

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Until the 1990s, studies of post-conflict situations concentrated mainly on the conventional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. Analysis was based on the reintegration of ex-combatants (variously known as ex-fighters or war veterans) into productive civilian livelihoods. However, in this thesis the emergent and broader disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of troops, repatriation and resettlement of ex-combatants, refugees and/or internally displaced people (DDRRR) will be applied. DDRRR is concerned with disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This makes this project an interdisciplinary and integrating one that explores the nexus between “DDR” of former combatants and “RR” of refugees in DDRRR.

The countries studied -Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa- experienced the repatriation and/or resettlement of refugees and/or internally displaced persons in addition to the DDR process. In Namibia and South Africa, sections of liberation fighters repatriated under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) programmes. This was in pursuit of creating sustainable, secure and peaceful post-conflict frameworks. In the three cases, DDRRR was conducted as part of processes of transition from colonialism or apartheid to independence or democracy following

negotiated settlements. The specific nature of these three countries' DDRRR programmes and the different contexts in which they were implemented influenced their impact on post-conflict peace building.

The United Nations (UN) was deliberately excluded from playing a pivotal role in Zimbabwe's independence process. Britain, the former colonial power, desired to exclusively control and influence a short transitional period that would not include a burdensome post-conflict peace building role.¹ Following the Lancaster House Agreement on Rhodesia of 21 December 1979, a British-led Commonwealth team played a central role in Zimbabwe's post-liberation struggle cease-fire monitoring, separation and containment of the hostile forces, initial troop integration and subsequent transition to independence. Zimbabwe's post independence disarmament and military integration of the three former warring parties, namely the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) into a unified, professional national army was conducted by a Joint High Command (JHC), comprising representatives of all the three armies, with the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) playing an advisory role. The integration process resulted in a new army of about 70 000 forces against an initial projected target of 30 000.

¹ See S.E. Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), pp.67-68; J. Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, (New York, United Nations, 1995), p.2

The government made a policy decision to plan and implement demobilization of the over-manned army. The establishment of a Demobilization Directorate under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare demonstrated that the new regime's attention was caught in the nexus of maintaining some residual capacity within ZANLA but at the same time undertaking the integration of a new army amidst national demobilization. The difficulty was how to practically implement this complex process at a time when the security of the new state was under threat. The security concerns derived, among others, from a lack of confidence in the new integrating army and the real possibility of a post-independence Western-backed military coup, not to mention the apartheid dimension. Institutional gaps combined with unfavorable post-independence economic, social, political and military frameworks resulted in ineffective DDR. The DDR process disintegrated and this translated to an absence of a dedicated reintegration policy by the government ending in a profound impact on the independent state's economic, social and political configuration.²

As explained earlier, in 1980 focus was on DDR and was substantially different from the broader DDRRR concept. Notwithstanding this, in the aftermath of the armed liberation conflict, Zimbabwean refugees (variously known as returnees or repatriates depending on who was referring to the same) were also repatriated under the auspices of the UNHCR and internally displaced people resettled. The process of repatriation was initially restricted by Rhodesians -with the acquiescence of the British Governor who had placed

² G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, "Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe's Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.1

monitors on the borders with Zambia and Mozambique- who perceived it as tipping the vote in favour of the liberation movements. It was crucial that the refugees, the majority who were under liberation party political control, return in time to participate in the 1980 independence elections -hence the restrictions by the still effective Rhodesian security machinery under General Walls.

Namibia experienced United Nations managed DDRRR. This resonated with the UN's increasing peace operations' presence in African states, in the post Cold War international security system.³ In 1989-1990, Namibia was host to the multidimensional UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) that supervised the country's transition to independence. UNTAG was directly involved and supervised the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of South African Defence Force' (SADF) and South West Africa People's Organization' troops as well as the repatriation and return of Namibian refugees⁴ and some unarmed PLAN fighters. It provided the political, military and technical support for these programmes. The UN's central role meant that Namibia's DDRRR had a significant international component and it was carried out under international auspices.

UNTAG's exact mandate expired after it had successfully carried out its task of supervising Namibia's elections. The independent Namibian government established a

³ A. Malaquias, 'Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?' in *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2002, vol. 55, no.2, p.415. The UN has carried out peace operations in 11 African countries after the Cold War ended: Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Western Sahara.

⁴ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, (New York, United Nations Department of Information), pp.209-210

new and professional military force comprising the former opponents - the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO's military wing and South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). This was carried out with BMATT's assistance. The government also had to implement the long-term reintegration of the demobilized combatants and returnees. However, the reintegration programme that the government initially formulated was incomprehensive and ineffective. The thesis will explore why Namibia's exercise failed to take into account lessons learnt from the Zimbabwean experience in DDRRR and whether this reflected historical shifts or specific needs of Namibia.

In South Africa the institutional framework for the DDRRR process was provided by the state. DDRRR was internally originated, locally-owned and state-managed. Demobilization and reintegration was closely linked to the establishment of the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The formation of the SANDF followed intricate negotiations between the two main stakeholders, namely, the African National Congress's (ANC) *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) and the National Party government's SADF. The Pan African Congress (PAC) delayed its involvement in these negotiations. During the negotiations "the National Party's approach, which was to 'ring-fence' defence from the political process as a guarantor of stability or viewed in another way, of entrenched interests"⁵ prevailed. A Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC), co-chaired by MK and SADF representatives, was set up to design the initial strategy for the complicated and sensitive merger of seven armed forces into a professional, efficient and

⁵ G. Cawthra, "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security': The Making of South Africa's Defence Policy,

representative South African National Defence Force (SANDF).⁶ The militarily intact and organizationally capable former SADF provided the framework and infrastructure for the integration process. BMATT was invited by the government to assist in the transformation of the national defence force according to international standards. Alongside the formation of the SANDF some MK and APLA ex-combatants were demobilized. At the time, prior to 1995, a comprehensive plan for demobilization and reintegration was absent. The UNHCR, eventually invited by the reluctant apartheid government, played an instrumental role in the return of South African refugees and sections of unarmed liberation fighters ahead of the 1994 multiparty elections. After the 1994 elections the government embarked on a drawn-out demobilization and reintegration programme.

