

Abstract:

This paper assesses the role of South Africa in the Burundian conflict between 1999-2004. This paper analyses the role of Third Party intervention and the role played by the international community in resolving the Burundian civil war. The main purpose of this research paper is to investigate the role played by external actors in African civil conflicts and in this case, specifically looking at South Africa's leading and challenging role in resolving the civil conflict in Burundi.

The research design that has been followed in this paper was a qualitative approach. This approach was utilised to collect information which is sensitive in nature so as to explain the circumstances surrounding the conflict and the resolution thereof. The information was then collected and then analysed to provide a qualitative explanation of the events that had occurred and issues surrounding Third Party intervention. Respondents were informed that their confidentiality of the interviews would be respected.

This investigation was guided by assessing South Africa's efforts in the management and facilitation of the peace process in Burundi in partnership with key external parties such as the UN, AU and Regional Initiative for Peace in Burundi. An assessment was also conducted around the limitations and the level of success encountered by South Africa's involvement in pursuit of diplomatic, political and military initiatives.

In the literature survey, conflict resolution, mediation and Third Party intervention forms the framework of this research paper.

This paper proves that South Africa played an instrumental part in the Burundi civil conflict, in which their participation, be it foreign policy initiatives, diplomatic efforts and military power or the central mediation role by South African president Nelson Mandela. This paper discusses that the Burundi conflict did not occur simply due to the animosity that existed between ethnic groups however this was a large contributing factor and the struggle for political power explains the root cause to the Burundi civil conflict and the manner in which politicians manipulated ethnicity, past injustices and policies of divide and rule as mechanisms and tools to gain power thus ensuring economic advantage at the expense of others.

Assessing the Role of South Africa in Burundi**Geevanayagi Pillay****TABLE OF CONTENTS:****CONTENTS PAGE**

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Chapter 1: Introduction

There is great importance especially on the rich and beautiful continent of Africa, in the times of increasing civil conflict to investigate the increasingly difficult role played by the interveners in Africa's contemporary civil conflicts by looking at the possibilities offered by a new world order and challenges experienced in addressing the conflicts and successful resolution thereof. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to examine, as far as possible, the impact of third party intervention in the case of South Africa's Peace Mission in Burundi between 1999 and 2004 through attempting to answer the following questions:

- What role did SA play in managing the Burundian peace process with key external partnerships such as the UN,AU and Regional Initiative for Burundi;
- To what extent, was SA's participation in the Burundi peace process successful and
- What were the limitations of SA's diplomatic, political and military involvement in resolving the Burundian civil conflict?

Taking into consideration, that increased opportunities and prospects for peace that arose after the end of the cold war, intra-state conflicts on the African continent increased in different dimensions such as scope, number and intensity of conflict. Hence, the need to investigate the challenging role played by interveners and looking at possibilities offered by the new world order and constraints in addressing the causes of the conflict. In order to find lasting resolution of a conflict, it is necessary to diagnose the root causes of the conflict. The root causes of the Burundi conflict have been mainly attributed to ethnic and regional discrimination, political and economic exclusion. In responding to these root causes, the key mediator of the Burundi conflict, Nelson Mandela with the assistance from the Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi and representatives from the UN and OAU designed a formula in which the issues of power sharing and reconciliation were to be addressed. This research paper examines and investigates the role played by external actors and the resolution of the Burundi conflict.

To define, the term "third party" makes reference to a person, usually acting on behalf of a bigger group of people who become involved in a conflict to assist the

disputing parties in coming to a kind of resolution. "Third party intervention does not always prevent or end violence...external involvement is more likely to lead to effective conflict management if it works to alter the perceptions of the antagonists and ensures that the parties truly own the peace" (De Maio, 2009). As was the case in South Africa's involvement in Burundi in which South Africa, as will be discussed later, was acting on behalf of a greater body or group of international actors.

Zartman (1991:299) maintains that, conflict can be "prevented" in some instances and "managed" in others, but "resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories, and interests". Coser (1956:8) argues that conflict emerges from an "incompatibility" of goals or actions. So conflict reduction implies both the reduction of incompatibilities as well as the reconciliation of pursuits of these incompatibilities to peaceful or political means. Thus, I am in agreement that for effective conflict management to occur, the ends and means should be linked together for successful resolution. Zartman (1999:300) presented that since politics is the process of managing demands, poorly managed demands are likely to result in violence, therefore, conflict management short of dealing with the root causes of the violence, is less likely to be fruitful. I completely agree that for any effective effort to address conflict, it must focus on the root causes.

It must be acknowledged that mediation was South Africa's key diplomatic instrument in addressing the Burundi conflict, so literature on mediation was analysed and utilised as a component of conflict resolution and will be elaborated upon further. According to Saadia and Zartman, (1996:445-461) mediation is "a form of Third party intervention in conflict". It is different from other third party intervention as it does not directly rely on the usage of force and its focus is not to take sides in the conflict. Its purpose is in actual fact to reach a fair settlement to the conflict, which is agreeable to both parties.

In most cases, third party intervention functions through mediation or arbitration. It is important to acknowledge that in mediation, the third party only possesses control over the process and not the outcome. It is the purpose of the mediator to help the belligerents in conflict resolution but does not possess the power to impose a settlement. In arbitration, third parties have control over both the process and the

outcome. According to Thompson, (2001:322) warring factions or parties present their positions or final offer to third parties, who further possess the power to impose a solution. This research paper will discuss the extent of SA's role as a mediator in the Burundi civil conflict.

According to Rubin, (1999:3) negotiation is a method of settling conflict rather than resolving it. Rubin further argues that the focus of negotiation is not attitude change per se, but an agreement to change behaviour in ways that make settlement possible. Some of the most important work in this entire process takes place during the pre-negotiation phase of resolving a conflict. Rubin goes on to say (Rubin, 1999:7-8), it is during this phase that key parties to the conflict are identified and invited to participate and where critical issues are raised and prioritised to constitute an agenda, and that a formula which is to form the basis of the general agreement is designed. In light of this information, how did South Africa approach the warring factions and key parties associated with the Burundi conflict and thus enable them to come to the negotiating table from which they agreed to adopt the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi and the ceasefires?

For effective negotiation to prevail and stick, it requires constant follow ups and implementation according to the agreed timeframes. To reach an agreement through negotiation is insufficient in itself. Parties are thought to have the potential to spoil agreements unless their views are attended to by incorporating them and must be given full attention in order for a negotiated agreement is to succeed. It is also crucial to take into consideration the number and importance of parties to a negotiation: “the greater the number of parties to a negotiation, the more difficult it will be to reach any agreement at all. But only if the relevant parties and interests are included in the negotiations is the agreement likely to stick” (Rubin,1999:8) Taking this information into consideration, highlights the question of how and on what basis did the facilitators of the Burundi peace process go about excluding the rebel movements, who were obviously key stakeholders in the peace process, and whose interests were crucial in determining the success of the peace process?

Third Party roles can constitute various different roles for instance that of arbitration or mediation protagonists and it is necessary to understand what both of these entail. In a mediation role, the third party only possesses control over the process and not

the outcome. It is the purpose of the mediator to help the belligerents in conflict resolution but does not possess the power to impose a settlement. In arbitration, third parties have control over both the process and outcome. Parties present their positions or final offer to a third party, who possesses the power to impose a solution. (Leigh Thompson, 2001: 322)

With specific reference to South Africa's involvement in Burundi, the Third Party role that was undertaken included but was not limited to the role of the mediator. The specific person to take up this position was that of ex-South African President and worldwide humanitarian, Nelson Mandela and backed by an initially more cautious President Thabo Mbeki (Bentley & Southall, 2005: chapter 9) as it was also widely known that South Africa would hope to "play a leading role in conflict resolution in a variety of international and, regional and sub-regional forums, and that the country will become an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international conflicts". (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998: pp 1-2). When former South African President Nelson Mandela was appointed as chief negotiator, this indeed marked the beginning of South Africa's involvement in the peace process (Boschoff, Vrey and Rautenbach, 2010; Svensson, 1998).¹

Essentially, the Third Party Intervention in Burundi occurred in the hopes of resolving the conflict that plagued the unstable state. Conflict resolution is facilitated by a "ripe moment, defined in terms of escalation that can be best understood in the context of policy alternatives...the mediator needs both to find a formula that meets the parties' demands and also manipulate the conflict – verbally or materially – in order to mediate effectively." (Zartman, 1989: 255) That is, in order to come out of a successful mediation, South Africa needed to consider what had caused the initial conflict and how it had come as far as to become a civil war. In addition to this, South Africa in the mediation role as well as the other members of intervening bodies needed to weigh up what conflicting parties were demanding at the negotiation table. As will be further elaborated on, it is the inference here that South Africa had indeed done all the above and considered the demands of the conflicting parties in the Burundi conflict. Mandela had addressed and welcomed parties to negotiate, considering what their demands were, but later continued without one of the rebel

¹ Mandela was later replaced as chief negotiator by Jacob Zuma, who was South Africa's Vice-President at the time (Boschoff, Vrey and Rautenbach, 2010).

movements as they had continuously been opposing any real progress towards peace. It is here important to consider that any external parties attempting to address conflict by helping belligerent parties refocus their energies must not only consider its own interests, but the “dynamics of the parties”.(Zartman, 1989: 255) Conflict resolution is effectively done in “concert”. Efforts are more successful if coordinated and collaborated. The search for the solution to the Burundi civil conflict was done in “concert”, then the question that arise is that how did SA manage this coordination and to provide a more acceptable outcome to the warring parties?

What needs to be discussed is South Africa’s involvement in a continuously evolving peace process that begun in Arusha, Tanzania in 1996 which offered an opportunity for Burundi to break out of the zero-sum game that has characterized its political and social life since shortly after independence (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 1).

Factors that will also be considered as gravely important in the evaluation of South Africa’s role as a third party interventionist are the following due to the impact it was seen to have had on reaching a ceasefire in the Burundi Crisis:

- The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was not signed by the two major conflicting parties, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), though the former later acceded to the Agreement. This non-inclusive action has hindered the peace implementation programs which have been infiltrated by FNL.
- The AU did not seek consent from FNL and FDD in constituting the mission in Burundi. This increasingly undermined the ceasefire and put the peace process in jeopardy. (Kent, Malan et al, 2000:1)

Due to the above contributing factors, this fell short of a peacekeeping mission because a traditional peacekeeping mission is where a ceasefire agreement is signed by warring parties is only meant to create a secure environment for the peacekeeping force to ensure that peace prevails between the hostile parties whilst negotiations are taking place to resolve the conflict. The Burundian conflict displays the absence of a ceasefire agreement thereby creating an insecure environment for Third Party Intervention. Thus, the need for this research to investigate the leading

role of South Africa's diplomatic efforts in trying to resolve the conflict and bring about peace in Burundi.

Action and urgency to intervene in the Burundian conflict led South Africa to appoint Nelson Mandela as the key mediator with the assistance of representatives from the UN, AU and Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi who were responsible to design a formula which the issues of power sharing and reconciliation were to be addressed. This culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement for Burundi was signed by 19 Burundian parties but excluded the signing and negotiation of the rebel movements such as that of the FNL and the FDD, two extremely significant parties in the Burundi civil conflict. What the Arusha agreement aimed to achieve was the creation of a system and set of legislature, rules and regulatory mechanisms which would assist in the quest for a country that was free of genocide and other gross human rights violations such as the ones that had been on-going since just after its independence. Arusha aimed to create legislation that would achieve a state of peace and political and economic stability, a system that would allow for prevalence of law and a reliable justice system and mainly ethnic diversity and unity without the consequence of civil war. It was agreed upon that the best way to achieve this would be the creation of a "transitional Government of National Unity", (United States Institute of Peace Library) this government would comprise of a proportion of representatives, that being 60 % Hutu and 40% Tutsi. There would also be a president, transitional as the Government was, that would change every 18 months.

One of the main issues with this transitional government came in the nomination of members for the National Assembly which belonged to parties which had not formerly been included. At this time, a vast majority of the population, at the very least those represented in the National Assembly previously, were Hutus. This would therefore, not have been a move towards ethnic equality nor the embracing of ethnic differences but would surely be the cause of further conflict and political instability. It is here important to note that in order to evade the clasps of future genocide and crimes against humanity, what needed to be addressed in Burundi, was their social dynamics, which in this case would be their ethnic clashes. Ethnic stability was a matter of extreme importance.

Despite the signing of the Arusha peace agreement which came with great hopes of ceasefire, the civil war continued well after its signing in 2000, to the extent that it spread into its neighbouring state, the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, there was a growing need for international intervention, especially since the changing thoughts on international intervention and state sovereignty, which will be discussed in greater detail later.

In addition to the Arusha peace Agreement signed in August of 2000, there was also a power sharing deal, signed in October of 2003, both inviting all related parties to join in the negotiations and later, reap in the benefits of a stable nation.

