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 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
 African Studies Seminar Paper
 to be presented at Seminar in RW 319 at
 4.00 p.m. on Monday 31 July 1989
 STATE BUREAUCRACY AND BLACK LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE MILLING WORKERS'
 STRIKE OF 1944
 by David Duncan
 No. 257
State Bureaucracy and Black Labour in South Africa: the
 Milling Workers' Strike of 1944.
 David Duncan
i) Introduct ion.
 In September 1944, African milling workers on the Rand, in Pretoria
 and in several other centres in the Transvaal, went on strike. The
 stoppage lasted only a few days, but it involved over 1200 hundred
 labourers) mare than half of whom mere arrested. The strike was
 supported by the Council for Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), the
 Trades and Labour Council (TLC), the Communist Party, the Campaign
 for Right and Justice (CRJ), and various religious
 denominations.(1) It attracted the attention of politicians at the
 highest level, and disrupted supplies of a basic commodity to the
 general public. The ending of the stoppage was confused, with
 compromises on both sides and appeals to official arbitration.
 Within four months, though, the workers were receiving a few
 shillings more each week in their pay packets.
 This study focuses on the role of the State bureaucracy before and
 during the milling dispute. The Department of Labour was chiefly
 involved in the run up to the strike? and in its settlement. During
 the actual stoppage, the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was much
 to the fore, with subsidiary parts for the South African Police,
 the Justice? Department, and the Prime Minister's office. All five-;
 had also been involved in the coal distributors' strike three
 months earlier, which helped to shape the tactics adopted by
 officials during the milling dispute.
 South African historiography has neglected the State and its
 internal divisions and contradictions, especially in the context of
 its relations with labour. The main works which have broached the
 topic-- such as Yudelman's "The Emergence of Modern South Africa",
 Davies's "Capital, state and white labour", and Johnstone's; "Class;,
 Race and Gold"-- have? tended to treat the State in an overly unified
 manner, seeing it either as an instrument of capital (or fractions
 thereof), or as possessing interests of its own which are
 subscribed to by all its constituent parts. (2) In particular, the
 position of the bureaucracy has been ignored. Little; attempt has
 been made to plot the divisions which existed between different
 branches of the civil service, or to explain the role of the
 bureaucracy in formulating and implementing the policies of
 successive governments.
 This is all the more remarkable given the recognition of the
 bureaucracy as an important factor in the literature on social
 theory. Max Weber regarded the development of bureaucratised state
 apparatus;, with its pyramidal hierarchy of authority and salaried,
 full-time staff, as a condition for the spread of capitalism.(3)
 For him, the formation of a formal, codified law, and its
 administration by the bureaucracy, promoted the centralisation of
 power in the hands; of a minority. In the context of South African
 labour history, this is certainly true of thus period 1910-1943.
 From the Native-? Labour Regulation Act of 1911 to the Native? Laws
 Commission of 1946-8, the State elaborated its; powers of control
Pago 2
 over African workers; it also created and expanded the civil
 service-? needed to implement the legislation and to stabilise and
 regularise the rapidly growing set of laws.(4)
 More recently, the English sociologist, Anthony Giddens, has
 criticised Weber's pessimistic view of bureaucratic organisation.
 He sees a constant process; of "active struggle, in which those in
 subordinate positions are by no means always the losers".(5) Again,
 aspects of Giddens' theories are evident in the course of this
 strike, even though the strikers had no formal rights in the
 political structure. Those in subordinate positions refused to be
 mere 'passive recipients' of bureaucratic domination, and instead,
 generated a minor degree of change through the collective
 withdrawal of labour.
 Theoretical literature from the field of public administration also
 sheds some light on the bureaucracy's role in this dispute. The
 discipline originated in the USA around 1900, and was only slowly
 accepted in South Africa by academics and administrators.(6) By the
 1930s, however, the Government, the bureaucracy and employers had
 all been imbued with the principles of scientific management. For
 the labour market, this encouraged a drive towards the more
 efficient 'use' of different categories of labour and their
 regulation by rationalised systems of control.<7) For the civil
 service itself, the "scientific management approach" placed a
 premium on highly-trained specialists, with clearly defined
 functions within the bureaucracy.(B) Both of these features are to
 be seen at work during the milling workers' strike: the stoppage
 was partly caused by the over-specialisation of the Labour and
 Native Affairs Departments; and yet the responses of officials were
 dictated partly by their outrage at the violation of their
 technical procedures for controlling labour relations.
 Within the State, the bureaucracy played a crucial role in dealing
 with the strike. Although Cabinet Ministers carried the ultimate
 responsibi1ty for their departments, and despite the Prime
 Minister's personal interest, it was left up to senior civil
 servants to carry out the routine functions* of the>ir departments.
 Moreover, in the NAD, the rapid turnover of ministers and the
 personal contact between the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA),
 Douglas Smit, and General Smutst gave the officials extra influence
 in determining the State's strategy in the strike. The Minister of
 Labour, Walter Made ley, had even less of a guiding hand over his
 department's officials? decisions were taken at the Divisional
 Inspector level, with only the most important ones; being referred
 to the Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker. Rarely, in any
 department, was a policy finalised without the advice of senior
 civi 3. servants.
ii) The coal distributors' strike.
 Two months before the milling strike, the Native Commissioner for
 Johannesburg, JM Brink, contacted the SNA about an article in "The
 Guardian" on a recent labour dispute.(9) He reminded him of their
 recent dinner with the Minister of Native Affairs, at which Brink
 and the Director of Native; Labour (DNL) had stressed the need for
 "firm action" against African strikers. "It would be disastrous",
 he wrote, "if the wrong impression... gained ground; but we can
 only counteract it by all concerned acting together firmly in
 connection with future strikes and not departing from any decisions
 when once made".(10)
 The article in question referred to the coal distributors' strike
 of June 1944. The outcome of that dispute had an important effect-
 on the policies of the Police and the Departments of Native
 Affairs, Labour and Justice during the milling workers' strike
 three months later.(11) A brief outline of that conflict is
 therefore necessary in this context.
