DEMOCRACY
 aJitJ
 1 3 - 1 5 JULY 1994
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 HISTORY WORKSHOP
 Ruth Iyob
 University of Asmara
 Eritrea
INTRODUCTION
 On May 24, 1993 Eritrea declared its independence and emerged as Africa's 52nd
 nation state.1 Its exclusion from the International and African political arena was
 ended after a thirty-year resistance to Ethiopian hegemony2. Eritrea's first bid for
 nationhood had begun in 1941 when it was the first to be freed by British-led
 Allied Forces3. The Eritrean quest of a one's own nation, derailed at various
 junctures by internal dissension and external collusion was finally ?SHoecssfiil1 after
 half a century.
 In the 1940s and 1950s the different peoples that constituted Eritrea had remained
 "strangers" to each other despite their co-habitation under a single colonial
 administration. Fonnaily declared as Italy's "first-bom colony" aad-a- prized-
 ?foasc8sieft4te-people-in 189JJ first encountered each other as colonial subjects to
 an alien European rule. The different communities adhering to two different
 religious and a mosaic of cultural and linguistic heritage emerged out of the
 crucible of colonial bondage with a vague notion of a unifying common identity ^_
 that of being Eritrean. Eritrea's pre-colonial past enaracterized by powerful
 indigenous chiefs alternating with interludes of external invaders from the
 Ethiopian Kingdom in the south and,fiver9jy kjngdem- of the eastern Red Sea*.
 Its geographic location on the south eastern coast of the Red Sea also resulted ^
 in commercial and cultural interaction with othe^ societies. The demarcation of
 its boundaries by Italy succeeded in erecting permeable be??2aHe? within which
 modern Eritrea's political history began to take shape. G.K.N. Trevaskis, a
 colonial administrator during the British Administration (1941-1952) aptly
 summarized the Eritrean scene of that period.
 The capriciousmanner of Eritrea's creation, its long history of
 immigrations, invasions, and partition between alien-rulers, and the
 physical diversity of its terrain have left rheiHLstamp on the
 inhabitants5.
 ' Issayas Afeworki, quote ch,l
 2
  Sanbar, Semir O.A.U.
 3
  First to be freed
 4
  Kolomodin
 5
  G.K.N. Trevaskis Eritrea: A Colony in Transition (1941-1952), LondoS : Oxford Univereity Press,
 1960, p.! 1
The replacement of Italy's colonial rule, ite-aspirationo to grandewr fmnctsateTby
 Mussolini's fascist rhete?e by imperial British presence was at first welcomed by
 the population. The jubilation at the eminent liberation was soon cut short as the
 caretaker British Administration proved to be unwilling and unable to shoulder the
 tasks of decolonization. The post-1945 world order was in the process of
 establishing new terms of reference where hegemonic domination through the ,?, \t?v*
 exercise of diplomatic, economic and military prowess was replacing the 19th
  t , ^
 century exercise of Europe's "civilizing mandate". /8f8fe-&q"first to be freed," ftl/tc*l's ^
 (followed by Somalia and Libya) the popular appeal for "a room of one's own, a\ ??>,/*(,
 country of ones own ; a century in which one was not a guest"6 began to echo
 amongst the Eritreans as well as their neighbors.
 In the Eritrean context, the appeal (later transformed into a defiant demand for a
 "room... a country of one's own" characterizes Eritrea's post colonial history. The
 Eritrean saga began with the dream of one's own articulated by the generation born
 under colonial rule and versed in the legal implications spawned legitimized by the
 post World War II emergent international order.
 The decolonization period, 1941-1945, ushered in a decade during which Eritrean
 confronted their disparate traditional legacies and jhe; recently acquired exposure
 to western concepts of government, administration and values. The intelligentsia
 which spear-headed the anti-colonial movement encountered resistance to the new
 conceptions of universal rights, enfranchisement and the rule of law that
 transcended ethnic and religious loyalties. The unenviable position of advocating
 self-rule when the political "self remained miied in a fragmented society divided
 by geographic, religious, linguistic and ethnic cleavages resulted in the absence of
 a common vision of the Eritrean nation. The pre-colonial past, replete with myths
 and legends and actual events of distrust and destruction wrought by factional
 communities was invoked. The strain upon the emerging identity proved to be too
 much and the weight of past history emerged as the victor. The death knell of ihe
 liberal and secular sentiments if the intelligentsia was sounded with the entry of
 imperial Ethiopia into the domestic Eritrean arena. Religion and its different
 fl
  These lines come from the Somali novelist, Numidin Farah and it was written about Somalia.
 Nevertheless the imagery it invokes is apt for the Eritrean quest of a nation which began with inhabiting a
 space. Numidin Farah, Sardines (St. Paul, MN: Greywolf Press, 1992,3rd edition, p.4)
prophets, aligning each individual and community in discrete social; cultural and
 economic spheres became, in the absence of a critical mass of advocates of a
 secular state, the rallying points for a nation. The meshing of religion and politics,
 myth and facts, past history and present imperatives is an inevitable pattern in the
 formation of a nation. This is especially true in most colonial territories which are
 amalgams of different peoples, histories and collective memories brought together
 by colonial boundaries.
 The process of the development of a common national identity shaped by pre-
 colonial and colonial interaction in Eritrea was also affected by the presence of
 imperial Ethiopia. Imperial claims to the "Mareb MeUash" (the area beyond the
 Mareb River) became the driving force that hardened traditional animosities and
 hostilities emanating from emnic?religious affiliations. The fragile and non-
 indigenous structure of administration introduce by the British Administration,
 which introduced the western model was incongruent with the visions and
 integration of authority, power and societal relations in the formed Italian colony.
