

Heritage, Politics and identity. Exploring the political manipulation of heritage in Zimbabwe

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the field of Heritage Studies.

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Declaration

I declare that this Research Report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in Hreritage at the University of Witswatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before in any other degree or examination in any other University.

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-----Day of-----, 2015 Johannesburg, South Africa

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

Postcolonial Zimbabwe is currently in an era characterised by discursive contestations. This has seen the ruling party, ZANU PF, engaging in severe discourse manipulation in a bid to gain political legitimacy. This new era has resulted in the emergence of what Ranger (2004) has termed ‘patriotic history’, which is a new form of narrow history, which is biased towards celebrating an exaggerated role played by ZANU PF in liberating Zimbabwe, portraying the ruling part as the only truly legitimate rulers of post-independence Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) has therefore, argued that ‘patriotic history’ forms Zimbabwe’s current master-narrative. This study, therefore, seeks to examine recent discourse on ZANU PF’s ideology, and to explore how this master narrative has been used to justify ZANU PF’s unpopular projects, such as the land reform programme, and the establishment of the National Youth Service by then-ZANU PF national commissar, Border Gezi, which are now popularly known as ‘Border Gezi youth camps’. The research borrows from Ndlovu-Gathseni’s (2011) argument that the ideology of Chimurenga (which is at the centre of ZANU PF’s patriotic history), is under constant ‘renewal’ so as to suit the needs of the day, especially in the face of heightened political opposition. The research therefore, seeks to explore this constant renewal of ideology in more recent years, and to explore recent discourses during the period ranging from 2000 to 2014.

Although several scholars have discussed Zimbabwe’s master-narrative and the way in which ZANU PF has used history for political legitimacy (see Ranger 2004, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams 2009, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011, Muchemwa 2010, Goredema and Chigora, 2009), this research argues that it is not only history, but also heritage, which is used as part of ZANU PF’s

ideology. The research argues that inasmuch as ZANU PF uses history for political legitimacy, the party also alchemises this revisionist history into a form of popular heritage. It is against this background that it may be argued the party also uses heritage with expediency, to achieve its political ends. The research argues that ZANU PF is, specifically, using heritage to forge a common national identity and to ensure that people connect to their past as a collective.

However, this study argues for heritage as an invaluable resource that has contributed in other contexts to bringing about broader, richer and more sustained improvements to the lives of the Zimbabwean people, in such ways that conserve, rather than exploit, both the natural and cultural resources.

1.2 Heritage rather than history

The discourse on heritage is polemical in nature, as the conceptualisation of the term 'heritage' itself is problematic. As a result, the concept of heritage has been interpreted differently by different special interest groups, making it difficult to arrive at an agreed definition of the term. Although some scholars such as Smith (2006) have associated heritage with that which is old or antiquated, heritage concerns more than merely the objects of antiquity or preservation, but is also defined by the link between the past, the present and the future as this is constantly being renewed. Regardless of the misconceptions, contradictions and ideological disagreements in respective heritage contexts, there is consensus regarding the fact that heritage pertains to invaluable assets that require special protection, conservation and preservation, and can be utilised to better people's lives. To that effect, UNESCO-ICCROM (2006) observes that although heritage is by no means uniformly desirable, it is widely viewed as a precious and invaluable resource, crucial for personal and collective identity.

Although heritage has been understood differently by different people over the years, some working definitions have been offered by leading scholars. Neufeld (2000) defines heritage as

everything people gain from their ancestors. Graham (2002) shares a similar understanding of heritage, and views it as the continuous definition and re-affirmation of cultural identity, a screening of values, a use of memories of the past and a selective source of the present generation.

From the definitions above, it becomes clear that heritage concerns a legacy that people receive from their ancestors and pass on to future generations (UNESCO-ICCROM 2006) and that sometimes this legacy is created and re-created, affirmed and re-affirmed by concerned communities during its transmission. It is possibly in the light of this understanding that the South African Heritage Resource Agency (SAHRA 2005) defined heritage as “our legacy from the past, what we live within the present, and what we pass on to future generations, to learn from, to marvel at and to enjoy”. An important aspect of heritage is the fact that it takes up many forms, tangible and intangible.

In an attempt to distinguish between heritage and history, Lowenthal (1998, p. 118) argues that, compared to history, “...heritage is not an inquiry into the past but a celebration of it, not an effort to know what actually happened, but a profession of faith in a past tailored to present day purpose.” While Lowenthal (1998) is correct in his argument that heritage is often presented in a way that is not fully reflective of the past, he fails to acknowledge the existence of other alternative approaches to heritage, which are not necessarily characterised by the use of myth. In that regard, this research maintains that although ZANU PF deploys heritage in a way that aligns more with what is suggested by Lowenthal (viz. a heritage laced with myth), there are indeed other, more positive ways in which Zimbabwean heritage is used to improve people’s lives; through tourism, employment creation, education and infrastructural development, to mention just but a few.

For the purpose of this research, Deacon’s (2004) understanding of intangible heritage is relevant. Deacon defines intangible heritage as heritage which cannot necessarily be touched or

seen, but which is preserved in the form of oral history, memories, performances, traditions and the meanings associated with places and objects. This research is then based on the idea that ZANU PF mostly deploys intangible heritage to boost its ideology, by attaching meanings and interpretations to heritage that suit its agendas, as well as engaging in a process of selective remembering of the past.

1.3 Background to the study

Politics in Zimbabwe took a new turn in 2008 as ZANU PF faced serious opposition and lost in the March 2008 harmonised elections, leading to the formation of a unity government between the opposition MDC and the incumbent ZANU PF regime. Although the MDC had proved to be a powerful opposition party since 2000, ZANU PF had managed to survive, but 2008 brought a change. The political atmosphere remained tense as each party looked for strategies to survive the next election in 2013.

In the year 2008 i did my work related learning with the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe. During that period, i was exposed to a number of incidents which provided insight into the strong link between heritage, politics and identity in Zimbabwe. One of these was when the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe received a letter from the president's office with instructions to declare Mbuya Chaza's grave (the founder of the local Guta Rajehova-a Church) a national heritage site, on the basis that when she was still alive, the prophetess had prophesied that the first president of Zimbabwe would come from Zvimba. This automatically altered the political mandate of members of the Guta Rajehova Church, who became vocal ZANU PF supporters as a result. The full narrative of the attempt to declare Mbuya Chaza's grave a national heritage site is beyond the scope of this research, but awakened an interest to investigate the recent discourse on the way in which ZANU PF uses heritage as a tool to forward political

aims.

1.4 Statement of the problem, aim and rationale

Thus, the problem of the study is the way in which ZANU PF continues to use heritage as a tool for political legitimacy, which has become a subject of recent discourse. A great deal of work that describes ZANU PF's deployment of history and/or heritage as a tool for political legitimacy has been written by several scholars (see Ranger 2004, Onslow 2011, Raftopoulos 2003b, Raftopoulos 2004b, Muzondidya 2004, Ndlovu Gatsheni 2011, Tendi 2010, Mlambo 2010, Kriger 2006). Most of these scholars observe that history and heritage are given a single master-narrative, which is narrow, and biased to suit the needs of the day has been widely resonated. The intention of this report is to provide an examination of the more recent ideological project of ZANU PF, by exploring the way in which heritage has been deployed for political gains in a more recent context, thus underscoring the need to examine certain events, such as the erection of the Joshua Nkomo statue, as well as the 2013 harmonised election. A careful examination of the land reform programme, the Border Gezi militia camps, as well as other elections before the 2013 harmonised elections, will provide an important background for the way in which ZANU PF's ideology finds its outworking in national heritage projects. The research will also examine selected speeches by Mugabe and other ZANU PF politicians during the period between 2000-2013, to bring the ZANU PF ideology into a closer focus. The research intends to pay particular attention to the rhetoric deployed by Mugabe at different stages, in an attempt to show how the master-narrative adopted by ZANU PF is flexible, and is under constant renewal and reconstruction, depending on the needs of the party at each particular stage.

Patriotic history, a term coined by Ranger (2004) has provided some useful lenses into the way that several scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) and Raftopolous (2003, 2004) have examined ZANU PF ideology from different angles. In the same vein, this study situates

patriotic history at the centre of its examinations. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) proposed that what Ranger (2004) termed 'patriotic history' is Zimbabwe's master-commemorative narrative, and this report borrows from these scholars to examine more recent instances that bear witness to ZANU PF's master narrative on heritage.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This research draws from Gramsci's theory of hegemony to examine recent discourse on the way in which heritage is used for political leverage, in order to gain political legitimacy in Zimbabwe. In his theory, Gramsci defines hegemony as

The ability of a social group to direct society both politically and morally.

The hegemonic group acquires authority through the intellectual, moral and cultural persuasion or consent of the governed population without applying violent, political or economic means of coercion. Nevertheless, coercion is always latently used in support of its hegemony. In order to become hegemony, a group must unite the features of coercion and consent through the notion of a dual feature (cited in Iseri, 2007).

Dowing et al. (1955) also define hegemony as the combined dominance over, and leadership of the society by the ruling class. Hegemony thereby centres on the construction of common-sense values and ideas, to which the ruling class is made to appear as if it is natural. Thus whatever the ruling class does, the people should accept as natural, and they become increasingly reluctant to challenge the status quo.

Gramsci's theory is an attempt to explain how, in politics, the ruling party's control is not solely dependent on violence, or on political or economic coercion, but through the establishment of a

hegemonic culture, through which the governed are persuaded to view the values of the ruling party as their own.

The theory stems from the idea that society is not comprised of homogeneous groups, but of social groups that are in endless conflict. The media as social institutions are often found at the centre of the battlezone of dominance, as various groups use it to attain power and achieve their political goals. Gramsci has suggested that society is a battlefield for different stakeholders to fight and attain their goals (Fiske, 1996).

Here, Gramsci's argument is that in order for a group to achieve hegemony, it has at its disposal the tool of coercion, or the means of consent, through persuasion. He further argues that coercion does entail domination, but may not necessarily involve physical coercion. However, he argues that some degree of such coercion is usually necessary to achieve the domination.

Gramsci's theory has provided an important basis for several scholars who have interrogated ZANU PF's ability to cling to power since 1980 to date, and the strategies employed. Following on from the available literature, this research attempts to show that despite all the physical resources of the state at its disposal, ZANU PF still seems to find it necessary to launch concentrated propaganda campaigns, as well as to use history and heritage to ascertain its dominance.

The research examines the way in which ZANU PF has used heritage to foster ideologies that have enabled it to cling on to power in the years between 2000-2014, where they were faced with serious political and economic challenges. The following chapters will, basing on Ranger's (2004) argument regarding the emergence of a new form of history in Zimbabwe, examine the way in which ZANU PF used heritage to justify the national land reform programme, as well as how the party has used the Chimurenga master narrative in more recent years for its continued survival. The research will also draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2010) work on Joshua Nkomo's

re-appropriation into patriotic history, by examining more recent events that led to the erection of a statue in his honour, and how these events are part of ZANU PF ideology. In so doing, the research attempts to show how Gramsci's theory is very much applicable in contemporary post-independence Zimbabwe, and show instances where ZANU PF seems to employ history and heritage to achieve hegemony, and to become the dominant party, without necessarily using force all the time.

1.6 Research Methodology

The main thrust of the research is to explore recent discourse on the way in which ZANU PF has used heritage to foster political agendas in Zimbabwe. As research material, I mainly used presidential speeches, speeches by other political figures, government policy documents, election manifestos, newspapers, and the internet, to explore the use of heritage as a political tool.

Critical Discourse analysis (CDA)

Fairclough (1995, p 132) defines critical discourse analysis as

discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.

Critical discourse analysis, therefore, primarily studies the way in which social power, dominance and/or inequality are enforced, and how these define the socio-political contexts of a given society.

Critical discourse analysis, as a research tool, aims to unpack the manner in which social inequality is sustained through rhetoric. Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p 271-280) summarise the main characteristic of CDA as follows: CDA addresses social problems; power relations are discursive; discourse constitutes society and culture; discourse does ideological work; discourse is historical; the link between text and society is mediated [by discourse]; discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory; discourse is a form of social action.

