the Millennium Declarations, are grossly inadequate.’²⁸

The MDGs agenda and the changing aid focus environment due to global shift to focus on the post September 11 2001 war on terror therefore served as the glue that brought diverse actors within GCAP together. GCAP therefore exhibits both the Gramscian attributes of civil society as part of the hegemonic block (their endorsement of the minimalist MDGs) as well as Polanyian countermovement (in the timing of its emergence, to oppose the apparent unacceptable shift of global agenda and resources from MDGs, while not limiting itself to MDGs alone). Thus, it may be argued, that for the leadership of GCAP, the MDGs offered a rallying point for the widest range civil society globally to coalesce around. The fact that global leaders had also endorsed the MDGs, provided GCAP with some leverage to demand a commitment from them to address poverty.

23 Esteva (1992:11) argues that underdevelopment is believed to be caused by internal and external factors, that include unfavourable terms of trade, unequal exchange, dependency, protectionism, imperfections of the market, corruption, and lack of democracy or entrepreneurship.

²⁴ Duda, (*op.cit*).

²⁵ See for example the *Montevideo Declaration*, (May 5, 2007:2) available online www.whiteband.org

²⁶ Maputo report 2003:6

²⁷ Valot (*op.cit*).

²⁸ Naidoo (*op.cit*).

While the MDGs may have provided some of the initial impetus behind the emergence of GCAP, there also were other factors that contributed to the birth of this global advocacy network at the beginning of the 21st century. Various scholars of civil society networking and practitioners have identified various motivations for networking and alliance building. This study used arguments advanced by Kogut (1998), and discussed under the Literature Review as a framework for analysing the main motivating factors for the formation of GCAP. I briefly look at these motivating factors and their relevance to explaining GCAP's evolution:

3.2.1 Transaction cost benefit motive:

Here, I posit that the global proliferation of civil society campaigning against poverty has created significant overlaps in their programmes and even membership that in turn, have created spaces for co-operation between different civil society organisations. According to Kogut (1998), considering that resources are finite, organisations come together through alliances and networks to pursue their common objectives. The motive is to maximise returns by pooling resources to achieve 'economies of scale' that may have escaped each of the member organisations while working alone. However, Kogut argues that this depends largely on the complementarities of the 'assets' introduced to the alliance and the synergies that arise as a result of this. It also depends on how effectively such alliances are managed. To maximize cooperation among the partners, a trust-based relationship must be developed (Østergaard and Nielsen 2005). In deciding to network, organisations must therefore confront the dilemmas of the opportunities that come with using trans-national networks to magnify their power without redefining their interests, and of leveraging existing structures of global power without becoming complicit in them (Evans 2005).

The drive to network may come from within civil society or even from the donors of civil society who push for creation of networks. As James and Malunga (2006:3) posits, 'the current enthusiasm for CSO consortia may be more a symptom of the perennial donor search for greater impact with less administrative (transaction) costs...' Further, Thandika Mkandawire graphically describes the current donor perspective on networks:

There is a tendency among donors in search of success stories to exhibit irrational exuberance about certain institutional arrangements... and given their quest for homogeneity and risk aversion, the chances are that donors will tend to propose models that facilitate monitoring rather than innovation and serendipity' (quoted in Tashereau and Bolger 2005:19, cited in James and Malunga 2006:3).

UNMC, Oxfam Novib, Oxfam GB and ActionAid devoted a considerable amount of energy and resources in organising and footing the bills for the consultations that went into the formation of GCAP. These organisations had representation in the Maputo, Reading, and the Johannesburg meetings. In these meetings, their representatives argued a case for MDGs. Further, in the course of the consultations, these organisations committed to funding GCAP activities and formed a funders group to facilitate this. Worthy noting here is that these organisations also pushed for policy demands which they had been campaigning on (including debt relief, more quality and quantity aid, and fairer trade practices) to form the blue print for GCAP's policy demands. As Valot states, 'at global level GCAP is supporting policies from Oxfam although trying to also present a third world policy perspective instead of a position from the north.'²⁹ The funders group also dictated whether they wanted to put their money in the national or global level operations.

Arguably therefore, the GCAP funders group (UNMC, Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib and ActionAid) have been great determinant in the genesis and evolution of GCAP, a constant feature of the alliance that has defined its nature and operations. Indeed, one of the major mobilisation events (the *Stand Up and Speak Out* Campaign) successfully undertaken by GCAP in the last two years (2006 & 2007), is jointly coordinated by UNMC and GCAP. As such, given the amount of energy and efforts that UNMC, Oxfam and ActionAid put into the consultations and funding of the activities of GCAP, and the fact that these organisations had on their own been campaigning on the various policy demands that GCAP ultimately adopted, one can deduce that transaction benefit was a motive among the architects of GCAP.

3.2.2 Strategic behaviour motive:

Global civil society advocacy alliances and networks are seen as strategic enablers for effectiveness in their advocacy work. This view sees alliances and networks as providing collaborative advantages in creating and expanding political opportunities³⁰ for the different

²⁹ Valot (*op.cit*). The same was independently verified from ActionAid, and Oxfam International websites. The ActionAid International website ActionAid, (www.actionaid.org) states that ActionAid is an international anti-poverty agency. Over the years, it has run several poverty alleviation relate campaign. Oxfam international website (www.oxfam.org) introduces Oxfam as a committed 'to find[ing] lasting solutions to poverty and injustice.'

³⁰ Tarrow (1994:85) defines political opportunities as 'consistent but not necessarily permanent formal... dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.' While McAdam (1996:27) identifies four dimensions of political opportunity: 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system: the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity: The presence or absence of elite

actors to achieve their goals through collective action (Ballard *et al.*, 2006:4; McAdam 1996:27; Tarrow 1994:85). This is because networking enables collective leveraging by civil society in challenging hegemonic status and its representatives in the world social and economic order. This view finds empirical reality within the different actors in GCAP. For example, according to Mwangi Waituru, GCAP was formed because there was ‘need for global civil society to act together for the fulfilment of specific issues’³¹ Naidoo corroborates this, arguing that GCAP was formed as an alliance, to bring different people together to push for commonly agreed policy demands in all the different areas and that it brings together different networks and organisations dealing with different issues and campaigns.³² Sylvia Boren, for example, stated that her ‘participation in networks and alliances is driven by a strong desire to contribute to making the world a better place, where as mobilisation is crucial for advocacy.’³³

Naidoo argues that only a few NGOs, if any, can claim a mass based constituency. As such, they have ‘to work together with, and seek support of significant mass based groups like students’ movements, trade unions, youth movements, women movements, and Faith Based Organisations, if they are to make significant changes.’³⁴ The Johannesburg Declaration (2004) acknowledges this inadequacy on NGOs to marshal mass support. GCAP’s founders therefore, confronted their individual weakness and divisions within the global civil society and transformed them into collective strategic advantages by committing to act together as an alliance of diverse NGOs, networks, trade unions, religious groups and other civil society actors in the fight against poverty.

In doing this, they acknowledged their diversity and were not pretentious of a commitment to endeavour to reach absolute agreement on a detailed global policy platform, but rather recognised and underscored the utility of unity of purpose in their collective struggle.³⁵ These positions continue to be reflected in the loose nature of the alliance, as well as in the broad

allies: the state capacity and propensity for repression’ (cited in Ballard *et al.* (2006:4). Ballard argues that changes in political opportunity involve shifts in any one or more of the four dimensions.

³¹ Waituru, M. (2007) interview on 06/11/2007. Mr. Waituru is GCAP Kenya Coordinator since 2006.

³² This view was expressed by Kumi Naidoo in an interview with him. The same was also expressed by Henri Valot, the former CIVICUS MDG Campaign Manager and now GCAP’s Web and New Media Coordinator.

³³ Interview with Sylvia Boren 12/10/2007. Boren is the head of Oxfam Novib. She is one of the three co-chairs of GCAP’s IFT. Others are Kumi Naidoo (Founding Chair of IFT) and Ana Augustino of ICAE, Uruguay. Oxfam Novib is also one of the principal funders of GCAP.

³⁴ Form an interview with Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

³⁵ See for example the Johannesburg Declaration September 2004; See also the Montevideo Declaration 2007.

All available at www.whiteband.org

policy positions in the different GCAP global platforms (Johannesburg 2004, Beirut 2006 and Montevideo 2007)³⁶ that provide for contextualisation of the campaign without providing the minute details of what the actual actions in they pursue. The bottom line within GCAP is much in line with Keck and Sikkink (1998:14) observations that ‘activists create alliances and networks when they believe that networking will further their organisational mission by sharing information, attaining greater visibility, gaining access to wider publics, multiplying channels of institutional access.’

Naidoo well captured the strategic considerations confronting the alliance asserting that ‘GCAP is not a campaign but a call to action against poverty.’³⁷ This statement primarily, captures the fluidity of the issues and actions that GCAP as a global civil society advocacy organisation has chosen to pursue. It also has a bearing on whether the different actors could cohere around it or not (James and Malunga 2006; Ballard *et al* (2006). Of note here is that GCAP has strategically and ingeniously chosen a broad conception of the fight against poverty as the glue that brings actors of different political and ideological suasions together. The representative of the feminist task force within GCAP and also one of the three co-chairs of the IFT, Ana Augustino supports this observation arguing:

Poverty eradication is central to many of the things the civil society does. Poverty is so extended in the world while at the same time there is so much opulence. GCAP came up to express the feeling that we cannot leave things as they were.³⁸

The Uganda Debt Network (UDN) for example, stated that they chose to join the GCAP omnibus because GCAP’s core demands (trade, good governance, aid and debt) are in line with their work and philosophy at the local, national, regional and international levels. They noted that UDN is originally a debt relief campaign organisation with a mission inclined to prudent utilisation of public resources in Uganda.’³⁹

There is though, a down side to this all encompassing policy as it becomes a source of the pulls and pushes within GCAP, discussed in the next chapter. That organisations and individuals join the GCAP campaign because of the issue involved:-the fight against poverty

³⁶ See for example the Montevideo Declaration that underscores this point. Available online at http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/reports/ift/montevideo/GCAP_Montevideo_Declaration_Final_eng.doc

³⁷ Interview with Naidoo, (*op.cit*).

³⁸ Interview with Ana Augustino 13/10/2007. Augustino is one of the three co-chairs of GCAP IFT and represents the feminist taskforce. She is also head of International Council for Adult Education (ICAE) Uruguay.

³⁹ UDN were participants in this study through its Director, Julius Kapwepwe. This information is based from an interview I had with him on the 04/11/2007. This was an email interview but was followed up later by a telephone call to the chair of the Board of UDN Mr. Zie Gariyo.

is clear. However, when the ways to achieve the goal are so blurred, then one has to do a critical analysis of the reasons. Martyn, explains this arguing that over the last two years, GCAP has, within the anti poverty movement, evolved to be what McDonalds are to hamburgers: it dominates. As such, organisations and people are now joining for the sake of bare minimums of what it stands for: fight against poverty through the achievement of MDGs and more so, on a need to belong.⁴⁰ The fight against poverty and MDG agenda therefore, while galvanising so many diverse actors have ‘become like the lowest common denominators of the focus with anyone with a social consciousness.’⁴¹ This position is taken by Bond *et al* (2005), who warn of possible reverse effect of ‘organisational demobilisation accompanied by lowest-common-denominator analyses and demands’ while also acknowledging ‘a need for focus and cohesion.’⁴²

3.2.3. Organisational learning motive:

Networking creates opportunities for organisational learning as well as technology and knowledge exchanges. In many cases, alliances and networks act as ‘ideas factories’ for members to generate and share knowledge on common issues and strategies. Covey (1995), has identified two main strategies for the achievement of stated policy goals of civil society organisations: advocacy and capacity building. Networks should therefore have the capacities for addressing the technicality and complexity of the issues. Capacity building midwives advocacy by strengthening the capacity and understanding of issues and the strategies for tackling them. This way, different actors are able to advocate on their own. In view of this, GCAP has, ‘in the last two years (2006 and 2007), been focusing on capacity building especially among the Southern coalitions.’⁴³ Kaluzi, the GCAP Malawi coordinator, offers evidence of this arguing that the different GCAP regional and global IFT support teams and structures have been supporting the national coalitions with information and guidance. This is aimed at keeping all actors abreast on the direction of the campaign as well as harmonise actions.⁴⁴ However, organisational learning motive especially its capacity building argument within GCAP is, in my view, more a result of necessity for GCAP to function well, rather than a motive for GCAP’s formation. As such, because capacity building and learning serves

⁴⁰ Martyn, (*op. cit.*)

⁴¹ *Ibid*

⁴² Bond et al (*op. cit.*)

⁴³ Naidoo (*op.cit.*)

⁴⁴ Kaluzi, S. (2007) Interview on 22/10/2007. (Tape recorded). Kaluzi is the GCAP Malawi coordinator.

as the grease that oils the GCAP ‘machine’, I argue that it can only be explained as a later necessity in the evolution and operations of GCAP.

From the foregoing discussion, I conclude that the first two motives (transaction cost benefit, and strategic behaviour motives) best give an account for GCAP’s emergence. However, neither of the two motives can sufficiently explain GCAP’s formation. Rather, I posit that an interplay of a host of intervening opportunities (i.e. the role of MDGs and the changing global agenda post September 11 2001) cited earlier, as well as the donor drive (transaction cost benefit) and strategic considerations on the need to pull and work together for collaborative advantages can better explain GCAP’s origins.

