

The influence of public participation on the Corridors of Freedom policy-making process and project

The case of Empire-Perth Development Corridor



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DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Masters of Science in Development Planning to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other University.

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ABSTRACT

In South Africa public participation is the cornerstone of our democracy, yet it often has limited influence over the final project and does not form an important part of the policy-making process. I investigate a controversial corridor development process in Johannesburg – Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom and how participation influenced the process and content. Through in-depth interviews with key individuals and through analysis of various documents I stitch together how this participation process unfolded. The policy process was highly complex and faced many internal challenges. It was carried out by consultants and initially was technocratic with limited participation but through a mix of resident mobilisation, opposition, and co-operation the process shifted to a more open one where new spaces for participation emerged where the public were able to influence *some* decisions. For a process similar to this one to run smoother it is essential the project team use graphics and illustrations which are context specific and capture the essence of the project. Participation needs to be embraced from the start and clearly incorporated into consultant's briefs, and a variety of spaces for participation need to be provided. These are essential factors contributing to the success of corridor projects which are arguably the most controversial in planning.

To my parents and family

for always believing in me and supporting me throughout my studies

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ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
BCF	Brixton Community Forum
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CoF	Corridors of Freedom
CoJ	City of Johannesburg
CTSPD	City Transformation and Spatial Planning Department
DA	Democratic Alliance
E-P	Empire-Perth Corridor
GDS	Growth and Development Strategy
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
JDA	Johannesburg Development Agency
JRA	Johannesburg Roads Agency
NDP	National Development Plan
NMT	Non-motorised Transportation
NPM	New Public Management
PRA	Parktown Residents Association
RA	Residents Association
RSDF	Regional Spatial Development Framework
SAF	Strategic Area Framework
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SoAP	School of Architecture and Planning
UJ	University of Johannesburg
UNS	Urban Network Strategy
Wits	University of the Witwatersrand
WRA	Westdene Residents Association

Chapter 1

Introduction to the research

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Public participation is widely acknowledged as an essential part of the policy-making process in the 21st century (Monno and Khakee, 2012; Satge, 2009; Silverman, 2006). It has provided external stakeholders¹ with an opportunity to have an influence over the environment in which they reside and policies which affect them. However, in practice participation is a complex matter which is often avoided by City officials because it is resource consuming in terms of time, money, and technical skill and its value is seen to be minimal (Everatt et al, 2010). This means that the influence which participation has had over policies is often limited. This research is primarily concerned with unpacking the influence participation had on the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom (CoF) process and content.

The Corridors of Freedom is the policy that will guide investment and development in the City of Johannesburg over the next 30 years. It is aimed at “re-stitching” the City in an attempt to overcome apartheid spatial planning. The Mayor of Johannesburg describes the Corridors of Freedom as “the launch of one of the largest public transportation development programmes in the history of South Africa. Johannesburg will lead in South Africa and in Africa to link transport development with high density housing and create viable, sustainable and integrated communities” (Tau, 2013: 7).

From the perspective of a City of Johannesburg (CoJ) official, the Corridors of Freedom process has been viewed as “very different to other strategies: it has been a highly complex process, with many different departments and stakeholder involved” (CoJ Official, 2014). From an external perspective, the Corridors of Freedom has received much public scrutiny: a public controversy emerged about the fact that genuine participation did not occur and the initiative was not developed in a transparent and democratic manner (van den Bussche, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). This led to a group of residents in the Empire-Perth corridor in particular to resist the policy and insist that their voices be heard in the process. This delayed the policy-making process substantially. To elaborate, the policy was meant to be approved at the end of 2013; it was officially adopted in October 2014, almost one year later.

¹ In this research external stakeholder refers mainly to participants in the process who are not part of the City of Johannesburg and the consultancy teams which worked in the project. It includes residents from all the affected communities, and institutions such as Wits University and University of Johannesburg. Ward Councillors are included as external stakeholders because they were supporting the residents who were mainly against the CoJ initially.

This research unpacks the Corridors of Freedom policy-making process with particular attention to public participation. The research seeks to understand the intricate dynamics of how the policy-making process was working before the participation process, and how this changed as a result of participation. The influence that participation had on the content, its “outcome” in the classic sense of the term, is a central concern. It has been argued by numerous authors that participation in post apartheid Johannesburg seldom has any influence on the outcome of policies (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). Furthermore, with the advent of new public management (NPM) and neoliberalisation, policy formulation is increasingly being outsourced to consultants (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014; Grijzen, 2010). With social and spatial transformation principles being at the core of the states agenda (NPC, 2011), the influence and place of participation becomes even more complex to manage, unpack and understand.

Policies such as the Corridors of Freedom, which aim to restructure the spatial layout and alter the status quo of cities in order to make them more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable (Wilkinson, 2006; Todes, 2000; Lotz, 1995) are arguably the most controversial and difficult to implement in terms of urban planning due to the high degree of resistance and opposition they receive from the affected communities (Cohen and Eimicke, 2006; Burby, 2003). The reason for this is that these visions and views are not always shared by all inhabitants (Kytta et al, 2013) and many residents do not want to see changes occur to their neighbourhoods, especially if it involves encouraging a diversity of residents to live in the suburb (Ibid). Forester et al (2013) found that conflict is bound to happen in this type of a process between the residents, developers, consultants and the Council. However, through the provision of spaces for deliberation and enough time given these conflicts can be addressed and mitigated.

This research demonstrates that amidst many internal challenges and conflict at the interface between the City Council, consultants, and public, the participation process was a game changer for the Empire-Perth Development Corridors (in terms of content and process). Through a mixture of opposition and co-operation, the external stakeholder’s participation had an impact on the policy content and process. To elaborate, the external stakeholders had to oppose the policy in its original form and the process because the project team were not going to conduct in-depth participation where the participants have an influence over the content of the CoF, but the project team changed their approach as to how they were formulating the policy and the external stakeholders worked with them in formulating some of the content. The way in which the external stakeholders mobilised and the strategies they used in order to have an influence over the content and process is

highlighted. The research demonstrates the power of participation and the potential it has to change a radical transformative policy such as the Corridors of Freedom.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Public participation is viewed as the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa (Faga, 2010; Satge, 2009; Day, 1997). It is an essential ingredient in strategic spatial planning (Healey, 1997) and it is widely agreed in planning theory that public participation should form part of all planning and policy-making processes (Monno and Khakee, 2012; Satge, 2009; Silverman, 2006): policy *should* be developed through a governance process where internal state actors and external stakeholders work together. External stakeholders have experiential knowledge and everyday on the ground experience that can greatly strengthen the quality of a policy (Kytta et al, 2013).

However, it has been argued that public participation usually does not have a fundamental influence on the outcome of policy in South Africa (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008) and in participation processes in general (Innes and Booher, 2004). The spaces of participation that have been provided in formal participation processes in post apartheid South Africa are usually ineffective and have little outcome on the decisions made and policy outcomes (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; King et al, 1998: cited in Shipley and Utz, 2012). Furthermore, government officials generally set the bar low in terms of participation spaces because they are frustrated with them as they are ineffective (Everatt et al, 2010). Participation has become about ticking boxes and ensuring that key performance indicators are met (GGLN, 2012). Participation processes are mostly framed as an event that has a distinct beginning and end with no communication before and none after (van Donk, 2012) – this small window is the only opportunity for stakeholders to engage and usually it is highly tokenistic or manipulative in the sense that most decisions have already been made.

This landscape described above is complicated further with the advent of New Public Management (NPM) and neoliberalisation processes in the sense that the state is increasingly outsourcing the formulation of planning policies (Hassen and Falleth, 2014; Grijzen, 2010). This places a substantial amount of power in consultants and threatens to exclude external stakeholders from policy processes even further (Boyte, 2004). In the instance of the CoF, the SAF formulation was outsourced to an external consultancy firm.

External stakeholders increasingly have to develop their own spaces to have an influence on policy and projects (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; Cornwall, 2002). However, these spaces often face legitimacy and representation problems because they are not created by the state (Miraftab, 2004). This means the likelihood of partnership and long term constructive deliberation are unlikely to happen as inventing

a space of participation often requires a degree of opposition / antagonism, that may or may not lead to recognition by the state.

As mentioned above, policies such as the CoF are described as some of the most difficult and controversial policies to implement due to their transformative² nature (Forester et al, 2013; Burby, 2003; Cohen and Eimicke, 2006). In a context where external stakeholders are not able to be efficiently heard and their views be taken into consideration there is bound to be conflict – especially where change is not wanted, or feared. This was clearly seen in a corridor development process in the City of Albuquerque in New Mexico, USA where there was strong resistance to the proposals made to transform and redevelop the corridor. There was conflict between all the stakeholders regarding what should happen in the corridor and how development should take place. It took a well thought out deliberative process with many public meetings to get the process moving again – a continuation of a technical process would have resulted in it being stopped indefinitely (Forester et al, 2013).

The Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom policy has been viewed as quite controversial as not many external stakeholders knew about the CoF until it was revealed in the first participation meeting held on the 2nd October 2013. Van der Westhuizen (2014) states the intention of the initial public meeting was to ‘confirm’ the policy. In other words residents were expected to accept the policy. But it was seen as if “it came out of nowhere” (van der Westhuizen, 2014). This has led to it being referred to as a “modernist top-down process” (van der Bussche, 2014). No external stakeholders took part in formulating the policy that was initially presented. This resulted in a negative reaction to the policy by the majority of the external stakeholders and resulted in the Empire-Perth CoF being heavily criticised. This was expressed in many media reporting’s such as the one below:

“[Corridors of Freedom] has brought many objections from residents who claim they have not been consulted properly and are concerned that the high-density, multiple-storey housing which is to be built, will destroy the character of the historic suburbs” (The Star, 2013).

At first glance, this might reflect NIMBYsm³ (not in my back yard) and more broadly in a post apartheid context resistance to change. This brings up a major challenge that the CoJ has to deal with. Any policy that might involve changing and transforming well established middle income suburbs into more inclusive areas which have a greater social mix will often be opposed by the

² Transformative in this sense means the altering of the current spatial and social landscape - changing the status quo into something more equitable and sustainable. This includes creating diversity in terms of race.

³ NIMBYism is an acronym for ‘not in my back yard’. It refers to organised opposition to a proposed project or plan. It usually refers to citizen-directed actions aimed at preventing the development of a certain project such as subsidised housing (Ware, 2003).

residents (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008): therefore, how does the City overcome and deal with this issue? Should they take a more top-down approach with such a controversial policy, and not give residents an option as far as the core principles are concerned (social transformation)? But surely then the participation processes should be developed to make this policy acceptable at least in its implementation or in its form – in other words, use participation to attempt to change mindsets and help residents understand the problem. But this route was not initially taken.

More generally though, any major change, even change that can overwhelmingly be considered as positive and legitimate, might be frightening for residents – it disturbs plans, creates uncertainties, and shifts local power balances in any community. So, was the City right in pushing this policy without much consultation, at least initially (to ensure that the core objectives of the strategy are followed through)? This suggests that it is a political problem that the City has to address and confront. This highlights an issue in the policy-making process where there is substantial conflict between the residents, the CoJ, and other stakeholders in the process such as consultants which acts as a major barrier to the success of the much needed CoF policy. How does the CoJ overcome these challenges to ensure the Empire-Perth CoF is not derailed and how do residents mobilise to ensure they have an influence?

1.3 RATIONALE

The interest in researching public participation has not faded. Even though there is a rich array of literature on participation, there are some gaps and areas that require more research. For instance, the influence of participation on redirecting policy objectives; and the influence that participation has on policy-making processes and the way in which policies are developed is not covered adequately in planning literature. Shipley and Utz (2012) stated that few studies have tried to evaluate the influence of participation and the relationship between outcomes and consultation formats. Further, the literature on participation has not adequately addressed evaluation of participation in practice (Brown and Chin, 2013) and the effectiveness of participation in practice (Pacione, 2014). Few research projects have attempted to illustrate the exact changes public participation has had on content of policies. Moreover, with the advent of NPM and outsourcing planning policy formulation, there is a lack of understanding on how this outsourcing affects the inclusion of external stakeholders and their influence on the policy. This research contributes to better understanding some of the gaps which are evident in the planning literature on public participation by providing an in-depth investigation on the Empire-Perth CoF policy-making and participation process.

The case study through which the questions are asked has been selected because the CoF is a massive policy which is receiving substantial political push and financial support. It has drawn an exceptional amount of attention in academia, the media, and the public. It is important to understand why certain decisions were made as it affects millions of people's lives. It is also a policy which involves many stakeholders, within and outside of the CoJ to work together in order to formulate this policy and to ensure that it is realised. I think, amidst such internal complexity, the CoJ wants to avoid opposition and derailment of the process as far as possible, but many of the CoJ's approaches and strategies in terms of carrying out the process were flawed (which actually leads precisely to derailment) and I deem there are important lessons officials, consultants, and academics can learn from the experiences of this process.

Exploring how the process and content of the policy changed assists in understanding how the residents are able to affect such a policy and the influence that they have in the context of Johannesburg. Johannesburg has indeed had a bleak history in terms of involving the public in its previous visioning processes such as Igoli 2002, 2010, Joburg 2030. Participation (especially invited) in these processes has not been transformative or had any influence, or in some cases was non-existent (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). However, in the Johannesburg Growth and Development Strategy 2040 (GDS 2040) the participation process was quite extensive with the use of various platforms including the Internet and social media (Peens, 2013). The City Officials in this process wanted to ensure everyone had their say. This pointed in a different direction to Winkler's findings in that the CoJ wanted to engage in creating the City's vision. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the public is having an influence on a policy which directly affects them and how they manage to have an influence if they are. It is also important to investigate if the nature of participation is changing – considering the approach taken to formulate the GDS 2040. The research will assist in understanding a major policy in the making and the complexities in developing such as policy.

1.4 AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The primary aim of the research is to understand and investigate the influence that the participation of the external stakeholders had on the CoF policy-making process and content of the SAF. It is also to investigate what the many causes for resistance from the external stakeholder were: there certainly is more to it than "we were not included". Furthermore, it is to understand how officials within the City have responded to this challenge. It also aims to understand the political spaces that were used and formed for participation in this process, and which spaces seemed to be the most influential and effective for obtaining information. An important part of this research is to see what

the actual outcome of the public's participation has been: where has the policy and its content changed / not changed and to what extent? What was the public able to change, have the core principles of CoF been lost, has participation affected the transformative nature of the CoF? Essentially this research illustrates how the public is able to affect and influence a major City policy and it highlights the strategies that the community have had to use in order to ensure they have an influence over the policy.

Many academics have highlighted the importance of understanding the context in which participation is set (Cornwall, 2008; Williams, 2004). The research takes Cornwall's and Williams suggestions and aims to understand the broader context in which the policy was being developed. In other words, how were the initial phases of the policy-making process working and how the outsourcing arrangement between the consultants and the CoJ worked? Thus, what effect did outsourcing have on engaging the public and including all stakeholders and how did this change through the process. In order to investigate how participation influenced the policy process it is important to understand how the process was initially functioning. The way in which participation was defined and interpreted is essential to understand and how this changed as the process progressed. The final aim of the research is to determine what the role of participation is, and could be, in such as strategic spatial planning policy: which has broader objectives of restructuring the City.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research report is primarily focused on understanding how public participation influenced the policy-making process and the content of the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom SAF. Therefore, the primary research question is:

How has public participation influenced the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom policy-making process and ultimately the policy itself?

I'm interested in the intricate political workings of the process and the broader context in which the policy was being developed. In order to understand how the policy-making process was influenced it is crucial to understand how it was functioning before participation took place and the way in which participation was framed in this process. Therefore, the first sub-question deals with how the policy process was working and how it framed participation.

- 1) *How was the policy process working before the participatory process? How was public participation conceptualised and framed in this process, and why?*

This process was not only carried out by the CoJ, consultants were centrally involved in formulating the policy. The relationship between the various parties (CoJ / consultants / public) is important to understand. Exploring how outsourcing a public policy affects aspects such as participation is imperative because this is a growing phenomenon with the advent of NPM and neoliberalisation. Therefore, the second sub-question deals with the notion of outsourcing.

- 2) What effect does outsourcing the formation of public policy have on the policy process and public participation?*

I also seek to investigate how residents mobilised and attempted to have an influence and bring their vision to the fore. Who was participating and what they were saying about the CoF is essential in understanding whether there were diverging ideas within the communities, or not, and who essentially got listened to.

- 3) How have residents mobilised, what are their visions for their neighbourhood and the city, what strategies have they used to bring this vision to the fore, is it a 'community' in the making or are there diverging interests?*

The way in which the city officials and consultants responded and reacted to the residents' mobilisation needs to be understood. The way the content received from the participatory process was dealt with by the CoJ officials and consultants is linked to the influence that residents can have over the process.

- 4) How did city officials and consultants reaction and respond to the residents mobilisation? How have they dealt with participation in the process, and how have the comments and suggestions been dealt with?*

What exactly the public has managed to change is important, because it may reveal that the participants either have a substantial amount of power (or not). This question and question 3, when read in conjunction, will assist in understanding which 'spaces' seem to be more effective in having an influence on the process and policy. Therefore, it is important to understand what exactly the participants have managed to influence and change.

- 5) What have the public influenced and changed in the CoF policy? How has the actual plan / policy content / vision / process changed (or not) since the participatory process? What does this mean for the core principles of the CoF?*

In terms of the underlying principles of the CoF policy and the mandate of the CoJ, which is generally to address social and spatial inequalities and to integrate Johannesburg in terms of income, race,

and land use, it brings me to reflect upon what the purpose of participation is in such a process. The CoJ needs to make these changes in order to create a more “resilient, liveable, and sustainable” city. With a policy that involves such deep social and spatial transformation is participation a requirement? This is a reflective question I aim to explore because from a city transformation point of view, deep level participation might threaten this objective. Therefore, should boundaries be placed around public participation? Thus the last question is:

6) What is the place of public participation in such a policy?


These are the questions that this research report focuses on. Light will be shed on the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom policy and participatory process and all the intricate details of what was taking place in the broader context of the process. This assists me in understanding how participation fits into such a process and the influence it has over it. Recommendations will be derived from findings and discussion on how to improve the process and participation in such a policy.

1.6 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Apartheid spatial planning has left Johannesburg a fragmented, highly car-oriented, low density, sprawling city, with the least advantaged citizens still having to live on the outskirts of the city far away from job opportunities and social amenities (Spinks, 2001). Over the past two decades, to a large extent, the apartheid city layout has been reinforced by low cost housing developments that have been built in remote locations on cheap available land (Oranje, 2014; Skosana, 2013; Herve, 2009). Dangor (1998) states that RDP housing estates have the same housing standard and ‘feel’ as the old apartheid townships. Dewar (1998) corroborates with this stating that these new low cost housing developments are largely mono-functional low density, which are missing social and other vibrant urban activities.

The public sector has invested extensively in the previously disadvantaged areas. However, this has largely failed to change private developer’s patterns of investment as they continue to invest in the already established, ‘advantaged’ areas in Joburg such as Sandton, Rosebank, Fourways, Randburg etc. As Oranje (2014) states, despite all the attempts to change patterns, South African cities two decades after democracy still bear the core apartheid features. This means that a large portion of Joburg’s population (especially the working class and poor citizens) have to travel long distances to access jobs and amenities (CoJ, 2013a). This also contributes to traffic congestion which results in high levels of fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. It is evident that Johannesburg in its current form is socially and environmentally unsustainable. The map below illustrates the

apartheid layout of Johannesburg which has had ever lasting effects on the City and is to a large degree still imbedded today.



Map 1.1: Apartheid spatial planning layout of Johannesburg with the Empire-Perth corridor highlighted in red (Cole and De Blij, 2007).

South African cities entered the 1990s with a strong apartheid urban planning legacy. This meant that urban planners, politicians, and officials were faced with the massive task of reconstructing the highly fragmented, segregated, and dispersed urban society (Donaldson, 2001). To this day planners, politicians, and officials face this same challenge.

Johannesburg's most recent response to addressing the ever pressing challenge of apartheid spatial planning is transit oriented corridor development which has been labelled the Corridors of Freedom. The Corridors of Freedom was introduced by Mayor Parks Tau in the State of the City address in May 2013. It aims at densifying the city and linking its fragmented parts in a way presented as rectifying and overcoming the spatial inequalities left behind by apartheid (CoF, 2014). On a general level, CoF promotes integrated development (in terms of land use, income level, and race) along main strategic transportation routes. The backbone of the CoF is the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Rea Vaya system⁴. The

⁴The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Rea Vaya is a bus network that has been implemented in Johannesburg. It is still in the process of being fully implemented but there are routes which are operational. It has various bus stations along the route and a dedicated bus lane. Bus intervals is approximately 15 to 20 minutes.


CoF aligns with and is one of the tools for implementing Johannesburg's GDS 2040 (CoJ, 2013b). Furthermore, the CoF is also aimed at ensuring that the principles and objectives set out in the National Development Plan 2030 are reached (JDA, 2014). Some of these principles include overcoming inequalities caused by apartheid by developing more inclusive and integrated development. Another objective is to contribute to a low-carbon emissions City; this involves densification and improving public transport. The following section outlines the specific context in which the Empire-Perth corridor is set.

1.6.1 Context of the Empire-Perth corridor

The Empire-Perth corridor is one of the chosen strategic locations for the CoF to take place. There are three corridors that have been identified as a priority in the short-term for development through the Corridors of Freedom policy: Empire-Perth (the focus for this research); Turffontein; and Louis Botha Avenue (see map 1.2).


Corridors which have been earmarked as the next phases of the CoF include: Sandton to Diepsloot, the mining belt, and Alexandra to Ivory Park. The areas selected for the corridor developments are in built up areas – generally closer to the CBD. They are also along routes which join peripheral areas to well located hubs such as Sandton and Joburg CBD.

Therefore, these are brown field developments that actively aim to change the existing structure of the city. All these areas have been selected because they are well located, connect important nodes, and have strengths that can be leveraged off of (for example, are close to amenities, social facilities, and job opportunities).



Map 1.2: Location of the three priority corridors in the CoJ (Peens, 2015).

Map 1.3 illustrates the suburbs included in the Empire-Perth corridor and the BRT trunk route between Soweto and Braamfontein.



Map 1.3: Affected suburbs and Wards in the Empire-Perth Development Corridor (Peens, 2015).

The Empire-Perth corridor is a main arterial route that connects Soweto to the Braamfontein near to Johannesburg central business district (CBD). The corridor also joins to Louis Botha corridor. A BRT trunk route was recently opened on the route and this is the backbone of the development.

Ward and Suburbs	Population Group %	% Post-matric Education (all population groups)	Income level % / income group ⁵ / annum
Ward 58: Vrededorp, Jan Hofmeyer, Fordsburg.	Black: 37 Coloured: 8 Indian: 43 White: 7	10	Lower: 35 Lower middle: 8 Middle: 8 Upper: 0.7
Ward 68: Coronationville; Bosmond.	Black: 56 Coloured: 42 Indian: 1 White: 0.5	8	Lower: 37 Lower middle: 8 Middle: 6 Upper: 0.3
Ward 69: Westdene, Auckland Park, Brixton, Richmond; Milpark; Hursthill, Half of Westbury	Black: 41 Coloured: 26 Indian: 15 White: 16	18	Lower: 33 Lower middle: 9 Middle: 13 Upper: 2
Ward 82: Half of Westbury; Newclare; Claremont	Black: 26 Coloured: 58 Indian: 2 White: 12	3	Lower: 37 Lower middle: 8 Middle: 5 Upper: 0.4
Ward 87: Melville, Parktown	Black: 30 Coloured: 2 Indian: 10 White: 56	41	Lower: 29 Lower middle: 7 Middle: 26 Upper: 31

Table 1.1: Statistics for the Wards which comprise the CoF study are (Statssa, 2011)

The area that the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom covers is highly diverse in terms of race, income, and land use. Areas such as Melville, Parktown, Auckland Park, Milpark, and Westdene, are old neighbourhoods mainly comprising of heritage houses. They are middle to upper income areas which are former White group areas – this is evident in that Ward 69 and 87 which encompasses these suburbs have a relatively high amount of White residents compared to the other Wards in the study area. Some of the neighbourhoods such as Melville and Parktown have remained predominantly White (56% White) (Statssa, 2011). Suburbs such as Westdene, Auckland Park, and Milpark have experienced a greater degree of mixing, with 41% of the residents in Ward 69 being Black; 26% Coloured and 16% White.

⁵ Lower income: R1 – R76,400; lower middle: R76,401 – R153,800; middle: R153,801 – R614,400; upper: R614,401 +

These suburbs are occupied by relatively well educated residents. The table above illustrates that 41% of the residents in Melville and Parktown have a tertiary education of some sort. 18% in Ward 69 suburbs such as Brixton, Westdene, and Auckland Park have a higher education. The national average for people with a post matric qualification of some sort is 6%. It is evident that there is a relatively high number of residents with post-matric qualifications residing in the Melville, Parktown, Westdene, Auckland Park, and Brixton area.

There is quite a high percentage of students living in the area due to its close proximity the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and University of Johannesburg (UJ). This has resulted in the development of student communes, some of which are illegal (Knight, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). Melville is famous for 7th Avenue which is a regional attraction. It is a high street with small trendy coffee shops and curio shops. Westdene also has a high street, Thornton Avenue; however it is in need of upgrading.

The majority of the communities in Ward 69 and 87 are well organised in that most of the suburbs have vocal residents associations representing the residents: such as the Westdene Residents Association; Brixton Community Forum; Melville Residents Association; Parktown Residents Association. The Ward Councillors in these Wards are vocal and are involved in their Wards. They are Democratic Alliance Councillors (the main opposition party to the African National Congress (ANC) in Johannesburg).

Brixton is a predominately working class neighbourhood that is experiencing increasing gentrification with more and more professionals and students moving into the area. It has a far greater mix of social groups compared to the other suburbs in Ward 69 and 87. It also has some serious issues with drugs and crime with some areas experiencing high degrees of decline (Brixton Community Forum, 2014).

Residents living in Wards 58; 68; and 82 generally have lower incomes with less residents being middle to upper income compared to Ward 69 and 87. It is evident from the stats in the table that level of education in these Wards is substantially lower compared to those in Ward 69 and 87. Ward 82 which comprises Half of Westbury, Newclare, and Claremont has an average post-matric education level below the national average of 6%. The Vrededorp, Jan Hofmeyer, Coronationville, and Bosmond areas have an education level slightly higher than the national average but substantially below those of the Melville, Parktown, Westdene, Auckland Park areas.

Many parts of the lower income suburbs are in decay and are in need of up-liftment. These communities are far less organised compared to those in Wards 69 and 87. Vrededorp has been

experiencing a great deal of decline with the neighbourhood being in a shocking condition. Unemployment and crime is rife. There are many vacant stands due to the demolitions that took place in the 1960s when the neighbourhood was declared a White group area. A similar case exists in Westbury and Newclare, where the dominant population group is Coloured. This area is also experiencing a high level of decline with minimal investment. Unemployment is high which contributes to the soaring crime rate. Even though Hurst Hill is in Ward 69 it is also a lower income neighbourhood that is experiencing large degrees of decline. The same can be said for Bosmont, however it is experiencing some gentrification.

The area also comprises of a mix of other uses and stakeholders. There are two major tertiary education institutions (Wits and UJ), various businesses, retail complexes / strips (e.g. Melville: 7th Avenue, Westden: Thornton, Main Street, High Street in Brixton, and Magalies street in Crosby), Campus Square, the SABC, Media24 headquarters, Greenpeace, Johannesburg Flying Squad, and institutions such as Lancet Laboratories. There are also many industries and factories in the industrial area: Industria.

The Empire-Perth corridor is, therefore, comprised of a wide mix of neighbourhoods and land uses. This suggests that there are many different stakeholders in the CoF study area. This research focuses on stakeholders who were directly involved and concerned with the CoF process, this mainly comprised of the communities in Ward 69 (see map 1.2). The corridor is also of a large scale, it spans approximately 10 kilometres in length and it is planned to affect about 0.8 kilometres either side of the Empire-Perth road.

1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter two provides the literature relevant for this topic. There are three main threads of literature which are covered. The first thread is policy-making which covers the two main approaches – rational and the iterative multi-actor. The second thread is public participation. This section outlines the definitions and typologies of participation, the spaces for participation are discussed and the influence that participation has had on policy in the past is explored. Literature on outsourcing the public policy formulation is discussed and the influence this has on public participation. Some experiences from Johannesburg are explored in order to obtain a better understanding of the experiences in this context. The third thread discusses the notion of corridor development and densification policies. This is to better understand the ‘object’ that this research is concerned with. It illustrates how these types of policies have been used to overcome the spatial and social inequalities caused by apartheid. This section demonstrates how these types of policies often face resident objection due to their aim of changing the status quo and the dilemmas this means for participation.

The third chapter provides an overview of the research methodology and methods used to obtain the necessary data to answer the research questions. I had many hurdles in the beginning of the research process while formulating the topic; therefore I reflect on this and demonstrate how this topic was shaped. Thus, the chapter starts with how the scope of the research was defined. The section discusses the research strategy and design that is used: case study research. The various sets of data required and the research methods which were used to obtain the information are outlined. This includes key respondents interviews and document analysis. The sequence in which the research was conducted is discussed and lastly all the ethical considerations are presented.

Chapter four is the first of three findings and analysis chapters. The findings chapters, as far as possible, are ordered chronologically. This chapter outlines how the process was working before the participation took place. It discusses what the tender stated the consultants were required to do and how participation was framed in this document and by the project team. It moves on to discuss the internal process in detail. This includes aspects relating to timeframes and political pressure; the way in which the project team conducted their analysis and how they formulated the content; the relationship between the City of Johannesburg and the consultants; and how the inter-departmental relations worked. This chapter provides the context in which the participation process was set and helps understand why the participation process was heavily flawed.

The second findings chapter, chapter five, discusses the participation process and all the dynamics and details related to it. It explains how the project team conducted the participation meetings they had planned and the way the participants responded to the CoF. The participant's reaction to the CoF is explored in detail and how this was affected by the presentation of the content and the media. The way residents mobilised in order to have an influence is evaluated. The project team's reaction and response to the backlash is outlined and how this resulted in a major change in the way the process was working. The change in process is unpacked and the new spaces of participation that emerged and how these spaces worked is discussed.

Chapter six is the third findings chapter. It explores the changes to the actual content of the CoF Strategic Area Framework (SAF) as a result of participation. It begins by stating the issues the participants in the first public meetings had with the policy and how those concerns were taken into consideration. It then discusses how the various responses after residents mobilised and the process changed had an influence on the CoF content. The chapter demonstrates that the participation had a drastic impact on the content. What the residents were able to change and what this means for the CoF is discussed. Finally the level of participation reached is analysed in order to attempt to understand if a genuine participation process commenced.

The last chapter, chapter seven is the conclusion. It ties the research together drawing broad conclusions out. It discusses many of the findings in relation to the literature outlined in chapter two. Some personal lessons I learnt from this research are discussed. Recommendations are provided to potentially assist officials and consultants, whom will be going through three more processes such as this one when the remainder of the corridors are developed. The chapter ends with a discussion of suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Policy-making, Public Participation and Development Corridors

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The research topic has been located and constructed at the intersection of three main disciplines and literature threads: policy-making, public participation, and corridor development (focused on resistance to corridor development). Literature on participation has tended to focus on participatory processes amongst participants, and seldom has intersected with policy-making theories. Similarly, policy-making literature seldom looks, or tends to underplay, the role of public participation (considered at best as a contextual factor).

The chapter begins with a discussion on debates around policy-making; this includes the two broad types of policy-making processes. It turns to public participation where a focus is placed on the different spaces of participation and how these spaces work; the impact that outsourcing has on participation and policy processes; the influence of participation on processes and outcomes; and the analytical tools utilised to evaluate participation. The third thread of literature included is that on the notion of corridors and densification as planning tools to be used for spatial transformation. These aspects are among the most controversial proposals in planning and have to be approached with caution.

2.2 POLICY-MAKING IN PLANNING

This section provides a discussion of policy-making in planning. It provides a definition of policy as well as policy-making. It outlines the two dominant approaches to developing policy within planning: rational technocratic approach, and the iterative multi-actor approach and how these approaches are linked to the paradigm shift from government to governance.

2.2.1 Defining policy and policy-making

The term 'policy' can be used to cover aspects ranging from high order strategies to administrative details (Government of South Africa, ND cited in Satge, 2009). Dukeshire and Thurlow (2002) define policy as "a declaration that defines the intention of a community, organisation, or government's goals and priorities... they create a framework within which the administration and staff can perform their assigned duties". Decisions on policy do not necessarily come through pre-determined channels; it is highly context specific and depends on the policy in question. Public policies are formulated through a process involving various internal and external stakeholders such as

municipal officials, politicians, and citizens who, ideally, work together to set an agenda for the common good (Ibid).

Policy-making is defined as “the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver outcomes – desired change in the real world” (ofmdfmni.gov.uk, 2003). The study of policy processes cuts across several disciplines including public administration, policy studies, urban studies, and political science (Maina, 2013). The literature relating to policy processes dates back to the 1800s and covers aspects relating to: government and administration, policy-making, intra and inter-organisational / governmental relations, and policy analysis (Ibid).

Policy-making is a highly complex process. One way in which the policy-making process has been explained is in a set of stages: agenda setting; formulation; decision-making; adoption; implementation; evaluation (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). Although this linear approach to studying and describing policy has been criticised for not representing reality it has been highly influential and its provided a starting point for unpacking the messiness of policy-making. It is the conventional means of describing policy processes (Ibid). This is the most common framework for research on policy-making; however research on the policy process seldom uses the whole policy cycle framework. To elaborate, most research relates to a specific stage of the policy process and aspects of it (Ibid). The policy cycle framework assisted in providing a guide to studying specific aspects of the process. Examples of these are examinations of how “histories and practices linked to shifting discourses and how these shape and guide policy problems” (Scoones et al, 2006: 9). Another investigates state, civil society and other interest groups relations in the policy process (Scoones et al, 2006). However, some researchers such as Scoones et al (2006) have developed a framework to study the whole policy process. This framework involves joining three main elements: discourse and policy narratives; actors and networks; and politics and interest.

This research is not concerned with understanding the whole Corridors of Freedom policy-making process, but rather only parts of it. To unpack the whole policy-making process takes a substantial amount of time and would not be possible in the timeframe provided. The research is mainly concerned with parts of the *agenda setting* and the *policy formulation* stages within the broader policy-making process. Therefore, when I refer to the “policy-making process” I am referring specifically to these first *two stages*.

Agenda setting is about identifying and framing the problem/s that need to be addressed. Jann and Wegrich (2007: 46) describe it as “a process of structuring the policy issue regarding potential strategies and instruments that shape the development of a policy in the subsequent stages of a

policy cycle". Various actors are generally involved in the agenda setting stage and aim to influence the priorities of government. There are many different patterns of agenda setting (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). In some cases public pressure forces the state to respond to a particular issue in order to retain credibility and legitimacy or simply to fulfil their mandate. Other factors could also force certain aspects onto the agenda. For instance, national priorities coerce lower tiers or spheres of government to place priority on certain issues (Ibid). Jann and Wegrich (2007) define these policies as "knee-jerk" responses in the sense that external pressure brings the problem onto the agenda. Agenda setting is a confluence of a number of interacting factors.

The policy formulation stage is when a policy problem that has been placed on the agenda is transformed into programmes or various proposals. "Policy formulation includes the definition of objectives...and the consideration of different action alternatives" (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 48). This research is particularly concerned with the influence public participation had on the policy-making process and how this contributed to the policy *formulation*. The research is also concerned with understanding the context in which this agenda setting, formulation stage and participation is set.

2.2.2 The two broad approaches to policy-making

This section starts by providing a discussion of the paradigm shift from *government* to *governance*. It discusses how this influenced policy-making and essentially led to a shift from highly technocratic rational processes to more interactive, iterative, and multi-actor processes.

Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) stated that one of the most striking developments in the analysis of policy-making is the shift in emphasis and vocabulary. This shift from a rational technocratic process to a more iterative participatory process is linked to the broader paradigm shift from *government* to *governance*. To govern is to rule with or to exercise authority (Rakodi, 2003). Government refers to "the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision-making" (Stoker, 1998: 34 cited in Rakodi, 2003). It refers to government acting alone on its own terms.

In contrast, governance refers to "the action, manner or system of governing in which the boundary between organisation and public and private sectors becomes permeable... The essence of governance is the interactive relationship between and within government and non-governmental forces" (Stoker, 1998: 38 cited in Rakodi, 2003). Governance involves joint action and common purposes, where shared values are developed amongst various role players. The rise of governance in the 1980s meant a change in the nature of policy-making and politics. This type of process involves the interplay between various actors all shaping the direction policy and decisions move in. It involves developing a shared strategic framework – therefore, there needs to be improved

capacity for inter-agency and department co-ordination for this to occur effectively (Rakodi, 2003). This is no easy task as modes of operation in government agencies and departments are strongly entrenched and there is often resistance to change. Diverging priorities and conflicting aims are often widespread and complicate matters (Ibid). Department's working in silos does not fit into the governance paradigm and this institutional lock-in has to be overcome in order to reach the full potential of a governance process.

Linked to the notions of government and governance, the policy process has generally been described in one of two ways. The first, which dominated the 1950s and 60s and is associated with 'governing' and 'government', describes policy-making as a linear rational process where a series of steps are taken each with an identifiable beginning and end. In this conceptualisation policy-making is viewed as a rational outcome of detailed data analysis with choices derived from this analysis (Linder and Peters, 1989). Decisions are made in a top-down manner by highly trained experts who announce their decisions to the public once they have already been made (Corkery et al, 1995). It was mainly expert knowledge which drove the policy process in the development of plans and strategies; the planner was the omniscient ruler who developed plans and policies with a fixed end (Lane, 2006). It is assumed that the "data and observations that form the input of its analytical techniques are non-problematical" (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003: 16). The rational, traditional policy process aimed to sanitise the processes and decision-making from 'irrational politics' and if the analysis is done correctly the right 'one best solution' follows automatically (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). This technocratic model meant that on the foundation of knowledge provided by experts and the use of scientific models, decisions could be reached which are objective and rational that are not influenced by politics and political views (Grijzen, 2010). This mode of policy-making did not provide any scope for public participation and was viewed as apolitical (Lane, 2006).

This form of policy-making and planning received much criticism in the late 1960s and 1970s. Hall (1983 cited in Lane, 2006: 288) states that "the failure of the blueprint planners to even consider which ends it were that society wished pursued was a source of persistent critique". Faludi (1973 cited in Lane, 2006) argues that due to planners and policy-makers being the 'omniscient ruler' it required them to have complete certainty, which is not possible. This led to the vast oversimplification of the world they were planning for and thus of plans and policies they created (Ibid). Webber (1983: 91 cited in Lane, 2006) argues that "the classical planning model...will not work in the absence of agreement on objectives". One of the major critiques of large scale technocratic urban planning is that it was often based on assumptions about systems behaviour that was not based on real-world experience of people living in the area (Lee, 1973). Therefore, plans

were often highly disjointed from the context they were planning for. Flyvbjerg (2000) corroborates with this in that he argues that it ignores other forms of knowledge such as local, experiential, and practical knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2000).

This conception of planning and policy-making slowly began to change as it became increasingly apparent the failure of planners to produce plans and essentially cities that met the needs of its residents (Healey, 1993; Hall, 1980; Friedman, 1973). Friedman (1973) referred to this as the crisis of 'expert knowledge'. This led to the failure of many planning projects and policies as they did not fully understand the contexts in which they were planning for and they did not resonate with what the public perceived as the best option.

This 'crisis' led to a shift in thinking about the way planning and policy should be developed. This leads me into the second approach to policy-making which is in line with the notions of policy-making: governance. This approach is markedly different to that of the first conceptualisation. The second perspective is, to a large degree, a critique of the first. Lamb (1987) describes it "as an iterative, often haphazard and highly political process". Corkery et al (1995) describes the policy-making process as movement through a maze which is far from the well-signposted path across a level playing field that some authors have suggested it to be. This camp has criticised the linear, technicist view in that they argue that the "rationalist model tends to depoliticise the issues which are the focus of policy through the use of neutral scientific language" (Sagte, 2009: 5).

Moreover, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003:7) state that "deliberative approaches to public policy emphasise collective, pragmatic, participatory, local problem solving in recognition that many problems are simply too complicated, too contested, and too unstable to allow for schematic, centralised regulation". Laws and Hager (2006) argue that scientific knowledge needs to be contextualised in the policy formulation process through the inclusion of various stakeholders. Grijzen (2010) posits that knowledge needs be developed in deliberative settings in order to construct shared meaning. This way of thinking means shifting the focus of analysis and casting aside the linear, technocratic, rational model, that is guided by experts and government officials, in favour of the messy and complex processes by which policy is formulated and implemented and the variety of actors involved (Scoones et al, 2006). Several concerns have been raised that the technicist way of developing policy has lost sight of the fact that citizens make democracy (Edigheji, 2005).

This understanding and the critique of the rational model led to the rise of a new paradigm called communicative planning (Allmendinger and Twedwr-Jones, 2002). It aimed to replace rational technocratic modes of planning with the notions of Habermas's theories of communicative

rationality (Harris, 2002). This means that planning should be done in an interactive way that promotes communication and dialogue (Healey, 1997). The legitimacy and quality of the planning process is hence based on factors such as the level of inclusivity, quality of the dialogue, and level of influence participants have over the process. In this type of a process “claims of experts are not necessarily valued more in the policy-making process than those of lay citizens” (Grijzen, 2010: 42). Decision-making was thus widened to incorporate non-governmental actors.

Winkler (2011: 259) states that “regardless of different philosophical underpinnings, scholars and activists alike hoped to remedy perceived crises in policy-making and planning by charting residents’ rights to a voice in public decision-making”. With many authors arguing for a more people-centred and participatory approach as well as the “astonishing failure of the modernisation project in various postcolonial contexts resulted in an explosion of interest in participatory governance” (Winkler, 2011: 259, see also Cities Alliance 2001; UN-Habitat, 2010 and World Bank 2000, 2001a). This opened up the floor for extensive research and since the 1960s a rich array of literature has emerged on the topic of public participation ranging from theories on how to conduct participation, critiques, and evaluations (Arnstein, 1969; Friedman, 1973; Healey, 1993; 1997; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998).

It has been noted that public participation has become a major element in policy-making processes in that it greatly impacts on the success of a policy (Owens, 1998) and it has become a normative pre-requisite of any policy process in a democratic society (Monno and Khakee, 2012; Satge, 2009; Silverman, 2006). By the 1990s it was institutionalised and included in governance processes in one form or another (in democratic societies) (Ibid). It is argued that citizens should be viewed as resources in the process as they have specific experiential knowledge, information, creativity, and energy that could prove useful for government decision-makers. Therefore, including the public in planning practices makes more connected, directed, and appropriate public policies (Owens, 1998).

The notions of communicative and participatory planning have been critiqued on various grounds. For instance, it has been argued that having consensus on a policy issue does not mean that, that is the best choice (Grijzen, 2010). Communicative planning processes have been critiqued for tending to protect the status quo as they are aimed at forging agreement and consensus. They do not tackle the existing power structures; therefore it is often the most powerful who are able to have the most influence (Hillier, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998). Grijzen (2010) illustrates how communicative planning theorists have acknowledged the notions of conflict (Healey, 1993) and power (Forester, 2006; 2009). They deem that communicative and deliberative planning can assist with overcoming these conflicts and actually provide a space for it, as well as including emotions in the policy-making

process (Forester, 2009; 2013) – which leads to a more context specific policy that has a greater chance of being accepted.

Even though there has been a paradigm shift from rational technocratic process to more participatory policy processes, the technicist process is still widespread in policy-making process in planning. This, to a certain degree, is attributed to New Public Management⁶ (NPM). Satge (2009) has argued that the ‘technicist’ mode of policy-making is strongly associated with NPM as it involves ‘professionalising the policy process’ (discussed in subsequent sections). NPM and neoliberal critics argue that it contributes to the destruction of democracy (Ott and Boonyarak, 2001; Falk, 2000 cited in Purcell, 2006). One of the main reasons for this is that NPM is based on the Hamiltonian tradition of public administration, which aims to improve the efficiency of the organisation while downplaying the importance of politics (Ott and Boonyarak, 2001). It is argued that NPM is strongly focused on customer-oriented management and because of this emphasis on customer responsiveness, aspects such as citizen participation, community empowerment, the involvement of courts, and executives are viewed as barriers to efficiency (Ott and Boonyarak, 2001). This greatly threatens the governance paradigm and participation by external stakeholders in public policy processes.

This body of literature is important to cover as it assists me in understanding the broader process in which this policy was developed. In other words, how the process was functioning before the participatory process took place and how participation fits into this whole policy process – as one of the aims of the research is to investigate the effects of participation on the process. Covering the two broad approaches to policy-making helps with understanding why there was a major issue with the way this policy was developed, i.e. potential disjuncture’s between what the public expect (government rhetoric of ‘democracy’, ‘participation’, and ‘inclusion’) and the way consultants and public officials carry out policy processes (to ensure efficiency, to meet key performance indicators, and to fulfil the requirements of NPM). The following section turns to the main focus of this report – participation in policy-making and planning processes.

⁶ New public management refers to “distinctive themes, styles, and patterns of public service management that have come to the fore within the past two decades” (Ott and Boonyarak, 2001).

2.3 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING

This section starts with attempting to define public participation and illustrating how participation can be framed and defined in many ways. It also provides an outline of the broad ideal models of participation: Arnstein classic *Ladder of Participation* and the more recent Spectrum of Participation development by the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2). It moves on to explain the spaces in which participation manifests: namely invented and invited spaces and the dynamics and relationship within and between the spaces. The influence that these spaces of participation have had on previous processes and policy outcomes is discussed as well as the increasing trend of the use of consultants in the policy-making process and the influence this has on participation and policy processes. Finally, participation is contextualised in Johannesburg and a brief outline of previous experiences is provided.

2.3.1 Definitions, principles, and *ideal* models of participation

Even though over the past three to four decades public participation has received much attention in academic circles and policy, there is still no universal definition of it and how it should be framed (Cornwall, 2008b; Cooke and Kathari, 2001). It is a term that is understood differently by government institutions, planners, and citizens (each group could view and define participation in a different way). However, there have been attempts to construct general normative definitions. Creighton (2005: 7) defines participation as “the process by which the public’s concerns, needs, and values are incorporated into governmental...decision-making. It is two-way communication and interaction, with the overall goal of better decisions supported by the public”. The World Bank (1996 cited in Njena, 2009) defines public participation as “a process in which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and the resources which affect them”. The significance of this definition is that it emphasises the notion of power in the process. Creighton (2005: 7) surveyed many definitions and he found that these elements emerged in most:

- “Public participation is not just providing information to the public. There is interaction between the organisation making the decision and people who want to participate.
- There is an organised process for involving the public. It does not occur accidentally.
- The participants have some level of impact or influence on the decision being made.”

