C\ H I S I O R V W O R K S H O P
 A( THE WITWATERSRAND: LABOUR, TOWNSHIPS AND PATTERNS OF PROTEST
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG
 3-7 FEBRUARY 1978
 AUTHOR: Sean Moroney
 (University of the Witwatersrand, SA Institute of Race
 Relations)
 TITLE: The Development of the Compound as a
 Mechanism of Worker Control 1900-1912
 MOT TO BE QUOTgD. REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED WITHOUT PERMISSION 0? THE APTHOR
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 In this paper I wish to describe the development of mine compounds on the
 Witwatersrand after the South African War and to highlight the central role
 they came to play in the process of labour extraction. The compound provides
 a useful focus of the labour system on the Witwatersrand over this period
 by linking state sponsored mechanisms of labour control (the pass laws,
 masters and servants act and labour recruiting) with the internal processes
 of the individual mines (control, discipline and coercion).
 INTRODUCTION
 The years following the South African war saw a decided qualitative change
 in the Witwatersrand's many mine compounds. Symptomatic of the period of
 more efficient exploitation fostered under the Milner adminstration, and
 particularly as a result of the strict controls introduced for Chinese
 labour from 1904 onwards, the compounds came to resemble more closely the
 effective institutions of worker control that were to dominate the South
 African migrant labour system throughout the century.(1)
 In the years immediately following the South African war there were dramatic
 changes in Che labour market of Southern Africa. A number of factors,
 including the growth of alternative, more attractive, work opportunities,(2)
 induced greater competition for labour within the South African market.
 Urgent representations were made by mine management for the state to remedy
 the "labour shortage". The 1903 Transvaal Labour Commission of Inquiry and
 the subsequent importation of Chinese indentured labour in 1904 were instit-
 uted in response. In addition the industry initiated measures to reduce
 internal competition. The Kitwatersrand Native Labour Association was
 established to undertake combined labour recruiting and a maximum average
 wage schedule was agreed upon within the industry to prevent further com-
 petition. Because of the stringent profitability constraints within which
 the mining industry operated and the continued exploitation of low yield
 mines, labour could not be attracted through increased, more competitive
 wages. Management devised a range of mechanisms to recruit and retain labour.
 WNLA and later other recruiting agents waged a concerted campaign to obtain
 labour from within Southern Africa using a variety of methods.(3)
 Due to the nature of the labour market and the often deceptive or coercive
 manner in which workers were obtained, management, in close collaboration
 with the state, devised a range of mechanisms to ensure the completion of
 contracts and prevent desertion. The pass-laws were a crucial component of
 management's strategy.(4) In conjunction, the'Master and Servants Law, pro-
 hibited strike action by black workers and thus ensured their continued cheap-
 ness. Within the mines widespread violence and coercion was employed to
 ensure the continued subjugation and productivity of workers. The compound
 was the social pivot of this system of labour repression.
 Prior to the South African War mine compounds developed along rudimentary
 lines compared with the tight security of those in Kimberley. However, as
 a result of the changes in the labour market after the war, management paid
 closer attention to compound security and efficiency. The relative freedom
 of movement previously enjoyed by workers was drastically reduced as the
 compounds became virtually "closed".(5) Desertion became increasingly
 difficult and absenteeism was reduced. In 1903 the Department of Native
 Affairs reported that "loafing" was "practically stamped out". In June
 1903, 5,4 workers per thousand "loafed" as opposed to a rate of 33,7 for
 the corresponding month in 1899,(6)
 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
 Compounds at the turn of the century generally consisted of a rectangular
 gathering of huts or barracks in which workers lived. The courtyard in the
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 centre would contain the kitchen, washing facilities (if they existed) and
 possibly the compound manager's office. Extensions of corrugated iron and
 vood were often built onto the original brick structures, making the court-
 yard more cramped. Conditions varied from one mine to another. However
 some were bad enough to necessitate official action in terras of the rudi-
 mentary niinimum standards laid down in 1905 by the Coloured Labourers Health
 Regulation Ordinance. Official action was hardly vigourous and often con-
 sisted of informal requests for improvement which allowed for lengthy
 stalling action on the part of the mines concerned.
 Compound rooms or huts accommodated anything between 20 and 50 workers.