 Labour problems first hit the coal distributing business in 1941,
 when the strike was connected with the Council for Non-European
 Trade Unions' demands for official recognition. On that occasion,
 370 strikers were arrested, and replacement workers taken on.(12)
 Wages and conditions were fixed in a Wage Board Determination which
 came into operation on 18 May, 1942.(13) It was this settlement
 which the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union (ACDWU)
 desired to have-? altered when they wrote to coal merchants on the
 Reef in May 1944. At that time, labourers were paid 26s per- week
 plus a ls/2d dirt allowance? the union demanded a minimum L..3 p.w.
 plus a 44 hour week, time-and-a-half for overtime, and full pay far
 three? weeks annual leave and public: holidays. Evidently, this was
 merely an initial bargaining position, probably intended to
 highlight the real needs of urban-dwelling Africans.(14) In the
 event, the coal merchants refused to negotiate. The strike? began on
 5 June before any contact had been made between the employers or
 the government departments and the union.
 In a pattern which was to be? repeated in the milling dispute, the
 Department of Labour failed to anticipate the stoppage. The
 Divisional Inspector of Labour also neglected to inform the DNL.'s
 office that the strike was underway.(15) More significantly, the
 Minister of Labour, Walter Madeley, only appointed an arbitrator
 after the dispute was shown to be a serious threat, and even then
 he? excluded mule drivers and farriers;, who were mentioned in the
 original demands.(16) The lack of coordination clearly irritated
 the DNL, who was responsible for the NAD officers who went to
 a d dress t h e? s t r i k e r s.
 At the local level, though, the NAD's Inspectors of Native-? Labour
 (INL) and Native? Commissioners ( N O , and the Department of Labour's
 Inspectors combined quite effectively to deal with separate groups
Page 2
 of labourers. In Brakpan, labourers in three coal companies struck
 work. Du Frees of the Department of Labour and the Benoni NC
 visited them together to warn them that their actions were illegal.
 The Labour Department official promised to investigate certain
 specific grievances himselfj and informed them that the question of
 wages; would have to be referred to higher authority. About eighty?
 s;even strikers promised to return to work the same afternoon. At
 Boksburg and Springs, the workers told government officials that
 they had come out at the instigation of union representatives; the
 Police later took sworn statements for use in incitement
 charges.(17)
 Only in Randfontein did the normal cooperation between the two
 departments break clown. Here, strikers rejected the Inspector of
 Native Labour's plea to return to work. The INL asked the Police to
 arrest them, but the Police, under instructions from their
 Divisional Commander, refused to become involved at this; stage. (IB)
 The DNL later warned the Inspector that NAD officials should not
 look to the Police for large scale arrests, and should work in
 d o s e contact with his office and with the Labour Department.(19)
 However, at the centre of the strike in Johannesburg, the? DNL
 himself, CP Alport, decided that a mass arrest was his only
 possible resort. One thousand workers struck at Newtown on 5 June,
 several hundred of whom gathered outside the works*. A Department of
 Labour Inspector addressed them, warning that the stoppage was
 illegal under emergency wartime regulations, and that they should
 submit their complaints; to his department for investigation. (20)
 The strikers were apparently unwilling to take any action in the
 absence of their Secretary, Daniel Kciza. The-? Labour Department once
 again failed to pass on important news to the DNL, in this case
 that Kosa was trying to get in touch with him by telephone. The
 official who had spoken to the strikers wanted the Police to arrest
 them all on the spot in strict accordance with the law. The Public
 Prosecutor vetoed this, and instead had the two union leaders,
 Abner Mtau and Daniel Koza, detained in the hope that with the
 'agitators' out of the way? the rest would return quietly to
 work.(21)
 The Police were? surprised to find some seven hundred strikers; on
 their doorste?p at headquarters the next morning. They demanded the
 immediate releas;e of Koza and Mtau, or their own arres;t. At this
 point, Alport spoke to the gathering, promising to name the day
 when they could meet Labour Department officials concerning their
 grievances. He was appalled to find them adamant in their demand
 for Koza's release, and duly stood by while the Police arrested 722
 strikers. Despite this impressive show of solidarity (the women
 workers appeared "disappointed" that they would not be detained
 too), and despite the? fact that the union leaders; were already in
 gaol, the only explanation Alport could think of was that they had
 been "led astray by the Union Officials".(22)
Page 3
 The? Departments of Labour and Native Affairs; had thus; pe?rmitted a
 highly unsatisfactory situation to develop. They had been unaware:
 of the prospects of a strike until it had actually begun, and had
 made no attempt to prevent it. Their subsequent efforts to bypass
 the union leaders and negotiate direct with the workers; ended in
 the Magistrate's cells; being burdened with hundreds of mouths to
 feed, and the employers being deprived Df their labour force at a
 time of shortage. White househol ders;, too, were upset, with much
 panic-buying of coal in anticipation of a long strike.(23) The bulk
 of the blame for this belonged to the Department of Labour. As; we
 shall see in the milling dispute, that department's lack of
 sensitivity to the needs of black workers in industry tended to
 hamper official efforts to reach an early settlement. The
 Government's policy was; to grant ' de facto' recognition to African
 unions by allowing them to make representations under the Wage and
 Industrial Conciliation Acts as well as the wartime arbitration
 machinery; but in practice, the Labour Department had little
 dealings; with these unions. (24) Consequently, when a crisis; arose*
 the Eitate was; unable to provide the sort of forum which might have
 brought about an immediate settlement between the workers and their
 employers.
 The rest of the action in the coal distributors;' strike revolved
 around the Wage Board and the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. The
 Wage Board Chairman, JH Botha, was appointed as arbitrator, and
 held hearings at the end of June.(25) A police spy was sent to
 attend the ACDWU meeting which selected representatives for the
 arbitration proceedings, though in the end Koza was allowed to
 speak on the workers' behalf. The Chairman criticised the employers
 for not negotiating with the African union. He dismissed their
 claims that the ACDWU had been discourteous;, arguing that since the
 Dept. of Labour dealt with black unions;, the employers should do so
 too. Koza and Senator Easner (one of the representatives of
 Africans in Parliament and an attorney in the case against the
 strikers) toned down the union's original demands to LI.15 p.w.
 plus a 44 hour week; the employers held out for no increase: at all,
 with wages remaining at 26s; p.w. plus; a ls/2d dirt allowance. The
 final settlement was; closer to the union's figure, at LI. 12=6 for
 adult labourers, and LI.15.0 for security guards.(26)
 In the Judicial arena, there were, in effect, two cases;- that of
 Koza and Mtau for incitement, and the: charge against the strikers;
 for stopping work illegally. Both charges were ultimately
 withdrawn. As the case against the strikers dragged on with
 repeated postponements, the defence lawyers protested the los;s of
 pay for each court appearance) the coal merchants complained about
 the los;s of labour; and the court officials; grew anxious; about the
 cost of the whole? thing. (27) Charges were dropped without reason on
 27 June.(28) The case against Koza was closed when he agreed to
 address striking milling workers in September.(29)
Page 4
 "The Guardian" regarded the coal distributors'1 strike as a clear
 victory for the workers. Hundreds of labourers had been prepared to
 go to gaol unless their union leaders were released; thirty lawyers
 had offered their services to defend them; and the; Prosecution had
 accepted that it could not implement the War Measure which made
 strikes by pass-bearing Africans illegal. "The Guardian" hoped that
 the Government would not try to implement this "iniquitous law" in
 the future.(30)
 It was this leader which prompted the Johannesburg Native
 Commissioner to call for greater cooperation and a less
 compromising stance within the bureaucracy against further African
 strike action. His department did indeed learn some lessons from
 the dispute which it applied during the milling workers' strike.
