
Dotto Martha Masters

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Abstract: The Question is, was policy-oriented learning part of the policymaking process in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies?

Political analysts have recently become interested in the learning process of policymakers and government in formulating and implementing public policies. The role they play in public policy is important as they are responsible for promoting the general welfare of a country. Their thinking, decision-making process and understanding of public policy issues determine the kind of policy adopted, and subsequently the impact it has on society.

Within this context, the paper examines South Africa’s policymaking process between 1994 and 2006, where three economic policies namely the Reconstruction Development Plan (1994), the Growth Employment and Redistribution (1996) strategy and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (2006) were adopted. Grounded in the theory of policy change, particularly looking at the concept of policy-oriented learning, this study examines the formulation processes of each of these policies to establish if how and to what extent learning influenced the decisions behind South Africa’s economic policies. Policy-oriented learning is broadly understood as a constructed and conscious change in thinking about policy issues, which in turn provide a better understanding of the effects of certain policy instruments. It looks at the relationship between policy change and generally holds that policymakers and the government can learn from their experiences, shared ideas and belief systems and draw lessons from other policymakers. What they learn can be used to modify their present actions based on their interpretation of how previous policies have performed. In other words, this learning can lead to a change in policy or an adjustment of an existing policy. Thus, in examining the different policy changes, South Africa experienced between 1994 and 2006, a policymaking pattern is found.

The study finds that in addition to social, political, and economic factors influencing policy decisions, the strategic interactions between civil societies, political movements, key stakeholders and the sharing and obtaining of knowledge between these parties influences policy decisions as well. In fact, learning plays an important role in the policymaking process.

Keywords: policy-learning, policymaking, policy change, economic policy, RDP, GEAR, ASGISA.
Declaration

I, Dotto Martha Masters, declare that this research report, apart from the contributions mentioned in the acknowledgements, is my own, unaided work. It is submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts by Coursework and Research in Development Studies to the University of Witwatersrand. It has not been presented before for any degree or examination at any other University.

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Signature of candidate

5th day of April 2019
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List of Abbreviations

ANC - African National Congress
ANCO - African National Civic Organisation
ACF - Advocacy Coalition Framework
ASGISA - Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
BBBEE - Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE - Black Economic Empowerment
BER - Bureau for Economic Research
BPPO - Business Processing Outsourcing
CEAS - Central Economic Advisory Services
COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions
DBSA - Development Bank of Southern Africa
DEP - Department of Economic Policy
DPME - Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
EROSA - Economic Research Southern Africa
ET - Economic Trends Research Group
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GEAR - Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU - Government of National Unity
IDRC - International Department Research Centre
ISP - Industrial Strategy Project
JIPSA - Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition
MDGs - Millennium Development Goals
MERG - Macroeconomic Research Group
NEM - Normative Economic Model
NGDS - National Growth and Development Strategy
NGP - National Growth Plan
NIEP - National Institute for Economic Policy
NP - National Party
NPM - New Public Management
NYS - National Youth Services
PAC - Pan African Congress
QIDS - Quality Improvement and Development Strategy
RDP - Reconstruction and Development Plan
RDP WP - Reconstruction and Development Plan White Paper
SACP - South African Communist Party
SAF - South African Foundations
SALGA - South African Local Government Association
SANGOCO - South African Non-Government Organisation Coalition
SARB - South African Reserve Bank
SMEs - Small and Medium Enterprises
SONA - State of the Nation Address
UYF - Unemployment Youth Fund
YAC - Youth Advisory Centre’s
YED - Youth Enterprises Development
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Transitional period

South Africa’s political transition between 1991 and 1994 took place under difficult economic conditions. The economy had been in decline since the early 1970s and was experiencing a decade-long recession. Economic growth was below population growth rates and was characterised by high levels of poverty and unemployment, unequal distribution of wealth and income, and low levels of human capital development (Roux A., 2005). The incoming democratic government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), inherited a country with an economy riddled with gross inequalities and high levels of unemployment (Baker, Boraine, & Krafchik, 1993). There was a need to introduce new economic policies that would raise the living standards for the previously disadvantaged population groups and policies needed to be created that would rectify the conditions created by apartheid and address the structural challenges within the economy. Thus, before South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the country went through a comprehensive political and socio-economic transformation. ANC was aware that all spheres of government needed to be restructured and that new policies needed to be implemented in order to facilitate transformation and change, as the challenges at the time were to develop an economic policy that could enable the country to meet domestic demands, deal with the socio-economic inequalities and compete internationally (Michie & Padayachree, 1997). It was quite evident that South Africa required a comprehensive economic reform programme.

Economic debate in South Africa

It is against this backdrop that the area of economic analysis and policy formulation was identified as an urgent priority by the ANC-alliance, which included the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), along with other democratic movements. Economic ideas were important components of institutional construction and change. Introducing a new economic strategy was paramount to the kind of government structure that would be adopted post-apartheid and most importantly to how the new government envisioned the development of a democratic economy. There was a view that the ANC was inexperienced in economic policymaking and its policy positions were based on
the principles enshrined in the Freedom Charter which stressed the ‘nationalisation’ of industries and the redistribution of land, which was considered by many as radical (Padayachee & Sender, 2017). Consequently, during the political transition, the ANC-alliance engaged in several discussions and negotiations with senior figures of the apartheid government, other progressive organisation and international actors regarding South Africa’s future, particularly on economic and social development (Freund, 2013).

Upon ANC’s request, several initiatives were introduced to assist the ANC-alliance to understand economic policy issues within the anti-apartheid movement and think about new economic policy frameworks. Research groups such as the Economic Trends Research Group (ET), the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERN) and Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) were all part of the discussions on possible economic policies that could be implemented post-apartheid. These research initiatives led to policy debates among the ANC-alliance. The significance of these debates was that ANC’s principle of inclusivity and redistribution formed the foundation of the economic policies. The ANC’s position within the broader economic debate was that “apartheid left a legacy of such distortions in the operation of the South African economy that extensive interventions were required for reconstruction. Furthermore, restructuring of the economy was not inimical to economic growth, instead, growth would occur through redistribution” (Michie & Padayachee, 1997).

Following extensive consultation and debates between the ANC-alliance, civil society groups and research groups, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) policy document was introduced before the 1994 elections. This document became the main policy platform of the ANC’s election manifesto and the first official economic government policy post elections. Since its introduction two other economic policies followed, the first of which was the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996 and then the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006. The main aim of the ANC-led government since the start of democracy in 1994 was to reduce the high levels of inequality and focus on sustainable and diversified economic growth through employment creation and the elimination of poverty. These policies shared similar objectives, however, they differed in their formulation and in their choice of policy instruments.
**Policies adopted**

The RDP was a people-oriented development policy that attempted to rectify the conditions created by apartheid. Its main priority was to put in place programmes that would meet the basic needs of the poor and restructure the economy while democratising the state and society (Terreblanche, 1999). The RDP aimed to improve service delivery to the poor and create an environment that would engender human development. However, two years after its adoption, the RDP faced several challenges which sparked debates on new macroeconomic and employment policy issues. Consequently, in June 1996, to address these challenges, restore confidence and enhance credibility, the government introduced GEAR. GEAR was adopted to recover South Africa’s economy and increase the growth rate. This would be achieved through a sharp increase in the private sector and direct foreign investment (Terreblanche, 1999). Despite having achieved some of its policy targets, GEAR faced a range of challenges. Key aspects of GEAR were never implemented, and it achieved very little success in private sector investment and wealth distribution (Department of Basic Education, n.d). The government acknowledged continued slow economic growth, poverty driven by unemployment, and low income. Subsequently, in 2006, the government introduced ASGISA. ASGISA was introduced with the view to reduce poverty by the year 2010 and bring down the unemployment rate to 14 per cent by 2012 (Department of Basic Education, n.d). An in-depth overview of these policies is provided in chapters three, four and five.

The shifts in policy since 1994 point to various factors, which include poor performance of the economy, government’s desire to have an economic policy that was widely accepted by domestic and international investors and bring fiscal and monetary stability. It can also be argued that other factors played a role in influencing how policymakers formulated policies and made specific policy decisions. State autonomy theorists – who can be defined as self-governing and independent from the interference of outside actors – argue that the state plays an important role in public policy and is largely independent of organised social interests and the electoral body that drive policy decisions (Hall, 1993). What influences policy decision? Technically the electoral body should – particularly in a democratic state – speak to the kind of policies adopted. However, there are instances where policies are influenced by ‘bureaucratic politics’, ‘policy legacies’ and external factors (Heclo, 1974).
It is for these specific reasons that political analysts have recently become interested in the learning process of policymakers. In this context, one is not referring to the learning of an individual, but policy-learning that involves the collective learning of organisations (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). Since the mid-1970’s “international relations, sociology, and policy analyses have evolved theoretical frameworks that use ideas, arguments and belief systems to understand and explain the processes and outcomes of policies” (Bandelow, 2005). It is understood that there are several reasons why policy changes. Some policies are new and innovative, whereas others change due to alterations of earlier policies. However, the belief that public policies are driven by social pressures has recently been challenged by the theory of policy-learning. Policy-learning highlights that states and organisations can change policies by learning from others (Cerna, 2013). The South African case is an interesting one as there were several shifts in policy between 1994 and 2006. Although these policies were similar in objectives they were different in other aspects, particularly their formulation processes.

Overall the research evaluates South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies, from the 1994 RDP policy through to the ASGISA policy of 2006. The research assesses these policies through the lens of policy-learning. It is important to note the similarities and differences in these policies, particularly in the decision-making process. Furthermore, it attempts to provide evidence of policy-learning within the policymaking process of each of these policies. In principle, the years leading up to the first democratic election presented an opportunity for policy-learning. Thus, are the RDP, GEAR, and ASGISA a product of this learning? Can the several shifts in policy be attributed to the failures and challenges that were faced within each policy? It is possible that the change in policy may have resulted from a combination of learning and the political and economic conditions at the time.

1.2 The Rationale for the Study

Although there are several studies on South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies, there hasn’t been an analysis looking closely at how policymakers during the policy formation process acquired the knowledge and understanding of economic policies. This requires a study of this nature to analyse learning aspects during the policymaking process. This study does not attempt to challenge existing arguments on these specific policies. Instead, it attempts to identify and examine possible instances of policy-learning within the policymaking process. Therefore, the focus of the study is the relationship between policy change and policy-learning.
The study offers a different perspective of South Africa’s policymaking process, as well as an understanding of the conditions that led to the shifts in policy. Furthermore, the study tests the state-centric argument that government remains an important player in governance and that policy decisions are driven by socioeconomic condition, furthermore the study also tests the argument that the process of learning is dominated by political elites and experts.

This study focused on South Africa, mainly because of the unique political transition it went through between 1991 and 1994. The economic and political conditions at that time required the restructuring of all government institutions, and a new economic strategy be adopted. However, the incoming government were said to have had very little experience in policy formulation and implementation which meant that policies were being implemented on a trial and error basis. This transition period also saw the involvement of domestic and international organisations and research groups assisting the ANC-alliance in economic policy formulation. Secondly, after the 1994 democratic elections, which led to the adoption of the RDP as the first economic policy, two other economic policies were subsequently adopted, GEAR and ASGISA, which are examples of policy change. Thus, the several changes in the economic policies of South Africa provide a good case study for the analysis of policy change. Importantly, analysing the influence of research groups and other organisations that were involved will give insight into how knowledge on economic policy was shared and received by the ANC government.

The concept of policy-oriented learning is broadly referred to as a “conscious and structured change in thinking about a specific policy issue” (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). It serves to provide a better understanding of the possible outcomes of certain policy instruments and is seen as “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intention which result from experience and are concerned with the attainment of policy objectives” (Heclo, 1974). Policy-oriented learning is an important concept of the theory of policy change, it is based on the idea that policy change is a result of learning from others, drawing from experiences, ideas, belief systems and from political elites. However, the belief that public policies are driven by social factors and conflicts is as yet largely untested. Heclo (1974) suggested an approach to public policymaking by focusing on knowledge attainment and utilisation which could provide better descriptions and understandings about public policies than the existing conflict-oriented policy theory. Thus, policy-learning seeks to offer an alternative to this argument, as it largely argues
that states and policymakers adjust policies based on what they have learnt from their past experiences and how past policies have performed.

There are many views available of South Africa’s post-apartheid policymaking process and decisions between 1993 and 2006 (e.g. Bond 1999; Roux 2002). However, much of the current study does not consider learning as a possible contributor to the decision-making process of public policy. The study focuses on how policymakers and administrators during that period adopted policies and attempts to see whether the change in policy resulted from policy-learning. Current studies on the concept of policy-oriented learning have only analysed policy change in Europe, America and Southeast Asia (e.g. Hall 1993; Sabatier 1987/1988; Heclo 1974; Blyth 2002) but not in Africa. Thus, the study makes use of literature on policy-learning and applies it to South Africa’s economic policies.

1.3 The Objective of the Study

The study attempts to operationalise and measure the concept of policy-oriented learning by analysing several policy changes South Africa experienced between 1994 and 2006. The study aims to interpret the existing literature on policy-learning and expand upon the analytical perspective which attempts to explain what factors of learning influence public policy decisions other than the long-standing conflict-based policy theory – which argues that policy change occurs due to power and conflict (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). It is important to note that the study does not introduce new material to the ongoing analyses around policy-learning.

This study attempts to offer a new perspective on South Africa’s policymaking process. Particularly paying attention to the transitional period (1991-1994) and between 1994 and 2006 when RDP, GEAR and ASGISA were adopted, furthermore, it attempts to look at instances of policy-learning in organisations that were involved in the construction and implementation of these policies. The three economic policies introduced differ in their formulation processes and ideologies. Thus, the study is an attempt to understand why there were these differences.

The overall objective of this study is to analyse the policymaking process in South Africa between 1993 and 2006 and locate instances where policy-oriented learning was implemented. Additionally, the study will establish if, how and to what extent policy-learning influenced South Africa’s policy change, who were the main actors involved and what their learning
process involved. This will assist in providing a broader understanding of the kind of circumstances and conditions that led the government to change policies.

The study attempts to answer the following primary and sub-questions:

**Was policy-oriented learning part of the policymaking process in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies?**

a. What were the underlining similarities and differences in the formulation of these policies?
b. Can the concept of policy-learning explain the decisions behind the shifts in policy?
c. Was the process of learning by-passed due to the political environment?

The research questions above have been constructed to assist in understanding the factors that led to these economic policy choices as well as understand whether learning formed part of the policymaking process. In addition, they will assist in establishing whether there was a pattern in the way in which policymakers went about formulating these policies. In attempting to answer the above research questions, the research has collected information and data from past literature and documentation analysing the RDP, GEAR and ASGISA policies. Furthermore, ANC economic document and government policy documents were analysed, and in-depth interviews were conducted with key individuals that were present and involved in the formulation of these policies.

In the future, this study may be used by policymakers as a tool to assess their thoughts and behaviour towards policy formulation.

**1.4 Research Design and Methodology**

The cases of policy change analysed in this study are derived from South Africa’s economic policy changes between 1994 and 2006. The research outlines these policies, the impetus behind them, their formulation process, their outcomes and the core ideas and groups involved. A combination of content analysis of government documents such as policy documents, memorandums, white papers, working groups, articles and books on these policies, elite interviews and personal observation of public discussions were used. The study adopts the *qualitative research* methodology to understand and analyse the policy formulation process and decisions that were adopted by the incoming democratic government in 1994 and twelve
years into democracy. The qualitative method is relevant to the study as it enables one to explain social behaviours and to think through existing or emerging concepts. Furthermore, it provides useful explanations and forms a platform for new inquiries (Yin, 2016). Within this study, several research methods under the umbrella of qualitative research methods were adopted to provide an in-depth analysis of the economic policymaking in South Africa.

Firstly, as the study only focuses on South Africa’s policymaking process between 1994 and 2006, the study adopts the single case-study method. The single case-study method offers a means of achieving an in-depth understanding of the behaviour and experiences of a single case (King, n.d.). South Africa was identified as an ideal case study mainly because of the shifts in economic policies it experienced within a relatively short space of time.

Secondly, descriptive research, which can assist in understanding and analysing a new concept has been adopted to assist in describing and understanding the concept of policy-oriented learning (Bless, Higson-Smith, & Sithole, 2013). Literature by Hall (1993), Sabatier (1988), Heclo (1974) and others who have written on policy-learning and policy change have been referred to and forms part of the literature review. Furthermore, descriptive research has allowed for various types of information and data to be collected in the study. Most importantly the descriptive research enabled the study to test factual hypotheses, particularly the argument that public policy is a result of socioeconomic and political conditions.

Thirdly, the study has relied heavily on secondary research, mainly because the study itself focuses on a specific period that required analysing historical data. Secondary research includes information and data that have been collected by other researchers or institutions in the same field of study (Bless, Higson-Smith, & Sithole, 2013). The secondary research utilised includes ANC policy documents, official government policy, books, academic journals as well as internet-based articles that refer to the specific policies in question. Kemp and Weehuizen (2005), offer a guide on how to study policy-learning. They advise that one ask actors directly or indirectly by analysing written and verbal statements. Thus extensive literature on these specific policies has been engaged, referenced and compared with.

Apart from consulting existing literature on South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies and existing policy documents, the study is informed by formal interviews, conducted in 2017 and 2018 with individuals that were present during former President Mandela and President
Mbeki’s administration, particularly those that were present and directly involved in the policy formulation and decisions between 1994 and 2006. Respondents were selected based on their history in South Africa’s transition, as well as their involvement and closeness to the policymaking process during the adoption of each policy. A key respondent is a former finance minister who was involved in both the RDP and GEAR policies. Key respondents included former finance minister Trevor Manual, Prof. Vishnu Padayachee, Dr. Iraj Abedian, Dr. Neva Makgetla and Mr. Goolam Aboobaker. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed to gain data. In conducting these interviews, the author was able to gain access to other key informants through snowball sampling. These interviews provided a perspective on how debates on economic policies took place and how knowledge of economic policy, policy formulation and implementation was disseminated and received between 1993 and 2006. The individual experiences and understanding of South Africa’s policymaking process were particularly focused on. Furthermore, the interviews provided information on how former-government officials and former policymakers viewed policymaking in South Africa. When access to certain individuals became a challenge, due to their high professional profile, alternative interviews were arranged with key individuals who have written extensively on these policies. These individuals had vital knowledge and data relating to the policymaking process and were in some cases involved in research groups that consulted on these policies.

In general, while conducting this research, it became evident that information and data from multiple sources allowed the author to create converging lines of inquiry. Which is why the qualitative method was adopted for this study, in order to make use of various research methods, namely descriptive research, single case-study, secondary research and in-depth interviews. The information and data collected were analysed making use of the thematic content analysis technique, which is useful for examining trends and patterns in documents. It is a method that examines and records themes within data by recognising patterns and similarities that are relevant to the phenomenon and the research question. With the interviews conducted, what was looked for were similarities in the personal experience of each respondents in the policymaking process between 1993-1994; their recollection of how the ANC and government began debates on new economic policy; how research on feasible policy options were conducted and who were the main actors and institutions that were involved; if new policies represented lessons learnt by government and if capacity to formulate and implement policy developed over time.
1.5 Ethical Considerations

The research study relied on information and data obtained from the existing literature and interviews that were conducted with key individuals that were present and directly involved in the formulation process of the economic policies in question. Thus, it was imperative that the study adhered to key ethical practices because of the human participants and the intellectual property. Ethics in research is important as it ensures that research is conducted according to high moral standards and does not harm people or communities intentionally or accidentally. It serves to protect the human rights of participants and that of the researcher. Research ethics rests on a set of principles that guide the process of ethical review. These principles include non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, fairness, and trustworthiness (Bless, Higson-Smith, & Sithole, 2013).

