NATIONALISM WITHOUT A STATE 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM AMONG 
STATELESS NATIONS 

 
HUMAIRAA MAYET 

1619692 
 
 

 
 
 

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AT 

THE UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG IN PARTIAL 

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF 

ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

SUPERVISED BY DR NATALIE ZÄHRINGER 



 2 

Acknowledgements 

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Natalie Zähringer, 

for her unwavering support. I would like to thank her for assisting me in navigating the terrain 

of a Master’s research report by consistently providing guidance and helpful feedback.  

I would like to thank my friends, particularly Khadija, Sameeha, Saffiya, Rumaysaa, Ali, and 

Muhammad Azhar, for believing in me and encouraging me to work on my research report.  

I would like to thank my comrades from the socialist and international solidarity movements, 

and especially Mahfouz, Roshan, Zaki, Raees, and Ndumiso, for showing great interest in my 

research and emboldening my topic selection.  

I would also like to express thanks to my parents, Imraan and Rabia, my brothers, Yahya and 

Aadil, my sister, Safiyya, and my sister-in-law, Shaazia, all of whom offered words of support 

to me over the duration of my Master’s degree.  

Above all else, I would like to express massive amounts of gratitude to those in the resistance 

movements in Palestine and Western Sahara, popular and organised, violent and nonviolent, 

for without them; there would not have been a research report. I would like to thank the 

Palestinian and Sahrawi resistance for inspiring not only my research, but also my activism. I 

stand in awe of their bravery and their firm belief in rising up against hierarchical systems of 

oppression and tyranny in their quest for self-determination and statehood.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 3 

Declaration 

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the Degree 

of Master of Arts in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, 

Johannesburg.  

Name: Humairaa Mayet 

Signed:  

 

Date: 15 February 2023 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 4 

Abstract 

A political philosophy employed by nationalist groups and parties, revolutionary nationalism, 

is used to resist the established order and achieve political goals. It is especially prevalent when 

power is held by a group or party which attempts to oppress and stifle certain identities and 

nationalities while enabling others. Revolutionary nationalism has been practiced by the people 

of Palestine and Western Sahara, both when they resisted against their European colonisers, 

Britain and Spain, and today, as they resist against their occupiers, Israel and Morocco. Forms 

of resistance practices include popular and organised resistance, as well as violent and 

nonviolent resistance. Similarities and differences emerge when analysing how each of these 

occupied populations attempted to resist through means of revolutionary nationalism and these 

can be examined and compared. Revolutionary nationalism often goes hand-in-hand with the 

expression of the right to self-determination, the highest form of which is statehood. The aim 

of this research report is to discern whether or not the practices of revolutionary nationalism 

give rise to self-determination, even though it has been proven that, in the post-Cold War era, 

they do not give rise to statehood.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 5 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

  
ANC African National Congress 

BDS Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 

BSO Black September Organisation 

DPP Democratic Progressive Party  

Frelimo Liberation Front of Mozambique 

Frente POLISARIO Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro 

Hamas Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah 

ICJ International Court of Justice 

IDF Israel Defense Forces 

MENA Middle East and North Africa 

MK Umkhonto we Sizwe 

NP National Party 

PA Palestinian Authority 

PAC Pan-African Congress 

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 

PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation 

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 

SACP South African Communist Party 

SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 

SPLA Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army 

UN United Nations 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

 

 

 

 

 



 6 

Table of Contents 

Introduction           9 

Chapter 1: Revolutionary Nationalism       13 

 Introduction          13 

 Nationalism           13 

 Revolutionary Nationalism         18 

 Types of Resistance         20 

 Conclusion          24 

Chapter 2: Self-determination       25 

 Introduction          25 

 Self-determination         25 

 Statehood          30 

 Scale of Self-determination        34 

 Conclusion          36 

Chapter 3: Palestine         38 

 Introduction           38 

 Historical Background         38 

  British Mandate in Palestine        38 

  Zionist Occupation         40 

 Revolutionary Nationalism        41 



 7 

  Popular Resistance         42 

  Organised Resistance         44 

Self-determination          50 

 Self-recognition        50 

 Informal Recognition        50 

 Formal Recognition        51 

 Statehood         51 

Conclusion          53 

Chapter 4: Western Sahara         53 

 Introduction           53 

 Historical Background         53 

  Spanish Colonisation        53 

  Moroccan Occupation        56 

 Revolutionary Nationalism         58 

  Popular Resistance         58 

  Organised Resistance         62 

 Self-determination         66 

  Self-recognition        66 

  Informal Recognition         67 

  Formal Recognition         68 



 8 

  Statehood         68 

 Conclusion           69 

Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis       70 

Introduction           70 

Historical Background         70 

Justifications for Colonisation and Occupation      72 

Revolutionary Nationalism         74 

 Popular Resistance         75 

 Organised Resistance        77 

Self-determination         79 

 Self-recognition        80 

 Informal Recognition        80 

 Formal Recognition         81 

 Statehood         81 

Is Revolutionary Nationalism Effective and Sustainable?   82 

 Conclusion          85 

Conclusion            86 

Appendix            91 

Bibliography          92 

 



 9 

Introduction 

Revolutionary nationalism is a type of nationalism which was developed predominantly by 

minority groups in order to counter hegemonic structures of power and disrupt the established 

political order. The currents of revolutionary nationalism flowed through the depths of the 

French Revolution, anti-Fascist struggles in Italy in response to the rise of Benito Mussolini, 

the Cần Vương movement in Vietnam, the rise of Black Nationalism in the United States, and 

African liberation movements in the epoch of decolonisation. While not quite as strong as they 

once were, the currents of revolutionary nationalism still flow through the shallows of 

international waters. Struggles of revolutionary nationalism were carried out for different 

reasons and had different end goals, though each of these have been remarkably similar as each 

has embodied the key aspects of resistance. The aims of some struggles were the recognition 

of identity and rights, while the aims of others were statehood. Each struggle sought different 

levels of self-determination. This research report outlines the parameters of revolutionary 

nationalism before applying the concept to the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. The 

people of Palestine and Western Sahara, in the modern era, have risen up against the colonial 

powers of Britain and Spain. As European colonialism collapsed, the Palestinian and Sahrawi 

people have resisted against their occupiers, Israel and Morocco, and continue to do so today.   

Self-determination is an incredibly important tenet of revolutionary nationalism and is a 

fundamental pillar atop which many revolutionary nationalist movements have been built. 

When a people are denied their right to self-determination, they tend to turn to strategies of 

revolutionary nationalism. Self-determination is a concept which is rather elusive and perhaps 

difficult to quantify as it has no finite scale of measurement. For the purpose of this research 

report, An attempt will be made to develop a measurement of self-determination. Self-

recognition will be posited as the lowest degree of self-determination and statehood as the 

highest, with various other degrees, such as classification as per United Nations principles, 

assistance from states and organisations, refusal to cooperate with occupiers in solidarity with 

the occupied, and receival of humanitarian aid, among others, falling in between. These will 

be classified as being a part of either informal recognition or formal recognition, with the latter 

being notably more significant than the former. This research report then attempts to apply 

these measurements to the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara in order to discern where on 

the scale they fall in comparison to one another.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%E1%BA%A7n_V%C6%B0%C6%A1ng_movement


 10 

While revolutionary nationalism, in conjunction with self-determination, often places an 

emphasis on statehood as the desired outcome, it does not always come to fruition, particularly 

in the current political landscape. The aftermath of the Cold War gave rise to a new global 

order, one which was quick to dismiss both the liberation movements of the twentieth century 

as well as the bilateral divide at the front of the international stage with each of its allies in the 

wings. Statehood was, in the post-Cold War era, seen as something which was already granted 

or gained, not something to be granted or gained. Thus, it was a common belief that states 

which were already in existence would continue to exist and territories which were not 

classified as states would continue in that vein.  

This research report takes a deductive approach, using the conceptual framework of 

revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in order to create an analytical approach to 

the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. The first chapter outlines the conceptual aspects of 

revolutionary nationalism and resistance, and offers examples of where these concepts were 

put into practice in order to enrich the discussion. The second chapter delves into the more 

nuanced facets of self-determination with a specific focus on statehood, offering an overview 

on each of the theories of statehood, constitutive and declarative. This chapter also creates a 

scale of self-determination which will be applied to the case studies under scrutiny in 

succeeding chapters. The third chapter analyses the case of Palestine, first providing an 

overview of colonisation by Britain and then occupation by Israel. Within this chapter, an 

analysis of revolutionary nationalism in Palestine is carried out, looking first at popular 

resistance and then at organised resistance. This chapter also applies the scale of self-

determination to the case of Palestine. The fourth chapter examines the case of Western Sahara, 

first offering an overview of colonisation by Spain and then occupation by Morocco. Within 

this chapter, an examination of revolutionary nationalism in Western Sahara is carried out, 

looking first at popular resistance and then at organised resistance. This chapter also applies 

the scale of self-determination to the case of Western Sahara. The fifth and final chapter brings 

together the theoretical and practical facets of this research report and purveys a comparative 

analysis between the two selected case studies, drawing similarities and differences between 

not only revolutionary nationalism in Palestine and Western Sahara, but also historical aspects 

of each of these cases, as well as the struggle of each of these populations for self-

determination.  



 11 

Over the course of this research report, attention is drawn to the fact that an analysis of 

revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in contemporary Palestine and Western 

Sahara without a historical analysis would be moot. It must be noted that without colonisation 

by Britain and Spain, occupation by Israel and Morocco would never have taken place. For 

decades, Palestinian and Sahrawi people have been fighting against and calling for an end to 

Israeli and Moroccan occupation and while strides have been made, the struggle is far from 

over. This is evident in the prevalence of Palestinian and Sahrawi movements in existence 

today and the sheer diversity and force present within these. These movements are far more 

established and structured than they were several decades ago. Movements in Palestine and 

Western Sahara which employ ideologies of revolutionary nationalism and strive for self-

determination are thoroughly fleshed out over the course of this research report. Strengths and 

weaknesses of particular organisations and political parties are highlighted and examined, as is 

the progress made by each of these.  