1.2 Literature Review

Despite the significance of DDRRR in fostering post-conflict peace building no comprehensive, empirical and comparative study on Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa exists. This section will attempt to demonstrate the academic neglect of this important area of study, citing relevant literature according to context and period. Significant UN literature presents the theoretical framework of post-conflict peace building.⁷ In these works the post-conflict peace-building concept is generally interpreted

1990-99” *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, Vol 1 No. 1, 2000, p.54

⁶ I. Liebenberg and M. Roefs, *Demobilisation and its Aftermath II: Economic Reinsertion of South Africa’s Demobilised Military Personnel*, (Pretoria, ISS, 2001), p.45

⁷ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York, United Nations, 1992); Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935 (New York, United Nations, 1994); K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the*

as a process that facilitates the transition from conflict to durable peace and sustainable development in an environment of peaceful co-existence.⁸

In his Report⁹ Boutros-Boutros Ghali (then UN Secretary General) gave a pioneering definition of the concept as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Manifold peace consolidation structures including disarmament of former warring parties and restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation are identified.

Ghali clarified that peace building is not necessarily the final phase of multidimensional UN peace operations that also embrace preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace keeping.¹⁰ In order to achieve durable peace, post-conflict peace building should address the root cause of conflicts. The imperatives of an expeditious and effective demobilization and reintegration process are stressed.

Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998, and *Report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) -otherwise famously known as *The Brahimi Report*

⁸ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York, United Nations, 1992); Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935 (New York, United Nations, 1994); K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*”, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998

⁹ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*

¹⁰ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935

UN Secretary General Kofi Anan¹¹ developed his predecessor's interpretation. He elucidated that post-conflict peace building needed to be multi-faceted, integrated, well financed and coordinated to effectively address the causal factors of conflict. These dynamics determine post-conflict peace building's success towards the consolidation of peace and prevention of recurring armed conflict. This process, which is a counterpart of humanitarian and development action, is argued to have a palpable human security orientation. The concept of peace building is also promoted in the Brahimi Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 2000.¹² In addition to enhancing the effectiveness of peace missions through clear and realistic mandates the Report also emphasized peace building and post-conflict reconstruction in an attempt to secure durable post-conflict frameworks.

UN literature categorizes DDR of former combatants as a crucial continuum that is part of an entire peace process.¹³ Given the unique nature of conflicts, they demand the design of tailor-made peace operation doctrines. Whilst acknowledging the impossibility of creating a blueprint or generic DDR model the UN gives general guidelines that must be flexibly applied during its planning, management, implementation and monitoring. The UN lists crucial pre-requisites for developing successful integrated, comprehensive and coordinated DDR programmes including entrenchment of DDR programmes in preceding

¹¹ K Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998

¹² United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305 - S/2000/809

¹³ United Nations, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines*, (New York, UNDPKO, 2000), Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935 (New York, United Nations, 1994), K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998

peace agreements and overall national post-conflict recovery and reconstruction strategies: specification of key elements of DDR such as the timeframe and benchmarks of the process, mode of disposition of collected weapons and ammunition, implementing institutions in the peace agreements and the formerly conflicting parties' demonstration of strong political will to abide by and respect the DDR protocols.

Curiously the major limitation of the above UN literature lies in its main strength. That is, while it provides a standard and useful conceptual framework for the assessment of post-conflict peace building, at the same time its contribution is somewhat undermined by the reality that the contextually distinct practical and operational environment does not necessarily conform to the theoretical template. Substantial scholarly literature has critically interrogated the UN interpretation of the post-conflict peace building concept. This literature is examined below.

Henning Haugerrudbraaten¹⁴ critiques the proposition of a precise definition of the peace building concept. Haugerrudbraaten asserts that the concept is subject to different interpretations. He distinguished six dimensions that inform the divergent usage of the peace-building term: aim, means, time frame, actors, process and organization. Basing on actor(s) and timeframe characteristics, the writer puts forward two versions of peace building namely short-term involvement of the international community and long-term indigenously oriented peace building. Whilst the UN definition stresses the need for peace building to address the underlying causes of conflict it, however, proposes peace

¹⁴ H. Haugerrudbraaten, "Peacebuilding: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts", *African Security Review*,

consolidation measures that seemingly address symptoms of conflict but not focusing on fundamental dimensions. The writer critically warns that the broad or narrow application of the term affects its utility and clarity. Haugerrudbraaten's identification of flaws and reality exposes weaknesses in accepting the peace building notion as it was advanced by UN-sanctioned texts.

Next, Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar¹⁵ stress the primacy of political reform and institutional capacitating in post-conflict peace building. Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and El Salvador are cited as examples in an attempt to buttress the important argument that the success of peace building significantly relies upon "the construction or strengthening of authoritative and eventually legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence." The writers argued that peace building should be context-specific, embrace elaborate objectives and yardsticks for what should eventually be self-sustaining and self-enforcing peace programmes. These initiatives should promote democracy, justice and equity.