As will be discussed in greater detail, the fact that the mediation by Nelson Mandela and the exclusion of key rebel movements, in the Arusha Agreement proved to be something of dire consequences. The Arusha agreement was signed only by politicians and not by armed forces such as the FDD and FNL, parties that played almost central roles in the crisis. It was also thought that in Mandela's hurry to get the peace agreement signed, was where they lacked the finer to details which could have ensured the success and sustenance of a ceasefire. On the other hand however, it needs to also be questioned whether delaying the signing of the agreement would have helped at all. (Dludlu, 2001) The Arusha Agreement may not have produced its desired outcome at first, but it certainly provided the means and motivation to ensure that Burundi was on the path to achieving the desired outcome. Furthermore, in terms of the power sharing deal, it did not always bring real sharing of power, rather more power for one than the other.

To gain some perspective, in the case of Burundi, much like its better-known neighbour to the north, Rwanda, the state has been greatly affected by violence between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in which some 300,000 people have died as a result since its independence in 1962 (Insight on Conflict). Rwanda and Burundi became independent from the colonial influence of Belgium as separate countries, despite the fact that they were both ethnically and culturally united, one of the common consequences of the Berlin Conference. Burundi's first government was controlled by Tutsi while the first Rwandan government was Hutu. (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi) The war in Burundi has claimed more than 200,000 lives and has been continuously identified by gross daily violations of international

humanitarian law including that of killings, rape, and torture of civilians, the use of child soldiers, and the forced displacement of populations (Nowrojee: 2004:6).

Three years after independence in Burundi, in 1965, Multi-ethnic government was broken down during the first elections after Hutu politicians won control of both houses of parliament. King Mwambutsa abolished the legislature before parliament could meet and the Hutu-dominated army revolted. The army coup was crushed by Tutsi officers led by Michel Micombero. King Mwambutsa IV fled the country and his son Ntare V assumed power (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi).

10 years after independence, in 1973, Burundi housed riots that killed 2000 top Tutsi officials and martial law was declared. Educated Hutu's were targeted and between 80,000 and 500,000 were killed, while more than 100,000 Hutu's fled to neighbouring countries and did not return. At the same time, France, China and Libya had increased their military aid to the Burundi government, and a report by the *International Commission of Jurists* and the *International League of the Rights of Man* identified systematic human rights abuses by the government against Hutu citizens (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi).

In 1988, floods of Hutu's were massacred by Tutsi's and thousands more fled to Rwanda. Ethnic violence increased in Burundi when the army killed 5-25,000 Hutu's in retaliation for murders of several Tutsi in the north. Roughly 60,000 Hutu's fled to Rwanda and another 100,000 became internally displaced persons in Burundi (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi).

In 1993, a new constitution in Burundi allowed for the possibility of multi-party elections, however, these elections failed to occur owing to the further violence which broke out, and about 175,000 refugees fled from Burundi into Rwanda. In June of that year, Melchior Ndadaye's Frodebu won multi-party polls, ending military rule and leading to the installation of a pro-Hutu government. Later that year however, Tutsi soldiers assassinated President Ndadaye. In revenge, some Frodebu members massacred Tutsis and the army began its reprisals. Burundi was plunged further into an ethnic conflict which claimed some 300,000 lives... and so began Burundi's full blown conflict (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi).

In August of 1995, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution (1012), to address the violations of international humanitarian law in Burundi, however, by February of 1996, the violence in Burundi had worsened and it was feared that a full out civil war and genocide were on the cards for the Central African state and intervening parties had to consider the possibilities of a military intervention (Bentley & Southall, 2005). The UN Security Council resolution was as such found to be inefficient in dealing with the crisis at hand owing to the fact that none of the four principles mentioned above were truly achieved, nor did the ethnic conflict come to an end with the passing of this UN Security Council resolution.

In August of 1996, the last 2 commercial flights left Burundi as the outside world tightened sanctions to punish the new military regime as violence continued. Following the Burundi coup of July 25, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere led East African leaders to impose sanctions on Burundi and force Buyoya to restore democratic rule and in July of 1999, peace talks in Burundi ended in a deadlock (Timeline of Events in Rwanda and Burundi). In addition to the distress caused by continued security issues following the 1996 coup d'état which brought President Buyoya back to power, Burundi has been subject to an embargo by neighbouring countries. The embargo was suspended on January 23, 1999 (Burundi Poverty Note).

What one would usually think would universally be seen as a gross violation of human rights and a need for intervention by the UN, it is here hugely important to attempt to understand why the resolution was unsuccessful and lacked the support from the international community. As was seen in the grave failure of the UN to act in prevention of the Rwandan genocide, and what can further be seen as a vast unwillingness for the international community to barge into any Central African issues, there were certain factors which limited the UN's ability to become involved: Firstly, the UN is constrained by the unwillingness of the US to become involved in far off African dilemma(s) especially following the outcomes and new approaches which came with the end of the Cold War (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 7) and following their adoption of almost a complete non-intervention policy, the US were not at the forefront of international conflict but rather playing in their own backyards.

Secondly, there is a kind of quiet recognition lying to the fact that France had regarded French speaking African states, Rwanda and Burundi as being within its particular sphere of influence, a further reason for US hesitancy (Bentley & Southall, 2005:7).

Thirdly, as mentioned above, what the Rwandan genocide has revealed is that the UN appears to be more than happy to allow the interrelated issues of Burundi and Rwanda completely at the hands of Africa itself. "US, UN and EU regard South Africa as having a leading role to play in brokering agreements, which will bring peace and democracy as part and parcel of its responsibility as the emerging regional power (or hegemon) in Eastern and Southern Africa", (Bentley & Southall, 2005:7) as indeed it was South Africa's intention to play a leading role both in the Burundi conflict and other African conflicts, especially emerging from Apartheid. As a result what one may notice of the mission in Burundi is the fact that the resolution of the conflict was a classic example of a region-led initiative supported by the AU, the UN and a high profile Facilitator, (Hon. Sam K. Kutesa, 2009) It was a conflict in which the role of external actors especially in the form of Third Party were seen to be of great importance.

Despite their conservatism in their involvement in Burundi, it is to be noted that there was UN presence within the country. In October of 1999, Hutu rebels attacked a UN humanitarian convoy and killed nine people. It was at this time reported that some 500 people a day were leaving Burundi fleeing to neighbouring countries owing to the growing violence and conflict (Timeline of events in Burundi). It was in this year, six years into the civil conflict in Burundi that African leaders nominated South African President Nelson Mandela to take on a mediatory position and interventionist role in Burundi.

By 2000, Nelson Mandela addressed peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, and reprimanded the leaders of Burundi for having failed their people and all of Africa. International pressure ensured the dismantling of 6 of nearly 60 camps holding Hutu civilians and President Buyoya had begun to make concession to end the war. He agreed to integrate the Tutsi-led army and to close down the regroupment camps by July 31st of the same year (Timeline of events in Burundi).

Days before it was promised that these camps would be closed, it was these very camps that were the causes of death of 53 Burundi civilians who were killed when they refused to go to these regroupment camps. In 2001 President Buyoya survived a coup attempt by Tutsi soldiers and sealed a power-sharing agreement with Hutu politicians. The Arusha accord called for Buyoya to lead for 18 months followed by a Hutu president for another 18 months with elections to follow (Timeline of events in Burundi) , forming a negotiation with more of a flare for fair governance.

In 2002, Buyoya and Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the main faction of the Forces for the Defence of Democracy, or FDD, agreed to a cease-fire leaving only one rebel group fighting in a conflict that has killed more than 200,000 people. By 2003 Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa had sent 3500 peacekeepers to enforce a truce which would end almost 10 years of civil war (Timeline of events in Burundi).

In 2003 the FDD which were the biggest Hutu rebel group, joined Burundi's transitional government. FNL rebels under Rwasa remained as a nuisance to the movement towards peace. Progress was made by 2004 when a national army was created out of former army and seven former rebel movements, which finally resulted in the new constitution and elections in Burundi which lead to a 2/3 (two-thirds) Hutu/Tutsi lead parliament (Timeline of events in Burundi).

In 1993, then special representative of the UN secretary general to Burundi, Mohammed Ould Abdallah, wrote a book entitled Burundi on the brink: a special envoy reflects on preventive diplomacy. More than a decade later Burundi was still 'on the brink' and required substantial peace building initiatives (Murithi, 2011:73).

Chapter 2: The Nature of Civil Conflicts in Africa and the Burundi Civil Conflict

“Africa has never experienced a lasting peace. Peace and stability proved elusive in pre-colonial Africa” (Mweti, 1999:537). The fragments of post-Cold war intra-conflicts in Africa has left lasting devastating effects, amongst many were the creation of massive refugees moving into neighbouring countries looking for stability and security, a situation that caused destabilisation in the sub-regional political and socio-economic sectors. Abubaker argues that conflicts that have occurred on the African Continent are classed by massive destruction and enormous magnitude”. Africa holds unenviable record of having more conflicts that any other continent in the world than any other continent in the world”(Abubaker,2001,p.2).

Africa is a continent rich in resources, cultural diversity and humanity which has often landed the continent the ill-fated fortune of being the object of many pursuers. As far back as 1884, during the Berlin Conference, what had come to be known as the scramble for Africa, this great continent was split on a map to be claimed by colonial powers, with little or no consideration for the occupants which inhabited these lands. This naturally formed the basis for much future conflict and civil war within the continent.

According to Brown (1996:25) there are three main structural factors which contribute to civil conflicts particularly in Africa, that is: 1) weak states, 2) intra-state security concerns and 3) ethnic geography. Similarly, one can consider there to be four main political reasons for internal civil conflicts: 1)discriminatory political institutions; 2)Exclusionary national ideologies; 3) inter-group politics; and 4)ethnic politics. Nathan (1999:3) states that there are a number of key factors which can be considered root causes of Africa’s civil conflicts including that of weak or failed states, authoritarian rule, lack of confidence between nation and state, the exclusion of minorities from governance as well acute social-economic deprivation and inequity.

During the Cold War, much of Africa was found to be the home of proxy wars between the two prominent world superpowers of the era. Even with the falling of the imperial influence and the gaining of independence in many countries in Africa, this history was not to be escaped and left Africa at risk of creating brittle states with little chance of real survival. At this time it is also important to note the prominence of

state sovereignty as well as the fact that the concept of non-intervention was one that was hardly contested. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, greater emphasis was placed on the commitment to the perpetuation of universal human rights. Despite the huge historical change that would affect the international system drastically, the Post-Cold War era did not bring about the expected outcome, in fact, the end of the Cold War did not bring about peace, but war and conflict. It was during this period that the amount of conflict and numbers of disputes which the United Nations had become involved in, in order to reach some kind of resolution, had increased. Post-Cold War conflict within Africa was on the rise, and as such was cause growing concern for international actors such as the United Nations, thus, it became an era of humanitarian intervention.

Since 1970, there have been roughly 30 wars fought on the continent of Africa alone, most of them being of a civil conflicts nature. This number fell to 12 by 1994 and where 14 had just emerged from devastating conflicts. It has therefore become apparent that states on the African continent were vulnerable to risk of civil conflicts owing to their backgrounds in colonialism which had created weak and economically and politically unstable states, or in some instances civil conflicts which overflow into neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, civil conflicts in Africa can not only be blamed solely on reasons relating to international actors, but rather needs to consider the factors which contribute to these wars specifically from within that country. In the case of Burundi, it would be ethnicity and cultural clashes.

The end of the Cold War marked the end of a historical era but changed the face of conflict. The end of the Cold War did not bring about peace, but instead war and conflict still prevailed. It introduced an era where the United Nations involvement in the resolution of disputes and conflict was on the increase. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, (1994: 403 – 406) stated that the response of the United Nations was seen to alleviate suffering and gross human rights violations inflicted on the civilian population and the involvement of the United Nations was to assist conflicting parties to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. During the Post-Cold War, the number of civil conflicts in Africa increased in number and intensity, and where a significant change in the conflict was noted. The conflicts spread rapidly with the potential to spread into neighbouring countries. The on-going civil conflict in Burundi has been continuous since the country's independence in 1962 which escalated into

a full blown conflict in 1993, at the end of the Cold War displacing hundreds of thousands Burundians and also threatening regional stability.

In the Post- Cold War era intra-state conflicts, spreading into neighbouring countries as it worsened created thousands of internally displaced persons and unstable and weak states right across the continent of Africa. As a result, these conflicts required the attention of both the international community and the regional authorities. However, due to the density of these civil conflicts, especially in the crimes which they are committing along the way, those of human rights violations and ethnic genocides, extreme levels of diplomacy and intervention would be required in an attempt to find a resolution to these conflicts.

Ngwane (1996:7) in his publication states that civil conflicts in Africa involve governance and democratic structure. These conflicts are informed by an individual states socio-political status, the states governance and leadership as well as its colonial legacy, which has proved to be of great importance even decades after the end of the rule of imperialist powers. In application, in Burundi, civil conflict was mainly due to the poor governance in the accommodation of all ethnic groups, much like South Africa's Apartheid to some extent. As South Africa currently exists as what the world fondly calls a "Rainbow Nation", this is precisely what Burundi would have needed to achieve in order to avoid any civil conflicts. The Burundi government were not able to put measures in place to allow for their ethnically diverse population to be treated as fair and equal when it came to their ethnicity and cultural backgrounds, instead, Burundi became the breeding ground for ethnic wars raging between different groups resulting in the loss of thousands of lives at a time. It has been said that ethnic discrimination in Africa was being exploited and is rooted in a colonial past. It had been said that ethnic discrimination was a means to continue a conflict for political gain and is not necessarily the only or even the main cause of the conflict at hand. Ethnic conflict had become a means of retaining political power over a state, especially a vulnerable state. (DFID, 2001:8) It is as thought ethnic conflict is part of a social dynamic for power relations in Africa. This was precisely the case in Burundi where the ruling persons had exploited ethnic conflict as a reason for civil conflict in order to retain power and pursue their personal interests in the country. It worked both ways- those who were already in power exploited ethnicity in order to retain

power, and those fighting for power exploited ethnicity in order to capture power in pursuit of their own respective personal objectives.

