

Sporting Mega-Events and South-to-South Security Exchanges: A Comparative Study of South Africa and Brazil

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Summary

The FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics are the most prestigious major sporting events in the world, and host governments implement security measures to match this stature. While global concerns about terrorism have led to a dramatic upsurge in the extent of security measures, the perceived threat of urban crime is becoming an increasingly prominent cause for apprehension. This has been of particular importance to South Africa's recent 2010 World Cup and for the unprecedented sequential hosting of both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil. In both contexts, security has been used as a statement of intent: the respective states have instrumentalized mega-events as an international platform to signal their ability to secure urban environments. This article will focus on a comparative study of areas in which the respective security preparations for the World Cup in Brazil have overlapped with the measures deployed in South Africa. Using examples of how Brazilian authorities have sought advice from their South Africa counterparts, it will suggest that both countries have adopted comparable risk aversion strategies.

Keywords

South Africa, Brazil, 2010 World Cup, 2014 World Cup, 2016 Olympics, crime, police, militarization

Introduction

This is one area [...] where I sleep like a baby, when it comes to 2010. Let's be clear on it, 2010 is safe in the hands of South Africans. And let's stop this thing of focusing on security. Let's focus on the beautiful game [...] [Those with problems about security measures should] go somewhere else, where people are shooting helicopters, where drug lords are shooting helicopters.¹

In a 2009 press conference held prior to his suspension for misappropriation of public funds, South African Police Service (SAPS) Commissioner Cele stridently claimed that people who were sceptical about the South African government's

¹ General Bheki Cele, Commissioner of the South African Police Service, press conference on 27 November 2009, quoted in 'Security: Cele Sleeps like a Baby over 2010', *The Witness*, 28 November 2009, available online at [http://www.witness.co.za/index.php?showcontent&global\[_id\]=31838](http://www.witness.co.za/index.php?showcontent&global[_id]=31838).

ability to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup (*Fédération Internationale de Football Association*; in English) International Federation of Association Football) could 'go somewhere else'. In particular, Cele contrasted South Africa with future 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic host Brazil, where, as noted in a leaked US diplomatic cable, 'the great question mark [...] has been the security situation [...] brought to the fore on October 17 as a gunfight between drug gangs, resulted in the shooting down of a police helicopter' close to the Maracana Stadium, a future World Cup venue.² However, Cele's choice of comparison was ironic: one year earlier the SAPS had publicly denied media claims that a police helicopter had been shot down after it crashed into power lines during a gun fight with armed robbers.³

These stories reveal the complex security dynamics that surround the organization and staging of mega-events in both South Africa and Brazil. On the one hand, the hosting of World Cups and Olympics can be considered a sign of prestige and political stability, as few states have the financial and organizational capacity to orchestrate events of such magnitude.⁴ On the other hand, both countries have considerable security issues. In the case of South Africa, the country's high rates of capital contact crimes, such as murder and armed robbery, led to often histrionic international media coverage about South Africa's lack of safety in the run-up to the World Cup.⁵ In what later transpired to be a hoax, one British company offered 'stab-proof' vests to tourists,⁶ while several participating teams hired heavily armed private security companies for protection during the event. In Brazil, fears about safety have emerged, from the threat of violence and kidnapping by gangs and drug *traficantes* who control many of the country's large urban shantytowns or *favelas*.⁷ Brazil's reputation for criminal violence has been reinforced through global popular culture, as in the form of major video games such as *Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2* and *Max Payne 3*, which depict cities — and in particular Rio de Janeiro — as free-fire zones. Security is further complicated by the emergence in Rio of *milicias*, armed groups typically comprised of

² Lisa Kubiske, *2016 Rio Olympics: The Future is Now*, diplomatic cable, 24 December 2009, available online at <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-532216>.

³ *SAPS Online*, 4 July 2008, available online at http://www.saps.gov.za/_dynamicModules/internetSite/newsBuild.asp?myURL=843.

⁴ Daniel Bernhard and Aaron K. Martin, 'Rethinking Security at the Olympics', in Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty (eds), *Security Games: Surveillance and Control at Mega-Events* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 37-67.

⁵ Scarlett Cornelissen, 'Mega Event Securitization in a Third World Setting: Global Processes and Ramifications During the 2010 FIFA World Cup', *Urban Studies*, vol. 48, no. 15, 2005, pp. 3221-3240.

⁶ 'Stab-proof Vests a Hoax', *Mail and Guardian Online*, 22 January 2010, available online at <http://mg.co.za/article/2010-01-22-stabproof-vests-a-hoax>.

⁷ Edsio Fernandes, 'Fear and Hope in Brazilian Cities', *City*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2010, pp. 189-192.

off-duty military-police members who have forcibly taken over the territories and trades of gangs, often with the support of local and state governments.⁸

In both South Africa and Brazil, the security preparations adopted seem as applicable to urban warfare as the policing of an entertainment event. For instance, 'the policing of Rio's narcotics trade is an especially urgent task now that the city will host the Olympics in 2016. Security is a task performed by armed civilian and military police and SWAT [special weapons and tactics] teams, carried by armoured vehicles and high mobility AS.350B2 light helicopters'.⁹ For the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) coordinated the joint operations of the SAPS, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), state intelligence, Metropolitan Police, private security employees, health and emergency services, and supporting government departments at the national, provincial and host-city levels.¹⁰ Temporary fortified and fenced security zones and cordons sprung up throughout the skein of host cities, augmented by military controls over civilian airspace and nautical borders. According to military officials, this was the largest ever 'command and control' operation in the history of the South African military, outmatching in size even the Apartheid regime's 'Bush war' in neighbouring Angola and Namibia.¹¹ While details of Brazil's security plan are vague at the time of writing in early 2013, the unprecedented consecutive hosting of the World Cup and Olympics suggests that measures will be even more comprehensive. The Brazilian federal government is in the process of establishing a Special Secretariat of Security for Major Events to coordinate federal, state and municipal plans and the operations of the various federal and state security forces at the 2014 World Cup (the Rio 2016 Olympics will be governed under the separate Olympic Public Authority).¹² However, these operations are not exclusively motivated by attempts to protect tourists from violence. As this article argues, security measures in both South Africa and Brazil were/are undergirded by a diversity of political and economic motivations, especially the goal of signalling

⁸ Christopher Gaffney, 'Securing the Olympic City', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, summer/fall 2012, pp. 75-82, available online at http://www.academia.edu/2090820/Securing_the_Olympic_City.

⁹ Peter Adey, 'Vertical Security in the Megacity: Legibility, Mobility and Aerial Politics', *Culture and Society*, vol. 27, no. 6, 2010, pp. 51-67.