3.3. GCAP’S EVOLUTION

Having dealt with the motivations, the next critical question is, why did GCAP architects go for a new organisation while there were others working on a variety of issues that GCAP sought to work on? The answer to this is offered by what Naidoo calls the ‘reality of global civil society architecture that existed in 2003.’⁴⁵ He acknowledges that there were indeed, specialized networks focusing on trade justice, debt cancellation, or on aid effectiveness like Jubilee 2000, and Reality of Aid Network besides others. However, no existing organisation dealt with the different aspects of poverty. There was therefore, a need for coordination of efforts of the different groups by agreeing to push for commonly agreed policy demands through a synchronised platform. This was in recognition that ‘defeating poverty requires a nuanced and integrated and a comprehensive strategy.’⁴⁶ GCAP was therefore, an attempt to align the different existing campaigns to broaden them and create a truly global presence that did not exist before. There was therefore, ‘a sense [of a] need to create something that was greater than the sum of the parts of the organisations working in these areas so as to facilitate and connect the different components of the fight against poverty into one global push.’⁴⁷ Next, I discuss the evolutionary path that GCAP has followed since its formation.

Alliance and networks are organic and grow in their complexity with time. Scholars and activists have developed models for analysing the evolution of networks. For the purposes of this study, I use a theoretical model attributed to James (2002), and James and Malunga (2006) in their evaluation of networks in Malawi. The model is relevant in this analysis

⁴⁵ Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

because it delineates distinct phases in the development of networks and alliances and shall help in explaining and locating ongoing developments and transformations for GCAP.

According to James (2002), networks generally follow a progression path from a relatively loose informal to more structured, complex, and formally organised one. However, he warns that the progression through these stages is not as linear as the above simple model may suggest. Different stages can be happening simultaneously. James and Malunga (2006:5)⁴⁸ identify four phases in development of networks reflected in creation of various committees in networks.

a) Informal Steering Group

In this first phase in the evolution of networks, interested parties come together over an issue of common concern. This phase is preceded by CSOs coalescing around interests triggered by either a workshop, research or an up-coming event (James 2002). Issues of concern and CSO interests are explored before deciding how to move forward. The interested parties then form an informal facilitation group (IFG) to coordinate their advocacy work. Within GCAP, this is exhibited by an informal international facilitation group that was formed during the Maputo meeting. This group worked on reaching out to a wider constituency and allies during the Reading meeting and subsequently, Johannesburg (September 2004) foundation meeting and Porto Alegre (January 2005) launch. The IFG was principally led by CIVICUS CEO (Naidoo) and the CIVICUS MDG Campaign Manager (Valot), Oxfam's MDG Campaign Manager (Owen James) and a few others. The majority of the mobilisation and advocacy activities in 2005, were however, done in the UK with these people's involvement and coordinated by the Make Poverty History (UK's GCAP national coalition).

b) Secretariat

At this phase, members establish a secretariat with staff (initially hosted by a member and then usually set up independently) because of inability of the members to devote as much time as required, to the issue and as such, members are unable to implement the action points agreed on (James and Malunga 2006). At this stage, the management of the secretariat is split between the secretariat host (responsible for day-to-day management of the funded activity) and a steering group or task force who provide direction to the co-ordinator. In GCAP, the

⁴⁸ See also James R. (September 2002:13), 'What Makes CSO Coalitions Effective? Lessons from Malawi,' The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Occasional Papers Series Number 38, Oxford, UK, Available online at http://www.intrac.org/pages/malawi_publications.html. Accessed on 12/03/2007.

IFG maintained this name until the Beirut 2006 meeting in which it was reconfigured and renamed the International Facilitation Team (IFT). Further, ‘a small (1-2 people maximum) IFT support team’⁴⁹ was established and ‘would report to IFT’⁵⁰ whose chair was CIVICUS’ CEO and oversaw their day to day operations. The IFT support team’s role was ‘communications, website, information sharing and in general, to service the IFT.’⁵¹ The IFT support team therefore for all purposes and intents but the name, operates as a secretariat. Here, we see a structure being created to serve different roles that the then IFG was unable to perform. The number of the people in the IFT support team has since grown to seven by December 2007.

It is important to note that even before the Beirut platform, aspects of a secretariat had emerged. James points to an inherent problem in the hosting of networks and alliances arguing that while a ‘physical location provides [a] solid home [...] it also inherently creates some distance from members’ (James 2002:20). GCAP has had to grapple with this conundrum in the course of its evolution. On the one hand, there has been a political necessity to maintain GCAP’s image of a Southern driven alliance serving social justice demands and not dominated by INGOs.⁵² Naidoo argues that this was in recognition that they needed to ‘craft an advocacy alliance in a way that did not rely on the ‘usual suspects’ within INGOs.’⁵³ However, there still has been a heavy presence of Northern based INGOs who provide not only monetary resources, but also occupy strategic decision making positions in GCAP structures.⁵⁴ There was thus a need to choose a host that would be able to balance the interdependence between the Northern and Southern CSOs and not alienate the Southern constituency while at the same time being able to do business with the Northern INGOs. At Johannesburg (September 2004), founding proceedings of GCAP, CIVICUS was asked to host GCAP in the interim. The CIVICUS CEO was also asked to chair the ‘interim’ steering committee. This was because, as many respondents pointed out, even though CIVICUS brief is not to directly deal with poverty issues, given her CSOs convening mandate, she was in a way, the most comfortable organisation to play the role of secretariat.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ Beirut Platform Declaration, (March 15, 2006:6) in The Global Call to Action against Poverty Report 2006, (p.52-58), GCAP, Johannesburg. South Africa.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Valot (*ibid.*).

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

⁵⁴ *ibid.*; Uvanga (*op.cit.*).

⁵⁵ Boren (*op.cit.*); Naidoo (*ibid.*); Valot (*op.cit.*).

According to Valot, 'CIVICUS hosting of GCAP has worked well, because Kumi as a global civil society leader commands respect across the geographical divide.'⁵⁶ It has also maintained GCAP within Southern CSOs reach. However, it has not been able to resolve the critical tensions between the North and South. These divisions were especially manifested in the advocacy activities of the 2005 G8 meeting in Gleneagles where voices of Southern grassroots activists were excluded because they were deemed 'unorganised and unsophisticated.'⁵⁷ Moreover, considering that most of the advocacy at the global level is done in international fora like the G8 meetings, the Bretton Woods annual meetings, the World Economic Forum among others, one wonders whether situating the global secretariat in the north would not have been a better strategic option. There are no clear cut answers to this especially in light of all the issues considered at deciding on CIVICUS' hosting.

c) *Registration and Strategy*

At this stage of the evolution of networks, the secretariat is registered as an independent organisation outside of the host organisation, complete with a strategy and appropriate internal management and a representative but independent board of governance to steer governance systems in the organisation (James 2002). In 2007 Montevideo meeting, GCAP supporters met and resolved to continue working together up to at least 2015 (the year when all MDGs should be achieved). In this meeting, there was a discussion revolving on the enormity of the work and the need for a more 'formal' GCAP. Consequently, a survey was done to determine the future structure of GCAP. The survey results supported the need to formally register GCAP. A taskforce was created to study possibilities of where to register GCAP. While this process was still ongoing at the time of writing this report, this clearly demonstrates a move towards the next phase in the evolution.

d) *Projects*

GCAP is yet to get to this phase. Here, the network operates with secured funding for projects and is subjected to project deadlines and quality standards. There is a danger of the network operating more independently of its members with the initial 'cause' often becoming a 'project'. Edwards and Gaventa (2001:9) however points that 'networks can still achieve their goals, build capacity, and preserve accountability to grassroots constituencies if they consciously plan to do so from the outset and are prepared to trade some amount of speed and

⁵⁶ Valot (*op.cit.*).

⁵⁷ Martyn (*op.cit.*).

convenience in order to negotiate a more democratic set of outcomes.’ Ashman (2001:12), has posited that, ‘at the most organised stage they develop collective governance bodies that are representative and independent of any individual member.’ Formalisation therefore brings in certain advantages, but is also fraught with real costs in terms of loss of flexibility and membership commitment. Nancy Foy (cited in James, 2002:14), warns that ‘the effectiveness of a network is inversely proportional to its formality’ (quoted by Handy, 1988:109).

3.4. GCAP’S ARCHITECTURE

This section discusses the structures and the different resources GCAP has marshalled in pursuit of its goals. If alliances and networks are the engines that drive global civil society advocacy, then their structures are the oil that runs and sustains them. Keck and Sikkink (1998), argue that structures are important in understanding and gauging the emergence, operations, the nature of relations and interactions between the different actors, and the success of a network. Every network therefore, needs a structure that gives an advocacy issue an agency through which issues are pursued. Keck and Sikkink (1998), further argues that it is issues that determine the structures that evolve in an alliance. For simpler issues, simpler structures evolve. Conversely, complex structures are needed for complex issue networks. The nature of structures (simple or complex) also reflects the strategies that a network employs. The key question that I sought to answer here is how issues that GCAP campaigns on have affected the structure or architecture as well as the nature of GCAP as an advocacy network.

Issues on their own do not in themselves, produce alliances and their structures. It is activists -‘people who care enough about some issues and are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals’⁵⁸ who do so. To do this, they need resources: -financial, human, as well as material (telephones, faxes, computers, internet, information, leadership and most importantly, structures). These are all things that GCAP has had to mobilise in its evolution and operations.

The founding Johannesburg Declaration of September 2004 identified core structures of the alliance and their specific roles were further ironed in a meeting held at Nordwijk

⁵⁸ Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, (1992:252), ‘Mobilising Technologies for Collective Action’ in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, ed. (1992) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

(Netherlands) in April 2005 and further in Padua (Italy) in May 2005. These structures were:

- 1) Global Action Forum**-an open forum for all organisations which wanted to be part of GCAP. This was the forum for information sharing, debate and participation for people and organisations supporting GCAP. The main means of information sharing was through Emails. The forum also included the IFG and national platforms;
- 2) International Facilitation Group (IFG)** - to facilitate the implementation of the agreed work. The IFG was open to all members of the GCAP who wished to be actively involved in GCAP work. GCAP sought to maintain various balances in representation (e.g. geographical, gender);
- 3) seven Sub-Groups**:- Lobby and Policy, Media, Mobilisation, New Media, Outreach, UN, and the G8. Each sub-group was encouraged to have co-chairs to share the workload and ensure some level of diversity;
- 4) Specialist Sub-Groups**:- whose role was to share ideas and actions amongst a certain type of GCAP supporters. These were both regional and sector specific. These specialist sub-groups included: Trade Union, Youth, Religious, Networks, Asia, Africa, Arab region, Latin America, Europe, and the G7;
- 5) The national coalitions**:- as the main levers of mobilisation for GCAP's work. Interested activists from each country were asked to form a national coalition. The national coalition would decide their activities, priorities and national demands building on existing initiatives. This was to be the beginning of the gradual creation of GCAP as a mass based social movement.

Further refinements, including renaming and abolition of some of the structures have continued within GCAP. The substantial refinement occurred during the March 2006 Beirut and May 2007 Montevideo Global Action Forum meetings. At the Beirut meeting, a leaner structure was negotiated and agreed upon that included: a) Global Action Forum; b) International Facilitation Team (IFT).⁵⁹

Also formalised as a structure within GCAP in Beirut was the Funders Group made up of the four main donors of GCAP (ActionAid, Oxfam Novib, Oxfam GB, and UNMC) who Fund the IFT support team as well as the different national coalitions.

3.4.1. The Roles of Different Constituent Parts (Structures) of GCAP

To better understand the roles of the different structures, I divide them into two broad categories: a) governance and b) operations. I have also looked at accountability mechanisms between the different structures to further aid my analysis. The governance and operational

⁵⁹ This was initially IFG but renamed IFT in Beirut.

roles are broadly played at different levels within GCAP: global, regional and national, with multidirectional lines of accountability between the different structures and levels. I now turn to looking at the specific structures and their roles.

a) International Facilitation team (IFT):

The IFT acts like a board responsible for the governance of GCAP and has the ultimate decision making authority at the global level. In Beirut 2006 Global Action Forum meeting, it was agreed that the IFT would comprise of 26 members representing regions (elected from national coalitions), and the newly constituted thematic taskforces (feminists, the youth and children, workers) and INGOs. The guiding principle in these representations was gender and regional balance while maintaining a dominant image of southern faces in the IFT. As such, the Beirut Platform agreed on the following representations: Women's Movement/Feminist Task Force (1), Youth and Children (1), Workers' Movement (1). Regionally, they agreed that IFT representations include: Africa (4, including 2 women), Asia and Pacific (4, with 2 women), Latin America and Caribbean (3 including at least 1 woman), Europe (3, including at least 1 from outside EU i.e. Eastern Europe), North America (2 including 1 woman) and Middle East (1) and six (6) from international NGOs. Activists from each region or thematic task force had to consult among themselves in choosing their representatives in the IFT. An automatic seat was reserved for CIVICUS in the IFT as the host organisation so as to ensure smooth operations and communications.

Prior to Beirut 2006, IFG played the leading role in the GCAP campaign. In Beirut, the centrality of national coalitions as the hub of the alliance activities was reinstated in line with the spirit of the founding Johannesburg Declaration and also to ensure a decentralised structure. Consequently, the new IFT would only govern the global level operations. IFT does not have any powers to dictate to the national and regional level structures. That role is left to national coalitions or regional networks facilitation group. Besides its governance role, IFT's other important role is a facilitating one in the process of decision making. It is the IFT that convenes Global Action Forum meetings for supporters to come together to be able to make the declarations that guide policy directions for GCAP.

