

Chapter Two

DDRRR Explained: A Conceptual and Operational Framework

This thesis does not attempt to give a novel conceptual framework of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people (DDRRR) as a component of post-conflict peace building. However, the study seeks to locate the process of DDRRR in the broader post-conflict and reconstruction environment by drawing on the experiences of the three case studies. What this chapter does is to clarify the conceptual framework for the analysis of DDRRR in post-conflict Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It clarifies and discusses the appropriate definitions and terminology as well as elucidates the continuum between the “DDR” of former combatants and “RR” of refugees in DDRRR.

2.1 The post-conflict peace building concept

The United Nations gives a standard theoretical framework for the emergent peace-building concept. In its pioneering definition it refers to peace building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”⁶⁹ This definition is useful in that it broadly refers to multifaceted initiatives, policies and programmes that aim at cultivating trust, interaction

⁶⁹ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York, United Nations, 1992), p.11; Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935* (New York, United Nations, 1994), p.21; K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict*

among formerly warring parties, and promotion of durable peace, stability and sustainable development in post-conflict situations.⁷⁰ The typical peace-enhancing mechanisms include reconciliation, democratization, institution building, good governance, social and economic reconstruction, judicial reform, civil society reconstruction and DDRRR (See Figure 2.1). The ground-breaking UN definition thus formalized the peace building concept. Post-conflict peace building was not an entirely new phenomenon as previously the UN and other peace processes had embraced identical components.

In order to be effective these peace building mechanisms should be implemented in an integrated and coordinated manner that is buttressed by a solid resource base.⁷¹ In addition, they should address the causal factors of the preceding conflict in order to consolidate the peace. Examination of past attempts at post-conflict peace building revealed the imperatives of designing specific and contextualized responses. These


and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa", (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998, p.14

⁷⁰ Interpretation of the post-conflict peace building concept has been subjected to considerable interrogation in E. M. Cousens and C. Kumar, with K. Wermester (eds.) *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); H. Haugerrudbraaten, "Peacebuilding: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts", *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No.6, 1998; R. Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", in *International Security*, Summer 1997, Vol. 22, No 1

⁷¹ K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in*

strategies should have elaborate objectives and yardsticks to facilitate evaluation.
Potentially self-enforcing and self-sustaining programmes are vital for durable peace.

Figure 2.1: The Concept of Peacebuilding



(* strong regional implications)

Source: Peter Batchelor and Kees Kingma, 'Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa'(Introduction to results of collaborative research0, forthcoming, Ashgate, 2002 in Kees Kingma, "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa", in *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol 9 Issue 2

2.2 The DDRRR Concept

The focus of this thesis is on DDRRR in a post-conflict setting. This section sets out the conceptual and operational modalities of DDRRR. For the purpose of this study DDRRR will be separately defined and conceptualized as follows:

Disarmament

“The collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes”.⁷² The process is dependent on the conclusion of a ceasefire to formalize cessation of hostilities and subsequent post-cease-fire cooperation and commitment of the former belligerent parties. This was the case in Mozambique after the Rome peace agreement of 1992. In some cases disarmament is dependent on the complete defeat of one entity. In Ethiopia the former army of the military Derg government was disarmed and demobilized following its defeat in 1991.⁷³ The current DDR exercise in Angola followed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government forces’ military defeat of the rebel National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) movement.

⁷² United Nations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, (New York, United Nations Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999), p.15

⁷³ K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.85

Disarmament is mainly a military operation. Considering the volatility that usually accompanies post-immediate transition eras, significant disarmament helps to create secure and stable frameworks.

This study will focus on the collection, storage and/or disposal of weapons of ex-combatants. These were the major target groups of the three countries' immediate attempts at post-conflict disarmament in order to facilitate their transition to civilian life.

Demobilization

Demobilization is the opposite of mobilization. It is “The process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace”.⁷⁴ It is a short-term process that aims to reduce the size of the armed forces.

