



Violent conflict and international migration in Africa, 2005-2013: Empirical patterns and government challenges

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Masters in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university

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ABSTRACT

This research report examines the governance and developmental challenges faced by countries that are major refugee destination countries. In doing so, I seek to examine the determinants of refugee outflows in Africa during the period of 2005 to 2013. I begin with the gravity model of refugee flows which helps identify and explain why certain countries tend to become major refugee destinations. The gravity model posits that refugee flows between two states is influenced by the distance and population size of both the destination and origin country. To this, I also add violent conflict which is expected to significantly affect refugee flows. In identifying major refugee destination nations, I also seek to understand which of these countries identify forced migration as a crucial governance and development challenge. The APRM text-mining analysis provides clarity on this. I use the statistical analysis to identify two countries that are popular refugee destination countries – Ethiopia and Kenya. I then present nested cases of trends of violent conflict and refugee flows.

My central findings are that the presence of violent conflict in the source country strongly increases refugee outflows. I also find that distance plays a significant role in influencing migration decisions. The dynamics in the case studies reveal that African states are faced with different migration related challenges, and that the governance of migration is highly depended on the cooperation, will and commitment between the host and source countries.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Africa is disproportionately affected by conflict-induced migration – By the end of 2015, more than 65 million people around the world were either displaced or had to flee their homes due to war, persecution, violence or human rights violation (UNHCR 2016). During this period, Africa was the most affected continent with approximately 16 million individuals either left displaced or forced to flee their countries. Approximately 5.2 million out of the 16 million forced migrants migrated to neighbouring countries. Africa also has five of the top ten receiving countries in the world (UNHCR 2016c).

Migration has always been an integral part of Africa's history. At the beginning of the twenty-first century approximately 200 million people were not residing in their country of origin (Jolle 2012, 99). Every single year millions of people flee their homes to escape violent conflict, natural disasters, poverty, and deprivation, thus becoming refugees, asylum seekers, or Internally Displaced Persons (Jolle 2012, 12). Between 1990 and 2013 internal migrants rose by 50 per cent (this is an increase of over 77 million new migrants) – most of this growth occurred between 2000 and 2010 (UNHCR 2013, 17). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR 2013), out of the 42.5 million persons of concern to the UNHCR 15.2 million were refugees, 26.4 million internally displaced, and 895, 000 asylum seekers (UNHCR 2013); and by the end of 2013, there were an estimated 16.7 million refugees, this is an increase from 15.2 million in 2011 (IOM 2014).

Migration, like globalisation, is not a new phenomenon. It is a complex issue that has been an integral part of human existence. In the African context, a number of socio-economic, political, cultural, geographical and environmental factors have placed pressure on people thus causing them to migrate (ACCORD 2015). Conflict induced forced migration has been the leading cause of migration across the world. Conflict induced migration has gained great prominence in recent years this can largely be attributed to the intensity, frequency and magnitude of violent conflict in countries like the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria, Libya, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ACCORD 2015). The heightened activity of terrorists, violent extremists and radical groups in North and West Africa and the Middle East has also contributed towards increased and widespread forced displacement of people who are in search of basic security and safety (ACCORD 2015). One of the key factors that differentiates migration trends and flows in Africa from other continents is the frequency and magnitude of these flows.

While violent conflicts in Africa has declined over the years, recent insurgencies in countries such as Mali, Niger and Mauritania, and low intensity conflicts surging within countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal bring to light the difficulties in combating internal and regional violent conflicts (Annan 2013, 1). These conflicts have severe consequences and result in the destruction of lives and property, internal displacement of people, a region wide refugee crises, poverty and disease, drug trafficking, the proliferation of small arms as well as illegal exploitation of natural resources (Annan 2013, 1). These consequences have manifested over years and have thus made it increasingly difficult to govern migration. This is partially due to the fact that destination countries do not have the capacity (financial, physical and political) to mitigate migration flows.

Existing literature sheds minimal insight on the impact that violent conflict has on competing destination countries and moreover the impact that geographical proximity has on a migrant's decision to immigrate. In addition, relatively few studies have focused on geographical proximity; violent conflict and migration at the same time (see Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011 and Iqbal 2007). This paper seeks to add to the existing literature on migration trends and patterns in Africa by studying how violent conflict and geographical proximity during the period of 2005 and 2013 in Africa influenced regional migration patterns. The paper also seeks to contribute towards the discussion on migration by examining how migration is captured both at a regional and national level.

I decided to focus on the period between 2005 and 2013 as this the period in which the first and most recent African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Country Review Reports (CRRs) were compiled. In analysing the CRRs, I will receive greater insight on how the APRM captures trends and patterns in African migration and the extent to which member countries identify forced migration as a governance and development issue. The main finding is that the APRM falls short of capturing regional trends and patterns. This speaks to a larger issue as it brings migration policies into question.

As noted above, one of the consequences of violent conflict which affects the entire continent is the forced migration challenge. The continued violent conflict in Somalia for example has seen over 1 million Somali's seeking refuge, mostly in Kenya and Ethiopia (Farah and Otondi 2015). The conflict has also left a further 1.1 million people internally displaced (Farah and Otondi 2015). Tension and violence tends to escalate during election cycles which can trigger long term violence. The post 2007 election violence in Kenya serves as an example. We witnessed a similar escalation of tensions during the 2013 elections, although fortunately there was the absence of election induced violence (Elder, Stigant and Claes 2014). Similar trends are also evident in Burundi. According to the UNHCR, election-related violence in Burundi has resulted in over 250, 000 refugees seeking refuge in countries

such as Tanzania, DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia (Dobbs and Gaynor 2016). In critically analysing violent conflict, existing literature tends to place focus on forced migration thus neglecting the manifestations of migration which includes the militarization of refugee camps and border disputes. These manifestations are evidence of short term plans being treated as long term plans (i.e. refugee camps in Kenya). This paper seeks to address some of these shortfalls.

The study proceeds as follows: Chapter Two is a discussion on the theoretical approach, in which I define the key variables. I also discuss the basic logic of the study and discuss the poor understanding of migration and how this has negative implications on migration policies. In Chapter three, I state the expected casual relationships. This is followed by the operationalization of the concepts and the specification of the regression model. In Chapter Four, I discuss the governance of migration in Africa by placing particular focus on the migration related challenges that destination countries are faced with. Two nested case studies are discussed in Chapter Five. Chapter six summarises the main findings of the study.

CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL APPROACH

POOR UNDERSTANDING ON MIGRATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Why limit the study of violent conflict and migration to Africa? There are three principal reasons. First, there is a general poor understanding on African migration, its dynamics, consequences and impact. The poor understanding of African migration stems from the limited studies on regional migration. Most available literature on African migration tends to focus on South-North migration and to a lesser extent South-South migration – let alone regional migration.

In order to understand African migration trends it is of the essence to trace back the inception of migration trends in Africa, this entails understanding and theorising the role of colonial and post-colonial African states in shaping migration processes that is often ignored or weakly theorised thus causing a poor understanding of African migration as a whole. In understanding the role that colonialism played in African migration processes it is important to take the following into consideration. Colonial and slave trade practices as well as the systematic use of forced labour have shaped African migration in many ways. During the colonial liberation period many Africans migrated in an attempt to escape conflict and war that was taking place in many African countries during the post-colonial period (Rwanatwara 2005, 179).

The establishment of new independent states did not mean that states would transition back to their peaceful state (Rwanatwara 2005, 179). During the colonial liberation period, conflicts in Africa were characterised by political and economic pressures, arms supplies, mercenaries and direct military intervention (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989).

States prioritised and placed great emphasis on the need to create a strong sense of national unity in ethnically diverse societies. As a result, this created tensions between the different ethnic groups which consequently resulted in violent conflicts in a number of African countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). Instability resulted in one of the following: violent conflicts either forced people to migrate in search of security in a different country or it provided an incentive for people to stay so that they could protect their families (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 5; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989).