Ultimately, a comparison is made between the Palestinian and Sahrawi struggles in an attempt 

to discern which of the two is more effective and which tactics have given rise to higher degrees 

of self-determination, despite neither of the territories having achieved statehood. In so doing, 

methods of over-time case study, cross-case study, and most-similar case study comparison are 

utilised. Over-time case study is used when delving into the historical backgrounds of each of 

the cases, particularly when examining the issue of colonisation by Britain and Spain, 

respectively, which plagued the territories in the modern age, as well as the beginning of each 

of the illegitimate occupations of Palestine and Western Sahara. The methods of cross-case 

study and most-similar case study appear in the fifth and final chapter when a comparison 

between Palestine and Western Sahara, with a focus on historical background, justifications for 

foreign imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, and self-determination, is made.  

In the post-Cold War era, revolutionary nationalism in occupied territories is counterproductive 

in the realisation of statehood but does lead to some degree of self-determination. Over the 

duration of this research report, it is proven that although revolutionary nationalism does not 

give way to statehood, it is a valuable tool in articulating self-recognition and receiving both 

formal and informal recognition from the international community. The aforementioned 

statement is proven by using content and historical analysis. These modes of analysis are 

utilised by carefully selecting and fleshing out qualitative data found in secondary sources. 

These methods of analysis have found that the territory of Palestine has made far more progress 



 12 

in its quest for self-determination through methods of revolutionary nationalism than that of 

Western Sahara. The former has been both informally and formally recognised on a much 

larger scale than the latter. Neither of the territories, however, despite their myriad attempts, 

have achieved statehood.  

“Where there is power, there is resistance” (1978: 95), is a statement made by a famous post-

structuralist scholar, Michel Foucault, who was, at one point, a staunch Marxist. This quote is 

used as a starting point for a Marxist theoretical framework which has been applied to this 

research report. Beyond this starting point, nationalism and self-determination, concepts which 

are prevalent in an array of political ideologies, will be analysed and examined from a Marxist 

perspective, drawing left-wing from theorists and academics, from Lenin to Gramsci to Said 

and others. A Marxist approach has been taken due to the fact that issues grappled with in this 

research report are largely Marxist in dimension. These include, but are not limited to, 

revolutionary nationalism and resistance, concepts which Marxist theorists and scholars have 

focused their writings upon for decades, if not centuries. For the purpose of this research report, 

however, the Foucault quote will be reworded in order to be read as ‘where there is colonisation 

or occupation, there is intifada.’ Colonisation and occupation are forms of power, and intifada 

is not only a form of resistance, but in the Middle East and North Africa, has proven itself to 

be a form of revolutionary nationalism.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 13 

Chapter 1: Revolutionary Nationalism  

Introduction 

Revolutionary nationalism is a form of nationalism which differs from nationalism in its most 

traditional form and is essential to this research report. This chapter outlines the parameters of 

nationalism as well as those of revolutionary nationalism, providing a theoretical background 

of the concepts which will be applied to the case studies of Palestine and Western Sahara in 

subsequent chapters. This chapter offers definitions of nationalism and revolutionary 

nationalism as well as examples of each. There will be a close look at the concept of resistance, 

a key tenet of revolutionary nationalism, in this chapter which provides examples of each of 

the13ariouss types of resistance. Revolutionary nationalism practiced in the territories of 

Palestine and Western Sahara will later be examined and classified as either popular resistance 

or organised resistance and a discussion as to whether they have either violent or nonviolent 

components to them will be carried out. 

Nationalism 

Nationalism in its most traditional sense is an ideology which purports that there should be no 

separation between nation and state, that the two concepts should be congruent in their entirety 

(Heywood, 2021: 131). There are myriad forms of nationalism with some forms having their 

roots in the Middle Ages, and others in the eras predating the Middle Ages. The most prevalent 

types of nationalism are ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism, also 

referred to as ethnonationalism, entails defining nationalism on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, 

those who share the same language, religious beliefs, and ancestry are grouped together as a 

result of these features, and those who do not are treated as inferior or other (Heywood, 2021: 

133). Civic nationalism, sometimes called liberal nationalism, is far more inclusive than its 

counterpart, ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism espouses values of tolerance, human rights, 

and justice, and seeks to treat all who form part of a nation as equal (Heywood, 2021: 133). 

Ethnic nationalism is the most volatile form of nationalism, and the form which can lead to 

tears within the political fabric by espousing racism, prejudice, ethnic cleansing, and genocide 

(Heywood, 2021: 137). Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is devoid of ethnocentrism and 

seeks to adhere to values which are now associated with the ideology of liberalism. 



 14 

Although some states were formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism, factors including 

colonialism, capitalism, and an array of others have complicated this formation. Japan is an 

example of a state which was formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism. A majority of those 

residing withing Japan can tie their ancestry to the land and trace it back for centuries, if not 

millennia. The Japanese, although not homogenous in their entirety, tend to have a common 

race, ethnicity, religion, and language (Connor, 1973: 87). They are largely Japanese, 

belonging to either Shintoism or Buddhism, and speak Japanese. There are, of course, 

exceptions to this, but the majority of those who live in Japan, barring immigrants, are similar, 

and utilise these commonalities to strive for self-determination. Japan is thus an example of a 

successful culmination of self-determination of the grounds of ethnic nationalism. The 

Japanese used their similarities to unify the population and bring about movements for self-

determination which ultimately resulted in statehood (Connor, 1973: 89). This, however, took 

place centuries prior to the contemporary epoch.  

A contrasting example to Japan is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also a state formed on the 

basis of ethnic nationalism. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking up of 

Yugoslavia in a region already riddled with ethnic tensions, the Bosnian War erupted. The 

Muslim Bosniacs were at war with the Christian Croats and Christian Serbs, who, despite 

having a common religion, used ethnicity as a dividing factor. Each of the three groups strived 

for self-determination and competed with one another for land and power, resulting in a war of 

massive proportions breaking out in the Balkans (Hartwell, 2019: 93). Ethnic cleansing, 

genocide, carpet bombing, and the systematic rape of women characterised the Bosnian War 

which eventually led to the formation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, separate to Croatia and 

Serbia. While ethnic nationalism was key to the struggle for self-determination and state 

formation, it was also the primary cause of conflict. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

illustrates how the self-determination of one group may infringe on the self-determination of 

another, resulting in friction, which, if extensive, can cause large-scale discord.  

Although myriad states were formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism, they have adapted and 

evolved into states which purport civic nationalism. The case of South Africa, barring violent 

outbreaks of Afrophobia and xenophobia, is a relatively successful example of civic 

nationalism. South Africa is a ‘rainbow nation’ where members of various races, ethnicities, 

religions, and languages live in harmony. The Constitution of South Africa states that the 

country belongs to all those who live in it (Sunstein, 1999: 123). Thus, despite coming from 



 15 

incredibly different walks of life, citizens of South Africa unite under a common notion of 

patriotism and civic nationalism. South Africans are a largely heterogenous demographic with 

black, white, coloured, and Asian people, among others, making up the population, alongside 

an array of ethnicities. Although Christianity is the predominant religion in the country, other 

religions are afforded the same rights and privileges. There is no common language in South 

Africa, but rather eleven official languages. Even though South Africa is in possession of 

abundant nationalities making it a rich tapestry instead of a homogenous one, all of these come 

together to strive for self-determination. Thus, South Africa prioritises civic nationalism over 

ethnic nationalism and attempts to adopt liberal values in order to maintain a sense of harmony 

between the various groupings that reside within the country.  

France was, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia, an ethnonational state, yet in the 

aftermath of the French Revolution which espoused the liberal values of ‘Liberty, Equality, 

and Fraternity,’ which became the slogan of the revolution, became one focused on civic 

nationalism. Today, however, although France claims to be a beacon of civic nationalism, this 

is not entirely the case. Within France, a majority of the citizens are white, French, Christian, 

and French-speaking. Thus, France exists as a largely homogenous state, albeit one with a fairly 

liberal constitution. Immigrants, particularly those from countries which were once French 

colonies, have, over the years, flocked to France. These immigrants, although French-speaking, 

are black, Muslim, and Algerian, Malian, Moroccan, and Senegalese, meaning that they differ 

vastly from the majority of citizens in France. As a result of their differences, immigrants to 

France are treated as inferior, despite the French Constitution stating otherwise (Asad, 2013: 

228). They are often excluded from the French struggle for self-determination and seen as 

undeserving of the privileges afforded to their French counterparts.  

Nationalism is always characterised by five key features. The first of these is allegiance. 

Allegiance is, in essentiality, a pledge of fidelity by citizens to the state. This entails the citizens 

affirming their loyalty to the state and its sovereign, as well as their promise to maintain the 

existing order of things (Beran, 1993: 480). The second feature is the aim of independence. 

Without independence, a nation cannot be classified as a state. A territory that is independent 

has complete control over its inner workings and is able to exercise self-governance and 

sovereignty without hindrances being imposed by external entities (Beran, 1993: 480). Thirdly, 

patriotism is an important an aspect of nationalism. Nationalism is bound to a state or defined 

territory and citizens display admiration and love toward the concept of this state or territory 



 16 

and being bound to it – this is known as patriotism (Beran, 1993: 485). Self-determination is 

the fourth feature of nationalism. To be discussed extensively in the succeeding chapter, self-

determination is the right for a specific group of people to select their sovereignty and political 

status as per their own beliefs without any external interference. Self-determination is an 

incredibly important aspect of nationalism as it directly affects the citizens and the sovereign, 

and the way that the international community perceives a specific ethnic or civic nation (Beran, 

1993: 484). Finally, solidarity is imperative to nationalism. Solidarity can be defined as an 

awareness of shared interests and objectives which creates a bond of unity between individuals, 

resulting in the actualisation of ideologies such as nationalism (Beran, 1993: 486). 

