

# The Russia–Ukraine war, the evolving global order, the Global South and emergence of non-alignment 2.0

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## Abstract

The conclusion to the special section argues that the Russia-Ukraine war has led to the emergence of non-alignment 2.0 in the Global South because the Cold War era non-alignment is anachronistic in the current/emerging world order. Non-alignment 2.0 is characterised by countries exercising strategic autonomy to maximise their geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests. They are neither aligned with the West nor with non-western powers forming a strategic alliance. Consequently, they have been unwilling to choose a side in the Russia-Ukraine war. In non-alignment 2.0, states in the Global South will be critical of both the West and non-western powers including China and Russia if they are unable to provide effective solutions to their problems and will create/provide their own norms and establish their own institutions to solve the problems facing these countries. Non-alignment 2.0 lacks coherence because it is unable to provide an effective political and economic path.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on the Global South—a group of diverse developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania which have taken common policy positions in international affairs and multilateral/minilateral organisations—from the perspective of the Russia–Ukraine war. It argues that the Russia–Ukraine war has led to the creation of a new non-alignment or non-alignment 2.0 in the Global South.

The non-alignment 2.0 which has emerged after the Russia–Ukraine war is different from the non-alignment 2.0 which was postulated by Indian scholars and practitioners in 2012 in a report published by a think-tank in India. It identifies and prescribes principles which should guide India's foreign policy and strategic posture for the coming decade. The Indian iteration of non-alignment is confined only to India and the report does not state that other countries should also ascribe to these principles and guidelines (Khilnani et al., 2012).

The new non-alignment which has materialised as a consequence of the Russia–Ukraine war is an analytical construct which conceptualises the actions of the countries in the Global South. It is not prescriptive

and does not provide policy or strategic guidelines to countries in the Global South. Non-alignment postulated in this article is characterised by countries in the Global South exercising strategic autonomy to maximise their geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests. They are unaligned with the West and also with non-western powers such as China and Russia. Some countries in the Global South have condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, some have espoused a neutral position and some have supported Russia. But criticism of Russia does not automatically imply support for or siding with the West. Countries in the Global South are disillusioned with the western liberal order. They feel alienated and disassociated with the western order. They want to reform and restructure it to have an increasing say in global affairs, increase economic growth and development, and enhance influence and status.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the origins of non-alignment and the non-alignment movement (NAM). It distinguishes between non-alignment the theory, and non-alignment the policy/strategy. It highlights the key features of non-alignment and the rationale for the formation of the

NAM. It also illustrates that in the new millennium, the NAM has become anachronistic. The following section focuses on the Global South's discontent with the US-led western liberal international order. It argues that the Global South is ambivalent and even hostile towards the Russia–Ukraine war because of the West's, especially the US', hypocrisy regarding sovereignty, the prospect of a nuclear war, and the damage caused to the global development agenda by the war. The third section focuses on the emergence of non-alignment 2.0 after the war in Ukraine. It highlights the key tenets of non-alignment 2.0 with countries exercising strategic autonomy to maximise their domestic and international goals and objectives. It highlights the differences between non-alignment 1.0, non-alignment 2.0 and active non-alignment (ANA). It also illustrates that non-alignment 2.0 lacks coherence because it is unable to offer an economic and political path to the Global South. The conclusion summarises the argument, compares and contrasts non-alignment 1.0 and non-alignment 2.0, and provides some prescriptions for policy.

## 2 | NON-ALIGNMENT 1.0 AND THE NAM

The theory/ideology of non-alignment emerged after the end of WWII with leaders of post-colonial countries in Asia and Africa focusing on the conduct of international relations in the new environment. They were concerned about colonialism and imperialism and sought independence of Asian and African countries from the colonial/imperial yoke. Leaders from post-colonial countries articulated their perceptions and aspirations without prior discussion. For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru in India, Marshall Josip Broz Tito in former Yugoslavia and Sukarno/Soekarno in Indonesia, all thought along the lines that the creation of justice and peace in their own region would be a harbinger for justice and peace globally. They promulgated and sought emancipation of people across the world, equality of all races, no class exploitation and no neo-colonialism. These assertions and themes later became the key tenets of non-alignment (Frangonikolopoulos, 1995; Singh, 1993).