As mentioned above, the formation of newly independent states did not necessarily translate into peaceful conditions, the formation of these new states was accompanied by even more challenges that African states had not previously dealt with. The state formation process compelled a number of states such as Algeria, Egypt and Cote d'Ivoire to discourage the emigration of their own populations as

they feared the consequences of emigration such as the brain drain, these states also placed great restrictions on immigration (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 6). Immigration restrictions and border controls were established to assert national sovereignty as immigrants were viewed as a threat to sovereignty, security, and ethnic homogeneity (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 6).

Political tensions and violent conflicts also prompted neighbouring African countries to seal off their borders; examples include South Africa during its anti-apartheid struggle, Morocco and Algeria as part of the conflict around the Western Sahara (Collyer 2003). The decision to seal off borders was also highly influenced by the perception by many states (like Algeria, Kenya and Egypt) that large scale migration would be a major source of brain drain and a threat to sovereignty (Collyer 2003).

Secondly, the research is partially based on a cross-national study, focused on 47 African countries over a period of 9 years, rather than on a global sample across different historical periods. The regional and temporal focus provides a degree of control over the sample.

Thirdly, Africa is disproportionately affected by conflict-induced migration and moreover, in comparison to other regions, violent conflicts in Africa are more severe and frequent. As mentioned earlier, what differentiates migration trends and flows in Africa from other continents is the frequency and magnitude of these flows. For example, by mid-2014, the crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) triggered the displacement of over 400, 000 asylum seekers, 500, 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), including an estimated 120, 000 third country national (UNHCR 2014, 4). Continued violence in northern Nigeria has resulted in a rise the number of IDPs. The number of IPDs rose from 1.2 million at the end of 2014, to 2.2 million by the end of 2015 (UNHCR 2016b, 20).

In addition, the outbreak of armed conflicts or deterioration of on-going ones in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan, among others, have contributed towards the significant increase in the number of refugees in the past four years. Observed trends also indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa is host to the largest number of refugees (4.1 million), followed by Asia and Pacific (3.8 million), the Middle East and North Africa (3 million) (UNHCR 2014, 4). Migration trends within the continent also indicate that a number of African countries such as Tanzania and Ethiopia have become both transit and destination states for irregular flows (UNHCR 2014, 5).

The poor understanding on African migration and its consequences is evident through various migration policies (or lack thereof) and poorly defined migration frameworks and coordination

mechanisms between governments (at both national and regional level); and lack of dialogue between countries of origin, transit and destination, unfolds itself in the inability to mitigate potential negative consequences and spill over effects. Comprehensive migration policies and well managed migration have the potential to yield benefits to both the destination and origin country. However, the mismanagement of migration has significant long term negative consequences for the state and migrant's well-being, this includes threats to national and regional security weakened inter-state relations and tensions between migrants and local communities (African Union 2006, 5). In countries such as Kenya, refugee camps have turned into cities. In the Dadaab refugee camp, which is now home to more than 463, 000 refugees, more than 10, 000 are third-generation refugees (Mongae 2016, 10). This important aspect of migration needs to be addressed as it highlights the fact that laws and policies intended to address the migration challenge, promote and protect migrants in Africa are temporary solutions that are being treated as long term (Mongae 2016, 10).

The refugee crisis in Kenya and Africa, suggests that the failure of migration policies is not necessarily the result of weaknesses of the receiving country but can be the result of migration policies that are based on the short term view of the migration process (migration policies are often determined by the length of the election period). It is of the essence to analyse and understand migration as a long term social process that is characterised by its own dynamics.

As indicated above, migration policies are also a direct reflection of the governance of migration. The adoption and institutionalisation of norms, standards, rules and decision making procedures that regulate how states respond to the movement of people across borders can either minimise or exacerbate the consequences of migration. If these norms and procedures have not been adopted and most importantly institutionalised, migration policies cannot serve their purpose.

The governance of migration can be practised through policies and initiatives. Policies such as The African Union migration and regional Integration Framework provides insight into how migration is understood and can it should be addressed at a regional level. Initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) provides insight into migration related challenges, the extent to which migration is prioritised at a national level as well as the extent to which migration is identified as a governance issue. It is important to understand the role of regional institutions such as the African Union and initiatives such as the APRM as they enable one identify progress, challenges and shortcomings.

CONCEPTUALISING VARIABLES

Conceptualising forced migration

Migration can be understood as the movement of people from one place to another – this includes internal migration (rural to urban) and international migration (from one country to another) – with the purpose of taking up permanent or semi-permanent residence (FMO 2012). Migration can be characterised by two categories: voluntary and involuntary migration.

It is of the essence to be able to differentiate voluntary and involuntary migration primarily because the policy for voluntary migration and the policy for involuntary migration have fundamental differences on an economic, social and political level. By differentiating forced migration from voluntary migration, displacement should be viewed from the point of view both of its cause and/or its purpose (Fischer & Vollmer 2009, 11). One of the shortcomings of the APRM CRRs is the lack of distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration. As a result, there is a conceptual conflation between the types of migrants. The conflation of these typologies reduces the quality of discussion around migration

Why is it important to make a distinction between forced and voluntary migration? A distinction between these typologies will expand our understanding and thinking around migration and the various consequences associated with migration. The most persuasive reason is the fact that there is a fundamental difference in experience between forced and non-forced migrants, the two types of migrants also have distinctive needs. In addition, not all African countries are faced with the same migration challenges. This is evident in the APRM CRRs. Some countries such as Lesotho, the discussion on migration is primarily linked to the emigration of Basotho people to countries such as South Africa for better economic opportunities (Lesotho CRR 2009, 48). In countries such as Ethiopia, migration is discussed in relation to violent conflict within the country and in neighbouring countries (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 116). In Nigeria's CRR both forced and involuntary migration are discussed (Nigeria CRR 2009).

Voluntary migrants are those who leave a particular country and settle elsewhere for better opportunities such as employment; business or for educational opportunities so that they can improve their lives (FMO 2012; Fischer & Vollmer 2009, 11). Forced migrants on the other hand, flee from social and/or political problems such as armed conflict, human rights violations and natural disasters. These unfavourable conditions cause mass internal displacement and forces individuals to find refuge in countries that will supposedly provide them with more security (FMO 2012). It can therefore be said that forced migration is associated with threat or fear (UNHCR 2013).

As mentioned above, the main factor that distinguishes forced and voluntary migrants is that the former migrate against their will (Kunz 1973). Another way to differentiate the two types of migrants is by further dichotomising migration – those with agency and those without agency – forced migrants are those that have little to no agency (Richmond 1994, 59). Forced migration can also be classified into two categories – forced migration caused by natural disasters and forced migration caused by violent conflict.

David Turton (2003, 10) argues that by classifying migrants as those with agency and those without, suggests that forced migrants have little to no scope for independent rational decision making. This way of thinking also suggests that forced migrants are passive victims of circumstances. Forced migrants may have a choice on when, where and how to move, this implies that forced migrants have agency. Turton further argues that the notion involuntary is the incorrect term to oppose voluntary. He suggests that the correct word is ‘compulsory’. Although I agree with Turton’s argument, I do not agree with his alternative use of language as it is equally limiting.

The term ‘compulsory’ is associated with the same connotations as the word ‘forced’ - the term implies that there is a lack of choice. By definition, the term compulsory is synonymous to obligation which is the same as the term forced. An act is involuntary or compulsory when it is done without thinking. The verb migrate is an act that we do (there is some degree of human agency). An alternative use of language would be ‘circumstantial’ oppose to ‘compulsory’. Circumstantial migration suggests that individuals migrate due to the situation/circumstances that they are in; the term does not insinuate that individuals do not have human agency. I do not conclude that the term ‘circumstantial migration’ should be replaced by the term ‘forced migration’, I do however suggest that we are mindful of the use of language when defining and dichotomising migration – and in this particular case forced migration. We should also recognise the conceptual conflation that the term ‘forced migrant’ raises. It is however, still the best term available.