The way in which participation is defined and conceptualised in a particular policy process affects the outcome of the participation. As Cornwall (2008: 269) states participation is “an infinitely malleable concept [that] can be used to evoke – and signify – almost anything that involves people”.

Participation is seen to bring many benefits to policy-making processes (Bryson et al, 2012; Monno and Khakee, 2012; Creighton, 2005). For instance, Bryson et al (2012) state that participants bring new information, motivation to address issues, and new ways of understanding issues to the policy process. This can be used by policy-makers to create new understandings; to generate better policies and projects; improve quality of decisions; secure buy-in from various stakeholders; limit costs, delays, mistakes, and litigation; increase awareness and education levels of citizens; and increase citizens commitment to implementation, thus the success of the policy (Bryson et al, 2012; Creighton, 2005; Potapchuk, 1996; Arnstein, 1969). Participation is also important for justice and fairness, the interests and needs of some groups may not be known and participation is a means in order to gain this knowledge (Innes and Booher, 2004). It is argued that when citizens are included in policy-making better quality policies are produced. Van Herzele (2004) found that experiential knowledge can be effectively integrated with expert knowledge in order to produce a more context specific outcome that is different from the original concept developed before the participatory process.

Having outlined the various benefits of participation, it is important to also point out some of the critiques. Time is a big factor for participation in today's age, people often do not have the time to attend public meetings and sometimes have to travel long distances to reach meeting locations (Kingston, 2002). City officials often have tight timeframes to formulate policies, therefore, cannot afford to spend their time in public meetings. This results in public officials leaving unreasonable timeframes for the public to respond (Goodspeed, 2008) meaning their input is limited. These meetings are often plagued with planning jargon making it difficult for a layperson to understand what is going on, thus limiting the influence they have over the policy (Saad-Sulonen and Botero, 2010).

A major issue is that it is generally the most affluent and educated citizens who participate (Carpenter and Brownhill, 2008; Everatt et al, 2010). This is directly linked to the notion of power. Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that power influences participation processes substantially. He notes that communication in participatory platforms is often about maintenance of the status quo as opposed to consensus building on matters which challenge it. In consensus building there has to be trade-offs and from this perspective, it is argued that, the powerful are the ones who get their way (Ibid). As Flyvbjerg's (1998) research suggests, even though governments in democracies promote participation it is the most powerful who have the most influence.

The following section outlines some of the normative typologies of participation which have emerged since the mainstreaming of participation.

2.3.1.1 Typologies of participation

Over the years various typologies of participation have been developed which highlight the different models, levels and conceptualisations of participation. These typologies are normative in that they generally place participation on a continuum from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ participation (Cornwall, 2008).

What these typologies provide for researchers is a yardstick to measure and evaluate a particular participation exercise. The first of these typologies to emerge, and the most influential, is Arnstein’s *ladder of participation*.

Arnstein provides eight typologies of participation ranging from ‘manipulation’ to ‘citizen control’ (Arnstein, 1969). The lower levels are classified as non-participation. The objectives of the lower forms of participation are to “cure” or “educate” the participants rather than allowing them to have an influence. The levels above this are described as tokenistic. They allow the participants voices to be heard but the participants do not have the power to ensure that their voice has an influence (Ibid). “When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no *muscle*, hence no assurance of changing the status quo” (Ibid: 217). The power-holders still essentially make the final decision.




Figure 2.1: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein, 1969).

The higher rungs include degrees of citizen control. The participants are able to weigh-in on decisions and have power to decide. These levels generally involve partnerships where participants are able to be involved in deciding trade-offs. The top two rungs of the ladder, delegated power and citizen control, are where the participants have a major role to play in the process and are able to make decisions (Ibid). This ladder is able to assist in understanding how much power and influence the participants are given over decisions.

More recently *The International Association for Public Participation* developed the *Spectrum of Participation* (IAP2, 2012). They argue that it is necessary to recognize what the initial purpose of the participatory process is. The model suggests that whether the objective of the participation is to inform, consult, or to empower, it has a role to play in a particular participation process. Table 1 below provides a summary of the IAP2 model ranging from informing (least impact) to empowering (greatest impact).

Increasing Level of Public Participation 					
	Inform	Consult	Involve	Collaborate	Empower
Public participation goal	To provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions.	To obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions.	To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered	To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.	To place decision-making in the hands of the public.
Promise to the public	We will keep you informed.	We will keep you informed, listen to and acknowledge concerns aspirations, and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.	We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision.	We will look to you for advice and innovation in formulating solutions and incorporate your advice and recommendations into the decisions to the maximum extent possible.	We will implement what you decide.
Example techniques	• Fact sheets • Web sites • Open houses	• Public comment • Focus groups • Surveys • Public meetings	• Workshops • Deliberative polling	• Citizen advisory committees • Consensus-building • Participatory decision-making	• Citizen juries • Ballots • Delegated decision

Table 2.1: IAP2 Spectrum of Public Participation (www.iap2.org)

Although Arnstein's typologies and the *Spectrum of Participation* provide a simple means of measuring participation, it is much more complex than this. They can be used as part of broader framework, however cannot be the only means to draw conclusions on how the participation process worked and the outcome of it. Cornwall (2008) points out that at different stages of the process different levels of participation may be reached, therefore she argues for greater specificity in terms of participation. It has to be situated in the context in which it is taking place (Cornwall, 2008). For instance, the lower levels of Arnstein's ladder are passed off as insincere and not genuine participation. However, Alfasi (2003) states that these lower levels in some cases translate to lower degrees of democratisation of policy and planning processes. What tends to be ignored is the influence that these tokenistic forms of participation may have on a policy or decision-making process (Alfasi, 2003). Participation is unpredictable and even the most tokenistic attempt at participation may have an influence on process and policy outcome (Cornwall, 2002) and this needs

to be considered. Therefore, only using the normative spectrums to understand participation could lead to inaccurate conclusions.

2.3.2 Spaces for participation

Over the past thirty years, with the mainstreaming of participation, many 'spaces' of participation have emerged. Cornwall (2002) states that, spaces for participation can be thought of in abstract terms as "the ways in which opportunities for engagement might be conceived or perceived, and more concretely, in terms of the actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens".

One of the main spaces which have emerged for participation is referred to as 'invited' spaces (Miraftab, 2004; Cornwall, 2002). These are spaces where people are invited to participate by various authorities such as government officials, consultants, and NGOs. They are legitimised by government and donors (Miraftab, 2004). Sinwell (2010: 24) defines invited spaces as "social spaces created by the government to include participation by communities". The main characteristic of these spaces is that external resource bearing agents bring them into being and they frame the way in which participation will be conducted (Ibid). These spaces include citizen hearings, round tables, workshops, consultations, working groups, and conferences (Frieesecke, 2011).

Some spaces for participation may be produced and made available by the powerful and certain authorities, but it could be filled with those whose alternative visions transform their possibilities (Cornwall, 2002). In other words spaces could be provided to fulfil a certain objective and function but the people who populate these spaces could use them for something quite different – that the initiators did not intend for. Cornwall (2002) posits that the most nominal efforts at involving the public and stakeholders can be used as a lever to create more space where participation can take place. The most tokenistic process can be used and deployed to broaden spaces and to provide opportunities for visibility and voice outside the structures of consultative processes – she argues that nothing can be prejudged when it comes to a participatory process.

Fleeting formations is a form of participation which is time-bound. It is spaces for participation which are opened up for a specific initiative (Cornwall, 2002). Cornwall (2002) argues that "despite their mercurial possibilities, these are liminal spaces; it is their very conditional, transitional, fleeting nature that makes them 'sites of radical possibility' as well as for the maintenance of the status quo". Understanding how these spaces are claimed and are being used is increasingly important as these approaches have become widely used in development and policy-making processes. Questions regarding how issues are framed, to representation and representativeness, understanding how

these spaces are claimed and used, by whom, and who is invited to take part are of great importance (Ibid).

In terms of representation invited spaces have been argued for often being unrepresentative of whole communities. In many cases it is only the well resourced and organised communities who participate in these spaces. Difficult to reach individuals such as lower income and migrant groups are often not part of the conversation (Carpenter and Brownill, 2010; Lipietz, 2008). A further point that needs to be considered is self-exclusion from participation processes (Cornwall, 2008). There are various reasons why people may not want to take part in participatory processes: they may not have the time, their confidence levels may be low and they feel that their knowledge is inferior, and individuals may feel that there is no point in participating. Where people feel they do not have a sense of belonging in a community they may also feel no inclination to get involved in community affairs. Previous bad experiences where participation did not bare any fruit may also deter individuals from participating because they believe it will not have an influence (Cornwall, 2008).

In contrast to the invited spaces created by authorities, are the more organic spaces which have emerged, often referred to as 'invented' spaces for participation (Miraftab, 2004). They are "occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their collective action". (Ibid: 1). These spaces emerge out of sets of shared concerns or a common interest. They often are born out of popular mobilisation such as identity or issue-based concerns or they may be spaces where like-minded people join up in a common pursuit (Cornwall, 2002). Invented spaces often challenge and confront authorities and the status quo (Miraftab, 2004). In some cases it can be difficult for residents, business, and other interest groups to organise themselves in order to respond to policies that affect their environment – it requires major effort (Alfasi, 2003).

The main characteristic of these spaces is that they are constituted and developed by the participants themselves, not developed by others for the participation of others (Cornwall, 2002). They are not legally regulated and are flexible to adaptability according to the occasion (Frieesecke, 2011). Cornwall (2002) has argued that these spaces can be 'sites of radical possibility' where those who are excluded have a voice. However, these spaces may also be populated by the affluent and can be deeply conservative, maintaining dominant exclusion, values and norms – reinforcing the status quo (Cornwall, 2002). As Masiko-Kambala et al (2012) point out; invented spaces are not necessarily democratic utopias as they can be highly exclusionary and marginalising. These spaces have their own sets of power politics and problems (Ibid).

These are arenas that are not initiated by the state and where citizens often act against the state – they are spaces which are chosen rather than offered (Miraftab, 2004). It is for these reasons that they are often viewed as spaces of more *genuine participation* compared to invited spaces. These spaces are made up of a spectrum of organisations and associations – radical and reactionary, established and emerging (Cornwall, 2002). Individuals gain a collective presence which is usually developed here. Cornwall (2002) states that “situated in the public sphere, institutions in this cluster have been the subject of powerful social imaginaries in development discourse in recent times”. It has been noted that spaces in this arena can be more exclusionary than spaces in any other. This is mainly due to the fact that they are primarily open to people who share the same interests and have a common identity.

Invented spaces for participation, therefore, often face issues with regards to representation. Volunteer groups that are created by a certain community or group in order to contribute to the development of plans and policies will act on planning issues as if they represent the public voice. Houtzager and Lavalley (2009) stated that this is claimed representation or assumed representation. What this means is that there are no authorised channels for accountability (Ibid). The issue is that these groups are often not formed through a democratic process and are only representative of a select group with the same objectives and interests (Alfasi, 2003). These groups do not ask themselves if they are being democratic. “They wave their ideological doctrine like a flag and basically represent themselves”. It is for these reasons that these spaces (volunteer groups) often “cannot be considered the authentic voice of the public” (Ibid: 195).

It is important to explore the notion of representation further because in the Empire-Perth process representation was used substantially. Houtzager and Lavalley (2009) identified six different types of representation they found to be used in Brazilian civil society: electoral; membership; identity; proximity; mediation; and service. In electoral representation the representatives are elected through a formal procedure. This is the best way to ensure accountability. The membership argument states that the very creation of the organisation by its members establishes the interests to be represented. The third type is identity. “The resemblance of existential or substantive attributes of the representative and represented is the basis of the identity notion of representation” (Ibid: 19). The likeness between the representative and the constituency ensure that the interests are represented. The fourth type is proximity. Here the important point is the solidarity between the actors and represented due to their physical closeness with the represented group. Because of the proximity of the actors to the represented they state they have an understanding of the interests of the represented. Participation by the represented in this type is

important. Mediation is the fifth type. “The mediation notion of representation is based on a perceived need to remedy an inequality which is not directly related to socioeconomic status but in access to the state” (Ibid: 21). It is a result of a problem in public institutions ability to hear the views and respond to those who are excluded. It attempts to open up channels into the state and mediating interests. The representative organisation provides access to public decision-making that usually would not be accessible. No accountability is attached to this notion as the relationship between the actor and the public is left unclear (Ibid). The last form of representation Houtzager and Lavalley (2009) identify is service. Here the represented are given a service and as a result experience concrete gains in quality of life.

Invented and invited spaces of participation are often presented as a dichotomy (Masiko-Kambala et al, 2012). It has been argued instead that they are not mutually exclusive and more than often co-exist and overlap (Ibid). Grassroots and citizen groups move between the two spaces and will utilise different sets of tools during their struggle or mission (Masiko-Kambala et al, 2012; Miraftab, 2004). “These spaces exist in dynamic relationship with each other; they are constantly shaped by struggles of legitimacy, contestation, co-option, transformation, and resistance” (Masiko-Kambala et al, 2012: 71). Masiko-Kambala et al (2012: 71) posit that invited and invented spaces should be thought of “as existing on a continuum from closed spaces where state decision-making occurs behind closed doors to invited spaces created by the state, to invented spaces created by citizens to self-organise and respond to issues”.

An important point to highlight is that often ‘authentic citizens’ are associated with invited spaces of participation, whereas extremists and outcasts are associated with invented spaces (Miraftab, 2004). Furthermore, invented spaces are often not viewed as legitimate and are criminalised by the state (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). Mitlin (2008) states that politicians and officials often treat this space with suspicion, this has meant that they have had uneven results in challenging government-led processes. This essentially affects the impact this space of participation has on decisions and outcomes. The interconnection and dynamics between different spaces of participation and under what conditions the inhabitants of these spaces move between them should be explored in further detail (Miraftab, 2004).

Cornwall (2002) noted that, when one is investigating participation and participatory processes it is important to treat it as a situated practice. This is an approach which locates “spaces for participation in the places they occur, framing their possibilities with reference to actual political, social, cultural and historical particularities, rather than idealised notion of democratic practice” (Ibid). Cornwall (2008) argues that in order to fully understand a participatory process one needs to

spell out what exactly people are being enjoined to participate in, for what purpose, who is involved and who is absent.

Understanding the spaces that are used for participation is essential for this research as various spaces for participation were used and some were created as a result of the inefficiencies of other spaces. The influence of participation is generally directly linked to the space used for participation and who is defining the terms. The following section unpacks the influence participation has had on process and policies before.

2.3.3 Influence of participation on process and policy in practice

In the decades following the mainstreaming of participation many critiques emerged regarding its ineffectiveness to have any sort of an influence on decisions and policy outcomes. It has increasingly become apparent that public participation has not lived up to the expectations of its most avid supporters (Shipley and Utz, 2012). Innes and Booher (2004: 1) sum this up succinctly:

“The traditional methods of public participation in government decision-making simply do not work. They do not achieve genuine participation in planning or decisions; they do not provide significant information to public officials that makes a difference to their actions; they do not satisfy members of the public that they are being heard; they do not improve the decisions that agencies and public officials make; and they don’t represent a broad spectrum of the public.”

The spaces of participation that Innes and Booher are referring to here are invited spaces such as public meeting, hearings, consultations, and workshops. King et al (1998: 323, cited in Shipley and Utz, 2012) reiterate this by asserting that “public hearings do not work” and Adams (2004) argues that public meetings do have a purpose but they do not provide residents with a sense that they have influenced the decision. Participatory local governance has largely become devoid of substantive meaning and lacks influence on planning (GGLN, 2012). Bircherstaff and Walker (2005) found in their study that participation is not having a substantial impact on policy processes neither on the outcomes of decisions. Benit-Gbaffou (2008) found that institutionalised mechanism for participation in South Africa such as Ward meeting, IDP processes, and development forums do not function properly and residents often sideline these spaces due to their inefficiencies.

In order to have an influence residents and lobby groups will utilise other channels to voice their opinion such as protests, litigation, and the media – these spaces seem to be more effective (Ibid). This is reiterated by Hanssen and Falleth (2014) who claim that when official channels do not work residents and local associations make use of more informal channels such as contacting local politicians and the media in order to mobilise local support. This has resulted in the rise of informal,

invented spaces where organisations emerge to give voice to communities and to articulate their needs and aspirations (Masiko-Kambala et al, 2012).

Hanssen and Falleth (2014) found that most residents who participated in planning processes did not feel that they had an influence over zoning plans, this is partly attributed to the fact that participation often takes place late in the process, at a time when important decisions have already been made (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014). Essentially the final policy has to conform to government guidance and sometimes municipal officials and consultants do not have much room for manoeuvre (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Urban policy and planning has been described as being a tank ship, meaning that it is so huge and heavy that once it is on a particular course it is virtually impossible to correct and change the course if it has started heading in the wrong direction (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014). Therefore, any influence by external actors and residents is considered modest at best. What is often the case is that once the public has voiced their suggestions and ideas, the administrators will decide on the 'worth' of the comments and ultimately decide what to include / exclude (Alfasi, 2003).

A further issue that impacts on the influence that participants have over a policy is how their role is framed in the process. To elaborate, in many participatory processes the only way for participants and external stakeholders to act is in a reactionary / objector fashion because they have not been given any other choice, this forces the participants into the role of complainer as opposed to a proactive contributor (Alfasi, 2003). When participation is framed in this manner it can become extremely counter-productive and frustrate everyone involved. It is important not to just investigate how participation is framed but to take a step further as Masiko-Kambala et al (2012: 72) note that when investigating a participation process it is important "to assess the degree to which the terms of engagement can be changed and negotiated by participants, than to focus only on their initial design". This provides a deeper understanding of the process.

Hanssen and Falleth (2014) note that many planners do not consider the voices of citizens because the public are against the policy or plan, but the planners did note that the public have a right to have an opinion (they just do not have to accept it). The study further revealed that if participants do not gain acceptance for their views they feel like they have not participated. Hanssen and Falleth (2014) found that many planners and policy makers thought that it is a misunderstanding of democracy that the local public get to decide on planning aspects and policies. What the proponents of participation tend to overlook is that the public cannot take part in all decisions; this is especially the case for decisions that require high technical competencies (Burke, 1968).

Hanna (2000) notes that when viewing the role and impact of participation, researchers often search for obvious demonstrations of inclusion and participation such as public meetings, committees, and extensive outreach processes or an obvious capacity building efforts. However, the influence of participation can be more hidden (by 'proxy') and that a planning initiative and policy can still be affected by non-governmental stakeholders and residents without an elaborate formal participation process. Hanna (2000) argues that even the most well developed participation process does not guarantee a significant influence over the decision or the policy outcome. It is argued that the "influence of participation is more likely a product of the impact of information and the way that communicative action affects the preferences of decision makers" (Hanna, 2000: 400). A process that appears to have minimal participation does not mean external stakeholders have not been listened to, only that such influences could be entrenched in other information sources (Ibid). This illustrates that it is difficult to measure the success and influence of participation. "Measuring the influence of participation by proxy is difficult, but it is an important concept in planning community and requires more research" (Hanna, 2000: 409). It involves investigating other avenues where information was shared.

Burby (2003) states that one of the main causes of failed plans are the fact that many of the issues planners are concerned about and the solutions that they advocate for lack publics who understand and appreciate the problem and will work to assist solve it. This often results in unproductive participatory processes because residents do not show or they oppose the policy because they do not see the problem. Even though participation can be a negative aspect in this respect, it can also greatly assist with changing people's mindsets about the society within which they live and make them understand the problem. Participation processes provide planners and policy makers with the opportunity to educate stakeholders about poorly understood problems and policy issues (Burby, 2003).

The influence which participation has on policy is increasingly affected by the emerging phenomenon of the use of consultants to formulate policies. The following section seeks to unpack this notion.

2.3.4 Participation and the 'consultocracy'

The public sector planning profession has gone through a few changes over the last decade or two. The profession is being restructured in a manner that fits into broader structural transformations that are mainly a result of neoliberalisation and the closely related new public management (NPM) (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014; Grijzen, 2010; McCann, 2001). A result of this restructuring is the increasing permeability in the institutional boundaries of planning, which is characterised by an ongoing outsourcing of functions to market-actors and privatisation of planning services; this is especially the case for plan and policy formation (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014). This means that urban policy is often left in the hands of corporate-supported organisations. The substantive formulation of policies and involvement of external stakeholders is placed under the consultants control (Grijzen, 2010). McCann (2001) goes on to note that NPM has resulted in what he terms "consultocracy". Planning that was viewed as a public, local activity, is increasingly becoming private and nonlocal as consultants now provide similar services to numerous cities and clients (Ibid). This has placed a substantial amount of power in the consultants' hands.

With the notion of the network society dominating contemporary landscapes (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), it is increasingly difficult for city officials to know which public to address and which policies will gain the support of these publics and which will not. In a network society it is argued that citizens are less likely to be organised in identifiable groups (such as trade unions) but often will mobilise themselves over certain issues for shorter periods of time (Grijzen, 2010). Grijzen (2010) states that "hiring of consultants might indicate the disparity between the skills of public officials and what governing in a network society demands of them". To elaborate, in a principal-agent relationship, the principal (City Council in this case) hires the agent (consulting firm) when the Council does not have the resources to carry out a specific job or cannot do the job as well as the agent can do it (Grijzen, 2010).

It is important to note that this type of outsourcing (for the development of policies and plans) is different to other forms of outsourcing such as government functions, for example refuse removal. It is different in the sense that the authority and responsibility for a certain public task and its implementation remains with the assignment-giver (City Council). What is outsourced is the substantive formulation of the policy (Grijzen, 2010).

It has also been argued that the use of consultants has increased, not only because of NPM, but also due to problems relating to co-ordination and co-operation in planning practices (Grijzen, 2010). As Grijzen (2010: 14) explains "the involvement of consultants is as a response to the increased complexity of political and institutional landscape". Planning has become a collective activity that is

no longer only undertaken by the planning department in a highly centralised manner. Departments and agencies are interdependent. This means that planning requires the co-operation and co-ordination of several departments, levels of government, and other actors which creates many challenges for officials. The widespread involvement of consultants is part of the attempt to overcome these challenges of co-ordination and co-operation (Grijzen, 2010). Consultants are external to the council and are able to take more of a holistic view (Ibid).

The increasing use of consultants and market actors to conduct planning activities has largely resulted in the planning and policy process becoming increasingly closed off to civil society and external actors (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014). McCann (2001) found that consultants often place tight control over the process and leave little room for negotiation. This has implications for public participation as it is the municipality that is responsible for conducting participation, not the consulting firm. Therefore, participation has to be written into the brief given to consultants. It has been noted that when the process is outsourced often external stakeholders such as citizens get pushed to the side. A major concern regarding this trend is that quality and democracy will be traded off for efficiency gains (Grijzen, 2010). Furthermore, it has been noted that the “reliance on consultants runs the risk of decreasing transparency and accountability as consultants operate at a distance from the accountability structures that regulate public officials” (Grijzen, 2010: 10). However, it is important to note that this is not always the case and in some instances consultants can increase mediation in the policy process between various actors (Grijzen, 2010).

An issue that Owens (1998) found in terms of the lack of residents involvement in the development of urban policies is that the programs were not specific about the role of residents in the city’s planning processes. Beyond a broad statement that residents should be included in the process, there was no definitive outline about the exact type and quality of participation that should characterise the process. This is problematic because as mentioned above participation has many different meanings and can be interpreted in different ways by the actors involved (Cornwall, 2008b). This lack of specificity when it came to participation allowed for narrow definitions of participation to be used in determining who would be involved in the city’s community planning process and how their contributions would be included (Owens, 1998). This issue is even more of a problem when consultants are used to develop policies because a large portion of the process lies in their hands and how participation is written (or not) into the brief becomes important and can provide a loop-hole for not conducting adequate participation.

The relationship between the principal and the agent has been outlined by the principal-agent theory (P-A). It is based on the assumption that there is always a conflict of interest between the

principle and the agent (Grijzen, 2010). For instance, the agent often wants to get the project done in the least amount of time while the principal wants a quality project that has been well thought out. P-A is partly about formulating incentives so that the agent works in the interest of the principle (Ibid). Grijzen (2010) states that some of the main ways the principle gets the agent to work in their interest is to have a competitive tendering process in the market. Due to the fact that the agent wants to remain employed by the principle and obtain future work from other potential principles, they act in the principles interest in order to obtain a good reputation in a competitive market. The second way the relationship is managed is through a contract. This dictates what the agent has to carry out and improves the accountability of the consultant to the principal. A contractual agreement limits the freedom afforded to consultants because the contract usually specifies what they should do (Ibid). Contractual agreements are mainly utilised when the policy problem has already been identified. Another form is through co-operation. This is where a relationship of trust is built between the principle and agent, and where the principal and agent work together. The last type of relationship that exists is coercion, where it is based on a hierarchical structure with the principle dictating what needs to be done by the agent (Grijzen, 2010). Often all or some of these factors are present in a principle-agents relationship.

Crewe (2001) identified various issues with outside design firms developing city spatial policies. In the development of the Southwest Corridor policy for Boston there was a high degree of public participation. The affected communities were invited to add their suggestions and alter the policy as they feel necessary. They changed various aspects of it, however the changes were quickly removed as the designers claimed that the community had no sense of scale and of the impact that their changes would have. The designers saw these changes as *interference* and *sabotage*. This leads Crewe (2001) to argue that it seems impossible to reach a compromise between 'designers' and residents in participation processes. Crewe (2001) found that designers and planners generally preferred public participation in small, discrete projects, rather than in larger ones as it is easier to *control* smaller groups. McCann (2001) argue that the workings of processes that are outsourced are strongly controlled by the consultants, leaving little room for alternative visions to be negotiated.

Having consultants develop policy and plans also raises other issues relating to how much they can actually change. How much control is the consultancy team given to incorporate alternative visions and ideas? It raises complexities in terms of how much of the input received from the public can the planner or designer accept and still be credible to the profession and his/her employer and the council (Shipely and Utz, 2012). Who essentially has the power to accept what the public suggests? This becomes more complex when there are various consultants and city officials working on a

policy. According to Sandercock (1998) planners should be committed to serving the community and they should give their loyalty to the community. However, in reality and in a local government setting this is not always possible (Alfasi, 2003). Alfasi (2003) has pointed out that translating the public's ideas, comments, and visions into specifics is a massive challenge. In other words, the raw data obtained from a participatory process has to be interpreted and converted into explicit planning concepts such as policies; this involves making minor decisions and evaluating each of the ideas and at the same time having to balance the objectives set internally (Ibid).

The next section aims to better understand and contextualise how participation has been occurring in the City of Johannesburg.

2.3.5 Contextualising Participation in Johannesburg

Over the past two decades South Africa has *moved* towards a more inclusive ideology of planning that is meant to be more democratic (Nyalunga, 2006; CSIR, 2005). According to van Donk (2012) "South Africa arguably has one of the most progressive policies on participatory local governance in the world" this is evident with the various legislation on the topic. The supreme law of the land, The Constitution (1996), states that participation is a political right given to all citizens and that citizen participation needs to be incorporated into government affairs (Nyalunga, 2006). This has led to participation being legislated in the *White Paper on Developmental Local Government* (1998); *Municipal Systems Act* (2000); and the *Municipal Structures Act* (1998). All these legislation advocate for the inclusion of citizens in policy-making process and state that they should have an influence over decisions. The Municipal Structures Act introduced Ward committees, which are meant to be the main channel for participation in municipalities, with their main aim being to bridge the gap between communities and administrative structure (Smith, 2008).

Even though public participation is viewed as an essential part of local government practices in South Africa, it does not always occur in such a way. As stated in previous sections the institutional methods of participation are largely ineffective and do not function properly (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). In Winkler's (2011) study of invited participation in the development of strategic visions for the future of Johannesburg it is clear that participation has many issues and is more than often not transformative in any such way. These invited spaces are not aimed at creating spaces for genuine / deep participation but rather are employed as confidence generating mechanism which is easily dismantled when required (Ibid). In many cases participation only occurs in the implementation and evaluation phase, where it is not possible for residents and other external stakeholders to have an influence over the content of the policy (Winkler, 2011).

Everatt et al (2010) found that CoJ officials generally do not set the bar high for participation as they are frustrated with the current state of participation. The practice of participation in most municipalities has become one of 'going through the motions' in order to ensure compliance with legislation (GGLN, 2012) and key performance indicators. More often than not it is approached as an activity or event, with little bearing on local priority setting (van Donk, 2012). Furthermore, lack of communication after the participatory process makes the public feel sidelined (Ibid).

Winkler's (2011) study investigated the Igoli 2002, Igoli 2010, and Joburg 2030 plans in order to understand the transformative nature of public participation in Johannesburg. It was evident that participation had virtually no effect on the outcome of the plans and in most cases left the participants even more disgruntled than when they begun the process (Ibid). These were mainly invited spaces in the city which had one purpose, to legitimise pre-determined decisions which were made internally. The bad experience of the Igoli 2002 and 2010 plans resulted in the CoJ developing the Joburg 2030; GDS 2006; and Human Development Strategy (2006) behind closed doors. Joburg 2030 was replaced with the Joburg GDS 2040 strategy in 2011 which was a highly consultative initiative which utilised a variety of platforms (such as social media) to engage with the public (Peens, 2013). It is clear that Johannesburg has had a bleak history in terms of participation, especially in terms of invited spaces. However, the GDS 2040 points in a different, more positive direction in terms of how a long term initiative was developed – one that attempted to reach out to public using a variety of tools and methods. To elaborate, the GDS 2040 outreach process was aimed at reaching as many people as possible. A variety of formats of participation were used such as public meetings, focus groups on specific topics, road shows, and online methods. The outreach process used social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Blogs to communicate with a wide range of stakeholders (Peens, 2013).

This section has illustrated how participation in Johannesburg has generally had quite a bleak history, especially the invited spaces. The following section moves on to the third thread of literature which is important for this research report: corridor development.

2.4 UNDERSTANDING THE 'OBJECT': CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT AS A STRATEGIC SPATIAL PLANNING CONCEPT

This section discusses the notion of corridor development. The reason this literature is included is that this is the concept that the Corridors of Freedom policy is based on. Therefore, it is important to understand this aspect as it provides a deeper understanding of what the policy aims to accomplish and the potential consequences such a policy can have on an urban environment. It also highlights public reactions and resistance to policies similar to the CoF which involve densification. This may assist our understanding of the reactions of some of the residents to the CoF. Furthermore, to understand the influence of public participation over the content of the CoF it is important to understand the basics of corridor development in the first place.

The section points out a dilemma which has to be dealt with by planners who are formulating corridor development policies which are aimed to restructure the city. That is that participation has the ability to endanger social and spatial transformation objectives, but participation is essential to conduct as it may prevent derailment.

2.4.1 What is corridor development?

The use of 'corridors' as a planning concept is rather old (Wilkinson, 2006; Warnich and Verster, 2005). About a century ago linear models were presented as alternatives to the densely populated, concentric industrial city models (Priemus and Zonneveld, 2003). Corridor development emerged as a critique of modernist planning and its consequences: low density urban sprawl dominated by the private vehicle. In the late 1970s early 80s the concept developed as a response to the poor performance of existing urban form (Martens, 2001).

Corridors have been described as bundles of infrastructure that link two or more urban nodes. They have emerged as an urban strategy dealing with a range of land use, transport, social and economic issue simultaneously (Martens, 2001). They exist at all scales from inter-regional to the local level: in the case of the CoF Empire-Perth corridor it is a metropolitan level corridor. Corridors directly promote urban integration, densification, mixed land use, containment of urban sprawl and the creation of quality urban environments (Warnich and Verster, 2005). Woodcock et al (2009: 4) states that "while there are many technical foci, from improving transit systems and their relationship to land use planning..to achieving a greater mixture of land uses, a fundamental is higher residential densities". The backbone of these corridors is generally a transit link such as a bus route, railway, or main roadway (Priemus and Zonneveld, 2003). These corridors are often referred to as 'activity corridors'.

Corridor development has largely incorporated the principles of transit oriented development (TOD) which essentially aims to develop high density, mixed use, integrated developments along transit corridors, interchanges and stations (Wilkinson, 2006). Naude (1988 cited in Martens, 2001) states that activity corridors can accommodate significant portions of expected population growth through migration, stimulate business, promote public transport, contain urban sprawl, and contain vehicular traffic growth. The general goal of these developments is to produce a more sustainable pattern of urbanisation so that residents have access to the services and amenities they need without having to travel exceptionally long distances.

Corridor planning or development has formed part of the broader notion of strategic spatial planning (Todes, 2008). Strategic spatial planning is one of the responses to the critiques of master planning which was viewed as too physical and not focused enough on social aspects, rigid, technocratic, and comprehensive – associated with the technocratic rational policy-making process. Strategic spatial planning argues for a more focused approach with attention given to a few key aspects. It develops a long-term vision and objectives in order to guide development as opposed to a 'comprehensive master plan' which dictates how development will occur (Albrechts, 2006). Strategic spatial planning promotes and aids brownfield development as opposed to greenfield development, where it aims to promote environmental sustainability (UN, 2008). Corridor development is used as a strategic planning concept (Todes, 2008) in order to fulfil the objective of strategic spatial planning.

An aspect that has been noted is that these corridors require a substantial amount of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewerage, drainage) and investment to implement. Furthermore, urban management is essential in order to ensure these corridors do not become slums. It has been argued that the development of corridors is no easy task – there needs to be strong political commitment and adequate financing (Berger et al, 2008). Carelse (1997) states that corridor development is a medium to long term strategy, the indicated timeframe for development is usually between 20 to 40 years. Therefore, implementation usually happens in a number of phases (Ibid). The public sector will promote development and create incentives in the areas they wish to establish the corridor – install all the necessary infrastructure and change the rights of the land to allow greater density, coverage, and use.

2.4.2 Corridor development as a restructuring element

In South Africa scholars such as Dewar and Uytenbogaard (1977) began introducing the corridor concept in the 1970s. In the 1970s and 80s the concept was reinforced by the critique of the apartheid city that emerged in the academic circles (Todes et al, 2000). The low density sprawling apartheid city, with its highly fragmented urban fabric and separated land uses, urban elements, and population groups, was strongly critiqued for its severe human and environmental consequences (Dewar, 2000). The consequences of apartheid spatial planning is that the majority of the poor live on the periphery of the city away from economic activity and amenities (Warnich and Verster, 2005). This urban layout is not sustainable in any sense: social, economic, nor environmental (Ibid). The concept of corridor development has become subsumed within the broader goal of restructuring our cities in order to better serve all their inhabitants (Wilkinson, 2006; Todes, 2000). Activity corridors are claimed to be one of the most powerful tool to integrate unstructured parts of the city together (Lotz, 1995).

According to Warnich and Verster (2005: 343) “corridor development is proposed in various policy documents as the answer to numerous spatial development challenges”. Wilkinson (2006) argues that it became standard practice in the metro cities to incorporate public transport based ‘activity / development corridors’ as a key element of city wide SDF’s⁷.

Donaldson (2001: 4) stated that “the main argument underpinning strategies of corridor and multi-nodal development is that they serve to build up thresholds and thus create locational opportunities for business [and public transport]”. Concentration of residential develops around transit stations within these corridors serves to increase thresholds to support public transport. These corridors purposely connect major nodes (Donaldson, 2001).

An activity corridor needs to have certain densities in order for it to be viable. Martens (2001) states that the corridor needs a density of about 100 – 300 people per hectare, it should be about 10 – 20 kilometres in length and be approximately 800 metres to 1 kilometre in width. These dimensions should create the thresholds necessary to sustain a corridor, the accompanying public transport and business. It has been argued however, that densification does not necessarily mean high-rise apartments, it could mean 3 to 4 storeys and / or residential subdivision (i.e. reducing space between buildings) (Donaldson, 2001).

⁷ A spatial development framework (SDF) is a mandatory part of a municipalities integrated development plan (IDP). Every municipality is required to have an IDP. An IDP outlines a vision, objectives, and the priorities for the next five years of the municipality and the development requirements. The SDF spatially locates these objectives and visions.

Despite the massive focus on corridor development in post-apartheid spatial planning, corridor projects have not really worked in the South African context (Wilkinson, 2006). For instance, in the late 1990s the Wetton-Lansdowne Corridor Development initiative, located in Cape Town was initiated by the Department of Transport in order to improve public transport and assist in restructuring the city. The project was to be implemented by an inter-departmental project team of the Cape Town Council. The project did not achieve the range of 'corridor enhancement' benefits anticipated by its proponents (Wilkinson, 2006). The City of Johannesburg has also embarked on corridor development in the past. In about 2006 the CoJ initiated the Bara-Link development corridor. This corridor also did not have the major transformative effects that corridor development is hailed to create.

The primary reason for the overwhelming failure of development corridors, according to Wilkinson (2006) is that an institutional structure has not been adopted to implement them and that the integration of urban planning and transport planning does not usually happen well. A further issue is that they are often opposed strongly by residents who live in the areas proposed for densification. This poses a massive challenge for corridor development. This is the subject of the next section.

2.4.3 Resistance to densification and corridor development

As the section above illustrates, there is consensus in the planning field and between planning academics / practitioners / professionals on the structural characteristics of sustainable urban form, in other words urban consolidation and densification policy focused around public transport routes (Kytta et al, 2013). Moreover, in a South African context these concepts are used to overcome the ills of apartheid spatial planning. The issue comes in where these views and visions are generally not shared by all the inhabitants of cities (Ibid). Conflicting rationalities is important in the South African context of exclusion and inequality (Watson, 2009: cited in van Donk, 2012). "In a highly divided context like South Africa, we cannot simply assume that public reasoning will lead to consensus, rather, we have to acknowledge the existence of fundamentally different and conflicting rationalities and develop appropriate intermediating spaces" (Ibid: 20).

In cities that are dominated by low density suburbs, the notion of densification is viewed as the 'other', so significant cultural change will result and be required (Woodcock et al, 2009). Therefore, the notion of densification has often been associated with resident resistance in the past. A contributing factor is that many people have a negative perception of densification and associate it with slums. This has resulted in an aversion towards densification (Adams et al, 2013).

Benit-Gbaffou (2008) has noted that densification has often been a spark for more affluent residents rage over development plans in Johannesburg. The resistance by local residents towards these types of plans and policies is largely based on fear of losing the environmental qualities that they appreciate without getting any perceived added value (Kytta et al, 2013). Claims regarding threats to character and place-identity are often used to defend neighbourhoods against what is viewed as inappropriate development (Dovey and Woodcock, 2011). As Woodcock et al (2009) state, that there is agreement, between sceptics and proponents of corridor and densification projects, that the character of proposed neighbourhoods will be different from the low densities which are currently prevailing. It is often believed that with densification comes a loss of urban neighbourhood character and local lifestyles (McGuirk and Argent, 2011). Studies have revealed that residents have a negative perception of higher density and often associate it with overcrowding (Kytta, Brobers and Kahila, 2011 cited in Kytta et al, 2013). Having said that, residents usually welcome the potential upgrades and instillation of public transport facilities, amenities, and infrastructure that come with these types of proposals (Kytta et al, 2013).

The development of activity corridors affects a number of different sectors across a city. This includes the activities and opportunities of individuals and communities in specific contexts (Martens, 2001). In many cases these policies leave out specifics and details (this is the nature of strategic planning – it does not provide the detail, it is seen as a guide) such as heights of buildings and interaction with the surroundings, leaving it up to the discretion of property developers (Woodcock et al, 2009). It has been argued that developers often get what they want when it comes to densification plans – “developers are merely doing what they do best, playing the system to maximise profit” (Woodcock et al, 2009: 17). These aspects do not sit well with residents of well established communities and neighbourhoods. It is mainly for the reasons mentioned above that it has been argued that urban consolidation and densification projects, which form part of aiming to support a more sustainable urban form are among the most controversial aspects in urban planning (Kytta et al, 2013).

Burby (2003) states that there are some policies that always run the risk of mobilising latent publics who will try and see that planners preferred policies are squashed. The most common of these are unwanted land-use policies and, what is referred to as NIMBY policies or projects where local support stifles needed land use change and sometimes leads to state mandates to force it (Burby, 2003). Cohen and Eimicke (2006) stated that land-use change and development projects in existing neighbourhoods have become difficult to pursue due to NIMBYism. Resident NIMBYism is cited as one of the key factors constraining the state to achieve neighbourhood densification (Woodcock et al,

2009). It has become part of the cost of doing business and is often expected (Cohen and Eimicke, 2006). What is meant by densification is an increase in the number of people and housing units in a particular space. What most residents generally have an issue with is that most densification policies propose a mix of income groups. This means some of the beneficiaries of densification projects are of a lower income group. Some of the densification which is proposed is often social housing, this is usually the source of the NIMBYism.

In this case participation can be extremely counterproductive because all the participants seek to do is stop the policy from being implemented. As Benit-Gbaffou (2008: 28) posits, “the needs for reconciliation, redistribution, and social integration, are huge and that fully-fledged participation [in all decisions] would probably endanger this aim”. This is mainly because some residents do not wish to see change and social transformation and participation could be used as an avenue where these objectives are prevented, altered or abandoned all together.

Therefore, one of the primary challenges to overcome is how to implement corridor develop and densification plans to accommodate resident’s aspirations as well as planning and design professionals (Woodcock et al, 2013). And in a South African context to ensure the goals of overcoming spatial fragmentation and inequality are not lost.

Adams et al (2013) argues that these issues relating to densification corridor projects can be addressed through better design and deliberative engagement processes, Forester et al (2013) corroborates with this. So the way in which these policies are presented to the public may have an influence on the participant’s perception and stance on the project. Kytta et al (2013: 30) argues that “a planning strategy that is sensitive to the local context and respects the inhabitants place experience can help in finding unique solutions and in restraining conflicts”. Furthermore, in order to avert and mitigate resistance from residents “densification projects need to understand and embrace local experiences and ways of living, and neighbourhood plans should be contextually sensitive” (pg. 31). Kytta et al (2013) argue that the location-based experiential knowledge that can be provided by residents is an important layer of contextually sensitive information that needs to be considered in developing these policies. With this new information planners will be able to perform contextually sensitive planning that could fundamentally increase the social acceptability of densification projects (Ibid) and potentially overcome the issue of derailment from residents who do not want these plans. This means that place specific information, experiential knowledge, is required from residents and participation is viewed as an important means of obtaining this. It has been found in previous studies that planners generally find contextually sensitive information from residents useful in urban planning especially in densification projects but that they seldom get

positive useful experiential information when using traditional participation settings (public meetings, gatherings, forums) (Ibid).

One of the most essential aspects in the process of developing a densification policy is to find out from residents which areas they value and those which require refurbishment. According to Kytta et al (2013) the places which are valued should be improved sensibly, while the places which require refurbishment may provide opportunities for infill development. This clearly adds to the argument that participation is an essential part of any densification project and should form a central part of the policy development.

Many issues exist in terms of public participation and densification projects. As Woodcock et al (2013: 18) states “the planning system engenders a climate of mistrust and cynicism. Both residents and developers tend to amplify conflict and avoid genuine consultation and negotiation that could result in benefit on both sides”. This makes participation highly difficult in such processes but at the same time it is very important.

2.4.3.1 Conflict in a corridor development process – City of Albuquerque, USA

Forester et al (2013) offers an account of a corridor planning process in the City of Albuquerque, USA that experienced a high level of resistance and conflict during the process. The project aimed to redevelop the corridor into a higher density area with a mix of uses. The residents did not want the project to go forward as they felt it would destroy the character of their neighbourhoods. Most of the communities along the corridor are organised and they came together and stopped the process. There were strong diverging ideas in that the residents wanted no development and the business owners and developers wanted more development. There were two public meetings planned, both turned into screaming matches that led to residents leaving angrier because they felt manipulated. The existing project team did not know what to do, so they brought on a university professor to help them get the process moving again (Forester et al, 2013).

The issue was that the project team imposed a policy on the neighbourhoods without properly understanding the context and what the residents and business owners in the area wanted. The policy was technically sound and all the necessary analysis had been done. The new member brought onto the team – to assist get the process moving again – stated that the only way to get this problem solved was to undertake an in-depth participation process where all stakeholders are able to shape the final policy. The context in which they were planning also had to be thoroughly understood first, before they attempt to draw up a policy. This involved going to the community members and finding out from them what do they see as the issues, what aspects are good about

their suburbs, which aspects are bad? It is essential to provide residents with an opportunity to express themselves – this part of planning is messy but it is arguably the most important (Forester et al, 2013).

The project team went back to square one and developed the policy with the residents and business owners. It became clear that the residents were highly concerned about the way new developments should look and how this development related to the public realm. Therefore, the project team included the public in deciding the guidelines which would be used to approve developments. This helped ease a vast amount of the residents' concerns. The project team, residents, and business owners all worked together, making compromises, negotiating, and learning from one another to formulate the corridor development policy. Everyone agreed on the content in the end and the second attempt at the process – which was highly deliberative and participatory – was successful in delivering a high quality policy (Forester et al, 2013).

The above case illustrates that a policy which had been stopped as a result of resident and business owner opposition could be rectified through a deliberative participatory process where all stakeholders concerns were taken into consideration and played a central part in shaping the final policy. What is important to point out is that this policy did not have an underlying aim of restructuring a city that is socially and spatially fragmented. It was just a redevelopment plan to guide zoning and development in this area. Therefore, it is easier to discuss all facets of the plan, whereas with a policy which has underlying principles based on social integration, accessibility, and spatial transformation, if these principles are at the centre of the conflict and the controversy, it becomes more difficult to discuss and negotiate these principles. Therefore, *what* is up for discussion becomes important. As Cornwall (2008) argues, what the public can be included in deciding is important to point out from the onset. The public cannot be involved in every single decision (Hanssen and Falleth, 2014).

The discussions above illustrates that planners face a massive dilemma as participation is said to offer the space for obtaining essential information and obtaining buy-in but also the space to express anger and potentially derail the project – these spaces can be highly counter-productive if they are not designed properly. The case above and the discussions illustrates that policies involving redevelopment plans and densification have to be approached with extreme caution and have to be well thought out for them to be accepted. The public debate is somewhat polarised on this aspect, with those who think that densification is a threat to 'character' and neighbourhood feel and those who think that resident democracy is a threat to sustainability (Dovey and Woodcock, 2011). In the end a balance has to be reached.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter has provided an overview of the literature relevant for this research. It first outlined some of the main debates within policy-making, with a focus on the policy-making as a rational or iterative process, then moved on to discuss participation in planning and policy-making processes. The last section aimed to briefly outline the 'object' under review – corridor development. It is evident from the discussion that there is a rich and diverse body of literature relating to this topic. However, there are a few areas where further investigation is required in order to deepen our understanding of participation in planning.