Non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy/policy emerged after the end of the Korean War in 1953 with India, Yugoslavia and other countries unwilling to join either of the two blocs led by the US and the Soviet Union. The post-colonial countries were apprehensive of ideological expansion in their own societies fearing that wars/conflicts would compromise their sovereignty. They wanted to retain maximum choice in exercising their foreign policy. Consequently, the Bandung conference was held in 1955 in Indonesia. It led to the 10-point Bandung Declaration, which sought to strengthen Afro-Asian unity and cooperation, and world peace.

The Bandung Declaration incorporated elements of the United Nations (UN) charter and the five principles of peaceful coexistence.<sup>1</sup>

The above principles became the key principles of the NAM at the inaugural summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1961 with Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia playing a leading role. The NAM eschewed direct involvement not only with the two superpowers but also with each other. Thus, NAM member states also tended to be non-aligned with other NAM members and advocated peaceful resolution of conflicts. The NAM was diverse, had an ambiguous membership criterion, and any country which was independent and was not a part of a multilateral military alliance was allowed to join (Frangonikolopoulos, 1995; Singh, 1993).

The NAM also sought economic development including economic aid, better terms for trade and removal and avoidance of economic domination which led to the formation of G77 (group of developing countries) in 1964. In the 1970s and 1980s, the NAM's agenda transformed from East–West polarity to North–South economic divide with calls for the New International Economic Order in the 1970s (Frangonikolopoulos, 1995; Namboodiri, 1980; Singh, 1993).

Non-alignment meant achieving 'strategic autonomy' – that is a state could pursue an independent foreign policy without being dependent on another state. The objective was maximising a country's national interests with the country able to adopt a position which safeguarded its interests, whether they were in line with one bloc or the other, or with neither of the two. It also did not imply equidistance from the two superpowers and the two blocs (Grant, 1995; Subrahmanyam, 1988).

Non-alignment was a preferred strategy for most of the post-colonial countries because it maximised their security relative to entering into an alliance with either superpower. It allowed member states to receive military and economic aid from both superpowers without taking sides and to bargain with both superpowers and get the best of both worlds (Bell, 1963; Frangonikolopoulos, 1995; Subrahmanyam, 1988).

The NAM came under increasing stress and faced a legitimacy crisis in the 1970s, 1980s and after the end of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup> However, despite the stresses, the crisis of legitimacy and contradictions in the foreign policy of most of the NAM member states, more and more countries in the developing world valued the NAM and wanted to join it (Frangonikolopoulos, 1995). The NAM has continued to exist because it 'symbolises and to a certain degree operationalises the "solidarity of the less powerful in global affairs"' (Ibid., 62–63).

In the new millennium, the NAM meets regularly. The second and the third Bandung conferences were held in 2005 and 2015 respectively. Both conferences sought to deepen South–South economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation and promote world peace. However, in the new millennium, the NAM has lost its

efficacy for numerous reasons,<sup>3</sup> but the most important factor is that non-alignment as an ideology is moribund. At the 2012 NAM summit, only 35 heads of states out of 120 member states attended the summit. At the 2016 summit in Venezuela, only 10 heads of states attended the summit (Pant, 2017).

Around the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the NAM has started to gain relevance again because criticism of western policies has become a core theme of discussion across many governments in the Global South. It has also become a forum to discuss some of the most pressing problems in global affairs. The 2019 NAM summit in Baku, Azerbaijan was attended by representatives of circa 160 countries and international organisations (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2019).

### 3 | GLOBAL SOUTH'S DISCONTENT WITH THE WEST AND AMBIVALENCE/HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE WAR

Discontent among countries in the Global South against the US-led Western liberal order (liberal in name but illiberal by action) was brewing even before the Russia–Ukraine war. There was a widespread belief in the countries in the Global South that the current world order is unable to meet their socio-economic, political and strategic needs/interests. The Russia–Ukraine war has exacerbated these countries' disenchantment with the West led by the US, with the countries in the Global South exhibiting ambivalence and even hostility towards the war for three reasons.

First, the West's, especially the US', duplicity regarding violation of sovereignty, be it the invasion of Iraq in 2003, military interventions in Libya and Syria for regime change, tepid response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, support for a Saudi Arabia led coalition in the Yemen conflict, and the conflict in Gaza. The unwillingness of the West to practice the principles which they preach has made the Western protests in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war hollow (Miliband, 2023).