Defining refugees

According to Kunz (1973), a distinction can be made between refugees and other migrants. Refugees are forced to leave their homes due to a change in their environment. The term ‘refugee’ is characterised by empirical sociological and socio-political connotations that cannot be understood and analysed in isolation. The 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person living outside of their own country and is unwilling or unable to return to their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution for religious, race, nationality, or being a

member of a certain social group or political opinion (UNHCR 2010). The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention broadens this definition by including individuals who as a result of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events that cause serious disturbance in either a part or the whole of his/her country or origin and is therefore compelled to leave his/her home country in order to take refuge in another country of origin or nationality (UNHCR 1967, 3). A refugee is in essence a person who has crossed an international border because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his/her own state.

Refugees do not only decide that they are fleeing a state, but they also decide which state they will flee to. This does not only support the argument that forced migrants have agency, but it also suggests that refugees take the conditions of both the source and destination country into consideration. This is evident when there is the occurrence of violent conflict in both the country of origin as well as in the country in which refugees flee to. This will most likely influence the volume of refugees that the latter receives.

Conceptualising violent conflict

More often than not, conflict in Africa is characterised by violence – this statement is very vague as violence comes in different forms. Three main sources of violence can be identified: state violence (repression and genocide); dissident violence (riots and guerrilla attacks), and state-dissident interaction (armed violence) (Melander and Öberg 2009, 158). Non-violent factors such as population size and the type of democracy have been argued to affect forced migration flows (Melander and Öberg 2009, 158).

The terms ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ are often used interchangeably; it is however necessary to differentiate the two as the manner and extent to which violent conflict is understood influences how it is interpreted by policy makers, media and society. The primary difference between conflict and war is determined by the intensity, which is determined by the number deaths – if the number of deaths reaches a threshold of a 1000 the conflict is identified as war (Demmers 2012, 4).

Christopher Mitchell (1981, 17), defines conflict as a situation in which any two or more parties perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals. For Demmers (2012, 5) and Mitchell (1981), conflict comprises of three crucial components: incompatibility, attitudes and behaviour. Incompatibility refers to cases when members of a particular group think that their goals cannot be attained because of the other party’s attempt to achieve their own respective goal/s (Demmers 2012, 5). The second component consists of conflict attitudes. This refers to the psychological state/s that

arise during conflict; this includes emotions, patterns of perception and misconception. The third component of conflict is behaviour. This refers to any action taken by the opposition party with the intention of making the opponent abandon or re-evaluate their goal/s (Mitchell 1981; Demmers 2012, 6).

Competing perspectives on the cause/s of violent conflict

The widely accepted argument is that violent conflict in Africa is primarily caused by ethnic and religious diversity. Scholars such as Elbadwi and Sambanis (2000) argue that contrary to popular belief, violence in Africa is caused by extreme poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources – not religious diversity or ethnic hatred. With regard to the latter, the two authors argue that in comparison to other regions, Africa is inherently safer because of its social diversity (Elbadwi and Sambanis 2000, 23). Elbadwi and Sambanis further argue that the institutionalisation of democratic reforms that effectively manage the challenges associated with Africa's diverse society is the best and fastest solution to reducing the prevalence of civil wars in Africa.

Murshed and Tadjoeeddin's (2009) article which assesses greed and grievance as explanations for violent internal conflict, argues that the presence of greed and grievance may help explain why violent conflicts begin, however neither are sufficient explanations for the outbreak of violent conflict. They argue that violent conflict is the result of failure of the social construct.

Anke Hoeffler (2012, 7) on the other hand, argues that state weaknesses create conditions for violent conflict. Weak state institutions perpetuate unstable conditions as they are unable to mitigate social and political issues. The inability for state institutions to peacefully mitigate issues such as differences between interest groups, corruption, as well as the inability to accommodate the growing demand to participate in politics can frustrate members of society. Other factors that perpetuate violent conflict are abject poverty, political instability, stagnate and slow economic growth and human insecurity (Bowd & Chikwanha 2013, 13).

As is evident, there is a lack of consensus on what causes violent conflict. It can however be agreed upon that violent conflict in Africa is a complex issue and is characterised by a number of intertwined factors. The ongoing and current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) serves as a case in point. The DRC has experienced two major wars: The Kabila war of 1996 – 1997; and the anti-kabila war or alternatively referred to as the continental war of 1998-2002) (UNECA 2015, 10).

The conflict in the DRC can be classified into the following three categories: political, economic and military. Politically, the conflict is driven by the need for power which allows access to state resources and revenues (UNECA 2015, 12). Economically, the conflict is driven by three groups: the government, rebel groups, and external actors who all seek control over the DRC's natural resource wealth. In addition, there is an unequal distribution of proceeds from natural resources, this is the cause of grievance among those who live in resource-endowed regions (UNECA 2015, 22). The local people argue that the state is exploiting their wealth without tangible benefits. Militarily, division within the military, as well as individual corruption and opportunism has created a national army that is characterised by large-scale theft, extortion, human rights violations and mutiny (UNECA 2015.32).

The ongoing conflict in the DRC is prolonged by other factors such as weak economic conditions. Weak economic conditions and bad economic policies has severely limited the DRC's governments ability to attend to the needs of the Congolese people by ensuring that they deliver basic public services. A weak economy did not directly cause conflict, it did however exacerbate existing economic and social related challenges. The economic crises did not only result in the economic alienation of a portion of the population (the youth and educated in particular) but it has also created an environment that was/is conducive for the mobilization of rebellions (UNECA 2015, 40). Bad governance and systematic institutional failure did not only fail to manage conflict but it prolonged conflict and failed to secure law and order. It also permitted corruption, kleptocracy and rent-seeking which alienated people from the state (UNECA 2015, 40). The manifestations of violent conflict in the DRC are some of the causes for the ongoing conflict. The Sierra Leone war is also the result of multiple causes.

Two of the leading conflict theorists, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991 – 2001) was caused and motivated by greed and grievances. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels had a number of grievances – one of them being some of the fighters where living on dire poverty and homelessness (Oscar 2010, 26). Arson and Zartman (2005) on the other hand argue that the war in Sierra Leone was caused by need, creed and greed. *Need* (historical grievances): People were excluded from the system and were deprived of basic needs (Arson and Zartman 2005; Oscar 2010, 44). The exclusionary system was made up of political elites and some Lebanese businessmen who used state power to enrich themselves and deprive others;

Creed (identity feelings): The Revolutionary United Front was emerged out of grievances. Students were becoming increasingly disgruntled and radicalised by social injustices, poverty, corruption, marginalisation, and political disenfranchisement (Oscar 2010, 46). *Greed* (natural resources): Elite greed and opportunism resulted in the criminalisation of the RUF insurgency. increased involvement of external patrons and rogue businessman (Oscar 2010, 47).

As is evident, there is no single factor that causes violent conflict, violent conflict is instead the result of overlapping factors. Based on the two case studies and competing perspectives, the causes of violent conflict are the result of the culmination of the following factors (Ohlson 2008):

Political and institutional factors: This includes weak state institutions, political exclusion, elite power struggles, corruption and identity politics.

Socio-economic factors: poverty, inequality, marginalisation and exclusion, and the absence or weakening of social cohesion.

Resource and environmental factors: scarcity of natural resources, greed, and unjust resource exploitation.

One or a combination of these factors can either cause or exacerbate conflict.

In chapter three, I use cross-national statistics to determine whether countries that experience intense violent conflict are more or less likely to produce high levels of forced migration outflows. Chapter 5 compares and contrasts findings from the empirical findings and select case studies where interesting comparisons can be drawn.

