DEMOCRACY
 1 3 - 1 5 JULY 1994
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 HISTORY WORKSHOP
 THE DOG OF THE BOERS': THE RISE, FALL AND LEGACY
 OF MANGOPE IN BOPUTHATSWANA
 Michael Lawrence and Andrew Manson
 History Department
 University of Boputhatswana
THF. "DOG OF THF. BOERS": THE RISE. FALL AND LEGACY OF MANGOPE
 IN BOPHUTHATSWANA.
 Michael Lawrence and Andrew Manson'
 "..national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time ,
 even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area of national
 studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today." E.J.
 Hobsbawm.{1990}.2
 "Such circumstances led Moiloa {the Hurutshe chief} to the disconsolate observation in
 1852 that he was no more than a" Dog of the Boers' "?'
 Introduction.
 Between the 3rd. and 12th. of March, 1994 South Africa witnessed, in dramatic media
 coverage, the fall of Lucas Mangope's regime in the homeland of Bophuthatswana. Within
 days an interim administration was put in place and in the democratic elections which
 followed in April the North-West province, consisting of a sustantial portion of the
 former Bophuthatswana, voted overwhelmingly for the African National Congress
 (A.N.C.) which Mangope had for years prevented from operating in the region. His
 overthrow was the second attempt to oust him. The first, in 1988, failed partly because it
 was a military as opposed to popular uprising and because the 1988 coup attempt was
 crushed by the intervention of the South African Defence Force. By 1994 however a
 significant shift in political development had occured, and the National Party intervened
 not to prop up Mangope but to oversee his departure from the political arena. The "mini-
 revolution" in Bophuthatswana is memorable for two events which captured the
 imagination of South Africans, if not the world. The first was the targeted looting of shops
 and organisations in which Mangope and his Cabinet had interests, which turned later to
 widescale looting. The second was the shooting.in cold blood, by a member of the
 Bophuthatswana Defence Force, of white right wingers of the paramilitary Afrikaner
 Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) who had entered the territory to assist Mangope in quelling
 the uprising.
 This paper traces the rise and fall of Mangope, a man who dictated the fortunes of over
 two million peoplefor over a decade. It defines the ldologicai basis of Bophuthatswana and
 analyses the various tactics and policies Mangope pursued to legitimate and sustain his
 homeland fantasy. This essentially involved a reformulation of earlier apartheid ethnic
 discourse. Although there was, from the mid-1990's a steady erosion of Mangope's
 credibility and support we suggest that, in the period leading up to the elections he
 1 Institute of Education and Depl. of History, University of Bophuthatswana. Thanks also to Tim Clynick for his
 comments on sections of this work.
 2 E.J.Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programmes, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
 3 Cited in A. Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1820-1913." Ph.D thesis, University of
 Cape town 1990, from A Report dated 22 November 1852 by R. Moffat in R. Lovett, The History of the London
 ary Soriety. 1795-1895. London 1899, p. 596.
? 2 ?
 political order. This he did by seeking alliances with other ethnically-minded elites in the
 region. The article also discusses how and at what point he overplayed his hand and placed
 himself outside the bounds of legitimate political discourse and action.
 Finally the paper examines the nature of the popular insurrection which toppled Mangope,
 and assesses whether the populist nature of institutions which sprung up after his downfall
 will sustain democratic practice in the former Bophuthatswana, which now encompasses a
 large section of the North West Province. This however has to be balanced against the
 political legacy of the Mangope era which retarded the emergence of a democratic political
 culture to a greater extent than the South African white supremacist state managed to do
 throughout the 1970's and 80's. This distinction between the Bantustan state and the
 central South African state implies that we reject the view that the latter represented a
 hegemonic force controlling totally its constituent parts. As recent events have shown the
 homeland elites did not passively accept the functional dictates of the South African state
 and succeded, within constraints, to restructure their own set of political, material and
 ideological interests*
 Our main argument in the Bophuthatswana context is that an elite powerholding group
 restructured earlier apartheid ethnic discourse vis-a-vis, the impending social and economic
 transformation in South Africa hoping to capture regional resources, knowing that the
 establishment of a central, unified state would precipitate a crisis of accumulation and a
 relocation of labour and capital. Thus it will be shown that appeals to "regionalism" and
 "federalism" were a disguised or truncated version of "nation" or, perhaps, "regional
 nationalism" as a political response to South Africa's political and economic restructuring.
 We will contend that the earlier discourse and policy of independence and Batswana
 nationhood that characterised the Bophuthatswana state was conceptually and materially
 sculptured and blended into a regional\territorial concept. Notably, there was a
 deracialisation or cleansing of the old "apartheid" discourse of "corporate federalism",
 though ironically its new allies of the far right white still cling to outmoded racist
 ideology.5 Woven into this was an inherent and perceived fear of being "pressed into a
 corner" by a more powerful and numerous "Xhosa dominated" ANC." As Hobsbawm has
 argued in a comparison of nineteenth and twentieth century nationalism, many recent "
 national movements" are "defensive reactions", not concerned with "political modernity"
 but " time and time again...reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to
 keep at. bay the forces of the modern world."''
 This, we argue, is the context in which Mangope's initiative to establish regional alliances
 such as the Southern African Tswana Forum (SATSWA) should be seen. It was hoped that
 4 There is a significant body of work on the relationship between the South African state and the Bantustans. See for
 example R. Southall, South Africa's Transkei-The Political Economy of an "Independent Bantustan. London.
 Heinemann, 1982; R. Tomlinson and M. Adelson, Regional Restructuring Under Apartheid, Johannesburg. Ravan, 1987;
 M. Swilling (ed), TJlcS_o.uth.Ailican,State, Johannesburg, 1989.
 5 Adelson and Tomlinson, Regional Restructuring, p.xiv.
 6 As Hobsbawm argues, in an examination of the development of twentieth century nationalism, there is a
 psychological component (open to manipulation) that "fuels such defensive reactions...whether against real or imaginary
 threats" in response to" fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic transformations". See Nalions.and.NiUluiialisni.
 p. lf.5.
 7 Hobsbawm. Nations.and.Nalio.nalisin, p. 37.
3 ?
 this forum would give him leverage in a situation where their case for independence and a
 form of confederalism would not find acceptance.
 Allied with these objectives is the need to uncover precisely to whom did homeland
 policies appeal, for the homeland was not created in a vacuum and Mangope has had to
 seek some legitimation by appealing to elements within Bophuthatswana and beyond. The
 article seeks to examine the ways Mangope's support base changed over time, for its
 position within the South African political context determined to a large extent the way in
 which the "reality" of Bophuthatswana was represented. It will be argued that in the 1950's
 and 60's the base of his support lay in a rural constituency, but that this expanded, as
 independence assumed a material reality, to include other interest groups in the mining,
 agricultural and business sectors. The persistence of a rural based alliance has been rather
 overshadowed by these other interests, but needs to be borne in mind particularly as it
 provided the basis for Mangope's attempt to retain access to land in a regional
 dispensation. In addition the creation and consolidation of a large homeland bureaucracy
 helped enormously in broadening the social base of his support, though it was precisely the
 shedding of support by this sector that led to his downfall.