¹⁰ Christopher McMichael, 'The Shock and Awe of Mega-Sports Events', *openDemocracy*, 31 January 2012, available online at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/christopher-mcmichael/shock-and-awe-of-mega-sports-events>.

¹¹ 'World Cup "Biggest Ever" South African Military' Deployment', *Digital Journal*, 14 October 2009, available online at <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/280504>.

¹² 'Strategic Security Plan for the 2014 World Cup is Publicized', *Brazil World Cup Portal*, 24 July 2012, available online at <http://www.copa2014.gov.br/en/noticia/strategic-security-plan-2014-world-cup-publicized>.

the 'global competitiveness' of the host countries as safe environments for business and capital accumulation.¹³

The Security of Mega-Events: The Wider Context

The security operations within South Africa and Brazil intersect with an international recalibration of mega-event security that is motivated both by concerns about urban crime and the perceived susceptibility of such events to spectacular terrorist attack by groups attempting to use tournaments as a platform to win exposure and media coverage. Since 9/11, mega-event measures in both developed and developing countries increasingly amount to a pre-emptive state of siege,¹⁴ from missile arrays outside the Beijing stadiums during the 2008 Olympics to warships in the Thames for the London 2012 Olympics. Moreover, mega-events dissolve many of the distinctions between developed and developing countries,¹⁵ particularly as these hallmark events are being held with growing frequency within middle powers situated in the global South.¹⁶ Indeed, this is indicative of a broader shift within geopolitical power, as 'Southern' countries such as China and India increasingly become centres of economic growth and political power.

However, the much vaunted 'stability' of emergent Southern powers often disguises the human consequences of rapid development and can include evictions, 'low-intensity wars' against the poor, institutionalized police violence and state repression.¹⁷ A salutary reminder is provided by the example of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, which were rated by FIFA during the bidding process for the 2010 World Cup as having 'good' to 'excellent' internal security.¹⁸ By the end 2011, however, all three countries had undergone revolutions, calling into question the quality of the 'internal security', which had been achieved through the systematic usage of torture and the suppression of dissent. Arguably, the focused security procedures at mega-events provide an illusory projection of the public safety situation in host countries. For example, the 2011 Pan American Games in Guadalajara took

¹³ Sebastian Saborio, 'The Pacification of the Favelas: Mega Events, Global Competitiveness and the Neutralization of Marginality', forthcoming in *Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes*, 2013.

¹⁴ Stephan Graham, *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* (London: Verso, 2010).

¹⁵ Marcelo Lopes de Souza, 'The Brave New (Urban) World of Fear and (Real or Presumed) Wars', *City*, vol. 14, no. 4, 2010, pp. 457-463.

¹⁶ Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser, 'Security Governance and Sport Mega-Events: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda', *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2010, pp. 49-61.

¹⁷ Arundhati Roy, 'Capitalism: A Ghost Story', *Outlook India*, 26 March 2012, available online at <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?280234>.

¹⁸ FIFA, '2010 FIFA World Cup Inspection Report', 2004, available online at <http://www.southafrica.info/2010/fifa-report.htm>.

place in the midst of Mexico's violent drug war, with athletes and tourists being provided with state protection that is not accessible to ordinary citizens.¹⁹

This tension between the opulence of mega-events and widespread social dysfunction and violence is characteristic of 'semi-peripheral' countries such as Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, which have some of the highest rates of inequality in the world. In the sense of small underdeveloped economies, however, they are not poor countries. Brazil and South Africa are both major economic players and share geopolitical ambitions as emergent 'regional powers'.²⁰ While Brazil's economy is much larger than South Africa's, a further point of convergence has been established with South Africa's admittance into the BRICS organization of leading developing nations (namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

In both South Africa and Brazil the reality and fear of crime has enforced the militarization of public space, calls for 'zero tolerance' policing and the emergence of a heavily armed private security industry.²¹ South Africa and Brazil also reflect similar historical transitions from authoritarian rule by 'national security' apparatus that was designed for internal repression rather than public safety: respectively the white supremacist Apartheid regime in South Africa and Brazil's military junta. At the same time, fears about crime have encouraged the transfer of 'war on crime' models from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which — as some critical scholars have argued — reinforces historical legacies of repressive policing in both countries.²²

Concurrently, mega-event preparations involve multi-scalar diplomatic interactions²³ that go beyond the marshalling of national and local institutions into a dedicated security apparatus. At the transnational level, policing entails a substantial degree of inter-state cooperation and exchanges and suggests that in some respects security measures are transnationally ordered, with planning extending beyond a host country's borders.²⁴ For instance, in the run-up to 2010, South Africa conducted joint Special Forces training missions with the US military, while preparations such as the increased screening of identity documents were also used to recalibrate South Africa's standing as a partner in counter-terrorism.²⁵ Global policing institutions also play an increasingly prominent role in national

¹⁹ Sean Fitzgerald 'Security Front and Centre at Pan Am Games in Guadalajara', *National Post*, 11 October 2011, available online at <http://sports.nationalpost.com/2011/10/11/security-front-and-centre-at-pan-am-games/>.

²⁰ Souza, 'The Brave New (Urban) World of Fear and (Real or Presumed) Wars', p. 461.

²¹ Souza, 'Social Movements in the Face of Criminal Power', *City*, vol. 13, no.1, pp. 26-52.

²² Tony Roshan Samara, 'State Security in Transition: The War on Crime in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Social Identities*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 277-312; and Loic Wacquant, 'The Militarization of Urban Marginality: Lessons from the Brazilian Metropolis', *International Political Sociology*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2008, pp. 56-74.

²³ Geoff Pigman, *Contemporary Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

²⁴ Graham, *Cities under Siege*.

²⁵ United States Department of State, 'Country Reports on Terrorism 2010: South Africa', 18 August 2011, available online at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e52481446.html>.

mobilizations, with Interpol providing major support functions during 2010, including the deployment of foreign officers to South Africa and the use of its global databases at international airports to prevent listed football hooligans and criminals from travelling to South Africa.²⁶ Mega-events are a major source of income for private security companies. In South Africa's case, domestic firms offered guarding services to the very wealthy and to visiting celebrities,²⁷ while international firms are already lining up to open new markets for surveillance, command and intelligence systems in Brazil.²⁸

In the World Cup, security governance is greatly impacted by the commercial imperatives of FIFA.²⁹ Although the Association remains technically registered as a non-profit organization under Swiss law, the revenue streams and prestige afforded by its ownership of the World Cup brand means that FIFA adopts an increasingly interventionist stance in the preparations of host countries. Under the terms and conditions laid out by FIFA, hosting rights are officially awarded to national football associations, which are required to establish a Local Organizing Committee (LOC) whose primary role is to act as FIFA's agent in negotiating and lobbying for the collaboration of national and local government in ensuring infrastructural, administrative and legal support. The comprehensive government guarantees, which are signed as a condition before bidding for hosting rights, insist that states manage and cross-subsidize all 'necessary arrangements' for FIFA's World Cup.