 Although the political imperatives of the post-W.W.H international order played a
 key part in the derailing of the first Eritrean bid for nationhood; I argue that the
 complex historical and socio-cultural dynamics within Eritrea and the Horn of
 Africa provided the context within modern Eritrean nationalism evolved and
 emerged after three decades.
 The first bid for freedom from alien rule gave rise to the establishment of the first
 anti-colonial organization Mahber Fikri Hager Eritra (MFHE) in Eritrea. The
 founding members consisted of the young intelligentsia, traditional figures of
 authority - notables and religious leaders. At first united by their common'goal of
 anti-Italian sentiments their vision of a future Eritrea was still shaped by
 traditional animosities that preempted the maturation of an all embracing national
 identity that encompassed the different faiths of Christianity and Islam.
 The MFHE's demand for an immediate end to Italian rule was not met by the
 British Military Administration due to the empire's declining economic resources
 and unwillingness to invest in ensuring a "fair" decolonization of a colonial
 territory.
 - 5 -
The BMA, as a care-taker of an occupies! territory was required to function at the
 minimum cost and had no mandate to introduce large-scale reforms or
 innovations, which might incur additional financial expenditure7.
 These constraints on the care-taker government were incompatible with the
 reforms demanded by the anti-colonial Eritrean nationalities of the 19440s from
 the "liberators" perspective the efforts of the Allies were focused on defeating the
 Axis powers rather than a pre-meditated "humanitarian" endeavor to free Eritrean
 from fascist rule. Once the Axis powers were defeated, the care-taker
 governments priorities (and those of the Allied Forces) immediately shifted to the
 establishment of spheres of influence in the post-1945 international order. The
 international debates about the fate of Eritrea (and the other Italian colonies of
 Libya and Somalia) began in 1945 four years after the defeat of the Italians. The
 body entrusted with this task was a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) made up
 of representatives of the USA, USSR, Britain and France. The solutions proposed
 by the "Big Four" were different and due to the lack of consensus another
 Commission - the Four Powers Commission of Investigation (FPC) was
 established in 1947.
 The time period between 1941 to 1947 when external powers were debating the
 fate of Eritrea the anti-colonial platform united in their original demand for the
 end of Italian rule had fragmented. Consensus, was also lacking in the domestic
 political arena as it was in the international arena.
 The first crack in the MFHE appeared with the entry of Ethiopia into the domestic
 and external debates over the fate of Eritrea. The Big Four's debated centered on
 either the maintenance, expansion of colonial possessions8 or the establishment of
 new bases and alliances9.
 7
  J.C.Cray and L. SUberman The Fate of Italy's Colonies: A Report to the Italian Colonial Bureau.,
 London: Fabian Publications, Ltd., July 1948, pp.24-26
 8
  American and Soviet efforts focused more on competition to establish footholds vacated by Italy and
 to replace Britain as the paramount international power in the Horn. See Marcus, pp79-87 -*;
 9
  Britain's interests were to ensure the economic well-being of its two colonies. British Soinaliland and
 the Sudan. Therefore Britain proposed to partition Eritrea between Ethiopia and the Sudan IO restore
 the Ogaden to Somalia. France on the other hand sought to maintain the colonial status and to prevent
 precedents of early independence for its colonies in the Horn and the Maghreb. For details, see
The domestic debates revolved around the type of post-occupation rule over
 Eritrea, heavily infused with which societal sector would emerge as the dominant
 power. The Eritrean intelligentsia of the 1940s demanded the ousting of foreign
 rule (both Italian and British) the traditional chiefs envisioned a return to a "pre-
 colonial" past.
 The one common denominator that made the fulfillment of external solutions ...
 the resolution of the Eritrean question to compatible with the Big Four's interest...
 was imperial Ethiopia's desire to incorporate the territory1?.
 The MFHE's elites - the new elites composed of the intelligentsia and the
 traditional elites composed of chiefs and religious leaders... shared anti-Italian
 sentiments and a desire for freedom from colonial rule. Beyond mis, the MFHE
 had little in the way of a clear political agenda which could withstand the pressure
 from within and without. The traditional elite regarded the defeat of the Italians as
 an opportunity to restore their pre-colonial power and status buttressed and
 justified by ethnic and religious affiliations. The new elite, product of the Italian
 colonial system and beneficiaries of western education, wanted to retain their
 status and prospects of social mobility. The prospects for a restoration of
 traditional figures to authority based on either lineage or conquest were thus first
 threatened by the intelligentsia which sought power on the basis of education,
 leadership, skiDs and populist appeal. Thus the first cleavage to appear was an
 urban rural divide, in the competition for power in the yet to-be-decolonized
 territory". This internal polarization within the MFHE provided a window of
 opportunity for imperial Ethiopia's aspiration for expansion through an alliance of
 the traditional elites and the Coptic Orthodox Church. The help of the Eritrean
 Coptic Church was enlisted in order to convert people to support union with
 Ethiopia as a venue for the decolonization of the territory.
 Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, the United States 1941-1974, Berkeley, University, of CA
 Press, 1983, p.41.