 Towards a Periodisation
 Mangope's conception and discourse of ethnicity and nationalism resonated with a sense of
 the Tswana past and reflected changing political developments and material conditions in
 South Africa over the past forty years or so. We have identified sfiisn historical phases
 which are of importance. The earlier phases he employed to give supposedly rational
 arguments for his policies. These are
 1) the precolonial period, characterised incorrectly as a time of Tswana unity and
 integration with a clear hierarchy of authority,
 2) the colonial period from c. 1820, especially the last half of the nineteenth century which
 was characterised by Boer and British competition for domination of the Tswana,
 3) the period marking his entry into politics during the apartheid era and the bantustan
 formation years of the 1950's and 60's,
 4) the espousal of non-racialism and flirtation with "liberal democracy" between about
 1977-84, summed up in the title of Mangope's book "A Place for All"",
 5) the late 1980's call for Pan-Tswanaism with Botswana and a reversal of the wrongs of
 colonialism,
 6) the time of intense "go it alone " nationalism coinciding with global nationalism
 prompted largely by the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.in the 1990's and the resurgence of
 ethnicity on the political agenda and finally 7) the South Africa Tswana Forum or
 SATSWA option of March 1991 with its focus on a regional conservative alliance based
 on mining and agricultural interests and its manifestation in the form of the Concerned
 South Africans Group(COSAG). These are not entirely discreet phases; they often overlap
 and reflect the shifting and sometimes contradictory nature of official Bophuthatswana
 8 L M. Mangope, A Place (or All, Via Afrika, Johannesburg, 1978.
thought and discourse. To these phases we should add the final assessment of his fall and
 legacy.
 1 Precolonial
 Two forms of Icgitimatory discourse seem to have been articulated regarding the ethnic
 origins of "nations", both of which were applied by the homeland authorities and
 ideologues. The first has been identified by Debray ' who points to two primary or
 anthropological determinants that define the social construction of "nation". These are the
 "delimitation of time" and the "assignation of origins". This fixing of a point of origin
 allows for ritualisation which legitimises and reinforces the social group's identity
 especially during periods of social, economic or political stress. This was most commonly
 employed by the proponents of Tswana nationalism to suggest the irreversibility of a
 Tswana " nation" built on a mythical past. This is encapsulated in a Tswana tradition that
 they arose from a bed of reeds at Ntswana Tdatsi {Where the sun sets}. Thus, according to
 such ideologues, the Tswana were delimited within an enclosed and identifiable space from
 the origin of time. As was the case with the South African state's discourse of ahnos, the
 unity of the Tswana was simply asserted. This is a highly problematic claim.
 The Tswana nation was taken as given and, so the argument goes, it was only the British
 who came and destroyed the fabric of Tswana nationhood in the colonial era. This view
 was strongly held by Mangope himself and became embedded in official homeland
 polemic. "The history of the Batswana nation", he is reported as saying to CODESA in
 1992, "goes back to the 11th century when it inhabited the greatest portion of the country
 north of the Orange river and south west of the Zambezi. We lived here as a sovereign and
 free people until we suffered the fate of the northward expansion of colonial Britain".
 From this it is concluded that "Bophuthatswana is not the product of apartheid but the
 legacy of British imperialism and colonialism that went wrong."*? British disregard for the
 Keate Award of 1871, which gave recognition to the land rights of some Tswana
 chiefdoms, was generally regarded and presented as " an act of colonial betrayal".!'
 The second ideolgical justification saw nationhood as being conferred through the granting
 of "independence" by South Africa. Thus an officially sponsored study claimed that "of
 major significance is the fact that while the Tswana lost their independence as tribes, they
 regained it {in 1977} as a nation, encompassed within a Tswana state". 12
 Though there is a certain commonality in the Tswana past built on the sharing of
 conditions, circumstances and language we argue that these are false conceptions of the
 Tswana past. Yet it has been the cornerstone on which Bophuthatswana has been built. In
 short there was no Tswana "nation " and attempts to revive or re-create it rest on a false
 9 "Marxism and the National Question". Interview with Regis Debray in NewXelt-Rcyiew, Scpl/Oct, 1977. p. 251.
 10 The Mafikeng Mail. Supplement, 4 December 1992.
 1 1 See Supplement to Jhe.Mafikeag.MfuX ** December 1992 under the heading "Bophuthatswana , A History of
 Colonial Betrayal."
 12 Anon. Zhe..Republic_o!J3_ophulhalswan.a, C. van Rensberg publications, Johannesburg, 1977, p.207.
assumption. While totemic forms of consciousness existed in precapitalist African societies,
 the incorporation of these societies into a wider capitalist world "yielded novel ethnic
 affiliations and groupings" of which the Tswana were one. As the work of the Comaroff's
 has shown, the idea of a self-conscious Tswana ethnic identity cannot be traced back to the
 mists of time. Tswana identity was constructed mostly from the outside by agents of
 colonialism who had a distorted view of the structure, organisation and cultural symbols
 of the people they classified. This process involved the participation of the indigenous
 people under the stimulus of the colonial order.!-' Thus Tswana ethnic consciousness was
 a phenomenon that emerged and spread unevenly from the latter half of the nineteenth
 century, supplanting totemic forms of consciousness that existed within autonomous
 chiefdoms living in the area prior to the colonial period. It is ironic that these colonial
 agents, who provided a conception of the collective Tswana identity used to advance
 Tswana ethnic consciousness, were accused by Mangope of betraying the Tswana and
 depriving them of their rightful and historic homeland. Nationhood is however an
 emotionally powerful, credible and convenient rallying point and an argument which no
 doubt appeals to many audiences, a fact which perhaps explains why Mangope was allowed
 to address the United Nations Security Council.
 What Mangope and others confused and conflated is this sense of commonality with a
 sense of community. As Pieterse explains "ethnic identity comprises many different modes
 along a wide spectrum ranging from objective markers to subjective identifications." ^
 There are then fundamental differences between ethnic category/group, ethnic community
 or ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. The first may be defined in terms of "objective cultural
 markers" (language, dialect, dress, custom, religion,etc.), the second is an ethnic category
 "that has adopted one or more of its marks of cultural distinctiveness and used them as
 symbols both to create internal cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic
 groups".15 In this sense "ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to
 class." 16 Central to this process is ethno-nationalism involving the politicisation of ethnic
 community .
 The constant reference to, and refrain upon the precolonial and colonial past thus was
 important as it provided a set of organising principles upon which to sculpture the new
 state. Central to this organisation was the institution of legitimate traditional authorities.
 In Tswana societies chiefs were the cornerstone of political organisation and activity and
 derived material power from their control of the land and other resources, particularly
 cattle. Chiefs were paid tribute (sehuba) but were expected to dispense patronage and to
 ensure that the needy did not suffer. Chiefs who overstepped the bounds of their authority
 and privilege or failed to carry out their duties to society could be forced out of office. The
 ultimate sanction against a recalcitrant chief was desertion by his followers.
 13 See for example J.Comaroff and J. Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination. Chapter two, (Wcstview
 Press, 1992.)
 14 J. N. Pieterse," The Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse", Conference on Ethnicity, Rhodes
 University, 1993.
 1 5 PR. Brass, F.ihnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. (New Delhi), Sage, I99l,p.263
 16 Piotcrse, "Varieties of Ethnic Politics", p. 5.
Mangopc, as a traditional leader (though by no means paramount Tswana chief) had a
 profound sense of what he was owed with correspondingly little sense of his dbhgations.
 The constitutional power he wielded as President of a state with no official opposition
 meant that he could exercise his chiefly control with little threat- in short the kind of
 precolonial sanctions mentioned above were removed, giving him the best of both worlds.