According to the conditions agreed to in the initial South African Bid Book,³⁰ the national state was responsible for funding and administering security measures at all designated venues, along with providing continuous close protection services for the FIFA 'family'. FIFA was granted legal indemnity from any cases arising as a result of the 2010 World Cup, as well as exemption from taxation and currency controls. The SAPS was ordered to enforce the marketing rights of FIFA and its corporate partners and sponsors, which included such major multinationals as Coca-Cola, Sony and McDonalds. This led to the establishment of special police units under the direction of FIFA officials, which during the World Cup patrolled 'commercial exclusion zones' around host cities for evidence of 'ambush' marketing by unaffiliated brands attempting to capitalize on

²⁶ 'At the Centre of Security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup', INTERPOL, 9 July 2010, available at <http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2010/N20100709b>.

²⁷ Gavrel Schneider and Alex Sinclair, 'Dynamic Alternatives: Making Safety at the World Cup a Reality', *Security Focus*, vol. 28, no. 8, pp. 32-33.

²⁸ Xin Dingding, 'Security Firm Seeks World Cup Glory', *China Daily Asia Pacific*, 21 March 2012, available at <http://www.chinadailyapac.com/article/security-firm-seeks-world-cup-glory>.

²⁹ Volker Eick, 'A Neoliberal Sports Event? FIFA from the *Estadio Nacional* to the Fan Mile', *City*, vol. 14, no. 3, 2010, pp. 278-297.

³⁰ South African Football Association, *South Africa 2010 Bid: Africa's Stage* (Johannesburg: SAFA, 2003).

the event.³¹ In practice, this meant that national security and commercialization became progressively indistinguishable, particularly as the sporting body and host government shared a consensus on reducing security incidents and protecting the image of the World Cup brand.³²

The interactions between this bouquet of state and private actors has been described as a mega-event 'security complex'.³³ For Boyle, this complex creates a security 'knowledge network', in which different actors work to exchange and build upon templates and standard operating procedures for mega-events.³⁴ Rather than circulating in 'flat, apolitical space in accordance with the rational intentions of policy-makers',³⁵ however, this market of ideas and templates is structured by prevailing political and power structures.

In this context, security also serves as a form of public diplomacy and perception management. Finely honed policing operations are deployed within a 'self-conscious'³⁶ display of safety, something that holds true in developed countries and the host nations of Brazil and South Africa. Internally, the expenditures for temporary security measures are legitimized through an appeal to developmental 'legacies',³⁷ such as improved crowd control and emergency management tactics, extended police arsenals and new CCTV systems within urban environments.

However, such legacies are debatable. The political, economic and social consequences have been documented by a global body of interdisciplinary literature. Security operations have been linked to a dramatic upsurge in social repression and surveillance, as laws and emergency measures are used to clamp down on political protest and to evict the urban poor.³⁸ Rather than mere policy responses conditioned by the exceptional security challenges of mega-events, such operations may also be motivated by the political desire to ensure an image of national order. Indeed, security itself becomes an affirmation of state prestige and modernity, as relatively few states possess the wealth, technological base and organizational resources to deliver a 'world class' security regime, leading to a situation in which policing measures are 'far greater than that provoked by concerns for

³¹ McMichael, 'The Shock and Awe of Mega-Sports Events'.

³² Francisco Klausner, 'FIFA Land 2006: Alliances between Security Politics and Business Interests for Germany's City Network', in CCCB, *Architectures of Fear: Terrorismo and the Future of Urbanism in the West*, conference held in Barcelona, 17-18 May 2007, available online at www.publicspace.org/.../b035-fifa-land-2006-tm-alliances-between-security-politics-and-business-interests-for-germany-s-city-network.

³³ Phillip Boyle and Kevin Haggerty, 'Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex', *International Political Sociology*, vol. 3, 2009, pp. 257-274.

³⁴ Phillip Boyle, 'Knowledge Networks: Mega-Events and Security Expertise', in Bennett and Haggerty (eds), *Security Games*, pp. 327-357.

³⁵ Boyle, 'Knowledge Networks', p. 330.

³⁶ Boyle and Haggerty, 'Knowledge Networks', p. 263.

³⁷ Christopher Gaffney, 'Mega-Events and Socio-Spatial Dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 1919-2016', *Journal of Latin American Geography*, vol. 9, no. 17, 2010, pp. 7-29.

³⁸ Giulianotti and Klausner, 'Security Governance and Sport Mega-Events'.

human safety or the protection of property, both of which are adequately addressed by the security provisions of normal life'.³⁹ The pressure exerted by the 'security nexus' to ensure that no costs are spared on measures can also result in inflationary budgets and the purchase of unnecessarily expensive security systems.⁴⁰ The security costs for 2010 went from an initial projection of 94 million rand in 2003 to what South African President Jacob Zuma described as a 1.3 billion rand 'war chest'.⁴¹ The fixed conditions laid out by organizations such as FIFA tend to ring-fence private profits at the expense of public spending⁴² and the suspension of taxation requirements and legal indemnity may subvert national laws and sovereignty.⁴³ The rhetoric of security legacies sharply contrasts with actual, limited deployment strategies, which favour the creation of dedicated enclaves that 'whilst not physically gated, are symbolically and technologically demarcated from their surrounding environments'.⁴⁴ Moreover, after the event, when the network of security experts, sporting associations and corporate sponsors move on, it is public services and ordinary people who have to pay the costs of ill-advised security expenditures. Ultimately, security measures result in unintended forms of social 'blowback'. As Stephan Graham notes of the long-term legacies of the 2004 Olympics:

In Athens, the \$300m 'super-panopticon' CCTV and information system built for the Games following intense US pressure remained after the event, along with the disused sports facilities. In fact, the system has been used by Greek police trying in vain to control the mass uprisings responding to the crash and savage austerity measures in the country.⁴⁵

Bearing the concept of legacies in mind, the remainder of this article focuses on some comparative aspects of security measures in Brazil and South Africa. The first three sections focus on organizational and governance similarities, before the final section engages with some of the wider social ramifications of such events. While concentration is on preparations for the 2010 and 2014 World Cup, the proximity of the Rio Olympics means that many of these governance measures

³⁹ Bernhard and Martin, 'Rethinking Security at the Olympics', p. 60.

⁴⁰ Minas Samatas, 'Security and Surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: Some Lessons from a Troubled Story', *International Criminal Justice Review*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2007, pp. 220-238.

⁴¹ Sabelo Ndlangisa, 'R 1.3 Billion for World Cup Safety', *City Press*, 20 April 2010, available online at <http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/News/R13-billion-for-World-Cup-safety-20100420>.

