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Title: The Construction of Apartheid, 1948-1961.

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What was distinctive about Apartheid in the 1950s, as compared with the 1960s? How was it constructed, and how did it change? Much of the academic and journalistic literature on Apartheid pre-'reform' depicts it as the product of a single, long-term 'grand plan', pursued systematically and unfalteringly by the National Party (NP) since its accession to power in 1948. Such views are challenged in this paper, which argues that although the Apartheid state has certainly been characterised by a singular degree of co-ordination, planning and coercion, the construction of Apartheid has not been a wholly linear, systematic or monolithic project. The state's uncertainties, conflicts, weaknesses, changes and failures, although far less visible than its cohesiveness and triumphs, have also made their mark on the construction of Apartheid. Moreover, some (but obviously not all) of the premises and objectives of Apartheid changed in fundamental ways at the onset of the 1960s. (The presentation of these arguments is very brief and schematic, being a summary of large chunks of my doctoral thesis.)

Brian Bunting (former editor of the Communist Party newspaper 'The Guardian' and then 'New Age') and Willem De Klerk (Afrikaner writer and political commentator) have stated the 'grand plan' view in its strongest terms, albeit from opposite ends of the political spectrum. In his notable study of Apartheid, written in 1969, Bunting asserted that

> there has been nothing haphazard or *laissez-faire* about Nationalist rule, in striking contrast to previous regimes. Operating on the basis of a preconceived ideology which has undergone very little change in the last fifteen years, the Nationalists have planned their strategy with care and worked step by step towards their goal. Nothing has been left to chance. (1)

De Klerk too, sees the development of Apartheid as having been a similarly thorough-going and unified project, spearheaded by Verwoerd (first a Senator, then also Minister of Native Affairs, and ultimately Prime Minister). In De Klerk's words,

> for the next eighteen years, Verwoerd would variously enlarge upon the themes of his speech to the Senate of 1948. Certain emphases would shift and refinements would take place...These however, would by no means be new to the *apartheidsgedagte* [apartheid-idea]...On the whole, Verwoerd would not deviate in the slightest degree from the concept he had analysed, and the design he had sketched in his first major speech as a parliamentarian. *He would revise nothing.* (2)

Similar accounts of Verwoerd's role, as having inspired and orchestrated the construction of Apartheid with his grand vision and all-embracing plans for the future, are given by both

apologists and academic critics of the Apartheid regime. (3) This sort of view also predominates in journalistic accounts of Apartheid, which exercise considerable influence over popular thinking on the subject. (4)

The 'grand plan' view is often not stated quite as baldly or strongly as Bunting or De Klerk do. But we can recognise it in the following familiar sorts of claims about Apartheid (pre-'reform'). First, it is often argued that by 1948, the Sauer Report - a confidential report produced internally for the NP in 1947 - equipped the newly elected Nationalist government with a ready-made, if rudimentary, blueprint for the future. The construction of Apartheid during the 1950s is thus seen as the direct outgrowth of pre-planned, long-term strategies, which the architects of state policy immediately proceeded to implement, step by step. As David Welsh put it,

> the Nationalists had appealed to the electorate with the slogan 'Apartheid', the tag given to a race policy that had been drawn up by an internal commission and to which the new regime would faithfully adhere. (5).

Similar claims are made by Janet Robertson, Ralph Horwitz and Douglas Hindson, for example. (6)

Second, the development of Apartheid through the 1950s and 1960s is depicted, explicitly or implicitly, as having been essentially continuous. The prominent policies of the 1960s - such as population removals, restrictions on the scale of urban African employment, 'homeland' 'self-government' and 'development' - are regarded as having been central to the design of Apartheid from the start. Progress towards these measures is thus seen as having been linear and cumulative, each step building on the successes of the last. (7)

In short, therefore, the 'grand plan' view of Apartheid, stated strongly, derives from the conviction that from the late 1940s, the architects of state policy knew where they were heading and how to get there, and proceeded unwaveringly, without changing course, until the onset of 'reform' in the mid-1970s. In many cases, a weaker version of this sort of argument is made, which recognises hiccups and temporary hitches in the implementation of the NP's blueprint. But the essential features of the 'grand plan' thesis is reiterated, in so far as the development of Apartheid is seen as having been fundamentally pre-planned, continuous and cumulative.

The appeal of this sort of view is readily understandable. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Apartheid state did indeed advance from strength to strength, with a greater degree of ideological fervour than any of its predecessors. The NP introduced an unprecedented scale of violence and repression into

blacks' encounters with the state. Organised black resistance was smashed. The economic subordination of African labour, already well-established by previous regimes, became more systematic once the NP took power. A national system of labour bureaux, introduced to monitor and control the distribution of African labour, placed increasingly severe constraints on Africans' freedom of movement and occupational choice. The Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Education Act, Immorality Act and others, laid the foundations for a more rigid and thorough-going system of racial domination than had existed to date. Moreover, several facets of Apartheid probably *did remain largely unchanged from 1948 through to the current* 'reform' period. Obviously no-one could characterise the policies of the Nationalist government as having been completely haphazard or *ad hoc*.

Still, to endorse the 'grand plan' view is to go to the other extreme, taking the NP's Promothean ideological discourses wholly at face value. For, contrary to the NP's self-image of ideological unity and continuity, the nature and future of 'Apartheid' has divided the Afrikaner nationalist alliance since the mid-1940s. Of course, many basic features of Apartheid - such as white minority rule, residential segregation, the prohibition of interracial sex and marriage - were not contested, since the commitment to white economic and political supremacy, and the 'complete eradication of any racial mixing' (8), was unanimous. But the Nationalist alliance was deeply divided over the extent to which the state should tolerate growing white dependence on African labour and the concomitant expansion of the urban African proletariat. Conflicting stances on this issue engendered distinct blueprints for Apartheid, neither of which had trounced the other by 1948. After the NP's election victory in 1948, the state's stance on this issue, and the policies which followed from it, were shaped in the first instance by the relative powers of the competing Afrikaner factions within the Native Affairs Department (NAD). The faction which dominated the design of these policies during the 1950s, had lost much of its authority within the NAD by the early 1960s. As a result, contrary to notion of a single 'grand plan', we can discern two distinct stages in the construction of NAD policy. A case study of the NAD's policies of the 1950s and 1960s defies the 'grand plan' view in another respect too. For, even within the broad framework of a particular conception of Apartheid, the construction of NAD policies took an uneven and often reactive course, over which the NAD did not exercise complete control. Nor did the implementation of NAD policy successfully achieve the objectives for which it was designed. Indeed, these failures played an important part in reorienting the NAD's policies after 1959/60. In short therefore, the construction of NAD policies was neither wholly linear, pre-planned or cumulative. In order to illustrate these points, the remainder of the paper looks very briefly at the NAD's stance on the issues of "economic integration" (of Africans in the 'white' economy) and African urbanisation during the 1950s; the sorts of policies issuing from it; the efficacy with which these policies were implemented; and how and why these policies changed after 1959.