Once again, knowing the devastating effects of conflict and particularly the civil conflicts in Africa and the effects on neighbouring states ensures that these conflicts then qualify as international conflicts which then requires and demands an international response from the international community regarding an intervention to address them as discussed in the Charter of the United Nations. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as "...the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied, (Holzgrefe, Keohane,2003:18)which in this specific instance is the intervention of South Africa, some international organisations and the Regional Initiative in the sovereign territory of Burundi.

Humanitarian intervention has become an act with many faces, one of the greater, more optimistic ones being the preservation and upholding of universal human rights, the prevention of civil conflicts, genocide, crimes against humanity and other gross human rights violations, one which may contest the sovereignty of a state, but which overlooks it only out of the pure obligation to the people occupying these states. "...it is that, in particular, the 'magnitude' of the human suffering generated by ethnic conflicts and the threats they pose to regional peace and security routinely results in calls for external intervention (Wippman, 1998: 2). Peacekeeping, especially in Africa post-Cold War had lost its perception of being a means to end hostility within a country and stabilise economies. Focus had now shifted to issues such as democracy and liberation, good governance, human rights and dignity, sustainable development and the pursuit of national reconciliation (Anglin, 2000:39).

Owing to the seriousness and increasing numbers of civil conflicts in Africa, it is almost inevitable that for peace to be reached, it is important and almost unavoidable that a Third Party becomes involved. The role of Third Party intervention in Africa's civil conflicts is vast and has increased in number over the years. These Post- Cold War conflicts began to blowout rapidly with the potential to spread into neighbouring countries for instance the on-going civil conflict in Burundi has been continuous since

the country's independence in 1962 which escalated into a full raged conflict in 1993, displacing hundreds of thousands Burundians and also threatening regional stability. Civil conflicts in Africa are multi-faceted introducing a variety of problems which are complex in nature, including that of resource wars and ethnic conflicts. The experience of international actors and that of the United Nations have shown that these conflicts have proven much difficult to address than inter-state conflicts (Marrack Goulding, 1999: 155).

As Third Party intervention is not limited to mere states or state representatives, but also constitute the involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations, International Organisations and the like, other factors need to be considered in this paper, for example, the role and presence of the UN and OAU.

It should also be noted that during this era international organisations and regional organisations to some extent were reluctant and in some cases unable to intervene in crises in Africa. "At the level of peacekeeping or "peace enforcement," military intervention in conflict- affected countries sponsored by African continental or sub-regional institutions is increasingly becoming a reality. The major world powers have not given the United Nations (U.N.) the capacity to respond effectively to Africa's wars" (Nowrojee, 2004:1). This will be discussed in further detail later in the paper.

The Organisation of African Unity [OAU] was established in 1963 in the hopes of eradicating the continent of Africa of colonial influence, to promote an amount of African unity, ensure the consolidation of universal human rights on the continent and provide better living conditions for the people of Africa, as well as to act as a facilitator or disputes between member states (Organisation of African Unity Charter, 1963). Much to the disappointment of its ambitious Charter, the organisation had in most cases failed to be more than a "talking shop, lacking both the will and the ability to enforce its decisions" (Peen Rodt, 2011: 2) This allowed for the continuation of occurrences such as gross human rights violations as was the case in Burundi. The constitutional set-up of the OAU's is such that its most prominent principles were: respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of its members (Mwanasali, 2008: 2).

Prior to the more intense involvement of the OAU, and just post-Cold War, various reports were done concerning the need for international peace and security following

what had been going on just a few years earlier during the on-going battle between the world superpowers. In the 1992 report “An Agenda for Peace”, written by the first African secretary-general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for proactive peace making and humanitarian intervention (Boutros-Ghali 1992 in Murithi, 2011: 71). The report highlighted four key area of activity, those of:

- Preventive diplomacy
- Peace making
- Peacekeeping
- Post-conflict peace building

Preventative Diplomacy, especially in this case relates to the United Nations’ ability to “conduct preventive diplomacy by preventing disputes and conflicts arising from interstate and intrastate relationships” (Opiyo, 2012:61). It is difficult however, especially on the rather unpredictable continent of Africa to be able to predict when and where conflicts are to break out and for what reasons. Despite this, the United Nations, South Africa and the Regional Initiative in Burundi had done the best of their ability to exercise preventative diplomacy to its furthest possible extent. This would have had to occur during the peace process however as upon intervention, Burundi was already in a state of civil conflict. Therefore, what had occurred was South Africa’s Third Party Intervention role was successful in their pursuit to prevent further disputes and conflicts. What is also to be inferred here is that the third party intervention was also successful in another of the four elements, that of post-conflict peace building - This considering that following the intervention, third party intervention including peace building mechanism to ensure and sustain the desired peace.

“Historically the OAU’s record indicates that the policy of non-intervention was applied to the extreme: African nation states oppressed their own people with impunity and did little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses in neighbouring countries. The OAU was perceived as a club of African heads of state, most of whom were not legitimately elected representatives of their citizens but self-appointed dictators and oligarchs” (Murithi, 2011: 72). The continent and the international community at large had the worst impression of the body and expected

nothing of real value in the assistance of civil conflicts in Africa. It cannot however be thought of entirely in the darkest of senses, the OAU was effective in leading the process of decolonisation as well as playing an anti-apartheid role in South Africa's time of need. The OAU showed initiative in peacekeeping to an extent, "the OAU utilised preventive diplomacy and peace making strategies, even though the terminology was only developed at the end of the 20th century" (Murithi, 2011: 72).

It was in fact in 1999, five years after the Rwandan genocide as well as five years after the liberation of South Africa from the encumbrance of apartheid which saw the OAU reaching its specified aim to liberate the African continent from colonialism (Murithi, 2011:72). In 2002, the OAU was succeeded by the African Union [AU] where the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference became a pledge of non-indifference instead. The AU's approach became one which had learnt from the failures of the OAU and had been one of greater interventions. Unlike the OAU, the AU has a constitutional duty to intervene in its member states under certain circumstances, while still respecting its member states national sovereignty (Peen Rodt, 2011:3). "The AU's 15-member PSC is mandated to conduct peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building" (Murithi, 2011: 3).

The AU has a further chartered "Responsibility to Protect" [R2P] initiative which prioritises circumstances in which intervention is absolutely essential. "The AU is explicitly committed to its R2P and has already taken an interventionist stance in a number of internal conflicts, amongst them in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia" (Peen Rodt, 2011: 3). It will later be explored to the extent of the "obligation" that the organisation exhibited especially in the case of Burundi. The African Mission in Burundi was the AU's first deployment of military power. The mission was mandated for a year and deployed from April 2003 to May 2004 (Peen Rodt, 2011).

The Burundi Civil Conflict

Ranked amongst the world's poorest countries by the United Nations, Burundi is a small, impoverished country boasting the second most populated country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Burundi's colonial experience was brief but undeniable had long lasting impact and effects on the development of the country and its people. Many observers and candidates that were interviewed described that Belgian policies had negatively affected both the social and political system and subsequently divided the

Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi which subsequently led to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Belgium favoured the Tutsi clan and awarded them more educational opportunities and power. This inequality of the treatment and different opportunities awarded to the Tutsis gave rise to animosity between the Hutus and Tutsis. Religion amongst other factors also contributed to the intense ethnic differences and thus created a division of elitism.

Suspicion, fear and hatred have been root causes that have led to the Hutu – Tutsi conflict. Because of mutual hatred and mistrust, each layer of violence contributes to the breaking down of relationships and contributes and perpetuates the conflict cycle further degenerating and damaging relationships.

Even though the Colonial period lasted between 1958 – 1962, the impact had devastated and damaged the Hutu-Tutsi relationship creating power conflicts between the Ganwa aristocrats, Tutsi and small emergent Hutu elite. According to Lemarchand, 1997; 581 - 604, the politics of exclusion was orchestrated on Burundians by colonialists. Given that during the pre-colonial era, the two groups lived harmoniously with each other and that this peaceful relationship was destroyed and damaged by colonialists. Different policies were applicable to different clans and the issue of improved educational and job opportunities to Tutsis further entrenched the dissatisfaction and the personal fear and hatred between the two groups. This discrimination was a root cause to the conflict that was brewing and contributed to creating a rift between the Hutus and Tutsi. However, a number of factors including economic exclusion, ethnicity and colonial legacy must be considered in order to provide sufficient evidence and explanation of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. According to Weinstein and Schirre, "Outbursts of violence between the two groups in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, and 1991 have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives". Herisse (2002) discusses that the crises that has affected Burundi is deeply entrenched in "imported and misapplied ideologies. Most notorious among these are Christianity, racial superiority and western-style democracy". According to Herisse (2002), it is apparent that these factors contributed to the degeneration of the social fabric and created an atmosphere that was not conducive towards development. Amongst these factors lies another effect of colonialism is the creation of "ethnocide" which can be explained simply as mass killings engineered by ethnicity, which has unfortunately occurred at every phase of political transition. Since attaining independence,

Burundians have been affected by massive violence and gross human rights violations. These killings have been generated due to the ethnic tension between the Hutus and Tutsis.

Ndikumana, 2000; 432 argues that due to political and economic inequalities, the cycle of conflict was perpetuated further across regions and the different ethnic groups. According to Ndikumana, the solution in resolving this conflict lies in the political and economic liberalization, which he explains is the correction of “the tradition of exclusion in politics that which has contributed to ethnic polarization”, which is a root cause for violence and conflict. He further explains that economic liberalization is the correction of access to national resources by limiting the government to be a conduit for the accumulation of wealth within the elite groups. Ndikumana further argues that political exclusion and unequal distribution of resources were the key root causes to the conflict in Burundi. As discussed and described in the Arusha peace and reconciliation agreement for Burundi, provided for power sharing between the warring factions and assisted in helping end the conflict. This contributes to the theories that the main root causes in the Burundian conflict was indeed over political and economic power.

There are conflicting reports and accounts of what really are the root causes of the conflict in Burundi. It could be the reason why the two major rebel groups, FDD and FNL refused to participate in the signing of the Arusha agreement in 2000. The FNL continuously rejects the idea of participating in any peace process.

Regrettably, for most of the country’s history, the government refused profusely to address the idea that ethnic tension existed between different ethnic groups and that ethnicity was a root cause to the conflict that existed. Following the violence that erupted in 1988, according to Ndikumana (2004:6) that the government formally acknowledged that there was ethnic tension that existed and contributed to the Burundian conflict. The large extent and role that both Hutu and Tutsi politicians played, with the goal of achieving their personal goals had contributed extensively towards the conflict. Taking into cognisance that both the Hutu and Tutsi politicians had negatively impacted on the conflict, driving their personal agendas of gaining political power and using the colonial settings and further distorted the social settings

of Burundi's history, enhances the argument that it is indeed incorrect to label the Burundi conflict as exclusively ethnic.

Reports from the United Nations had revealed that tens of thousands of people lost their lives in the conflict, with hundreds of thousands fleeing to neighbouring countries causing widespread internally displaced people. This serious human catastrophe falls within the prescription of the United Nation Charter which discusses the international threat towards peace and security thus the Burundi conflict required urgent intervention from the United Nations Security council. Regrettably, the conflict from Burundi spilled over to neighbouring countries like DR Congo and Rwanda.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Fieldwork Analysis

This chapter contains research and interviews from respondents from different spheres which contributed towards the findings in this report. This chapter deals with the fieldwork analysis and data that was gathered.

This research paper aims at examining, as far as possible, the impact of third party intervention in the case of South Africa's Peace Mission in Burundi between 1999 and 2004 through attempting to answer the following questions:

- What role did SA play in managing the Burundian peace process with key external partnerships such as the UN,AU and Regional Initiative for Burundi;
- To what extent, was SA's participation in the Burundi peace process successful and
- What were the limitations of SA's diplomatic, political and military involvement in resolving the Burundian civil conflict?

Research utilised a qualitative research approach. This was because of its characteristic quality that "focuses on the analysis of information so as to generate qualitative explanation of social phenomena" (Mwanje, 2001:2). Therefore, the qualitative approach was utilised and applied to analyse collected data and offer explanations around issues related to third party intervention in Burundi during the civil conflict.

Primary data that was collected was conducted by utilising in-depth interviews that are semi-structured were administered. For the purposes of this paper, an interview guide consisting of a number of different themes was relied upon to gather the information required. The interview guide consisted of open-ended questions , which gave the respondents an opportunity to express their opinions. The researcher, at times, also guided the respondents back to the questions at hand, when they tended to stray away from the topic at hand.