 The NAD made a greater attempt to keep in contact with the
 Transvaal African Milling Workers Union (TAMWU) and CNETU than it
 had with the ACDWU. The-; Native Affairs and Labour Departments also
 looked to the Police for immediate coercive action to give effect-
 to the Eitate's extensive powers of repression. In general, the two
 departments coordinated their actions and pooled information to
 eliminate some of the problems which arose during the coal dispute.
 On the other hand, the Department of Labour remained inflexible in
 its dealings with African workers. Both departments placed undue
 trust in mass arrests, ignoring the failure of this tactic in the
 coal dispute. And worst of all from the point of view of the
 bureaucracy, they over-estimated the degree of cooperation which
 they could expect from employers. When the coal strike was; settled,
 the merchants agreed to take back the workers without any
 victimisation. At least two employers reneged on their word when
 they saw the court case running on interminably; in order to serve
 the short term interests of their businesses, they threatened to
 break the settlement by discharging the former strikers and re-
 engaging the replacements. This conflicted with the aims of the
 state bureaucracy, which intended to protect the long term
 interests of capital, in this instance by securing a peaceful
 return to work through a negotiated settlement. Essentially the
 same problem of short term versus long term interests was; to arise
 in the milling workers' strike, though this time in rather a
 d i f ferent form.
iii) The run up to the milling workers' strike.
 At one level, the milling industry dispute was caused by the
 appallingly low wages and poor conditions endured by the workers.
 Yet the conflict would never have erupted if the various government
 departments involved had been less preoccupied with internal
 administrative procedures, and with their own well-being and
 prestige in the public eye. The positions adopted by the
 departments within the State varied considerably, and affected the
 course of the strike at every stage.
 The development of the State's regulation and control of black
 workers since 1910 had left the work divided primarily between the
 Native Affairs and the Labour Departments. The NAD traditionally
 administered all walks of African life; this was doubly so in
 districts proclaimed under the Native Labour Regulation Act of
 1911. In these 'labour areas', the Government Native Labour Bureau
 (GNLB) controlled passes, recruiting, and the conditions of
 employment of African workers.(31) Local Native Commissioners
 within labour districts were responsible to the? Director of Native
 Labour for all functions relating to labour, as were the GNLB'5 own
 local Inspectors of Native Labour.
 The INL's duties sometimes overlapped with those of the? Department
 of Labour, which was responsible for the Industrial Conciliation
 and Wage Acts, and whose Inspectors enforced the Factories Act
 (concerning conditions on the shop floor).(32) Founded in 1924,
 this department was concerned initially only with white workers;
 but as more blacks sought employment within the industrial economy
 in the 1930s, it became necessary to incorporate them within the
 forms of regulation created for whites.
 Two features of its history played significant parts in the
 Department of Labour's handling of the milling workers' strike. The
 first of these was its officials' obvious; preference for dealing
 with white workers and their representatives. The department's
 Ministers and some of its top civil servantsi including the then
 Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker, were themselves former trade
 unionists who had thrown in their lot with the State during the
 period of the Pact Government. Their attitude towards white trade?
 unions, as shown in their relations with the National Milling
 Workers Industrial Union (NMWIU) in this dispute, remained
 paternalistic; their treatment of the nascent African unions was at
 best off-hand and on occasion openly hostile.(33)
 The second notable feature of the Labour Department's development
 was the proliferation of ways in which its officers could mediate
 or arbitrate in labour disputes. (34) The Industrial! Conciliation
 Act of 1924 provided for industrial councils and conciliation
 boards of registered unions and employers' associations. If this
 failed to produce harmony, a board's members could select an
 arbitrator to settle their differences. And if one or other of the?
Page 2
 parties could not afford the services of an arbitrator (as happened
 in this case), the Minister of Labour was empowered to appoint a
 civil servant to do the job. Further forms of arbitration supported
 by increasing degrees of coercion were established under the Wage
 Act of 1925 (plus amendments), and War Measures 9 and 145 of
 1942.(35) These laws were? introduced by successive governments to
 deal with new situations? and were not always fully understood by
 the Department of Labour itself, let alone? by the union organisers.
 This was especially cle?ar in the milling workers' dispute, where
 the settlement machinery operated by the Department of Labour often
 created mare problems than it solved.
 The NAD and the Labour Department maintained a common commitment to
 preventing the? disruption of a key industry at a time when South
 Africa was still heavily involved in the war in Europe. This
 apparent unity, which was shared by the Coalition Government and
 the wartime bureaucracy, was strengthened by the direct
 intervention of the Prime Minister himself. (36) However, it would
 be wrong to conclude that this was the sole or, on occasion, even
 the main priority for the NAD, which on some issues differed
 significantly from the Department of Labour.
 In every sphere of its activities, the NAD was hampered by having
 to deal with a double 'constituency1. The Director of Native Labour
 and his colleagues presented themselves; as the protectors of black
 workers in the dangerous? hostile environment of the industrial
 areas. At the same time, the NAD was constantly under pre?ssiure? from
 a government elected entirely by whites to produce an obedient and
 inexpensive class; of black labourers. This forced the department to
 be intensely Jealous of its authoritative image? in the eye?s; of the
 African population. In the course of the strike, it became more
 important for the NAD to avoid loss of face before the black-
 proletariat than to put the mills back to work.(37)
 The? other departments which dealt with the strike were the South
 African Police (SAP) and the Justice Department. Representing
 between them the overtly coercive arm of the State, there? is little
 evidence that eithe?r developed as coherent a view of events as did
 Labour and Native Affairs. In the? early stages, the Police were in
 fact the best informed branch of the State, as they sent spie?s to
 union meetings, and compiled factual reports which were sent round
 without comment to the other departments.(38) At the height of the
 strike, it was, of course?, the? Police who had to do the dirty work
 of arresting picketers, though they appear to have done so only
 after receiving the go-ahead from Labour and NAD officials. In
 general, the SAP and the Justice Department could afford to be less
 concerned about the course and final outcome of the dispute, as
 they would not be the first to be held responsible by the
 Government and the white public if things went wrong.