One area that needs to be better understood is the notion of outsourcing and using consultants to develop public policies and the effects that this has on a participatory process. Furthermore, this makes the process even more complex and how all the actors (internal and external) are managed in order to generate the policy has not been investigated in much detail. Shipley and Utz (2012) have noted that the planning literature on participation often does not make a distinction between the various methods and modes, they go on to argue that much of what is written about participation methods is descriptive, even promotional not analytical or evaluative. Shipley and Utz (2012) highlighted that different outcomes come from different methods. Despite the importance of evaluating the outcomes of participation, most studies have only sought to evaluate the process, leaving out outcomes (Ibid). This research will aim to explore some of these aspects in more detail and provide a highly contextual study of the policy and participation process in the making of the CoF. The following chapter discusses how this research came about in more detail and how the research was conducted.

CHAPTER 3

Research Design, Process, and Methods

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a discussion of the processes and research methods which were utilised in order to approach the research questions. It begins by discussing how the topic and scope of the research was defined, it then moves on to explain the research strategy which has been used to base this research on: case study research.

The type of research which is best suited for this study is mainly qualitative research. An outline of the type of research as well as the data which was required and from whom it was needed is provided. The first set of data was obtained from in-depth key respondent interviews with three main groups: external stakeholders⁸, CoJ officials, and the consultants. These three groups were selected as they were the main role players in the CoF participation process.

The next set of data required was from documents such as minutes of the public meeting, CoF strategic area frameworks, and response letters from external stakeholders to the CoJ regarding the CoF. In order to understand the role and impact of the participatory process, I needed data relating to how the policy process was functioning before the participatory process occurred; how the participatory process functioned (from an internal and external perspective); the relationship between CoJ and consultants and how that influenced participation, and information on what and how the public influenced the process and policy is required. The way in which the data was analysed is also outlined and the sequence of events that were taken in collecting the data and conducting the research.

3.2 DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

Defining the topic and the scope of the research is the most important step in a research process. It is an iterative process that at times can be overwhelming, something all researchers are familiar with. But every research project has its own unique process for the way in which it was defined. This section describes the process of defining the topic and scope because it was not clear cut. This is important to highlight as I had many challenges relating to methodology and this had a major influence on defining the scope of the research and where the emphasis was placed in the topic.

⁸ External stakeholder in this research is defined as an individual or institution that is not part of the CoJ or the consultancy teams. In other words, they do not form part of the project team.

The topic was originally centred purely on the policy-making process and how such a policy is created from an internal perspective in the City of Johannesburg: how the policy vision for Corridors of Freedom was developed in a context where many City departments and agencies were involved. There was a potential for an informal internship in the City Transformation Department where I would be able to observe, from the inside, how this type of process is formulated. This would be done under the auspices of the Rosettenville Studio. Rosettenville studio is a research programme which is focused on understanding various aspects in Rosettenville. It was run in the School of Architecture and Planning at Wits. A meeting was held between the Director of the Studio, CUBES Director and my supervisor, with CoJ Planning officials, to establish how the Studio research could be made useful and available to the City in its effort to implement a Corridor in its vicinity (the Turffontein corridor). In this context, the possibility of an internship on Corridor policy-making processes (with the case study of Turffontein) had been discussed.

After this meeting, with the assistance of my supervisor, Claire Benit-Gbaffou, a follow up was set up with the CoJ planners who were directly involved in the CoF policy-making process. The aim of the meeting was partly to attempt to set up the internship and research process under the Rosettenville Studio. Furthermore, it was also aimed at assisting with defining the scope of the research and determining the potential for such a topic. This meeting was unstructured in that it was mainly an informal conversation with minimal control imposed by me and the CoJ officials in the meeting could speak freely about the process. I asked only a few questions relating to what the officials brought up. Even though this was an unstructured meeting the researcher goes into it knowing what they need to gain from it (I-Tech, 2010). It has been noted that in formative research studies often unstructured interviews are conducted in the initial phases because they are able to provide general information relating to the topic and they are able to assist with pointing the researcher in the right direction (Ibid).

Before this meeting took place I submitted a five page document to the CoJ officials containing a proposal for the scope of the research and research questions. The research questions pertained to how the policy-making process functioned and it had sub-questions including who were the parties involved; what vehicles were set up to ensure that these parties work together; how the participation process worked; and how the CoJ plan on implementing the CoF. I was informed by the CoJ officials that these are all massive questions on their own and that I would have to narrow my focus substantially because this was a highly complicated and complex process.

From this meeting it seemed that an internship was a real possibility and the CoJ officials were, if not keen, at least agreeable on the idea. However, this did not materialise as I was later informed by the City officials that they were under extreme pressure and do not have the time to be involved extensively in tutoring or training me, and I understood that research on the process was perhaps not welcome from an internal perspective (for such a burning political issue).

This created a challenge as the primary method to conduct this research required extensive observation; participation in meetings (both internal to the City and external with stakeholders) and this was not possible. There is also no documentation regarding the internal process such as minutes of meetings between departments or within departments, as one of the officials said, most communication was done via emails or verbally in meetings. Therefore, unfortunately this topic was short lived as I was not able to gain access on a regular basis and to compound the matter the internal process was drawing to a close.

Before I abandoned this topic, I tried to shift the focus slightly, in ways that would require observation of public processes rather than internal observations of state practices. I thought of investigating policy implementation of the CoF. However, this topic also required a substantial amount of observation within the CoJ. Moreover, I was informed by two CoJ officials that the City has not reached the implementation phase of the process. Once the final CoF strategic area framework policy is approved by Council then they would develop more detailed precinct and implementation plans (this would happen near the end of my research process). This confirmed that I could not do this topic, at this point in time, as the City has not yet developed their implementation plans – thus, the research would be premature and missing a crucial element if I went that route.

The initial aim of the research outlined above was to theorise the state and to understand the challenges under which such a policy is created. To assist me develop my knowledge on state practices I was fortunate enough (with the assistance of my supervisor) to join an exclusive set of workshops undertaken by the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI) on state practices. The state would be looked at from various perspectives throughout the workshop sessions, for example Foucaudian, neo-liberal, and feminist perspectives. I thoroughly enjoyed these sessions; however they did not seem highly beneficial for my research, especially when the prospect of having regular access into the CoJ faded. Furthermore, the workshops felt distant from Urban and Regional Planning and at times I could not see the link between the sessions and the direction my research was moving in. I decided to terminate my participation in the workshops, especially once the City officials informed me it would not be possible to gain access on a regular basis. However, I do not regret joining the workshop as it enlightened me and provided explanations for why the state is

often ineffective. It assisted with broadening my perspective on the state and its functioning and it assisted me in thinking more critically about my research.

I redefined my research topic, to investigate more specifically how external stakeholders and residents' participation has shaped and influenced this policy. The reason this was selected was first because residents would probably be more accessible and willing to provide information of the process from an external perspective. The second reason was participation was quite a controversial aspect at first, but seemed to have taken some interesting turns through the process. What gave me this impression was a School Talk conducted on the Corridors of Freedom at Wits on the 24 February 2014. Various lecturers and academics spoke about the policy and how flawed it was and how it was presented in a technocratic top-down fashion as this massive new policy for Johannesburg. The issue of public participation was discussed by a lecturer from the School of Architecture and Planning who lives in one of the neighbourhoods affected by the Empire-Perth Corridor – Diaan van der Westhuizen. He highlighted various issues with the way the process was being carried out and the way in which the CoF was presented at the public meeting. I spoke to him after that session to discuss the participation in more detail and found out that there was more to the process than a few public meetings that were completely unproductive. I realised that this topic had much potential and it was an angle that I could take in order to look at the process and content of the CoF from.

I was also part of a study group in SoAP for students conducting their research on Corridors of Freedom and / or for the Rosettenville Studio⁹. We met about once a month while we were developing our research topics; these sessions were extremely beneficial because lecturers and fellow students would provide input and guidance on how one could move forward. These sessions were instrumental in shaping this research. It was from these sessions in conjunction with many consultations with my supervisor, many other lecturers in the SoAP, the School talk mentioned above, and the preliminary meeting with officials described in the previous section, that I decided to conduct my research on how public participation influenced the CoF policy-making process and policy outcome.

Investigating the public participation aspect of the CoF allowed me to contextualise it in relation to how the broader process was functioning: therefore, elements of the initial topic are still present in this one, however the focus is on participation and how it impacted policy in the making, rather than on solely policy-making (which would require a strong internal perspective). This meant I'm not solely dependent on City officials who are working under extreme pressure. I deemed that access to

⁹ The CoF and Rosettenville studio study group was set up by a few lecturers and students in order to assist with research challenges, share findings, network, and gain advice.

information for the chosen topic would be easier to obtain and there is an identifiable problem from an outsider's perspective (the debates between the CoJ / consultants and the affected residents). This makes the research more manageable and framed, which is necessary for the timeframe of the research. I also have a deep interest in public participation and what its role in practice is in policy-making and planning processes. To elaborate, I conducted my honours research (Peens, 2013) on the use of social media in the Joburg 2040 GDS public participation process. This research sparked my interest in policy-making and participation processes.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the research design and strategy used to conduct and frame the research. It outlines the type and kind of data that was required in order to attempt to answer the research questions. The research methods which were used to collect the data are discussed in detail and the sequence in which the data was collected is described.

3.3 CASE STUDY RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN

This research uses the case study approach as a research strategy to base the research on; therefore it is important to discuss it briefly. Yin (1994) states that case studies are the preferred research strategy when 'why' and 'how' questions are being asked, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context. The case study allows us to understand complex social phenomenon (Ibid). A major advantage of a case study is that it allows the researcher to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, for example: managerial and organisational processes (Sarantachos, 2005). This strategy is utilised because the researcher deliberately wants to cover and explore contextual conditions (Yin, 1994). Watson (2002: 184) highlights that the case study is useful in studying planning practices as it allows for the "interrelating of actors, circumstances, contextual settings, and sequences of events". This makes the research strategy appropriate for this study as I have to fully understand the context in which the policy was being formulated and how all the actors related to one another (between internal and external actors).

The case study approach has unique strengths in that it has the ability to deal with a wide variety of evidence and research methods (Ibid). It uses a variety of methods in order to obtain data, such as: documents, interviews, artefacts, and observations (Bromley, 1986 cited in Sarantachos, 2005). Flyvbjerg (2001) states that it groups several methods into one in order to fully understand a particular case. The research strategy aims to study and analyse a case in-depth utilising any research tool necessary (AAPS, 2010). The way in which case study research is made thorough is with the use of multiple methods and data sources (Ibid).

Sarantachos (2005) points out that there are three different types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. An intrinsic case study is normally conducted to learn about this specific case. There is no expectation that the results will be generalised to explain other cases. Instrumental case studies are used to enquire into a social issue or to refine a theory. Collective case studies include a number of single case studies investigated jointly. This research makes use of a single intrinsic case study as I aim to understand a particular case in a substantial amount of detail and the results may not be generalisable.

The case study selected for this research is the Corridors of Freedom participation and policy-making process. The underlying objective of the policy is to 'restructure the apartheid city', this makes it an interesting case to explore in terms of how the public reacts and feels about this type of policy and what the place of participation is in such a policy with such strong social and spatial transformative goals. Furthermore, in this case there were many residents who mobilised in order to ensure that they have some sort of an influence over the policy outcome. This provides me with an opportunity to explore the nuances of this participation process and gain a better understanding of how it is occurring as it has been widely argued in the past that participation is highly ineffective in Johannesburg (van Donk, 2012; Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). The case provides us with a great opportunity to learn how to improve strategic spatial planning processes and ensure that we create quality policies that consider the needs of everyone.

Within this case study various data sources and research methods have been employed to obtain the information:

- Key respondent interviews were used to acquire information from CoJ officials, consultants, and key community representatives.
- Various documents have been used such as response letters, reports, public meeting minutes, CoF draft documents and presentations.
- Media reports were evaluated in order to determine the response to CoF and how this contributed to the negative image of the CoF.

3.4 IDENTIFYING AND INTERVIEWING KEY RESPONDENTS

This section highlights who the key respondents were; how they were identified; the type of information which was required from them; and the specific method that was employed to obtain the information needed from the key respondents. In this research 'key respondent' is defined as individuals who were centrally involved, either internally or externally in the CoF process. A key respondent generally has a substantial amount of knowledge and insight on the topic, or a part of it,

which is under investigation (Kumar, 1989). They have obtained this knowledge and insight through firsthand experience, involvement, and observation with an issue pertaining to the research. It is for this reason they are able to provide in-depth information on a particular topic (I-Tech, 2010).

The key respondents are not chosen randomly (Kumar, 1989). This was the case for this research. Informants were selected based on the fact that they possess information that was required for the research (Ibid). The investigator should identify the appropriate groups from which key respondents are drawn from (this is unpacked in the following paragraphs). The individuals who are selected should not be 'spectators' or 'on-lookers' but rather people who were centrally immersed in the process (Ibid). This helps to ensure that the researcher obtains accurate accounts of what occurred. Kumar (1989) stated that it is essential that a conscious effort is made to select respondents with diverse opinions and perspectives.

Three main groups of respondents were identified: CoJ officials, the 'community'/ residents, and consultants who were involved in the process. The first group identified as being essential in the process was CoJ officials, specifically from the City Transformation and Spatial Planning Department (CTSPD)¹⁰. The CTSPD is the unit commissioned with formulating the CoF policy and strategic area frameworks: this department is essentially the project leader, thus aware of all the major happenings and events in the process. It is for this reason that this unit was selected within the CoJ. The way key respondents were selected from the CTSPD was in terms of who was centrally involved in the Empire-Perth Corridor process. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there are currently three corridors being planned: Empire-Perth (the focus of this study); Turffontein; and Louis Botha. The three corridors are headed by three different teams (the teams are small consisting of about 2 / 3 people from the CTSPD). Therefore, the main official involved in the participation process and the one handling the comments received from the public was selected as a key respondent.

The second important group of respondents that were identified was the consultancy teams. The CTSPD hired consultants in May 2013 from Gamcon to develop the majority of the strategic area frameworks. Later on in the process (from December 2013 / January 2014) another consultant was brought onto the team who is from Iyer Urban Design Studio. Therefore, a key respondent from Gamcon (this is a pseudonym as the consultancy firm did not consent to their name being used in this report) was selected who was on the consultancy team who was responsible for developing the CoF SAF's – Mr Venter (also a pseudonym): they were in the public meetings representing Gamcon and assisting with the responses to the public. There was only one consultant from Iyer, Paul Hanger,

¹⁰ The City Transformation and Spatial Planning Department is responsible for strategic planning within the CoJ. This unit develops the City's spatial development framework (SDF); growth management strategy (GMS); density policy; and nodal policy (CoJ, undated).

and he was selected as a key respondent. Hanger was important to include as he took over as the main project leader from the middle of the process and took the process to completion.

The third group that has been identified which is essential in the process were external stakeholders. An external stakeholder was viewed as someone who is not on the project team in the CoF policy-making process (in other words they are not from a CoJ department involved in formulating the policy; Gamcon; nor Iyer). In the case of this research external stakeholders include: task group members (consisting of various professionals, residents association members) residents associations (Westdene Residents Association (WRA), Brixton Community Forum (BCF)), universities (Wits, UJ), Ward Councillors¹¹, community leaders, and residents themselves. All of these groups were selected because they were instrumental in this process in one form or another.

The way in which these groups were identified and selected is initially through word of mouth and interviews with key respondents themselves. To provide an example, in the Wits School talk on the CoF held on the 24th February 2014 I identified that Diaan van der Westhuizen was a participant in the process and my supervisor informed me that he played an important role in the process. Van der Westhuizen informed me that he was involved to a large extent. I set up an interview with him where he identified many of the important members involved externally – this is from his first-hand experience and participation in the process. These individuals were then contacted who further revealed important members and so the process went on. This is referred to as the snowball method, where one obtains contacts from each subsequent key respondent.

The task group¹² was made up of various individuals. It was decided to interview primary members within this group. For instance, the Ward Councillor of Ward 69 set up the task group and was the main co-ordinator. Within the task group there were key individuals such as Mark Schaerer from Brixton Community Forum – he headed the team much of the time. Van der Westhuizen was one of the members of the task group who begun to draw up the response document that was sent to the CoJ (this is discussed in detail in subsequent sections). These were core members of the task group and had a substantial amount of detail on how they operated and what they were doing. Therefore, were selected to be part of the research.

¹¹ The Ward Councillor, even though they are part of Council, was viewed as an external stakeholder in this research. The reason for this is the Ward Councillor was not part of the internal team developing the policy and they were assisting the residents and communities to mobilise against the policy.

¹² The task groups were set up by the Ward Councillor and included three groups: an urban planning / urban design group; heritage group; and a legal group. Each team within the task group concentrated on their respective theme as there was a substantial amount of content to get through. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

Residents associations were essential in communicating between residents and the task group, drafting their own response documents, and ensuring that their communities were represented and informed at all times. From the Westdene Residents Association (WRA) the individual who was the Chair at the time the CoF process was taking place was selected as they were involved in meetings with the task group and creating their own responses. A member of the Brixton Community Forum was also interviewed.

I was informed by van der Westhuizen and Schaerer that the University of Johannesburg was an essential stakeholder in the process. Therefore, they had to be included in this research. The individual who represented the institution in the CoF process was selected. In the case of UJ it was the Director of Property Management¹³, Charmaine Keet.

It was not only the middle income suburbs that were participating in the process but also the lower income neighbourhoods such as Westbury, Newclare, and Coronationville. Therefore, it was necessary to include respondents from these communities. It was a challenge contacting residents here; however Dube from the City Transformation office provided me with a contact of the individual they used for their communication: Shahiem Ismail. He is a community activist / leader who has been involved in community work in the Westbury, Newclare, Coronationville, Vrededorp area for over 30 years. He was the Ward Councillor for Ward 82 at the time the CoF participation process was taking place and has been a Ward committee member in the past. He was involved in the CoF participation process from the start and is still involved. Therefore, he is aware of what has been taking place in the aforementioned neighbourhoods and can speak on their behalf.

Figure 3.1 below illustrates the way the key respondents were identified (i.e how the snowball method progressed through the research).

¹³ The Department of Property Management at UJ is responsible for all matters relating to development, land, and town planning aspects. They manage all UJ's property and are responsible for acquiring land for expansion.




Figure 3.1: Diagram illustrating how respondents were found (snowballing process).

Figure 3.2 below illustrates schematically what is described in this section. In other words which respondents belong to which group and how they relate to one another.




Figure3.2: Diagram illustrating the relationship between the various respondents.

3.4.1 Type of research and information required

In order to understand the impact which participation had on the process, I needed to understand how the process was initially working. This information was obtained from the CoJ officials and the consultants who were involved in the process. Information that was required relates to how the process was functioning before the participatory process; why participation was not included in the initial phases; how the City officials and consultants dealt with the negative reactions to the CoF; how the public views were included; the relationship to developers; their perceptions of public participation in a policy of this nature (aimed at rectifying the ills of apartheid planning and attempting to restructure the city); and how the relationship between the consultancy firms, CTSPD, and other departments functioned.

The information required from the consultancy firms relates to how they were involved in the process; how they and the CoJ worked together; how they have witnessed the process change; were they required to include the public (from which stage and why); how they included the information obtained from the public meetings; and how useful the public meetings have been for them.

The next set of information required was from the residents who were participating in the process. In my preliminary research it was identified that it was mainly the affluent residents of the area who had been participating in the process. Generally speaking the residents associations in this area, such as Melville; Westdene; and Brixton, are very strong and vocal and the communities are relatively well organised. There are also many professionals and academics which reside in these neighbourhoods. So, it is evident that the research is generally dealing with a relatively affluent community which is quite well organised. In order to obtain information from the public's point of view and how they mobilised in the process, in-depth interviews were held with various role players as shown in figure 3.2 in the external stakeholder block.

The information which was required from the external stakeholders was how they mobilised; how they witnessed the process change; what was the main reason for participating; what was their reaction to and perception of the policy and why; how did their perception change; do they feel they were being listen to; what strategies did they use in order to try influence the content of the policy; and to what extent does the public feel they have influenced the CoF content.

The research methods which fall under qualitative research are: face-to-face interviews, discourse analysis (of written and spoken text), group interviews, focus groups, participant observation, visual media (Philip, 1997), phenomenology, and ethnography (Creswell, 2009). The method which best

suits obtaining the type of qualitative data required is through face-to-face in-depth interviews with the key respondents.

3.4.1.1 In-depth key respondent interviews

To gain the necessary information from the individuals identified in previous sections, in-depth key respondent interviews were held with a select group of people. This qualitative data collection method involves intensive face-to-face interviews with a small number of respondents in order to obtain their perspectives on a specific process, program, outcome, or situation (Boyce and Neale, 2006). The primary advantage of this method is that it provides highly detailed information that is not always available through other data collection techniques such as questionnaires (Boyce and Neale, 2006). Furthermore, in-depth interviews are often able to provide a clearer understanding of a particular case and what took place and the reason for it (Ibid). With semi-structured interviews the researcher remains in control of the interview and ensures it stays on topic.

In the case of this research, I began the interviews with asking about the respondent's background relating to their position, how long they have been involved in a certain organisation / group / community etc. I moved on to gaining the information required from that particular respondent. The interview guides varied from respondent to respondent depending on if they were an internal or external stakeholder and depending on what the researcher knew about them before the interview (e.g. if they were part of the task group or the residents association). Once gaining some background the first question I asked most of the respondents was: "tell me about the process?" This question proved extremely effective because respondents would automatically start their storey in chronological order. It also allowed the respondents to express themselves freely. In most cases the questions that followed in the interview guide would be covered by the storey they were telling. When necessary I would prompt them for more information on a particular aspect if they did not provide enough detail while bringing it up on their own accord. All of the interviews were audio recorded and I took notes of any points that stood out to me during the interview. All the interviews were transcribed verbatim.

3.4.1.2 Limitations of key respondent interviews

There are a few limitations of key respondent interviews that should be mentioned. One of them is that they are prone to bias. The reason for this is that if a person is directly involved in carrying out a process or developing a policy they may want to show it in a good light because it bares their name. They may not be willing to explore the challenges and faults that may exist because it may expose them criticism (Boyce and Neale, 2006). This challenge is certainly an issue for this research because the consultants involved are representing the consultancy firms which they work for and may not be

able to speak without a bias; the same can be said for the CoJ officials. The way in which this issue was attempted to be dealt with is that respondents who were not affiliated to either the consultancy firm or the CoJ were included. This is not to say that community members are unbiased. To elaborate they belong to their networks and organisation and they could be just as biased regarding their perspective as the consultants and officials. Having said that they are more likely to reveal challenges and faults they experienced in the process and be more critical of the way it was run.

A further issue that has been noted with key respondent interviews is the reliability of the data and verifying it (Kumar, 1989). Issues of reliability emerge because respondents have to speak about events that have already occurred. They may have forgotten some details or they could confuse events and provide inaccurate information. This has major impacts on the findings of a research project. Ways to overcome this include interviewing various people who were involved and who are differently positioned and using more than one method to obtain data. This is referred to as triangulation of data (Yin, 2004). Once all your data and interviews from differently positioned key respondents is pointing in the same direction then you are able to trust that the data is reliable (Ibid). In this research various respondents, coming from different perspectives were interviewed and documents which were available were used.

3.5 DATA FROM DOCUMENTS – DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

The research makes use of various documents in order to assist understand what was taking place in the process and what individuals and groups were making of the participation process and the content of the CoF. Documents are also utilised to assist measure the influence of public participation on the CoF strategic area framework itself. To elaborate, minutes of meetings and response letters sent to the CoJ help identify the issues, they also took place at a certain point in time, therefore it is possible to attempt to determine a cause-effect relationship. Documents such as the response letters also provided quite detailed information and specific information regarding the CoF and recommendations.

This involves analysing a variety of documents. There is no specific science to document analysis and it generally involves a vast amount of content in the form of written text, maps, tables, graphs, and pictures. It is for this reason that it is primarily a qualitative research method (Bowen, 2009) – it is used as a qualitative method in this research. Bowen (2009) stated that as a research method, document analysis is highly appropriate for qualitative case studies which are intense, producing rich descriptions of a phenomena, events, processes, or programs.

“Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009: 27). It is often utilised in conjunction with other qualitative research methods and is used as a means for triangulation (Eisner, 1991). Bowen (2009) noted that it is important to determine the authenticity, credibility, and accuracy of the selected documents.

It is imperative to point out that document analysis is not a data collection method because the data comes in the form of the document. It is about finding, selecting, and accessing the right documentation. As Bowen (2009) states document analysis yields data in the form of quotations, excerpts, or entire passages.

Document analysis can be used for various purposes. Information contained in documents can fill gaps in the study and it can supplement other research data obtained from other methods such as interviews. Documents can be used to track changes and development, especially where various drafts of a document are available the researcher can compare them in order to identify the changes (Bowen, 2009). In this research documents are used for all these purposes. Yin (1994) argues that even subtle changes in a draft can reflect substantive developments in a project or policy.

The documents that were used in this study included:

- The State of the City Address: assists with context and to understand how this policy has been framed and the importance given to it. For a policy to be announced in the State of the City Address is a major political statement. This document is in the public domain and is available on the Internet;
- CoF overview documents: outlines the general principles, objectives, and description of CoF – assist our understanding of what the policy is. This document is also available on the Internet (CoJ, 2013a);
- The CoF strategic area frameworks: documents illustrating the vision, objectives, and plans¹⁴ for the chosen corridors – various ‘detailed’ drafts. These documents are on the CoF website;
- Presentations of CoF to the public: provides a condensed version of strategic area frameworks. They are available on the CoF website;
- Minutes of participation meetings: assist in understanding how the participation meetings were running, what issues were being raised by whom etc. The minutes are on the CoF website. Mark Schaerer provide me with his minutes from one of the public meetings;

¹⁴ In the context of the CoF the word plan is used in this research when referring specifically to the actual map which graphically / spatially represents the CoF vision.

- Report and response letters: this includes objections, responses and suggestions from external stakeholders – further assist with what the issues were, what external stakeholders were attempting to do about it, and what the City’s response was. These documents were obtained from key respondents themselves – from the task group, WRA, and UJ;
- Tender document: illustrates what the city was asking external consultants to do – assists with understanding how the CoF was pitched to external stakeholders and where potential gaps were. This document was provided by a member of the task group, Mark Schaerer;
- Media reporting’s and newspaper articles: this can assist with seeing how the CoF was being portrayed in the public domain. Online and newspaper articles were selected. All the articles I came across about the Empire-Perth Corridor were used.

Some of the documents were used in conjunction with each other. The minutes of meetings and the reports sent in by the task team were used to identify the key issues, this was then analysed against the CoF strategic area framework in order to determine if the suggestions had any impact on the policy. The data gained from the interviews with the key respondents from the task team, UJ, residents associations, was also used to determine if the issues brought up in these meetings regarding the content was rectified / changed in the final approved CoF policy. A group of residents that came together drafted a report which was sent to the CTSPD and the consultancy firm. The document outlines all the concerns and suggestions for the CoF policy and process. This document was useful in assisting determine what the group’s stance on the policy was. UJ also drafted a response letter to the initial draft CoF SAF which was sent to the CoJ. WRA drafted a response letter that was sent to the CoJ regarding the second draft SAF.

There were previous precinct plans that had been approved by the CoJ and which formed part of the Regional Spatial Development Framework (RSDf). They were developed by residents in areas such as Brixton, Melville and Westdene and were formulated in a participatory manner. I wanted to obtain these documents to see how they were included in formulating the policy and the influence they had on the CoF but I was unable to gain access to them. The links on the CoJ website were broken, I suspect the plans have been removed because they are no longer applicable – the CoF trumps all other spatial policy in this area. Therefore, I had to rely on key respondents to inform me on how the plans were incorporated / not incorporated.

3.5.1 Limitations of document analysis

There are a number of drawbacks that need to be considered when conducting document analysis. One of them is that if documents are not in the public domain it may be difficult obtaining access to them (Bowen, 2009). Yin (1994) notes that in some cases, with sensitive topics for example, access to documents may be deliberately blocked in order to prevent criticism or to ensure confidentiality. In some instances documents do not contain sufficient detail (Bowen, 2009). A further issue relating to this method is that sometimes documents simply do not exist or are incomplete. Bowen (2009: 33) stated that “the absence, sparseness, or incompleteness of documents should suggest something about the object of the investigation or the people involved. What it might suggest, for example, is that certain matters have been given little attention or that certain voices have not been heard”.

In the case of this research, in relation to the participation process there is a substantial amount of documentation in the public domain. A website was set up specifically for the CoF process where various important documents were published. These documents include the CoF strategic area frameworks, minutes of two public meetings, the presentations delivered in the public meetings, and the CoF overview document. Some of the letters the CoJ sent out to the public are also on the internet. The limitation is that not all of the public meetings were minuted, not all of the presentations are available online, and the initial draft of the CoF strategic area framework is not available online. These documents have to be obtained from the consultancy firm or the CoJ. Other essential documents such as response letters from the community and personal notes on some of the participation meetings were obtained from key respondents from the communities who were involved in the process. The tender document for the Corridors of Freedom was provided by one of the key respondents from the task group.

3.6 SEQUENCE IN WHICH RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED

This section provides an outline of the sequence in which the research was conducted and the order the methods were applied. To start, as described at the beginning of this chapter a broad topic was selected. The process of identifying and narrowing down the topic was conducted. This process involved interviews, reading literature on those topics and much brainstorming / deliberation.

Once the narrowing down process was complete and it was decided to focus on public participation in the policy-making process and the influence that it has over the policy, the initial literature review was written. I begun field work and decided to start the interview process with the external stakeholders: key members of the task group, resident associations, and institutions. While I was conducting the interviews with external stakeholders I was concurrently reading through all the

documentation I had access to. This included the minutes of the public meetings, the CoF SAF drafts, the presentations done during the public meetings. Documents received from the respondents during the interview process such as response / objection / suggestion letters; the CoF tender document; and personal meeting notes were also read through while the interviews were being conducted.

I moved on to interviewing the CoJ officials who were driving the policy and participation processes internally. Once the data had been obtained from the CoJ officials, the consultants, who played a central role in the policy process, were interviewed.

The reason for the order in which the three groups of respondents were interviewed (i.e external stakeholders then internal) was that the external respondents (members of the task group, residents associations, communities etc.) could provide me with details on how the process was functioning and their experience of being part of the participation process. This meant that once I progressed to interviewing the internal stakeholders such as the CTSPD planners and the consultants, I would not be 'going in blind' and would already have an understanding of how the participation process was functioning from an external perspective. This allowed me to probe at a much deeper level and ask critically informed questions about specific aspects. This also subtly illustrated to the respondent that I was informed. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.

The next stage of the research involved tracking the changes in the CoF strategic area framework drafts and presentations. The minutes of the meetings (for the ones that have minutes); response letters; and the data from the three groups, especially the external stakeholders, were used to track the impact that the participation had on the process as well as the CoF strategic area framework itself. This involved thoroughly reading through the initial CoF SAF draft, reading the minutes of the public meetings, reading the response letter written by the tasks teams, and looking at what the media was reporting on the policy. Then I read later drafts and the final CoF document to determine if the suggestions, issues, and concerns raised were included, and if so, to what extent.

Once all the data had been collected, I officially began the analysis. However, the analysis had been taking place from the time an interview was conducted as it would raise questions and I would take note of any initial thoughts that stood out to me in the process. The first step of the analysis involved placing all the data from the interviews into themes. 131 themes emerged out of the data. Not all of these were relevant and many were interrelated. All the data from all interviews was categorised in these themes. This made it easier to analyse all respondents' comments regarding a specific theme and make linkages between all the respondents. The way in which the findings were

presented is, as far as possible, in chronological order and how the process unfolded. This was not always possible because of the organisation of themes. After the writing up of the findings and the analysis, conclusions and recommendations were drawn out.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The research does not deal with a vulnerable group or an aspect that raises major ethical concerns, therefore, there are no serious ethical aspects to consider beyond that of permission to utilise information and consent to use the data collected through the key respondent interviews.

Permission was required from the authors of the response letters sent to the CoJ and consultants to use the information as data for this research. I wished to audio record all the key respondent interviews; therefore permission was required to do so and to transcribe the interviews. A covering letter was drawn up to inform the respondents what exactly the research entails and that their identity (if required) will be kept anonymous. All respondents participated in the research on their own personal capacity. When dealing with the minutes it was important for the researcher not to use the participants' names as they have not provided permission to do so, therefore public meeting participants were kept anonymous. The name of the initial consultancy firm was kept anonymous because permission was not given to me to use the consultancy firm's name. Therefore a pseudonym has been used for the consultancy firm: Gamcon and for the consultant who was on the Gamcon project team: James Venter.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The chapter discussed the methodology and research methods used in this research. It is evident that defining the topic and scope of the research was no easy task. It took months to develop the final research question and it involved much reading, talking, preliminary fieldwork, brainstorming, and consultations. At many times compromises had to be made due to limitations such as regular access to the CoJ and it played an essential role in the direction that the research took. This process proved to be highly challenging and demanding. At times it felt as if I was deviating into topics that were not planning related, this contributed to the challenge and made me feel uneasy. The shifting topic was not an easy process. Having said that, what I have learnt during this process has provided me with a solid foundation for the research. I explored and read about many other aspects such as the anthropology of the state, inter-departmental issues, and policy implementation. This contributed to opening my mind and to developing my understanding on a much broader base.

Through the topic definition stage of the research what I did not realise at the time, because I felt so overwhelmed and uneasy, was that I was already generating findings and developing a broad understanding of the internal dynamics in the CoJ, the challenges planners have to face in

formulating a policy such as this one, the spaces of participation that begun to emerge in the process, and most importantly I was slowly stitching together the broader timeline and context of the process. This was an essential background to have – for any topic where a researcher is investigating the CoF – before conducting the field work. Having the Corridors of Freedom and Rosettenville studio study group was highly beneficial in this process in that lecturers' and fellow students could share their perspectives and insights. These initial stages of the research were essential, and it most certainly contributed to the growth of me as a young researcher. It was an invaluable process that ensured this research was based on a solid foundation.

The following three chapters provide the results and findings obtained from the research methods outlined in this chapter. Firstly, the initial stages of the process are outlined in the first of three findings chapters, then the details pertaining to how the participation process functioned and how external stakeholders mobilised and the influence this had on the process is discussed in the second findings chapter, and finally the influence that participation had on the content of the CoF is discussed in the third findings chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Setting the participation process in context: the process and events leading up to public participation

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the first of three which presents the findings and analysis of the data that was obtained from the research methods explained in the previous chapter. As far as possible the findings are presented in chronological order so that the reader has an understanding of how the process unfolded and where the participation and resident mobilisation took place. However, there are some aspects that are not presented in chronological order due to the structure of the themes.

This research is concerned with the context in which the policy process was taking place, how the broader policy-making process was working and how public participation influenced this process. The chapter is aimed at exploring these aspects and highlighting how this process was functioning before the participation took place: what essentially were the consultants appointed / asked to do, how the project team was developing this policy, and were they considering other plans which have been created for these areas are aspects that are unpacked. It seeks to explore how the relationship between the CoJ and the consultancy firm functioned and how involved, or rather how much freedom was the consultancy firm afforded in the process and the impact this had on public participation; how participation was framed initially and how this changed as the process progressed is also of interest.

The chapter illuminates all the complexities and challenges that the project team had to endure and overcome in a process such as this, which in the end requires many departments and external stakeholders' co-operation. It is evident from the contents of this chapter that it is important to understand all the intricate details in the broader process because most of them have a direct bearing on the participation process. This adds substantial value and understanding compared to only exploring the participation process in isolation.

This chapter is also a response to Cornwall's (2008) and Williams (2004) call for understanding the context in which the participation is set. As Cornwall (2008) noted, the way in which participation is carried out and its outcome is largely dependent on the context and those within it. Furthermore, Williams (2004) states that too much attention has been placed on the detail of methods and participation events and little on the broader context. Therefore, one of Williams main objectives is

to emphasise that looking at aspects such as who and what gets represented should not overshadow the institutional context in which participation is located (Williams, 2004). This is not a contextual chapter per se but it does partly serve that purpose in that it sets the scene in which participation took place.

The chapter begins with an overview of various policies which contributed to the framing of the CoF and how this sets the broader overarching vision and principles for the CoF. This is important to understand because it helps us understand why certain aspects of the policy are not up for discussion. The tender for the CoF is discussed and what the CoJ asked the consultants to undertake in terms of process and content. The discussion moves on to the internal process where aspects such as the tight timeframes, political pressure, how the content of the CoF SAF was being developed, how external stakeholders and plans were being included, the relationship between the CoJ and the consultants, and issues related to inter-departmental relations are all explored in this intriguing chapter.

4.2 AGENDA SETTING IN THE COF PROCESS

The CoF agenda setting process did not take place in isolation as its own confined process. As Jann and Wegrich (2007) state about agenda setting, it is affected by many factors; this was most certainly the case for the CoF. The primary factor influencing the problem and ideas that came onto the agenda regarding the CoF policy was higher level policies at National and at City level. This section is not aimed at providing a comprehensive understanding of all the factors which contributed to where the CoF policy came from, rather it aims to illustrate that the main influence of how this policy got on the CoJ agenda is from higher level policy.

4.2.1 The National Development Plan and Urban Network Strategy

The National Development Plan 2030 sets out where the country should be by 2030. It is a multi-sectoral plan which deals with South Africa's most pressing issues. Chapter 8 – transforming human settlements – is primarily concerned with addressing the spatial inequalities present in our cities and the consequences thereof. It states that cities should aim at increasing densities in well located areas, improve public transport infrastructure, and ensure that the poor live closer to (or are connected to) amenities and job opportunities (NPC, 2011).

At a national level, the National Development Programme¹⁵ developed a new strategy in 2011/2012 in order to improve the value for money and long-term impact of interventions. This strategy is known as the Urban Network Strategy (UNS) which has a pro-poor / pro-growth investment approach (National Treasury, undated). The strategy is aimed at facilitating the eradication of spatial inequality in order to create liveable, sustainable, integrated and resilient cities. The urban-network is about interconnecting nodes with public transport. The National Development Programme Grant focuses allocations to municipalities which initiate projects and processes to implement this strategy and which follow the principles outlined in it. Some of the criteria in the UNS include: “population densities, levels and diversity of economic activity, concentration of poverty and the presence of connectivity networks i.e. public transport” (National Treasury, undated). There are currently 18 municipalities on board with the strategy, with all 8 metros included (Ibid). The CoF is in line the NDP and UNS.

4.2.2 Growth and Development Strategy 2040

At the City level is the Joburg Growth and Development Strategy 2040. The GDS is in line with all national objectives. The Joburg GDS 2040 started the process of developing the CoJ’s new vision, within the national framework, and the foundation for how to move the metro into a more “resilient, sustainable and liveable” society (CoJ, 2011). The GDS formulated the broad strategic vision for Johannesburg. It has eight themes including aspects such as transport, liveable communities, poverty and health, and governance. Each theme is explored in detail highlighting the challenges and how it should work in the future (CoJ, 2011). The GDS is not a spatial document, it does not indicate where and how the vision will be realised spatially it only provides the normative principles and objectives (containing 4 outcomes and 21 outputs) – it is a high level strategy that is meant to guide spatial policies (CoJ, 2011).

The objectives and principles are briefly outlined in order to gain an understanding of the foundation of the GDS 2040 as this has a direct influence on the CoF. There are 6 main principles which underpin the GDS 2040 including: eradicating poverty; building and growing an inclusive economy; building sustainable human settlements; ensuring resource security and environmental sustainability; achieving social inclusion through support – and enablement; and promoting good governance (CoJ,

¹⁵ ¹⁵ The National Development Programme is “driven by the notion that public investment and funding can be used creatively to attract private and community investment to unlock the social and economic potential in targeted areas”. It is a grant that supports and “and facilitate[s] the planning and development of neighbourhood development programmes and projects that provide catalytic infrastructure to leverage third party public and private sector investment for future and more sustainable development”. (National Treasury, undated).

2011: 34, 35). The GDS has 4 outcomes (under each outcome there are various outputs) which it aims to achieve by 2040 these include:

- “Improved quality of life and development-driven resilience for all
- Provide a resilient, liveable, sustainable urban environment – underpinned by infrastructure supportive of a low-carbon economy
- An inclusive, job-intensive, resilient and competitive economy
- A leading metropolitan government that pro-actively contributes to and builds a sustainable, socially inclusive, locally integrated and globally competitive Gauteng City Region” (CoJ, 2011: 91).

All of the above principles and objectives are aimed at reaching this vision:

“Johannesburg – a World Class African City of the future – a vibrant, equitable African city, strengthened through its diversity, a city that provides real quality of life; a city that provides sustainability for all its citizens; a resilient and adaptive society” (CoJ, 2011: 35).

The CoF is “the new spatial development vision, which is in line with the City’s Growth and Development Strategy 2040” (CoJ, 2013b). The CoF (2014: 56) states that the Corridors of Freedom meets the following GDS development paradigms: “balanced and shared growth; facilitated social mobility; and settlement restructuring”. This means that the CoF can be viewed as part of the broader GDS 2040 process – essentially as part of the *implementation phase* of certain aspects of the GDS policy (Dube, 2015).

The CoF takes the principles and objectives from the GDS 2040 and translates this into space and physical interventions (Dube, 2015). This, however was not an easy task (discussed in subsequent sections). It took the City Transformation Department a few months to determine what the deliverables would be for the consultants who would get the tender as they have never done a spatial policy of this nature (Dube, 2015).

It is clear that the CoJ views the CoF as part of the GDS process because in one of the public meetings (which was held in October 2013) a CoJ official stated that “the Corridors of Freedom was mainly participated around the Growth and Development Strategy of the City, which was a far wider (metro wide) type of process” (CoJ, 2013d: 11). As mentioned in the previous chapter the GDS 2040 was developed in quite a participatory manner (Peens, 2013).

The discussion above illustrates that the agenda of the CoF was formed by higher level policies. Thus, it can be argued that the CoF coming onto the CoJ’s agenda was a knee-jerk response, in terms

of the NDP, UNS, and GDS 2040. The CoJ has just branded it as the Corridors of Freedom and framed it as a Mayoral policy– for political reasons. In other words, so that Mayor Tau can leave *his* mark on the CoJ leaving a legacy and potentially gaining more support for him and his political party (ANC) in the future. The CoJ has also used the CoF to assist in addressing other issues highlighted in other policies such as the Sustainable Human Settlements Urbanisation Plan which highlights the shortage of affordable accommodation in Johannesburg (discussed in further detail in a subsequent section).

What is evident here is that there is limited room, if any, in the agenda setting stage for public participation. The CTSPD was developing the terms of reference and what had to take place in the policy formation stage in a closed space. This is mainly because what was on the agenda, what the problem was, and what needs to be done about it was not up for discussion. The NDP, UNS, and GDS have gone through their own policy-processes which have involved various role players. Therefore, I argue that the direction the CoJ had to take and the principles it had to adopt in the CoF policy were clear cut. As pointed out above by Dube (2015) what was a challenge was how to develop the terms of reference and translate all the factors from higher level policy into clear ideas of what has to be delivered at the end of the policy formation process.

4.3 THE TENDER AND WHAT IT REQUESTED TO BE DONE

This section briefly outlines what the CoF tender stated in terms of the basics that had to be done and what it stated about participation: how was participation framed in the tender, how many meetings were required and who the consultants should include in the participation process. This provides a better understanding of what the consultants were tasked to carry out.

Companies bidding for the CoF had to have their proposals in by the 7th March 2013 (CoJ, 2013c). Gamcon which is a well established, respected global engineering firm that has produced excellent projects in 36 countries won the bid. It is primarily an engineering firm that also does spatial planning and transportation planning. The types of projects Gamcon is involved in are mainly massive civil and structural engineering projects. Not many of the projects they carry out have a social element in them – which is central to the CoF.

The Gamcon team started working on the policy in May 2013 (Venter, 2014) and the work had to be complete by the 5th September 2013 according to the tender (CoJ, 2013c). The tender states that the CoJ is embarking on developing strategies for key development corridors along current and potential transit service routes (CoJ, 2013c). It states that the CoJ's future spatial vision is based on “an economically and socially transformed city that is more sustainable, resilient and liveable” (Ibid: 4). It highlights that the intention of the corridor is “to optimise development in and around high intensity

movement corridors, to create more inclusive and accessible opportunities for residents of Johannesburg and create economies of scale that are attractive to investors” (Ibid: 4).

At first glance the tender seems to provide the vision, but later on it states that “the primary objective [of the consultancy team] is to clearly define a development vision and objectives for the defined development corridor” (Ibid, 4). Therefore, the tender provides a broad overarching vision (as stated in the previous paragraph) and what the basis of that vision should be but it states that the consultants should clearly define the vision and objectives – thus they have to identify the specifics.

The CoJ requested a multi-disciplinary team with expertise and competency in development planning, property economics, and integrated and sustainable municipal infrastructure planning as the core skills. It states the consultancy team “must clearly demonstrate it has the appropriate skills, experience and capacity to deliver the scope of work described [in the tender]” (Ibid: 11). The tender notes that complementary skills may include modelling and 3D architectural ability.

The CoJ requested that the work should be done in four phases. The first phase would include the ‘strategic analysis and synthesis’ which involves looking at aspects such as spatial analysis, structuring elements, development trends, infrastructure capacity, property economic feasibility, heritage impact assessment, and city region context analysis. This phase is highly technical and involves carrying out the technical analysis.

The second phase is ‘draft strategic area framework’; the purpose of this phase was to generate proposals and targets in order to investigate their feasibility. It involves aspects such as defining the desired built form and spatial vision, and guidelines for the built environment and infrastructure. What is important about this phase is that the tender states that “discussion with focused groups and specialist inputs” should take place (CoJ, 2013c: 7). During this phase it is noted that “a minimum of 8 focus meetings and interviews with key stakeholders” should take place (Ibid: 10).

The third phase involves the finalisation of the SAF and the development proposals. It includes 3D modelling of proposals as well as architectural renderings of priority precincts (a minimum of two priority precincts needs to be selected). The tender states that the architectural renderings are “for presentation purposes and to facilitate stakeholder engagement” (CoJ, 2013c: 7). The visuals should be of a “very high quality” so that they can be used as marketing and promotional tools and to encourage and promote buy-in to the proposals and business cases during work-shops, stakeholder engagement, and meetings. During this phase the consultants need to *present* the SAF on at least 4 occasions (CoJ, 2013c).

The fourth phase in the development of the CoF is to develop an implementation strategy. This includes aspects such as incentives for development, programs, and phasing of development. The tender states that in this stage work shopping should occur:

“work shopping of this implementation strategy, prioritising, allocation of roles, and responsibilities and phasing with key stakeholders and focus groups. It is anticipated that this will require 3 half-day workshops” (CoJ, 2013c: 7)

The above elements illustrate that the CoJ outsourced the whole policy development to external consultants. It is evident from the discussion above that the CoJ provided the consultants with the broad normative vision for the CoF but did not specifically state exactly what should take place or how. How the vision is to work spatially was for the consultants to determine. What comes through from the tender is that the proposals have to create opportunities for inclusivity and accessibility; it also states that mixed use intensification is required. Therefore, the tender provides certain aspects that need to be at the core of the spatial vision.