The reason for selecting the respondents below were specifically for it's in depth knowledge and experience around the issues that were pertinent to the research problem. The list of respondents interviewed for the purposes of this research were:

- Burundian officials
- Conflict Field experts
- South African Operational Commanders

Other data sources that were utilised were reports, policy decisions and papers, on the resolution of stakeholders involved in the Burundi peace process. These constituted primary data collecting tools whilst scholarly literature and internet research were secondary data collecting tools.

According to Walker, in order to facilitate data analysis, categories were designed and formulated in advance which enabled the collected data to be sorted by “putting the appropriate sections of the data into particular categories they illustrate” (Walker, op.cit, p.58). This method of data analysis required constant analysis to ensure that thorough data analysis was done.

Intervention as highlighted in the title of this paper, is not restricted to only peace enforcement or military operation, but also includes non-military preventative measures. This research paper focuses only on external third party intervention that was employed during the Burundi civil conflict.

This paper broadly focuses on the SA’s efforts in resolving the Burundi civil conflict from 1999-2004 under the leadership of former President Nelson Mandela who was appointed as chief mediator. After 2004, the United Nations took over control from the AU.

Fieldwork Analysis

Burundian Officials

- **Impact Assessment of the civil conflict in Burundi:**

Prior to colonialism, ethnic tension and problems were not prevalent in the Burundian society. all classes of people from different tribes were peacefully integrated and lived under the same King, the King who possessed all the power and neither tribes of Hutu’s, Tutsi’s nor Twas had a discrepancy with power that was the prized possession of the King. There was no discrimination between the Hutu’s and Tutsi’s by the king who equally afforded opportunities to members of both tribes to serve on

the Loyal Court, giving each member a different role and objective to be achieved. Cognisance must be taken that many chiefs belonged to the bloodline of the loyal family and only a few Tutsi's and Hutu's occupied such positions of power. The negative influence of colonialism impacted on ethnic issues being utilised to discriminate between different tribes. Thus ethnicity became an issue and was utilised by politicians as a tool to gain political power. The politicians excluded some groups while giving opportunities sparingly to a few selected individuals who created an environment of inequality and discrimination. This lifted feelings of a desire for vengeance in being excluded. The excluded group therefore came up with the idea that in order to liberate themselves, the only solution would be to launch a military campaign using ethnicity as an instrument to inflict violence. The Hutu's experienced deep rooted exclusions and alienation on the ground so their ethnic background since they were not afforded opportunities to education and were excluded from the appointment of key positions in the country and thus the only solution to correct the situation was to launch a military campaign based on ethnicity. Taking into consideration that Burundi during the pre-colonial era did not experience the issue of ethnicity and thus makes us to believe that the colonialists had created the problems associated with ethnicity through policies of divide and rule. Post-Colonial leaders had grounds to manipulate their position by using ethnicity as a mechanism to ensure that those individuals from different ethnic backgrounds were excluded. Regrettably, this created a lot of hate and resentment in those that had been excluded, who then mobilised around the issues of ethnicity, inequality and discrimination to escalate the civil conflict.

During the colonial era, only Tutsi's and Ganwa's were appointed in administration posts and afforded opportunities to education. During 1962-1966 ethnic tension had increased in Parliament. In 1964, the first Prime Minister, Ngendendwe Pierre, was killed. Between the period 1967-68, the Hutu's plotted to deport President Micombero out of presidency. The President had become aware of this and killed all the Hutu's in the army and a number of civilians. In 1993, the first democratic elections were held. The Hutu politicians used ethnicity as a major tool to win power. They in turn used the example that they had experience regarding exclusion under the rule of the Tutsi's. The civil conflict intensified after the death of the first Hutu president that had been democratically elected. There were massive killings of

Tutsi's and during the same period, similar killings had been occurring in neighbouring Rwanda thus creating regional peace and security instability. After these incidents occurred, Hutu rebel movements mobilised intensely with the goal of defeating the Tutsi army. Taking into consideration killings thereafter were based on ethnicity. Both the Hutu and Tutsi's and their fight for political power stands out as a key issue in an attempt to ensure, that there is maintenance or capturing of political power.

In Burundi and Rwanda, the issue of ethnicity did not exist and this characteristic was purely a creation of colonialism. Regrettably, ethnicity was an influential component in the conflict in Burundi. During the civil conflict people were killed on the basis of ethnicity and in reverse people captured power in the name of ethnicity.

During the Burundi conflict, the issue of regionalism played a huge role in perpetuating the conflict. All senior positions were occupied by staff from Bururi province which was the President's region. Business opportunities were awarded to individuals based on regional background. Only Tutsi's from Bururi were appointed and taken into consideration for key positions in Government and this is what explains why Tutsi's from other different regions joined a Hutu part named CDD-FDD in protest of this discrimination and inequality. There was a rating of Tutsi's per province, any Tutsi that were from other provinces, were second class if they did not reside in the Bururi province. Taking the above into consideration, the Hutu's faced a similar fate, and if they resided in other regions other than Bururi, there was much resentment and hate.

The colonial legacy proves to be the basis of injustice, exclusion, inequality, discrimination and stereotyping, that were later seen in the Burundian society. In 1935, administrative reforms were carried out by Belgian colonialists who recklessly advised the King to dismiss all Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs on the grounds of inefficiency and incompetency. Educational opportunities were only afforded to Tutsi's and Ganwa's because it was seen that they had more in common with the European colonialists.

At the end of the colonial era, the Burundian government was not prepared to govern themselves after the colonialists had left. Burundians failed to realise that bad governance and incompetent leadership was ruing the country, but rather chose to

interpret this as bad policies and procedures that were implemented by colonialists. Based on the above provided information, we can draw a conclusion that colonialism was responsible for unfair, discriminatory, unequal policies and unfair class division, key factors that were the root causes of ethnic tension among Burundian groups which impacted significantly on the violent conflicts in post-Colonial Burundi however, cognisance should be taken that post-colonial leaders also contributed towards the creation of conflict in Burundi. Burundi politicians were exceptionally greedy for power and wealth accumulation. In pursuit of their personal objectives and hidden agenda's they manipulated colonial legacy.

Bad governance issues were a realisation that leaders were not visionary and failed to promote national interests by not allowing discrimination to occur between Burundian people. Other respondents attributed that exclusion was the root cause of the conflict, explaining that people were power hungry and ensured that power was dominated by a certain group. On the other hand, some respondents argued that because of the impoverished settings, poverty was the main cause of the Burundian civil conflict. For instance, politicians mobilised masses of peasants to kill their neighbours because they were a different ethnic group and loot their properties.

□ **Third party intervention in resolving the civil conflict in Burundi:**

The tremendous role that third parties have played in avoiding the explanation of conflict has been acknowledged especially in the case of the Burundian civil conflict. Many different Burundian parties had taken ownership and responsibility to provide solutions to resolve the conflict on their own but they reached a phase where they realised that third Party intervention was a determining factor in resolving the conflict. In 1996, former President Nyerere was nominated as chief mediator in the Burundi civil conflict. Former South African President Nelson Mandela together with Nyerere played an important role during the peace negotiations because of their influence in the international system and their ability to exercise pressure on different parties. Considering that the UN had refused to send troops or a peace keeping force because of the disarmament process that did not take place for the FDD. External key roles players such as the AU, South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia played a crucial role after the ceasefire agreement had been signed and implemented. The

AU peacekeeping force was responsible for the monitoring and observation of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement by both parties.

President Nyerere and leaders of the Burundi regional initiative were often under the impression that there was a lack of understanding from representatives at the Burundi government and often rejected these opinions which resulted in delays of the negotiations.

Had it not been for Third Party intervention, lots of innocent people would have continued to die, gross human rights violations would have worsened, the issue of internally displaced people would have increased, so long as the concerns raised between warring factions remained unaddressed. A respondent had clearly articulated that had it not been for Third Party intervention, the conflict would have seriously worsened and another genocide would have occurred. Third Party intervention had been extensive and critical in the Burundian civil conflict, ensuring that confidence had increased in Burundians by insuring that the situation did not degenerate into chaos and that stability would increase. Third parties had influence in the political arena and played a key political role in ensuring that warring factions stop fighting which had continued to threaten the stability.

The Arusha agreement was successfully implemented due to the support and assistance rendered by Third parties during the peace process and negotiations. If not for the presence of Third Parties, warring factions would have totally disregarded the agreement and continued with the civil conflict. Third part intervention also provided solutions in the resolving of contentious issues that would have attributed to the increase of the conflict. The successful resolution of the restructuring of the army of 50/50 % of both Hutu's and Tutsi's given that this had been rejected by the Tutsi's: the time frame of the transition period and the decision of who would be the ruling party in the first period had brokered the ceasefire agreement. The successful resolution thereof, created an atmosphere of confidence between Hutu's in exile and those fleeing to Rwanda. Some respondents claimed the Third Party involvement and intervention had only been received after the genocide had occurred in Burundi. The intervention was only helpful in facilitation of talks and discussions between warring factions in search of a solution to eradicate genocidal tendencies. Some respondents believed that Third Parties did not adequately prevent innocent civilians

from being killed sometimes by government or rebel forces. The presence of external parties helped prevent killings and internal displacements however, the psycho social trauma that had been left after the war was intense and needed reassurance that justice will prevail and stability would increase. The South African troops deployed in Burundi offered protection to many exiled neighbours who had left the country after killing people. The release of some political leaders found guilty by courts had been a process that directly followed. Respondents submitted that there was enormous development on the diplomatic and political front due to Third Party intervention. Chief conflict mediators Mandela and Nyerere addressed key issues like power sharing between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's, which was a root cause of the conflict. Respondents articulated that military intervention by Third Parties was insignificant and that they failed to prevent killings perpetrated by warring factions. Human protection was not provided and therefore human security was not addressed. South Africa's former President Nelson Mandela, Chief negotiator for the Burundian civil conflict was a key player during the peace process negotiations and resolution of the conflict. Mandela, his natural charisma and international popularity granted him the opportunity to mobilise the UN, the US, EU, AU to understand the escalation of the Burundi conflict. Mandela had achieved balance by pushing hard on both sides while applying a softer approach on all parties ensuring the creation of trust prevailing throughout the different parties. Mandela's approach was tough and assertive at times but this characteristic of being honest with all parties made him a formidable force in the peace process which would have not been successful if he had not intervened. Understanding the root causes of conflict and taking into cognisance that political power was deeply entrenched in the Burundian conflict, Mandela proposed a quota system power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi's. 60% Hutu's and 40% Tutsi's with key appointments in parliament and cabinet with a 50/50 split of the two groups in the military and police.

Whenever decisions and proposals were impossible to consider Mandela's charisma, fear and respect was attached to him personally by the Burundians. They looked at him as the president of a Hegemony and all that South Africa represented on the African continent given that South Africa had experienced very similar conflict when compared to the Burundian civil conflict. Members of different parties were often invited to South Africa who was very keen to listen to his advice, wisdom and

direction, finally, due to his representation of a hegemonic country and a giant in Southern Africa. In addition the professionalism , strict diplomacy and impartiality displayed by diplomats from South Africa was a real life experience in showing South Africa's experience in resolving conflict in order to facilitate the Burundi peace process.

Mandela's international accreditation, experience in conflict negotiation and the resolution thereof and the impartiality that he had displayed at all times during the peace process contributed towards an environment of trust and respect amongst all parties. Utilising his skills to rally and mobilise the international community, in an attempt to escalate the issues of conflict and seek support for the resolution of the Burundian conflict, contributed to the forward movement of the peace agreement. Taking cognisance that after the signing of the Arusha agreement, the responsibility of the UN was to deploy peacekeepers but subsequently effused to do so, arguing that major warring factor CNDD-FDD were still fighting and the conflict was still prevalent. The South African National Defence Force rose to the occasion and deployed its own South African troops to assist in monitoring and observing the ceasefire agreement. This was exceptionally crucial as this contributed to the successful implementation of the Arusha agreement, particularly the transitional government. After the deployment of the South African peace keeping force to Burundi, exiled Hutu leaders returned in large numbers. Due to the presence and protected covering of South African troops, Hutu politicians felt more secure and confident during their negotiations with their Tutsi counterparts. The professionalism of the South African troops that were deployed dispelled any intention of attacks on the returning leaders. Furthermore, the presence of South Africa peacekeepers disrupted and ended the mobilisation of Hutu's politicians.

Due to the above information, we are in the position to argue that the contribution of the South African troops and peacekeeping force created an environment of stability and security to become more apparent in Burundi, for example, the return of Hutu leaders creating a sense of security which ensured the promotion of peaceful negotiations to take place and thus contributing to the elimination of large groups mobilising to ensure that the cycle of conflict was perpetuated.

□ **Key components that will facilitate lasting peace in Burundi:**

The warring faction FNL was difficult to convince that the power sharing within the peace process will be well managed, observed and monitored given that a main root cause of the conflict centred around power there was indeed the need to ensure that the peace process would have effective and fair mechanisms in the eyes of all the parties when related to power sharing which contributed to the building of lasting, sustainable peace in Burundi. The deeply entrenched stereotyping between the Hutu and Tutsi conflict would be a process that requires long term initiatives in breaking down of both identities and ensuring that Burundian people can embrace a national identity which is to see themselves as Burundians and not be identified by their ethnic groupings.