The relations between the IFT, the regional and national structures (bodies) within GCAP is dictated upon by the policies developed during Global Action Groups platforms (i.e. September 2004, Johannesburg Platform, March 2006 Beirut platform, and May 2007 Montevideo Platform). These policies are communicated to all supporters of GCAP as

‘declarations’. Whatever policy framework the IFT works on, comes within the confines of the global meetings. In a sense, global meeting is like a general assembly of the GCAP supporters.⁶⁰

Imata however pointed to a major challenge in the composition of IFT. These are to do with the question of representation (this is covered in greater details under the new proposed structure of GCAP post 2007). He argued that despite the broad guiding principles in the composition of IFT, it has not been very clear within GCAP what the IFT membership criteria is. As such,

it is not clear who has a right to speak, or vote and decide on what issues. However, the global meeting is *de facto*, the ultimate decision making body and IFT functions within the parameters set by the global declarations.⁶¹

IFT does not have the power to go beyond what is written in these global declarations. This has ensured that consultations are the norm before any changes are made. However, given the rather diffuse structure of GCAP, and the availability of all the IFT members for consultations is not always guaranteed, the speed of decision making and action is either hampered, or arbitrariness becomes the way of conducting business. As Martyn argues, GCAP’s ‘open door policy leaves it vulnerable to the broad constituency.’⁶² More so, she continues to argue that while the Johannesburg Declaration proposed strong institutional systems, it has been personality driven. GCAP at the global level has therefore evolved institutions that have relied on personal discretion as the *de facto* practice with arbitrary decision making that serves as precedent for policy that is not written (documented) anywhere as there is no formal constitution for the alliance. This extreme arbitrariness according to Martyn is also reflected even in the national coalitions.⁶³

To facilitate IFT’s work, an IFT support team was established by the Beirut Platform 2006 even though in practice, its roles were already being performed by two staff members at the host organisation-CIVICUS. The IFT support team was tasked with the day-to-day operational decisions. Valot states that in the 2006 Beirut Global Action Forum Platform, there was the challenge in the naming of the IFT support team and especially on whether it

⁶⁰ Imata, K. (2007), interview on 12/10/2007. (Tape recorded). Mr Imata is a former GCAP Senior Manager and has been involved with GCAP since 2005, first as a coordinator for the Japanese GCAP coalition and later as a Senior Manager in GCAP at the Johannesburg global office. He also serves in the IFT as one of the regional representatives for Asia-Pacific region.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Martyn (*op.cit.*).

⁶³ *Ibid.*

was a secretariat. There was resistance by a majority of the national coalitions to calling it a secretariat as this would have given legitimacy to the centralisation of the alliance's campaign and operations. This would have been against the spirit of the founding Johannesburg Declaration that underscored the centrality of the loose nature of GCAP as an alliance. In the end, the Platform decided on IFT support team even though its modus operandi was more like a secretariat.

As the name implies, this structure is supposed to support the work of the IFT. However, study participants working at the IFT held that there is a gap between this setup (name) and reality, for IFT support team not only supports the IFT, but also carries out other roles. The support team is responsible for supporting the IFT in communications, coordination, and mobilisation of regional and national coalitions.

b) Regional Networks and National Coalitions:

The regional networks act as forums for activist from within geographical regions to share information on how best to localise the campaign. These regions are identified as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, Europe, Middle east and Asia-Pacific. The real task of localising the campaign lies with the national coalition. At both levels, there is a facilitation team whose responsibility is to steer the activities of the alliance in their region as well as nominating representatives to the IFT. According to GCAP's official website, national platforms had increased from only 15 in January 2005 to approximately 115 by September 2006. The National Coalitions through the Regional Networks elect their representatives to the IFT described in (a) above. The national coalitions meet through their regional networks deliberate and develop common policy platforms before the global Action Forum. Just as in the IFT, there is a secretariat for the regional and national networks that supports the work of these structures.

c) The Funders Group:

In GCAP, there is, as one of the basic structures at the global level, a funders group. The funders group was established by UNMC, ActionAid International, Oxfam Novib and Oxfam GB to provide financial resources to support GCAP's IFT work. Their support also goes directly to the activities of the national and regional networks. The funders group is also represented in the IFT. Since May 2007, one representative of the funders group (CEO of Oxfam Novib) was also nominated to be one of the two additional co-chairs of GCAP in an expanded leadership structure.

Three of the organisations forming the funders group except the UNMC are in reality, also civil society organisations originally from the global North. Experience so far indicates that the funders group wields considerable clout in deciding the course of the alliance. A renewed vigour to bring back MDGs (pushed by UNMC) at the centre of the campaign is a good example of this. This portends possible problems of what Chomsky (1999) calls ‘hegemony’ of one part of civil society over the other, i.e. the northern richer CSOs over their southern counterparts with ‘networking’ becoming an euphemism for this hegemony. This feature has been a source of disquiet in the way the campaign was being run especially in 2005. Bond et al, (2005), for example poses the following questions on GCAP:

Do these gaffes signify something deeper? Merely careless paternalism? Or perhaps a sense that the main outcomes of this campaign are to be celebrated in media buzz, fashion statements, celebrity chasing and the NGOs’ proximity to power?

There is thus a need for a delicate balance in making sure that GCAP does not degenerate into a confirmation of these fears. I will turn to look at further contestations on this and how GCAP has tried to address them later in this chapter.

Outside of the structures discussed above, there are also different task forces within GCAP such as the feminist task force, children and youth task force, trade task force, media taskforce, and the debt task force, whose roles and visibility are not as prominent. However, they help in the development of policy demands relevant to their areas of expertise.

3.4.2. Relations between Different Tiers and Structures within GCAP.

There have been challenges within GCAP emanating from the loose nature of the structures of the alliance. To begin with, there are no clear reporting and accountability lines between the different structures. This is especially between the national coalitions, the regional, and the global. The Uganda Debt Network (UDN) Director, Julius Kapwepwe when asked what the nature of their interactions with the GCAP IFT in Johannesburg and the GCAP Africa Regional Secretariat was, bluntly stated that it was ‘very weak, or close to non-existent.’⁶⁴ However, the Kenyan national coalition reported a different experience arguing that they received a lot of support and linkage with other arms of the campaign. The same is reported from the Malawian national coalition. However, the bottom line is that there is definitely a

⁶⁴ Kapwepwe (*op.cit*).

certain level of disjuncture between the various players involved in the campaign, a fact that Augustino and Uvanga both corroborated.

GCAP attributes this disjuncture to the loose nature of the alliance as well as a tiered level of interaction. The looseness of GCAP at the global level is replicated at the national coalition's level. According to Waituru, the Kenyan coalition is characterised by inconsistent activity: 'members engage on a walk in walk out basis and level of engagement varies with periods. It is highest during the months of mobilization.'⁶⁵ Valot states that sometimes regional representatives within the IFT do not necessarily represent the regions and communication within the regions is wanting in many instances. However, he contends that given the highly consultative nature of decision making within the IFT, GCAP has tried to not want to appear to do things that are contradictory to its broad based mass support.⁶⁶

The loose nature of the alliance seems to militate against effective operations of GCAP. Imata argues that there have been trade-offs as well as traps. The traps have come from the fact that people can join GCAP without necessarily having much understanding of its mechanisms, activity and structures.⁶⁷ This has been a source of contestations and has led to discussions on the need to institutionalise or formalise GCAP. On the other hand, Valot is of the view that the open nature has been positive and inspiring as more people from many countries have been able to set up their national coalitions and participate in GCAP's activities. The above observations and my analysis led me to concur with Valot's caution that, the loose nature of the alliance makes life difficult for those at the IFT support team. Valot argues that given the lack of clear frames of reference it is difficult to track who is doing what, at what particular time, and in what way.⁶⁸ He therefore rightly concedes that while the alliance has worked, they are weary of possibilities of inefficiencies and bad practices within hence the need to improve on GCAP's operations and image through a more formal and streamlined structures at different levels. These views were mentioned by at least four of the participants of the study including Uvanga from the regional secretariat. This is truly an indication that there are frustrations with the loose nature of the alliance.

Besides addressing obvious questions of accountability, the other argument for the institutionalisation of GCAP is the need to widen the fundraising base. This would include

⁶⁵ Waituru (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁶ Valot (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁷ Imata (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁸ Valot (*op.cit.*).

corporations who are unable to fund GCAP because of the lack of a formal structure within the alliance. Mekata (2000:143) captures some of the funding and identify problems that go with loose alliances in a case study of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). She states:

In December 1997, ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams jointly received the Nobel Peace prize for helping to establish an international convention that bans antipersonnel mines. Half the prize went directly to Williams, but the other half had to wait nearly a year to reach ICBL...because ICBL did not exist legally. It was an amorphous network of NGOs, and not registered as an entity anywhere in the world.

However, it is interesting to note that there is still a feeling that formalisation will definitely alienate some parts of GCAP's support. This is because the current talk of the formalisation of GCAP in many ways is attributable to its 'donors'. This is a fact that many of the respondents agreed to. As the head of Oxfam Novib, Sylvia Boren stated:

we of course would want to see a little bit of more structure and formalisation within GCAP ... to better manage the over US\$ 180million used in the advocacy and campaign by GCAP and its affiliates (over 850 organisations) at various levels (local, national, regional and global).⁶⁹

For donors, this is a call to greater accountability. Boren continued to state that as the funders group, they have had to negotiate within the alliance, arguing that GCAP with formal structures and legal identity would promote greater horizontal and vertical mutual accountabilities and inclusiveness.

It is however interesting to note that Boren, in her position of head of Oxfam Novib, a dominant player in the funders group and a co-chair of GCAP was in fact tasked with exploring the possibility of incorporation of a GCAP trust in the Netherlands.⁷⁰ The critical question therefore, was whether it is possible to ignore the fact that the funders may have pushed the agenda of formalisation too much. Naidoo agrees with this view, arguing that this is indeed a reflection of the reality of an element of donor influence. The bottom line is that they control the purse strings, and the reality is that he who pays the piper gets to choose the tune. This finding aligns with what James and Malunga (2006) assessment of Malawi coalitions, in which donors sometimes push their agenda in the networks.

⁶⁹ Boren (*op.cit*).


⁷⁰ Imata (*op.cit*)

Undeniably, donor influence is clear within GCAP. However, negotiations have been the *modus operandi*. The results of such negotiation during the Montevideo meeting, was an ‘agreement’ on the future of GCAP and its structures. Consequently, GCAP is now being transformed into a formal network administered by a Trust.⁷¹ This phase in GCAP’s development aligns with James and Malunga’s (2006) third phase. Despite the said negotiations on the future structure of GCAP, there are still disquiets over the institutionalisation. Some constituency fears that diversity and autonomy should be maintained in the future structure. They also fear that greater structural complexity would come with greater bureaucratic bungles. As Valot argues, creating a clearer structure requires revisiting the question of ownership and roles of different parts within the alliance.

However, a survey done by GCAP just before the Montevideo 2007 meeting on the future structure of GCAP showed that a majority of GCAP national coalitions supported the idea of a more formalised structure. This was in recognition of the need for greater accountability and transparency. The figure in the next page summarises the proposed new structure of GCAP. This proposed model looks even more complex to comprehend than the current one. It does however promise to offer clearer lines of accountability. Most structures have remained, others renamed, and more added, to reflect the growing complexity. A new inclusion though is a proposed GCAP Trust which shall be the entity with the legal mandate for GCAP.

⁷¹ Imata (*ibid*) states that apparently, the law in Netherlands does not require any organisation registered there to be physically headquartered or operational in Netherlands. As such, GCAP can still continue being a global network and operational anywhere in the world. The only requirement is to hold the Board meeting once on the Dutch soil.

Figure A: GCAP Global Structure
(governed by GCAP Charter)



Source: www.whiteband.org

3.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter, forms part of the bulk of the analysis and discussions from the research and has presented the main findings of the study related to the evolution, motivations for GCAP's formation, the different phases that GCAP has undergone, as well as the nature and structure of GCAP.

In looking at the evolution, I have argued that GCAP was a reactive initiative whose formation and operations were, and continue to be hinged on MDGs. I have argued that the clarion call for its formation was informed by the changing focus of international community precipitated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent shifts to marshalling of resources to the war on terror while MDGs took a back seat. I have also argued that in the course of GCAP's development, it has remained within the parameters of the development model followed by other networks.

By looking at the structures, I have demonstrated that the loose nature of the GCAP alliance has been both a positive contributor to mass mobilisation but has also had a downside to it that has caused frustrations from a slow nature of decision making and actions on the part of some within the alliance. This has, in effect, called for a more bureaucratised and institutionalised architecture to redress some of these shortfalls i.e. shift towards James and Malunga's (2006) phase three. However, I have also demonstrate that there are potential dangers to the alliance from a more bureaucratised structure as it might end up alienating some constituency and goes against the grain of thought at the time of GCAP's conception. Indeed I have demonstrated that it has become a source of one of the contestations within GCAP which will be the central focus for chapter four.

The key learning from GCAP's evolution, structures and strategies I posit, is that it is not possible to push through individual positions without compromising and diluting them in a network. The idea is to be able to accommodate each others view so as to progress. GCAP has managed to do this fairly well albeit there are still, many contradictions and challenges that GCAP still grapples with. These challenges and contradictions are the focus of the next chapter that deals with the pulls and pushes within GCAP.

IV: THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF CRAFTING GCAP

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Global civil society networks are complex and paradoxical forms of organisations. This chapter will analyse the politics and dynamics that have shaped the nature of GCAP as a global civil society alliance. The chapter identifies and discusses the challenges involved in crafting an effective and focussed yet, inclusive and broad based trans-national advocacy network, which presents both opportunities and challenges as agendas, approaches, and strategies conflict. I have divided the identified paradoxes in this chapter under three broad categories: a) the nature, of and the framing of GCAP's advocacy agenda as well as the strategies that go into it; b) the nature of GCAP and its constituency; and c) the resource question (which includes the role of donors and the closely linked question of North-South divide).

The idea is to analyse the paradoxes that come with the diversity, flexibility and dynamic creativity, volatility and success of global civil society alliances as an interesting phenomenon for social scientific inquiry.¹ In doing this, I will begin with a discussion on the strategies that GCAP has used to develop a global advocacy agenda that enables the different players to cohere to it. This discussion is important in shaping the next level of analysis of the centrifugal and centripetal forces within GCAP, especially, in answering the critical question of how GCAP has managed to keep afloat despite the inherent pulls and pushes within it.