The World Bank, itself a major provider of technical and financial assistance to governments planning and implementing demobilization and reintegration processes has also produced landmark work on the subject. Although always with serious shortcomings, the World Bank does not believe, for instance, in funding soldiers before they are disarmed. However, when they are, the Bank tends to focus on reconstructing the

Vol. 7, No.6, 1998

¹⁵ E.M. Cousens and C. Kumar, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

productive sector to the detriment of the disarmed combatant who is now expected to survive on monthly allowances of about US\$50. It is not surprising that in past World Bank-assisted DDR programmes such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia it was more lucrative for ineffectively reintegrated demobilized soldiers to recidivate rather than operate under the World Bank programme.¹⁶ An important World Bank study¹⁷ gives practical guidelines and good practices that assist the design and implementation of effective demobilization and reintegration processes basing on country-case studies including Ethiopia, Namibia, Uganda, Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda. While not a blueprint for demobilization and reintegration, which is a country-specific process, the study usefully isolates certain key actions for successful demobilization and reintegration. These include political will on the part of the government; central coordination and decentralized implementation and classification of ex-combatants. Besides the obvious dangers of one-size-fits-all prescriptions, the template presented by this contribution is useful for evaluating demobilization and reintegration programmes.

Kees Kingma's article¹⁸ is one of the few that highlights the “distinct political and socio-economic contexts” of African countries experience of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and assessed the contribution of the process to post-conflict peace building. He argues that peace building is greatly aided by the creation or presence of

¹⁶ For instance in May 2002 Human Rights Watch reported that “Hundreds of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants are crossing into Liberia to fight as mercenaries. Liberian government troops and LURD rebel soldiers are crossing into Sierra Leone to loot or escape fighting, and, in a few cases, to abduct people for forced labor. Liberian army deserters are also to be found on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they could present an additional security threat.”

¹⁷ N.J. Colleta., M. Kostner and I. Wiedohofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (USA, The World Bank, 1996)

functional and legitimate political and institutional environments. This also guarantees compliance with the peace agreement if the parties demonstrate the crucial political will. Kingma argued the centrality of demobilization and reintegration in post-conflict peace building. Explaining the characteristics that make ex-combatants a special category for assistance, he advanced the need for balancing their support with that for wider community development to stem post-reintegration intra-state conflict. A generalized assessment of the differential impact of demobilization and reintegration on African countries post-war peace building programmes is included. The countries cursorily assessed are Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

A growing body of DDR literature highlights the importance of differentiating fighters according to the nature of armed formations they participated in as well as sex and age. Vanessa Farr's paper¹⁹ stresses the imperatives of devising and implementing "gender-aware demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration." This is in resonance with the UN's current call for mainstreaming gender in its system. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (point 13) on Women, Peace and Security stresses the need for the implementation of DDR processes that recognize the specific needs of the target population according to gender. Drawing on examples from Africa, Farr, points out that DDR should be gender sensitive in order to facilitate equal gender relations and positively contribute to peace building. She, however, points out that it is critical to consider the country-specific gender ideologies when implementing gender-conscious

¹⁸ K. Kingma, "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa" *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp.181-201

DDR. In a subsequent contribution²⁰ towards the operationalization of gender inclusion, Farr points out that, actors in peace negotiations and agreements should recognize the special needs of women and girls and explicitly involve them in the planning of the DDR process.

Post-conflict peace building has had inadvertent outcomes as a result of being perceived as a function of “liberal internationalism” that is located within democratic politics and liberal economies. This is especially the view of the international community. However, it has been argued, and we think correctly, that political and economic liberalization is not an automatic guarantee for durable peace.²¹ Instead, partly as a result of the inherent conflict “character of democracy and capitalism”, it may have a negative impact on war-torn post-conflict societies. Carefully selected cases in which the limitations of “liberal internationalism” manifested themselves resulting in continued conflict or relapse, within 10 years, include Rwanda, Angola, Bosnia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Paris suggests an alternative: “strategic liberalism” aimed at mitigating the devastating impact of “liberal internationalism” through the conduct of elections in a secure framework; civil society reconstruction; democratization; media control; growth oriented economic policies and flexible and extended timeframes.

The significance of disarmament and demobilization as part of post-war rehabilitation and development manifests itself in several areas. These include the perceived release of

¹⁹ V. Farr, *Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool*, (Bonn, BICC, 2000)

²⁰ V. Farr, “The importance of a gender perspective to successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes” *Disarmament Forum*, Issue 4, 2003, p.26

resources from the military sector for use in the productive sector in order to precipitate sustainable development; the checking of the political power of the military; enhancing security and human development.²² It is also true that successful demobilization and reintegration incorporates the need for an assessment of the beneficiaries, sensitization of all essential stakeholders, mobilization of resources and linkage of demobilization with reintegration- all through timely, elaborate and practical programmes.²³ Case studies of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique are used to demonstrate that whilst the potential for demobilization to contribute to peace building is certain there exists no blueprint for the process whose nature is also influenced by the particular character of the preceding conflict and its termination.²⁴

Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink's book²⁵ and J. Rogge²⁶ and B.S. Chimni's²⁷ articles consider repatriation and resettlement of refugees in their home or preferred alternative countries as a critical undertaking in a post-conflict setting. The process enables the self-determination of the returnees and has implications for participatory politics. Refugees comprise a distinct group with legal status. Technically, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are not refugees but they should be considered as such, as they need similar

²¹ R. Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism" *International Security*, Summer 1997, Vol. 22, No 1, pp.54-89

²² K. Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), pp.23-24

²³ K. Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, p.17

²⁴ K. Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*

²⁵ T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., 'Introduction': *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994)

²⁶ J. Rogge, "Repatriation of Refugees A not so simple 'optimum' solution", in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994)

²⁷ B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 163-180

assistance.²⁸ The UNHCR, which has a clear mandate to provide assistance to refugees (and other IDPs), should act in synergy with appropriate United Nations aid agencies and NGOs in order to enable design and implementation of consolidated and durable solutions. Planned, coordinated and assisted repatriation is the desirable solution to refugee situations compared to spontaneous or self-repatriation.²⁹ The success of repatriation and resettlement -like DDR- depends on the treatment of the intended beneficiaries as a differentiated mass with specific aspirations, needs and capacities.³⁰ In addition, pre-conditions for sustainable return should be created when the UNHCR is crippled by human and material resources limitations.