 10
  For details on debates concerning the fate of Eritrea by the FPC and the UN, see Okbazgbi Yohaanes,
 Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991, pp,51 -25
 11
  This was clearly demonstrated by Trevaskis statement of the urban-centered view of the new eiite that
 "no-Eritrean class was better-fed with liberal ideas than the Asmara intelligentsia (and) note was so
 starved of British reform" Trevaskis, Colony in Transition, p.52
 - 5 -
The politicization of religion and the new proposal of uniting Eritrea with Ethiopia
 led to the sharpening of pre-existing local, socio-cultural, economic and political
 cleavages between the Christian and Muslim Eritrean communities. Union with
 the Ethiopia would ensure the continuity of feudal traditional forms of rule that
 pre-existing local, socio-cultural, economic and political cleavages between the
 Christian and Muslim Eritrean communities. Union with Ethiopia would ensure
 the continuity of feudal traditional, forms of rule that pre-empted the emergence of
 the intelligentsia elite which threatened the traditional elites. The introduction of
 religion as an actor in nationalist politics served to weaken the fragile bonds of the
 intelligentsia whose power-base and appeal was limited to the urban sectors. The
 demand for union, supported by the Coptic Church and the majority of the
 traditional elites was soon paralleled by a demand for immediate independence
 and the formation of a sovereign state of Eritrea. By 1944, a group known as the
 Eritrea for Eritreans had taken up the banned of independence. The specter of an
 Imperial and Christian empire presented a dilemma for Muslim inhabitants who
 faced a return to the capricious rule of aristocracy and the exigencies of lord-serf
 relations sought by traditional elites who were willing to accept imperial Ethiopian
 domination in return for a restoration of feudal control weakened by Italian
 colonial rule and British reforms'2.
 Thus, in the decade of the 1940s, Eritrea which entered a new stage... from
 colonial rule, to occupation and decolonization... contested internally and
 externally and lacking a consensus on its future. The sole anti-colonial movement
 of 1941, MFKE, splintered into two factions - pro-union and pro independence
 which became the foundations for the three major parties of the late 1940s and
 1950s. The major external actors were the four powers, imperial Ethiopia and the
 newly established United Nations. Internally, factionalism and fragmentation
 based on self-determination, pre-colonial affiliation, and ethno-religious rivalries
 resulted in an era of legal and illegal political activism that turned the ex-Italian
 colony into a contested territory. The diplomatic, military and economic resources
 of imperial Ethiopia derailed the first bid of Eritrean aspirations to nationhood and
 brought about the realization of an expanded territory through a UN sponsored
 12
  For details on the ruling castes of the Muslim inhabited areas see S.F. Nadel Races and Tribes of
 Eritrea. Asmara, British Military Administration -Eritrea, January 1944
 - f f -
federation in 1952. The pro-union elements supported by imperial Ethiopia
 emeiged victorious and the Ethiopianization of Eritrea became institutionalized
 through a submission to the Crown.
 Belatedly, the pro-independence parties and groups attempted to coalesce under
 the demand for independence transcending ethnic, religious and religious rivalries.
 The Independence Bloc established in 1949 13 was by that time facing the
 formidable might of a neighboring empire, with access to international channels
 which has allied itself with the emergent American superpower in its quest for
 regional hegemony. The fragmented Eritrean nationalism, polarized by socio-
 economic and cultural identification to political affiliation proved incapable of
 transcending its historica constraints. On December 2, 1950 the UN General
 Assembly passed resolution 390 A(V) to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia as an
 "autonomous unit ... under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.14" The UN
 resolution to implement a flawed and eschewed framework inaugurated a new era
 in the 1950s which gave birth to a defiant nationalism which sharpened the
 contours of Eritrean nationalism in the following two decades. The subordination
 of Eritrean society which underwent European colonialism, experienced political
 competition and interaction among its disparate sectors, ... under absolute
 imperial control was to prove incompatible G.K.N. Trevaskis, a former British
 official in Eritrea pointed out the difficulties of maintaining federal relations IS that
 bound the two societies in light of the tendency of an absolutist empire to "fall
 back on its traditional model of rule"16.
 Imperial Ethiopian tendency for absolute control was manifested in two ways.
 The first was a continuation of imperial patronage of pro-union Eritrean autonomy
 over its economic, social and political affairs. These two approaches to the federal
 13
  The Independence Bloc, Selfi Natznet, was established on July 25. 1949 and-it. included four parties
 and two associations which proclaimed then commitment to independence. For details, see Nai Ertra
 Semunawit Gazeta, No.308 "Me'merekta Selfi Natznet Eritia'', Thursday, M y -28, 1'949.
 14
  For details see United Nations, "Text of Resolution 390 A(V) adopted on December 2 1950 by the
 General Assembly, Official Records: Seventh Session, Supplement, No.15 (A/2188) New York, 1952.
 pp.74-75
 15
  See Trevaskis, Colony in Transition, p. 129-130
 16
  Ruth Iyob, The Brilrean Struggle for Independence: domination, resistance and nationalism.
 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994 forthcoming Oct. 1994 forthcoming
 Oct.1994 Manuscript page 143
solution were to result in "... Eritrean discontent and eventual revolt"17. This
 discontent and revolt triggered by Ethiopian encroachments on Eritrean autonomy
 resulted in the re-assessment of the linkage between the two countries and a re-
 vitalization of the secular nationalist elements which attempted to re-group the
 fragmented nationalism of the 1940's and redefine the nature of nationalist protest.
 During the federation years, 1952-1962, freedom of expression was curtailed. But
 grass roots resentment against the violation of individual rights and the autonomy
 of the Eritrean state found expression in the folk-culture. The harshness of
 Ethiopian rule seems to exceed that of Italian rule. The legendary words of a
 traditional Retrain chief in 1894 who had warned his people belatedly of
 encroaching colonial rule? that" it is difficult to find a cure once the red snake
 had bitten"18 was reversed in the 1950's with incredulity. The realization that a
 "fraternal black snake advocating African' liberation through unity' as a cure for
 [European] colonialism".
 The incredulity and despair at having missed an historic opportunity of escaping
 domination European and African - is reflected in a popular song of the mid
 195O's.2?
 Ata Ane'ye Gerimuni I am amazed at whafs happening.
 Marcia Indierro' do I never thought we would
 N'kheid Mesulini! go backwards in history
 Kabzi khulu's Mussolini Would Mussolini have
 d'o Me'heseleni?! been better for me?!