 The stoppage of work on II September 1944 came as a shock to
Page 3
 Department of Labour officials. Two years earlier, the Department
 of Labour had successfully arranged a Conciliation Board for the
 milling industry, comprising the employers and the National Milling
 Workers; Industrial Union, the officially recognised organisation
 for skilled and some semi-skilled workers. The NMWIU at that point
 had been in a deplorable state, with inexpert, part-time leaders,
 and the bulk its paultry membership in Arrears with their union
 dues. (39) The Department of Labour overcame? these difficulties to
 establish what it regarded as an acceptable arena in which to work
 out an agreemen t.
 The Conciliation Board met in April 1942. The NMWIU had a mandate
 from the Transvaal African Milling Workers Union to represent its
 members, as pass-bearing Africans were prevented under the
 Industrial Conciliation Act from putting their own case. (40) This;
 placed the NMWIU in a highly ambiguous position, as one of its
 contentions was; that the industry was; unfairly using cheap black
 and coloured labour to the detriment of white workers;. The union
 further showed its inability to represient all parties equally by
 calling for higher wages for coloureds and As;iatics in Durban, on
 the s;purious; grounds that they were more efficient than blacks;. (41)
 On the positive side, the NMWIU argued for a 207. increase for
 unskilled labourers, and a 107. raise for skilled workers.
 Predictably, though, the final settlement was much more favourable
 to those directly represented at the meeting than to Africans.
 ?>killed labour won their 10%, with a subsequent 2.5% increasie tiE?d
 to each 25 point rise in the retail price index.(42) Labourers'
 wages were brought into line with those in Wage Determination 70,
 which covered the commercial and distributive industries, but this
 applied only in the larger milling centres. Hours of work, overtime
 payments and holidays; mere brought under the Factories Act for all
 workers.
 The impatience shown in 1944 by African labourers in the Transvaal
 can in part be traced to the lack of satisfaction accorded them in
 this settlement. When it was first enforced, it was the African
 Flour Milling Workers;' Union in Natal which protesited most loudly,
 and in a manner that was; to have? important repercussions two years
 later. (4Z4) The Nataxl union insisted that the agreement should never
 have? been extended to Africans at all. It claimed that the white?
 union had no right to speak for Africans; and warned that its
 members in Durban were threatening to strike against the
 'scandalously' low wage of 23s per week. The Labour Department
 replied simply that the settlement (which was binding on blacks; to
 prevent employers from taking on Africans; to replace whites;) could
 not be cancelled under the Industrial Conciliation Act.(44)
 This agreement expired on May 24, 1944. Lulled into a false* sense
 of security by the fact that the previous agreement had run its
 coursie without incident, Department of Labour officials confidently
10
 Page 4
 expected to be able to arrange a. new settlement between the NMWIU
 and the employers. Negotiations began on 3 July 1944, when the
 Divisional Inspector submitted the NMWIU's request for a
 Conciliation Board; they were still going on when African employees
 in the Transvaal struck work on September 11.(45)
 Divisions within each of the parties- the State, the unions and the
 employers- all hindered the preparation of a new agreement. The
 white union was; at first unwilling to represent unskilled workers
 at all. Its leaders claimed that the African union had refused to
 be bound by any of the findings of a Conciliation Board, and that
 the Africans were pursuing their own redress through arbitration.
 It is passible that the NMWIU was confusing the position of the
 Natal union mentioned above with those of the Transvaal unions.(46)
 The NMWIU does not seem to have appreciated the differences of
 opinion between the Transvaal African Milling Workers Union (based
 in Johannesburgj and operating mainly on the Rand), the African
 Milling Workers Union (which had its headquarters in Pretoria), and
 the African Flour Milling Workers Union in Natal. When the
 Department of Labour later informed the NMWIU that it would have to
 represent unskilled interests on the Conciliation Board, its
 Secretary, F. Bumby, replied that he had been in close touch with
 TAMWU from the outset; but he certainly did not understand the
 sense of urgency and despair which drove black workers to take
 matters into their own hands.(47)
 The NMWIU was further hampered by the lack of organisation which
 prevailed in the union throughout the early 1940s. The white union
 could not provide the necessary evidence of its membership, and had
 to call in the Department of Labour's Inspectors to have its books
 cert ified. (48) It was not until early August that the Secretary for
 Labour was satisfied that the NMWIU was sufficiently representative
 of skilled workers to take its place? on a Conciliation Board. (49)
 The employers, too, helped to delay the final settlement. The
 Department of Labour's favourite scenario was that the unions
 should meet the employers informally and settle their differences
 amongst themselves. (50) However., as in 3.942, the? milling industry
 took every opportunity to offset any increase in wages.(51) The
 trump card for the industry was that the Conciliation Board's; lack
 of representativeness prevented its findings being made
 retrospective?, so any postonement of the final accord neant a real
 saving on wages for employers. The SA Maize Millers' and the
 Transvaal Flour Millers' Associations were careful to reject
 initial overtures from the NMWIU. Thereafter they deflected the
 African unions with vague promises of incorporation under the
 Conciliation Board.(52) The employers also kept the Department of
 Labour well informed about TAMWU's warnings about industrial
 action, with a view to securing the State?'s support in the event of
 an illegal stoppage.
Page 5
 It is unclear whether the milling companies deliberately avoided
 forming a single, united body in order to make the application of
 national wage agreements more difficult. The NMWIU openly accused
 the? Cape Province employers of using this ploy at the time of the
 previous Conciliation Board.(53) At any rate? the fact that in
 1944, only Port Elizabeth had an umbrella body, with another fifty-
 three companies being represented individually, did not make things
 any easier.