Fairclough (1992) asserts that language is central to the achievement of hegemony. For the purpose of this research, critical discourse analysis was used to determine how language and words have been used by ZANU PF politicians to achieve hegemony. This was done through the critical examination of speeches by Mugabe and other ZANU PF politicians to determine the presence of certain words, concepts, themes, phrases, characters and imagery that form the fabric of hegemonic rhetorical practices. In particular, critical discourse analysis helped me pick out words and metaphors that recur in policy statements, presidential speeches and proclamations by political leaders, which are suggestive of the use of heritage as a political tool in recent years.

1.7 Literature review

The Foundation Myth

As earlier presented in Chapter One, SAHRA (2005) defines heritage as our legacy from the past, what we live with in the present, and what we pass on to future generations, to learn from, to marvel at and to enjoy. UNESCO (2003) brings into perspective that heritage not only entails the tangible aspects such as monuments and sites, but also involves the intangible elements, such as

ethical values, social customs, belief systems religious ceremonies and traditional knowledge systems.

Whatever our understanding of heritage may be, UNESCO (2003) stresses the importance of safeguarding this invaluable resource, and puts special emphasis on the protection of intangible heritage (2003 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage). UNESCO (2003) justifies the need to safeguard intangible heritage as a way of highlighting the achievements of communities often considered to be backward. In this regard, UNESCO emphasises the idea that heritage is a celebration of the past, for the purposes of the present day community.

In an attempt to unpack the term heritage, Smith (2009) has argued that heritage is “cultural practices involved in the construction and regulation of a wide range of values and understanding”. From this argument, it becomes clear that heritage is a medium through which identity, power and society are produced and reproduced (Munjeri, 2003).

Munjeri’s (2003) argument on heritage being an axis of identity, power and society production and reproduction perhaps resonates with Lowenthal’s (1998, p. 118) criticism of heritage, when he argues that “heritage is not an inquiry into the past but a celebration of it, not an effort to know what actually happened but a profession of faith in a past tailored to present day purpose.” He further argues that heritage, stands “accused of undermining historical truth with twisted myth” and goes further to point out that the ‘myth’ is exclusive and gives power to a selected group (Lowenthal 1998, p.118). What Lowenthal fails to acknowledge however, is that heritage is very broad and that there are other alternatives to its use which bring positive development to the communities in which it finds preservation. However, his argument that heritage is open to manipulation is valid for the purposes of this research, as it aims at examining the way in which Zimbabwean heritage has been used to foster ZANU PF ideology by “undermining historical

truth with twisted myth” in the years between 2000-2013.

Marschall (2004, p. 22) brings up the concept of the ‘foundation myth’, where she argues that “every new political order forms a group identity through a process of selective remembering and the invention of usable pasts”. She further explains that the most significant aspect of this process is the forging of a foundation myth, which traces the roots and defines the beginning of a new nation. Her use of the word ‘invention’ seems to suggest that the past is fabricated, and not necessarily true. From her discussion on the ‘foundation myth’, one can clearly note the potential link that exists between heritage and power, hence the need for this research to examine recent discourse on how heritage has been used by ZANU PF to achieve hegemony, especially in the case of the 2013 harmonised election.

Rowlands (2006) seems to follow the same line of thought as Lowenthal and Marschall, as he also argues that cultural heritage sustains powerful nationalists’ mythologies, which seek to reclaim and possess lost pasts and to redeem the glory of ancient past. He argues that the ‘seduction of heritage’ is in its promise to redeem a past, and in so doing, be a means to revive a sense of authentic being in the contemporary world. He further argues that cultural heritage is highly selective, and is concerned as much with the ability to forget as the ability to remember. Rowland’s argument also forms part of the basis this research, as it brings into play the question of how Zimbabwean heritage is being used as part of the ploy to sustain ZANU PF’s leadership.

Rowland (2006) opines that the selective nature of heritage justifies the concern by Lowenthal that heritage (as compared to history), is routinely mobilised around the issue of cultural amnesia, and original acts of violence. He argues that cultural amnesia is motivated to forget the traumatic events that endanger a temporary sense of unity and totality. However, this research will attempt to show that, as much as ZANU PF has tried to induce cultural amnesia on traumatic events,

such as the Gukurahundi massacre, it continues to put the nation through some traumatic events such as the re-enactment of the liberation war struggle through the Border Gezi militia camps, the violent intimidations during elections, and the violent ways in which the land reform programme was carried out.

Lowenthal, Marschall and Rowland's arguments all indicate that heritage as discourse implies the use of a single 'legitimate' narrative, which usually fails to accept that more than one story can be told. Although this research is based on the assumption that ZANU PF gives heritage a master narrative to foster its ideology, it also acknowledges that this is just one way of looking at heritage, and that Zimbabwean heritage is, and can continue to be, used in a more positive light, that brings development to the communities around it.

Patriotic history as Zimbabwe's master commemorative narrative

A number of scholars, among whom is Ranger (2004), have sought to interrogate Zimbabwe's dominant narrative of the past. This dominant narrative has been famously coined as 'patriotic history' by Ranger (2004, p. 218), who defines it as a new form of history, which is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition. He further explains that this dominant narrative is an attempt "to reach out to the youth over the heads of their parents and teachers, all of whom are said to have forgotten or betrayed revolutionary values". Ranger (2004, p. 218), who had at first celebrated the emergence of nationalist historiography – stressing its importance of celebrating the aspirations and modernisation, as well as resistance of the former-colonised – now laments the emergence of this new form of history, which disregards all history which is not essentially political. Ranger 2004 argues that the patriotic history of Zimbabwe is much narrower, characterised by a master-narrative that is intended to assist ZANU PF to achieve hegemony.

Ranger's concept of patriotic history has provided an important backdrop for other scholars who have argued that ZANU PF has deployed a distorted version of history, especially the history of the country's liberation struggle, in an attempt to maintain a hegemonic narrative of the country Zimbabwe. Several scholars have suggested that what Ranger (2004) termed patriotic history forms Zimbabwe's master-narrative and foundation myth, as proposed by Marschall (2004) (Kriger 2006, Muzondidya 2007, Mlambo 2010, Tendi 2010, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011).

Chiumbu (2004) further argues that patriotic history is a master-narrative that has come about as an attempt by ZANU PF to legitimise its unpopular projects, such as the land reform programme, to cling to power, as well as to present a misconstrued version of what it means to be a true patriotic Zimbabwean. It is against this backdrop that this research attempts to examine recent discourses on how this new patriotic history, which automatically entails a 'patriotic heritage', has continued to be used in the years 2000-2014.

Reiterating Ranger's lamentation over the use of 'patriotic history' in Zimbabwe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that when ZANU-PF assumed state power in 1980, it quickly penetrated the state and nation, making sure the party was indistinguishable from them. He notes that this was done through selective deployment of history, memory and commemoration, so as to establish hegemony and claim uncontested political legitimacy. The process involved creative yoking of ZANU-PF's ideology and national history, resulting in 'rule by historiography'.

In arguing for the effectiveness of Ranger's (2004) 'patriotic history', Muzondidya (2010) has observed that ZANU PF used a patriotic version of history to frame the land issue as a native-settler question, and even gained popularity with many Zimbabweans as they positioned the land question within the context of their endeavour to redress colonial injustices. In other words, through patriotic history, ZANU PF attempted to convince the nation that its land reform programme was the only option if Zimbabwe was to ever gain full independence and

sovereignty.

In another article, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Wendy (2009, p. 952) give an account of how heritage was used to legitimise the land reform programme by the Zimbabwean government. They argue that during that period, Zimbabwe saw a careful re-packaging of the land question, as not simply an economic issue, but also as a fundamental part of Zimbabwe's cultural heritage. They note that "land played a central role in the cultural and symbolic politics of the third Chimurenga as both material resource and cultural heritage"(Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009,p.952)

They further argue that in 2002, there was an intensification of government-sponsored cultural activities that sought to gather support for the ruling party's agendas, while at the same time, discrediting the opposition parties, who apparently have no 'heritage background'.

As Askew (2002) argued in the case of Tanzania, "performing the nation" included the repackaging of romanticised culture as a handmaiden of a particular mode of politics. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011), in Zimbabwe, this performance took the form of 'bashes', galas and commemorations, as well as dramatisation of ZANU PF's legitimacy as founder of post-independence Zimbabwe.

All these scholars generally agree with Ranger's argument that in its attempt to cling on to power, ZANU PF formulated a new form of history, which made them central to the founding of Zimbabwe, and portrayed them as the founders of post-independence Zimbabwe.

Muchemwa (2010) argues that ZANU PF's efforts to make itself central to the birth of the nation Zimbabwe is evident in the party's selection criterion for national heroes. He gives an account of how, after independence, the government constructed a 'national heroesacre' in Harare, as well as provincial and district burial grounds for those who had actively contributed to the liberation struggle. He however argues that heroism became in the process subjective, as it

was solely defined from a ZANU PF perspective.

Regarding heroism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that the selection criteria of heroes is not transparent, resulting in a lot of contestations between ZANU PF and those who have not bought into the notion of patriotic history. He asserts that the heroes acre, which was meant to be a powerful source of national unity and a strong source of legitimacy, has become a site of contestation, with some veteran nationalists indicating before their death that they do not want to be buried at the national shrine.

In relation to the politics around the selection of heroes, Kriger (1995. P 323) argues that “public debates around war heroes have merely reflected the tensions in Zimbabwean society and politics and have highlighted how fragile national authority and national unity are in a new nation.” As if in response to this, Bhebhe and Ranger (1995) argue that creating national heroes is a politically turbulent process, one which has made mass social and economic inequalities highly visible.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that the Chimurenga ideology is constantly being renewed by leaders of ZANU-PF and is today used to legitimise an increasingly unpopular regime that has presided over Zimbabwe since 1980. He further argues that every time ZANU PF is cornered politically by opposition forces, it has ominously reminded people through the expression ‘Zimbabwe ndeyeropa’ (‘Zimbabwe came through bloodshed’), that it would go back to the bush to fight another Chimurenga, if it is defeated in an election. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argument provides an important basis for this research, and its need to examine more recent discourse into how ZANU PF continues to use history and heritage in an attempt to achieve hegemony.

1.8 Conclusion

This first chapter has provided a background to the research, examining literature on the subject of ZANU PF’s master-narrative discourse in recent years, as well as providing a theoretical frame

for the research. Chapter Two will examine the issue of land, and how it was used as a framework for patriotic history. This chapter is important, as it gives a preview as to the nature of the way in which ZANU PF enhances its ideology. Chapter Three will examine the Chimurenga master-narrative, and argue that in the subsequent years 2000-2014, ZANU PF used the idea of the liberation heritage to portray themselves as the liberators of post-independence Zimbabwe. Chapter Four then discusses Joshua Nkomo, and examines ZANU PF's attempt to rewrite history by inscribing Nkomo's heritage into patriotic narrative.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LAND AS A HERITAGE TOOL FOR POLITICAL LEVERAGE

2.1 Introduction

Although Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, this did not automatically translate to economic empowerment for the majority of its people. This is so because the country inherited an unfairly distributed land, where the minority white population owned the biggest tracts of fertile land. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 left the majority of black Zimbabweans in reserves, which were mostly found in the marginal agro-ecological zones where stones grew better than crops. Palmer (1977) explains that "...this Act institutionalized the racial division of all land in the country and divided the country into the Reserves [land exclusively for occupation by Africans]; Alienated Land [land exclusively for White occupation, on which Africans could live only as employees]; and Native Purchase Areas [land where African farmers could gain limited ownership of farms]". Under this Act, a European area was declared which consisted of 49 million acres and comprised over half the total farming land in the country. Palmer (1977) further argues that as compensation, Africans were given the right to freehold tenure on the

newly created Native Purchase Areas, which were located adjacent to the Reserves. (Palmer 1977). Following this Act, several other policies, which include, among others, the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969, were put in place and further stripped the majority black Zimbabweans of any rights to their land.

After Independence, the government's numerous attempts to redress the unfair land distribution pattern were heavily crippled by a weakened economic, and, as Moyo (1995) argues, by the end of the 1980s only about 52 000 families had been resettled.