The most traditional forms of nationalism were associated with whiteness and Eurocentrism 

and date back thousands of years. Revolutionary nationalism, however, began to emerge in the 

late nineteenth and early twentieth century as anti-colonial and decolonial movements spread 

across the globe. Nationalism predates colonialism and can be traced back over the course of 

centuries. It was nationalism which motivated the 30 Year War in Europe (1618-1648) which 

came to an end following the Treaty of Westphalia. That is not to say that there was only a 

singular type of nationalism which had no contrasting forms of nationalism in the colonial and 

imperial epoch, but rather to say that the dimensions of nationalism grew immensely in 

response to colonialism and imperialism (Cabral, 1979: 13).  

The premise of nationalism as a doctrine is to promote and uplift the interests of a nation, often 

represented by a certain group of people (Heywood, 2021: 131). Nationalist movements often, 

but not always, strive for sovereignty over what they believe to be their homeland, thus what 

must become their nation-state. Nationalism purports self-determination as one of its primary 

facets as nations seek to govern themselves without external interference (Heywood, 2021: 

132). The development of a national identity is one of the aims of nationalism, and this is what 

allows for a community to draw upon their shared characteristics, whether they be culture, 

ethnicity, language, religion, tradition, or any other social element. Although nationalism is 

believed to have been historically and socially constructed, its ramifications have been 

manifold and it has undoubtedly painted thick strokes over the canvas that is the international 

realm as it is seen today.  

Variants of nationalism have been claimed by different groupings across the political spectrum. 

From left to right, elements of nationalism make an appearance in numerous political 

ideologies (Heywood, 2021: 135). While it has been shunned by certain factions, it has been 



 17 

embraced by most and thus integrated into their creeds. While certain circles within Marxist 

thought have wholeheartedly combined nationalist beliefs with their own political 

philosophies, others have not. Within Marxist thought, nationalism is sometimes seen as a tool 

of the bourgeoisie which is used to sow division within the ranks of the proletariat and thus, 

ensure that class consciousness is never developed and that a working-class revolution never 

takes place (Munck, 1986: 6). Hence, nationalism is classified as something which effectively 

hinders the political aspirations of specific Marxists.  

Although nationalist ideals may clash with Marxist ideals, this is not always the case (Lenin, 

2002: 123). On the one hand, the state, and by extension, ideas of nationalism, are seen as an 

apparatus of the bourgeoise, one which the ruling class utilises to oppress the proletariat. On 

the other hand, however, nationalism can be seen as a tenet of Marxism. One type of 

nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, illustrates this perfectly. Revolutionary nationalism is 

a political philosophy whose followers seek to revolt against the existing order and usher in a 

new order where they have the rights they require, and above all else, the right to self-

determination (Lenin, 1977). Revolutionary nationalism is, by any other name, resistance. 

Tactics of resistance are inherent to revolutionary nationalism, hence their close association. 

Moreover, Marxism and resistance are inextricably bound. Marxism often grapples with 

structures of power and their tenets and seeks to develop strategies to resist them, much like 

revolutionary nationalism does. Thus, Marxism is often affiliated with both resistance and 

revolutionary nationalism.  

According to Lenin, a staunch Marxist, “the tendency of every national movement is towards 

the formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best 

satisfied” (1977: 8). While Lenin concurs to some extent with many other theorists, Rosa 

Luxemburg notwithstanding, on the issue of nationalism, he is of the belief if one were to look 

at the concept of nationalism without being bogged down by the abstract nature of this notion, 

one would find that it is not quite as bound to capitalism as we have been led to believe (Lenin, 

1977: 396). The nation-state has been created to thrive under the contemporary conditions of 

capitalism, but should capitalism cease to exist, the nation-state will not necessarily cease 

alongside it. Thus, although it appears that the nation-state and capitalism are mutualistic, this 

is untrue. The nation-state can exist without capitalism, not in the form as it is seen today, but 

in a slightly altered form; one in which it would still be recognisable as the nation-state (Lenin, 

1977: 396). Self-determination, which is construed to be an integral part of nationalism, is also 



 18 

only bound to capitalism to a certain extent. That is to say, self-determination is not capitalistic 

and would be capable of surviving in a world without capitalism.  

At the time Lenin penned this particular pamphlet, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, 

intellectuals across Europe were grappling with ideas of asymmetry between states around the 

world, and even states within Europe. Countries across the globe were undoubtedly unequal 

and this resulted in less powerful states developing a dependence on more powerful states. This 

system of dependency was far more capitalistic than nationalism and self-determination could 

ever be (Lenin, 1977: 397). Thus, Lenin was a proponent of nationalism and self-determination 

while simultaneously being a critic of capitalism. Lenin posited that nationalism and self-

determination, if practiced while knowing that they were not necessarily tied to capitalism, 

could liberate weak states from being dependent on world powers (1977: 399). By liberating 

themselves from powerful states and turning inward, smaller states could eventually liberate 

themselves from capitalism. The journey to a post-capitalist state would be impossible without 

nationalism and self-determination. 

Revolutionary Nationalism 

Nationalist ideals often seek to maintain and replicate the existing hierarchy within 

communities and societies (Heywood, 2021: 131). Revolutionary nationalist ideals, however, 

seek to overturn the existing hierarchy and are employed by the marginalised and downtrodden, 

or even by minority groups who are of the belief that the hierarchy overlooks or oppresses them 

(Cabral, 1979: 18). Examples of revolutionary nationalism can be found across the globe and 

can be traced back over centuries. Revolutionary nationalism was popularised by resistance 

movements in the face of oppressive and tyrannical regimes, including those of colonisation 

and occupation. Revolutionary nationalism, like resistance, is not a political doctrine but 

commonalities can be found in different instances of revolutionary nationalism as they are 

carried out by different nationalities around the world (Davidson, 1986: 32).  

There is no singular type of revolutionary nationalism as each type occurs in response to a 

specific regime (Davidson, 1986: 17). Instances of revolutionary nationalism have been 

documented on multiple continents and have spanned several historical epochs. It was 

extensively examined by Amilcar Cabral, a scholar and intellectual who looked at liberation 

movements in Africa during the twentieth century. Cabral concluded that many of these 

liberation movements had within them key aspects of revolutionary nationalism. In the mid 



 19 

and late twentieth century, waves of decolonisation washed over the African continent and the 

indigenous population began to seize power from their colonial overlords and shed systems of 

decentralised despotism (Mamdani, 2018: 56).  

In Africa, decolonisation became the weapon of choice taken up by the masses. Kwame 

Nkrumah who Cabral cites as a source of inspiration and “the strategist of genius in the struggle 

against classic colonialism” (Cabral, 1979: 115), paved the way for a canon of literature on 

resistance and revolutionary nationalism in Africa, along with an array of other scholars and 

intellectuals. Cabral and others fleshed out the ideologies of Nkrumah and those who came 

before him. Cabral, in particular, synthesised the ideal of revolutionary nationalism. To Cabral, 

the nationalism he believed in and fought for was always one of a revolutionary nature 

(Davidson, 1984). He projected this affirmation onto all anti-colonial, nationalist struggles in 

Africa. While a fight for self-governance and sovereignty were revolutionary in their own right, 

according to Cabral, liberation in Africa would have to move beyond the nation-state, a 

Western concept, to be truly revolutionary (Davidson, 1984: 23). Cabral was a devoted 

follower of the doctrine of Pan-Africanism and sought to bring this creed to fruition using 

different strategies of decolonisation which he described in his writings.  

The liberation movements in Africa were headed and carried out by the indigenous population 

who sought to regain control over their land which had been colonised and occupied by 

European powers in the aftermath of the Scramble for Africa (Davidson, 1986: 37). At the 

Berlin Congress in 1884, Europe set its sights on the African continent and between 

themselves, carved it up, all while paying no heed to the communities and societies which 

resided on the continent. After agreeing on how to divide the continent, states in Europe began 

to violently colonise and occupy the territories they had chosen for themselves (Wirz and 

Eckert, 2004: 141).  

Colonisation may be difficult to define given the complex dimensions introduced by the 

contemporary global political system. One might be quick to dismiss the colonial monster and 

its many, many tentacles as a relic of the past, an extinct creature. Colonisation has, however, 

indeterminably altered the lands it was carried out on and is still alive and well today. The other 

half, perhaps the crueller half, of the coin of colonisation, settler colonialism, too ran – and still 

runs – rampant (Wolfe, 1999: 15). This research report posits that settler colonialism is crueller 

than colonisation because while the latter exploits the land, the former exploits both the land 

and its inhabitants. That, however, is not to say that colonisation does not affect the people. 



 20 

Settler colonialism entails the displacement of the indigenous people in favour of an incoming 

population who has no ties to the land they will settle on. “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s 

specific, irreducible element” (Wolfe, 1999: 48). Hence, above all else, settler colonialism 

focuses on usurping territory from the indigenous population.  

The notion of occupation is undoubtedly tied to that of imperialism, and imperialism is the 

highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1999: 1). Imperialism is inherently anti-Marxist, as is 

occupation. Belligerent occupation is, in effectuality, a transitory stage. This, however, is not 

always the case (Benvenisti, 2008: 634). Occupation can be a salient feature of the political 

fabric of a state but is, ideally, supposed to give way to annexation or collapse in its entirety. 