Third party intervention and the role of the international community should be constant in ensuring that sustainable peace and security is prevalent amongst the Burundian society. Strong action needs to be taken against negative forces that contributed and perpetuated the cycle of conflict.

Economic recovery and reconstruction of Burundi should be continuously supported by the international community. There should be a long term sustainable plan to provide opportunities for the youth who could very easily be mobilised for rebel activities for a means of survival. In the decade long civil war contributed towards the breakdown of the economic system, unemployment issues especially amongst youth and the destabilisation of infrastructure. There was an urgent appeal to key role players within the international community to support the rebuilding of the economy as a preventative mechanism in ensuring that vulnerable youth would not mobilise further, which would impact on the destabilisation of Burundi.

Good governance is core in providing safety, security, stability and transparency throughout government. Without the promotion of good governance, root causes of the conflict such as ethnicity, regionalism and individual agenda's would still be a viable option for parties wishing to ignite the cycle of conflict. A constitution that is free and fair and agreed upon by all parties must replace the current one as stipulated in the Arusha Peace process. The ability of the new constitution to address past inequity, imbalances and injustices, should be a document that all Burundians will adhere to which will assist the reconciliation process. This should

provide the foundation for justice to prevail and for the mechanisms of good governance and a justice system to be prevalent.

The cycle of stereotyping is a highly psycho-social process that is entrenched deeply in individuals that experienced stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination and unfair treatment. In order for the breaking down of stereotypical barriers of Hutu and Tutsi's much education is required to assist in the breaking down of the cycle of prejudice. To be seen some people and to adopt a national identity, this will include an extensive, collaborative and nationwide public information system designed to address the past inequalities in the Burundi ethnic group history which contributed to the ethnic violence experienced during the civil conflict.

The submission made by respondents indicate that the involvement of civil society of organisations and the public was excluded in the peace negotiations, this was a crucial role of the Third Party to ensure that there was no excluded parties that could have contributed towards the negotiation. By failing to involve the public and civil society organisations, the Arusha Peace Agreement in particular was denied the opportunity of popular ownership.

3.2 Conflict Field Experts

□ Globalisation of the civil conflict in Burundi:

Cognisance has to be taken that the Burundian civil conflict is not exclusive to Burundi alone but rather plays a sub-regional role in enhancing sub-regional conflict which is inevitably the inability of Hutu's and Tutsi's living peacefully together without any tentacles of conflict. Due to the Burundian conflict being a part of sub-regional conflict, this problem is not limited to Burundi alone but also to Rwanda, Uganda and Eastern Congo. After the Rwandan genocide in 1994 many of the Rwandans guilty of genocide fled from Rwanda into Goma, Eastern DRC, and spillage was experienced throughout Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to a certain extent. It is imperative to acknowledge that if stabilisation of the Eastern DRC does not occur, the possibility of conflict resolution in one country that is affected would result in conflict not being resolved in another country due to the issue of sub-regional

conflict. Without conflict resolution in the above mentioned countries, sustainable peace cannot be endured.

The root causes of conflict in Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and Eastern DRC has a similar threat that is common in all countries that are experiencing conflict. The issues of ethnic tension, ethnicity, inequality, and unfair distribution of power, war economy and the perspective of spoilers are common amongst countries in this region. The spilling over of conflict provides a foundation of many similarities between Burundi and other countries for example, Rwanda experienced the Genocide due to the contributing factor of Tutsi' in Burundi to fleeing to neighbouring countries. Also, cognisance has to be taken that Hutu-Tutsi ethnic solidarity spills over from border to border which poses a major threat to regional instability. It is known that Hutu's that fled from Rwanda to Burundi into Congo have been negative force multipliers and joined rebel groups such as the Mai-Mai to perpetuate the cycle of conflict.

In the beginning of the conflict in Burundi, there were no Third Party interventionists which contributed to the conflict escalating. Burundi is a small mountainous country which suffers from resource scarcity in relation to our mineral Congo. There is little or nothing to fight over including the impact of negative international actors that normally destabilise peace to fight over natural resources. Therefore, Burundi has a better opportunity of enjoying stability and lasting peace ignoring the fact that there will still be problems with the FNL. Unfortunately, due to the escalation of the conflict, there were gross human rights violations and unimaginable, catastrophic human rights violations which forced hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians to flee to safety beyond borders. Thus given the nature of the conflict and the situation that was created during the Burundi civil conflict which destabilised the region which contributed towards the insecurity and instability internationally. It can be argued, that international attention was crucial that Third party intervention to address the conflict to stop the destabilisation of the nation, masses of innocent lives being lost and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people fleeing to neighbouring countries in search of safety.

□ **Dynamics of the Civil Conflict in Burundi:**

Due to the total absence of trust between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's in the Burundi, the mind-set of the Tutsi's was that they would all be exterminated by the Hutu's as in the case of the Rwandan genocide. Due to this belief, the conception of this idea of extermination was even further entrenched due to Tutsi belief that there were more than enough Hutu genocidal leaders who were more than capable of creating genocide in Burundi. The above information sadly contributed to constant Tutsi repressive rules and laws since independence.

Due to the internally displaced people fleeing into neighbouring countries in search of safety and security, it is crucial to note that the development agenda was undermined which contributed to the creation of socio-economic consequences and humanitarian crisis. Furthermore the conflict created an intense relationship between Tanzania and Burundi for example. President Buyoya and government was always under the impression that Tanzania was in support of Burundian warring factions. This factor could have lead both countries into war. Due to the mistrust between these two countries, reinforced the idea of ethnic solidarity across borders which undermined regional and international efforts that were designed to address the civil conflict in Burundi. Due to this contributing factor, negotiations were prolonged and therefore resulted in a peaceful solution to the conflict being delayed.

□ **Ensuring peace and stability in Burundi:**

The trauma caused amongst both the Hutu and Tutsi's are unimaginable beyond belief. The gross human rights violations, mass killings, intensive violence and sexual crimes committed are entrenched in the foundation of how Burundians relate to the issue of truth, justice and the question of impunity. After surviving an ordeal of this traumatic nature, it is very difficult for people to deal with the past and find forgiveness to move forward. Indeed there is a need for reconciliation and for the truth to be told for people to deal with the past. Since 1965, the use of violence and mass killings against others were inevitable up to the recent past. The assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president in 1993 is an event that escalated the Burundi conflict. For the purposes of reconciliation, the truth of what actually transpired in events leading up to the assassination has to be told. The manifestation of violence has often been escalated in the form of revenge killings on a group for

past incidences that have occurred. Reconciliation is therefore needed, in some way to appease the anger harboured by some Burundians. If this reconciliation is successful it will ensure the prevention of future conflicts committed in the name of revenge.

Security sector reform especially in the arena of the military and the police are a critical component of the total transformation and establishment of effective state institutions. Security sector reform is a multi-faceted process that involves key components such as disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation which contributes to a safe and secure environment however, it is necessary for the international community to support and contribute to this process. Cognisance has to be taken that the agenda, of SSR cannot be realised immediately. It is a time intensive process that requires commitment, ownership and inclusivity of all key role players that is party to building reforms and bringing about an awareness of good governance.

Government has to be a leading role player to ensure that all parties are included in all processes. In the case of Burundi, government should ensure that the FNL is involved in the government system if only to ensure sustainable peace. Government should ensure that all parties are encouraged to participate in the peace process. For peace and stability to prevail in Burundi, all parties including the FNL need to be included in all government processes of Burundi. The need for national unity in the Burundian government will cement differences and promote unity amongst the different parties. However, it should be imperative that government should concede to giving greater concessions to the FNL to ensure that they become fully inclusive and participatory in the peace process.

Respondents submitted that Burundi's conflict was not caused by ethnicity but because of the mobilisation by political leaders to exploit ethnic differences thereby making ethnicity a core ingredient in the generation of conflict.

3.5 South African operational Commanders-The Burundi Peacekeeping Mission

□ Mission objectives and challenges:

The respondents submitted that South Africa had deployed with a single mission objective and that was solely to provide protections to VIP's which were mostly politicians that had been exiled to ensure that they were afforded the opportunity to participate in the negotiations and the transitional government. However, after the South Africa peacekeeping force deployed to Burundi, the mission objectives had extended to include the monitoring and observation of the implementation of the ceasefire by the rebels and the government of Burundi. Under the umbrella of the UN mission these were the prescribed mission objectives:

- Peacekeeping and during some stages peace enforcement.
- Monitoring of a ceasefire and that all warring factions were in abidance of it; and
- Ensuring a successful editorial process.

According to respondents, there was agreement that a large portion of the mission objectives had indeed been achieved. Attacks and violence on former political prisoners had been halted thus ensuring that elections were conducted smoothly, fighting however, had not ceased due to the FNL who continued to perpetuate the cycle of conflict. This indicates that South African peacekeepers were indeed limited and were faced with challenges of limitation and the mandate of the mission and that of AMIB. Cognisance has to be taken that under the umbrella of the UN this mandate had been broadened to incorporate peacekeeping. During the peace processes it was the realisation that lasting peace in Burundi would be difficult to attain seeing that the FNL were not included in the peace process.

Peacekeeping forces were faced with the position that they continuously encountered resistance from government forces as well as rebel forces.

Respondents submitted that government forces were not in agreement of the deployment of South African troops in Burundi. Very often South African troops experienced road blocks by government forces while exporting former exiled leaders that needed to join their combatants for consultation. It was only after the

deployment of South African troops that exiled leaders agreed to return to the country. Prior to this, exiled leaders refused to return to Burundi because of the fear of their safety, thus resulting in a delay of the processes. Both warring factions continued to display violence and random shooting with the objective of threatening exiled leaders and to make constant that the war had not ended. This was indeed a difficult peacekeeping deployment for South Africa, in terms of the role, position, mandate and objectives that needed to be achieved. Apart from this, South African troops were under constant attack from both belligerent parties and government forces, alleging that South Africa were allies of the former rebels. However, respondents argued that South Africa was capable of enforcing the peacekeeping mandate. Cognisance has to be taken that under the UN mission, limitations of the operations proved to be challenging. Even though whilst protecting VIP's, shots were fired and tension was experienced. Limitations have restricted operations which should have been taken to protect civilians. There was an insufficient amount of forces to carry out peacekeeping duties, thus the Memorandum of Understanding which limited wider operations of South African peacekeepers only applied under South African mission mandate and not under UN mission mandates, whose mandate had been extended to include peace enforcement. It is important to note, that according to some Burundian respondents, even under the UN umbrella with an expansion of mandate mission, South African peacekeepers still found themselves in the position of being unable to protect civilians facing danger. South African operational commanders had revealed that there were insufficient military resources at hand to ensure the protection of civilians. South African operational commanders discussed in detail the challenge of ensuring implementation of peace enforcement having been faced with many different constraints from the Burundian government forces. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions were prevented from undertaking night operations yet killings and random shootings in most of the cases happened during the nights. This constraint faced by South African troops had contravened the UN mission codes which clearly articulates that UN troops are unrestricted and can go anywhere at any time into any area where need may arise.

In any peacekeeping mission the importance of an intelligence network within the framework of an early warning system is a critical requirement in ensuring success of the operation. Local people were highly uncooperative due to the fear of being killed

by government forces if they cooperated with peacekeepers on information that was required. This raises the question of having a much more coordinated network to gather information. The peacekeeping mission suffered with delays due to the challenges experienced in the logistics section, equipment that was required were only available and obtainable in South Africa which took a long time to obtain. Insufficient and inappropriate transport for former exile leaders was also a huge challenge. Not forgetting the difficult terrain to manoeuvre in, a constant challenge was language barriers because only a few members of the South African force could speak and understand Swahili. Respondents agreed that in an effort to eliminate threats from the local forces, a high standard of discipline and a show of force were demonstrated by the South African peacekeepers. The increase of providing full protection of VIP's was demonstrated in the most professional manner. Transparency of the operational and tactical plan with commanders of the Burundian army had increased communication and ensured that both South African peacekeepers and the Burundian government force was in acknowledgement of the intended movements. This also helped and increased confidence amongst former exile leaders bringing about a sense of security and calming their fears of knowing that they were possible targets. By both government and rebel forces being made aware of the specific mission at hand by South African troops, brought about a changed mind-set regarding South African troops in Burundi. South African operational commanders stressed the importance of a show of force as a military strategy that was implemented in Burundi in order to deal with the complex situations. South African commanders singled out the importance of effective and coordinated approach towards communication that could assist all parties to the conflict, and opportunity to resolve the conflict.

After experiencing huge challenges with logistics, other external parties offered support in finding solutions to the challenges experienced, especially the AU. Situational reports of the extreme challenges faced were submitted to South African government and the UN office in Burundi which were later sent to the UN Headquarters in New York.

A key challenge on the ground was with the government of Burundi, what they would say and what they would do on the ground was completely different. There was support from government on a strategic level, however, the level of support was

decreased substantially on a tactical level which made it increasingly difficult to launch ground operations.