CHAPTER 3: VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION

This chapter aims to critically analyse the association between violent conflict and forced migration by controlling for the effects of other variables. In doing so, I seek to provide a deeper understanding on trends and patterns in African migration by identifying popular destination countries and moreover examining how effective existing migration policies in these respective countries are in governing migration.

I estimate regression models to see whether countries that experienced intense violent conflict also experience high forced migration outflows. I make use of control variables to measure the possibility of other factors such as population size and distance as driving the bivariate association between violent conflict and forced migration. This chapter is structured as follows: in the first section, I discuss the measures used in the regression model. This is followed by a regression estimate table, which will provide data on the empirical association between violent conflict and forced migration.

I identify three broad types of factors that could have an influence on refugee flows: Distance between the host and source country, violent conflict in the source and host country, and the population of both the host and source country. My findings and analysis seek to further the understanding of the dynamics of refugee flows in Africa, by taking the characteristics of the source and host country into consideration.

CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

Measuring the dependent variable

I am partially interested in investigating the extent to which violent conflict affects migration and the extent to which geographical proximity affects where one decides to migrate. Individuals included in this analysis are international forced migrants in need of assistance from the United Nations Human Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Forced migration flows are measured as the net count of refugees from a country in a given year. This is obtained by tallying the number of refugees from African countries (that have available data) between 2005 and 2013. The refugee population category includes people who are refugees and/or are in refugee like situations. The latter refers to people who face protection risks similar to those of refugees and seek to migrate, but in comparison to refugees, they have not been ascertained (UNHCR 2013).

According to the UNHCR's mid-year trends report (2015, 4), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is host to the world's largest number of refugees (4.1 million), this is followed by Asia and Pacific (3.8 million), Europe (3.5 million), the Middle East and North Africa (3 million). Somalia is the world's third largest source country of refugees and the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa – as of 2015, Somalia produced 1.1 million refugees (UNHCR 2015, 6). Other important source countries for refugees include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (535,300), the Central African Republic (470,600), Myanmar (458,400), Eritrea (383,900), and Iraq (377,700) (UNHCR 2015, 6). It is interesting to take note of the fact that half of the top refugees hosting countries are located in SSA, with four of them being the least developed countries (UNHCR 2015, 6). This challenges the idea that refugees are more likely to migrate to more developed countries. Research and data compiled by the UNHCR indicates that although the refugee population in Africa has declined over the last 15 years, by the end of 2010, African refugees represented 27 percent of all refugees in the world (Lucas 2013, 12).

Violent conflict

Data for violent conflict was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The UCDP defines and measures battle related deaths as the number of deaths caused by armed force between two warring parties in a conflict dyad (UCDP 2016). This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities, bombardments of military units, cities and villages. All deaths are included – military as well as civilian incurred situations (UCDP 2016). A minimum of 25 battle related deaths per calendar year is required in order for it to be included in the UCDP database. The intensity of the violence is divided into the following two categories (UCDP 2016):

Minor: a minimum of 25 but less than 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year

War: At least 1000 battle related deaths in one calendar year.

The gravity model

One of the main objectives of this paper is to better understand what influences the migration flow between two countries. The gravity model is one of the key instruments in unpacking this objective. It is also one of the main tools that assisted in determining the variables.

Gravity models provide a framework to understand what determines the migration flows between two countries (Greenwood 2005, 727). They are partially used by researchers to better assess the impacts of migration policies on migration flows. Gravity models have previously been used to predict the

movement of people between two locations, and the distance between two states. In addition, they have also been used to predict migration flows (Greenwood 2005, 728). They assume that the flows between two countries are directly proportional to their size and are inversely proportional to the physical distance between them.

According to this model, countries with larger populations attract and generate more migrants. Migration models address the following questions:

- 1) Who migrates?
- 2) Why do these migrants migrate?
- 3) Where do they come from and where do they migrate to?
- 4) When do they migrate?
- 5) What are the consequences for the migrants as well as the destination country and their country of origin?

The use of a gravity model will help explain which countries in Africa are most exposed to large refugee flows.

Control variables

Control variables include variables that have been found to have an effect on the number of forced migration flows. In addition to violent conflict, two measures are included. The first is population size and distance – which are expected to influence the magnitude of forced migration flows. In order to capture consistency with the gravity model, all of the variables have been logged transformed.

Population size of the destination and country of origin

Population size has been argued to affect forced migration flows. In previous research, population size has rarely shown to have a significant effect on forced migration flows. However, there is no reason to believe that in comparison to countries with smaller populations, countries with greater populations are more likely to produce more forced migrants (Melander & Öberg 2009, 162). Data for population size comes from the World Bank.

Although it is generally accepted that distance influences refugee flows, minimal empirical studies have been compiled to explain the extent to which the two variables are associated. This paper seeks to add on to our understanding on trends and patterns in African migration and one of the ways in which I seek to do so is by examining how distance mediates the flow of refugees. The role that distance plays in determining the volume of refugee's challenges the widely accepted view that when deciding where to migrate, conditions in the host country highly influence where refugees migrate to. In other words, if the conditions in a potential host country are favorable but the state is relatively far from the host country than these conditions are unlikely to be considered.

Data on distance was obtained from the Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). The data is based on the distance between two countries (CEPII 2016). The distance between the pairs of countries is calculated based on bilateral distances between the biggest cities in each country – the distance is measured in kilometers (CEPII 2016).

Table 1 summaries the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the population of both the destination and origin country, refugee flows, the distance between country of origin and destination country, and violent conflict. The distribution for refugee inflows – with a mean of 6.50 and a median of 2.00, indicates that it is skewed towards the right. Countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad and Uganda received a large inflow of refugees. The variable for refugee outflows has mean of 5.30 and a median of 8.10 which indicates that the distribution is skewed to the left. Countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan produced large numbers of refugees; others such as Madagascar, Lesotho and South Africa produced a small number of refugees.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Measures ¹	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Refugee outflows	5.30	8.10	1.10	8.00	4.50
Refugee inflows	6.50	2.00	9.40	1.20	3.50
Distance	2.00	2.00	3.20	1.50	2.50
population	7.39	6.00	6.50	4.30	3.50
Number of deaths	2.20	3.60	4.30	1.00	1.70

*Values rounded to the second decimal place

¹ Values are in scientific notation

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION

Existing literature that examines the effect of violence on migration varies in its analysis and conclusion on what drives migration. It is agreed that there is a strong association between the two; however, there has been great debates about the correlation between the two variables and whether the effect is direct or indirect (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011, 401). On the one hand it is argued that the effect is indirect in the sense that violence has an extreme negative impact on the economy and that in turn leads to emigration (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011, 401). Scholars such as Morrison and May (1994) found that conflict related economic turmoil was more important than violence in predicting out-migration between provinces in Guatemala.

Shellman and Stewart (2007), on the other hand found that trends in Haitian emigration to the United States were strongly predicted by political violence. Melander and Öberg (2009) have suggested that migration is more a product of the geographic scope of violence and the extent to which it touches urban areas rather than its intensity. They have also found that the intensity of armed conflict is not related to the number of potential forced migrants. A cross-national comparative analysis by Schmeidl (1997) found that violence predicts international refugee flows more strongly than national economic conditions.

Although there is a lack of consensus about whether or not the relationship between violent conflict and migration is direct or indirect, the common feature in the outcomes of these studies is that there is strong and consistent evidence that people flee from generalised violence.

The rational choice perspective suggests that as violence intensifies so does the risk of physical safety, this in turn results in the increase in the probability of people wanting to move because they seek to reduce this risk by moving elsewhere (Bohra and Massey 2011, 7). Due to the data limitations, the intensity of violence is often measured according to the number of deaths. I use the same method to measure the intensity of violent conflict.