 Official Eritrean and Ethiopian censorship of discontent was met by an increasing
 awareness of the curtailment of rights. Popular assessment of the ineffectual
 Eritrean Assembly, instituted as a national legislative body entrusted with the task
 17
  Trevaskis,/4 Colony in Transition, p. 130
 18
  C. Conti Rossini, documents 'Bahta Hagos' lament in Italian. As "Dopo che il serpente rosso ha
 morso; per quanto cerchi, non si Irova il suo rimedio," translated from the Tigrigaa narration of" Keih
 temen ind>hri nekhisu delCkha ay'ghinen fcwsu". See Rossini, Proverbi Tradizioni' e Canzoni Tigrine
 (Italia: Amboglio Airoldi, 1942:305).
 19
  lyob, R. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, P. 78
 20
  A verse of a Tigringna song from the late 1950's popular in the Inda Shahi (Tea Houses) and Inda
 Suwa (Beer Houses) of Asmara.
of debating public issues and formulating policies representing Eritrean concerns,
 interests and grievances, could be measured by folk songs echoing a warning of
 unaddressed grievance.
 Assembleia B'haki Fredu MP's do the right thing
 Kabti Reshan so that you may leave
 B'dehan FC'twerdu your offices safely.
 Such sentiments and warnings were not limited to aggrieved folk-singers. By May,
 1962, the conventional wisdom that the autonomy of Eritrean Assembly, was an
 instrument to act as a rubber stamp for the Ethiopian crown wishes to annex the
 territory led to a demonstration of high school students demanding freedom. The
 demonstration was well organized and reflected the existence of organized
 resistance leading the American Consul in Asmara, to note that:
 it was a surprising and courageous move in the police state. Symptomatic of
 general discontent...apparently triggered off by a widespread rumor that the
 Eritrean Assembly was about to vote for full union with Ethiopia.21
 Indeed, the Consul's remarks were accurate about the existence of an organized
 clandestine opposition because with a wide spread following. The folk songs, and
 the "rumours" were based on the information network established by the first
 Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) which came into existence in 1958. The
 warning to the MPs combined with the student demonstrations had indeed struck
 home. An imperial edict soon followed to strengthen the police force to ensure
 order in the territory. The Eritrean Assembly, which convened on June 19, 1962
 rejected the proposal submitted by titular head of the Eritrean Assembly sending
 out the first signal that "the acquiescence of the Eritreans cannot be taken for
 granted even though its members may have been suborned with money, titles or
 decorations.22 The defiance to Ethiopia's imperial control had taken hold at the
 grass-roots and had created an organized network that operated out of every
 21
  Foreign Service Despatch. Matthew Looram, American Consul to the Department of State,
 Washington D.C., USA, No. 775 a.00/5.2562, May 25, 1962.
 22
  Foreign Service Despatch "Monthly Summary of Everb - June, 1962" from Matthew Looram,
 American Consul, Asmara to the Department of State, Washington DC, USA, No 775 a.00/7462, July 4,
 1962.
community through the use of the cultural arena. The Hare Khat Tahrir Eritrea
 (ELM), which came into being in 1958 was an urban-based nationalist movement
 which began by young Eritrean exiles in Port Sudan who had (6 years after
 federation) realized that the facade of federation could not accommodate the
 autonomy granted by UN Resolution 390 a (V). The party leaders and traditional
 elites of the 1940's were replaced by young exiles who focused on the tasks of
 reconciling the fragmented nationalism that had led to the failure of Eritrea's first
 bid for nationhood.23 The founders of the ELM, all Muslims, attempted to
 overcome the religious hostility fueled by the Ethiopian and Eritrean Coptic
 Churches in the competition for power during the British Administration. In an
 effort, to narrow the class cleavages of traditional Eritrean society their
 recruitment efforts were directed at the working class, small traders and students,
 social groups from which the leadership itself was derived. By widening the scope
 of membership, the ELM's platform challenged the traditional mode of conducting
 politics through patronage and inter-elite alliances. The ELM's charter was the
 first to formally declare that Eritrea belonged to both Christian and Muslim alike
 thus pre-empting the re-awakening of traditional hostilities between adherents of
 the two religions.
 A new politics of protest clearly indicative of a generational difference in political
 attitudes emerged under the ELM which aimed at:
 1) a re-definition of a politically distinct, pluralist and secular Eritrean state;
 2) a re-assertion of the Eritrean demand for independence citing Ethiopia's
 violation of Eritrea's constitutional rights.
 3) a rejection of Pan-Ethiopianism24
 4) denunciation of elite nationalism based on patronage politics and
 confessionalism.
 2 3
  For details see John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa.
 Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987.pp.l06-107 and Ruth lyob, The Eritrean Struggle.pp. 171-
 182.
 2 4
  Pan-Ethiopianism is defined here as the doctrine based on coerced unity justified/legitimated by virtue
 of claims to cultural similarity and conquest. It has been presented as an expression of" African unity"
 and used to legitimate Ethiopia's territorial expansion in the Post-War II era. For details see lyob, pp.65.
 - 10 ~
These goals were not expressed openly in the formal arena, therefore, political
 thought and opposition became ensconced in the informal sector. Tea-houses,
 bazaars, soccer events and schools became the center for recruitment and
 mobilization. Clandestine cells consisted of a core group of seven persons, each of
 whom was in turn assigned the task of recruiting six additional members.
 Induction into the organization required an oath to support the preamble, to donate
 3% of one's earnings and to attend bi-weekly meeting.25 This new organizational
 structure reflected a similarity with the Sudanese Communist Party's mode of
 operation which also emphasized literary study circles.26 The ELM's mobilization
 strategies appealed to Eritreans of different ages, faiths, economic classes and
 political orientations. It widened the scope of political activities, introduced a
 degree of tolerance. This was in marked contrast to the previous decade when
 membership and representation depended on the good will of elites ... party
 politicians and traditional rulers... which had circumscribed mass political activity.