Occupation occurs either without a formal claim of sovereignty or with a contested claim of 

sovereignty. This claim can be contested by either the indigenous occupied population or other 

states and international bodies (Roberts, 1984). The notion of legality often plays a role with 

regards to occupations, yet due to the absence of a world government, occupations can rarely 

be governed or controlled by external powers unless the occupier explicitly allows for this, 

which, once again, is hardly ever the case (Benvenisti, 2012: 18). Essentially, there are 

countless reasons as to why territories are occupied, all of which are convoluted and complex, 

and hardly ever clear cut (Benvenisti, 2008: 647). 

Resistance and revolutionary nationalism, arise in response to colonisation and occupation. 

These are, however, not the only reasons that resistance and revolutionary nationalism burgeon 

but are the reasons that this research report focuses on. Colonisation and occupation can be 

described as the abuse of power by one group at the expense of another, and as Foucault said, 

“where there is power, there is resistance” (1978: 95). This famous quote can be reworded and 

read as ‘where there is colonisation and occupation, there is revolutionary nationalism.’ 

Types of Resistance 

There are different types of resistance which arise in response to different forms of power. 

Resistance is, effectively, organised by members of civil society in order to disrupt the 

workings of the government which the members of the resistance believe is illegitimate. This 

could be in response to an oppressive government or an occupying power. Resistance is not a 

compact concept, there are many types of resistance. Even though the aims of many resistance 

movements are to overthrow the existing political hierarchy, there are a number of ways in 

which this can be done (Ebert, 1991: 291).  



 21 

Popular resistance is typically comprised of civilians who seek to interrupt the political order. 

Rarely are these individuals ever a part of political organisations. They are simply members of 

civil society who are disgruntled with the power structure and seek to articulate their 

frustrations with the government (Tripp, 2021: 9). Popular resistance occurs in the forms of 

pickets and protests to government buildings and departments, civil disobedience, and the use 

of social media. It may also occur in the form of destroying government property, attacking or 

assassinating government officials, or violent riots. Popular resistance involves ordinary 

citizens of a country striving to liberate themselves from an oppressive system. This liberation 

movement often aligns with the processes laid out by international law (Tripp, 2021: 13).  

A remarkable example of popular resistance is that of Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi. In 

2010, frustrations were burgeoning across the Middle East and North Africa in response to 

autocratic regimes and economic strife (Rosiny, 2012: 3). A street vendor in the region of Sidi 

Bouzid in Tunisia, Bouazizi was among the millions of civilians who were bearing the brunt 

of dictatorships and a plummeting economy. He had repeatedly had his wares confiscated by 

Tunisian police who had accused him of trading illegally (Dutta, 2013: 139). As a vendor, 

trading on the street was his only source of income and being abused by the police on multiple 

occasions resulted in Bouazizi becoming incredibly stressed and frustrated. In order to display 

his exasperation with the situation, Bouazizi doused himself in gasoline while standing in front 

of the governor’s office and set himself alight. This act of self-immolation was one of the most 

notable acts of resistance carried out over the course of history (Rosiny, 2012: 6). Bouazizi was 

hospitalised but the burns on his body were incredibly severe, and he did not survive; he passed 

away at the Ben Arous Burn and Trauma Centre. The self-immolation of Bouazizi was 

photographed and shared on social media. He trended not only in the Middle East and North 

Africa, but around the world. Later, it would be said that by setting himself on fire in a display 

of resistance, Bouazizi was the accelerant which would set alight the region, bringing about the 

Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Arab Spring (Dutta, 2013: 148).   

Organised resistance, like popular resistance, involves members of civil society (Shaw, 2009). 

The one key difference lies in the name. While the popular is resistance is fairly decentralised, 

its counterpart is far more organised (Lilja et al., 2017: 40). In order to topple the overarching 

power system, members of civil society mobilise and form organisations which provides the 

resistance movement with a significant amount of structure. The formation of organisations, 

however, is accompanied by its own set of complexities and difficulties. While resistance 



 22 

organisations often have the same final goal in common – overthrowing the current 

governmental structure – the means to the identical end differs substantially. This difference is 

often because of ideological rifts (Shaw, 2009: 102). As a result of this disjointedness, many 

liberation organisations are formed in the face of a single oppressor (Lilja et al., 2017: 43). 

Organised resistance has been found around the world in myriad forms, and while it can occur 

in manners similar to popular resistance, it is more centralised.  

In South Africa, under the apartheid regime, organised resistance became a key aspect of the 

liberation movement. The African National Congress (ANC) emerged as an organisation which 

called for the collapse of the National Party (NP) which sought to uphold the racist laws it had 

put into place (McKinley, 2018: 29). The ANC was not the only organisation which was created 

to challenge the dominance of the NP. Other organisations such as the South African 

Communist Party (SACP), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), and others also joined the anti-

apartheid movement (Lissoni, 2009: 288).  The reason so many parties participated in the 

struggle was because each party differed along ideological lines and in so doing, created their 

own organisations. To an extent, each organisation had their own successes in resisting the 

racist apartheid government. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, is a 

superb example of organised resistance. Existing as an underground movement for some time, 

MK adopted methods of guerrilla warfare as it strived to resist apartheid in the mid and late 

twentieth century (Lissoni, 2009: 293). MK coordinated attacks against the apartheid 

government in a manner in which popular resistance would never have been able to. It has been 

argued by some that the daring nature of MK cadres contributed substantially to the collapse 

of the apartheid regime in South Africa (McKinley, 2018: 33).  

Both popular and organised resistance can be nonviolent in form. Nonviolent resistance 

emphasises achieving political goals and advocates for peaceful protests and non-cooperation 

without violence or even the threat of it (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013: 272). Despite 

being conflated with civil disobedience, nonviolent resistance differs from the aforementioned 

concept as a result of the connotations attributed to each of the notions. On one hand, civil 

disobedience is an act which effectively violates one or multiple laws of a country or polity 

and is carried out intentionally, and one which the actor knows will result in repercussions from 

the state and its sovereign (Lang, 1970: 156). Civil disobedience is not necessarily nonviolent; 

thus, it cannot be conflated with nonviolent resistance. Acts of nonviolent resistance do not 

always violate the laws of a country or polity, are not always carried out across a country, and 



 23 

the actors are not always aware of the repercussions that they will have to face from the state 

and its sovereign (Lang, 1970: 156). Nonviolent resistance is also referred to as passive 

resistance or pacifism (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013: 271).  

The Eastern Bloc is rich with examples of nonviolent resistance. During World War II, Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania were swallowed by the Soviet Union and integrated into the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Neither of the three states were particularly satisfied with 

this integration but were too weak to fight against the USSR (Brokaw and Brokaw, 2001: 19). 

In 1988, during the Cold War, mass gatherings took place across Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 

where members of civil society would loudly sing protest songs, calling for the end of the 

Soviet regime in their countries and their liberation from the USSR. While this event alone did 

not lead to their exit from the USSR, it can be seen as a contributing factor (Brokaw and 

Brokaw, 2001: 23). Samizdat, literally translated to mean ‘self-publishing,’ was widely 

practiced across Eastern Europe in order to evade censorship. The Soviet police controlled the 

literature, which was circulated around its Republics, and in order to avoid them, in an act of 

nonviolent resistance, members of civil society from journalists to novelists to poets would 

practice samizdat (Yakushev, 1975: 186). Writers would publish their own works in secret and 

circulate pieces of their work, not only around their own countries, but around the entirety of 

the USSR.  

Violent resistance often occurs in response to violent regimes. Colonisation, which goes hand-

in-hand with imperialism and occupation, is an extremely violent process, hence 

“decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon” (Fanon, 1961: 56). While nonviolence has 

its place in the resistance, the logic of organisations is to employ violent resistance in order to 

achieve faster, more substantial results. This does not always happen. Often, in response to 

violence, the oppressor strikes back at the resistance even harder than before (Scholz, 2007: 

38). Although sometimes, violent resistance does achieve the outcomes of the organisation or 

population. Therefore, violent resistance is not a predictable path on which to tread (Scholz, 

2007: 39). The formation of violent resistance is often, but not always, organised. Although 

individuals may carry out violent resistance, perhaps in the form of attacking a high-level 

government official who is a part of an oppressive regime, it is more likely to be organised 

rather than popular. An organisation has within it more power and resources than an individual, 

and thus is able to carry out acts of violent resistance with more ease. Often, those who seek to 



 24 

resist an oppressor in a violent manner form militias which coordinate attacks on the 

government as they seek to uproot or invert the political hierarchy (Scholz, 2007: 44).  

During the Mozambican War of Independence, tactics of violent resistance were utilised. The 

war was an armed conflict between Portugal, which had seized the country in the Scramble for 

Africa, and the Liberation Front of Mozambique, also known as Frente de Libertação de 

Moçambique, or FRELIMO, as the latter sought to achieve independence from their colonial 

overlords (Jentzsch, 2022: 25). When calls for self-determination were not heeded by the 

Portuguese, Mozambicans turned to fighting against their colonisers in a bid for independence. 

Although the Portuguese were better resourced than the Mozambicans, they were not expecting 

guerrilla warfare from FRELIMO during what became known as the Carnation Revolution, 

which saw Mozambican freedom fighters attempt to overthrow the colonial power (Jentzsch, 

2022: 29). The coup, which culminated in independence in 1975, saw measures of extreme 

violence taken by resistance forces as they fought against colonialists. The Mozambican War 

of Independence ended in a ceasefire and finally led to the exit of the Portuguese from the 

country, but not without the loss of hundreds of lives, the injury of thousands, and extensive 

damage to infrastructure which was already poor to begin with (Jentzsch, 2022: 47).  