What this illustrates is that the CoJ defined the policy problem and provided a substantial amount of detail in terms of the way the process should be undertaken and the content that should be produced from each phase. As Grijzen (2010) states, when the assignment-giver provides the policy problem and a contract that needs to be adhered to, the consultants have a lot less freedom in the process as they are not defining the problem or the way the process should run. This is evidently the case with the CoF as the phases were clearly outlined. Thus, the consultants were not given free rein on how the process should work.

What is apparent from the competencies that the tender requests are that the core skills originally called for were not purely technical; it was a mixture of skills. For instance, development planning and urban planning do not only include technical aspects, but have a strong social element to them that involves understanding the complex context in which the CoF is being developed. What is noticeable with the core skills asked for is that it did not include urban design. However, later on in the tender it becomes clear that phase three of the policy development involves the creation of 3D detailed renderings of specific precincts. This is fundamentally the core skills of an urban designer. The tender later on states that an additional skill may be modelling and 3D architectural representations – but it is not a core skill, yet it also states that “very high quality” graphics are expected. This illustrates that there seems to be missing skills in the tender because it calls for skills that are held by an urban designer: developing 3D representations of the built environment and developing guidelines for development.

The consultancy team that was selected to develop the CoF was a multi-disciplinary team; but they had more of a focus on technical aspects as opposed to social. Venter admitted that their expertise is more focused on civil engineering and strategic planning than urban design and property aspects:

“we don’t really focus property, they (CoJ) saw the corridor and BRT and thought ‘transportation’ and we won the bid, but the BRT was already operational...so I don’t think we were the ideal consultants in the end to do this kind of work, it is not really our core work”.

It is evident that the consultants appointed to formulate the policy did not have all the skills outlined in the tender and the tender left out some essential skills required to carry out this project successfully. What this resulted in is the consultants not providing enough attention to the more complex social issues and focused more on technical aspects such as infrastructure capacity, walking distances, and thresholds.

In terms of public participation, the tender called for participation in the middle two phases: during the development of the draft strategic area framework (phase 2) and in the finalisation of the SAF and presentation of 3D representations (phase 3). This means that participation was basically required from the point when the proposals were to be developed (or at least at some point in phase 2 which is not at the end of the process). For phase two it states that 8 focus group sessions should take place. This is a relatively high number of focus group meetings. However, the term ‘stakeholder’ is used. This is extremely vague and could mean anyone. It could be internal stakeholders such as CoJ departments and agencies, not necessarily external stakeholders such as citizens, institutions, and residents associations. Dube (2015) confirmed that those 8 stakeholder sessions were not just external stakeholders but all stakeholders. The tender, however, is not clear on who these focus group sessions should be conducted with. It also does not indicate how these sessions should be conducted and how much of the information gained in them should be included in the SAF.

The third phase also requires participation. It states that the consultants should “present their work a minimum of four occasions in this phase” (CoJ, 2013c: 10). The way Venter (2014) stated how participation was explained in the contract is that

“it was just a one liner right at the bottom and you think ag ja...it came across more as present your findings to the public”.

The key word used is *present*, in both the way the tender framed it and in the way Venter explained it. This in fact implies no genuine level of participation but rather just presenting the findings, and this is exactly how the Gamcon consultants understood the tender (Venter, 2014). Furthermore, it

illustrates that participation was not taken as a serious part of the tender. However, it could be argued that the 'deeper level of participation' was meant to occur in the focus groups called for in phase 2.

What can be concluded from this is that participation was included in the tender; however it was vague and did not provide specifics on the way it should be done. This is hugely problematic because as Cornwall (2008) argues, participation can be interpreted in many different ways and organisations / agencies have to be specific when defining participation. If they are not specific it opens up the opportunity to do as little 'genuine' participation as possible or to frame a window dressing activity as appropriate participation.

There was confusion on Gamcon's side regarding the participation process because they were under the impression that the CoJ would set up the public meetings and that Gamcon only had to be there to *present* the content. According to Venter the CoJ "never specified who was responsible for setting up the meetings". The CTSPD informed the consultants that as part of their appointment they have to provide a quote to undertake the participation process (Dube, 2015). Gamcon provided a quote and they were now responsible for undertaking the participation process. Venter stated that the participation process "was a separate appointment to our technical appointment and then because of that we had to facilitate the participation". What this illustrates is that the CoJ was once again not clear on the details of participation (who should facilitate the process) and this lead to confusion on the consultant's part.

It also highlights the fact that consultants are not obliged to conduct public participation and they will not just conduct participation out of their own free will. At this point it was not seen as an important part of their practices. Furthermore, the participation process was viewed as a separate process from the broader 'internal' policy process from both the CoJ and Gamcon as opposed to an integral, essential part of it. Participation was an afterthought as it was even quoted separately from the rest of the CoF policy-making process at a much later point.

4.4 THE INTERNAL PROCESS AND POLICY FORMULATION

This section discusses the internal process that was followed directly after the awarding of the tender. It highlights how Gamcon and the CTSPD were formulating the policy and many of the challenges and dynamics that were experienced in the policy-making process. This includes aspects such as inter-departmental relations, relationship between the CoJ and Gamcon, and internal challenges within Gamcon.

4.4.1 Timeframes and political pressure

The CTSPD were informed about the idea to carry out corridor development in Johannesburg in 2012 (Dube, 2015). The Gamcon consultants started working on the policy in May 2013 (Venter, 2014). It is clear that there was a minimum of 5 months between the time the CTSPD were informed they should start a process to develop strategic corridors to when the project team actually started working on the content of the CoF. This is a substantial amount of time – this time was spent formulating the terms of reference and the deliverables for the brief / tender. From the start, timeframes were an issue. Dube (2015) explains that:

“this for us was not just in the normal line of frameworks that we usually do [SDF’s; RSDF’s; precinct plans]...so we spent a lot of time pretty much figuring out what the actual deliverables should be, although we did the terms of reference before that but in clarifying what needs to happen in order to achieve the objective of the Corridors of Freedom as announced by the Mayor, we needed to take a lot more time amongst ourselves to actually determine the deliverables and at what level of detail is needed and what studies are required or not”

It is evident that the city officials spent a substantial amount of the time dedicated to the policy formulation trying to figure out what exactly is required to be produced as this type of spatial policy had never been done in Johannesburg before. This is no fault of the City officials as this is something new to them and they have to deliver, however it meant there was less time to actually spend on formulating the content.

As mentioned Gamcon started working on the first phase of the policy development process in May 2013. The tender stated that all four phases of the policy development had to be completed by 30 September 2013, but Gamcon were informed once they had the tender that it was to be done by the 30 October so that the policy could be approved and released by council by the end of November 2013 (Venter, 2014). That essentially left six months (originally five months) for Gamcon to develop what is described as the biggest transport and development policy in the history of South Africa. This timeframe was ridiculous as Venter (2014) pointed out:

“every single person that I had to go and see in the first two months said ‘six months? Are you flippin’ crazy?’”

The matter was compounded by the fact that the consultancy team had to cover many different aspects in a relatively high level of detail as Venter (2014) explained:

“you have to give the detail on heritage, environmental, and transport, and land use and property and financial and then there is infrastructure, so looking back now I’ve done other projects where we did 5% of the work in more time, the detailed work, so it was very difficult to do the whole corridor [in the timeframe provided]”.

Even though Venter (2014) argued that the timeframes were ridiculous for the amount and type of work required, which I agree they were, Gamcon decided to bid for the project knowing what it involved. The tender clearly stated the timeframes, when it had to be completed by, and all the work that had to be done. If they thought it was ‘too ridiculous’ they could have not bid in the first place, or they could have negotiated more time before the process started. In other cases (Forester et al 2011; 2013) consultants have stated upfront that they require X amount of time to deliver the required project and if they do not have that amount of time they will not do the project.

This is also the first time that a policy of this nature and scale was being done in Johannesburg, and the first time the consultants were working on this type of a policy. Corridor development has been proposed in Johannesburg and many other cities in South Africa but it usually forms part of the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) and is not its own spatial policy with a high level of detail. As Hanger (2014) stated “it is a new kind of policy area for the City” and Venter (2014) puts forward:

“It was a type of project that hasn’t been done in this type of detail, with looking at every single facet of planning and of infrastructure provision...[and]...six months was very short, but because it is so politically motivated if we objected and said what you are asking us to do is too much, the answer just came from upstairs saying this has to be done, we sorry this is the number one priority project in the CoJ this has to be done”.

It is clear from the discussion above that time was a major constraint in the development of the CoF policy. It is important to remind the reader that the CoF is strongly politically supported. It is the mayor’s project and he wants to get it implemented as soon as possible so that he can start seeing results before his term ends. This is evident in many of the respondent’s description of the CoF:

“This is the number one priority project in the CoJ this has to be done...the direction that we got was that Mayor wants to see stuff being done already because he wants to say I promised you the corridors and here it’s happening” (Venter, 2014).

“He [mayor] did not actually care, because it was a political thing” (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

“The whole of the Corridors of Freedom is a political agenda by the ruling party to roll out development into areas where they can obviously get votes” (Ward Councillor, 2014).

The pressure to get the policy completed was immense and, as can be seen from Venter, once they were immersed in the process a plea for more time was not listened to and at the same time the consultancy team was trying to figure out how best to develop the policy because they have never done something of this nature before. There was a slight degree of confusion (Venter, 2014). This in itself is a recipe for disaster. With a policy that is extremely politically motivated, officials and consultants seldom have the power to determine the way in which the process is run. This makes for an extremely difficult environment to work in.

In a process with such tight timeframes and massive political push, it is unlikely that public participation would be a major element of the process or have any influence on the content or process because it is widely acknowledged that one of the first aspects to be placed aside in such a context is public participation. The reason for this is that it is time consuming and is often viewed as not adding value to the content or process (Innes and Booher, 2004). This is exactly what happened in this process – participation was an afterthought, and could only be seen as a nuisance delaying and even potentially derailing an already challenging process.

4.4.2 The way in which the process was functioning before participation

This section outlines the way the CoF process was functioning before the ‘formal’ participation process commenced in October 2013. It discusses how the consultancy team was conducting the analysis for the CoF and how the content for the SAF was derived. Moreover, it interrogates how external stakeholders were involved in these initial stages of the process and the way in which previous precinct plans were consulted.

4.4.2.1 Conducting the analysis and developing the SAF content

The initial project team included the *Integrated Planning Unit* at Gamcon which includes transportation engineers, transport planners, spatial planners, property market experts, and environmental experts. They were the core members drawing up the content of the CoF policy; however the main drivers were transport planners and engineers (Venter, 2014). The City Transformation and Spatial Planning Department were the project managers (Dube, 2015). Venter

noted that the City Transformation department were involved in all major decisions and everything had to be 'approved' by the department. In other words, they did not just leave it up to the consultants to develop what they pleased. In terms of content, the CTSPD had full power to decide on it (ultimately this has to be approved by Council so they have the final say) (Dube, 2015).

The Integrated Planning Unit at Gamcon developed the first draft of the policy in a closed space. They conducted various detailed technical assessments in terms of the current status quo. The analysis involved investigating aspects such as current infrastructure capacity, vacancy rates, investment rates, development and property market trends, heritage, urban decay, open space, existing land uses / building heights, and what the potential and feasibility for development in this area is (Venter, 2014; CoJ, 2013c). Out of this analysis the three key questions that had to be answered were:

- "What is the function of the study area – currently- and what could it be if re-positioned?
- Where and what are the re-development opportunities?
- What are the critical development constraints?" (CoJ, 2013c).

This analysis had to be completed by the end of May 2013. This gave the consultancy team one month to conduct the analysis (Venter, 2014). As Venter (2014) highlighted:

"At the end of May we had to present and submit an analysis and it was very difficult especially in Empire because there are many neighbourhoods along the way and each has got a different character and level of income and infrastructure levels. So on the infrastructure side basically we did water and electricity, roads and sewerage. That is our speciality, and that part of the analysis was easy because it was mainly numbers and figures you get from the entities like City Power and Water, so it is very easy to do the calculations. But the analysis of everything else... to do that in a month was quite difficult."

What this means is that the detail which was required and that was asked for by the CoJ could not be attained. The analysis at this stage was reduced to numbers, figures, and calculations with the more complex aspects such as social impact and heritage being given less / no attention as these aspects require site visits and a much deeper level of in the field analysis which was not properly conducted due to the tight timeframes. Furthermore, Gamcon is a Pretoria based company; therefore most of their consultants live in Pretoria, so they could not even use their own experiential knowledge on Johannesburg as it was limited.

The way in which the analysis was carried out was not in a ground up / bottom up approach but rather in a top down way. This means that not enough time was spent in the field understanding the

specific context such as neighbourhood character, traffic congestion, and how the community use and interact with their environment. The analysis was detached from the context (van der Westhuizen, 2014). It was a highly rational way of conducting the analysis – not looking at fine grained aspects but mainly at numbers.

Out of this analysis the consultants developed the spatial vision and proposals for development in the corridor. Different scenarios were formulated based on three different growth rates: low, medium, and high growth rate and all the modelling related to that scenario was conducted. The scenarios were used in order to determine how much development (especially residential) could be intensified and what infrastructure, amenities, open space, and services will be required to support that intensification. At the end of August 2013 the three scenarios were finalised (Venter, 2014).

Once the scenarios were developed they were presented to the City Transformation department. The CTSPD chose the high growth scenario to be in the first draft SAF and to be presented to the communities in the public meetings. This scenario was not intended by the consultants to be selected for the final draft SAF, but according to Venter (2014) certain high rank individuals within the City Transformation department insisted on taking the high growth option. Venter (2014) admitted that “in the beginning we had some weird ideas based on the client’s insistence to see how far we could push the boundaries in terms of densification in Empire...our (Gamcon’s) high was very high, too high”. Dube (2015) also admitted that in the beginning for the first draft that “we were going for the full thing...it was an ambitious draft”. The consultants were aware that based on their modelling the high growth option was not possible because they would not be able to provide the required open space and the infrastructure required would cost too much to upgrade. “We could not realistically fit another 400,000 people in Empire-Perth, it would cost too much”. According to Venter (2014) “they [CTSPD] kept on saying ‘no don’t tell me you can’t, think of how’”. But for the first draft SAF this was the scenario selected.

According to Venter, one of the reasons for the CoJ trying to push densification as far as possible is largely attributed to the estimates made in the Sustainable Human Settlements Urbanisation Plan for Johannesburg. It suggests that approximately 1.1 million new houses will be required between 2010 and 2030: 60% of which has to be low income, 20% middle income, and 20% high income (CoJ, undated). This is required in order to keep up with the current urbanisation and growth rates of Johannesburg’s population and housing demands. There are only three corridors planned for the short to medium term and a further three in the long term, this means that each corridor has to accommodate a substantial amount of new dwelling units and people – the majority of which needs to be lower income. This is the rationale for the original push for as much densification as possible.

4.4.2.2 The inclusion of existing precinct plans and participation

In the beginning of the process the CTSPD provided the Gamcon consultants with the precinct plans¹⁶ for the suburbs included in the Empire-Perth CoF, the Rea Vaya plans, UJ's commune policy, as well as the RSDF and SDF. Venter stated that they went through the plans; however they did not base their proposals on revised versions of the precinct plans. As mentioned above, they based their proposals on their own analysis and what the client asked for. Furthermore, some of the precinct plans were out of date as they did not have the BRT included. Venter noted that "we did veer away from the existing plans". The initial proposals put forward by Gamcon had not taken much of the existing plans into consideration.

According to Keet (2014) who is the head of UJ Property Management, a developer from the area gave UJ a presentation on a proposal for a 'student precinct' / 'student city' in the beginning of 2013. Keet stated that "they [the developers] came with a proposal and they wanted us [UJ] to buy into the proposal and at that stage the university wasn't interested because the magnitude of this was too big". The developer's proposed excessive densification in the neighbourhoods surrounding UJ. Keet (2014) informed the developers that they did not need that level of accommodation and they feel the plans would have a negative impact on the character of the affected neighbourhoods, therefore they do not want to be a part of the plan and they did not endorse it. Allegedly this developer gave the same presentation to the CTSPD soon after the one given to UJ (beginning of 2013, before the official CoF policy process started) and "obviously the City supported it because it linked to their own Corridors of Freedom" Keet stated. At this point the CoF discussions were still in early stages and according to Keet (2014) the City were starting the process and "they grabbed and took all the information from the developer's proposal and sold it as gospel, saying UJ wanted this and UJ wanted that". The developer "made *assumptions* that in 2015, 2016 and 2018 this is how many beds you [UJ] will need" [emphasis added] (Ibid). Keet states that neither the CTSPD nor the Gamcon consultants clarified the information contained in the developers proposal with UJ and just assumed it was accurate. Therefore, much of the information on the projected amount of students that will be in the area was obtained from the developers report (Keet, 2014).

Dube (2015) denies the allegations presented above stating that the CTSPD were under the impression that the developer's document came from UJ. "We received it as an input from UJ". Dube further notes that they did not obtain the projected number of beds from the developers /

¹⁶ Many of the suburbs in the CoF study area had developed detailed precinct plans for their neighbourhoods. These plans were official as they had been approved by the CoJ. They offer detail on a specific suburb and how development should occur in the future. These plans have to be developed in a participatory manner as they require $\pm 80\%$ of the community to agree on the plan in order for it to be approved by council (Harrison, 2014).

UJ's report and only used it as one input. The numbers used were obtained from the Minister of Higher Education's report which stated 28,000 beds would be required in the area surrounding UJ. Dube further argues that "in any case the CoF is not about student accommodation" that is only a part of it. Furthermore, it is argued that UJ was involved in the drafting of the Minister's report, however due to the backlash from the public it is alleged that UJ wants nothing to do with these figures in order to prevent further aversion towards UJ by the surrounding communities.

The discussion above illustrates that there is a confusing relationship between UJ, the CoJ/project team, and a developer. There seems to be confusion and a slight degree of finger pointing and I am not sure which side is correct. What I make of this is that there was a severe lack of communication taking place between these three parties, therefore some of the information used as an input was not accurate.

The only engagement with external stakeholders that took place during the process of the development of the scenarios was with the Westbury community and a session which was held with Wits and UJ on the 26th July 2013. The session with Wits and UJ, where they had a meeting with the project team, involved representatives from both institutions presenting each universities master plan and their plans for future expansion, growth, and projected needs for student accommodation. Each institution provided their suggestions on how development should occur around their properties in the future (Keet, 2014). The project team did not present their proposals at this session. This illustrates that the project team had the opportunity to clarify the information that they had on the projections of the Universities needs which was provided by the developers and Minister of Higher Education's report, however did not take the advice from the institutions.

The engagement with Westbury was "informal" and it involved a 'walk-through' of the community where the residents were able to identify issues and give suggestions to the consultancy team. Gamcon had met the Westbury Community Forum on previous work relating to the BRT; therefore, they set up this informal 'walk-through' with the Westbury Community Forum. This was "the only face to face contact with the public before the formal public participation consultation process" (Venter, 2014). The walk-through was not of any major value according to Venter (2014). He stated that the majority of the issues were not related to the CoF. They were issues relating to everyday operational problems and to aspects such as damage caused to their houses by BRT construction, and "there is not enough policing along Empire road" – these are aspects that cannot be addressed in a strategic document such as the CoF. However, the consultants passed the requests on to the relevant CoJ departments. Therefore, the only ounce of participation (which included residents living in the corridor) that took place in the initial phases of the process was not useful for the SAF

formulation. The only aspect that came out of the walk-through which was of use to the consultants was that the community required a pedestrian bridge over Empire road. This got included in the detailed plans for Westbury (Venter, 2014; Hanger, 2014).

In the beginning of 2013, well-networked residents in the area begun enquiring to the CTSPD about rumours of a new spatial policy (CoF) being developed for their neighbourhoods – the existing spatial policies (RSDF's, precinct plans) were being revised (Schaerer, 2014). This is before the CoF was officially announced to the public in May 2013 in the State of the City Address. The residents enquiring about this were informed by the CTSPD that the CoJ was not doing anything as yet and the public will be informed in due course (Schaerer, 2014). The CoF was formally introduced to the public in May 2013. In June / July some of the residents contacted the project team once again stating that they would like to be involved in the process and enquiring about what is happening with the process (Schaerer, 2014; Venter, 2014). The residents did not hear back from the CTSPD until the public meetings held in the beginning of October 2013. Venter (2014) stated that the CTSPD informed the Gamcon consultants that before the participation process starts they want to have content on the table in order to begin the discussions. Therefore, the project team did not want to include external stakeholders until they had a draft SAF. This is understandable; however it should not appear to external stakeholders that there is no room for suggestions.

The discussion above illustrates that the way the process was functioning in the beginning of the development of the policy was in a highly technocratic and closed manner. It was primarily a technical team formulating the policy. This part of the process correlates to the rational technocratic policy-making model, which is described as a highly apolitical process (Corkery, 1995). The scenarios were deduced from the analysis in a highly rational way. It was based on technical expertise, technical guidelines, and calculations, done in an armchair with a severe lack of consideration of more complex issues such as social impact and heritage. The outcome of the policy is viewed as a result of scientific data analysis, after following a series of steps – this is a classic example of a technocratic process (Linder and Peters, 1989).

From the discussion in this section it appears that not all the scenarios were based directly on the analysis, because Venter (2014) pointed out that they could not realistically carry out the high growth scenario. The growth scenarios were meant to show the limits, in other words, to test the 'theoretical bounds' of what was possible – it was a modelling exercise. Even though the results showed the high growth model to be unrealistic it was chosen anyway. Thus, even though this was a rational technical process to start with, the chosen scenario for the first draft was not the 'rational' choice as the data said it was unrealistic.

The initial phases of the process were being developed in a highly centralised manner as there were only 2 occasions in the initial phases where external stakeholders were contacted and it was only a select group. The core project team (CTSDP and Gamcon consultants) did not attempt to create networks and shared understandings with external stakeholders. They did not include a wide array of external stakeholders from the beginning of the process, therefore major elements that constitute the notion of governance (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003) were absent in this process.

It is evident that some members of the public wanted to be an integral part of the process as they were enquiring about it from early on. They were offering to assist but the CoJ failed to respond (Schaerer, 2014). This is probably due to the severe lack of time in the process and the fact that Gamcon was developing the policy in a highly technical manner. It also illustrates a massive lack of communication between the project team and the external stakeholders: the project team did not respond to requests of community members to be included and the external stakeholders were not afforded an explanation as to how the project team were carrying the process out or their rationale for not including external stakeholder at that particular stage. Due to this lack of involvement of external stakeholders at crucial points in the policy process it was highly de-politicised. The process was “only internal, basically it involved seeing internal CoJ departments” (Venter, 2014). As Venter (2014) notes “it was a classic planning process phase 1 analysis, phase 2, phase 3, phase 4”.

4.4.2.3 Principle-agent relationship between the CoJ and consultants

The City Transformation department appointed Gamcon to carry out the CoF policy formulation. They agreed to the specific members who would comprise the team within Gamcon. The team leaders on the Gamcon team have worked with high rank officials within the CoJ departments and have worked for them in the past. This meant that the City Transformation department was familiar with the work that has been done by many of the members on the Gamcon team. However, three months into the policy formulation process four directors at Gamcon resigned in order to start their own consultancies, three of which were the main project leaders on the consultancy team for the CoF (Venter, 2014). This was a major challenge as they had a tight deadline, as discussed above, and it was challenging for Gamcon staff as some individuals were brought into the process to carry on the work, but they were not familiar with what was taking place and how to develop this policy.

The City Transformation department did not take well to this news and, according to Venter, this affected the relationship between the CoJ and Gamcon consultants. As Venter stated, “informing [City Transformation] of that was the first real kidney shot and put a lot of strain on the relationship”. Venter stated that the CTSPD informed Gamcon that if they had not spent a large amount of time on the policy, they would have appointed another consultancy firm to carry out the

work. Venter (2014) felt like the CTSPD lost trust in them. Dube (2015) argues that it was not a loss of trust just that there may be a delay in the project because the CTSPD have to “spend a lot of time transferring the same discussion to different types of people to ensure that there is continuity”. This took valuable time the CTSPD did not have.

This illustrates that the relationship between the CTSPD and the Gamcon team was under strain and from the consultants perspective the city officials did not have full faith in the consultants who were left on the team. This affected the process in a negative manner as Venter stated that it made it very difficult to move forward: the CTSPD did not always take the consultants advice.

A further aspect which affected the relationship between the CTSPD and the consultants is that during the process, in many cases there were deviations from the tender or contract based on instructions from CoJ officials. In terms of this, the way the CTSPD and Gamcon communicated was in an ad-hoc manner. To elaborate, they mainly communicated via email or the consultants were told informally by officials in the City Transformation Department what to change or what to include / exclude. This in many instances was not in the tender or was different to what was outlined in the tender; however it was an issue that was encountered along the way or something that came up last minute (Venter, 2014). What this means is that in many cases there is no paper trail as to how certain decisions were made. There is no evidence to say who made what decision. This made it easy for both the consultants and the CoJ to go back and say ‘but that is out of our scope of work’, or ‘you were not asked to do that in the contract’, considering the type of relationship that developed, this was encountered many times in the process (Venter, 2014). To a certain degree this negatively affected the relationship between the CTSPD and the Gamcon consultants.

The discussion above demonstrates that the principle-agent relationship was grounded by a contractual agreement – outlined in the tender document. However, what this discussion illustrates is that the CTSPD department did not leave the policy development up to the consultants, as was found by Grijzen (2010) who states that one of the main issues with outsourcing to external consultants is that City officials, most of the time, are not involved in the process and leave it up to the consultants to carry out. It can be seen that the CTSPD was involved throughout this part of process and in actual fact were instructing the Gamcon consultants what to do even though there was a contract. This illustrates elements of coercion as well as co-operation in the relationship because the CTSPD was often informing the project team what to do but was also working with them in making some decisions. However, this seems to have been done in a very informal way with no proper record of what was being said and done, therefore, it becomes a situation of ‘your word against my word’ when the situation went wrong.

4.4.2.4 Inter-departmental relations

The Corridors of Freedom is a policy that requires many departments within the CoJ to work together to formulate and implement. The CoF involves infrastructure upgrading which involves City Power; Joburg Water; Johannesburg Roads Agency; and Johannesburg Transport department. It involves social housing and public space improvements therefore departments and agencies such as City Parks, the Johannesburg Social Housing Company (Joshco) and Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA); and it involves the potential development of City owned property, therefore the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) is also an important agency. Almost every department in the CoJ needs to be involved in order to develop the policy and ensure that it is implemented.

The Gamcon consultants were required to meet with all the relevant departments in order to obtain the necessary information from them (this was part of their 8 stakeholder focus group sessions as outlined in the tender). A major challenge encountered by the consultancy team was that many of the departments they went to meet, such as City Power and Johannesburg Transport, did not know about the Corridors of Freedom and the details relating to it. The consultants had to introduce the CoF to the departments most of the time (Venter, 2014). This is surprising because the CoF is 'the number one policy in Johannesburg' yet some of the departments are unaware what CTSPD and the consultants are undertaking. Venter noted that it was challenging because it is a major political policy which is strongly supported by the Mayor but the consultants are "messing in everyone else's terrain". As Venter (2014) explained, they would propose certain BRT feeder routes based on their *technical* analysis but

"Joburg transport don't have any plans for additional feeder routes in Empire...and then we say let's densify here and you go to City Power and they say we don't know what you are talking about, who are you? We [City Power] don't have plans for here we are spending our capital budget in this area. So it took us a good 3 months just to go and see and introduce the project to all the relevant internal departments" (Venter, 2014).

The CTSPD set up meetings with some of the more central departments such as Johannesburg Transport (these are referred to as plenary meetings) but reportedly the majority of the individuals invited often did not turn up to the sessions (Venter, 2014; Strydom, 2014). For instance, 25 officials are invited and 8 attended the meeting and they have no background on the CoF (Venter, 2014). The people who attended do not always take the consultants seriously because, as mentioned above the department's plans are elsewhere and not necessarily about providing more feeder routes in Empire-Perth or a new BRT route extending to Turffontein for instance. Furthermore, the officials who do attend the meeting are often not the top officials; this means they are unable to make

decisions without their department's head / director approval and they do not want to make decisions in these meeting as they are classed as "work sessions" (Venter, 2014). Therefore, the consultants would have to wait, in some cases weeks, for feedback from the officials on a decision. When a follow up meeting was held, often the officials that attended were different to the ones who attended the first meeting and the consultants and CTSPD team were back to square one (Venter, 2014; Strydom, 2014). As Dube (2015) stated with regards to the internal plenary meetings "you can't guarantee the same people will attend all the time". This proved to be highly frustrating for the project team, especially the consultants, as they are mandated to develop proposals in this area but the departments, who will be responsible for implementing a certain part of the CoF, were not always co-operating or co-ordinating.

Dube (2015) pointed out that on a general level each department has an idea of what the other departments are doing as it is published in the business plan. However, with aspects such as public participation the departments usually do not co-ordinate calendars (Dube, 2015). What this means is that, for instance, the transport department may conduct a participation process on proposed cycle lanes, then a few weeks later the Corridors project team present their proposals which may not be in line with what the public saw in Transport Departments meeting. This confuses external stakeholders and contributes to them losing trust in the CoJ because it shows that each department does not really know what the other is doing. Ideally in the CoF public meetings there should be a representative from all the affected departments to answer questions posed about that department's involvement.

To complicate matters further there were other consultants appointed to define the new Metro Bus routes. With the introduction of the BRT, Metro Bus Routes had to be redefined in order to prevent two bus services serving the same area. Venter stated that because the BRT was already running when they were appointed it was difficult to work around these other aspects of redefining routes. The consultants working on the new Metro Bus routes were not able to provide the Gamcon consultants with the new routes because they had not finalised them. This affected Gamcon's plans because they were working on assumptions in terms of where the routes would potentially be. When they would see the routes the other consultants are working on they often did not match with the outcomes of Gamcon's analysis. This proved to be extremely challenging for the consultancy team. Venter stated that "we were in this weird haze where we have 6 months to complete Empire Perth but there are no definite answers in terms of where the future Metro Bus routes going to be". Therefore, they had to make assumptions.

According to Grijzen (2010) one of the main advantages of appointing consultants to develop a policy is that they are able to overcome one of the biggest problems in planning: co-ordination and co-operation of different levels of government and departments. It is argued by Grijzen that because consultants are external to government they are able to take all the information and assist with co-ordination between the different departments – they have more of a holistic view compared to officials. However, this is not exactly the case with the CoF process and it illustrates that it is not always as simple. In this case the consultants found co-ordinating the departments and having to integrate the information from each department as one of the biggest challenges of the process. This experience can largely be attributed to City officials from other departments who made this process difficult by not being responsive, not attending meetings, and essentially not being able to make decisions without their senior's approval.

What the inter-departmental issues meant for the process is that many assumptions had to be made. As mentioned in the previous section the timeframe in which the policy had to be completed was extremely tight and this read in conjunction with the inter-departmental relations meant that the Gamcon consultants had no option but to assume or else they would not have delivered the policy on time. This to a certain degree meant content was not specific and there was a great chance that the content would be incorrect or not consistent with other department's plans. This was largely out of the consultant's control!

The notion of governance is not only about the inclusion of external stakeholders but also other departments and agencies within an organisation, meaning it should not only be the department responsible for the development of a particular policy drafting it but many other internal departments should be involved (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). What can be deduced from the discussion above is that the consultants and the CTSPD were including various internal departments and agencies and were trying exceptionally hard to co-ordinate other departments plans with the CoF, even though it was challenging and may not have produced the desired results (i.e. all departments being co-operative and working together) the principle of including them is present. Moreover, the project team were grappling with the complexity that comes with including many other internal actors. Therefore, the project team fulfilled half the requirements of a governance process because, as mentioned in previous sections, they did not included external stakeholders and grapple with that complexity from the beginning of the process.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter highlighted the intricate dynamics taking place and some of the challenges the project team faced in these initial phases. What is evident from the findings presented here is that there were numerous challenges the project team had to deal with in the initial phases of the process. The biggest challenge for the Gamcon consultants was getting the policy completed in the timeframe provided and, at this point, the co-ordination and co-operation of internal CoJ departments. This contributed to the use of many assumptions. The relationship between the CTSPD and the Gamcon consultants was under strain and this contributed to difficulties within the process. The CTSPD did not have faith in the new members placed on the project team – this would make it difficult for the consultants to fully commit to the CoF because your own client does not have 100% faith in you, this would naturally lead to a bad attitude towards the process and CoF.

The CoJ and project team made a few fundamental mistakes in that they did not listen to the request made by the public in order to be included in the process from an early point. Furthermore, they did not properly verify the data obtained from the developer regarding the projections for UJ even though they had a session with both Universities where they presented their suggestions, they still went with the developer's projections and their own modelling. This essentially resulted in data being utilised to base proposals on that was potentially inaccurate and flawed.

With a process that is faced with so many challenges and difficulties, with massive political support and pressure, the chances of participation being an important element of the process is minimal. Even a process that does run relatively smoothly, participation often is not a central part of it as it is seen as too time consuming and difficult (Innes and Booher, 2004). The consultants struggled to get the internal stakeholders to co-operate; therefore the thought of including external stakeholders must have been daunting. It would have complicated what is already an extremely challenging and messy process even more. However, the community in Empire-Perth was not going to settle for a top-down decision that is imposed on them. The next chapter explains the participation process and the way the residents mobilised in order to attempt to have an influence over the process and content. The discussion in this chapter is referred to and the effects of many of the issues and challenges outlined here are explored.

CHAPTER 5

The participation process, resident's mobilisation and its impact on the policy-making process

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is aimed at exploring the participation process. It explains how participation was conducted and what many of the repercussions were for some of the aspects outlined in the previous chapter. It discusses the issues the public raised about the process. It moves on to explain how the residents mobilised in order to attempt to have an influence over the way the process was working. The impact this had on the policy-making process is interrogated. The influence it had on the content is the subject of the following chapter.

The chapter explores various aspects such as the way the presentation of the content affected the public's reaction; how the media affected the way people viewed the policy; the spaces for participation that were used and those that emerged as well as how these spaces interrelated creating new spaces; issues the consultants had in terms of scope; diverging ideas that emerged in the process; and the representivity of the main group that mobilised.

This chapter illustrates that the most tokenistic attempt at participation may result in unintended consequences that have a major impact on a process. As Cornwall (2008) argues, a participation process cannot be prejudged for how it will pan out.

5.2 THE *INITIAL* PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS

By the 'initial public participation process' what is meant is the two public meetings that were originally planned for - the only two meetings that were meant to take place. The section begins by outlining how external stakeholders were informed about the process and the attendance of the public meetings. It moves on to explain how the participation process functioned and the 'fait-accompli' nature of the participation. The way in which the CoF was presented to the public is outlined as I argue this contributed to the negative reaction to the CoF and the way the media portrayed the CoF is also outlined.

5.2.1 Notification and attendance of public meeting

It was agreed between the Gamcon consultants and the CTSPD that the participation process would take place in October 2013. It would include four public meetings for Empire-Perth, one on the 3rd October 2013 at Marks Park (located in Emmarentia, just north of Melville) and another on the 4th October at Westbury Recreational Centre. The second round would take place on the 29th October at Marks Park and the 31th October at Coronationville Recreation Centre. Technically it was only two public meetings as the content presented at Marks Park was the same as that presented at Westbury. The participation sessions were split for the different areas. Gamcon confirmed in the first public meeting that they were contracted to do two public meetings per area (i.e. two at Marks Park and two in Westbury) (CoJ, 2013f).

A notice was published on the Gamcon website and in two of the local newspapers (the Northcliffe Melville Times and the Westside Urban News) stating that there will be a public meeting regarding the CoF. Figure 5.1 alongside illustrates an example of the notice in the papers. The residents were *invited*, to what the CoJ called a public *consultation* meeting (Knight, 2014). The notice states that the meeting is aimed at “engaging the public in the formulation of a Strategic Area Framework” (CoJ, 2013j).

The Ward Councillor was also informed about the public meeting and tried to spread the word out to the communities by informing heads of residents associations who could inform their constituencies (Knight, 2014). The Councillor also informed businesses and institutions in the area (Keet, 2014). Most of the respondents agreed that the first public meeting was not adequately publicised and that if it was not for their networks they probably would not have known about the meeting (Keet, 2014; Knight, 2014; van der Wetshuizen, 2014). If you were not part of a




Figure 5.1: The first notice for public participation placed in the Northcliff Melville Times (CoJ, 2013j).

network linked to the Ward Councillor, if you did not view the advert on Gamcon's website, or read a newspaper the notice was published in you would not have known about the meeting. No posters were put up and no flyers were sent out (Keet, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014), however the CTSPD stated they did send out flyers (Dube, 2015). Keet explains that:

"They published it on their (Gamcon) website and in the newspaper. I don't have time to go through the newspaper everyday to see if the City is up to something. You would expect something as massive as this to be better publicised, it's not as though they didn't know who we [UJ] are, they know".

This means many residents did not know about the first public meeting. However, at the first meeting 73 participants attended (which is considered a high amount for a participation process in Johannesburg), consisting of residents, business owners, representatives from residents associations, institutions such as UJ, and journalists (CoJ, 2013e). This illustrates that there was much interest / concern around the CoF. Keet stated that at the first meeting a lot of people attended compared to previous participation processes she has been involved in, where you are lucky if 10 people attend. However, the first public meeting had the lowest attendance out of all the public meetings for the CoF. Keet stated that in her experience residents often do not attend public meetings but "with Corridors of Freedom all of a sudden people were attending these meetings". This illustrates that even though it was not publicised extensively, through word of mouth people found out about it and were interested/concerned.

The same cannot be said for the first public meeting that took place at the Westbury Recreation Centre for the Westbury, Sophiatown, Corinationville, and Pennyville communities. The first meeting had to be cancelled due to poor attendance (CoJ, 2013i). This clearly illustrates that not enough effort was put into ensuring that the lower income residents were aware about the public meeting; and perhaps awareness on the scope of the policy, or residents' belief in their ability to meaningfully participate are lower in this context.

The majority of the people who attended the meeting at Marks Park, were White middle income residents (Schaerer, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). The Marks Park participation meeting, which was for suburbs including, Melville, Westdene, Auckland Park, Brixton, Crosby, Vrededorp, Rossmore, and Milpark did not have a wide mix of groups represented. As mentioned in chapter 1, most of these suburbs have a range of races and income groups living within them and some are predominantly lower income such as Vrededorp. The lack of diversity in the public meetings could be due to the fact that the lower income residents may not be part of the network the middle and

upper income residents are a part of and the fact that the meetings were not well publicised, or as stated above they do not deem they will be able to have an influence over the policy.

5.2.2 How the participation process worked

The meeting commenced with the CTSPD providing an overview of the CoF concept and what it entailed (van der Westhuizen, 2014; Venter, 2014). This presentation included an overview of the current status quo in Johannesburg: high urbanisation rates, spatial inequality, increasing informal settlements, lower income housing developments on the periphery, and the poor being located far from employment and amenities (Venter, 2014). The presentation went on to state that Johannesburg cannot keep developing in such a way and that the inequalities of the past need to be overcome (Ibid).

The Gamcon consultants followed with their presentation. As discussed in chapter 4 the consultants developed three scenarios. The CTSPD chose the high growth scenario to form the basis of the first draft of the CoF which was to be presented to the public. The CTSPD informed the consultants that in the first public meeting they should present only the high growth scenario to the public as presenting all three will be too confusing (Venter, 2014). Therefore, the consultants presented the high growth scenario, which Venter himself admitted was “too extreme”. After the consultants presented their proposal and the SAF the floor was open for a question / answer and discussion session. After this the way forward was presented by the project team.

The discussion above demonstrates that this is a classic example of an invited space for participation as it was created by the project team and the agenda was set by them where the participants were not able to influence it (Cornwall, 2002). The project team had full control over this space (especially the CTSPD as they decided on what scenario to present) and they defined the ‘rules of engagement’ at the start of the meeting. The participants had to listen to the presentation and wait until the end to ask questions or provide responses / suggestions. The question answer session was facilitated by a member of the Gamcon consultancy team. People could only ask one or two questions so that there was enough time to get as many questions as possible (this is the general form invited participation takes in Johannesburg). This was a highly ‘controlled’ space where the project team had the power. Figure 5.2 illustrates the public meeting held at Marks Park. The picture demonstrates that this is a classic participation meeting with a PowerPoint presentation and the officials sitting in front presenting the content to an audience in a lecture style.

The participants found that they were not able to have a proper dialogue or discussion because of how much had to be completed in the meeting. As Knight (2014) explained:

“we felt we were not always able to have discussions and you would ask a question and get an answer and then there wasn’t time to go back and say well now I need to get more information now that you have told me that, they [project team] didn’t have that kind of dialogue there wasn’t sufficient time” (Knight, 2014).



Figure 5.2: Image from the participation meeting held on the 2/10/2013 (Snyman, 2013)

According to communicative planning theorists two-way quality dialogue is one of the most important aspects of the participation process (Innes and Booher, 2004; Healey, 1997). This evidently was not present in the initial public meetings. Furthermore, due to the fact that this was the first time the public was introduced to the CoF they were more concerned about asking broad questions about the policy, such as “why is the city doing this?; Why in this area?” and them trying to get their heads around what was going on, on a broad level that there was very little time for the public to provide useful feedback on the actual content of the SAF proposals. Therefore, there were no comments from the public which could actually be used by the project team to be incorporated into the SAF. This is largely a result of the way the participation process was framed.

5.2.3 A *fait accompli* participation process?

There were many issues raised with the participation process and the way it was expected to move forward. The major issue in terms of process was that the participants felt like this meeting was just a ‘tick box’ session and that all the major decisions had already been made – despite the public notice stating otherwise which said the project team wish to “engage” the residents in the formulation of the SAF. The participants saw the SAF that was presented to them as the final design, as van der Westhuizen (2014) noted, people were saying “you come here and present this as if it is a final design”. As stated above the participation process was to take place in October 2013 and as outlined in the previous chapter the policy would be sent to council in November 2013. This was also confirmed in the first public meeting when a participant enquired about how much time there was to participate. It became apparent that there were only two, officially planned, opportunities for the

public to be involved before the policy went to Council (CoF, 2013f). As a participant in the meeting expressed:

“I am concerned about the statement that this plan will be at Council in November [2013]...If this is the timeframe then all the planning has already been done and then I am not certain why I am sitting here?” (CoJ, 2013f: 15).

The response to this comment by a CTSPD official was that:

“What was said is that our intention is to submit by the end of November [2013] to Council so it will only get before Council for a decision in about February next year [2014]” (CoJ, 2013f: 15).

This still means that public participation would only take place in October, giving the public only one month to comment. The public would not be able to comment or be involved while the policy is at Council because these are usually internal processes and decisions. Moreover, the project team cannot be working on content once the document has been submitted to Council. It is evident that the public was concerned that they would not have enough time to be involved in the process. This illustrates that the document that was presented in the initial meeting was close to a final product, because it is unlikely the content was going to change drastically one month before submission to Council. However, Dube (2015) argued that the content presented in the second public meeting was not finalised and there were still adjustments to be made and room for revisions, but not drastic changes.

From the minutes of the first two meetings it is evident that the sessions were more about a ‘defence’ rather than to obtain substantive information that could be used by the project team. The reason this tone emerged in the meeting is due to the responses the project team were receiving from the public. To elaborate, the overwhelmingly negative response to the policy forced the project team to be defensive. The public also took a defensive stance in terms of their neighbourhoods (Dube, 2015).

The way participation was framed gave the public no opportunity to get involved on a meaningful level. This echoes what Alfasi (2003) argued that the way participation is framed has an influence on the way the public reacts. In many participation processes the public is forced into a reactionary / objector role because they are given no choice. The session was not designed to obtain deep substantive comments nor detail that could influence the policy drastically. In actual fact the participation was counteractive for the project team. As opposed to what Bryson et al (2012) argued, the way participation was framed in this process it did not provide the project team with a

great deal of useful information or buy-in but rather more criticism and resentment towards the CoF.

“The very first public participation meeting, the intention was for them to present the Corridor of Freedom development and the purpose of CoF development, which areas would be affected, what the background was and why the mayor in particular wanted to do this” (Knight, 2014).

“The engagement was not meaningful. If they had done it properly they would have come to us long before they did” (Schaerer, 2014).

“Initially they did not actually have a lot of interest, Gamcon did not show a lot of interest in actual participation and with the first meeting we all got the idea that they want to come in and present to us this is what is going to happen” (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

It is evident that the intention of the participation was initially aimed at *informing* the public of what is going to happen. This is the most tokenistic form of participation as outlined by Arnstein (1969) on the Ladder of Citizen Participation. At this level, the public have a right to voice their opinions but their voices do not have to be listened to. Essentially the participation has no influence on the outcome of the policy. On the IAP2 Spectrum of Participation (2012), the way the participation process was framed here also reflected *informing*, which is the lowest level of participation on this Spectrum. According to IAP2 the goal of this level of participation is “to provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions”.

Mayor Parks Tau was present in the second public meeting, I presume so he could witness the issues expressed by the public himself and maybe the project team thought his presence would mitigate the resistance. After the project team presented the Mayor gave an impromptu speech. He stated that he attended the meeting in order to obtain

“a sense of the key issues that people want to factor into the decision-making process and also to get us to understand that [the CoJ] are engaged in a genuine public participation process that is intended to solicit input that is intended to inform the decision-making process. So what we are presenting is to achieve that level of public engagement and participation, taking into account what we need to address” (Tau, 2013a).

The Mayor moves on to explain the importance of the CoF and why it is necessary: “redress the CoJ’s history”; to implement the principles in the National Development Plan (NDP) such as “national equity” and to overcome the many challenges CoJ’s poorest residents have to face (Tau, 2013a).

The discussion above demonstrates that Mayor Tau believed that the City was embarking on a *genuine participation process*. This is not evident in the two meetings that took place in October 2013. As shown in this section, the participation meetings were indeed tick box sessions despite what the Mayor claims. “It really felt as though they were just ticking the boxes and saying we have done our bit and now you must be happy as we have done it for the greater good of everyone” (Schaerer, 2014). The external stakeholders were not wrong to think this because as outlined in chapter 4 the participation process was a separate quotation to the rest of the process, therefore was not intended to be a major or important part of it.

What is important to note about the Mayors contribution is that in the second public meeting there seems to be a realisation by the Mayor and project team that they may have to change their approach to participation. The Mayor stated that:

“How do we take this plan forward? How do we do it in a way that works for everyone? Because we can’t say that it is not going to happen, we can’t ignore the reality. I think we need to have a conversation that says this is *how* you can best do it, maybe we expand here, maybe we extend the efficiencies here and there... The best thing to do is to converse, to discuss, to contest the ideas, *in relation to what we are trying to achieve for our city*” [emphasis added] (Tau, 2013a).