The competing perspectives suggest that there is uncertainty about the degree to which violent conflict influences forced migration. Armed conflict is the greatest cause of forced migration. It is however important to understand the manner in which it effects forced migration. For example, armed conflict in any particular country is experienced differently, in other words where the conflict takes place influences the seriousness of the threat – larger countries may have less affected areas than

smaller states. Melander and Öberg (2009, 159) argue that forced migration flows are more likely to increase as the larger portion of the country is affected by the fighting. Contrary to their expectation, Melander and Öberg found that the intensity of the violence did not have any significant impact on forced migration flows.

It can be understood that violence increases the perceived threat to one's security; this in turn forces people to migrate to places where their safety is protected. It is however not enough to reduce the relationship between violence and migration to a simple linear function – as this relationship is characterised by a number of intertwined factors. By choosing to migrate to less familiar surroundings, individuals can expose themselves to violence that they are seeking to escape. This threat of violence may occur while travelling or in the destination country (i.e. human trafficking). The decision of where to migrate to could therefore largely depend on the intensity of the violence. At lower levels of violence, people are less likely to migrate. The higher the intensity of violence, people will feel more threatened and will choose to migrate elsewhere. I therefore predict the number of forced migrants to increase the higher the intensity of violence (H1). During low levels of violence, I predict a lower rate of migration flows. This suggests that there is a threshold of violence that individuals are willing to tolerate (Williams & Pradhan 2009, 5).

The association between migration and geographical proximity

Both theory and empirical studies tend to focus on the consequences of violent conflict and its causes, as well as why individuals decide to migrate during conflict (see Williams and Pradhan 2009). What these studies tend to overlook is how or the extent to which geographical proximity influences one's decision to migrate. This can lead to an incomplete picture about violent conflict, individuals, and the communities they live in as well as how individuals experience violent conflict. It can be assumed that migrants are more likely to migrate to destination countries closest to their country of origin. I therefore expect that, *ceteris paribus*, during violent conflict migrants are more likely to migrate to countries that are closest to their country of origin (H2).

Literature that has examined the association between migration and geographical proximity give evidence that distance has a strong negative effect (See Beals, Levy and Moses 1967). That is to say, the bigger the distance between two countries the lower the migration flows between them. Melander and Öberg (2009) found that people within a country that is experiencing armed conflict will experience this conflict differently. This difference in experience is depended on where they live,

relative to the fighting. They also propose that the number of people, who are forced to flee their homes, is related to the geographical scope and location of the violence. Findings from their study suggest that geographical proximity is more important in determining the magnitude of forced migration flows. This finding holds true when controlling for other factors that influence forced migration such as the regime type, genocide, socio-economic factors (GDP per capita and the population size), and the intensity of the intrastate conflict. Table 2 measures this finding. I use control variables to measure that the association between violent conflict and migration flows, which is driven by distance and the population size of the origin and destination country.

Table 2: Regression Estimates

	Dependent variable: refugees			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	6.14	-44.72	-42.12	-1.77
	(0.80)	(-5.92)	(0.00)	(0.98)
Log(violent conflict)	0.69	0.25	0.25	0.29***
	(0.15)	(2.02)	(0.05)	(0.16)
Log(populationA)		2.48	2.46	2.49***
		(6.75)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Log(populationB)			-0.11	-0.18
			(0.34)	(0.61)
Log(distance)				-3.27
				(0.11)
adj. R-squared	0.30	0.65	0.65	0.56
sigma	3.58	2.53	2.54	2.54
N	47	47	47	30

Table 2 contains regression estimates of my analysis of refugee flows in Africa from 2005 to 2013 – with refugee outflows from the country of origin as the dependent variable. The first number for each variable is the coefficient, and the number in the parenthesis is the *t* statistic. Column (1) contains estimates of a regression of migration flows on the logarithm of violent conflict. The coefficient estimate shows that there is strong positive bivariate association between migration and violent conflict. The hypothesis that intense violent conflict produces more refugees is supported. The model shows that violent conflict in the country of origin has a significant positive affect on refugee flows. An increase in the number of deaths in the source country increases refugee flows by 69 percent. Column (2) adds the population size of the country of origin. The coefficient for violent remains positive but is significantly stronger.

The regression estimate in column 3 shows that population size in the destination country is negatively associated with refugee flows. A migrant's ability to find refuge is dependent on the willingness of the host state to allow refugees into its territory. Some states may be hesitant host a large number of refugees due to security concerns or a lack of resources. This variable has no effect on the violent conflict coefficient, while the coefficient for the population of the origin country remains positive.


Column (4) adds distance. The distance coefficient has a significant effect on the violent conflict coefficient. The coefficient estimates support the expectation that refugees are more likely to migrate to countries that are geographically close to their country of origin. Distance has a significantly negative effect on refugee flows. Each kilometre increase in distance between the destination and origin country is associated with a -3.27 reduction in the number of refugees between the two states. During times of violent conflict, migrants live in dire conditions, thus their primary focus is to escape from the violent conflict. It therefore comes as no surprise that forced migrants will more likely than not migrant to nearby states. This constraint makes distance a significant factor in influencing migration decisions.

Figure 1 depicts the association between violent conflict and refugee outflows. The countries in the sample are spread out. It is worth noting that not every country that experienced intense violent conflict produced a large number of refugees. For instance, Algeria (DZA) and Ethiopia (ETH) both experienced the same levels of intense violent conflict however, there were more refugee outflows in

Ethiopia than there were in Algeria. Countries such as Angola (AGO) and Rwanda (RWA) experienced less intense violent conflict however, both countries produced a large number of refugees – their refugee outflows exceed other countries that experienced more intense violent conflict. It comes as no surprise that both Somalia (SOM) and Sudan (SDN) are the largest refugee producing countries. On an international level Somalia is the third largest source country and the largest refugee producing country in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR 2015, 6). South Sudan is the fourth largest source country of refugees worldwide (UNHCR 2015, 6).

The vast majority of countries depicted in figure 1 are both source and host countries. This poses a complex challenge in mitigating and governing migration at both national and regional level. Individual states find it challenging to attend to the needs of local migrants and migrants from neighbouring countries. This can in turn cause tensions between migrants and the locals and between the host and source countries. With regards to migration policies, being a source and host country makes it difficult to decide which challenges and needs to prioritise – national, sub-regional or regional.

Figure 1: The association between violent conflict and refugee flows – 2005-2013



CONCLUSION

Existing literature pertaining the relationship between violent conflict and forced migration have competing conclusions and findings as to whether or not the relationship is direct or indirect. However, a common thread in this literature is that there is a strong association between violent conflict and forced migration. There is also a common agreement that the magnitude of the conflict has a direct effect on forced migration flows. Countries that experience high levels of violent conflict are more likely to produce high levels of forced migration flows and countries that experience less intense

violent conflict are more likely to experience fewer people migrating elsewhere. This hypothesis is based on the understanding that one's decision to migrate is highly influenced by the extent to which one feels that their personal security is at risk. Existing literature on forced migration pays minimal attention to the role that geographical proximity influences African migration flows.

My findings confirm that violent conflict forces a large number of people to abandon their homes. The results also show that distance has a significant negative effect on refugee flows. This indicates that migrants will more likely migrate to countries that are closest to their country of origin. Given the conditions that migrants are faced with during violent conflict, their focus is on finding safety thus migrants do not take the social, economic and political conditions of the host country into consideration. Figure 1 shows that not all African countries that experienced intense violent conflict produced a large number of refugees.

Findings from figure 1 indicate that a number of African states are both source and host countries. This poses a complex challenge in mitigating and governing migration at both national and regional level, as individual states find it challenging to attend to the needs of local migrants and migrants from neighbouring countries.