Conclusion 

Revolutionary nationalism and resistance are bound to the quest for self-determination by 

stateless nations, yet an analysis of these notions would be incomplete without an examination 

of nationalism and its central facets. The theoretical concepts grappled with in this chapter have 

set the scene for ensuing chapters. Nationalism has been around for centuries and has played a 

role in altering the international sphere in its own right, as has revolutionary nationalism. 

Revolutionary nationalism can be tied closely to resistance which has many forms, some of 

which will be fleshed out over the duration of the subsequent chapters of this research report.  

 

 

 

 



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Chapter 2: Self-determination 

Introduction 

Self-determination can be seen as an expression of a national consciousness or a national 

identity, and thus, can be perceived to be an expression of nationalism. For the purpose of this 

research report, self-determination is incredibly important as it will provide a scale upon which 

cases of territories can be measured. This chapter defines self-determination and discusses the 

contestations which have emerged surrounding the concept by providing an overview of the 

issues alongside examples. A debate on self-determination and statehood is also presented. 

Ultimately, this chapter essentially discusses self-determination in a way which develops a 

scale on which the case studies of Palestine and Western Sahara can later be measured.  

Self-determination 

A political ideology which is inextricably bound to nationalism as well as revolutionary 

nationalism, self-determination is a key principle of contemporary international law and is 

classified as a jus cogens rule. This means that it is a peremptory norm from which no 

derogation is allowed (Saul, 2011: 613). The particulars of self-determination are clearly 

outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, and it is seen as an inalienable human right. Self-

determination, under international law, states that all people, regardless of their identity, are 

entitled to equal rights and equal opportunities and are allowed to freely choose their 

government, sovereignty, and status of statehood without any external interference (Moore, 

1997: 906). The self-determination of nations is rather similar to the self-determination of 

individuals. It is essentially the ability to exercise free will without any external encumbrances. 

Over the course of history, self-determination has emerged as an issue which was, and still is, 

difficult to resolve as a result of the overarching issues of colonialism, imperialism, and 

occupation which undoubtedly serve as impediments to the achievement of self-determination 

by certain nations (Saul, 2011: 630).  

Extremely convoluted, self-determination contains within it an array of inconsistencies. 

Although there are certain criteria which self-determination is inseparable from, certain 

definitions extend upon the concept, while others do not. The core principles, however, are 

essential. Self-determination is the process whereby a group of people, in a majority of cases, 

a nation, in possession of a certain degree of political consciousness seek to form a state and 



 26 

select a sovereign government (Saul, 2011: 627). According to the International Court of 

Justice (ICJ), self-determination is bound to statehood only in the aftermath of colonialism and 

imperialism (Coleman, 2010: 66). If a nation was not subjected to the horrors of colonialism 

and imperialism, they would still be granted the right to self-determination, but this right would 

not be bound to statehood. A nation of this nature would be granted the right to live peacefully 

within the boundaries of an already existing state with democratic principles. These nations 

would have their identities protected and would not be discriminated against but would not be 

granted their own sovereign state.  

This concept can be easily illustrated when looking at the case of South Africa. The Afrikaner 

people in South Africa have been granted the right to self-determination, but not to statehood. 

Within the borders of contemporary South Africa, the Afrikaner identity is protected, and 

Afrikaners do not experience extensive discrimination. The Afrikaners, however, do not have 

their own state, despite having actively pursued the Volkstaat. This is due to the fact that the 

Afrikaner people were at no point in time actively subjected to colonial and imperial ventures 

by foreign powers. Thus, despite being granted the right to self-determination, this right is not 

linked to that of statehood (Ramutsindela, 2001: 59).  

Self-determination can be seen as advantageous because it can be utilised to implement social 

justice, it protects the national culture, and is an expression of collective autonomy. The 

aforementioned facets serve as advantages because it has been determined that states are likely 

to thrive when they embrace a single national group (Saul, 2011: 619). A common quest for 

self-determination, above all else, creates trust between citizens on the basis of commonality. 

The development of harmony and trust between citizens allows for them to solve problems 

collectively, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice democracy (Moore, 

1997: 909). While self-determination does not always equate to state sovereignty, it does allow 

for the recognition of international obligations and duties of justice. Self-determination may be 

used to justify secession; however, this is only in cases where the government fails to meet the 

requirements of a certain nation (Moore, 1997: 912). All people have the right to independence 

and self-determination, but not all have the right to statehood. Secession is a drastic measure, 

a last resort, to which not all nations can turn. Should all nations have sought secession on an 

arbitrary basis, the international stage would be smeared with thousands of microstates which 

would be unable to sustain themselves.  



 27 

Kosovo was, perhaps, a drastic example which resulted in a form of secession when Kosovo 

was declared independent of Serbia (Cismas, 2010: 531). This took place in 2008 and occurred 

due to the fact that separatist movements called for an independent state in the face of 

widespread discrimination and oppression faced by ethnic Kosovar. The Serbian government 

was opposed to this, but the newly formed Kosovo was quickly recognised as an official state 

by world powers, including the United States, Western Europe, China, and others, effectively 

rendering Serbia powerless (Cismas, 2010: 531). In their new state, Kosovar finally found 

themselves rid of Serbian persecution. Kosovo is one successful example of secession, and 

although the state is not recognised by all and still has not achieved fully-fledged membership 

at the United Nations, it exists as a space for ethnic Kosovar to practice self-determination. 

While there have been many attempts at secession around the world, a majority of these have 

been incredibly unsuccessful, with only very few working out in favour of the oppressed 

population.  

The history of self-determination is fairly extensive and complex and can formally be traced 

back to the American Revolution and the French Revolution but likely predates these seminal 

events. Succeeding revolutions across Europe and the Treaty of Versailles, which sought to 

address dilemmas which emerged in World War I, as well as the decolonial movements in the 

aftermath of World War II all drew heavily upon the notion of self-determination (Tamir, 1991: 

566). It can be argued that, at one stage, empire and self-determination were diametrically 

opposed. Thus, the imperial conquests which characterised the modern age, and still rear their 

head from time to time, are essentially antagonistic to the concept of self-determination. The 

Russian Empire, Austrian-Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire, Qing Empire, as well as Pax 

Britannica and Pax Americana, conquered lands, colonised peoples, and took over systems of 

governance with little concern for the self-determination of the nations they affected during 

their imperial ventures (Tamir, 1991: 572). In anti-imperial struggles, nations affected by these 

empires drew upon principles of self-determination in their attempts but often failed as they 

were weak compared to the empires which conquered them and could do little to retaliate. 

Colonial ventures carried out in later years by various world powers also had no concern for 

the self-determination of the nations which they brutally colonised and occupied. In the 

Scramble for Africa and the Great Game, African and Central Asian nations were overpowered 

by European states despite employing tactics of self-determination. Therefore, although the 

history of self-determination is rather vast, the history of the quelling and quashing of self-

determination is just as vast, if not even more vast (Tamir, 1991: 589).  



 28 

Self-determination is a highly contested concept. Despite being bestowed upon all by the 

United Nations alongside other international and transnational organisations, this theory is not 

always put into practice. Minorities in certain countries are repressed and therefore unable to 

exercise their right to self-determination. Hence, while all people should have the right to self-

determination, this right may fail to materialise for some, or, should it materialise, it is stolen 

away (Castellino, 2021: 41). The waters around the right to self-determination are often 

muddied, particularly because some groups are of the belief that their self-determination can 

only come at the expense of the self-determination of another group (Corntassel, 2008: 106). 

This brings to the fore an especially difficult dilemma. If the self-determination of one nation 

impedes the self-determination of another, which nation is entitled to carry out their practices 

of self-determination at the expense of the other? Moreover, who is it who determines which 

nation receives priority in its respective quests for self-determination? These are convoluted 

questions to which there is no simple answer but to which there is precedent – in the past, 

history has observed certain nations prioritising their self-determination in favour of that of 

another nation, and whether the international community has chosen sides in this debacle and 

if so, which side it was that they chose (Castellino, 2021: 47).  

An example of the prioritisation of the self-determination of one nation over another is that of 

the United States, a controversial case. It has effectively weaponised American nationalism, 

which is predominantly white, masculine, and middle class as it seeks to quash other forms of 

nationalism and the calls for self-determination from the Native American and African 

American nationalists, calls which have repeatedly fallen on deaf ears (Karuka, 2017: 83). 

Native Americans can trace their legacy back to the land prior to the arrival of Christopher 

Columbus and the Mayflower and seek to secede from the United States. Ever since the arrival 

of European colonisers to the United States, the indigenous population experienced extreme 

hardship and strife (Washburn, 2005: 779). The federal government eventually agreeing to 

recognise tribal sovereignty to a certain extent is insufficient as the Constitution of the United 

States still does not recognise Native Americans as independent, nor the reservations 

designated for Native Americans as truly belonging to them. As a result of being oppressed 

and treated unfairly for centuries, Native Americans now seek to establish an independent 

homeland, Aztlán, named after the land of the Aztecs. Aztlán would encompass part of Mexico 

and a portion of the South-Western United States, and its creation would allow Native 

Americans to freely practice self-determination (Washburn, 2005: 779).  



 29 

Ethnic African Americans, too, seek secession from the United States. Ancestors of the African 

American population were forcibly removed from their homelands on the African continent 

and had to undergo a perilous journey to the United States which caused the deaths of hundreds, 

if not thousands, of passengers on ships (Onaci, 2012: 14). Once they arrived in the United 

States, they were forced to work as slaves on plantations or in houses where they were abused 

and overworked, so much so that thousands more died. Those who survived the epoch of 

slavery, along with their descendants as well as the descendants of those who did not survive, 

were then forced to endure the Jim Crow era which saw the codification of extremely racist 

laws in the United States. As a result of the oppression faced in the past, African American 

nationalists are calling for the creation of what they call New Afrika (Onaci, 2012: 17). New 

Afrika would be populated by African Americans and be under African American control, 

allowing them to practice self-determination free of the people who once played an active role 

in their abuse and oppression. The United States has failed to heed the many calls from Native 

Americans in particular, as well as African Americans as they fight for their self-determination 

in the face of white, masculine, middle class American nationalism. Therefore, the self-

determination of the one, white Americans, has been prioritised over that of the others, Native 

Americans and African Americans (Karuka, 2017: 95).  