⁴² Eick, 'A Neoliberal Sports Event?'

⁴³ Sophie Nakueira, *Security Governance of Mega Events: The Architects and Architecture of the 2010 World Cup*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013.

⁴⁴ Peter Fussey and Jon Coaffee, 'Olympic Rings of Steel: Constructing Security for 2012 and Beyond', in Bennett and Haggerty (eds), *Security Games*, pp. 68-101.

⁴⁵ 'Olympic 2012 Security: Welcome to Lockdown London', *The Guardian*, 12 March 2012, available online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/mar/12/london-olympics-security-lockdown-london>.

overlap as part of a wider process of restructuring, fortifying and ‘disciplining’ urban space within Brazil.⁴⁶

The Republic of South Africa and Brazil: Cooperation and Exchanges

As a prelude to the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS sent security fact-finding missions to the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, the 2008 UEFA tournament in Austria and Switzerland, and the 2008 Beijing Olympics.⁴⁷ Observers were also deployed to view sporting security operations in Brazil itself.⁴⁸ Reciprocally, Brazilian police officials were stationed in South Africa at the International Police Cooperation Centre in Pretoria during the 2010 World Cup. As part of this SAPS-initiated project, Brazilian officers assisted their South African counterparts at matches in which Brazil’s national team was playing.⁴⁹ The conduit served an important practical function when assessing the behaviour of foreign fans and ensuring that boisterous forms of celebration were not misinterpreted as security risks.⁵⁰

The experience of the 2010 World Cup also served a pedagogical function for Brazilian officials. The Brazilian LOC dispatched a security team with an apparent focus on learning how South Africa had handled both the organization and threat reduction, and how South Africa had mitigated scepticism about its ability to deliver a safe tournament. Ricardo Teixeira, head of the Brazilian LOC, was quoted as saying:

We have been here long enough to monitor everything that we can and should learn from South Africa, whether negative or positive; we will use that to ensure that Brazil stages the best World Cup ever. [...] We are not saying people should judge us by what South Africa has been able or unable to deliver — but what we are saying is, we are here to learn and ensure that we use every lesson to our advantage.⁵¹

South African officials from both the security services and the LOC subsequently attended several mega-event-related conferences in Brazil. In 2012, at the

⁴⁶ Gaffney, ‘Mega-Events and Socio-Spatial Dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 1919-2016’.

⁴⁷ Nathi Mthethwa, ‘Remarks to the Foreign Correspondents Association on the 2010 FIFA World Cup™, Security Readiness’, Sandton Convention Centre, Gauteng, 31 May 2010, available online at <http://www.saembassybulgaria.com/latest-news/fifa-2010/world-cup-security-2010.html>.

⁴⁸ Elrena van der Spuy, ‘The World Cup 2010 and Police Cooperation: The South African Case’, in Sean Tait and Elrena van der Spuy (eds), *Cooperation and Accountability in the Cross-border Policing of Southern Africa* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2010), pp. 107-120.

⁴⁹ Government Communication Information Service, *SA Yearbook 2009-2010* (Pretoria: GCIS, 2009), p. 174.

⁵⁰ Chris Eaton, ‘Cops: Have a Party, Not A War’, *KickOff*, 6 March 2010, available online at <http://www.kickoff.com/2010/news/14235/interpol-2010-world-cup-chris-eaton.php>.

⁵¹ ‘Brazilian Top Brass to Take Lessons from SA’, *SANews.gov.za*, 8 July 2010, available online at www.buanews.gov.za/rss/10/10070814151002.

'Soccerex Football Business' meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Danny Jordaan, the former head of the South African LOC, argued that Brazil should emulate the establishment of a single, national security plan coordinated through a military-style command and control system.⁵² In 2011, Mlungisi Ncame, head of security for the South African Football Association (SAFA), and officials from the SAPS and emergency services, all attended a South American policing conference in Rio with the theme of 'Security Planning for Major Sporting Events'.⁵³ Ncame claimed at the conference that ensuring a favourable financial environment for FIFA through the implementation of the 2010 Special Measures Act was chief among the lessons learned by South Africa.⁵⁴ Furthermore, he cited South Africa's adoption of a dedicated World Cup court system, which handed out 'zero tolerance' sentences for crimes such as theft from tourists, as a potential means for Brazil to improve its dangerous image.

Based on the deployment of Brazilian officers in South Africa, it seems that at least some elements of South Africa's security strategy will be adopted for 2014. Brazil has promised to establish an 'International Integrated Security Centre',⁵⁵ similar to the international police centre established in South Africa. This will include representatives from participating countries, 'international information exchange' and a 'control Centre, which will bring together the country's security and intelligence capabilities in a high-technology venue equipped with information systems, and the integration of Brazil's public security forces'.⁵⁶

Total Security

The promotion of a technologically sophisticated, nationally integrated security system echoes the 'total security'⁵⁷ stance adopted by the South African government. Police and military officials described World Cup operations as an 'interoperable'⁵⁸ mission fusing security forces with other government

⁵² Bill Wilson, 'South African World Cup Lessons for Brazil', *BBC*, 26 November 2010, available online at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11840439>.

⁵³ Paul Santiago, '9th IACP South American Executive Policing Conference', *Police Chief*, vol. LXXVIII, no. 10, October 2011, available online at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2496&issue_id=102011.

⁵⁴ Zoe Roller, 'Mega-Event Security Conference Spotlights Rio', *Rio Times*, 30 August 2011, available online at <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-business/mega-event-security-conference-spotlights-rio/#>.

⁵⁵ 'Brazil to Have an International Security Centre for 2014 World Cup', *Brazil World Cup Portal*, 5 December 2011, available online at <http://www.copa2014.gov.br/en/noticia/brazil-have-international-security-centre-world-cup>.

⁵⁶ *Brazil World Cup Portal*.

⁵⁷ Colin Bennett and Kevin Haggerty, 'Introduction', in Bennett and Haggerty (eds), *Security Games*, pp. 1-36.