What the above quotation does is it ends the meeting off by showing the participants that the CoJ is open to discussion, it shows the residents that the CoJ is willing to discuss with them the best way to move this process forward (because the first approach clearly did not work). However, the Mayor makes clear that they are willing to discuss “in relation to what we are trying to achieve for our city”. This illustrates from the start that the CoJ is willing to discuss *how* best to do it but not *what* is to be done.

This section illustrated that the way this participation process was being carried out and how it was framed was highly problematic, I argue that this was compounded by the way the content was actually presented and the images used in the presentation to the public. There was a realisation in the second public meeting that there had to be a change in the process in order for the CoF policy to move forward.

5.2.4 Presentation of content in the public meeting

In a public participation process, the graphics and the way in which the content is presented is imperative because this is what will most likely elicit a response, whether it is positive or negative (Adams et al, 2013). Bosselman (1998) argues that the images used to show a project to the public can have major effects on their perceptions of it. In the case of the CoF, I argue that the way the content was presented had an important role in shaping the public's perception of the CoF, and in this context it was overwhelmingly negative (van der Westhuizen, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Knight, 2014). Figure 5.3 illustrates some of the exact images presented in the first public meeting which show what the project team envisioned for the future of the area.



Figure 5.3: The vision for Auckland Park. Mix of lower income and student accommodation ranging from 4 to 6 storeys (CoJ, 2013g).



Figure 5.4: Typologies of housing envisioned for the corridor (CoJ, 2013g).



Figure 5.5: European style open space precedent (CoJ, 2013g)



Figure 5.6: Auckland Park currently, single dwellings (Google Streetview, 2015).

From the illustrations above (Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 compared to Figure 5.6) it is clear that the images shown to the public were completely detached from their current reality and context. According to van der Westhuizen (2014) the visual representations illustrated were completely removed from the context; some images were taken from European cities. As van der Westhuizen stated:

“They [project team] tried to entice people with examples of European Cities [Figure 4], but people are not stupid, even if you know nothing about urbanism you know it will not turn out that way in South Africa. People have an on the ground sense of what densification looks like” (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

Therefore, the public was not buying-in to the images they were shown. South Africans have a tendency to associate high density with slums and run down areas such as Hillbrow. This makes it difficult for the public to visualise the proposals in their suburbs. There are no incremental images showing how this would be reached over a period of 40 years. The images presented no longer show the single freestanding houses which characterise the area today. A lay person who does not have experience in urban planning and urban design would read into these images as this is exactly what is going to happen and that the neighbourhoods are going to be demolished to create what is shown. Knight (2014) stated that the visuals presented did not assist her in the public meeting whatsoever. In actual fact it is apparent that the visualisations did the project team a major disservice. Van der Westhuizen and Schaerer explain that:

“I think there was a bit of mis-communication on the Gamcon side, because what they showed people, this is kind of the nature of showing people images, people think those images just will become set in stone, that is what is going to be built” (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

“the 3D images did not seem to speak to what they were telling us we were going to get. They spoke about street life but they still had buildings isolated on a block with a parking lot around it, so we could not understand why they were showing us one thing and telling us another thing” (Schaerer, 2014).

Figure 5.7 illustrates the image Schaerer is referring to.



Figure 5.7: High density accommodation overlooking a parking lot (CoJ, 2013g).

Venter (2014) believed that the images were not a major contributor to the response the public had to the presentation. He stated that most of the people who attended the meeting were already disgruntled with the CoF because of the way the process had been running. Furthermore, he said “we lost the public within the first five minutes of the [CTSPD’s] presentation”. As mentioned above the CTSPD presented before the Gamcon consultants. According to him this presentation was one of the main contributors to the negative perceptions of the CoF because it was in this presentation that it was stated that the informal settlements are increasing and lower income residents need to be located closer to jobs and amenities. The Gamcon consultant’s presentation followed with the densification proposals in their suburbs. The perception was that the lower income people from

informal settlements were going to move into the lower income housing proposed in Empire-Perth (Venter, 2014).

Box 5.1: Louis Botha Presentation of content

Paul Hanger from Iyer was the primary consultant on the Louis Botha Development Corridor. The Louis Botha process started before the E-P process. This process had virtually no resistance from residents and ran much smoother compared to the Empire-Perth process. It is for this reason that at various points I reflect on some aspects of how the Louis Botha process was done in order for me to strengthen my argument of how certain aspects influenced the Empire-Perth process. This text box aims at outlining how the content of the Louis Botha corridor was presented.

The images below show how the project team on the Louis Botha corridor illustrated some of the changes that would occur in the neighbourhoods which are also currently predominantly low density single dwelling units (a similar urban form to Empire-Perth).



Figure 5.8: current situation in Orange Grove (CoJ, undated B)



Figure 5.9: Densification proposals in Orange Grove (CoJ, undated B)

It is evident from figure 5.8 and 5.9 that the proposals do not illustrate a complete 'destruction' of the neighbourhood. It clearly shows the new proposed buildings and how they fit into the current urban form. It is easier to see what has changed

and it allows the stakeholders to discuss those specific spaces. I argue that this is a better way of presenting the proposals compared to illustrating images that show no resemblance of what the current form looks like. If the objective is to completely change the current urban form, then incremental images need to be shown.



Figure 5.10: Louis Botha current situation (CoJ, undated B).



Figure 5.11: Louise Botha after CoF interventions and BRT (CoJ undated B).

Figure 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate how the Louis Botha team tried to keep the local context in the images that they showed. Photoshop has been used to superimpose the proposed future vision onto the current context, this ensures that the local context is kept and it allows lay people to understand how this will look. I argue that these images are less likely to elicit a negative response. This seems to be the case in that there was no major resistance in the Louis Botha Corridor process. This could have been one contributing aspect to its ‘smoother’ running.

What Venter stated is a contributing factor, however, it is evident, from the external stakeholder’s perspective, that the images shown to the public played an important role in the perceptions of the public and it elicited a negative reaction. As Knight (2014) stated that “all it [the visualisations] did was alert us that we need to engage with this because this is not satisfactory so it spurred us to move forward a lot more”. Hanger (2014) also noted that some of the images presented by Gamcon may have created the perception that the suburbs were going to be redeveloped into what was shown, which is not the case, it is an incremental process. This goes back to what van der Westhuizen and Schaerer stated that there seemed to be a disjuncture between the images shown and what the consultants were saying and presenting.

Dube (2015) further points out that the lay person struggles to read maps from presentations. As Dube states “when that is the first thing that they [public] see, it becomes very hard to look at from a local perspective, they just see blue, red, the colours”. That is why it is essential to use 3-dimensional images (Bosselman, 1998). However, as discussed in the paragraphs above these 3-D images have to relate to the context and illustrate the principles that are being put forward. The images in this case did not do this, therefore did not assist the project team in any such way.

What the consultants presented was a concept that was testing the “theoretical bounds” of densification in the study area (CoJ, 2013f). For instance, if they put in 400,000 people how much open space would be required? Then they worked out that according to the minimum guidelines on open space, 22 hectares is required for this particular density. They then highlighted all the existing open space, but because the density was so high in this particular scenario the existing open space was not enough. Therefore, the consultants highlighted what *potentially* could be open space, this included spaces such as the cemetery and Johannesburg Country Club. Venter (2014) stated that the point was to illustrate the impact that that level of densification would have (testing the theoretical bounds of that scenario) – the intention was not to convert the prestigious Johannesburg Country Club into an open park for everyone (Venter, 2014) (although doing this would be a massive political statement, which really holds onto the principles of accessibility and inclusivity). It was just to illustrate that if that density had to be reached that is the amount of open space required (Ibid). This was not grasped by the majority of the participants in the meeting and they cannot be blamed for that because it is confusing. This made the public lose any last grain of faith in the project team because the team had marked open space in areas that external stakeholders felt cannot be open space. This illustrates the power of the images used to represent planning proposals.

5.2.5 Media portrayal of the CoF

How the media portrayed the CoF is important to explore as it played a role in shaping residents understanding and perceptions of the policy. Dube (2015) stated that what was portrayed in the media was mostly a negative sentiment towards the CoF, however this is not how all the residents felt about the CoF in the study area (this is discussed in subsequent sections). Thus, a negative sentiment was mainly published in the public domain. This became the ‘Empire-Perth opinion’, when in fact it was not the only opinion (Dube, 2015; Ismail, 2015). Many of the residents in Melville, Westdene, Auckland Park have access to the media, therefore, their opinion seemed to take precedent (Ibid). Hanger (2014) also pointed out that much of what was published in the media was not accurate and was not what the project team were intending to do.

The media reporting's in the Northcliff Melville Times, which appeared in the 8th November 2013 paper, were somewhat neutral in that it was relaying what occurred in the public meetings and how residents felt about the policy. It also explained briefly what the CoF was about. However, there were sensationalist statements that could stir panic in residents such as:

"The corridor along Empire-Perth route will change forever as block upon block of high density housing pierces the skyline in the coming decades" (Snyman, 2013).

The Star and the Citizen were also both somewhat neutral in their reporting's on the CoF, stating why it was important but also stating the issues some residents had with it. However, these issues seem to be what one remembers when they read the article. The newspaper reporting's tended to place a strong emphasis on the notion of developing high-rise accommodation, for instance the Star reports:

"Residents are worried developers are just going to start building high-rise buildings" (The Star, 2013).

The Mail and Guardian reported that:

"the new city skyline will consist of high-rise residential development growing around transit nodes..." (Pienaar, 2013).

This exemplifies the residents' anxieties of high-rise buildings replacing the small single stand heritage houses that characterise the neighbourhood's streets. Furthermore, the word 'high-rise' congers up a certain image in most people's minds: of a 20 storey monolith building. The reporting's also tend to emphasise that it is not just about providing higher density but also about providing affordable accommodation. For instance, in the Star (2013) the CoF is described as:

"densification with affordable housing"

The Mail and Guardian quoted a member of the Mayoral Committee stating that:

"the high density development built around the transport nodes will see us meeting the accommodation demands of our citizens with low-cost housing, rental accommodation, and offerings for entry-level home owners" (Pienaar, 2013).

It is evident from reading various articles and from the quotes above that the notion of affordable housing is always mentioned. The image which this paints is that the CoJ is planning only high-rise affordable housing. This screams Hillbrow to the average middle-class South African. Furthermore, the image that most South Africans get when someone says 'low-cost housing' is of an RDP house

(such as the houses seen in figure 5.12 below). Therefore, the words used by politicians who are quoted by newspapers have a massive impact on the idea residents get about what is being proposed.

Some of the articles also included quotes from concerned residents. The Citizen reported that:

“As the CoJ continues to promote its proposed Corridors of Freedom project to restitch the city, residents along the routes fear an influx of new people could lead to increased crime. A Melville resident stated that “wherever mass population was recorded more crime soon followed”” (Gibbs, 2013).

The Star (2013) quoted a concerned resident:

““This news comes like a thief in the night. How on earth does the city council dare to demolish two of the oldest suburbs in Joburg, which date to 1900 and before? We cannot lose our heritage to unscrupulous developers”

What the two quotations above illustrate is two concerned residents providing their opinions. However, they come across as facts. If someone knows nothing about the CoF or urban planning and urban design they would panic because they would think their neighbourhood is going to become crime infested and, even worse, they are going to be demolished. It is not possible for the CoJ to come in and demolish the suburbs and it never was their intention to do this, but the media creates these images which contribute to the negative reactions towards the CoF. Furthermore, the constant emphasis on ‘restructuring’ the city and overcoming apartheid spatial planning would worry many of the conservative residents living in the affected suburbs who would prefer the status quo to be preserved.

There were articles in some newspapers such as the Die Vryburger which represented the CoF in a purely negative light. The article titled “Word Johannesburg ‘n lokasie?” which means “Will Johannesburg be a location?” The article stated that the CoJ is planning on putting low-cost housing in the well established neighbourhoods along Empire-Perth road. It stated that the area will be a new “location” and another Soweto (Die Vryburger, 2013). The article showed a picture of low-cost housing stating this is what the well established neighbourhoods will become (Figure 5.8).



Figure 5.8: The image the Die Vryburger newspaper illustrated saying this is what the suburbs along E-P road will become (Die Vryburger, 2013)

This is not what the CoJ and project team were proposing, far from it in actual fact, however, a layperson who does not have an understanding of urban planning / design may believe what is shown in these reporting's. This places a false image in the public's mind and contributes to their negative perception of the CoF. Even though most of the media articles were neutral in their reporting's of both sides of the storey (i.e. why CoF is necessary and residents concerns) the negative aspects were still present and people would not overlook these factors but would probably focus on these points instead of the positive ones. The above discussion illustrates a few examples of what Hanger (2014) was referring to, that the media was often portraying the complete wrong idea of what the project team were proposing.

5.3 PARTICIPANTS REACTIONS TO THE COF

As can be seen the participants in the meeting did not take well to the proposals. The discontent was mainly over the fact that participation was occurring so late in the process and that only two public meetings were scheduled. The other issues revolved around the extreme level of densification and issues related to it such as urban management, safety, services, and neighbourhood character (CoJ, 2013d & f; Schaerer, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014).

The level of negative reaction and backlash was not expected by the Gamcon consultants (Venter, 2014). Dube (2015) stated that the CTSPD was expecting some degree of resistance because Dube has worked with this community before and understands some of its sentiments, the CoF is also a 'NIMBY' type of policy (Woodcock et al, 2013); however she admitted that they did not expect such a high level of resistance.

It is important to note that the reaction of the public by no means was only the fault of the project team and the way they presented the CoF and framed public participation. NIMBY was a definite factor in the meetings. For instance in the first meeting a resident commented:

"Why urbanisation? Why are you not developing the rural areas improving their systems and their transport out there? Why not take people out of the city?" (CoJ, 2013f: 15).

Furthermore, Venter (2014) and Hanger (2014) stated that it was prevalent that people were mainly concerned about their own neighbourhood and street. Numerous residents in the meeting noted that they are not against densification or development but asked why the CoJ is not rather investing in the inner city, in rundown neighbourhoods, and in the rural areas (CoJ, 2013f& h). This is a clear case of NIMBY – 'we want it but not in my backyard'. Dube (2015) notes that few people seemed to be against the concept of the CoF however were not happy with the fact that it was their neighbourhood that was chosen.

This clearly demonstrates the issues highlighted by Kytta et al (2013); Woodcock et al (2013); and Burby (2003). In other words, residents do not want to see their neighbourhoods change and with densification plans they are bound to.

The consultants could understand this reaction, Venter (2014) stated:

“I could understand the backlash from the start, I think it quickly became apparent that in a sense especially with a project of this nature, the high profile nature of it, that the public participation process was not handled correctly, so you can understand the frustration of the people.”

As Cohen and Eimicke (2006) state, NIMBY has become part of the cost of doing business, it is inevitable with policies of this nature. Burby (2003) refers to land-use and densification projects as ‘NIMBY projects’. This is one of the reasons the consultants were not too concerned with the comments made which had NIMBY undertones as in most cases it is expected and these comments usually do not have any weight in court.

At the end of the second public meeting at Marks Park the project team presented that the participation process would be extended until the end of November 2013 so that the CoF could be sent to council by February 2014 (CoJ, 2013h). The majority of the participants were still highly disgruntled by the way the process had been carried out and were not happy with the fact that the content of the SAF had not changed substantially since the first public meeting: ‘blanket densification’ was still proposed for the whole SAF study area. It was still felt that this was not enough time. Van der Westhuizen (2014) stated that:

“people nagged on and on and on for hours around the same point. You did not consider us, you come here and present this as if it is a final design...people did not want to look at what was on the slides...people felt we have seen a few things, but we don’t actually trust you guys”

Therefore, in the second public meeting once again very little constructive discussion occurred around the CoF content, the participants had no trust in the project team as they had not attempted to build it (Ibid; Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014). As discussed in chapter 1, areas such Melville, Westdene, and Auckland Park have many professionals living there, including lawyers. Van der Westhuizen (2014) stated that in the second meeting lawyers were saying that the process is unconstitutional and threw legal jargon at the project team. This was extremely intimidating for the CTSPD and the Gamcon consultants who felt they were unprotected (Venter, 2014; Dube, 2015). The fact that the Mayor was in the room made no difference.

Residents were not only angry but were also worried about what was going to happen to their property. Knight (2014) stated that the WRA received many queries from Westdene residents

“there was a feeling coming through of panic, people were saying should I sell, should we move, what is Westdene going to look like, how is development going to be controlled...”

Although the majority of the residents in the Marks Park meeting were concerned about the CoF, it is important to point out that not all the participants in the Marks Park public meetings responded to the CoF in the same way. For instance, developers in the area responded positively. A developer stated:

“I wish to congratulate Gamcon and the council for a great initiative. Wish to comment that higher density will probably be necessitated because of land cost and because of the need for closer access to the city especially where there is a big need for student accommodation” (CoJ, 2013d).

Van der Westhuizen (2014) noted that while there were some comments like the one above they mainly came from developers and the majority of the participants in the meeting did not take the developers seriously and shrugged their comments off.

The second public meeting in the Westbury community had a better turn out and the meeting could take place. In many respects similar issues were raised in this meeting to the ones held at Marks Park. For instance, the Ward Councillor from Ward 82 (part of Westbury, Sophiatown, and Newclare) felt the same way as the residents at Marks Park, that there seemed to be little reason for participation as all the content was formulated. The Ward Councillor stated:

“my question is why do you need the community every time, when you have to do window dressing for us on the CoF. This presentation hasn’t changed that much from round 2 and round 1 it is still the same thing...” (CoJ, 2014).

However, overall the response was substantially less negative compared to the Marks Park meetings. For example, some residents stated:

“I would like to welcome the presentation; it was a comprehensive presentation...” (CoJ, 2014i)

“The framework is to be commended for trying to address the legacies of apartheid planning in the region and that is an important thing to say off hand” (Ibid).

Ismail (2015) highlighted that most of the community members in Westbury, Newclare, Sophiatown, and Coronationville “welcomed the Corridors of Freedom with open arms”. As Ismail explains:

“we [the Westbury, Newclare community] felt very neglected as a former Coloured area for the past 20 years”.

Therefore, when there was an announcement that there was going to be a policy to uplift the area the communities in Westbury were extremely happy.

It is clear that the sentiment was not all negative. Dube (2015) confirmed this by stating that the response from the Westbury and Pennyville communities was very different, it was more positive. The main reason for this, according to Dube, is that they have substantial problems in their neighbourhoods which they would like to be fixed (Dube, 2015). To elaborate, there are issues with services, with drainage, with decaying public realm and streets. Therefore, they are happy to hear that their communities will be receiving attention (Dube, 2015; Ismail, 2015).

In terms of the CoF it was mainly the resident's part of Ward 69 (Westdene, Melville, Auckland Park, Brixton, Richmond, Rossmore) who felt the need to mobilise because they believed the policy was “ludicrous”.

5.4 RESIDENTS MOBILISATION

It was clear at this point that there were problems in terms of the process and in terms of the content of the CoF. The majority of the residents were concerned about the ‘fait accompli’ nature of the process and that the content was flawed in their view. The project team became aware that the public were highly disgruntled by the CoF. van der Westhuizen (2014) stated “I was anticipating huge problems”.

Most people were not against the concept of Corridors of Freedom (or not openly). The underlying principles are well grounded and understood as discussed in chapter 2 and 4. Dube (2015) stated that there was not much conflict or disagreement over the principles of the CoF it was more about the where's, how's, when's, and how much: the details. The Ward Councillor (2014); Knight (2014); and Schaerer (2014) highlighted the lack of detail in the plans as one of the biggest issues. Some residents realised that they were not going to put a stop to the CoF, it is too politically motivated (van der Westhuizen, 2014; Schaerer, 2014). In actual fact van der Westhuizen stated that he and a few other people he contacted after the public meetings (Schaerer being one and a few other design professionals living in the study area) fundamentally supported the idea behind CoF,

“it is an opportunity to bring urbanism to the suburbs” (van der Westhuizen, 2014)

“We are not against development, we are not against change, we saw the opportunity for some very positive outcomes coming from the project... but we needed to know where, what, and how” (Knight, 2014).

“We were very much pro densification we knew the benefits of it, we knew it was inevitable but we felt there was a better way to do it” (Schaerer, 2014).

What they did not support is how the process unfolded and the majority of the content of the CoF. It is evident in the minutes of the Westbury meeting that some of the residents in the Westbury, Newclare area, such as the Ward Councillor for Ward 82 (parts of Westbury, Sophiatown, and Newclare) were concerned with the way the process was running and the limited space for engagement – they were not resisting the content of the policy though. There were also many unanswered questions regarding aspects such as Job creation which they felt needed to be addressed (CoJ, 2013i).

5.4.1 Establishment of the task group

After the public meetings at Marks Park is when the new spaces for engagement emerged. After the second meeting at Marks Park Van der Westhuizen made notes on what he felt were the most pressing issues regarding the CoF. The Ward Councillor for Ward 69 (most affected ward), who represents the Democratic Alliance (DA)¹⁷, decided to setup a meeting (Ward Councillor, 2014; Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014). The Councillor contacted various stakeholders, but mostly professionals who lived in the Ward that could assist in developing a response to the CoF policy. Urban planning and urban design professionals were contacted; a lawyer; heritage specialist; and representatives from the suburbs (mainly from the residents associations) which fell in Ward 69. The Councillor also contacted Keet from UJ requesting that they provide a response to the CoF. The group met and decided on a way forward.

As the main strategy to mobilise against the CoF, the task groups decided to draft a report that outlined in detail what was wrong with the process and the flaws in the content. This strategy may have been chosen as the project team and the Mayor stated in the second public meeting that they were willing to have further discussions on how best to move the process forward. It was decided that they need to understand exactly what is being proposed and formulate a response based on the way the process was running and issues they found with the content. The Ward Councillor (2014) stated that they had to “fight knowledge with knowledge”. They decided that the best route to take was to illustrate all the flaws in the content and show, using local experiential knowledge, why the

¹⁷ Democratic Alliance is the main opposition party in Johannesburg.

plans and policy are “ludicrous” rather than coming across as NIMBYst, emotional residents. This is a powerful strategy as NIMBYst comments can easily be pushed aside in the light of the public interest and the greater good, but if the task group is able to expose severe flaws that have evidence to back it, there is little room for the project team to hide.

The group decided to break themselves into four teams: Urban planning / design; infrastructure; heritage; and legal. This was mainly done for convenience purposes as they, at the time, had very little time to get a response in and try attempt to change the direction the CoF was moving in. Furthermore, the people in the group had certain expertise, therefore would concentrate on particular aspects.

The notes which van der Westhuizen started on the content became the basis of the report. Once the task groups were formed they all went their separate ways to formulate a response on their specific topic. The document which van der Westhuizen started was circulated via e-mail and everyone in the task group added their response. They edited each other’s contributions in order to ensure that all members of the group were happy with the content of the report. All of the communication in the task groups from this point onwards took place via email as it was too difficult to constantly set up meetings with everyone. Schaerer spearheaded the teams and ensured that everything was running on track (Knight, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). The completed report was sent to the project team (CTSPD and Gamcon); UJ; and to residents associations on the 8th November 2013 (Schaerer, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). It was also published on the internet.

The task group met with a lawyer in order to obtain legal advice and they had a lawyer on their team (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). The task group did not completely rule out using litigation as Knight (2014) explained:

“There was a view put forward by the task team and members of the suburbs that if we were totally unhappy with the way forward that the Council was taking, the direction it was taking and if it was pushing through plans and we were really not happy at all, we would seek an injunction which is why we had an Advocate working with us and we would seek an injunction to stop any development until such time there had been proper and due participation and that is something that we always had in the background”.

The task group decided to put someone in charge to conduct fundraising in case they had to go the legal route the money raised could be used to pay some of the legal fees. Luckily that route was not required (Knight, 2014).

An interesting point with the task group is that they decided not to use the media as a tool to have an influence. All the members of the task group who I interviewed informed me that they view the media as being too sensationalist (Ward Councillor, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Knight, 2014). As Schaerer put it “they [the media] really get it horribly wrong half the time”. But Van der Westhuizen (2014) stated that it did come up as a strategy they could use if they needed to add more pressure.

The discussion above demonstrates that this is an invented space of participation that emerged. The invited space (public meeting) made a group of residents aware of the fact that there were problems with the process and content, therefore resulted in the development of the invented space. This space was aimed at challenging the CoJ and the proposal it had put forward, which is a key characteristic of an invented space (Miraftab, 2004). This space initially took the form of a meeting, however soon moved into cyber space (the Internet) where most communication took place via email. The result of this invented space was the production of a report.

Masiko-Kambala et al (2012) points out that invented spaces are not necessarily democratic utopias as they can be exclusionary and not representative. These spaces can be exclusionary in the sense that others may not be a part of the same network (Cornwall, 2002). This means that difficult to reach individuals such as lower income groups are often not part of the discussion (Carpenter and Brownill, 2010; Lipietz, 2008). Moreover, Alfasi (2003) states that volunteer groups are not democratically elected, therefore there are issues with them representing a broader public and they cannot be seen as the authentic voice of the public. Invented spaces can give the poor a voice but they can also be spaces that are populated by deeply conservative residents who wish to maintain exclusion and reinforce the status quo (Cornwall, 2002).

In the case of the task groups, it is evident that a few people were *invited* by the Ward Councillor to join the task group, these people could contact more people to be a part of the group. It can be seen how someone who is not part of the network can easily be excluded (this may not be intentional). I argue that even though the task group was not democratically elected to represent the residents in Ward 69, they did have a certain amount of legitimacy. The reason for this is that representatives from all the residents associations in the Ward were included in the task group. Residents associations are democratically elected and their purpose is to represent their constituencies. Therefore, as Knight (2014) highlighted, she was on the task group and another member from the WRA, therefore they would ensure their residents’ concerns were raised.

From Houtzager and Lavelle’s (2009) six notions of representation, the ones which apply to the task group is identity, in the sense that the people who formed the task group came from the same type

of community. The proximity argument could also be used as the 'closeness' and 'embeddness' of the representatives to the representatives and the neighbourhoods they reside in could justify the task group being representatives of the Ward 69 residents. The mediation argument also applies in the sense that the task group was providing a channel into the state that otherwise would not exist without them. The task group connects the residents of Ward 69 to the project team.

The way in which the communication worked is that the task group would inform resident association representatives and they would inform their constituencies via newsletter, email, and the Internet (Knight, 2014). The residents associations such as the WRA played an important part in keeping the residents informed about what the task group was doing. What gives the task group more credibility is that the Ward Councillor who set up the group was also democratically elected and their job is to represent the residents of their Ward. Therefore, I argue that these factors make the task group a legitimate representative of the residents in Ward 69 suburbs.

The issue Cornwall (2002) highlights that invented spaces may aim to exclude a certain group and maintain the status quo does not seem to apply to the task group. The reason for this is that Schaerer (2014) noted that the task group asked if any residents would like to join them. It was an informal set up and anyone with an interest in the CoF could join. Furthermore, as illustrated through this chapter and the next chapter, the task groups aim was not to maintain the status quo and stop the CoF from taking place, instead most members of the task group were pro CoF.

5.4.2 The task group's report

This section is aimed at understanding the task groups report that they sent to the project team. As this chapter is concerned mainly with process, only issues regarding process which the task group highlighted in their report is discussed. The issues the report highlighted regarding content are discussed in the subsequent chapter. The section also aims to unpack how the task group wrote the report, what did they use as their main tactic, what argument was being built. The full report is presented in Annexure 9.1

The report is structured in terms of themes. There are twelve themes, including aspects such as "time frames and participation"; "student housing"; "the design proposal and design team". Each theme has a substantial amount of detail unpacking it. The report begins by outlining the benefits of densification and the potential it has to transform the built environment, it moves on to explain that if densification is not properly planned for, managed, regulated, and guided it can have numerous negative effects such as overcrowding, concentration of social ills, and increased crime (Task Group, 2013).

What this does is it illustrates to the project team right from the start that the task group is aware of what densification is about and that they are knowledgeable of what it entails. This in a sense gives a degree of credibility as it shows that they know what they are talking about. Furthermore, the task group highlight the *benefits* of densification and state that “accessibility to poorer communities is not automatically achieved by densification” (Task Group, 2013). This shows that they are not necessarily against densification or the CoF principles. I argue that this is a powerful way to begin the report as it sets the record straight that the task group was not intending to moan about densification but rather illustrate why the policy content was heavily flawed.

The first issue the Task Group dealt with is the timeframes and the poor participation process. They state that the public meetings where ‘information sessions’ rather than gaining input from the community on how the “CoF can be translated into workable and inclusive plans”. They quote the Municipal Systems which states participation should be conducted from the start of the process and a community forum should be set up. As mentioned above, as a result of the backlash in the first public meeting it was announced in the second public meeting that the participation process would be extended until the end of November 2013. The task group argued that this is still not enough time considering the magnitude of the proposals (Ibid). The main concern brought up is that:

“the task group is concerned that the framework proposed on the 29th October 2013 had in essence not changed despite the concerns raised at the meeting on the 2nd October 2013. The participation process cannot be a box ticking exercise and should inform the framework itself. This should be through revision of what has been proposed” (Task Group, 2013: 3).

This illustrates that the participation was not intended to be an important part of the process that provided substantive information but rather to inform the public of what the CoJ was embarking on.

It is pointed out that one of the fundamental problems is that urban design skills were missing: “this results in unrealistic representations or projections of what will happen if this plan were to be adopted” (Task Group, 2013: 7). The task group highlight that creating a “quality public realm” cannot be left up to the private sector and developers. They are not interested in creating a quality public environment and they are unlikely to create the types of sidewalks envisioned on their own accord.

What the task group is attempting to do here is to point out the lacking skills on the project team and trying to illustrate why the plans are flawed. They provide numerous examples illustrating why the content is flawed.

It is evident from the report that the task group did not just say they object to the CoF and 'nag' on about how they were not included. They developed a well thought out argument which clearly pointed out how unrealistic the plan was, the lack of certain expertise on the project team, and the complete lack of consideration for the context. The argument developed was a mix between a political one and a technical one; however it was primarily technical with a focus on issues with the actual content. For instance, the Task Group went into a substantial amount of detail regarding what the current SDF and RSDF proposes for the area outlining technical aspects which the CoF does not consider. There is evidence of a political argument, where the Task Group brings up on numerous occasions that the CoJ is unable to manage the City effectively at the moment, thus how are they going to manage these areas with even more residents.

The Task Group also made the argument that the project team has not considered that the study area is primarily constituted of "secure stable and mixed communities...these stable communities provide support and should not be disrupted" this was one of the only points where a strong NIMBY sentiment came through and I argue that statements such as these reduced the power of the report because they illustrate the 'emotional resident'. The parts of the report that were based on facts with experiential knowledge backing it were the most convincing parts of the report because it is difficult to argue with facts. Emotional NIMBY statements can easily be ignored and cause the task group to lose credibility, but there weren't many comments of this nature.

What is important to point out is that the task group, at various, points provided examples of how it could be done better or more appropriate areas where densification could take place and they provided reasons for their suggestions. This provided the task group with a degree of credibility and most importantly shows the project team that they have something to offer. The task group did not make threats in the report, however they made it clear that they understood their rights and were aware of the legislation which requires the project team to conduct participation.

Furthermore, many of the members of the task group are professionals within the urban planning, urban design, and architectural fields, therefore as Knight (2014) explained it:

"I think this is an important point, that we had people that were working with us that had the knowledge, it wasn't just lay people who said we want to know more, it was people who had the right kind of knowledge and who could be beneficial to CoJ in the development of their plans because they knew what they were talking about."

This shows that Knight (2014) and other respondents such as the Ward Councillor (2014) placed a substantial amount of importance on the fact that many of the members in the Task Group were in a

profession related to the built environment. This in their view automatically gave them more credibility. This illustrates it was deemed that a laypersons comments may not be listened to or their comments were worth less than those of the professionals.

5.4.3 UJ's response to the CoF

As part of the task groups strategy the Ward Councillor wanted to get one of the biggest stakeholders in the study area on their side: UJ. UJ and the Task Group decided to put their differences aside and stand together to support one another (see box 5.2 for a deeper analysis of the relationship between the community and UJ). Keet (2014) stated that the Ward Councillor was in favour of the community and the university working together. The university was also invited to the meeting set up by the Ward Councillor.

Box 5.2: Relationship between the community and UJ

It is import to briefly provide some background on the relationship between the communities surrounding UJ and UJ. This assists in illustrating how an issue is able to bring certain stakeholders together. The relationship between them before the participation process was not ideal. As Keet (2014) explained “we have a very tender relationship with the community”. The reason for this is that according to Keet (2014) every time the university tries to develop or re-zone one of its properties the community always objects to it.

“It is as if the community has this whole resentment towards the university and I sit in a lot of town planning appeals” (Keet, 2014).

The community also blame the University for the development of student communes and the influx of students into the suburbs surrounding UJ. There have been countless disputes over ‘illegal communes’ (Keet, 2014). The community also does not like the fact that UJ is closed off from surrounding neighbourhoods and due to the fact that UJ refuses to open up its campus to the public it acts as a massive barrier between Brixton area and Westdene / Melville areas (Schaerer, 2014). It is evident that the relationship between the community and UJ was poor. The community resent the fact that UJ is contributing to changes which are occurring in their neighbourhoods. This relationship slowly begun to change as UJ and the Ward Councillor set up a forum to deal with the student communes and various other issues. As Keet (2014) explained “we built a very tender relationship”.

In the first CoF public meeting this ‘tender’ relationship was shattered because, as mentioned in the previous chapter the project team stated UJ needs 28,000 beds. Therefore, the community thought UJ was behind these plans and they received much of the blame (Keet, 2014). The relationship between UJ and the community changed once again when UJ informed the community that they had no intention of expanding. This, with the help of the Ward Councillor, led to UJ and the task group joining forces to object to the CoF. According the Keet (2014) UJ and the communities have developed a much stronger relationship with one another. UJ now has networks into the communities, thus they can communicate directly with each other (Keet, 2014).

Keet stated that there were general items of concern that overlapped with the issues the community had.

“The community had their concerns and we had ours, but some of the concerns were shared and those we discussed and also decided that we support one another”.

UJ stated in a letter to the CTSPD that they object to the latest draft (October 2013 draft) of the CoF SAF. The letter was sent on the 29th November 2013. It was also a direct response to a call from the CoJ to meet with Wits and UJ on the 4th December 2013. UJ stated in the letter that the CoJ cannot provide less than a week notice for a meeting and they were not happy with the fact the meeting was scheduled for a time when a vast majority of the university staff have left for the December break. UJ therefore requested that the meeting take place on the 7th January 2014 (UJ, 2013).

One of UJ’s main objections was over the 28,000 beds which the university allegedly required (Keet, 2014). UJ states they have had sight of the document developed by the task group and that they fully support all the points made therein. UJ stated that:

“the university is able to identify with the concerns noted in the Report, particularly those relating to the timeframes for consultation and the inadequacy of the consultation process itself; the inadequate interrogation of current precinct development plans for densification; insufficient attention to design principles; incorrect information and reliance on a wrongful perception (not verified with us) that the University needs additional student housing as well as concerns about inadequate infrastructure” (UJ, 2013).

It is clear that UJ had similar concerns to the community; therefore it made sense for them to join forces in this process. This is the first time the community and UJ have allied with each other in order to have an influence over a City decision; usually it is UJ versus the community (Keet, 2014). The following section discusses what residents associations were doing during the period straight after the participation meetings in October.

5.4.4 The role of residents associations

In most instance residents associations did not develop their own response to the CoF as they had a representative on the task group; therefore the residents associations' response was included in the Report developed by the task group. The residents associations which were part of the task group were the Melville RA; Westdene RA; Rossmore, Auckland Park RA; Brixton Community Forum; and Crosby Neighbourhood Watch (Task Group, 2013).

According to van der Westhuizen (2014) the resident associations "did not contribute much in addition to the professional team". The task group was responsible for dealing with the content. The role of the residents associations became to communicate back to their constituencies what the task group were doing and what progress was being made. Therefore, the residents associations played an import role in terms of communication. The box below provides an example of the dynamics between the Ward Councillor and the WRA.

Box 5.3: WRA working apart from the Task Group

The WRA stated that they were receiving many queries from their constituency regarding the CoF. Knight (2014) stated that there was a degree of panic as she explained:

"people were saying should I sell, should we move, what is Westdene going to look like and who is going to be coming here and how is the development going to be controlled and there was a feeling of panic and we decided as a Residents Association that we needed to call a meeting just purely for the Westdene residents to try and assure them that we were taking action to get into detailed discussions and that there was a task team"

This panic occurred due to many reasons: the extreme images shown to the residents in the first meeting, what was stated in the media, and people's fear of change. It is evident that the WRA wanted to re-assure their residents that a structure was being set up to ensure the residents were represented. According to Knight the WRA did not intend to discuss the actual content of the CoF in this meeting, but rather just to inform residents of what the 'plan' was and that they were being represented – to give the residents some peace of mind. However, the Ward Councillor objected to the WRA holding said meeting (Knight, 2014). Knight (2014) explains:

"the Ward Councillor felt we should not have that meeting because it could raise more questions than answers, so we were very reluctant because we [WRA] felt we should do it, and we are an independent organisation who could do it, but [the Councillor] agreed as a compromise that [she/he] would put a press release out into the local newspaper explaining exactly what we were going to explain in the meeting, so on that promise we cancelled our plans for a meeting, but unfortunately the Councillor failed to issue a press release".

It is evident that the Ward Councillor was concerned that this meeting may cause more confusion. It may be a power battle where the Ward Councillor wants to be the one to represent his/her constituency and come across as the one who is leading the way, however I argue that this is

probably not the case because the Councillor failed to put a press release in the paper explaining what the task group was doing, therefore, the Councillor was not trying to come across as the one doing all the work. It appears that the Councillor wanted everyone in the Ward to work together as one cohesive team. In other words, discussions should be at a Ward level, I suppose to keep everyone on the same page. As the Ward Councillor explains:

“the Ward works together we never did anything in isolation although some of the suburbs might think that they did something in isolation, Westdene always tried to separate itself a little bit from the things”

The quote illustrates that the Ward Councillor preferred everyone in the Ward to work together. This is understandable because if each RA was working by itself and not as a team it could potentially compromise the task group as the RA’s argument may not be the same as the task groups, therefore there will be less coherence when the project team receives feedback on the CoF from the community. Keeping everyone on the same page and using one representative group ensures there are less diverging ideas to compromise and undermine the argument set forth by the task group.

The WRA decided they had to inform their constituency about what was taking place because it is the WRA’s mandate to represent the residents of Westdene. Therefore, the WRA sent out a newsletter informing the residents that a task group has been set up and they are drafting a report responding to the CoF.

In the WRA the CoF was discussed in the general residents association meetings, van der Westhuizen stated it was mainly members of the Task Group providing feedback on what they were doing and generally there were few questions. It was an agenda point but meetings were not specifically set up for the CoF. What was an issue is that in meetings held by residents associations, such as this one in Westdene some residents stated that the “poor people should just go out into the vlaktes [rural areas]”. Members of the task group in this meeting “made it quite clear that that kind of thinking is absolutely unacceptable and racists and it was not moving us forward” (van der Westhuizen, 2014). These meetings were also used by some task group members and those who were ‘pro’ CoF to explain that from a sustainability point of view we cannot carry on developing cities the way we have been and that the CoF may have many benefits for residents, as van der Westhuizen explained:

“the sustainable argument came across much clearer than the integration, social equity argument and also then the people could see the benefit of hopefully property values that could increase due to something like this [CoF]”

Brixton Community Forum (BCF) did not hold a specific meeting for the CoF either. Schaerer (2014) stated that members of the task group in the general BCF meetings did not push an agenda and in most cases there was agreement over the CoF and what the task group was doing. The community in

Brixton was more receptive to the ideas of the CoF compared to neighbourhoods such as Westdene and Melville (Schaerer, 2014).

What can be seen from the discussion above is that there were diverging ideas in the communities. The Task Group was generally pro Corridors of Freedom as they understood the benefits and need for it. There were conservative residents who would prefer the status quo to be protected. The discussion highlights that there were residents who had expressed racist views in the RA meetings. This was not openly seen in the CoF public meetings; there were NIMBY comments, but not comments that appeared blatantly racist. In some cases the residents' association general meetings were used to try and change some of the resident's mindsets and show them why it is necessary to support the CoF. This could have assisted the residents in seeing the CoF from a different angle, but a different language had to be used by those pro CoF trying to show those against CoF why it is important. They used the notion of sustainability which is something that affects us all; therefore, it is more likely to catch the attention of a resident who does not want integration.

The three sections above illustrate what some of the stakeholder groups within the Empire-Perth corridor did in order to have an influence over the way the process was running and on the content of the CoF. The following section provides an outline of what the project team did and how they responded to the objection and disapproval.

5.5 PROJECT TEAMS REACTION TO OBJECTIONS

The point after the residents 'backlash' and mobilisation is when there was a breakdown in the process (Venter, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). Venter (2014) stated that for weeks after the participation process the CoF process came to a standstill as the project team attempted to figure out how to move forward. The CTSPD informed Gamcon to build the CoF website where all the necessary information regarding the CoF could be uploaded and accessed by the public (Venter, 2014). This included presentations done in the public meetings, the full CoF SAF drafts, and minutes of the public meetings. The project team also spent much of this time attempting to respond to the comments received during the October 2013 public meetings as well as the responses sent in by the various stakeholders such as the Report by the task group and UJ's objection letter (Venter, 2014).

The project team was anxious at this point because in the last public meeting lawyers were present. Venter (2014) stated

"they [lawyers] started throwing the municipal systems act at us saying that the CoJ did not follow the correct procedures, it was f*****g crap, these lawyers, you see old ommies [men] with 50 years of experience asking "why did you do this?", "how did you do that?", what did

you base your assumptions on?”, “where did you get this information?”, “when did you see these people?”.

Venter (2014) stated that they even asked for minutes of various internal meetings (which I am aware do not exist due to the more informal way the CTSPD and Gamcon communicated – discussed in the previous chapter). This rattled the Gamcon consultants substantially. Both Gamcon and the CTSPD at this point were worried that the CoF was going to be derailed (Dube, 2015) and that the CoJ would have a court case on their hands (Venter, 2014). Venter (2014) stated that if the external stakeholders had to take them to court the process could be suspended for up to three years or even indefinitely. The CTSPD felt that based on the level of resistance they experienced; they had to go back to the drawing board to see how they can include external stakeholders in a way that provides them with a “level of confidence and comfort” in order to ensure the process is not short-circuited (Dube, 2015).

The CTSPD and the Gamcon consultants realised that the project team they had was not suitable to deal with the issues and problems highlighted in the various response letters. Venter claimed that:

“somewhere in December [2013] there was a technical break of trust they [CTSPD] basically did not heed to our advice anymore, the relationship, to say it nicely ended in November...but from an infrastructure point of view we kept on because that is not your opinion against somebody else’s opinion that is hard technical facts”

It is evident from Venter’s perspective that the CTSPD held the Gamcon consultants responsible for the backlash and felt that the current consultancy team was not suitable to carry out the policy formulation after the issues had been highlighted through the public participation process.

From the CTSPD’s perspective they did not lose faith in the Gamcon consulting team but rather that there was a realisation that there was “a gap in the expertise” as Dube (2015) put it. As outlined in the section above, the responses to the CoF SAF pertained largely to *detail*, the residents understood the where’s and what’s but wanted more detail on the how’s, when’s, the guidelines, and how the public realm would function, for instance. These were aspects that the current project team could not address properly as these are skills that an urban designer possesses. Dube (2015) explained that:

“there needed to be some changes with the project itself, it was not just that we lost trust, there was a realisation that there was a gap in the expertise that needed to be filled, it wasn’t like you cannot produce the project, it was that we realised that we needed to add a new skill into the mix”.

This gap in expertise goes back to the tender. The previous chapter highlighted the core skills required in the tender and urban design was not one of them. Therefore, it is not the fault of the Gamcon consultants that they did not have urban design as one of their core skills. They had the main skills highlighted in the tender. For what the CoF SAF was originally meant to be: a high level strategic framework that provides the broad overview of the area which ‘tests the theoretical bounds of the densification’ and at a later stage has more detailed precinct plans (Dube, 2015), the skills on the project team were sufficient. However, this did not sit well with most of the participants in the public meetings; they wanted more *detail* (Knight, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). The box below discusses some of the challenges with regards to the amount of detail and vagueness in the CoF SAF and the scale at which it was dealing with.

Box 5.4: The nature of the CoF policy

It has been mentioned before that the CoF is a new policy area for the CoJ (Venter, 2014; Hanger, 2014; Dube, 2015). The CoF SAF is at a different scale to other spatial policies in the CoJ. There is the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) which is the spatial framework for the whole Metro. Then there are Regional Spatial Development Frameworks (RSDF’s) which are for each of the regions within the metro. More detailed than an RSDF are Urban design Frameworks / Precinct plans which is for neighbourhoods, or a particular precinct (Harrison, 2014). As the area becomes smaller and more focused so the plans become more detailed and less conceptual.

The CoF SAF is somewhere between an RSDF and an Urban Design Framework. Therefore, the level of detail required is unclear and becomes an issue. The reason for this is that at the scale that the CoF SAF is dealing with one is able to see the street and the particular neighbourhood, therefore where the project team draw *that line* has a much bigger implication compared to where they draw *that line* on an SDF or RSDF (documents which are far more conceptual). Therefore, it becomes difficult to be more conceptual and vague at the scale of the CoF SAF, which the project team was originally aiming to do. It is also difficult for the project team to provide the level of detail that an Urban Design Framework or precinct plan has for the whole area of the SAF, which includes about 10 neighbourhoods. Hanger (2014) explains the issue:

“it is difficult to work with a blob if you are working with a more specific street based delineation, it becomes a bit more practical...people actually wanted to know how it would influence their area”

What can be seen from this is that it becomes difficult to keep such a plan conceptual or vague. Residents do not like the fact that the project team was not being very specific. However, this is the nature of a strategic plan, it leaves out specifics and details, it is meant to be a guide, a framework (Woodcock et al, 2009). It is not meant to be a ‘masterplan’ which provides every little detail and where exactly everything is going to be located. This makes it a difficult scale to work with because the project team have to find a balance between detail, ‘strategicness’ and ‘conceptualness’. The appointment of Iyer is a clear illustration that they needed to move towards more detail, a more rigid plan.

The approach taken by the project team to be vaguer about certain aspects came in direct conflict with what the residents wanted to see and hear: detail, detail, and more detail (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). There was a realisation that the approach needed to change as they realised they needed to provide more detail and urban design elements.

It is evident that there were issues from many perspectives: the external stakeholders were disgruntled with the project team; Gamcon felt the CTSPD lost trust in them; and the CTSPD realised they needed to add urban design skills to their project team. These are major issues that could easily result in the derailment of a policy and test the most seasoned professionals.