South African operational commanders submitted that they would communicate with other contingent commanders from other countries on a regular basis to deal with similar challenges that were experienced in different areas of deployment. A coordinated and cooperative method between external parties had facilitated the implementation of mission mandates.

The presence of the peacekeeping force, foreign forces and third parties to the conflict had eliminated great fear, instability and insecurity amongst the local population. Having seen the display of foreign forces which provided some sort of psychological security to the local people, who then began to trust foreign forces to ensure that no attempt by warring factions to destabilise the security situation would be successful. Cognisance should be taken that South Africa willingly jumped to the opportunity to help a fellow African state that was in need of assistance by undertaking such a risky mission in the initial stages without the support of the UN which displays the hegemonic regional role that South Africa plays in sub-Saharan Africa which ensures the African Renaissance and the commitment towards NEPADS objective.

For the objectives of NEPAD to be achieved, Burundi has to ensure that peace is sustained for the promotion of regional stability. South Africa plays a key role in the effective implementation of NEPAD's objectives in Southern Africa. In comparative assessment, some sort of peace has been enjoyed by many civilians compared to previous years and there is an agreed feeling that the country will not degenerate into civil war again. Therefore, respondents agreed that South Africa's intervention of helping to assist in the civil conflict of Burundi was done in accordance of the NEPAD and African Renaissance programmes. These programmes strive to enhance and promote economic development on the African continent by ensuring the resolution of conflicts.

□ **The protection of civilians related to Third Party involvement:**

Respondents submitted that Africa is in need of suitable early warning mechanisms that ensure peace keeping forces are deployed before there is an escalation of

conflict in a country. In the case of Burundi's civil conflict, the cycle of violence had degenerated to a worsened state whereby there was an increase in gross human rights violations and masses of killing before Third party intervention could be implemented. The lives of the local population were subjected to greater risk, South African operational commanders were in agreement that a rapid reaction brigade should deploy under any circumstances within a very short space of time. However, the brigade must include experts and troops that are well trained, disciplined and professional taking into consideration modern technological advancement, covert and overt operation and guerrilla warfare. Each region should have a rapid reaction brigade of this nature to be able to deploy immediately and stop the escalation of conflict. To ensure that the rapid reaction brigade can deploy at short notice, early warning mechanisms are a pre-requisite to ensure that this process is successful. This process would also support actions of preventative diplomacy before resorting to a military deployment.

Third party interveners should always ensure that the lives of civilians are protected and that they are pro-active in ensuring that lives are not lost. However, this requires sufficient weaponry and armament. This could prove to be challenging if the host country resists military intervention by external forces because this would take away the host governments primary responsibility of protecting the people of the land.

Chapter 4: The Role of South Africa in Burundi

“South Africa considers the promotion of peace and security to be its topmost Africa[n] policy goal, in addition to advancing the course of democracy and human rights and pursuing sustainable development and poverty alleviation” (Kagwanja, 2011:27). It was this policy goal which resulted in South Africa’s intervention in Burundi, a role which would comprise of all the above policy objectives.

“Whatever the ambiguities which surround the armed intervention of states into the affairs of others, there is little doubt that the involvement of South Africa and other key players in the Burundi peace process fully enjoy the sanction of international law, having the full backing, *inter alia*, of the UN and the AU” (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 3). In fact, in many ways, the UN has delegated international responsibility for the resolution of conflicts and furthermore the establishment of democracy, especially in the case of Burundi, to what is now known as the African Union, which has in turn delegated their responsibility to an unofficial group of states more affectionately known as the ‘regional initiative’ which comprised of South Africa, Uganda and Tanzania (Bentley & Southall, R, 2005: 4). “More support from one actor can to some extent compensate for less support from another. This was the case with AMIB [African Mission in Burundi], where South African commitment and capabilities made up for limited resources on part of the AU, its member states and institutions and insufficient interest from the international donor community” (Peen Rodt, 2011: Abstract). It also would have made up for the lack in initial action by the UN and the limited action of the international community.

As the focus of this paper is South Africa’s role in this conflict, what needs to be examined to some extent is the amount that South Africa has invested in the Burundi civil conflict. “The political investment which South Africa, in particular, is making in the Burundian peace process is considerable. The full extent of this can only be appreciated against the background of four major factors: (i) the legal basis for international intervention; (ii) the political limits to the involvement in the Burundian crisis imposed by international actors upon the UN; (iii) the regional context of African involvement in Burundi; and (iv) the dynamics of international interventions in conflict-torn countries” (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 2).

Nyerere's view was that all parties should be included in negotiation talks, that is both UPRONA and FRODEBU together and not one without the other, irrespective of the size of the parties present. Unfortunately this was not entirely effective and very soon after talks had begun; parties were separating from their armed wings or breaking away from their representatives at Arusha, such as the FDD and FNL. South Africa played a role in the Arusha talks even before they placed a mediator within them. With Nyerere at the forefront of negotiations and post the FDD and FNL removing themselves from talks, negotiations were formally managed by the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Foundation which consisted only of Nyerere and two other representatives and further assisted by Tanzanian civilian servants and some confidantes of Nyerere. In this group was South African representative in the form of a Human Rights Lawyer sent by the South Africa's Presidential Office (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 1). "The presence of a South African human rights lawyer would further represent and infer South Africa's diplomatic foreign policy intentions and procedures towards the Burundi civil conflict.

The second round of talks began in June of 1998 and resulted in the creation of five committees each responsible for their own issues, although implementation of the fifth committee was postponed, such progress was made in the respective committees that it eventually culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 66). "Each committee stood for the following:

- Committee 1: responsible for the compilation of a document in which all parties would agree regarding the nature of the conflict and problems of genocide and exclusion, as well as solutions to these problems.
- Committee 2: Responsible for outlining strategies for democracy and good governance
- Committee 3: Responsible for devising strategies for achieving peace and security for all
- Committee 4: Responsible for proposing measures for economic reconstruction and development (Renda, 2000: 1).

Again, South Africa was not without a role here as the Third Committee had South African General Andrew Masondo as the vice-chairperson (Bentley &

Southall,2005:66) “again ensuring South African diplomatic pursuit. “Mandela also changed the approach to the negotiations, adopting a more public and forceful position vis-à-vis the parties, and he also injected financial and diplomatic resources from the South African government into the peace making process” (Ayebare, 2010:83).

The Arusha Peace Agreement would not have been successful without the backing of military power as a plan B insurance plan. “Were it not for South Africa’s leadership in guaranteeing Arusha and ensuring its implementation, the peace process would undoubtedly have collapsed. To secure the implementation of Arusha and the establishment of the transitional institutions, South Africa sent a force of 700 troops in November 2001. This South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was mandated to protect Burundian politicians who returned from exile to take part in transitional institutions. South Africa maintained its military presence and contributed more troops after the signing of the December 2002 cease-fire agreement between the CNDD-FDD and the Government of Burundi.

The accord was signed in August 2000 by President Buyoya's government, the National Assembly and 17 political parties, including seven Hutu parties many of whose members were reluctant to return unless their security could be ensured. Hours before the South African troops arrived, the leader of the main Hutu party, Jean Minani, returned to Burundi after spending five years in exile in neighbouring Tanzania.

The peace process envisages the transitional government being created on Nov 1 (Butcher, 2001).

As inclusion goes, it could not have been in the best hopes that peace could be achieved if the rebel groups were not part of the negotiation process. Mandela managed to secure the agreement of a meeting with both the FDD and FNL in March of 2000. These talks however, proved to be a difficult task with these rebel groups continuously stonewalling and which further lead to Mandela losing his patience and continuing with the negotiations without them (Bentley & Southall, 2005:73), an indication of one of the more unsuccessful parts of the negotiations and of the final signed agreement. The following may considered as the main issues with the signed

Arusha Peace Accord and which as a result would render this undertaking unsuccessful as a peacekeeping mission:

- The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was not signed by the two major conflicting parties, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), though the former later acceded to the Agreement. This non-inclusive action has hindered the peace implementation programs which have been infiltrated by FNL.
- The AU did not seek consent from FNL and FDD in constituting the mission in Burundi. This increasingly undermined the ceasefire and put the peace process in jeopardy (Kent & Malan, et al, 2000:1).

The African union deployed a one-year operation in Burundi in 2003, the African Mission in Burundi which was later transitioned into the ONUB, the United Nations operation in Burundi. When the mission gradually wound down, the South Africa contingency remained on the ground in the form of an African union special Task Force (AU STF), but this was much later in 2006. (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project) Owing to the above, South Africa has played a big role in managing the Burundi peace process with the UN, the AU and the Regional initiative in Burundi. It is the specific involvement of Nelson Mandela in the role of mediator that culminated in the Arusha Accord of 2000 which further lead to tremendous progress towards the ending of ethnic violence and conflicts in Burundi (Bentley & Southall, 2005:1).

Following Nyerere's death, it was believed that due to his experience in reconciliation of opposing parties in the form of carrying South Africa from the clutches of Apartheid that Nelson Mandela would be the suitable successor (Bentley & Southall, 2005). "South Africa's intervention in Burundi, through Mandela, came at a critical juncture for both South Africa and Burundi. For Burundi, with the rebel groups still excluded, the fighting continued with increasing civilian cost, and for South Africa, emerging from its own process of post-apartheid transition, Burundi presented the opportunity to share its own experiences through a large-scale peace process, and whose success would inevitably impact on the stability of the whole region" (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi, 2007: 17).

The success of Mandela in his role as mediator began with his strong belief that this conflict required the support of the international community. "...he was forceful in garnering support from the international community by highlighting the plight of the Burundian people, arguing that they deserved peace, and emphasising the importance of the success of the negotiations for the stability of the region as a whole, in particular, he was able to harness the backing of the EU, as well as of the US." This was evident even in the presence of Bill Clinton at the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord in 2000. Now as mentioned earlier, UN and US support for the Burundi crisis and similarly their inability to prevent the Rwandan genocide amounted to less chances of successful cessation in these conflicts. "...the UN is one of the few major actors providing humanitarian aid to Burundi; it has largely stayed on the side-lines diplomatically" (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 4).

As is commonly known, the UN exists as the peacekeeping body of the world, and would naturally be expected to participate in diplomatic negotiations and mediations in order to have curbed the on-going violence in Burundi, similar to the role that the US would have held in this process as being the global superpower and as holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which was later convinced by Mandela and had adopted Resolution 1286 in Burundi. South Africa's role as a third party in Burundi included the successful harbouring of very influential international bodies and entities. In addition to that of the US and the UN, Mandela had ensured the presence of various other international players at the talks in 1999, that included representatives in the form of King Fahd from Saudi Arabia, President Jacques Chirac of France, President Olesgun Obasanjo of Nigeria, as well as Presidents of both Tanzania and Uganda respectively and finally Salim Salim as the Secretary General of the OAU (Bentley & Southall, 2005).

Mandela placed large emphasis during negotiations on the fact that the longer it took for an agreement to be discussed, the more innocent Burundian civilians were being killed again putting his experience from the Apartheid years to good and sharing examples from other African states including that of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. Furthermore, Mandela placed pressure on President Buyoya to close so-called 'regroupment camps' which were claimed to be the aid of civilians who had been displaced, when in actual fact their function was to further separate the rebel groups (Bentley & Southall, 2005).

As this would hold very little substantial progress on the matter at hand, Buyoya took note at the amount of international fire he was under for these camps he agreed to close them. 6 months later however, these camps were still fully functioning and had undergone no change, it was only through the persuasion of Mandela that the government had begun to disband the 'regroupment camps' (Bentley & Southall, 2005).

In President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa saw foreign policy initiatives which included aspects and emphasis on regional integration and a possible "United States of Africa". Mbeki was punting NEPAD and believed that there were and could only be African solutions to African problems, hence the involvement in the issues of Central Africa, and the partnership in the Regional Initiative. Despite this, South Africa's involvement in Africa tended to occur in states where the economic and political conditions have the greatest impact on South Africa as a state, as well as which states would be the best sites for South African foreign investment (Bentley & Southall, 2005:2:7).

It is however not the inference here, that South Africa's involvement in the Burundi conflict is anything less than a humanitarian intervention on the basis of its obligation to the people within this state. "...it is fundamentally important that South Africa and the moral and material interests of its people become deeply engaged by the difficult quest for peace throughout the entire continent. Indeed, this is far less a commitment to a theoretical Pan Africanism than a down-to-earth recognition that democracy and development in South Africa are both inextricably linked to progress towards those goals throughout Africa as a whole" (Bentley & Southall, 2005: 1:1). "By October, a 3,500-strong force had been deployed to Burundi, largely from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. However, delays in donor funding, bureaucratic inertia and the absence of a political agreement initially frustrated the ... peace effort" (Nowrojee, 2004:6). This proved to be a further limitation to South Africa's efforts in the crisis struck country.

Diplomatic efforts can have various pros and cons as can the alternative of development assistance. For instance for social, economic, ethnic and regional gaps, diplomatic efforts can address inter-group elite facilitation and mediation, and development assistance could address such issues like monitoring and evaluation

using peace and conflict indicators; investments targeted to assist the disadvantaged or those affected by the on-going violence and human rights violations and even go as far as leadership training with a special emphasis on techniques of conflict management and mitigation (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005: 16).