Second, the possibility of a nuclear war. The US and its allies have provided economic and financial assistance, military aid, critical intelligence and trained Ukraine's military which has prolonged the war and made it difficult for Russia to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. As the Kremlin's war plans have gone awry, President Vladimir Putin has time and again threatened to use nuclear weapons in the war to create fissures in the trans-Atlantic alliance over the provision of assistance to Ukraine. This has sent alarm bells across the world with Brazil and Ghana stating in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that since 2020, nuclear disarmament has gone into reverse. There are also concerns about a nuclear accident on a scale similar to or greater than

Chernobyl in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power facility in eastern Ukraine which has been occupied and controlled by Russian forces (Alden, 2023).

Third, the damage the war and its prolongation has caused to the global development agenda and the creation of socio-economic and political instability in countries in the Global South. Some countries in the Global South have also been negatively impacted by sanctions imposed on Russia which limited trade and other commercial exchanges with Russia leading to lower economic growth rates in some countries in the Global South. Initially, the war led to a rise in the price of oil and gas, fertilisers, food items and other essential commodities which exacerbated poverty in these countries (see contributions, special section). Circa 80 low- and middle-income countries are at the risk of debt distress due to inflationary pressures caused by the increase in energy prices as a consequence of the war which also contributed to interest rate hikes. Approximately, 75% of these countries are also vulnerable to the impact of climate change. These countries are at the precipice of social and economic disaster due to an unfair international financial architecture coupled with increasing debt and the climate crisis, with these countries forced to choose between saving lives and debt servicing (Vasic-Lalovic et al., 2023).

Thus, countries in the Global South have called for an end to the war. Many in the Global South consider this war as a European war which does not concern them. They are not concerned with who the guilty party is. They are not concerned with human rights violations and the loss of territory in the war. They are not concerned with global issues, but more focused on issues and problems which they faced before the war, as a result of the war and those which have been exacerbated by the war (see contributions, special section).

### 4 | NEW NON-ALIGNMENT OR NON-ALIGNMENT 2.0

This section highlights the emergence of new non-alignment or non-alignment 2.0 in the Global South in the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine war. Some countries in the Global South have taken a neutral position in the war, but their neutrality is nuanced (see contributions, special section). Some of these countries have neither condemned Russia for invading Ukraine nor condoned the war. More importantly, voting against Russia by countries in the Global South does not imply supporting the West and its hegemonic position. The Global South wants an end to the war and most of the countries have been unwilling to provide arms to either side (Haddad, 2023). They have been unwilling to toe the West's narrative on the war and have been unwilling to impose sanctions on Moscow (see contributions, special section). According to the International Crisis Group (2023), 'Most non-European

countries that voted to deplore Russia's aggression last March did not follow up with sanctions. Doing the right thing at the UN can be an alibi for not doing much about the war in the real world'. It would suffice to say that the Global South wants to disassociate itself from the West's response to the war, although the median position in the Global South blames Russia for its aggression towards Ukraine. Overall, the Global South is unwilling to choose a side in the war. This has ushered in an era of neo-non-alignment or non-alignment 2.0 with growing resentment in the Global South against the liberal international order and the US-led West's hypocrisy (Alden, 2023).

#### 4.1 | Non-alignment 2.0

Non-alignment 2.0 has emerged as a result of the Russia–Ukraine war and it fits the entirety of the Global South. However, the non-alignment of the Cold War era is anachronistic in the current world order which is increasingly dispersed, if not fragmented. Moreover, non-alignment as an ideology and strategy has lost efficacy because of the emergence of a multipolar world order that is increasingly characterised by 'fluid allegiances, blocs, foreign policy groups such as the BRICS and others as well as ad hoc coalitions' (Introduction, special section). This has led to a new non-alignment or non-alignment 2.0 with countries in the Global South unwilling to join an alliance with the West or other major/global powers.