This research, therefore acknowledges that there was a real need for the redistribution of land after independence, given the extent of land dispossession under colonial rule.

Mlambo (2010) argues that land redistribution in Zimbabwe took a new twist in 2000 when the ruling party was faced with serious political challenges and they had to turn to land for survival. Following Mlambo's (2010) argument, this chapter examines the way in which patriotic history was used to justify the land issue. In so doing, the chapter agrees with Mlambo(2010) and other scholars who have argued that land redistribution after 2000 was no longer just a matter of redressing colonial injustice but rather a strategy for ZANU PF to hold on to power.

According to Mlambo (2010), the year 2000 brought a shift in the political climate in Zimbabwe. Although opposition to ZANU PF's hegemony had first emerged in the late 1980s, it reached its zenith in 2000. Most Zimbabwean citizens grew weary of ZANU PF and its ideologies, as it continued to fail to fulfil some of the fundamental promises of independence. Muzondidya (2010) argues that people's loss of faith in the revolutionary party was made manifest through the increased number of people who openly supported and voted for the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The "No" vote to constitutional reforms in 2000 heralded ZANU PF's loss of popularity, and subsequent failure to maintain hegemony.

This was the first time that ZANU PF had been openly challenged, and with the realisation that the MDC party was quickly gaining popular support, ZANU PF was obliged to act swiftly to re-assert the party's hegemony and legitimacy. Trapped between a rock and a hard place, ZANU

PF turned to the land issue, as unfinished business from the colonial days (Meridith 2002, Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003).

The fast track land invasions were dubbed the 'Third Chimurenga', an indication that although the country had now been independent for 23 years, there was still a legitimate war to be fought, until land was given back to the 'people', its rightful inheritors. In an attempt to re-assert hegemony, ZANU PF employed 'patriotic history' (Ranger, 2004), which portrayed Mugabe as Zimbabwe's saviour, without whom the country would still be under colonial rule. Land was cast at the centre of the party's version of 'patriotic history', and the master-narrative around it portrayed it as the heritage of the people.

This chapter therefore aims at examining the use of patriotic history to justify the land issue, as well as to explore the different imagery that appeared, as new words were formed and old words gained new meanings, all in a bid to cast *land as heritage*, for the sake of new hegemony.

2.2 *Land as heritage* becomes intertwined with politics as ZANU PF struggles to maintain legitimacy

Following the chaotic land invasions by war veterans and other ZANU PF supporters, Robert Mugabe publicly endorsed the invasions on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) national television channel when he announced:

I will never order the war veterans to retreat from the farms they are on [...] what are we supposed to do? [...] fold our arms and say "ah, you are the ordained ones by the Almighty, by virtue of your white skin and by virtue of your being British, royal blood every one of you, we will not touch your land"? No. The end has come; land will now come to the people (ZBC News, 9 April 2000).

An analysis of his speech on this day shows how he (Mugabe), recast the land issue as a racial issue. His use of phrases like “ordained ones by the Almighty” pointed to the presumed “superiority” of the white farmers on religious bases. He deliberately used such terms with to provoke popular memory of the colonial indentured and slave labour. By so doing, he was able to increase the likelihood of support from almost anyone who had suffered the atrocities of the colonial period. At the same time, his statement is laced with sarcasm; he made fun of the white settlers and Britain, and at the same time, allowed his audience to laugh at their former colonial master.

In the same speech, Mugabe’s use of the word “people”, when he says “the land will now come to the people” opens up a fresh debate on who he considers to be “the people” and what it takes to belong to this category of people. Here, one begins to note Mugabe’s strategy in redefining what it means to be Zimbabwean, as he creates new definitions of national identity and patriotism. MDC and all its supporters were automatically labelled as ‘sell-outs’, who perpetuated the desires of the colonial emperor rather than providing for ‘the needs of the people’.

Mugabe and other ZANU PF politicians harnessed every opportunity that came their way to support the land invasions, as well as to perpetuate the notion of the opposition MDC, as stooges of the British. During the independence celebrations of 2000, Mugabe, in his speech asserted the following:

Land reform is the last colonial question, heavily qualifying our sovereignty. We are determined to resolve it, once and for all. Let us continue to cherish our independence as well as uphold the principles of our sovereignty. Let us defend our freedom and deliver the benefits of independence to our people (18 April 2000).

Here, his speech was aimed at alerting people that without the land, there is no freedom, there is no independence. Here we begin to see Mugabe's attempt to interlink land and identity issues. In the same speech, he went on further to say:

“Tiri vana vevhu...[...] Ivhu redu inhaka yedu...”(we are sons and daughters of the soil[...] Our land is our heritage...).

In this statement, he contrasts the idea of land as the heritage of the Zimbabwean people, to combat the colonial narrative that would claim the land as God-given to white settlers. He deliberately includes these two opposing ideas in the same speech in order to make a pointed contrast. He starts from the idea of an ‘ordained’ white population, then moves to land as a ‘heritage of the people’, ingratiating himself to his audience by stoking a sense of righteous indignation.

In the same speech, Mugabe begins to portray land as heritage, and when he says “tiri vana vevhu...” (we are sons and daughters of the soil), he creates an explicit connection between land and identity, as if to say that without the land, the black people of Zimbabwe have no identity and that the people of Zimbabwe are organically connected to the land. In several other speeches following this, Mugabe continually reiterated these statements.

Although this research accepts that ZANU PF mainly used violence and intimidation to obtain votes, it argues that the party tried to use the land redistribution campaign to persuade people that they deserved to remain in power and that they had the people's best interest at heart. They promised land to everyone and for a moment, the country went into frenzy, where the masses felt liberated, and anyone could occupy a piece of land without restriction. People felt

empowered, and for a moment, believed the country was finally realising the dream of independence. This fleeting belief that the land reform programme was an honourable project was to be found locally as well as internationally. This is evidenced for example, by David Anderson's comment in *The Independent UK* (4 May, 2000) where he wrote:

Many African leaders in particular will agree with Mr. Mugabe's contention that he is merely seeking to right the wrongs of history [...] there are good reasons for African bitterness over land. Whites in colonial Rhodesia simply took the land they wanted by conquest. They paid no compensation to the Africans they dispossessed [...]Mugabe is right about land reform (*The Independent (UK)* 4 May, 2000).

In response to complaints and allegations that the land invasions were not legal, the then-Information Minister, Chen Chimutengwende, dismissed allegations of high level orchestration as "absolute rubbish", but bluntly pointed out that "those who voted 'NO' complicated the matter... it is now leading to these invasions, and I can only see more invasions [ahead]"(*Editorial, Mail and Guardian*, 2 March 2000).

Here, Chimutengwende points directly towards party political motivations behind the land invasion. Contrary to ZANU PF's convincing narrative that they were correcting colonial injustice, this assertion clearly shows the rhetoric by means of which the land invasions were used as a tool for political leverage, somehow suggesting that if the people had voted in ZANU PF's favour, it would not have been necessary to invade the land. Chimutengwende's statement clearly echoes arguments made by Onslow (2011), that the construction of the history of land tapped into existing grievances and beliefs, proving to be a strategy through which ZANU PF sought to re-assert its hegemony.

Mugabe understood that Zimbabwean people were desperate for land, and he used that to discredit his opponent, Tsvangirai (President of the MDC party), whose policy on the land question seemed less decisive. He took advantage of MDC's unclear land policy to argue that Tsvangirai had, in fact, 'sold the land to the British', and that as a result, that people should not vote for him, as he was intent on selling the country over to foreign colonial interest, and reversing the gains of the liberation struggle for independence from colonial rule. In many of his speeches, Mugabe repeatedly questioned Tsvangirai's intentions over land, and made implications that his silence on land meant that he intended to sell it back to the white farmers who had historically appropriated it. To emphasise their point, ZANU PF designed an advert which was repeatedly played on the national television channel, ZBC.

Zimbabwe Independent January 18, 2002

Sliding from 6 points to 5 points and still going down...

WHERE HAS THE LAND GONE?

MDC'S 6 Point Plan for a Better Future

- PEACE- Fairness, Justice, Security, Law and Order

FOOD Available and Affordable Prices

Fig 2.0

As evidenced in fig 2.0 above, ZANU PF took advantage of MDC's silence on the issue of land to portray Tsvangirai as a conman, who would willingly reverse the gains of the liberation struggle, by selling land back to the British. Here, we note that ZANU PF employs negative advertising to discredit Tsvangirai, and continues to portray themselves as the party fighting for the rights of the people, by giving them back their land, while Tsvangirai is busy dining with the 'enemy'.

To prove Tsvangirai to be a sell-out, a picture of him with a group of white farmers giving his

party a cheque of donations was inserted in the advertisement shown in fig 2.0. In the picture, Tsvangirai is seen clapping hands, a gesture of gratitude and appreciation. This depiction of gratitude served the rhetorical claim that Tsvangirai was reversing the gains of independence, where Mugabe could then be cast as the only political candidate with the best interests of the people at heart.

During the period in question, Mugabe continued to use the rhetoric centering on the question of land reparations, as evidenced by his speech during the 2005 hero's day commemoration. During this event, Mugabe is on record as saying:

Without doubt, our heroes are happy that a crucial part of this new phase of our struggle has been completed. The land has been freed and today all our heroes lie on the soil that they fought for. Their spirits are unbound, free to roam the land they left shackled, thanks again to the Third Chimurenga... (Address by Mugabe on the commemoration of heroes day, August 2005).

In this address, Mugabe makes reference to the departed heroes and somehow implies that the 'fast tracked' land reform programme was meant to appease the spirits of the departed liberation war heroes. In his speech above, he argues that the fallen heroes could never have rested well if land had not been given back to the black Zimbabwean people. Indirectly, Mugabe manages to claim an endorsement of his land reform programme from the fallen liberation war heroes, which automatically qualifies him as a true leader of Zimbabwe, who sought to appease the spirits of those who fought during the struggle. Mugabe managed to justify his land reform programme, and at the same time, sought allegiance from anyone under a sense of obligation to honour the fallen heroes.

In the same statement above, Mugabe made inferences to the organic connection of the people to the land, and to the ancestors. He attempted to create a picture where the people had no identity without the land and stresses that the ancestors are not happy with that. By so doing, Mugabe emphasises on the need of the people to please their ancestors.

Even years after the intensive fast track land reform program, Mugabe has continued to use the land rhetoric to gain popularity. Addressing people at a chief installation ceremony in Zvimba, Mugabe is on record saying:

They [whites in Zimbabwe] were selling to each other among themselves, and we will not recognise any of that nonsense. They were living like kings and queens on our land and we chucked them out. Now we want all of it (NewZimbabwe.com, 08 September, 2014).

In this address, Mugabe claims that the white “lived like kings and queens because of the soil”. In this statement land is discussed in terms of the privileges of rulership, where Mugabe somehow suggests that land accords its owner a type of political legitimacy (“when the whites had the land they were the kings, now we are the kings and we need the land to legitimize our rule”). It becomes quite evident that land will always be at the centre stage of Zimbabwean politics.

ZANU PF used all state apparatus, especially newspapers, to campaign for political legitimacy. *The Herald* (2011), for example, carried a staff writer’s story that reads as follows:

While ZANU PF talks about land reform, indigenisation and economic empowerment, inputs support for farmers etc., MDC-T is busy talking [sic] about homosexuality, legalising prostitution, opposing

empowerment, reversing land reform, curtailing male libido, nude diplomats etc. [sic]. And then they turn around [sic] and claim elections were rigged.

Here, the party controlled newspaper castigated the MDC as a retrogressive party that promotes all the things that go against Zimbabwean culture, such as homosexuality and prostitution. Again, the newspapercasts the MDC as having an agenda aimed at reversing the land reform programme,thereby reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. In so doing, ZANU PF managed to defame the opposition.

It is interesting though to note that in the same story, ZANU PF not only attempts to assert its hegemony, but also advocates for a particular ZANU PF patriarchal society, condemning MDC for the supposed perpetuation a society where men are emasculated.