⁵⁸ Willem H. Le Roux, *Modelling and Simulation-based Support Interoperability Exercises in Preparation*

departments to ensure 'real-time monitoring, collating and reporting on the roll out of [... the security] plan as well as the occurrence of any incidents'.⁵⁹ A series of preparatory exercises were used to demonstrate that the security forces were prepared to deal with any 'crime or terror-related threat, as well as any natural or non-crime related disaster'.⁶⁰ These simulations ranged from violent standoffs with hordes of unruly hooligans to hijackers. Officials regularly told the press that despite South Africa having no 'known adversaries', they were ready for 'biological, chemical and radiation strikes, while hospitals have prepared to deal with a surge of victims of an attack'.⁶¹

Similarly, Brazilian officials have described their strategic approach towards 2014 as pivoting around 'integration' of existing security elements, pre-emption and the deployment of advanced technology. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Justice's Secretary for the Security of Large-Scale Events, José Ricardo Botelho:

We want to work proactively rather than defensively; hence the importance of technology. We are linking everything so that when a person fitting this profile applies for a visa, for example, we will already have the first barrier in place. [...] We are working with state-of-the-art equipment to identify these people. We do not want them among us.⁶²

In both South Africa and Brazil, security technology is clearly a central tool for expediting the speed and effectiveness of a response to a security risk. While the SAPS purchased bomb-disposal robots, light helicopters with thermal-imaging software, new mobile crowd-control vehicles, water cannons and flexible body armour, Brazil has included at least one unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in its itinerary.⁶³ Both countries have used metaphors gleaned from science fiction to describe their deployment of futuristic technology. In 2008 the SAPS described the body armour purchased for the World Cup tournament as a 'Robocop protective outfit [that] will be used in riot situations [...] to] protect police in the worst crowd control situations — even when criminals pelt them with

of 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa (Pretoria: CSIR, 2008), available online at http://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/2723/1/Lc%20Roux_P_2008.pdf.

⁵⁹ 'SAMHS to support FIFA 2010 World Cup', *South African Soldier Magazine*, vol. 17, no. 3, March 2010, pp. 38-39.

⁶⁰ Professor Ndawonde, 'Action-packed SAPS Exercise Shows Off Crime Busting Tactics', *BuaNews*, 2 October 2009, available online at <http://www.buanews.gov.za/rss/09/09100208351001>.

⁶¹ Donna Bryson, 'South Africa Prepares to Secure World Cup', *USA Today*, 30 March 2010, available online at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-africa-prepares-to-secure-world-cup/>.

⁶² 'Integration is the Keyword in the Strategic Security Plan', *Brazil World Cup Portal*, 14 September 2011, available online at <http://www.copa2014.gov.br/en/noticia/integration-keyword-strategic-security-plan>.

⁶³ 'Brazil Satisfied with First Chapter of Strategic Frontiers Plan', *Mercopress*, 11 October 2011, available online at <http://en.mercopress.com/2011/10/11/brazil-satisfied-with-first-chapter-of-strategic-frontiers-plan>.

petrol bombs'.⁶⁴ Likewise, Brazilian police are intending to test so-called 'RoboCop' eye glasses equipped with a biometric scanner 'that scans up to 400 faces per second' and 'cross-checks those images against a database of criminals and terrorists'.⁶⁵

This combination of high-end technology and a posture of pre-emption are reflective of underlying and continually vigilant security logic about threats emerging from within host cities, from hooligans to terrorists disguised as suicide bombers. According to Ben Steyn, former head of South Africa's apartheid government's notorious 'Project Coast' biological weapons project, and organizer of the SANDF's chemical attack preparations for 2010, the potential threat of WMDs at the World Cup emerged from the possible misuse of readily available commercial chemicals.⁶⁶ As a result, preparatory exercises taught:

[...] the principles of command and control and the management of a disaster area. In the beginning, the emphasis of the exercise was on the battlefield, but then we moved to the civilian area, which is where terrorists could or would strike.⁶⁷

Such counter-measures indicate how military and police strategy throughout the world is increasingly reacting to a limitless sense of threat in which political violence and spectacular acts of terrorism can, at least in principle, occur at any time, on any scale, or in any environment. The post-9/11 'long war' has militarized cities across the globe, from increased security at air and land borders to harsh anti-terror laws — a battlefield that is particularly evident in the exceptional circumstances of mega-events. As such, the security measures taken for South Africa and Brazil demonstrate the host states' capacity, prestige and ability to match their wealthier Northern counterparts. From a practical standpoint, the resources leveraged as a result of hosting preparations allow government institutions to take a short cut to some of the technological developments in more developed countries. In the case of South African airport security, for example, the preparations for 'every possibly known eventuality [...] identified with the global aviation industry through its history' were intended to show that the airports could

⁶⁴ 'SAPS Strengthen Hold on Cape Town Airport for 2010', *SAPS Journal Online*, 2 December 2008, available online at http://www.sapsjournalonline.gov.za/dynamic/journal_dynamic.aspx?pageid=414&jid=12743.

⁶⁵ Lauren Frayer, 'Brazilian Police Debut "RoboCop" Glasses Ahead of World Cup', *AOLNews*, 13 April 2011, available online at <http://www.aolnews.com/2011/04/13/brazilian-police-debut-robocop-glasses-ahead-of-world-cup/>.

⁶⁶ 'South Africa Trains CW Attack Responders', *Global Security Newswire*, 29 May 2007, available online at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-africa-trains-cw-attack-responders/>.

⁶⁷ The SANDF's Ben Steyn, quoted by Graeme Hosken, *Pretoria News*, 28 May 2007, and published in 'South Africa Trains CW Attack Responders', available online at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-africa-trains-cw-attack-responders/>.

‘compete on a global level with airports in “developed” countries without having to rely on external expertise’.⁶⁸

FIFA and the Host States

Concerns over Brazil’s security preparations, however, remain. In March 2012, FIFA Secretary-General Jérôme Valcke noted that Brazil might not be able to deliver on its promise of ‘world-class’ security. Brazil was lagging behind on stadium construction and had reneged on promises to implement a World Cup enabling bill. Valcke said that Brazil needed a ‘kick up the backside’, adding that ‘there is no way we cannot receive a guarantee about security or terrorism. That is not the responsibility of FIFA. It is not an option not to have this bill’.⁶⁹ An angry Brazilian government responded that it would no longer work with Valcke, while the Brazilian Sports Minister called for him to be barred from Brazil. This rift between the Brazilian government and FIFA garnered substantial media coverage and was only smoothed over after Valcke issued an apology in which he claimed that he had been misquoted. But while Brazil’s Lower Congress rushed the desired bill, the Senate were more reticent, as the legislation would have contravened the ban on alcohol sales within Brazil’s stadiums, although, as expected, the bill was eventually passed in May 2012.

An alternate explanation for the pressure exerted by FIFA was presented by former head of the South African LOC Danny Jordaan, who was appointed as a special adviser to the Brazilian LOC:

The World Cup generates 90 per cent of FIFA’s revenue and is considered to be its crown jewel. [...] The 2010 World Cup, which was acknowledged as the most successful ever, generated a massive US\$ 4.2bn [Brazilian real 33.6bn]. The projected target for Brazil is to grow that by 10 per cent to US\$ 4.6bn (Brazilian real 36.8bn). [...] The committee’s task is to critically examine Brazil’s preparations to ensure there are no logistical obstacles to this target being achieved.⁷⁰

Jordaan’s quote suggests that FIFA’s insistence on the establishment of a tournament-centred legal architecture was as much a matter of ensuring upward profits as it was about ensuring efficient public safety. In fact, the FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act adopted an open-ended set of definitions that referred both to security and commercial concerns.⁷¹ The Act allowed the LOC, in conjunction

⁶⁸ Author’s interview with Trevor Teegler of the Airports Company South Africa, 28 October 2009.

