No. 264
 UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
 A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
 African Studies Seminar Paper
 to be presented at Seminar in RW 319 at
 4.00 p.m. on Monday 23rd October, 1989
 Title: Gangs, Councillors and the Apartheid State: The Newclare Squatters
 Movements of 1952.
 by: Deon Van Tonder
 This paper ?ay not be quoted without
 the permission of the author
GANGS, COUNCILLORS AND THE APARTHEID STATE: THE NEWCLARE
 SQUATTERS MOVEMENT OF 1952*
 PEON VAN TONDER
 UNISA
 They were bloody clashes but ... in the context of the
 time and the circumstances in that part of the world,
 they were relatively minor. Fighting was an absolutely
 common feature there every weekend without exception...
 Periodically these became more serious... instead of one or
 two murders, there'd be say, half a dozen, perhaps even
 more. But the violence was not exceptional.. .This was the
 normal feature of life in Sophiatown and particularly in
 Newclare...Newclare was a yery tough area and like any
 slum ... you accept that there is violence constantly ... One
 must ... C.also3 ... remember that rioting and fighting was
 a form of amusement ... Young people stiff with boredom. 1
 This was the judgement of W.J.P. Carr, former Manager of the Non-
 European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council, when
 asked about the violence in Newclare during the 1940s and 50s. Yet,
 in 1952, this "relatively minor" type of clash erupted into one of
 the largest suburbian squatter movements that Johannesburg has ever
 experienced. Not only did some 300 African families move across the
 railway line to Northern Newclare to squat on Council-owned land, but
 they remained there for seven months while the Johannesburg City
 Council and the Central Government deliberated on ways of removing
 them.
 Unlike the squatter settlements which sprang up around
 Johannesburg during the mid-1940s in protest to the shortage of
 housing and the Johannesburg City Council's apparent inertia to
 alleviate the situation, the Newclare squatters movement flowed out
 of a violent clash within the community itself. While officialdom
 viewed this as yet another inter-tribal conflict (which could later
 be used by Apartheid apologists and ideologues to justify ethnic
 segregation), the movement highlighted the underlying tensions and
 forces which were operating beneath the surface to shape this
 community. By 1952, Newclare had become an increasingly volatile
 area with tensions often expressing themselves in the form of
 unbridled violence and anti-social crime. Far from being a united
 and closely 2knit community as has often been suggested by people like
 Don Mattera , Newclare's proletariat and lumpen-proletariat were
 divided into various groupings including vigilance organizations and
 gangsters. During the early 1950s two distinct sections falling into
 the latter categories could be distinguished: the Ama-Rashea, a group
 (* I am most grateful to Greg Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh,
 Hilary Sapire and Jane Carruthers for their valuable
 comments on earlier drafts of this paper.)
 1. Interview with W.J.P. Carr, 7 December 1988.
 2. Don Mattera, "Sophiatown" in D. Ricci ( e d . ) , Reef of Time,
 (Johannesburg, 1986), p. 209, and Don Mattera, "Sophiatown: The
 New Political Frontiers", Talk given to African Studies Forum,
 UNISA, 5 April 1989.
 Page 1
of 3asotho migrants who came to regard Newclare as its stronghold,
 and the Civic Guards, a vigilance committee who tended to rally large
 sections of the population there behind them , since they offered
 some protection against the gangster element.
 Up until recently, gangsterism and anti-social crime has been a
 subject ignored in South Africa's historical literature. Apart from
 Van Onselen's two-volume work which gave exposure to the gangs which
 emerged out of various social transformations accompanying the
 industrial revolution on the Rand, much of the literature during
 the 1970s and early 1980s has ignored the important role which gangs
 and anti-soqial crime played in community struggles and black
 resistance. This gap is however gradually being plugged by a whole
 body of literature which situates township gangs and "Tsotsis" firmly
 within the proletarianization process. Attention is also given here
 to the ways in which gangs form, the elements which bind them
 together and the notion of a "gang culture".
 Don Pinnock's pionering study on the gangs which formed in Cape
 Town's predominantly "coloured" districts, has seen gangsterism in
 the South African context as emerging not only out of the development
 of Apartheid but also out of the various problems experienced by the
 working class. These include the fear of dispossession, violence
 and death. He shows how, for example, the state through a
 deliberate policy of social enginering, implemented the Group Areas
 Act which broke down the long established forms of social control. A
 natural outgrowth of this situation was the emergence of ganging,
 through which Cape Town's youth and working classes could build up
 new networks of associations and resort to whatever means guarenteed
 survi val.
 The work done on gangs on the Reef Townships tends to highlight the
 ways in which Pinnock's findings dealing with the Cape gangs can be
 applied to the Johannesburg context. Clive Glazer for example, has
 also shown how, through an appreciation of certain styles and
 rituals, working class subcultures such as the Tsotsi youth gangs on
 the Rand, challenge working class problems such as the exclusion from
 political power structures, low pay, unemployment, lack of property-
 ownership and overcrowded living conditions.
 C. Van Onselen, New Babylon and New Nineveh: Studies in the
 Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914,
 2 volumes, (Johannesburg, 1982). The works which ignore the role
 of gangs in black resistance are those which deal with more
 institutional forms of protest such as Peter Walshe's The Rise of
 African Nationalism in South Africa, (Cape Town, 1987 e d . ) .
 Literature on the Western Areas in particular ignoring gangsterism
 are the articles by Deborah Hart and Gordon Pirie, "The Sight and
 Soul of Sophiatown" in Geographical Review, vol. 74, No. 1,
 January 1984, and "The Transformation of Johannesburg's Black
 Western Areas" in Journal of Urban History, vol. II, No. 4,
 August 1985.
 D. Pinnock, The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control
 in Cape Towni (Cape Town, 1984).
 C. Glazer, "Anti-Social Bandits: Culture, Hegemony
 and the Tsotsi Subculture on the Witwatersrand
 during the 1940s and 1950s", Paper presented to a Wits MA
 Seminar, August 1988, and "Students, Tsotsis and the
 Congress Youth League: Youth Organization on the Rand in
 the 1940s and 1950s", Paper presented to the History
 Page 2
In a sense, gangsterism is thus a way in which a rightless group
 can assert its identity and respond to its position under
 oppression. Unfortunately the literature on the Ama-Rashea gangs and
 the Civic Guard movement, is rather sparse, but as this paper will
 show, they too fit into the scenarios painted by Pinnock and Glazer.
 Both factions were representative of the different methods employed
 by Africans to survive in a hostile urban environment where
 everything was pitted against them. During the period under
 review, basic social amenities for the still ever-increasing African
 urban population were still inadequate. Poverty had risen
 dramatically in Newclare and the lack of housing with its resultant
 overcrowding tended to exacerbate misery and tension. Here, as in
 other townships there were various responses to these social evils.
 Illicit brewing, prostitution, hawking, gambling and gangsterism
 were all facets, albeit illegal ones, of the struggle to survive in
 the cities. The Newclare squatting movement emphasised these
 survival strategies.
 While much of the literature on squatting has focused on the
 larger, mope organised and more widely publicised squatting
 movements, such as those which emerged in Orlando during the
 1940s, Durban during the 1940s and 50s and Crossroads during the
 1970s and 80s, the Newclare squatters movement of 1952 has gone
 virtually unnoticed by historians. Yet it was a movement of
 considerable significance.
 While the origins of this squatter movement differed from similar
 movements in the past (such as those which sprang up in Orlando,
 Pimville and Alexandra in the period 1944-46 in response to the
 massive housing shortage which could not be alleviated by the
 Johannesburg City Council), the ways in which the squatter community
 organised itself was based on a set of political practises, the
 core components of which were generated by other such settlements
 during the 1940s. The nature of these political practises - the
 rudimentary policing of the squatter camp by members of the
 settlement, the election or self- appointment of representative
 leaders, the illicit brewing and selling of alcohol and the
 reliance on the law to plead their case - were all elucidated in a
 recent paper by Phillip Bonner, and on closer comparison, the
 ties between the Newclare movement and those of the past are quite
 evident since the Newclare squatter's movement organised itself
 exactly along these lines.
 Another reason why the Newclare squatters movement proved
 significant in the history of the Newclare township, was that it
 Workshop of the University of the Witwatersrand, February
 1987.
 See for example Alf Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfields:
 squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-47" in B. Bozzoli
 (ed.j, Townships and Protest: Studies in the Social History
 of the Witwatersrand, (Johannesburg, 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 19-48, Paul
 Maylam, "The "Black Belt": African Squatters in Durban
 1935-1950" in Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 17,
 no. 3, 1983, and Josette Cole, Crossroads: The politics of
 Reform 1976-1986, (Johannesburg, 1987).
 P. Bonner, "The Politics of Black Squatter Movements on the
 Rand, 1944-1952", Paper presented to the 12th Biennial
 Conference of the South African Historical Society,
 University of Natal, Pieterinaritzburg, January 1989.