When contrasted against other issues, it appears that self-determination is irreconcilable with 

an array of ideologies. In the twentieth century in particular, self-determination was the cause 

of a number of conflicts, especially as decolonisation swept across the globe and minority 

groups within states began to seek secession (Toft, 2012: 582). These movements resulted in 

sporadic bursts of violence around the world and while some were successful, some are yet to 

be resolved. Territoriality has presented a massive predicament to the realisation and 

actualisation of self-determination. Oftentimes, a nation ties itself to a delineated territory over 

which it has sovereignty allowing it to determine their political status. Nationalism often has 

territory as one of its inherent characteristics and the absence of a territory causes a stumbling 

block to appear in the path of the quest of a nation for self-determination (Todt, 2012: 588). 

Self-determination, as per the definition within the constraints of international law, is 

inextricably bound to territory and cannot be practiced in its entirety without it. Thus, arises 

the question: can a nation exercise self-determination in the absence of a defined territory? 

Historical precedents have illustrated that this is, in fact, possible despite being somewhat more 

difficult as national self-determination does not always entail state sovereignty (Toft, 2012: 

597).  



 30 

A nation which practices self-determination in the absence of a nation state is that of the 

Kurdish people. Kurdistan is not an official state, but a territory in which a majority of the 

Kurds reside, spread across Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (Kaya, 2015: 16). Kurdistan is not 

recognised as a state by the international community, nor any of the countries across which it 

spans, yet the Kurdish people still exercise national self-determination in parts of the territory 

which they occupy (Çakmak, 2015: 23). There exists a Kurdish government called the Patriotic 

Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, which has on multiple occasions called for the sovereignty 

of the Kurdish people but is yet to succeed in its aims. Nonetheless, the PUK strives for the 

actualisation of self-determination for the Kurdish population and has succeeded in gaining 

seats in the Iraqi Parliament and gaining partial recognition for Iraqi Kurdistan in the North of 

the country (Kaya, 2015: 16). Although Iraqi Kurdistan is technically a province of Iraq and 

not its own sovereign state, recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan by the government of Iraq was a 

massive achievement for the Kurdish people who seek to do the same in the states of Iran, 

Syria, and Turkey. Kurdistan is a noteworthy example which illustrates that national self-

determination is not necessarily tied to a formally recognised territory and can be practiced in 

its absence (Çakmak, 2015: 128). The Kurdish people have, for decades, called for Kurdish 

sovereignty over the region and despite not having been granted sovereignty, have still, to some 

extent, practiced self-determination in the enclaves within which they reside across the Middle 

East. Although acts of self-determination have been branded as illegal by the governments of 

Iran and Turkey, and Kurdish people have experienced persecution around the region, Kurdish 

nationalism has persisted and small albeit significant gains have been made in the actualisation 

of Kurdish self-determination (Çakmak, 2015: 131).  

Statehood 

Self-determination is not a homogenous concept, but one which exists in varying degrees, the 

highest of which is invariably statehood (Haklai, 2015: 463). Different degrees of self-

determination can, in the contemporary era, be achieved by different nations who seek these 

out on the basis of ethnicity, faith, or an array of other commonalities. Movements for self-

determination among certain nations can culminate in statehood. Statehood, however, is not an 

arbitrary classification, but a rather complex one under the constraints of international law 

(Crawford and Crawford, 2006: 9). In order for a territory to be classified as a state, it has to 

fulfil certain criteria. Failure to fulfil these criteria results in failure to achieve statehood and 

gives way to the creation of a stateless population. As per the requirements of the Montevideo 



 31 

Convention of 1933, which are affirmed by the declarative theory of statehood. In order to be 

a state, a territory must be in possession of a permanent population, a defined territory, a 

functional government, and the ability to conduct international relations (Dugard, 2021: 94). 

All four of these criteria must be met in order to attain statehood. In contrast, the constitutive 

theory of statehood posits international recognition as the primary requirement for achieving 

statehood.  

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States codified the declarative theory 

of statehood and integrated it into customary international law (Dugard, 2021: 95). The 

declarative theory of statehood differs significantly from the constitutive theory of statehood, 

the latter of which claims that a territory can only be classified as a state if it is formally 

recognised by another state or multiple other states. The constitutive theory of statehood was 

developed in the nineteenth century (Erman, 2013: 144), while the declarative theory came 

decades later. Today, the international community fails to adhere strictly to either theory when 

analysing issues of statehood but takes a more politically nuanced approach. On occasion, 

states which meet the criteria of either theory still find themselves classified as stateless due to 

the politics at play in the contemporary era.  

The first criterion outlined by the declarative theory of statehood is that of a permanent 

population (Grant, 1998: 404). This is a complicated requirement to meet because the 

Montevideo Convention does not explain how small or large the population has to be, only that 

it has to be permanent (Grant, 2998: 404). States such as China and India meet this criterion as 

each of these countries has a permanent population of well over one billion. The states of Nauru 

and Tuvalu also meet this criterion despite each having populations of only approximately 

10 000 each. A majority of stateless nations are able to meet this criterion due to the fact that 

it is not especially specific (Grant, 1998: 405). Most stateless nations have a permanent 

population with some having a diaspora alongside this. The Circassians are the exception. As 

a result of the Circassian genocide carried out by the Russian Empire, surviving Circassians 

fled to the Middle East and Central Asia where they reside today as a diaspora only. Hence, 

Circassians fail to meet the first criterion for statehood (Catic, 2015: 1691).  

The second criterion as per the declarative theory of statehood is that of a defined territory 

(Grant, 1998: 409). Land is the cornerstone of a state, and thus in order to be classified as a 

state, a territory must be clearly defined as belonging to a particular nation. A territory must 

have clear borders and must not be disputed (Grant, 1998: 409). It must belong solely to the 



 32 

nation which claims it and have no claims laid to it by any other nations. Defined territories are 

what represent states on maps and in diagrams. The region of Jammu and Kashmir, while a 

defined territory, is not classified as belonging to the residents of the region, but part of it 

belongs to India and another part of it to Pakistan (Tavares, 2008: 282). Thus, it does not meet 

the second criteria for statehood as a result of its defined territory being disputed between states, 

among other reasons.  

The third criterion outlined by the declarative theory of statehood is that of a functional 

government (Grant, 1998: 413). A government is the highest form of authority within a state 

and is in possession of physical control over not only the citizens, but also over the 

administering of territory. If a state is unable to control its own territory, it does not have a 

functional government, but rather a government which is dysfunctional; one which is unable 

to administer the lands under its sovereignty (Grant, 1998: 414). The government of the Uyghur 

people, for example, has not been entirely functional and has only managed to gain a limited 

amount of control over the Xinjiang region in China as a result of its own failures and its 

inability to secede from China (Bhattacharya, 2003: 375). Due to the fact that they do not have 

a centralised and functional government, the Uyghur people do not meet the third criterion of 

statehood.  

The fourth and final criterion as per the declarative theory of statehood is the ability to conduct 

international relations (Grant, 1998: 419). In order to conduct international relations, a nation 

must engage with the international community and must be able to exchange diplomats and 

ambassadors with other states. In order to do so, not only would a nation have to be, at least to 

a certain degree, recognised by other states, it would also be required that no external entity 

claims the capacity to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the territory (Grant, 1998: 419). The 

Cham people, despite being indigenous to Vietnam, are only recognised as a minority group 

and have no official representation in the Vietnamese government, nor any governmental 

departments. It is the Vietnamese government which makes the foreign policy decisions on 

behalf of the Cham people. Although the Cham people have a fairly amiable relationship with 

the Vietnamese government, they lack the ability to conduct international relations (Dawson, 

2016: 4) and thus, fail to meet the fourth criterion for statehood.  

If a population meets all four of the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, it is 

formally classified as a state in the contemporary era (Grant, 1998: 425). This classification, 

however, has proven to exist far more in theory than in practice. Thus, a chasm between the 



 33 

constitutive theory and the declarative theory is exposed. There is no theory which is more 

correct than the other, nor is there a theory favoured in the international sphere. Rather, a 

combination of both theories is used when recognising statehood. This, however, is both 

arbitrary and subjective, and while some states and bodies may favour the former, others would 

favour the latter. Thus, a series of asymmetries, a majority of which are effectively 

irreconcilable emerges. These allow for some light to be shed on the complex practice of 

recognition. A state is awarded an array of rights and privileges which are not afforded to 

territories which are classified as stateless. At present, there are 193 states which are formally 

recognised as members of the United Nations, with several populations being deemed stateless 

as a result of not meeting any number of the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention. Even 

if a state meets one, two, or three of these criteria, it will not be classified as a state, and only 

can be deemed so if it meets all four of the criteria (Grant, 1998: 427) and is recognised by the 

international community. As a result of these stringent confines, many populations fail to meet 

the requirements of statehood and are thus classified as stateless. Sometimes, it may appear 

that a territory meets all four criteria, yet still fails to be classified as a state by the United 

Nations. This is for a number of reasons, predominantly political ones, such as states with veto 

power refusing to allow a territory to formally become a member. This issue illustrates one of 

the problems within the declarative theory. That is not to say that there are no problems within 

the constitutive theory, which has proven itself to be inefficient at certain junctures. It can thus 

be deduced that it is not enough to use just one theory in the recognition of states, but a 

combination of the declarative theory and the constitutive theory.  