Having looked at some of the international studies on DDRRR it then becomes pertinent to review academic accounts on the three countries that are the subject of this study. Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa's DDRRR experiences are amongst the most studied. In the case of Zimbabwe's DDR, Norma Krieger's book³¹ is the most comprehensive contribution on Zimbabwe's military veterans focusing on their identity. The book traces the recent centrality of ex-fighters in the country's political framework to the immediate post-independence era. In it, she argues that the relationship between the ruling ZANU PF and the war veterans has consistently been characterized by "power seeking agendas, their appeals to the revolutionary liberation, their use of violence and

²⁸ J. Rogge, "Repatriation of Refugees A not so simple 'optimum' solution", in T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994)

²⁹ T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *Introduction: When Refugees Go Home*, (Trenton, Africa World Press, 1994); B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, p164

³⁰ T. Allen and H. Morsink, eds., *Introduction: When Refugees Go Home*; B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective' p.164

³¹ N. Krieger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*,

intimidation” and their “simultaneous conflict and collaboration as party and veterans manipulate one another.”³²

This resonates with the earlier version that also provides background information on the troubled socio-economic status of Zimbabwe war veterans trying to survive in a stagnant economy.³³ In her work, Norma Krieger highlights, among other things, the controversy that surrounded the country’s hero-making process, in the absence of a clearly defined hero selection criteria, the disparity between welfare benefits awarded to National Heroes and the lesser important heroes, and more pertinently the abject poverty of living ex-combatants or the “Forgotten Heroes.”³⁴ She applauds the formation of the War Veterans Association (WVA), “an organisation that believes that, ex-combatants have special interests and are entitled to rewards and compensation from the government and will ensure that they will be a persistent voice...”³⁵ in the background of contradicting official statements on whether to accord ex-combatants preferential treatment in the socio-economic sphere.

Richard Werbner, further developed Krieger’s theme of the problematic classification of Heroes and the related compensation policy in his contribution.³⁶ In this, he emphasizes

(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003)

³² N. Krieger, *Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.208

³³ N. J. Kriger, “The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity” in Bhebe N and T Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications,1995), p.156

³⁴ N. J. Kriger, “The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity”, p.156

³⁵ N. J. Kriger, “The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity”, p.162

³⁶ R. Werbner, “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in

the elitist nature of Zimbabwe's hero creation and rewarding policy that therefore excludes the foot soldiers.³⁷ More significantly, he portrays the living ordinary guerrillas' demands for compensation as caused, to some extent, by the government's divisive compensation policy.³⁸ Werbner depicts the 1997 war veterans' demonstrations as driven by the "common veterans" quest for significant tribute from a distributive post-colonial state which, however, apparently lacked the requisite resources after a decade of economic structural adjustment and he argues that the Government's "War-Veterans Benefits' Scheme" has since exacerbated Zimbabwe's economic ills.³⁹

Muchaparara Musemwa's piece⁴⁰ focuses on the demobilization and social reintegration programmes implemented by the Zimbabwe Government. Musemwa dwells on the inadequacies of the "impetuously designed" demobilisation and civil reintegration programme and the resultant suffering of many ex-combatants.⁴¹ He highlights the unenviable position of some female ex-combatants who faced serious reintegration constraints due to society's general perception of female ex-combatants as being of

Zimbabwe," in Werbner R, ed., *Memory and the post colony: African anthropology and the critique of power*, (London, Zed Books, 1998)

³⁷ R. Werbner, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe," in Werbner R, ed., *Memory and the post colony: African anthropology and the critique of power*, (London, Zed Books, 1998), p.78

³⁸ R. Werbner, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe", p.81

³⁹ R. Werbner, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Post wars of the Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe", pp.81-82

⁴⁰ M. Musemwa, "The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993", in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995)

⁴¹ M. Musemwa, "The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993", in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.46

wayward morals.⁴² Musemwa documents the establishment of the WVA, by war veterans due to “The general lack of concern for their welfare by the Government,” whose fearless articulation of the war veterans’ plight and grievances went unheeded by an insensitive Government.⁴³

Zimbabwe Women Writers⁴⁴ published a useful collection of personal interviews with women ex-combatants and a collaborator. Teresa A Barnes’ article⁴⁵ is also based on interviews which she carried out with liberation war veterans in an effort to safeguard from oblivion the experiences of “ordinary soldiers.” While no analysis of the interview output is made these contributions do furnish us with an insight into the experiences, aspiration and expectations of female war veterans at independence through guerrilla life-stories.

Cedric Thornberry’s book⁴⁶ provides a comprehensive insider account of UNTAG. While giving a useful contextual background through the conclusion of UNTAG, Thornberry, who was Chief Aide to the SRSG, isolates novel explanations for the eventual assured success of the multi-dimensional peace operation. Unsurprisingly, he also offers an

⁴² M. Musemwa, “The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993”, in J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995), p.46

⁴³ M. Musemwa, “The Ambiguities of Democracy: The Demobilisation of Zimbabwean Ex-Combatants and The Ordeal of Rehabilitation, 1980-1993”, p.46 and p.51

⁴⁴ Zimbabwe Women Writers, *Women of Resilience: The Voices of Women Combatants*, (Harare, Zimbabwe Women Writers, 2000)

⁴⁵ T.A. Barnes, “The Heroes' Struggle: Life After the Liberation War for Four Ex-Combatants in Zimbabwe” in Bhebe N and T Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), p.118

⁴⁶ C. Thornberry, *A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia's Independence*” (Windhoek, Gamsberg

alternative viewpoint in defence of UNTAG's well documented inauspicious start on 1 April 1989. Citing Namibia's long northern border area, failure by parties to observe the ceasefire and UNTAG being a peacekeeping and not peace enforcement operation, Thornberry posits that "at the time it would have been impossible for UNTAG to have stopped the SWAPO advance by military means, for reasons both operational and political" and "what the UN did in order to contain and resolve the situation was necessary."⁴⁷