In terms of human rights violations, a diplomatic approach can address and provide access to discussion with elites of a state in a negotiation fashion in order to end war crimes and any crimes against humanity. This approach is clear in South Africa's diplomatic policy in Burundi. Developmental assistance on the other hand could prove beneficial in the harbouring of support for human rights perhaps in the form of advocacy groups, support for judicial system reform and capacity building as well as further support for security sector reform (Brachet & Wolpe, 2005). This too was seen in south Africa's third party mediatory role. What can be questioned here is, considering the fact that there is another possibility which stands as a solution to conflict, has South Africa made the best possible use of this? Or has the acts of development assistance not been used to its full effects? This may stand as a limitation to their diplomatic approach. "...while the conjunction of diplomatic, security and development initiatives can help consolidate the return of peace, development assistance can increase its sustainability by making the dividends of peace visible to the population. Improving the equitable access to social services, fostering economic growth and diversification, stimulating employment all can calm the political climate and deepen public confidence in the peace process"(Brachet & Wolpe, 2005:18).

Despite the fact that a full blown genocide or official genocide was averted in the case of Burundi, it left the population in insufferable circumstances. Much of the Burundi public fled the state to neighbouring states as refugees in the mere hope of survival. It cannot be ignored that Burundi has deterred a full-scale humanitarian emergency since 1993, but the population is relentlessly sliding in the form of declining health and nutrition, and rapidly eroding real incomes, towards a situation where households have no buffer against external shocks. Many households remain of the breadline by the split of hairs (Burundi Poverty Note).

Development assistance of some kind should have been a necessity considering that the reason for the humanitarian aid in Burundi was to further avoid any human rights violations as well as for the wellbeing of the people of Burundi. Although

mediation to end the civil conflict was too a necessity, it also meant that the people would have to take a bit of a back seat in the interim.

South Africa's political diplomacy on its own was not enough to ensure a ceasefire in Burundi. Even drastic political measures such as the one taken in 2001 when over 11 % of the Burundi population was infected with HIV and as a result, upon strategy decisions undertaken under the advisory of Mandela, the international community pledged funds to Burundi of over \$760 million for reconstruction and to fight AIDS.

"The strategy of a donor conference, in 2000 held in Paris, saw the international community pledge a total of US\$ 440 million, which sought to convince the Burundians that political stability and progress would be matched by improvements in socio-economic settings" (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi, 2007:17).

"The Arusha agreement called for security assurances in the form of international troop deployments. South Africa found itself in a position where it was expected to devise a strategy to support the fledgling peace process by South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi deploying its own forces. This deployment took place for the first time under the new policy conceived in South Africa's White Paper on Peace Missions" (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: 2007:18).

Even in third Party intervention, it cannot be thought that the intervention occurs without the support and backing of at least some international organisation or heavy weight. For instance, in the face of the UN or AU at the time not having direct influence within Burundi and leaving it to the hands of the regional initiative, South Africa as the intervener still had the support of others. "On 26 October 2001, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of Burundi and South Africa, enabling the deployment of South African troops in support of the implementation of the Arusha Accord. That same day, President Thabo Mbeki signed Presidential Minute 654/2001, authorising the deployment of troops "in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic of South Africa towards military support to the peace process in the Republic of Burundi." Nelson Mandela managed to secure a Security Council Resolution on 29 October 2001 (SCR 1375/2001) that endorsed the entry of South African troops into Burundi" (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi, 2007: 27).

South Africa was further involved in the Burundi civil crisis by sending in military power. In a mission that cost the country R1.5 billion in five years, South Africa deployed under direct order from mediator at the time, Nelson Mandela in support of what Department of Defence spokesman Sam Mkhwanazi calls a “somewhat shaky ceasefire agreement clinched in Arusha, Tanzania, between the then-warring parties. “The South African National Defence Force deployed 701 personnel to provide static and close protection to returning political leaders of the main protagonists, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Force for Democracy (CNDD-FDD) led by Pierre Nkurunziza (current President of Burundi) and the Hutu Front for Democracy (FRODEBU) led by Domitien Ndayizeye respectively” (Engelbrecht, 2010).

It further said of spokesman Mkhwanazi, that troop presence under an AU mandate did not automatically guarantee a ceasefire. Upon thought, one can be certain that the SANDF would not have expected this anyway and despite military presence Burundi continued to be volatile as attacks continued in the capital, Bujumbura, leaving the Department of Defence with little option but to secure Cabinet approval to increase the SANDF’s force levels to 1600 (Sam Mkhwanazi, 2010).

Even the decision to deploy troops into Burundi and so consummate South Africa’s peace mission in Burundi was a decision made with political hopes and not the inference of violence. “The deployment of the SANDF to protect returning political leaders effectively marked the country’s engagement in peace operations in Burundi, and was a significant part of Mandela’s strategic input into the Arusha agreement” (South Africa’s Peacekeeping Role in Burundi, 2007:19). The impact of South African military presence grew, as the role changed from the protection of politicians to the contribution towards a ceasefire, a great advantage to the South African mission in Burundi. “The SANDF’s efforts assisted in laying the foundation for political dialogue, restored a semblance of peace, instilled hope and ushered a new beginning to the people of Burundi to build their country,” (Engelbrecht, 2010).

Upon evaluation of the Arusha Peace Negotiations, some factors had contributed to the impression that it was not entirely successful, not necessarily at the fault of one particular party but perhaps as a result of miscalculation or ill-considered factors by the external mediators. For one, the fact that the agreement was not signed by all

involved parties gave the Arusha Peace Accord a loophole which naturally would place the people of Burundi at further risk should one of the unsigned parties decide to regain the momentum that the civil war in Burundi would have lost in the time of negotiations. "The fact that the ceasefire agreement was not signed by all the parties and that issues of peace and security dealt with through the Third Committee of the Arusha had not been concluded, compromised the Accord in eyes of many. Some considered the situation neither war nor peace (International Crisis Group, 2000), though the overall security immediately improved except in three provinces" (Basagic, 2007:23).

It would appear that the Accord may now have put Burundi in an even more volatile situation than they were in before, in fact, violence continued. "The 2003 handover of power was considered a success because Buyoya stepped down. Simultaneously, there was an outbreak of violence from militias that had not signed the Ceasefire Agreement (Bentley & Southall, 2005, p. 96) This outburst again created displacement and insecurity. This frail peace somehow held despite very grim prognoses. By the middle of January 2004, former rebels were integrated in the national army, except for the FNL that was not part of the peace agreement and that continued its attacks on the government army" (Bentley & Southall, 2005, p. 96).

Despite Mandela having excluded the rebel groups from negotiation due to their constant unwillingness to cooperate, can one blame South African diplomatic effort completely for this shortfall? It is imperative to remember here, as mentioned previously, that in mediation, the Third Party only possesses control over the process and not the outcome should they be in a mediation role as was South Africa.

This is what Mandela in representation of South Africa had tried to achieve and as such cannot be to blame. It is only in arbitration that third parties have control over both the process and the outcome. Warring factions/ parties present their positions or final offer to a third party, who possesses the power to impose a solution (Leigh Thompson , 2001:322).

One may consider this a limitation to South Africa's diplomatic approach in Burundi questioning whether or not it would have been possible for South Africa to have taken an arbitration role.

South Africa as a Third Party interventionist naturally had to include more than just the involvement and winnings that resulted from South Africa's mediation roles, it also included military intervention. for the first time since the end of Apartheid, South Africa deployed peacekeeping troops outside of their own borders to the capital of Burundi in which 240 soldiers were deployed in October of 2001 to await the further arrival of 500 more in the day to follow (Butcher, 2001).

"A 36-month transition worked well. Under the Mandela-brokered deal there was to be a Tutsi president and a Hutu vice-president in the first half of the transition with the positions reversed in the second 18 months. Mandela decided that Buyoya should lead the country for first period as interim president" (Basagic,2007:24).

Despite Mandela's trying efforts to broker a peace agreement in Burundi, violence continued and Mandela was stretched to diplomatic mechanisms such as that of the calling for strikes, nevertheless a rather unconventional strike." Nelson Mandela yesterday called on the women of Burundi to deny their husbands marital services if they refuse to sign a peace accord aimed at ending the civil war" (Lockwood,2000).

The Burundi crisis claimed the lives of thousands of Burundian civilians, deaths which continued through much of the Arusha Peace Negotiations, and as such needs to be considered as one of the many hurdles and limitations that intervening parties would need to consider. It is possible at the same time to consider the Arusha Peace Negotiations and the involvement of the regional initiative, with special mention to South Africa in both a diplomatic and military capacity, a success in terms of the cooperation between African states that had become exemplary. "The Arusha process has served as an example of leadership and cooperation among several African countries. The Heads of State of at least seven African countries have been involved" (Curtis, 2000).

Upon further evaluation and analysis of the Arusha agreement, which despite its success, was subject to many limitations for instance as discussed the fact that it was signed only by politicians and not by armed movements. This may have limited the negotiations slightly but would have been hindered even further should the mediation have included the voices and constant disagreement from the rebel forces. South African mediation and external intervention parties were working towards a ceasefire and end to the violence.

In addition, as the exploitation of ethnic difference as a cause for conflict exists especially in Burundi, it was also noted that some rebel groups wished to negotiate not with government but with military. It may be considered that this is due to the fact that in Burundi, much like in many other African states and international states, military power is the patron of political power, especially in weak and unstable states.

After the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord and up to 2004, the following international interventions continued in Burundi: the South African Protection Service Detachment in 2001, the African Union Mission in Burundi in 2003/2004 and the United Nations Mission in Burundi in 2004/2006 (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi, 2007:24). "The AU and UN peacekeeping missions came as part of a peace agreement and, importantly, as a condition for the signing of the cease-fire agreement. They [all] were a mechanism of third-party regional or international military reinforcement of peace process" (Basagic, 2007: 25)

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Findings of the Research:

Ethnic diversity was not the main root cause of the Burundi civil conflict but it contributed to the way in which politicians exploited ethnic differences that ensured ethnic diversity was a key ingredient in the generation of the conflict. In the case of Burundi, both Tutsi's and Hutu's struggled with the attainment of power and refused to share with any other ethnic group due to the history and the events that had occurred during the colonial era. Policies and procedures that were created and implemented during the colonial era were deeply entrenched in the memories of all different ethnic groups. In an attempt to control power, different ethnic groups had utilised ethnic identity as a tool of exploitation. Another challenge that faced Burundi was that excluded political groups mobilised ethnic solidarity to challenge the power regime. This ensured that ethnic diversity formed the basis for political struggles in the attainment of economic advantages. Purely on the basis to maintain, defend and or capture political power, ethnically motivated killings became a trend in the conflict that devastated Burundi. Due to the above information that has been discussed throughout this paper I am in the position to argue that exclusion based purely on ethnicity created a strong ethnic consciousness which was manipulated as a resource that motivated and escalated the conflict, but also displays the strong linkages between economic and political power that was a key indicator that influenced the civil conflict.

Colonialism was key ingredient that changed the behaviour of the local people and entrenched the animosity between Hutu's and Tutsi's.

Colonialists planted seeds of hate, disgust, unequal and unfair policies that ensured that Hutu's and Tutsi's would never be able to accept each other and stand together as Burundians. This traumatic entrenchment between the Hutu's and Tutsi's was not merely through processes and procedures, but was also psychological. The Belgians attempted to restructure the traditional administrative system to ensure Tutsi dominance. Colonial policies differentiated between different ethnic groups elevating the social status of Tutsi's and Hutu's also by giving them privileged opportunities to education. Coupled with the seeds of domination that had already been sown by the Belgian colonialists, this deep entrenchment of animosity had been created

amongst Hutu's which resulted as being a resource and key ingredient in the post-colonial conflict.

As a result of the ethnic divide created in the colonial era, ethnocide was introduced, thereby creating a condition that mass killings were acceptable which had occurred in every stage during political transition. After obtaining independence, the Hutu and Tutsi have still experienced massive violence, mass killings and gross human rights violations. These mass killings had occurred within the context of power struggles but the underlying root causes were in fact already being ignited by ethnic prejudice. Due to the above argument the civil conflict in Burundi had been sustained by rival politicians seeking state power and thereby manipulating ethnicity in order to mobilise groups of people.

The era of colonialism brought about the exclusion of certain ethnic groups, unfair policies and unfair class divisions through this intense ethnic antagonism between Burundians significantly contributed to the violent conflict in the post-colonial era in Burundi. Cognisance has to be taken to not rule out the fact that post-colonial leaders also played a role in escalating conflict amongst Burundians because of the personal need and greed for power. Due to the above information, the root cause to the civil conflict that brought on immense devastation in Burundi lies in the struggle for power by rival politicians who had in fact manipulated ethnicity and past injustice to gain economic advantage.

South Africa's national interest and foreign policy in Africa was the key component that motivated the South African government to assist and address the Burundi civil conflict, South Africa had recently experienced a peaceful transition to democracy based on the South African approach for conflict resolution and the vision of sustainable development. South Africa's peace, security and stability also ensured regional stability where there would be a conducive environment where trade and development could thrive and thus preventing future conflicts in the region. Due to the hegemonic role that South Africa plays in sub-Saharan Africa there was a great motivation based on humanitarian grounds and the search to secure sustainable peace on the entire continent. The events that impact the rest of the African continent are also tied to the future of South Africa.