 Usually double decked bunks were built against the wall', and were often
 turned into separate cabins by their occupants nailing strips of wood over
 the openings to protect themselves and their belongings. As a result of
 overcrowding in most casesfworkers were forced to sleep on earth floors
 which, because of poor drainage and leaking roofs, became-muddy during
 rain. Heating facilities were seldom provided and workers installed their
 own ' Imbnnla or fire buckets which usually had no chimneys. Damp conditions
 combined with poor ventilation and the fumes of the fire buckets contributed
 towards r.he high incidence of respiratory disease rates on the mines.
 Workers would also experience drastic changes in temperature as they emerged
 from an underground shift and often had no opportunity to dry their clothes.
 Usually they would have to stand in the heat, wet or cold waiting for their
 work and meal tickets.
 In 1903, 5022 African' workers were officially reported to have died on the
 Witwatcrsrand mines and the causes were summarised as follows:(8)
 Pneumonia and
 Tuberculosis
 Accidents
 meningitis 59
 5
 4
 ,90%
 33%
 ;c3%
 Intestinal
 Scurvy
 Other
 infections 11
 5
 12
 ,86%
 ,87Z
 ,90Z
 At the turn of the century few compounds had washing facilities but by 1903
 most had installed concrete baths in the courtyard in which workers washed
 themselves and their clothes.(9)
 The remarkable variation in conditions from one mine to another appears
 to have been determined by a mixture of their different profitability rates
 and arbitrary managerial attitudes. The variations were reflected in'
 death rates which in 1903 ranged from 31,10 per thousand per annum on the
 Wemmer mine to 135,21 per thousand on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine. By
 1905 the death rate for the Langlaagte nine was still as high as 135,68 per
 thousand.(10) An inspection in 1908 revealed that despite government
 requests for improvements, conditions on the Randfontein group of mines (11)
 were as bad as, or worse than, after the war.
 Diet also contributed towards the high rate of disease and death. The
 industry's drive to keep"working costs" as low as possible, determined
 that the workers' diet was both monotonous and deficient. Scurvy rates
 grew to alarming proportions after the war. Vegetables were rare as part
 of a compound diet and the mealie-meal, the staple content, was inferior,
 being derived from oven dried imported grain and had minimal nutrition.(12)
 Medical officers as well as the Department of Native Affairs made recommen-
 dations for improvements to the diet and accommodation with varying tones
 of urgency. The government was loath to introduce and enforce regulations.
 In addition, those medical officers most aware of the prevailing conditions
 were usually employed by the mines and therefore found it difficult to
 press too strongly or openly for improvements, if they were in any way
 inclined to do so.(13) The most that medical officers achieved were piece-
 meal improvements and the widespread introduction of "kaffir-beer" as a
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 nutritious diet supplement from 1903 onwards. Workers did whatever they
 could themselves to supplement their diet.(14) A black contractor estimated *"
 in 1907 that mine workers spent over twenty of the fifcy shillings they
 then earned per month on food purchases.(15) It was clearly to management's -.
 benefit for workers to spend a considerable portion of their wages on food. L
 T J Britten, who conducted a study of "Native WasLage" for the Chamber of ?
 Mines in 1904 recommended that the mines should provide .
 Greater facilities to the natives to spend their money by thei
 establishment of a greater number of eating houses and kaffir stores,
 conducted under the supervision of the mines.
 He said all managers agreed with him that if this was done workers would
 spend longer times on the Witwatersrand on the presumption that they had
 earning targets which would take longer to reach.(16)
 Food, as an extremely scarce commodity in the compounds, became an instru-
 ment of coercion in the hands of management. Food stappages were used in
 some mines to punish "loafers" and "inefficients" who did not go on shift
 or complete their quota of work. Mines in the Consolidated Cold Fields
 and J B Robinson groups were noted by Pritchard of the Native Affairs
 Department in 1909 as being most inclined to use this method. In the case
 of the J B Robinson mines ' ' ?