 Employing a conception of the tradititional powers vested in chiefs during precolonial
 times, Mangope frequently resorted to removing chiefs opposed to him from office. In
 Phokeng chief Lebone Molatlegi was deposed and his wife deported, and in Taung chief
 Mankurwane met the same fate. Both are paramount chiefs, no less senior to Mangope
 himself. In Braklaagte the Sebogodi family was ousted for opposing reincorporation to
 Bophuthatswana though they clearly held majority support in the village. These represent
 the most flagrant cases but other instances of interference also can be cited. Mangope thus
 was concerned about his rural constituency and determined not to let go his grip on rural
 affairs. The earlier "organising principles " of precolonial social structure were thus been
 carried through from the past to the era of modern apartheid and manipulated to suit the
 particular needs of the ethnically based state. This created a distortion of the nature of
 precolonial social organisation. As many scholars have noted, the Tswana mejafe
 frequently absorbed groupings from outside, especially during the Difaqane period in the
 1820's, and showed widely divergent ethnic origins. Far from being exclusive, Tswana
 society was structured in such a way as to allow and cope with inclusion.
 Mangope's construction of the ethnic state encompassed a view that corresponds closely
 with Brass1 idea of inter-ethnic struggle for resources, based on certain rights.!'' At
 independence non-Tswana's believed the Constitution Act and the Bill of rights would
 protect them but there has been since that time a consistent campaign against them. At the
 end of the |970's there was for example harassment in the form of police raids against non-
 Tswana's opposed to independence in the Odi-Moretele region. The early 80's witnessed
 further "official harassment" of non-Tswana's in the form of denial of work permits,
 citizenship and pensions. The time from 1983 to about 1986 Keenan periodises as the
 "Nigerian" option!" - when two million migrants, mainly Ghanains, were expelled.
 Bophuthatswana amended the Land Control Act to redefine non-Tswana citizens as
 squatters to provide legal legitimacy for their eviction. From 1986 discrimination against
 non-Tswana's has not been followed with any particular determination {though it did not
 stop} because the state's attention began to focus more on the growing threat posed by the
 resurgence of forces within South Africa opposed to the Bantustan system.
 The Colonial Period
 An aspect of Bophuthatswana's interpretation of its position rested on historical
 circumstances going back to the colonial period. Basically, this period was characterised by
 competition for the land and resources of the Tswana between the British and the Boers of
 17 Brass, P. E\hnic.Gr?Up.S and-lhc_State. London, Croon Helm, (1985).
 18 J. Keenan. "Pandora's Box: The Private Accounts of a Bantustan Local Authority" , So.uth-Alr.ican JUvicw,
 1986.
the South African Republic. However the Tswana themselves were divided in their
 reaction to external pressures, some communities strategically allying with the Boers to
 settle old scores with their traditional rivals, some becoming total dependents of the Boer
 Republics, and others siding with British imperial interests. The Tshidi Barolong on the
 one hand and the Ratlou and Rapulana factions on the other became longstanding enemies
 due to the fact that the South African Republic attempted to advance its land claims
 through its allies, the Ratlou and Rapulana. Similarly, factions of the Tlhaping were torn
 even further apart by taking sides in the struggle between Boers and the British for control
 of the region. Other communities, like Moiloa's Hurutshe, were subject to intense
 demands for labour and tax, that led to the self-deprecatory remark, cited in the title, that
 he was no more than a "Dog of the Boers".
 Ironically {in the light of recent initiatives to form an alliance with local Afrikaners} it
 was in Mmabatho, the stronghold of Bophuthatswana, that the Barolong people in the
 187O's and 188O's were subject to the most intense pressure on their lands from mainly
 Boer freebooters. Moreover Tswana chiefdoms subject to Boer hegemony were forced to
 enter into complex and often contradictory relationships with their rulers that involved
 both co-operation and resistance. As will be seen later BritishXBoer conflict and the false
 notion of an uncomplicated and persistent AfnkaneATswana unity again have surfaced in
 the discourse and initiatives of homeland politics.
 Bantustan Formation
 Thus echoes of the precolonial and colonial past reverberated around the political arena
 and in the Bophuthatswana media to justify, explain or rationalise certain actions and
 policies. Ironically though Mangope cannot lay claim to significant chiefly status. Let us
 turn now to examine this key individual on whom the edifice of Bophuthatswana rested
 and around whom Tswana identity was built in terms of the Grand Apartheid system.
 Mangope is from the Bahurutshe chiefdom, most of whom have long inhabited a reserve to
 the north of Zeerust. The Mangope clan was at one time a senior one amongst the
 Hurutshe but did not occupy land in the reserve. In the mid-nineteenth century the
 Mangope faction moved to modern Botswana. They returned some twenty years later but,
 having once departed the area, were obliged formally to accept the authority of the
 Bahurutshe ba Gopane who allowed them to settle in the reserve at Motswedi, within the
 area of their authority. Only in 1941 was the independence of the Hurutshe at Motswedi
 recognised, an act which offended the Gopane chiefs but which endeared the Mangope
 chiefly family to the government. Circumstances then played into the hands of the
 Mangope family. Though the Moiloa family based at Dinokana were recognised as the
 Hurutshe paramounts, in 1957-58 Abram Moiloa was in the forefront of the "Hurutshe
 revolt" against the taking of passes and was deposed and fled to Botswana. As most of the
 Moiloa family had supported Abram, and were A.N.C. members, the Bantu Affairs
 Department then cast around for a traditional authority that would administer affairs
 according to the dictates of Departmental policy. At this time the reserve had been
 earmarked to become the first Regional Authority in the Transvaal, a first step on the
route to the Bantustan policy devised by the architects of "Grand Apartheid". Thus it was
 doubly necessary to find a chief who would be compliant with state policy. The obvious
 choice was Lucas Mangope, father of the future president of Bophuthatswana, and chief at
 Motswedi. Not only was Mangope beholden to the government for conferring
 independent status on him, but he had openly sided with the government in the
 disturbances of 1957-58. He died before he could be appointed but on the 7 August 1959
 his son was installed head of the Bahurutshe Tribal Authority.^ At the ceremony Chief
 Lucas "delighted his critics by imploring the Minister of Bantu Administration to ' lead us
 and we shall try to crawl'".20 This behaviour and simpering apologia was the apotheosis
 of the language of bantustan subservience.
 Two key points thus emerge from this account of the origins of the Tswana bantustan and
 the Mangope family's role. First, Mangope's claim to paramountcy, even over the
 Bahurutshe, (let alone over other Tswana communities) has little validity. It is of course
 largely immaterial whether homeland leaders have legitimacy- even if they do it does not
 legitimate the system- but Mangope justified his control over tribal structures partly on the
 grounds that he is a chief of significant status. This status, as we have indicated, stems more
 from his appointment to head of the Tribal Authority than to genuine paramountcy.
 The second point to note is that it is apparent that Mangope's position was created and
 underwritten by the South African state. From the very start of his career, he aligned
 himself with the South African authorities and was a key player in their plans for the
 creation of Bophuthatswana. In 1961 he became deputy of the Tswana Territorial
 Authority and in 1972 he secured enough support to become chief minister of the self-
 governing bantustan of Bophuthatswana.
 Though Mangope's rise to power was due entirely to the policies of the South African
 government, the idea of forging a Tswana identity which could be promoted to advance
 the interests of Tswana people in relation to other ethnic groups had been rooted in a
 legacy of identity formation propagated by important figures in the nineteenth century.