 The new opposition spread throughout towns and cities and Mahber Shewate (7
 member cells) quickly multiplied.
 Secondary schools under pressure from Ethiopian "amharization"27 policies
 provided a ready-made network of alienated elements which included students,
 teachers and civil servants in the Ministry of Education. The banning of political
 parties and unions after the federal act was implemented led to the politicization of
 social organizations such as soccer teams. Soccer team members were recruited
 into the ELM when they traveled to the Sudan and spread the network inside
 Eritrea,
 The failure of the older nationalists of the 1940's was viewed as a betrayal of
 Eritrea's youth which was expressed in the social and cultural arena. Popular folk
 songs in the beer houses reflected the discontent with the older generation. An
 example was:
 2 5
  Stefaao Posia, Eritrea: Colooia Tradita. Rome: Edizione Associate, 199, pp.69-70.
 M
  For details on the SCP see Tim Niblock, Class and Power in the Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese
 Politics, 1898-1985. New York: University of New York Press, 1987,pp. 163-183.
 2 7
  The term amharization refers to the imposition of Ethiopia's official language - Amharic- and its
 replacement of Eritrea's medium of instruction - Tigringna and Arabic. These policies were also
 accompanied by the transfer of Ethiopian teachers to Eritrean schools.
 - u-
Abotat'na Uwano Our misguided "elders
 Ab Idom kelo Although they had the power
 Lemano they went begging.
 Such popular expressions of growing nationalism in the streets was also re-
 inforced by the establishment of a cultural association, the Mahber Theatre
 Asmara (Ma. T. A.).28 Ma. T. A. served as a recruitment center, fund raiser and
 an outlet for the frustrated population.
 As discontent increased so did the responses of the Ethiopian Empire. By 1959 a
 series of steps were taken to ensure the absolute control of the Empire over its
 federated "state" of Eritrea: In November, 1959, the Eritrean flag was replaced by
 the Ethiopian tricolour; in May 1960, the Eritrean Seal of Government was
 abolished and the name was changed to "Eritrean Administration". Students
 protesting the addition of the Amharic language as a requirement in the Eritrean
 curriculum were jailed.29 Dismayed at the poor performance of its "formally
 elected" representatives, Eritreans flocked to the Ma. T.A.'s bi-monthly cultural
 shows. Plays, singers and stand-up comics satirized the federal scheme and-
 warned against the evils of "alien" cultures.30 Although the shows were censored
 by authorities, the artists camouflaged the political messages in the intricacies of
 traditional ballads. In the cultural arena both the new radicals and traditional
 nationalists were united in their desire to oppose Ethiopian absolutism.
 The clandestine politics of protest permeated a wide constituency and popularized
 the nationalist struggle through a creative mobilization of social and economic
 grievances against Ethiopian violations of federal guarantees. The creative
 radicalism of the ELM despite its large following in urban Eritrean centers and in
 exile was lacking the support of veteran party politicians and traditional elites who
 perceived it as too radical and mistrusted its " communist" affiliations.
 2 8
  Ma. T. A. was not the only cultural organization at that time. AD earlier organization known as the
 Mahber M'mhiash Hagerawi Bahli (Association for the Improvement and Preservation of National
 Culture) had been established in the late 1950's by two musicians Tewolde Redda and Tkabo
 Woldemariam who were also members of Ma. T. A. For details, see Poscia, Colonia Tradita, p.88.
 2 9
  Interview with Kesete Habtezion, a participant in the student demonstrations of 1960.14 August,
 1990, New York, USA.
 30
  This was in reference to the American broadcasts from the Kagnew Station in Asmara (an agreement
 between the Empire and superpowers that formalized Ethiopia's alliance with the West) and the Amharic
 language broadcasts from Radio Ethiopia in Addis Ababa.
 -u-
The ELM envisioned the liberation of Eritrea through a coup d' etat, which was
 considered as fool hardy and not feasible by experienced politicians. Traditional
 elites' support thus went to a newer opposition, with recruits in the rural areas and
 head-quarters in Cairo which was established by veteran political exiles. The
 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) came into being in 1960 led by former leaders of
 the Eritrean Assembly and ex-party leaders in exile. Despite its enthusiastic
 followers and successful establishment of opposition networks, the ELM cells
 were hampered by the feet that the leadership was in exile and distant from the
 daily events that affected its members. The acephalous nature of the ELM ells and
 then lack of autonomous decision making capacity mitigated against the quick
 action needed for any urban-based clandestine opposition to be effective. Unable
 to obtain the support of experienced politicians and the traditional elite, the ELM
 (belatedly) resolved to consider the "necessity of armed struggle in the event of a
 failed coup.31
 In 1961 the ELF declared its armed struggle as the sole means of achieving
 independence and obtained support from both me urban and rural population
 including a number of ELM cells which joined the new front.32 Although the ELF
 (like the ELM) had the disadvantage of being directed from outside Eritrea, it
 benefited from its well-known leaders of the past. In September 1961, the first
 shots rang in the lowland Barka region. They came from the guns of Hamid Idris
 Awate's group made up of thirteen ELF recruits. The ELM proceeded to continue
 to organize a separate armed struggle ELM-ELF rivalry had triggered a warning
 signal that the Eritrean-Ethiopian federation had become untenable.
 The Assembly was convened and Eritrea was declared a part of the Ethiopian
 Empire. The Executive of the Eritrean Administration, a staunch pro-unionist,
 clearly demonstrated that the facade of federation was no longer necessary: this
 words clearly expressed the Empire's views on the ten years of linkage:
 Our continent and ourselves have through the law clearly identified
 ourselves as Ethiopians and have merged with our "Mother Country" for
 the last ten years... The people of Eritrea know that they had become
 fused with their greater part, governed by the Emperor and protected by
 31
  Markakis, National and Class Conflict, p . 197.