Ben Mwarania's *Kenya Battalion in Namibia*⁴⁸ is a balanced theoretical and practical handbook written by a participant in the implementation of Namibia's settlement plan. The book describes the contribution of a participant nation by drawing on the wider UNTAG picture. It lays out the role of Kenya Battalion (Kenbatt) of which the author was a member in the supervision of the "birth of a new member nation." Mwarania gives a useful narration of the Settlement Plan and the UN Peace Plan's Programme, which constitutes an important template for evaluating UNTAG's ultimate performance. The author raises crucial and often ignored points on the complications inherent in a peacekeeping environment. Kenbatt had to cope with the residual racism amongst the majority of white Namibians who resented black UNTAG personnel. This explains the labeling of black peacekeepers as "partners of the terrorist" (South West Africa People's Organization) SWAPO. The book eulogizes UNTAG in general and glorifies Kenbatt's presence and participation that reportedly earned it "respect" in Namibia.

Macmillan Publishers, 2004)

⁴⁷C. Thornberry, *A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia's Independence* (Windhoek, Gamsberg Macmillan Publishers, 2004), p.140

⁴⁸ B. Mwarania, *Kenya Battalion in Namibia*, (Nakuru, Media Document Supplies, 1999)

Lionel. Cliffe *et. al*⁴⁹ meticulously project the UN managed transition of Namibia to independence from apartheid South Africa's colonial rule. They give useful background material to the internationalization of the Namibian question. The reasons for the delay in implementing the UN Plan for Namibia are explained. In addition to South Africa's obduracy the Contact Group was not prepared to countenance the transfer of power to a SWAPO government. Similar attention is given to the false start of UNTAG's activities in Namibia on 1 April 1989. It is made apparent that the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) combatants who entered Namibia on the fateful day did not harbour military goals.

Notable scholarly works also exist on the demobilization and reintegration of South Africa's fighters. There are none on South Africa's repatriation operation. The common focus of the literature on South Africa's DDR is the unsuccessful reintegration of the ex-fighters into civilian life. Lephophotho Mashike and Mafole Mokalobe's paper⁵⁰ uses country-wide interviews with 410 former combatants to detail how specific categories of the ex-combatants reintegrated. Sasha Gear⁵¹ uses interviews with former combatants to confirm the reintegration problems they encounter(ed) against their marginalization by the state and the wider community. Ian Liebenberg and Marlene Roefs's⁵² survey of 307

⁴⁹ L. Cliffe *et. al* , *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*, (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 1994)

⁵⁰ L. Mashike and M. Mokalobe, *Reintegration into Civilian Life: The case of former MK and APLA combatants*, TRACK TWO, Vol 12 No 1, 2004

⁵¹ S. Gear, *Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-combatants in the New South Africa*, Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 8, 2002

⁵² I. Liebenberg and M. Roefs, *Demobilisation and its Aftermath II: Economic Reinsertion of South Africa's Demobilised Military Personnel*, ISS Monograph Series No. 61, 2001

former soldiers produced similar conclusions on demobilization and reintegration problems mainly that of unemployment. In their background of a survey of a random sample of 2 000 potential retrenchees meant to better inform future reintegration processes Garth Shelton, *et al*, also conclude that the majority of South Africa's ex-fighters are unemployed and experience difficulties. Jacklyn Cock's survey of 180 mainly ex-NSF informants lists the impeding factors to effective and sustainable reintegration. These including lack of education, skills and work experience.⁵³ The above works list poor planning and problematic execution as some of the counterpart factors that explain South Africa's ineffective DDR strategies. These in-depth interview-based contributions are usefully fed on by this research relating to the ex-fighters perspectives on their unsuccessful reintegration.

This thesis will add to the existing body of literature on DDRRR and the emerging peace building concept by drawing common new principles and guidelines from the conceptual, institutional, political and socioeconomic frameworks under which DDRRR occurred in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. While there are significant individual studies of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia's DDRRR there has been no substantive comparative study of these three. Also, existing studies do not comprehensively demonstrate how specific dynamics of the armed conflict, conflict terminating peace agreements and the conceptual, political, socio-economic and institutional frameworks impacted DDRRR. The use of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, as case studies will illustrate how the strengths and limitations of specific institutional frameworks impacts

⁵³ J. Cock, *Towards A Common Society: The Integration of Soldiers and Armies in A Future South Africa*,

on the formulation and implementation of the DDRRR process. It would also demonstrate who was involved and who was excluded in the formulation and implementation of the DDRRR strategies and to what effect? The thesis will also tackle the impacts of the DDRRR process in relation to peace building.

1.3 Relevance of the study

This thesis is a study on isolating and documenting the comparative DDRRR country experiences of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Successful DDRRR is a sine qua non for long-term peace and stability. The majority of new post-conflict states in southern Africa have faltered within a decade on the anvil of unsuccessful DDRRR initiatives. The three countries under review have been chosen because they provide valuable insights into how specific conflict spectrums, negotiated settlements, conceptual, political, socio-economic and institutional frameworks influence post-conflict DDRRR processes and outcomes.

Substantial literature on the DDR experiences of African countries including Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe exist.⁵⁴ Similarly, scholarly studies of refugees and internally displaced persons in post-

(Unpublished, Johannesburg, March, 1993)

⁵⁴ Notable works include: J. Cilliers, ed., *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, (Half Way, IDP, 1995); N.J. Colleta., M. Kostner and I Wiedohofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (USA, The World Bank, 1996); K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000); K. Kingma., “Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa”, pp181-201, in *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2; I. Liebenberg and M. Roefs,

conflict settings have been published.⁵⁵ Notwithstanding this, however, these DDR studies have tended to dwell on the definition, strengths, weaknesses and experiences of the process in several African countries. This study looks at and systematizes the critical connection between DDR and repatriation and resettlement of refugees given that both processes deal with classes (ex-combatants, refugees and IDPs) that need to be reintegrated to promote post-conflict peace building.