⁶⁹ Matt Scott, ‘World Cup Row Between Brazil and FIFA Worsens as General Secretary Jerome Valcke Calls Government Puerile’, *The Telegraph*, 3 March 2012, available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/9121006/World-Cup-row-between-Brazil-and-Fifa-worsens-as-general-secretary-Jerome-Valcke-calls-government-puerile.html>.

⁷⁰ Kgomoitso Setshua, ‘Jordaan Gives Brazil the Thumbs Up’, *Sunday World*, 8 April 2012, available online at <http://www.sundayworld.co.za/sport/2012/04/08/jordaan-gives-brazil-the-thumbs-up>.

⁷¹ *Second 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act, Act No. 12 of 2006*, Government Gazette no. 459, 7 September 2006.

with the SAPS National Commissioner, to declare stadiums, public viewing areas and other 2010-related facilities as designated areas that could not be accessed without accreditation, and to identify 'exclusion' and 'commercial restriction' zones that prohibited unlicensed commercial activity. The Act also created 'traffic-free zones' within exclusion zones and enabled search-and-seizure powers by so-called 'peace officers' for vehicles and persons within these zones. The Act's creation of a legal framework for the establishment of an archipelago of controlled zones was accompanied by the temporary suspension of certain restrictions on alcohol sales and the import of pharmaceuticals. Although this bill served important security functions, in allowing for the establishment of restricted 'stop-and-search zones' during the World Cup, it was equally important in protecting FIFA's intellectual property rights through the spatial 'sterilization of non-official advertising'.⁷²

During the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the complex web of legal and spatial restrictions created a substantial amount of public resentment towards FIFA. Local businesses, from small-scale entrepreneurs to a national airline, found themselves facing investigation for using variations on phrases such as 'World Cup' and '2010' in their advertising.⁷³ Street vendors, a particularly important source of income in the informal sector, found their opportunities to capitalize on the influx of tourists around venues greatly circumscribed by the restrictions. Tourists who had been arrested for inadvertently contravening 'ambush marketing' restrictions also claimed that they had been manhandled and threatened by the South African police.⁷⁴ Constitutional expert Pierre de Vos argues that the penalties handed out for breaking commercial restrictions were excessive and out of step with proportional sentencing (for example, a Nigerian national was sentenced to three years for the illegal possession of 30 tickets).⁷⁵

FIFA's financial and legal concessions from the state were also called into question. One widely disseminated article in the *City Press* newspaper quoted a 'senior government official' as saying that 'FIFA are a bunch of thugs. Not even the UN expects you to sign away your tax base. These mafiosos do'.⁷⁶ This choice of metaphor alludes to how FIFA's financial success has been accompanied by serious allegations of corruption, bribery and interference with the voting for World Cup

⁷² SAFA, *South Africa 2010 Bid: Africa's Stage*, sect. 9.3.15.

⁷³ Lebogang Seale, 'FIFA are Bullies', *IOL*, 12 April 2010, available online at <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/video-fifa-are-bullies-1.480279>.

⁷⁴ Aislinn Laing, 'World Cup 2010: Police Arrest Women in Dutch Orange Dresses', *The Telegraph*, 16 June 2010, available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/world-cup-2010/7830319/World-Cup-2010-Police-arrest-women-in-Dutch-orange-dresses.html>.

⁷⁵ 'On World Cup Courts and the Prosecution of "Criminals"', *Constitutionally Speaking* blog, 7 July 2010, available online at <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-world-cup-courts-and-the-prosecution-of-criminals/>.

⁷⁶ 'FIFA's Great SA Rip-Off', 6 June 2010, available online at <http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/News/Fifas-great-SA-rip-off-20100606>.

hosting rights.⁷⁷ FIFA's reputation has been increasingly tarnished by such allegations, with some of its corporate partners expressing serious reservations about the Association's administration and negative international image.⁷⁸ Government officials described FIFA as having a 'colonial' and imperious attitude towards South Africa,⁷⁹ while the head of 2010 strategic planning for Durban, Julie-May Ellingson, suggested that FIFA officials were aloof and unaccountable towards South African organizers.⁸⁰

The Association's image was further damaged by the failure of the LOC to resolve a long-standing wage dispute with private security guards at South African stadiums. During the Confederations Cup in 2009, the SAPS was forced to perform stadium duty after Stallion Security withdrew, alleging that the LOC was only paying 300 rand for 12-hour guard shifts.⁸¹ In a larger-scale repeat, stewards from Stallion Security went on strike one week after the World Cup began, affecting inner-perimeter security duties in five of the ten stadiums. According to the stewards, the strikes were provoked by legitimate grievances over wages (the LOC had promised 1,500 rand for daily shifts but was only giving workers 205 rand per day). The stewards were then fired by the LOC and the SAPS had to rapidly deploy student constables from police training colleges to stadiums in Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Durban, and Soccer City and Ellis Park in Gauteng. Running battles between riot police and the striking stewards broke out near the Durban venue, with the SAPS using rubber bullets, tear gas and percussion grenades to disperse the protestors. The SAPS spun this event in its favour, with officials citing the institution's ability to secure stadiums without advance warning as evidence of the depth of its security training and preparations.

In the media and the popular imagination, FIFA was presented as an invasive force that had captured the state and turned South Africa into a temporary colony or fiefdom, where national sovereignty 'was surrendered to a gang of old, white men in Geneva who conceive of South Africa principally as a sound stage on which a month-long commercial for their sponsors is to be filmed'.⁸² Such comparisons became so prevalent that Danny Jordaan felt obliged to publicly deny that South Africa had 'sold out', stating that 'the fact of the matter is that more

⁷⁷ Andrew Jennings, *Foul! The Secret World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals*, (London: HarperSport, 2007).

⁷⁸ 'Unopposed Blatter Re-elected by FIFA', *Al Jazeera*, 1 June 2011, available online at <http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/football/2011/06/201106114238301300.html>.

⁷⁹ Niren Tolsi, 'My City, My World Cup: Helen Zille', *Mail and Guardian*, 21 May 2010, available online at <http://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-21-my-city-world-cup-helen-zille>.

⁸⁰ Colleen Dardagan, 'What We Learnt From The World Cup', *The Mercury*, 13 June 2011, p. 10.

⁸¹ Adriaan Basson and Niren Tolsi, 'World Cup Security Shambles', *Mail and Guardian*, 18 June 2010, available online at <http://mg.co.za/article/2010-06-18-world-cup-security-shambles>.