2.3 Who was given what land?

This chapter questions the purported factthat ZANU PF's fast track land invasions were undertaken strictly to address 'the last colonial question' querying whether it may have been mere political strategy necessitated by the struggle for political legitimacy (see Muzondidya 2010, Onslow 2011, Mlambo 2010). Although Mugabe and his ZANU PF party made claims that they had the needs of the poor people at heart when orchestrating the land reform programme, the following table of statistics provides evidence to the contrary.

Cabinet Ministerbeneficiariesof the land reform programme

| Name of owner | Farm | Size | Area |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|
| R. G. Mugabe | 1.Gushungo diaries | 1000ha | Mazowe |
| | 2.Iron Mask | 1046ha | Mazowe |
| | 3.Sigaru Farm | 873ha | Mazowe |
| | 4.Gwina Farm | 1445ha | Banket |
| | 5.Liverdale farm | 1488ha | Mazowe |
| | 5.Highfield | 445ha | Norton |
| | 6.Cressydale Estate | 676ha | Norton |
| | 7.Tankatara | 575ha | Norton |
| | 8.Clifford | 1050ha | Norton |
| | 9.John O’Groat Farm | 760ha | Norton |
| | 10.Bassiville | 1200ha | Mazowe |
| 11Gushungo Estates | 4046ha | Darwendale | |
| Herbert Murerwa | Rise Holm | 1100ha | Arcturus |
| Ignatious Chombo | 1.Allan Grange | 3000ha | Banket |
| | 2. Oldham | 400ha | Chegutu |
| Webster Shamhu | Lorbourne Farm | 1340ha | Selous |
| | Tobacco Estate | 900ha | Chegutu |
| Obert Mpofu | Young Farm | 2300ha | Nyamandlovu |
| | Umguza Block 39,40,41 | 62000 ha | Umguza |
| | Auchenberg | 1026ha | Nyamandlovu |
| Walter Mzembi | BW Farm | 720ha | Masvingo |
| Sithembiso Nyoni | Fountain Farm | 3100ha | Insiza |
| S &M Mujuru | Alamein Farm | 1300ha | Beatrice |
| Simon Khaya Moyo | Morula Block 36 | 2034 ha | Bulilamangwe |

| | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------|--------------|
| Joseph Made | Tora Farm | 840ha | Odzi |
| Emmerson Mngangwa | Sherwood Farm | 1600ha | Kwekwe |
| Frances Nhema | Nyamanda | 1000ha | Karoi |
| Stanislaus Mudenge | Chikowore Farm | 760ha | Masvingo |
| Kembo Mohadi | 1.Jopembe block | 3000ha | Beitbridge |
| | 2. Benlynian Range | 3200ha | Beightbridge |
| Patrick Chinamasa | 1. 1. Tsukumai | 800ha | Headlands |
| | 2. 2. Nyamazura | 160ha | Rusape |

Security Service Chiefs who were beneficiaries of the land reform programme

| Name | Farm | Size | Area |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------|-----------|
| Constantine Chiwenga | Chakoma Estates | 1276ha | Goromonzi |
| Perence Shiri | Bamboo Creek | 1950ha | Shamva |
| Augustine Chihuri | Woodlands Farm | xxxx | Shamva |
| Paradzayi Zimondi | Upton Farm | 1029ha | Goromonzi |
| Elson Moyo | Daisy Farm | 1600ha | Chegutu |
| Henry Muchena | Serui Drift | 1500 | Chegutu |
| | | | |

Judges who benefitted from the land reform programme

| Name of owner | Farm | Size | Area |
|---------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------|
| Godfrey Chidyausiku | Estes Park | 895ha | Concession |
| Luke Malaba | Marula Block 35 | 1866ha | Bulilimangwe |
| Paddington Garwe | Faun Farm | 760ha | Chegutu |
| Antonia Guvava | Harndale Farm | 1000ha | Chegutu |

| | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------|--------------|
| Mafias Cheda | Marula Block 37 | 3039 | Bulilimangwe |
| Ben Hlatshwayo | Kent estate | 800ha | Norton |
| Charles Hungwe | Little England | 6756 | Makonde |
| Chitakunye elfias | The Grange | 1300ha | Chegutu |

Provincial Governors who benefitted from the land reform programme

| Name of owner | Farm | Size | Area |
|----------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
| David Karimanzira | Arcadia Farm | 1300ha | Marondera |
| Cain Mathema | Gwayi Ranch | 4600ha | Gwayi |
| Chris Mushohwe | Kondozi Farm | 400ha | Odzi |
| Titus Maluleke | Clipshap Farm | 306ha | Masvingo |
| Thokozile Mathutu | Dete valley farm | 2800ha | Dete |
| Angeline Masuku | Wollendale Farm | 3000ha | Gwanda |
| Cephas Msipa | Cheshire Farm | 2100ha | Gweru |

Other ZANU PF Government and high ranking officials who also benefitted from the land reform program

| Name | Farm | Size | Area |
|---------------|------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Reward Marufu | Leopard's Vlei | 1294ha | |
| Sabina Mugabe | 1.Kachere Farm | 880ha | MazoweMakonde |
| | 2. Mlembwe Farm | 1037ha | Norton |
| | 3. Longwood Farm | 924ha | Norton |
| | 4.Gowrie Farm | 430ha | |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|---------|------------|
| Leo Mugabe | 1.Diandra | 815ha | Darwandale |
| | 2.Nangadza | 1200ha | Mhangura |
| | 3. Journey's end | 3000ha | Makonde |
| Patrick Zhuwao | Marivale Farm | 244ha | Mazowe |
| George Charambe | Battlefields 02 | 1572ha | Kwekwe |
| Nathan Shamhuyarira | Mt. Carmel | Xxxx | Chegutu |
| Bright Matonga | Lion's Vlei | 2000ha | Chegutu |
| Amos Midzi | Magudu Ranch | 10701ha | Chiredzi |
| Dick Mafios | Insingizi Farm | 1100ha | Bindura |
| | Melfort | 554ha | Mazowe |
| Joseph Chinotimba | Watakai | 1240ha | Mazowe |
| Happison Muchechetere | Burry Hill Estate | 617ha | Makonde |
| Tobaiwa mudede | Ballineety | 3147ha | Nyabira |
| Austine Zvoma | Chinomwe Estates | 1432ha | Makonde |
| David Parerenyatwa | Rudolphia | 802ha | Lomagundi |
| Charles Utete | Rudzimi | 3350ha | Lomagundi |

(Data compiled from information found on www.ZimOnline.com)

The data presented above suggests that, rather than the proletariat, Mugabe and his supporters in government were the main personal beneficiaries of the land reform programme, contrary to claims that the programme was designed to afford equal opportunities to land. This somehow validates an argument made by web-based news agency ZimOnline, who reported these that “a new well connected black elite, of about 2,200 people, controls nearly 40% of the 14million

hectares seized from farmers” (ZimOnline 30 November, 2010).

ZimOnline (2010) argues that government documents and audit reports show that the biggest beneficiaries of land reform were ZANU PF members and supporters, security service chiefs and traditional chiefs, who had openly shown their allegiance to Mugabe’s party. This brings into question the true agenda of the land reform programme, and somehow bears witness to the fact that the programme was never meant to benefit the general public, as most only got a maximum of 50 hectares of land, in contrast with the vast amounts reserved for the new blackelite.

To further support the idea that the land reform program benefited a minority black ‘*elite*’, The Financial Gazette (2012 p. 12) argued:

...the land reform has largely benefitted the bigwigs [sic] in ZANU PF, including their associates, some of whom helped themselves to several forms [of land], in total disregard of the ‘oneman, onefarm’ principle, which could have helped decongest the land pressures in the communal areas.

This bias in the way that the land was distributed is in direct contrast to the promises made by President Mugabe on the eve of independence celebrations in 1980, when he said:

May I assure you that my government is determined to bring about meaningful change to the lives of the majority of the people in the country? But I must ask you to be patient and allow my government time to organise programmes that will effectively yield that change. (ZBC News online, 10 April 2012).

Here, Mugabe was promising that his government would work tirelessly to make sure that the

broader population reaped the rewards of the liberation struggle. However, the table above suggests that this has not been the case, as only a few elite have really benefitted from the land reform, with the majority of the Zimbabwean black population obtaining at most 50 hectares of land. This reinforces the argument that the land reform programme was never about addressing colonial injustices, but rather a ploy on ZANU PF's part to ascertain its legitimacy, by buying popularity with the Zimbabwean majority population.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that in its search for political legitimacy, ZANU PF turned to land and embarked on a haphazard land reform programme, which was heavily marred by corruption. It argues that the fast-track land reform was a desperate move adopted in the face of serious political opposition, and that the true agenda behind this land invasion was to gain the popular vote, rather than to address colonial injustices. In this chapter, it becomes apparent that ZANU PF used land to re-assert itself as a people's party, with the people's best interest at heart. The chapter has also attempted to prove that in its ideology, ZANU PF approaches land from a heritage perspective, so as to make it more appealing and justifiable.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 THE CHIMURENGA MONOLOGUE

3.1 ZANU PF Mobilisation of History-The Chimurenga Master-narrative

Werbner (1998) argues that while the founding moment of a nation is one, the origin myth is effectively plural. He argues that there is no one way of fixing the national imagination forever, and suggests that the ideological effectiveness of the origin myth is in the semblance it gives of singularity, when in actual fact, there is plurality. Werbner's argument suggests that the foundation myth is constantly being reimagined, depending on the whims of political powers at hand. It also suggests that a master-narrative is given to a founding moment that has many other stories (Werbner, 1998). This chapter seeks to explore the way in which ZANU PF has used history, memory and memory space (heritage) as the origin myth of the nation of Zimbabwe. It argues that the liberation war has been mobilised as a founding moment, which defines being Zimbabwean. As Werbner (1998) argues, the founding moment of a nation has plural stories, and this chapter also argues that the story of the liberation struggle is decidedly plural, when compared to the master narrative that ZANU PF endorses. The argument presented is that within the larger context of the liberation war stories, ZANU PF has imposed on the nation what Marschall (2005 p.2) refers to as "selective remembering and the invention of usable pasts", where the party has promoted only those stories that portray the party as the liberators of modern day Zimbabwe, hence making them the legitimate rulers of post-independence Zimbabwe. This has been done at the expense of all the other individual narratives, which have been downplayed in the party's bid to make the nation remember only that story which makes them, and them alone, true liberation war heroes.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2005, 2003) argues that in a bid to evoke a sense of unity and legitimacy, Zimbabwe has seen a constant appeal to the memory of the liberation war known as "Chimurenga" in chiShona. Chimurenga is a term that became popular in Zimbabwe in the 1970s, as a vernacular name for the armed liberation struggle against colonial rule. After independence, the term has gained new dimensions, where it is also used to capture the spirit of

Black empowerment struggles that started with the fast-track land reform programme that was famously dubbed the 'Third Chimurenga' by Mugabe in 2001. Zimbabwe has seen three phases of Chimurenga (Chimurenga One, Two and Three) and Ndlovu-Gauthseni (2005) argue that the armed liberation war, along with other liberation heritage, became the main foundation myth of the new Zimbabwe nation. Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, so central to the identity and politics of the post-colonial state, has since the 1990s come under increasing historical scrutiny. This chapter seeks to examine recent discourse on how ZANU PF has used the memories of the Chimurenga struggle (as liberation heritage) to portray the party as the legitimate rulers of post-independent Zimbabwe.

3.2 Zimbabwe National Youth Service Border Gezi

A national youth service is not unique to Zimbabwe alone, as many countries around the world implement it in some form. Chibber (1994, p. 52) explains the basis of the national youth service as originating from the principles that each and every citizen has an obligation to render some service to the nation for the many benefits he/she receives from it.

In an attempt to unpack the concept of the national youth service, Mulaudzi (2000:13) defines it as:

Special government initiative that engages the youth in prioritising national development programmes. It seeks to involve young people in activities that benefit communities, whilst developing their abilities through service and learning, and aims to inculcate a sense of patriotism and nationhood.