4.1 THE NATURE OF GCAP 'S ADVOCACY AGENDA

This section deals with the framing of poverty as GCAP's main advocacy agenda and the contestations and paradoxes inherent in it. The section will therefore identify and analyse the different strategies that GCAP has used in this framing and in their work. The section will also analyse and explain how issue framing and strategies have affected the development of GCAP's operations.

In a world of highly contested views, networks must ensure that their messages on the issues they advocate carry weight and authority for them to be effective.² Given the broad based

¹ Gains made by global civil society networks should be read in conjunction with the inherent complexities of such alliances.

² Keck and Sikkink (1998:8) argue that this happens through activists identifying a problem, specifying a cause, and proposing a solution, all with an eye toward producing procedural, substantive, and normative change in their area of concern.

nature of GCAP, there are often contestations on policy agenda within the alliance. Keck and Sikkink (1998) call such contestations ‘frame disputes.’ To effectively frame issues, core campaign organisers should ensure that relevant stakeholders with access to necessary information are incorporated into the network. These are the actors who help in framing issues in a language acceptable to many of the constituencies. In doing this, they are laying baselines that they would all subscribe to. Internally, the framing of the advocacy agenda and the policies that go with it serve, as the magnet that pulls different actors together and keeps them committed to the collective.

The baselines within GCAP are found in the declarations developed from the various global forums that the International Facilitation Team (IFT) organises for the purposes of consultations. The very first of these was the Johannesburg declaration of 2004, then came the Beirut declaration of 2006 and the most recent one the Montevideo declaration of 2006. These declarations, according to Naidoo, are crafted along two main set of areas that allow different actors to cohere around them. These issues are: ‘1) economic and 2) social, both of which are closely related.’³ These hinged on the recognition that ‘current strategies to fight poverty are solely ameliorative and are geared towards alleviation, rather than for eradication of poverty. The declarations therefore underscored a commitment to work together in confronting global poverty and the forces that continue to perpetuate it.’⁴

In advocacy, the powers of information, ideas and strategies are critical in persuading other actors to join them so as to build synergy and positions for advocacy, but even more importantly, for their targets to act on their demands. Keck and Sikkink (1998:16) argue that these processes are not devoid of conflicts as they often involve not just reasoning with peers but also bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encouraging sanctions and shaming of opponents and targets. Networks and alliances should therefore have clear strategies and well-reasoned arguments based on evidence in the framing of their issues.

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), effective framing must be clear, dramatic, powerful and appealing to shared principles.⁵ They identify a set of four political strategies that

³ Naidoo. K. (2007), interview on 10/10/2007. (Tape recorded). Naidoo is CIVICUS Chief Executive and one of chief architects of GCAP. He has been the Chair of GCAP international facilitation team (IFT) since GCAP’s inception.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Bono, the renowned Irish rock star corroborates this by arguing that ‘issues need tension, jeopardy and a sense of what-might-be to succeed’ (cited in Tyrangiel, 2005).

activists use for this purpose: 1) **Information Politics**: The ability of networks to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and using it where it will have the most impact; 2) **Symbolic Politics**: identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events; 2) **Leverage Politics**: mobilisation of targets to hold up to the scrutiny of peers, thereby exerting moral leverage on the assumption that governments and other targets, value the good opinion of others; 4) **Accountability Politics**: networks try to convince their targeted actors to publicly change their positions on issues. This also happens through exposing the differences between the talk from the walk (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:22-24).

A combination of these four political strategies can be seen within GCAP, although not reflected in a coherent manner. Firstly, within the realm of information politics in issue framing, the proponents of GCAP strategically chose to broadly define fighting poverty (GCAP's central issue) in a way that is heterogeneous, fluid, and broad enough to allow different actors, autonomy in their interpretations and work.⁶ According to Martyn, this was reinforced by placing the national coalitions as the hub of GCAP's operations.⁷

There are two competing ideas on the effects of the loose nature of GCAP. Martyn attaches a negative connotation to the loose alliance. For her, GCAP became somewhat of an amorphous 'one size fits all' type of advocacy network as it tried to accommodate all the contending views. This was not an easy thing.⁸ Martyn argues that, by not defining the minute details of what GCAP wanted to do, how, and who would do it, GCAP opened itself to a lot of idealism on the possibilities available.⁹ She cites the discussions during the Montevideo platform (May 2007) to demonstrate this, arguing that 'in the declaration, there was a line with a slogan: "*We must uproot the evils of capitalism.*" Yet, no substantive policy was developed to echo this statement.'

Martyn further projects this as a 'disjuncture between some of the values espoused in the policy making cycles and actual substantive policy that exists.'¹⁰ This is especially so, she argues, given that when it came to discussing GCAP's policy document on International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and the mobilisation around October 17th *Stand Up and Speak Out* campaign, many of the participants said that GCAP was not a radical organisation and

⁶ Augustino, A., (2007) interview on 13/10/2007. Augustino is one of the three co-chairs of GCAP IFT and represents the feminist taskforce. She is also head of International Council for Adult Education (ICAE) Uruguay.

⁷ Martyn, R., (2007) interview on 21/08/2007. (Tape recorded). Martyn is a former GCAP Mobilisation Officer.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

therefore not opposed to IFIs and capitalism *per se*.¹¹ The broad based nature of the alliance constituency therefore sacrifices divergent radical policy for artificial coherences. This in effect has alienated the ‘left’ as ‘radical’ ideas have been marginalised. Other substantive reasons have also contributed to this process such as politics of expediency (*realpolitik*), the politics of the key players in GCAP, and the role of donors.

The inherent disjuncture is therefore, an illustration of *realpolitik* at its best. The loose framing of issues and the devolution of the actions of the campaign activities has been a powerful tool within GCAP. This has enabled different actors within GCAP to cohere around loosely defined issues and work together, and in the process, created a big constituency necessary for GCAP’s mobilisation.¹² This is because, for Naidoo, fighting global poverty requires nuanced and comprehensively integrated strategies and interventions by a broad array of actors across the spectrum in both the North and South.¹³ As such, the loose nature of the alliance allowed as many organisations and activists from all parts of the globe to be part of GCAP.

Within the framing of issues and strategies for operations, GCAP activists sought to utilise a combination of information, leverage, and accountability politics. This was through using commitments made by the world leaders through the Millennium Declarations in September 2000 as well as the then 35 year old pledges by G7 (excluding Russia) and other developed countries to commit 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to development aid. In post 9/11 events and the shifting of global priorities and resources to the US led war on terror, GCAP activists reminded world leaders, especially G8 countries, that it was immoral and wrong for poor people to continue to die and suffer while there were so many resources. They questioned the lack of political will of these leaders to help the poor out of their misery and accused rich nations of doing nothing about it.¹⁴ Naidoo captured this well when he argued:

¹¹ This is not to mean that everyone in GCAP support IFIs. Rather, I would argue that this was in line with the post Washington consensus thinking of partnerships between the different actors (state, market and civil society) in development that has dominated in GCAP.

¹² For example, in 2007, GCAP mobilised 43.7 million people in 127 countries during the *Stand Up and Speak Out* Campaign on the International Day for the eradication of poverty (17/10/2007) (<http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/GcapSpecials/anti-poverty-day/index.html>).


¹³ Naidoo, (*op.cit*).

¹⁴ For example, a GCAP media release on July 7th 2007 (symbolic half-way mark in the MDGs implementation) titled ‘GCAP Campaigners Come Out in Force to Bemoan Inexcusable Progress on Millennium Development Goals’ argues that while \$47bn per year is needed to meet Health, Education and Water Sanitation Millennium Development Goals by 2015, \$1 trillion is spent on military each year [surely] the money is available. It is a question of where political will is directed.’

If the UK and US for example can organise and find hundreds of thousands of billions of dollars for an illegal and unjust catastrophic war in Iraq, they can surely find similar amounts to save the lives of the poor who are now perishing at a rate of 7000 people per day.¹⁵

The graph below shows the aid flows from developed countries as a percentage of their GNI in 2004.

Figure B: 1 Aid Flows from Developed countries as a Percentage of their GNI by 2004



Source: OECD-DAC, in *Reality of Aid 2006* Report,

The graph indicates that only five developed countries (Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Netherlands) had reached or surpassed the 0.7% target. GCAP has used such data as well as data from Social Watch, ActionAid and Oxfam¹⁶ in leverage politics. Here they name and shame developed countries who have not met the 0.7% aid target set in 1970.

¹⁵ Naidoo, (*op.cit*).

¹⁶ Valot, H., (2007), interview on 06/09/2007 (Tape recorded). Valot is the former CIVICUS MDG Campaign Manager and currently GCAP Web and New Media Manager. He has been at the GCAP since it started; Naidoo (*ibid*). The outcomes of the 2005 G8 meeting are discussed in greater details in this charter, under the experiences of using celebrities in GCAP.

It is from such pressure that in the 2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting, the G8 powers renewed their commitment to reach the 0.7% mark by 2015.¹⁷ Press statements issued by Naidoo after the 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit in which, referring to failure of G8 to commit immediate funds to development, he said: ‘the people have spoken, G8 has whispered,’ and another in 2007: ‘the whisper has turned into a whimper’ are examples of both leverage and accountability politics.¹⁸ All the declarations spell out clearly some of these broken promises and the consequences for the poor of the world. For example, the Montevideo Declaration states that ‘governments and international institutions continue to renege on their promise to eradicate poverty’ and enumerates a number of reasons responsible for this state of affairs. Key among these are: increases in human rights violations, sharp reductions on space for citizens’ action, increasing insecurity because of escalation of conflicts and militarisation that have taken valuable resources away from fighting poverty to fighting wars, and deepening feminization of poverty.

GCAP has also made use of symbolic politics activism and mobilisation. The most visible of such is the mobilisation on October 17th which GCAP has dubbed the ‘international day for the eradication of poverty.’ The symbolic significance of this day is that it comes two days before the traditional World Bank and IMF’s annual meetings in Washington D.C. These meetings bring together political leaders and senior World Bank and IMF officials from virtually all the countries of the world to discuss development and international finance issues. GCAP has seized this as a crucial opportunity to mobilise in a symbolic *Stand Up and Speak Out* against poverty campaign to call for IFIs to avail resources for the achievement of MDGs as well as calls for their (IFIs) urgent reforms. Further, GCAP also mobilises around the G8 summit (June) and the International Women’s day (March 8). For instance, one of the greatest things that informed GCAP’s campaign especially in 2005 was the flurry of activities around the Gleneagles’ G8 summit. This was because the Make Poverty History campaign (the GCAP national coalition in the UK) wanted to seize the opportunity of the 2005 UK presidency on both EU and the G8 to push both the G8 and the EU governments for a deal on

¹⁷ See UK Aid Network (UKAN) (2006), ‘More and Better Aid: Are the G8 Promises Being Delivered?’ UK Aid Network (UKAN) briefing note, June 2006, available online at http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/aid/G8_aid_briefing.doc.

¹⁸ See Kumi Naidoo, ‘From a whisper to a whimper: Reflections on the G8 Summit,’ in E-Civics, 13 June 2007, <http://www.civics.org/new/content/deskoftheseecretarygeneral68.htm>.

debt cancellation, more aid and fairer trade terms for developing countries, particularly Africa.¹⁹

Symbolic and accountability politics are also evident in GCAP's targeting strategy. This is reflected in the targeting of G8 and the IFIs by GCAP for what GCAP deem to be their (G8 and IFIs) historical culpability for the poverty that ravages the developing world. Citing Walter Rodney's classical text; *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Naidoo argues:

G8 countries are not passive observers of poverty that exists today and benignly and philanthropically want to be helpful. They carry ...a significant culpability for the poverty that exists [...] The African continent can tell the story best from slave trade, to communism, to decolonisation [...] we were being kicked around like political football especially during the cold war [...] some of the arms still causing havoc in this continent were provided during the cold war by one or the other of the super powers.²⁰

GCAP therefore, targets these nations to call them to account for, and act, on their past and present 'sins of commission' for the poverty in the developing world. For Naidoo, the G8 and other countries could easily help end poverty if they had the political will to do so. This is because these nations (G8) and IFIs wield the greatest economic and political power in the current global governance arrangements. As such, if they were committed to ensuring that appropriate levels of resources for fighting poverty are made available, they could easily deliver.²¹ More so, on issues of debt, trade and aid, Naidoo asserts that, 'developing countries have very limited real voice to influence these agendas.'²²

Other strategies and activities that GCAP has employed in pursuance of its vision have been the use of celebrities, concerts, negotiations, conferencing, peaceful street demonstrations, tribunals and alternative reporting. In doing this, the media has been a strong ally in picking up the messages and amplifying them. The strategic importance of the media to the campaign came early in the formation of GCAP. In the December 2003 Maputo meeting, the then Chief of Bureau of BBC Network Africa, Joseph Warungu, was one of the key people participating and delivered a paper on possible media and global civil society partnership.²³

¹⁹ Valot, (*op.cit*); Uvanga, T. (2007), interview on 13/10/2007 (Tape recorded). Uvanga served as GCAP Namibia coordinator in 2006 before taking up a position as GCAP Africa (a regional continental structure within GCAP) Policy Consultant.

²⁰ Naidoo (*op.cit*).

²¹ *Ibid*

²² *Ibid*.

²³ *Maputo Report*, (December 2003).

To conclude, there are various examples of the different types of strategies used in the framing of GCAP of the issues, actions, and targeting by GCAP. In doing this, I have illustrated different types of politics (information, accountability, leverage, and symbolic politics). I have also shown that GCAP's strategies in the framing of the issues and in mobilising for support have not been without challenges; nor are they neat and coherent. One of most problematic strategy has been on the use of celebrities, especially in 2005 that led to a fallout and subsequent demise of MPH UK, which was then, the most active national coalition within GCAP. Below, I delve into these experiences in greater details.