⁸² Nic Dawes, 'The Dream Team', *Mail and Guardian*, 11 June 2010, available online at <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-06-11-the-dream-team>.

countries are making bids. [...] If you make a bid then you accept the terms and conditions of the event'⁸³

The idea of a FIFA 'takeover' externalized the Association's relationship with the state and its claim that a private organization had temporarily seized control of the government and public policy.⁸⁴ As Jordaan pointed out, however, the South African government had willingly entered into contractual agreement with FIFA. Furthermore, the composition of the LOC blurred demarcations between the state and FIFA. Several incumbent government ministers involved in security planning were represented on the Committee, along with prominent figures from sports' administrations, business and the media, and the head of the LOC's security directorate, Linda Mti, was the former Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Affairs, who had left government in 2006 amid allegations of irregularities in the awarding of tenders. The role of the LOC was initially to 'lobby and/or petition the government' on FIFA's behalf, but the composition of the LOC executive blurred this distinction by actively encouraging the participation of state officials directly responsible for security measures during the 2010 World Cup.⁸⁵ For example, Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa demanded that the SAPS receive remuneration from the LOC for the additional duties performed during the World Cup, and went on to blame the committee for not concluding proper security contracts, despite the fact that he himself was on the LOC's board of directors!⁸⁶

This hypocrisy highlights how 'local stakeholders at such events should not be understood merely as passive recipients of authoritative orders imposed from outside'.⁸⁷ For city planners and policy-makers, the 2010 World Cup provided an unprecedented opportunity. The scale and characteristics of the 2010 World Cup may have made planning more extensive, but their efforts, as well as police and military operations, did have a national event hosting model to learn from: the security measures established at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. These included joint operations of the SAPS, Metropolitan police and SANDF, airspace restrictions, the cancellation of police leave, the establishment of barricades, and the declaration of traffic restriction zones.

⁸³ 'We Didn't Sell Out South Africa — Jordaan', *Politicsweb*, 11 May 2010, available online at <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=175397&sn=Marketingweb+detail>.

⁸⁴ Steve Tombs and David Whyte, 'The State and Corporate Crime', in Roy Coleman *et al.* (eds), *State, Power, Crime* (London: Sage, 2010), pp. 103-115.

⁸⁵ FIFA Organizing Association, '*Organizing Association Agreement*', p. 28.

⁸⁶ 'Minister wants R90m for Cops', *The Star*, 2 September 2010, available online at http://www.project2010.co.za/2010_World_Cup_security.asp.

⁸⁷ Francisco Klauser, 'Interpretative Flexibility of the Event-City: Security, Branding and Urban Entrepreneurialism at the European Football Championships 2008', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (online pre-publication version), 9 June 2011, pp. 1-14, available online at [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1468-2427.2011.01064.x/pdf](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2427.2011.01064.x/pdf).

The Sandton Convention Centre itself was handed over to the United Nations for its exclusive use, which included access control accreditation and a ban on protests within the 'security zone'.⁸⁸ Even official statements about the exceptionality of security measures appear familiar: 'We aim to change misperceptions about safety and security in South Africa in general and in Gauteng in particular and hope that our efforts will help to attract the attention of foreign tourists and investors'.⁸⁹ Similarly the security measures used at the UN COP 17 conference in Durban in late 2011 were almost an exact replica of the World Cup operations,⁹⁰ which included the temporary reactivation of the special courts system and the release of an official SAPS press statement which was cut and pasted from a speech made by Minister Mthethwa about the World Cup.⁹¹

Pacification?

The importance of local factors in creating security measures at major events indicates how — despite the occasional public disputes — sporting bodies and governments converge on governance models that aim at enforcing spatial and social order during tournaments.⁹² However, the trajectory of benefits and the discursive linkages made between mega-events and public safety legacies are grossly uneven and mask undercurrents such as the stigmatization of 'problematic' groups and territories and the continued move towards the private domination of urban space.⁹³ A report compiled by social movements and popular committees in several of the Brazilian host cities details some of the sociological fallout from preparations.⁹⁴ These include the exploitation of stadium construction workers, a lack of public consultation about the terms and conditions of hosting, and a dramatic increase in evictions, which — as the report vividly notes — have been accompanied by:

⁸⁸ WSSD Secretariat *Guideline on Major Group Registrations in Jo'burg*, 12 August 2002, available online at <http://www.earthsummit2002.org/es/preparations/global/summit/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Accred%20-%20Secretariat%20Info.pdf>.

⁸⁹ 'Security Beefed Up for WSSD', *News24*, 7 August 2002, available online at <http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Security-beefed-up-for-WSSD-20020807>.

⁹⁰ John Yeld, 'COP17 Protests Will Be Peaceful', *The Daily News*, 25 November 2011, available online at <http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/cop17-protests-will-be-peaceful-1.1186093>.

⁹¹ 'All Systems Go in Securing COP17', *SAPS Journal Online*, 28 November 2011, available online at http://www.sapsjournalonline.gov.za/dynamic/journal_dynamic.aspx?pageid=414&jid=27893.

⁹² Gaffney, 'Mega-Events and Socio-Spatial Dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 1919-2016'.

⁹³ Neil Gray, 'CG 2014: Formulary for a Skewed Urbanism', *Mute*, 19 April 2009, available online at <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/cg-2014-formulary-skewed-urbanism>.

⁹⁴ Andrea Dip, 'Brazil's 2014 World Cup: Rights Abuses Revealed In Report', *The Huffington Post*, 14 December 2011, available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/12/brazil-world-cup-abuses_n_1143905.html.

[...] strategies of war and persecution, such as [...] entering homes without judicial authority, misappropriating and destroying personal property, using verbal violence against residents, threatening integrity and family rights, cutting public services, and demolishing and abandoning the ruins of one in every three houses so that neighbouring homes overlook scenes of terror.⁹⁵

In Rio, efforts to assert state control over *favelas*, spearheaded by special 'Pacifying Police Units' (UPP) have taken on war-like dimensions (the term 'pacification' is most commonly associated with US military planners during the Vietnam War), and a Wikileaks cable compared recent actions in Brazil to 'counter-insurgency' operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹⁶ While the pacification programme has had some success in stabilizing targeted *favelas*, it has overwhelmingly focused on policing and occupation rather than creating long-term development upgrades.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the UPP's actions have had little impact on the state-criminal dimension of violent crime: the programme has focused on gangs and has done nothing to 'combat the expanding influence of the *milicias*'⁹⁸ or to curb police violence. As a recent Amnesty International report put it, 'the norm remains that citizens, especially residents of *favelas*, remain hostage to violence from gangs, militias and the police' and that 'extrajudicial killings remain widespread'.⁹⁹

In Brazil, a 'spatial propinquity between the rich and poor in Brazilian cities' informs security preparations, whereas a historic legacy of separation was a feature of the 2010 World Cup.¹⁰⁰ FIFA's initial assessment of South Africa noted that 'general information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security', but that this was concentrated in 'marginal areas', a sentiment later echoed by South African police officials.¹⁰¹ And while security preparations were less intensive than the 'counter-insurgency' campaigns in Brazil, the tournament did provide impetus for evictions and removals. Despite government assurances that evictions would not take place because of the World Cup, there is a large body of evidence that suggests otherwise — that localized forced removals around South Africa were fast-tracked by the proximity of the event.¹⁰²

Furthermore, the installation of the SAPS-directed command-and-control 'war machine' in preparation for the tournament occurred parallel to efforts to remilitarize the police service.¹⁰³ Reform included the adoption of the military

⁹⁵ Dip, 'Brazil's 2014 World Cup'.