 Thus the idea of a given Tswana "nation" is not only rooted in "traditionalist" thinking.
 As much literature on ethnicity in Africa has argued,2'it is a notion reinforced, often
 invented, by "cultural brokers", such as missionaries, intellectuals, anthropologists and
 others who provide rational argument or scientific "evidence" for peoples' definitions of
 self or social constructions of reality. Missionaries such as Moffat forged a sense of cultural
 identity, bearing the imprint of Christian Europe, by standardising the Tswana language
 and translating the Bible into Setswana." It was Moffat who coined the term "Tswana " to
 give a historical and social construct to the people among whom he worked. Tswana
 intellectuals in the early nineteenth century formed themselves into organisations such as
 the Barolong National Council and the Barolong Progressive Association to promote their
 19 SeeJ.Drummondand A. Manson. "The Transformation of Moiloa's Reaserve in the Western Transvaal, 1919-1848"
 Paper to Canadian African Studies Association, Montreal, 1992.
 2 0 T.Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, Johannesburg,l98}, p.278.
 2 1 See Vail, Rectcaliojl_oU>ibaliilll and the work of Patrick Harries.
 22 See Comaroff and Comaroff. ThtHistoricaliraawnauon, pp.252-25.1.
broad interests under the banner of Tswana ethnicity. 23 S.M. Molema, the renowned
 author and historian, in his later years praised Mangope for his decision to take
 independence.24
 If there was a body of intellectual backing for the idea of a Tswana nation there was also a
 more material source of support for the taking of "independence". This lay in the emergent
 elites which had established themselves in the Tswana reserves and appreciated the
 advantages to be gained from being the beneficiaries of commercial enterprises in the
 reserves which had formerly been the preserve of whites and Indians. Case studies reveal
 that this category of entrepreneur formed an alliance with certain chiefs and were
 supported by state officials of the Native Affairs Department in the 1940's and 5O's.25
 According to Clynick there was also an alliance between capitalising white Afrikaner
 farmers and the bantustan apparachik that was later to pave the way for the entry of co-
 operatives into Bophuthatswana and a development model based on technocratic
 management of agriculture through Agricor, the parastatal set up to promote
 agriculture.26 The significance of this alliance has often been overlooked though it has not
 been disguised. Mangope himself was a active commercial farmer, as were many of his
 significant political supporters and this agricultural strategy has benefitted this class at the
 expense of the former African tenants thrown off white farms and relocated in the
 homeland. As will be seen later the idea of a Tswana\Afrikaner rural oligarchy {with the
 addition of a mineral exploiting component} was given more formal substance towards the
 end of Mangope's political career.
 We contend therefore that there existed certain social forces and interest groups who
 sought, successfully as it transpired, to use the homeland edifice as a basis for further
 accumulation. There was during the late 60's and 1970's a growing economic chasm
 between this class and masses of dispossessed African producers thrown off black spots or
 white farms and resettled in the homeland.
 At a later stage only did the Bophuthatswana regime consolidate and expand its support
 through the creation of a large bureaucracy whose support it was able to capture through
 job creation, fear and patronage. This never constituted a loyal constituency and this
 bureaucracy, as events proved, switched allegiances with little difficulty to the African
 National Congress which it believed could offer better opportunities. Initially Mangope's
 support therefore rested on mainly on a narrow rural elite and a questionable traditional
 authority on whom he counted and to whose interests he looked. This necessitated an
 ongoing and energetic propaganda campaign to unite the inhabitants of Bophuthatswana
 23 For ihc Barolong National Council see the work of T.CIynick, forthcoming. For the Barolong Progressive
 association see C. Murray,
 24 Personal communication, Jane Starfield,1993. See also the Manuscript by S.M.Molema on " History of the Barolong";
 A.D.6.1 Molema Papers, University of the Witwatersrand, where he talks approvingly of Mangope's role in "creating an
 opportunity for a wider scope for service" by taking "self-rule".
 25 See the work of J.Drummond and A.Manson, "The Rise and Demise of African Agricultural Production in Dinokana
 Village, Bophuthatswana, 1919-1988". Canadian journal of African Studies, vol.23 no.3, (1993)
 26 This view is emerging in the work of Tim Clynick who is examining the evolution of the Tswana based reserves in
 llic twrntielh cenlury.
under the banner of "Tswanaism", and to strive for international recognition on the basis
 that it constituted a nation.
 "A Place for All"
 After attaining independence the leaders of Bophuthatswana switched to a new line of
 argument in persuance of recognition as a soverign state. Independence offered the chance
 to establish a non-racial society at a time when South Africa itself was still in the grip of
 apartheid. Bophuthatswana was thus presented as "A Place for All", a haven of non-
 racialism. In respects this had some foundation but it also served as a propagandist
 opportunity . Accompanying this was an attempt to portray Bophuthatswana as a "liberal
 democracy" with a Bill of Rights with in-built protection for the rights of individuals.
 Central to this was the use of key ideological state apparatus, in particular formal
 education, to provide for the social and cultural reproduction of a form of Batswana
 identity and history, similar to the Botswana nation building Kagiso Education
 Commission. In particular geography and history text books provided the curricula
 foundations for the delimitations of space and time respectively. At the level of tertiary
 education the establishment of an Institute of African Studies at the University of
 Bophuthatswana for example largely provided for an ideological base for a particular type
 of Tswana studies affording cultural brokerage for government.27
 This type of argument however could not be sustained, for two reasons.Firstly it was
 designed mainly to appeal to an international audience and had little relevance for the
 masses who, desperate for jobs and security, viewed outsiders or "foreigners" as
 competitors and were more likely to buy the notion of exclusive ethnic nationalism. The
 "place for all" strategy was thus inherently contradictory, particularly as it was persued
 simultaneously with the denial of work permits, citizenship, and pensions to non-
 Tswana's.
 Secondly it became clear that Bophuthatswana was not a place for political opponents as
 well. It was noted for example that the very last Section (18.1) in the Bill of Rights
 specified that other laws could override the Bill of Rights. These included the Internal
 Security Act and the Security Clearance Act which were increasingly used to suppress
 political opponents and organisations.28 Political repression in Bophuthatswana was
 thrown more sharply into focus by the rise of popular resistance, manifested by the
 formation and growth of the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African
 Trade Unions and student organisations, which began to actively oppose the homeland
 system. In 1990 a state of Emergency was declared to enable the state to deal more
 effectively with the "threat" to Bophuthatswana's independence. Adding to this decline in
 the "democratic image" of Bophuthatswana was the exclusion of non-Tswana's and the
 eradication of rural powerbases opposed to Mangope's rule referred to earlier. The
 situation thus became reversed- as there was an increasing degree of political tolerance in
 South Africa there was a rising intolerance in Bophuthatswana. From about 1985 the
 rhetoric of free political expression ceased to be heard in Bophuthatswana ruling circles.
 2 7 See Popagano Report /Education Commission, 1978 and N.C5LLoQk.Matlhaie.di, vol.11, no.l.
 28 See "Problems in the Creation of a climate for free Political Opposition in Bophulhalswana", Mafikcn^ Anli-
 Rcpression Forum, 1991.