The process typically involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation to encourage their transition to civilian life.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ United Nations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, (New York, United Nations Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999), p.15

⁷⁵ J. Hughes-Wilson and A. Wilkinson, *Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes: A Proposal for Practical Technical Measures*, (New York, UNDP, 2001)

Reintegration

“Assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their families’ economic and social reintegration into civil society”.⁷⁶ Reintegration is, however, a quad-pronged mechanism that is not only economic and social but also political and psychological in nature. It is a complex, long-term process through which ex-combatants and their dependants (re) settle in post-war communities (social), become part of the decision making process (political), engage in sustainable civilian employment and livelihoods (economic)⁷⁷ as well as adjust attitudes and expectations and/or deal with their war related mental trauma (psychological).⁷⁸ Reintegration is primarily a civilian process and probably the last phase of transforming fighters into a civilian nature that is congruent with peace.

Repatriation and Resettlement/Reintegration

Return of refugees and internally displaced persons and their reintegration in preferred home locations.⁷⁹ UNHCR - the UN agency that facilitates and promotes repatriation- explains voluntary repatriation as “a practical technique for effecting the safe and dignified return of refugees once the conditions that forced them to flee or remain outside

⁷⁶ United Nations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment*, (New York, United Nations Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999), p.15

⁷⁷ K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.28

⁷⁸ K. Kingma, “Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa”, in *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p.183

⁷⁹ While the UNHCR may refer to resettlement as relocation to a preferred third country in this study it is used to refer to the repatriation from host country in order to settle in the country of origin

their country no longer exist.”⁸⁰ According to the UNHCR voluntary repatriation to country of origin in conditions of safety and dignity is the “ideal” durable solution to the refugee problem.⁸¹ This is in comparison with the alternative two solutions: local integration in host country and resettlement to a third country of choice.

Voluntary repatriation is based upon the individual refugee’s choice to return. In practice it has assumed two patterns, first, official, organized and assisted and second, informal, unorganized and unassisted. Marrjoleine Zieck summarized the main distinction between organized and spontaneous return:

Whereas in situations of spontaneous return it is the refugees themselves who are the prime actors, taking their fate in their own hands when deciding whether, when, and how to return, in organized returns it is UNHCR that takes over the responsibility for the fate of refugees. In so doing, UNHCR is to conform to international standards, in particular to everything the solution of voluntary repatriation may require in that respect.⁸²

Experience has, however, revealed that spontaneous return has been the most popular. A variety of complex incidental reasons inspire spontaneous return including the refugees’ perception of viability of return; lack of clear information either about conditions in home countries or on the formal repatriation operation; wish for family reunification; attachment to homelands and increasingly inhospitable conditions in host country. According to the UNHCR 90 per cent of the approximately 20 million refugees that repatriated in the 1990s were spontaneous returns. In the case of post-war Angola about

⁸⁰ UNHCR, UN Document A/AC.96/815

⁸¹ B.S. Chimni, ‘Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective’, *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2 , p.165

⁸² M. Zieck, *UNHCR and voluntary repatriation of refugees: a legal analysis*, (The Hague, M. Nijhoff,

150 000 of 450 000 refugees returned on their own compared to only 12 000 who returned under the official UNHCR programme that began in June 2003.

A tripartite agreement between the UNHCR, the host country and country of origin should normally exist on the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees who should normally return to their original homes. This outlines the legal administrative framework for the repatriation programme. Tripartite agreements cover issues such as safety, personal documentation, land tenure and asset transfer. They are important for the plan and implementation of a well coordinated repatriation operation.

The UNCHR usually provides the returnees with transport, legal protection and relief assistance to facilitate their smooth reintegration into home societies. Its mandate legally ceases once refugees have crossed the border back. Governments of the country of return are expected to assume responsibility for the resettlement or reintegration of returnees. In line with its founding 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, amended by the New York Protocol of 1967, the UNHCR is legally mandated to cater for refugees who cross international borders. IDPs, who have identical characteristics with trans-boundary refugees, are not the UNHCR prerogative.