The research subjects for the study were former and current government officials, who have either been directly involved during the policymaking process or the implementation stages. These government officials are regarded as professional and elite interviewees. This posed an ethics challenge, mainly due to the specialist professional role and the positions they held and hold. Thus confidentiality, anonymity and consent agreements were crucial. At most times, the author came across challenges of access and participants declining to participate where they were expected to speak freely and confide in the interviewer. The following ethics practices were followed:

**Autonomy:** All participants were given the opportunity to consider and re-consider their participation and contribution throughout the study, as they were provided beforehand with the interview questions and an information sheet detailing the purpose and intention of the research, as well as what was expected of them.

**Anonymity:** The key informants mostly included prominent government officials. Consequently, the researcher adhered to those individuals who requested to not be identified.

**Consent:** Before interviews were conducted, participants were informed fully of the purpose, any risks and costs involved and the methods and intended use of the study. In addition, participants received an information sheet that detailed the purpose of the study and what was
expected of their participation. Furthermore, participants were required to sign a consent form for a formal interview after the initial meeting during which the research area was discussed.

**Respect and confidentiality:** Requests by participants to remain anonymous was honoured. Furthermore, the decision by some of the participants to no longer participate in the study was respected. In such cases, the information, as well as the data that was collected from them, was discarded. All participants were directed to the SEBS Ethics Committee to address any concerns regarding their participation.
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Understanding policy, policymaking and the decision-making process

Before analysing policy, it is important to understand concepts such as policy and policymaking. Policy refers to, “the actions of government and the intentions that determine those actions” (Cochran, et al., 1999). In other words, these are the basic principles guiding the government. Furthermore, policy consists of political decisions for implementing programmes to achieve certain policy goals (Peters G., 1999). Policy as defined by Guba (1984) is an “assertion of intent or goals, a governing body’s decision to regulate, control, promote, service and otherwise influence matters within its sphere of authority, and a strategy undertaken to solve a problem”. There is no single definition of policy, however, according to Birkland (2015), a policy is made by the government in response to a problem, it is interpreted and implemented by public and private actors, and it is what government chooses to do or not do.

Thus, policies are developed by government bodies and officials and therefore focuses on the purposive action by or for governments (Walt, 1994). In general, government institutions set specific goals and objectives they aspire to achieve. Thus, a policy is directed towards the accomplishment of a purpose or goal that is seen to be in the best interests of society. For example, policy goals may include an improved health system, an increase in the employment rate, improved trade, poverty reductions and an advancing economy. These may take different forms; a policy may be a law or a set of regulations that govern a specific issue in society. For example, in 1994 the new South African government adopted a policy, namely the RDP, to address the economic problems as well as factors such as inequality, unemployment and the high levels of poverty. Two definitions of policy are adopted in this study, these being, policy as a strategy undertaken by the government to solve a problem and policy as a set of guidelines that guide the government’s actions on a specific problem.

For there to be a policy, government or institutions must go through a policymaking process. The policymaking process refers to the preparation of draft legislation, regulations, white paper or discussion documents where members of government, society and interest groups can discuss, raise concerns and provide input on a proposed policy that indicates the governments intent to address a particular issue. Thus, the policymaking process consists of several phases,
which are linked, the process itself does not have a definite beginning or end (Dunn, 2004). According to Wolman (1981), policy formulation includes several components, each affecting the overall performance of a policy. These components include agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, policy assessment and policy adaptation. However, in other cases policies are adopted first and then justified by working backwards to agenda setting (Dunn, 2004). The policymaking process is a vital part of a policy, as it is the link between political institutions and policy outcomes. The various stages of policymaking are outlined below:

Policy agenda setting is the stage at which policy issues are identified and defined. According to Wolman (1981), policy formulation begins with the ‘conceptualisation of a policy problem’, this conceptualisation stage includes data collection where stakeholders identify critical issues and demand government action. Policymakers acknowledge that a policy issue can only reach the political agenda if it is converted into a political issue.

Policy formulation is the stage at which policies are created or changed (World Health Organization, 2005). This stage occurs when officials or policymakers develop an effective and alternative course of action to address an issue on the policy agenda (Hayes, 2001). Furthermore, during the formulation stage, the policy assumes the form of executive instructions, court decisions and legislative acts that must be approved through a political process before a policy is adopted.

Policy adoption is the stage at which a policy has gone through the government process and is then adopted by means of a decision by the cabinet and government departments as official government policy.

Implementation of a policy is the stage during which an adopted policy is carried out. Implementation is defined as the “carrying out of basic policy decisions, usually incorporated in a statute but can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). The policy is thus carried out by administrative units within the government who allocate financial and administrative resources to comply with the policy.

Policy evaluation is conducted by policymakers once a policy is implemented. During this process, the government determines whether government agencies, legislatures and courts are
following the policy requirements. These include monitoring and assessments of existing or proposed policies. This stage particularly covers the content, implementation, and outcomes of policies. Evaluation is an important stage in policymaking as it will indicate the effectiveness, efficiency and consistency of an adopted policy. Furthermore, it assists policymakers in adjusting policy so that the government can implement policies effectively and efficiently.

These five stages represent the policy formulation process. Policy analysts and policymakers explore alternative approaches to solving policy problems constantly. Therefore, the formulation process does not necessarily end in the adoption of an isolated and firm policy, in fact, Turnpenny et al. state that “policies continue to be reformulated and re-evaluated throughout their implementation” (2015), which can be seen as tool-informed learning. Overall, policy represents a decision made by a government body on behalf of public interest and the formulation process, involves a process of making good decisions (Torjman, 2005). Policymakers, which may include government and non-government officials, interest groups and international organisations consider a range of options and their potential impact on a specific policy issue when making policy decisions. Factors such as who will benefit, who will be negatively affected, the period required for implementation, costs, financing and political complexities are considered during the policymaking process (Torjman, 2005). At the end of this process, a policy is implemented. However, the effectiveness of a policy cannot be determined by the policymaking process alone as several factors such as the stability, the credibility of a policy and the political processes in a country influences the outcome of a policy. Therefore, an understanding of these factors is important for this study, particularly examining how political institutions, political incentives and behaviours influence the policymaking process, which can influence the properties of public policies and their outcomes and how these consequently influence policy change.

2.2 Policymaking in South Africa between 1991-2006

The apartheid era presented significant policy challenges for South Africa during the transition period between 1991 and 1994. Early in the 1980s, South Africa’s economy was experiencing a long-term decline in economic growth compared to other global markets (Aron, Kahn, & Kingdon, 2009). Several factors underpinned the decline in the economy between 1980 and 1994. These included the fall in the price of gold, the decline of production and employment in the manufacturing sector which resulted in slow GDP growth, high unemployment rates, the
imposition of political and economic sanctions, the increase in interest rates, and the segregation policies implemented by the apartheid system that limited the black majority’s participation in economic and political activities. Thus, the combination of the deteriorating economy, the economic and political sanctions and the political conflict that heightened between 1960 and 1990 worsened economic growth and led to the apartheid system being unsustainable by the early 1990s. The collapse of the South African currency, high inflation rates and the fast decline of the production rate heralded the end of the Apartheid regime. It became very clear that the crisis facing South Africa could only be resolved through economic and political transformation.

What followed were several secret meetings and negotiations between the apartheid government, Nelson Mandela and the leadership of the ANC between 1989 and 1993. These negotiations resulted in the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 and the unbanning of anti-apartheid political parties (ANC, PAC and SACP) in 1991. This led to the repeal of the segregationist policies and the coming together of the National Party (NP) government and the ANC-alliance to map out South Africa’s future. During these negotiations, economic reform was recognised as the most important factor and rightly so. Both the NP and the ANC-alliance forged separate economic models to present during negotiations. This became a crucial period in South Africa’s economic and political transition. Subsequently, economic policymaking in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 was characterised by the transitional period and negotiations.

During this period, it was highly anticipated that the ANC would win the 1994 election. Thus, the political party was confronted with the daunting task of putting together an economic policy strategy that would address all the challenges of apartheid and at the same time appeal to domestic and global markets. Furthermore, the transition period was marked by high expectations that economic performance could be a turnaround and a transformation that ensured cohesion, inclusion and opportunity for all – particularly those groups who were previously disadvantaged and had been prevented from benefiting from the economy. Restructuring the economy was very important and reflected the need to integrate previously disadvantaged groups into formal economic sectors. Thus, while the 1994 democratic election was viewed as the culmination of political liberation, it was also viewed as the start of economic restructuring. When the ANC was elected as the new government in 1994, it was faced with
several challenges, specifically the need to introduce an inclusive and democratic economic policy.

The ANC thus adopted neo-liberal ideas which for many years characterised South Africa’s economic policies and its policymaking process. Historically, the ANC had placed little emphasis on economic issues, so much so that when they were unbanned in 1991 and began the process of negotiations and discussion with domestic and foreign institutions on the political and economic transition, their economic policies were unclear (Terreblanche, 1999). However, before 1991 the ANC was not concerned with the economy as its first and greatest priority was to dismantle the apartheid government. Nonetheless, the ANC’s policy formulations can be traced back to 1955. Before 1991, the ANC’s economic policy was influenced by several factors and events. Firstly, it was influenced by anti-colonial African socialist movements, mainly characterised by the nationalisation of large corporations with compensation, land reforms, the expansion of the state and the use of state-owned companies for economic advancements (Hirsch, 2005). This thinking was supported by the 1955 Freedom Charter document, a set of core principles adopted by the ANC-alliance, which in its economic section refers to the nationalisation of key industries. However, by the late 1980s, when the economy was in a decline and politics shifted towards possible negotiation on a resolution to the social and political conflicts. The ANC’s economic policy shifted again towards a more conservative form. This shift was influenced by the emergence of the economically vital East and South-East Asia, which was a result of a market-oriented economy and government intervention (Hirsch, 2005). Another factor was the failure of Soviet socialism in Eastern Europe (Hirsch, 2005). Consequently, by 1990 the ANC and other opposition parties in South Africa united around the idea of social democracy following its proposal by Joe Slovo in a paper titled ‘Has Socialism Failed’. However, between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, ANC’s leadership returned to the key principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter.

The Freedom Charter, a key document for the ANC, was adopted in 1955 at the gathering of the Congress of the People in Kliptown, Johannesburg. The gathering consisted of the ANC-alliance, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. Thousands of people gathered over two days to endorse the first policy document that aimed to unify all South Africans in a struggle for a democratic society that was non-racial and non-sexiest (Hirsch, 2005). The Charter is a statement of fundamental principles that declares the following (African National Congress, 1955):
The people shall govern
All national groups shall have equal rights
The people shall share in the country’s wealth
The land shall be shared among those who work on it
All shall be equal before the law
All shall enjoy equal human rights
There shall be work and security
The doors of learning and culture shall be opened
There shall be houses, security, and comfort
There shall be peace and friendship

The Charter has been open to various interpretations. Particularly the declaration that the “The people shall share in the country’s wealth” (African National Congress, 1955). This has been recognised as the economic clause of the Charter, from where the commitment for nationalisation was drawn. The declaration called for the national wealth and heritage be restored to all South Africans; resources, financial institutions and monopoly industries be nationalised; all other industry and trade be managed in a way that benefits the wellbeing of the people; and that all people shall have equal rights to trade, manufacture, and enter professions (African National Congress, 1955). Extensive debates have taken place around this particular clause, with many calling it a radical alternative to the levels of inequality and structures of powers created by apartheid. This specific clause entailed major structural transformation and wealth redistribution from the rich to the poor as it referred to land reform, nationalisation of mines and industry, an increase in government spending on education and housing, job creation and generalised wage increases (Suckling & White, 1988).

During the transitional period, the leadership of the ANC had committed itself to the nationalisation programme of the Charter (Freund, 2013). However, as Nelson Mandela met with business leaders around the world from early 1990, he began to rethink the economic policy position of the ANC, particularly because of the criticism it received from local and foreign businesses and the effect it had on business confidence. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders were exposed to a campaign by international capitalist forces to adopt an economic policy that would gain business confidence and align South Africa to neoliberal model of economics (Freund, 2013). They were advised against nationalisation policies by representatives from Britain, Vietnam, China and the Netherlands. As a result the ANC
abandoned nationalisation and the radical economic policies proposed in the Charter, mainly because of the pressure received from local and foreign business, but also the ANC leadership realised that although nationalisation may still be a policy option, it could be a risk to the financial resources of the new government, as there was not enough wealth to be able to solve the problem of the poor through redistribution of wealth (Hirsch, 2005). Thus, with this new understanding of the possible implications of nationalisation, the ANC moved away from this ideology and began to work on an economic policy that they deemed more democratic. Although there was the perception that the ANC had no policymaking capacity, one may argue that this was not necessarily the case. ANC may not have had new progressive ideas and economic strategies, but it did have structures in place for policy discussions before its unbanning and before the 1994 elections. For example, during the late 1980s and before 1990, there were several international conferences hosted on the post-apartheid economy. These conferences provided a platform for both South Africa and international social scientists to engage with ANC academics, leaders and economic thinkers to begin addressing post-apartheid economic challenges (Padayachee, 1998). Furthermore, there were other meetings taking place between ANC leaders in exile, businesses and non-governmental leaders that discussed the post-apartheid economy. One such meeting was organised in Lusaka, Zambia, in mid-1989, it resulted in the gathering of about 238 delegates which included academics, business people, media and ANC representatives.

In addition, several research groups were developing reports that informed post-apartheid policy leaders. These research groups included the MERG and the ET. The ET was established to serve the policy needs of COSATU, a key ally to the ANC. The ET was conducting advisory research on policy relating to the economic sanctions for COSATU, however, following the end of apartheid, the ET shifted to analysing the causes of the economic crisis in South Africa to offer well-informed policy advise (Hirsch, 2005). Similarly, the ANC had established a Department of Economic and Planning in the mid-1980s which later became the Department of Economic Policy (DEP) in 1990. The DEP conducted research, carried out policy analysis and formulated new policies, they further briefed ANC leaders on economic affairs, coordinated with trade unions, business and the international community, ensuring the awareness and participation of ANC members in economic policy formulation, trained ANC members in economic matters, coordinated economic research, established an institute of economic policy research and training, and gathered and processed economic intelligence (Mandela & Padayachee, 1995). However, despite such initiatives, the DEP lacked the capacity
to formulate policy and the level of economic knowledge was low, which raised concerns of the ability of the ANC’s structures to present and address economic policy matters (Padayachee V. , 2017). It was thus recommended by the leadership of the ANC, that urgent restructuring of the policy formulation capacity of the ANC, particularly the DEP was required. Furthermore, the ANC leadership soon realised that its’ socialist ideals (nationalisation) were not particularly popular with foreign investors. Nelson Mandela realised following his visit to Davos, Switzerland in 1991 – at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, where the first official statement of South Africa’s economic policy was to be given– that the ANC needed to adopt a more market-friendly economic policy.

As a result, during a visit to Canada in 1990, Nelson Mandela requested assistance from the Canadian authorities in economic research, analysis and policy formulation. This reflected a shift in the ANC’s economic policy thinking, from demand-led, nationalisation policies to more market-friendly, market-oriented approaches (Mandela & Padayachee, 1995). Policymaking and formulation within the ANC-alliance thus began with economic consensus building in the years leading up to 1994. The ANC-alliance engaged with union leaders, local and foreign business leaders, international and domestic politicians, and representatives from South Africa’s financial institutions and academics on initiatives towards economic policymaking (Aron, Kahn, & Kingdon, 2009). One highly recognised initiative was the emergence of MERG, which was a project proposed by Canada’s IDRC – who were in partnership with the ANC-alliance and the African National Civic Organisation (ANCO) between 1991 and 1995, to conduct several missions in South Africa to assist in its democratic transition, particularly on economic policy following Mandela’s request. What emerged was MERG.

MERG was established to assist the ANC in developing a macroeconomic model and setting economic policy recommendations that the ANC could adopt. The MERG project included a number of researchers who were South African economists who believed in social democracy. These included Brian Kahn, Stephen Gelb, Alec Erwin and Maria Ramos whom all become key policymakers and leaders within the South African government structures and the academic field. The MERG project aligned itself to the democratic movement by adopting key economic policy objectives from both the ANC and COSATU which were directed toward “eliminating extreme poverty and inequalities, democratising the state and the economic industrial policy, creating employment opportunities, developing human resources and enhancing technological capability” (MERG, 1993). It also aimed to create a social wage and
to empower civil society. The ET which was only accessible to COSATU fed into the MERG project. MERG used these objectives as a starting point and took the approach of growth through redistribution (Freund, 2013). The aim of MERG thus become to “secure a rapid improvement in the quality of life of the poorest and disadvantaged groups in South Africa” (MERG, 1993). MERG produced a report that considered South Africa’s economy as a whole, emphasising certain areas of concern, this report provided policy recommendations to the ANC emphasising projects towards job creation, training programmes for unemployed peoples, programmes to improve the status of poor women, the improvement of access and quality education and healthcare, housing and electrification, the raising of the minimum wage and the improvement of the skills of employed workers (MERG, 1993). Both the MERG and ET research initiatives represented a substantial body of skills that could be referred to for policy determinations. One may see these as instances of knowledge sharing and learning from experts. However, it is important to note that, despite the recommendation by MERG and the subsequent report it produced, in the final years of 1993 and before the 1994 democratic elections the MERG report was dumped unceremoniously and the ANC implemented none of its recommendations.

Economic policymaking in South Africa between 1991 and 1994 can be seen as being characterised by the transitional period which included several negotiations between the NP, who attempted to keep its power by introducing its own economic policy. Additionally, it was characterised by the ANC’s attempt, through a collective process, to navigate inputs from its alliance partners, research groups and domestic and international experts on economic policy. The RDP was a by-product of this collective process that included several consultations with all stakeholders and civil society. Contrary to the belief that the ANC had no policymaking capacity, Abedian (2018) states that the leadership of the ANC were well equipped at that time to formulate policies, the government structures that they were to inherit may not have had the capacity, yet the ANC leadership were equipped politically and ethically. Thus, although the government departments the ANC inherited were not equipped, capable or capacititated to participate in policymaking, [due to the political ideology of the apartheid government who centralised economic policymaking at the department of finance] they had a plan, they had political will and they were willing to learn to ensure that they could adopt the necessary policymaking capacity. Trevor Manuel the former finance minister stated that those that were brought into government in 1994, “were policy novices, we needed to read voraciously, we needed to test our ideas with a series of assumptions and we needed to overlay that on the
reality” (2017). Furthermore, one needs to understand that when the ANC was elected into government, they faced a myriad of challenges and policymaking was one of them. The political and economic transition provided key constraints to the policymaking process, for example, the new incoming government had limited time frame to restructure the state, very little experience in governing and very little legitimacy to a democratically elected government (Manuel, 2017). Consequently, the new ANC government needed to manage the different relationships between government, trade union movements, businesses and labour unions that were all key to the policymaking process.