Contrary to the received wisdom, the critical issue of the extent to which the Apartheid system should accomodate the capitalist demand for African labour, was the source of an unresolved conflict within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance on the eve of the 1948 election (9). In his pioneering study of Afrikaner nationalism, Dan O'Meara has argued that the NP was brought to power by an Afrikaner nationalist class alliance, comprising 'Transvaal, Cape and Orange Free State farmers, specific categories of white labour, and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie' (10), which had thrown its weight behind a single, hegemonic conception of Apartheid. But paradoxically, while stressing the class differences within this alliance, O'Meara did not recognise that these class divisions underlay competing conceptions of Apartheid, neither of which was hegemonic. Afrikaners were indeed united in their commitment to white supremacy; but as we shall see, they were divided, largely (although not exclusively) along class lines, over whether or not white supremacy was threatened by deepening white dependence on African labour.

By 1948, the economic and political developments of the 1940s had thrust this issue of "economic integration" to the centre-stage of Afrikaner debate. The 1940s had seen the spectacular expansion of manufacturing, accompanied by the rapid growth of the urban African workforce. (Between 1935 and 1945, the number of Africans employed in manufacturing rose by 119.1%, from 112 091 (which constituted 46.3% of the manufacturing workforce) to 245 538 (54.6% of the workforce) (11). Yet, as demand for African labour grew, so too had the militancy and volatility of the urban African proletariat. In contrast to the relative quiescence of the 1930s, the war years ushered in a decade of political turbulence, stirred up by desperate economic and social conditions, coupled with rising expectations and assertiveness. Much of the resistance was "informal and spontaneous - particular local difficulties would reach a point at which they could no longer be tolerated and would provoke a reaction by township residents" (12). But, to the alarm of most whites, this surge of grassroots militancy also gave new momentum to both the ANC and the CPSA. By linking up with grassroots struggles, these organisations succeeded in enlisting wider mass support (13). African trade unions also grew in strength and size. By 1945, over 100 000 African workers (approximately 40% of the African industrial workforce) were unionised, as compared with 37 000 in 1939 (14). The years 1939-1945 also saw a record number of 304 strikes, involving 58 000 Africans, 'Coloureds' and Indians (15). Over 70 000 African miners then went on strike in 1946.

The opposing factions within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance held differing views of the 'problem' posed by the deepening "economic integration" of Africans, and its appropriate solution. The faction which I call 'purist' was drawn primarily from the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie and working class, although it did command some support in business circles - such as the Stellenbosch Chamber of Commerce. According to the purists, the rising tide of urban African militancy during the 1940s was symptomatic of the fundamental incompatability between 'political segregation' and 'economic integration'. In their view, white dependence on African labour would ultimately sound the death

knell of white supremacy. For, as the proportion of Africans in the urban workforce continued to expand, so too would their bargaining powers. These powers would be wielded with growing assertiveness and militancy, thanks to rising political expectations, borne of improving standards of living and levels of education in the cities. The sheer size of the urban African proletariat, it was argued, would ensure that an African insurrection against white minority rule would ultimately triumph, since "even repeated recourse to force majeure is powerless in the end against the force of numbers" (16). The purists therefore regarded "total segregation" - including "economic segregation" - as the only reliable safeguard of white supremacy. Apartheid, in their view, should aim at the gradual but steady extrication of African labour from the 'white' economy.(17) To this end, they claimed, it would be essential for the state to impose quotas on the permissible numbers of Africans working in 'white' areas; create incentives to accelerate mechanisation, and launch a concerted drive to stimulate white immigration. In addition, Apartheid should include a thorough-going programme of population resettlement, to remove Africans from 'white' areas of the country to their rightful 'homes' in the reserves. (18)

The opposing faction was dominated by Afrikaner agricultural, industrial and commercial capital. Predictably, in these circles, there was far less enthusiasm at the prospect of "economic segregation". In their view, the political ferment of the 1940s was caused by a weak state, rather than any underlying contradiction between the imperatives of white supremacy and the growth of the African workforce. Provided the state was suitably fortified to subvert the threat of African unionisation and populist insurrection, they maintained, there was no need for whites to forego their access to African labour. Instead, Apartheid should be eminently "practical":

> It must be acknowledged that the non-white worker already constitutes an integral part of our economic structure, that he is now so enmeshed in the spheres of our economic life that for the first fifty to one hundred years (if not longer), total segregation is pure wishful thinking. Any government which disregards this irrefutable fact will soon discover that it is no longer in a position to govern. (19)

In terms of this "practical" blueprint for Apartheid, curtailing the further growth of urbanised African communities would be likewise an unnecessary and economically damaging undertaking. As the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) told the Tomlinson Commission, "stabilised" labour was preferable to "migratory" labour (20). So Africans should be permitted into urban areas provided they were *bona fide* workseekers, and they should not be prevented from settling there permanently with their families. The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU), representing the interests of white farmers, concurred. (21)

The Sauer Report, treated by many scholars as the source of Apartheid policies, was in fact an internally contradictory and ambiguous document - contradictory because it wove together strands from these mutually exclusive conceptions of Apartheid, and ambiguous because it did not finally choose between them. The Report both endorsed and qualified the principle of 'total segregation', and simultaneously proposed some policy measures to limit white access to African labour, and others which would expedite the expansion of the African workforce. (22) Clearly, the origins of the Apartheid policies of the 1950s cannot be explained by the presence of a single, hegemonic blueprint for Apartheid. We have to examine which of the competing blueprints for Apartheid gained the upper hand within the state during the 1950s, and why.

The conflict within the NP and the state over 'economic integration' and African urbanisation, persisted throughout the 1950s, and on into the 1960s - although by 1960, the 'practical' position had become more reformist and the 'purist' position less extreme (see later). O'Meara has claimed that the views of Afrikaner capital were hegemonic from the start. But he underestimated the size and influence of the purist faction. In his view, it was merely a small group of politically marginal, ivory-tower intellectuals, who championed the cause of 'total segregation' (23). In fact, however, this position commanded strong support within the Dutch Reformed Church - particularly during the early 1950s (24). And several NP MPs - including Senator Jan De Klerk (the second Minister of Labour), Donges (first Minister of the Interior), N. Diedrichs and D. De Wet Nel - called for immediate moves towards the goal of "economic apartheid" (25). It is important to bear these conflicts in mind, as a backdrop to our understanding of state policy in the 1950s; otherwise, it is difficult to make sense of the change of course in policies towards Africans in urban areas, which became evident after 1959 (as will be shown later).

Throughout the 1950s, then, as A. Hepple, leader of the South African Labour Party, declared, "we have heard the NP speak with many voices on the question of their Native policy" (26). But in the midst of these controversies, one set of voices wrested much of the authority to define the notion of Apartheid which shaped the making of state policy. The Minister of Native Affairs occupied a privileged position in the construction of Apartheid, since his portfolio covered the key problem area for Apartheid - the so-called 'Native question'. Seizing upon this strategic advantage, Jansen (the first Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs) and Verwoerd (his successor) proceeded to enlarge the resources and enhance the prestige and power of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) within the state.

Once the NP had been installed in government, the NAD's most immediate and pressing concern was the achievement of "better control" (27) over the employment and residence of Africans in the urban areas. As we have seen, this was exactly the policy area which was most controversial and contested within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance. The Sauer Report, moreover, had

failed to provide a consistent, ready-made solution. How then, did architects of NAD policy respond to conflicts within Afrikanerdom over meaning and appropriate course for Apartheid?