4.2 GCAP EXPERIENCES IN USING CELEBRITIES

The quest for answers to the development puzzle cannot be found by advancing on one front without addressing others: they are all inextricably linked.

Development has always suffered from oversimplification both of problem and prescriptions.

-Maggie Black (2002: 131).

The use of celebrities has been a major strategy in advocacy networks since trans-national activism emerged in global governance arena. Past involvement of high profile people can be seen, for example, in the Campaign for Elimination of Landmines where Princess Diana played a significant role. GCAP has used celebrities especially in 2005. Key celebrities involved have included Nelson Mandela, Bob Geldolf, and Bono. In this section, I analyse the case of celebrity involvement in Make Poverty History (MPH) UK (one of the national GCAP coalitions). As shall be evident, their involvement has also become a source of contestations and tensions in GCAP.

According to Cressy (2007), the last two decades have witnessed a growing number of civil society networks and celebrities joining hands to raise awareness and advocate for change on a variety of issues. The increasing prevalence of celebrity advocates in global civil society advocacy networks, has led to important questions such as: Why the new found partnership between the celebrities and advocacy networks? Huddart, (2005:40, cited in Cressy, 2007:16-17) identifies three types of celebrity advocates contributions to civil society campaigns: awareness raising, fundraising, and political advocacy. In each category, celebrity advocates are seen as legitimizers of campaigns. Advocacy networks have used celebrities to dramatize issues, 'add tension, jeopardy and a sense of what-might-be to succeed' (Bono, as cited in

Tyrangiel, 2005).²⁴ Street (1998:437) explains that celebrities carry a lot of weight. However, the question on whether a campaign positively gains from the celebrities depends on how well they are able to articulate the issues. Sometimes, the process of mediating positions on issues results in losses to meanings and frames.

Right from the start of GCAP at the Maputo meeting, high profile individuals like Graca Machel were already involved. While Machel is a civil society leader in her own right, her inclusion in hosting the initial founding deliberations was a strategic one considering her high public profile. She is the wife of Nelson Mandela. Mandela himself graced one of the London concerts in the build-up to the G8 summit. In this concert, just a day before the G8 Finance Ministers meeting on February 4th 2005, Mandela delivered a short but powerful speech that combined many of the politics that GCAP strategically utilises. He bluntly told rich nations that time had come to deliver on their often repeated pledge to help poor countries. He likened poverty to apartheid and slavery, which in his view, was not natural, but man-made. To the leaders of the G8, he told them: 'The world is hungry for action, not words.' He summed up his message to leaders of affluent countries in saying: 'Do not look the other way. Do not hesitate.'²⁵

Within GCAP, 2005 was a phenomenal year with many opportunities for lobbying and advocacy.²⁶ It needs to be noted that this was coming at the formative stages of GCAP and many of today's national coalitions with the exception of MPH UK in addition to Canada, Australia and US and a couple of other countries had not been formed. In view of its limited presence in many countries, GCAP's main strategy in 2005 was a focus on a media campaign and enlisted celebrities to help it garner public support for its work.

The most visible event of the MPH campaign events were a series of Live 8 concerts organised in collaboration with the MPH global campaign by Bob Geldof. The Live 8 concerts took place in the eight G8 nations, in addition to one concert in Johannesburg, four days before the G8 summit was to commence. However, the live aid concerts became the beginning of cracks between the MPH activists and celebrities. The first signs that Geldof had literally stolen the thunder from GCAP were evident when he refused to include many

²⁴ See also Keck Sikkink (199:20) who argues that networks need to 'call attention to issues, or create them by using language that dramatises and draws attention to their concerns.'

²⁵ See Hasan Suroor, (Feb 04, 2005) Mandela joins anti-poverty campaign' in *The Hindu*, available at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/02/04/stories/2005020401761300.htm>.

²⁶ These opportunities have been dealt with in Chapter Three of this thesis.

celebrity performers from the developing world. Asked why, he retorted: ‘Live 8 is not a cultural event. Only musicians with more than 4 million record sales could play, because otherwise people in China would switch off’ (Hodkinson, 2005). This apparent silencing of African voices did not go unnoticed. Emmanuel Jal, a former Sudanese child soldier turned global hip-hop star, criticised this, arguing that by silencing African self-representation, many Africans had lost all respect for Geldof, adding, ‘it looks like he is making history by using the poor people.’²⁷

In the G8 summit, no wide sweeping outcomes were achieved either on debt relief, trade or more aid. The outcomes were just a series of promises and declarations that Christian Aid, one of the leading NGO members of the MPH, deemed ‘vastly inadequate’ (Abugre, 2005). Instead of committing and immediately availing \$50 billion a year in international aid as the MDGs had proposed, they agreed to reach this figure by 2010. They also agreed to MPH demands that ‘poor countries should be free to determine their own economic policies’ (Hodkinson, 2005). At the end of the summit, the G8 leaders were proclaiming complete success on the issues to which the MPH demanded. Thousands of activists were both dismayed and infuriated by this.

To many campaigners, the details of the 2005 G8 deal reflected very little policy change. Reacting to the promise by the G8 to avail \$ 50 billion by 2010, Kumi Naidoo stated, ‘the promise to deliver more aid by 2010 is like waiting five years before responding to [a] tsunami.’²⁸ Abdul-Raheem (2006) equated the deal to ‘being offered a handkerchief by the same person who is beating the hell out of you.’²⁹ The official MPH press release stated, ‘today the G8 have chosen not to do all that campaigners insist is necessary to free people trapped in the prison of poverty.’³⁰ Stephen Lewis, the UN special envoy for Africa dismissed the deal saying:

²⁷ Hodkinson (November 9, 2005), “Geldof 8 – Africa nil: how rock stars betrayed the poor”. *New Internationalist Online*, <http://live.newint.org/features/geldof-8/0-11-05.htm>.

²⁸ Cited in Hodkinson (ibid); See also Hodkinson (2005), ‘How Rock Stars Betrayed the Poor: Post-Gleneagles fallout’, *Z Magazine Online*, October 2005 Volume 18 Number 10; James Landale, Half Full or Half Empty, BBC, Friday, 8 July, 2005, 17:28 GMT 18:28 UK, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4665923.stm; http://www.ewjf.org.uk/wp/?page_id=75.

²⁹ Abdul-Raheem is the Deputy Director of UNMC. Prior to joining UNMC, he was the head of a Uganda based Global Pan-African Movement.

³⁰ Cited in Abugre, C (2005). ‘The 2005 G8: Business as Usual the Morning After?’ *Pambazuka*, (14 September 2005).

A fair trade regiment is a will-o-the-wisp. Cancellation of debt is a fragment. The increase in foreign aid is purely conjectural. We have Kilimanjaro to climb before we meet the needs of Africa (Lewis, 2001:31).

While civil society activists were condemning the deal, Bono and Bob Geldof, the two most recognisable celebrity faces in the campaign were jubilant. Bob Geldof saw it fit to admonish the activists. The quotes below attributed to Geldof illustrate how far his statements and delusions on the deal deviated from the positions of the campaign he was supposed to be supporting:

-‘On aid, ten out of ten. On debt, eight out of ten. On trade...it is quite clear that the summit, uniquely, decided that enforced liberalization must no longer take place. That is a serious, excellent result on trade.’³¹

-‘This has been the most important summit there has ever been for Africa. There are no equivocations. Africa and the poor of that continent got more from the last 3 days than they have ever got at previous summits.’³²

-I wouldn’t say this is the end of extreme poverty, but it is the beginning of the end.’³³

Bono too contradicted the messages of MPH campaigners. Activists were outraged with this endorsement by Geldof and Bono. Kofi Mawuli Klu, referred to these celebrities as ‘crocodile tear-shedding poverty pimps, trading in the distorted images of ... impoverished African masses.’³⁴ Stephen Lewis said of Bob Geldof: ‘to hear it from crusader Bob Geldof, that the summit was a spectacular success, I’m not sure I can capture his full addiction to hyperbole...’ (Lewis 2005: 26). MPH issued statements regretting joining forces with Geldof and Bono, stating that the two had hijacked their cause and shoved off everyone else. Cressy (2007:38) is of the view that ‘in addition to distorting the campaign message and in the process legitimizing a widely condemned G8 deal, the celebrity advocates contributed to the de-politicization of the MPH UK campaign’ thereby ‘undermining the articulation of more radical voices and meaningful dissent to the G8 policy agenda’ (Chossudovsky, 2005). The de-politicization further hindered the campaign by creating the impression that global poverty

³¹Hodkinson (November 9, 2005), ‘Geldof 8 – Africa nil: how rock stars betrayed the poor’, *New Internationalist Online*, <http://live.newint.org/features/geldof-8/0-11-05.htm>.

³²*Ibid.*

³³ Chossudovsky (2005), ‘Live 8: Corporate Media Bonanza’, *Global Research*. (5 July 2005), www.globalresearch.ca

³⁴ Hodkinson (op. cit). Kofi Mawuli Klu is the chair of the Pan-Afrikan Task Force for Internationalist Dialogue (PATFID).

could be made history in 2005, which, according to Naidoo was ‘an extremely naïve expectation.’³⁵

On the whole, there were mixed experiences in the utility of celebrities within GCAP. Whether celebrities involvement brought in any positive or negative energy, ‘depended on the celebrities themselves as well as the ability or inability of GCAP to manage them. Equally important a reason was that some of the celebrities were not equal to the task.’³⁶ As such, I argue that while celebrities are well recognised as social activists and making use of them is good for the GCAP campaign, as they have played a bridging role in getting the messages across to the powerful G8 leaders, I have also illustrated the doubled edged sword nature in the use of celebrities in GCAP. An imposing role of celebrities originally ‘recruited’ to help move the campaign forward cannot be gainsaid. However, as it was to turn out, the celebrity involvement especially in MPH UK had disastrous effect, so much so that 2005 proved a debacle that led to the death of MPH UK at a time when GCAP was just starting to gain roots in other countries. The reasons for this debacle within MPH are summarised by the quote from Black (2002) at the beginning of this section: the issues that MPH UK sought to advocate on were over simplified and often misunderstood by the celebrities that MPH UK collaborated with and had become the mouth pieces of the campaign. According to Cressy (2007), the celebrity involvement was counterproductive as they skewed the campaign’s message, de-politicized the issues and disempowered the people whom the campaign sought to empower and support. I therefore conclude that celebrity involvement resulted in a dream deferred for millions of activists and the poor especially in Africa, who had expected a better deal from the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit.

Having discussed the nature and framing of the issues GCAP advocates on, as well as strategies used in the alliance, and illustrated some of the challenges they have posed for GCAP, I now turn to discuss some of the other paradoxes in GCAP.

4.3 THE NATURE OF GCAP

This section analyses the contestations that have emanated from the nature of GCAP. This starts with the critical question on whether GCAP is an anti-systemic or a stabilising organisation. The section then looks at what involvement of the state and private sector in GCAP's activities, as well as GCAP’s orientation to MDGs and what they portend for GCAP.

³⁵ Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

³⁶ Valot (*op.cit.*).

Global civil society networks and alliances are part of global civil society. However, what constitutes civil society and especially its global manifestations remains highly contested. From the start, GCAP was fraught with problems of deciding who to include or leave out of the alliance. Part of the problem emanates from GCAP's conscious strategy at having an open door policy inviting whoever wanted to be its supporter. As such, individuals and CSOs of different political and ideological leanings in the programming of their anti poverty work, became part of the alliance. This is interesting for this analysis for at least two reasons: firstly, how would GCAP manage the dual membership character of individuals and organisations? Secondly, was support for anti-poverty, a sufficient point of unity for all these different actors?

To begin with, there was no homogeneity in the beliefs and actions required to end poverty even though there were baselines drawn from the Johannesburg Declaration that called for debt relief, more aid for development, and fair trade. In some cases, GCAP's manifests itself as a stabilising and pacifying force, thereby perpetuating hegemonic conditions. To illustrate this, Hodkinson (2005) for example, argued of widespread unhappiness within the coalition over the 'campaign's public face and its cosiness to Blair and Brown.' He argued that MPH's policy demands were virtually indistinguishable from those of the UK government. This is especially so because the 'deeply compromised Commission for Africa had already set out its neo-liberal proposals for the corporate plunder of Africa's human and natural resources under the identical headlines used by MPH – 'trade justice, drop the debt and more and better aid.'³⁷ The principal reasons advanced for this cosiness is that Oxfam's (one of the key actors in MPH) political independence from neo-liberal governance is highly compromised by the funding it receives from the UK government or other public funds.'³⁸ In other instances though, GCAP has been active as a counter-hegemonic or a transformation force by lobbying the G8 states and international financial institutions in debt cancellation, more and better quality of aid, and better trade terms with fairly radical language on policies. I therefore argue that GCAP does not neatly fit in either the Polanyian or Gramscian views discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Rather, actors within it are found dotted on different positions in a continuum between Gramsci and Polanyi views.