On the other hand, between 1994 and 2006, the ANC embarked on economic strategies that focused on development economics, aiming at facilitating and restructuring the economy. The ANC led government had over the years developed the capacity to formulate policy, which allowed key economic departments to be able to participate in policy discussions and during policy formulation. As a result, the formulation processes of both GEAR and ASGISA differ slightly to that of the RDP. Although GEAR still relied on expert advice, it was formulated within the department of finance and the president’s office. Nonetheless, the government was able to call on key experts within its department to discuss key policy issues. Although consultation remained a key process, it was done on a smaller scale and in a more closed manner than what was done with the RDP. Only a few key individuals were involved in the policy formulation, particularly with GEAR, while ASGISA allowed for wider consultation although it was limited to key experts.

Overall, policymaking in South Africa between 1993 and 2006 centred around sustainable growth-through-redistribution and redistribution-through-growth. It was characterised by the political and economic transition into democracy, and the constant need of policymakers and government to redress the wrongs of the past. The debates on economic policy during the transitional period mostly depended on the consultations and advice of the domestic and international community. In the early days, the ANC and its alliance sought expert advice from well-established institutions like the Canadian IDRC, MERG, the ET and the National Economic Forum. Between 1996 and 2006 the ANC government’s policymaking capacity evolved and developed over the years, which enabled the government to formulate these policies through its own structures and depended on the knowledge and expertise of experts from government departments. By requesting such expert advice, consulting with various
stakeholders and navigating inputs from all parties involved, one can perceive it as evidence of learning and the sharing of knowledge on the part of policymakers.

2.3 The Theory of Policy Change

According to Bennet and Howlett (1992) “policy change refers to incremental shifts in existing structures or new and innovative policies”. Policy change is a result of events and factors that set the stage for major change, these include dramatic events or crises, external shocks (such as trade and global financial crisis), internal domestic shocks (such as drought, unemployment, and taxation), negotiated agreements, changes in the governing coalitions and administrative and legislative turnover (Schlager, 2007). Policy change can be seen as the process of improving the performance and outcomes of an existing system, ensuring its efficiency and equitable response to future changes. It is understood that policy changes in a variety of ways. Some policies are new and innovative, whilst others change due to alterations of earlier policies. Sabatier (1988) states that a change in policy is usually the result of changes in external factors such as macroeconomic situations or new governance (institutional change).

There are several factors, such as public opinion, social and economic conditions, scientific discoveries, advancement of technology, nongovernmental organisations, lobbying from business and interest groups and political activities that influence policy outcomes directly or indirectly. Not only do domestic policy issues affect a country’s public policies but influences from the international community have a significant impact, such as globalisation. Issues such as poverty, low levels of development, abuse of human rights, global economic recession, migration and environmental deterioration require regional and international cooperation (Roux N. , 2002).

Subsequently, policy formulation is mostly understood as a social and political process, mainly because at most times, policies are developed in response to social, political and economic conditions in a country. The conflict-based theory argues that policy changes due to social pressures and conflicts (Heclo, 1974). However, the belief that social pressures drive public policies has recently been challenged by the theory of policy-learning. Heclo (1974) suggested that policy-learning should be used to analyse policies as it could yield better explanations and an understanding of policies. Consequently, policy-learning highlights that states and organisations can change policies by learning from others, as knowledge is seen as a factor that
influences policy by catalysing new debates and new opportunities (Cerna, 2013). This concept is outlined in the next section and further discussed.

2.4 Policy Learning

The main conceptual framework that guides this study is policy-learning. In this context, learning suggests a rational decision-making process by governments on policy issues to ensure that policy becomes more efficient and effective in achieving policy objectives (Marsh & Sharman, 2009). According to Marsh and Sharman (2009), policy-learning can lead to complete or partial policy transfer. The concept of policy-oriented learning derives from the theory of policy change, which refers to a change in thinking about policy problems, leading to a better understanding of the effects of certain policy instruments which result in a change in policy. Sabatier (1988) defines policy-oriented learning “as a relatively continuing series of alterations in the thought or behavioural intentions which result from experiences and new information”. Heclo (1974) on the other hand defines policy-learning as a continuous change in the thought and behavioural intentions of policymakers, which results from their experiences and is concerned with the realisation of policy goals.

Policy-learning generally entails policymakers learning about the “viability of policy interventions”, the “social construction of a policy” and “the strategy for advocating a given policy idea” (May, 1992). This learning according to May (1992), may lead to policymakers understanding why a policy has failed and thus improve policy performance. In addition, this learning may lead to the redefinition of policy goals and a more sophisticated policy idea. Thus, the concept of policy-learning looks at the connection between learning and policy change.

However, policy-learning is a mixed concept, as different types of learning exist. These are distinguished as social learning, political learning, lesson drawing, instrumental learning and casual and diagnostic learning. These are important to distinguish, because their interactions will assist in understanding what factors lead to policy change. Hall (1993) describes three of these types of policy-learning. The first is instrumental learning, this is when policymakers adjust or improve policy instruments to attain a specified set of targets (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). Instrumental learning “results from showing that one implementation approach is preferred over another, either through formal evaluation or more limited comparison” (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). The second is conceptual learning, this occurs when the outlook on a
problem changes, thus the policy adopts new concepts, principles and images. It deals specifically with the goals and strategies of a policy (Kemp & Weehuizen, 2005). The instruments of a policy are altered without drastically changing the order of goals behind it (Hall, 1993). The third is distinguished as social learning, where learning is a cognitive process that takes place in a social context and involves changes in the hierarchy of goals underlying a policy (Hall, 1993).

Another form of learning is political learning, which occurs “within advocacy coalitions, leading to more sophisticated advocacy of particular proposals or problems” (May, 1992). According to Hall, political learning is thus concerned with “lessons about manoeuvring within and the manipulation of policy processes to advance an idea or problem” (Hall, 1993). Furthermore, lesson drawing is another type of learning in which “policymakers learn from past experiences of others with common problems” (Rose, 1991). Policymakers can draw lessons that will help them deal with similar issues in a better manner (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). Therefore, policymakers can learn from the lessons drawn from past domestic and foreign experiences. Overall, these types of learning are collectively concerned with how the process of learning affects the process of policymaking and decision making, as well as how policymakers adjust policy goals and techniques in response to new evidence (Cerna, 2013).

Thus, these different types of policy-learning will be central to the conceptual framework for the study. Kemp and Weehuizen (2005) advise when studying policy-learning, a distinction should be made between the different types of policy-learning as well as their interactions, but should also establish, ‘what is being learned’, ‘who is learning’ and ‘what effect does this learning have on policy’. Thus, in the South African case, the study will distinguish between which types of learning characterised the policy changes and it will closely look at the conditions that led to the change and hopefully identify the key factors and actors that influenced these policy decisions through policy-learning.

As with most concepts, policy-learning cannot be directly observed, however, May (1992) provides various indicators for each type of learning that should be seen as evidence of policy-learning. The first indicator of policy-learning would be a change in instruments or a change in existing policy programmes for carrying out a policy (May, 1992). The redesign of a policy, where key factors of the implementation process are changed or adjusted may include assistance, funding, the timing of implementation, and organisational structures. A second
indicator would be the redefining of a policy, that is changing the policy objectives and goals of existing policy (May, 1992). A third indicator is a change in political strategy (May, 1992). This is when policymakers adopt new tactics to deal with a policy problem. Therefore, when analysing South Africa’s RDP, GEAR, and ASGISA policies, these indicators will be examined to answer the research question.

Useful literature is available on South Africa’s economic policy, both during the transitional period between 1991 and 1994 and between 1994 and 2006. In particular, the transition from an apartheid state to a democratic state and the debates around economic policy post-1993 has been documented by many (Freund, 2013, Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013 and Padayachhee, 1998), however, they do very little to analyse economic policymaking from the perspective of learning. For example, Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013), in their paper deal specifically with state restructuring involving the emergence and consolidation of a dominant national treasury, which enabled the treasury in post-apartheid to develop the ability to shape policymaking across all areas of state intervention, and establish an efficient and effective workforce, and the ability to implement macro-economic framework and an oversight apparatus which strengthened macro-economic policy reform. This restructuring was crucial for post-apartheid South Africa, particularly for the new democratic government who needed to address the legacies of apartheid. Thus, although restructuring of the state somewhat deals with an aspect of learning, this is more about the restructuring of public administration and rebuilding the government to be more efficient and effective. Which reflects more the concept of new public management (NPM). NPM is a model of public administration that developed in the 1980s, that represented the restructuring of the public sector to more business-like and improve government efficiency by borrowing management models from the private sector. In other words, decentralising control of resources, exploring better and effective ways of service delivery. Fundamental to NPM according to Chipkin and Lipietz (2012) is the emphasis on novel incentive structures to combat inefficient and wasteful practices of traditional public management, which derives from public sector choice theories and new institutional economics, which introduced result-orientated and performance-related operating principals to keep government efficient. In addition, NPM sought to increase the accountability of government through the introduction of market-based mechanisms.
In the South African context, NPM was introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s during the transitional period. There were debates developing about the form of post-apartheid public sector service. There was a gathering in 1991, the Mount Grace Conference on the National Public Administration Initiative, that debated questions around restructuring the apartheid state from highly bureaucratic to a democratic administration, which would include “partnerships between civil societies and state structure to increase public control of and participation in administrative governance and service delivery; and financial and democratic accountability” (Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012). This was very important to have for the new government, as it would have determined the organisational structure and ability of the new administration. Not to dismiss the concept of NPM, particularly the fact that the restructuring of the apartheid state into a democratic state was crucial and impactful on key government institutions, especially the efficiency of government in policymaking, policy regulation and implementation, and subsequently service delivery. However, the concept of NPM is not key to this study. Mainly because it does not deal specifically with the concept of learning. Chipkin and Meny-Gilbert (2012) cite Ngoma (2007:235) who argues that NPM never questions the skills and competencies [of government managers], it instead assumes that they have the necessary training and the required competencies to lead and direct change. Therefore, as much as NPM sought to change traditional public management, which is seen as bureaucratic, law-driven administrations, into an innovative and adaptive public service that can deliver efficiently and effectively, in my view, it does not emphasise the importance of a government learning in policymaking. It is rather more concerned about the organisational design of the public sector.

Another term to look at is the developmental state, which is characterised by having strong state intervention and extensive regulation and planning, with the ability to take necessary policy decisions to achieve economic development and social equity. Von Holdt’s study of bureaucracy and the developmental state argues that effective bureaucracy is key for a developmental state to be able to implement ambitious policy programmes (Von-Holdt, 2010). One key attribute of a developmental state is the presence of a Weberian bureaucracy, which is a well-structured, cohesive and a sufficiently resourced administration, that has the correct operational processes to implement policies with a highly skilled and efficient workforce. Post-apartheid South Africa has inserted the concept of a developmental state into the country’s growth strategy [the National Development Plan]. Which was important to do, however since 1994, South Africa has not been able to achieve and sustain the rate of economic growth achieved by the Asian ‘Tigers’ (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan),
which is where the concept of a developmental state emerged from. And this is because there has been growing institutional failures and dysfunctionality within the post-apartheid state. Nonetheless, the concept of a developmental state is important for an effective and efficient government in policymaking and policy implementation.

Heclo (1974), Hall (1993) and Sabatier’s (1988), theories, arguments and findings on what leads to policy change provide a general understanding that through policy-learning, policymakers are able to generate and use knowledge about the motivations, strategies, processes and the impacts of policies on society. Although there seems to be a definitional ambiguity in these works, which suggests that there are different notions of learning, the general argument is that policy-learning can be attributed to the change in policy. Thus, the general approach of policy-learning is that states can learn from their past experiences, from shared ideas and belief systems and states can draw lessons from other states and organisations on certain policies. Policy-learning can assist policymakers by modifying their present actions from the understanding and interpretation of how previous policies performed.

The literature review examines four themes; political elites, ideas, shared beliefs and lesson-drawing. These themes of learning compete in the literature around policy change and are widely used by analysts to describe instances of policy decision stemming from knowledge sharing and knowledge-based judgments for future expectation on policies. The following questions can be answered by examining these themes: Who learns and what is learned? And what are the effects of this learning?

**Political Elites**

Heclo (1974) argues that the growth of the welfare state was a result of the web of objective needs, class capacities and the cumulative learning processes of political tradition. His work focuses on the process of learning among public policymakers. He was particularly concerned with policymaking as a form of government problem solving on society’s behalf (Heclo, 1974). This literature is relevant to the question at hand, as Heclo (1974) argues that policy change is not only due to socioeconomic and political conditions, but that the knowledge and experiences of political elites also influence policy decisions and policy change.
Heclo (1974) defines policy-learning as “a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that results from experiences”. He further explains that two types of policy change occur from policy-learning. The first is ‘classical conditioning’, which is effectively routine and conditioned policy responses (Bevir, 2007), and the second being, ‘instrumental conditioning’, where policy-learning takes place in instances of major policy change (Bevir, 2007). In explaining what factors lead to policy change, Heclo (1974) introduces a model of social learning with three central features. The first suggests that policies change due to new developments in an existing policy after implementation. In other words, policymakers react to the outcomes and legacies of past policies. Secondly, the key actors involved in the learning process are political officials and key experts in public policy (Hall, 1993). Thirdly, social learning emphasises the ability of states to act freely from social pressure (Hall, 1993). Thus, in addition to ‘outside factors’ influencing public policy, Heclo (1974) argues that the knowledge and experiences of political elites should be considered as a factor that can affect policy change. Heclo thus views policy change as an “interaction of actors within a policy community involving both competitions for power and efforts to develop more well-informed means of addressing the policy issues” (1974).

Heclo’s core interest is on the effects of policy-learning on the general process of a policy change. He examines the way in which elites gradually learned more about a specific policy problem and experimented with various solutions to achieve policy objectives (Sabatier P., 1988). For Heclo, the policy process is more about the learning aspect than a process of conflict resolution, as policymakers can learn from the experiences of other authorities and from past governments and how things were done. Thus, policy change is a result of “economic development, the outcome of popular electoral, party competition, the result of interest groups and the emergence and growth of administrative expertise” (Heclo, 1974). This is evident in South Africa, as before the finalisation and the adoption of the RDP in 1994, several consultations and workshops were held with approximately 100 members from the democratic movement social forces (Visser, 2005). ASGISA too was adopted after several consultation sessions with the ANC-alliance and government departments (ANC Youth League, 2009).

As a result, policymakers learn from past experiences, the substance and the process of policy (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). The result of this learning leads to the alterations of policy instruments and programmes as to better achieve policy objectives. Thus, for this study,
examining the role of political elites in policymaking will assist in understanding the political thought process of the policies in question.

**Ideas**

Hall (1993) argues that ideas influence policy change. The ideational approach in policy-learning argues that it is, “systems of ideas which influence how politicians and policymakers learn how to address a policy problem” (Evans, 2009). Hall (1993) attempted to understand the connection between ideas and policymaking, how these ideas influence policies and distinguish the principal actors in social learning. He particularly sought to explain the forces that come together to create paradigm changes and the implication for state theory. His findings assisted in distinguishing these aspects of South Africa’s policies.

Similar to Heclo (1974), Hall defines social learning as, “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experiences and new information” (Hall, 1993). He explains that policy change occurs because of the ideas available to policymakers and officials and he elaborates that, “there are political, economic and social crises that occur which affect policy decisions” (Hall, 1993). In addition, Hall (1993) insists that social learning must be closely related to policy models, which are frameworks embodying linguistics, normative and epistemic dimensions that govern the policy process. He argues that they are more important for policy-learning than political leaders, as they involve information on past experiences. The terminology that policymakers use to communicate their ideas and standards are embodied in a framework that specifies their goals (Hall, 1993). Thus, political authority is essential to the process of policy paradigm, as a change in one policy paradigm to another will likely lead to a shift in the position of authority over policy (Hall, 1993).

Using this stance, social learning forms part of the normal policymaking process whereby decision makers try to understand why some policies succeed while others fail (Hall, 1993). As a result, the key actors of learning are experts in each field of policy, these include state and societal actors. In addition, the argument is made that, “state autonomy from societal forces is the condition which allows policy formation to be characterised by learning rather than by conflict” (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). Hall also cites Bennet & Howlett (1992) who argue that “we need to recognised that parties are not the only channels that bind the state to society and that the direction of policy is also influenced by a network of ideas to which both the state and
society contribute to”. Thus although, the influence of bureaucrats is inexorably increasing while that of politicians declining, both play a key role and influential role in policy formulation.

According to Hall (1993), learning involves three different types of orders, also referred to as the three-fold typology of levels of policy intervention. These are the first-order, second-order and third-order changes. The first-order changes – which are routine adjustments to existing policies – occur because policymakers have experienced something or have come across a problem (Hall, 1993). The second-order changes are changes that occur in policy instruments (Hall, 1993). These instruments are what governments have put in place to achieve certain policy goals. Policymakers adopt new instruments to rectify an identified problem. Lastly, third-order change takes place due to a shift in the goals themselves, which usually result in a new policy (Hall, 1993). Each of these types is associated with a higher level of change and the changes that take place in the first and second levels are equal to changes within a paradigm, whereas changes in the third level corresponded to a change of paradigm (Blyth, 2002). Thus, a change in ideas results in institutional and policy change. But what effect does this learning have on policy change? According to Hall (1993), the policymaking process is, “associated with learning about instruments, whereas learning about policy goals occurs only in special conditions associated with shifts in ‘policy paradigm’ or changes in the dominant set of policy ideas which shape discourse in the policymaking process” (Hall, 1993).

Overall, Hall’s ideational argument is important to examine in the case of South Africa, and the different economic ideas that guided the formulation of the RDP, GEAR and ASGISA policies. Therefore, policy-learning according to Hall (1993), can either lead to certain aspects of a policy changing, these can be objectives or the instruments of a policy, however, the most dramatic change would be the result of a shift to a new policy. This would aid the analysis of whether these three types of policy changes occurred in South Africa. However, Hall’s three orders of changes may at times be unrealistic as he concludes in the case of Britain, where he realised that the third-order change was different in Britain to what he initially outlined. Nonetheless, Hall’s work will assist in examining whether there were special conditions that led to South Africa’s shifts in policy or whether it was a shift in policy ideas.
Shared Beliefs

Sabatier’s (1987,1988) approach argues that policy-learning is a great factor in policy development and change. Sabatier (1987) believes that it is the belief systems of actors belonging to an advocacy coalition that influences policy decisions. Sabatier’s arguments are relevant to the study as it will assist in examining the belief systems of the various actors and organisations involved in the policies. He draws from Heclo’s argument, who viewed, “policy change as being a product of both large-scale social, economic and political changes, and the strategic interaction of people within a policy community involving both competitions for power and efforts to develop more knowledgeable means of addressing the policy problem” (Heclo, 1974). However, Sabatier type of learning specifically focuses on the interaction of political actors from different organisations who share similar policy interests and attempt through these policy networks to respond to changing economic and political conditions (Sabatier P., 1987). Sabatier’s approach differs from Heclo’s as it focuses on the way in which political leaders from different coalitions adjust their belief systems over time. Sabatier (1988), thus defines policy-learning as, “a relatively enduring alteration of thought or behavioural intentions that are concerned with the attainment of the teachings of a policy belief system”. According to Sabatier (1988), policy subsystem or advocacy coalitions are the agents of learning. Advocacy coalitions are understood as policy networks, which include state and non-state-actors who share a similar belief system and play a role in the formulation, dissemination and evaluation of key policy issues.