The relative political influence of the competing positions on 'Apartheid' within the NAD depended upon several variables - notably, the relative powers of the opposing factions within the Nationalist alliance; the distribution of power between the NAD and local authorities; and various pressures and constraints of the historical moment. As we shall see, the particular configuration of these variables during the early 1950s, when the foundations of the first phase of Apartheid were laid, gave the 'practical' conception of Apartheid a greater (although by no means total) hold over NAD policy, than its purist adversary. By the onset of the 1960s, however, each of these factors had changed, resulting in turn in a change in the premises and direction of NAD policy.

The purist faction was not without influence within the NAD. W.M. Eiselin, appointed by Jansen as Secretary for Native Affairs, was a founder member of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) which championed the 'total segregation' cause. Verwoerd, who took over as Minister of Native Affairs in 1951, created a research department dominated by SABRA intellectuals. Also, D. De Wet Nel, another founder member of SABRA, was appointed to lead the Native Affairs Commission, a body which advised the Minister of Native Affairs on policy matters.

But NAD policy was more 'practical' than it was purist, since it was premised on the 'practical' acceptance of the growing white dependence on African labour and the resultant expansion of the urban African proletariat, as economic necessities. As Verwoerd told a meeting with the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM) and Federated Chambers of Industries (FCI) in 1951, "the implementation of Apartheid would take account of economic reality" (28). The NAD accepted that "the economic organisation of the land and interior will have the same character as it has now" (29). The ensuing political threats would be dealt with by intensifying the state's control over African political organisations and trade unions, and by imposing a more rigorous and aggressive influx control policy.

Central to the design of the NAD's influx control policy was the ideological and administrative differentiation between Africans who were "detribalised" and "urbanised", and those who were still "tribalised". The architects of NAD policy went along with the "practical" blueprint in accepting that "detribalised" city-dwellers, who had no 'tribal' ties or base in the reserves, had the 'residential right' to remain in the urban areas permanently, *whether or not they were employed there.* As Verwoerd put it,

> a little less than one-third [of the African population] lives and works in the cities, of whom a section have become detribalised and urbanised. The Apartheid policy takes this reality into account. (30)

However, sharing some of the purists' anxieties about the growth of the urban proletariat, the NAD set out to freeze all further urbanisation. In future, only migrant workers would be permitted the join the urban African community, and only for the duration of their employment contracts. Moreover, in order to limit the number of migrant workers drawn into the cities, an urban labour preference principle was built into the influx control policy: employers in the cities would be compelled to draw on the services of the urbanised unemployed before importing additional migrant workers. As well as extracting maximum economic advantage from the resident urban African population, the ULPP was designed to ensure that a greater proportion of African workseekers from the reserves, were redirected to the farms, having been refused entry into cities with existing labour surpluses. The NAD thus claimed to have found economically 'practical' ways of limiting the growth of the urban African proletariat.

The NAD declared its strategy as a "short-term" measure, postponing the decision as to whether the preservation of Apartheid would ultimately require the measures advocated by the purists, for "future generations and their policies" (31). This characterisation of NAD strategy was partly an ideological device to accomodate the purist position in some way. (Jansen and Verwoerd were determined to dismiss the UP's jibes about dissension and confusion within Afrikaner ranks over the meaning of 'Apartheid'.) But it also reflected the newly elected government's priorities, of making a visible impact on immediate problems, and consolidating and extending its power. The long-term future of Apartheid was less of an issue at this early stage. Inevitably, however, short-term policies have long-term implications; in this case, the NAD introduced an influx control policy which set back still further the prospects of removing the urbanised African population to the reserves and curtailing 'economic integration' in the manner proposed by the purists.

As I suggested earlier, the NAD's position on 'economic integration' and African urbanisation is explained by a combination of factors. Afrikaner capital, although not hegemonic within the Afrikaner nationalist alliance, exercised considerable powers within the policy-making process. During the early 1950s, as suggested earlier, the SAAU and AHI endorsed more or less the same blueprint for Apartheid - one which was marked by its acceptance of the economic inevitability of unrestricted 'economic integration' and continuing, but controlled, African urbanisation. Jointly, they constituted a powerful lobby within the NAD for 'practical' Apartheid. Indeed, the interests of white farmers, as represented by the SAAU, were afforded a regular and privileged hearing within the NAD. As a NAD memorandum explained,

> there is in existence a liason committee (usually referred to as 'Die Skakelkommittee') between the Minister of Native Affairs and his Department on the one hand, and the SAAU and various provincial agricultural unions on the other. All Native labour matters affecting agriculture, such as questions of the supply of labour, wages, and conditions of employment and policy generally, are discussed with this Committee which is presided over either by the Minister or the Secretary of Native Affairs, and which meets as and when necessary. (32)

The NAD's legislation for controlling the numbers of Africans living and working in urban areas - a matter of direct concern to farmers - was therefore drafted in close consultation with this Skakelkommittee.

The interests of Afrikaner industry and commerce also weighed heavily upon the NAD. During the 1940s, the Broederbond had spearheaded the so-called Economic Movement, to advance the cause of Afrikaner business. Due largely to its efforts and investments, between 1939 and 1949, the number of Afrikaner-owned manufacturing concerns increased from 1 293 to 3 385, with turnover expanding from £6 000 000 to £43 000 000. Commercial establishments numbered 9 585 by 1949, as compared with 2 428 in 1939, and their turnover shot up from £28 000 000 to £203 700 000 (33). However, as O'Meara points out, "many of these (new businesses) were small and under-capitalised" (34). Were the NAD to have taken a purist line on Apartheid, insisting that employers make proportionately more use of white (and therefore more costly) labour and invest more in mechanisation, many of these new Afrikaner businesses would have collapsed. Ironically, the purists' proposals would have inflicted a far heavier burden on Afrikaner industrial capital than its English-speaking counterpart. For, most of the larger capital-intensive industries capable of surviving such an onslaught from the state, were owned by English-speakers. The 1950 'Ekonomiese Volkskongres', however, reiterated the NP's commitment to enhancing the prosperity and competitiveness of Afrikaner business.

The interests of Afrikaner farmers and industrialists do not wholly explain the NAD's commitment to a 'practical' approach to Apartheid. Other factors derived from the limited powers and capabilities of the NAD. In at least one important respect, the economic organisation of the country was not in the hands of the NAD, nor any other central government department. Decisions as to how much urban land would be set aside for industrial development rested with the elected city councils which, together with the municipalities, constituted the local arm of the state. As the NAD was well aware, the local authorities had a vested interest in the expansion of local industries, which boosted the employment prospects and general economic prosperity of their areas. During the 1950s, the NAD was not yet strong enough to

provoke a confrontation with the local authorities by attempting to usurp these powers. When spelling out NAD policy in 1951, Jansen could therefore do little more than issue "warnings against the unlimited expansion of industries in our large urban areas" (35).

The local authorities geared the NAD towards 'practical' policies in other respects too. During the early 1950s, the local authorities in many of the larger cities - such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town - were dominated by the United Party (UP). The policy preferences of these local authorities were therefore strongly aligned with the recommendations of the Fagan Commission, endorsed by the UP. Indeed, their evidence to this Commission had had a considerable impact on its findings. In the NAD too, the influence of the larger local authorities was well-established (36). For, the NAD's administrative activities, undertaken by the Native Affairs Commissioners, were concentrated in the rural areas. It was the local authorities alone who had acquired experience and expertise in dealing with "the bewildering complexity of urban African administration" (37), and the larger local authorities whose opinion carried the most weight in these matters.