 One? ve?ry re?al division within the ranks; of the employers was over
 the issue? of compounds and rations. The Pretoria companies, which
 provided both, demanded increases in the deductions they were
 allowed to make from their workers1 pay for food and quarters.(54)
 They argued that their employees were sheltered from the rise in
 the cost of living, and that the value of these services had gone
 up. The Pretoria mills paid L4.6.8 plus food and quarters worth
 LI.16.0; Johannesburg mills paid only L6. No answer was received
 from the Department of Labour, and the arbitrator later followed
 TAMWU in condemning the compounds as serving no useful purpose. (55)
 To turn once again to the departments of state?, one might expect to
 find evidence of greate?r unity and strength of purpose, but this
 was far from the case. If anything, the Estate's actions were? less
 certain and more contradictory than those? of either the employers
 or the unions. The Department of Labour was aware of the intensity
 of feeling among black milling workers, but took no action beyond
 informing the African unions that preparations for a Conciliation
 Board were underway, and warning them not to strike.(56) Labour
 Department officials were at first uncertain whether to accede to
 calls from supporters of the black workers for an arbitrator under
 War Meaure 9 or 143;(37) they only decided on a Conciliation Board
 to cover all workers after a lengthy internal debate. (38) Despite?
 frequent reminders of the urgency of the situation from, among
 others, the Council for Non-Exiropean Trade Unions, the Trades and
 Labour Council, and Eienator Hyman Basne?r, the Department of Labour
 completely lost sight of the prospect of a strike. Instead, its
 officials busied themselves with the intricate procedures involved
 in administering a Board under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
 The NAD's Director of Native Labour, CP Alport, paid rather more
 attention to the Police reports on black traide union meetings, and
 took the threat of a stoppage? much more? seriously. Throughout the
 ensuing weeks, his department was concerned not to repeat the
 mistakes of the coal distributors' strike?. The? main problem with
 the DNL's handling of the run up to the milling workers' strike was
 that he? confused two entirely separate industries. Alport wis;ely
 forewarned the Secretary for Native Affairs; in early July of the
 immimence of action by black workers; but it was; not until after
 the stoppage in the baking industry, in which 800 Africans were
 arrested and then released, that Alport learnt that baking and
 milling were two different trades.(59)
Page 6
 The Transvaal African Milling Workers Union5 led by G. Molefe,
 first served its demands on milling companies across the Reef on
 June 14.(60) The union was not unreasonable: its Secretary asked
 for a minimum wage of L.2 p&r week plus cost of living allowance.
 When the employers rejectd these demands) and the Department of
 Labour failed to bring about a speedy settlement, TAMWU found it
 increasingly difficult to keep control of its members. On 23 July,
 workers at a mass meeting in Johannesburg ignored their leaders'
 calls for patience, and voted to strike from 31 July if their
 demands were not met. The strike was only prevented at the last
 minute when the Department of Labour announced that a Conciliation
 Board would meet on 14 August.) and that TAMWU could give evidence
 before it.(61)
13
 iv) The milling workers' strike.
 The Conciliation Board for the milling industry met from 14-16
 August, 1944. Molefe and Gana Makabeni of CNETU appeared on TAMWU's
 behalf with a range of proposals on rates of pay and
 conditions. (62) These had clearly bee?n drawn up in association with
 the NMWIU, which made similar demands during the Board's meetings.
 The NMWIU secured concessions on annual leave, and on the
 reclassification at higher rates of pay of maize and provender
 millers, and of skilled workers in Natal. The white union accepted
 the employers' offer of LI.15.0 for unskilled workers in the main
 urban centres! with lesser rates in other areas. Negotiations broke
 down on the issue of skilled wages and the class;! fi cat ion and rates
 of pay of semi-skilled employees.(63)
 If the Minister of Labour had then heeded TAMWU's request for an
 arbitrator under War Measure 145, the strike could still have been
 prevented. African labourers would have accepted the rates; already
 agreed upon by the Board* and the whole dispute might have been
 wrapped up in a day. Instead, the Department of Labour, true to its
 practice of operating wherever posisible through the white unions,
 pressed ahead with its drawn out debate with the NMWIU.
 Further procedural problems dogged the road to a final settlement
 between the employers; and the NMWIU. First, they could not agree on
 an arbitrator, so this had to be left up to the Minister of Labour
 to decide. The following week, the Secretary of the NMWIU realised
 that his organisation could not afford the services of an
 independent arbitrator. What he really wanted was a settlement
 under War Measure 9, which would force the Government to foot the
 bill.(64) The Department of Labour overcame this by selecting a
 civil servant for the Job. Again, delays occurred, as; an internal
 disagreement arose over whether to appoint an official from Cape
 Town, or one from the Rand. By the time the? department had picked
 the Additional Magistrate? in Johannesburg as arbitrator, and
 outlined his duties, the strike was already underway.(65)
 "The E>tar" estimated that 1200 Africans withheld their labour on
 Monday, 11 September; the next day, the "Rand Daily Mail" put the
 figure at 1500.(66) Production was; halted at mills all across the
 Reef, even though white employees, content that the arbitrator was;
 appointed on the very day the stoppage began, refused to come out
 in solidarity.
 The? NAD's; role automatically became much more important once the
 strike? began. The stoppage caused a flurry of activity within the
 department, not only because of the numbers involved and the
 crucial position of the milling indusstry, but als;o because it drew
 the attention of the very highes;t politicians. Piet van der Byl,
 the? Ministe?r of Ncitis'e Affairs, reported to General Smuts, who made
 personal recommendations through the Department of Labour
 concerning the return to work.(67) With bread running out in the
14-
 Page 2
 country'si industrial heartland, and with their political masters
 watching anxiously over their shoulders, it was essential for the
 NAD to resolve the dispute swiftly and efficiently.
 The first step in the NAD's; strategy was for the DNL to address a
 large gathering of strikers at the Premier Milling Company in
 Johannesburg.<63) He informed them that an arbitrator had been
 appointed, and asked them to return to work in the meantime. To
 back this up, Daniel Koza was released from police custody and the
 charges against him dropped on condition that he would use his
 influence to end the stoppage. The first meeting met with no
 response, so three days later A1 port tried again, this time
 appearing at one of the daily gatherings of strikers at the
 Johannesburg Bantu Sports Ground.
 As in the coal distributors1 strike, the DNL had to maintain a fine
 line between preserving the dignity and authority of his office,
 and impressing upon his audience the supposed advantages of going
 back to work. He? kept up the debate for two hours; but with little
 to offer but threats of replacement and arrest, and vague promises
 of a future settlement, he made no progress;. The NAD was generally
 unpopular among the African population in the cities. This was
 especially s;o among members of African trade unions;, asi the NAD was;
 seen as; coming between them and full recognition and registration
 by the Department of Labour. Consequently* Alport's; claim that he
 was "anxious, as their guardian, that no new labour should be
 recruited in their place" had no impact on the meeting.(69)
 Similar efforts; by other Native Labour Bureau officials and by the
 Native Commissioner in Krugersdorp also failed. (7(3) An official
 from the Department of Labour visited the Exports; Ground to menace
 the strikers with the legal position, but to no avail.(71) The
 failure of these efforts and the disrespect with which their
 representatives were treated) confirmed the views of both
 departments that the Government must take a tougher line.