CHAPTER 4: THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION IN AFRICA

Migration and governance is interlinked. To understand migration trends and patterns in each individual country and the continent at large, it is necessary to understand how each individual country governs migration – this influences how governments address migration related issues at a regional level. Regional migration issues can be traced back to national and regional migration policies, institutions and legislations that Africa has drafted and implemented. A more thorough understanding on the migration policies and legislation will provide more insight into how effective these policies are and moreover, how migration is conceptualised and understood. The governance of migration is also interlinked with development, thus strong coherent migration policies are needed to boost regional integration and inclusive development.

Well managed migration can be beneficial to both the receiving and sending countries. The former can receive intellectual human capital, whereas the latter can receive millions if not billions in remittances from those who work overseas and in neighbouring countries. Sending countries can also attract investment from affluent members of their Diaspora; returning emigrants can bring back skills, expertise and personal wealth (The Economic Intelligence Unit 2016, 7). Well managed migration flows can also improve security (particularly for the receiving country and migrants) as it gives the destination country more control over who enters the country. Poorly managed migration on the hand can result in insecurity for both the sending and receiving countries. It can encourage illegal activities such as migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and social unrest (The Economic Intelligence Unit 2016, 7).

WHAT IS THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION?

The governance of migration involves various aspects including: health, security, economics and politics. It is for this reason that there have been contesting debates amongst scholars and research institutions such as the United Nations General Assembly, the High Commission for Human Rights and the Migration Policy Institute, on what constitutes migration governance. A list of widely accepted definitions from scholars, multilateral bodies and institutions are provided below.

The Migration Observatory defines the governance of migration as the norms and structures that regulate and shape how states respond to international migration (The Migration Observatory 2011).

Alexandra Betts’ (2011), definition of migration governance is similar to the migration observatory’s definition. Betts argues that migration governance consists of a range of rules, norms, principals, decision making procedures that exist over and above the level of the nation state.

Migration Policy Institute: defines migration as the formation of a set of norms and rules that are formulated to regulate how states respond to the movement of people across borders and actions taken to create a shared agenda that is based on safe, secure, legal, and orderly migration.

REGIONAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION

The governance of migration at a regional level presents itself with several opportunities and advantages. In comparison to the governance of migration at an international level, regional agreements can be characterised by shared interests, and the small number of governments involved makes it easier to reach a common ground as there is a good degree of similarities as far as development objectives are concerned.

The governance of migration in Africa requires commitment, resources and institutions that are capable of institutionalising migration related laws and rules. The governance of migration also requires the willingness of national governments to relinquish formal regulatory authority over migration to a regional authority. African states need to be willing to discuss common principals for regional cooperation. The unwillingness to relinquish this authority is equivalent to holding onto that which is not there. In other words, states have never had full sovereign control over migration and are losing the little control that they have in the new era of globalization. States have little control over things such as illegal migration, smugglers, and migrants continue to defy migration laws and national policies as some tend to overlook their length and terms of stay. There is also an increased loss of control over who may enter, leave and remain in the destination country.

This lack of control places emphasis on the need for a regional authority. A good starting point is committing and strengthening existing institutions that have the potential and ability to play a crucial and constructive role in reshaping how migration is understood and mitigated at both a national and regional level. Migration movements in Southern Africa are primarily motivated by work opportunities; whereas migration movements in East Africa are mainly driven by forced migration (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016, 8). A better understanding of migration at a national level will shed light into regional patterns and trends. One of the only regional institutions that have this ability is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

MIGRATION AS A GOVERNANCE ISSUE FOR DESTINATION COUNTRIES

The outbreak of violent conflict such as civil war does not only affect the conflict stricken country, but neighbouring countries are also severely affected. The spill over effects of civil war into neighbouring countries presents itself in the form of social and political instability, disruption to trade and imports, the influx of refugees, and collateral damage. Using a basic Solow growth model to measure the effects of a conflict on economic growth, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) found that for a sample of 84 countries over a period of 30 years (between 1960 – 1990), civil wars had a significant negative impact on the level of GDP per capita for both the neighbouring and conflict afflicted country. Murdoch and Sandler conclude that all neighbouring countries as well as the conflict afflicted country experience a negative growth effect from conflict.

De Groot (2010) did a follow up study in which, in comparison to Murdoch and Sandler, he included the distance between the conflict afflicted country and neighbouring countries and thus made a distinction between primary and secondary neighbouring countries – his findings provide a more thorough explanation on the effects of civil war. De Groot found that countries that share the same border suffer from the negative effects of proximate conflict however, the effect is not significant. When observing non-contiguous countries, De Groot found that these countries are more likely to experience a positive spill over of conflict (such as a growth trade-off) and that this effect is greater for countries that are closer to the conflict country. Other governance issues that host countries are faced with during and after conflict include the militarization of IDP and refugee camps.

Militarization of IDP and refugee camps

The militarization of refugee camps is not a new phenomenon. Its inception can be traced at least to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Muggah 2014). Little is known about the scale or scope of the problem (Lischer 2000, 1). Even less attention has been paid to the causes of the different forms of refugee and IDP militarization, how states address and perceive the problem differently, the extent to which it has created a spill over effect, and the manner in which refugees and IDPs experience its manifestations differently (Muggah 2014, 173). The escalation of IDP and refugee militarization in countries such as Darfur and the Chadian border have increased the call for more understanding of the extent and pervasiveness of the crises.

The primary motivation of militarization includes (Kaln 2008, 18):

- Recruitment of soldiers from among refugee and IDP populations
- Use of the camps as a bases for armed attack
- Trafficking small arms
- Increasing legitimacy of armed groups through political manipulation and
- Use of the camps as a source of revenue

The militarization of refugee camps defeats the initial purpose of camps – which is to provide IDPs and refugees with safety. The militarization of IDP and refugee camps can lead to the breakdown of law and order within the camps and in the host country. It can also lead to the violation of IDP and refugee rights. The host country and migrant’s security is dependent on the formation and implementation of durable solutions. Another governance issue that migration has created is refugee camps turning into cities.

Thousands of Somalis arrived at the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya in 1991, and the camp continues to grow – if it were a city, it would be the fourth largest in Kenya (Mohdin 2015). Dadaab, is now home to more than 463, 000 refugees – over 10, 000 are third-generation refugees born in the camp (Mohdin 2015). Refugees are not allowed to leave the camp until they receive a special pass. There are no jobs; lack of permanent structures; there are temporary taps for water, the camp is unhygienic due to overcrowding (Mohdin 2015). The rise of al-Shabab and its high-profile attacks in Kenya has increased suspicion of refugee camps in Kenya as politicians believe that the camps are providing sanctuary and support to the Jihadists.

The refugee crisis in Kenya highlights the fact that there is no alternative solution to the refugee camps in Kenya. To address this challenge, both Kenya and Somalia need to work together as this is a challenge that is beyond the Kenyan government’s capacity. The Somali government could assist Kenya financially (Mongae 2016, 3).

MIGRATION LEGISLATION AND POLICY INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

When discussing important regional issues such as migration, it is important to understand the role of regional institutions, policies, initiatives and think tanks as they highly influence the formation and content of policies and law. The manner and extent to which regional initiatives such as the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the African Peer Review Mechanism understand and capture migration trends and patterns is directly linked to the extent to which migration is prioritised.

The African Union's migration framework

Crossing borders – may it be voluntary or forced – is accompanied by opportunities and threats thus although local, national and regional responses to migration cannot address all migration related challenges, these responses play a pivotal role in ensuring human rights protections and that both the sending and receiving countries, benefit from migration.

The African Union's approach to migration is articulated in two policy documents: the African Common Position on Migration and Development (African Common Position), and the Migration Policy Framework for Africa which were both adopted in 2006 by the Executive Council of the AU (Achiame and Landau 2015). Both of these policy documents provide guidelines on how African states should regulate migration and the treatment of immigrants.