 Page 3
tended to fuel the fires of the Western Areas Removal Scheme. The
 continuing controversy over possible solutions to the squatting
 problem and the fact that it dragged on for no less than seven
 months, provided H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs at that
 time, with enough propaganda needed to argue the case in favour of
 the complete removal of the Western Areas of Johannesburg. Apart from
 this, the movement also
 proved crucial in conditioning the relationship between Verwoerd and
 the Johannesburg City Council. Its role in determining the nature of
 Verwoerd's strategy in dealing with a recalcitrant City Council which
 was rather reluctant to remove the squatters and place them in the
 already overcrowded Moroka emergency camp, cannot be underestimated.
 In this instance, as with trying to get the Council to cooperate with
 the Resettlement Board in 1954 the threat to withhold all future
 funds from the Council, became an integral part of Counci1-Verwoerd
 pol itics.
 This paper is an attempt to explore and analyse not only the nature
 of the Newclare squatters movement by showing how it fed into the
 Western Areas Removal scheme, but also to examine some aspects of the
 Newclare community itself during the early 1950s in the period prior
 to removal. By looking at Newclare a greater understanding can be
 had of how certain sections of the working class reacted to its
 environment and how its actions helped shape their community. What
 follows therefore is not only an exploration of how the clash between
 different sections of the Newclare community led to a squatting
 movement of some magnitude, but also attempts to look behind the
 scenes to see in what ways it served to determine and mould
 governmental and Council policy vis-a-vis the destruction of
 Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare.
 THE NATURE OF THE NEWCLARE COMMUNITY 3Y 1952
 Like Sophiatown, Newclare formed part of the farm Waterval 10 and
 was surveyed as a site for a future ."non-European" township as early
 as 1905. In 1912 Newclare received official muncipal regognition
 with the sole intention that it would become an area for "Coloured"
 occupation only. By 1949 the township was however proclaimed under
 section 8 (1) of Act no. 25 of 1945, as an area predominantly
 occupied by Africans. In fact, by 1950 Newclare's African population
 totalled 14 561 while its "Coloured" population totalled only
 1 0 6 9 . 8
 Although it was inextricably part of the Western Areas of
 Johannesburg which also consisted of Sophiatown, Martindale and
 Western Native Township, Newclare had its own distinct character.
 Unlike Sophiatown with its more heterogenous class composition
 Newclare's population was predominantly working class: 552 were
 labourers (mainly on the mines close to the township), and 2)% were
 factory workers. The rest of the population consisted of
 washerwomen, domestic workers, craftsmen and the unemployed. (See
 Appendix A)
 As a result of the low earning power of its population, coupled
 8. City of Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, Survey
 of the Western Areas of Johannesburg, 1950. Copy housed in
 Municipal Library Johannesburg, p. 26. (Hereafter referred to as
 Survey. )
 9. Ibid, p.50.
 Page 4
with a drastic rise in population during the 1940s due to the steady
 stream of migrant workers and their families into Johannesburg-.
 Newclare rapidly developed into a worse slum than Sophiatown. In
 1950 housing conditions there were rated as of a much lower standard
 than in Martindale and Sophiatown. (See Appendix B) It was estimated
 that an average of seven families occupied each stand. A survey
 undertaken by the Non-Eurpoean Affairs Department of the Johannesburg
 City Council in 1950 showed that the 579 stands in Newclare
 (averaging a size ,Qf 50ft x 100ft) supported a population of no
 fewer than 16 980. This meant an average of 29 people per stand.
 Most African home-owners who had to pay off their bonds could not do
 so without taking in tenants and letting every possible room in the
 house. Because these owners were hamstrung by high bond rates and
 exorbitant sewerage fees, money was not freely available and tenancy
 proved to be the only viable solution. This resulted in extremely
 unhealthy and crowded living conditions. Rows of four and sometimes
 six rooms, individual shacks made out of wood, zinc and hessian and
 double rows of rooms (making.back to back letting possible) were
 built on almost every stand.
 As in the case of Sophiatown, the only evidence that can be relied
 on to give some indication of life and conditions in Newclare are the
 accounts given in the literature of the period which are often
 romanticised, Trevor Huddleston's descriptions in Naught for Your
 Comfort and various oral testimonies. Of these sources, two
 particular vignettes stand out:
 ...a different atmosphere hangs like the smoke from its
 thousand braziers over the squalid houses and over the
 "smart" homes which stand side by side in its unplanned
 and unchartered streets. You can go down any street in
 Newclare and suddenly without warning and without reason,
 find it has petered out into a field, grimy and grey...
 Or you can walk down a narrow alley between houses and
 discover an open yard, with a row of rooms facing it,
 doors open or half shuttered with old packing-cases to
 keep the children in, a single latrine, a single tap, and
 twenty families making their own community in that narrow
 plot.13
 and
 The open coal brazier was an inextricable part of life
 in Newclare...To visit Newclare at sunset was like enter-
 ing a city on fire. A thick cloud of smoke from an
 interminable line of open braziers, planted at short
 intervals in front of the hovels, hung over the township
 at that hour. They were not bothered by the obsession
 10. In 1937 the number of families living in Newclare numbered 1 691
 and by 1950, this number had risen to 4 609 which meant that an
 average of 224 families were moving into the area every year.
 Ibid. p. 9.
 11. Ibid, p. 27.
 12. City of Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, Report on a
 Sample Survey of the Native Population residing in the Western
 Areas of Johannesburg, 1951, p.15.(Hereafter referred to as Sample
 Survey. )
 Page 5
with air pollution those people. For them necessity
 dictated that it was more expedient to fill the chests
 of all with smoke fumes than go hungry for lack of
 somewhere to cook, or be cold in winter...It was...
 also ...the meeting place of urchins who sought the
 freedom the street offered from the imprisonment of
 one-room houses in the evening...14
 Since Newclare formed part of the urban environment, it was also
 beset by similar problems facing other African townships.
 Constant liquour and pass raids, strenuous attempts at influx control
 and constant police harassment created a potential cauldron of
 discontent which was worsened by rumours of impending removal to
 Meadowlands. Liquor raids in particular, generated a great deal of
 animosity towards the police. In Newclare. brewing was the most
 common source of an additional income and was far more prevalent
 than in Sophiatown and undertaken on practically every stand.
 The result was that the number of shebeens in Newclare was higher
 than in Sophiatown and hence, police raids occurred more frequently.
 During January and February 1950, numerous raids took place in
 Newclare. On 30 January 500 police entered the township and arrested
 650 Africans of whom 175 appeared in court charged under the pass
 and liquor laws. On 15 February 250 Africans were again detained by
 police in another raid,on similar charges.
 The Result of this discontent was that by 1950 the black working
 class openly started to reveal its opposition,, and tensions exploded
 in uprisings all over the Rand. Newclare was no exception and in
 fact proved to be an explosive political force. Prior to 1950,
 uprisings as a result of the proposed increase in tram fares, minor
 clashes between residents of the Western Areas and the white
 residents of the surrounding suburbs and various gang fights had
 taken place. In 1950 another riot was sparked off in the area by the
 attempted arrest of an African for being in possession of liquor
 illegally. The arrest was thwarted by a crowd which soon gathered and
 when police called for reinforcements the crowd retaliated with
 stone-throwing. Although it seemed a relatively minor skirmish
 between residents and the police, the Commission of Inquiry which was
 set up to investigate into this and other riots on the Rand, found
 other underlying causative factors. These had built up over a long
 period. Despite the Communist bogey which was held responsible for
 any political riot which occurred in South Africa at the time, it was
 antagonism to White Government on account of its strong heavy-handed
 control over all aspects of African's lives and strong anti-police
 feelings aroused by their role as government agents, which was cited
 as the major cause.
 The nature of Urban Administration was also an area which elicited
 discontent, especially owing to Advisory Board elections, Lodgers'
 permits and the inefficient bureaucratic nature of Location
 13. T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, (Glasgow, 1981 ed.)
 p. 76.
 14. M. Moteane, "The Russians are Coming" in Chi ldren of the
 Twi1ight, (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 137.
 15. Sample Survey, p. 13.
 16. The Star, 30 and 31 January 1950 and The Rand Daily Mai 1, 15
 February 1950.
 17. These permits were however not rigidly enforced in the Western
Administration. Other less important and perhaps more questionable
 causes of township unrest were cited too. These included the
 influence of bioscope films, public utterances and statements in the
 press, intimidation, residential admixture of races and the "Tsotsis 1
 Reign of Terror" in the townships.