Pan-Tswanaism
 By the late 198O's the idea of presenting Bophuthatswana as a liberal democratic state was
 no longer tenable and, with an upsurge of political activity in South Africa and the
 concomitant demand for a unitary state, Mangope turned in the early 1980's to embrace
 enthusiastically the notion of Pan -Tswanaism. Of course this derived from the idea of the
 all encompassing Tswana nation. But he used this concept to propagate an idea that was
 essentially novel. The British, by dividing the Tswana "Nation" in 1885 when the
 distinction was made between the Protectorate and British Bechuanaland (later annexed to
 the Cape and thus becoming part of South Africa), were now held responsible for
 depriving the Tswana in South Africa of the independence enjoyed by their kin in
 Botswana.^' While it was true that the British had laid down a arbitrary border it did not
 in fact divide a "Nation" though it certainly did divide certain chiefdoms, such as the
 Hurutshe and Rolong, from their kinsfolk. However this line of argument shifted the
 debate back to the colonial era, and exonerated the proponents and executers of
 segregation and apartheid. The shift to British colonialism provided the opportunity to re-
 assign the origins of the contemporary Tswana political condition in order to provide a
 legitimatory basis for three broad objectives.
 First to absolve his own collaborative role in the reproduction of the apartheid state,
 second to provide an expedient and identifiable discourse and rationale for his claims to
 international recognition, articulated in such fora as the United Nations and the British
 House of Commons, and lastly to provide a basis for the forging of an alliance with
 conservative interests in the region who have a common abhorrence for British
 colonialism and a belief that nations have a right to self-determination. In addition to these
 legitimating objectives, this rhetoric helped to counter internal pressures against
 Bophuthatswana's independence.
 The appeal for independence based on Pan-Tswanaism failed, primarily and most
 ironically because it was rejected by the very people with whom Mangope felt himself
 historically embraced- the Tswana of Botswana. Botswana, though recognising language
 and other cultural links between its citizens and those people resident in Bophuthatswana,
 refused to recognise Bophuthatswana's independence.^ This led to an ambivalent attitude
 whereby on the one hand Bophuthatswana appealed to a sense of common Tswana
 identity whilst on the other it exerted pressure on Botswana to force that country into low
 level diplomatic contact and negotiations. In 1982 for example Bophuthatswana
 constructed a dam which drew water from the major source for the Gaborone dam. In the
 arguments which followed Bophuthatswana insisted that Botswana negotiate directly with
 her instead of South Africa, calling in addition for "a round table conference ...with the
 29 This point is made by Dnimmond. "According to this line of reasoning Bophuthatswana was not a child of apartheid
 but rather the bastard offspring of British colonial rule in Southern Africa'. DrummondJ. 'Reincorporating the
 Bamustans into South Africa: The Question of Bophuthatswana", Orography. 76, (1991), PP. 396-373.
 3 0 In 1977 President'Scretse Khama referred to Bophulhatswana when it atained independence as a "child of Apartheid",
 Maliliejlg-Msil, 1 July '977.
- 12 -
 establishment of diplomatic relations".^In 1986\87 Bophuthatswana took advantage of its
 geopolitical situation in southern Africa to exert pressure on Botswana whilst
 simultaneously maintaining its calls for diplomatic links. On this occasion
 Bophuthatswana placed a visa restriction on Botswana citizens which effectively closed the
 border and severely disrupted road and rail links between Botswana, Bophuthatswana and
 the R.S.A. The rationale behind this action was made abundantly clear when Mangope
 warned at the annual Independence celebration that "if Botswana cannot change its foreign
 policy on Bophuthatswana and continues with its mud-slinging, then Bophuthatswana will
 have no option but to retaliate."32
 A further reason why the idea of a fully united Tswana state failed was because it is the
 stated policy of the Organisation of African Unity that the colonial boundaries should
 remain as they were at the time of independence of the member states. Thus with the pan-
 Tswanaism concept fairly well dead and buried {though not entirely; its appeal is to strong
 for certain die hard nationalists} the homeland regime sought new arguments to legitimise
 its continued existence.
 Global Nationalism
 Fortuitously the events precipitated by the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
 revival of nationalist sentiments and actions in the various republics gave added impetus to
 arguments for nationhood and ethnicity. Though this was never a clear or fully separate
 phase of a search for respectable political discourse, there was nevertheless a regular
 searching for other examples or political arguments for nationhood, of which the growth
 of nationalist sentiment and movements in the Soviet Union was just one, albeit powerful,
 justification for status as an independent nation.
 Israel's determination to preserve its identity and status as a nation was seen as a source of
 inspiration for the newly created Batswana nation in Bophuthatswana. For example the
 Minister of Information at an independence day celebration at the Bophuthatswana Trade
 Mission in Israel drew comparisons between the two countries. He noted that the
 "similarities between the founding of Israel and those of the Botswana in regaining their
 promised land are truly remarkable".33 This explains the close relationship that grew
 between Bophuthatswana and Israel. Since 1977 there were regular exchanges and national
 development initiatives. Israeli advisors and businessmen frequently visited and were given
 favourable positions and contracts in Bophuthatswana.
 Similarly dignitaries arrived from the Ukraine at the Bophuthatswana Independence
 celebrations in 1992 to "foster goodwill" and to "teach us about the newly independent
 Ukraine", and its struggles to distance itself from the Russian state. In 1992 a trade advisor,
 31 JUrc.Mafikcng.Mail. 20 May I98.V
 32 Sec TJlc.MafikcnR.Miul, 12 December 1986. For a Kilter account of the episode see J.Drummond and A. Mansnn.
 "The Evolution and Cnnpcinpnrary Significance of the Bophuthalswana-Botswana Border Landscape", in I). Rnml.v
 and J. Minghi(eds.), The Geography of Bo.r.ikrJ.aadseapej, Routledgc, London. 1991.
 33.Mafikcng.Mail, 4 IVc. 1992.
doubling as an "ambassador", was sent off to Riga to form relations with the newly
 independent state of Latvia. Subsequently in July 1993 Mangope and some advisors visited
 Latvia to strengthen this link by the opening of the Information Service of
 Bophuthatswana (ISOB). In an address to the Latvian Foreign Affairs Committee,
 Mangope proceeded to lay an ideological foundation for a possible future relationship
 based on drawing out historical similarities between the two. He noted that they "have
 many things in common - including the fear of communism, which in South Africa is a
 threat in the form of the A.N.C."^ He concluded that the irony of their two histories"
 will not be lost on the Latvians when I tell you that the masterminds behind the sinister
 plot to seize total power in our region are drawn from the ranks of the South African
 Communist Party (and) ...the the African National Congress who are still committed to
 classic communist doctrine in spite of its disastrous consequences and its abject failure
 wherever it has been allowed to poison society."^
 This East European ethnic discourse and policy captured the imagination of the
 Bophuthatswana media. An editorial noted Yugoslavia's release from the "yoke of
 communism" and the fact that this led not to "rejoicing" but a "bloody war between
 different ethnic groupings in the territory". It lauded what it saw as "a democratic solution
 to the problem by the United Nations to stop this warring between the Serbs, Croats and
 Muslims." The solution, it observed, is based on a "brokered ceasefire in terms of which
 the country will be broken up into ethnic states." Significantly convoluted and crude
 analogies are made with the "National Party arguments in favour of apartheid and the
 division of ethnic groups" premised historically on the fact that these ethnic groups "did
 not get on and separation would prevent violence." ?'"
 However events within South Africa, especially from 1990, tended to focus attention more
 on national as opposed to international developments. The resurgence of global
 nationalism did however provide a useful background to Bophuthatswana's later attempt
 to find respectability and the chance for continuity as a separate ethnically based nation.