From this definition, it is clear that whatever structure a country chooses to adopt on national youth service, its main thrust is to engage the youth in developmental projects which benefit the

community. In other works, it means a community with national youth service should be better as compared to one that doesn't. This understanding of national youth service is explained by Gowon (1994, p. 5), who argues that its aim should be to "develop, instil and maintain a sense of nationalism, responsibility, discipline and voluntarism among the youth populace through appropriate training and meaningful participation in the development process of the nation". It is probably against this same background that Zimbabwe also established a National Youth Service Programme in 2001.

The timing of the setting up of the institutions has put it under the spotlight, as it came at a period when ZANU PF was struggling to maintain hegemony. Several scholars have questioned the genuineness of the government in setting up these national youth service institutions, with Zeilig (2005:1) arguing that the Zimbabwe national youth service was a way of mobilising the youth politically in support of the ruling party. This section agrees with these sentiments, and aims to examine discourse which show the way in which the NYSZ bears witness to ZANU PF's attempt to achieve hegemony.

The Border Gezi youth camps were set up in 2001, a year after ZANU PF had lost to the opposition party MDC in the constitutional reform elections. It became evident during this period that ZANU PF hegemony was under serious threat, and Rupiya (2005) argues that the re-launch of the Zimbabwe national youth service was necessitated following the realisation that there was a need for cheap and available labour that could be used to execute state supported extra-legal service, which included violence. Thus, at the height of political contestations between ZANU PF and MDC, the ruling party saw fit to initiate an institution that would specifically assist in promoting its agenda.

The youths who were recruited at various Border Gezi youth camps in the country were mostly unemployed, and mostly school drop-outs, who would religiously execute duties delegated to them by party seniors. Known colloquially as 'green bombers' because of the colour of their uniforms, the youths were feared in all corners of the country, as they were known for being ruthless and violent. Hence Rupiya (2005) concluded that the exercise was universally condemned, even by bigger organisations such as the African Union (AU).

In further explaining ZANU PF's use of the NYSZ, Scarnecchia (2006) argued that the state can use paramilitary institutions to maintain or command control over its subjects. In this case, ZANU PF, therefore had to build an institution that would imitate the security forces. Although the government was not prepared to release its army to terrorise ordinary villagers in order for them to vote for ZANU PF, the youths from NYS were there to do the same job.

One of my cousins went to the Border Gezi Camps in Khami, Bulawayo. My own experience of visiting him there revealed that the youth were made to live as if in military camps, where food was very minimal, and they had to wake up before dawn to train. They would run whilst singing liberation war songs. One of the most famous ones was:

Simudza gumbo, hiya, harisi rako, hiya, nderaMugabe (Lift your leg up
high, it does not belong to you, it belongs to Mugabe).

When I asked my cousin what they were learning and who their lecturers were, I was left convinced that the Border Gezi programme was a ZANU-PF indoctrination initiative, aimed at forcing upon all school leavers a ZANU PF-centred view of Zimbabwean history and the present. All training materials in the camp consisted of ZANU PF campaign material and political speeches and, the lecturers in these camps were not qualified history teachers, but rather Liberation war veterans.

Events after the setting up of the youth camps also suggest that ZANU PF was preparing a militia team for itself as the same youths, after graduation, went on to perpetuate violence on those suspected to be supporting MDC. This idea is resonated by Zeilig (2005, p. 1) when he argues that, “the government returned to the dormant concept of national youth service.....the attempt by the regime to construct a social base to confront the emergent opposition movement....Youth became a crucial element of ZANU PF’s social base.”

These camps were sites where ZANU PF indoctrinated Zimbabwean youth and transformed them into uncontested supporters of the revolutionary party, such that when they were released into their communities, they would violently force the same ideology upon the broader community.

Through the use of the youth camps, ZANU PF managed to force a re-enactment of the liberation struggle. Zimbabweans were not only reminded about the liberation struggle, but had to physically embody and experience the struggle. Targeted at the youth, the re-enactment of the liberation struggle ensured that even those born after independence not only relied on third party experience of historical events, but also ‘experienced’ the struggle for themselves. In so doing, ZANU PF succeeded in convincing these youths that they were fighting for a noble cause, as well as to convince those who were against the ZANU PF ideology that the party was prepared to go all the way if they lost political power. ZANU PF created an environment of war in the country as a way of reminding people that if they did not vote in its favour, there would be war again in Zimbabwe.

ZANU PF established militia bases similar in ideology to those of the liberation struggle and these were part of ZANU PF’s mobilisation of liberation heritage for its political advancement. I was staying in Chivi (Masvingo Province) at the time, and our days were characterised by the sound of military helicopters, which would fly very low, at least three times a day. These had no

apparent purpose, other than to create a sense of foreboding, and it seemed an effective way in which to intimidate people by bringing back memories of the liberation war struggle, giving the impression that this would be escalated unless ZANU PF was indeed voted into power.

Here, we see ZANU PF's use of heritage, history, memory and memory space and the re-enactment of history to gain political legitimacy. The party invoked people's memories of the liberation struggle, to the extent of physically restaging the visceral circumstances of the liberation war struggle. This suggests that ZANU PF partially used heritage in an attempt to achieve its hegemony.

The following section will examine discourse around the Zimbabwe 2013 harmonised election in an attempt to show how, despite holding all physical state apparatus in their hands (Newspapers, ZBC TV and radio, the army, and the police), ZANU PF continued to use a master-narrative of Zimbabwean heritage as part of their campaign strategy.

3.3 Mugabe's 2013 election campaign in retrospect...A walk down memory lane

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) argues that since independence, policy issues in Zimbabwe do not dominate election campaigns, but rather, that political actors use elections to remind the electorate who it was that liberated the country from colonialism. As if to validate Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2011) argument, ZANU PF's election campaign was highly characterised by reference to the master-narrative of Zimbabwe's liberation heritage. At most rallies during the 2013 election campaign, Mugabe took pains to remind people that he and his party were the founders of post-independence Zimbabwe.

3.4 A brief analysis of ZANU PF's 2013 election manifesto

ZANU PF launched its election manifesto on 5 July, 2013 in Highfield, Harare. The choice of venue seems not to have been arbitrary, and from my own assessment, was deliberately meant to revive memories of the party's nationalist roots, as the party was formed there in 1963. Again, in 1980, after the liberation struggle, the party had its first major rally in Highfield. Facing the threat of party divisions, it was strategic for ZANU PF to go back to its origins to launch the 2013 manifesto, as this had the capacity to invoke the people's memories, and to remind them where they came from and what it took to get the party where it is today. Mugabe's strategy worked in strengthening party ties and making sure that his party would compete in the election united.

The introductory statement of the Manifesto launched on this day reads:

This People's Manifesto of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) for the 2013 harmonised elections comes against the background of the enduring and unforgettable fact that it is ZANU PF which liberated Zimbabwe after prosecuting a heroic armed struggle. It was this people's resort to the bullet that won Zimbabweans the right to the ballot that everyone enjoys today as a legacy of our liberation struggle (Team ZANU PF 2013 Manifesto).

This introduction of the Manifesto is rich with meaning. In a single paragraph, ZANU PF manages to take advantage of its war credentials and crudely asserts that it is they that liberated Zimbabwe. They portray themselves to be heroes, and suggest that without ZANU PF, Zimbabwe would still be under colonial rule. By so doing, ZANU PF attempts to dictate the people's liberation memories, and manipulates a sense of loyalty by questioning loyalty to those

who died during the liberation struggle. In the same statement, Mugabe makes use of an ominous wordplay between the words ballot and bullet – this can be read both as a claim to legitimacy, and as threat of hegemonic power.

Here, a new expedient master narrative emerges. In the same introductory statement, ZANU PF portrays itself as the only liberators of Zimbabwe, where the party chooses to ignore all the other players in the struggle, including ZAPU and Abel Muzorewa's Party. Contrary to his other famous speeches, which were repeatedly played on ZBC-TV and radio in 1987, after the signing of the unity accord, it is overtly stated: "Tisu chete ZANLA ne ZIPRA takaunza rusununguko nekuzvitonga muno muZimbabwe (It is only us ZANLA and ZIPRA who brought independence and majority rule in Zimbabwe). We are the ones who brought democracy and majority rule."

In that speech Mugabe was acknowledging the role played by ZIPRA in the liberation struggle. However, in the face of political challenge, ZANU PF deliberately downplays the role of ZIPRA, and steals all the lime-light.

In the same paragraph of the manifesto, ZANU PF cleverly elides the people with the party in an attempt to appeal to the proletariat: "...it was *this people's* resort to the bullet that won Zimbabweans the right to the ballot that everyone enjoys today, as a legacy of our liberation struggle"[emphasis added] (Team ZANU PF 2013 Manifesto).

Here, this substitution allows ZANU PF to portray a scenario where the party is a people's party, and being ZANU PF becomes ontologically synonymous with Zimbabwean citizenship. Indirectly, ZANU PF portrays its intolerance to plural narratives, and tries to dictate a single identity for everyone. Here, they also make a claim that had it not been for the resort to the bullet, Zimbabweans would not have the right to vote. This is an appeal to people's conscience to

say they should vote for ZANU PF, because it is the very party that made voting possible. As Ndlovu-Gatscheni 2011 argues, ZANU PF's reviving of the liberation rhetoric is crafted to remind the Zimbabwean people to be grateful that they were freed (by ZANU PF) from colonialism. Again, here we see the recurrence of a master narrative, where ZANU PF makes the implicit threat that without them colonialism could reassert itself.

The second paragraph of the Manifesto (2013) reads:

...this People's Manifesto is a solemn call from the fallen and living heroes of our liberation struggle, indeed from the wailing bones that lie in many places known and others yet to be discovered, for every Zimbabwean to patriotically cherish and jealously guard the gains of our heroic liberation struggle.

Again, ZANU PF implies that failure to vote for it constitutes a failure to guard the gains of the liberation struggle. It raises patriotism and indirectly suggests that true patriotic Zimbabweans would never vote for any other party, other than ZANU PF.

Zimbabwean culture, like most African cultures, believes that the living dead have the power to control what happens in the lives of the living. Mugabe takes advantage of this belief in his speeches and constantly conjures the spirit of the dead. The manifesto makes reference to the "*Wailing bones*" of the departed liberation war heroes knowing fully well that his audience will feel obligated to honour the desires of the living dead. His use of the word "*Wailing*" is deliberate, meant to give the impression that the spirit of the deceased are in agony because their descendants are betraying the country by choosing the opposition MDC instead of ZANU PF

Another passage of the Manifesto (2013) reads:

ZANU PF understands that for the people's goals to be won and defended, everybody must be part of the great team that liberated Zimbabwe and brought freedom and democracy that everyone enjoys today: the team that enabled Zimbabwe to take back its land: the team that has protected and enshrined Zimbabwe's gains of the liberation struggle and defended Zimbabwe's traditional and religious values against such evils as homosexuality in the new constitution: the team that is the home of the youths who are taking the button to defend Zimbabwe's natural resources. That team is Team ZANU PF 2013.

Here, it is interesting to note how ZANU PF now turns to the language of sport: "team ZANU PF, goals to be defended, great team etc.") and indictments ("evils such as homosexuality"). This resonates the argument in this research that ZANU PF's narrative is subject to change according to political demand, and that ZANU PF has a sophisticated grasp of its audience.

Again, we see ZANU PF making reference to its liberation war credentials. In this passage, ZANU PF takes sole credit for liberating the nation and makes claims that it is responsible for the freedom and democracy of "everyone" who benefitted from this. In the first line of this paragraph, ZANU PF conclusively asserts that Zimbabwe cannot succeed, and realise its goals, without ZANU PF in power.

In the Zimbabwean culture, homosexuality is a practice that is not well accepted, and ZANU PF banks on this to make claims that they are the party specifically mandated to fight this 'evil' practice. Their claim somehow casts a shadow on their opposition, where they indirectly imply that MDC is supporting and promoting homosexuality and voting MDC would automatically

endorse the practice. Here, ZANU PF claims custodianship of Zimbabwean traditional values, thereby gaining popularity with traditional leaders, as well as all Zimbabweans, who still uphold their cultural values.

An overall analysis of ZANU PF's 2013 Manifesto clearly shows that their campaign was mainly based on cultural heritage. The party makes use of its liberation war credentials to make claims that they are the legitimate rulers of Zimbabwe. The party claims that they are the only ones who have the burden of preserving Zimbabwean culture and heritage and that without them, Zimbabwe would be doomed. The manifesto is a clear indication that ZANU PF mobilises cultural heritage to gain political legitimacy.