 At one time the food ration was refused to 'loafers', as they
 termed them, with the result that, in some cases I am informed
 'inefficients' /who possibly may not have been physically able
 to perform the standard day's work7 and actually sick natives
 have been in the past deprived of food. It is well known that the
 natives share their food and it should therefore have been obvious
 to those in authority that punishment of this nature would fall as
 heavily on good workers as it would on.malingerers and loafers who it
 was specially desired should suffer by it.(17)
 On the Celdenhuis Deep Mine workers were given a bonus of "one pound of raw
 meat" if they drilled an extra 48 inches in one shift. The Manager
 reported that "the experiment has been found to act as a splendid induce-
 ment to Natives to become more efficient, while the native efficiency of
 this mine has increased during the last feu weeks by leaps and bounds."(18)
 The physical conditions outlined above constituted the debilitating compound
 environment in which workers' goals were maintained at a conveniently low
 level, concerned primarily with day to day survival and the eventual com-
 pletion of their contracts. The alternative chosen by many was to desert.
 Those who remained found relief in liquor, which was traded illegally in
 great quantities and varieties. On those Sundays when shifts did not go
 down (19) workers would buy meat to cook over outside fires and drink what-
 ever concoctions they could obtain or brew themselves. Sunday revelry
 sometimes developed into inter-tribal or even inter-compound clashes.
 Workers also found human contact and sexual release in nearby locations
 if these were allowed to develop and access was permitted.
 STRUCTURES OF CONTROL
 The central authority in the compound was the white manager. Workers
 understood that he exercised extreme power over their daily working lives.
 Higher management relied on him to maintain discipline and a continuous
 pressure on workers to work their shifts. The compound manager, through
 the tremendous power he exercised, often determined the level of coercion
 and violence that would prevail throughout the mine. He could choose to
 provide relatively good accommodation and food as well as protection against
 violence inflicted by white workers. If he left labour control in the
 !l
 : ? .. ? 4/
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 ^hands of cruel compound policemen, neglected
 compound conditions and condoned or encouraged violence, his mine would
 1
  earn a bad reputation. Some compound managers in fact intervened effectively
 ?p= on behalf of workers who had been cheated of their pay. (20) Mr H M Taberer,
 at the time an inspector for the Department of Native Affairs, admitted in
 1907 that the compound manager, with his force of "police" was the de facto
 ruler over the workers' lives, having complete control over their freedom
 of movement through the pass system.(21) Only compound managers could issue
 special passes for workers to leave the compound if they were not going
 on shift.
 The manager had under his command a group of compound "police" who played
 a crucial collaborative role in controlling workers. '.3 van Onselen found
 in Rhodesia, compound "police" on the Witwatersrand, were also selected
 because of their social distance from the majority of Africans amongst whom
 they would work.(22) On the Witwatersrand, workers from Natal and Zulu-
 land remained a small proportion of the labour force during the period
 under review.(23) Evidence indicates that Zulus were appointed as compound
 "police" on many mines. Numerous complaints against their excesses were
 recorded. Tribal headmen and sons of chiefs of various tribes were also
 appointed as police on some mines.(24) Some mine managements recognised
 that the level of antagonism between vorkers and "police" of different
 tribes was non-productive and appointed "police" representative of all the
 tribes in the compound.(25)
 However, management also used tribal differences as a means of maintaining
 division amongst workers. Buckle, Chairman of the 1931 Native Grievances
 Enquiry listed the following as the three "safeguards" used by management:
 "(1) The personal influence of the compound managers.
 (2) The native respect for European authority as personified
 in the police.
 (3) The inter-tribal jealousies which have always rendered it
 possible, in the last resort, to protect Europeans by
 utilising one tribe against another."(26)
 Evidence shows that inter-tribal jealousies were maintained through the
 compound "police", separate accommodation (usually according to the prefer-
 ence of workers themselves), tribally composed work gangs and through
 differential access to scarce commodities like food.
 Heading the compound "police", and directly under the compound manager was
 the head Induna. He supervised the compound police and fed the manager y'
 "with a constant stream of politico-economic intelligence".(27) The
 "police" wore uniforms and handcuffs and carried sjamboks which they used
 liberally as they "hustled" workers from the compounds to the tnineheads to
 go on shift. When complaints arose regarding the use of sjamboks, manage"
 ment argued that they were merely meant to be "badges of office" and dis-
 claimed responsibility for their other uses.(28) "Bossboys", another key
 group of collaborators, controlled workers underground and extended the
 violence of the compound system. They also used sjamboks to maintain
 discipline (29) in conjunction with the white miners who also dispersed
 blows freely.