To understand and explain the connection between belief systems and policy change, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) developed the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which emphasises the importance of the belief systems of policy networks for understanding the role policy analysis has in policy-learning and the effect of learning on government programmes (Sebatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The ACF consists of three simple properties, firstly for one to understand the process of policy change and the role of policy-learning, one needs to focus on a period, as this will allow one to analyse the formulation and implementation of a policy and its programmes. This, in turn, will assist in accurately analysing the success and failures of policy. The second property is that one must focus on analysing ‘policy subsystems’ to be able to understand why policy changes. ‘Policy subsystems’ include actors at various levels who play important roles in the dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas (Sabatier P., 1988). Lastly, public policies can be theorised similarly to belief systems, which are a set of
values, priorities and assumptions of how to achieve policy objectives. Sabatier argues that “the idea that public policies can be theorised like belief systems provides a vehicle for assessing the influence of various actors over time, particularly the role of beliefs in policy change” (1988).

With regards to what is being learned, for Sabatier, it is learning about the core beliefs held by members of a coalition. These beliefs extend to, “fundamental normative and ontological axioms that define personal philosophy” (Sabatier P., 1988). These core beliefs, which are unlikely to change, are involved in the alteration of two other belief structures, namely ‘near core’ and ‘secondary aspects’. Near core – unlikely to change – is the “fundamental policy position concerning the basic strategies for achieving core beliefs” (Sabatier P., 1988). Whereas, secondary aspects – which can change as people learn of the effects of policies – are the “instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement near core” (Sabatier P., 1988). Therefore, for Sabatier, policy-learning improves the understanding of the state of a belief system, it improves the understanding of the relationship between objectives and causes of a belief system, and it detects and response to policy challenges in a belief system (Sabatier P., 1988).

Similar to Hall, Sabatier refers to the three types of policy-learning that happen within the subsystems, these are instrumental learning, conceptual learning and social learning. Thus, in answering the question of what is being learned, Sabatier (Sabatier P., 1987) describes policy-learning as, “an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realise core beliefs” on how to implement public policies better. What are the effects of this learning? For Sabatier, learning is about the techniques and processes to improve policy, by having, “policy encompassing and effectively implementing core beliefs” (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). However, it is not clear as to how learning relates to changes in core beliefs. Sabatier, thus argues that, “while policy-learning is important for policy change and can often alter secondary aspects of a belief system, changes in the core aspect of a policy are usually due to perturbations in non-cognitive factors, external to the subsystem such as macroeconomic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing coalition” (1987). Thus, core beliefs can be influenced by a set of external factors that could cause tension and provide constraints to the core beliefs. These include socioeconomic changes, changes in governance and coalitions, technological advancement, and the impact of past policy decision and existing policies (Sabatier P., 1987).
Overall, Sabatier provides a different perspective for understanding the policymaking process, particularly understanding the relationship between beliefs and policy change. His work focuses on policy networks learning from past experiences on how to better achieve and implement their core beliefs on policy. Sabatier’s definition and framework will form the base in analysing South Africa’s policies and evaluate whether core beliefs influenced the decision-making process.

**Lesson drawing**

Another conception of policy-learning is lesson-drawing. According to Rose (1991), lesson-drawing is a type of learning that allows policymakers to learn from the experiences of others. A lesson is generally understood as an activity undertaken to learn something, or something learned through experience. In this context, a lesson is defined as, “an action-oriented conclusion about a programme in operation elsewhere, the setting can be another city, another state, another nation or organisation’s own past” (Rose, 1991). It also implies that a decision is made to do the same elsewhere. The lesson thus focuses on a specific programme that government may already have or may adopt. The idea that policymakers and governments can learn from others and draw lessons can help policymakers deal with their own problems better (Rose, 1991). This form of learning in basic terms seeks to use the knowledge of others to improve a current problem. Policymakers thus learn something new and thus make decisions on how this new information can better improve existing policy programmes (Rose, 1991).

There are several forms of lesson drawing outlined by Rose (1991), that are seen to be the result of lesson-drawing. Firstly, people can copy, or rather adopt a policy that is already in effect in another jurisdiction, secondly, people can emulate a policy, by adjusting an existing to new and the specific circumstances, thirdly people learn by hybridisation, thus combining parts of a policy from two different places, fourthly, learning can come about through synthesis, by combining familiar elements from a policy that is in effect in three or more different places, and finally by inspirations, people can make use of policies from elsewhere as intellectual stimulus for developing a new policy not implemented elsewhere (Rose, 1991). According to Rose (1991), these five are the common effects of lesson drawing on policymaking.

According to Rose (1991), it is the policymakers who learn from expert professionals and communities that include knowledge-based networks of individuals who are experts and can
advise on common policy concerns. The lesson that is learned in this process includes a decision about a programme in effect elsewhere and whether it can be adopted (Rose, 1991). The process of drawing a lesson includes learning by scanning through existing programmes elsewhere and then producing an alternative programme to a current programme that is ineffective (Bennet & Howlett, 1992). Thus, policymakers learn of a programme that was successful or unsuccessful elsewhere and judge whether it will be helpful to their policy issue. Similar to Sabatier (1988), Rose’s (1991) lesson drawing is a type of learning that affects instruments and programmes adopted by governments. Overall, with lesson-drawing, it is understood that policy networks are informed through policy instruments that exist elsewhere and glean from policy instruments to deal with policy issues, which will result in a programme/policy change.

However, lesson-drawing is limited by the feasibility of what is learned, there is also no guarantee that the lesson drawn will be both desirable and practical. Limitations of lesson-drawing include: it is difficult to tell if a programme from elsewhere will be effective and successful in another country, primarily because of the difference in contexts (Rose, 1991). In most cases, a programme from one nation will be unrelated to the historical experiences of another nation. Thus, it is very important for policymakers to be aware of a country’s historical background and check the feasibility of a programme. Secondly, the preference by policymakers to adopt an idea or programme that has worked effectively elsewhere demonstrates a possible unwillingness to develop new policy ideas (Rose, 1991). This can inversely be viewed as a positive element as policymakers are learning from the experiences of others, however, it indicates that policymakers may not be engaging in research.

Overall, lesson-drawing allows policymakers the opportunity to make use of knowledge from others to improve current programmes. For the current study, the idea of lesson drawing is important, as any evidence of lesson-drawing by the ANC will clearly prove that learning was part of the policymaking process and subsequently resulted in policy change. When analysing the different policies, it appears that before 1994, the ANC relied heavily on the findings of research groups, which can be translated into knowledge sharing and using what others knew and experienced about economic policy as part of the policymaking process. Thus, it will be very useful to analyse the policies from the perspective of ‘lesson-drawing’.
CHAPTER 3: THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

This chapter examines the RDP, the first economic policy to be adopted in post-apartheid South Africa in 1994. It examines the circumstances in which it originated, how it was formulated and its finalisation as a government policy. The role of policy-learning can be analysed closely by examining the different stages of the RDP’s formulation process as this is where instances of policy-learning can be found. The chapter ends with a discussion on whether learning played a key role and exactly which type of learning, as provided by the theory of policy-oriented learning, was present.

3.1 The Reconstruction and Development Plan

The RDP was the first economic policy the ANC-led government adopted in 1994 following the democratic elections. It is described as a united, comprehensible socioeconomic policy strategy, which sought to bring together all South Africans and the resources of the country towards the eradication of apartheid laws and practices and build a democratic society (Government of National Unity, 1994). The RDP came at a time when South Africa needed a new economic policy that would rejuvenate the economy and make it inclusive. Thus, the RDP was seen at the time as the most relevant and appropriate policy to adopt as it was a “comprehensive response to the conditions democracy inherited and it dealt with the basic needs approach, focusing on issues of the importance of economic growth and employment creation” (Aboobaker, 2017). It was thus an economic policy strategy that was based on a progressive and developmental approach. The RDP outlined a comprehensive plan to address the previous injustices, particularly the social, economic and spatial challenges. In particular, it aimed at combining growth, development, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation into one economic strategy. It aimed to do this by incorporating ideas of democracy, prosperity and sustainable economic growth. It argued that growth and development were interdependent. Furthermore, the RDP aimed at reducing poverty and inequality, particularly for the previously disadvantaged groups. The RDP was guided by a number of principles which focused on building a democratic nation that was people-oriented and provided peace and security for all.

These key principles focused on building a sustainable economy and meeting the immediate basic needs of the people such as water, electricity, education and healthcare. They also focused on the provision of peace and security for all and building the human resources and
infrastructure in all sectors. Furthermore, nation-building was introduced to firstly ensure that South Africa could develop into a strong nation and secondly would be able to play a role in the international community. Overall these principles depended on a thorough ongoing democratisation process in South Africa. The democratisation of government and its institutions was extremely important to the RDP, as it needed fundamental changes in how policies were formulated and implemented. Thus, through the RDP, democracy was to be an active process empowering everyone to contribute to reconstructing and developing South Africa. The RDP set out to implement several policy programmes that facilitated its aims. These are grouped into five key policy programmes which aimed to attain the long-term objectives of the RDP. These were, “meeting basic needs, developing human resources, building the economy, democratising the state and society and implementing the RDP” (RDP WP, 1994).

The RDP policy was facilitated through the RDP office, which was located at the president’s office and headed by Jay Naidoo, who held the position of Minister of the RDP. The RDP office monitored as well as ensuring that funds and resources were effectively being allocated towards RDP programmes. However, the RDP lost its momentum and by 1996 was replaced by GEAR. Nevertheless, the RDP remains an integral part of South Africa’s economic policies.

3.2 The Origins of the RDP

The RDP was a policy that emerged out of a process involving several consultations, workshops, advise and research from experts in the field of macroeconomics and a combination of the interests and sectors within the ANC. Before the 1994 elections, the ANC was involved in several engagements with movements and research institutions in the form of a policymaking process that involved extensive consultation amongst the ANC alliance, civil societies, research institutions and a wide range of economic policy experts. This was an effort by the ANC to ensure that the economic policy they were to adopt, firstly arose from a democratic process and secondly considered all aspects of development, as well as worked towards addressing the social ills. The policymaking process included a series of events. These included the drafting of several policy documents from the ANC’s headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, several meetings that were held between academics, political leaders and business leaders on economic policy and the consultation of significant policy groups who researched economic policy options. In addition, a range of economic, social and anti-apartheid conferences were held between 1986
and 1990, these were hosted in cities internationally, including, Beijing, Amsterdam, Boston, Freiburg, Harare, Paris and Lausanne. These conferences provided the ANC with a platform to introduce and discuss its economic policy position.

Thus, before the 1994 elections, civic movements and democratic social organisations began to work closely with the ANC to develop a plan for social transformation and a new vision for post-apartheid South Africa. Several experts began to advise the ANC and its alliance on the kind of economic policy it should adopt. COSATU, a key ally of the ANC, is recognised as a key player in the negotiations surrounding the transition and in assisting the ANC in formulating its economic policy position at the time.

**Policy Documents**

The first formal policy document was titled, ‘ANC and COSATU Recommendations on Post-Apartheid Economic Policy’ was drafted by the ANC. This document emanated from a conference in Harare, Zimbabwe in May 1990. It was the first time that South African based economic researchers who were associated with COSATU, ET, Economic Research on Southern Africa, the ANC, and economists from outside of South Africa met to discuss a common economic policy framework (Hirsch, 2005). This policy document was taken as the policy statement of the ANC, which advocated for a growth model that relied on macroeconomic stability, competitiveness and exports, and narrow state intervention to address the past wrongs. Another important factor of the policy document was its emphasis on nationalisation as a possible strategy to ensure a viable state sector. Furthermore, it focused on issues regarding the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors, as well as labour rights, human resources, gender equity issues and welfare and housing programmes to deal with redistribution issues. Thus, offering a conventional, modern social democratic approach to the challenges inherited from the apartheid government to revive the economy.

A second policy document put forth by the ANC, was titled ‘Forward to a Democratic Economy’, which was published by the ANC’s DEP. It was a document put together by ANC economists, which included those that were in exile and those based in South Africa. Unlike the previous policy document, which had been put together five months earlier, there was no influence from COSATU and international advisers. However, the policy document shared similar recommendations referring to wealth and income redistribution and the restructuring of
key industrial (Hirsch, 2005). One notable difference is its recommendation that the private sector would play a significant role in the economy as this would build business confidence and assist the government in achieving its democratic development goals.

A third key policy document was, ‘The Ready to Govern’ document. The document represented a set of proposed policies that the ANC intended to pursue. The economic section recommended policy actions that aimed to create a strong, dynamic and balanced economy through eliminating poverty and inequalities, democratising the state and private sector, creating employment opportunities, improving the quality of life for all through sustainable growth and development, developing a regional economy and considering the environmental impact (African National Congress, 1992). Furthermore, the economic section outlined key policy areas, these included the “anti-trust, anti-monopoly and mergers policy, the fiscal and monetary policy, the labour market policy, rural development, industrial policy, trade and foreign investment, the mining and energy policy and regional cooperation in African” (African National Congress, 1992).

Research Initiatives

Several policy research networks and academic-led think-tanks developed in the early 1990s to assist the ANC and its allies, which focused on economic analysis and policy issues. These included the ET, the Industrial Strategy Projects (ISP) and MERG.

The ET, formulated by COSATU, did not play a significant role in the economic policy thinking of the ANC, mainly due to the strained relationship between the two political organisations. COSATU commissioned a group of economists to work on reports analysing the impact of sanctions on South Africa’s economy, the research showed that the economic crisis in South Africa was a result of apartheid policies. As a result, the commission became a critique of the economics of apartheid and shifted to conducting research on policy issues. The ET managed to create a network of university-based researchers and a comprehensible group of over twenty economists with robust and diverse skills, who provided work for major national labour movements. Thus, the ET was viewed as a body that provided COSATU with quality economic policy advice. However, Padayachee (1998) argues that it was not an initiative that could provide a full set of alternative policy prescriptions for post-apartheid South Africa. Firstly, because the trade unions did not favour it, secondly because its weak relationship with
the ANC made it difficult to engage at such a level and thirdly because it was reluctant to be associated with a political movement. The ET did, however, play a significant and leading role at the Harare Conference in Zimbabwe in 1990, which was a gathering that included progressive economists from South Africa and London to discuss economic policy options for South Africa. The ET was only viewed as a useful framework for historical context rather than for policy analysis (Padayachee V., 1998).

The ISP was another initiative suggested by COSATU, it originated from the ET. COSATU launched a new research project to conduct policy-focused research. The research carried out by the ISP was conducted for social and political movements, thus it was more accepted by the ANC than the ET had been. It seemed to be more organised with a group of economists that had various and relevant skills. Furthermore, it engaged in training its researchers and embraced key economic policy options that advanced some sections of business capital and the Washington consensus (Padayachee V., 1998). The ISP’s main goal was to find a way to revive the manufacturing sector to preserve and create jobs and wealth. The ISP produced a number of articles and studies on the industrial sectors and issues pertaining to development in small-business, innovation, trade and competition policy (Hirsch, 2005). Regarding economic policy position, the ISP’s policy ideas represented a shift from state and demand-side approach to a more global, supply-side oriented economic transformation. It contained key policy proposals focused on re-organising industrial relations, educational training, increasing competition of the domestic market, encouraging cooperation between firms and the development of instruments to support development and innovation in small-businesses (Hirsch, 2005). The ISP's policy recommendation drew from the East Asian development experience, which emphasised the role of the state in the economy, particularly in competitiveness – the expectation was that growth would be a result of export markets – modern production methods and a new growth theory which recognised the important role of technology in development, in productivity and competitiveness. Thus, when looking at the industrial and trade policies of post-apartheid South Africa, it is evident that it was influenced by the ISP, particularly when looking at COSATU’s economic position which echoed the recommendation put forth by the ISP.

A third research initiative was MERG, which emerged from a request by Nelson Mandela, who stated that there was an “immediate need for a better understanding of economic policy issues in South Africa” (MERG, 1993). Consequently, a request was directed to the Canadian
government to assist the ANC structures in economic policy research and build its capacity to formulate economic policy. The Canadian government through its IDRC called for the establishment of MERG, a network-based research group which was to assist the democratic movement to develop a better understanding of economic policy issues and policy formulation. MERG was established to assist the ANC in stimulating and coordinating policy research and training in macroeconomics policy and macroeconomic modelling (Padayachee V., 1998). MERG researchers included economists from South African universities (some that were involved in the ET and ISP) and British economists who were associated with the Economic Research on South (EROSA) programme. The policy recommendations of MERG, which were published in a report titled, ‘Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa’ in 1993, drew from the post-Keynesian approach, where employment and unemployment, investment and savings and monetary policies are seen as key problems in economic development. The report made a case for higher wages which would serve as an engine of growth and an increase in spending financed from taxation, it further called for the nationalisation of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and an increase in governments control of private investment (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). Thus, MERG, envisioned growth happening in two-phase, first through a crowding-in approach led by the state’s social and infrastructure investment programmes, and sustainable growth which would result in private investment as growth picked up (Padayachee V., 1998).

However, the MERG process faced some challenges and complications. Firstly, it was criticised by South African economists for the heavy participation and contributions of foreign economic experts, they argued that only South Africans should have been key actors in drawing policy options for South Africa. This led to strained relationships between some MERG researchers and the ANC DEP. Furthermore, when its final report was presented to the ANC DEP, and later published, it contained contradictions – not only on its own policy position, but it also contradicted the policy position adopted in the ANC’s ‘Ready to Govern’ document and reignited unresolved conflicts between researchers. Furthermore, MERG’s argument for control over private investment and the call to nationalise the SARB was inconsistent with the ANC’s commitment to reassuring investors for the purpose of attracting capital flows and the agreement that the ANC already made negotiations to keep the SARB independent – in part to reassure investors that its economic policy would promote macroeconomic stability (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015). These may have been the contributing factors that led the ANC leadership to abandoning the MERG report in 1993. Padayachee (1998) states that the MERG’s report
was abandoned due to the mistrust of the ANC towards the approach of academic economists and social scientist conducting the research. Nonetheless, MERG was acknowledged as an important influence on macroeconomic policy formulation in post-apartheid South Africa, as it produced papers on policy options for the consideration of the democratic movement.

Despite these initiatives, the final draft of the RDP did not represent the work and policy proposals of academics from the ET, ISP and MERG policies. Although key individuals from these organisations formed part of the technical team that drafted the final version of the RDP as a government White Paper. Thus, their experiences and knowledge were transferred to the final version of the RDP.