Furthermore, the co-operation of the local authorities was indispensable to the implementation of NAD policy. The distribution of control over Africans in urban areas, between the NAD and local authorities, had been ambiguous ever since the Act of Union ruled on the matter in 1909. One section of the Act had given local authorities control over municipal affairs, while another section gave the central government control over African affairs (38). At SABRA's suggestion, in the early 1950s, Verwoerd took a few steps to strengthen the NAD's hand. For example, municipal Managers of 'Non-European Affairs' were required to hold a licence from the Minister of Native Affairs, which could be revoked if Departmental policy was flouted. But during the 1950s, the NAD had neither the strength nor the resources radically to restructure the system of urban administration. The local authorities therefore remained the principal agents of Departmental policy in urban areas, with considerable powers and authority.

Finally, the 'practical' lobby was further strengthened by the political weaknesses of the newly elected Nationalist government, uncertain of re-election. The NP had won the 1948 election with a small majority of seats, but only 39.4% of the vote (39). During the NP's first term of office, when several of the key Apartheid laws of the 1950s were passed, the architects of NAD policy were cautious, and intent on dispelling UP accusations that Apartheid was the work of ideological zealots with no understanding of, or concern for, its economically damaging consequences. Also, with an initial time-table of five years, careful long-term planning was inappropriate.

The impact of the NAD's policies on the lives of Africans was

brutal and traumatic, marking a new order and intensity of state repression. Police harrassment and brutality became commonplace. As the influx control restrictions were tightened, so the number of people 'endorsed out' to a life of even harsher poverty in the reserves, grew. So too did the numbers imprisoned for a myriad 'petty contraventions' of the pass laws. As Blokes Modisane remarked caustically, "in our curious society, going to jail...was a social institution, something to be expected; it was Harry Bloom who wrote: more Africans go to prison than to school" (40). But from the NAD's point of view, its influx control policies failed to provide the desired degree of control over the number of Africans living and working in urban areas.

The NAD's objectives were partly thwarted by the legislative process itself. As we have seen, the NAD was prepared to concede that "detribalised" Africans had the "residential right" to remain in the urban area in which they were currently living, whether or not they ministered to white needs. Having become fully "urbanised", Verwoerd told parliament, these people were entitled to "certain guarantees, security and stability" (41) - including protection against removal if unemployed. But membership of this relatively privileged "detribalised" group was very narrowly defined, limited to Africans who had been "born and continuously resident" in the area. In order to effect the desired freeze on further African urbanisation, the NAD intended to refuse any African who had not been born in an urban area, the right to remain there permanently. This proposal met with a broad front of opposition - from the ANC and SACPSA, the politically moderate Location Advisory Boards' Congress, ASSOCOM, FCI, as well as within the House of Assembly and the Senate. The passage of the Native laws Amendment Bill, which contained the NAD's principal influx control measures, is an interesting illustration of the effects of opposition on the construction of Apartheid in the early 1950s. But the details cannot be covered here. (42) Suffice it to say that Verwoerd was pressured into modifying his original clause conferring 'residential rights', so that it encompassed two extra groups of qualifiers. First, men and women who had worked continuously in an urban area for ten years with one employer or fifteen years for several employers, were now accepted as permanent residents of the area, whether or not they subsequently became unemployed. And the wives and dependent children of men with 'residential rights' were also recognised as members of the 'urbanised' community. Of course, the terms of section 10(1) of the Urban Areas Act, which allocated these 'rights', were still extremely restrictive. But Verwoerd's concessions had important administrative implications.

During the 1950s, the NAD was prepared to allow 'economic integration' to proceed unchecked in the cities, partly because it was confident of its powers to restrict the growth of the urban African proletariat to the 'practical' minimum. As we have seen, this was to be achieved in two ways. Firstly, the urban labour preference policy (ULPP) was designed to eliminate "large" (43) urban labour surpluses. Declaring the need "to employ every possible Bantu legally domiciled in town" (44), the NAD intended the ULPP to ensure "the placement of city Bantu in jobs which are now in practice reserved for migrant labourers" (45). This

included urban women and "juveniles" (aged 15-20); by making "better use" of their labour, the NAD hoped to diminish the demand for additional migrant labour. And secondly, all future migration to the cities would be on a temporary basis large urban labour surpluses.

Ironically, however, the influx control legislation unwittingly introduced substantial obstacles on both fronts. The ULPP was premised upon the NAD's capacity to "channel" urbanised Africans into specified jobs ahead of migrant workers; but the newly amended section 10(1)(a),(b)&(c) of the Urban Areas Act gave "urbanised" men, women and youths the *legal right* to resist taking jobs which they did not want, remaining unemployed if they chose to.

Partly because of section 10(1), therefore, the ULPP was largely inoperative (46). Instead of restricting the growth of the urban population by eliminating urban unemployment, by the end of the 1950s, levels of urban unemployment rose (47) alongside the continuing expansion of the migrant workforce (48) and the urban African population at large (49). In the words of the Botha Report (1962), an inter-departmental committee of inquiry into "idleness and unemployment among urban Bantu",

> the anomaly exists, that workseekers from outside the urban areas are admitted in, despite the fact that there is already a surplus in the towns. (50)

The NAD also failed to prevent the growth of the permanent, urbanised community in the cities. Again, the influx control legislation was part of the problem, for the amended section 10 subverted the possibility of a *legal* freeze on further urbanisation. Women from rural areas who married urbanised men were entitled to settle in the urban areas, and raise their children there. Also, men who had been born in rural areas were entitled to settle permanently in urban areas after a long period of registered employment there. As the NAD's policy-makers complained in later years, contrary to intention, section 10 licenced

> the phenomenon of continuous growth of the urban Bantu population...irrespective of whether or not the labour requirements of a particular urban area justified such a large urban Bantu population. (51)

The NAD was aware of these gaps in its control as the decade wore on, and responded to them by trying to plug legal loopholes and extend the powers of its bureaucracy. But by 1961, as we shall see, the then renamed Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) had begun to change course, having come to

perceive its failings as the symptoms of fundamental limitations in the very premises and methods of its 'practical' policies.

The first signs of the impending shift were evident in 1959, with the introduction of the new 'homeland self-government' policy. As Verwoerd (then Prime Minister) told parliament in 1961, this policy represented a departure from the government's original intentions; it "is not what we wanted to see", he said (52). During the 1950s, the reserves were treated essentially as reservoirs of African labour at the disposal of whites. The commitment to 'separate development' was largely the ideological means to legitimise the denial of the franchise to Africans living in the country. The reserves were defined as the permanent political 'home' of all Africans, as a means of excluding them from the polity of 'white' South Africa. But Africans had no political rights within the reserves (53). By the 1960s, however, 'separate development' was vaunted as a means of allocating Africans the 'right' to 'self-government' in their own 'homelands'.