 Workers reacted against the compound and underground collaborators in the
 limited ways that they were able to. The mining industry of which the colla-
 borators were the agents, "the abrasive edge of managerial practice and
 policy",(30) suffered as a consequence of the high rate of defensive
 desertion and labour withdrawal that occurred.(31) Sir Godfrey Lagden,Commissioner of
 Native Affairs, while on tour of the Cape Colony in 1904 with the S.A.
 5/.*....
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 Native Affairs Commission, wrote a memorandum to his office drawing attention
 to the fact that potential workers in the Cape refused to be recruited for
 the Witwatersrand "because they are set upon and hammered by the Zulu
 police on the mines".(32) I have been unable to find direct evidence of
 individual retaliatory action by workers against compound police but I
 am convinced that it occurred(33) Such action would have produced minimal
 results compared with labour withdrawal. Management was more concerned to
 prevent labour withdrawal than to protect its own collaborators.
 Each mine compound had, as a vital part of its coercive machinery, a
 detention room, or, as it was known to workers, "stocks" a result of the
 fact that stocks were used in these rooms until the time of the Kilner
 Administration. (34) In 1903 the acting pass commissioner judged the mine
 detention room to be:
 an absolute essential as being the only means of controlling
 riotous and quarrelsome natives. It must be remembered that in the
 majority of cases mines are situated in a very considerable
 distance from any charge office or gaol, and as it not infrequently
 happens that a native 'runo amok1 it is necessary that he should
 be promptly dealt with in order to prevent further developments".(35)
 The Commissioner claimed that department inspectors were always informed
 whenever a worker was detained so that such workers were "seldom detained
 for more than a few hours". However it is clear that the use of detention
 rooms was hardly controlled as judiciously as the Commissioner tried to
 make out. Compound police could detain workers as they saw fit and numerous
 cases emerged where white miners and contractors also made use of the
 detention room to punish workers under their supervision underground.(36)
 In 1905 a white contractor, Anderson, on the Croesus mine was found guilty
 of assaulting
 one native Jim Simali by placing handcuffs on his wrists and
 handcuffing him to an iron staple attached to a wooden plank
 made fast to the floor and did keep the said Jim Simali in this
 position for A days without food or drink.
 In defence Anderson claimed that
 This is a common practice on the mines to lock up natives like
 this - a kind of punishment. We are not allowed to lash them so
 they are locked up.
 Simali had refused to return to work for Anderson on the night shift, as
 he had already worked an entire day shift. Anderson was fined ?20 or one
 month's imprisonment.(37) Far from controlling the use of the detention
 rooms, some compound managers abused the institution. In 1909 the Assistant
 Compound Manager at the Village Deep was found guilty of assaulting a worker
 and "inflicting various wounds" by thrashing him with a sjambok while he was
 fastened by handcuffs' to a table in a detention room for about 12 hours. (38)
 In June 1902 1 000 workers at the Langlaagte mine went on strike, broke
 out of their compound and marched towards the Village Deep Mine from where
 they had been recruited. The strike was defused by police action. However
 one policeman reported the complaints made to him by the workers:
 The compound manger ill treats them by having them thrashed in
 the compound and down the mine with a cat-o-nine tails and
 thrashed them on. the testicles: further that they were not
 allowed out of the compound for a moment, that they were shut up
 like dogs. Also that the compound manager gave instructions to the
 i
 -,?; 6 /
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 native police to hit them when they saw fit, stated that they
 would work and not give any trouble if the compound manager
 treated them as human beings not dogs nnd they would not continue
 to work while he was in charge of the compound and they would
 kill him if he continued (39)
 It is important not to generalise with regard to such patterns of violence.
 The fact that the Langlaagte strike was partially a result of the disparity
 of conditions experienced by the workers who had previously worked at
 Village Deep, indicates that workers themselves recognised the differences.