It is commonly agreed that ex-combatants are a special target group for preferential reintegration assistance. The World Bank pointed out that survey data for DDR cases “suggest many former combatants lack basic education, marketable job skills, and for some, the social skills needed for successful economic and social integration.”⁵⁶ Nicole Ball put it succinctly: “The typical (war) veteran is semiliterate at best, is unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land, and frequently has many dependents.”⁵⁷ The ex-combatants’ need for support is undeniable. They require humanitarian assistance considering their immediate post war unemployed status and that they lost time and opportunities while fighting to liberate their countries and improve the prospects of their kith and kin.⁵⁸ The livelihood, security and status of the ex-combatants prior to conflict termination would have depended on their military capabilities, military

Demobilisation and its Aftermath II: Economic Reinsertion of South Africa’s Demobilised Military Personnel, (Pretoria, ISS, 2001)

⁵⁵ T. Allen and H. Morsink, (eds), *When Refugees Go Home: African Experiences*, (London, James Currey, 1994). B.S. Chimni, ‘Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective’, *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, pp.163-180

⁵⁶ Quoted in M. Ejigu and T. Gedamu, *Conversion in Africa: Past Experiences and Future Outlook*, (Bonn, BICC, 1996), p.17

⁵⁷ N. Ball, ‘Demobilizing and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa’, K. Kumar, ed., *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p.86

⁵⁸ K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*,

supplies and possession of weapons. This makes it easier for ex-combatants to identify with their military past and difficult to connect with uncertain civilian livelihoods necessitating the need for reintegration assistance. In addition, planned reintegration of ex-combatants can facilitate the developmental use of their skills whilst addressing the potential security threat posed by frustrated ex-combatants.⁵⁹ The planned reintegration programme should, however, revolve around realistic and achievable targets. This prevents the emergence of a crisis of expectations among ex-combatants that could engender conflict between disenchanted beneficiaries and the government and broader society.

As has been illustrated in many African countries such as the three select cases of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia; Angola and Mozambique unsuccessfully reintegrated ex-combatants and the war veterans have been a source of post-conflict instability. While their destabilization effect might not have been immediate, unemployed and disillusioned ex-fighters eventually mobilized around the war veteran identity and articulated for state recompense for their wartime roles and sacrifices.⁶⁰ Disruptive protests against their governments have been their strategy of choice.

Despite the above, post-assistance conflict assistance should also embrace other war affected and vulnerable communities. These include refugees and other persons displaced by conflict. Just like former combatants, repatriates and formerly displaced people need

(Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.226

⁵⁹ K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, p.226

⁶⁰ See for example J. McMullin, "Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-643; R. Preston, *The Integration of Returned Exiles, Former Combatants and Other War-Affected Namibians*, (Windhoek,

to reintegrate into post-conflict communities. This reintegration typically involves the elimination of physical, social, psychological and material insecurities previously occasioned by armed conflict.⁶¹ The reintegration of ex-combatants intersects with that of the repatriates and IDPs. Loren Landau pointed that:

Clearly they are two parallel processes. Obviously different groups are going to have special needs. Someone who has been involved in fighting is obviously going to need to be retrained and there is a compelling reason to make sure they have economic activities that do not involve violence so that they do not return, whereas the sort of processes to reintegrate refugees may be different. They may actually be better educated as they got education in exile. Their issue may be access to land or reclaiming goods or reintegrating them in different ways. It is critical that these people (ex-combatants and returnees) be considered together. In most cases this is not happening. In most cases there are enough problems just finding space for refugees.⁶²

Kees Kingma notes that failure to balance between targeted support for ex-combatants and support for other war affected groups could cause discontent among the latter thereby derailing reintegration of the former.⁶³ No systemic study focuses on the links between DDR and the repatriation and resettlement of refugees in post-conflict Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It is against this background that this study focuses on the broader DDRRR that embraces the significant ex-combatant constituency and the wider war-affected communities such as refugees and IDPs.

NISER, 1993)

⁶¹ B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, p.168

⁶² Interview with Loren B. Landau, Director and Research Coordinator, Forced Migration Studies Programme University of the Witwatersrand, 14 March 2005, Johannesburg

⁶³ K. Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.225

This study also focuses on how DDRRR in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa was inextricably tied to the nature of the preceding armed conflict, conflict terminating peace agreements and the succeeding military, political and socio-economical and institutional framework. Peace agreements may significantly dictate the nature, design and/or timeframes, as well as conduct of the DDRRR. A comparative analysis of the country-specific British/Commonwealth, UN and internal/state-led peace negotiations and DDRRR processes will enable judgment of the extent to which the select cases adhere to this pattern. The post-conflict governments faced the challenge of carrying out DDRRR as part of the broader process of restarting and normalizing the military, political and socio-economical contexts.

In all the three cases, DDRRR was implemented under immense international scrutiny. Britain and the Commonwealth were actively involved, while South Africa had significant interests in Zimbabwe's process that took place during the Cold War. Namibia's DDRRR was largely carried out by the UN/international community at the end of the Cold War. National authorities largely led the implementation of the process in South Africa as part of the transition to democracy. Notwithstanding this novelty, South Africa's DDRRR was implemented against a background of converging international interests for its success in the post Cold War era. The UNHCR, the international agency mandated to deal with refugees issues, was involved in all three countries' repatriation processes. British military advisers also participated, in different forms, in all three.