 32
  Hadas Eritra "The Clandestine Struggle: The ELM," No.98, Wednesday, August 5,1992
 -15-
one seal. As for the thing called federation, the people do not know the
 intricacies of federation let along the word or concept itself... .
 Therefore I present to you the wishes of our people that the present
 (federal) administration be dissolved because it is imposed by aliens and
 has never been part of our history. ... As representatives of your people
 and guardians of history 1 trust that you will accept this unanimously33.
 The charade had ended and this signaled an inauspicious closure to the politics of
 protest and ushered in an era of armed struggle and national liberation in post-
 colonial Eritrea. Annexation, which ended the territory's brief interlude with
 "democracy" and "popular participation", was the anti-climactic end to a gradual
 usurpation of the right of self-determination for Eritrea.
 The Eritrean-Ethiopian federation, envisioned as a mechanism of decolonization,
 succeeded in constructing a new legal entity which only affirmed the existence of
 Eritrea by virtue of its association with the Empire. The semblance of autonomy
 and even acquiescence to international law were flagrantly violated by the
 annexation of the territory. Adding insult to injury, the uneasy federal linkage was
 severed with the announcement that a decade of compromise among Eritrean
  y
 nationalist had amounted to nothing less than an "alien" imposition/' This
 experience of outright erasure of a decade of historical experience and the denial
 of a political and socio-cultural entity known as Eritrea remained engraved in the
 collective Eritrean memory and ignored until the re-grouping of nationalist
 elements, once again, seeking to restore its separate entity. The construction of a
 mature nationalism, transcending traditional cleavages and capable of challenging
 external intervention was to take an additional two decades.//The Eritreans of the
 1940s and 1950s had been faced with the opportunity to create a "nation" from the
 artificial amalgamation of its disparate communities. Although the "Eritreans" of
 this era had inhabited clearly demarcated boundaries they had not developed a
 clear sense of what separated them from their neighbors to the south, north-east or
 east. They had barely began to interact as equal members of the new post-colonial
 society before external interests derailed their path to nationhood.
 3 3
  For details see Asfha Woldemichael's speech to the Assembly, published in Zemen, Asmara,
 Thursday, 15 November 1962, p . l
The process of separating primary affiliations of kinship, regionalism and religion
 involves yet another process ... that of shared historical experience... resulting in a
 compilation of collective memories. As everywhere else, the creation of a
 consensus that defines the common experience, the compilation of a shared
 political lexicon, sets of symbols, and ideology were in their embryonic stages in
 the two decades following colonial rule34.
 Eritrean nationalism permeable to competing external threats, underwent a
 qualitative transformation during the Federation period, culminating in the
 establishment of an anti-Ethiopia liberation struggle.
 To build the Eritrean Polity
 Independent Eritrea faces multiple challenges of economic, social and political
 reconstruction. Although future generations will continue to feel the after-effects
 of the long war, Eritreans emerged with a strong sense of nationalism which binds
 the different ethnic and religious groups as citizens. What Trevaskis described as
 a "conglomerate of different communities" had, after thirty years of wax, fused
 into a single people. While Italian colonialism can be credited for demarcating
 modem Eritrea's boundaries, Ethiopian hegemonic domination was the principal
 contributing factor in the construction of a separation of a separate Eritrean
 political identity.
 Eritreans finally achieved their quest for a country of their own. They proved to
 the outside world that they can co-exist and cooperate with their larger neighbor if
 the relationship is based on consent and consensus rather than coercion. The
 needs of both countries - Ethiopia's access to the sea and Eritrea's need for a stable
 trading and financial partner - were achieved through negotiation and bilateral
 agreements. The first independent government of Eritrea also emphasized the
 importance of solidarity between the peoples of both countries and announced that
 it is cooperating with the Ethiopian Government to enable the "free movements of
 people and harmonization of immigration laws."3S These new relations of
 economic interdependence and social reconciliation became possible because
 34
  John Lonsdale, African Pasts in Africa's Future, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 25, No. ! , 1989:
 35
  Telephone interview with Ato Arefaine Berhe, Minister Counselor and Deputy Head of Mission,
 Embassy of Eritrea, Washington, D.C., August 9, 1993
 - 1 5 -
Eritrea and Ethiopia treated each other as equals. The end of the Cold War also
 decreased the possibility of external intervention, which could have favored one
 side over the other.
 The new nation faces immense problems of re-construction. During the interim
 period while the country prepared for the referendum, investments and
 international economic assistance were delayed.36 External assistance was also not
 forthcoming because of the government's insistence on dictating the terms of aid
 and prioritizing projects dealing with food security, land reform, education and
 social justice. Prior to independence a proposed aid package of S26 million tied to
 free-market reforms was rejected by the Eritrean government due to a
 "misunderstanding" over priorities and a clash of attitudes. After a series of
 meetings compromises were reached and aid started to flow from both the USAID,
 the European Community and the World Bank."
 The long years of war and the absence of the rule of law had also created a socio-
 economic system based on patronage and bribery. The government faced
 problems of corruption, inflation, a thriving black market and unequal
 development of urban and rural areas.38 New laws intended to correct these
 problems were drafted and put into effect immediately. The leadership appealed
 to the population for support in these efforts to eliminate poverty, inequality and a
 better life for all citizens.