 When these meetings; took place, the NAD's; pass offices were already
 supplying replacements to the mills. By 18 September, four mills
 were working normally, with further recruiting going ahead at the
 employers' request. The NAD saw this as an integral part of its
 overall strategy; it wanted the mills to keep the replacements as;
 permanent s;taff, and not to use them merely to force? the hand of
 the strikers (though the departme?nt tried this too). NAD officials
 thus refused to learn the lesson of the coal dis;tributors;' s;trike>,
 where the replacements were dismissed as soon as it suited the
 merchants.(72)
 After their initial overtures; to the s;trikers;, the Native Affairs
 and Labour Departments wholeheartedly supported more repressive
 tactics. In accordance with the DNL's minute; at the close of the
 coal dispute, the Department of Labour announced that the sitrike-
Page 3
 bound sreas would be excluded from the benefits of the arbitrator's
 award. NAD and Labour Department officials mere replaced at the
 strikers' meetings by a heavy police presence, and armed constables
 were sent to protect transport vans. The SAP read a Control Order
 at the Bantu Sports Ground, but this merely provoked the CNETU
 leaders to give? the order to begin picketing the mills. (73) On 12
 EJeptember, there were violent clashes between police and picketers
 when the latter attacked substitue labourers. Three days later, the
 ?)AP took the initiative by attempting to arrest strikers at several
 mills for holding unauthorised gatherings. At the Union Flour
 Mills, the picketers came armed with sticks, and used stones and
 bricks to fend off the police. In all, some 646 Africans were
 arrested for public violence and illegal gathering. Two CNETU
 leaders, Edward Mkoena and Elliot Molapo, were held under the
 Riotous Assemblies Act.(74)
 At the political level, the strike was not going well for the
 Government and the bureaucracy. The; "Sunday Times" quoted a Joint
 statement by the Campaign for Right and Justice, the Trades and
 Labour Council and CNETU, which blamed the dispute on the
 starvation wages paid to urban Africans. The Department of Labour
 was singled out for failing to appoint an arbitrator under War
 Measure 145 in either this or the coal strikes. In the Afrikaans
 press, "Die Vaderland" praised the Prime Minister's swift and
 forceful action;(75) but "Die Transvaler" attacked the Smuts,
 arguing that the? strike was "a symptom of the bad conditions the
 Government had created in South Africa with its colour policy and
 policy in connection with Communism".(76) From the left, the
 Department of Labour was besieged by protests from TLC and CNETU,
 and the Ministers of Justice and Native? Affairs spent three hours
 listening to a deputation from the CRJ and several religious
 denominations. All this moved the DNL to plead that he, at le?ast,
 had seen the strike; coming as e?arly as IE* July, and had called for
 prompt action to forestall it.(77)
 Up to this point, Native Affairs and Labour had enjoyed the
 wholehearted support of the employers for their handling of the
 dispute. However, on IE) September, the mill-owners broke ranks and
 negotiated with the CRJ. With half the strikers in gaol and no
 prospect of an early settlement, the employers considered that
 their immediate interests were best served by an unofficial
 compromise. The substitute labour had proved to be of little use,
 and the mills were anxious to re-employ experienced workers.
 Senator Basner agreed on behalf of the strikers that they would
 return to work in exchange for a promise that the employers would
 put pressure on the Ministers of Justice and Labour to drop the
 charges. The mill-owners further bound themselves to take back 70"/.
 of the workers immediately, and to negotiate with TAMWU for a wage
 increase.(78)
 This "gentlemen's agreement" highlighted the conflict of interest
Page 4
 which existed between the mi 11-owners and the Departments of Labour
 and Native? Affairs. The mill-owners were concerned with the
 immediate? profitability of their businesses, which, they claimed,
 had been hindered, first by the Labour Department's footdragging in
 appointing an arbitrator, and then by the? mass arrests which made
 an early return to work impossible.(79)
 Department of Labour officials protested furiously that their
 administrative procedures had been undermined by the unofficial
 settlement.(B0) Madeley had announced that the strike-bound areas
 would not be covered by the arbitrator; under no circumstances did
 they want the strikers to benefit from wage increases before
 milling workers in the rest of the country.(81) As far as the
 Department of Labour was concerned, once its machinery was set in
 motion, there was no way of altering its course or pace.
 The NAD was more concerned about how the whole affair affected it
 standing with Africans. Its prestige had already taken a blow when
 Alport was rebuffed by the strikers' meeting in Johannesburg. This
 was not helped by the NAD's involvement in recruiting substitute
 labourers. The Minister and hist senior civil servants; believed that
 they had been betrayed by the employers, and that their authority
 in similar situations in future would be diminished. At a Joint
 meeting with the Department of Labour and several mill-owners,
 Reitz harangued the employers for failing to "stand by their guns":
 Having drawn the Prime Minister and three Ministers into this you
 see some obscure outside body to settle the matter without even
 notifying us of what you were doing and subvert and jeopardise all
 future negotiations.(82)
 The Government and its Department of Native Affairs; had to consider
 the long term interests of industry as a whole, not just the short
 term requirements of a few mi 11 --owners. The? EState had established
 machinery to control African workers;- to prevent them striking, and
 to obviate the need for high wage incre?as;es; which, as Smuts himself
 said, would only lead to spiralling inflation. (83) In this cas;e?,
 the employers had first invoked the State machinery, and then
 abandoned it when they found it too cumbersome and slow-moving.
 Underlying the outrage expressed by the two departments and their
 ministers was the fear that they were their grip on the entire
 field of labour relations was starting to slip: in other words,
 they were in danger of losing part of their 'raison d'etre'.