Successful DDRRR fosters a stable and secure framework in which the concomitant peace building activities are expected to thrive. DDRRR is universally recognized as having significant effects on the broader post-conflict peace building efforts. The UN and some analysts argue that while there is no blueprint for DDRRR, there is a reciprocal relationship between the process and wider post-conflict peace building and reconstruction.⁶⁴

The three country studies present useful test cases for DDRRR's contribution to peace building. Few authors specifically investigate and evaluate the impact of DDRRR on the wider peace building process.⁶⁵ Ineffective DDR may lead to relapse of war, upsurge in armed criminality or other post-war destabilization. The timely repatriation and resettlement of refugees enfranchises them and enables them to participate in significant multi-party elections that usually follow conflict termination. This lends greater credibility and legitimacy to the post-conflict democratization process.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York, United Nations, 1992); Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*, Report of the Secretary General, A/48/935 (New York, United Nations, 1994); K. Anan, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, (UNS/1998/318), 13 April 1998, K. Kingma, ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p.25. K. Kingma, "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp181-182; Paris R, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", *International Security*, Summer 1997, Vol. 22, No 1, pp.54-89, UN. (2000). *Report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. (The Brahimi Report).

⁶⁵ K Kingma., ed., *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and the Security Impacts*, (Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000); K. Kingma., "Demobilization, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa", *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp181-201 present few useful works that highlight the military, political and socio-economical distinct contexts of African countries' experience of DDR and highlight the importance of assessing the impact of DDR on post-war peace-building programmes.

⁶⁶ B.S. Chimni, 'Refugees and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Critical Perspective', *International Peacekeeping*, Summer 2002, vol. 9, no. 2, p.163

By addressing the needs of ex-combatants and uprooted peoples, DDRRR reduces human vulnerabilities making it compliant with the broader human security debate that stresses the security of the individual. Human security aims “to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term fulfillment.”⁶⁷ It embraces the individual’s safety from chronic threats (such as hunger, disease and repression) and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.⁶⁸ It is the incidence of some of these indicators among the ex-fighter and returnee population that shows the effects of DDRRR.

The success of the related peace building activities augurs well for successful DDRRR in the long term. This thesis assesses how the effectiveness or failure of DDRRR impacted post-conflict peace, security and sustainable development in the three countries.

1.4 Thesis Focus

The preceding paragraphs highlighted the significance of DDRRR. This thesis will examine comparatively how the nature of the preceding armed conflict, conflict terminating peace agreement and the conceptual, institutional, political, social and economic frameworks impacted on post-conflict DDRRR processes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It specifically:

⁶⁷ S. Alkire, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, CRISE Working Paper 2, (Oxford, CRISE, 2001), p.2

⁶⁸ UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, (New York, UNDP, 1994)

- Analyzes and evaluates the DDRRR experiences of post-conflict Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa
- Measures the success of DDRRR against its goals and the effects on post-war national stability and the wider peace-building process, in a historical context
- Draws parallels among these contextually different case studies and discuss the implications of the differences
- Assesses the influence of the international context and involvement by external actors on the outcome of DDRRR
- Identifies which of former colonial power, UN or national authorities provided a better institutional framework for DDRRR?
- Examines the implications, if any, for future DDRRR programmes in African countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, as each DDRRR process takes place in a unique setting the thesis would draw some conclusions, food for thought or practical policy recommendations for enhancing future DDRRR efforts

In the above pursuit the study was guided by the following research questions:

- Who should undertake DDRRR processes?
- What roles did the international actors play in the three countries' DDRRR processes and with what effects?
- What DDRRR programmes and strategies were designed and implemented by the respective governments, UK/Commonwealth or UN and their implementing partners?

- What were the objectives of these programmes and how accurately did they reflect the local framework and challenges?
- How effective and sustainable were these DDRRR initiatives and did they have a constructive impact on the broader peace building process?
- In what political, economic and social contexts was DDRRR implemented in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa?
- What lessons can be drawn from the comparative assessment of these contextualized DDRRR programmes?
- What are the implications for future DDRRR activity?

1.5 Methodology

This study is based on desk research, interviews with key informants, internet searches and seminar/workshop participation and also enjoys the historical advantage of distance. Southern Africa's wars of liberation ended in 1991 with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). A review and analysis of the relevant existing literature and available data on DDRRR and post conflict peace building was carried out. Primary source materials including archival documents, policy documents, UN Reports, regional organizations' reports, NGO reports, War Veteran Associations' documents, project implementation reports and media articles were scrutinized. Where appropriate the stated aims, monitoring mechanisms and reports or evaluations on the DDRRR programmes constituted crucial benchmarks for appraising the programmes' impact. Given that DDRRR in the three countries was carried out some time ago and the mobility of UN and

other international agency implementing personnel - making it impossible to interview these during in-country fieldwork- the reports, evaluations and communiqués were particularly useful.

In pursuit of the research objectives as well as to facilitate recording of empirical information on the three countries' DDRRR programmes, in-depth interviews and discussions with key resource persons and stakeholders were conducted in the select countries. The major target groups were:

- Government officials, politicians, serving and former security officers who were/have been directly involved in policy making and implementation
- Academics and experts who offered an analytical viewpoint of the DDRRR processes
- The leadership of war veterans' welfare organizations who also worked with the grassroots-ex-fighters and were in a position to offer a representative and common opinion on DDR

These groups were carefully selected for their capacity to provide answers to the investigation of the conceptual, institutional and implementation contexts of DDRRR as well as its impacts in the three countries. Some of these respondents also gave some readings and documents that were appropriate for the research problem.

In addition to the three main categories of respondents the most useful range of ex-fighters and returnees were selected. Focus group and individual interviews with ex-combatants and returnees based on the snow-ball approach also enabled evaluation of the

impact of DDRRR and subsequent attempts by the concerned governments to redress deficits. National and international NGO representatives concerned with DDRRR were also interviewed. A total of 60 interviews were conducted; 28 in Zimbabwe, 23 in South Africa and 19 in Namibia.

Searches of relevant web sites including those of the United Nations, UNHCR, Bonn International Center for Conversion and Institute for Security Studies constituted a key data gathering method. UN documents and files were particularly useful as it was impossible to interview UNTAG personnel who had long left Namibia by the time in-country fieldwork was done.