There has since been debate on whether UNHCR's mandate should be expanded to address the needs of IDPs. Meanwhile, in a move that demonstrated UNHCR's broad assistance "a growing population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who, although

1997) p.9

not technically refugees, have become a major new burden for the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations.”⁸³ Despite not being legally mandated, in practice the UNHCR already plays a “substantial role regarding internally displaced and indicated its capacity to play a protection function on their behalf, especially for persons who become internally displaced upon repatriation.”⁸⁴ In February 2005, for instance, UNHCR committed US\$14 million- US\$5.5 million on non-food items and distribution outlets, US\$3.3 for transportation; US\$5 million for reintegration projects in areas of return to assist return and reintegration of IDPs in Liberia.⁸⁵

UNHCR conducts repatriation in multifaceted and complex institutional environments. According to Joan Fitzpatrick “UNHCR functions as an operational international partner with UN peacekeeping and development departments and with funding states in confronting complex emergencies. UNHCR collaborates with many private relief organizations in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”⁸⁶ In the cases of Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992 - 1993) and Mozambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992 – 1994) the UNHCR repatriated and assisted the ensuing resettlement programmes under UN peace operation’ frameworks. UNHCR works in partnership with other specialized but

⁸³ J. Stremlau, *People in peril : human rights, humanitarian action, and preventing deadly conflict*, (New York, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998), p.3

⁸⁴ J. Fitzpatrick , “ Taking Stock: The Refugee Convention at 50”, U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 2001*, p.27

⁸⁵ “UNHCR to spend \$14 million on IDP return in Liberia; more counties cleared for return” < <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home/+dwwBmWe9K-3wwwwwwwwwwwwFqnN0bItFqnDni5AFqnN0bIDzmqwwwwww/opendoc.html>>, Accessed on 1 February 2005

⁸⁶ J. Fitzpatrick , “ Taking Stock: The Refugee Convention at 50”, U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 2001*, p.24

interrelated agencies. These include the World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Education and Scientific Organization and the Scientific and Cultural Organization.

The agencies' involvement in the repatriation process facilitates the extension of assistance into countries of return and the development from immediate relief to medium-term assistance. The ultimate goal would be the long-term self-sufficiency of returnees, which in turn facilitates durable refugee solutions. Robert F. Gorman notes that "Certainly, once emergency relief needs are met, refugee self-reliance should be promoted as early as possible so that they do not become permanent wards of international charity or continual drain on host country resources."⁸⁷

UNHCR identifies certain preconditions that are critical for successful repatriation and resettlement when it refers to peace building as:

...the process whereby national protection and the rule of law are re-established. More specifically, it entails an absence of social and political violence, the establishment of effective judicial procedures, the introduction of pluralistic forms of government, and the equitable distribution of resources.⁸⁸

These three elements are key to the secure and successful resettlement of returnees. They influence refugees/IDPs' decision to return. In order for repatriation and resettlement to

⁸⁷ R. F. Gorman, *Coping with Africa's refugee burden: a time for solutions*, (Dordrecht : M. Nijhoff, 1987), p.8

be sustainable and facilitate peace building it should be implemented when the original displacement-generating contexts have changed to conditions that guarantee the returnees' physical, material, social and psychological securities.⁸⁹ For instance, the UNHCR began a voluntary repatriation programme for Chadian refugees in 2000 following the facilitative 1998 peace agreement that ended violence. The UNHCR terminated its repatriation operation in Angola following the collapse of the Lusaka peace accord and resumption of warfare in 1998. A favourable and thriving relationship between the returnees, larger community and state is also critical. The returnees, whose characteristics might have been transformed by exile experiences, need to be accommodated and relate with a community that might have been static.

⁸⁸ *The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), p.159 in B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, p.165

⁸⁹ B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p.168

Figure 2.2: The DDRRR Concept





Figure 2.3: Reintegration



DDRRR is often enshrined in conflict terminating peace agreements which then productively become the directing framework of the process. There are different motivations for parties to sign peace agreements. These include the high costs of continued warfare; the high costs of a military stalemate; plan to use a negotiated settlement as an avenue to gain political or economic stakes that could not be obtained via military victory; and third-party pressures and security guarantees. It is important to note that the agreements should not only stress DDRRR. They should be clear on the nature and implementation of the process. For instance, while emphasizing the need for reintegration support for ex-fighters to guard against immediate post-agreement threats to peace posed by unsuccessfully reinstated fighters, the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique of 4 October 1992 between Frelimo and Renamo was inauspiciously not specific on the DDR programme.⁹⁰

DDRRR is also planned and implemented under the guidance of critical institutional frameworks that may be established by peace agreements. These frameworks refer to the roles, mandates and the administrative and functional structures of the various organized entities and stakeholders⁹¹ in the DDRRR process. In Africa the UN and governments have traditionally formulated and managed the process. Where the government leads the process it usually sets up a national-level coordinating committee comprising key stakeholders to plan and implement DDR. The international community, mainly the UN and its specialized agencies, conducted DDRRR programmes in Mozambique and