 The solution agreed on to strengthen the two departments' position
 was for the mill-owners to refuse wage increases to the former
 strikers until the arbitrator had announced his; award. Reitz would
 ask the Department of Justice not to withdraw the charges on any
 account. Finally, the DNL would "drive home to the Natives in
17
 Page 5
 question that the strike had not achieved any object other than the
 loss of wages for the period of the stoppage of work".(84)
18
 v) Conclusion
 A few weeks later, the Department of Labour refused to send the
 instructions which they had promised the employers on what to do
 about the strikers' wage increase. The department's officials were
 still smarting from what they saw as shabby treatment by both sides
 in the dispute. It was left up to the industry to grant the
 increase? awarded by the arbitrator to the rest of the country: a
 rise of 4s.l0d on the Rand, and 2s.4d in Pretoria.(85) Higher rates
 were also laid down for some semi-skilled workers. By this time,
 the Attorney-General had already dropped charges against the
 strikers: there was little point in his filling the Jails and
 further disrupting the milling industry Just to save face for
 another branch of the civil service.(86)
 The entire history of the strike demonstrates the importance of
 looking at such divisions within the bureaucracy) and how they
 affected the course of events in society as a whole. This type Df
 analysis is specially pertinent to the history of labour relations,
 as the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts drew trade unions into
 the structure of administrative procedure) and) in many cases,
 dictated the terms and pace of their development.
 Dunbar Moodie) writing on the mineworkers' strike of 1946, has
 shown how different departments, performing disparate functions,
 could approach a problem from ai variety of angles; but the thrust
 of his article is that the State pulled together to tackle the
 stoppage in the gold-mining industry, and to buttress the interests
 of big capitaxl. (?)7) An examination of other disputes, such as the
 coal distributors' and milling workers' strikes of 1944, highlights
 a number of other factors which have to be taken into account. Most
 importantly, it is necessary to consider the internal interests
 which developed within particular departments, and which, on
 occasion, put them at odds with each other, with the employers;, and
 with the unions. This affected not Just the civil servants, but
 their ministers too, whose political fortunes were tied to the
 prestige and efficiency of their departments.
 At the same time, the dynamics; of such events; were often contingent
 on the administrative procedures followed by civil service
 departments and their sub-branches. In the case of the milling
 dispute) the Department of Labour's primary concern with white
 unions and on following through on time-consuming regulations;, left
 African workers feeling so desperate and isolated that they
 resorted to strike action. The DNL was; at least aware of the way
 things were going, but it was not his Job to interfere in
 Department of Labour business; he contented himself with reporting
 to his own superior in Cape Town.
 It would be wrong to conclude from this that the state bureaucracy
 was; s;o hopele-?ssly divided that the? policies; and procedures; of the
 different departments were at odds; with those? of the Prime Minister
Page 2
 and his Cabinet. Smuts himself approved many of the steps taken by
 the bureaucrats in the course of this strike. On the whole, the
 EJtate combined fairly effectively to keep workers; in check, and to
 keep the wheels of industry grinding for the benefit of the moneyed
 classes. But to ignore the bureaucracy, and the administrative
 procedures and sectional interests which flourished within it, is
 to prohibit a full understanding of the labour history of South
 Africa in this period.
Notes.
 1) "Forum" 23/9/44; Central Archives Depot (CAD) Pretoria, Dept. of
 Labour (ARB) LC1052/409, Cape? District Committee;, Communist Party
 of South Africa to Minister of Labour 3.8/9/44.
 2) D Yude1man, The Emergence of Modern South Africa. State, Capital
 and the Incorporation of Organised Labour on the South African
 Goldf ields, 1902--1939 (Connecticut, 1983); RH Davies, Capital,
 state and white labour in South Africa 1900-1960: an historical
 materialist analysis of class formation and class relations
 (Brighton, 1979); FA Johns tone, Class, ra.c& and gold: a study of
 class relations and discrimination in S>outh A f r i c::a (Lon don, 1976)?
 S Dubow's " EJegregat ion and 'Native Administration' in South Africa,
 1920-1936" (Oxford University D.Phil., 1986) provides a useful
 examination of the NAD, but specifically excludes those? functions
 relating to labour. For labour regulation in the contemporary
 period, see S Greenberg's excel le?nt Legitimating the Illegitimate:
 State, Markets and Resistance in South Africa (Berkeley, Ca.,
 1987).
 3) M Weber, Eliconorny and Society (English trans;. : Berkeley, 1978)
 PP.956-994.
 4) The Public Health Act, 1919, expanded the functions of the
 Public Health Dept.; the NAD was reorganised in 1923, and the Dept.
 of Labour was founded in 1924. The Dept. of Labour gradually
 acquired various duties from the old Dept. of Mines; and Industries
 (CAD, Dept. of Agriculture (L..DB) R3699). The Dept. of Social Welfare
 was established in the late? 1930s, initially as part of the Dept.
 of Labour, and then as a separate organisation.
 5) A Giddens, Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction (London,
 1932) p.35.
 6) JJN Cloete, I n 1 e i d i n g t o t d i e P u b 1 i e k e A d ni i n i s t r a s i e (Pretoria,
 1967).
 7) J Lewis, Industrialisation and Trade? Union Organisation in South
 Africa, 1924-55 (Cambridge, 1934) pp.111-131.
 &) SX Hanekon & C Thornhill, Public Administration in Contemporary
 Society: A South African Perspective (Bergvlei, 1983) pp.44-3. See
 also CAD, Native Affairs Dept. (NTS) 449/280 on "Efficiency of
 Nat i ve Labour".
 9) "The Guardian", 6/7/44.
 10) NTS 133/332, Brink to SNA 12/7/44.
 11) NTS 199/332, DNL to SNA 23/6/44.
Page 2
 12) NTS 138/332, DNL to SNA 19/5/41.
 13) NTS 138/332, Native Commissioner, Benoni to DNL 15/6/44.
 14) NTS 138/332, Daniel Koza to Messrs. Coal Cartage Contractors
 8/5/44.
 15) NTS 138/332, DNL to SNA 13/6/44.
 16) NTS 138/332, Koza to Messrs. Coal Cartage Contractors 8/5/44;
 DNL to SNA 12/6/44.
 17) NTS 138/332, NC Benoni to DNL 5/6/44.
 18) NTS 138/332, INL Randfontsin to NC Krugersdorp 9/6/44.
 19) NTS 138/332, DNL to NC Krugersdorp 15/6/44.
 20) NTS 138/332, DNL'iB rough notes on strike 6/6/44.
 21) NTS 138/332, DNL'15 rough notes on strike 6/6/44.
 22) NTS 138/332, DNL'15 rough notes on strike 6/6/44.
 23) "The Star" 17/7/44.
 24) NTS 138/332, Notes on deputation's meeting with Secretary for
 Labour 6/6/41.
 25) "Natal Witness", 29/6/44.
 26) Govt. Notice No.1222, 21/7/44.
 27) "The Star" 24/6/44; "The Guardian" 6/7/44.
 28) "Daily Mail" 28/6/44.
 29) NC Germiston/Boksburg to DNL 5/6/44.
 30) "The Guardian" 26/6/44.