 In 1905. the District Controller at Boksburg noted the considerable variations
 in conditions:
 On certain mines, no harsh treatment of any nature whatever will" be
 permitted. On others, I regret to have to state, it is not only
 passively winked at, but in some cases actively condoned... (40)
 The compound structure provided a cover for violence at all levels of the
 labour extraction process. In the first instance, a worker, if he wished
 to lay u complaint of assault, and presuming he had a day off shift, would
 have to obtain a special day pass from the compound manager to proceed to
 the nearest pass office. The manager could refuse such a pass if he realised
 the worker's intention, which he would in most cases. Native Affairs
 inspectors or police investigators would always have to obtain the manager's
 permission to enter the compound and would probably have to state their
 purpose. They could easily be misdirected by the manager as Pritchard,
 the Boksburg Native Affairs District Controller had experienced:
 ... the Department will always be at the mercy of the Manager and
 Compound Overseer, as far as our intelligence is concerned... the
 crux of the reason why our intelligence is defective, is the fact
 that Compound Overseers do not - and I go further and say dare
 not, report to the Officers of the Department every occurrence
 having reference to the conditions of the natives under them...
 the mere giving away of 'compound secrets' might mean summary
 dismissal (
 In the closed society of the compound, witnesses could be prevailed upon to
 make themselves unavailable. Pritchard exemplified this in 1905:
 On the new Modderfontein Cold Mining Company a very serious case
 of assault was unearthed in which a native who had been kicked
 in the ribs, died of the effects. The case was handed over to
 the Transvaal Town Police, but, notwithstanding their most strenuous
 endeavours, no prosecution was instituted, owing to the fact that
 the principal witnesses were - in my opinion - spirited away. (42)
 Whatever the decision of a court might be, the complainant would still
 have to return to his compound and perhaps suffer reprisals, possibly of
 a more covert nature. A worker had very little to gain by laying a com-
 plaint:
 ... I am of opinion that all cases of ill treatment do not come
 to the knowledge of our office in the form they should. Witness
 the case of Rex vs Seames. In this the natives admitted on oath,
 that they had never complained, or thought of complaining, of what
 was subsequently.found to be wholesale flogging of a most brutal
 anture.(43)
 The compound extended the clandestine nature of the widespread pattern of
 underground assault. In the same way it protected management from workers
 taking legal action against other forms of abuse, particularly illegal pay
 7/.'....
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 deductions and extensions of contract time. Compound society was regulated
  r
 by its own rules and survival necessitated compliance and subjugation.
 Even where workers did lay a complaint of ill-usage and Native Affairs and "v
 police investigations led to a prosecution, the law courts, reflecting j^.
 standards of settler justice, did not strain their powers to punish assault.
 Punishment for white miners convicted of assault was always minimal. For
 example, a Native Affairs Official noted in 1906 that in a particular
 assault case in which the accused was merely discharged with a warning, the
 magistrate made remarks in court which made it "appear that he considers
 flogging of natives by their employers as justifiable under certain
 circumstances". The District Controller continued: ? .
 This may in some way account for the number of assault cases in
 which I have recently failed to obtain convictions against
 white men for assaults of natives".(44)
 Although individual government officials(45) attempted to act against
 abuses and even agitate for reforms, policy makers in the Milner administration
 would consistently refrain from interfering with the mine's internal labour
 extraction processes and continued until its demise, to tread its colla-
 borative path.(46) This attitude was reflected in the action of what one
 speculates to be the majority of department inspectors. An African contractor
 told the 1907 Mining Industry Commission:
 The complaints of natives are many, but are not known, and
 even if they are known they are winked at by the so-called
 Insepctors who spend much of their time in chatting with the
 mine officials and neglect the people whom they are supposed
 to look after. (47)
 The manner in which the State supported the. compound system is reflected
 in the following two cases. On 1909, as a result of an increasing incidence
 of assaults being exposed, the CID Deputy Commissioner wrote to his
 superiors as follows:
 I desire to draw the commissioner's attention to the so called
 mine police boys employed by'the different mine companies.
 These boys are not in any way legally sanctioned either to
 arrest or otherwise detain natives ... still they are to be
 seen going about armed with handcuffs and a badge and making
 arrests. In the mine compounds there are cells in which the
 natives are imprisoned and in which they are frequently handcuffed
 under cruel and unneccessary conditions, and no steps appear to be
 taken by the Inspector of Mines Department or Native Affairs Depart-
 ment to remedy matters. (48)
 The commissioner of police proposed that the compound "police" should be
 drawn under the control of his department, a proposal which the Native
 Affairs Department opposed strenuously and successfully. The latter was
 very loath to interfere with the "individuality and influence" of the com-
 pound manager "so essential to a well controlled native compound".(49)
 In 1905 Brownlee, Magistrate at Mount Fletcher in the Cape, was sent to
 Johannesburg as a result of complaints sent by workers to their district
 magistrates. He took statements from the workers on the New Heriot and
 Driefontein mines which revealed particularly indiscriminate punishment
 being meted out by white miners and very little attempt being made by
 compound overseers to rectify the situation. The reasons for assault ranged
 from lack'of skill on the workers part to plain unprovoked violence.