5.6 THE START OF A NEW PROCESS

As mentioned in the previous section factors were changed in the process. This had an influence on the way the process progressed and how the content of the CoF was shaped and formulated. This section is aimed at unpacking the details of how the process changed as a result of participation. The way the project team was re-thought and a change in the emphasis of expertise is outlined. The spaces of participation that emerged are discussed and the level of influence the participants had on the content. I also discuss an important aspect which is who was having an influence in the process.

5.6.1 Change in emphasis of expertise

As a result of the realisation of the gap in the expertise and the change in the nature and level of detail of the CoF SAF, there was a mutual agreement between Gamcon and the CTSPD to broaden the skills on the project team and bring on an urban design consultant (Paul Hanger) to do all the design related aspects of the CoF (Dube, 2015; Venter, 2014). This is when (end of November early December 2013) the urban design firm Iyer got brought into the process. Dube (2015) stated that:

“we brought in Iyer mid project, to basically help us refine the document from an urban design perspective.”

The consultant appointed from Iyer was the same one used to develop the Louis Botha CoF SAF, a process that ran much smoother than the Empire-Perth process. This also meant that because the consultant from Iyer had worked on the Louis Botha Corridor, he was familiar with the CoF concept and what it entailed making it much easier for Hanger to be brought into the process. Furthermore, Hanger works in Johannesburg and is familiar with the context (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

Iyer had a different approach to the CoF compared to Gamcon. As discussed in the section on the presentation of the CoF content, Iyer’s approach in the Louis Botha corridor was a more ground-up

approach (Hanger, 2014). They started by looking at the context and working their way up. Hanger (2014) stated that:

“In terms of approach, our approach to Louis Botha was to look almost at how the area could grow based on what is there how it could densify and appropriate typologies of densification. We tried to get a sense of what the processes were that would allow the densification to happen. For instance, who would the developers be, what sort of finance would they be accessing basically trying to get a sense as to what the most realistic processes were in terms of densifying the corridor. It was very much a ground up approach that we had taken on Louis Botha and they felt that that might actually add value to Empire Perth as well.”

These are factors that the original project team did not focus on and it was now Iyer’s task to provide, as Venter (2014) put it, “the urban design details”. Gamcon was still working on the policy; they were doing the technical aspects such as infrastructure, while Iyer was responsible for the urban design aspects. It is evident from the discussion above that due to the fact that most of the external stakeholders were disgruntled with the CoF SAF and their comments regarding the lack of an urban designer on the project team, had a direct influence on the process because the CTSPD appointed an urban designer mid-process.

5.6.2 Extension of the participation process

The project team also realised that one of the biggest issues brought up was the fact that external stakeholders were not properly included in the process and that, even though the participation process was extended by a month until the end of November 2013, the external stakeholders still argued that this was not enough time. The project team decided to extend the participation even further to April 2014. Venter (2014) stated that:

“after the backlash the department [CTSPD] and us took public participation much more seriously”.

It is clear that the comments by the external stakeholders regarding the inadequate participation process had an influence on the way the policy process was working as the participation was extended by a further 5 months after the 1 month extension was not deemed adequate (the participation process would essentially be 7 months, with the initial participation process considered). Dube (2015) stated that the CTSPD could not have anticipated that amount of time for public participation in the beginning of the process, especially for a policy that was this complex. In terms of a participation process in Johannesburg, 7 months is a long process. For instance, the GDS 2040 participation process was 2 months and this was for the whole metro (Peens, 2013).

One of the reasons the participation process was extended a second time is that the project team were concerned that the process would be derailed due to legal action (Venter, 2014). This was not the only reason for extending the process according to Dube. She argues that they were aware that due to the level of backlash, for the policy to be a success they had to re-think the process.

Furthermore, Dube (2015) noted that:

“for something that big to be a success you need to have buy-in from the community, to go into an implementation stage where there is 100% negativity would not have assisted, you also want to put assets in the city that the community would be proud of and take care of, and would use...it is the communities who are the end users at the end of the day, and the people that will probably take care of that new urban environment. So I don't think it was an option for us to move forward without them.”

It is clear that the CTSPD had a few eye openers during the participation process. The project team were too caught up in trying to figure out how exactly to do the policy formulation and to get it complete in the timeframe provided that they forgot about the communities and the people (Schaerer, 2014; Knight, 2014). The participation process allowed the project team (especially the CTSPD) to see the flaws in the policy, because as mentioned above the task group was composed of professionals in urban planning, urban design, architecture etc. Therefore, they could provide well informed insight and criticism. This all meant that the process had to change in order to fix the problems.

It also illustrates that the CoJ is serious about implementing the CoF as they are concerned that if residents have a negative attitude towards the CoF it could be a major hindrance to its implementation. The CTSPD wanted to ensure that the community was at least partly on board with the policy.

5.7 NEW SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION EMERGE

This section discusses the spaces of participation that emerged after the backlash in the public meetings. It also provides an outline of the way these spaces worked and how representative they were. An emphasis is placed on the Task Group and Ward 69 residents as they were central to most of the participation process and Ward 69 is the most directly affected by the CoF (see map 1.2).

5.7.1 Focus group meetings

Once the participation process was extended and Iyer were brought onto the project team various meetings were set up with numerous external stakeholders (see annexure 9.2 for a full breakdown of all the meetings held). There was a clear change in the process and the way the content of the CoF was being formulated. Venter (2014) stated that in November, December (2013), and January (2014) the project team had focused meetings with the task group, residents associations, the universities, business forums, and other organisations. He went on to say that they saw many stakeholders who they did not plan on seeing before the backlash and who they did not intend to see during the planned participation process. The focus group meetings were aimed to be smaller sessions that were more focused where dialogue and discussion was able to take place.

5.7.1.1 Task Group and Ward 69

The first focus meeting to be held was with representatives from the residents associations in Ward 69 and the task group. They were invited by the project team to take part in these meetings. These meetings took place at the end of November 2013 (CoJ, 2014a).

The one meeting took place at the CTSPD offices. There were about 12 external participants present. The project team had printed out large maps illustrating the proposals and each suburb was shown over the projector so the participants were able to see more detail of particular areas (Knight, 2014). The participants were able to draw on the maps and show certain aspects directly to the project team (van der Westhuizen, 2014). There was a two-way dialogue taking place; it was not only a presentation of the content to the participants: they could actively engage with the project team. The participants as Knight (2014) put it:

“were able to really sit and say you know you can’t really do this, you have to think about that a bit more first and we had a bit more say on what the department [CTSPD] could do and what we thought was proper and right.”

Schaerer (2014) reiterated this:

“we could sit down, draw on plans and it was a lot better arranged, instead of a power point presentation they had sessions where we could actually talk, ‘hey I agree to this and that.’”

In this meeting the participants and the project team could discuss the content of the policy. Van der Westhuizen (2014) stated that the main discussion point was around the density lines. The aim of the task group in this meeting was to point out to the project team that there density cut points were not linking to the environment they envisioned:

“so it was to get them to realise they had these very strange density cut points for what they were imagining and we were trying to convince them that if you are in a suburban low density area you can actually densify in many other ways other than allowing an 8 storey building to be next to a house.” (van der Westhuizen, 2014).

Schaerer (2014) and van der Westhuizen (2014) noted that the project team at this point was still quite defensive in that they wanted the residents to justify why densification was not to occur in the suburbs selected. However, the project team was more open to listening to the residents and they felt they were being heard. Knight (2014) explains:

“the process changed when [Iyer] came on board and we felt that, from my perspective, that’s when I felt we were getting listened to and [Hanger] was trying to show us plans... when we got an Urban Designer on board we felt that we were getting somewhere and he was able to talk the same language to our task team and the task team could speak the same language to him and it was much better” (Knight, 2014).

Dube (2015) stated that the task group members in some cases were not on the same page. In other words they would often debate amongst themselves about a certain aspect, for instance some of the members would argue that densification is more appropriate in Melville than in Brixton. This illustrates that there were diverging ideas on the details of the plan. However, the debates helped make a robust discussion in the focus group meetings. The participants were building off each other’s suggestions in a similar fashion to what was experienced in the corridor process in the City of Albuquerque (Forester et al, 2013).

Dube (2015) and Venter (2014) stated that there were some negatives to the task group. The major drawback from their perspective was that they brought a lawyer with to the focus group session. Dube (2015) states that from the beginning it created a sense of hostility as the project team felt they were not protected. Furthermore, the types of documents that the CTSPD develop were not the type of legal documents where one is able to say that in section 5.5 this was said and it cannot

happen for these reasons (Ibid). This happened a few times and Dube (2015) argued that this was preventing the project team from discussing technical issues and the content.

To understand this point about the task group bringing their lawyer with to the meeting, it is important to remind the reader of the structure of the task group. There were 4 main teams that made up the group: urban planning / design; infrastructure, heritage; and legal. Therefore, a lawyer was part of the task group and attended at their own freewill. According to van der Westhuizen (2014) many of the members on the task group got irritated with the lawyer because the project team was trying to engage with the task group and he kept on threatening the project team with legal irregularities. Some members of the task group informed the lawyer to 'back off' and as the process progressed the 'legal team' became less important and was no longer required (van der Westhuizen, 2014). The lawyer was accused of being self-interested because his only solution to the CoF was for it to be stopped, he soon removed himself from the process when he realised the CoF was here to stay and that the majority of the residents in the task group supported the idea of the CoF.

It is important to ask the question how representative was the task group of the community. This has been touched on in a previous section but I think it is important to provide more detail. In the focus group meeting van der Westhuizen (2014) stated that it often became a negotiation game where neighbourhoods were discussed but there was no one present to represent that neighbourhood. For example, the task group would say 'you must give us this piece of Brixton and you can take that portion of Crosby', but there is no one in the meeting to defend Crosby and ensure that is the best location for the proposal.

The project team were aware of the potential bias of the Task Group and the Ward 69 residents. Dube (2015) pointed out that:

"the extent to which someone represents everyone, you cannot be sure, whether it is a constitution of certain people with certain interests or it is a representative of everyone, but mostly the people in Brixton would talk about the Brixton issues but the common thing around what they saw as the flaws of the document at the time were similar".

In general the members of the task group and Ward 69 were more concerned about their own areas (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014; Venter, 2014). For instance, when Melville residents found out that Melville was no longer a main part of the proposals there was suddenly an overwhelming disinterest of Melville residents (Hanger, 2014). This illustrates that in some cases people were only interested if they were directly affected. This makes it difficult for residents to speak on the behalf of other

neighbourhoods. For this reason, the project team tried to include residents and stakeholders from all neighbourhoods within the study area – beyond the task group which organised themselves.

It is evident from the discussion above that the participants in the focus group meeting were able to engage on a much deeper level compared to the general public meetings. Furthermore, the participants in the meeting felt they were being listened to. However, as discussed in the paragraph above, who was being represented in these meetings is important or there is the chance that other communities who are less vocal are not heard.

5.7.1.2 Inclusion of other residents associations and communities

The project team did not only meet with the task group and community members from Ward 69, they also met with the Parktown Residents Association (PRA); the Westbury, Pennyville, and Sophiatown communities; and the universities (see Annexure 9.2). It is important to highlight that the sentiment for the Empire-Perth corridor was not the same throughout the communities affected. The impression that a person got from the outside (such as myself and most people who are not living in one of the affected suburbs) is that the majority of the people, at least initially, despised the CoF. This is primarily due to the fact that it is mainly the resourced residents who have access to the media and it was the negative voice that the media was picking up (or chose to listen to – as Schaerer (2014) put it, the media like the sensationalist stories). Dube (2015) pointed out that not everyone the project team saw (after the backlash at the public meetings at Marks Park) had a negative attitude towards the CoF.

The project team met with the PRA and with the Parktown North RA (PNRA). Parktown is a similar community to Melville, Westdene, and Auckland Park in terms of demographic makeup and it is a middle to higher income neighbourhood. One would expect them to have a similar reaction to the one the Melville, Westdene, Auckland Park community had, but instead, they thought the CoF was a great idea and supported it. Dube (2015) explained:

“I met with the Councillor and the experts that he chose to bring on the day [2/12/2013] and some of the residents there, they live in a similar suburban environment, and they came to a public meeting, they are concerned they are worried, scared, whatever the case is, and we go there and present the concept of the CoF and what it is trying to achieve, the excitement that they had, the understanding that they had was amazing”.

However, Dube (2015) highlights that Parktown is not directly affected by the CoF proposals, therefore they support the broader principles of it, which most people do. The Parktown residents have little reason to resist the CoF.

As discussed above, the lower income communities generally responded well to the CoF (Dube, 2015; Ismail, 2015; CoJ, 2013i). The project team experienced a different sentiment in the lower income communities such as Westbury and Pennyville (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014). Most of the residents here received the CoF well. Dube (2015) noted that the residents in these communities are just happy with the fact that their neighbourhood is receiving attention.

After the first set of public meetings, which took place in October 2013, steering committees were set up in the lower income communities. Ismail (2015) stated that the CTSPD formulated these steering committees to ensure that the communities were included and listened to. Anyone who wanted to join the committees could. Ismail states that:

“the steering committees were made up of various people, there would be various people from the City and consultants and they took us by the hand...we have had over 10 of these meetings”

The Westbury precinct has been marked as a priority precinct meaning it forms part of phase one of the implementation. This means the CoJ is upgrading numerous public spaces, putting in cycle lanes, and redesigning the sidewalks. These steering committee meetings are aimed at including residents in these projects and understanding what their suggestions and comments are for a specific project (Ismail, 2015).

Some of the issues brought up were that Westbury requires a bridge across Empire; that the BRT construction damaged houses along Empire; and some comments related to operational issues such as poor service delivery. Even though the majority of the comments were not relevant for the CoF SAF the project team were able to use them in defining specific projects for the CoF (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014). One being the Westbury pedestrian bridge and they redirect the comments they could not address to the relevant departments.

Since the process as a whole changed the Westbury community has been very happy with the way the process has been running and what the CoF is all about, Ismail (2015) explains:

“I’m happy, I’m grateful, I’m over the moon, we have been waiting to see our communities grow like this for many years, for many years we have been dreaming about these types of streets, cycle lanes, we never had this stuff, we were dreaming about having beautiful parks...I can say it is happening and we welcome it!”

Ismail (2015) goes on to say that:

“In terms of community participation we have been involved to the fullest and they [project team] have taken on board a lot of our suggestions, things are happening”

It is evident from this discussion that it was not only the task group and the residents from Ward 69 that the project team were meeting with. As Dube (2015) stated, even where there were no resident associations and where the communities are not organised the project team attempted to bring the residents together to discuss the CoF. This shows that the project team were not only including the residents who resisted the original proposals but also tried to include residents from all neighbourhoods. This demonstrates a more genuine attempt to turn the process around for the better as they were not just trying to keep the 'resisters' / 'objectors' included and quite.

Moreover, a large proportion of the lower income residents and areas such as Parktown supported the City. It is evident that the lower income communities liked the idea of the CoF and some of the residents deem they were sufficiently included in the process. One of the reasons for the difference in sentiment between the lower income communities and those in Ward 69, who are generally more affluent, is that the residents in areas such as Westbury and Coronationville have much to gain from the CoF (i.e. many of their public spaces are severely degraded, sidewalks are in a state of disrepair, and there are low investment rates). However, most of the residents in Ward 69 don't really have anything to gain from the CoF, except a potential increase in property values.

It is clear from Ismail's statement that the Westbury community have been quite involved in the CoF process. It is important to highlight that this participation is in specific projects, because Westbury is a priority precinct, implementation is already taking place. This points in a positive direction as the project team have been informing the residents of Ward 69 that there will be more participation in the implementation of projects in the next phase (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014). It is evident that the project team involved the Westbury community in the implementation phase (over 10 meetings to date). Therefore, I can only surmise that when more specific projects take place in areas such as Westdene, Auckland Park, and Brixton that participation will take place.

Due to the fact that the lower income communities and areas such as Parktown supported the CoF and what the City were doing, it means there is less reason for the project team to have intense participation with these groups because they do not have a problem with the proposals in the first place. However, as mentioned above the suggestions that the lower income communities provided which were of relevance to the CoF were included in the specific projects.

5.7.2 Addition of public meetings and the CoF open day

The project team added a third round of public meetings to the participation process, which was set to take place in March 2014. It would include a general public meeting at Marks Park and in Westbury. These meetings were the same format of the public meetings that took place in October 2013. The sentiment in this meeting was substantially less negative than those which took place in October 2013. However, there were similar comments in terms of issues with urban management, services, crime, and heritage. Surprisingly, some residents were still complaining about the process stating that they have not been included. For instance, a Melville resident stated:

“I understand that this is stage three of the public participation process but I don’t feel that I have participated at all” (CoJ, 2014b: 12).

This is a problem that the project team faced in the public sessions: residents who have not participated in the process at all suddenly show up to a session near the end of the process and complain that they have not participated. Furthermore, some residents were still criticising the content severely stating that:

“we are facing a completely abstract presentation of yellow blocks and red blocks and green blocks and for you to say well we are going to be sensitive to all these areas and we don’t even see photos of these areas, we are looking at abstraction upon abstraction” (CoJ, 2014b: 7)

The project team reacted to these comments by stating that there have been numerous meetings between the last public session and this one. Residents and members of the task group and the Ward Councillor attested to this in this public meeting by stating that much has happened and changed in terms of the process and content (this will be the subject of the following chapter). The project team also stated that many of the concerns raised are addressed in the full 120 page document, as it is not possible to present everything in the public meeting (CoJ, 2014b).

By analysing the public meeting minutes it is evident that this added session reached the same level of participation, on Arnstein (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation and the Spectrum of Participation (IAP2, 2012) that was reached in October 2013. That is ‘informing’. This is the most tokenistic form of participation. The reason for it only being ‘informing’ is that the project team present, then the participants provide comments, it is up to the discretion of the project team whether they listen to the comment or not.

5.7.2.1 CoF open day

The project team decided to include an open day in the participation process which took place on the 26th March 2014. This would mark the closure of the face-to-face participation process and the last opportunity for residents to find out about the CoF or give input on the policy. The open day was something new that the CTSPD and the consultants had not done before (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014). The session was not like a general public meeting where the project team present their work to residents and the participants provide input after the session. Rather this meeting was held for residents to have one-on-one time with the project team and ask specific questions and provide their suggestions. The meeting took place from 14:00 until 20:00. This allowed many residents to attend the meeting. Hanger (2014) stated that the primary reason for the open day was to try and give everyone a chance to have a say because not everyone can attend the public meetings and not everyone was part of the task group.

I was present for the first two hours of this meeting and saw how it was conducted. It involved the project team sitting with the maps of the proposals surrounded by participants who were all asking questions, giving suggestions and working together (this can be seen in figure 5.13 below). The participants could also write down comments and suggestions on a comments register. This meeting also allowed people the opportunity to ask questions that they would not generally ask in a public meeting. For instance, some people do not feel comfortable asking about their specific property in front of other residents (Dube, 2015). The atmosphere was very informal with residents in some cases grouping together separately to discuss specific aspects amongst themselves. The project team was not leading the session: it was not 'facilitated' (the informal nature of the meeting can be seen in figure 5.9).

Hanger (2014) noted that they received valuable information from this meeting. He stated that it is particularly valuable in areas where there is contestation because the project team is able to have a conversation with the people and both sides are able to be heard. In these sessions the project team and the



Figure 5.9: Participants in the CoF open day commenting on the proposals (Peens, 2014).

participants were able to talk about the content in much more detail compared to the general public meetings.

From observation at the open day it was apparent that it was not only about informing the public. The level of participation was deeper than that and allowed residents to engage one-on-one with the project team; draw on the maps; and discuss amongst themselves. The project team were not controlling the session and neither were the participants, it was an equal discussion. On Arnstein (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation the level of participation reached in the open day meeting was 'consultation' or 'placation'. This is still viewed as a degree of tokenism, however is higher up on the ladder compared to 'informing'. The reason this session was still tokenistic is the participants were not given direct power to *change* content; it was up to the discretion of project team what to listen to and what not to listen to. On the Spectrum of Participation (IAP2, 2012), the level of participation reached was also 'consultation'. This is still quite low on the Spectrum, however it represents an improvement from the first two public meetings.

5.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided a discussion of the way in which participation occurred in the process initially. It shows what contributed to the negative reaction towards the CoF and what the project team did in order to overcome this. The way the process changed was discussed in detail and the new spaces of participation that emerged were unpacked.

The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the invented space of participation (residents mobilising and drafting a report on the CoF) led to the development of more invited spaces (i.e the focus groups with various stakeholders; another round of public meetings, and an open day where residents could have more of a discussion). These invited spaces were more meaningful than the two public meetings that were originally only going to take place. The findings here represent a clear example of how invited and invented spaces are not mutually exclusive but work to shape and form one another. As Masiko-Kambala et al (2012) state citizens move between these spaces depending on which works better for a particular issue, these two spaces have a dynamic relationship with each other.

The new participation process was a higher quality process. Innes and Booher (2004) and Healey (1997) argue that a quality participation process needs to have two-way dialogue, it needs to be inclusive with diverse participants being involved, mutually shared knowledge, and have continuous engagement. I would argue that the new process meets most of these requirements to some degree. For instance, spaces of participation were provided where the participants were able to

have a two-way quality discussion where they felt they were being listened to (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014) – for instance in the focus group sessions and in the Open Day meeting. It was not only the middle income residents who were participating, the project team made the effort to set up meetings with the lower income residents in Westbury, Newclare, and Pennyville and the residents here were happy with how they were included and feel they were being listened to (Ismail, 2015). These spaces allowed for a much greater level of information sharing from both the project teams' side and the participants side in that each could provide their suggestions and potentially change the others perspective slightly. The ongoing participation, I deem is too early to evaluate as implementation has not begun properly as yet. However, were it has begun it looks promising as external stakeholders are being included, for instance in many Westbury project and with the bridge being built at Kingsway and University Road by the JDA and JRA (Ismail, 2015; Keet, 2014).

The findings here correlated with those found in the literature in that large public meetings / hearings do not work effectively (King et al, 1998 cited in Shipley and Utz, 2012; Innes and boohar, 2004). These meetings did not yield results that were useful for the project team and the participants found that these meetings were not useful as they could not have a proper discussion with the project team. The most effective means of gaining information for the CoF was through the smaller focus group sessions (Dube, 2014; Venter, 2014; Hanger, 2014). In these sessions it was possible to debate about content. The task group also felt that these sessions were the most useful, however a few of them felt that what really had an impact was the report they sent, this was seen as the factor which caused the process to turn around: using experiential knowledge to build an argument (Schaerer, 2014; Knight, 2014, Ward Councillor, 2014, van der Westhuizen, 2014). There was consensus among the respondents that the process changed for the better once Iyer was brought on board.

It is safe to say that public participation in the case of the CoF had a major influence on the policy-making process; it became more open and towards the end represented a governance process. It moved from a more rational technocratic one to an open, multi-actor process which grappled with the politics on the ground and the complicated context.

Now that it is apparent that the participation had an influence on the policy-making process, the primary aim of the next chapter is to explore how the actual content of the CoF changed and what the public were able to influence / not influence.

CHAPTER 6

The influence of public participation on the content of the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provided a detailed discussion of how the participation process worked and concluded that participation had a definite influence on the policy-making process. The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate the influence participation had on the *content* of the Corridors of Freedom policy, whose change is documented here in particular through the analysis of the various drafts of the SAF. How the content of the SAF was changing through the drafts as a result of participation; what were the public having an influence on; and how the project team and residents felt about any changes which occurred to the content.

It has been widely argued that participation in Johannesburg; especially the invited spaces do not have an influence over the direction of policies: this is especially the case for lower income residents who do not have access to the media, or who cannot afford litigation (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). The external stakeholders in Empire-Perth, which were not lower income in their majority, did not use litigation or the media extensively, therefore measuring the influence of this more co-operative form of participation is important and necessary.


The chapter begins by outlining what was initially presented to the participants in the first meeting. Next it explains what issues the participants had with the content of this draft. The changes made to the content after the first round of participation is evaluated and how the public responded to these issues. The changes after the 'backlash' are assessed. What the stakeholders were actually influencing is analysed and how the changes being made to the CoF were viewed by the project team is outlined. The chapter ends with a discussion of the level of participation that was reached in the process.

6.2 TRACKING CHANGES IN THE COF SAF

I used the first draft SAF which was presented in the first round (2nd October 2013) of participation as the starting point. The maps presented in the second public meeting (29th October) are also used. The next draft published was in March 2014, this is used and the final draft which was approved by council in November 2014 is utilised to see the extent of the changes. The main issues the task group and various other external stakeholders had with the CoF content is outlined.

6.2.1 The first draft CoF SAF

There are numerous maps in the CoF that illustrate the spatial vision; however map 6.1 below shows the majority of the elements in the CoF proposal. It illustrates the densification areas, proposed BRT extension, the non-motorised transport (NMT) routes, and future zoning options. The SAF proposals are focused on aspects relating to densification, public transport, and NMT. The maps and images below are the exact ones the participants were shown in the first public meeting (2nd October 2013).



Map 6.1: Spatial vision for Empire Perth illustrating density, NMT routes, BRT routes and land uses (CoF, 2013)



Map 6.2: Proposed building heights for Empire-Perth (CoF, 2013).

The maps above illustrate that densification is proposed in one form or another throughout the study area. Only small portions of some suburbs are proposed to be 3 storeys or less. In the first draft the densification was mainly envisioned to take place through the development of medium-rise buildings (2-8 storeys). This was evident in the section in the CoF entitled: “densification urban design principles”. Figure 6.1 below illustrate conceptually what the buildings would be.



Figure 6.1: Conceptual images of the buildings envisioned for Empire-Perth (CoF, 2013).

The typologies of housing shown, which was envisioned for the densification areas, were only of medium-rise and high-rise. The typologies in the first row are for the densification in the student precinct in Auckland Park and the second row is of social housing in Westbury. The typologies are shown in the images below (figure 6.2).



Twickenham Avenue			
High Rise Residential Type 1	High Rise Residential Type 2	High Rise Residential Type 3	High Rise Residential Type 4
			
200 - 500 u/ha	200 - 500 u/ha	200 - 500 u/ha	200 - 500 u/ha
55sqm	64sqm	44sqm	30sqm
50%	50%	50%	50%
8 Storeys	8 Storeys	4 Storeys	4 Storeys
Social Housing			
Medium Residential Type 1	Medium Residential Type 2	Medium Residential Type 3	Medium Residential Type 4
			
120 - 200 u/ha	120 - 200 u/ha	120 - 200 u/ha	120 - 200 u/ha
43sqm	50sqm	55sqm	55sqm
50%	55%	55%	60%
4 Storeys	4 Storeys	4 Storeys	4 Storeys

Figure 6.2: Typology of housing envisioned for the Empire-Perth Corridor (CoF, 2013).

The project team noted in the first draft SAF that in order to attain the vision of the CoF the following options for densification were selected (in order of priority): “large scale precinct development; consolidation and redevelopment; higher density infill on underutilised land; and increased land use rights” (CoF, 2013: 64). This shows the main aim of the densification was for large scale densification.

6.2.2 Comments in first public meeting regarding the proposals

As discussed in the previous chapter the proposals elicited a negative response from the external stakeholders in the first Marks Park meeting held on the 2nd October 2013. From the comments made in this session it can be seen that the residents were not content with the level and extent of densification (CoJ, 2013f). It was feared that this would ruin the character of the neighbourhoods.

The participants pointed out a few errors on the plan such as the Country Club and Brixton cemetery being marked as ‘open space’ (as discussed in chapter 5, this was not an error, rather part of the modelling) and connections through Westdene Dam which were not possible (CoJ, 2013f; Ward Councillor, 2014). The residents also disputed that UJ required 28,000 beds. There was also the

concern of urban management raised as residents were worried their suburbs would become crime infested and turn into a slum.

The current state of the infrastructure was pointed out as a potential barrier to further development. The residents stated that there was a focus on east/west connections but little consideration for north/south connections (which is a problem currently). The issue of heritage was also highlighted as a major concern. The lack of consideration for the approved precinct plans¹⁸ angered many participants in the meeting.

These were generally the types of comments the project team received regarding the first draft presentation in the first meeting. Residents were more concerned about the fact that participation was not conducted properly and that external stakeholders had a very short time to participate in a policy they deem is near to the final product. Therefore, participation and the flawed process was the main point of discussion and as the project team put it in the follow up presentation presented in the second public meeting: “the single biggest issue raised [in the first meeting] was participation” (CoJ, 2013h). This means details were not discussed in this meeting and the comments regarding content were quite broad (this is due to the nature of the meeting and the initial framing of participation – discussed in chapter 5).

6.2.3 Changes to CoF content after first round participation

In the second participation meeting, held on the 29th October 2013, (which was meant to be the last meeting), no new draft was drawn up. Only the presentation to the public was available, therefore the map from the presentation is used to analyse if there were any changes to the content after the first public meeting.

¹⁸ As discussed in chapter 3 it was not possible to view the precinct plans as the link on the CoJ website to the various plans is broken.



Map 6.3: Second draft SAF proposals presented in the second public meeting (29/10/2013) (CoJ, 2013h).

From map 6.3 compared to 6.1 it can be seen that the content of the SAF did not change drastically. The level of densification was reduced. To elaborate, the areas marked as high density on the initial map were reduced to medium density, medium density reduced to low density, and low density reduced to super low density. However, the very high density areas on the initial plan remained high density on the revised plan. Furthermore, the project team still presented 'blanket densification' throughout the whole study area – however the levels were reduced slightly. Besides the extremely high levels of densification very few of the issues raised in the first public meeting in terms of content were addressed (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). It would have been difficult for the project team to make drastic changes to the content based on the types of comments received in this session, as they were too broad.

This illustrates that the project team tried to address the main issue raised in the first meeting: the level of densification. Thus, the first public meeting indeed did have a small influence over the content of the CoF. Besides the densities being reduced, the public meeting was largely ineffective at gaining useful information from the external stakeholders which could influence the policy.

6.2.4 Issues outlined by external stakeholders after the resident mobilisation

Comments on this second round came in the form of a report, objection letters, comments through email to the consultants, and comments made in the public meeting. The project team compiled all the comments into a table with responses. This provides a general understanding of what the comments were during the extended participation process from November 2013 to March 2014. The next draft of the SAF was published in March 2014 (2nd draft). It is important to remember that it was during this time that the urban design firm Iyer got brought into the process (end November, December 2013). The issues discussed here are about content and not process: the comments regarding City management and everyday operational issues are not included in this section (the project team received many of these comments); only comments which relate directly to CoF content are discussed.

One of the biggest points raised was the blanket densification which was proposed. It was criticised for being un-strategic and too extreme for this type of an area, predominantly low density residential (Task Group, 2013; CoJ, 2014b). The task group argued that there are many other ways of densifying in residential areas besides only building medium and high-rise buildings – only medium to high rise typologies were shown in the first draft SAF (Task Group, 2013; Schaerer, 2014; van der Westhuizen, 2014). The task group (2013) noted that the densification proposals appeared to be based on a desktop study without knowledge of the area, they provide an example:

Legend

- Proposed BRT Stations
- BRT Stations
- BRT Truck Routes
- Complementary Routes
- Proposed C&E Routes
- Proposed MDT

Units per Hectare

- Low density (10 - 20 units)
- Medium density (20 - 120 units)
- High density (120 - 200 units)
- High Density (200 - 500 units)

Future Zoning Options

- Mixed use (Predominantly Business Use)
- Office
- Education
- Social & Multi-Use
- Residential
- Open Space

The task group and residents mentioned that appropriate scaling down of the density and intensity of land use was important to protect the character of the neighbourhoods [3] (CoJ, 2014b; Task Group, 2013). Caroline Street [4] is an existing mixed use higher density strip that was ignored, higher intensity densification was suggested here (Task Group, 2013). An NMT route is required on Caroline Street [4]. It was proposed by an external stakeholder that Twickernam Avenue in Auckland Park be closed off and be made a pedestrian link between the two UJ campuses [5] (CoJ, 2014b). The task group (2013) suggested that mixed use development should only be proposed around BRT stations as mixed use areas have not worked in the core residential areas such as in Westdene. The Kingsway frontage is a huge division between the northern and southern communities and needs to be densified [6] (Task Group, 2013).

A major point of concern was that none of the previous precinct plans that had been developed for the suburbs in the study area had been considered. According to the task group (2013) these plans were more contextually sensitive and they were developed in a participatory manner. As the task group (2013: 4) explained:

“[the precinct plans] clearly stipulate densification areas. There is no reference to these or how they proposed densification. They have been ignored and all the work, time, and money spent of them made redundant”.

The task group and the residents strongly disputed the numbers required for student housing in the corridor. They argue that the 28,000 beds required is an unsubstantiated figure (Task Group 2013; CoJ, 2014b). They stated that there are vacancies in student accommodation as announced by Southpoint in 2013 (Task Group, 2013). Furthermore, UJ informed the communities in April 2013, in one of the commune committee meetings that had been set up to deal with the issue of illegal communes, that it would not be expanding its campuses in Auckland Park; therefore there is no need for student accommodation in the Empire-Perth area (Task Group, 2013a; CoJ, 2013f).

A factor that was of major concern to some residents and the task group was that relating to social housing. The Task Group (2013a) stated that:

“there are inconsistencies with what type of housing is to be provided versus who will provide it...it is believed that the majority of housing required is for lower income groups. This type of housing cannot only be provided by the City (due to lack of funds) and it is not viable for developers to develop the housing... The CoJ has not indicated how they will provide the social housing and where it will be located. As income mixing is one of the key factors of the Corridors of Freedom it cannot be left to chance and it should be stipulated up front”.

The task group (2013) pointed out that one of the primary goals of the CoF is accessibility and inclusion of the poor. They argue that this objective is not automatically achieved by densification, however the very opposite can occur because it is bound to unleash speculative development processes.

The intersection at Kingsway Road and University Road (UJ and Campus Square) is a major problem with students crossing in dangerous circumstances. The project team proposed an underground tunnel from UJ to Campus Square (figure 6.3).

This was strongly opposed by the community and the task group as it was argued that worldwide research has indicated that these types of underpasses

are crime hotspots. The project team was severely criticised for even suggesting this in a South African context (van der Westhuizen, 2014). They suggested that a better option would be to provide an overpass.



Figure 6.3: Underpass from UJ to Campus Square proposed by the project team (CoJ, 2013g).

The residents were not happy with the way the phasing was to work. In the first public meeting and in the first draft of the CoF SAF it was stated that there are 4 phases, however if an application is made in an area marked as phase 2, 3, etc. and the CoJ is implementing phase 1 the CoJ will still probably approve the development if it is in line with CoF guidelines. Phase 1 includes catalytic projects in Westbury, the Student Precinct in Auckland Park, and the Business node in Brixton (CoF, 2013). This concerned many residents as they felt that developers would probably start developing in areas marked for later phases as properties in phase 1, in Auckland Park for example, which are closer to the BRT stations are more expensive. Therefore, the CoJ would not get the intended urban form (high density around BRT routes and decreasing into the suburbs) as densification would occur further away from the BRT stations in the core of the neighbourhoods, resulting in a 'donut-effect' densification pattern (Task Group 2013; 2013a; van der Westhuizen 2014). Therefore, it was suggested that the first phase should focus on the BRT route and vacant land should be prioritised. They argued that there are numerous vacant sites along Kingsway that should form part of the first phase of densification [7].

The task group and the residents outline what could be the biggest blockage for development in the Empire-Perth corridor: heritage. The vast majority of the buildings in the study area are heritage

buildings and this was completely ignored by the project team in the initial drafts. Some of the suburbs are over 100 years old making the houses heritage dwellings. The brief heritage section in the SAF did not recognise that there are high significant areas within the suburbs which are termed low to medium significance in terms of heritage (e.g. in Brixton). It is stated by the task group (2013) that due to the fact that the study area is greater than 5000m² they have to do a Heritage Impact Assessment of all the suburbs.

The next major point highlighted in the report was infrastructure, in terms of electricity, water, storm water, and sewerage which are all major issues in the area at the moment. Furthermore, the residents stated that not enough health care facilities have been proposed in the stud area. There was also a concern over the fact that no social and environmental impact assessments were done for the proposals.

The external stakeholders where not content with the design guidelines outlined in the first drafts of the SAF. They stated they were too generic and not detailed enough and would not provide an adequate guide for developers and the private sector (CoJ, 2014b). They wanted more detail on how buildings would relate to the public realm and aspects such as 'ecological infrastructure should be implemented into the design' (CoJ, 2014b).

As mentioned in the previous chapter the Westbury community did not have major issues with the overall content of the plan, they just wanted their specific concerns to be included in projects (Ismail, 2015). Ismail stated he insisted that a bridge be built over Fuel road to allow children to cross over the street safely. The community wanted to ensure that they would be employed in the implementation of projects. Ismail (2015) stated that recommendations they made to the project team such as getting school children to plant the trees and make flower beds were all listened to.

6.2.5 The inclusion of the public participation comments

The project team took all the comments received via the different platforms (public meetings, focus group sessions, reports, response letters, and email) and formulated responses to the comments. The document was circulated to all the members on the project team so that the comments could be edited and to ensure that everyone was content with the response (Hanger, 2014). Hanger (2014) explains this process:

“all the comments that came in were put into a report, a table where each one was individually responded to, that was circulated and we all looked at each comment and indicated how we could bring it into the work or whether it could be dealt with outside our process and through

that we would meet and talk about the comments and basically [Dube] would reply to individual people.”

Venter (2014) stated that even though everyone in the process provided their input on the comments, in the end the CTSPD had the final say over what the response would be. For the aspects of the process that Gamcon were still working on (mainly the technical aspects such as infrastructure) they did not take on board every single comment that was made. Iyer, the main consultants to take the process to completion and deal with the finer details, had a different view of how they dealt with the comments. Hanger (2014) stated that:

“Most of the input we had, had an impact on the shape of the final product. All the community comments were considered at some level. In fact some of the comments that came in were comments from developers saying, based on these proposals they are not going to be able to develop their land holdings in this area. And in fact those proposals were not there for them; it was part of the bigger picture so some of those were discarded and there are some angry developers out there. But a lot of that is based on existing land ownership and basically trying to sway things that suit them rather than what suits the city” (Hanger, 2014).

Dube (2015) also stated that a substantial amount of the comments had an impact on the SAF:

“from what we received, you could say 60% of the comments that related to the document were included there were some that were addressed but did not appear in the document like, there is no heritage study, you can’t include that in the document, but we are doing something about it” (Dube, 2015).

From CTSPD and Iyers’ perspective, the project team defiantly included the majority of the comments and suggestions that came through from the public. The figure below provides an example of how the comments were responded to.

Comments	Response from the City
The proposed densification is unclear	The maps have been refined to be more readable in terms of specific development proposals.
Strategic framework should take into consideration existing precinct plans and the RSDF	The existing Precinct Plans and RSDF proposals have been considered in the reworking of the SAF proposals. It should be noted, however, that the current SAF process will deviate in places from existing frameworks – these deviations are noted, and it is anticipated that certain Precinct Plans will require rescinding / revision to give effect to the vision as defined in the SAF.
The route from Brixton to Braamfontein, via Caroline Street meeting Enoch Sontonga is entirely ignored. Fietas has a history of medium density and has numerous vacant sites. It too could be an appropriate area for revitalisation.	These issues have been taken into consideration in the revised SAF Proposals. Pageview and Vrededorp have been included in the densification proposals and the proposed transport route along High street was diverted to include future development of these decayed areas.
The Strategic Framework consistently uses a distances to the BRT and does not take into account the topography that would increase the time taken to walk the 400 and 800m distances	The actual walkability is influenced by slope as well as by street/block configuration, and varies from station to station. The revised SAF proposals are influenced to a large extent by these more localised influences. On average the intensification areas are 500m walkable distance from the existing BRT route and the proposed transit stops along high street in Brixton and Pageview areas.

Figure 6.4: Example of the summary of comments compiled by the project team (CoJ, 2014b).

The table illustrates that the project team was not only defending themselves, but also at times, truly taking the comments into consideration and stating how the comment has or has not affected the SAF. The problem with responding in this format is that the project team could easily omit a comment or only respond to part of a comment. However, in general the project team commented with enough detail to understand why they decided or not decided to use the suggestion or comment.

It is important to remember that there were focus group sessions where residents could debate about issues and draw on maps; this was also taken into consideration by the project team, however I am not able to analyse this as there is no clear record of what took place in those meetings.

6.2.6 Changes in the CoF content after resident mobilisation



Map 6.5: March 2014 draft of the SAF (2nd draft), illustrating the densification areas (CoF, 2014).

Comparing map 6.4 to 6.5, it can be argued that the CoF proposals changed substantially. Keet (2014) noted that “the community and us [UJ] had a huge influence on the final document”. Schaerer (2014) reiterated Keet stating that “[Iyer] drastically changed the plan; they cut back on a lot”.

The main change, as seen in the March 2014 draft, was in the extent, level and process of densification. The densification is now focused around the BRT trunk route (Empire) and the proposed extension to the BRT along High Street in Brixton. The level of densification in the first plan went up to 500 dwelling units per hectare (dph) (about 6 – 8 storeys) in areas such as Westdene, Auckland Park, and Richmond. The majority of the remainder of the study area was proposed to be 120 – 200 dph (4 – 6 storeys). The highest density now proposed is in the region of 160 – 250 dph as opposed to 500 dph. That is half the highest densities proposed in the first draft SAF. The majority of the densification proposed is between 101 – 160 dph. This is a drastic decrease in the level of densification.

The type of housing typologies envisioned and how that typology can be reached (the process of densification) was also changed. In the first draft only medium and high-rise typologies were shown, no incremental images were presented (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). The task group (2013) argued there were many other ways of densifying. The project team explored other options of how densification could take place. Van der Westhuizen (2014) stated:

“[Hanger] came up with a whole series of typologies to visualise the different density options. That became a very good tool, those three dimensional graphics”

The new images and the way densification was to take place is shown in the images below. The project team also stated a rough figure of what the typology would be worth and an approximate amount the rent would be for a unit. The public was more receptive to these images as they were of an incremental nature, showing how the final typology could be reached and that densification did not only have to occur through the construction of medium and high-rise buildings.




Figure 6.5: Densification typologies and stages shown in the March 2014 draft (CoF, 2014).

The suggestions made regarding densifying strategic areas such as Thornton Avenue and Caroline Street as opposed to whole suburbs was taken on board. The densification has been completely removed from Melville in the second draft. One of the reasons for this could be that many of the Melville residents were opposed to the CoF, therefore removing their suburb from the plan in the short term may prevent the residents from stalling the CoF and potentially derailing it. It is also apparent that the NMT route no longer continues down High Street but is converted to join Caroline Street, which was marked out by residents as an important route taken between Brixton and Braamfontein.

The suggestion of closing Twickernam Avenue and dedicating it as a pedestrian connection between the two UJ campuses (it is surmised that UJ made this suggestion as this is what their masterplan states) was not taken on board. The project team noted that the reason for this is that there is a school there which requires access (CoJ, 2014b).

According to Schaerer (2014) there was a point in the process where there were diverging ideas in the task group in terms of what should happen along UJ's edges. The professionals and community members on the task group wanted the edges of UJ to be densified in order to make the University more engaging with the surrounding neighbourhoods. The University was completely against this proposal and apparently the Ward Councillor was supporting UJ. In the end, the project team decided to heed to the advice of the professionals and the community members in the task group and propose that the edges of UJ facing Kingsway get densified.

In terms of the issue relating to the need for 28,000 beds by UJ, the project team stated they obtained this figure from a report conducted by the Minister of Higher Education (Dube, 2015). They acknowledged that the number may have been inaccurate and removed it from the document. However, it was stated that this made little difference as the CoF was never only about student accommodation but for all types of housing and groups (Dube, 2015; CoJ, 2014b).

The concerns raised by the residents and task group relating to social housing, its funding and location was not addressed by the project team. The revised document does not show any consideration for the concern: it does not provide the location or state explicitly how it can be implemented. Instead, a list of incentives and financing options is provided in the final draft SAF and states that mechanisms need to be explored by the CoJ. The task group and many residents are not content that these details are not in the SAF; however, the project team argues this forms part of the next phase of the process which regards specific precinct plans and projects. These plans and projects are meant to be developed in a participatory manner (Dube, 2015).

The CTSPD is seeking out appropriate locations for social housing at the moment (late 2014, early 2015) with the Johannesburg Social Housing Company (Joshco)²⁰. Furthermore, the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) has received an expanded mandate to assist implement CoF where they are to develop partnerships and provide incentives for developers to carry out development in the identified corridors. These processes are still ‘kicking off’ internally. It is hoped that once specific projects and sites have been selected that participation will occur. This will probably be the case as this is one of the functions of the specific ‘Development Facilitation Unit’ currently (February 2015) being established within the JDA, with the specific mandate to ensure there is community buy-in and to manage stakeholder relations. This unit will also ensure that the core principles and objective of the CoF are adhered to in the developments which occur in the Corridors. What is evident from this discussion is that even though the CoF document does not state everything about implementation the CoJ is in the process of setting up the appropriate mechanism, with whole new units being dedicated to implementing the CoF. Therefore, the CoJ is expanding capacity.

Having said that, it is problematic that the broad SAF does not provide at least an indication of potential locations for social housing – especially considering the underlying principles of the policy – or state how this can take place and ensure developers do not only construct middle and upper income housing. This is one of the more contentious issues that the CoJ would have to deal with in this process. Furthermore, due to the fact that it is not represented spatially there was no opportunity for residents to have input. The project team may have left out these details because they might have been concerned it would disrupt the process further (which was finally moving), however, ironing out the issues and discussing it sooner rather than later is a better option, because when these locations are presented to the public they may conger up more opposition leading to further delays.

The underpass connecting UJ to Campus Square, which was proposed in the first draft, was removed. Instead various options are being explored in terms of constructing a bridge over the intersection and adjusting UJ access points (UJ, 2014). This is one of the priority projects and is being done by the JDA, Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) and UJ. According to Keet (2014) this specific project has had quite a substantial amount of community input and has been developed in a collaborative manner. This points out that in many cases the CoJ may be planning on conducting more detailed participation at the individual project level (Dube, 2015; Hanger, 2014).

²⁰ Joshco is an entity of the CoJ. It provides affordable, sustainable social housing. They are responsible for the construction and management of social housing developed by the CoJ.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Gamcon consultants deviated substantially from the precinct plans in their initial draft (Venter, 2014). However, after the backlash Venter stated that “we really stuck to those plans at the second attempt”. Hanger (2014) pointed out that they completely considered the other plans in the area such as the precinct plans and the UJ masterplan. These various proposals coming out of the SAF were aligned with many of the aspects in these policies. “All of those studies did play a role in shaping the final plan” (Hanger, 2014).