 What is revealing, is the Commission's view that much trouble
 was being created by Tsotsi gangsters. Newclare in this respect was
 no different from other townships but again, it was to be its
 distinctive type of gangster that distinguished it from Sophiatown
 and Martindale. Whereas the latter areas were occupied by the
 "Americans" and "Berliners", Tsotsi groups fashioned along Western
 lines and who wore "American clothes, like Palm Beach, Palm Dale,
 Magregoc shirts, Magregor trousers, Florsheims, ?and@ Stetson
 hats," T y
 Newclare was home to the Ama-Rashea or Russian gang. The early
 history of this gang is not well documented but it would seem that it
 first arose during the late 1920s as vigilance societies organised by
 members of different ethnic groups. By the late 1940s they had
 however transformed themselves into fierce social predators who
 preyed unhindered on township residents,^naming themselves after the
 Russian victors in the Second World War. Anthony Sampson regarded
 this group as the most sinister and notorious of the Johannesburg
 gangs:
 Unlike others, they were strongly tribal in origin; they
 were all Basutos, and had come from the poor, proud
 independence of Basutoland to the slum township of Newclare,
 near Sophiatown. Their uniform symbolised their predicament;
 they wore expensive gaberdine trousers and smart hats; but
 in the place of coats, they wore large blankets draped round
 them, defiant in their very design. A favourite pattern
 showed British fighter planes and bombs revolving round a
 crown, with "V" for Victoria, the great white Queen. The
 stately blanketed figures walked gravely up and down the
 slimy streets of Newclare, their tribal dignity still about
 them. 21
 Like most working class sub-cultures which emerge as a response to
 the contradictions which develop in the hegemonic culture, the Ama-
 Rashea proved to be a distinct response to material conditions in
 Areas, having been relaxed by the City Council during the 1940s
 as a result of the housing shortage. See City of Johannesburg,
 Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department,
 For the period December 1944 to 30 June 1948, p. 5. (Hereafter
 referred to as NEAD Report.)
 18. Union of South Africa, Report of the Commission Appointed
 to Enquire into Acts of Violence Committed by Natives at
 Krugersdorp, Newlands, Randfontein and Newclare, U.G.
 47/1950, pp. 9-12.
 19. Kort Boy in an interview conducted by the Junction Avenue
 Theatre Company and reproduced in P. Stein and R. Jacobsin
 (eds.), Sophiatown Speaks, (Johannesburg, 1986), p. 67.
 20. David Coplan, In Township Tonight: South Africa's Black
 City Music and~Theatre, (Johannesburg, 1985), p. 101.
 21. A. Sampson, Drum: A Venture into the New Africa, (London,
 1956), p.109-110.
 Page 7
Newclare and other Reef townships and the various contradictions
 posed by industrial development on the Rand. Faced by exclusion
 from political power structures, lack of property-ownership low wages
 and high rates of unemployment, life in the urban areas proved to be
 unstable and insecure. These problems were exacerbated by intense
 pressure and competition for every kind of urban service and
 resource. While the African urban population doubled between 1937
 and 1952, housing remained scarce and at a premium. All this created
 a social situation in the urban residential areas characterised by
 extreme poverty and misery amongst the African proletarian
 population. Many were forced to resort to whatever means they could
 in order to survive. Gangsterism was thus but one symptom of the
 negative social forces at work in the cities and can be regarded as
 part of what can be termed, a culture of survival.
 During the 1940s and 1950s, gangs became an important feature of
 urban township life. The freehold areas of Sophiatown, Martindale and
 Newclare proved to be a haven for gangsters. Apart from the the rich
 shebeen and Marabi culture, these areas were free from Council
 administration which made the policing of these areas more difficult.
 Hence both survival and prosperity was made easier. Many of these
 gangs had different aims, strategies and characteristics. While some
 were organised along age lines like Don Mattera's "Vultures", some
 were more overtly ethnic in character like the Ama-Rashea. The most
 notable feature of this latter group was that it was an organisation
 of Basotho migrant workers seeking employment on the Rand. Their
 response to the alienating experience of urban life was to organise
 themselves into gangs based on their common historical and
 "traditional" background. My interpretation of the Russians has
 relied heavily on the arguments of Belinda Bozzoli. She has shown
 for example, that although the process of proletarianization has
 varied from region to region, the arrival of groups of migrant
 workers from particular areas^such as the British protectorates, has
 often occurred in "cohorts". The Russian gang which was
 essentially made up of Basotho migrants, tends to support this
 position, since they tended not only to ignore other ethnic groupings,
 but identified themselves according to their village of origin and
 based their fighting units firmly on their village identity.
 Bozzoli further argues that "in the case of gangsters on the Rand,
 being a Basotho and being a gangster were coinciding points of
 22. In 1937 the population of the Western Areas of Johannesburg
 (Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Western Native Township)
 stood at 35 150, but by 1950 this number had risen to 66 577.
 This resulted in a great housing shortage which the
 Johannesburg City Council could not alleviate. A NEAD survey in
 1946 revealed that in Johannesburg, 40 000 families needed
 accommodation and that in 1948 this number would increase to
 62 000. Nead Report, p.4.
 23. Belinda Bozzoli (ed. ), Introduction to Class, Community and
 Conflict: South African Perspectives, (Johannesburg, 198777 p.
 23.
 24. Jonathan Clegg in his article "Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing back
 the body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the
 Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations 1882-1944" in P. Bonner (ed.),
 Working Papers in Southern African Studies Vol. 11, has
 identified similar trends amongst different groupings in the
 Zululand region.
 Page 8
identity which served, perhaps to distinguish the migrant worker from
 his urban counterpart". In this respect, what she has stated about
 the adoption of an identifiable set of motifs by a particular group
 of people with similar societal and cultural experiences, also
 rings true of the Russians. It can be argued that their brightly
 coloured blankets was an emblem, a popular motif, signifying their
 ethnicity, and providing a way of negotiating an identity and a means
 of providing collective security.
 While the "Russians" shared a common historical and "traditional"
 background, they were far from a united entity and during the early
 1950s two distinct factions emerged: the Matsieng and the Ha
 Mo lapo. It was these two factions which began to carve up the
 African locations of the Reef into separate spheres of influence,
 with the Matsieng led by S.S. Hlalele gaining dominance over and
 establishing its headquarters in Newclare. This division often
 resulted in the flaring up of so-called "faction fights" stretching
 all over the Rand from the Western Areas of Johannesburg to B e n o n i ,
 Germiston and Evaton. Bonner has seen these conflicts as reflecting
 the deprivation of African working class life on the Witwatersrand
 with its urgent quest to secure and control the barest necessities
 of life, such as employment and housing in a situation where
 these resources were in desperately short supply. Ironically, this
 competition manifested itself in the use of extreme violence which
 added to the harsh existence of many urban Africans. Often surging
 through Newclare extorting considerable sums of money on the pretext
 of offering physical protection {"We fight while you are a s l e e o g
 We fight with our enemies and thus it is you we are fighting for" ) ,
 "the Matsieng instilled fear into the hearts and minds of ordinary
 township residents:
 25. Bozzoli, Class, Community and Conflict, p.24.
 26. Ibid. p.12.
 27. These two factions reflected divisions within Sotho society
 itself. Matsieng was an area in Central Lesotho originally ruled
 by Moshoeshoe I's son, Letsie. Ha Molapo on the other hand, was
 an area in North East Lesotho and was ruled by his other son
 Molapo. The constant rivalry between these two princes forms a
 dominant theme in Sotho history. The rivalry in the Ama-Rashea
 which resulted in the split into the above-mentioned groups
 reportedly started because of a quarrel over a woman, but at the
 same time reflected the basic divisions within traditional Sotho
 Society. See J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ma-Rashea: A
 Participant's Perspective" in B. Bozzoli, C l a s s , Community and
 Conf1ict, p. 446.
 28. P. Bonner and R. Lambert, "Batons and bare heads: The
 Strike at Amato Textiles, February 1958", in S. Marks and
 S. Trapido ( e d s . ) , The Politics of Race, Class &
 Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, O-ondon,
 19 8 7 ) , p. 344.
 29. Johannes Rantoa, ex-Russian gang member in an interview
 with the Oral History Project of the Institute of Southern
 African Studies at the National University of Lesotho.
 Reproduced in J. Guy and M. Thabane's article, "The Ma-
 Rashea: A Participant's Perspective" in B. Bozzoli ( e d . ) ,
 Class Community and Conflict, p. 455.
 Page 9
...We came to associate the name "Russians" with
 violence. They would descend on the township in great
 battalions, clad in brightly coloured blankets, pants
 belted high, white shoes and the inevitable stick which
 was a deadly weapon in the hands of a Masotho...If you
 heard a whistle blow, you had to clear off the streets if
 you valued your life. They were insanely brave, those
 "Russians". It seemed to them violence was just a game.30
 Since they fell outside of the sphere of organised gangster and crime
 syndicates, other tsotsis feared them too:
 Funnily enough, the greatest obstacles to these gangs
 is the behaviour of the "Russians" - the Basuto groups
 that will not combine with them, but often without
 warning attack them with sticks. The joke is that these
 "Russian" gangs are not primarily interested in organised
 crime. They do not care much for robbery and theft.