 White miners punched, kicked and struck with instruments such as sjamboks,
 jumpers, stones, hammers, shovels and leather bands. Workers' heads and
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 groins appear to have been prime targets, although some miners had sufficient
 foresight to hit them only where they were clothed, so that marks would
 not give evidence of thoir action.(50)
 Officials of the Transvaal Native Affairs Department became highly indig-
 nant at the fact that Brownlee, from another colony, had come to investigate
 and expose conditions on "their" mines. In their objections they inadver-
 tently gave an indication of their attitudes to assaults on workers:
 without in any way desiring to justify the assailant
 I cannot but think that the natives gave considerable provocation
 by their insolent and insubordinate manner. It should not be
 overlooked that miners are, as a rule a rough and ready
 class who give a blow as a means of correction as naturally as
 a duck.takes to water though nothing could excuse anything
 in the nature of a deliberate flogging.(SI)
 CONCLUSION
 Beyond providing for coercive labour extraction and tho continued subjug-
 ation of workers, compounds during the period under review became effective
 instruments to quell worker unrest and resistance and to prevent inter-
 mine organisation. This purpose was most clearly articulated by Buckle,
 chairman of the 1913 Native Grievances Enquiry. He recommended
 that steps ought certainly, to be taken to render compounds
 more easily convertible into places of detention, where the
 compound has strong, steel cased gates which can be locked
 from the outside, and one entrance, and high walls with
 no outer windows, a comparatively few armed men can prevent
 exit from it and thus isolate a disturbance which might other-
 wise spread with alarming consequences. (52)
 Police and management tactics during strikes that have been documented,
 indicate that consistently, the first step was to persuade or force
 workers back to their compound. Promises of reform would be made and
 assurances given by state officials. However, once back in the compound,
 workers would be less militant, and promises were never fulfilled.
 I hope that I have been able to reflect the development of the compounds on
 the Witwatersrand in a way which not only describes their environment but
 which also indicates their vital role in labour extraction. Indeed the
 former is merely a symptom of the latter. During the century compounds were
 to become more uniform and sophisticated in their methods and structures.
 However, their violent and coercive roots were to have a determining
 influence on patterns of industrial relations.
 ooOOOoo
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 NOTES
 1. Compounds in the gold raining industry have been discussed by other
 writers including Van Onselen, C. Chibaro; "The Role of Collaborators
 in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs Vol. 27,
 October 1973; Pearson, P. "Authority and Control in a South African
 Goldmine Compound" African Studies Institute, Wits. Mimeo. This
 apper confirms the observations made by these writers. However an
 attempt is made to place the development of the compounds within a
 particular historical context - a period during which pressure for
 production increased and the compound became consciously included as
 a managerial mechanism to extract most production for least expense.
 2. See Moroney Industrial Conflict in a Labour Repressive Economy:
 Black Labour on the Transvaal Gold Mines 1901-1912 Honours Dissertation
 Wits 1976 pp. 1-2.
 3. Ibid., pp.19-31.
 4. See Johnatone, Class Race and Gold pp. 35-39.
 5. The fact that the compounds were not completely closed was due largely,
 van Onselen claims, to opposition from trade and commerce, which
 sector thrived on the custom of mine workers who bought food on a
 large scale to supplement their diets. Correspondence to the Depart-
 ment of Native Affairs from representatives of trade and commerce,
 confirms this claim. See SNA 2/251/01. Letter from the Association
 of Chambers of Commerce of S.A.; also SNA 2/300/01.
 6. Secretary for Native Affairs 23/1761/03. Report of the Chief Inspector,
 "loafing" was a term applied by management to a labour pattern symp-
 tomatic of the Witwatersrand's work environment. Long shifts, bad
 health, mistreatment, the effects of liquor and poor motivation caused
 a considerable number of a mine's work complement to absent themselves
 from the daily shift. "Loafing" or absenteeism can be viewed as a
 short term worker strategy in protest against conditions or merely
 to ensure recuperation and ultimate survival.