In non-alignment 2.0, countries are neither willing to overthrow the western liberal international order nor are they willing to accept an alternative to that order. Thus, they are unaligned with the West and also with other major/global powers including China and Russia. What countries in the Global South want is reform and restructuring of the liberal international order in line with realities of the current world, into an order which can cater to their socio-economic, political and strategic interests. States in the Global South want a greater say in global affairs. But the West has been unwilling to reform the world order that it spawned, be it the reform of the UNSC, the IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. Only minimalistic changes were made to IMF quotas which is akin to window dressing rather than substantive changes. Thus, countries in the Global South feel alienated or disassociated with the present liberal world order.

In non-alignment 2.0, states in the Global South have adopted a policy/strategy of strategic autonomy which allows the states to follow an independent foreign policy—which is not dependent or influenced by the West or other major/global powers—to maximise their national interests. They are pursuing policies/strategies to find solutions to the problems they face. Thus, non-alignment 2.0 is a foreign policy strategy adopted by countries in the Global South. The position

taken by some countries in the Global South is reminiscent of the position taken by countries in Asia and Africa (under the rubric of the NAM) during the Cold War when these countries did not want to choose between the two blocs.

Contributions in the special section highlight that states have adopted a policy of neutrality in the Russia–Ukraine war and have been unwilling to criticise Moscow despite pressure from the US and the West because criticism impinges on their national interests. For instance, India has refrained from criticising Moscow because it believes that it will have an adverse impact on its national security. India is dependent on Russian weapons platforms and this will continue for decades. Moreover, Moscow is a reliable arms supplier. Concerns regarding Russia's strengthening relations with China and Pakistan have also influenced New Delhi's decision (also see Verma, 2023a). Indonesia's neutrality towards the war is also influenced by its strategic ties with Russia and the modernisation of its armed forces in which Moscow will play a key role (contribution, special section). Egypt has also taken a middle ground to avoid antagonising Russia and the West because it needs both for its economic growth and development and national security (contribution, special section). On the other hand, Brazil and South Africa have been critical of the West too. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has blamed both President Putin and President Zelensky for the war, and the West for fuelling the war by providing military and financial assistance to Ukraine (contribution, special section). President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa has blamed the West for the war in Ukraine because of NATO's eastward expansion and not recognising Russia's legitimate security concerns (contribution, special section).

As part of strategic autonomy, countries in the Global South have not supported imposition of sanctions against Russia in the UN. They have respected the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia but have not adopted them formally (see contributions, special section). For instance, Argentina refused to impose sanctions on Russia and did not endorse the provision of arms to Ukraine. Brazil stated that it would vote against a UN resolution which imposes sanctions on Russia. It also stated that it will not support a resolution which allows the provision of arms to either party as it will only prolong the war. Brazil has continued to import fertilisers from Russia to sustain the agricultural sector and commodity exports. Egypt also refused to impose sanctions on Russia. Indonesia has continued to import fertilisers from Russia to safeguard its food security. Russian exports of semi-finished iron, refined petroleum, asbestos, briquettes and coal are crucial for Indonesia's development. India has refused to impose sanctions on Russia and has continued to buy discounted oil from Russia despite criticism and

pressure from the US and the European Union not to do so. It has also failed to abide by the oil price cap imposed by the West. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly rebuffed the US, its ally, and has helped Russia to garner oil revenues by cooperating with Moscow in OPEC+ and by cutting oil production.

Contributions to the special section also highlight that countries in the Global South have sought to mediate in the war and have called for an end to the war for varying reasons—including geoeconomics, geostrategic and geopolitical—as they exercise strategic autonomy to achieve their national interests. For instance, the mission of African head of States under the leadership of South Africa travelled to Kyiv and Moscow trying to directly mediate between the two parties because of the adverse impact of the war on the socio-economic stability of these countries due to a spike in food prices. Egypt too sought to act as a mediator to reduce the economic hardships faced by its citizens and countries in the Global South. Indonesia's President Joko Widodo wanted to mediate and bring an end to the war to ensure the efficacy of Jakarta's G-20 chairmanship and for his domestic political agenda focusing on economic developmental priorities. Saudi Arabia's offer to act as a mediator was influenced by its ambition to establish itself as a rising power in global affairs and achieve domestic, regional and international goals. India is apprehensive that the war is reducing Russia's comprehensive national power and reducing its role in global affairs. A weakened/diminished Russia is not in India's interests because it will strengthen China–Russia relations with Russia playing the role of a junior partner or a vassal state which will undermine India's geopolitical and geostrategic interests, and undermine its national security (Verma, 2023b).