³⁷ Hodkinson, Stewart, (June 28, 2005) Inside The Murky World Of The UK's Make Poverty History Campaign, Red Pepper , Z Magazine <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8181>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Another paradox within GCAP is its loose nature. The GCAP alliance has underscored that national networks are the engines for its work.³⁹ While there are broad guidelines on who can be part of the alliance, as the GCAP official website (www.whiteband.org) indicates, the national coalitions have autonomy over who should be part of the national coalition.⁴⁰ As such, GCAP's IFT does not prescribe what its grassroots should be like, what they do, or how they define themselves. In this setup, the national coalitions are left to choose who to invite or do business with. Indeed, in some instances, one finds involvement of a multiplicity of actors across the spectrum of civil society, the private sector, as well as governments in GCAP. In others, GCAP does not want to have certain elements of civil society or business and governments as part of the alliance. Evidence for this again comes from the UK's Make Poverty History (MPH). There were very strong anti-war (i.e. the war in Afghanistan and Iraq that had been waged as part of the war on terror) sentiments and a lot of militant demonstrations were going on in the UK in 2005. Activists had united through the Stop the War Coalition (STWC) in the UK. STWC had applied to join MPH in the UK. However, many of the mainstream NGOs were uncomfortable with this. According to Hodkinson (2005), despite its open door policy:

the MPH Coordinating Team, which include[d] Oxfam, Comic Relief and the TUC, ha[d] ...twice unanimously vetoed the Stop the War Coalition's (STWC) application to join MPH on the Orwellian grounds that the issues of economic justice and development are separate from that of war, and STWC's participation in Edinburgh on 2 July would confuse the message.'⁴¹

The real reasons for not accepting STWC and other radical groups, in Hodkinson's view were 'ethical.' Hodkinson states that a leaked email to MPH from Milipedia (an events organiser), had asked the coalition to decide what they were prepared to tolerate and at what point to draw the line and what action to take.'⁴² This led to the above noted veto.

A nuanced look at the government and business involvement in GCAP reveals that it is of necessity, to incorporate different actors as sources of funding as well as the implementers of policy. The coordinator of Malawi GCAP coalition captured this best when he said:

³⁹ Naidoo (*ibid*); Valot (*op.cit*).The same view was supported by all interviews with the people involved in GCAP.

⁴⁰ The website states that it is faith based groups, trade unions, NGOs, community based organisations, social movements, and CSO networks.

⁴¹ Hodkinson (June 28, 2005), 'Inside The Murky World Of The UK's Make Poverty History Campaign', Red Pepper , Z Magazine, available online at

<http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8181>.

⁴² *Ibid*.

We also have a strong partnership with the government of Malawi and that is why you find some CSOs in most of the government's task forces [...]. The government this year helped us in mobilizing pupils in the government schools during the *Stand Up and Speak Out* campaign.⁴³

The GCAP Malawi coalition's justification for their close relationship with the government is built on the post-Washington consensus paradigm of the private-public partnership in development with civil society as participants involved in enriching participation and democratic governance of the development process.⁴⁴ For GCAP Malawi, there are therefore, mutually beneficial roles of the different players in development process and more so in the fight against poverty.⁴⁵ The Malawian GCAP coalition in their programming and implementation, has therefore mapped out different stakeholder (including government, businesses, traditional leaders, civil society, individuals, and families) roles.⁴⁶ This presupposes a partnership or collaboration between the different societal players in the fight against poverty. This partnership explains the ability of the Malawi Coalition to mobilise over 2 million people (during the October 17th 2007 *Stand Up and Speak Out Campaign*) which is a fairly sizeable percentage of the total population of Malawi (12.9 million).⁴⁷ Ghimire (2005) has argued that relations between civil society and government can be beneficial. Citing the WTO meeting in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003, he writes:

It was an alliance between civil society groups and powerful governments from developing countries at the Cancun trade negotiations [...] which insisted on the removal of Northern agricultural subsidies and changes in the rules for foreign investment and competition that were unfavourable to developing countries.⁴⁸

However, it needs mention that while such partnerships and collaborations can also be great rallying points as the cases of Malawi and in the WTO trade talks cited above demonstrate, within the GCAP family, it has also been a source of contestations. Boren for instance, stated that there is definitely a tension generated by the question of whether to include the private

⁴³ Kaluzi, S., (2007), interview on 22/10/2007. (Tape recorded). Kaluzi is the Coordinator of GCAP Malawi coalition.

⁴⁴ See for example Duda, T. (2007:37), 'Evaluating the Millennium Development Goals: an African Perspective' in *OSSREA Bulletin* Vol. IV. No2 (June 2007), who argues on a partnership based noting of MDGs implementation.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Population estimates by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFP), available online at <http://www.unfpa.org/profile/malawi.cfm>.

⁴⁸ Ghimire (2005:7), 'The Contemporary Global Social Movements: Emergent Proposals, Connectivity and Development Implications.' Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 19 August 2005, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland.

sector as well as political parties and governments/states in the campaign. This is primarily because of the inherent dangers of such cooperation resulting in co-optations as the case of the role of Oxfam in MPH has demonstrated. A key figure within GCAP, Henri Valot, alludes to inherent tensions generated by GCAP's nature especially on its partnership with the UNMC.⁴⁹

Other tensions according to Boren, are on the nature and composition of GCAP. This is on: a) whether to keep the campaign voluntary or to professionalize it; b) a disjuncture between the radical 'left' with the more middle leaning activists within GCAP; and c) whether to include the youth and workers in the campaign. There is thus, a need to find a middle ground on all these issues. There are many more contestations, about inclusivity of various viewpoints that also needs to be taken into account in building strategic alliances against poverty.⁵⁰

As a result of these contestations, Regina Martyn, a former GCAP mobilisation officer underscores the need to 'dissect and deconstruct who GCAP's constituency is how many they are, and how many are key in the decision making structures. For example, the critical question here would be how many of the mainstream feminist organizations are part of GCAP? This is because as it were, some would be GCAP supporters have opted to stay out because of the apparent GCAP's dominant players' embrace of the private public partnership mantra of the post-Washington consensus (Bond, 2006).⁵¹

Another major issue which has been a source of contention is GCAP's orientation to MDGs. Martyn posited that MDGs are like the lowest common denominators and a focus for anyone with a social conscious.⁵² This had an impact in the rallying of certain groups towards, or against GCAP. Arguably, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, no other issue has elicited as much contentions in GCAP as the MDGs. As such, while MDGs have been the glue that holds different GCAP actors together, it has also been the greatest contested issue on GCAP's identity, politics and policy programming. This contestation continues to be reflected in

⁴⁹ Valot (*op.cit*).

⁵⁰ Boren, S. (2007), interview on 12/10/2007 (Tape recorded). Boren is the CEO of Oxfam Novib (part of the funding group) and one of the three GCAP Co-chairs.

⁵¹ Such CSOs according to Hodkinson, include the Bangkok based anti-globalisation network- Focus on Global South- led by Weldon Bello, a leftist Pilipino academic and activist, as well as 'Jubilee South which has 'taken a consistently more militant view, seeking to pressure national leaders to collectively repudiate the debt' asserting that the trade positions of GCAP do not challenge the WTO-led globalisation process in any forceful way' (Ghimire 2005:6). Interestingly, these organizations were involved in the initial discussions for the formation of GCAP but refused to endorse the minimalist GCAP advocacy issues.

⁵² Martyn (*op.cit*).

GCAP either through attempts by actors like UNMC to mainstream the importance of MDGs in the campaign while some other actors are opposed to this.

However, intense as the contestations on MDGs are, there is an acknowledgement within certain ‘progressive’ civil society actors that the achievement of MDGs will be crucial in narrowing the wealth gap between the North and the South divide.⁵³ Boren argues that the positive thing about GCAP and MDGs has been the mobilisation of citizens of the South who are victims of injustices in the management of global political economy. In the process, some are realising that the situations they face are not insurmountable and that they can do something about it in their own ways. For the people of the North, she posits, there is a feeling created by the MDGs that they can contribute to the betterment of their colleagues’ lives in the South.⁵⁴

Furthermore, MDGs have, because of their indicator focused nature, provided concrete opportunities for citizens to hold their governments accountable. According to Duda (2007:37):

MDGs appear like a change of strategy in approaching “development”. The MDGs entail for one thing focus on outcomes rather than inputs that go into the “development” programmes ... The UN also plans to focus more on partnership based “development” interventions ... These new approaches serve as a sign that the UN experts have realized that “development” has so far failed to deliver and in this sense the new MDGs are thus an admission of previous failures [quotation marks in original].

4.4 THE RESOURCE QUESTION AND THE NORTH- SOUTH DIVIDE

This part deals with other forms of manifestations of pulls and pushes within GCAP that are related to the question of resources. The study sought to investigate ways in which donors have influenced the GCAP alliance. In doing this, the study also sought answers to a proxy question of how the interactions between the Northern and Southern actors have been managed. This is because donors of GCAP are part of the global civil society and a part of GCAP too. Resources are the fuel that runs alliances. Their scarcity or availability affects operations of a network. The ways in which they are availed, and by whom, also has an

⁵³ Boren, (*op.cit*).

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

impact in not only the alliances' nature but also the framing of the issues. Within GCAP, the resource question has manifested itself in the form of the North versus the South divide, and its siamese sister - the donor influence. These have had a bearing on internal democracy and operations within GCAP.

'The one who is suffering from diarrhoea is the one who opens the door.'
(Malawi proverb).

This Malawi proverb was used by Simekina Kaluzi, the coordinator of the GCAP coalition in Malawi in one of my interviews in this study to underscore the primacy of the grassroots and national coalitions especially in poor countries in driving the GCAP campaign. The same is echoed in GCAP's founding Johannesburg Declaration and in subsequent declarations from various GCAP's global platforms. For instance, Beirut Declaration states:

National coalitions are the base for our action and cooperation. National activities are home grown and designed around national priorities and demands. They will continue to build on existing initiatives. Mass mobilization, grassroots advocacy and global solidarity are key to the campaign.⁵⁵

This study sought to ascertain whether there was any disconnect or alignment between the above stated intent and practice. The findings reveal that GCAP has had to contend with challenges of the nature of relationships between its different parts. This is especially on the influence those who provide resources, have had on the alliance. Critics warn that if a balance is not struck, this challenge may result in marginalisation and the eclipsing of the very constituency that trans-national alliances are expected to serve (Abugre, 2005; Bond, 2006; Chomsky, 1999; Cressy, 2007; Hodkinson, 2005). The following discussion highlights the delicate balance and the problems of donor influence in GCAP.

The Role of Donors:

Undeniably, the role of donors in civil society alliances and networks is a tricky one. Donors bring in a whole range of opportunities, but also threats and challenges, to the identity and independence of the networks as well as reshape the contours and directions of accountability. Sometimes secretariat's attention is deflected to focus on donor accountability rather than to members. In some instances, donors and some supporters have tended to 'hijack' the motive for these networks (James and Malunga 2006). Critical lenses were focussed on trying to establish whether donors have had any particular influence in GCAP and how, if they exist,

⁵⁵ Beirut Platform Declaration, (March 15, 2006) in *The Global Call to Action against Poverty Report 2006:52-58*), GCAP, Johannesburg. South Africa.

these have been manifested. According to Naidoo, the issue of resources for any advocacy work is an objective point of division and challenge for any trans-national network and GCAP is no exception.⁵⁶ He however argues that within GCAP, there has been an effort to maintain its image as a Southern driven network in its leadership and policies. However, he states: 'human business being what it is, there are permanent tensions building up on question of who drives the agenda, as well as from the vigilance of those that give us the money [donors].'⁵⁷

The study revealed that there is within GCAP, an eternal vigilance to try to ensure that donors do not hijack the alliance. According to Naidoo, this vigilance comes first by default, from the multiple roles of GCAP funders. This is because GCAP does not have donors of a conventional sense. Its principal donors are Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib, ActionAid International and UNMC who, 'in addition to funding, are also actively involved in the campaign.'⁵⁸ There are thus inherent strategic coherences and points of convergence between GCAP and its funders.⁵⁹ To ensure that there is no undue influence of the funders group within GCAP, Naidoo argues that funders are required, as everybody else is, to float ideas and argue their case on any single issue in the Global Action Forum and nothing guarantees their views get preferential treatment.

There are however, constant threats to the autonomy of the alliance from the most resourced and powerful actors. Hodkinson (2005) makes a case for the possibility of Oxfam's unrivalled financial resources and existing public profile, overwhelming and dwarfing other actors.⁶⁰ This view is corroborated by several of the study participants e.g. Valot, Kaluzi and Uvanga. Valot, for example, revealed that GCAP is supporting Oxfam's policy demands but also presents a third world policy perspective. For him, this also serves to legitimise GCAP's positions in the global arena because these policies and positions are, in his view, well researched and are in many cases compromise positions that have gone through thorough negotiations and are used to rally the rest of the constituency.⁶¹ Whether this is by design or default is hard to tell. However, this observation confirms Keck and Sikkink's (1998)

⁵⁶ Naidoo (*op. cit.*).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* See also Beirut Platform Declaration, (March 15, 2006) in The Global Call to Action against Poverty Report 2006, (p.52-58), GCAP, Johannesburg. South Africa.

⁵⁹ Boren (*op.cit.*). The same views are supported by Naidoo (*op.cit.*), and Waituru (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁰ Hodkinson (June 28, 2005), 'Inside the Murky World of the UK's Make Poverty History Campaign', *Red Pepper, Z Magazine* <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8181>.

⁶¹ Valot (*op.cit.*).

position that trans-national networks involve small but informed and crucial number of activist policy positions from organisations and institutions involved in a given campaign or advocacy role in policy programming and then mobilise for support from other members. If one were to consider the amounts of energies that Oxfam has collectively put into GCAP right from its beginnings, the observation above is clearly a manifestation of donor [Oxfam] influence.

Many participants of this study conceded that existing mechanisms do not necessarily ensure zero donor influence and equal access to spaces and channels of influence for everyone in GCAP.⁶² Indeed, while multiple roles and identity on the part of some of the actors might provide opportunities for a smoother way of function, my analysis reveals that it is also a source of tensions within GCAP. This is especially so, as the weaker and under resourced actors sometimes have to take instructions, albeit, mediated by the negotiations and consultations, that happen in Global Action Forums from the mightier actors.