 SATSWA-The Southern African Tswana Forum.
 Bophuthatswana's SATSWA initiative must be seen against the background of Mandela's
 release, the CODESA negotiations, and the reality of South African restructuring leading
 towards a unitary state dispensation. Behind the scenes activity and informal debates about
 this imminent restructuring led, on the 15 March 1991, to the first official meeting of
 interest groups in the region to explore a wide range of issues including agriculture,
 mining, business, education, health, social services and rural development. This provided
 the basis for a conference on regional government convened on 23 March 1992. The social
 basis and support for this initiative comprised 320 Bophuthatswana government and
 34.Mafikcng.Mail. July 9, 1993.
 35 Qnolc.l in MalikcngJ^ail, 9 July 1993.
 36Ma(ikci>eMail.7May 1991.
parastatal officials, academics from the Universities of Bophuthatswana and Potchefstroom
 and also regionally based farmers and businessmen, including some mining interests.
 From this evolved the idea of regional consolidation referred to by the Star as a " Tswana-
 Boereland superstate."-'' This plan would lead to a region which would be the second
 largest in size, encompassing most of present Bophuthatswana, large portions of the
 Orange Free State, including Bloemfontein, parts of the Northern Cape, including
 Kimberley and Upington.{See Map} Provision was also made for the farming areas and
 agricultural interests of Ellisras, Thabazimbi and Nylstroom in the north-western
 Transvaal. As Drummond notes the aim of SATSWA was "to promote a 'greater
 Bophuthatswana', which would incorporate and guarantee white farming interests, against
 an envisaged centralist state".?"* The population of the.area was projected to be about 6.3
 million inhabitants {56% Tswana speaking}. It would have a Gross Geographic Product
 {GGP} of 239 billion Rand comprising, inter alia, 60% mining interests, 11% commerce
 and industry and 3% agriculture. The mining interest was based on large geological studies
 on mineral deposits of platinum, chrome, iron, manganese, gold, asbestos, tin, diamonds,
 copper, zinc and lead.
 Mangope's presentation to a meeting of the Forum on the 26 March 1992 was both
 informative and instructive in its construction of Batswana history and in its attempt to
 forge a new set of material interests for the region.
 At the outset his address was concerned about the tendency to homogenise the TVBC
 states. He lamented the trend to generalise in lumping all the TVBC states together as if
 they were a "homogenous group or single entity." ^9 The adoption of the notion of ethnic
 difference from the other states is clearly spelt out and perceived in terms of "history",
 "development", "economy", "achievements" and " apart from other reasons, because we
 are a democracy." Most important Mangope claimed emphatically that "we are an
 independent nation" and "not a product of apartheid". His historical grounds for this
 interpretation is premised on the "fact" that in 1977 "we regained the independence which
 the British so treacherously took from us at the turn of the last century" .40
 The appeal for regionalism was constructed and argued against a perceived fear of the "idea
 of one unitary state based on a "one man one vote situation and the winner takes all"
 alternative. Mangope argued that a "logical solution" to this fear is "the devolution of
 power to regional governments." The basis and success this regionalism rested on the
 notion of bringing together "groups of people who share the same basic values, norms and
 beliefs".
 3 7 J h t i u r , March 27, 1993.
 38 J. Drummond, "The Demise of Territorial Apartheid: Retncorporaling the Bantustans in a ' New' South Africa",
 Tijdschrih voor Efnnnnmhp <*n Sociale Geografie. 5, (1991),p.343.
 3 9 See The Mafikirng Mail. 4 Dcember 1992. 'There is no doubt that in the minds of all South African leaders, that
 Bophuthatswana is seen as uniquely different from any olher in the former or present homelands. It occupies a special
 place."
 4 0 These quotations come from President Mangope's address to the SATSWA Forum.
At this point Mangope's address significantly shifted its tack by employing Afrikaans as a
 linguistic medium. The "Afrikaner en die Batswana" are seen "in vele opsigte dieselfde
 waardes, geloof, en norme handhaaf "{In all respects to have the same values, beliefs and
 norms}. These "same values" are grounded in beliefs of "Christlike-beginsels" { Christian
 principles}, "vreedsame naasbestaan" {peaceful co-existence}, "onderskryf deur beginsels
 van die vrye mark stelsel" {commitment to the free enterprise system} and faith in " waade
 aan ons tradities , ons taal en ons geskiedenis" {worth in our own traditions, our language
 and our history}.
 While the material bases and anticipated social support for this regionalism was not
 evident at this juncture of the address Mangope did make a strong psychological appeal to
 both perceived and imaginary threats to this co-existence. He for instance made reference
 to a "vn ou Tswana spreekwoord" {an old Tswana saying}; "Fifing go tshwaranwa ka
 dikobo" translated into Afrikaans as " waneer dit donker is moet ons aan mekaar se
 komberse of klere vashou" {when it becomes dark we must together hold on to each
 others blankets and clothes.} This darkness was metaphorically projected into the then
 South African political crisis and debates around a unitary South Africa:
 "Breer vertaal sou dit kon beteken dat, in tye van nood en gevaar, moet ons mekaar se
 hande vat en saam die toekoms aandurf. Ek glo dat nou, meer as ooit tevore die tyd
 aangebreek het dat die Afrikaner en die Batswana in die Westlike gebiede van Suider
 Afrika meekar se hande moet vat en met moed en geloof aan 'n nuwe toekoms werk"
 {Broadly translated it can mean that in times of need and danger we must embrace each
 others hands and embrace the future together. I believe that now, more than ever, the
 Afrikaner and the Batswana in the western part of Southern Africa must take each others
 hands and with determination and conviction work towards a new future.}
 This response to political darkness and future uncertainty was not limited by Mangope to
 the contemporary South African political crisis. Indeed Mangope refered to the
 "sewentiende eeu" {seventeenth century} when n'n teen woordigheid en beskawing in die
 gebied Suid en Wes van die Zambesie gevestig het". It was as a result of this threat that the
 Batswana " saam men Griekwa en Voortrekker moes ons veg teen vyandige boorlinge en
 impis wat ons Christelike geloof en beskawingspeil bedreig het." {The Batswana stood
 together with the Griqua and voortrekkers against the enemy tribes and regiments that
 threatened their Christian belief and civilisation} Against this historical interpretation
 Mangope, in addition to assuming a typical colonial discourse, guaranteed his audience
 that they could rest assured {"u kan gerus"} that this historical period was a clear
 indication of the "noue bande wat daar in die verlede tussen Afrikaner en Tswana bestaan
 het." {The close bonds that have existed between Afrikaner and Tswana.}
 The documents presented at SATSWA which provided the reasoning and various
 justifications for it, require comment on two levels. Firstly, historically one can detect
 again the falsification to suit particular ends. The Tswana are presented as a homogenous
 entity who acted with one intention arid with one interest. In fact the various chiefdoms
 assumed differing attitudes and tactics to the imposition of white domination. Moreover
 by the beginning of the twentieth century, if not before, Tswana society had become
sufficiently differentiated for separate groups and classes to act independently towards
 white farmers and capitalists. In addition the notion of Tswana/Afrikaner unity in the past
 is presented as given and uncomplicated, whereas relationships were fraught with conflict
 and contradiction. Certainly collaboration, even co-operation, was one tactic resorted to
 by Tswana chiefs. But these tactics were not based on any notion of a common identity.