## 4.2 | Non-alignment 1.0 versus non-alignment 2.0

Non-alignment 2.0 is different from its previous iteration. In non-alignment 2.0, there is the absence of the formation of opposing blocs or coalitions unlike in non-alignment 1.0. This can be attributed to the lack of direct power of both the US and Russia especially the lack of material capabilities on Russia's part relative to the US and through the offer of public goods. Second, there is a less ideologized framework relative to non-alignment 1.0 wherein there was a contest between capitalism and socialism/communism, with both superpowers promulgating the superiority of their own political and economic systems based on their receptive ideological stance. Third, the current world order is characterised by multipolarity unlike during the Cold War which was characterised by bipolarity. In non-alignment 2.0,

these states are alienated from the current world order. They are seeking solutions and pursuing their own policies/strategies instead of focusing on global issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war. They are exercising 'strategic autonomy' to maximise their national interests. Moreover, like its predecessor, non-alignment 2.0 lacks coherence, and has been unable to articulate or highlight a clear economic or political path or trajectory.

## 4.3 | Active non-alignment

ANA borrows from non-alignment 1.0. It is also influenced by scholars such as Juan Carlos Puig and Helio Jaguaribe belonging to the 'autonomy school' in Latin American International Relations. ANA accepts that there has been a shift in the economic centre of gravity from the West towards the East especially due to China's rise, and a shift in wealth from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific in the new millennium (Heine, 2022).

ANA first emerged in 2020 as a consequence of two factors. First the geopolitical contest for primacy between the US and China. Fortín et al. (2023) are of the opinion that the contest for international primacy between Washington and Beijing is the beginning of the Second Cold War, contrary to Christensen (2021) who has argued that there will be no Cold War between the US and China. Latin America faces a dilemma because it is pressured to choose a side. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc throughout the world, but Latin America with 8% of the world population and 30% of global deaths was more severely affected (Fortín et al., 2023). Hence, Fortín et al. (2020, 2023) proposed ANA for Latin America as a region. They contend that under ANA, countries in Latin America should strengthen regionalism, reorient their country's foreign policy to the global realities, understanding the rise of China and the existence of new international financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and maintaining equidistance from China and the US and refusing to align automatically with any major power (Fortín et al., 2020). Thus, governments in Latin America should seek to maximise their own interests and adopt a flexible approach à la India in an increasingly interdependent and globalised world (Fortín et al., 2020; Heine, 2022).

Heine (2022) argues that ANA is not limited to Latin America. The reaction to the Russia–Ukraine war in countries in Asia and Africa highlights that it has gained traction in this part of the world where the NAM was born. The initial ANA was primarily a result of the US–China Cold War, but 'the current U.S.–Russia conflict playing out in Ukraine has its own features, which are different from the former, but does

share some common elements, including what has been dubbed “the West versus the Rest” dynamics’ (Heine, 2022: 4).

#### 4.4 | ANA versus non-alignment 2.0

Non-alignment 2.0 shares some characteristics with ANA but is also different in certain respects. For instance, both postulate that states should pursue policies to preserve their strategic autonomy to maximise their national interests and should remain equidistant from great powers. However, ANA postulates that there are two great powers or superpowers namely the US and China, and there is the prevalence of a new Cold War, and countries in Latin America should not take sides and maintain equal distance between the two countries. Non-alignment 2.0 provides a better and more realistic perspective because it postulates that the current world order is multipolar and there are multiple major/great powers in the international system. Moreover, ANA emerged before the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war, whereas non-alignment 2.0 emerged after the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war. Third, ANA is confined to Latin America although Heine (2022) has argued that it is also applicable to countries in Asia and Africa. Non-alignment 2.0 is more holistic and is applicable to all the countries in the Global South as illustrated by contributions in the special section.