The notion of 'separate development' was thus redefined within a new ideological discourse on 'multi-nationalism' and 'ethnic self-determination' (54). As Blaar Coetzee (then deputy Minister of BAD) put it in 1966,

> our policy is...'multi-nationalism', and seeing that all nationalisms are exclusive, it is obvious that each group must have its own sphere where it can enjoy and exercise in full the privileges of a free society. (55)

These shifts formed part of the state's defences against increasingly hostile international condemnation of Apartheid during the late 1950s. Nationalist struggles for independence in colonial Africa during the late 1950s had focussed international attention on the oppressive regime in South Africa, which put it under severe pressure to address the problem of African political rights. In an attempt to win some legitimacy in the eyes of its critics, the government's 'homeland' solution mimicked the language of 'ethnic self-determination' used by African nationalists up north. But this strategy was seen expressly as a means of

> buying the white man his freedom and the right to retain domination in what is his country, settled for him by his forefathers. (56)

The effects of an ideological discourse transcend its immediate instrumentality, however. The new language of ethnicity and "multi-nationalism" also heralded the beginnings of a fundamental shift in the BAD's attitude towards Africans in the so-called 'white' urban areas. As we saw earlier, the basis of the NAD's

'practical' policies of the 1950s had been the rigid ideological and administrative differentiation between "tribalised" and "urbanised" "detribalised" Africans. Recognising that "detribalised" Africans had lost their 'tribal' affiliations, the NAD conceded that their permanent home was in the urban areas. But by 1959, this 'practical' premise was under attack: the BAD indicated a new intention to level the status of all Africans, inside and outside the 'urbanised' group. In marked contrast to the language of 'practical' politics, the BAD now discarded its earlier declaration that the "fact" of "detribalisation" entitled "urbanised" Africans to certain "guarantes, security and stability". Indeed, the very notion of "detribalisation" was scorned. Stressing the fundamental ethnic unity of Africans in the urban and rural areas, the BAD expressly rejected the idea that there were "two kinds of Africans" (57), those who were "urbanised" and those who retained ties with the reserves. As Eiselin explained in 1959, "our policy only recognises one Bantu community in its ethnic sub-divisions" (58). Or, as the then deputy Minister (B. Coetzee) and Minister (M.C. Botha) put it in later years,

> whatever the world may say, the Bantu city dweller is someone who still yearns for his homeland, and that yearning must be stimulated. (59)

> The Bantu in white urban areas cannot be dissected from their national relatives in the homelands, not even if they were born here in the white area. The Bantu in the white urban areas and those in the Bantu homelands are linked together into one nation by bonds of language...descent, kinship, tribal relations, custom, pride, material interests and many other matters. (60)

Using this new language of 'ethnic' 'unity', the BAD now denounced the concept of "residential rights", which had underpinned the influx control policy of the 1950s. The memorandum defending the 1959 Bantu Self-Government Act declaimed the notion of "residential rights" as an indefensible "deviation" from the "principles of separate development" (61). Whereas the purpose of "separate development" was to allocate Africans their 'own sphere' in their "ethnic" "homelands", argued the BAD, the policies initiated in the early 1950s had

> granted permanence...to Bantu...in European areas. Contrary to the basic aims...of 'separate development'...the Bantu has been allowed to make his home wherever he elects in the whole of South Africa, and this practice has necessarily created the impression that...the Bantu...can lay claim to the same rights as Europeans in European areas. (62)

By 1959, therefore, the BAD had announced its dissatisfaction

with its existing policies, departing from its earlier limited acceptance of African urbanisation. However, the decisive push into the second phase of BAD policy came with the escalation of urban African resistance after 1959, culminating in the widespread turbulence after the Sharpeville massacres of March 1960.

The wave of protest in the urban areas which rose in the late 1950s drew its momentum partly from the shop floor. Between 1955 and 1958, the number of industrial disputes and people on strike nearly doubled over the levels of the early 1950s (63). However, the main thrust of resistance came from within the townships, beginning with the squatter settlements of Cato Manor, Durban, early in 1959. Initially provoked by opposition to the state's plans to remove African squatters from the Cato Manor area, the disturbances raged for several months, inflamed by municipal raids on illegal beer stills. By August 1959, the Manager of the Durban Non-European Affairs Department, Bourquin, called a meeting with the Minister of BAD to declare the local authority's impotence and defeat in Cato Manor. As Bourquin put it,

> the authority of the Durban City Council - the civil governmental authority for the area - has been challenged and overthrown. That statement is not an exaggeration of the facts, for it is true to say that the City Council has been defeated at Cato Manor, and cannot restore its authority without the fullest co-operation and most active assistance of the Government. (64)

The tumult in Durban made headlines in the overseas press. But this was a small taste of the more severe and damaging international censure soon to come. In December 1959, the PAC and ANC both unveiled plans for national 'anti-pass' campaigns. Their protests took an unexpectedly dramatic turn in March 1960, when the South African Police opened fire on a crowd of PAC protestors in Sharpeville, Vereeniging. Sixty-nine people were killed and 180 injured. As the unrest spread to other areas of the country, a state of emergency was declared, and a political storm broke. The injustices of Apartheid now the subject of heated criticism abroad, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth. International confidence in the country's economic prospects dived, and during 1960, the country suffered a net outflow of R180 000 000, and "a balance of payments crisis more severe than any experienced since 1932" (65).

As these economic and political crises dawned, the Afrikaner nationalist alliance was once again thrown into turmoil over the long-controversial issues of 'economic integration' and African urbanisation. Recall that in the late 1940s, it was the upsurgence of African militancy in the townships which had concentrated Afrikaners' attention on the potential political threats levelled by 'economic integration'. So too in 1960; long-standing anxieties about the political dangers of an expanding urban African proletariat were brought to the fore once more. The Afrikaner nationalist alliance, NP, and the BAD in

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particular, entered a phase of intensive reflection and reassessment of existing policies towards Africans in urban areas. Conflicting verdicts were passed. (66). But the BAD took the view that the existing influx control policy had been proven too weak a defence aginst the threat of urban insurrection. After a decade of 'practical' influx control policies, militant 'agitation' in the townships had escalated, rather than diminished. A conference of Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioners in 1961 pronounced the labour bureaux system to date "a complete failure" (67). When reflecting on the performance of NAD policies during the 1950s, Departmental inquiries identified gaping holes in the BAD's control over the urban African labour market and the urban population at large and diagnosed these shortcomings as symptoms of the inadequacies of its earlier 'practical' approach to the urban areas (68). Within the BAD, it was therefore agreed that it was now necessary and possible to take far more aggressive steps to reduce the size of the urban African proletariat, by initiating new forms of social and economic engineering. This is not to say that the BAD completely abandoned all its existing policies. Nevertheless, as we shall see, after 1960, the BAD instituted certain departures from its previous policies, based on a new stance on both 'economic integration' and African urbanisation. The remainder of this paper looks first, at the substance of these changes, and then explains why they were introduced.

Throughout the 1960s, the successive Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the BAD spearheaded moves to curb white dependence on African labour. Their arguments echoed some of the warnings which had been sounded by SABRA during the late 940s, that 'economic integration' was Apartheid's Achilles Heel. By having allowed industrial dependence on African labour to proceed unchecked, the BAD declared, the state was now sitting on a political time bomb. As De Wet Nel, then Minister of BAD, declared in 1964, "if Apartheid should fail, it would probably be due to uncontrolled economic integration" (69).