 31) The labour areas were reorganised by the Public Services
 Commission in 1923. Transvaal Archives Depot (TAB), Pretoria) GNLB
 291/18/78.
 32) ARB CF2/0, F2/0.
 33) HJ & RE Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950
 ( Harmondsuior t h , 1969 ) P. 328.
 34) IM Phillips, "The 'Civilised Labour Policy' and the Private
Page 3
 Sector: the Operation of the South African Wage Act, 1925-37"
 (Rhodes University Ph.D., 1984).
 35) Simons & Simons, Class and Colour, p.556-8.
 36) NTS 199/332, NAD Memo 23/9/44; Minister of Native Affairs
 22/9/44.
 37) NTS 199/332, Notes on milling employers' deputation to Minister
 of Native Affairs 26/9/44.
 38) For example, Det/Bgnt Boy, Report on TAMWU meeting 29/7/44 in
 NTS 199/332.
 39) ARE LCI052/282, Chief Clerk "C" Division to Secretary for
 Labour 13/12/41.
 40) ARB LC1052/282, Minutes of 1st meeting of Conciliation Board
 20/4/42.
 41) ARB LC1052/282, Minutes of 3rd meeting of Conciliation Board
 22/4/42.
 42) ARB LC1052/282, Chief Clerk "C" Division to Secretary for
 Labour 5/5/42.
 43) ARB I..C1052/282, Secretary, African Flour Milling Workers'
 Union, Natal, to Minister of Labour 3/12/42.
 44) ARB LC1052/282, Private Secretary to Minister of Labour to
 Secretary, African Flour Milling Workers Union, Natal 8/12/42.
 43) ARB LC1052/409, Divisional Inspector, Johannesburg to Eiecretary
 f CD r Lab o u r 3 / 7 / 4 4.
 46) ARB LC1032/409, handwritten note of 6/7/44 on letter of TAMWU
 to Secretary for Labour 4/7/44.
 47) ARB LC1052/409, Secretary, NMWIU to Secretary for Labour
 5/8/44.
 48) ARB LC1052/409, Secretary, NMWIU to F)otgeiter, Dept. of Labour
 18/7/44; Secretary for Labour to Secretary, NMWIU 21/7/44.
 49) ARB LC1052/409, Secretary for Labour to Secretary, NMWIU
 4/8/44.
 30) ARB LC1052/409, ESecretsry, TAMWU to Chief Divisional Inspector,
 Jo h annes bur g 15/6/44.
 51) ARB LC1052/232, Secretary, NMWIU, to Divisional Inspector,
Page 4
 J o h a n n e? s b u r g (n o date-?),
 152) ARE LC1052/409, Secretary, South African Maize Millers'
 Association, Transvaal Flour Millers' Association to Secretary,
 African Milling Workers Union 29/6/44.
 53) ARE LC1052/282, Secretary, NMWIU to Divisional Inspector,
 Johannesburg (no Daite).
 54) ARE LC1052/409, Pretoria milling companies to Minister of
 Labour 4/7/44.
 53) ARE LCI052/409, Minutes of 1st meeting of Conciliation Board
 14/8/44 5 memorandum by Charles Fr^^er, Arbitrator, re. award in
 mi 11 i ng j. ndustry 23/ 12/44.
 56) ARE LC1052/409, Secretary for Labour to Secretary, TAMWU
 27/6/4; Divisional Inspector, Pretoria to Secretary for Labour
 1/8/44.
 57) ARE LC1052/409, Secretary for Labour to Divisional Inspector,
 Johannesburg 11/7/44.
 5?!) ARE LC1052/409, Divisional Inspector, Johanne?sburg to Secretary
 for Labour 25/7/44; Secretary for Labour to Secretary, NMWIU
 4/8/44.
 59) NTS 199/332, DNL to SNA IB/7/44.
 60) NTS 199/332, Secretary, TAMWU to milling companies 14/6/44.
 61) NTS 199/332, Divisional Inspector, Johannesburg to Secretary,
 TAMWU 26/7/44.
 62) ARE LC1052/409, Minutes of 1st meeting of Conciliation Board
 14/8/44; TAMWU statement for Conciliation Board (no date).
 63) ARE LCI052/409, Notes on milling industry dispute 25/10/44.
 64) ARE LC1052/409, Secretary, NMWIU to Divisional Inspector,
 Johannesburg 21 /E>/44.
 65) ARE LCI052/409, Divisional Inspector, Johannesburg to Secretary
 for Labour 12/9/44.
 66) "The Star" 11/9/44; "Rand Daily Mail" 13/9/44.
 67) "The Star" 15/9/44; NTS 199/332, unsigned NAD memo 23/9/44.
 68) "Rand Daily Mail" 12/9/44; "The Star" 14/9/44.
 69) "The Star" 14/9/44.
Page 5
 70) "Rand Daily Mail" 12/9/44; NTS 199/332, NC Krugersdorp to DNL
 18/9/44.
 71) "Rand Daily Mail" 13/9//44.
 72) "The Star" 12/6/44.
 73) NTS 199/332, SAP District Commandant, Johannesburg, to Deputy
 Commissioner, Witwatersrand Division 21/9/44.
 74) "Rand Daily Mail" 18/9/44.
 75) "Die Vaderland" 13/9/44, 15/9/44.
 76) "Forum" 23/9/44.
 77) NTS 199/332, DNL to SNA 2(3/9/44.
 78) "Rand Dai1y Ma i1" 20/9/44.
 79) NTS 199/332, Minutes of milling employers' deputation to
 Minister of Native Affairs 26/9/44, p.l.
 E!0) ARE LCI052/409, Chief Clerk "C" Division to Under Secretary for
 Labour 26/9/44.
 81) ARB LC1Q52/409, Divisional Inspector, Johannesburg to Secretary
 for Labour 12/9/44.
 82) NTS 199/332) Minutes of milling employers' deputation to
 Minister of Native Affairs 26/9/44, p.3.
 83) NTS 585/313 pt.2P, Prime Minister to Minister of Native Affairs
 8/8/41.
 84) ARB LC1052/409, Chief Clerk "C" Division to Under Secretary for
 Labour 26/9/44.
 85) ARB LC1052/409, Chief Clerk "C" Division to Secretary for
 Labour 2/1/45.
 36) NTS 199/332, DNL to SNA 25/10/44.
 87) TD Moodie, "The-; South African State? and Industrial Conflict in
 the 1940s", International Journal of African Historical Studies, 21
 no.l (1988): pp.21-61.