⁹⁰ See J. McMullin, "Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-643

⁹¹ See "Glossary of terms"

<http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/forests/en/en4_6.htm#an403>, Accessed on 21

Angola during the 1990s. Eritrea's mid-1990s DDR process was largely funded and implemented by its government via the national Department for Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants. The armed opposition is also a major actor in post-conflict DDR. Implementing partners such as local and international NGOs, donor, evangelical and local communities have also played important and supportive roles in the planning, implementation and funding of DDRRR (See Figure 2.4). Institutional support and capacity building programmes like staff training are necessary for the effective implementation of DDRRR.

Figure 2.4: Actors in DDRRR processes

- Government
- Armed forces/parties
- Demobilized fighters and War Veteran Associations
- Refugees and IDPs (Returnees)
- Families of ex-fighters and returnees
- Wider communities in which ex-fighters and returnees re-integrate
- Local business community
- UN and its specialized agencies such as UNPKOs, UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, WFP)
- World Bank
- NGOs

- Donor Agencies
- Religious organizations

Multi-dimensional DDRRR initiatives designed to ensure relief assistance, capacity and eventual long-term self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries include: registration, collection, control and disposal of arms, provision of civilian clothing, cash-payments at time of demobilization and subsequent intervals, foodstuffs, household utensils, land allocation, agricultural training, inputs and implements, school fees for children, counselling, legal or entrepreneurial advice, management and technical advice, credit schemes job placement, health support and referral services⁹² (See Figure 2). These are a complex coordination of civilian and military tasks.

DDRRR is the opposite of mobilization for war. Vanessa Farr summarized the aim of DDR as “through a process that is symbolic as well as practical, to offer fighters a new identity that is compatible with peaceful development and sustainable growth.”⁹³ Similarly, the purpose of refugee repatriation and reintegration is to incorporate returnees into the post-conflict society and facilitate their attainment of self-sufficiency.

The success of DDRRR is tied to the wider transformation from a war environment to a peacetime social, political, economic and military context. For instance, DDR should be part of the broader post-conflict demilitarization process. There are two crucial aspects.

⁹² K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.29

⁹³ V. Farr, “The importance of a gender perspective to successful disarmament, demobilization and

First, at the state level demilitarization “involves the deconstruction of ideologies and military organizations and the reassertion of civilian control over the state and economy” and via demobilization potentially “implies a reduction in arms and in military expenditure, and frees up resources – both human and structural – for conversion to non-military activities.”⁹⁴ During the era of its total national strategy South Africa typified a nation in which the military strongly influenced government policies and dominated the security agenda. Between 1990 and 1998 there was significant military expenditure reductions in South Africa and Ethiopia, with the two countries and Angola accounting for about 70 per cent of the reduction in heavy weapons in sub-Saharan Africa.⁹⁵

Second, demilitarization of the broader society which is dependent on the level of commitment to “the de-glorification of the armed forces by the media and security in general, the withdrawal of observable military influences in the education system, and a sustained reduction in consumerist militarism.”⁹⁶

DDRRR is also dependent on the remaking of the broader socio-economic and political setting. Vanessa Farr argues, and we think rightly so, that:

Even while programmes to meet combatants’ needs must be put in place as quickly as possible after formal cessation of hostilities...planners should not lose sight of how demobilization, disarmament and reintegration interact with other social reformation after war. To improve the chances that this interaction will be peaceful and constructive, an awareness of longer-term goals, such as promotion

reintegration processes” *Disarmament Forum*, Issue 4, 2003, p.27

⁹⁴ V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), p.9

⁹⁵ G. Harris, “The case or demilitarization in sub-Saharan Africa,” in G. Harris, ed, *Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cost Effective Alternatives to the Military*, (Pretoria, ISS, 2004), p.4

⁹⁶ G. Lamb in V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), p.9

of greater equality through the reformulation of previously exclusionary social, political and economic practices, is essential to the successful implementation of demobilization and reintegration processes.⁹⁷

DDRRR, for instance, benefits from the job openings created by economic reconstruction.