 7. Fergwsson, Central, Robinson, North Randfontein, South Randfontein,
 Porges and Stubbs.
 8. These figures do not reflect the numerous workers who died on the way
 to or at home of diseases or injuries contracted or received while
 on Witwatersrand mines. There is evidence that this incalculable
 death rate i>as substantial. Figures taken from Coelho Report
 SNA'40/12/03 p.19.
 9. SNA 9/1200/02. Report by inspector Pietersen on compounds, 23 July
 1902; See Coelho Report, SNA 50/2912/03 and Report on the compounds
 for further details of compount conditions of the Randfontein group
 of nines, SNA 76/1616/Oii, October 1908.
 10. SNA 4O/2255/P2. Comparative Death Rates on Various Mines, 1903;
 SNA 56/1303/05. Report by Dr Turner.
 11. Fergusson, Central, Robinson,. North Randfontein, South Randfontein,
 Porges and Stubbs.
 12.- In 19.03 Dr Sansom, the District Health Officer, instigated en enquiry
 into the quality of meal used on the mines. Samples of the meal
 9/
- 9 -
 were examined by a government analyst and many were found to be unfit
 for human consumption containing moulds, weevils and other insects.
 SNA 28/2788/03. Sansom to Windhara.
 13. In March 1902, Wybergh, the Government Mining Engineer, wrote to
 Dr Turner, a government doctor, about the high rate of preventable
 illness in the mines and commented on the compromising situation of
 mine medical officers: "... so long as they are paid by the mining
 companies they dare not press their opinions where expensive alter-
 ations or improvements are required. They are simply at the mercy
 of their employers, and would in very many cases undoubtedly be dis-
 cussed if they made themselves unpleasant. Of courso there are
 honourable exceptions... but you must be aware of cases in which
 medical reports have been suppressed or amended even when made by
 very responsible men." SNA 7/609/02, 21 March 1902.
 14. The Chamber of Mines supported the introduction of "kaffirbeer"
 because "the privilege thus granted would render the natives more con-
 tented and inclined to prolong their stay on the Rand". SNA 14/1858/02.
 15. Makhothe in evidence before the 1907 Mining Industry Commission.
 Minutes of evidence p.1449. Such food purchases would often benefit
 the mining companies themselves as they owned mine stores.
 16. Herman Ekstein Archives 138:395 T Britten, Report on the wastage of
 Native Labour on the mines of the Witwatersrand District 1904.
 17. SNA 90/1825/09. Memorandum by Pritchard on the position of
 the Native labour supply as at 31 March 1909 p.21.
 18. Ibid. Pritchard quoting Hallimond p.22.
 19. When shifts did not go down on Sundays workers were not paid for the
 day, nor were they provided with mine rations as a general rule.
 20. SNA 61/3868/05. Smith, District Controller Krugersdorp to Windham,
 Secretary for Native Affairs.
 21. Mining Industry Commission, 1907 Mininutes of evidence p.1315. The
 central position of the compound manager from worker's view is reflected
 in the names given to mines. A large proportion were named after
 . compound managers, their attributes or characteristics:
 eg. Henry Nourse Deep - Madonnel (McDonald)
 Van Ryn West - Thomas
 Robinson Deep - David
 Primrose in Sinqangau - Fierce T taper
 Bonanza - Spensile - Spencer
 SNA 8/858/02. "Revised list of Kaffir Names on'Mines", 14 October 1907.
 22. Van Onselen, C. "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining
 Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs vol. 27, 1973 p.403.
 23. In 1903 for example, Zulu tribesmen constituted only 1,022 of the'
 total African work force on the mines. SNA 27/771/03 Report of WNLA
 Board of management 2 April 1903. Zulus also appear to have mono-
 polised positions in the State's black police force.
 24. Chiefs played a corresponding collaborative role in the recruiting
 process. The cooption of tribal authority in the labour extraction
 system is an important theme. For further details regarding chiefs
 10/
, - 10 - O. ?
 as collaborators see Moroney, S. Op Cit p.28. - ?
 25. Native Grievances Enquiry Report 1913-14 UC 34 p.19.
 26. Ibid, p.64. ' ?
 27. Ibid, p.16
 28. Ibid, p.19.
 29. tbid. p.19.