 They are just thugs that make life tough for ordinary
 people and gangsters alike...the "Russians" are an inde-
 pendent lot, yery tribal, very proud. They resent being
 classed with the "tsotsis" and they prefer to beat them
 from the streets.31
 In response to the ruthless grip exercised by the Matsieng faction
 over Newclare, a counter group emerged organised along the lines of a
 neighbourhood watch. Known as the "Civic Guards", they dedicated
 themselves to offering protection to all the residents in Newclare
 North by arming themselves with heavy sticks and patrolling the
 township at night, especially on weekends. It is difficult to gauge
 the Civic Guard's class and social character, as the only evidence
 which exists on this group are scattered newspaper articles and
 passing reference in Council and Advisory Board Minutes.
 Nevertheless, existing evidence does reveal that members of this
 movement were predominantly residents of Newclare, including
 property-owners, tenants as well~as sub-tenants who were essentially
 opposed to the "tsotsi" element. This so-called guard movement
 was not an entirely new phenomenon and had already emerged during the
 war years in many urban townships. There is also substantial evidence
 to show that it had in fact been quite successful in combatting
 township crime. One example is a statement made by one of the
 members of the Jabavu Advisory Board, who said that by the beginning
 of 1952 there were no "tsotsis" in his area due to the activities of
 the "Civic Guards". In many respects the Civic Guard had certain
 advantages over the police as they often knew the gangsters and could
 therefore track them down to their homes. In March 1952 the
 Guardian also reported that "where previously in North Newclare there
 30. M. Melamu, "The Russians are Coming", p. 139.
 31. "Organised Gangsterism", Drum, December 1955, p.29.
 32. See Kathleen Vundla, PQ: The Story of Philip Vundla of South
 Africa, (Johannesburg, 1973), pp. 30-31.
 33. Intermediary Archives Depot, Johannesburg, West Rand
 Administration Board Archive (IAD W R A B ) , file no. 351/1
 vol. 1, Extract from the Jabavu Advisory Board Minutes, 8
 September, 1955.
 Page 10
was an average of ten rape cases on a Monday Morning and two or three
 corpses, since the coming.of the Civic Guard there have hardly been
 any crimes of violence." W.J.P. Carr,
 Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg
 City Council also spoke of how he encouraged the "Civic Guard" since
 it was "controlling the indiscriminate roaming around of
 criminals".
 On numerous occasions between 1952 and 1953, the Guard movement
 tried to get official recognition from the authorities whom they
 hoped would supply them with at least one policeman to help them with
 their reconnaissance in the townships. This recognition was,
 however, not forthcoming. The police refused to ally themselves with
 this movement at all. Two reasons for this have been advanced:
 residents were unanimous in feeling that the success achieved by the
 Guards in combatting crime and succeeding where the police had
 failed, placed the latter in a rather precarious position as a so-
 called law enforcement agency. The police could not acknowledge
 their apparent weakness and therefore became rather envious of a
 movement which had the support of the people. It seemed only
 natural therefore that they should refuse to giwe such an
 organisation official recognition and sanction. On the other hand,
 the police viewpoint, expressed by Colonel J.C. Kriek, was that the
 Civic Guard would inevitably be penetrated by criminal elements and
 would degenerate into another "Native Gang", while at the same time
 having leaders which were well-known Communists.
 Despite all the animosity from official sources towards the Guard,
 which eventually resulted in its banning in 1953, the movement
 prospered but did not become a strong enough force to prevent the use
 of strong-arm tactics by the "Russians". The latent tensions
 between these two groups were openly revealed in March 1952 when
 violent clashes broke out between them. By June conditions in
 Newclare had become so bad that the residents from South Newclare, in
 open revolt against the intimidation of the "Russians", moved from
 their homes and trekked across the railway line to squat on
 Counci1-owned land.
 THE TREK ACROSS THE RAILWAY LINE
 The violence which was to culminate in the Newclare squatting
 movement had begun on the weekend of the 9th of March 1952.
 Disturbances broke out on the Sunday morning when the Russians, who
 had for weeks before started extorting money from the residents of
 South Newclare, tried to cross the railway line to attack the Civic
 Guard in Northern Newclare. The latter retaliated which resulted in
 an escalating gang war. The next week saw sporadic clashes in which
 nine Africans were killed and many more injured. Although the
 police intervened, it seemed to many that they showed a more
 favourable disposition towards the Russians than to the Civic
 Guard.
 34. The Guardian, 13 March 1952.
 35. Interview with W.J.P. Carr, December 1988.
 36. IAD WRAB, file no. 351/1 vol. 1, Extract from Jabavu
 Advisory Board Minutes, 8 Sept. 1955.
 37. The Guardian, 27 March 1952.
 38. See The Guardian, 13 March 1952 and T. Huddleston,
 Naught for Your Comfort, pp. 18-79. The question of police
 Page 11
Still, the Russians had an intimate knowledge of the terrain and in
 some cases managed to evade the police by hiding by day and prowling
 at night. The tactics which they adopted were to round up citizens
 late at night and during the early morning and forced the head of
 each family to pay one pound "protection" money. They were joined by
 the Basotho women who went about the township during the day
 demanding five shillings from each woman they met and threatening
 those who resisted with violence. The 1950 Survey showed that there
 was a considerable number of Basotho women in Newclare who lived
 either by themselves, or with a group of unrelated men andgthat apart
 from brewing, these women had no legal means of support.
 On the surface it seems that this extortion was simply a lumpen-
 proletariat's response to unemployment, but Johannes Rantoa, an ex-
 Russian, has a different explanation. While admitting that when
 collecting this money "we did not ask for it nicely", he averred
 that this money was needed for the largest item of Russian
 expenditure - the Lawyers whom thew had to employ to defend their
 members against state prosecution. This goes a long way to explain
 the causes of the Newclare violence, which clearly grew out of the
 exigencies of Russian life on the Rand. It was simply another facet
 of the working class's response to the hardships imposed by urban
 social control and the structures of domination. It was a struggle
 rooted in the realities of urban life and not simply another
 spontaneous flare up of "recreational violence" as Carr saw it.
 THE WESTERN AREAS OF JOHANNESBURG
 non-involvement was to be raised by many parties including
 The Johannesburg City Council throughout 1952 and 1953.
 39. Sample Survey, 1951, p. 19.
 40. J. Guy and M. Thabane, "The Ama-Rashea, a Participant's
 perspective", pp. 454-455.
 Page 12
Nevertheless, the impact on the Newclare community was profound.
 On the 23th May 1952, 300 African families hastily grabbed whatever
 belongings they could, left their homes in Southern Newclare and
 trekked across the railway line to find alternative accommodation in
 the Northern areas of the suburb where Russian influence was
 negligible. This was an entirely spontaneous movement and involved
 the mass movement of property-owners, tenants and sub-tenants. For a
 few weeks after the move, forty families squatted in the open on
 Lot 99 (also known as Reno S q u a r e ) , a piece of vacant ground owned by
 the Transvaal Provincial Administration while another forty families
 squatted on neighbouring territory, stands 431 and 432. These
 numbers swelled almost daily. By 19 June they had established about
 100 dilapidated wood, iron, hessian and cardboard shelters and it
 was also apparent that many more structures were in the process of
 being built.
 From the outset, conditions there were appalling. Without
 sanitation, squatters were forced to get water from neighbouring
 houses and to use any amenities available in nearby areas. By mid-
 June the squatting had spread to the municipal park known as Charles
 Phillip Square as well as to and stands 497 and 460. Soon these
 areas were filled with refuse and waste water and a genuine fear
 arose about the menace it posed to public health. With little
 protection against the elements and the harsh winter climate, misery
 and hardships became a feature of the Newclare Squatter camp:
 The women have a hard time of it. They try to get some
 order in the shacks, crowded with the articles they
 saved from their homes before the Russians appeared.
 Wardrobes, small miserable tables, basins, tins, shabby
 suitcases, and dozens of small articles lie in con-
 fusion all around them. They buy water at 1d. to 3d.
 a bucket from the houses in the neighbourhood. They go to
 these houses for their toilet...Misery everywhere.. .Six
 days ago Katie Nonzwaye gave birth to a child in a shack.
 She is weak. Katie lives with her husband and three
 children in this shack....In every shack there is the
 same story of degradation and misery. 42
 These conditions provoked a massive outcry from both the press and
 the clergy, especially from Trevor Huddleston. As Newclare's
 shanty town grew steadily it became obvious that the Johannesburg
 City Council would have to formulate a coherent and detailed policy
 to deal with this squatting problem. But problem-solviny of this
 nature was not one of the Council's strong points, as its dealings
 with the housing shortage and the Moroka squatters clearly showed
 during the 1940s. The response to the Newclare settlement was
 also to be characterised by similar feelings of impotency which was
 increased by the reluctance of the police to provide protection for
 41. IAD WRA3, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Letter from acting chief
 Health Inspector, I.J. Distiller, to Deputy Medical Officer
 of Health, 20 June 1952.
 42. The Clarion, 26 June 1952.
 43. See specifically Peter Wilkinson's paper, "A Place to live:
 The Resolution of the African Housing Crisis in
 Johannesburg, 1944-1954", paper presented to the African
 Studies Seminar, 27 July 1981.