Igboland has a permanent population, thereby meeting one of the four criteria of the 

Montevideo Convention. The territory of Igboland is highly disputed by Nigeria and far from 

defined. In fact, an attempt to determine the finite borders of Igboland would likely heighten 

tensions between the Igbo people and the government of Nigeria. Absent from Igboland, too, 

is a functional government and the ability to conduct international relations; two requirements 

of which the territory falls short (Onuoha, 2013: 17). Therefore, Igboland cannot be classified 

as a state, despite meeting one out of the four requirements. Guam has a permanent population 

and a defined territory, thereby meeting two of the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention. 

A functional government and the ability to conduct international relations, however, are not 

present in Guam. The United State governs over the territory and conducts international 

relations on behalf of Guam (Na’puti and Hahn, 2020: 19). Therefore, Guam cannot be 

classified as a state, despite meeting two out of the four requirements. Taiwan is in possession 



 34 

of three criteria for the classification of statehood. It has a permanent population, a defined 

territory off the coast of Mainland China, and a functional government in the form of the 

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan, however, is not entirely capable of conducting 

international relations on its own and falls under the banner of Mainland China at the United 

Nations and other transnational organisations (Bartmann, 2008: 114). Therefore, Taiwan 

cannot be classified as a state, despite meeting three out of the four requirements.  

193 states around the world are de facto states as well as de jure states. This means that they 

exist both in reality and in law (Berg, 2007: 201). Today, there exist states which are only one 

of the two, not both. Somaliland, for example, is a de facto state; it exists in reality, it has a 

designated territory, a population, and a partially functional government. It cannot be denied 

that Somaliland has attempted to position itself as a state in the international system, however, 

it fails to meet the legal requirements of statehood (Arieff, 2008: 60). At present, there are no 

states which are only de jure but not de facto. Over the course of World War II, however, 

certain governments, while in exile, conducted diplomatic relations with the Allied Powers 

despite their countries having been invaded and occupied by the Axis Powers. As a result of 

these relations, they were effectively classified as being de jure states (Blay, 1993: 275).   

Scale of Self-determination 

There are different degrees of self-determination, but there is no scale, no yardstick or 

thermometer or calliper, upon which self-determination can be measured. For the purpose of 

this research report, an attempt has been made to create a scale upon which self-determination 

can be measured. Self-determination is not a finite concept and is, essentially, one which is 

subjective. As a result of these characteristics, self-determination is incredibly difficult to 

quantify.  

This research report puts forward the notion that there are four degrees of self-determination. 

The smallest and perhaps the most insignificant degree of self-determination is that of self-

recognition (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 442). Self-recognition will undoubtedly bring about unity 

for a number of different reasons and serve as a unifying factor among the population. The next 

degree of self-determination is that of informal recognition from external parties and states 

(Margalit and Raz, 1990: 447). While this recognition is not written in stone by any means, it 

assists in paving the way for formal recognition, which is the next degree. Formal recognition 

necessitates the recognition and acknowledgement of certain nations by other states and parties 



 35 

and being cast in a role on the international stage (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 453). The final 

degree of self-determination, and the most significant, is statehood (Haklai, 2015: 467).  

 

All populations striving for self-determination practice self-recognition, for without the latter, 

the achievement of the former would be impossible. A majority of the Rohingya from the 

Rakhine State in Myanmar have been expelled in an act of ethnic cleansing by the Buddhist 

majority against the Muslim minority and are scattered across the subcontinent, with some still 

residing within the borders of their homeland as an oppressed population. Although they 

practice self-recognition, the Rohingya are neither informally nor formally recognised as a 

nation of their own and are thus not awarded the privileges afforded to nation states (Sejan, 

2022: 44). Northern Cyprus is not a formally recognised state but is seen as a province of the 

Republic of Cyprus which is under Turkish occupation. Therefore, Turkey is the only state 

which recognises Northern Cyprus as a sovereign nation (Stephen, 2013: 579). Not even the 

United Nations classifies Northern Cyprus as a state, yet there are states which once formally 

recognised Northern Cyprus as independent, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, who withdrew 

their initial recognition and now recognise Northern Cyprus only informally (Ker-Lindsay: 



 36 

2017: 446). The Vatican City, more commonly referred to by the name of its government, the 

Holy See, is a formally recognised state but a state which has only observer status at the United 

Nations. Thus, despite being recognised formally by a majority of states around the world, it 

has not been fully and formally recognised by the several transnational organisations which 

hold a considerable amount of influence around the world (Duursma, 1994: 80). There are, at 

present, 193 states which have achieved the final and highest degree of self-determination, 

which is statehood. Despite the statehood of certain nations being disputed, for example, the 

statehood of North Korea is not recognised by South Korea and that of South Korea is not 

recognised by North Korea, these territories are still states and their status of statehood cannot 

be easily altered (Altenberger, 2013: 7).  

The expression of a national identity is presented differently by different nations. One 

commonality is that of a united front in a quest for self-determination. This entails a similar, 

but not identical, aim toward building a national consciousness. This can be done in numerous 

ways, but typically involves the finding of common traits between members of a nation. These 

could be a common race, ethnicity, religion, and language with regards to ethnic nationalism, 

and a common homeland and participation in society with regards to civic nationalism 

(Heywood, 2021: 133). In the past, the former appeared to outweigh the latter, but at present, 

it appears that the latter is dominating the former.  

Self-determination is an incredibly complex and convoluted ideal which is presented 

differently in countries across the world. As a result, the scale of self-determination developed 

in the preceding paragraphs is incredibly broad and lacks uniformity. Self-determination is not 

at all a homogenous concept and is thus difficult, if not impossible, to quantify fully. The scale, 

however, as a result of its wide range, can be universally applied and will be utilised in 

succeeding chapters as attempts are made to quantify the degree to which the right to self-

determination is practiced in Palestine and Western Sahara.  

Conclusion 

The measurement of self-determination is an incredibly difficult task due to the fact that it is 

not a concept which can easily be quantified. This chapter, however, has discussed the more 

nuanced aspects of self-determination in relation to nationalism and revolutionary nationalism, 

and the manner in which self-determination is exercised, first as self-recognition, in order to 



 37 

give rise to informal recognition, formal recognition, and eventually, statehood, the highest 

degree of self-determination.  

  



 38 

Chapter 3: Palestine 

Introduction 

Palestine is not a state in the international system but exists as an occupied territory. This 

classification is extended to the Gaza Strip and a portion of the West Bank, and includes the 

territories captured by the Apartheid State of Israel in the Six-Day War which took place in 

1967. Historic Palestine has an incredibly complex history which can be traced all the way 

back to the Bronze and Iron Ages and the Biblical Epoch. Its history was always under scrutiny 

and is still heavily disputed today. Revolutionary Palestinian nationalism and resistance have 

characterised the contemporary landscape of the Levantine region and they are some of the 

most prolific and progressive instances of revolutionary nationalism in the current age. This 

chapter begins by discussing the historical background of the occupation, followed by a close 

analysis of revolutionary nationalism and self-determination in Palestine. The different forms 

of resistance in Palestine will be examined, and their techniques will be analysed.  

Historical Background 

Historic Palestine is documented to be one of the first sites of civilisation in the world with 

artifacts found in the area dating back to the Bronze and Iron Ages. It has also existed as a site 

of conquests. Over the course of its history, the lands presently known as Israel and Palestine 

have seen a takeover by the Ancient Egyptians, the establishment of Judea and Samaria, 

invasion by Babylonians and Persians, the Hellenistic period, the entrance of the Roman 

Empire, the Byzantine era, occupation by Muslim forces, the entrance of the Ottoman Empire, 

the establishment of the British Mandate, and the creation of the State of Israel which allowed 

for occupation by Zionist militias (Khalidi, 2020: 18). For the purpose of this research report, 

it would be impossible to discuss the various events which shaped Historic Palestine, hence, 

for the sake of brevity, only the events of the twentieth century and the twenty-first century 

will be fleshed out.  

British Mandate in Palestine  

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a majority of the lands in the Middle East were under 

the control of the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, systematic revolts against the 

Ottomans, coupled with the losses suffered in the Balkan Wars and the Great War, saw the 



 39 

Ottoman Empire being driven out of the Gulf and the Levant (Khalidi, 2020: 27). Instead of 

independence, however, came the entrance of the British and the French, who carved up the 

Middle East in a manner which can only be described as arbitrary as per the Sykes-Picot 

Agreement. Thus, Arab states were colonised once again with no say in their sovereignty and 

although the faces of the colonisers changed, their methods barely differed at all. While the 

contemporary Middle East undoubtedly has remnants of Ottoman colonialism running through 

it, it was inarguably British and French colonialism which played the most significant role in 

shaping the Middle East as it is known today (Pappé, 2022: 7). British forces invaded Historic 

Palestine in 1920 and British occupation was granted legitimacy by the League of Nations in 

1922 when it formally came to exist as a British Mandate. Those residing in Historic Palestine 

opposed the British invasion just as they had opposed the Ottoman invasion but were rendered 

powerless against one of the most distinguished colonial powers in the world. At the time, the 

land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea was inhabited by ethnically 

Palestinian Arabs who made up a majority of the population, as well as an array of minority 

groups, including Jewish Arabs (Khalidi, 2020: 39). These groups banded together in an 

attempt to resist British colonisation but were ultimately unsuccessful as all uprisings were 

immediately stopped in their tracks.  

Prior to the invasion of Historic Palestine by the British, the Balfour Declaration was signed. 