The Migration Policy Framework addresses nine key thematic migration issues: border migration, forced displacement, human rights of migrants, labour migration, irregular migration, internal migration, migration development, migration data, and inter-state cooperation and partnerships (African Union 2006). Its primary focus is to provide necessary guidelines and principals to assist member states and their Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the formation of migration policies (African Union 2006). The Migration policy framework provides the following guidelines and principals:

- it calls for member states to enact policy protecting and promoting migrant's human rights by example raising awareness and eradicating discrimination
- it calls on member states to 'harmonise national legislation with the international convention to ensure that the rights of migrants are protected and that migrants are integrated in host countries
- it encourages member states to adopt and adapt anti-racist human rights training for public officials
- it urges international migration and human rights organisations to coordinate anti-xenophobia activities

Shortcomings

Although the Migration Policy Framework has developed a number of guidelines and initiatives, there are weaknesses and shortcomings which include institutional, conceptual and political facets. First, while it remains important for the AU to propose frameworks and standards, there is no institutional

mechanism to guide or monitor AU member state's compliance to their content. As a result, member states are not held accountable within the frameworks established by the AU as well as those established at a national level. In addition, the implementation of these frameworks is dependent on the willingness of member states and the priority that they attach to migration issues. Through policies such as the Migration Policy Framework, the African Union needs to do more to make refuge in Africa appealing to Africans and to work more closely with individual member states in addressing migration. Laws, standards, principals and guidelines should not only be declared but should also be seen. It is also difficult to assess how effective these frameworks are in addressing the migrant crises in Africa.

The APRM and its role in the discussion on migration

The APRM is a uniquely home-grown African initiative that was formulated by the African Union in hopes of institutionalising democratic processes and accountability in governance as well as institutionalising new development paradigms across the continent.

The APRM is often described as Africa's unique and innovative approach to governance with the objective of improving governance dynamics at the local, national, continental and international level (Busia 2013). The APRM is also considered to be one of the most unique concepts to emerge from the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in promoting good governance in Africa. The overarching goal that has been set out by NEPAD is to encourage the "adoption of policies, standards and practices" that will promote political stability, high economic growth and sustainable development among member states (NEPAD 2003). NEPAD established the APRM as an institution that would track the progress of member states towards meeting the dual objectives of good governance and development (NEPAD 2003). This concept has captured the attention of the G-7, the European Union, the Africa-EU partnership and other aid donors (Masterson 2004, 2).

Although participation is open to all African Union member states, the APRM is conceived as a voluntary body and by June 2015, 35 of the 52 eligible states had joined. This is significant as it gives member states the option of whether or not they would be liked to be signatory participants (Masterson 2004, 2). Like many other institutions, there are costs and benefits of joining the APRM, one of the costs of joining the APRM is that states avail their domestic, political and economic governance to be "scrutinised" by member states; and one of the potential benefits of joining the APRM is gaining the reputation of good governance (Bing-Poppoe 2010, 1; Masterson 2004, 2).

The latter can serve as some form of deception as it may be the sole motivating factor that encourages states to join the APRM. Hence why out of the 35 eligible states that has joined only 16 countries have thus far gone under review (Bing-Poppoe 2010, 7).

The APRM is a system that encourages African countries to submit voluntary reviews of their governance progress by their peers and compel lengthy and comprehensive reports on various matters. The purpose and objective of the APRM review process is to identify underperforming areas, and ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values which have been set out by the African Union (NEPAD 2003, 1).

Under the guidance of an APRM panel, participating countries go through a self-administrated internal process, identify their own shortcomings and weaknesses. Another factor that makes the APRM unique is the fact that it provides recommendations and well based predictions on the outcome of certain challenges. In understanding and identifying how the APRM conceptualises and captures governance and development challenges one is able to identify the following:


- the strengths (which can be maximised) and shortfalls of the APRM – which will contribute towards understanding why migration is contextualized in the manner in which it is and most importantly, shortfalls bring to light what needs to be worked on to improve the reporting of the CRRs, this will hopefully provide greater insight into how to govern migration better.
- Critical analysis of the APRM country reports will reveal the manner in which forced migration is emphasised in Africa and moreover differences in emphasis between countries and;
- this will in turn provide greater insight into how forced migration trends and patterns finds its way into official thinking about governance and development challenges.

In comparison to other regional institutions, the APRM is one of the only regional institutions that try to identify regional governance issues by critically assessing the performance of each member state. Another factor that differentiates the APRM from other regional institutions is that it looks at the performance of individual African countries. An institution like the AU on the other hand provides insight on its stance on issues such as migration, it does not provide insight on country specific issues – it provides regional insight. Although the APRM does fall short of adequately addressing migration it is a shortfall that can be addressed.

Methodology

The analysis of the APRM CRRs will be based on a text-mining analysis. Text-mining is a method that uses a large “bag of words” so that the word frequencies can be statistically analysed. This method involves statistically analysing word frequencies that have been extracted from the 16 published reports (Mali’s report is the only report that has been excluded as it has not yet been translated into English). The word frequencies are expressed as a number per 10, 000 words of text, this helps indicate the degree to which emphasis has been placed on the paper’s key concepts. By systematically analysing the word frequencies, one can identify certain patterns that might not have been as evident in the CRRs. Text-mining brings to light what the APRM reports say or does not say about the extracted issues. Text mining also helps indicate extracted issues that great emphasis has been placed on across all chapters in the report

Figure 2: Frequency of migration word clusters (per 10 000 words of text)



Heat maps enable one to compare and contrast countries and draw interesting findings between them. The heat map (figure 2) depicts the word frequency, concentration and distribution across chapter/focus area and country. Words related to forced migration appear four times per 10 000 words in the country reports. This average is displayed at the bottom right cell of the heat map. Ethiopia has the highest word frequency (ten times per 10, 000 words). This is followed by Tanzania (seven times per 10, 000 words). All 16 countries identified migration as a political issue – with Ethiopia making the most reference to forced migration.

Taking Kenya's geographical location as well as acts of terror one would have expected more discussion on forced migration. Nigeria is another country where a greater discussion on forced migration was expected. Like Kenya, Nigeria has been subjected to terrorist acts. According to the internal displacement monitoring centre, as of December 2015, there were approximately 2,151,000 internally displaced people in Nigeria – 12.6 per cent were displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 per cent by natural disasters and 85 per cent as a result of insurgency attacks by Islamists (IDMC 2016). It is evident that there is a discrepancy between the findings from the CRRs and existing data and literature.


The success of the APRM and its ability to address pressing regional issues such as migration is not only dependent on the institution, but it is also depended on the commitment and willingness of African governments to identify migration as a pressing issue and this requires collective action. Every state is affected by migration through one way or another, thus migration cannot solely be addressed at a national level. Cooperation at a regional level requires acknowledging the fact that every state is faced with different migration related challenges. One of the challenges in trying to address migration at a continental level is trying not to overlook certain aspects and not generalizing migration related issues. Thus, one of the main challenges that future APRM CRRs will be faced with is formulating questionnaires that assist countries in discussing country specific issues and moreover, thoroughly discussing migration whilst addressing other regional issues. Another challenge for the APRM is getting more countries to join.

Figure 3 depicts APRM word frequencies in relation to refugee inflows. I am able to select two countries that have been popular destinations of refugees during 2005 to 2013 as case studies, and then compare one country where refugees feature more prominently in its APRM report and another country where they feature less prominently. The graph shows that Ethiopia makes the most reference to refugees in its APRM report while countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso and Lesotho made the least reference to refugees. During this period, Kenya received the largest number of refugees yet it made moderate references to refugees. I am therefore interested in understanding why regardless of

the fact that both Ethiopia and Kenya are popular refugee destinations, Ethiopia makes more reference to refugees.