 Page 13
the Newclare residents against the "Russian" menace.
 THE MUNICIPAL RESPONSE
 Really perturbed about the situation, W.J.P. Carr telephoned the
 police who informed him that the squatters had already been
 instructed to return home and had been offered police protection.
 This offer was refused, presumably because of threats made by the
 Russians. With great difficulty, Carr then managed to arrange a
 meeting between the leaders of the two opposing factions in an effort
 to quell the escalating violence in the area. The "Russian" group
 was represented by Solomon Hlalele, Colley Seamantha and Edward
 Mohale, while the Civic Guard group was represented by December
 Madinyane, Ben Kenosi and John Ralintsi. Gideon Pott, agent for the
 High Commission Territories was also present at this meeting. He was
 asked to attend since it had been freely alleged that the Russians
 were from Basotholand.
 At the meeting Hlalele and Madinyane were informed that the
 authorities were gravely concerned about the continuing violence and
 prevailing lawlessness which was "severely hindering the social
 progress of the African population in the city". Carr also stated
 that their actions tended to give the "Native" population a
 reputation for violence and-lawlessness and for forming and
 maintaining criminal gangs. When asked about the causes of the
 violence in Newclare, each leader simply blamed the other and Carr
 therefore drew his own conclusions. Ignoring the deep underlying
 causes of the violence which had not been thoroughly investigated,
 Carr attributed the unrest to these two leaders whom he regarded as
 being locked into a struggle for supremacy and control of the illicit
 funds extorted from Newclare residents. His further response was to
 write to the Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police,
 suggesting that both leaders be arrestecj6and brought to trial on
 grounds of public violence and rioting. This was however,
 not done.
 After this stalemate, the Non-European Affairs Committee debated at
 length as to what policy should be adopted towards the squatters. The
 main difficulty was that there was no alternative accommodation
 available for them. In the interim period, many houses formerly
 occupied by the refugees in South Newclare had been taken over by
 members of the Russian gang as well as their families.
 Forcible removal became regarded as the only option open to the
 Council, but it felt that the courts would not grant an order for
 the expulsion of the squatters, in the absence of some alternative
 forms of accommodation. However, Brian Porter, the Town Clerk,
 was of the opinion that it was possible under the Prevention of
 Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 to take action against the African
 families who were squatting illegally in Newclare. The Act provided
 that whenever persons squatted on property either with or without
 the owner's permission under conditions which threatened the health
 and safety of the public generally, the magistrate could, after
 44. IAD WRA3, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Non-European Affairs
 Department (NEAD) Report no 22/1952 of Manager of NEAD,
 W.J.P. Carr to Non-European Affairs Committee for its
 meeting of 26 June 1952.
 45. Ibid.
 46. Ibid.
 Page 14
consultation with the Local Authority grant orders to effect the
 immediate removal of such persons, transfer them elsewhere aod
 demolish any buildings or structures which they had erected.
 The squatters were notified of Council intentions by means of
 notices which were posted up all around the squatter settlement on 30
 June 1952. These stated that if the squatters had not evacuated the
 area by 3 July, the Council intended to make an application to the
 Magistrate of Johannesburg for an order requiring tbeir removal and
 their return to the areas from which they had come. The notice also
 informed squatters that they were entitled to legal representation
 before the Magistrate, either by members of the squatter's
 community itself, or by an advocate.
 On 29 of June, violent clashes between the Russians and the Civic
 Guard had broken out again. More than 500 Africans clashed at
 Westbury Bridge. Fourteen were seriously injured5gnd treated, at
 the Coronation Hospital, mainly for head injuries. The Russians
 were also involved in clashes in Germiston that same weekend, where
 six Africans were killed. It was evident that their power was spread
 over a wide geographical area. These clashes tended to give an air
 of permanence to the Newclare squatter settlement, because
 immediately afterwards, other members of the 242 families camped on
 lot 99, began making improvements to their shacks. The number of
 squatters now stood at 1 200.
 That the Johannesburg City Council had no solution to the squatting
 problem became glaringly obvious at a meeting of the Non-European
 Affairs Committee on 2 July 1952. Attended by representatives of the
 police, the Government and NEAD, Council members stated emphatically
 that since the Council had no powers to solve this pressing problem,
 the police should step in to remove the lawless element. They felt
 that the Council was being blamed unnecessarily for neglect-p
 accusations which should be laid at the door of the police.
 Numerous examples were cited where the police had refused to act
 against cases of intimidation, extortion and victimization of
 Newclare residents. Councillor A. Cutter suggested that the root
 cause of the Newclare problem lay in the inadequate protection
 afforded by the police in the area. When he had visited the township
 on 28 June he had seen 50 to 100 police at the Newlands police
 station, but had observed only one African policeman between 9 and
 11 am in South Newclare. The squatters had informed him that
 gangsters had come into their houses, thrown furniture around and
 had told them to vacate their premises. When asked if they had
 complained to the police, he was told that tUe police had stood on
 the street corners and had taken no notice.
 It is very difficult to gauge the reasons for the apparent police
 47. IAD WRAB, file no. 150/15, vol. 1, Letter to the Manager of
 NEAD from the Town Clerk, 29 June 1951.
 48. The Star, 30 June 1952
 49. IAD WRAB, file no. 158/15, vol. 1, City of Johannesburg
 Notice to Squatters at Newclare.
 50. The Star and Die Transvaler, 30 June 1952.
 51. The Rand Daily Mail, 1 July 1952.
 52. IAD WRAB, file no. 158/15, vol. 1, Minutes of the special
 meeting of the Non-European Affairs Committee in
 conjunction with the General Purposes Committee, 2 July
 1952, p. 3.
 53. Ibid, p. 4.
 Page 15
apathy. Trevor Huddleston saw in police reluctance to disarm the
 Russians a deliberate state strategy of "divide and remove".
 3y 1952 the Western Areas Removal scheme was finally crystallizing
 into shape and the continued unrest and tension in Newclare could be
 used as effective propaganda to provide ultimate justification for
 removing these townships. Although this squatter movement was to
 eventually feed into the removal scheme, it is rather difficult to
 explain police action solely in terms of its being part of a general
 conspiracy to promote pro-removal propaganda. Evidence which might
 reveal possible links between the "Russians" and the police is
 lacking and consequently an alternative explanation has to be
 sought. Carr has perhaps given the most plausible answer to this
 question. He has argued that there was only a very small police
 contingent stationed in Western Native Township, and the only police
 station was situated in Newlands. With limited forces at their
 disposal and a vast area to 5cover, police power and influence was
 therefore quite restricted.
 Police reluctance to arrest the leaders involved in the Newclare
 disturbances once again placed the ball firmly in the Council's
 court. Calling for an emergency meeting of NEAC later in the
 afternoon of 2 July, the Council decided to invoke the provisions of
 the Illegal Squatting Act and ordered the population of plotg99 to
 leave the area and return home by midnight of the same day. 3y 3
 July, none of the 240 families had moved from their shanties in
 accordance with Municipal demands and the Council promptly applied
 to the Magistrates Court for an eviction order against the
 fami1ies.
 By 4 July 1952, it was clear that conditions in the squatter camp
 had deteriorated rapidly. Sickness began to take its toll: 20
 people were hospitalised for various ailments. Robert Mgojo,
 secretary of the camp, felt that many more people were becoming ill
 because of bad housing, over-population, inadequate sanitary and
 cooking facilities, all of which favoured the rapid spread of
 infection.
 It was at this juncture that the Native Affairs Department (NAD)
 under its minister, H.F. Verwoerd, became involved in the struggle
 between the Council and the squatters. Representatives of NAD, the
 Council and the police became locked in trilateral negotiations in an
 attempt to find alternative accommodation for the squatters. The
 Council realised that despite the court order, there were legal
 barriers against demolition of shacks should the Council eventually
 wish to forcibly remove the squatters. Shacks could not be
 demolished without a court order which could only be obtained if it
 could be proved that alternative accommodation existed. In an effort
 to devise strategies to cope with the situation, a meeting was called
 54. T. Huddleston, Naught for Your Comfort, p. 86. This view
 was shared by one resident who even went as far as
 likening the so-called alliance between "Russians" and
 police with the use by the state of Witdoeke in the
 Crossroads disturbances of 1986.She felt that many Russians
 acted as spies for the police. Interview with Patricia
 Moetapele, 1 July 1939.
 55. Interview with W.J.P. Carr, 7 December 1988.
 56. The Rand Daily Mail, 2 July 1952.
 57. Ibid, 3 July 1952.
 58. The Star, 4 July 1952.
 Page 16
between the Council and officials from NAD on 8 July 1952.