Equally important is the role played by the wider society in which the former-combatants and returnees are supposed to resettle. Communities should be ready to receive the ex-combatants and returnees. Herein lies the need to sensitize the grassroots and enlist their support for DDRRR in order to create conditions necessary for the successful implementation of the process. This also preempts the likelihood of reintegration support unwittingly engendering fear or resentment on the part of the wider society. Some ex-combatants who resettled in Mozambique's rural areas were important beneficiaries of the harnessing of 'social capital' or traditional healing and reintegration processes.⁹⁸ The local communities in which ex-combatants reintegrate should be flexible and accommodative of them. This promotes reconciliation and an environment favourable for the reintegration process. The success of DDRRR, thus, significantly depends on the presence of a viable wider environment into which ex-fighters and returnees re-enter.

DDRRR has political, security, fiscal and socio-economic effects on post-conflict transition and sustainability of peace.⁹⁹ There is an evident reciprocal relationship

⁹⁷ V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), p.5

⁹⁸ See for example C. Alden, 'Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique' in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33(3), 2002, pp.351-353

⁹⁹ K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998, p.14. See also United Nations, 'The Role of the United Nations

between DDRRR and the broader post-conflict peace building. Effective DDRRR facilitates both human and state security. For instance, DDRRR can address the social, economic, political, health and environmental needs of ex-combatants and uprooted people. If these needs are adequately met the positive impacts will feed on to regime and national security and the broader post-conflict peace building objectives. These secure and stable post-conflict frameworks are conducive for the rollout of related initiatives such as reconciliation, democratization, institution building, good governance, social and economic reconstruction, judicial reform and civil society reconstruction. In turn, prospects for successful DDRRR increase in an environment of enhanced economic development. The primary motivation of DDRRR “has been the preservation or reconstruction of local security – local security logically contributes to regional security, which in turn contributes to a more stable global environment, and thus benefits donors.”¹⁰⁰

The involvement of former military personnel in organized criminal networks in the Balkans, Russia and Mozambique and the participation of former security forces from Eastern Europe and South Africa as mercenaries in the Angola and Congo conflicts exemplify the destabilizing roles of former combatants who are not successfully reintegrated.¹⁰¹ Similarly, failed attempts at DDR twice contributed to the resumption of

Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’, Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council, S/2000/101, 11 Feb. (New York, United Nations, 2000) and United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, A/55/3055-S/2000/809, (New York, United Nations, 2000)

¹⁰⁰ *Demobilization and Its Implications for HIV/AIDS*

<http://www.certi.org/publications/demob/Demobilization_Final.html>, Accessed on 8 December 2003

¹⁰¹ See for example C. Alden, ‘Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique’ in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33(3), 2002, pp.341-342 and J. McMullin, “Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?”

armed conflict between the MPLA and UNITA in Angola. This derailed attempts at post-conflict peace building and reconstruction. In Mozambique DDR- planned and funded by the international community- precluded major disruptions by former combatants and fostered short-term stability and post-conflict peace building.

In fiscal and socio-economic terms, DDR has a perceived peace dividend. It could facilitate long-term reduction in military expenditure thereby freeing economic resources for public and social sector expenditure as well as human resources for economically productive activities.¹⁰² This is particularly true for most developing countries in which “the military sector does not contribute significantly to the national economy, as there is little research and production of military technology.”¹⁰³ Reduction of military expenditure also finds favour with International Financial Institutions’ conditionalities for continued donor aid that these developing countries desperately need. Reintegration of the demobilized soldiers may, however, make the DDR process an expensive undertaking in the short-term.

Through its effects on the defence expenditure and national development link DDR could significantly contribute to post-conflict security sector transformation. DDR can also encourage substitution of violent conflict resolution methods by peaceful political

International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-643

¹⁰² K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Houndsmill, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), pp23-24. K. Kingma, “Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa”, *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p.181; Toolbox: 8, *Military Demobilization*, <<http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox8.htm>>, Accessed on 18 March 2004

¹⁰³ *Demobilization and Its Implications for HIV/AIDS*
<http://www.certi.org/publications/demob/Demobilization_Final.html>, Accessed on 8 December 2003.

For a critique of the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth see J. Dumas, “The role of demilitarization in promoting democracy and prosperity in Africa” in J. Brauer and J. Dunne, eds., *Arming the south*, (Palgrave, London, 2002, pp.15-33

practices and negotiation via the reduction of former rivals' military capacities.¹⁰⁴ DDR places more emphasis on civilian governance than the military sector. This augurs well for the democratization rather than militarization of politics.