A complex relationship between GCAP and funders and especially the UNMC exists. This is especially so, because the funders group have, for a while, been pushing for two agendas: a) the mainstreaming of MDGs agenda in GCAP; and b) the formalisation of GCAP as a legal entity.⁶³ This has brought in further contestations between the pro and anti apparent reduction of GCAP to a MDGs campaign. With the imminent incorporation of a GCAP trust, it is understandable to view donors as having a heavy hand in the direction the campaign takes.⁶⁴ Martyn attributes the reason for UNMC's influence to its being the most organised donor with a massive bureaucracy and access to the UN. This is the critical factor for GCAP and the other donors as well.⁶⁵ For her, this is a manifestation of *realpolitik* within GCAP.

A view from the funders' perspective, however, argues that any undue donor influence in GCAP is a product of circumstances. In some instances, other players within GCAP have given the funders group the leeway to steer the direction of the alliance. Boren, for instance, stated the following about the happenings in the May 2007 Montevideo meeting: 'there was a

⁶² Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

⁶³ Valot (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁴ Martyn, (*op.cit.*) further cemented this view of the researcher. The same view is echoed by Uvanga (*op.cit.*). Waituru (*op.cit.*) is of the views that the campaign is overly influenced by donors. He notes that while this 'threatens the sustainability and value of national rooting of the campaign,' as underscored by the Johannesburg, Beirut and Montevideo Declaration, 'it enriches the agenda and builds the capacity of national coalitions in advocacy.'

⁶⁵ Martyn (*ibid.*).

tendency to leave out the difficult tasks of negotiating the future vision of the alliance to the donor groups.’⁶⁶ What is clear therefore is that with time, the funders group have emerged as a dominant force in the alliance. With their pushing for institutionalisation, the view has found support from even the national coalitions.⁶⁷ However for others, this is a ‘betrayal of what GCAP was all about [...], a loose network and an alliance of networks of MDG campaigns, as well as including the trade justice movements and networks.’⁶⁸

For many of the supporters of a formal institution with a legal mandate, this would help in effective management of not only the monetary resources but also of the various other mobilisational resources without overwhelming the host organisation (CIVICUS) and its board to this. This would also ensure better formal horizontal and vertical mutual accountabilities and inclusiveness, as members would have to undergo some vetting unlike the open door system now in place.⁶⁹

Indeed, in the past, there have been aspersions on the accountability and legitimacy of GCAP on the positions it takes on poverty in the global arena on behalf of its constituency. For instance, Waituru acknowledges that GCAP has poorly managed its accountabilities to different stakeholders. He however points the fact that there are efforts to strengthen the national coalitions so as to root the campaign in the national priorities. According to Valot, GCAP has also addressed these through conscious consultation. For example, there was a survey on the future structure of GCAP before the Montevideo meeting. Obviously, Valot is weary of the diversity and multiplicity of the inputs they get, precipitating a need to find a common ground on how to move forward.⁷⁰

What is clear from the scenario described above is that it is impossible to ignore the fact that the funders group may have pushed the institutionalisation agenda too far, to the extent that at times, networks become captives of donor interests (James and Malunga (2006). Despite pursuing this particular angle in my interviews with many of the study participants, their official line was that this was not the case within GCAP. However, the evidence above alludes to an intense funders influence in GCAP. This dominance of the funders group over

⁶⁶ Boren (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁷ Uvanga (*op.cit.*) for instance supports the idea of institutionalisation. The results of a survey done by GCAP just before the Montevideo Global Action Forum meeting were also in favour of institutionalisation even though there was minority dissent on this.

⁶⁸ Valot (*op.cit.*).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ These views were expressed Uvanga (*op.cit.*); Naidoo (*op.cit.*), as well as Boren (*op.cit.*).

other organs and structures within GCAP gives credence to Chomsky's assertion of existence of hegemony of one part of civil society over the other (Chomsky, 1999). It is interesting to note that this hegemony of one part over another is a manifestation not only of funders versus other constituents, but has a North-South dichotomy in it. It should be noted that three of the four main funders of GCAP (Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib, and ActionAid International) are all Northern in origin.

From the forgoing discussion, it is evident that extreme and complex politics are involved in agenda-setting within GCAP. This, complexity is attributable to the loose nature of the alliance. Martyn stated that there is a 'cunny' decentralisation of decision making and actions strategy on certain issues within GCAP that allows some of people and institutions to avoid taking a lead in critical decisions and as such, exonerates them from the same.⁷¹ Hodkinson (2005) and Cressy (2007) report a different experience for GCAP in 2005. They reveal that the MPH UK campaign organisers in 2005 attempted to centralise the campaign with disastrous consequences including the exclusion of voices from the South. Kofi Maluwi Klu, rightly captured the anger and sentiments of many of the excluded Southern voices when he stated of GCAP's apparent lack of southern representatives: 'nothing about us, without us.'⁷² Considering the direction and the outcome of the 2005 G8 summit, one is left with many unanswered 'what if' questions. A fine balance needs to be struck between over-centralisation and fluidity.

In principle the idea of making national coalitions the hub of the alliance is commendable. However, greater efforts will need to be made to ensure an alignment of what is on paper with practice. An alternative is unthinkable if one were to literary take the Malawian proverb at the beginning of this section. The critical question here and perhaps relevant to other trans-national civil society alliances is, can those who suffer from diarrhoea afford to wait for others to come and open the door for them so that they get to help themselves? The simple answer to this is no. However, there might be weaknesses within the Southern actors that require capacity building to redress. The bottom line is that genuine complementarities between the Northern and Southern actors within global networks, needs to be addressed.

⁷¹ Martyn, (*op.cit*).

⁷² Hodkinson (2005), 'Inside the murky world of Make Poverty History', in *Red Pepper*, Z Magazine <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8181>; Joe Cressy, (May 2007), *Celebrity advocacy: A Participatory Analysis of the Make Poverty History Campaign*, School of Public Affairs and Policy Management, Carleton University, Canada. Cressy, 2007, served as a volunteer in GCAP as a mobilisation officer.

4.5. CONCLUSION

This analysis was set against an assertion by Naidoo in my interview with him, that ‘GCAP is not a global campaign against poverty but a call to action against poverty.’ For him, campaigns are centre driven and GCAP is not such because it is an amalgam of different actors with a host of ideologies who have converged in a loosely organised way to challenge the highly organised system of domination that sustains global poverty. This chapter has discussed the strategies that GCAP has marshalled for its work. I have demonstrated that these strategies have been responsible for GCAP’s particular way of operating and in some instances, have been a source of frustrations on efforts and success. Indeed, the diversity within GCAP will always fuel some form of contestations but coherences as well, and that these pose interesting challenges as well as opportunities that any network or alliance has to deal with. I have showed that the centripetal and centrifugal forces within GCAP might hinder progress because it takes time and energy to get to agree. However, they are also sources of strengths as it shows that ‘even people who disagree on certain social issues believe that poverty is such a big thing that they are prepared to work together.’⁷³

As such, despite the shortcomings, and the pulls and pushes, my analysis leads me to agree with those intimately involved in GCAP who stated that there are sufficient synergies within GCAP to sustain the campaign. However, there are genuine fears that the proposed new structure coupled with the fact that the UNMC is busy pushing the MDGs agenda, and sometimes oversimplifying the issues, might lead to loss of enthusiasm from those within GCAP who are fundamentally opposed to the reduction of GCAP to a MDGs campaign.

⁷³ Naidoo (*op.cit.*).

V: CONCLUSIONS

This study aimed at investigating conditions under which global civil society advocacy networks are crafted and how they operate and exercise social power in global governance. This thesis has covered many areas and issues worthy reiterating. Using a case study approach, it has tried to identify, analyse, and document GCAP's experiences, strategies, and challenges in trans-national networking and advocacy.

This analysis was set against an assertion by Kumi Naidoo, the chair of GCAP's International Facilitation Team (IFT) that 'GCAP is not a global campaign against poverty but a call to action against poverty.'¹ For him, campaigns are driven from the centre and GCAP is not such. It is an amalgam of different actors with a host of ideologies and actions that have converged in a loosely organised way, to challenge the highly organised system of domination that sustains global poverty. I posit that operationally, the structures within GCAP have yielded a mixed bag of experiences represented in smooth operations as well as challenges. This has necessitated a need for critical reflections and rethinking at different phases of GCAP's evolution.

GCAP as a global civil society advocacy network is a product of its time. Global civil society has been making an effort to move away from ideological uniformity as a basis of networking (such as the socialist internationals that were born at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries) to particularistic universalism mediated by networking in open spaces like in the World Social Forum, where fluidity and multiplicity of issues, actors, and strategies converge. Networks of this loose nature have created what Evans (2005:37) refers to as 'new possibilities for concatenation among existing trans-national networks as well as adding organisational innovations of [its] own.' Ultimately, networks such as GCAP have become broad enough to transcend issue-specific and group-specific organisations.

Indeed, through networking, GCAP offers its members a platform for leveraging dominant global structures through its oppositional organisation as well as mobilisation of the various groups of people and organisations on various issues that it campaigns on. Even GCAP's most outspoken critics like Patrick Bond, at least agrees with the need for an 'appropriate' model of arriving at 'programmatic and practical strategic unity' although he questions the

¹ Naidoo (2007), interview on 10/10/2007. (Tape recorded).

strategy, that ‘could have the reverse effect [and] organisational demobilization accompanied by lowest-common-denominator analyses and demands’ (Bond *et al* 2005).

In Chapter One, I discussed the background to the research described in this report. I argued that the last few decades have witnessed the emergence of global civil society in global governance. The reasons for this are contested. Some commentators argue that this has been a result of conscious attempts at reorganisation and reorientation of global governance systems towards a participatory nature to include citizen groups mediated by global civil society. I however submit that this has not come without a fight from civil society itself. That these changes have happened after global civil society started calling for reforms of global governance systems and institutions to make them democratic (Commission on Global governance, 1995) cannot be overlooked. One only needs to look a little far back as mid 1980s when there was little to show in the existence of the global civil society in global governance to appreciate this change.

In this thesis, I have argued that global civil society networks have been the agency for advocacy. Several factors have been advanced to account for their emergence. The principal ones include the ‘associational revolution’ of the 1980s and 90s. This, I argue, was an offshoot of the economic neo-liberal globalisation process that resulted in human societies becoming more interconnected. This came with the transformation of electronic communication systems and cuts in the costs of international travel. While this was happening, the central role of state in the development process came under severe criticism as a result of the free market fundamentalist economic policies that were now in the mainstream of economic management and development preached by the Bretton Woods sisters (IMF and World Bank).

I have argued that contemporary global civil society advocacy networks are products of necessity from a process characterised by lapses and failures of both state and market to provide for, and protect the global commons. This has resulted in worsening conditions of the poor in many parts of the world. At the same time, today’s globalised world has seen an increased power and influence of trans-national corporations, with the erosion of individual nation states’ ability to regulate the market. In this scenario, global civil society has evolved to not only contribute to the provision of services and the protection of our global commons, but also to hold to account the acts and powers of both state and business so that they are exercised in a restrained manner.

In Chapter Two, I defined and conceptually operationalised key terms and issues involved in the research by reviewing a variegated body of literature. I also developed a framework from which my analysis is based. In doing this, I identified and analysed the inherent structural, resources and capacity constraints of individual organisations to meet the challenges that come in advocacy work. Global civil society organisations, I argue, have therefore formed alliances and networks to pool resources and confront their collective challenges. Activists often draw powerful support from such networks (Price 2003). Networking not only strengthens particular (individual) organisations, but may also have a broader impact in invigorating the civil society sector. As a result of networking for advocacy, global civil society has become a challenge to the finality of the nation-state and the private sector in both national and international affairs (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Indeed, as Evans (2005) argues, we cannot understand some key outcomes in world politics today, without taking account of the influence of trans-national civil society actors.

This research sought to establish where, within the continuum of ideas in conceptualisation of global civil society, GCAP and its constituents would fall. Further, the research sought to ascertain conditions under which global civil society may either, by design or default, act as a pacifying agency in the maintenance of the hegemonic status or a counter-hegemonic force. Fundamental to understanding GCAP's paradoxes is the fact that it combines both the Gramscian and Polanyian senses. In line with the Gramscian conception, GCAP it tries to combine existing institutional spaces (G8, International Finance Institutions etc) and policy platforms and policies (MDGs), to lobby for a world free of poverty. In doing this, it has enlisted state support in some countries. Here, two examples stand out on the experiences: a) a beneficial relationship in GCAP Malawi coalition where the government even takes part in mobilisations; b) the MPH UK campaign 'smokescreen' made up of big international NGOs of British origin (like Oxfam, ActionAid, etc) as well as smaller activists, NGOs, and celebrities who supported UK government and did not achieve much for all the pomp and drama that went with it.

The loose nature of the alliance has allowed organic anti-systemic ideas to flourish within GCAP. This is as far as the basic objectives for its formation (i.e. to call for action against poverty and global inequality) go. This demonstrates a group not at ease with the status quo and in Polanyian sense, struggles for a dignified life and social protection for the poor. GCAP seeks to change the status quo by calling for a better life for millions of the poor in

developing world to live free from want, and high economic indebtedness arising from a global system that has over the years, heavily exploited and disregarded the plight of the poor. In its framing of advocacy agenda, GCAP has heavily implicated the machinery of the global governance institutions for the current state of things and demanded actions to redress the situation.

I argue that networking has emerged out of necessity based on a number of motivations. These motivations are dealt with in details in Chapter Three. Firstly, donors have been pushing for collective actions so as to demonstrate impact. Here, they encourage and even push CSOs to network and pool resources together. The second motivation for networks is a product of the challenges faced by global civil society that forces them to act strategically through networks. Here, the thesis is that as global civil society has become an increasingly prominent player in development and governance, there have been increasing calls by critics questioning its legitimacy. In addition, there is a challenge for civil society organisations to become effective in their efforts to make significant impacts on the issues they work on. I have also underscored as a motivation, the inherent structural and resources capacity constraints of individual organisations in their work. These scenarios call for global civil society to network and find common grounds for working together in confronting their collective challenges.