3.5 ZANU PF 2013 election campaign message

On 10 July 2013, Mugabe appeared for his first rally in the election year at Nzvimbo in Chiweshe, a constituency in Mashonaland Central Province. This was one of the twelve rallies he carried out in each of the country's provinces and they were dubbed "Star Rallies". Again, his choice of first venue for one of his star rallies seems not to have been accidental. In his opening remarks at the rally Mugabe stated, "I heard Tsvangirai was campaigning in Mashonaland Central. Does he not know that this is Mbuya Nehanda's province? We had the first of our star rallies here at Nzvimbo, so that I could remind you of who you truly are and to remind you that a lot of people died here during the liberation struggle" (ZBC News, 10 July, 2013).

Mugabe's opening remarks at his first rally of the season showcased an exploitation of history – not just any kind of history, but the kind that Ranger (2004) refers to as "patriotic history", for his campaign. In his statement "does he not know that this is Mbuya Nehanda's Province?" Mugabe invokes (an association with) Mbuya Nehanda, who has a legitimate claim over the votes in Mbuya Nehanda's Province. He makes indirect implications that his opponent, Tsvangirai, is

an outsider, with no link whatsoever to Mbuya Nehanda, and hence cannot possibly rule over the celebrated hero's home province. As Tendi (2008) has argued, that patriotic history puts the MDC on the defensive, because their leader has no liberation war credentials.

Although he said this in Nzvimbo, his opening statement had long-term implications, taking into consideration the status of Mbuya Nehanda at a national level. According to Zimbabwean history, Mbuya Nehanda hailed from Mashonaland Central, and is presented as an influential spirit medium in the First Chimurenga (uprisings) against the British South Africa Company (BSAC). Nehanda was captured and executed by the BSAC and her mythologised valour was a source of inspiration in the Second Chimurenga, which led to independence in 1980. Considering the high standing of Mbuya Nehanda in Zimbabwean history, discrediting Tsvangirai as having no link to the heroine, indirectly discredits him as undeserving of any vote whatsoever in a country which Mbuya Nehanda fought so hard to liberate. On the other hand, Mugabe portrayed himself as the true deserving leader of the nation, stemming from his direct lineage with Mbuya Nehanda. This is a clear indication of Mugabe's exploitation of history and memory space in his 2013 election campaign.

His effort to remind people "that a lot of people died here during the liberation struggle" is also another indication of the way in which Mugabe's 2013 election campaign mined history, memory and memory space of all its worth. Mugabe invokes people's memories of the liberation struggle, and by so doing, indicates that voting otherwise would constitute a betrayal to historical duty. His statement implies that voting for Tsvangirai is equivalent to selling the country.

At the same rally, Mugabe went on to portray Tsvangirai and the MDC-T as "puppets of the west", seeking to reverse the legacy of Zimbabwe's liberation war, and he warned the gathering not to betray the liberation Struggle by voting for them. He claimed:

This is going to be my first stop in the long journey throughout the country reminding people who we are, especially after 2008 when we seemed like we had forgotten about our history. Let's not make the same mistake of 2008. We should be wary of puppet political parties that are seeking to reverse the gains of independence.

Here, Mugabe positions the 2008 defeat not only as a ZANU PF defeat, but as a defeat to the dreams and hopes of those who fought for the liberation struggle. He accuses the population of having forgotten their history by voting for a party with no historical background.

The rally in Chiweshe was a template for the other twelve rallies Mugabe addressed during the 2013 election campaign. He made use of Zimbabwe's Liberation history and explored what Ranger refers to as "patriotic history" to portray his ZANU PF as a party with a history that liberated the country, and hence, a party with a legitimate claim to the seat of power. He tactfully downplayed his opponent on the basis that he has no history of liberating the country and portrayed MDC-T as a party with no history.

At every one of his twelve rallies, as broadcasted on ZBC television, the first thirty to forty five minutes presented an impromptu patriotic history lecture. At the Masvingo Star Rally, Mugabe noted that in 2008, ZANU PF lost 14 seats and won 12 seats in Masvingo Province, and he was surprised. He asked himself what went wrong yet the party won the liberation struggle. Have you forgotten being oppressed? Have you forgotten already that your children died for this country? (Masvingo Star Rally, 2013).

Here, he plays with people's emotions and reminds them of the past, as if to suggest that failure

to vote for ZANU PF would take them back into the “trenches”.

From the selected speeches above, it becomes evident that ZANU PF used heritage to achieve hegemony during the 2013 harmonised election. Although this report does not, by any chance, imply the success of the ZANU PF rhetoric, the results of the 2013 election are notable, where ZANU PF had a landslide victory after using as its strategy, which included party-political appeals to heritage. An extraction of the Masvingo province results is presented in the table below. These results somehow suggest that ZANU PF managed to achieve hegemony. However, It is beyond the scope of this research to examine whether this success ought to be attributed to the use of the ZANU PF master-narrative.

ZESN Report on the 2013 Harmonised Elections

| Constituency | No of Voters MDC-T | No of Voters ZANU-PF |
|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Masvingo North | MDC-T 3,277 | Zanu PF 10,358 |
| Masvingo West | MDC-T 4,687 | Zanu PF 7,634 |
| Bikita West | MDC-T 3,863, | Zanu PF 12,322 |
| Gutu East | MDC-T 3,469, | Zanu PF 7,372, |
| Gutu South | MDC-T 3,723 | Zanu PF 7,927 |
| Gutu Central | MDC-T 3,248 | Zanu PF 9,311 |
| Chivi South | MDC-T 2,755 | Zanu PF 12,599 |
| Chivi Central | MDC-T 3,725 | Zanu PF 12,559 |

| | | |
|----------------|---------------|------------------------|
| Chiredzi South | MDC-T 1,937 | Zanu PF 8,148 |
| Chiredzi East | MDC-T 2,094 | Zanu PF 8,926 |
| Bikita South | MDC-T 3,659 | Zanu PF 9,397 |
| Chivi North | MDC-T 4,149 | Zanu PF 8,827, |
| Zaka West | MDC-T 2,896 | Zanu PF 7,340 |
| Zaka Central | MDC-T 4,158 | Zanu PF 10,604 |
| Masvingo Urban | MDC-T 10,424 | Zanu PF 10,928, |
| Gutu North | , MDC-T 2,045 | Zanu PF 6,845 |
| Gutu West | MDC-T 2,232 | Zanu PF 13,499 |
| Mwenezi West | MDC-T 2,482 | Zanu PF 18,196 |

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Mugabe has used liberation heritage to persuade voters into supporting ZANU PF, and suggests that there is a broader strategy aimed at inculcating a war mentality. The chapter has supported Ranger's (2004) assertion that history is at the centre of Zimbabwean politics and a narrow version of this history, 'patriotic history', is being used by ZANU PF in an attempt to achieve hegemony. It has proven that Zimbabwe as a nation is being held hostage to its liberation history, where the younger generation are dictated to in heritage terms, and not given a chance to formulate their own relationship to history and/or heritage. The chapter gives evidence of the way in which ZANU PF is intolerant of opposition, and how it uses its biased war credentials to discredit anyone else who does not have liberation history. At that rate, the new generation has no chance and is forced to abandon their political dreams as they cannot re-fight a war that no longer exists, to merely obtain war credentials.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 JOSHUA NKOMO'S REAPPROPRIATION INTO PATRIOTIC NARRATIVES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams (2010) have explored the different identities that have been ascribed to Joshua Nkomo since the time of the liberation struggle to date, since his death. They argue that at different stages in his life, it has either been that he bestowed upon himself an identity, or other political interest group did. Their argument is also that his posthumously gained identity was mainly an attempt by ZANU PF to reinvokethe past in the present and make Nkomo's legacy part of the patriotic narrative. Borrowing from these ideas, the chapter seeks to examine more recent discourses on the attempt to rewrite Nkomo into patriotic history. Nkomo's autobiography, *Nkomo, the story of my life* (1984), provided a useful insight on this topic, as it gave a good backdrop against which to compare Nkomo's narrative as forwarded by ZANU PF today, and his story from the horse's mouth (through the autobiography).

This chapter explores the different identities that have been ascribed to Joshua Nkomo from the days before independence to date. It attempts to locate the reasons for Nkomo's shifting identity in the context of ZANU PF's patriotic agenda, and argues that the party is constantly manipulating the memory and legacy of Joshua Nkomo to advance its own political agendas. The chapter argues that Nkomo's re-appropriated identity goes beyond just the need to honour a hero, but is rather heavily intertwined with postcolonial politics and ZANU PF's quest to build a master narrative that garners political legitimacy. In this chapter, I draw on the work of Fontein (2010) and agree that the symbolism of bones play a peculiar role in Zimbabwe's postcolonial imagination. To that effect, I argue that the bones and legacy of Nkomo are being used or abused by the ruling party so as to build a falsified picture of unity between Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, appealing to those who support Nkomo to sympathise with ZANU PF party politics.

I argue that Nkomo's legacy is actively used by ZANU PF to drive its version of a 'patriotic history', and I aim to examine the way in which the memory of Nkomo's legacy is constantly narrowed, invented and re-invented so as to suit whatever objective appears on ZANU PF's table. The chapter is aligned to Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams' (2010 p 193) argument that "the prominent place of history in the Zimbabwe of the early 2000s is thus demonstrated by the state's instrumentalisation and simplification of history, the broadcasting of a narrow form of 'patriotic history'". In that context, I argue that the history and legacy of Nkomo has been narrowed and oversimplified. This official narrative ignores all the tension between Mugabe's ZANLA and Nkomo's ZIPRA forces during the liberation war. It ignores what happened during "Gukurahundi" and the fact that the massacre happened as a result of what seemed like irreconcilable differences between the two nationalist leaders. The narrative even ignores the fact that even after independence; Nkomo was obliged to go into exile, claiming that Mugabe was hunting him like an animal (Nkomo 1984). The official history of Zimbabwe today all but ignores the very fact that Mugabe hounded Nkomo while he was alive. Instead, the narrative portrays a united front between Mugabe and Nkomo, and this chapter argues that this is a deliberate obfuscation, through which the ruling party stands to benefit politically.

To do this, it is imperative that the chapter explore the different identities assumed by Nkomo throughout his political career, which I argue did not end with his death, but continued thereafter. A text and content analysis of Mugabe's speeches concerning Nkomo will also be carried out, as this will help to explore how these changed with time, from "hate speech" during and after the liberation war to "praise speech" after his death. These narratives will be contrasted with Nkomo's own narrative, given through his autobiography (Nkomo, 1984), which seem to portray a totally different relationship to that portrayed in the ZANUPF narrative. I draw on the work of Vambe (2009), where he argues that Nkomo's autobiography is more than just a self-representation, but rather, comes off as part of his own political positioning. Although the

biography fails to be objective in self-representing, and, as Vambe argues, Nkomo seems to be telling Mugabe's story rather than his own, what is significant to this research is the fact that Nkomo's story paints a picture of deeply rooted hatred between Mugabe and himself. One begins to question then why Mugabe and his ZANU PF members would want to sugar-coat that, and portray unity where there was none. Of importance is the fact that Nkomo's autobiography openly challenges Zimbabwe's official history.

4.2 Nkomo, the 'Father of Zimbabwe': An inscription into patriotic history

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams (2010) give a clear account of the different identities assumed by Nkomo at different stages in his life. They argue that at a time when ZANU PF made efforts to portray Nkomo as a weak and compromising figure, he himself, through his autobiography, bestowed upon himself the title of "Father Zimbabwe", arguing that he had "fathered" the nation. They argue that although Nkomo's representation through the eyes of ZANU PF had undergone substantial adjustment after he signed the unity accord, the subsequent glorification of Nkomo's legacy was reinforced after his death. The following section focuses on giving evidence of this change, as well as arguing for how controversial the change was.

Joshua Nkomo's death on the 1st of July 1999 was both a sad and opportunistic happening for different people. To his family, they had truly lost a father, but to certain political forces, what they saw was an opportunity to gain political mileage.