 The development of a country can be measured by the even growth
 of all sectors of society. It is not only unjust but also backward
 when only the elite enjoys life while the majority of consumers
 struggle to survive. The [government] ...calls on everyone to
 cooperate in implementing the guidelines and proclamations.39
 On the eve of independence, the government raised the salaries of the civil service
 in order to equalize the gap between Hie high cost of living. The liberalization of
 the economy necessitated the lifting of state control over the local economy while
 36
  Saleh, Heba "Now That The War is Over," BBC Focus on Africa- Vol.3, No.3, July-September 1992,
 p.49
 37
  Hubbell, Stephen, "Eritrea Nascent: The Next Fight for Independence," The Nation. May 31,1993.
 See also Sarah Gauch, "Eritrea Seeks Industrial Revival," African Business, February 1933, p.45
 38
  HadasErtra, "Equal Attention to Urban and Rural Areas," 1*0.16, Wednesday, October 23,1991.
 39
  HadasEritra. No.70, Wednesday, April 29,1992
 - 1 6 -
at the same time trying to curb excessive high prices by merchants and petty
 traders. Maintaining a balance between a gradual opening of the economy and
 protecting the rights of consumers and suppliers resulted in a cautious move
 towards privatization. In order to avoid the dangers of an unfettered free market
 system, economic dependency, and uneven development without scaring off
 investors the government revised the guidelines and laws dealing with both local
 and foreign companies.40
 Nevertheless, Eritrea's natural resources as natural gas, oil, gold and copper
 deposits, fisheries and tourism provided the new nation with a strong position to
 dictate its terms of investment. The prospects of oil deposits in the Eritrean coast,
 confirmed by new geological studies, led to exploratory talks between Eritrean and
 multinational companies in 1992.41 Mobil Oil was the first to establish a branch
 office in Asmara with SHELL, AGIP and TOTAL, following suit.? One of the
 first decrees after the declaration of independence were Proclamation 40/1993
 dealing with the regulation of oil exploration and Proclamation 41/1993 of
 revenue collection from oil exploration activities.43 Maintaining a balance
 between the government's policy of self-reliance and attracting international
 investors could very well expedite the integration of the previously isolated
 Eritrea's economy and its national re-construction.
 The importance of striking a balance between Eritrean national interests and the
 international economic community were stressed during the new nation's
 participation at the meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council in July 1993.
 President Issaias Afewerki stressed the need for a convergence of interests
 between donors and recipients.
 What is required, and what has been conspicuously lacking, is
 international assistance commensurate with the needs of the country...
 The aspect that needs elaboration perhaps is the impact of assistance on
 recipient communities: whether it inspires or dampens their creativity
 40
  PGE, Investment Proclamation. No.18/1991. Gazette of Eritrean Laws, Vol. 1, No.4, Asmara,
 December 1991
 41
  Mabmoud Nagati, "Red Sea Oil Shows Attract Attention to Miocene Salt, Post-Salt Sequence,"
 Oil&Gas Journal. December 7, 1992, pp. 46-53. See also "Exploration Slated on Contract Are in
 Ethiopian Frontier," Oil&Gas Journal. November 20, 1989, p.36
 42
  HadasEritra. No.73, Saturday, May 9,1992
 43
  Government of Eritrea, "Dimtsi Hafash" Radio Broadcast, August 3,1993
 - 1 7 -
and self-respect? what mechanisms and instruments can be developed
 to inhibit mentalities and attitudes of permanent dependence?
 [Our] government believes that all assistance granted or disbursed must
 include in-built mechanisms of sustainability with a view of
 [generating], at least partially, the funds for other development
 projects...44
 These views reflected a maturation of Eritrea's policy of self reliance and a
 willingness to come to terms with the new nation's need for integration in the
 world economic system. Its potential for a viable economy - assessed as too poor
 and weak by the UN in 1950 - has certainly been reversed in the 1990s. The
 uncertainties of whether the new nation and its former guerrilla leaders could
 demonstrate the necessary flexibility and operate as functional members of the -y
 international economic system were dispelled in the early months of its existence.
 Eritrea's future success will depend on how it develops its economic capabilities
 and allocates its resources to meet the demands of its population.
 Jackson and RosbeTg noted in 1982 that at independence almost all African
 countries were endowed with the juridical attributes of statehood without,
 however, also having in place the empirical reality that undergirds it.45 In effect
 they received the institutions and structures of government, but without the benefit
 of the mass civic loyalty and sense of political community that could animate the
 state and create the nation-state. That latter task, of building national civic
 cultures, has preoccupied the post-colonial African states during the past thirty
 years and, sad to say, thus far it has been accomplished with only partial success.
 Eritrea represents another perhaps unique, case of African state-building.
 The referendum of April 1993, which gave Eritrea its independence, was
 conducted from the "empirical" base of a mature nationalism and a strong sense of
 political community nurtured during the thirty years' war with, its imperial 3
 neighbor. The new state also emerged with a dedicated leadership group, the
 experience of running a "parallel polity." All this is at least as much, and perhaps
 44
  United Nations, "Address by H.E. Issaias Afewerki, President of Eritrea to the 1993, ReguJar Session
 of The Economic and Social Conncil, Geneva, July 3,1993
 45
  Robert H.Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and
 Juridical in Statehood," "World Politics 35, No.l (October 1992).
 - 1 8 -
more, as had other African states such as Algeria, Mozambique, Angola,
 Zimbabwe, and Guinea-Bissau emerging from "wars of national liberation." But is
 it enough of a foundation on which to build the new Eritrean polity? Perhaps, but
 given the mixed bag of experience,46 for good and for ill, of modem Africa, it is
 worth devoting some sober reflection to some of the daunting political problems
 facing the new Eritrean regime.