The issues regarding the phasing (and the ‘donut effect’ some were concerned about) were not changed in the second draft. The CoF document still states that if a development application is received for an area marked as a later phase than what the CoJ is currently implementing they will approve it, if it is in line with the CoF principles and guidelines. However, with the drastic reduction in and the restructuring of the densification zones, means that the ‘donut effect’ should be limited. In other words, the densification zones are in areas close to the BRT route and main roads, not in the core of suburbs. Therefore, it can be argued that this issue was addressed by the project team by reducing the densification area and focusing it around the BRT routes and main roads.

The later drafts of the SAF have a more detailed section on heritage. Furthermore, the CTSPD has initiated a heritage assessment for the entire affected area. These studies take time to put together; therefore, it was not possible for the project team to wait for the studies to be complete before finalising the SAF. Dube (2015) states that once they have the heritage study they will make any necessary amendments to the SAF. Therefore, even though the heritage issue is not explicitly addressed in the SAF final document, the CTSPD is doing something about it (Dube, 2015).

Many of the residents stated they wanted more detail on the different suburbs and the design guidelines (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014; Task Group, 2013). In the final SAF the guidelines are more detailed compared to those in earlier drafts, incorporating aspects such as building orientation and frontage, building heights, land uses, landscaping/public space, side-building set-backs, building materials, parking, etc. However, Schaerer (2014) and Knight (2014) state that they are still too generic and there should be suburb specific guidelines. The project team state that guidelines for each suburb are not necessary at this stage as each development will be evaluated in terms of its specific context.

Having said that, the external stakeholders did not have the opportunity to be involved in formulating the design guidelines. The image and character of the suburbs is important to the residents (Knight, 2014; Keet, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Task Group, 2013), therefore, not including them in formulating the design guidelines is problematic – even if the guidelines are sound from an

urban design perspective – the external stakeholders should still have an input. As with the City of Albuquerque transport corridor process, the project team included the residents in formulating the design guidelines and this helped them obtain buy-in from the residents and it helps at later stages of the process in that the external stakeholders know that the buildings and developments will comply with the guidelines they were involved in developing, therefore are less likely to respond in a negative way to individual developments (Forester et al, 2013).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the comments received from the lower income areas such as Westbury and Pennyville were mainly operational issues. As Dube (2015) stated, these communities have existing issues that need to be addressed such as stormwater problems and dangerous streets. The majority of the issues raised in these meetings were passed on to the relevant departments (Venter, 2014), however the aspects that could be incorporated into the CoF (discussed below) were. These communities were less concerned about the technical aspects such as density lines and instead provided the project team with issues that they could be address in specific projects. Some of the bigger issues they raised, such as their children not having a safe place to cross Perth road, was turned into a project (Pedestrian Bridge).

Westbury is a focus priority area therefore it has a precinct plan that was developed specifically for it. I was not able to view this precinct plan and it was not available on the internet at the time this was drafted. However, Hanger (2014) informed me that the development of the plan was done in a participatory manner. Hanger (2014) explains:

“we basically did a door to door kind of participation. We are introducing the cycle lanes, NMT routes and upgrading the environment, this means there was scope to actually get the community involved in determining how this should look, things like benches, would they like benches outside their property, or rather a tree or both or what their preferences were so that was basically done with every single household in that area”.

The Westbury community stated they needed a bridge and that there houses were at risk of being hit by speeding cars on Fuel road. The project team addressed these issues by incorporating the bridge into a project as well as placing concrete barriers to protect the houses from cars.

Infrastructure, such as storm water, has been prioritised. According to Ismail (2015) the project team listened to the community requests and needs. Most of the concerns have been incorporated into projects (Ibid). For instance, one of the major issues brought up in the Westbury public meetings was job creation. All projects related to the CoF, as far as possible, employ local residents and use SMME's from the area. Ismail (2015) states that:

“Corridors of Freedom has created a lot of jobs in our community, a lot of SMME’s are getting the projects, because we stood firm and said the contractors will employ the people in our community and now they are getting work...Many of our parks and streets are being upgraded... as we can see today a lot of it is happening”.

What can be seen from the discussion above is that many of the comments and suggestions made on the first draft SAF had a major impact on the content of the SAF. The main points it was influencing were those around densification and how this should take place. It was not only the Ward 69 residents who were having an influence over the content, but the lower income communities. They were not affecting the overall plan such as the Ward 69 residents and the task group but they were influencing what the specific projects in their neighbourhoods would entail, the lower income communities did not have a problem with the overall plan (Ismail, 2015). What is surprising is that they did not ask about social housing. Maybe this is because they are less worried about the location of it compared to the middle income residents, or they have not realised the opportunity the CoF holds for providing better quality housing in their area.

The fact that the lower income residents were having an influence on the outcome of specific projects is at least partly different to what previous studies on participation in Johannesburg have found: that participation generally has no influence on the outcome of a policy, especially if the residents concerned are lower income as they have less of a voice (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008), even if it is minimal.

The explanation for the impact the lower income residents were having could be because the residents would benefit from the projects they had a more co-operative as opposed to antagonistic response to it (their neighbourhood is in desperate need of upliftment and investment). This makes it easier for the project team to work with them and more willing to work with the residents as they did not have major opposing ideas. A second explanation could be a political one in that the Ward Councillor here is an ANC Councillor. This means that local politics is more likely aligned and supportive of the CoJ plans – critical engagement might not have been encouraged in order to prevent criticism and to ensure the CoJ’s plans go forward. A third explanation could be that many of the residents here have a lower education, therefore may have less of an understanding of technical aspects such as densification. Thus the residents mainly commented on detailed aspects (specific projects such as park upgrades) as opposed to the broader strategic vision and what it aims to do. These more specific aspects, such as a bridge, are easier to incorporate compared to rectifying technical aspects.

6.2.7 Comments on March 2014 draft

The comments received for the March 2014 draft were not extensive. They generally pertained to smaller details and were quite localised. The comments below were obtained from the 'summary of comments' compiled by the project team; a response letter from the WRA; and a response email from the Ward Councillor on behalf of the residents of Ward 69.

A large proportion of the comments, once again, pertained to densification. The densification along Ripley Road in Auckland Park is neither promoted nor desirable [a]²¹ (CoJ, 2014b). In Westdene densification in the area north of Westdene dam is not supported [b] (Ibid; WRA, 2014).

Furthermore, the densification south of Westdene dam should be concentrated around Perth road, the area closest to the dam should rather be medium or low density not high density [c] (WRA, 2014). The densification in Westdene should be extended to Motor Street [d] (CoJ, 2014b). The medium density south of Westdene dam should be high density [e].

²¹ The letter in square brackets corresponds to the letters on map 6.4 where the comment is spatially located or an area is shown where the comment is applicable.



Map 6.6: March 2014 draft of the SAF with areas of concern shown (CoF, 2014).

The Ward 69 residents through the Ward Councillor's email stated that the IDP budget indicated that funds have been earmarked for developments such as Westdene Dam. The residents want to see detailed precinct plans before these projects commence, they are still not content with the level of detail they were seeing (Ward Councillor, 2014; Knight 2014). The residents still did not feel that the issues relating to infrastructure have been dealt with effectively (i.e. when the infrastructure is going to be upgraded to support the new development (Ward Councillor, 2014)). The residents were still concerned about phasing and stating that they were worried that "perimeter stands" would be redeveloped before areas such as Thornton, and High Street (Ibid).

While a large proportion of the comments were about suggestions to reduce the densification areas even further, a number of comments were promoting the opposite. For instance, some of the comments in the 'summary of comments' compiled by the project team, stated that the area north of UJ parking should be high density instead of medium [f]. In Rossmore the blocks between Putney Road and Hampton Avenue should form part of the densification proposals [g]. In Crosby the area along Magalies street should be included in the densification area [h] (Ibid). Hamilton Street in Crosby should be a mixed use area [i]. Some are not content that mid-block cut off points for densification are used and it is suggested that entire blocks should be included [example at j].


It is evident that from the comments outlined above that some stakeholders wanted the densification to increase in certain areas. It is not clear who exactly made which comment as the 'summary of comments' compiled by the project team does not state who suggested which comment, it only provides the stakeholders who commented under that specific theme. I would argue that these comments may have come from developers. The reason for this is that Hanger (2014) stated that there were many angry developers because with the changes made to the proposals property they owned did not fall within the new proposed areas. Furthermore Venter (2014) stated that developers wanted the level and extent of densification to be increased. Dube (2015) reiterated this stating that:

"Developers were pushing for more density; communities were pushing for less and less"


Therefore, according to the project team there were diverging ideas in terms of the developers and residents.

6.2.8 The Final Corridors of Freedom Strategic Area Framework

The two maps below illustrate the final CoF SAF proposals which were approved by council in September 2014. Map 6.7 illustrates the consolidated SAF illustrating the densification zones and NMT routes. Map 6.8 shows the level of densification.



Map 6.7: Final consolidated Empire-Perth densification areas (CoF, 2014b).



Map 6.8: Final consolidated Empire-Perth SAF proposals (CoF, 2014b).

Comparing map 6.7 and 6.8 with 6.6, there are virtually no changes to the content: the only difference is the densification south of Westdene dam. The project team took the residents advice and made only the area along Perth road a high density zone. The issues some of the external stakeholders raised regarding the need for more detailed precinct plans were partly met. Five Priority Precincts were chosen to focus on in the short term (Auckland Park; Brixton; Westbury; Milpark; and Pennyville). These suburbs have separate plans which are slightly more detailed and which specify key projects in that area. The CoF SAF has always included a section on implementation which deals with the cost of projects and who will carry them out. The final draft SAF makes this section easier to understand in terms of what the project is, how much it will cost and who is responsible for carrying it out.

The aspect relating to heritage and the continued concern for the impact the proposals will have on heritage have not been addressed in the final SAF, it is the same as in the previous draft. However, the document clearly notes that an in-depth heritage study of all three proposed corridors is being undertaken to understand the exact impact. Thus, the issue is being addressed. Other than that the final plan is almost identical to the March 2014 draft.

This means that the project team did not listen to the plea from developers (or rather 'pro densification activists') to increase the densities in various areas. This is an interesting finding as I initially thought the project team would listen more to developers - because they are the ones who are eventually going to implement much of the CoF; and previous research has found that most of the time developers get what they want when it comes to densification plans (Woodcock et al, 2009).

The way the project team responded to some of the comments that did not affect the content was, for example, the suggestion for densification to extent from Perth Road to Motor Street in Westdene, the project team responded that

"the merit to this proposal has not been clarified or submitted. The midblock density cuts ensures that there is proper scaling down of densities towards the low rise neighbourhoods" (CoJ, 2014b).

Their response to the comment stating that the block directly north of UJ parking should be high not medium density was

"the area behind the parking is seen as a scaling down use from the high intensity uses proposed for UJ parking. The intermediate density is seen to be more appropriate for the area. The plan will remain unchanged" (CoJ, 2014b).

In most instances the comments were of this nature in response to proposals which were not accepted. As can be seen in these comments, it appears that the project team genuinely considered the proposals, however decided that for the purpose of the plan it may not be suitable. Therefore, they often provided a reason for why the comment did not influence a change in the content, it was not just disregarded.

6.3 WHAT WERE EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS PARTICIPATING IN AND INFLUENCING?

The external stakeholders have been participating in detailed aspects relating to the content of the CoF: where the density lines are drawn, where the density cuts points should occur, and which are the best routes for the NMT network. The external stakeholders were not participating in what the broader vision, principles, and objectives of the CoF should be. They were not included in the discussions of where corridors should be located. These were decisions that were made internally by City officials and politicians and these decisions were guided by the NDP, UNS, and GDS 2040.

The fact that the public did not participate in these foundational aspects of the CoF is important to discuss further. As mentioned in previous chapters, the vision for the CoF came from the Joburg GDS 2040 which, on a broad level, aims to create a *resilient, liveable, and sustainable* city which addresses the inequalities caused by apartheid (for more detailed discussions of the Joburg GDS 2040 see Groesser, 2013; Peens, 2013). As a spatial policy the CoF adopts the principles of Transit Oriented Development (TOD) and Corridor Development to achieve some of the objectives outlined in the GDS 2040 (see Simoes, 2014 for a detailed account of this). Consequently, the principles and objectives in the CoF are primarily derived from those of TOD and corridor development in order to overcome spatial inequality and provide more accessible, inclusive, mixed-use developments. These are broader City objectives that are also outlined in the Integrated Transport Plan (2013), the IDP, and SDF at the City level and in the UNS and NDP at a national level. Therefore, external stakeholders are not going to have an influence over this broader vision and the principles because it is defined in numerous city and national policies.

The external stakeholders also did not participate in deciding where the corridors would be located because this was defined based on existing and proposed BRT routes. Burby (1968) points out an important aspect which is of relevance here, he states that proponents of participation often overlook that the public cannot always participate in every single decision as some decisions may require high technical competencies or decisions have to be made by government for the greater good / public interest. If it is left up to the public those most vocal will dominate and the status quo will be entrenched, therefore there are certain decisions the state has to make behind closed doors.

It is essential to highlight that many external stakeholders felt it was not necessary to participate in defining the vision, the principles and objectives. As Schaerer (2014) explained:

“Not many people had objections to the broader picture, people understand why it is necessary...in general we weren’t allowed to change the broader picture and I don’t think anybody tried to object”.

It is clear from this comment that there was an understanding by some (especially those in the task group) as to why this has to happen. However, some of the comments made in the public meetings and in RA meetings suggest that not everyone would agree on the principles and vision, with comments such as:

“Why are the density increases being proposed in middle class neighbourhoods and the areas which require improvement such as the area behind the SABC not being considered?”

“Why are you not developing in the rural areas improving their systems and transport out there? Why not take people out of the city and not bring them in?”

According to van der Westhuizen (2014) these types of comments also occurred in the RA meetings with people stating “we have so much space in South Africa why don’t we just take them out there”.

Even if the vision and principles were up for discussion, the CoJ would presumably not change its policies to reflect these ideas which support and entrench the status quo. Firstly, it would be going against the principles outlined in the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (2013) which lays the foundation of spatial planning principles in South Africa. The point is the principles are almost unquestionable.

The residents were also not having an influence over where and how social housing would be implemented. This is a core element of the CoF and not including the external stakeholders in these discussions is of major concern. The project team seems like they were avoiding the matter as members of the task group asked on numerous occasions how the social housing is going to be implemented and where it would be located but this matter was always avoided (Schaerer, 2014).

The design guidelines were also not up for discussion. The external stakeholders wanted to be involved in the formulation of the guidelines but they never were included. This was a lost opportunity in my view as it is something which can be debated and where compromises can be made (as was the case with how densification would occur). The residents being involved in formulating the guidelines was a key element in the success of the Albuquerque corridor process (Forester, 2013).

Getting back to what the public were influencing, I argue that these may appear to be small details, however, they are essential aspects. The reason for this is because influencing the density lines, extent of densification and density levels, essentially affects the level of transformation and where it takes place. For instance, as a result of public participation areas such as Melville and the core of most suburbs got removed from the densification proposals. To a certain degree the status quo has been preserved as densification has been concentrated to certain areas. I am not arguing that all the suburbs should have stayed in the densification zones, I am trying to illustrate that having an influence over the density lines and level of densification is highly significant. Furthermore, the local knowledge of the external stakeholders assisted the project team in developing a more realistic plan and policy.

The lower income communities were not having a drastic influence on the overall content of the plan such as density lines – they were not concerned about influencing this (Ismail, 2015). They were influencing what specific projects would take place such the bridge over Fuel road, barriers between BRT route and houses, upgrading of certain parks, and the upgrading of stormwater infrastructure. Even though what they were influencing was not the overall plan they were influencing crucial aspects in projects which greatly affect the quality of life for the residents in Westbury, Newclare, Coronationville areas. However, once again they were not asked about the vexing issue of social housing and how the residents living in the lower income areas could potentially benefit.

It can be argued that to overcome the spatial inequality caused by apartheid planning, a policy just as grand needs to be proposed to rectify it. The proposals in the final policy are not grand or extreme, in actual fact they are quite modest, this is largely as a result of public participation. This illuminates an issue Benit-Gbaffou (2008) points out that the need for social integration, redistribution, and reconciliation may be endangered by fully-fledged participation. It is clear the CoF was watered down; substantially reducing its transformative potential (this is putting aside all the technical ‘errors’ of the CoF). The fact that social housing or lower income housing is hardly mentioned in the CoF document – especially spatially – is of major concern because this may prevent the transformative potential of the CoF as it has not explicitly dealt with this issue. What it shows the outside reader is that this has not been thought about (even if it has).

6.3.1 How the project team viewed the changes

The changes made to the Corridors of Freedom content were quite extreme as seen in the sections above. How the project team felt about these changes and the final SAF is briefly discussed in this section.

Dube (2015) admits that the changes made to the content may have been too drastic. The densification reduced substantially more than what the project team would have liked. However, she argues that:

“I wouldn’t say that we don’t achieve what we intended but the change was a bit drastic.”

Dube (2015) stated that by reducing the level and extent of densification it just means the target will be reached sooner (because the target is lower). In other words, suburbs are changing, the urban form is changing, therefore in 100 years these suburbs could all comprise of 4 – 8 storey buildings, it all depends on the timeframe we are looking at.

Venter (2014) stated that the densification came down to such a level that this is where it would probably land up in 40 years without a plan. To explain, the natural growth rates would have caused the area to densify in this manner anyway. In Venter (2014) words:

“if you had just left Empire-Perth the natural growth in any case in 40 years would get there [80,000 extra people], maybe not catering for all income groups but the density would get there naturally”.

It is clear from Dube and Venter’s perspective that the level of densification may have come down too much. Dube states

“a lot of it was a compromise in some instances...but for the short term we are achieving the right densities to support the public transport initiatives”.

The sentiment I picked up is that the project team was not overly content with the level of changes they had to make but they do not deem it compromised what they set out to achieve.

6.4 THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

It has been argued that Arnstein's Ladder of Participation is too normative to evaluate a whole participatory process and it is not always possible to locate the whole entire process on the ladder. At certain stages the level of participation may be higher than at other stages (Cornwall, 2008). However, it provides an understanding to see what level of participation was reached in the various meetings. In the case of this process there were two broad types of meetings: public meetings and focus group sessions.

The public meetings, those which took place before and after the change in the process were *consultation* sessions. They were not highly effective at creating two-way dialogue (Knight, 2014) and high quality suggestions / input were not obtained from these sessions (Venter, 2014). They were effective spaces for allowing external stakeholders to gain a broad understanding of what the CoF was about and they were effective in contributing to resident's mobilisation. The first public meeting had an influence over the content in that the level of densification was reduced, but the extent of densification was not (still proposed 'blanket densification').

In the various focus group meetings the external stakeholders were able to engage on a much deeper level compared to the general public meetings (discussed in chapter 5). What was up for discussion were aspects relating to details, in other words density line, cut points, level of densification, and NMT routes. I have argued that it is quite significant to have an influence over the level and extent of densification and where it should occur. Based on this and the nature of the focus group meetings (see chapter 5) I argue that the level of participation reach on Arnstein (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation is 'placation' with some elements of 'partnership'.

The reason for this is that the members of the task group were *negotiating* over space and each side were making *trade-offs*, however the project team still had the power to decide the feasibility or legitimacy of the proposal set forth by the external stakeholders. It is evident from this chapter that the proposals of where the task group were suggesting densification and where it should be removed were largely being listened to, to such an extent that the project team deems they may have decreased the density too much. This shows that the project team let go of a small amount of power but retained most of it in that they made the final decision. Furthermore, the participants in the meeting felt they were being listened to and their suggestions being taken on board.

It is important to note that the level of participation reached is more placation than partnership because it was not the City who initiated this partnership from the very start, the residents initiated the negotiations or 'partnership' by demanding a new, more open process (Arnstein, 1969). This

arrangement emerged out of a highly tokenistic process. It was a backlash which led to this arrangement; it was a compromise that had to be made by the CoJ in order to ensure the CoF would be delivered in an acceptable timeframe.

What also brought down the level of participation is that after the last focus group sessions, after the last public meeting, and the open day the public did not obtain any feedback of what was happening (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). Some of the external stakeholders wanted to see the final proposals before they went to council for approval, mainly to ensure aspects such as social housing was addressed and that the design guidelines were appropriate; however this did not happen (Knight, 2014; Schaerer, 2014; Ward Councillor, 2014). This illustrates, in my view, that there was not a strong partnership forged here as the CoJ held onto their power and only released small bits when they felt it was necessary. Knight (2014) stated that the participation process was not ended properly and if there was a meeting or two on the framework sent to Council it would have been an excellent participation process. In Knight's words:

“If we got to see the final plans before they went to Council I think we all could have given ourselves a pat on the back and said you know that was a very good public participation we are all very happy with what's going to happen”

In the project team's defence, as can be seen by draft two compared to the final draft there is virtually no change in the content. So technically the public had seen the 'final draft proposals' before they went to council. However, the external stakeholders were unaware that it was basically going to be the March 2014 draft that would be the final product²². This should have been communicated to the external stakeholders so they were aware. Although most of the external stakeholders would not be happy until they saw the details they were asking for (very detailed precinct plans, specific guidelines for each suburb, and the exact location of social housing), this did not really appear in the final draft. The level of detail asked for was not provided.

Even though there were various issues with this participation process (in the initial process and the revised process: lack of communication at times and the external stakeholders not having a chance to look at the final draft before it was sent to council) Dube (2015) states that:

“based on the participation processes that we have done this was the most intense, I've never done participation, from a participation point of view, like what has happened in Empire-Perth”

²² Other aspects changed for instance the analysis was more refined, the implementation section had more detail, but the actual SAF proposal was basically identical.

Venter (2014) also stated that he has never been involved in such an intensive public participation process. Therefore, it is evident that even though this participation process was not been perfect, in relation to how participation usually takes place and how officials and consultants usually carry it out this was viewed as one of the most intensive processes the project team has been involved in. This is a massive achievement and illustrates the backlash and initial participation definitely had a strong influence on the policy-making process.

What this discussion points to is what Alfasi (2003) argued – Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation tends to ignore the influence that more tokenistic forms of participation may have. In this process the citizens did not have full control, the project team made the ultimate decision of what to submit to Council, but in this specific case the project team decided to listen to most of the suggestions of the task group, Ward 69 residents, and the Westbury residents. Thus the participation had quite a substantial impact. They decided to listen for various reasons: to avoid derailment; realisation there were flaws with the process and content; realisation that the external stakeholders could offer useful insights; and a realisation that they could not move forward with implementation with 100% negativity towards the CoF. But in another process the participation could also be tokenistic but the project team in a different case may decide not to listen to the external stakeholders, therefore the external stakeholders would have less influence. Thus, we need to look at each process specifically and understand the context, as a tokenistic process may still have a high influence on the content – as was the case with the Empire-Perth CoF SAF.

6.5 CONCLUSION

The findings in this chapter support Hanna’s (2000) argument that researchers who are investigating the role of participation and the influence of it on a project or policy, often look for obvious forms of inclusion such as public meetings, extensive participation programs, and decision-making committees. However, other forms of information often have a major impact. This was the case in the CoF process in that the task group and other external stakeholders such as the WRA and UJ sent reports and response letters to the project team with comments and suggestions. Many of the suggestions made in these reports were taken into consideration by the project team and some of them had an influence on the content. If I only investigated the public meeting and focus group session the findings would have come out different as the influence may not have been as great. Therefore, as Hanna (2000) argues it is essential to look for all kinds of information that may have had an influence on the content or process.

The chapter has explored the influence the participation process had on the content of the Empire-Perth Development Corridor. Participation has had a drastic influence over the content of the CoF,

especially relating to the level and extent of densification. Hanssen and Falleth (2014) argued that it is incredibly difficult for the public to have an influence over policies once they are headed in a certain direction. They state that once a policy is on a certain course it is like a 'tank ship', meaning that once it is on a particular course it is virtually impossible to correct it, any influence by external stakeholders is considered modest at best. However, the findings of this research illustrate that the public were able to change the content of a policy and the direction it was moving in quite drastically.

It seems like the broader relations of how the public and the CoJ relate to each other, at least in this process, have changed. The reason for this is that, even though the participation did not reach partnership in the formulation of the content, the JDA has a mandate to ensure public buy-in and stakeholder engagement in the next phases of the process (this is one of the primary functions of the specifically set up Development Facilitation Unit in the JDA). The project team and CoJ are now also well aware of the fact that external stakeholders can easily derail a process – especially where residents have strong networks, technical knowhow and resources.

A point which comes through in this chapter which requires re-emphasising is that of diverging ideas. It is clear that within the external stakeholders some were pro densification and wanting densification to be pushed as far as possible and there those who wanted densification to be concentrated in certain areas (more strategic) and some who wanted no densification. These are diverging standpoints which the project team essentially had to decide on. As Dube (2015) states "as the City you have to look at the broader level and what is in the interest of the public, and make a decision based on that". What can be seen from the findings is that the project team heeded to the suggestions of those who wanted to concentrate densification as opposed to those who wanted to push densification as far as possible. There was also a difference in what the lower and middle to upper residents were influencing. The lower income residents were not overly concerned about the broader plan of where densification was taking place but were more concerned about everyday on-the-ground aspects such as job creation and the upliftment of their community.

From this chapter and chapter 5 it is apparent that a more co-operative approach and strategy worked in favour of the task group and the residents of Ward 69, they were able to affect the process and the content in a drastic manner. In essence the task group and residents of Ward 69 won most of the battle. However, there are still unanswered questions regarding social housing and design guidelines.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion and Recommendation

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous three chapters have unpacked the Corridors of Freedom Empire-Perth participation process in order to determine the influence this had on the policy-making process as well as the content. From these chapters it can be concluded that this was a highly challenging process, however, participation had an influence on the policy-making process as well as the content of the CoF. This chapter is aimed at drawing conclusions from the previous three chapters and tying them together. These findings are linked back to the literature outlined in chapter 2 in order to assist understand participation in a big process such as the CoF. Recommendations are drawn out from some of the conclusions. The chapter also provides what future research is required to deepen our understanding of the topics related to this research. The report ends with some personal reflections and lessons I have learnt from the research.

7.2 TYING THE PROCESS TOGETHER

The policy-making process of the Empire-Perth CoF was initially working in a highly closed off and technocratic manner. The project team were basing their proposals on what they saw as a 'rational analysis', which is the primary characteristic of a technocratic policy process (Linder and Peters, 1989). The decisions in this type of a process are made in a top-down manner and announced to the public once they have already been made (Corkery et al, 1995). Furthermore, this approach aims to sanitise the process from so called 'irrational politics' (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). All these elements were present in the CoF policy-making process. It is important to point out that even though, from an outside or public participation perspective, the process was a rational technocratic one, it was still highly complex in the sense that inter-departmental co-ordination was being attempted, co-operation between other consultants working on other projects and proposals was also being attempted: this points to evidence of a governance process, in the sense that "the essence of governance is the interactive relationship *between* and *within* government and non-governmental forces" [emphasis added] (Soker1998: 38 cited in Rakodi, 2003). It can be seen that half the requirements of a governance process were present in the initial phases: it was not only the CTSPD and consultants working on the CoF as they were making attempts to co-operate with internal stakeholder, however this was a mammoth task and evidence from the first public meeting and from Venter (2014) suggests it was not excessively successful.

The above situation coupled with the fact that the consultants and the CTSPD were not sure how to develop such a spatial policy makes it extremely challenging to understand what was required. The tight timeframes and immense political push meant the project team did not have much time to brainstorm how to move forward. In this type of a situation participation would never be an important part of the process because it would add a layer of complexity and take a substantial amount of time (Innes and Booher, 2004) which the project team initially thought it could not afford.

Participation is a legal requirement in South Africa; therefore the project team had to conduct participation. Even though it is a legal requirement, in general City officials do not set the bar high for participation because they are frustrated with it (Everatt et al, 2010) and see it as a time consuming exercise which reaps few useful results. The way the CTSPD framed participation in the CoF process illustrates the officials here do not see much value in it as participation was framed in a way to get it done quickly with as little disruption as possible to the way the process was being run. Under the circumstances outlined above it can be seen the reason the project team decided to use a more technocratic rational process: it was so complex without participation and they initially saw little value in an extensive participation process.

Once the project team got to the participation process, there were many factors inhibiting them in the public meeting. One of the less obvious ones was ineffectiveness of inter-departmental relations. The effect this had on the initial participation meetings was that many assumptions had to be made because the project team in some cases was not able to effectively work with all departments. The project team did not know exactly what other departments had planned for the future; therefore, in the first two public meetings when participants asked about specifics such as infrastructure: “the consultants and the CoJ had few answers” (van der Westhuizen 2014). The lack of co-ordination between departments contributed hugely towards diminishing the trust and faith the residents had in the project team, because it appears as if the project team has not done their “homework”. The research shows that under the difficult circumstances the project team tried their best but the public want solid answers and details in these types of projects (Woodcock et al, 2009). Something the project team were unable to provide because of the lack of co-ordination between departments.

The fact that the project team derived their proposals from a technocratic modelling analysis, there proposals did not consider the context in which they were planning. As Lee (1973) argues, the technocratic process is usually based on generic assumptions of how a system works as opposed to real-world everyday experiences of people living in the area. Moreover, the technocratic rational method generally results in the oversimplification of complex issues, thus oversimplified plans and policies are created (Faludi, 1973: cited in Lane, 2006). This was the case with the CoF in that it just

proposed densification in areas within an 800 metre walking distance from a BRT station (or it seemed this way to the external stakeholders), but contextual factors such as heritage, the nature of the current suburbs, topography were not considered. This resulted in a plan that could be heavily criticised.

The way the proposals were presented to the participants in the meetings also inhibited the project team. Even though Venter (2014) deems the representations did not play a major role in the backlash, I argued that this was one of the main reasons the residents reacted the way they did. I agree with Adams et al (2013) and Bosselman (1998) that images shown to the public elicit a response. Bosselman stated images of proposals need to be accurate, engaging and detailed, and understandable. Most of these elements were missing in the graphics shown to the public in the initial meetings.

All the above mentioned factors taken together meant the project team had a flawed process and flawed content from an external stakeholder perspective. Webber (1983: cited in Lane, 2006) argues that the only way the classic top-down planning model can work is if there is no contestation over what is being proposed. However, in this case there was definitely no agreement over what was being proposed or the way the process was running. Thus, the CoJ's attempt at including as little participation as possible initially to save time and prevent more complexity, backfired in that it stalled the process by almost a year and caused the CoF to nearly be derailed.

When looking back at how the initial policy-making process was framed it was evidently not in line with the new paradigm of participatory and collaborative planning which forms a major part of strategic spatial planning (Healey, 1998) and dominates the discourse and practices of planning in the 21st century. It has been argued that these more technocratic types of planning processes are still occurring today partly because of neoliberalisation and NPM, which is associated with technicising and professionalising the policy process (Satge, 2009). NPM cynics argue it contributes to the obliteration of democracy; the reason for this is that NPM aims to downplay politics in public processes (Ott and Boonyarak, 2001). The NPM and neoliberalisation trend, therefore greatly threatens the governance paradigm and participation by external stakeholders. This partly explains why the process was closed off to external stakeholders because the policy formulation was outsourced to a consultancy firm.

The research pointed to an issue that is only starting to emerge in the literature. That is of how participation is affected by outsourcing and using consultants to formulate public policies. The findings of this research illustrate that although the CTSPD outsourced the development of the

policy, they were still quite involved in the process. The CTSPD had the final say and could inform the consultants to change whatever they deemed necessary (Venter, 2014). Therefore, the consultants did not have full power over the process and content as Grijzen (2010) stated occurs in most outsourcing situations. Hassen and Falleth (2014) argue that what seems to be the case is that the increasing use of consultants has resulted in policy processes becoming more closed off to external stakeholders and civil society, the findings in this research corroborate with this. The reason for this is that the relationship between the client (City Council) and the consultant is usually grounded by a brief or tender. The tender, in this case, did not provide specifics on participation and did not provide enough time for a meaningful participation process. It was vague and did not provide a definition of what is meant by participation nor what the role of civil society and external stakeholders should be in the process – a similar issue that Owen (1998) found in his research. As was seen in Cornwall (2008) participation can be defined in many ways and it can be interpreted in a way that inhibits genuine participation. A consultant will only do what they are paid to do (which is completely understandable) and what the tender states they should do. Thus, aspects such as participation will generally not be done at freewill.

A Further contributing factor to the lack of participation was time. The CTSPD provided the project team with only a few months to formulate the whole policy. This was quite unrealistic on the CTSPD side but the consultants could have turned the offer down or simply did not have to bid for the tender if they thought the timeframe was ridiculous. Consultants are in a position to negotiate with their client on timeframes and they should make it clear that for them to do their work properly they require X amount of months; otherwise they cannot do the project. Forester et al (2011) illustrates how a consultant stated the ground rules in terms of what they are required to do in order to carry the project out properly and if the Council was not prepared to do what was asked they would not work on the project.

For a process that started on such a bad foot with many internal challenges, it is surprising to see that participation became one of the defining factors of this process and much of the content of the Empire-Perth CoF SAF. This, however, did not come without a fight. The research clearly illustrated how participants moved between different spaces of participation and created new spaces to ensure that their voice was heard. The ineffective invited space led residents to mobilise which created an invented space of participation. This evidently demonstrates what Cornwall (2002) argues, that invited spaces may be produced by authorities in power, but these spaces can be filled with individuals who do not share the same vision. These alternative visions can transform the invited spaces possibilities (Cornwall, 2002). The CoF invited space of participation became a space where

residents realised they had to do something to change the direction of the process and content of the CoF. It was a space that led to the creation of an invented space, as Cornwall (2002) posits, the most nominal tokenistic efforts at involving external stakeholders can be used as a lever to produce more space for participation to take place. The task group was formed as a result of the extremely tokenistic space provided. This finding also correlates to Masiko-Kambala et al (2012) argument that invented and invited spaces of participation cannot be viewed as mutually exclusive spaces as they usually co-exist and overlap creating and shaping one another.

Previous research has found that public meetings / hearings are ineffective as spaces for participation that lead to an influence on the content of policies (Winkler, 2011; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; Innes and Booher, 2004; King et al, 1998: cited in Shipley and Utz, 2012). This research found that the public meetings indeed had a slight influence over the content of the policy – the level of densification was reduced. Furthermore, they were effective at alerting the external stakeholders that they had to mobilise to change the process and content – therefore it served an important purpose (a different one to what was anticipated by the project team). The public meetings did not help the project team and left almost all the participants frustrated. It actually inhibited the project team and contributed to the backlash because residents felt they were not being listened to in that space.

The most deliberative format of participation in this process was the smaller focus group sessions. The external stakeholders felt they could express their concerns in this space and explain themselves. They felt they were being listened to and heard and the external stakeholders were able to have a deeper conversation with the project team where they were able to ‘negotiate’ and build a relationship. The project team felt the same about the focus group sessions. They stated they obtained more useful information from these sessions and the project team could explain their proposals better. In these sessions the external stakeholders were able to draw on and engage with the proposals. It was after these focus group sessions and the report sent to the project team that the changes started to occur to the content of the policy.

The research showed that it was not only the middle to upper income communities participating but also the lower income communities. However, their views of the CoF differed substantially. The extent and depth of participation also differed substantially. The lower income communities did not seem to have an issue with the overall CoF concept. We can explain this by several factors: because they had much to gain (e.g. better quality public spaces, streets, and investment which they currently do not have), and because they were more concerned about issues they had in their communities. Further reasons could include that the lower income residents have a lower education

and less design knowledge to be able to contest the proposals and to see the full consequences thereof. The Ward Councillor, who is an ANC Councillor, may not have been pointing to the flaws in the proposals such as an opposition party Councillor would have. This means the depth of participation in the lower income communities was less. They were having an influence on very specific details that could help the project team in formulating the projects.

It was mainly the middle to upper income groups, who were the most affected, who did not like the idea of the CoF or how it was being carried out, but the sentiment was mixed in that some residents fully supported the idea such as in Parktown and many residents in the task group. It is clear that developers were pushing hard for more densification while the communities were generally pushing for less.

What is surprising is that the project team listened to the residents not the developers. The residents wanted the densification to be concentrated around the BRT routes and main routes in order to protect the core of the suburbs. The project team decided to keep densification concentrated to these areas because the residents, who have the ability to derail the process, would not agree to have densification in the core of the suburbs or 800 metres away from the BRT route. Some developers did not have landholdings in these areas but rather in the core of some suburbs or on the outskirts of the study area. Thus the project team did not consider their plea to extend the densification zones as the project team and task group / residents came to an agreement to protect the character of the core of the suburbs – to mitigate against further opposition. It is unusual for a City Council to not listen to the developers because often it is developers who get their way when it comes to densification projects (Woodcock et al, 2009) as they play a central role in the realisation of these policies. But, I suspect to prevent derailment or further opposition in this process the project team had to make compromises.

I would argue that in general the residents from the lower income areas as well as the middle to upper income areas got their way, to some extent, in terms of the final product. Even though many residents are still not completely content with the outcome and how the process ended, they still got 80% of the densification removed. Because the CoJ is currently at the implementation phase in Westbury almost all of their concerns were adopted and converted into projects and real changes are taking place (Dube, 2015; Ismail, 2015). As Ismail (2015) stated: “we are over over happy”. Having said that, there are a few crucial aspects the external stakeholders did not have an opportunity to be involved in; these include the design guidelines and the social housing. The CoF SAF does not deal extensively with social housing; this is a concern considering the underlying

objectives of the CoF. May be the CoJ will include the public in these decisions in the implementation phase – only time will tell.

What the research has illuminated is that corridor development which incorporates densification proposals and has broader objectives of restructuring cities needs to be approached with caution. As Burby (2003) points out, these unwanted policies often mobilise latent publics who try to ensure these policies are squashed. This was also shown in Foresters et al (2013) research on a corridor development process where there was also major opposition and the residents were able to stop the process until they were brought on as partners. Woodcock et al (2009) states that one of the main factors constraining the state from achieving neighbourhood densification is NIMBYsm and opposition. These types of policies are some of the most controversial and difficult to carry out in planning (Forester et al, 2013; Woodcock, 2009; Burby, 2003). Therefore, the project team could not have chosen a worse approach, initially, to formulate this policy. However, they approached the backlash in an almost submissive manner which I deem was the best way they could react because if they stuck to the original process I highly doubt there would be an Empire-Perth corridor today. After the process opened up, the project team contained the discussion to certain aspects including: density lines, the process for densification to take place, the best routes for NMT, and what should be included in projects, but the policy principles and objectives itself were not up for discussion, they managed to stick to what the policy was all about which is a great accomplishment for the project team.

7.3 BROADER FACTORS INFLUENCED BY THE PARTICIPATION PROCESS

The previous three chapters demonstrate that the participation had a substantial influence on the policy-making process as well as the content of the CoF. However, it became apparent that there were other aspects which were also influenced by the participation process. These are factors that go beyond the CoF and illustrate the positive effects that emerged out of this testing process.

The first major influence the CoF had is that it fostered community building. The communities surrounding UJ and UJ did not have a good relationship (Box 5.2). The relationship was highly antagonistic within the 'community' affected by the CoF. The surrounding communities blamed the University for the influx of students and the rise of communes in the area which has allegedly decreased property values. What the CoF process did was bring the University and the communities together to work on a common goal: change the process and the content of the CoF. The university and the communities are now on 'talking' terms and a network has been built. Thus, if UJ want to do a development that may affect Auckland Park, they now know which residents to contact in the neighbourhood (Keet, 2014). Residents and resident associations have made new contacts in the

surrounding neighbourhoods which could assist them in future mobilisations. This process has contributed to building a strong community – something which will either help the CoJ in the implementation of the CoF or seriously hinder it, depending on how they approach the implementation process.

The CoF participation process also led the Gamcon consultants to change their practices in terms of how they formulate policies and projects. Venter (2014) stated that projects that they have worked on after the CoF, they have carried out in a different way. Despite what the contract or brief states the consultants at Gamcon make sure they meet with the main stakeholders at the start of the process, they ask for a list of all the primary stakeholders from the client. Therefore, when they get to the participation process 90% of the external stakeholders know who they are and what they are doing (Venter, 2014). This reduces the risk of opposition substantially. The reason they have changed their practice is because Gamcon does a substantial amount of work for government, therefore getting a bad track record will affect potential future work. So to ensure the process runs smoothly they make contact with the main stakeholders from the start. “We take participation seriously after the Corridors of Freedom because we have had our fingers burnt” (Venter, 2014).

The CTSPD also notes that they have become cognisant of the fact that they have to take participation seriously in the implementation phase of the CoF. Furthermore, Dube (2015) states that the networks are in place so it makes it easier now for participation to take place in the latter phases of the process. The JDA development facilitation unit is largely responsible for assisting with the implementation of the CoF and they are required to obtain buy-in from communities and ensure all stakeholders are involved in the process going forward. For Empire-Perth the community structures are there and community members want to be involved and are asking to sit on committees that make decisions about developments. The JDA and CoJ should take them up on their offer.

The community members who were not professionals in the built environment fields that took part in the process learnt a great deal about urban planning and design. As the Ward Councillor stated, after the CoF process she probably knows more about planning than the average planning graduate. The participation process also played an important role in beginning the process of changing people’s mindsets. Ismail (2015) and Keet (2014) stated that many residents were initially against the CoF because they were afraid of change. After the participation process there seemed to be more of an understanding about the CoF. As Keet explained:

“I won’t say everybody is happy but at least there is a compromise and I think there is a sense of acceptability, people are now accepting that changes are coming, it is inevitable, and they can either make that a positive change or it will be negative, so you have to adapt or die”.

The participation process was an essential arena for changing mindsets. To elaborate, van der Westhuizen (2014) noted that Hanger had a particular language he would use to convince the community members and to inform them that the CoF SAF is not intended to be a masterplan but rather it is a guide. As Burby (2003) pointed out, participation processes allow planners and policy makers to educate the public about policy problems. This “acceptability” that was formed during this process will be essential for the successful implementation of the CoF, something that would have not been there if the project team decided not to change the process.

It is clear that the participation process did not only influence the CoF policy-making process and content, but extended beyond that and affected broader aspects such as consultants practices, creating awareness in the CTSPD, community building, and assisting in changing mindset (even if only marginally). This is a huge achievement and makes this difficult process worthwhile.

7.4 WHAT IS THE PLACE OF PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A PROCESS?

This is not an easy question to answer but it is an important one as this type of policy has not been done in the CoJ before. With regards to densification projects and residents resistance, the literature review illustrated that participation can endanger the aim of social transformation but it is also useful to allow external stakeholders to learn about the issues. It is argued that fully-fledged participation²³ may endanger the aims of social transformation if the public, and in particular micro local publics, are able to participate in every single decision such as the principles and objectives underlying the policy as well as how it is implemented (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; Burby, 2003). Whilst local forms of NIMBYsm could endanger the political vision of the elected government (arguably endorsed by the majority at broader scales through other forms of participation like democratic vote), and some projects will necessarily generate forms of NIMBY opposition whose legitimacy needs to be confronted to other legitimacies and claims, it is argued that participation is nevertheless an important strategy to overcome NIMBY in this type of a process (Adams et al, 2013; Kytta et al, 2013) - if it is framed around ‘how to make a policy (more) acceptable to local communities’ rather than ‘should this policy happen’. Kytta et al (2013) argue that including the residents and their experience can lead to unique solutions to solve the problems. What is evident

²³ What is meant by fully-fledged participation is ‘participation in everything’. In other words, the public is able to participate in what the underlying principles are, what the vision should be, and how this should happen on the ground – and they influence all of these aspects.

from the discussion is that there is agreement that participation has an important role in such a process but *what* decisions the public are included in is an important factor.

From the findings in this research the conclusion I have reached is that participation plays an essential role. I agree with Benit-Gbaffou (2008) that 'participation in all decisions' has the ability to prevent social and spatial transformation as this was evident, to a degree in this research. To elaborate, the participation in the CoF process was able to reduce the densification areas substantially, meaning the level of transformation that could be attained was drastically reduced and the level of participation here was not citizen control. If the level of participation was *citizen control*, in this case, there probably would be even less densification zones.

This is not to say that participation should not be conducted adequately because this creates more anger amongst the residents. In this case the minimal participation (superficial information) planned by CoJ was not sufficiently thought through. The project team's original strategy was to briefly inform the public of what they were doing with no genuine or deep participation planned. This almost caused the derailment of the process.

What I draw from my research is that a deeper level of participation has to be included and it has an essential role to play in such a process. As illustrated above, participation can for instance play an important role in changing people's mindsets and educating them on planning issues. However, the way in which the social and spatial transformation objectives can be reached is by 'allowing' the public to participate in the how's and when's but not the what's and where's. In the CoF process the external stakeholders could not change the underlying principles of the policy, as Dube (2015) stated "we really stuck to it [the principles]" but they could influence how this took place and the finer details of where within the study area. As Mayor Tau put it, the public can participate in relation to what the CoJ wants to achieve. The majority of the residents in this case were content with this approach (i.e. influencing the more detailed aspects as opposed to the underlying vision and principles).

Avid public participation supporters such as Arnstein (1969) may argue that this is not genuine participation as the external stakeholders are only able to participate in some aspects of the policy, arguably less important aspects. Though, in a policy where social and spatial transformations are the primary objectives this approach is necessary, this finding corroborates with Benit-Gbaffou's (2008) argument. There have to be non-negotiables in this context. These principles are not up for discussion because the majority of South Africans voted for a political party which stands for redistribution, reconciliation, and social transformation. It is the state's responsibility to ensure the

public interest is protected and that these objectives are followed through in their policy, therefore to ensure broader societal changes occur it has to make certain decisions. Hanssen and Falleth (2014) found in their study that some planners stated that it was a misunderstanding that the public get to decide on all planning aspects, in a sense this research supports this finding.

The role of participation in such a policy is, therefore, to obtain local experiential knowledge which can contribute to developing more realistic context sensitive policies and plans. It's to work with the residents and external stakeholders to understand and find the best way the process can be carried out. But the goals and objectives related to social and spatial transformation should not be up for negotiation. Participation and the various spaces which emerge from it can be used to change mindsets and perceptions. So participation has an essential role in a process such as this and can ensure that the policy is not derailed.

7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

This section makes recommendations based on the findings and analysis done in chapters 4, 5, and 6. The CoJ has another three corridors it plans on developing in the longer term; therefore the CoJ will be going through the process of developing more SAF's in the near future. It is deemed that the recommendations made here, if adopted, will assist in the smoother running of a process such as this one as it offers key lessons.

7.5.1 Graphics and representations used

It is evident from the findings in this research that the graphics used and the way the project team represented the CoF to the public had a major influence on the way the residents reacted to it. The images the project team showed the public illustrated the total destruction of their neighbourhoods with higher density being located everywhere. There was no consideration for the current context and the public could not relate to the images shown to them. Precedent images from Europe were shown as an attempt to "entice the residents". However, most South Africans have a perception of densification and showing them images of European cities angered them even further.