The BAD did not advocate the wholesale extrication of African labour from the so-called 'white' areas; but it did deviate from the premises of the policies drafted in the 1950s, by underlining the need to curtail the *scale* of 'economic integration' in the cities. The BAD now recogised that an influx control policy limiting the supply of African labour to the cities in accordance with the prevailing demand - as had been the case in the 1950s - was too weak an instrument for containing the urban population growth. As Blaar Coetzee explained in 1966,

> how must we deal with the problem of the increase of Bantu labour on the Witwatersrand?...It is clear that influx control can never be more than an instrument to make the flow of Bantu labour as orderly as possible. *It can never be a solution.* (70)

Determined to institute "positive measures" to deal with the "problem", the BAD introduced successive bills making provision for labour quotas limiting the maximum permissible ratio of African to white workers in the urban areas. The first attempt was made in 1960, in the 'Bantu in European Areas Bill, hastily drafted by BAD lawyers in the wake of the Sharpeville shootings. But this Bill was dropped as hurriedly as it was circulated, following strong protests from local authorities and organised commerce and industry. A similar fate befell the first draft of the 1963 Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, which also made provision for labour quotas. But in 1967, the Physical Planning Act was passed, legally limiting the number of Africans employed in a specified area or class of employment. (The Act also gave the government new powers to control the allocation of land for industrial development).

After 1960, the BAD's controls over African residence in urban areas also changed, in line with its changed stance on African urbanisation. Extending and intensifying the attack launched on the concept of "residential rights" in 1959, the 1960s saw repeated attempts by the BAD to scrap section 10 of the Urban Areas Act (which enshrined these "rights"). These efforts foundered; but the BAD succeeded in whittling away the "guarantees, security and stability" associated with 10(1)(a),(b)&(c) rights in other, less direct ways. Acquiring these 'rights' became dependent on the availability of approved accomodation. Section 10(1)(c) was tightened. The introduction of the so-called 'call-in card' system in 1968 made it compulsory for all migrant workers to return annually to their districts of origin, thus preventing a migrant from notching up ten or fifteen years continuous service. However, the most dramatic and draconian blow to the principle underpinning section 10, as introduced in the 1952 legislation, was delivered by the BAD's urban removals policy. Instituted formally in 1961 (71), this policy grew more aggressive as the decade wore on. It was a policy which expressly overruled the terms of section 10: *all* Africans - irrespective of whether or not they had 10(1)(a)(b)&(c) rights - were liable for removal to the 'homelands' if they were "unproductive" - that is, if they were not ministering to white needs.

How do we explain these changes of course within the BAD? As was suggested earlier, the BAD's new policies were constructed within the ideological and legal framework of the "homeland self-government" policy. But this does not fully explain the BAD's drive to restructure its urban policies. After all, the sorts of moves initiated by the BAD after 1959 had been dismissed earlier in the decade as 'impractical' and unnecessary. The NAD had then accepted unrestricted 'economic integration' as economically indispensable, and had yielded to the "reality" of "detribalisation". Yet, by 1960, the "practical" barriers to the BAD's new urban policy objectives were larger, rather than smaller. For, the size of the urban African workforce had grown, signifying the still deeper dependence of industrial profitability on African labour. And the size of the "detribalised" population had likewise expanded further.

We saw earlier in the paper that a combination of three principal variables explained why, in the early 1950s, the NAD was predisposed towards a largely 'practical' stance on 'economic integration' and African urbanisation: 1) the power of Afrikaner capitalist interests, relative to those of petty-bourgeois groupings such as SABRA, within the NAD; 2), the power of local authorities within the NAD; 3) the NP's electoral uncertainties, which made for a cautious, short-term approach. By 1960, all three factors had altered. Firstly, a new alliance of the SAAU, SABRA and the Broederbond held sway over BAD policy-making; secondly, the BAD had positioned itself for a frontal attack on the local authorities; and thirdly, the NP had considerably strengthened its grip on the reigns of power. These changes are examined briefly in turn.

During the early 1950s, the AHI and SAAU had shared essentially the same views on urban Africans. Both had been confident that continuing 'economic integration' and African urbanisation were not inherently threatening to the preservation of white supremacy. Throughout the 1950s, the SAAU continued to enjoy a privileged hearing within the NAD. Indeed, the 1960 'Bantu in European Areas' bill was drafted in consultation with the SAAU's 'Skakelkommittee', which had continued to meet regularly with the Department (72). However, as the decade passed, the SAAU and AHI parted company over the issue of state policy towards urban Africans. The AHI remained resolutely 'practical' and increasingly reformist. After the Sharpeville shootings, the AHI, along with ASSOCOM, FCI, SEIFSA and the Chamber of Mines, urged the BAD to relax its controls over urbanised Africans, in order to cultivate the support of a "loyal middle-class type of Bantu" (73). The SAAU, on the other hand, had grown increasingly wary of policies which unwittingly increased the size and bargaining power of the urban proletariat (74).

The SAAU's anxieties, brought to a head by the Sharpeville crisis, were shared by the dominant grouping within SABRA, which also had a tight hold over policy-making within the BAD. During the 1950s, SABRA had undergone its own internal conflicts and realignments. Initially, the organisation came out strongly in favour of 'total segregation', facilitated by an ambitious programme of 'development' in the reserves. But by the late 1950s, a large faction within SABRA had shifted ground. The division was provoked by the publication of the Tomlinson Commission, which had been briefed to examine the prospects for the socio-economic development of the reserves. According to Nic Olivier, the Commission had been appointed by Jansen at SABRA's behest, and SABRA's influence over its findings was marked. (75) Indeed, the Commission reiterated SABRA's original view that the reserves should be developed into economically viable entities. Verwoerd, however, rejected Tomlinson's programme of development as too costly, and proposed a more limited 'five year' plan. By the late 1950s, Verwoerd's powers within SABRA had expanded to the point where the dominant faction had succumbed to his view, softening its stance on 'total segregation', calling merely for

stricter controls on African urbanisation and 'economic integration', within a framework of the limited development of the reserves. Only a minority of what John Lazar calls the "visionaries" stood by the original prescription for thorough-going 'total segregation' (76). By 1959, the pro-Verwoerdian faction in SABRA was powerfully represented within the BAD. In addition to SABRA's long-standing influence over the BAD's research division and the Native Affairs Commission (see earlier), members of the dominant SABRA grouping now monopolised key policy-making positions in the BAD. After Verwoerd left the BAD to become Prime Minister in 1958, the positions of Minister, deputy Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs were all filled by powerful members of SABRA - D. De Wet Nel, M.C. Botha, and W. Eiselin. As founder members of SABRA, they shared a long-standing suspicion of the 'practical' position on 'economic integration' and African urbanisation taken by the AHI. But their antipathy towards the AHI's reformist proposals was heightened by further conflicts within SABRA triggered by the Sharpeville shootings. The 1960 SABRA conference, held a month later in April, was dominated by debates over urban Africans. The 'visionaries', recognising Verwoerd's intransigence over 'total segregation', adopted essentially the same stance as the AHI - calling for a more co-optive, ameliorative approach towards the urban areas. Ironically, the AHI received the backing of the staunchest proponents of 'total segregation'! But support for the 'visionaries' within SABRA continued to decline, until by 1961, they were ousted altogether as the pro-Verwoerdian faction mounted a *coup* of all office-bearing positions. The marginalisation of the visionaries within SABRA heralded a similar fate for their reformist recommendations, along with those of the AHI, within the BAD.