 Rather they were short-lived, pragmatic and accommodating, and Tswana leaders were just
 as prone to follow a path of opposition and noncooperation.'" However in the SATSWA
 discourse this presumed unity was elevated to a truism while at the same time the
 differences between the Tswana and other major African chiefdoms, especially the Zulu
 and Xhosa, are exaggerated and highlighted to preserve a regional identity in the face of the
 threat of absorption into a unitary state dominated by more powerful and numerous
 forces.
 Secondly, in a contemporary sense this "unity" is projected into the present to provide the
 basis for regional cooperation. Thus the documents refer to the regional sense of
 communality or regional loyalty which "should be taken into account". Ethnicity is not
 obscured; in fact it is the point of reference for the regional dispensation. While admitting
 that in the historical past the "criterion" of ethnicity "achieved mixed success" and,
 "because of its racial connotations...should be avoided in future demarcation
 considerations", the documents however add that the "fact is that ethnicity cannot be
 ignored and that culture, language, religion and traditions need to be taken into
 consideration in any future demarcation".^ Or, as one senior Bophuthatswana official put
 it, the "ANC wants to play down the difference of ethnic groups...but we cannot accept
 that4-'". The threat of loosing control of access to jobs and material benefits was strongly
 stated as a justification for a regional dispensation. For example the fear of possible loss of
 jobs in the bureaurcracy to returning exiles is expressed by senior officials in the Public
 Service Commission. The ANC Regional Proposals, which advocate a region comprising
 the present Transkei, Border and Ciskei are interpreted as an attempt to hold on to an
 ethnic powerbase and are advanced as a reason to allocate resources on a regional and
 ethnic basis to Bophuthatswana. The ANC and National Party "alliance" was seen as
 operating "primarily for the benefit of an urban bourgeoisie and the Xhosa ethnic group"
 and " all others would be excluded from full participation in the benefits of political
 patronage."
 The Bophuthatswana/ Conservative Party alliance was then seen as being
 counterhegemonic to the ANC/NP alliance. The SATSWA option was a purely
 functionalist and manipulative exercise, prompted by material threats and justified on
 specious and questionable grounds. It obscured obvious class divisions which existed in the
 region and assumed a kind of consential homogeneity. At the same time however the
 initiative was aimed at creating a form of inter-ethnic class based cooperation.
 41 For an example of this see A.Manson. "The Hurutshe and the Formation of the Transvaal Siaie, ISM-1870.
 Intf rnational Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 2 1992."
 4 2 See SATSWA document 1 ."Regional Government for the Western Transvaal, BophuthalswaiKi and ihr Northern
 Cape, and Document 2 "SATSWA Regional Demarcation Proposal."
 43 Cited in Jeffrey, Conflirt in Bophuthatswana.p.lRV
This flirtation with right wing politics was taken a step further with the formation of the
 Concerned South African Group (COSAG), comprising broad conservative interest
 groups including the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Conservative Party and Parties in the
 Ciskei. This alliance was formed to oppose emergent and more powerful political forces.
 This eventually coalesced into the Freedom Front to fight the A.N.C. on the one hand and
 the National Party on the other. By late 1993 Mangope had firmly, placed his future in a
 nationally based right wing alliance.
 Toward.'; The Insurrection of March 1994.
 As the crisis deepened in Bophuthatswana the government's actions became more and
 more politically extreme, undermining the very basis of its previously rational and
 seemingly "fair" contestation for the region. The main reason for this irrational extremism
 lay in the growing opposition to the government from within and the shrinking social
 base from which the state operated. At the forefront of opposition were students and
 school pupils who in the first half of 1993 mounted strong protests against the Mangope
 administration. The University was at varying times closed or was on strike and Colleges
 of Education, Manpower Training Centres and the Technicon likewise were plagued by
 unrest and were periodically shutdown. An unscheduled closure of schools took place
 from the 15 to 20 June to pre-empt planned student protests during that period. Mangope
 refused to concede that this opposition came from "his" people, blaming the A.N.C. and
 its alliance members for infiltrating Bophuthatswana in order to destroy it from within.
 Mangope, betweeen May and July 1993, on three occasions called his civil servants to warn
 them not to listen to A.N.C. propaganda and not to transfer allegiance to the organisation.
 When dissent was expressed he called the civil servants "drunken pigs" and sent them
 home. Finally, on the 23 July, in a move which the SABC called "another blow to freedom
 of political expression in the country", he warned that any civil servants joining the
 A.N.C. of S.A.C.P. or sympathising with them would be fired. The management
 structures of BOP Broadcasting and the AGRICOR parastatal were restructured in an
 attempt to accomodate the interests and to buy the favour of a section of BaTswana whose
 paths to power were blocked by the existing, mainly white, top hierarchies. A major rucus
 developed between Mr. Andrew Khutsoane, Head of the Bophuthatswana National
 Library Services, and the government, after Khutsoane made public allegations concerning
 the integrity and honesty of Mr.Rowan Cronje, a long serving Cabinet Minister and
 Bophuthatswana's negotiator at the World Trade Centre. There were indications too that
 business interests wwere increasingly uneasy about future prospects if Bophuthatswana
 clung tenaciously to its independent status. ?
 These developments were accompanied with an almost hysterical and anachronistic
 rhetoric that linked the A.N.C. to a communist plot to destroy the country, expressed
 graphically by the statements made by Mangope on his visit to Latvia. Thus these excesses
 painted a picture of a state loosing credibility and desperately trying to maintain its
 ground. They also undermined the reasonable and acceptable option of regionalism that
 the Mangope administration has worked so hard to present. By the start of 1994
 Mangopc's actions and attitudes had clearly begun to alienate intellectuals, students, civil
 servants and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie whose support Mangope depended.
- 18
 Despite these signs the suddeness of his fall took most people by surprise.However, as the
 comments in this introduction indicate, there could be no mistaking the deep seated
 antagonism felt towards his rule and his policy of alliance with the far right.
 Mangope's 1 egacy and Democratic Practise
 In the period following Mangope's overthrow there was a collapse of authority which
 could be described as a semi-revolutionary situation. From the outside the Transitional
 Executive Council in South Africa assumed control, sending in the South African Defence
 Force and establishing an interim office of the "Joint Administrators" to administer the
 region. On the ground there was an efforesence of "Staff Associations" formed in
 government and parastatal structures in twenty-eight districts of the former homeland to
 give expression to local demands and grievances. These structures grew out of "people's
 fora" who allegedly elected them to represent them. They subsequently merged into a
 structure known as "The Joint Staff Association" which began to advise the office of the
 Joint Administrators and to make demands for the suspension of Magope's senior staff.
 Subsequently, Mangope's cabinet and senior civil servants, army and police officers were
 removed. Unpopular chiefs were forced out of office and banished one's returned. Some
 reorganisation of management structures in parastatals and the University began to take
 place to give expression to these democratic impulses. In short, it appeared that the region
 was experiencing a far more radical break from the past than was the case in South Africa
 where the ANG and De Klerk's administration were forging a power sharing arrangement
 leading to negotiated democratisation.
 However it began to become evident that civil servants' concerns centred as much, if not
 more, around the issues of parity in wages and discontent over expatriates or seconded
 South African officials than around notions of democratic representation or transparency
 in government. The Joint Administrators found themselves facing the same hostile
 reaction over salary issues as did Mangope's Ministers, despite President Mandela's
 assurances that civil servants in the various administrations in the country would be given
 parity in wages.