Following the burial of Nkomo, Mugabe is on record as addressing the nation, arguing that Nkomo's story is, "...in large measure the story of our nation, yes, the story of you and me as our destiny took a painful and torturous meander towards self-rule and full nationhood"(cited in *The Herald*, 10 July, 1999).

Of particular interest to this research is not the fact that Mugabe showered Nkomo with praise,

but the irony in the claim that Nkomo's story is the 'story of the nation'. One begins to wonder, as Vambe (2009) has questioned, what Nkomo's story really is, is it the one presented in his autobiography, where he undermines Mugabe's reputation, or the one the nation was yet to hear from ZANU PF following his death? If Nkomo's story is to be interpreted as the one presented in his autobiography, then Mugabe, in his effort to re-appropriate Nkomo, acknowledged that the official narrative is based more on myth than fact (Lowenthal, 1998). It is then quite clear that what Nkomo claims to be his story in the autobiography, and what ZANU PF and Mugabe want to portray as his story, are two totally different narratives. Here, it becomes apparent that from the moment Nkomo died, ZANU PF embarked on a project of erasing Nkomo's narrative, and the narratives of so many different people, who had interacted with Nkomo on different levels. Surely, Nkomo had meant different things to different people: a father, a husband, a brother, a leader, a friend, a foe etc. It then becomes difficult for 'Nkomo's story' to follow a single narrative arc, or to be so representative of the nation as to become the story of the nation. This gives evidence that ZANU PF, through Nkomo's 'story' and many others presented in patriotic history, forces on the nation what Rowlands (2006) refers to as selective remembering.

Considering the bad blood between Nkomo and Mugabe, it was surprising when Mugabe acknowledged Joshua Nkomo's contribution to the liberation struggle, by saying "the mountain has fallen... it is a loss so keenly felt by all of us, by all Zimbabweans who saw in the Vice President a father figure, a founder of our nation. The giant has fallen and the nation mourns" (cited in *The Zimbabwe News*, 1999).

The description of Joshua Nkomo as a mountain reveals something about the way that Robert Mugabe regarded Joshua Nkomo in death. The description of Nkomo as a mountain contrasts with the way in which he was demonised in the 1980s. For instance, Nkala is on record saying

about Nkomo and his party that “they contributed in their small way and we have given them a share proportional to their contribution” (cited in *The Herald*, 1980).

His posthumous identity as a ‘mountain’ contrasts with his “small contribution” during the liberation war. A mountain is something that is gigantic. How, then, does someone whose contribution was so small, or insignificant, become equated with a mountain.

A few days after his death, The Zimbabwe news carried the following editorial column:

The death of Cde Joshua Nkomo must give birth to national rededication to those ideals that made him a national hero. To act otherwise would be a betrayal of not only Cde Joshua Nkomo, but of all those whose footsteps in which he walked, such as Ambuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi, Umzilikazi kaMatshobana and Lobengula the Great (cited in *The Zimbabwe News*, 1999).

This editorial in Zimbabwe news is a clear indication of the re-appropriation of Joshua Nkomo’s identity. It shows how he began to be inscribed into patriotic history. For the first time, we see Nkomo put in the same league with names such as Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi, who are attributed to having played a major role in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe. Mugabe and ZANU PF have used the legacy of Mbuya Nehanda to become associated with political legitimacy, as they claim direct lineage with these legends. Nkomo’s association with these two is a huge shift in his ascribed identity.

If Mugabe’s claim that he is the legitimate leader of Zimbabwe, heir apparent to Ambuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi are anything to go by, Nkomo’s association with the two

automatically suggests that he shares the same ideologies with Mugabe. Rhetorically, for ZANU PF, if Nkomo shared the same dream with Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi, by inference this means that he shared the same dream with Mugabe. By portraying him in such a way, Mugabe and ZANU PF seize the moment to have rally behind them all those who supported and believed in Nkomo's dreams.

Two days after Nkomo's burial, Mugabe did something very unusual. He reappeared on National Television, and addressed the nation as follows:

I come back to thank you and pay tribute to you for the moving and overwhelming show of oneness and empathy you all demonstrated as our nation went through a difficult and painful moment of acknowledging the passing away of one so great and loving, one whose life's story is in large measure the story of our nation, yes the story of you and me as our destiny took a painful and tortuous meander towards self-rule and full nationhood.. I was humbled to hear your mournful sobs and plaintive cries, to see grief's etches on the face of our stricken nation , as Zimbabwean's –men and Women, Young and old, rural and urban, Ndebele, Shona, this or that political grouping, this or that religious creed, all expressing spontaneously outpouring of deep grief over the passing of our great hero (cited in *The Zimbabwe News*, 1999).

This speech marked the official beginning of re-imagination of the Zimbabwean nation on the basis of Joshua Nkomo's career. In his personal autobiography, Joshua Nkomo accuses Mugabe of having fanned the fires of tribalism and resentment against him and labelled him "Zimundeverere" (useless Ndebele man) (Nkomo, 1984).It is interesting to note then how, in his

speech, Mugabe denies the very basis of his conflicts with Joshua Nkomo which was mainly on tribal grounds, where he stated, “as Zimbabweans – men and women, young and old, rural and urban, Ndebele, Shona, ‘this or that’ political grouping, ‘this or that’ religious creed, all expressing spontaneously outpouring of deep grief over the passing of our great hero” (cited in *The Zimbabwe News*, 1999).

This is a clear attempt by Mugabe and ZANU PF to use Joshua Nkomo’s death to bridge the tribal gap and get rid of all hatred and rivalry between the Shona and the Ndebele, and by so doing, to ensure that they rally the Ndebele behind them in the upcoming election year. He also equates Nkomo’s life story with the story of the nation. In so doing, we begin to see Mugabe thrusting upon Nkomo the title of fatherhood upon the nation. He portrays Nkomo as a visionary of national unity, and in so doing, reiterates ZANU PF’s dominance of Zimbabwe’s political scene. It is rather ironic to see Mugabe’s willingness in acknowledging Nkomo’s contribution to the process of becoming Zimbabwe taking into consideration that in the 1970s, Mugabe strongly believed ZANU PF to be the sole carrier of the “burden of history enjoying the oracular blessing of Nehanda and Kaguvu” (Mugabe, 1978). During the same period, Mugabe addressed the people of Matabeleland thus: “do not be afraid that my government will neglect you now that your great leader is gone, my government will treat Matabeleland just as it did when Mr. Nkomo was alive” (cited in *The Guardian*, 1999). His comment was clearly meant to lull the people of Matabeleland into believing that Mugabe had their best interest at heart. However, the comment failed to achieve this purpose, as it was met with hostility. One online comment in response to this said, “Mugabe hounded Nkomo while he was alive and his government has starved Matabeleland of development so that it is the poorest and most backward part of Zimbabwe, so being treated the way we were treated when Umdala wethu was still alive is exactly what we are afraid of” (cited in *The Guardian*, 1999).

This comment is suggestive of the bad blood that existed between Mugabe and Nkomo, which undermined development in his home province. This picture is in clear contrast to the relationship that Mugabe since tried to portray, a narrative conflict suggestive of ZANU PF's attempt to dictate memories and impose selective remembering (Rowlands, 2006).

The charade to re-write Nkomo's legacy did not end there, as ZANU PF went on to declare a gala and even to erect a memorial statue of Nkomo.

4.3 Of Politicised Biras and Galas: The Umdala wethu Gala

In 2001, after ZANU PF had faced its first ever historic defeat by the opposition MDC, the government introduced a musical gala in Joshua Nkomo's honour, which was famously dubbed "The Umdala Wethu Gala" (Our dear old man gala). This celebration emphasised the aspect of national unity, as Joshua Nkomo was represented as a symbol of national unity because he signed the Unity accord. The timing of the gala was strategic taking into consideration that ZANU PF had just lost major parliamentary seats to the opposition party. One begins to question why the gala did not start in 1999, soon after Nkomo's death, or in 2000, the year following. Why was it only thought of after the historic defeat of ZANU PF? In the face of a storm, it seems that Mugabe and ZANU PF once again tried to conjure the spirit of Joshua Nkomo from the grave to their own political benefit, by introducing a gala that would, once again, bring the people together, bridge tribal gaps, and create the public impression that ZANU PF was there to fulfil Nkomo's dream, where anyone against ZANU PF was mocking the memory of a man who was known as "Father of Zimbabwe" (Muchemwa, 2010).

4.4 The Erection of Joshua Nkomo's statue: A platform for ZANU PF'S politicking

The official unveiling of the Joshua Nkomo statue was held on the 22nd of December 2013, coinciding with the unity day celebrations, which commemorated the signing of the Unity accord between Mugabe's ZANU and Nkomo's ZAPU to form the Patriotic Front ZANUPF. At the official opening ceremony, Mugabe started by showering praises to the late Joshua Nkomo, portraying him as a man who had the nation at heart, and who was thus deserving of the title father Zimbabwe.

It is important to note the setting and the audience on this day. The official unveiling was held in Bulawayo, at the site where the memorial statue has been raised. Against that background, one can assume that the crowd mainly constituted of people from Bulawayo. The political history of Zimbabwe has it that Mugabe is very unpopular in Bulawayo, as a result of the Gukurahundi Massacre. In the July 2013 elections, Mugabe's ZANU PF failed to gain a single seat in parliament in Bulawayo Province. It is also important to remember that Bulawayo province is passionate about the legacy of Joshua Nkomo, and has always recognised him as their true leader, instead of Robert Mugabe.

It is thereby easy to interpret Mugabe's treatment of Nkomo as an attempt to reach out to the Ndebele ethnic group that he savagely abused during the Gukurahundi massacre. This section will attempt to dissect Mugabe's speech on this function, as well as to attach to it possible meanings, and to explore what ZANU PF possibly intended to achieve during the function.

After showering Nkomo with praises and portraying him as a true "father of the nation", well deserving of having a memorial statue erected in his name, Mugabe deviated from the tabled agenda as he went on to say: "how could we not claim back our land, the land which Umdala wethu had fought for, for most of his life? Taking back the land would be one sure way of making Mdala wethu roll with joy in his grave". (Mugabe 2013)

Here, Mugabe cleverly raises the land issue at a platform where land was not part of the agenda.

He attempts to justify it by suggesting that Joshua Nkomo fought for the land, and hence, that he would have been disappointed had the land not been given back to the majority black people. Here he implies that the land grab was not just his idea, but rather, was carried out to make sure that Joshua Nkomo had not fought in vain. By suggesting this to be the case, Mugabe probably intended to remind the province that he and Nkomo had fought for the same cause, and hence, by betraying his hegemony, the province was also betraying Nkomo. It possibly was an appeal to the province to support him, and he did so by appealing to their memories of Joshua Nkomo.

His statement that taking back the land would make “Umdala wethu roll with joy in his grave”, has indirect implications that at the present moment, Joshua Nkomo, is angry with the Ndebele people for failing to rally behind Mugabe during the land grab as well as thereafter. Here, he attempts to appeal to their loyalty for Nkomo, and somehow suggests that loyalty to Nkomo should automatically translate to loyalty for Mugabe. It is important to bear in mind that traditional Zimbabwean culture believes in rites of passage, one of which holds death not as the end of life, but a passage into something greater than life, where the dead have vast powers to control the lives of the living, and where it is therefore of value to appease the ‘living dead’. There is also the belief that the ancestors know better than the living. Equipped with that knowledge, Mugabe makes reference to Nkomo’s happiness in the grave. Here, Gramsci’s argument that the general public are manipulated into seeing the views of the hegemony as their own. To do that, Mugabe conjures Nkomo’s spirit from the dead.