⁹⁶ Chris Aresenault, 'Counter-insurgency "Improves" Brazil's Slums', *Al Jazeera*, 4 January 2012, available online at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/201112281252381901.html>.

⁹⁷ Gaffney, 'Securing the Olympic City'.

⁹⁸ Gaffney, 'Securing the Olympic City', p. 80.

⁹⁹ Amnesty International, 'Country Report: Brazil', 2011, available online at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/brazil/report-2011>.

¹⁰⁰ Wacquant, 'The Militarization of Urban Marginality', p. 59.

¹⁰¹ 'Crime Not Expected to Affect 2010', *The Star*, 26 January 2007, available online at <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/crime-won-t-affect-world-cup-venues-1.312541>.

¹⁰² Caroline Newton, 'The Reverse Side of the Medal: About the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the Beautification of the N2 in Cape Town', *Urban Forum*, vol. 20, no.1, 2009, pp. 93-108.

¹⁰³ Van Der Spuy, 'The World Cup 2010 and Police Cooperation', p. 112.

ranks last used under apartheid, the official promulgation of a 'fierce' new 'people's war on crime', and public endorsement of 'shoot-to-kill' tactics. These measures were accompanied by an upsurge in deaths in custody, incidents of police brutality and violence against protesters. It has also been argued that bellicose war talk created a national tone that gave a 'green light' to local state repression — a mood reminiscent of the apartheid government's adoption of counter-insurgency and 'low-intensity conflict' (LIC) strategies during the 1980s.¹⁰⁴ Notably, in a country that has one of the highest recorded rates of community protests in the world, the most visible post-tournament usage of World Cup purchases — such as the 'Robocop' body armour and water cannons — has been in the area of crowd control, rather than in 'combat' with dangerous criminals.

For Brazil, Gaffney argues that security is more about appearance and protecting sites of value than about leaving a sustainable public safety legacy, a sentiment given credence by State Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame's acknowledgement that the goal of the pacification programme has been to 'protect the most economically productive areas of Rio de Janeiro'.¹⁰⁵ Police officials in South Africa were also ambivalent about the long-term benefits of 2010, with the official crime statistics for the period conceding that the visible policing strategy was only *probably* a factor in reducing some areas of the national crime rate — hardly the legacy promised before the World Cup.¹⁰⁶ In both South Africa and Brazil, it appears that police reform and action were merely used to 'pacify' urban space in the name of event security and ensure that a 'brighter and nicer' image would be projected to the outside world.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

The cases presented in this article suggest that the Brazilian authorities, as was the case with their South African predecessors, will be successful in securing the next rounds of mega-events. While occasional public disputes between host governments and sporting bodies might make for interesting news stories, they obscure the consensus shared between public and private security actors on ensuring 'world-class' preparations. Whether in the global north or south, or in semi-peripheral countries that blur such distinctions, convergence has resulted in the creation of event security models, which are rapidly translated and assimilated depending on the unique needs of the host nation. The cordons, restrictions and

¹⁰⁴ Churchland Programme, *Dark Corners of the State We're In*, 22 November 2011, p. 10, available online at <http://churchland.org.za/padkos%20articles/what%20did%20we%20learn%20final.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ Gaffney, 'Securing the Olympic City', p. 80.

¹⁰⁶ SAPS, *Crime Report 2010/2011: Together Squeezing Crime to Zero* (Pretoria: SAPS Corporate Branding and Design, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Mark Neocleous, 'Security as Pacification', in Mark Neocleous and G. Rigakos (eds), *Anti-Security* (Ottawa, ON: Red Quill Press, 2011), pp. 23-56.

zones that spring up around major sporting events have proved to be resilient in 'neutralizing' street crime, crowd violence and commercial infractions. However, as the policing of commercial restrictions shows, these measures are as much about ensuring profitability and projecting a desired image of host cities. As such, *security becomes an issue of aesthetics* and a portmanteau term that covers everything from air restrictions and counter-terrorism measures to open-ended projects, enforcing social control and preventing 'embarrassing' protests. On-going police and state projects are particularly concentrated and visible during mega-events, often contrasting with the official discourse of national cohesion and the apolitical enjoyment of sport. The security politics of mega-events cannot therefore be separated from wider political and social dynamics.

Alongside reflecting national and localized projects of state control, the intensification of event security is driven by the mandates of transnational sporting bodies. While these institutions are prodigiously successful at ensuring that policing measures create and ensure citadels of tax-free profit extraction during events, they often display a callous indifference towards what is perpetrated in the name of 'security'. FIFA recently refused to cooperate with the UN on ensuring that housing evictions would not occur during World Cups, stating that the Association has nothing to do with the politics of host countries. Similarly, the April 2012 Grand Prix in Bahrain was accompanied by a ferocious state clampdown on pro-democracy protests: the response from Formula 1 management was that 'we are not a political body; we are a sporting body',¹⁰⁸ while a protestor brandished a sign that read 'Stop racing on our blood'.¹⁰⁹ Not only do these organizations benefit from massive amounts of public spending and the creation of legal frameworks that insulate them from risk; they also substantially benefit from wider 'pacifications' within host cities and countries. As long as host governments are prepared to install such wide-reaching security measures, it seems unlikely that sporting organizations will scale back their requirements. As this article has argued, the question of how mega-events can best be policed often detracts from the wider social implications that the securitization of mega-events inevitably generates.

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¹⁰⁸ Colin Freeman, 'Bahrain Grand Prix: Riot Squads, Teargas and Petrol Bombs as Protesters Claim Police Beat Shia Activist to Death', *The Telegraph*, 21 April 2012, available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/9218779/Bahrain-Grand-Prix-riot-squads-teargas-and-petrol-bombs-as-protesters-claim-police-beat-Shia-activist-to-death.html>.

¹⁰⁹ *Pictivist*, 21 April 2012, available online at <http://pictivist.wordpress.com/2012/04/21/fl-stop-racing-on-our-blood/>.