 At the meeting, representatives of NAD stated that Verwoerd was
 more in favour of the squatters being removed to an alternative site
 than their being forced to return to their homes in Newclare. He
 intimated that under the proposed Native Services Levy Bill presently
 before parliament, money would be made available to the Council for
 an alternative Sjte and for the necessary services which would be
 required there. The only land available to the Council was
 an area called Vukuzenzele but this was earmarked for rehousing the
 residents of the of the the Moroka Emergency camp who had waited for
 Council housing since 1947. Carr therefore suggested that a start be
 made with the Western Areas Removal Scheme { W . A . R . S . ) , since the
 government had already allocated land in the Meadowlands area for the
 rehousing of the Africans affected.
 Most of the Councillors concurred with Carr's views and after
 lengthy negotiations, it was finally decided by this meeting that
 the squatters from Newclare would be removed as part of the Western
 Areas Scheme, firstly to Moroka as a temporary measure and then
 subsequently to Meadowlands. The cost of this removal would be
 shared between the Council and NAD on an equal-basis and the police
 would give the necessary assistance required. On the same day, the
 eviction order was granted, which instructed all squatters to remove
 themselves and their belongings from Northern Newclare by midnight on
 10 July. According to this order, if the squatters refused to move
 they would then^be forcibly removed by the City Council to the Moroka
 Emergency Camp. Furthermore, the City Council was also granted
 authorisation to demolish and r&tgove all structures which were
 erected on the Newclare stands, 0
 SQUATTER RESISTANCE TO REMOVAL
 After the Council decision became known, the squatters, who had
 refused to move, organised a petition to be presented to the Rand
 division of the Supreme Court in order to prevent the Johannesburg
 City Council from clearing them out of their temporary homes. The
 chief applicant was December Valashiya Chlamini who assumed the
 leadership role in the squatters camp. Not much is known about
 Dhlamini except that he was one of the residents of Southern
 Newclare and one of the Civic Guards. He became self-elected leader
 of the squatters,once the movement got underway. Very much like
 James Kpanza in 1944, he soon appointed two assistants, Manyabi
 Moloi and Robert Radebe as secretary and treasurer respectively who
 59. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15. vol. 1, Notes of meeting held
 between officials of the Government Department of Native
 Affairs and officials of the Johannesburg City Council,
 8 July 1952.
 60. Ibid, p. 3.
 61. Ibid, pp. 5-6.
 62. This camp was established in March 1947 as a site and
 service scheme to deal with the wave of squatter movements
 in Orlando, Pimville and Alexandra. The camp which was to
 be only a temporary emergency measure, had by the early
 1950s become almost permanent due to the escalating housing
 shortage.
 63. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Order of the Magistrate,
 Johannesburg in terms of Section 5 of Act 52 of 1951.
 Page 17
collected money for the legal representation of the squatters in
 court. During the court proceedings, the Counsel for the African
 families said that the squatters were prepared to return to their
 homes only on condition that they were afforded police protection
 against the Russians. The result was a Court Order staying their
 eviction from the camp and the granting of a rule nisi calling on the
 Council to fshow cause why the eviction order should not be
 cancel led.
 On 31 July the Council resolved to oppose the applications of
 Dhlamini in the Supreme Court. But this was to be unsuccessful.
 When the case was heard in the Supreme Court on 18 August, the judge
 set aside the rule for eviction of the squatters because of a "gross
 irregularity" in the issue of the magisterial order compelling the
 squatters to leave Newclare. The evidence placed before the
 magistrate by the Council had been done so confidentially and
 therefore it was not authorised in terms of the Illegal Squatting
 Act. The squatters had had no opportunity of stating their own
 case and denying the charges. A further irregularity was that the
 magistrate had ordered the forcible removal of the squatters to
 Moroka while the notice originally posted by the City Council at the
 camp had stated its intention to return the squatters "from whence
 they came". The final ruling was consequently that it was now up to
 the Council to make a pew application for the eviction of the
 squatters of Newclare. 0
 The failure to take decisive action and find a practical solution
 to the problem seemed to be a characteristic of the Johannesburg City
 Council's approach to African housing and squatting in general. The
 establishment of Moroka Emergency Camp in 1947 and the acceptance of
 a policy of controlled squatting had provided the Council with a
 temporary means of dealing with the squatter movements on the Rand,
 at least during the late 1940s. However, by 1952, even these
 temporary solutions were denied to it and therefore, as a last
 resort, it sought actively to engage the aid of the Native Affairs
 Department and Verwoerd in particular in its attempts to find a a way
 of terminating the Newclare squatter's movement.
 VERWOERD AMD THE REMOVAL OF THE NEWCLARE SQUATTERS
 In an effort to bring the violence to an end and force the
 squatters to return home, the Council appealed directly to Verwoerd
 to use his power to have the ringleaders in the two factions
 arrested. It did not wish to make fresh applications through the
 courts and became convinced that the only path left open was to take
 action against whoever was deemed responsible for the unrest. The
 direct entrance of Verwoerd into the struggle between the Council and
 the squatters ushered in a new, and certainly more decisive phase in
 the history of Newclare township. Firmly dedicated to the
 Stallardist principle that Africans could not have any political
 rights or freehold tenure in the "white" urban areas, Verwoerd's role
 in the social engineering phase during the 1950s designed to create
 64. The Rand Daily Mail, 11 July 1952.
 65. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15 vol. 1, Report of the Acting Town
 Clerk to the Non-European and Finance Committees. Joint
 meeting 31 July 1952.
 66. The Star, 18 August 1952 and The Rand Daily Mai 1,
 19 August 1952.
 Page 18
"apartheid" cities, was of paramount importance. After the passing
 of the Group Areas Act in 1950, the touchstone of Apartheid, Verwoerd
 was to be personally responsible for a whole string of legislation
 which not only aimed at manipulating urban space so as to create
 separate residential areas designated for occupation by specific
 racial groups, but which gradually destroyed any existing rights
 which Africans might have had in urban areas. A clear example of
 this was the Western Areas Removal Scheme which he took over from the
 Johannesburg City Council, refined and started to implement from
 1951 onwards. The Newclare squatter movement therefore presented
 Verwoerd with a perfect chance to actively intervene in the Western
 Areas of Johannesburg in 1S52, to thereby make a preliminary attempt
 to implement his more grandiose apartheid designs.
 The meeting between a deputation from the City Council with the
 Minister of the Native Affairs Department, Verwoerd, and the Minister
 of Justice, C.R. Swart, took place on 6 September 1952, three months
 after the squatters settled on the vacant stands in Northern
 Newclare. The statements made by Verwoerd at this meeting tended in
 the main to reveal not only his thoughts on the general state of the
 Western Areas of Johannesburg and Newclare in particular, but also
 his views on the ultimate objectives of total apartheid: separate
 residential areas for Africans along ethnic lines in planned
 townships, where full control over the urban African population
 could be regained and manitained. This also revealed the extent to
 which NAD was to be primarily motivated by the wide-scale political
 mobilisation of the African urban population during the early 1950s.
 Verwoerd in particular, considered that the urban areas were
 a fruitful breeding ground for unrest, owing to the massive
 uncontrolled influx of Africans into the towns and cities. For this
 reason, his prime concern was not so much the settlement of disputes
 between the Russians and the Civic Guard, but the fact that the
 Council should do everything in its power to reassert its authority
 in the region and undertake the removal of the squatters. His advice
 therefore was that the Council make a new application to the Courts
 for a removal order. In effect, this proposal meant an immediate
 commencement on the clearance of all African residents as part and
 parcel of the Western Areas Scheme. Verwoerd further stated that his
 Department could not undertake the removal of the squatters itself
 but was prepared to offer the Council loans from the 800 0Q0 pounds
 set aside by the Government for the Western Areas Scheme.
 In a subsequent statement to the press, Verwoerd went a step
 further in pointing out that the only real solution to the Newclare
 squatter problem was the removal of both South and North Newclare and
 67. For a detailed discussion of Verwoerd's policies, see Alexander
 Hepple, Verwoerd, (Penguin, 1967) and Henry Kenny, Architect of
 Apartheid: H.F. Verwoerd - An Appraisal, {Johannesburg, 1980).
 68. The evolution of the Western Areas Removal Scheme from the 1940s
 through to the 1950s as well as Verwoerd's role in bringing the
 scheme into fruition, will be explored in greater detail in my
 thesis dealing with the Destruction of Sophiatown, Martindale
 and Newclare.
 69. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Report of what trans-
 pired at the meeting between a deputation from the
 Johannesburg City Council and Verwoerd, contained in
 Urgency Report no 31/1952 to Special Meeting of the NEAC,
 11 September 1952.
 Page 19
the rehousing of their inhabitants in more controlled and ethnically
 planned townships. Not only did Verwoerd's statements to the press
 elicit strong condemnation from the press and Anglican clergy, but it
 also placed the Council in a rather difficult position. It was clear
 that Verwoerd was trying to force the Council's hand to remove the
 Newclare Community and thereby use squatting as a testing ground
 for implementing the Western Areas Removal Scheme. The Council on the
 other hand, in a display of open defiance against Verwoerd, cpgarded
 his "solution " as far from satisfactory let alone feasible. Once
 again, as during the late 1940s, its desperation to find a solution
 to the squatting problems which beset the Rand, and this time to find
 an alternative to Verwoerd's proposals, were mirrored in its
 resolutions and its complete failure to implement them. On 11
 September 1952 the Council resolved to declare the areas occupied by
 the squatters in Newclare as emergency camps and that all possible
 steps be taken to accelerate the solution of the Council's housing
 shortage. The City Engineer was thus instructed to proceed
  71
 immediately with a programme to provide 2 500 houses a year.