Graphics and representations are essential in a participation process especially when the policy involves making physical changes to neighbourhoods (Bosselman, 1998). The answer, therefore, is not to remove images from the process but rather to show the right images (discussed below), to make sure what the intention is and what the images show is on the same track. If the objective is to transform an area which is currently low density to all higher density over a period of 40 years then incremental images should be shown so that a lay person understands that their neighbourhood is not going to be demolished.

Bosselman (1998) states that when representations are used in participation processes three principles are essential. Firstly, the representations have to be *accurate* because the images are meant to lead decisions and negative consequences could occur if decisions are made on inaccurate representations. Secondly, the representations need to be *engaging and detailed* they need to be true to the senses of those who will experience the designs once they are built. Lastly, they need to be *understandable* to those who will be affected by the proposal. If the designs are understandable they will allow them to be open for evaluation. In this case it is also important to show images to the external stakeholders that they can relate to and which illustrate an incremental process as opposed to showing the residents images which are completely detached from the context.

The graphics are arguably the most important aspect of the presentation as the graphics illustrate what the intention is. Therefore, time needs to be spent developing quality representations (they don't necessarily have to be full architectural renderings but the graphics need to be effective). This could save the project team much time because if the representations illustrate the exact intentions, it could avoid a massive backlash and potential derailment. As I argued in chapter 5, the Louis Botha project team illustrated their intentions much more clearly with more context specific, incremental illustrations (See Box 5.1).

7.5.2 Outsourcing public policy and the inclusion of participation

Although Grijzen (2010) highlights many advantages of using consultants in spatial and regional planning such as acting as mediators, breaking through and working across boundaries, and enlarging scope, appointing consultants to carry out public policy formation needs to be taken with caution. As this research demonstrated, consultants will not do public participation and include external stakeholders at their own freewill, this is understandable – they only do what they are paid and asked to do. It is evident from this research that the tender was not clear and specific about public participation. This meant that the consultants could 'define' and frame participation in the form of information sessions. The research also found that ad-hoc and 'informal' forms of communication are not ideal because if things do not go to plan there often needs to be proof of who made certain decisions so the respective people / departments / consultants / politicians can be held responsible. This was not a major issue in the CoF case but there was evidence of it.

If a City Council is going to appoint consultants to work on a policy or project it is essential that the brief / tender is detailed about factors such as participation. It should spell out exactly what type of participation is required, who is responsible for carrying the participation out, and from when should the external stakeholders be brought into the process. If all these details are not in the tender they will not be carried out by the consultants. Moreover, there needs to be a formal record of all

decisions made (e.g. unforeseen change in scope) no matter how tedious this may be it may be essential to maintain the reputation of a consultancy firm or be required by City officials to hold consultants accountable.

The tender document for the CoF illustrates that the CoJ in this case did not intend for the process to have extensive participation as it was not extensively mentioned in the tender, with only the bare minimum required. This was probably done to cut time and costs. What this research shows is that if participation had been an important part of the tender and it made provision for a much deeper and extensive participation process there may not have been the issues experienced in the process with a near derailment. The time and cost may have been reduced substantially if participation was integrated into the process much sooner because the issues the public brought up could have been addressed four months earlier. Therefore, the CoJ should not avoid participation and should rather include it in the process as soon as possible.

The initial consultancy firm stated they were not given enough time to carry out the work adequately. If the consultants deem when they get the tender that it is not enough time to carry out the requested work the consultancy firm should attempt to negotiate more time with client from the start or simply refuse the job – their reputation is on the line and if they are willing to go ahead without negotiating what is required or refusing the job then they need to be prepared to face the consequences. Consultants have done this before, for instance in Forester et al (2011 and 2013). This could be difficult to do especially in a case when the employees who have to carry out the work are not the same as those who agree on the contract and tender. In this case there needs to be proper communication internally between those who make the decision to take a tender and those who have to carry out the work in order to ensure it can be done.

7.5.3 Providing spaces that allow for engagement

The public meetings were able to give the public a broad sense of what was being proposed but it did not foster quality two-way dialogue or provide the participants with a sense they have had a major influence on the policy or provide the project team with quality information. It was found that the smaller focus group sessions were more effective at obtaining detailed information from the public and allowing external stakeholders to truly be listened to. The project team as well as the external stakeholders found them more useful.

This does not mean that general public meetings should not take place, they are important and they have a purpose, as Adams (2004) argues, these spaces have a role but it is not for deep participation where residents have a major influence. These sessions can be used to identify external stakeholders

who want to be involved in the process and to set up task groups / stakeholder committees who will be involved in focus group meetings. The public meetings can be used as information sessions (and they should be referred to as such because that is all they are). They should not be the only space for participation. The project team also added a new format of participation that they hadn't used before: the open day. This was a more informal session where residents were able to ask the project team specific questions and where they could provide their recommendations and suggestion. The project team were available at this session for 6 hours and they felt it was useful.

Therefore, I recommend that a variety of spaces should be provided for participation. Public hearings / meetings cannot be the only space as this will probably result in residents forming their own spaces to express themselves (such as protests, litigation, the media). Focus group meetings, open day sessions, and public meetings should be incorporated into the public participation process from the start of the process (or as soon as possible) and the purpose of each format should be made clear so that external stakeholders do not have false expectations about a particular space provided. Enough time and resources should be allocated for this as it could help prevent law suites, last minute extensions to project deadlines, appointment of new consultants at the eleventh hour, and derailments of the process – which all cost more than 'doing it right the first time'.

Officials and consultants should also make use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Blogs to distribute information and obtain feedback from residents. This by no means can be the only form of communication but as part of a broader participation process it can be highly effective as it reaches a different demographic – generally younger and those who do not want to attend public meetings or focus group sessions. They can still have a say on social media and stay informed. It is an effective platform to keep residents informed over an extended period of time (see Peens, 2013).

Constant communication is vital and this is something the CTSPD and many other CoJ departments' needs to improve on. Communication should not occur during the participation process and stop all together once the participation is complete; it needs to continue, if it doesn't it angers external stakeholders even further. External stakeholders need to be kept informed about what is currently taking place in the process. In communities where there is a structure such as a residents association or a community leader the information can be sent to these structures / individuals so it can be distributed to their constituencies. Updates could also be placed in the local newspapers. This will help build a relationship between the communities and the CoJ departments.

There should be some public meetings and focus group sessions where representatives of the affected departments are included. Therefore, specific questions regarding a specific departments' duties can be asked directly to that departments representative. This will prevent a project team from looking unprepared and like they have not done their "homework". This is particularly important for a policy such as the CoF where numerous departments are needed to implement the policy.

I want to emphasise that a deep level participation process is not a waste of time, because if time is not allocated to participation it could lead to the process being stalled and time and money will be wasted anyway. We also need to remember that it is not only spatial and social transformation that is spelled out in the NDP and GDS 2040 but also improved governance processes. Therefore, we need to strive to also meet these objectives in national and city policy which aim to make more open, deliberative, and transparent policy-making processes.

7.6 FUTURE RESEARCH

This research was focused on the Empire-Perth Development Corridor and only mentioned the Louis Botha and Turffontein corridors. There is much scope to explore these processes in more detail as their contexts are all different, especially Turffontein. Furthermore, the Louis Botha Corridor was formulated by Iyer from conception, therefore unpacking the process they went through and how they developed the content of that corridor could help with understanding how this could be done in the future as the Louis Botha process had substantially less resistance. Moreover, there are three corridors planned for the longer term, the observational research I wanted to initially do could be attempted with one of these corridors if the researcher is able to gain regular access to the CoJ.

The Corridors of Freedom process is now at the stage where investigating implementation is possible. The CoJ is setting up units internally to ensure development is promoted and occurs in the corridors as envisioned. For example, the Development Facilitation Unit in the JDA is being expanded to ensure the CoF is implemented – the expanded unit's task is purely to focus on the CoF. The Unit is responsible for land acquisition, identifying specific projects, negotiating with developers and property owners, and obtaining buy-in from developers and communities. Investigating the tools, methods, and strategies this Unit uses and how successful these are will be valuable research as implementing densification projects and corridor development is no easy task and often does not have the intended outcomes (Wilkinson, 2006). Furthermore, there is limited empirical research on how corridors are implemented in a South African context.

This research was concerned with the broader Empire-Perth CoF SAF, not specific projects. There is much potential for researchers to investigate specific projects. For example, the Westdene Dam, which is earmarked to become a regional attraction in Johannesburg with redevelopments and upgrades proposed. It could be used as a specific case study to investigate how the internal departments within the CoJ are working together as this is a massive policy and this research highlighted that inter-departmental relations are a massive issue. The Westdene community developed their own proposal for the Dam just before the CoF was announced. They are insisting that their proposals be used but the visions between what the Westdene community see the dam as and what the CoJ envisions the dam to be appears to be two different things. Thus, I anticipate a potentially challenging project if the Westdene community and CoJ have different visions for the area. Therefore, investigating how the vision for the dam is developed and how the departments work together to realise this could be an interesting research project.

The notion of outsourcing public policies needs to be investigated further. This research explored this but not in a substantial amount of detail because it was not the primary focus. This is an increasing phenomenon which has numerous effects on the way public policy is formulated and from what I found in this research it adds a layer of complexity to already highly complex processes. Although City officials may be outsourcing because they do not have all the technical skills to develop the policy (Grijzen, 2010) when there are issues with the content it is usually the City officials who take the brunt of the backlash. This is because the consultant is generally not accountable to the public, but the City Council is. Therefore, although the City Council may be avoiding complexity in the beginning by outsourcing, they have to deal with it once the participation process starts, for instance. The relationship between the public, consultants, and city councils needs to be explored further with specific case studies.

7.7 PERSONAL LESSONS

My understanding of participation has shifted substantially during this research process. I started the research with a highly normative understanding of participation and policy-making. As my fieldwork progressed it became apparent all the dynamics that affect a process such as this. It is not as simple as “they just did not include us”. There were many factors that shaped this result, some were the fault of City officials, some of the consultants, some of other institutional factors such as inter-departmental relations. What I am saying is that when investigating a participation process one cannot only look at the participation process in isolation. My findings and conclusions would have painted a very different picture if I had just looked at the participation process in isolation.

When I read planners stating that “it is a misunderstanding that the public get to be involved in all decisions” in Hanssen and Falleth’s (2014) article, I did not agree at all. This research showed me why the public can’t be involved in all decisions. My initial thoughts on participation were that the public need to be involved in all the visioning, developing the objectives, and how it should occur on the ground, but in a context where we need to promote social and spatial transformation this may not be possible because everyone does not share this vision as Woodcock et al (2009) argued. Therefore, the state and public planners have to ensure that these ideals are followed through and as Benit-Gbaffou (2008) argues participation in all decisions can endanger transformative objectives. Therefore, I now understand that participation plays an important role in such a process but participation needs to be limited to the hows not the wheres and whats.

This research has taught me many valuable lessons as a young professional. When I was an undergrad at Wits School of Architecture and Planning I focused on the urban design specialisation. In other words, I chose the urban design stream instead of politics or housing. I always saw myself being involved in the design side of planning; I was less interested in the ‘politics’ and wanted to avoid it as much as possible. However, as time progressed it became more and more apparent that politics was at the centre of this profession. This research clearly proved this to me in that the project team tried to just do a design and avoid the politics of dealing with the public and this did not work.

In my third year of study I did an urban design framework for Parkhurst in Johannesburg. This community is similar to the Westdene and Melville communities in that it is a predominantly middle to upper income neighbourhood that is well organised with a vocal residents association. It also has an iconic ‘high street’ running through the centre of the suburb. When I reflect back on the proposals I made in that UDF, they were very similar to those of the CoF. I proposed densification in certain parts of the neighbourhood, placed a focus on public transport and non-motorised forms of transportation, and I placed social housing in numerous locations throughout Parkhurst. I thought this project was perfect, I thought about everything: the most appropriate place for bus stops, for the densest buildings and for the locations of social housing. What did not even cross my mind is how the current residents would react to this proposal.

I see now that if that project was done in the real world I would probably have a court case hanging over me and the project would have been derailed or changed drastically. What I took from my research is that you have to have a holistic view; you need to understand the design facet but you also have to be aware of the political aspects. The politics cannot be ignored as I ignorantly thought

in my undergrad years. The politics is central and for any urban design / planning project, there needs to be a balance between all factors.

7.8 FINAL REMARKS

In a process that meant to have as minimal participation as possible, participation became the centre of this process. It became one of the defining factors of the Empire-Perth Corridor of Freedom. It influenced the final deadline and the way participation was framed (extending the participation process from two public meetings held over one month to many meetings and focus groups session over six months); it changed the composition of project team; and finally it changed the outcome of the policy in terms of density lines, the extent of densification, the best routes to use for NMT's, and more detailed guidelines. The participation did not influence the principles of the CoF but it provided a space for starting to change people's mindset and in the end there is a level of acceptability and people know change is imminent.

In the end, I deem the process was successful in producing a high quality spatial policy that provides a sufficient guide for officials, developers, and other actors to transform the corridor. The policy is more specific and realistic in its final form, but substantially less visionary and radical – something which may be required to overcome the persisting apartheid spatial planning and its consequences.

The recommendations suggested in this report could assist in ensuring that similar processes to this one are more open to external stakeholders and make sure that the participation process is structured in a way that gives residents an opportunity to influence how the policy takes shape while at the same time ensuring that the principles of integration, accessibility, and social and spatial transformation are protected.

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9. ANNEXURE

9.1 Report compiled by Task Group

COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO COF

8 November 2013

Report on the Perth Empire Corridor Strategic Framework

The Empire Perth Corridor Working Group Consists of the following Associations who have put together this document as a response to the two presentations made by the City of Johannesburg and Gamcon on the 2nd and 29th October 2013 on the Empire-Perth Strategic Area Framework:

Mellville Residents Association

Rossmore, Auckland Park Residents Association

Westdene Residents Association

Brixton Community Forum

Crosby Neighbourhood Watch

GENERAL POINTS:

- Urbanisation and densification are inevitable for the urban areas of Johannesburg.
- There are plenty of precedents world-wide that demonstrate the benefits of densification to (1) make high quality public spaces feasible, (2) contribute to higher property values, (3) make multiple modes of transportation feasible, (4) contribute to social cohesion and higher sense of community, (5) better security and lower crime due to “eyes on the street”, and (6) allow for greater choice in destinations and services.
- There is also evidence that indicates that densification, if not carefully planned for, guided, regulated and managed can lead to (1) overcrowding, (2) concentration of social ills, (3) increased crime due to more people moving through, (4) public health risks due to bad sanitation, lack of rubbish removal, (5) over-burdening or under-provision of basic services (water, electricity, storm water and rubbish removal), (6) displacement of poor households where these already inhabit these areas – displacement happens as a result of speculative development, demolition of existing rental housing to maximise on the new opportunities presented by changed zoning parameters.
- In other words, one of the primary goals of the Corridors of Freedom Project, namely densification, is not inherently good or bad. Densification could be a positive vision for the area, but what is troublesome, is the lack of consideration, planning, and control of the process and lack of understanding of what will be needed to manage densification.
- The other primary goal of the Corridors of Freedom Project, namely accessibility to poorer communities, is not automatically achieved by densification; particularly as rezoning to allow for more compact development is intended to unleash speculative development processes.

The Work Group objects to the Strategic Development Framework for the Empire Perth Corridor:

The work group notes that the City of Johannesburg has existing policies and plans to guide densification, in particular the current RSDF 2010/2011 for Region B and the previously approved Precinct Plans (Auckland Park/ Melville Precinct plan; Urban Development Framework for Brixton, Hursthill, Mayfair West, Crosby, Coronationville, Langlaagte North, Bosmont and Rossmore) of 2008. These precinct plans all allow for strategic densification and respond to the BRT routes and the Rea Vaya Urban Design Guidelines. They involved public participation. It must be noted that they have not triggered densification in the carefully selected, suitable areas for densification, a concern we return to below. The objection to the Empire Perth Corridor Strategic Area Framework proposal are based on but not limited to the following:

TIME FRAMES & PARTICIPATION:

- In May 2013 the mayor of Johannesburg announced a new concept that would be applied to particularly the BRT routes- namely the Corridors of Freedom. The City had been requested by Resident Associations to provide information on the implementation of the corridors. The first the residents got to hear detail of the framework was at the public meeting on the 2nd October 2013. The public were told that there would be 1

more public meeting and the framework would be put before Council by the end of November for approval next year. This would give the public only 1,5 months to be part of the process which affects entire suburbs – suburbs that have a complex composition of people, many of whom have invested their money and lives in building homes and communities, and others for whom these suburbs provide temporary opportunities for livelihood and residence in relatively close proximity to important economic and educational amenities.

- The Corridor of Freedom Project process suffers from a lack of participation early on and throughout the process. The Project consultants indicated that they are mandated in their contract to conduct only two participatory sessions. In reality, these sessions turn out to be information sessions about decisions where completed plans are presented, giving the impression that decisions have already been made, rather than sessions that gain input from the community and stakeholders about how the Corridor of Freedom idea can be translated into workable and inclusive plans, regulations and processes. We note that the tender awarded to the consultants, however, calls for 3 workshops involving stakeholders. It is unclear if this is during the planning phase. However it does state that during the process a forum is to be created for various resident associations to interact and be part of the planning process. This has not been done and the consultants are in violation of their tender. We note this with serious concern.
- This creation of a forum for community or resident associations to be part of the planning process is stipulated in the Local Government Municipal System Regulations Act. Under chapter 4 Miscellaneous (regs 15-16) 15 (1) (a) 'In the absence of an appropriate municipal wide structure for community participation, a municipality must establish a forum that will enhance community participation'.

This forum should have been created at the start of the project prior to any work being undertaken.

- Further to this, the City has been slow in its uploading of the documents and dissemination of information. Initially only a week was given to comment on the Framework (it was finally uploaded on the 15th October 2013 and comments were due on the 29th October 2013). We do not consider this provided a reasonable opportunity for community participation. (It is noted that following the complaints made on public participation that this has been extended to allow for some participation between the 11th and 29th November 2013. This was confirmed at the meeting on the 29th October 2013- These timeframes remain very tight for the scale of the framework proposed)
- Apart from communities and resident associations, the University stakeholders, the SABC, Businesses, Country club, health services, Metro police, Social services, SAPS, CPF's and SCF's were also not included in the planning processes. One presentation was made to interested Wits University staff on 26 July under the Thought Leadership initiative, but it involved only a small component of the actual plan and focused on the University to University (Wits-UJ) connections. Input was made at this session which has not been taken on board by Gamcon. For instance, attention was drawn to the complete omission of Metrobus routes that cross the Corridor of Freedom area, indeed the only functional municipal transport in the area at the time of the presentation. The Metrobus routes are still absent on the public transport plans for the Corridor of Freedom as currently proposed. Further, major role players that are able to give security and purpose to this vision are not being adequately consulted. We have also no indication of potential 'social interest' investors, such as social housing associations, being brought on board. They have a critical role to play in ensuring inclusive forms of densification and countering the speculative processes that have driven up rents in the entire area under consideration for the Corridor of Freedom.
- Of grave concern to existing residents is the fact that there is no indication that public participation will be encouraged if and when private investors start to show interest in developing the area on a speculative basis.
- The work group is concerned that the Framework proposed on the 29th October 2013 had in essence not changed despite the concerns raised at the meeting on the 2nd October 2013. The participation process cannot be a box ticking exercise and should inform the framework itself. This should be through revision of what has been proposed.

THE SDF AND RSDF and PRECINCT PLANS:

- The City of Johannesburg indicated during the meeting on the 2nd of October 2013 that this plan supersedes the current precinct plans that were previously approved. No notification was given to the community that the precinct plans for affected areas were being revised in a manner that would repeat the deeply participatory, statutory process that was conducted around 2008 and in prior precinct planning exercises.
- The RSDF and SDF documents quite clearly indicate that strategic frameworks should take into consideration existing precinct plans and the RSDF. All the break downs for the sub areas of Region B in the area effected call for the residential cores of the suburbs to be protected. This is not the case in the proposal.

- Herman Pienaar of the City of Johannesburg indicated in the meeting on the 2 October 2013 that these previous plans did not take into account the BRT route. This is factually incorrect as the precinct plan and RSDF were both approved after the BRT was started and indeed densification was enabled around the BRT routes. Careful concepts were developed for this densification, noting in particular BRT stops (in some cases alternative positions for these stops were considered). The Precinct Plan for Brixton, Westbury, Crosby was based on the movement corridor and took into consideration the BRT stops. It had extensive community participation and allowed for various areas of mixed use, high density and medium density. We also note the precinct plan that was prepared for the Fietas/Mayfair area, and the importance this gave to the route from Brixton to Braamfontein, via Caroline Street meeting Enoch Sontonga. This route is entirely ignored in the currently proposed Corridor of Freedom Plan. Fietas has a history of medium density and has numerous vacant sites. It too could be an appropriate area for revitalisation.
- The SDF sets up principles that have been ignored in the development framework proposed by Gamcon for the Corridor of Freedom:
 - The highest intensity of land use must be located within the nodes with the highest densities adjacent to public transport stations.
 - Appropriate scaling down of the density and intensity of land uses on the interface and beyond the nodal boundary must be managed and facilitated to protect existing residential areas.

We note that this is a critical principle for success of the Corridor of Freedom. The current proposal does not give priority to such a scaling. With slow uptake of densification, as can be expected, the result will be an arbitrarily located scattering of densification, not resulting in the benefits promised by the idea of Corridors of Freedom.

Our comment on Table 5.17 of the Density Assessment of 5.3 Strategic Densification of the SDF:

- Where will increased density be considered?: *The following is important when assessing where in the City increased densities will be considered: What do local planning directives indicate? The RSDF's indicate more specific densities where relevant and where there is a particular Precinct Plan or Development Framework that stipulates a particular density.*

These are the precinct plans indicated above that clearly stipulate densification areas. There is no reference to these or how they proposed densification. They have been ignored and all the work, time and money spent on them made redundant.

- What Density will be considered (locational factors/ density guidelines)?: *The ultimate determination of the density is dependent on a combination of the locational attributes and site specific characteristics including:*

Critical assessment of adjacent properties (height, orientation, privacy)

This is not stipulated nor shown in the Spatial Development Plan for the Corridor of Freedom.

Our comment on Table 5.19 of the Corridor of Freedom Plan (Public Transport Density Guidelines):

This table divides densities up into two distances from BRT stations/ mobility routes. These are adjacent and within 200m of a Phase 1 BRT trunk route.

Table 5.18 Nodal Density guidelines uses 500m from a defined regional nodal boundary. In this case the area is not a regional node, but a district node.

The Strategic Framework consistently uses a distance of 800m. This distance conflicts with the SDF guidelines. The distances used by Gamcon are based on "walkability isochrones". These do not take into account the steep topography across the site that would increase the time taken to walk the 400 and 800m distances.

The densities proposed in tables 5.19 and 5.18 of the SDF are drastically lower than those shown in Figure 64 of the strategic Framework which are generally from 120 to 500du/hectare. In 5.19 the highest densities proposed are 50-70du per hectare fronting onto an existing mobility spine. In 5.18 only in a defined Nodal Boundary (CBD/Metropolitan/Regional) may densities be above 100, supported should the infrastructure allow it). Generally densities of 20-90du per hectare are allowed in a district node (where infrastructure, access and design allows)

The RSDF 2010/2011 calls for a variety of objectives all supporting degrees of densification while protecting the suburbs:

Sub area 2:

Objective 1: To improve existing economic and infrastructure (public and private) investment in the Sub Area.

1. Promote the development of the area as viable neighbourhood areas. Support mixed uses around rail stations and residential densification around community facilities as proposed in the Urban Development Framework For Brixton, Hursthill, Mayfair West, Crosby, Coronationville, Kathrada, Slovo Park, Newlands South, Montclare, Newclare, Claremont, Westbury, Waterval, Langlaagte North, Bosmont and Rossmore.

Sub area 3:

1. To ensure compatibility between the mixed commercial development and the adjacent residential areas and the educational facilities
 - 1.1 To protect and enhance the residential area in Auckland Park South
 - 1.2 To ensure compatibility between the mixed commercial and residential development along High Street and the adjacent residential areas
 - 1.3 To strengthen residential areas within Crosby

21.2.4 To contain business activities within the Mayfair nodal core and protect the residential amenity building stock in Mayfair

61.5. To protect the residential amenity and strengthen the institutional corridor with the provision of associated compatible uses.

Sub Area 5:

2. To retain the existing residential character and densities of sub area 5.

Sub Area 6:

1. 3. To ensure that the unique character of the Melville, Richmond and Westdene (east of the dam) area is maintained.

The RSDF makes specific reference to where densification is to take place and the proposed densities. All of the objectives very clearly call for the protection of the residential areas within the core of the suburbs. All of these have been ignored with the 'blanket' densification that takes no cognisance of the previous RSDF's that were approved through consultation with the affected community. Densification appears to be purely based on an arbitrary walking distance to BRT stations and sub stations, while ignoring a range of other important contextual characteristics of the neighbourhoods.

STUDENT HOUSING:

- Unsubstantiated numbers have been given to justify the extent of densification, especially with reference to the number of students needing to be housed. The number of 28000 students requiring accommodation was never supported by any concrete market research or needs assessment. In fact, students are already being accommodated in existing communes, and the demand for additional accommodation has not been quantitatively appraised. There are also numerous vacancies in buildings in nearby Braamfontein as confirmed by the property owner Southpoint which provides student housing. The University of Johannesburg also publically announced to the residents of the surrounding area at a meeting in April 2013 that they had no intention of expanding the UJ campus in Auckland Park (which, under different circumstances, could have resulted in growth in student numbers). Wits University has also capped student numbers.
- There are already 6000 students living in the suburbs around the university. They are living in houses with up to 10 people in each property, already increasing the densities well beyond the 3.7 people per unit as indicated in the Strategic Framework.
- The framework does not propose how it will deal with communes. The Gamcon plan proposes a blanket opportunity to rezone, but the consultants have not indicated what will prevent large (and up to 4 storeys) private communes that merely use the FAR and Coverage revision to create much larger and more problematic communes, scattered across large areas. Will commune owners be able to rezone as a boarding house putting more people than the accepted 10 as per the City's own Commune Policy? A further concern is the existing slum-lording and unauthorised densification (without plan submission), particularly in areas such as Brixton and Westdene, but also present across the other areas under consideration. It indicates the City's inability to adequately manage densification and enforce regulation, a key concern to residents.

THE DESIGN PROPOSAL AND DESIGN TEAM:

- Proposals are set forth and decisions are made based on no feasibility studies or needs assessment, not any detailed analysis of the area. To residents, it appears as if the consultants did not visit the area. So for instance, existing strips of shops and higher density corridors, such as along Thornton Road in Westdene or Caroline Road as it passes through Fitas, are completely ignored. These provided convenience in terms of shops and must therefore be combined into the planned pedestrian networks. It appears that existing pedestrian flows were also not taken into account, for instance the routes taken by impoverished school children from Jan Hofmeyer along Caroline Street
- There is a more fundamental problem with the lack of urban design skills and expertise both in the City and in the consulting firm. There is no evidence that qualified urban designers, registered with the Urban Design

Institute of South Africa (UDISA), were involved in the development of the plan or framework. This results in unrealistic representations or projections of what will happen if this plan were to be adopted.

- Claims are made about the benefits of good urban design of high density developments, which simply are not evident in the current proposals. For example, the “more eyes on the street for safety” can only realise if residents are more likely to walk than to drive (however, most residential types will only be feasible for development if parking is provided). For walking to be encouraged, streets need to be well lit at night, boundary walls and fences see-through, buildings oriented and opening up towards the street, the transportation systems need to be integrated, regular and reliable, and 24-hour on-street security provided. Without these conditions, driving will remain the dominant mode of transportation for residents, and high levels of congestion on the roads.
- Development of public spaces and street infrastructure (such as sidewalks, cross-walks, street lights, shading and trees, benches, etc.) cannot not be left up to the volition of private developers. First, it is unlikely to be implemented, second, there will be a lack of continuity of these amenities if not implemented in accordance to larger scale systems (properly designed and implemented with the expertise of trained urban designers). The committee members who compiled this report have direct experiences with engaging reputed developers over densification plans for individual properties, where precisely this lack of an interest in public spaces, trees, street interface has been evident.
- The 'blanket' rezoning approach, as already suggested above, is unstrategic and represents a very low level of planning engagement with the complex aim of achieving higher densities together with convenience, inclusion, amenity and mobility . There is no strategic rezoning shown, nor any phasing of this urban transformation. The first phase should concentrate more on the BRT route and should optimise on vacant land. There are indeed numerous vacant stands along Kingsway that should form part of a first phase of densification.
- The vision proposed by Gamcon is segregated into low income, high income and student housing. This is against the principles set out initially and definitely violates the idea of Corridors of Freedom which are precisely to overcome the segregated legacy of Johannesburg. As is generally known, the categories of low and high income remain predominantly racialised in South Africa. It is only through the conceptualisation and careful planning of mixed income across the Corridor of Freedom, that this legacy can be overcome. We reject the idea of segregated zones with considerable outrage. We also would like to acknowledge that the suburbs subject to this plan/framework are some of the most mixed areas both in terms of income and race. This is not by design. The process through certain areas become ‘mixed’ is poorly understood and cannot simply be replicated through a label on a map. The danger we foresee is that this mixing of income which is already existent, will be destroyed by speculative pressures to maximise income from rents – inevitably, the poorer tenants are the first to be displaced.
- Secure stable and mixed communities that exist within the framework have been ignored. There is no reference to the various communities, resident associations and the benefit they provide for the citizens in the suburbs. These stable communities provide support and should not be disrupted. Any real ‘Corridor of Freedom’ plan should seek to build on this, to improve these existing areas through increased amenity and convenience, which in turn results in higher demand for residence in this area, which leads to sound investment in higher densities over time.
- No new parks are shown. Cemeteries can’t be counted as recreational parks and should not be included in the “open space” ratio unless there are plans to reform them into safe and accessible green spaces with picnic and other facilities. The number of proposed parks and public squares need to be positioned upfront and cannot be included on an ad hoc basis. The Country Club is also shown as a publicly accessible open space, which it certainly is not: the majority of residents from the area do not have access to it. It is walled in and therefore has no relationship at all with the surrounding residential areas.
- The positioning of new schools is random-fig 70: in Brixton the new school is positioned on a series of historic houses- many are traditional semi-detached houses. Virtually all are over 60 years and protected. In Crosby an existing park is proposed for a school (when in fact parks will be required even more with densification). In Melville an existing park currently (proposed for retail) is shown as a potential educational facility. It is clear that the correct research has not been done based on these three examples.
- The proposed densification appears to be a desktop study without any knowledge of the area: eg. 7th Street Melville has been shown with 6 to 8 stories for the new allowed densities. It is clear this can never occur due to the heritage and the importance of this shopping and restaurant strip to the city. Thornton Street in Westdene is a more likely candidate for infill densification, yet this has been ignored, as mentioned above. There are many existing open blocks with car parks or demolished buildings on Thornton Road. This road

could be enhanced with mixed use development. Again, it is evident that the skills of the consultants and their understanding of urban design is clearly lacking.

- The more detailed plans for Auckland Park do not take any of the large vacant portions of land into consideration for Phase 1. This should be the first point for densification: “infill” is stressed by the SDF densification strategy.
- There does not appear to be any “strategic” application of the densities nor any guideline as to how they are to be implemented.
- There is no strategy as to how Kingsway will be dealt with. The proposed subway is controversial at best and does not solve the current issues that Campus square and the narrow pavements create. The current Kingsway street frontage is a huge division between north and south- this is not addressed in the framework strategy. It is important to note that based on crime mapping done by the Brixton Sector Crime Forum this stretch on Kingsway is one of the worst areas for street crime. A subway merely takes this crime underground, to include a pun. What is needed is an appropriate strategy to design pedestrian and cycle friendly intersection on the surface, as is common and successful for much larger intersections in many large cities across the globe.
- The implementation plans are weak in detail. The architecture and urban planning are extremely poor and cannot be considered as the basis for any precinct plans. There are no commitments from the City for public space other than in Westdene – these examples are also poorly resolved and naïve in their suggestions. They should be completely revised. The student precinct as currently conceived will be very disruptive to the suburb of Auckland Park and does not aim to use vacant land that exists along Kingsway. Its appropriateness is questionable.

HERITAGE AND SOCIAL IMPACT:

- The requirements of the NHRA are to be met in full, and in particular, since the subject area is greater than 5000sq.m. consideration must be given to the undertaking of a Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA).
- The heritage analysis in the report does not recognise that they are high significance areas within the suburbs which are termed low and medium significance. Such places which are for example in Brixton and Industria represent industrial growth within the City which are of high significance as they show the pattern of development of Johannesburg Industries, social and architectural history. Such areas should be identified by the research team and within the precinct plans to avoid generalisation of an area.
- Melville, Westdene and Brixton have typical working class buildings from the 1920s and 1930s which in some streets have changed very little over the years. High walls which are characteristic of almost every suburb in Johannesburg do not justify the drastic changes in the height and layout of buildings which in itself are over a 100 years old and defines the character and form of the suburbs’. The streetscape itself is of high cultural significance as it shows the general layout of the original suburbs and of the distinguishing features of every suburb. An Heritage Impact Assessment should be prepared for every suburb and addressed on every street where a street density change is proposed. This heritage assessment should not just consider the individual houses but also the street fabric created.
- All the suburbs have a unique history in relation to the city’s growth and change. Brixton was a key suburb in the 1922 strikes, that would change the course of History in our country. Vrededorp/ Fietas and Sopiataown were suburbs subjected to mass evictions during Apartheid. Melville has symbolised a changing city with its original working class history then gentrifying and changing to a cultural hub in the city.
- High density streetscape will diminish the significance of heritage buildings and will dwarf buildings which are of high heritage significance, rightly said the heritage buildings in these suburbs are in a mosaic pattern but it must be noted that it is as important to preserve the surrounding area of a historically important building as it is protect the building itself. The report does not make cognisance of that fact.
- Part of the heritage understanding for the area is to understand the social heritage of the area. This is completely ignored in the framework. There are modernist houses in Streatley Avenue that are ignored. Most of the houses are older than 60 years. Any development over 100sqm needs to have a heritage impact assessment. None of the street-scapes have been considered.
- There is no social impact study done. There are currently very strong communities that exist within all the suburbs affected. Impacts on them need to be assessed and how this will affect the future of the suburbs.
- There are many poor people living in these suburbs- they are more likely to be displaced due to the development.

- Comments made at the meeting on 2 October 2013 by Herman Pienaar of CoJ that phase 2 developments may be allowed prior to phase 1 are inappropriate and potentially destructive. The city cannot be vague in implementation or they can be manipulated and be destructive to communities.
- There is no mention made of the National Monuments in the area- of particular concern are the Melville Koppies and the potential impact on it and the stone age sites.

TRANSPORT:

- The success of densification along the Corridors of Freedom hinges upon successfully integrating various transportation systems, and not only considering the Bus Rapid Transit system as the dominant mode of transportation. Currently the City (and the consultants) assumes that public transport will become the dominant mode of movement throughout the City. However, the lack of integration of the transport systems (Metrobus, Rea Vaya, cars, taxis, walking, bicycles, tuk-tuks, Putcobuses) will become more problematic over time. It has become common to see pedestrians walk in the designated bus lanes in the middle of the road, risking their lives by navigating cars, busses, and taxis on both sides. Properly integrating these systems are key to unlocking the 'freedom' that is promised in the idea of Corridors of Freedom.
- The assumption that residents do not have cars, is flawed. Especially considering the fact that transport is not considered on a multidimensional level (including taxis, busses, bicycles, etc.). To get this right, investment in public infrastructure such as sidewalks, street trees, cross walks, bike lanes, traffic calming etc. is critical, and should be high on the agenda.
- The planning and design committee agree that the previous RSDF (2010 and 2011) proposed suitable areas of densification and should be followed before implementing densification on such a grand scale. This scale suggests to us desperation on the part of the City to implement a strategy that it hasn't managed to implement in the most sensible areas previously stipulated in the RSDF. The SDP for the City clearly sets out guidelines for densification: these guidelines call for all densification possibilities within the RSDF and precinct plans to be adhered to. This is clearly ignored in the development framework.

INFRASTRUCTURE:

- No densification should occur until all necessary infrastructure is planned and budgeted for and the requirements for each phase have been implemented. This includes the schools, clinics, recreation centres etc. It also includes the necessary increase in capacity to the water, sewerage, stormwater and electricity networks as well as the renewal of the 70 year old infrastructure.
- Electricity supply to these suburbs has been seriously compromised in the past months and power outages have become a virtual daily occurrence. Despite the high number of recent power outages and a major incident of sabotage, which left most of Johannesburg in the dark, the CoJ unrealistically claims a decline in outages over the past three years.
- Water supply to these areas is only sufficient for residential 1, low-density living. The current water pressure in the supply lines, which at times becomes very low, will not be adequate to sustain medium density developments, let alone high density developments.
- An added danger of low water pressure in medium- and high-density living is that fire services rely on a high-pressure water supply to operate effectively. Inadequate water pressure could therefore lead to loss of life and irreparable damage to property.
- These current infrastructures are already feeling the pressure of population increases in these suburbs due to the dramatically increased student numbers at UJ and the resultant communes (legal and illegal) in these areas.
- In the presentation on 2 October, neither the City, nor the consultants could give any indication that funding will be made available for the infrastructure projects. This remains a concern.
- The healthcare facilities are shown on Gamcon's plans to be adequate. What they do not acknowledge is that these do not only serve the local areas but huge sections of the city, which the BRT will further exacerbate. The vast number of people proposed in the densification will not be sufficiently catered for by the facilities proposed.
- Building another reservoir in Brixton will require time and advance budgeting and yet the developments in the student precinct are said to commence in this financial year. It may also require expropriation of land and there is no indication of how this will be done.
- The sanitation/sewerage infrastructure will also come under huge pressure with the intended developments. The sewerage and storm water infrastructure for these urban areas was not designed to support medium and high density developments and won't be able to cope with the additional pressure of larger numbers of

people moving into these suburbs. Currently the overloaded sewerage system in Westdene frequently pushes back into the houses and properties of the residents. Should this happen in the future, the residents can brace themselves for unhygienic circumstances with raw sewerage freely flowing in the streets and storm water systems. In Westbury and Crosby numerous properties get flooded every time it rains because the storm water system is insufficient.

- The CoJ produces large volumes of waste (approximately 1,8 million tonnes of garbage each year, with 244 200 tonnes in the form of illegal dumping, and 1 779 tonnes collected as litter from the streets). As a result, the City is facing a serious problem in terms of landfill space and the dump sites in Crosby and Brixton only accept a few cars loads a day.
- Also the road and transport infrastructure in the suburbs was designed for low-density living. However, the majority of public transport users continue to rely on the mini-bus taxi industry. The city-owned Metrobus transports about 80 000 passengers per day. Even though the city plans to reduce the busses and taxis on the road, many of these are circumventing the now narrower Rea Vaya route by forming new routes through the narrow streets of the suburbs such as from Steydler street in Westbury to 4th avenue Westdene.
- Parktown suffered severely due to the route construction on the Empire Road Section. The loss, without replacement, of many very old and symbolic trees, felled to widen the road, and the inadequate restoration of the Frank Brown Park, used as a construction yard, spoil stock pile and material store, back to public open space suitable for the needs of the surrounding communities, remains as a legacy of that phase.
- Social infrastructure that should be addressed, upgraded and expanded to suite densification:
 - Police stations for each suburb
 - Crime prevention systems
 - Schools
 - Clinics
 - Parks
 - Recreational areas and sports facilities
 - Cemeteries

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:

- There is no indication as to how this development with impact on the environment. No Environmental Impact Assessment has been presented. There is no strategy to ensure that developments are sustainable from an energy point of view or how energy efficiency and sustainability will be ensured.
- There is no indication how stormwater will be dealt with in the higher densities which will increase the areas of hard surfaces and thus put further strain on stormwater and the river systems into which this discharges, and increase flood lines lower down.

PHASING:

- The phasing of the densification must be strictly controlled. There must be time frames stipulated and these should relate directly to the infrastructure provided in advance of that phase.
- Herman Pienaar noted that the City could allow for Phase 2 developments to start before Phase 1 as particular land may be more easily developed due to ownership. This is unacceptable – developers will densify arbitrarily far from the stations in the middle of currently low rise residential areas where there is not the amenity promised by this plan, and where instead an existing functional residential areas is disrupted. In our view, this idea of the City is inappropriately biased to certain developers who happen to own properties in areas that currently do not allow for densification, and who might well be asserting pressure on City politicians. We foresee costly legal battles as neighbouring residents resist such ad hoc densification. A proper phasing simply makes sense to everyone other than those wishing to appease individual property owners who made poor investments by buying in the wrong areas.
- The principles of densification with mixed use have to be “tested”. It needs to be concentrated in close proximity to public transport, to ensure the commercial aspect of mixed use in fact flourishes. We note with concern small pockets of shops embedded in areas such as Westdene that have been boarded up because there is insufficient exposure for commerce to thrive. The position for such mixed use densification of the first phase must only be on the BRT nodes. The City should provide incentives to encourage the vacant land on these areas to be developed, and for land with existing low rise development in these areas to be redeveloped. The residents of areas surrounding the BRT cannot be subjected to higher density in “easier” areas purely because the City has not managed to give sufficient incentives that developers develop the higher densities in the correct areas.

INADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS:

- Public/private partnerships are ill-defined and the main stake holders are not considered or approached. The most likely scenario is for the Universities (UJ and Wits) to build high density student housing and later other mix-use developments to follow.
- Currently, the land values are too high for private investors to build anything but middle-to higher income accommodation or highly subsidised student housing (noting that the 'subsidies' stem from student loan and bursary systems and the benefits of these guaranteed rents go to developers). It is possible that the City could provide incentives for lower-income/social housing. However, care needs to be taken to ensure these projects are successful and do not overtly affect market prices of the surrounding communities. A mix of income levels could be set and enforced for every development. It is agreed that social housing associations should be allocated opportunities in the corridor and diversify the low cost component from benefitting students only, to benefit a wider range of poorer households who can use the opportunities these areas are endowed with to move out of poverty
- There also needs to be strict controls over where development can take place, enforcing zoning for high density development in certain areas and capping of upper density limits of these developments.

Concentrations of poverty, lack of rental tenure security (i.e. arbitrary evictions), overcrowding, rent hikes, and illegal construction and slumlord scenarios remain concerns; scenarios that currently play themselves out in these areas due to a number of illegal student communes. However, the City does not provide details or demonstrate the capacity to control and prevent these likely scenarios on a bigger scale.

MANAGEMENT AND CITY COMMITMENT:

- It was clear, even by Mr Pienaar's own admission at the first meeting on 2 October 2013, that the City can currently not manage high density areas nor the lower density areas. No densification can be allowed until the City has changed its own management structures that will improve service delivery, improve law enforcement, allow for residents to raise their concerns in a structured manner. We would, however, like to acknowledge the Commune Policy initiative as an important step in the right direction.
 - Further to this the City does not give any commitment to the design guidelines it will enforce to ensure that the developments are of the correct mix, create the right social spaces, do not impact the area in an adverse manner, have the right setbacks etc. No Bylaw amendments have been proposed.
 - The city needs to commit to a plan and not continue to revise plans every few years. The City of Johannesburg already has in place Precinct plans that allow for the densification that responds to the BRT and the need to house more people. The constant revision of plans does not assist in improving the areas and achieving the goals set out and merely creates distrust with the residents in the area. The city should focus on providing incentives to ensure that the areas they originally earmarked for densification are more viable and that densification 'creep' does not occur as is likely from the Strategic framework proposed. The city have not done any assessment as to why they have failed to encourage the densification in these areas and should rather focus on this than huge schemes that become even more difficult to implement and manage.
 - Agreements reached and commitments made during the process, need to be recorded and incorporated in a suitable form, into the final framework. The community structures need a suitable mechanism of monitoring and reporting to ensure compliance, by the relevant stakeholders, with the undertaking made.
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9.2 Details on participation process

	Date	Venue	Time
1st Round	2 October 2013	Marks Park	18:00
	3 October 2013 (Cancelled due to poor attendance)	Westbury Recreation Centre	10:00
2nd Round	29 October	Marks Park	18:00
	31 October 2013	Coronationville Recreation Centre	18:00
3rd Round	18 March 2013	Marks Park	18:00
	19 March 2013	Danie Van Zyl Recreation Centre	18:00
Affected Councillors	22 August 2013	City Transformation boardroom	10:00
Ward 87	17 January 2014	ACA Krans building	18:00
Ward 69	20 January 2014	Marks Park	18:00
Ward 69	6 March 2014	Marks Park	18:00
PRA meeting 1	2 December 2013	Wits	18:00
PRA meeting 2	6 February 2010	Wits	18:00
PNRA	16 October 2013	7 th Avenue Parktown North	18:00
Ward 69 (Combination of Melville, Brxton, Westdene, Auckland Park, residents associations)	25 November 2013 20 February 2014 6 March 2014	Marks Park	18:00
Ward 69 (Working Group)	27 November 2013 19 February 2014	City Transformation Boardroom	10:00 9:00
Pennyville Community Reps	14 November 2013	Pennyville Creche	18:00
Westbury, Crosby, Bosmont, Coronationville, Sophiatown, Community reps	19 November 2013	Coronationville	18:00
UJ and Wits	26 July 2013 28 October 2013	Wits Wits	10:30
UJ	19 January 2014	AKP Campus	11:00
Wits	7 March 2014	City Transformation boardroom	10:00
UJ	3 April 2014	Bunting campus	13:00
South African Association of Consulting Planners (SAACP) Developers and Planners	22 November 2013 19 February 2014	City Transformation boardroom	10:00 10:00
Heritage Organisations (Egoli and Jhb Heritage Foundations)	27 January 2013	Office HMJ Prins	12:00
Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry	18 November 2013	City Transformation boardroom	14:00
Egoli Gas	28 November 2013	City Transformation boardroom	10:00
SAPOA	21 November 2013	City Transformation boardroom	14:00
Social Housing Companies	20 November 2013 28 March 2014	Joschco	9:00 9:30



**SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE**

**SCHOOL
OF ARCHITECTURE
AND PLANNING**



CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROTOCOL NUMBER SOAP14/08/21/08

PROJECT TITLE

The influence of public participation on the corridors of freedom policy-making process and project: the case of the Empire Perth

INVESTIGATOR(S)

Mr Bradley Peens (Student#:472607)

SCHOOL

Architecture and Planning

DEGREE PROGRAMME

Planning

DATE CONSIDERED

21 August 2014

DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE

Approved Conditionally

EXPIRY DATE

21 August 2016

CHAIRPERSON

(Associate Professor Diaan van der Westhuizen)

DATE 01/09/2014

cc: Supervisor : Professor C. Benit-Gbaffou

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to resubmit the protocol to the Committee.

Signature

11.09.2014
Date