**COSATU**

COSATU was a leading non-racial trade union federation that was formed during heightened political unrest in the country in the mid-1980s. They represented over 1.2 million members from the industrial sector as a political union against the apartheid government, they formed and introduced their proposal for a ‘Reconstruction Accord’ in 1993. COSATU at the time was emerging as a key electoral ally of the ANC leading up to the elections in 1994. It had endorsed the ANC’s Freedom Charter and following the unbanning of the ANC and other political parties in 1990, had entered negotiations with the ANC and the SACP to formulate an alliance, which resulted in the tripartite alliance. COSATU was concerned about the labour movement and the inclusion of the rights of the working class in government policy and programmes (Visser, 2005). Thus, the tripartite alliance, referred to as the ANC-alliance, was formulated to ensure that the new democratic government would adopt labour-friendly economic policies. Thus, COSATU’s ‘Reconstruction Accord’ was revised several times and it was later modified into the ‘Reconstruction Programme’ by the tripartite alliance, COSATU then adopted it as its economic position.

Although the ANC was developing a new vision for South Africa, it had no concrete economic policies to present, thus, as a way of assisting the ANC set its economic transformation agenda and offer its support in the 1994 elections, COSATU introduced the RDP to the ANC, hoping it would endorse it as their economic position (Visser, 2005). Subsequently, the ANC agreed to adopt the RDP as its election manifesto during a conference on Reconstruction and Strategy in January 1994 (Stewart, 1997). COSATU become a very influential body in South Africa’s
economic policy formulation that followed. For example, Abedian (2018) states that, “a lot of people who ended up in policymaking circles had some association with COSATU, such as Jay Naidoo and Patrick Bond [who played a key role in drafting the final RDP policy] and this was because COSATU was the domestic base of the ANC proxy in terms of economic policy”. The policy that existed in 1994 was because COSATU had commissioned a few individuals to work on key policy areas.

Finalisation of the RDP

The RDP represented a wide range of participation from social democratic movements, and other non-governmental organisations, particularly policy experts and policy advisors from the social, political and labour movements in South Africa. Furthermore, it went through six drafts, between 1993 and 1994, the final policy framework became the election manifesto of the ANC. The wide range of involvement indicated that the RDP was formulated through a democratic process, however, it also resulted in a lengthy list of concerns and targets that the RDP sought to address. Abedian (2018) is of the view that the RDP was overly ambitious and unrealistic, thus the policy needed to be shortened and specific. However, the finalisation of the RDP represented a significantly different process although there was great participation of several movements, organisations and many experts in the process, they were not contributors to the final government RDP White Paper. Instead, the RDP was drawn by the people who would be part of its implementation and a group of intellectuals from non-government organisations who steered the RDP document’s drafting in a specific direction. The president had handpicked a group of consultants to convert the RDP document into the RDP White Paper, these individuals included, Alec Erwin, Jay Naidoo, Iraj Abedian, Jeremy Cronin, Patrick Bond; Bernie Fanaroff and Howie Gabriels. They were the key proponents of the RDP and played an integral part in the ANC’s acceptance of the RDP White Paper as its official economic policy in late 1994.

3.3 The RDP White Paper

The RDP White Paper (RDP WP) was finalised following a process which included the first draft, in the form of an RDP Green Paper, this was produced by the ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU). It served as a discussion document on the proposed RDP economic policy. The RDP WP was drafted and revised several times within government, however social and labour movements only saw a version of the RDP WP towards the end of September 1994,
just before its publication in November 1994, following several changes due to differences both within the GNU and the ANC alliance (Padayachee V., 1998).

The final RDP WP published in November 1994, attempted to operationalise the original RDP base document, as well as conceptualising an economic policy to accompany the RDP. The RDP WP provided a plan as to how the government would begin to implement the RDP and the management strategies it would adopt for implementation.

Although the RDP WP stemmed from the ideals of the original RDP document, it was an incoherent and fragmented version. Firstly, it lacked a clear statement of purpose; although Jay Naidoo, believed that it set out government’s strategy for implementing the RDP, there was no clear understanding as to how it would achieve the objectives set in the original RDP document (Terreblanche, 1999). Furthermore, it represented a compromise from the neo-liberal, trickle-down developmental economic policy, thus shifting away from the original document’s left-winged development agenda. The principles and economic strategies adopted in the RDP WP contradicted those of the original RDP. This may have been a result of the RDP WP being seen as the result of the reconciliation and compromise-making politics within the GNU. Abedian (2018) states that the original RDP was a long wish list that was impossible to achieve, thus the RDP WP presented a more achievable set of objectives. The RDP WP was seen to play the role of setting out a clear economic strategy, defining targets and priorities for the RDP for post-apartheid South Africa, which the original base document did not do.

### 3.4 The Performance of the RDP

The RDP highlighted that social and economic problems were interconnected, particularly poverty alleviation and economic reconstruction. Thus, to achieve development in these areas, five key programmes were proposed that would combine growth and development. These included meeting basics needs, developing human resources, democratising the state and society, building the economy and implementing the RDP. These programmes adopted a people-driven agenda, in which it sought to empower the ordinary person by creating a better life for all by ensuring basic needs were met. Furthermore, these programmes sought to restructure and rebuild the economy through the expansion of infrastructure to stimulate and strengthen the economy. This was essential for the new South Africa, considering the state of the economy in 1994. There were deep structural issues in the economy that needed to be
addressed, for example, the manufacturing sector was inefficient in production, it depended on low wages and failed to create jobs, the industrial economy was heavily concentrated and limited competition, the labour force was inefficient due to limited skills, the agriculture sector was heavily subsidised commercially and government expenditure depended on the taxation of wealthy individuals which led to a growing deficit and exacerbated the situation, large amounts of private capital were flowing out the country (Lodge, 2002).

So, to what extent did the government under the RDP achieve a better life for all? Regarding the first program, which was, ‘meeting basic needs’, which its objectives included, “housing, electricity, land reform, social security and social welfare, water, health care, job creation through public works and education and training” (RDP WP, 1994). The government was able to improve access to basic infrastructure substantially. With regards to housing, the goal was to build one million houses in five years and provide well-located and affordable houses to all by 2003. Subsequently, between 1994-2001 about 1.13 million houses were built which qualified for government subsidy, these were able to accommodate 5 million of the estimated 12.5 million people without proper housing. Regarding electrification and water, the government committed to supplying electricity to 2.5 million households, to connect electricity to all schools and clinics by the year 2000, and to provide clean water each day to every person in the first two years (Knight, 2001). As a result, between 1994 and 2000, about 1.75 million households were connected to the national grid and a further 600 000 homes were planned to be connected in the next three years. Regarding water access, by 1998, about 2.5 million people gained access to clean water for the first time. Two years on, in 2000 this achievement was doubled and about 4.8 million people had access to clean water (Lodge, 2002). With regards to land reform, the government committed to the redistribution of residential and agricultural land to individuals and communities who cannot afford land but need it. It further committed to compensation of land to those who lost their land due to apartheid laws. By early 1999, about 39 000 families had been settled on 355 000 hectares of land, making use of their Settlement Land Acquisition Grants (Lodge, 2002). Although this was an achievement, the government still had a long way to go to achieve the RDP objectives of redistributing 30 per cent of commercial land within five years (Lodge, 2002). With regards to social security, the government established an extensive social welfare system that catered for those that were vulnerable to social issues (the disabled, children in need, the aged, the very poor). For example, pregnant women and small children now had access to free health care programmes and about five million school children had access to free meals (Visser, 2005).
With regards to healthcare, the government committed to supplying free medical healthcare to all children under the age of six, furthermore, funds were to be channelled towards improving maternity care for pregnant women and organising programmes to prevent and treat diseases such as HIV/AIDs and Tuberculosis (Knight, 2001). Between 1994 and 1998, 500 new clinics were established which provided 5 million people with access to primary healthcare services. The government committed to creating jobs through public works programmes. These programmes were to provide basic needs and create jobs, especially for the poor and in rural areas. Subsequently, by early 1995, community-based works programmes were established which employed 240 000 people (Lodge, 2002). One key programme of the RDP was the development of human resources through education and training. The government had thus committed to ensuring that all people have access to equal education and training opportunities, in terms of schooling, it proposed ten years of government-funded compulsory education, with class sizes of no more than forty students by the year 2000. Furthermore, new schools would be built to meet demands and existing schools and educational facilities were to be democratised and used to full capacity. In addition, teachers were to be trained accordingly, to meet the challenges of post-apartheid South Africa (Knight, 2001). As a result, a joint initiative by the RDP and the National Department of Education resulted in the National School Building Programme towards the restoration of schools and the improvement of the quality of learning (Lodge, 2002). Lastly, the RDP programmes to democratise the state and society were successful, the new government was able to achieve the removal of division within power structures, improving democratic processes in all government structures.

Although the RDP achieved some surprising results, particularly in line with the provision that social security was accessible to all who needed it and in meeting the basic needs, the RDP encountered several challenges. The RDP was government economic policy for only two years, from 1994 up until 1996, before it was, ‘replaced’ by GEAR. The economy thus remained largely fundamentally unstructured and issues such as “capital intensity, inequality, unemployment, widespread poverty and large-scale economic concentration” continued (Terreblanche, 1999). Furthermore, although there was an increase in the economic growth rate of 3 per cent between 1994 and 1995, it declined to less than 2 per cent in 1996 and 1997 (Terreblanche, 1999). In addition, the economic growth experienced did not equate to an increase in jobs. Instead, unemployment remained at high levels, and income distribution become more unequal than what it was in 1991 (Terreblanche, 1999)
3.5 Criticism and Challenges

The RDP was notably one of the most widely supported economic policies in post-apartheid South Africa. It was also seen by officials at the time, and still today, as the right policy to have been adopted in 1994. However, the RDP implementation process experienced a number of challenges and it received heavy criticism on its economic policy decisions. At the same time, it was balancing the heavy demand it placed on government and trying to reassure domestic and foreign investors, as well as international donors. Terreblanche (1999) states that although there was very little wrong with the RDP from a social perspective, it was too ambitious and the target it gave itself of five years was too short to achieve all its aims. In addition, the RDP lacked a detailed plan for achieving its main objectives. It can be said that it was too broadly formulated and ended up being a wish list that was ambitious and unattainable considering the economic and political condition of the country at the time (Terreblanche, 1999). Manuel (2017), states that there were many issues that they did not get to with the RDP because of time constraints, disagreements with the statistics at play and the ANC leadership thought they would be able to deal with it later. Thus, when the RDP was adopted by the ANC, it was firstly because the ANC needed to announce its economic position which domestic and international viewers were asking for and it needed an election manifesto. Most importantly, the ANC’s first task during the first years of democracy was to restructure the country and thus could not achieve all the goals of the RDP.

Hirsch (2005) argues that there were two main constraints to the RDP that were not considered. The first was how was the government going to improve revenue flows. Although the RDP had committed itself to fiscal discipline, by reallocating the existing revenue. It failed to commit to the collection of new taxes and implementing a wealth tax, which should have been the obvious step given the governments task of restoring social justices for all. However, it seems, according to Terreblanche (1999), that the new government had no knowledge of the tax capacity of the economy at the time, which was restricted, but also that an inclination to not pay taxes developed amongst the wealthy whites. Furthermore, organisational inefficiencies hampered revenue collection. A second constraint was the lack of sufficient skilled managers, techniques of policy coordination and implementation in government (Hirsch, 2005). Although there was an RDP office that was established to facilitate both the issues of mobilising financial resources and the coordination of policy and implementation of programmes, unfortunately, it was not able to deal with the enormous task it faced from 1994 onwards. For example, Makgetla
(2017) – who was in the RDP office – reported that they had no idea of what they were doing and it was not necessarily because they did not have the capacity, there just was no pressure to deliver, this was because government at that time had an enormous task of restructuring the whole economy and government structures and its priorities were divided.

One challenge that confronted the RDP was the lack of state capacity. When the ANC came into power following the 1994 election, the government lacked the administrative capacity to implement the RDP. Unfortunately, the new staff that were responsible for implementation were inefficient, they did not have the training and experience to build efficient and effective public services and they lacked proper implementation skills. This resulted in huge backlogs of the RDP programmes and the provision of basic services to communities. A second challenge was the RDP office itself, which was set up in the office of the President and headed by Jay Naidoo as the Minister. The RDP office created some confusion, it was not clear if the RDP office was to be a super-ministry, as it was assessing activities of other departments, or it was supposed to have a supervisory or approval authority over other departments, or whether it was supposed to be a developmental planning ministry that initiated new transformation projects. This created disputes between the RDP office and the spending of government departments. Furthermore, its financial accountability was unclear. These led to tension between Jay Naidoo and other ministers, particularly over the failures in delivery.

Another challenge was the RDP Fund, which was established to direct the processes of capital spending projects in the public sector. Funds for the RDP offices came from a top-slicing of total government expenditure, in which it would then return to line departments who submitted approved proposals and business plans for capital spending projects that met the criteria of the RDP (Blumenfeld, 1996). The RDP had stated that it should not increase government expenditure significantly, and thus its objectives were to be accomplished through the reallocation of government expenditure from all departments. The existence of such a fund created further ambiguities about the role of the RDP and the RDP office. Although projects were approved by a cabinet committee, Jay Naidoo had the sole signing powers of the RDP fund. This further added uncertainties about the procedures for projects approval and where the authority lies. In addition, projects that were approved had to be jointly funded by the RDP fund and the departments involved. This led to some RDP projects failing because of a lack of infrastructure support, because government was unable to allocate adequate funds to meet the RDP’s goals without redirecting funds from other government departments, which caused
conflicts between ministers and resistance, this resulted in significant holdups and lack of funding for some projects and thus further exacerbated the capacity to deliver (Blumenfeld, 1996). Overall the structure of the RDP as a collection of projects and the RDP as a vision for social transformation began to look tenuous.

Economically, the RDP faced some challenges. There were a few economic policy issues that arose. The lack of connection between the RDP and wider economic policy issues was problematic. For example, the government was unable to explain how it would address the “short-term and long-term conflicts between its objective of faster output, export and employment growth, a low budget deficit, lower tax burdens, increased social welfare provision and reduced income inequalities” (Blumenfeld, 1996). The RDP thus provided no clear plan as to how it hoped to achieve higher rates of job creation and economic growth. In addition, the different ministries were making and implementing policies that were independent of each other. These created difficulties in attempts to achieve the RDP objectives. On the other hand, the poor performance of the economy, which was experiencing high inflation, declining GDP growth and a large fiscal deficit, was an indication that it was hindering the realisation of the RDP’s goals. The new government had hoped for economic growth to be between 4 and 6 per cent per annum. However, economic growth grew slightly above the population growth of 2.5 per cent, this was not enough. A significant contributor was the major currency crisis in February 1996, which resulted in the value of the rand declining by 25 per cent (Visser, 2005). The government thus introduced a more conservative macroeconomic strategy, GEAR, as a means of calming the domestic capital and foreign currency market concerns over the commitment to sound macroeconomic policies.

In addition to the mixed performance of the RDP, it was criticised for being too ambitious and that the government was too soft, or rather hesitant to make critical choices about RDP priorities. The RDP needed clear-cut policy decisions, but it seems there were trade-offs, between growth, redistribution, unemployment, meeting the basic needs against inflation, macroeconomic stability and structural adjustments. The government was clearly not ready for the huge task it gave itself in terms of the RDP objectives and by 1996, the government accepted its own limitations and realised that it did not have the capacity to implement the RDP. Subsequently, the RDP was downgraded and the RDP office closed. Its functions were transferred and carried out by different institutions. For example, the functions of the RDP fund were transferred to the Department of Finance, the development planning functions were
transferred to the office of the deputy-president at the time, and the economic policymaking and central statistical functions were also transferred to the deputy president's office. With the closure of the RDP office, a new economic policy, GEAR, was introduced.

3.6 Discussion: Was policy-oriented learning evident during the formulation of the RDP Policy?

According to the literature on the theory of policy-oriented learning, there are different ways policymakers can learn during the policymaking process. This learning can lead to either the adjustment and redefinition of policy instruments, to improving the performance of a policy, or to the adoption of a new policy. Table 1 illustrates the different types of learning and what it may lead to.

Table 1: Policy-Oriented Learning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Entails Learning about</th>
<th>May lead to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Lessons about the viability of policy instruments or implementation designs.</td>
<td>Understanding the source of policy failure, the adjustment and improvement of policy instrument to attain certain policy targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual</td>
<td>The instruments of policy, the goals and strategies. New information.</td>
<td>New principles being adopted because the outlook has changed. Adjustments and redefinition of policy instrument to achieve goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>The policy construction of a policy problem, or policy goals.</td>
<td>Policy goals and targets are changed or redefined. Possibly the adoption of a new policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political feasibility and policy processes of the policy idea or problem, and from political elites.</td>
<td>More sophisticated advocacy of a policy idea or problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson Drawing</td>
<td>Past experiences from other policies that share a common problem.</td>
<td>Adjustments and redefinition of policy instruments to achieve goals. Possibly, the adoption of a new policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideational</td>
<td>Ideologies, ideas or theories: a shared belief system, neoliberalism, developmental ideologies, democratic ideas</td>
<td>Adjustments and redefinition of policy instruments to achieve goals. Possibly the adoption of a new policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Belief</td>
<td>A subsystem or advocacy group that share a similar belief or idea, from key actors and public officials belonging to a group or institution</td>
<td>Adjustments and redefinition of policy instrument to achieve goals. Possibly the adoption of a new policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RDP economic policy emerged from the social and political circumstances South Africa found itself in. South Africa’s economic and political situation was unstable due to the laws of the apartheid government, which had left South Africa’s economy in decline, isolated from global markets and crippled, with massive social challenges such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. As a result, when the political landscape was shifting, the incoming new government understood that they would have to adopt an economic policy that renewed the
economy as well as addressed the social challenges and the social disparity. Therefore, the driving force behind the policy change that was seen in 1994 resulted from the political, social and economic state of the country. Secondly, the ANC, alongside its alliance partners began to work on an economic policy framework for the new South Africa. This process included various forms, and this is where examples of learning can be found.

Firstly, there were extensive consultations, workshops and conferences the ANC engaged in to formulate economic policy. Although this was limited to the RDP base document before its finalisation as a government RDP WP in 1996, in which the process was narrow and included a small technical team of economists and experts in the field, the extensive consultation played a key role in its formulation. Learning is evident during this process. There was participation from all organs of civil society, academia, the alliance partners and international institutions. These platforms enabled the ANC to narrow down key policy issues and build an economic strategy for post-apartheid South Africa. According to the theory of policy-oriented learning, this represents instrumental, social and political learning. This entails learning about the viability of policy instruments, learning from the policy construction of a policy problem and learning about the political and economic feasibility and policy processes of the policy problem. Thus, in the South African case, the ANC embarked on a broad policymaking process that was inclusive. This illustrates their need at the time to learn of all the policy options that would work in a democratic economy. They attempted to ensure that the policy that they would eventually adopt would be the most feasible, politically and socioeconomically for the country. These three types of learning all led to the adoption of a new policy in 1994 in the form of the RDP policy.