He further on went to say: “...the man whose statue we are unveiling today has always had the land issue at his heart. He was “Mwana Wevhu, Son of the soil”. Umdala Wethu’s deathbed message remains vivid to me, to this day. He told me to continue the land reform programme and maintain the unity of the people.” (Mugabe 2013)

In this statement, we see Mugabe reiterating the importance of the land reform programme to Nkomo. Most importantly however, is Mugabe’s attempt to paint a picture where he and Nkomo

are very close, close enough that he, Mugabe, is the one who was sitting at Nkomo's deathbed and got his last testimonial will. This, however, stands in contrast to the true nature of their relationship as portrayed by Nkomo (1984) in his autobiography *The Story of My Life*. Mugabe hated Nkomo so much that it is alleged that when he was offered a seat by Julius Nyerere in his office where he met Nkomo months before, he is alleged to have said: "if you think I'm going to sit right where that fat bastard just sat, you'll have to think again" (cited in Geoff 2003). It is thus possible to question Mugabe's true agenda in trying to posthumously befriend his lifelong enemy as he says in his speech; "Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo was my co-partner in the unity accord which assured unity and peace in Zimbabwe" (Mugabe 2013)

He then goes on to talk about how he had asked Nkomo to assume the role of presidency, and that he refused: "I sent another delegation, he said no. I sent a third delegation, again he said no. I wanted him to be the president while I was the prime minister." (Mugabe 2013)

This speech seems intended to show Mugabe's magnanimity, and his desire to work with Nkomo. Not once does he talk about the Gukurahundi massacre, or how they hunted Nkomo when they regarded him as a dissident leader during that time. In this speech, Mugabe refers to Nkomo as a unifier, but up to now he has not apologised for the Gukurahundi massacre. His intention here is to emotionally blackmail the Ndebele people, by pointing out that if they are truly loyal to Nkomo's memories, then they should remain loyal to the unity accord signed by Nkomo, and the way to do so is to rally behind ZANU PF, instead of any other opposition party.

He further went on to say:

"The statue and the renamed street allow us to continuously reflect on where we stand as a nation; also to introspect on what we are doing as people, vis-à-vis what Dr Joshua Nkomo stood for" (Mugabe 2013)

Mugabe in this speech gives his audience a heavily edited history lesson, where his relationship

with Nkomo is constructed. After that he then asks his audience to reflect on their actions, especially their political actions, and measure them against Joshua Nkomo's ideology. Here, he indirectly suggests that all those who are supporting the opposition or breaking away from ZANU PF are not being true to the memories of the 'Father of Zimbabwe'.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, despite indications by Ndlovu-Gatheni and Willems (2010), that Mugabe hounded Nkomo while he was still alive, efforts were made to inculcate him into 'patriotic history'. His heritage and legacy were re-written to give the picture of a united front between Mugabe and Nkomo. However, the chapter points to inconsistencies in the relationship of the two leaders, and questions Mugabe's agenda in re-appropriating Nkomo. This chapter has shown that Nkomo's legacy was, and is, still being used by ZANU PF to gain political legitimacy, and to convince Nkomo's sympathisers that he and the late leader shared the same ideologies.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the research report and gives major conclusion to the research. It reviews the problem and the purpose of the study, as well as the major findings and how they relate to the heritage-politics-identity nexus. This research report is an investigation into how heritage has been manipulated for political gains in Zimbabwe.

The research has used Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explore how heritage is being used in contemporary Zimbabwe for political gains. In his theory, Gramsci argues that in order for a group to become the hegemony, it has at its disposal the tool of coercion or the means of obtaining consent through persuasion. He argues that hegemony cannot be obtained entirely through physical force. Borrowing from Gramsci's theory, this research has supported arguments by scholars like Ranger (2004) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), who have put forward the argument that ZANU PF's ability to cling on to power since 1980 is not entirely because of its use of physical force, but through coercion, achieved through their mobilisation of cultural heritage. This research report has gone a step further, and explored more contemporary examples as to how ZANU PF is mobilising cultural heritage to gain political legitimacy.

It goes further to explore the theory of the 'foundation myth' put forward by Marschall (2005). In this theory, Marschall (2005) argues for the idea that every new political order has to form a group identity through a process of selective remembering and the invention of a usable past.

Her argument is that every new nation needs a 'founding moment' that defines it and that this founding moment heavily relies on the process of selective remembering. What Marschall implies is that a group identity cannot be formed unless all members in that group have the same belief on their origins. However, that kind of consensus is not always the case, and individuals normally have different individual stories. Marschall argues then that it is imperative that these individual narratives be put aside and the nation be given one narrative that defines who they are as a nation. In her argument, she clearly postulates that this narrative does not necessarily need to be true hence her use of the term 'invention of a usable past'. This implies that the people in power are selective of a narrative that suits their agenda and works in their favour. In her theory, Marschall introduces the concept of the 'master-narrative', which is a single and narrow but dominant narrative that prevails at the expense of several plural narratives. Marschall's (2005) theory on the foundation myth is used in this research to support the arguments that the Chimurenga monologue has largely been used as Zimbabwe's 'foundation myth'.

In arguing that the Chimurenga monologue is being used as the 'foundation myth' of Zimbabwe, the research turned to Ranger (2004) and his formulation of 'patriotic history'. In his argument, Ranger asserts that 'patriotic history' is a new form of history, which is narrow, and regards as irrelevant any history that is not political. He further asserts that 'patriotic history' is intended to ensure the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary traditions. The research used Ranger's theory of 'patriotic history' to argue that there is a new form of history in Zimbabwe, which has a single master narrative, which is not reflective of the smaller individual stories. It uses this argument to support claims made by other scholars that ZANU PF's stay in power is not solely dependent on its use of violence, but can also be attributed to its ability to mobilise cultural heritage and history to its advantage.

5.2 Discussion

Scholars like Ranger (2004), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2005, 2006, 2009, 2011), Muzondidya (2010), and

Mlambo (2010) have made arguments that ZANU PF has at its disposal cultural heritage, history and memory space which it uses to gain and maintain political legitimacy, and this research has supported these arguments by giving more recent, up to date examples on how this has been achieved. The research has looked at evidence that dates between 2000 and 2013.

A textual analysis of speeches made by Mugabe and other ZANU PF officials was presented, and used as evidence of how the revolutionary party is using heritage for political advantages. The study provided analysis of these speeches, within critical discourse analysis approach. It emerged from the study that that Mugabe and ZANU PF almost always argue that they liberated Zimbabwe and that they are the true and legitimate rulers of the country. However, the way they sing the song varies with where they are, who their audiences are, what challenges they are facing at that time and most importantly, what they hope to achieve by reiterating the rhetoric.

This research argues that ZANU PF's patriotic narrative is not consistent, but rather is constantly being reviewed depending on the agenda at hand. A good example of this variation is shown in Chapter Four, where Joshua Nkomo, who was once regarded as the 'father of dissidents', acquired the title of 'Father Zimbabwe' on the grounds that he had agreed to sign the unity accord, which basically neutralised ZAPU's political power. His popularity as 'Father Zimbabwe' intensified after he had passed away, as ZANU PF struggled to gain popularity in Matabeleland, a region which was well known to sympathize with Nkomo.

The research casts Mugabe as a cunning politician, who knows how to read his crowd and twist the Chimurenga rhetoric in a way that would move a given crowd. For instance, during his star rally in Chiweshe, Mugabe took the liberty to remind people that Chiweshe is Mbuya Nehanda's province, and hence, Mugabe chose to play on the emotions of his crowd by questioning their loyalty to Mbuya Nehanda. However, Mugabe did not use the same Mbuya Nehanda rhetoric in Masvingo, but rather reminded the people of their oppression under colonial rule, and implied that voting for the MDC would take them back to that situation of oppression.

Mugabe's strength lies in his ability to create a strong link between himself, the ancestors and the chiefdom. The research argues that part of Mugabe's success is his ability to cast himself as the heir apparent to Mbuya Nehanda, Sekuru Kaguvi, Chaminuka, and all the other national ancestors. Zimbabwean history celebrates these ancestors as the first true heroes of Zimbabwe, who took the first steps in resisting colonial rule; it celebrates these ancestors as the founders of Zimbabwe. As a result, Mugabe's link to these ancestors presents him as the true and legitimate heir, who has the legal right to Zimbabwe's political power, as it is his inheritance.

The research goes further to examine ZANU PF's victory in the 2013 harmonised elections, and uses Masvingo's landslide victory as a case study. The landslide victory in Masvingo came as a surprise to most people, who thought that ZANU PF had lost popularity in the province. During the Masvingo star rally in 2013, Mugabe gave his crowd a history lesson, reminding them of the atrocities of colonialism, and ended up urging the province to go back to being a one-party province. Indeed, the election results turned Masvingo into a one party province with all parliamentary seats being won by ZANU PF candidates. ZANU PF's landslide victory might be inconceivable to many, taking into consideration the harsh socio-economic conditions that the country has experienced since the early nineties. However, I argue that people are still willing to trust in and vote for Mugabe, despite all this, because to them, he personifies the image of a man who dares speak and stand against the forces of oppression. His electoral campaign is almost always centred on a combination of liberation heritage and history and the anti-western rhetoric; and in the eyes of the electorate, Mugabe is the brave hero who is able to tell Tony Blair to "keep his England" so that he "keeps his Zimbabwe" (Mugabe, 2005). I argue that the liberation rhetoric has continued to work all the while, because some Zimbabwean citizens have failed to separate Mugabe as a person from the war of the liberation, and its gains. In its rhetoric, ZANU PF has successfully intertwined itself with the people and the nation. As a result, I argue that people willingly overlook Mugabe and ZANU PF's transgressions for the sake of protecting the

country, sovereignty as they are made to believe that betraying ZANU PF is synonymous with betraying the nation and reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. I have further argued that ZANU PF's rhetoric has worked thus far, because the party has managed to build a master narrative that portrays Mugabe as the 'father of the revolution'.

This research has argued that Mugabe and his ZANU PF have imposed the master-narrative on Zimbabwe, silenced the other narratives, twisted history and fed a distorted heritage to its people. All this in an attempt to achieve hegemony and assert political legitimacy. The years between 2000 to 2014 has borne witness to ZANU PF's ideological rhetoric, and the way in which it has been constructed, deconstructed, affirmed and reaffirmed, depending on the needs of the day. The argument is that ZANU PF's ideological master-narrative is flexible, and is constantly changing, especially in the face of serious political threats. Although these arguments have been presented before by other scholars (Kriger 2006, Raftopoulos 2003, Raftopoulos 2004, Mlambo 2010, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Williams 2010, and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003, 2005, 2011), what this report offers is an examination of the more recent discourse on this ideological master-narrative.

5.3 Conclusion

This paper has shown how heritage has, over the years, been used to foster a common national identity as well as how it has been manipulated for political purposes. There is strong evidence in the report of the fluid nature of heritage interpretation, and the way in which it is constantly in a state of 'becoming'. The paper explores how heritage has, as Rowland (2005) argues, been used as a point of departure for the formation of post-colonial Zimbabwe. There is evidence in the report that heritage has been used to create the 'foundation myth' of Zimbabwe as a nation, and hence, has been subjected to a process of selective remembering (Marschall, 2005), where the

public has been presented with one master-narrative that is exclusive and intolerant of all other narratives.

This narrative has elided Robert Mugabe with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle itself. The same narrative casts a picture where, without Mugabe, there would be no ZANU PF, and without ZANU PF, there would be no Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it argues that without ZANU PF, there would be no land.

It is quite evident from the research that Zimbabwe as a nation is rallied by ZANU PF's cry of 'we liberated you'. There seems to be a constant attempt to shape gods and heroes, who cannot be challenged because of the sacrifices they made towards the liberation of the country, where heritage is a major tool used in the construction of these gods.

During election campaigns, there is a tendency by politicians to constantly refer to their role in "the struggle". Surprisingly though, when the elections are over, the amount of people having experienced the struggle decreases. The research observed a trend in Zimbabwe, where the opposition parties are discredited, because they do not have a liberation history to fall back on. It is interesting to note how a Chimurenga language has found contest in post-independent Zimbabwe in the years around the turn of the millennium. The research argues that the political manipulation of heritage puts Zimbabwe at a risk, where the dominant party gains exclusive ownership of the ideals of the struggle, and where the new generation is forever held hostage to the country's liberation from colonialism. It is a question as to whether participation in the liberation struggle guarantees its leaders and movements the right to rule a country or society forever.

All the chapters put together basically argue that heritage is at the center of Zimbabwean politics and more often than not, is invented or re-invented in a way that favours the political party in power.

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