The exact origins of GCAP are contested. The contestations are based on the role of Northern and Southern civil society organisations in GCAP's formation. More specifically on the question of whom among the two had a greater role in the formation of GCAP? The findings reveal that there was substantial involvement of Northern CSOs specifically Oxfam and ActionAid who sponsored the workshop on the initial discussion (in Maputo in December 2003). They continue to substantially fund GCAP's activities. Besides funding, these organisations are represented in many of the structures of the alliance. This feature happens due to the fact that Oxfam and ActionAid are not donors in the conventional sense, but are part of the civil society themselves. These multiple identities of some of the actors in GCAP have been sources of tensions at various levels and stages in GCAP's evolution.

There is overwhelming empirical evidence to support the conclusion that the funders group have an upper hand in determining the path that GCAP continues to travel. This is shown at two levels: a) structurally:-as exhibited by the role of donors in pushing for registration of GCAP, and b) programmatically:-as exhibited by the desire of UNMC to place the contested

MDGs at the heart of the GCAP's campaign. Evidence from this research reveals that this is potentially problematic as it might alienate some constituencies. I conclude that despite the symbolic gesture in situating GCAP's secretariat (IFT support team) in the South, the power behind the throne remains in the North. While this is the case, a closer look at the numbers that GCAP's key mobilisation day on October 17th 2007, reveals that of the 43,716,440 people that participated in the *Stand Up and Speak Out* campaign, only a paltry 1.7% (326,641 people) were from the global North.²

The numbers cited above amplify the oft held view that social and economic dynamics in the global order are controlled by a few of Northern countries and its people through global institutions and the social and economic order that goes with it. Past experiences within Make Poverty History in the UK in 2005 attest to this. This will need to be addressed if GCAP wants to, indeed, put those who are the primary sufferers from a distorted global system in charge of the organisation that serves them.

The process of crafting a global civil society network is an intricate one as GCAP's case demonstrates. A lot of negotiations were involved in the process of recruiting allies and in framing of the advocacy issues. The situation is even more complicated in situations where there aren't universal agreements on issue framing and on the strategies for pursuing the issues. This calls for ingenuity in coming up with strategies for crafting of global civil society advocacy networks. Chapters Three and Four have dealt with the intricacies involved in the crafting of GCAP. The findings affirm that there were and still are, many challenges and strategies involved.

Such challenges and strategies, the GCAP case has illustrated, include:

- a) Defining issues in as much a fluid way as possible. The idea is to try as much as possible to come up with a frame of issues that as many players as possible, can be subscribe to. This strategy is illustrated in GCAP's fluid definition of poverty. While this inclusive type of issue framing is desirable as it gets the numbers, it also brings in diversity of actors with varied expectations.
- b) Evolving an effective operations strategy around whether to centralise or decentralise operations and actions. Issues involved include questions of devolution of activities

² These figures are from the official website of the Stand Up campaign and were verified by the Guinness World Records: available online at <http://www.standagainstopoverty.org/en/press/release/oct-18-2007>. Accessed 23/12/2007.

such as mobilisations and determining the levels of autonomy of members and supporters on specific aspects of the campaign. Within GCAP, evidence shows that there is a mix of both centralisation as well as devolution of operations. However, basic frameworks are laid by the various global platforms declarations starting with the Johannesburg Declaration of September 2004. These were subsequently renegotiated and updated in March 2006 in Beirut and in May 2007 in Montevideo. Autonomy on decision making and interpretation of the issues and on the strategies to pursue the goals is guaranteed in the letters of these declarations.

The outcomes of such negotiations do not always reflect what the original architects may have hoped for. Rather, the result has usually been an amorphous ‘one size fits all’ type of organisation and diluted issues. However, the bottom line is to create political opportunities through linking various players from local to global both vertically and horizontally so as to carry out advocacy. As Evans (2005:7) argues, this is a product of necessity, and that:

it is hardly surprising that participants in trans-national campaigns are often what Tarrow (2003) calls rooted cosmopolitans: people whose activism begins with ties to local communities and driven by the desire to improve the lot of members of those communities. A constant dialectic between strategies that speak to local roots and strategies that leverage global connections is fundamental....

I posit that GCAP as a network has been able to challenge her targets in global governance processes. Arguably alliances have become useful, if not imperative for advocacy through the political opportunities created from strengths in numbers and diversity (Kogut’s strategic behaviour motive identified in Chapter Three). I have also posited that networks must utilise already existing or potential opportunities or be able to create them in their advocacy work. Without opportunities, networks may never be heard. Within GCAP, at the time of the Maputo meeting, there was some thinking ahead on opportunities available to the campaign. There were direct opportunities presented by the congruence of three major international events to take place in 2005. These events were the G8 Gleneagles summit (July), the Millennium + 5 Summit in New York (September) and the WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong (December). In addition, the Beijing +10 and the Cairo +5 were scheduled for the same year (GCAP Report 2006:7).

In Chapter Three, the report delved into GCAP’s origins, evolutionary path, and its architecture. The findings reveal that GCAP was a reactive initiative hinged on MDGs. The impetus for GCAP’s formation however, cannot be fully explained by MDGs. The MDGs

were used as a rallying tool amidst a significant realignment of the global community agenda from MDGs to the war on terror in post 9/11 terrorist bombing in America. But MDGs were quite contentious within global civil society because of their minimalist nature. However, in the context of shifting global agenda, even some of the ardent critics softened on the realisation that while the MDGs were minimalist, a half loaf was better than none. They therefore chose to work together through GCAP, to try and steer back the global agenda to developmental goals.

An analysis of GCAP in Chapter Three and Four reveals that global civil society advocacy networks are not made up of neat coherent parts, strategies, structures and operations. Instead, the diversity of members and support has brought in, not only political opportunities, but indeed, a multitude of challenges to operations and effectiveness. The challenges for GCAP, I have demonstrated, were right from the start and manifested in issue framing and alignment. I therefore contrasted different opinions on what GCAP's orientation to MDGs might portend for the wider development goals. Evidence has ranged from those who support MDGs because they offer a starting point such as Oxfam Novib's Sylvia Boren; and also those of the view that MDGs offer concrete opportunities for citizens to hold their governments into account because of the goal oriented nature which is easy to monitor (such as Waituru of GCAP Kenya). I have also looked at the evidence from those opposed to GCAP's orientation to MDGs arguing that they may distract attention from the real development goals. These include Patrick Bond who faults GCAP, and its mainstream civil society constituency (Oxfam, ActionAid, CIVICUS and others) of suffering from delusions in the directions of their gaze, in targeting the international governance institutions and Third World elites, and taking it for granted that these are the solution, and not part of the problem (Bond, 2006:116). I conclude that these extremes need to be balanced.

I posit that considering the wording of the different declarations (Johannesburg, Beirut, Montevideo), GCAP has the potential to undermine the existing hegemony and their attendant exclusions and create a much fairer world. However, it has not achieved much in this regard. In many instances, even the concessions and promises that it has managed to get from its advocacy activities have been criticised as too little too late.

Further evidence leads me to conclude that leaders of the rich countries seem deaf to advocacy by GCAP and others global civil society actor. It might, of necessity then, require GCAP to change its approaches and activities. This is because evidence from constant

activities in the last three years of GCAP's advocacy points out that simply operating within the confines of legally demarcated spaces and means might not yield much. This calls for a more radical approach in GCAP advocacy work. In fact, it seems like this is the language that the international governance institutions seem to understand best. In deed, there is already recognition that this has been a more effective strategy. There are many examples from the past that attest to this: Seattle in 1999, Cancun in 2004, Genoa in 2001 among others.³ Other scholars have also come to the same conclusion.⁴ This line of thinking might finally find its way in GCAP if the words of Naidoo are anything to go by:

It might be that come 2010, if our voices are not heard, and governments have not acted with the urgency that the situation calls for, then I would see a different phase and it might come before 2010. Personally, I think the time is right... But if we in deed got this way, the passive resistance component needs to be there but we might need to consciously engage with passive resistance that breaks the law.⁵

However, an objective analysis reveals that GCAP is far from doing such a thing. It will first need to build strong grassroots capacity as well as getting strong political allies in the mainstream of global politics and in the words of Kumi, 'not just with the leftists and the people in the South. Rather, it should be people like Mary Robinsons or the Bill Clinton who have better access to the corridors of the powers that be, and can be able to tell world leaders, you know what, these guys can be a bit rough sometimes, but you cannot disagree with what their demands are.'⁶ However, critics would argue that seeking alliances with the likes of Clinton would fundamentally undermine any radical project aimed at eradicating poverty. It is surely this contradiction that bedevils the work of GCAP.

The above proposition by Naidoo led me to interrogate further those ideas. As a starting point, considering the idea of adapting a more radical approach were to be mainstreamed, what would be the implications that GCAP would have to grapple with? Would UNMC, given its links to the UN system, yet it is one of GCAP's principle donors and actors, be prepared to endorse such an approach? Would other major funders like Oxfam, given their

³ In all these meetings there were massive global civil society protests against global trade rules.

⁴ This is discussed in greater details in chapter 2. See for example, Perlas 2001 and Munck 2006 on arguments on protests by global civil society power to determine outcomes of such conferences.

⁵ Naidoo, K., interview on 10/10/2007 (Tape recorded). He clarified that these were his personal views and do not reflect ideas and positions in GCAP. I probed and prompted others on this idea with other of the study participants from GCAP. Imata held that they had not given such thoughts a chance but situations should definitely define strategies.

⁶ *Ibid.*

profiles and close links with governments in the West from where they get their own funding, be also prepared to take and support such a position? Would they participate if called up to do so? Would GCAP be willing to divorce itself from such groups and continue on its own?

It should be further noted that such a strategy would require closer ties with open and democratic regimes in the global South that will guarantee citizens rights to peaceful assembly and protests. At the moment, I doubt there are sufficient conditions to enable this happen in the foreseeable future. Further, considering the current directions in the future of GCAP, it seems highly unlikely that this might be an option. If anything, institutionalisation is likely to result to further alienation of the grassroots and radical constituencies as actions and strategies get more centralised. This will be a danger. As Evans (2005:7) warns, ‘without the promise of redressing the grievances of ordinary people where they live, trans-national social movements have no base and their capacity to challenge established power is limited.’

Another critical infrastructural necessity for networks covered in this thesis is structures. Structures are the oil that runs and sustains global civil society networks. The rationale in GCAP’s structures is to ensure that the campaign remains hinged on the actions and strategies of the national coalitions who form global policy making organ (the Global Action Forum). The governance and operational structure (IFT and IFT support team) gets directions on what to do and how to do it from this Global Action Forum. A complex set of relationships also exists between the different structures. On the whole, these structures have been evolving in their complexity with time depending of the stages (phases) of GCAP's development.

By looking at the structures, I have argued and demonstrated that the loose nature of the GCAP alliance has been a positive contributor in mass mobilisation. But it has had a downside as well. The loose nature of the alliance coupled with lack of clear lines of accountability has caused a lot of frustrations from a slow nature of decision making and actions. This has in effect called for a more bureaucratised and institutionalised architecture to redress some of these shortfalls. However, I have also argued that there are potential dangers to the alliance from a more bureaucratised structure. Indeed, I have demonstrated that it has become a source of one of the contestations within GCAP which are the central focus in Chapter Four.

This study also looked at lessons that can be gleaned from GCAP’s experiences and what they may mean for the future of the global advocacy networks and especially the anti-poverty

movement. The key learning identified from GCAP's evolution, structures and strategies, I posit, is that in a network, it is not possible to push for individual positions without compromising and diluting them. To effectively participate in a network, individual organisations and activists must accommodate other peoples view points.

Keck and Sikkink (1998:2) have argued that the 'novelty and relevance of trans-national networks lies in their ability to mobilise information strategically to help create new issues, and categories to pressure, persuade and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations and governments.' GCAP's achievements in doing this can be judged at two levels: a) firstly, by looking at the policy demands that GCAP has made and whether they have been met even partially; and b) secondly, on a long term perspective, GCAP building and consolidating of a broad based antipoverty movement. There is guarded caution as to what GCAP has been able to achieve in terms of the policy demands it has been making. GCAP's activists argue that they have contributed to some of the policy changes and this is indicative of their success. For them, GCAP has contributed to the legitimising the idea of 100% debt cancellations even though no country has benefited from it yet. Further, they got commitments from the G8 and EU in 2005 to double their aid by 2010. However, on the whole, greater scrutiny is needed before GCAP one can attribute any policy changes on the issues of aid and debt cancellation solely to any of GCAP's actions or to its significant contributions.

GCAP's experiences have also served to demonstrate that despite the contestation between actors, global civil society can chose to work together on commonly agreed baselines. Within GCAP, these baselines are found in the declarations developed from the various Global Action Forums the IFT organises for the purposes of consultations. I therefore, conclude that despite the inherent tensions and paradoxes, the present and future ability of global civil society in effectively participating in the contestations and the fortifications within the global governance structures, lies in their collective willingness to stand and work together. Unless they find a level of unity within their diversity, and can treat diversity as strength and not a weakness, they cannot succeed in what they are doing. Of course, as Bond (2006) argues, it is not at all easy to interlock the already varying actors into a coherent political approach.

Further, GCAP has managed to build a conscience on the part of many CSOs and people on the need to actively participate in advocating for global social and economic justice. This has happened through mobilisation and targeted interventions in a north-south partnership. It has

also created spaces for participatory governance system for different civil society players to play an active role especially at national levels. However, the unequal relations between the north-south partners will need to be addressed if GCAP is to continue operating as a truly southern led network. In conclusion, GCAP has managed to create an impression that a group of private individuals can organise, mobilise and get hearing from powerful institutions like the G8. This is truly a reflection of global civil society alliances' growing influence.

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