The official SABRA position on Africans in urban areas coincided with, and was itself dominated by, that of the Broederbond, which had by then acquired unprecedented powers over the shaping of Apartheid policy. As John Lazar has explained, Verwoerd's successful bid to succeed Strijdom as Prime Minister was backed by the Broederbond. Once installed in office, Verwoerd then proceeded to expand the Broederbond's powers within the state further, as a means of bolstering his own hold over the course of state policy. And the interests represented by the Broederbond were essentially those of the group which had come to dominate Apartheid policy-making in the NP: "a powerful, economically ambitious, politically assertive, urbanised grouping - spearheaded by Afrikaner intellectuals, teachers, professionals and bureaucrats". (77)

> With access to improved educational opportunities, as well as state patronage and employment - and with a resurgent Broederbond as a vehicle for its demands - this grouping assumed a central decision-making role within the NP, and in the overall reshaping of Apartheid ideology. (78)

The second factor which explains the BAD's change of course after

1959 was its growing assertiveness and aggressiveness *vis a vis* local authorities. In the early 1950s, the NAD had been thoroughly dependent on the co-operation and the expertise of the local authorities, whose lobby for 'practical' policies was therefore a powerful one. But as the 1950s progressed, the NAD had expanded, increasing the resources and expertise necessary for Departmental officers to take over some of the responsibilities and powers of local authorities. The Sharpeville crisis was again the watershed which greatly accelerated these moves, presenting the BAD with an opportunity for a more forceful attack. In 1959, as we have seen, the Durban City Council had admitted all-round defeat in Cato Manor. And in 1960, the government made much of the fact that

> the disturbances took place especially in areas where the local authorities are controlled by opponents of government policy, and it is well known that the principles of separate development have not always been applied in the same good spirit as underlies the aims of the government. (79)

The 1960 'Bantu in European Areas' Bill thus launched a singularly aggressive onslaught on the powers of local authorities, in a bid to increase the BAD's direct control over the townships - a process which was to culminate, finally, in the creation of the Administration Boards (completely under the BAD's control) in 1971.

Finally, the BAD's policy-makers could abandon much of the caution and pragmatism which marked the policies introduced in the early 1950s, thanks to the growth in the NP's electoral support. The 1960 Republican referendum, during which the white electorate voted for the country to become a republic, gave the NP its first outright majority of votes: 850 458 voted with the NP, and 775 878 voted against - a majority of approximately 52%. Shortly afterwards, the NP won the 1961 election with a majority of 53% of the vote (80).

To conclude, this paper has challenged the prevailing picture of the development of Apartheid, as the enactment of a single, long-term 'grand plan', in three respects. We have seen, firstly, that despite certain obvious and important continuities, there is nevertheless a sufficiently striking disjuncture between the NAD's policies in the 1950s and 1960s as to warrant the notion of *two distinct phases* in the development of Apartheid before the current 'reform' era. Each phase was marked by certain distinctive features. One of the hallmarks of the first phase (1948 - 1959/60), when compared with previous decades, was a new order and intensity of repression suffered by blacks. Also, the Nationalist government's policies were more systematic and ideologically cohesive than those of its predecessors. One of the distinctive features of the first phase, when compared with the second (1960/1 - 1976/8), was the state's relatively 'practical' approach to the dilemmas presented by the growth of

the urban African proletariat. During the first phase, the NAD's policy-makers set out to tackle these 'problems' by strengthening and expanding the repressive powers of the state. Confident that these moves would be sufficient to subvert the threat of insurrection, and taking a pragmatic stance on 'economic integration', the architects of NAD policy did not set out to fetter industrial dependence on African labour. Nor did they dispute the existence of a "detribalised" African community, and its "residential right" to remain in the urban areas, whether ministering to white needs or not. Also, although the NAD tightened its grip over the local authorities, they remained the principal agents of "urban native administration", with a considerable degree of independence and power. During the 1960s, however, the BAD disputed its earlier position on "economic integration", challenged the very concept of "residential rights" for urbanised Africans, and declared the necessity for new forms of social and economic engineering to curtail the size of the urban proletariat. Moreover, this policy shift was accompanied by the increasing centralisation of administrative powers in the hands of the BAD itself.// Secondly, these changes were *not wholly pre-planned*. They were facilitated by a new configuration of political forces, and were triggered in response to pressures and problems of the historical moment. And thirdly, these changes were *not simply the next stage in a systematic and cumulative process*, in which each step builds on the successes of the last. The changes in the design of BAD policies in the 1960s reflected an attempt by the BAD to *undo* what it then perceived to be the errors of its previous policies.

FOOTNOTES.

1. B. Bunting, *Rise of the South African Reich* (England, Penguin, 1969), p. 132.

2. W. De Klerk, *The Puritans in Africa* (England, Penguin, 1976), p. 239.

3. See for example, F.A. Van Jaarsveld, *From Van Riebeeck to Vorster, 1652-1974* (Johannesburg, Perskor, 1975), and T.R. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Britain, MacMillan, 1977).

4. See for example, D. Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa* (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1981); M. Attwell, *South Africa: Background To The Crisis* (London, Sidgewick and Jackson, 1986); B. Lapping, *Apartheid.*

5. D. Welsh, 'The Growth of Towns', in M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), *Oxford History of South Africa*, vol. 2 (London, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 191.

6. J. Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 12; ; R. Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p. 2. D. Hindson, *The Pass System and Formation of an Urban African Proletariat* (Univ. of Sussex D. Phil thesis, 1983) p. 162 See also B. Bunting, 'The Origins of Apartheid' in A. La Guma (ed), *A Collection of Writings on South African Racism by South Africans* (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), pp. 24-5.

7. See for example, A. Keppel-Jones, *South Africa: A Short History* (London, Hutchinson University Library, 1975 edn); A. Hepple, *Verwoerd* (England, Penguin, 1967); D. Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa*; M. Attwell, *South Africa: Background to the Crisis.*

8. *Verslag Van Die Kleuraagstuk Van Die Herenigde Nasionale Party* (hereafter *Sauer Report*), 1947, p. 1.

9. This argument is developed in more detail in D. Posel, 'The Meaning of Apartheid Before 1948: Conflicts of Interests and Powers Within the Afrikaner Nationalist Alliance', *JSAS* 14. no. 1 (1987).

10. D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 243.

11. South African Institute of Race Relations, *The Logic of Economic Integration*, RR 76/1952, p. 5.

12. C. Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa*, (London, Onyx,1982), p. 74.

13. For more detail, see C. Walker, *ibid*, and T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, (London and New York, Longman, 1983).

14. C. Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa*, p. 113

15. H.J. and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (Baltimore, Penguin, 1969), p. 555.

16. University of Witwatersrand Library (hereafter UWL), SAIRR unsorted papers, Fagan Commission Evidence (hereafter FCE), W.M.R.

Malherbe et al, 'Reply to Mr Justic Fagan's Defence', 10 May 1949, p. 3.

17. SABRA, *Integration or Separate Development* (Stellenbosch, Pro Ecclesiasa, 1952) p. 4.

18. UWL, SAIRR unsorted papers, FCE, Instituut Vir Volkswelstand, 'Getuienis Voorgele Aan die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Wette op Naturelle in Stedelike Gebiede', Q. 24 (b), 3(b); Q.1 para. 2(d).

19. *Volkshandel*, June 1948, cited in D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p. 175.

20. UNISA, Hearings of Tomlinson Commission (hereafter TCH), Vol. 87, 13 Feb. 1953, pp. 8006-7.

21. UNISA, Tomlinson Commission Evidence, SAAU, 'Memorandum on Separate Development' (1944); also, TCH, Vol. 10, 19 May 1952, p. 533. Note that most scholars share M. Legassick's view that 'both farming and gold-mining retained an interest in limiting or preventing African urbanisation'. (M. Legassick, 'Legislation, ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa', *JSAS*, 1(1), 1974, p. 14.