The 1917 Agreement outlined the potential for a Jewish homeland to be established in Historic 

Palestine (Pappé, 2022: 9). The creation of a solely Jewish state was imperative given the 

struggles Jewish people had faced across Western and Eastern Europe, as a result of their 

ethnicity and religion. Antisemitism in the form of discrimination and pogroms were on the 

rise in Europe and the Balfour Declaration sought to allow for the Jewish population to exist 

in a space away from the rising tides of antisemitism. In the Balfour Declaration, it stated 

clearly that this space would be created in Historic Palestine (Khalidi, 2020: 32). This, 

however, was not always the case, and the idea of a Jewish safe haven was first expressed with 

Kenya in mind. Kenya, a British colony at the time, was offered by the British to the Jewish 

people but later withdrawn. In the late 1800s, many contrasting ideas about the location of the 

Jewish homeland emerged, both from the Jewish people and the British, however, it appeared 

that a majority of individuals favoured the idea of Historic Palestine above all others. The 

Balfour Declaration proved to be especially useful in the aftermath of World War I when 

Jewish people migrated out of Europe en masse after experiencing unparalleled strife and 

hardship. Millions of Jewish people were flung around the world, with a majority settling in 



 40 

Historic Palestine in the 1940s. This development paved the way for the creation of the State 

of Israel in 1948 (Pappé, 2022: 16).  

Zionist Occupation 

Zionism is a political ideology which has been associated with Judaism, so much so that today 

the two appear to be inseparable. This, however, is not the case. The former is an ideology 

which advocates the creation of a Jewish homeland and Jewish self-determination at the 

expense of an entire population, while the latter is an Abrahamic religion (Kahlidi, 2020: 12). 

Thus, the conflation of the two, while widely practiced, is erroneous. Theodor Herzl, the man 

known as the founding father of Zionism, established the movement at the end of the nineteenth 

century in response to the discrimination Jewish people were forced to endure in Europe 

(Pappé, 2022: 23). Herzl, determined to gain the support of influential figures, wrote to Cecil 

John Rhodes, the notorious coloniser of Southern Africa. In his letter, he asked Rhodes for 

support, stating that Zionism “is something colonial” (Halbrook, 1972: 103) and not all that 

different from the conquests carried out by Rhodes himself. This is perhaps the most accurate 

definition of Zionism, in the words of its founder himself – “something colonial” (Halbrook, 

1972: 103). While Herzl was deciding where the Jewish homeland would be established, scores 

of Jewish people began migrating to Historic Palestine, particularly from Eastern Europe, in a 

bid to avoid pogroms which specifically targeted members of the Jewish faith (Khalidi, 2020: 

77). Ethnic Palestinians rejected these initial waves of migration and in the 1930s, as Jewish 

migration to Historic Palestine began to increase rapidly, and carried out the Great Revolt. This 

is one of the first and most formative instances of revolutionary Palestinian nationalism. These 

waves of migration aligned closely with the plan of action proffered by Herzl (Pappé, 2022: 

39). Herzl had, in his ideologies, particularly those outlined at the First Zionist Congress in 

Basel, insisted that members of the Jewish faith be provided with a safe homeland to which all 

believers could migrate and live in peace. In the twentieth century, this insistence came to 

fruition.  

On 15 May 1948, the State of Israel was created. This coincided with the systematic expulsion 

of approximately 750 000 ethnic Palestinians and the razing of close to 500 Palestinian villages 

in what became known as al-Nakba (the catastrophe) (Khalidi, 2020: 42). Zionist militias were 

responsible for the systematic displacement of Palestinian men, women, and children and the 

destruction of their villages. The creation of the State of Israel would have been impossible 

without the exodus of close to one million ethnic Palestinians, one of the most prolific acts of 



 41 

ethnic cleansing in the modern era (Pappé, 2022: 47). Swathes of land in Historic Palestine 

were seized in an attempt to create room for incoming Jewish settlers, millions of which took 

up residence on land which once belonged to Palestinians. With a significant proportion of 

Palestinians displaced around the Middle East and North Africa, those remaining within the 

borders were unable to combat Zionist forces, despite a multitude of attempts at resistance. 

Thus, ethic Palestinians who remained in the State of Israel in the aftermath of al-Nakba were 

treated as second-class citizens and still are seen as inferior today (Khalidi, 2020: 44).  

In 1967, the Six-Day War took place between Israel and a coalition of Arab states which 

included Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. After close to a week of severe fighting, 

Israel emerged victorious, seizing parts of the West Bank and the Golan Heights as trophies 

and expelling thousands of Palestinians and Syrians from these territories (Pappé, 2022: 93). 

This defeat became known as al-Naksa (the setback). Israel, although victorious, seized these 

territories illegitimately and still occupies them today, despite this occupation being in 

contravention of International Law (Khalidi, 2020: 97). The United Nations classifies the lands 

seized by Israel after the War of 1967 as being illegally occupied. The international body, 

however, has stressed time and time again that the borders before the Six-Day War be 

considered as official. Palestinians who reside in the West Bank live under Israeli occupation 

and suffer greatly in comparison to their Jewish counterparts (Pappé, 2022: 71). They face the 

risk of arbitrary imprisonment, and as of late, the risk of irrational eviction, both of which are 

entirely unjustifiable. Moreover, Palestinians are subjected to checkpoints which infringe on 

their right to freedom of movement, and those who live in the West Bank of the boundaries of 

the State of Israel are not allowed into the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is known as the largest 

open-air prison in the world and those who reside within it are subjected to extreme difficulty 

should they desire to leave the Strip (Khalidi, 2020: 129). Thus, disregard for the freedom of 

movement of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and enforcing the inhumane conditions they must 

live under is in transgression of International Law.  

Revolutionary Nationalism 

Palestinian nationalism is revolutionary in its entirety (Franjieh, 1972: 56). It seeks to overturn 

the existing hierarchy of power and implement a new order which is far more democratic, and 

which does not position Palestinian people as second-class citizens, but as a nationality which 

is awarded the same rights as their Israeli counterparts. Revolutionary nationalism is practiced 



 42 

in myriad ways across occupied Palestine, with the two most common manners of practice 

being those of popular and organised resistance.  

Popular Resistance 

The First Intifada and Second Intifada saw the rise of popular resistance in Palestinian civil 

society. Although popular resistance arose in response to the initial entrance of Zionist forces 

and settlers in 1948, it grew gradually over the years and although full of crests and troughs, 

peaked during the Intifadas of the late 1980s and early 2000s. Loosely translated, the word 

‘intifada,’ means ‘to be shaken’ or ‘to shake oneself,’ which is exactly what occurred in 

occupied Palestine during these uprisings (Said, 1989: 24).  

The First Intifada began in the Jabalia Refugee Camp when a vehicle belonging to the Israel 

Defense Forces (IDF) crashed into a car filled with four Palestinian civilians, all of whom were 

killed (Shikaki, 2002: 89). The event occurred on 9 December 1987 and the Israeli state denied 

that the crash was a coordinated one. Nevertheless, responses from Palestinian civil society 

came in the form of civil disobedience as they protested the illegitimate occupation of the Gaza 

Strip and the West Bank, which began 20 years earlier, during the Six-Day War (Shikaki, 2002: 

89). During the revolt, Palestinian civilians from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea 

and beyond actively targeted the IDF and Israeli Police by barricading certain areas in 

Occupied Palestine, throwing stones and even Molotov cocktails at soldiers and police officers, 

and damaging Israeli infrastructure by repeatedly defacing it with pro-Palestine graffiti. 

Although there were several interventions from Palestinian organisations over the course of the 

First Intifada, a majority of the acts of resistance and revolutionary nationalism were carried 

out by Palestinian civilians who had no organisational affiliation whatsoever (Naser-Najjab, 

2020: 66). Palestinian civilians also engaged in several suicide bombings. Other key aspects of 

the First Intifada were the general strikes which occurred across Historic Palestine, not just the 

territories which were illegally seized in 1967 (Naser-Najjab, 2020: 69). Across Palestine and 

Israel, Palestinians boycotted the Israeli Civil Administration, particularly in the Gaza Strip 

and the West Bank. Palestinians also orchestrated an economic boycott which was 

characterised by the refusal of Palestinians to work as labourers in Israeli Settlements and in 

Israeli factories and production plants. Many Palestinians also refused to pay taxes during this 

time and did not drive cars with Israeli license plates (Pressman, 2017: 522-524).  



 43 

In response to the actions coordinated by ethnic Palestinians in the First Intifada, the State of 

Israel deployed approximately 80 000 IDF personnel who descended swiftly and harshly upon 

the occupied territories (Karkar, 2007: 10). These soldiers used disproportionate force to break 

up and shut down displays of revolutionary nationalism by the Palestinian people, including 

firing directly at peaceful protestors, shooting with the intention to maim, and employing a 

lethal amount of force (Karkar, 2007: 10). In the first year of the five-year, nine-month long 

Intifada, Israel killed well over 300 Palestinians while only 12 Israelis died as a result of the 

violence. IDF soldiers adopted brutal tactics which included beating Palestinians, including 

women and adolescents, with clubs, and firing semi-lethal plastic bullets at protestors. 

Although exact numbers are unclear, it is estimated that Israeli soldiers and police officers 

killed approximately 1 600 Palestinians during the First Intifada, and that 180 Israelis – just a 

fraction of the Palestinian victims – died throughout this period (Nasrallah, 2013: 81). After 

running its course, the Intifada officially came to an end on 13 September 1993. The Intifada 

gave way to the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), neither of 

which were the desired outcomes of the Palestinian popular uprising. The PA was supposed to 

take control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as per the Oslo Accords, yet this venture 

effectively failed as a result of Israeli interference and corruption, among other issues (Dana, 

2015: 2). Thus, the Intifada had to be violently suppressed in order to bring the revolt to an end 

(Nasrallah, 2013: 85). Ultimately, the First Intifada was characterised by asymmetrical warfare 

as the Israeli state had significant financial and strategic advantages and Palestinians c