DDRRR can also become subject to political forces. Ineffective reintegration and rehabilitation and the attendant impoverishment of ex-fighters and returnees can be used by political parties for their own purposes. For example, the opposition can use perceived neglect of ex-fighters to make the government look inept or uncaring, while the government can use DDRRR support as a bait to entice and establish hold on a politically important niche of the electorate. The ex-fighters' vulnerability and continued dependence on state support can be exploited for the government's political gain. Mozambique's reintegration experience was attended by distrust and animosity. Renamo protested against the ineligibility of its former fighters from receiving state pensions. But the ruling Frelimo argued that the poverty of ex-Renamo fighters was due to the inability of the former rebel movement in caring for its supporters.¹⁰⁵

The repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced people enfranchises and crucially affords them the opportunity to participate in subsequent transitional or post-conflict elections. This augurs well for their self-determination, establishment and legitimization of participatory democracy that is important for broader peace building. Transitional or post-conflict elections "can implant the idea of democratic contestation in

¹⁰⁴ Toolbox: 8, *Military Demobilization*, <<http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox8.htm>>, Accessed on 18 March 2004

¹⁰⁵ J. McMullin, "Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No.4, Winter 2004, p.634

the countries lacking such traditions and give impetus to efforts to build a society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.”¹⁰⁶ Just like DDR, repatriation of refugees, also, has the potential to contribute to long-term development. According to the World Refugee Survey:

while repatriation/reintegration assistance may be expensive, in the long run it is also cost-effective. Funding a successful repatriation is less expensive than maintaining tens or hundreds of thousands or more refugees in camps for *years* on end. And helping returnees, and their country, work towards self-sufficiency is also more cost-effective than forcing them to remain dependent on emergency relief programs and foreign aid.¹⁰⁷

Repatriation and resettlement can also imply the return of professionals and skilled personnel who could positively contribute to post-conflict socio-economic reconstruction and development. DDRRR thus resonates with the developing global emphasis on human or people-centred security in relation to state security. It addresses the non-military threats to the security of the target groups such as poverty, disenfranchisement and coercion.

Analysts, however, agree that the success of DDRRR as a component of post-conflict peace building is circumstantial upon the twofold commitment of the formerly warring parties on one hand and the international community on the other. Mats Berdall noted that:

¹⁰⁶ USAID quoted in D. Gallagher and A. Schowengerdt, “Participation of Refugees in Post Conflict Elections” in K. Kumar, ed, *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*, (London, Lynne Rienner, 1998), p.197

¹⁰⁷ “Repatriation: Tackling Protection and Assistance Concerns” <http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/repatriation_wrs93.htm>, Accessed on 14 October 2004

External actors cannot replace political commitment, nor can they generate political momentum in the absence of trust and will among the parties. They can, however, by the manner in which support is extended, discourage defection from a peace process, thus strengthening, however subtly, the degree of commitment that does exist.¹⁰⁸

The international community could provide third-party security guarantees for post-peace agreement DDRRR thereby nurturing the parties' confidence in the process. This augurs well for the successful implementation of the process.

DDRRR implementation and its impact are influenced by a country's "distinct political and socio-economic contexts".¹⁰⁹ In order to effectively augment war-to-peace transitions comprehensive DDRRR programmes need to be contextualized in a dual manner. DDRRR components should, first, strategically conform to the specific local operational environment and second, categorize intended beneficiaries as a heterogeneous population. DDRRR processes should be informed by a needs assessment and demographic profile of the ex-fighters and returnees. It should address the target recipients' diverse needs according to age, sex, physical condition, length of service/displacement, geographic location, education levels and skills.¹¹⁰ Females, children and disabled ex-combatants and returnees represent special target groups. In addition DDRRR's success hinges on formulation and flexible implementation of timely support initiatives. It is against the foregoing definitional usage and conceptualization

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in C. Alden, "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33(3), 2002, p354.

¹⁰⁹ K. Kingma, "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2

¹¹⁰ See V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), V. Farr, "The importance of a gender perspective to successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes" *Disarmament Forum*, Issue 4, 2003

that this thesis will analyze Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa's DRRR programmes.