 In the rural areas the return to power of traditional leaders forced out by Mangope does
 not neccessarily translate into the establishment of popular democratic practises or
 structures. Many might indeed be seeking to establish and entrench political and economic
 powers that they had lost in the Mangope years. Moreover Mangope entrenched the
 powers of chiefs (provided they supported him) during his rule. This was begun almost
 immediately after independence with the Weichers Commission which set in place tribal
 authorities with distinct powers. While "this was ostensibly done under the guise of
 decentralisation, community participation, rural development and democracy, the
 dominance of the state and its bureaucracy was, and remains, the paramount aim.'"''* As
 has been noted rural people's lives are shaped around the institution of chieftaincy, which,
 with its patriarchal and generational inbalances, is essentially repressive. As Richard
 Levin's paper to this Workshop shows, there is in parts of the eastern Transvaal significant
 opposition in local communities to the role of chiefs in land allocation and development
 44 See M. Lawrence, "Chiefs, Tribal Authority and Village Education", Ne?'_Lo_gk MillUies?)i, July 1
issues that sets the scene for local struggles over land allocation, tribal levies and labour
 duties etc.45 The indications are that similar struggles are being replicated in the western
 Transvaal. For example in Madikwe region, the ANC stalwart Philemon Mathole,
 established in 1991 a civic known as the Committee of Ten to challenge the power of local
 chiefs and to demand open governance from them. This example seved as a model for
 several other rural populist initiatives in the region.^
 It is apparent too that the democratic impulse was felt very differentialy in the former
 homeland. Whilst in Mmabatho and the urban areas of the homeland the insurrection did
 capture the imagination of most people, it had little impact in remote districts. In Ganyesa
 for example reports indicated that people were unsure of how to respond to Mangope's fall
 and did not offer any opposition to Mangope supportors.
 Some reference needs to be made to the other communities in the region, especially
 Mangope's alliance partners, the white right. The severe setback they suffered and the stark
 destruction of the illusion of a Tswana \Boere homeland has further embittered this
 element. The abject failure of a cross ethnic alliance will undoubedly cause them to fall
 back on conceptions of popular democracy based on notions of a common and inherited
 consciousness moulded by history, language and experience.
 Finally it should be borne in mind that there was a very undeveloped political or
 democratic culture in Bophuthatswana. As indicated whilst South Africa liberalised in the
 late 1980's, Mangope became increasingly authoritarian. The Trade Union movement was
 never allowed to develop, nor was there the emergence of the "civic associations" that
 mushroomed in the 1980's, nor was there the same degree of student organisation in the
 schools and tertiary institutions. As Lodge has noted these "communal organisations...did
 help to change popular attitudes to unjust authority, to alter popular expectations from
 goverment, and instill more egalitarian political values". "*'
 Thus the legacy of Mangope is somewhat ambiguous. His extremely authoritarian regime
 lead to a lack of local popular empowerment, yet its fall left a power vacuum that
 institutionally could be exploited to radically challenge relations of power. His ethnic
 minded approach created its own blend of Tswana populism which he propagated openly
 and it remains to be seen how much appeal this will hold in rural areas within the old
 Bophuthatswana.
 Conclusion
 In conclusion this paper has revealed the changing nature of ethnicity formation in an area
 which has hitherto received scant critical attention. We have indicated the transition from
 a crude formulation of ethnic identity in the bantustan formation period, based on a
 45 R.Levin, "Participatory Research and Democratic Agrarian Transformation: The Case of the Eastern Transvaal
 Central Lowveld." History Workshop Paper, Wits University.< July 1994.
 4 6 Mathole, a Treason Trialist and Secretary of the Transvaal ANC in the 1950's, was banished to the region in the late
 1970(s. See South African Institute of Race Relations-Oral Archive, Interview by A Manson, 1992, and a forthcoming
 publication by M.Lawrence, focussing especially on his role in'this community.
 47 T. Lodge," South Africa: Democracy and Development in Post-Apartheid Society", Paper to Institute for Advanced
 Social Research, Wits University 1994.
notion of precolonial organisation, to a more sophisticated reformulation to provide an
 acceptable post-apartheid discourse and political practise as a counter hegemonic strategy in
 an period when coalition and alliance politics appeared the order of the day. While not
 obscuring the material base of this initiative, it is obvious that the Bophuthatswana
 strategy was conceived to find resonance with the ideology of a besieged and threatened
 Afrikaner rural constituency itself steeped in decades of socialisation into a perception of
 politics premised on notions of ethnicity and nationhood. By presenting this proposal of
 political restructuring in an attractive ethnic package Mangope hoped to improve his
 chances of mobilising a greater, more respectable and significant constituency. This
 platform would then provide the basis from which to launch a serious challenge for rights,
 privileges and available resources.
 Although the motives and explanations for this bid for power are questionable and flawed
 one could argue that it did provide at least a logical option, particularly as regionalism at
 that time was finding itself increasingly on the agenda of politicians negotiating South
 Africa's future.
 Despite the growing opposition to his regime, the suddeness of Mangope's fall took most
 people by surprise. At what point precisely he lost control of the process he was engaged
 in is hard to pinpoint. Certainly his shift from regional to national politics could be seen as
 a crucial turning point in terms of political tactics. However it was the glee with which
 most Tswana viewed the shooting of the khaki clad AWB in front of a Mercedes Benz that
 best explains the failure of Mangope's vision and political strategy. For the masses in
 Bophuthatswana, Mangope's efforts to delve into nineteenth century history to explain the
 "kinship" between the Boers and the Tswana were implausible. For most Tswana's their
 experiences of life on the farms of the Western Transvaal, of redundancies and removals,
 made a mockery of Tswana\Afrikaner unity. For Mangope to align himself with far right
 Afrikaners was even more outrageous. It was, like his unfortunate precursor, Moiloa, to
 declare himself a willing "Dog of the Boers".
 Why though did Mangope not see the folly of his actions? From all accounts he had placed
 himself beyond advice from even his cabinet who feared to openly challenge his actions.
 Quite clearly he was a victim of his own blinkered vision and believed the apartheid-
 created myth that he was a leader of a truely independent state. Incredibly it is clear that he
 seriously believed in the fantasies he spun and the opportunistic strategies he employed to
 legitimise and prop up his homeland fable. Most of the homeland leaders recognised the
 implausibihty of this objective and ensured a semblance of a political future by declaring
 for the A.N.C. A leader like Buthelezi, on the other hand could ensure political revival
 because he proclaimed a message of ethnic-national unity which had a pronounced appeal
 to the Zulu. Mangope however could not overcome the obvious contradiction that a fully
 recognised Tswana nation-state existed right alongside the borders of Bophuthatswana, and
 the creation of a second, particularly out of an apartheid system, was an impossibility.
 Liberal parliamentarianism may have been established in the former Bophuthatswanu bui
 the growth of a popular political culture and practise will depend on how sucessfully the
 organs of civil society can be built in a region. This will mean overcoming some
 limitations. Though not sealed off from the democratisation process, many of the
inhabitants of Bophuthatswana were not extended even the basic democratic freedoms
 such as free political expression and association, let alone afforded the opportunity of
 experiencing the habits and attitudes gained from engagement with a popular democratic
 political culture. In addition it will take some time to rid the region totally of the ethnic
 variety of populism expounded by the Mangope regime.