Secondly, several policy documents and research initiatives that were available to the ANC for policy consideration represented the second kind of learning. These documents offered policy proposals, which all drew from different economic ideas. This represented ideational policy-learning, which entails learning about ideas and theories of a policy problem. These documents drew from a number of possible economic ideas, which were believed would be viable for South Africa’s post-apartheid economy. On the other hand, the research initiatives, MERG, ET and the ISP, represented a form of learning that can be seen as shared beliefs. Sabatier (1988) and Hall (1993), argue that policymakers learn from policy subsystems, advocacy groups or networks that share similar ideas of a policy. These research groups provided the ANC-alliance with the capacity to analyses policy and formulate economic policy. These research groups
included networks of university-based researchers and economists whose key focus was on economic analysis and policy issues for post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, the ANC looked to these research groups for policy advice, they learnt from a group that believed in a set of policy options but also believed in a particular economic idea, such as neoliberalism or democratic development economy.

Another element was the expertise the ANC called on when it converted the RDP to a government White Paper. This process involved a small technical team of handpicked and trusted individuals chosen by the ANC leadership to streamline the RDP base document which was a wish list of what society needed, into a government White Paper that considered all social and macroeconomic policy issues. This part of the process was not as consultative and participatory as the previous stages were. Nonetheless, it drew from the expertise of economists, academics and institutions that formed part of the consultations and research groups. This represents conceptual, social and political learning which entails learning about the instruments of policy, policy goals and the political feasibility and policy processes of the policy.

Thus, learning did form a key part of the RDP policy formulation process. There were significant changes before 1994 when the RDP was still in its early stages of formulation up until it was converted into a government White Paper. The government adopted a broad policymaking process that included a combination of the consultations, policy documents, advice from research groups and experts which represented a wide range of learning. It is important to note that when the ANC came into power, they had no real capacity to formulate and analyse economic policy, thus its decision to have the involvement of its alliance partners, civil society, research groups and experts in the development of the RDP, represented the willingness to learn and adopt a policy that fitted the economic and political needs of South Africa at that time.
CHAPTER 4: GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION

The following chapter closely examines GEAR, the second economic policy to be adopted in post-apartheid South Africa in 1996. GEAR, a macroeconomic policy, was seen to, replace the RDP as the new economic policy, thus it is an ideal example of policy change. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter will analyse GEAR’s formulation process, which differed slightly to that of the RDP, to determine if learning played a key role and to further determine whether learning was a consistent practice. The chapter ends with a discussion on whether learning played a key role, and exactly which type of learning as argued in the literature on policy-oriented learning was represented.

4.1 Growth, Employment and Redistribution

GEAR was a macroeconomic strategy that was introduced in mid-1996 by the Department of Finance at a period when the rand was depreciating, foreign exchange reserves were at low levels and the high unemployment rate and overall economic growth was inadequate to meet social investment needs. It was introduced to restore confidence and enhance credibility in the South African economy and was an effort to improve economic growth, development and policy coordination within government. GEAR was built on the goals set out by the RDP by committing the government to macroeconomic and social economic targets, however focusing more on macroeconomic discipline. Thus, GEAR did not necessarily replace the RDP, it was a macroeconomic strategy aimed at ensuring that the RDP goals were achieved. GEAR proposed a set of policies towards rapid liberalisation for the economy through the relaxation of exchange rates controls, trade liberalisation, regulation, deficit reduction and strict monetary and fiscal policies to stabilise the rand and the economy (Heintz, 2003).

GEAR put forward three broad policy themes, which aimed to improve macroeconomic discipline through the reduction of the budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP and by reducing government debt through interest rate reduction, it also aimed to increase trade competitiveness by reducing tariffs and encouraging foreign direct investment and its final aim was to liberalise markets through privatisation and allowing the forces of supply and demand to determine prices (Roux A., 2005). GEAR’s point of departure from the RDP was that sustainable economic development could only be achieved by the ‘redistribution through growth’ approach. Thus, it was not necessarily as people-oriented as the RDP was (growth through redistribution), but it saw South Africa’s economic development resulting from a high
economic growth rate because of sharp increase in private sector investment (Terreblanche, 1999).

The core elements of GEAR focused on a strategy towards faster fiscal deficit reduction to cover debt obligations, budget reforms to support redistributive expenditure, counter inflation and increase investment expenditure, an exchange rate policy to keep the exchange rate competitive and to maintain a consistent monetary policy (Department of Finance, 1996). GEAR further aimed to impact the economy through the relaxation of exchange controls, tariff reductions, increased tax incentives to encourage investment, creating a structured collective bargaining system, enforcing a stronger levy system to fund education and training, expanding trade and investment flows in Southern Africa and a commitment to the implementation of stable and coordinated policies (Department of Finance, 1996). These goals implied that state-owned enterprises and assets be privatised, that economic development should be led by the private sector with minimum state intervention, that there would be deep cuts in government expenditure, export-oriented economy should be encouraged to increase competitiveness, that exchange controls should be relaxed, that the budgets for social services delivery and infrastructure programmes should be reprioritised to meeting the basic needs of all people and thus a transformation into the private sector facilitating social services (Visser, 2005).

The origins and formulation of GEAR

GEAR’s formulation process differed slightly to that of the RDP. It emerged quite rapidly in early 1996, following events that included the persistent economic challenges, the appointment of Trevor Manuel as the new finance minister (which unsettled domestic and global markets), and the dissolution of the RDP office as a separate government entity. Manuel (2017) reported that government at that time “needed to provide strong messages that they were in control of the economy and that they wanted to restructure it”. Before its adoption in early 1996, debates around a new economic policy emerged and several economic policy documents were proposed to the government.

First was a growth strategy document titled, ‘Growth for All’ from the South African Foundation (SAF), a lobby group for big South African business. The report, which was hostile towards the new government economic policy, argued that the government had no credible and comprehensive policy framework (Terreblanche, 1999). It rejected the RDP as unattainable and criticised government’s fiscal, investment, labour and trade policies. The document called
for action in five areas, these were “legislation, macroeconomic policy, government, markets and foreign trade and investment” (Mathe, 2002). It further proposed that investor confidence had to be boosted through a number of measures. These measures included “action against crime, a reduction in the budget deficit through government expenditure reduction, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the adoption of a dual labour market without prescribed minimum wages to absorb the unemployed into lower paid jobs, one market would be for skilled and unionised workers and the other for unskilled and non-unionised workers” (Mathe, 2002). Although, according to Hirsch (2005), the report was a useful contribution to the economic debate at the time, it was not considered by government, as some argued that it was out of place and it assumed that the market would solve South Africa’s problems and that it viewed the government as extraneous (COSATU, 2010). However, when the GEAR strategy is examined, it is evident that much of the proposals contained in the ‘Growth for All’ document is found in GEAR, which indicates GEAR’s inclination towards a capitalistic economy.

A second policy document was the ‘Social Equity and Job Creation’ document, this was introduced by the labour sector movement on behalf of three major union federations – particularly COSATU – who produced it as a response to the policy debates at the time and to SAF. This document was proposed shortly after Manuel’s appointment as minister and it gave effect to the realisation of the RDP in the form of a policy document (COSATU, 2010). It emphasised the importance of acknowledging the historical roots of South Africa’s socioeconomic challenges. It further stressed the need for a more interventionist policy focusing on demand-side, job creation and social equity (Mathe, 2002). It proposed an employment creation strategy, through measures that included public works, housing, demand expansion, training and land reform. It looked to a redistributive fiscal policy, the breakup of economic concentration, the building of industrial democracy and the promotion of equity and economic development (COSATU, 2010). However, this document was likened to the ‘Growth for All’ document as too strident and a struggle for influence, thus it was not considered.

A third policy document was from the National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP), which was a descendant of MERG, and was headed by Villa Pillay – a long-time advisor to the ANC and the person who had led the MERG. NIEP was established to provide the ANC with foreign financial assistance toward policy formulation. However, it failed to do this, but instead developed strategies that criticised the ANC’s mainstream economic debates and ridiculed the policy debates between the ANC and its allies. It further criticised the ANC’s fiscal policy and
suggested that government adopt an expanded budget deficit between 7 and 8 per cent of the GDP, as opposed to the ANC’s suggestion of cutting the budget deficit (Hirsch, 2005). In the background, the currency suffered another sharp decline, as it lost 10 per cent between late March and early May 1996. The government thus had to respond to calm both the domestic and global markets. The government thus embarked on developing an economic policy to present at the 1996/1997 Budget Speech. During this time, several suggestions emerged within the government. Firstly, the government requested the Central Economic Advisory Services (CEAS), a government agency from the apartheid-era that was situated in the RDP office, to prepare a statement on macroeconomic policy. The statement referred to the NEM – an economic policy that was initially introduced in 1993 by the apartheid government –, which proposed a neo-classical framework for growth, with a more prominent role to be played by the private sector. However, it was never published or considered by the government as it failed to recognise the potential for capital flow and because it was deemed irrelevant to the changing landscape of the economy (Hirsch, 2005). The CEAS was dissolved a year later. Another effort by the government was a project from the RDP Office. The RDP office was working on an economic policy project that included all government departments. What resulted was a draft summary paper, titled ‘National Growth and Development Strategy’ (NGDS), the proposed strategy shifted away from the RDP document, by adopting a trickle-down approach to economic development. In other words, economic growth to all would flow from the top to the bottom. However, this proposal was downplayed by the government.

At the same time, the newly appointed finance minister, Trevor Manuel, adopted a project that had been developing amongst a group of officials since late 1995. According to official documents, the group included key academics from three South African universities, these were Iraj Abedian (coordinator) and Brian Kahn (University of Cape Town), Stephen Gelb (University of Durban-Westville), Ben Smit and Servaas van der Berg (University of Stellenbosch). As well as civil servants from key government departments, these included Andrew Donaldson (Department of Finance), Alan Hirsch (Department of Trade and Industry), and Guy Mhone (Department of Labour). Others who contributed were economists Ian Goldin and Dirk van Seventer from the Developmental Bank of Southern Africa, Daleen Smal and Ernie van der Merwe from SARB and Luiz Pereira da Silva and Richard Ketley from the World Bank (Department of Finance, 1996). This representation indicated that GEAR was created by the elite with no representation from civil society, particularly the labour unions (Mathe, 2002). However, Makgetla (2017) states that although there was extensive consultation within
government and very limited consultation outside, the drafters of GEAR did allow certain sectors to look at their respective chapters. For example, labour unions were given the opportunity to read and comment on the content and offer suggestions on the chapter on labour, whilst not being allowed to look at other chapters. Nonetheless, the technical group worked on a project towards a macroeconomic policy for South Africa. Manuel had requested that the project be completed in time for the 1996/1997 budget speech. He believed it would address several questions market analysts were asking of him. In particular, he believed it would offer a coherent and a clear set of economic policies to guide the economy. He further hoped it would restore stability and confidence in the South African economy. What resulted was the GEAR strategy, which Manuel then announced at the 1996/1887 budget speech as the new economic policy of South Africa.

GEAR was generally received well by local and international markets, particularly because of the strict fiscal and monetary policy it proposed. However, its formulation and policy recommendations were heavily criticised by progressive and mainstream economists. In terms of its formulation, GEAR differed from the RDP base document, it was not negotiated openly, it lacked popular participation and consultation and it was not subjected to public opinion. Instead, it was developed quite rapidly by a technical team that excluded the tripartite alliance members (COSATU and SACP), which caused internal disagreements amongst the alliance. COSATU stated that it was caught off-guard by the ANC-led GNU announcement of GEAR and compared it to the old NP’s introduction of NEM (COSATU, 1998).

President Nelson Mandela presented GEAR as non-negotiable, which many questioned, they also questioned the ‘secrecy’ surrounding its formulation, research methods and the economic model used. In addition, it was led politically by the office of the President, ANC ministers (Trevor Manuel of Finance Ministry, Alec Erwin of Trade and Industry Ministry), bureaucrats and a research group that included top individuals from MERG, ISP and ET research groups. For this reason, it was criticised by several academics, leftist political economist, labour leaders and from members of the ANC itself. COSATU and the SACP rejected it, they were concerned about the conservative fiscal and monetary policy stance it took (Hirsch, 2005). They further argued that it surrendered to the demands of international capitalism. Thus, turning its back on the original RDP and a betrayal to the working class. COSATU and SACP had a difficult time working with the ANC following GEAR’s announcement, as it felt GEAR was formulated behind closed doors and they were not properly consulted.
Furthermore, others criticised it for being too optimistic. For example, the NIEP raised questions as to whether it would be able to achieve its outlined objectives. Terreblanche (1999) went as far as stating that the original targets of GEAR were overly optimistic and utopian and that it was just an attempt to enhance its ideological acceptability in all circles. In addition, Adelzadeh criticised GEAR of failing “to propose an analytically sound and empirically justified strategy that integrates the main objectives of the RDP” (1996). He argued that GEAR’s adoption of neo-liberal policy and strategies – which features fiscal austerity, export-oriented production and privatisation, less state intervention and a transfer of competence to the private sector – would fail to achieve the RDP objectives and would constrain growth, employment and redistribution (Adelzadeh, 1996).

Ideologically GEAR included various common elements of different models. For example, it followed both the SAF’s ‘Growth for all’ document and the NEM’s policy proposals of free markets and the need for flexibility of wages and prices in both the labour and financial markets. Secondly, GEAR’s policy framework was broadly in line with the Washington consensus (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), which represented a baseline of economic policies for adoption by developing countries. These included keeping competitive exchange rates within the country, strict fiscal and monetary policies, liberalising trade and foreign investment opportunities, privatising state enterprises, legalising security property rights and letting interest rates be controlled by the markets. It looked at directing government spending towards investment in infrastructure, healthcare, education and looked at reforming the tax system to a broader tax base. In fact, GEAR was seen to represent the neoliberal economic policy ideas of the World Bank and the IMF, however with a more ‘integrated’ democratic approach (Padayachee V. , 1998). Nonetheless, neither the World Bank or the IMF were part of GEAR’s formulation.

Nevertheless, the implementation of GEAR happened quite rapidly following its announcement. All key government departments and SARB participated in the implementation process of the strategy and endorsed its outcome. According to Thabo Mbeki, who was deputy president at the time, GEAR was to guide all of government’s growth and development programmes.
4.2 The Performance of GEAR

GEAR had outlined a set of macroeconomic policy targets including the reduction of the fiscal deficit in proportion to the GDP from 5.1 per cent to 3 per cent by the year 2000, it aimed to raise the GDP from 3.5 percent in 1996 to 6 percent in 2000 and to increase employment growth above the economically active population from 1.3 percent to 4.3 percent in 2000 by creating 400 000 new jobs by 2000 and a total of 1 352 000 jobs between 1996 and 2000 (Department of Finance, 1996). Furthermore, GEAR aimed to “decrease inflation to less than 10 percent, a deficit on the current account and the balance of payments between 2 and 3 percent, to impact on a ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP of 21.5 percent in five years to improve income distribution, to relax exchange controls and to reduce the budget deficit to below 4 percent of GDP” (Department of Finance, 1996).

In some areas, performance exceeded the expectation of GEAR. For example, the government was able to achieve macroeconomic stability and accountability, as its “fiscal deficit, inflation and government consumption targets were met, recording figures of 2.2, 5.4 and 18 per cent respectively by 2000” (Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017). These achievements were possible due to an improvement in the government's management of public finances and the reduction of government expenditure following the tightening of monetary and fiscal policy and the restructuring of government at all levels. Furthermore, revenue collection improved at the South African Revenue Services (SARS) resulting in an increase in real government spending, a reduction in the budget deficit and a reduction in government debt levels, while at the same time cutting income tax rates (Hirsch, 2005). One noteworthy intervention was the increase in expenditure on social services and infrastructure services, particularly in education, healthcare, social welfare, housing, access to water and electricity. Government’s expenditure on social benefits rose from R10 billion in 1994 to R38.4 billion in 2003 which resulted in an increase in the number of beneficiaries to 6.8 million from 2.6 million (Hirsch, 2005).

However, despite these achievements GEAR did not live up to expectation. GEAR’s targets of economic growth, employment and redistribution were missed. By the end of 2000, job creation, investment in the private sector and GDP growth indicators were disappointing. The only achievement with regards to GDP was that the negative growth rate of the early nineties was reversed. The economy only grew by 2.7 per cent a year –never exceeding 5 per cent– instead of the targeted 6 per cent a year (Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017). This negatively impacted the employment and redistributive targets of GEAR. For example, GEAR had
promised that economic growth would be accompanied by employment growth, however, the low levels of economic growth and private investment between 1996 and 2001 were insufficient to generate new jobs and lower unemployment. Instead, more than 1 million jobs were lost and unemployment increased above the 30 per cent mark (Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017). Many argued that the failure of GEAR in job creation was a combination of the increasing skills mismatch, low economic growth and the low Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which were not enough to fund employment creation. Furthermore, investment levels were dismal, real government investment grew only by 1.8 per cent instead of 7.1 per cent and real investment in the private, parastatal and public sectors dropped sharply, particularly toward the end of the year 2000 (Hirsch, 2005).

### 4.3 Challenges and Criticisms of GEAR

Streak (2004) provides several arguments as to what led to the failure of the GEAR strategy and key objectives. These can be seen as challenges as well as limitations of the policy. Firstly, Streak argues that “it is incorrect to assume that the poor growth and development performance in the country was mainly due to the implementation of GEAR” (2004). Whilst Hirsch (2005) argues that the GEAR policy was implemented in an inconsistent and uncoordinated way, particularly with regards to its monetary policy. It was unrealistic in its investment targets, as the 5-year timeline plan was not enough to see positive investment response and the government lacked the capacity to develop effective institutions, plans and investments modalities that would have achieved its projections (Hirsch, 2005). The poor performance could have also been due to external factors, such as the macroeconomic crisis of Asia, Brazil and Russia, the slowdown in the global economy and the political development in the United States of America and in Zimbabwe. These factors required the South African government to further adopt a more conservative monetary policy, which was necessary to prevent the debt from threatening economic growth and development. One needs to note that GEAR was set to stabilise South Africa’s macroeconomics and ensure investors that the government was committed to implementing long-term developmental policies that improved prospects for delivering developmental goods, which it didn’t completely achieve. In fact, these policy decisions limited growth and investment in the economy and reduced government investment expenditure and the lower levels of macroeconomic reforms proved to be more difficult than the reform of the National Treasury and trade policy (Hirsch, 2005). However, a study by
Weeks (1999), contradicts this argument, as he argues that globalisation was an integral part of the GEAR strategy missing some of its objectives.