 Verwoerd's immediate response to the Johannesburg City Council's
 refusal to implement his proposals, was to blackmail the Council by
 threatening to deny any future help and financial assistance to the
 Council unless it accepted his proposals for dealing with the
 Newclare squatters. This approach was to become a firm
 characteristic in his dealings with the City Council, especially in
 1954 when the Council decided to withhold all assistance from the
 implementation of W.A.R.S.. Verwoerd's reaction was to threaten to
 withhold all funds for any future Council African housing schemes and
 to have the Resettlement Board designated as an urban Local
 Authority. The Council's retort in 1952 ? 2was that the Minister's
 actions were "childish" and irresponsible. Nevertheless, Verwoerd's
 strong-arm tactics had the desired effect since they spearheaded the
 Council's reconsideration of re-applying for an eviction order from
 the Magistrate.
 From October to November 1952, the Council set about collecting as
 much information on the nature of the squatter community in Newclare
 as possible which it could use to substantiate its appeal for an
 eviction order in court. One of the most important pieces of
 evidence was a letter from the Superintendent of Western Native
 Township to the Manager of NEAD. In it he stated that on a visit
 to the camp, he found that 17 new shacks were being erected, new
 squatters were moving into the area and illicit liquor was being
 brewed and sold in the squatter camp. At the same time December
 Dhlamini had assumed a definite leadership role among the squatters
 and had received money from new occupants as an entrance fee into
 the squatters' camp. Additional periodic payments by way of a levy
 70. The Star, 12 September 1952.
 71. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Extract of the Minutes
 of the Non-European Affairs Committee to consider
 Verwoerd's proposals. 11 September 1952.
 72. The Star, 16 September 1952 and The Rand Dai ly Mai 1, 17
 September 1952.
 73. IAD WRA3, File no. 158/15, vol. 1, Extract from the minutes
 of the Non-European Affairs Committee, 25 September 1952.
 74. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 2, Letter from the Super-
 intendent of Western Native Township to the Manager of the
 Non-European Affairs Department, 23 October 1952.
 Page 20
75
 were also imposed on residents already living there. In October
 it was also reported that he had informed squatters that he had been
 authorised by the Council to not only control the camp but to collect
 monies from the residents as well. This development highlights the
 similarities between the internal political structure of the
 Newclare squatter camp and squatter movements of the past,
 especially that organised and led by James Mpanza and the Sofasonke
 Party in 1944. They also imposed an entrance fee on squatters in the
 Orlando squatter camp as well as a weekly levy for the right to
 erect shelters from whatever materials were at hand.
 Various Affidavits were consequently signed and posted around the
 squatter's camp to inform the squatters of Council intentions, and to
 prevent a recurrence of the failure of its earlier application for an
 eviction order on the grounds of submitting confidential reports.
 Carr's affidavit mentioned the complete absence of proper sanitary
 and health facilities as a reason for wanting the eviction order:
 In consequence of the lack of amenities, I am of the
 opinion that the health of the squatters themselves and
 the people in the vicinity is being seriously jeopardised,
 with a consequential danger to health of the public
 generally. A second serious defect lies in the complete
 absence of ordinary control measures, as is customary in
 a proclaimed Native Location. By this I mean that there
 is virtually no control over trading, preparation of and
 exposing of food for consumption and cleanly domestic
 facilities, and the prevention of illicit sale of liquor
 of all descriptions.73
 On S December 1952 the Magistrate granted an eviction order stating
 that he was satisfied that public health was being endangered and
 removal of the squatters to Moroka was thus deemed necessary. On 17
 December the removals started, thereby ending the troubled seven
 months in the community since the squatting movement had begun but
 not the controversy which was to rage over the removal of the entire
 area just three years later. Although the eviction order was a
 short victory for the Johannesburg City Council, the plight of the
 shack-dwellers was not alleviated, even though their living
 conditions were slightly improved at Moroka. In a move which was to
 mirror National Party apartheid strategy in the removals to
 Meadowlands, where in a deliberate policy of "divide and rule" the
 three communities were broken up and housing policy was instituted
 along ethnic lines, the Council destroyed the unity of the Newclare
 squatters. On arriving at Moroka the squatters were not housed
 together as a community but were situated amongst the Moroka
 75. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 2, Sworn Affidavit by
 Arthur Cleverley, Location Superintendent of Western Native
 Township, 4 November 1952.
 76. IAD WRAB, File no 158/15, vol. 2, Message from W. Carr to the
 Newclare squatters concerning Dhlamini. 14 October 1952.
 77. See Alf Stadler, "Birds in the Cornfield..."
 73. IAD WRAB, File no. 158/15, vol. 2, Sworn Affidavit by
 William Carr, 4 November 195?.. His affidavit was
 accompanied by others from the Medical Officer of Health,
 the Assistant Medical Officer of Health, District Health
 Inspector and a report of the Town Clerk.
 Page 21
residents t h e m s e l v e s , including various Russian factions which were
 already established there. The Council's obvious intention was to
 break the existing power groupings forged in Newclare in an attempt
 to enforce its own c o n t r o l . The process of community development
 which took place among the squatters as a means of mutual protection
 against the Russians was thus shattered and individuals were left
 isolated and far more vulnerable to attack than they had been in
 Newc lare.
 CONCLUSION
 The Newclare squatters' movement of 1952 was clearly an important
 event in the history of Newclare township. It was catalytic in
 shaping the removal policies towards this area, particularly after
 1954. Considering that this township also formed a part of the
 Western Areas of Johannesburg which was also earmarked for removal,
 the reverberations from Newclare were felt throughout this larger
 urban region. Here communities were riven by endemic upheavals
 caused not only by social banditry but also the larger designs of
 apartheid government.
 The social fabric of Newclare and its internal struggles closely
 resembled that of other African townships in South Africa. And like
 Pinnock and Glazer, I have attempted to elucidate the particular
 survival strategies and responses of various sections of the Newclare
 community to similiar social, environmental and material conditions
 experienced elsewhere. The main argument is that although the
 squatter community was structurally similar to other movements in the
 past, its origins were slightly different. Unlike movements which
 grew almost exclusively out of housing shortages and influx control,
 the Newclare squatters movement also had its genesis in the
 widespread gang warfare of the "Russians", who exacted "protection"
 payments from the hapless residents. But it must be pointed out that
 gang development also had its roots in the lack of housing and
 miserable conditions faced by the urban poor.
 This article thus also challenges Anthony Sampson's assertion that
 the Russian gangs were merely an "apparition of the antique
 Africa", which fails to recognize the precise nature
 of the struggle for survival in a hostile urban complex where jobs,
 housing and livable salaries were at a premium. Naturally, the
 outcome of such hardships were often brutal and dislocating; they
 fractured township communities and created gangster impulses. Nowhere
 is this more vivdly illustrated than in the Newclare squatters
 movement, where ordinary residents became embroiled in conflict with
 the Russians. They were forced to leave their homes and trek across
 the railway line to squat on land ownned by the Johannesburg City
 C o u n c i 1 .
 Another important issue which has been raised in this article is
 the question of police complicity in the disruption of Newclare
 society. The police seemed ill-equipped and even reluctant to take
 decisive action against the leaders of the Russian gangs, apparently
 condoning their sorties in the township. The exact relationship
 between the police and the Russians is rather difficult to fathom
 however. Any suggestion of a formal alliance would be an
 exaggeration, but the refusal to control the activities of these
 79. Anthony Sampson, Drum, A Venture into the New Africa
 p. 111.
 Page 22
gangs in their attacks on the "Civic Guard" insinuates at least
 cautious preference for the Russians. Owing to the inadequacy of
 policing in Newclare, it is clear that the gangs themselves served as
 informal agencies of social control in the community.
 The third crucial point is the effect of Johannesburg City Council
 intrusion in Newclare. Its particular role and style of intrusion,
 is construed as being instigated by governmental pressure,
 specifically that exerted by the Native Affairs Department under
 Verwoerd. It is suggested here that the coupling of the Council and
 NAD ushered in a new phase of social engineering in Johannesburg
 which precipitated the removal for the entire Western Areas in 1955.