Under the guidance and leadership of the chief negotiator, former South African President Nelson Mandela, who was key to insist on preventative diplomacy and a diplomatic solution y continuously warning of the repercussions of using a completely militarised solution. Mandela continuously used his energy and strength to mobilise key international actors and regional countries to support a peaceful solution to address the civil conflict that brought on devastation to Burundi.

Due to the limited mandate which required an expansion in the operations and number of troops deployed to stabilise Burundi, South Africa had to merge into AMIB. With this expansion of mandate, saw the inclusion of monitoring and verification of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the providing of protection to former exiled Hutu leaders, the facilitation of the joint ceasefire commission and the technical commission that had to ensure the restructuring and reintegration of new Burundian national defence and police force. Apart from the above mandate also included was the inclusion of safety and security for parties and key individuals, identification of assembly and disengagement areas and the technical assistance required for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Third Party intervention provided by South Africa and it troops deployment inevitable meant that all parties to the conflict were included in the peace negotiations and transitional government. The safety and security provided to the former exiled Hutu politicians encouraged them to participate in the peace processes and negotiations which were critical to the success of the peace process. The deployment of South African troops had ensured a heightened sense of security to the local population by demonstrating that South Africa was a neutral party. Due to the above environment that was created by the South African troops, this saw the end of mobilisation within the Hutu community for conflict.

The diplomatic efforts led by former South Africa President Nelson Mandela helped in achieving a 50/50 split in the Burundian National Defence forces between Hutu's and Tutsi's and a transitional government which was based on a 60% Hutu and a 40% Tutsi spilt in both cabinet and parliament. South Africa's diplomatic efforts also assisted in resolving issues that were severely contested by the warring factions. A critical success factor was the approach that South Africa had taken regarding the engagement with the international community and the rallying for support to ensure that the Burundi peace process would be successful. Several supportive meetings

between Burundi's neighbouring countries were held in South Africa inclusive of warring factions that were combined to move the peace process forward.

Although efforts were intensified under the facilitation of Nelson Mandela which attributed to the culmination of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, the agreement was only signed by certain political parties seeing that other groups refused profusely to sign the agreement. All rebel movements were excluded in the Arusha Agreement thus the Arusha Peace process failed in reaching consensus and agreement around issues that perpetuated the Burundian civil conflict. Even though provision was made that a national constitution would be made which was an ingredient that had emanated from the Arusha agreement, this constitution was unilaterally imposed on the Burundian population even though it was a known fact that all Tutsi parties had rejected it. We furthermore saw the issues of power sharing arise again in the 2005 elections as different parties questioned cabinet appointments.

Inclusion of all parties to the conflict and in particular the civil society organisations of Burundi, is a pre-requisite for the popular ownership of the peace process in the case of Burundi, it is the Arusha agreement. Expected Third Party intervention (South Africa) was to ensure that all parties were included and involved throughout every stage of the peace process in this case; this was not done where unfortunately civil society organisations were denied the opportunity of participating in the peace process and negotiations. The entitlement for all parties to be involved is a prerequisite to attain sustainable peace.

South Africa's diplomatic intervention, that was key to resolving deadlocks, experience in the ceasefire agreement was critically important in attaining compromise between the different warring factions. The assistance of the government of Burundi, South African diplomats and CNDD-FDD saw the signing of the ceasefire on December 2, 2002 in Arusha, Tanzania.

Had it not been for Third Party intervention, many innocent civilians would continue to die; there would have been an increase in internally displaced people, a growing devastation of the land, and the continuation and increase of continued gross human rights violations. Third Party intervention had immediately contributed towards the decrease in escalation of the conflict that was ravaging Burundi. This contribution

stopped the worsening of the situation in Burundi which could have been compared to the start of the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. Cognisance must be taken by Third Party intervention impacted enormously on diplomatic and political intervention and the key focus was not on the military front even though this proved to be helpful in facilitating negotiations which was key in the resolution on contentious issues.

Conforming to the UN traditional peacekeeping norms proved to be challenging and difficult to observe in the case of Burundi. Post-Cold War has brought about an era whereby human rights and human security had gained wider recognition which saw the redefining of international norms of non-intervention and sovereignty. Due to the circumstances facing the protection of civilians and the imminent attacks and threats on their lives made it difficult to conform to the traditional UN peacekeeping laws.

A coordinated approach to conflict resolution is far more effective which ensures that all efforts are integrated to achieve a common objective. Although regional countries joined or participated under the umbrella of the regional initiative for peace in Burundi, some countries at times pursued individual initiatives trying to resolve the Burundi conflict by themselves. The strategy implemented by Mandela around the mobilisation of the international community inclusive of the UN and key influential members was of paramount importance to ensure positive outcomes in the peace process and negotiations.

The elements and components of the pre-negotiation phase is a critical success factor in the resolution of conflict, it is in this initial phase that key parties to the conflict are identified; key issues are raised and identified to constitute an agenda. It is this formula that is discussed in the pre-negotiation phase that forms the basis of the general agreement that is signed during the peace process. A critical success factor was South Africa's diplomatic approach of having a strategy of separating talks with different warring factions prior to the negotiations was key in the peace process.

A key component of Third Party intervention is the process of facilitation that forms the foundation of what procedures need to be followed in negotiation. Mediations however, is where a more active role in the brokering of negotiations and arbitrations must be facilitated by Third Party. Therefore, the critical role of chief negotiator former President Nelson Mandela, was key in differentiating between facilitation and

mediation. His role was not to merely reach an agreement, but to ensure that there was effective communication and increased understanding of all the challenges and contentious issues that arose around the negotiations.

This paper has revealed that a number of factors combined together must be utilised to explain the civil conflict experienced in Burundi. This paper dismisses the idea that one cannot argue purely on the basis that the Burundi conflict was exclusively caused by ethnic diversity between Hutu's and Tutsi's but rather the conflict was rooted and entrenched in the desire of self-attainment- capturing and or the preservation of political power ensuring the manipulation of colonial history, regionalism, ethnic diversity and the history of Burundi as a nation.

5.2 Recommendations :

A criteria for the Arusha agreement to be successfully implemented will require a need from all parties to participate in the peace process. Given that the civil society organisations were excluded from this process, there is a need to unpack and discuss key facets of the agreement. This will ensure ownership by all Burundians which will enable a smooth and effective implementation of the Arusha Agreement which will enable Burundians to establish their country based on a solid foundation of peace.

From a political perspective, there is a need to revisit the Arusha agreement on the basis of addressing the issue of political power between parties. In the 2005 elections the Tutsi parties have already questioned the basis of their exclusion from key cabinet appointments. This paper has provided evidence that the root cause behind the civil conflict in Burundi centred on the thrust and attainment of power. All parties need to be ensured that there will be a system of effective and fair mechanisms related to power sharing which will allow the building of permanent peace in Burundi. This should however, be a long term initiative until all Burundians have embraced each other and a national identity. So long as the division between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups exists, the foundation laid for a democratic structure will not be successful.

The current constitution passed was not generally accepted by all Tutsis and was greatly influenced by the Arusha peace process. There is a need for a new

constitution to be developed that will include the participation of all Burundians which will ensure a solid ground for peace building in Burundi. The commission of truth and reconciliation must be set up for people to understand what happened and for the process of forgiveness to take place.

The international community, neighbouring countries within the region need to support initiatives surrounding the issue of the FNL merging with negative forces of DRC. Third Party interventions should ensure that there are no supplies and no support bases for the FNL to operate out of. Support initiatives around the FNL should commence to start serious negotiations with government with the idea that peace attained in Burundi will contribute and promote regional peace and stability.

For reconciliation and sustainable peace Burundi should revisit its violent history where mass killings and gross human rights violations occurred. Burundi should strive to bring justice to all those responsible for committing crimes against Burundians.

Reconstruction and development should be immediate priorities to be addressed by the elected government with their assistance of the international community. Implementation of protocol IV of the Arusha Peace Accords needs to be revisited. In addition, the youth of Burundi should be mobilised and afforded opportunities related to initiatives that support Burundi's economic recovery and reconstruction. This will ensure that idle youth do not mobilise and ignite the cycle of conflict that devastated Burundi for a decade. Effective communication and the need for peace programmes surrounding sensitisation, breaking down of barriers, stereotypes and the cycle of prejudice is a key requirement to promote national identity amongst all Burundians irrespective of being Hutu or Tutsi.

An environment of intensified efforts to promote the strengthening of structures for the consolidation of peace and stability for all Burundians is a key component in ensuring that the country does not return to war. Amongst other structures for consideration will be returning refugees, providing training for security personnel, initiatives to protect human rights, reforming state institutions and encouraging political participation through informal and formal negotiation as discussed by Boutros Boutros Ghali in the report to UN Security Council in 1992.

If there is evidence that a host country is unable to provide basic necessities related to safety and security to all citizens, the immediate action and discharging of Chapter VII by the UN Security Council should be instant whether or not the host country is willing to cooperate and consent to such an action. To maintain international peace and security, the need and the responsibility to protect civilians under imminent attack and threat should fall within the umbrella of the UN Security Council's responsibility.

The absence of an early warning system or mechanisms contributed towards hundreds of thousands of Burundians being massacred under mysterious circumstances that are still not clearly explained. The killings of these masses of people were unable to immediately attract the attention and intervention by the international community. A key recommendation of this paper therefore is the urgent need for effective early warning systems on the African continent.

In conclusion, this paper had aimed to assess the role of South Africa in Burundi (1999-2004) and by all the above provided information, it is my inference and belief that South Africa had played an instrumental part in the Burundi civil conflict, in which their participation, be it foreign policy initiatives, diplomatic efforts and military power or the central mediation role played by former South Africa President Nelson Mandela. It is my further opinion as supported by the above that the Burundi conflict did not occur simply due to the animosity that existed between ethnic groups, however, this was a large contributing factor. South Africa's Third Party intervention led to Burundi's peace process being successful through many different efforts initiated by South Africa be it diplomatic, political and of military involvement. The situation and environment was conducive in allowing the chief negotiator Nelson Mandela to ensure that negotiations and the peace process reach a successful resolution to ensure that the civil conflict would cease.

This paper has provided substantial evidence of the key and critical role that South Africa played in the resolution of the civil conflict in Burundi. It is my assessment that the Third Party initiative by South Africa in the Burundian civil conflict was key to the success of the resolution of the conflict.

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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

BURUNDIAN OFFICIALS

1. Describe the role that ethnicity has played in fuelling the Burundian conflict?
2. What effects has the political and economical exclusion had on the Burundian society? How has these factors perpetuated the conflict?
3. Do you agree that colonial legacy has contributed to the escalation of the Burundi conflict and had caused divide amongst the Burundi people? Explain?
4. Do you agree that the conflict would have escalated in Burundi in the event that there were no third party (external actors) involvement? Explain?
5. Describe the role that South Africa played during the Burundi peace process?
6. How has the South African Peace Mission assisted Burundi in keeping peace? Explain?
7. What were your expectations of the Peace Mission deployed by South Africa?
8. In your opinion, your recommendations to ensure that peace is sustained in Burundi.

SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS

1. Explain the mission objectives for the Burundi Peacekeeping Mission? In your opinion, to what extent were they achieved?
2. Describe the key challenges that were faced during your deployment?
3. In your opinion, were these challenges addressed accordingly?
4. Was the Burundian government officials/ warring factions, senior officers, cooperate in your pursuit of achieving the mission objectives?
5. What was your role and involvement in the mission? Did you engage and interact with external parties in search of peace in Burundi?
6. What are your thoughts surrounding the success of SA Peace Mission? Was it a successful, worthwhile deployment?
7. In your opinion, what recommendations can be made to external interveners to protect and save the lives of civilians facing catastrophic situations in a conflict as experienced by Burundi and its people?

CONFLICT FIELD EXPERTS

1. Explain the Burundi conflict in relation to broader conflicts as experienced in the Great Lakes Region?
2. What are the international/regional implications of Burundi's civil conflict?
3. In your opinion, what are the root causes of Burundi's civil conflict?
4. In your opinion, do you agree on the strict observance of the United Nation's traditional peacekeeping norms during the Burundian conflict? Explain?
5. Your thoughts on the challenges and success of the Arusha Peace and reconciliation agreement and other key agreements such as eg. Protocol on Political, Defence and Security power sharing in Burundi.
6. In light of the civil conflict experienced in Burundi, what do you consider to be the appropriate action plans/ recommendations/strategies that the International communities should consider and implement in order to address them and seek sustainable resolution.
7. In your opinion, what would be the underlying challenges of Burundi's civil conflict that needs to be addressed in order for the country to be placed on the route towards sustainable peace?

APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Key officials

Members of Commission of Demobilisation and Reintegration

Members from University of Burundi

SA's Operational Commanders

Deputy Force Commander, UN Peace Keeping Mission

UN Peacekeepers

SA Peacekeepers

Field experts from ISS