Secondly, a number of flaws contained in the policy indicated it was bound to fail in some areas. One was the assumption by the policy that “budget deficit reductions would initiate growth through private investment in response to lower budget deficits and interest rates” (Streak, 2004), which was not certain, as it is not possible to depend on private investment stimulating growth as interest rates may not fall and investors’ confidence – which can be influenced by crime and political instability – can undermine investment. The policy was naïve in its approach of integrating South Africa into the global economy. It depended greatly on and believed that FDI would result in growth and employment creation. Furthermore, a key focus on liberalisation and integration downplayed the reality that global capitalism is harsh to developing countries whose domestic economies cannot compete in the global economy. The job losses in the manufacturing sector in the 1990s, the depreciation and dramatic depreciation of the rand in 2001 and the interest rate increases following the Asian crisis bear testimony to the implication of liberalising a protected economy too quickly (Streak, 2004). Instead of relying heavily on globalisation, the GEAR strategy should have adopted a more cautious and different approach to opening the economy.

Thirdly, GEAR depended heavily on investment-led growth for job creation, poverty and inequality reduction. Although, it was correct for GEAR to assume the link between job creation and poverty reduction as evidence suggest that unemployment is a key cause of poverty. Streak (2004) states that the trend in the capital intensity of the economy since the 1970s and the causes of unemployment showed that a heavy dependency on investment-led growth was challenging, government should have learned from this. For example, labour absorption declined considerably between 1970 and 1990, due to the economy becoming much more capital intensive. In addition, the assumption that job creation would lead to economic growth and subsequently reduce poverty was weakened by the skills mismatch between the poor and the needs of the industry. Hence, demand in labour generated by economic growth and private sector investment tends to do little in creating jobs for the unskilled poor who desperately need jobs (Taylor, 2002). Thus, GEAR was incorrect to assume the link between private sector-led growth, employment creation and poverty reduction. What was crucial was for the government to fund investment towards key programmes for job creation and poverty reduction.
Fourthly, GEAR miscalculated governments potential in delivering basic services. Many argued that GEAR lacked the emphasis on the maintainences of social stability, thus not keeping with the promises of the RDP. Finally, GEAR failed to learn that “development theory and economic history illustrated that a heavy reliance on sound macroeconomic policy, liberalisation, efficiency reforms and private sector investment was unlikely to produce rapid economic growth and development” (Streak, 2004). The presumption that macroeconomic stability can be sustained and would be sufficient for growth, poverty and inequality reduction was too narrow and missed the mark. Furthermore, GEAR failed to learn from the experiences of the previous three years where social-economic stability, government efficiency and greater state capacity were at high levels and were all equally important. Thus, although sound fiscal and monetary policy is vital for stimulating private sector investment and growth, it is also equally important that government plays a key role in stimulating growth and reducing poverty and inequality through investment and industrial policy. It would be futile to rely principally on macroeconomic strategies. COSATU, an outspoken critic of GEAR, criticised GEAR particularly on its neoliberal approach and stated that GEAR failed to deliver the promised economic growth, employment creation and the redistribution of income and wealth for the poor. In particular, they argued that GEAR’s narrow focus on stringent fiscal and monetary targets conflicted with goals of the RDP (Knight, 2001).

By the end of 2005 GEAR had failed in placing the South African economy on a higher growth path, which resulted in the failure to reduce the apartheid legacies of inequality and poverty. Although it achieved its goals of macroeconomic stability, it failed to achieve its intended economic growth. Thus, one may argue that the government may have failed in learning from past experiences on the effectiveness of economic policy. The lack of sufficient job creation to reduce unemployment and inequality contributed to growing calls for the government to play a larger role in the economy and pursue economic growth through the notion of a developmental state. As a result, GEAR was replaced in 2006 by ASGISA, which signalled a shift in economic policy.

4.4 Discussion: Was policy-oriented learning evident during the formulation of GEAR?

The adoption of GEAR in 1996 is a key example of policy change. GEAR emerged following governments realisation that the socioeconomic limitations and challenges faced by its predecessor, the RDP, which failed to accelerate economic growth and reduce the high levels
of unemployment, poverty and inequality, needed to be addressed with a new economic strategy. This came in the form of GEAR, which was underpinned by neoliberal economics. It aimed to grow the economy by reducing restrictions on FDI, privatising state-owned enterprises, export-led growth and to integrate the South African economy into the global economy. It was introduced as an economic model towards economic growth, rebuilding and restructuring the economy by keeping with the RDP objectives. Upon close examination of GEAR’s formulation process against the literature on policy-oriented learning, three types of learning were identified.

Firstly, it represented ‘lesson-drawing’. According to Rose (1991), lesson-drawing is a type of learning that allows policymakers to learn from the positive and negative experiences of others who share a common policy issue. In the South African case, the government adopted a new economic policy following the failure of the RDP, however, it promised to keep key socioeconomic objectives outlined in the RDP, thus combining objectives from the previous policy with a newer version. Rose (1991) referred to this as hybridisation – combining parts of a policy with a new policy. In fact, GEAR continued with the objectives of the RDP, but it adopted a more macroeconomic approach to deliver RDP’s objectives. Therefore, GEAR can be seen as drawing-lessons from the poor performance of the RDP and adjusting the goals of the RDP into a newer economic strategy. In addition, a close look at the policies proposed by GEAR illustrates that it drew ideas from policy documents that were suggested to the government prior to its adoption, these being the NEM from the NP and ‘Growth for All’ from SAF, which both called for budget reduction, reduction in government spending, privatisation, free markets and the need for flexibility of wages and prices in both the labour and financial markets. Lastly, we see the policy change as a by-product of persistent economic and social challenges that RDP failed to address.

Secondly, ‘shared belief’ learning was identified. ‘Shared belief’ entails learning from a group that shares a similar belief on an idea or belonging to a coalition group/institution that shares a similar belief system. This learning can lead to the adjustment or redefinition of policy instruments or in some cases the adoption of a new policy, which we see in the case of GEAR. Sabatier (1987) believes that it is the belief systems of actors belonging to an advocacy coalition that influences policy decisions. This advocacy coalition or policy network includes a variety of individuals who are either state actors or non-state actors that share a similar belief system and play a key role in the formulation, dissemination and evaluation of policy issues.
In the South African case, a key feature of GEAR was its closed-door formulation process, which was coordinated by a group of handpicked individuals that were entrusted by the finance minister and the President. These individuals included academics from South African universities, civil servants from three key government departments and economists from the DBSA and the World Bank who were experts in the field of economic policy. Thus, GEAR was formulated by a group of individuals who shared a similar belief in the kind of economic policy the government should adopt. Furthermore, the same team who drafted the final RDP policy, formed part of the same technical team that drafted GEAR, thus, bringing in their experiences and expertise.

Thirdly, ‘ideational learning’ which ties in with the previous type of learning, argues that it is a system of ideas which influence how politicians and policymakers learn how to address policy issues. According to Hall (1993), policy change is influenced by ideas available to policymakers and officials, in which policymakers work within a framework of ideas and standards that specify the goals of the problems they are to address and that is entrenched in the terminology policymakers communicate within their work. Ideational learning entails policymakers adjusting policies or adopting a new policy according to the ideologies that they are exposed to and affiliated with. When examining the policy proposals put forward by GEAR, they resemble neo-liberal development, the integrated strategy it put forward particularly illustrates this. It primarily aimed to stimulate foreign investment, economic growth, global trade and global competition. Furthermore, the formulation process, which lacked popular participation and included the dominance of the financial sector confirms that it was a market-driven capitalist economic policy which was strongly associated with neoliberalism. To illustrate its neoliberal characteristics, one can closely look at the technical team that created GEAR. The individuals who formed part of the team were also part of various institutions that supported neo-liberal economics or supported macroeconomic stabilisation policies. The World Bank representatives, for example, brought with them their ideas and understanding of economic policy from the World Bank, whose key policy proposals included privatisation, FDI, trade liberalisation and monetary and fiscal austerity. Unions and other civil servants who would have brought in a more democratic developmental approach were excluded from the formulation process.

Overall, the policy change experienced in 1996 represents learning on the part of policymakers and the government. In governments efforts to implement a policy to address the ongoing
economic and social challenges, it drew from the performance of the previous policy and the experiences and knowledge from experts in the field. Thus, it represented lesson drawing, shared belief and ideational learning.
CHAPTER 5: ACCELERATED AND SHARED GROWTH INITIATIVE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

The following chapter closely examines the third policy change experienced in post-apartheid South Africa. ASGISA was introduced in 2006 following the need to accelerate and share growth differently and continue to address key socio-economic challenges. ASGISA’s formulation process was close to that of the RDP. However, ASGISA differed to both the RDP and GEAR in the sense that government by that time had developed its own policymaking capacity, thus it could formulate policy without the need to rely on the knowledge and expertise of external economists and academics. Thus, learning in this sense could take place collectively within the state. The chapter ends with a discussion on whether learning played a key role, and exactly which type of learning as argued by the theory of policy-oriented learning is represented.

5.1 The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa

ASGISA was introduced in early 2006 by the Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, as a coordinating policy framework to enable the government to achieve the goal of halving unemployment and poverty rates between 2004 and 2014. The government was looking at how they could increase the growth rate and find ways to share that growth in a different way. It built on the foundations of the RDP’s goals of building a democratic society and integrated economy. ASGISA’s main objectives included, “accelerating economic growth to an average of at least 4.5 per cent between 2005 and 2009 and further to a sustainable 6 per cent average annual growth rate between 2010 and 2014” (The Presidency, 2006). ASGISA further aimed “to reduce the unemployment rate from 30 per cent to 15 per cent by 2014 and to reduce poverty from one-third to one-sixth of the population by 2014” (The Presidency, 2006). To achieve these, the framework identified six key binding constraints to economic growth. These were, “the relative volatility of the currency, the cost, efficiency and capacity of the national logistics system, shortages of suitability skilled labour and the spatial distortions of apartheid affecting low-skilled labour costs, barriers to entry limits to competition and limited new investment opportunities” (The Presidency, 2006). The other binding constraints were environment regulations and the burden on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the lack of capacity and leadership in state organisation (The Presidency, 2006).
To address and counter these binding constraints, ASGISA set in place a number of specific strategies, these included, “infrastructure programmes, sector investment strategies, skills and education initiatives, second economy interventions and small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) development” (The Presidency, 2006). They further looked to address “macro-economic issues such as the volatility of the exchange rate and public administration issues such as improved service delivery” (The Presidency, 2006).

Compared to its predecessors, ASGISA is distinguished by its strong emphasis on defined and specific growth-enhancing projects. ASGISA distinguished itself more as a set of initiatives than an economic policy. The rationale behind ASGISA was the understanding and acknowledgement that its predecessors had made substantial socioeconomic achievements since the democratic transition. However, great social and economic challenges remained, which required further government intervention. ASGISA thus replaced GEAR as the new economic framework to respond to a range of ongoing constraints to economic growth, particularly issues of poverty and unemployment and aimed to improve policy implementation.

The Origins and Formulation of ASGISA

The ASGISA policy initially originated from a commitment made in the ANC’s 2004 election manifesto to halve unemployment and poverty by 2014. The 2004 election manifesto listed a number of targets and objectives for its ‘Vision 2014’. Making up ‘Vision 2014’ objectives were three key targets amongst others that ASGISA adopted, these were, firstly, halving unemployment by 2014 through new employment opportunities, skills training, support to small businesses and creating opportunities for self-employment as well as sustainable community livelihoods. It secondly aimed to halve poverty by 2014 through economic development, a comprehensive social welfare system, land reform and improved household and community assets. Thirdly, it aimed through an education system to provide its citizens with market specific skills to encourage self-employment (ANC, 2004). To achieve these targets, the manifesto listed a number of programmes, which ASGISA adopted as its initiatives, particularly the programmes for economic growth, sustainable livelihoods and access to services. These initiatives included government investment in improving the manufacturing and mining sector, infrastructure development, such as roads, rail, air transportation, telecommunications, energy, and business services. It also looked to allocate funds towards facilitating Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) which aimed to benefit
communities as well as workers and small businesses, to aid skills development and to provide learnerships and work experiences opportunities for the youth (ANC, 2004).

ASGISA was officially launched in 2006 following extensive consultations with various stakeholders, department ministers, organised business, labour unions, religious leaders, youth and women in various forums, and experts on economic policy. The government had acknowledged that the economic policies put in place pre-2006 had yielded meaningful results in social and economic development, as the economy was creating more jobs than before due to the structural improvements in the job-creating capacity of growth. At the same time, the government had lowered its debt and improved its management of the budget, which enabled the economy to become more expansionary (ANC, 2005). However, great social and economic challenges remained, which unfortunately previous strategies failed to address efficiently. These included high unemployment rates, especially amongst the youth, continued poverty, low economic growth, low savings and investment levels and deep inequalities based on class, race, and gender. As a result, the government emphasised the need for a new policy that would improve policy implementation – which President Thabo Mbeki argued remained a key challenge for government – and accelerate economic growth. This is what ASGISA aimed to do by focusing on addressing several ongoing challenges in the economy. ASGISA thus emerged out of government’s need to introduce a new policy framework that would specifically address ongoing challenges and be able to identify the constraints to economic growth, unemployment, poverty and inequality and counter them.

Following these consultations, the government developed a focused set of initiatives to accelerate shared growth. This resulted in a strategy paper, prepared under the minister of finance Trevor Manuel. President Thabo Mbeki then mandated the Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and a task team to identify constraints in the economy and propose interventions to increase the capacity for economic growth to a sustainable 6 per cent per annum and address challenges emerging within the Second Economy (ANC, 2005). The task team included ministers from Finance, Trade and Industry and Public Enterprises, the Premiers of Gauteng and Eastern Cape, and the Mayor of Johannesburg who represented the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). Different to both the consultation and formulation processes of the RDP and GEAR policy, ASGISA’s formulation process in late 2005 and early 2006 had the necessary capacity as government departments had developed their own policymaking capacity, which Abedian (2018) stats that there was no more a need to
deploy external people to work on an economic policy. Thus, although there were extensive consultations, it was an internal process that included all the necessary government departments and labour movements. ASGISA was thus announced towards the end of 2005 and then launched in 2006 as the official economic policy following GEAR.

The advantage of ASGISA as a policy document was that there was extensive government consultation with stakeholders and ANC alliance partners, thus, it represented a combination of policy positions. This may explain why it received a good reception from various stakeholders. However, ASGISA did receive some criticism following its announcement. Contrary to the extensive consultations, COSATU and the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) argued that there was insufficient consultation with civil society organisations, COSATU believed the policy would reduce workers’ rights in small business. Makgetla (2017) states that the attitude of COSATU towards ASGISA was due to its earlier issues with GEAR and thus there was no trust in government anymore on economic policy. The government was thus cautioned to ensure that they included and worked equally with all interest groups. In addition, experts from the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) and the University of Stellenbosch had warned that ASGISA as an economic growth plan may not be feasible, as they saw some serious macroeconomic inconsistencies. They further questioned how the sizeable increase in public investment would be funded. Nonetheless, ASGISA was implemented amidst ongoing adjustment and consultation with all key stakeholders.

5.2 Performance and Challenges of ASGISA

ASGISA’s key objectives were to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014, to improve the country’s economic performance and to increase the country’s job creation capacity by boosting employment through prioritising labour-intensive export sectors, namely the tourism and business process outsourcing sectors with opportunities for SMEs and based on the two economies concept, also ASGISA targeted the massive expansion of infrastructure and skills development, by planning to spend 5 per cent of the country’s GDP per annum on infrastructure development, skills development and education by 2010 (Koma, 2013). To achieve these objectives, the government estimated that the level of economic growth would need an average growth rate of 4.5 per cent between 2005 and 2009 and a further 6 per cent between 2010 and 2014. Furthermore, policymakers identified six binding constraints to economic growth, which ASGISA countered using several initiatives. These were:
- infrastructure investment and development;
- sector and industry-specific investment strategies;
- skills and education development to address skills shortage and enhance policy implementation;
- eliminate the second economy;
- macroeconomic strategies to reduce currency volatility and overvaluation; and
- public administration.

Given the brief period that priority was given to ASGISA, it is difficult to measure its successes and failures. Nonetheless, there were notable achievements towards ASGISA’s objectives during the 2006/2007 period. These included “the growth rate which rose to an average rate of over 5 per cent; the rate of investment increased to over 20 per cent of GDP from 15 per cent; the rate of investment of government increased to over 10 per cent annually and that of public enterprises to an even higher level; effective tracking mechanisms for government projects were introduced; government were successful in reducing unnecessary red tape; universities committed to rapidly increasing their output of technical professionals for a period of three years; the annual output of artisans more than doubled; key new sector strategies and an industrial policy action plan was developed and introduced; the Competition Act, 1998 (Act 89 of 1998) was amended; programmes such as the Project Consolidate and Siyenza Manje to support the strengthening of municipal management were implemented successfully; and reduced the volatility of the currency and the severity of interest rate cycles” (The Presidency, 2007).

In terms of the initiatives to counter the six binding constraints, progress was mixed. In infrastructure investment, performance exceeded expectations. The government had committed itself to improve the availability and reliability of infrastructure services in the public sector, particularly in public enterprises such as the state’s power utility (Eskom) and the country’s rail, port and pipeline company (Transnet). Key areas included local roads, water and electricity distribution, housing, schools, healthcare facilities, business centres, recreational and sports centres, research and development infrastructure, and government services – police, courts and correctional facilities. Government and public enterprises investment achieved very high levels of investment rates, mainly supported by the increased economic growth rate. However, there existed some challenges that limited infrastructure and public enterprise investment. These
included the lack of human resources, organisational capacity and intergovernmental co-operation. Secondly, there was no synergy between large public and private organisations, each organisation tended to work individually and thus there was no alignment between government departments and the private sector (The Presidency, 2007).

In sector and industrial investment strategies, the government acknowledged the need for sector-specific investment strategies to promote investment in key sectors that were labour intensive and rapidly growing that could offer opportunities for BBBEE and small-business development. These sectors included tourism, business process outsourcing (BPO), and biofuels. The government made important progress with the launch of the Industrial Policy Action Plan and the National Industrial Policy Framework. By 2007, there had been considerable progress in all three sectors, specifically in policy intervention and the development of systems and capacity to improve government leadership in economic policy. All three sectors were able to create sustainable employment, in particular, the BPO and tourism sector recorded an increase in export earnings and attracted foreign investment. For example, by mid-2007, the BPO sector established a successful incentive scheme which supported six investment projects that resulted in 10,000 employment opportunities and supported peri-urban communities (The Presidency, 2007). Whilst the tourism sector in collaboration with government departments made substantial progress in air transport, implementation was delayed in the biofuel sector by technical concerns and thus not much progress was recorded, but it received investment interest in the industry. However, key challenges included poor implementation systems and coordination across the state, inadequate resources, the weakness of stakeholder organisations, particularly for the poor communities, and the evaluation process which examines the impact of the programmes on the ASGISA’s targets of growth, poverty and unemployment reduction (The Presidency, 2007).