#### 4.5 | Non-alignment 2.0 lacks coherence

The new avatar of non-alignment (also) lacks coherence. The NAM comprising 120 states has failed to establish a uniform position on various issues including the war in Ukraine. Some states in the Global South have been split over the Russia–Ukraine war in the UN: some condemning Russia, some supporting Russia and some espousing neutrality. South Africa could only muster the support of 50 countries from the Global South/NAM for a resolution it drafted for humanitarian support for Ukraine in the UN while excluding any censure of Russia (Menon, 2023). Similarly, there is no unanimity in the African Union (see contribution, special section) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Verma & Düben, 2024).

Non-alignment 2.0 is also unable to offer a suitable economic path for the Global South. Countries in Global South need both the West and non-western major powers like China and Russia for economic growth and development, to improve the standard of living of their people and for combating global economic challenges. Moreover, approximately 80 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are suffering from a debt crisis which has also limited the ability of the Global South to chart out an independent economic path.

A coherent political path is also unviable as the era of bipolarity is over. In a multipolar and globalised world, with separate systems, and a high level of economic and political interdependence, traditional balancing is not possible. For instance, BRICS forum comprising China, a non-western power, and countries from the Global South, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other minilateral and multilateral sub-regional, regional and trans-regional groups, forums and institutions. Despite the Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese troops in June 2020 which led to casualties on both sides and the ongoing border standoff between India and China along the disputed border, BRICS has not become dysfunctional. India is still a member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and continues to receive loans from the AIIB for development projects (Verma, 2024).

## 5 | CONCLUSION

The Russia–Ukraine war is set to transform the world order. There is a lack of consensus among scholars, analysts and policymakers on whether the global order will transition to a multipolar or bipolar one or from a bipolar or multipolar one to a multiplex one. This article has argued that the Russia–Ukraine war has led to the emergence of non-alignment 2.0 in the Global South because the Cold War era non-alignment 1.0 is not viable in the current and emerging world order.

The new non-alignment shares some similarities but is also different from its previous avatar, non-alignment 1.0, and ANA. In non-alignment 1.0, states were non-aligned with either bloc. They chose not to take sides. In non-alignment 2.0, the states are also not taking sides. However, the world order is multipolar or moving towards multipolarity rather than a bipolar world order, there is less ideologized framework relative to the Cold War era and there is no formation of opposing blocs or coalitions. Unlike ANA, non-alignment 2.0 is a consequence of the Russia–Ukraine war, is not confined to Latin America and is more representative of the Global South.

In non-alignment 2.0, Global South states feel alienated and disassociated with the current western liberal order. They do not want to topple the western liberal international order but seek reform and restructuring of this order to meet their socio-economic, political and strategic goals and combat global challenges especially climate change. In non-alignment 2.0, states in the Global South will be critical of both the West and non-western powers including China and Russia if they are unable to provide effective solutions to their problems and will create/provide their own norms and establish their own institutions to solve the problems facing these countries.

Additionally, both non-alignment 1.0 and non-alignment 2.0 lack coherence. Non-alignment 1.0 was interpreted by different NAM members in different ways. India maintained that it was non-aligned even after signing the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971 which was a de-facto alliance between the two countries against Pakistan and China in South Asia. Non-alignment 2.0 is unable to provide an effective political and economic path because more than half of the Global South is suffering from or at risk of a debt crisis, which it can be argued, has been exacerbated by the Russia–Ukraine war. Moreover, traditional balancing is not possible in a globalised world order, with high levels of economic interdependence, and where coalitions, allegiances and alignments are constantly changing.

All three iterations of non-alignment stress on the policy/strategy of strategic autonomy to maximise a country's national interests. All three emphasise the non-exclusion of blocs, maintaining equidistance with the West and major/global powers, with states striving to achieve their domestic, regional and global goals. Thus, in non-alignment 2.0, the foreign policy of states in the Global South is likely to become more tactical and/or pragmatic and/or transactional in nature vis-à-vis the West and other states. The more the West and other major/global powers force countries in the Global South to pick sides, the more they will gravitate towards non-alignment characterised by strategic autonomy. The West and the major/global powers should take note.

## CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors report no conflict of interest.

## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The five principles are peaceful co-existence, equality and co-operation for mutual benefit, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, mutual non-aggression and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are stated in the Sino-Indian agreement signed in 1954.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed discussion see Namboodiri (1980); Rana (1987); Singh (1993); Subrahmanyam (1980).

<sup>3</sup>For a detailed discussion see Patrick (2012).

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