 It is evident that both Verwoerd and the Council intended to use the
 Newclare squatter settlement as the testing ground for the initial
 implementation of removal on a grand scale and part of the envisaged
 segregation of Johannesburg. Despite the collusion, however,
 relations between these two protagonists were not always cordial or
 co-operative. Each vied for its own workable strategy for the
 removal of the the Newclare squatters. It is nevertheless contended
 that the Council bowed to the reactionary programme devised by
 Verwoerd and NAD, primarily because of its dependence upon government
 funding for African housing within the municipality. Verwoerd's
 threats to withhold finances persuaded the Council to acquiesce in
 the Nationalist Government's removal plan.
 Such material considerations also proved effective again when
 the Council finally agreed to co-operate with the Natives
 Resettlement Board, created to help implement the Western Areas
 removal scheme from 1954 onwards.
 Thus, the complex network of Russian Activity, police vascillation
 and ineptitude as well as Council complicity with NAD chartered the
 course towards the removal of the Newclare squatters, which in turn,
 added momentum to the evolution of a wider removal scheme for the
 entire Western Areas of Johannesburg.
 Page 23
APPENDIX A
 TABLE 1
 DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION
 AND TOWNSHIP:
 OCCUPATION
 LABOURER
 WASHERWOMAN
 DOMESTICS
 FACTCRY WORKER
 CRAFTSMEN
 TRANSPORT WORKER
 POLICE/NIGHT
 WATCHMEN
 PROFFESSIONAL/
 CLERK
 ITINERANT TRADER
 FIXED TRADER
 HOUSEWIFE
 PENSIONER
 OTHER
 UNEMPLOYABLE
 SOPHIATOWN
 %
 42
 3
 5
 22
 5
 9
 2
 3
 3
 1
 2
 1
 1
 1
 MARTINDALE
 %
 33
 ?3
 5
 26
 4
 13
 2
 4
 3
 1
 3
 1
 1
 1
 NEWCLARE
 %
 55
 2
 3
 21
 4
 4
 3
 2
 1
 1
 2
 0.5
 1
 0.5
 EXACT UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURE WERE UNAVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF WRITING
 UP THE SURVEY REPORT IN 1950. FIGURES DID REVEAL THOUGH THAT
 ONE IN EVERY TWENTY HEADS Or FAMILIES WAS UNEMPLOYED. (SURVEY P.44)
 TABLE II
 FAMILY INCOMES UNDER 30 POUNDS IN SOPHIATOWN, MARTINDALE AND NEWCLARE
 MONTHLY INCOME IN
 POUNDS AND SHILINGS
 UNDER 2.10
 2. 10-UNDER 5.0
 5.0
 7.10
 10.0
 12.10
 15.0
 17.10
 20.10
 22.10
 25.10
 27.10
 ALL INCOMES
 UNDER 30.0
 SOPHIATOWN/MARTINDALE
 % OF ALL AFRICAN
 FAMILIES
 1
 2
 4
 14
 25
 14
 10
 5
 5
 3
 3
 1
 87
 NEWCLARE
 % OF ALL AFRICAN
 FAMILIES
 3
 1
 7
 18
 26
 10
 9
 4
 3
 2
 1
 1
 85
 Page 24
APPENDIX B
 TABLE 1
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES IN THE WESTERN AREAS
 ACCORDING TO TYPE OF TENANCY:
 TOWNSHIP
 SOPHT/MARTIND.
 NEWCLARE
 W ? N. T.
 ALL TOWNSHIPS
 OWNER %
 4
 1
 2
 TENANT
 80
 82
 87
 82
 SUB-TENANT %
 16
 17
 13
 16
 TABLE II
 NATURE OF DWELLINGS IN THE WESTERN AREAS:
 CONSTRUCTION OF
 DWELLING
 IN ORDER/IN NEED
 OF RECONSTRUCTION
 NEEDING DEMOLITION
 SOPHIATOWN
 NO.
 5 764
 5 202
 %
 52
 48
 MARTINDALE
 NO
 1 100
 1 017
 %
 52
 48
 NEWCLARE
 NO.
 1 887
 2 722
 %
 41
 59
 APPENDIX C
 TABLE I
 THE AFRICAN MALE AND FEMALE POPULATION OF THE WESTERN AREAS
 PERSONS
 NO.
 NO.
 ALL
 NO.I
 ETHN
 MALES
 FEMALES
 PERSONS
 N ALL
 IC GROUPS
 SOPH
 MART
 21
 17
 39
 44
 IATOWN/
 INDALE
 317
 869
 186
 096
 NEWCLARE
 7 452
 7 109
 14 561
 16 985
 ? WESTERN NATIVE
 TOWNSHIP
 6 202
 6 228
 12 830
 13 341
 ALL
 34
 31
 66
 74
 975
 606
 577
 422
 TABLE II
 DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN FAMILIES:
 TOWNSHIP
 SOPHIATOWN
 MARTINDALE
 NEWCLARE
 W.N.T.
 TOTAL
 NO. OF AFRICAN FAMILIES FOUND
 IN 1950
 10 966
 2 117
 4 609
 2 600
 20 292
 Page 25
TABLE III
 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS ACCORDING TO
 LANGUAGE GROUPS AND SEX, AS FOUND IN A SAMPLE OF 303 HOUSEHOLDS
 THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN AREAS. 1951 SAMPLE SURVEY.
 LANGUAGE
 GROUPS
 XHOSA
 S. SOTHO
 N. SOTHO
 TSWANA
 ZULU
 SWAZI
 SHANGAAN
 VENDA
 FOREIGN
 FAMI
 NO.
 50
 59
 39
 139
 67
 17
 23
 11
 25
 LIES
 %
 11
 13
 9
 32
 15
 4
 5
 3
 6
 PERSONS
 NO.
 135
 201
 123
 403
 173
 47
 67
 29
 49
 %
 11
 16
 10
 33
 14
 4
 5
 2
 4
 PERCENTAGE
 MALE %
 55
 47
 48
 51
 50
 49
 58
 62
 73
 OF SEXES
 FEMALE %
 45
 53
 52
 49
 50
 51
 42
 38
 27
 Page 26
B iblxography
 Nclebe 1 e, N jabu 1 a L 19b3 J " Life- susta::Lning Poetry o f a Fi.gh1::i.ng
 People, M Staff rider, 5 (3), 44-45.
 L 19H4 J " Turkish Tales, and Some Thoughts on South African
 Fiction, " Staff rider, 6 (1), 24-25, 42-48.
 - [1984 (I9bb)j "Norna Award Acceptance Speech," Staff rider. 6 (2),
 39-40.
 i. 19BbaJ "The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New Writings in
 South Africa, " Journa 1 af Southern A f:rican Studies, 12 (2).,
 143-b7.
 LlBBBb] "The English Language and Social Uhange "Ln South
 Africa, " Keynote Paper at Jubilee Conference of English Academy of
 Southern Africa.
 L1BB7 J "European culture in SA ignores reality, " Extracts from
 address at Senate Specia 1 L_ectures, Wits Lin1veK si ty, pub 1 ished in
 The Star, September b, 13bV.
 ootriotes
 1.. V. f. W a 11 e r B e n J a in i n, " I" hi e S t o r y t e 11 e r, " i n I l l u m i n a t i o n s ,
 J o n a t hi a n C a p e (I.... c;t n d o n ) ? 13 7 0..
 'A.. \ he J..eve 1. of d e b a t e a t tl"ie Gabarone c o n f e r e n c e on '' Uu 1 1 u r e and
 R e s i s t a n a e'' a f e w y e a r s a go s e e in e d t o r e I11 e c t a n i n a b i. 111 y t o g o
 boyon c::l bl"ie o 1 d teKPHIS.
Addendum
 1 he above paper is the first part of what was Intended as a three?
 part ar gument. 1 n the secon d part, it was my in tent1on to con s ider
 the story collection, Fools, in the light of Ndebele" s critical
 writings, and, in particular, with regard to his notion of the
 storyteller. His discursive preoccupations with narrative
 p e r s p e c tive, s e n s i tive c hi a r a c t e r i s a 11 o n, the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n
 sub J ective process an d obJeat i ve condition s, the re 1 ationshxp between
 t he p o 111 i c i s i n g i n t e 1 It. e c t u a 1 a n d p o p ular c u 1.1 u re, an d t hi e
 involvement of n on -politicised aspects of social life in the momentum
 towards a new society, are ail strongly present in his fictional work
 as well, I intended particularly to dwell on Nclebele' s way of
 drarna 11 s in g socia 1 tens ion s :in Af r ican town ships.
 H o w e? v e r, 111 y m a i n c r i t i c a 1 p a i n t pi :.i c k :i n J;J u p o 1-1 c o m m e n t s l:i r i e f 1 y
 made towards the end of this paper -was that literary culture in
 S o u t l"i A f r i c:: a I") as an essen t :i.. a 11 y '' in i d dX. e o !. a s s " c::: |-i a r a c t er, a n d
 privileges, in its focus on individual character, "middle class"
 preoccupat:i..cins, 1 angua9e and perspect::i.ves. Ndel:ie 1 e does not escape
 tl'ils bias of the medium, despite his sensitivity to some of 1 bs
 dangers.