Under skills and education development, the government realised that the greatest impediment to efforts in infrastructure and private sector investment was the shortage of professional and technical skills. Together with its sister programme, the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), ASGISA introduced a number of initiatives towards skills development. First were the Medium-Term Educational programmes to raise the level of skills needed in the economy. These programmes included, mathematics and science programmes, the Quality Improvement and Development Strategy (QIDS), career guidance, refurbishments of Education and Training colleges, the Adult Basic and Education training programme and the
Employment Services System (connecting employers with employees) (The Presidency, 2007). Secondly, experienced professionals and managers were deployed to local government to assist in improving project development, implementation and maintenance capability. And thirdly, a trust fund was established to run these initiatives that encouraged youths to take advantage of the skills development programmes that were offered. By 2007, a great breakthrough was made in areas of engineering and artisan development and the number of graduates and skilled workers grew, however not at a fast pace. Through the School QIDS, which aimed to improve the quality of teaching resulted in over 6000 schools receiving indigenous language material to improve literacy and 47 530 jobs were created through its targeted teacher training and development in mathematics, science and technology (DPSA, 2007). Through the JIPSA initiative, progress had been made in placing unemployed graduates. For example, by 2007, some 3 589 graduates had been placed in local companies for training through the Unemployment Youth Fund (UYF), and an additional 202 people were placed with companies overseas (The Presidency, 2006).

In eliminating the secondary economy, a number of interventions were identified as necessary to bridge the gap with the second economy, which is characterised by poverty, unemployment and inequality. These interventions aimed at addressing the deep-seated inequalities created by the apartheid system and assist the marginalised poor, leveraging the first economy through increasing public expenditure in investment to promote small business and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and linking small businesses with economic opportunities including skills development and finance. These initiatives were public employment, youth programmes, sector strategies, jobs for growth, and unblocking productive assets. In public employment was the Expanded Public Works Programmes (EPWP), which between 2004 and 2007 created a total of 954 853 work opportunities across the infrastructure, economic, environmental and social sectors (The Presidency, 2007). However, this represented ‘work opportunities’ rather than full employment. In youth programmes were the National Youth Services (NYS), the Youth Enterprises Development (YED), and the Youth Advisory Centres (YAC). The NYS offered more than 59 000 unemployed young people and volunteers with skills development opportunities and volunteer projects in tutoring and positive living campaigns that enabled them to serve their communities (The Presidency, 2007). Whilst the YED committed to delivering training in business skills, services in consultancy, business development services, access to market opportunities, and enterprise finance to the youth to promote entrepreneurs, enterprise development and self-employment among the youth, (The Presidency, 2007). As a
result, in 2007, over 14 000 school going youths were involved in entrepreneurial activities, and youths out of school were assisted in improving and starting their own business (The Presidency, 2007). Furthermore, more than 10 000 jobs were created, and a total of 114 entrepreneurs were connected with business mentors who offered them advice and coaching in growing and improving their business (The Presidency, 2007). The YAC programme which provided the youth with access to information, advice, support in business development, market access, skills training and jobs in entrepreneurship, resulted in over 500 000 young people benefiting from services offered by YAC programmes during the 2007/08 financial year. All in all, infrastructure maintenance and construction had created around 70 000 full-time jobs and through the UYF placed 500 people a year in jobs and was expected to expand in the future (DPSA, 2007).

In macroeconomic interventions programmes, which aimed at reducing currency volatility and overvaluation, ensuring that fiscal and monetary policy were working together to produce sustainable and shared growth, through improving budgeting and expenditure management in government, particularly in government capital investment. By the end of 2007, macroeconomic stability had increased, volatility of the rand was relatively low, Gross Foreign Reserves rose by over 25 per cent, the interest rate rose by 2 per cent which resulted in a prime interest rate of 14.5 per cent, the rate of investment increased sharply – highest since 1985 – as real fixed investment grew at a rate of 14.8 per cent in 2007 which resulted in the increase of 20.6 per cent in investment of GDP (The Presidency, 2007). Furthermore, public sector investment grew strongly, investment in public enterprises grew by 32.6 per cent in 2007. Overall, macroeconomic stability had increased which saw the rate of unemployment falling to 23 per cent and the poverty rate falling to 43.2 per cent (The Presidency, 2007). ASGISA had planned to improve the organisational and capacity of the state in order to address the challenges of ASGISA. This translated into government and institutional interventions. The challenges included a lack of “skilled and committed staff in the public services, lack of human resources to implement policies, inadequate financial resources, corruption and mismanagement of funds, lack of people-driven development, lack of proper coordination between departments and institutions, and barriers to competition and investment opportunities” (Chagunda, 2006). According to the 2007 annual report, by the end of 2007, governance systems and coordination between government departments had improved. However, there was insufficient capacity in the departments to implement programmes, there were insufficient reporting and monitoring systems in place, and there was a shortage of
professionals and well-qualified applicants entering the governance and the administration cluster (The Presidency, 2007).

Challenges of ASGISA

Given the short period of ASGISA as government policy, it is difficult to say if ASGISA ran into some challenges or whether it would have failed in its intended objectives by the year 2014. Nevertheless, while there was some reasonable level of success, poverty and unemployment levels remained unacceptably high. There were common challenges that government acknowledged were affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of all ASGISA’s programmes. For example, funding for ASGISA’s programmes depended on the existing budgets of government departments which caused backlogs. Secondly, coordination and implementation of ASGISA programmes had proven to be more difficult than expected, even between government departments and the private sector. Third, there was some inconsistency between the strategies and interventions, thus no synergy between the programmes and the subsequent interventions, and lastly there were insufficient reporting and monitoring systems in place (The Presidency, 2007).

Overall, the future of the ASGISA programmes was uncertain as no official word came from the government regarding its fate largely because of the new political leadership that assumed power in 2009 following the national elections which saw President Thabo Mbeki being ousted. The change in political leadership saw the introduction of a new macroeconomic development policy, the New Growth Path (NGP).

5.3 Discussion: Was policy-oriented learning evident during the formulation of ASGISA?

The launch of ASGISA in 2006 represented the government’s decision to change its socioeconomic policy once again. Although ASGISA was regarded as a policy, it was more of a set of initiatives that offered strategies and interventions to achieve key objectives. Former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka stated, “ASGISA is neither a new policy nor replaces GEAR, it is a set of limited interventions intended to identify and unblock binding constraints on achieving a 6 per cent economic growth rate by 2014” (Legassick, 2007). Nonetheless, ASGISA was launched following the need to address the ongoing challenges of
unemployment, poverty and inequality that its predecessors failed to address and to overcome the constraints to accelerated growth. A close examination of the formulation process represents three types of learning. The report found the following types of learning with regards to ASGISA.

Firstly, the formulation process represented social learning, which Hall (1993) argues naturally forms part of the policymaking process, and this is because policymakers and government naturally come to a decision to change or adopt a new policy on the basis of economic and political changes and the performance of the economy. Social learning entails learning about the success and failures of previous policies and the construction of a policy problem. This type of learning may lead to policy objectives being adjusted or the adoption of a new policy. ASGISA emerged due to the need to accelerate economic growth and the ongoing issues of high levels of unemployment and poverty. Thus, the government acknowledged that an innovative approach was needed to be in place to address these issues specifically. The fundamental objective of ASGISA was amongst others to accelerate the achievement of growth and employment creation. On the other hand, ASGISA emerged from extensive consultations with various stakeholders and government officials. According to the ASGISA documents, the government consulted with various stakeholders and domestic and international experts on economic policy. Thus, indicating the government’s effort to learn from various experts and various stakeholders about a feasible economic policy, which according to the theory of policy-oriented learning represents instrumental and political learning. Which entails learning about the political and economic feasibility of the policy and the policy processes of the policy idea or problem. Usually, the learning comes from the knowledge and experience of experts and political elites. With ASGISA, that was the case, those who were consulted were either experts in the field of economic policy and on South Africa’s economy, and they were key officials within government, particularly from key economic departments. These two types of learning, Instrumental and political learning, can either lead to the adjustment and the improvement of policy instruments and programmes, which ASGISA fundamentally did, by the introduction of new innovative policy programmes.

Secondly, conceptual learning was identified. ASGISA was implemented mainly because the government had realised that previous policy instruments were failing in achieving the key objectives of reducing poverty and unemployment. Thus, it outlined a set of specific initiatives, which can be seen as policy instruments, to address these ongoing challenges. This represents
conceptual learning, which relates to the alteration of policy instruments without radically altering the policy goals. In other words, the position on a policy issue changes due to the availability of new instruments or information. Conceptual learning argues that policymakers learn about new policy instruments that can be implemented to achieve set goals. This type of learning may lead to new policy principles being adopted or the adjustment and redefinition of policy instrument to achieve set goals. ASGISA in many ways represents a policy that has kept with the goals of both the RDP and GEAR policies but has adjusted policy instruments through the introduction of several initiatives.

The third type of learning that was identified was lesson drawing. Lesson drawing according to Rose (1991) states that policymakers learn through drawing lessons from past experiences of either previous or existing policies, learning from institutions or other states that share a common problem. ASGISA was not necessarily new as it continued with the goals of both the RDP and GEAR. However, it drew from a number of documents and initiatives on economic policy. For example, ASGISA was built on the foundation of the RDP, continuing with the RDP’s goals of building a democratic and a single integrated economy. Furthermore, it kept in with the objectives of readdressing the social and economic inequalities institutionalised by the apartheid era, and it continued with GEAR’s growth target of 6 per cent per annum. A second example is its replication of the goals and interventions outlined in the ANC’s 2004 election manifesto under its ‘Vision 2014’. Equally, ASGISA’s targets were set in line with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015, which called for the end of poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all. In particular, South Africa committed to achieving eight of the MDGs. These included “eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development” (United Nations, 2018). Thus, as with both its predecessors, learning played an integral part in ASGISA’s policy formulation.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 Key Findings

The study found the following trends in the case of South Africa’s policy changes between 1994 and 2006:

1) Each policy change was a result of the need to address the challenges of apartheid and the ongoing socioeconomic challenges, thus it was driven by political, social and economic factors.

2) The policymaking process was characterised by the broader consultative process, research-heavy and driven by academic deliberation. During the formulation of these policies, the government relied on the knowledge and inputs of expert economists, civil society organisations, research groups, trade unions and key stakeholders. Therefore, the policymaking process was at most times inclusive and open, except for GEAR, which was done behind closed doors, and the RDP White Paper which was finalised by a small technical team. Padayachee (1998) states that “a gradual process of organisational coherence in the relationship between academics, economic think-tanks and social and political movements characterised the decade of liberation and the early days of South Africa’s policymaking process”.

3) The change in policies reflected a fundamental shift in economic ideology, the trend in the theoretical foundation of economic policy analysis and advice advanced and developed over time. From a social democratic economy by 1990, to MERG’s post-Keynesian approach in 1993 which supported a democratic developmental state, to the ISP’s mid-1990’s corporatist strategy and post-Fordist vision of global competitiveness, and finally, with the RDP WP and GEAR, to neoliberalism (Padayachee V. , 1998), thus there was a progression in economic ideas.

4) Although the policies differed in name, the objectives of each policy mostly remained the same, in fact, each policy adjusted its policy instruments to achieve goals originally set in the RDP. Furthermore, the process of each policies shared some similarities, these being they were commissioned from within government – in the case of the RDP, it was first the election
manifesto for the ANC, they all become official government policy, and they did not incorporate external inputs in a deliberative manner.

5) The trend has been to present new policies whenever difficulties are experienced with existing policies, instead of confronting and grappling with those difficulties with a view to resolving them, which can lead to confusion, policy uncertainty and implementations challenges.

6) The policies somewhat share similar formulations process, for example with the finalisation of the RDP WP and GEAR, government relied on technical teams, comprising of macroeconomic policy experts, economists and academics, whereas with the RDP base document and ASGISA, government consulted widely with all stakeholders, therefore there was this consistency in the way in which knowledge was acquired and distributed.

7) With each change in policy, the capacity to formulate and implement policies within government structures improved over time. Particularly during ASGISA’s formulation, the government had at this point developed its own policymaking capacity, thus not needing the assistance of external economist and experts.

Overall, in answering the key research question: *Was policy-oriented learning part of the policymaking process in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies?* The study found that learning formed part of the policymaking process. In fact, the policymaking process itself allowed for learning to take place through the stages of policy agenda setting and policy evaluation. Whether the learning was consistent and done collectively, is another matter. However, with the ever-changing policy environment between 1994 and 2006, South Africa’s government ensured through democratic processes that its policies were well debated, except for GEAR. The extensive consultations it allowed with the RDP base document and the ASGISA policy represented instances of learning and the willingness by government to accept and acquire knowledge and experiences from those whom they engaged with. Furthermore, the existence of review mechanisms, such as the weekly Cabinet Lekgotla, where all policies are reviewed by ANC structures, the government budgetary process, which is a policy review mechanism and an important oversight function of parliament, is where all government decisions are reviewed and is provided with the tools to achieve its economic and development goals, and the State of the Nation Address (SONA) where progress of policies are outlined and
new goals are set. An important department to acknowledge is the establishment of the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency in 2010, now the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME). It serves as the government’s role in monitoring and evaluation, assessing management performance, supporting the national evaluation system, and developing planning and monitoring capacity in government departments. Through citizen-based monitoring, the national evaluation system, and socio-economic impact assessment system, the government can assess the implementation, quality control, capacity support and outcomes of government policy. These allow for continuous learning and improvement of policy. Particularly the DPME, which represents governments continuous efforts in learning about the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the policies it implements and how their outcomes can improve.

According to the literature on policy-oriented learning, policy-learning generally entails policymakers learning about the “viability of policy interventions”, the “social construction of a policy” and the “strategy for advocating a given policy idea” (May, 1992). This learning may lead to policymakers understanding why a policy has failed and thus improving policy performance, as well as lead to the redefinition of policy goals and a more sophisticated policy idea. The literature offered several examples of policy-learning that can be found within the policymaking process (see Table 1). With regards to the three policies examined, most of these were represented, however, three were very common. The first being social learning, which Hall (1993) argues forms part of the normal policymaking process. Policymakers and government make policy decision first a foremost based on the issues at hand and their understanding from the failures and success of previous policies. The second was lesson-drawing, who May (1992) argue allows policymakers to learn from both the positive and negative experiences of others and past policies. And thirdly, shared beliefs, which are the beliefs systems of actors belonging to an advocacy coalition that influences policy decisions. Central to the policy decisions made between 1994 and 2006 was the socioeconomic challenges, the advice received from the consultation process and commissioned technical teams of economic experts and learning from the failures and achievements of past policies.

6.2 Key Sub-Research Questions Revisited

The key questions were as follows:
a. What were the underlining similarities and differences in the formulation of these policies?

Similarities included the extensive consultation process with both the RDP and ASGISA policies and the use of technical teams to finalise both the RDP WP and GEAR policy. One difference includes the advantage ASGISA had over both the RDP and GEAR, by the time of its formulation, the government had developed its own policymaking capacity, thus did not require the assistance of economist and experts outside of government structures.

b. Can the concept of policy-learning explain the decisions behind the shifts in policy?

No, firstly because in general policy is made in response to a problem that requires attention. For example, RDP emerged to address the legacies of apartheid, which left the country in high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty. Whilst GEAR was introduced to improve and stabilise macroeconomics and address ongoing issues of inequality, poverty and unemployment, and ASGISA was introduced following government understanding that they needed to accelerate growth and redistribute growth differently to address ongoing socioeconomic challenges. Thus, learning was not the only factor in the several shifts in policy, but it formed part of it. It was an essential part of the policy debates that took place. When the ANC came into government it did not have the most efficient and effective policymaking skills, thus it embarked on a wide campaign to learn as much as it could from institutions like the MERG, Canada’s IDRC, ET, academic think-tanks and other civil societies on a possible economic policy. Therefore, the knowledge and experiences the ANC acquired during these formulation processes influenced how they thought about economic policy in the South African context. For the government to implement a policy that closely addresses key issues, they needed to engage at all levels, they needed to test and debate the feasibility of a policy, and this could only be done through studying past experiences of existing policies, engaging with different policymakers, learning from what has worked and not.

c. Was the process of learning by-passed due to the political environment?

No, although the political and economic environment played a key role in the decision to change policy. The ANC through consultation ensured that it engaged with civil society, trade unions and key stakeholders in policy discussion. This was the ANC’s mechanisms of ensuring
that it adopted a policy that was inclusive, but most importantly was feasible to the economic challenges.

6.3 Limitations of the Study

The study does not examine all the economic policies that have been adopted to date, these all being the RDP, GEAR, ASGISA, the National Growth Plan (NGP) and the National Development Plan (NDP). Instead, the study only focuses on the first three policies that were adopted. The reason for this is because of time constraints. Secondly and most importantly, the Mandela (1994-1999) and Mbeki (1999-2008) era needs to be separated from the Zuma (2009-2018) era – in which the NGP and the NDP were introduced–, mainly because the Mandela and Mbeki era focused on restructuring the state and building the ability to run a democratic state. Whereas, Zuma’s era – which had inherited a government that had built its ability in policy reform, had development departmental efficiency and monitoring capacity – has been characterised with maladministration, leadership instability within the ANC, corruption, policy uncertainty, and weakening in the state capacity to implement policy. Abedian (2018) argues that since 2008, the government in formulation policy “are not equipped, they only think of plundering and they don’t understand, and they, in fact, use policy terminology to mislead the nation….they are not equipped with either adequate ethics, in fact, the total opposite, nor are they equipped with the sophistication of governing or presiding over a sophisticated economy with such huge backlogs”, furthermore he argued that “the lack of implementation is because the country confused cabinet with the machinery of the state”.

However, one may argue that during Zuma’s leadership, despite the corruption and maladministration an important monitoring and evaluation capacity was established, this being the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in the Presidency in 2010. The DPME has and continues to play a crucial part in evidence-based policymaking. The department through tools such as feedback from citizens, the use of evidence in policy processes, both at the department and in other state departments, monitors the implementation of policies and attempts to identify and resolves problems. Which represents an important mechanism of policy-learning. It would be key to analyse how effective this department has been in learning and subsequently improving policy implementation and outcomes over time. Furthermore, the adoption of both the NGP and NDP in post-ASGISA further represents policy changes, and thus shows governments eagerness to learn and implement better policies to
achieve the ongoing structural challenges that previous policies failed to achieve. Thirdly, the decision was made to focus on these three policies, particularly because they were policies that were formulated and adopted in the early years of democracy, which was the period where the most learning took place, although not to argue that learning in post-ASGISA is not happening, as policymaking is an ongoing process and is ever developing. Furthermore, the policymaking process of these three policies can provide some indication as to how policies, in general, are formulated in South Africa.

6.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations are what government and policymakers could ensure exists within the policymaking process and government structures. These recommendations also speak to the specific challenges faced in the RDP, GEAR and ASGISA polices during their implementation phase. For learning to take place the government needs to ensure that there is stable leadership and has an administration that is committed, competent, ethical and experienced. The government needs to also ensure that an effective and efficient monitoring and evaluation system exists with the capacity to formulate and implement policy. In addition, for better policy implementation, government needs to ensure synergy, mutual understanding and trust exists amongst government and private sectors. Moreover, instead of replacing one policy with another due to ongoing challenges, policymakers could rather keep what is working and just adjust policy instruments to achieve intended goals.

6.5 Concluding Remarks

Policy change is, therefore, a product of social, political and economic changes, and the persistent social and economic challenges that previous policies have failed to address, the strategic interactions between civil societies, social and political movements, key stakeholders, policymakers, and government, and the sharing and obtaining of knowledge.
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