22. For more detail, see D. Posel, *The Meaning of Apartheid Before 1948...*, pp.136-8.

23. D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p. 175.

24. SAIRR, *The Economic Development of the Reserves*, Fact paper no.3, 1959, p. 4.

25. *HAD*, 1951, vol. 76, col. 7796; 1955, vol. 88, cols. 3442, 4033, 3770, 1948, vol. 62, col. 2988-94; 1950, vol. 71, col. 4775-6.

26. *HAD*, 1950, vol. 71, col. 4743.

27. Brakpan City Council (hereafter BCC), Brakpan Municipal Records (BMR) 14/1/25, 'Conference Between Native Affairs Department and Managers of Non-European Affairs...8,9,10 January 1953' (hereafter '1953 Conference'), p. 8.

28. ASSOCOM, 'Non-European Affairs' Files (NEAF), 'Interview With Minister of Native Affairs, on 11 May 1951', p. 3.

29. BCC, BMR 14/1/25, '1953 Conference...', p. 8.

30. Cited in A.N. Pelzer (ed), *Verwoerd Speaks* (Johannesburg, APB Publishers, 1966), p. 26.

31. *HAD*, 1955, vol. 87, col. 199.

32. UWL, A98Mfe/Portfolio 7, Industrial Legislation Commission of inquiry, Miscellaneous Memoranda: NAD Memorandum on 'Native Labour Bureaux', 17 Aug. 1948, p. 7.

33. S. Trapido, 'Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures', *American Political Science Review*, LVII no. 1(1963), p. 80.

34. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, p. 184.

35. E.G. Jansen, *Native Policy of the Union of South Africa*, Native Affairs Fact Paper IX (Jan. 1951), p. 11.

36. Interviews with W.J.P. Carr, 17 April 1984 and N.J. Olivier, 5 July 1985. See also BCC, BMR, Minutes of Meetings of Association of Reef Managers of Non-European Affairs, 1942-6.

37. L. Holleman, *The Tightrope Dancers: Report on Seventh Annual Conference of Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs* (Durban, Institute for Social Research, 1958), p. 1.

38. E. Hellman, 'Urban Areas', in E. Hellman(ed), *Handbook on Race Relations* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 232.

39. K. Heard, *General Elections in South Africa*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 59.

40. B. Modisane, *Blame Me On History* (Johannesburg, A.D. Donker, 1986 edn), p. 38.

41. *HAD*, 1952, vol. 77, col. 1311.

42. This subject is written up in chapter 4 of D. Posel, 'Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid, 1948-1961' (D. Phil, Oxford University, 1987).

43. ~~Ibid~~, HAD, 1952, vol 77 col. 1315.

44. W. Eiselin, 'The Demand for and the Supply of Bantu Labour, *Bantu*, no.5 (May 1958), p. 9.

45. W. Eiselin, *ibid*, pp. 13-4.

46. See chapters 6,7 of 'Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid, 1948-1961', and D. Posel, 'Doing Business With The Pass Laws: Influx Control Policy and the Interests of Manufacturing and Commerce in South Africa in the 1950s', *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Collected Seminar Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, Vol. 17 (1987).

47. A. Hepple, 'Unemployment By Race', *Africa South*, 4 no.2 (Jan. - March 1960), p. 48.

48. FCI, NEAF, 'Native Labour Problems of the Urban Areas Act', 195, p. 3.

49. According to census figures, the urban African population increased from 2 328 534 in 1951 to 3 443 950 in 1960, an increase of 47.9%. By 1960, the urban African population comprised 31.8% of the total African population, as compared with 23.7% and 27.2% in 1946 and 1951 respectively.

50. NAD, *Verslag Van die Interdepartmentele Kommittee Insake Ledige en Nie-Werkende Bantoes in Stedelike Gebiede* (hereafter *Botha Report*), 1962, p. 4.

51. M.C.Botha's 'Opening Address', in IANA, *Proceedings of 1962 Annual Conference*, p. 89.

52. *HAD*, 1961, vol. 107, col. 4191.

53. The Bantu Authorities Act had been passed in 1951, which 'made provision for the establishment of tribal, regional and territorial authorities, and for gradual delegation to these authorities of certain executive and administrative powers, including levying of rates'. But there was 'no elective principle in the constitution of these authorities' and 'the system envisaged was for local government only'. (M. Horrell, *Legislation and Race Relations*, (Natal, SAIRR, 1971 pp. 22-3.

54. This ideological stress on ethnicity accompanied the change in official nomenclature from 'native' to 'bantu', signifying the replacement of a language of racial divisions with one which stressed ethnic identities and differences.

55. IANA, *Proceedings of First Biennial Meeting of Officials*, 1966 p. 7.

56. *HAD*, 1961, vol. 107, col. 4191.

57. W. Eiselin, 'Harmonious Multi-Community Development', *Optima*, March 1959, p. 18.

58. W. Eiselin, *ibid*, p. 18.

59. IANA, *Proceedings of First Biennial Meeting of Officials*, pp. 8-9.

60. *Senate Debates*, 1967, col. 2830.

61. Union of South Africa, *Memorandum Explaining Background and Objects of Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill 1959*, N.P. 3-1959.

62. *Ibid*.

63. H.R. Griffiths and R.A. Jones, *South African Labour Economics* (Johannesburg, McGraw Hill, 1980), p. 101.

64. Killie Campbell Library (KCL), Bourquin Papers, KCM 55218, Durban NEAD, 'Notes for Meeting with Minister of BAD', 3 August 1959.

65. D. Hobart Houghton, *The South African Economy* (Cape Town, OUP, 1964), p. 184.

66. For more detail, see ch. 9 of D. Posel, 'Influx Control and the Construction of Apartheid'.

67. Department of Co-operation and Development Library, 'Konferensie Van Hoof Bantoesakekommissarisse te Pretoria, 16 tot 19 November 1961'.

68. NAD, *Botha Report* (1962).

69. Quoted in N. Rhoodie, *Apartheid and Racial Partnership in South Africa* (Academica, Pretoria, 1966), p. 98.

70. West Rand Administration Board, Johannesburg Municipal Records (JMR) A78/2, B. Coetzee, Address to National Development and Management Foundation Symposium on 'Effective Bantu Employment', 11 June 1966, p. 7 (my italics).

71. The 1961 Conference of Chief Bantu Commissioners drew up the first

national procedures for the 'Removal of Surplus or Illegal Bantu in white areas to Bantu areas'.

72. SAAU, *Report of the General Council to 1961 Annual Congress*, November 1961, p. 57.

73. 'Commercial Opinion', July 1960, p. 7.

74. SAAU, *Report of General Council....*; also, S. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development* (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1980), p. 101-2. Note that although the dominant mouthpiece Afrikaner agricultural interests, the SAAU did not represent all farmers. But, the nature of ideological and political divisions within agricultural capital is beyond the scope of this paper.

75. J. Lazar, 'The Role of SABRA in the Formulation of Apartheid Ideology, 1948-1961', in Univ. of London, ICS, *Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, 1986.

76. Interview with N. Olivier, 5/7/85.

77. J. Lazar, *ibid.*

78. J. Lazar, *ibid.*

79. BCC, BMR 14/1/10, 'Statement of Government Policy Following Recent Riots, 20 May 1960'.

80. K. Heard, *General Elections in South Africa*, p. 86.