Appropriate Conferences, Seminars and Workshops with professionals and academics were attended in each of the countries. These forums were held by the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), University of Zimbabwe, Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR) and Centre for Defence and Security Management Network (CDSM), both at Wits University, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and Africa Institute South Africa (AISA). Preliminary research findings were presented and discussed at some of these forums. The inaugural South Africa Military Veterans Symposium was also attended in pursuit of maximizing the interview output.

The historical approach method was used. The study involves the historical accounts of the three countries' DDRRR in order to assess the visible and significant ramifications.

This also made it possible to circumvent the danger of getting stuck with analyzing a moving object and all the associated inconsistencies. Since reintegration is a slow process, the time that has passed since its implementation in the three countries, provides for informed assessment and strong conclusions.

Within the context of this study, the quantitative and qualitative approaches were used in combination. The nature of the project involves qualitative policy-oriented research. The qualitative research methodology was congruent with the research questions. Where available, quantitative research information, in particular statistics on the post-DDR and post-resettlement status of the ex-fighter and returnee populations was used to support evidence derived from qualitative research. The participant observation method was used by the researcher who attended and participated at military veterans' symposiums.

For this project, the deductive research approach was preferred. The research was based on existing and established conceptualizations on the DDRRR subject. The three case studies are investigated and analyzed on the basis of existing conceptual and operational frameworks

In this thesis the impact of DDRRR is operationalized and measured around the following variables and performance indicators:

- Successful negotiated settlements and conduct of democratic elections under peaceful frameworks

- Compliance, by the parties, with DDRRR provisions is a common measure of the success of the process
- Timeliness and quality of assistance provided to ex-combatants and refugees
- Attainment of visible equal status between ex-combatants and returnees on the one hand and non-combatants and stay-at-homes on the other was considered as a measure of reintegration
- Political inclusion and financial independence of ex-combatants and returnees
- Absence of significant, sustained and widespread disruptions by former combatants' in the medium-to-long-term was a measure of success of DDR
- Outcome of DDRRR in relation to stated policy objectives

These benchmarks may be subjective and have debatable thresholds but still present valuable indicators for a study on the practice and outcomes of DDRRR.

1.6 Scope and Organization

The thesis comprises three parts. The preceding introduction of the research problem and chapter two clarifying the conceptual framework for the assessment of DDRRR as a

component of post-conflict peace building constitute Part I. This sets the scene for Part II, comprising self-contained case studies of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa's experience of DDRRR. Chapter Three intersects Zimbabwe's Commonwealth/UK initiated DDRRR. The fourth chapter deals with the Namibian experience of DDRRR. Namibia presents a case of internationally managed post-conflict DDRRR. DDRRR was implemented in a UN peacekeeping operation context as part of the transition to independence. Chapter Five looks at South Africa's case of a largely locally owned and directed DDRRR process. Efforts are made to analyze these different but novel case studies under similar headings to facilitate comparative analysis.

In Part III the case studies are compared and conclusions and recommendations proffered. The institutional factors including the role of national governments and the international community are assessed basing on the three cases. The major findings of the study are summarized here. Common aspects in the DDRRR experiences of the three countries are identified. The chapter also examines the extent to which Namibia and South Africa's DDRRR processes adopted or ignored lessons from Zimbabwe's earlier experience. Remarks on how the local terrain influences the nature and impact of DDRRR in relation to wider post-conflict peace building are included. The context of future DDRRR processes factoring in on the experiences of the three case studies is considered in the form of recommendations.

1.7 Hypotheses

Stated in hypothesis form, this thesis posits first that the conceptual, political, social, economic and institutional frameworks under which DDRRR is carried out influence the outcome and impacts of the process. This study will begin with one question: who should undertake DDRRR processes? It will ask whether the internationalized and perceived as impartial UN architecture with its more comprehensive infrastructure and experience permitted a more integrated intervention that enhanced the chances for the success of DDRRR in Namibia. It will comparatively focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Commonwealth/British and state-led processes in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively. It will assess the success and failures of these three institutional frameworks.

A second hypothesis is that successful implementation of DDRRR depends on its place and importance in peace agreements and mandates of implementing institutions. That is, according to this hypothesis, successful implementation of DDRRR can result from the centrality and specificity of the process in conflict-terminating negotiation processes and agreements. The process will investigate who was inside and who was outside these processes and what impact this had on the success of the processes. In Namibia's case disarmament and demobilization of troops as well as repatriation of refugees formed core elements of UNTAG's military mandate. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force was a disengagement observation force that implemented disarmament measures by separation and containment agreed to by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia's parties. A sub-Council on Defence was assigned the elaborate task of reforming democratic South Africa's military force structure. This embraced the demobilization and reintegration of forces.

A third hypothesis is that failure of any of the separate DDRRR components has an attendant negative impact on the whole process and its contribution to broader peace building. Ineffective disarmament will frustrate subsequent efforts at demobilization and reintegration. Neglecting the psychological transition (war trauma counselling) of former combatants will have negative effects on their socio-economic reintegration and negatively impacts the communities into which they attempt to reintegrate. Similarly, failed reintegration of ex-combatants breeds socio-political and economic challenges. To better understand the complex interactions of these processes, the thesis will comparatively verify the impact of the individual DDRRR components on the complete process.

The fourth hypothesis is that the nature of the preceding armed conflict determines DDRRR. Zimbabwe experienced a long and brutal armed liberation struggle in which two fully-fledged guerrilla armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA) actively engaged the Rhodesian forces and occasionally each other. A larger and more complex DDRRR process was subsequently required in Zimbabwe's post-conflict situation. South Africa, for instance, experienced a civil war in which battlefield engagements were limited and external to the country, making reintegration easier. The thesis will assess how the differences of the ideologies, actors, types, lengths, and intensity of the wars fought impacted on the DDRRR processes in the three countries.