 _ Of. m c s e problems, the ^ institutional one deserves close attention. Given the
 disarray, the inefficiency, and often, the corrupt nature of the administrative
 infrastructure left behind by the Ethiopians in the main towns, the Eritreans
 confront a mixed blessing: on the one hand , they can simply sweep away the old
 institutions and rebuild with brand new ones, but on the other, they must literally
 create (or re-create) institutional memories, the minutiae of administrative
 regulation, the hierarchies of bureaucratic responsibilities, and learn, and learn
 quicldy, the dynamics and machineries of meeting public needs with official
 responses. As the events of May 20, 1993 unfulfilled promises and unmet
 expectations can lead either to active confrontation or a gradual disengagement of
 the society from its government. If Eritreans are to succeed in establishing a
 pluralist and democratic system of government a great deal will depend on crafting
 mechanisms of accountability, maintaining open channels of communication
 between the leadership and its constituents, decentralizing the various bodies of
 government and ensuring a system of checks and balances.
 Another set of problems, although less visible than those involving institution-
 building, is equally challenging. At issue are the imperatives of movine^rom a
 war economy to one based on peace; of shifting minds, energies, and attitudes
 from resistance to reconstruction; of giving "empirical" reality to the ideological
 premises of the struggle. In effect, what will be needed is a new covenant
 between the Eritrean people and the state based on the reciprocities of civic
 obligation and not on the need to survive in the face of a common enemy. Of
 course, there is no standard list that defines these problematic: its content is
 4 6
  For an excellent analysis of the consequence of the legacies of this failure and constraints to
 democratization see Rene Lemarchand, "Africa's Troubled Transitions," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3,
 No. 4, October 1992, pp. 99-108 and "Uncivil States and Civil Societies,"
 Studies. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp.177-191.
 ? 19-
situationally defined. In the Eritrean case, these questions, at least, will have
 answered.
 Given the general commitment to democracy, can the Eritrean leadership develop
 a modus operandi that combines its efficient mobilizing capability with the
 flexibility necessary for the tasks of governance? In order for democracy to
 succeed Eritreans must be socialized not merely mobilized to democratic values.
 In the past, the EPLF's success was based on a hierarchical chain of command and
 its ability to impose discipline in the pursuit of a collective goal of independence.
 The maintenance of the political unity forged among Eritreans of different ethnic
 communities, religious affiliations and ideological orientations during the
 liberation struggle, requires tolerance. Democracy - a messy business, at best -
 requires that individual rights, liberties, diverse opinions and interest be taken into
 consideration simultaneously with the collective good. If the government of
 Eritrea does not succumb to the temptation to overvalue order and stability and
 thus curb the sphere of political participation, the population can be socialized to
 live with the happy uncertainties of democracy.
 Is there, or can there be found, an ideology appropriate to national construction,
 one that can define the transition from the liberation struggle to the making of an
 Eritrean polity? The most difficult task facing the future Eritrean government will
 be how to harmonize the private and public spheres, giving each its due in the new
 democratic environment. During the war years and the interim period from 1991-
 1993 , the private sphere was subordinated to the attainment of the larger common
 good - independence. The country's economic survival and reconstruction of the
 war is shattered economy were made possible because of such collective
 endeavors and discipline. Having achieved independence and shouldered the
 burdens of governance a balance must be struck so that both the public good and
 individual needs can be maintained and the gains of the past can be perpetuated.
 In this task, both the people and the state will have to constantly re-affirm and
 revise the basis of interaction between the governing institutions and the governed.
 Given the past history of fratricidal conflict within the Eritrean political
 camp, can the present leadership capitalize on its current unity to devise ways by
 which internal differences can be contained and/or institutionalized, rather than
 erupting in violence? Bold and innovative steps need to be taken by the post-
 - 2 0 -
independence government in order to ensure that war is not used as a substitute for
 political dialogue. Protecting the constitutional rights of all citizens without
 discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion or gender is a fundamental step
 towards the creation of a unity based on diversity. Future governments need to be
 careful not to fall into the self-destructive trap of most new African governments,
 i.e., curtailing the democratic rights of the opposition in the name of eliminating
 threats to "national security." The government of independent Eritrea prohibits the
 formation of "political parties based on religion, ethnicity, region, province... and
 those with direct or indirect linkages to political forces abroad."47 It also has
 taken the time and expended efforts in educating its people about the dangers of
 religious fundamentalism and ethnic chauvinism. At the outset of 1993 it
 appeared that the new government was successful in establishing the basis for a
 relatively inclusive political system which included former opponents. Members
 of defunct liberation fronts such as the ELF, ELF-PLF, EDM and other
 organizations who had been in exile joined the new government as members of the
 assembly and civil service. It set up the legal framework for a pluralist system
 which utilized both traditional social customs and modern laws..48 It took steps to
 ensure mat the population is informed about the nature and functioning of the new
 political framework.49 The more challenging task will be to keep it going.
 How can political pluralism be maintained? Successful plural polities which
 maintain self-conscious social groups in tolerant accommodation to each other are
 rare in modern Africa. The potential for a democratic Eritrean polity exists. It
 will be up to both the government(s) of Eritrea and its people to ensure that the
 lessons of the past have not been in vain.
 4 7
  Hadas Eritra, "President IssaiasAfeworii Responds to Questions from the People," No.83,
 Wednesday, June 16, 1993
 4 8
  The PGE since 1991 published eight proclamations concerning the re-establishment of legal laws
 concerning the civil code, laws governing crimes, abjudication, labor and commercial laws. For
 details see PGE, Negarit Gazeta, Vol.1, 1991, September IS, 1991. Traditional customs governing
 adjudication and administration were adapted to existing structure of local governments.
 4 9
  The PGE used the media - radio, television and newspapers as well as official publications - to
 educate the population about civic duties, political parties, modes of popular participation and voting. In
 addition, it issued a new series of pamphlets with a special focus on pluralist systems, political parties
 and systems of governance which are also used to inform the public. For details see PGE (EPLF), State-
 Government, Party (Asmara: Department of Media and Culture, December 1992), 1-56.
 - 2 1 -