 30. Van Onselen, C. Chibaro p.141.
 31. For a more detailed description of these strategies of worker protest
 see Moroney, S. "Mine Worker Protest on the Wit'watersrand 1901-1912"
 South African Labour Bulletin vol. 3 No. 5, March-April 1977. pp.11-15.
 32. SNA 39/2936/04. Lagden to Windham. This strong reaction was confirmed
 by reports submitted by 18 Cape Chiefs who were taken on a tour of
 the Reef's compounds in 1903, in an attempt to promote recruiting in
 their home areas. Almost without exception they cited the rough
 treatment by compound police, usually named as being Zulu, as one of
 the Chief complaints of the workers they had interviewed and a retard-
 ing factor in recruiting.
 33. Van Onselen's study of the Ninevite organisation shows that collaborators
 were singled out "for singularly unmerciful attention". The Ninevites
 had penetrated many of the Witwatersrand compounds and there was a
 likelihood that their methods of dealing, with collaborators were
 emulated by workers. Van Onselen, C. "South Africa's Lumpenproletarian
 Army: 'Umkosi waNtaba',- 'The Regiment of the Hills', 1890-1920"
 Conference on Southern African Labour History University of the Wit-
 watersrand, Institute of African Studies April 1976 p.16.
 34. These rooms were referred to rather euphemistically as"isolation
 rooms" by management in compound plans etc. Although stocks were
 taken out after the war, they were replaced by handcuffs attached to
 a pole on the ground. ^
 35. SNA 39/3069/03 Memorandum on the unpopularity among Cape Colony
 Natives of Service on the Rand p.5.
 36. SNA 53/701/05. Complaints of Native labourers from Mqanduli,
 Driefontein mine 9 March 1905.
 37. SNA 57/2147/05 Court transcript: van den Berg vs Anderson 13 May 1905.
 38. SNA 89/1261/09 Pres6 clipping entitled "Savage Brutality".
 39. SNA 11/1308/02. Report of Trooper Brickhill 26 September 1902.
 40. SNA 61/3868/05. Boksburg Controller to Windhara 15 December 1905.
 41. SNA 61/3868/05 Boksburg District Controller. 15 December 1905.
 42. Ibid.
 43. flbid.
 44. SNA 68/2579/06. Kimberley to Pritchard 10 August 1906. The controller
 reported that his office had processed 18 ill-treatment cases over
 11/.
- H -
 8 months. In nine cases the assailant was warned, in three fines
 ranging from ?2-E5 were imposed, in four the assailant was acquitted
 and three cases were dismissed because of insufficient or con-
 flicting evidence. For details of the substantial number of cases
 in which workers laid charges tor assault see Moroney S. op cit pp.
 102-105. In 1905, 118 cases of "ill usage" were reported to pass
 office.-;.
 45. Jeeves points out that "during 1902 and early 1903 the departmental
 inspectors who were supposed to act in some sense as the 'protectors'
 of Africans on the mines, investigated thirteen cases of alleged
 assault upon black mine workers by their white oversaeis and twenty-
 eight complaints concerning wage irregularities, in the same period
 well over 3000 Africans were disciplined for breach of contract and
 for other "offences" against their employers". Jeeves A. "The Control
 of Migration Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of
 Kruger and Milner". Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 2
 no. 1. October 1975. So although I quote officials who were more
 inclined to take action, their conscientiousness was rare. The
 absenca of related correspondence from roost other "controllers" indicates
 their lack of rxtivity in this area.
 46. For a brief survey of state-management collaboration over this period
 see Moroney, S. Industrial Conflict pp.32-39.
 47. Mining Industry Commission, 1907 Minutes of Evidence, 29 October 1907
 J M Makholte p.1442.
 48. SNA 89/1361/09., Mavrogardate to Commissioner, Transvaal Police
 23 April 1909.
 49. SNA 89/1361/09. Pritchard to Windham September 1909.
 50. SNA 53/701/05; SNA 53/699/05. Brownlee to Windham 7, 9th March 1905 .
 also SNA 93/40/09 Record of assaults committed upon and hardships
 suffered by natives on mines and works, during November 1909.
 51 SNA 53/701/05 Pietersen to Windham, 12th March 1905.
 52, Native Grievances Enquiry Report 1913-1914 par. 501, p.67.