Two primary reasons help explain why Ethiopia makes more reference to refugees. First, Ethiopia’s CRR was compelled at a later stage; there were therefore more forced migration related issues to discuss. Secondly, although both countries are destination and origin countries, Ethiopia has border disputes with neighbouring countries, this fuels tensions and clashes between refugees and locals.

Figure 3: APRM word frequencies in relation to refugee inflows



CONCLUSION

With the world becoming increasingly interconnected, governments are finding it increasingly difficult to control and regulate migration flows. Cooperation at both a national and regional level should not be perceived as a loss of sovereignty, it should rather be viewed as exercising sovereignty collectively. Committing to the governance of migration at a regional level encompasses a lot of untapped ideas and solutions. It also rejuvenates the idea of “African solutions for African problems”. In comparison to the regulation of international migration, the policies formed to address regional migration will be context specific and will be sensitive to Africa's history and development.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY SELECTION, ETHIOPIA AND KENYA, 2005-2013

Both Ethiopia and Kenya received the largest inflow of refugees during the selected period – both of these countries are currently the largest and second largest refugee hosting countries in Africa and are also refugee producing countries. Both Kenya and Ethiopia are located in the Horn of Africa. They are both major source and host countries and are faced with similar migration related challenges. The geographical locations of both of these countries make them vulnerable to large refugee inflows. Given that Ethiopia and Kenya are the first and second largest refugee receiving countries in Africa, it is of interest to understand why Ethiopia makes more reference to forced migration than Kenya.

ETHIOPIA: VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION, 2005-2013

Country overview

From the 1980's, the Horn of Africa – which consists of Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Ethiopia - became the largest refugee producing area in the world, with Ethiopia being the largest refugee producing country (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009, 5). Today, Ethiopia receives the largest inflow of refugees. Given its geographical location, migration trends in Ethiopia are heavily interlinked with regional and sub-regional issues. Ethiopia is both a source and destination country for voluntary and involuntary migrants. It is also used as a transit area by many migrants.

Ethiopia is located in East Africa and is the only African country that has never been a colony. Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a population of 99.4 million (World Bank 2017). Ethiopia is faced with a number of challenges such as drought, famines, overpopulation, poverty, political instability, and is one of the world's poorest nations with a per capita income of \$590 which is substantially lower than the regional average (World Bank 2017). The government has however made great efforts in improving economic and social conditions. Ethiopia's economy has grown at an average of 10.8 percent per year in 2004/05 – 2014/15, this is double the regional average of 5.4 percent (World Bank 2017). Economic growth has had a positive effect on poverty reduction in both rural and urban areas.

Ethiopia is a good case in point on the number of complexities that characterise African migration. Not only is it faced with droughts, famine, internal conflict and displacement, but it also borders with countries that are politically unstable. In addition, it has an ongoing border dispute with Eritrea which

presents an ongoing risk of renewed conflict and displacement, which will not only affect the two countries but the entire Horn of Africa.

Conflict and political violence in Ethiopia

As mentioned above, for decades, Ethiopia has been faced with famines, internal, sub-regional and inter-state conflicts. Somalia and Ethiopia were waged in a war between 1977 and 1978, and between 1998 and 2000, it fought in a border war with Eritrea; and from 2007 to early 2009 there was conflict between the army, insurgents (supported by Eritrea) and other nationalist groups in Somalia (Fransen & Kuschminder 2009, 9; Ethiopia CRR 2011, 69). Ethiopia has nonetheless been able resolve conflicts that it has been involved in. Conflicts with Sudan and Djibouti have been resolved (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 70). Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea remains tense- there is no conflict between the two states nor is there peace.

There is no single cause for conflict and displacement in Ethiopia. Conflict between different ethnic groups over power struggles; the introduction of new resources such as food aid and new permanent settlement; access to scarce resources; and competing territorial claims by ethnic or different national groups are some of the triggers of conflict which subsequently cause internal displacement (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 70). Other sources of conflict include economic inequalities and the inequitable distribution of wealth; mismanagement of diversity; improperly addressed challenges of refugees and displaced people, and the emergence of organised crime (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 70).

There are a number of factors that make it difficult to effectively address intra and inter-state conflicts in Ethiopia. This includes: human and financial resource constraints; inadequate coordination between sub-regional and other actors in comprehending and assessing conflict situations; the lack of political will from the international community and neighbouring countries to take absolute action against those who undermine sub-regional peace and security; inadequate logistics and trained manpower to tackle peace-keeping and conflict prevention functions missions; inadequate United Nations follow-up and support on conflicts in the sub-region; and continental and regional conflict management mechanisms at early stages of development; a combination of all of these factors make it difficult to adequately provide sustainable solutions to regional dilemmas and challenges (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 70).

Ethiopia hosts the largest number of refugees in Africa. The refugee crisis in South Sudan has had negative spill over effects in Ethiopia. Since the beginning of 2014, almost 190,000 refugees from South Sudan have been accepted into Ethiopia (World Bank 2016, 1). The continuous influx of refugees into Ethiopia has placed further strains on resources and operations. Ethiopia's close proximity to South Sudan has made it vulnerable and easily accessible for many refugees.

Apart from South Sudanese refugees, Ethiopia also receives an increasing number of refugees from Eritrea. In 2009, about 250 to 300 Eritrean refugees found refuge in Ethiopia every month, this increased to 2,000 a month in 2014 (UNHCR 2016, 1). Between January and August 2014, Ethiopia received about 200,000 new refugee arrivals (UNHCR 2016, 1). By the end of 2013 Ethiopia hosted 433,936 refugees who were displaced by droughts, conflicts, political events, and civil wars in neighbouring countries (World Bank 2016). As noted above, the vast majority of refugees in Ethiopia come from Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea and Sudan. All of these countries are neighbour countries. This supports my hypothesis which states that refugees are more likely to migrate to countries that are closest to their country of origin.

Ethiopia makes the most reference to forced migration – forced migration related words occur 10 times per 10,000 words in its CRR. Although there is a general low reference to forced migration in all of the APRM reports, the discussion on refugees in Ethiopia's APRM report (figure 2) is accurately depicted in figure 1. In its APRM report, forced migration is discussed in relation to the various factors that trigger intra and inter-state violent conflict.

Due to the continuous large inflow of refugees from neighbouring countries, the Ethiopian government has found it increasingly difficult to assist refugees and IDPs. At times there are delays with the food supply, thus causing scarcity and hunger among refugees (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 116). Medicine is also not always available at refugee camp health centres. The Ethiopian government has however committed itself to protect and accommodate refugees and returning citizens. The government has partnered with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations to provide both legal and physical protection to refugees in Ethiopia (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 115). Refugees are offered free primary education. There are also several peace-building programmes to support government in assisting refugees. The government has also allocated land for the 23 refugee camps and provides police presence around these camps (UNHCR 2016, 1). In addition, refugees are allowed to attend universities, with 75 percent of the fees paid by the government and 25 percent by the UNHCR (UNHCR 2016, 2)

Internal displacement in Ethiopia

Due to the restrictions that have been placed on media and humanitarian organisations that seek to profile those in need, it is difficult to get accurate estimations on the amount of people that have been displaced. The UN does however estimate that in 2009, over 300,000 people were left displaced due to conflict or violence. In the previous year, the intra-clan conflict in the Gambella region displaced almost 13,000 people (IDCM 2009, 3). Government encounter insurgency activities in regions such as Somali, Oromiya, and Gambella have also contributed to large displacement (IDCM 2009, 3).

The IDP population in Ethiopia, increased by over 100,000 individuals between March and September 2013 – IDPs from Ethiopia increased from 313,560 individuals in March to 426,315 in individuals in September (OCHCR 2013). Displacement was largely driven by conflict or natural disaster. It is worth noting that violent conflict in Ethiopia has an indirect effect on forced migration. One of the consequences of conflict is poverty which in turn causes large migration movements of people.

Migration legislation and policy initiatives in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has drafted and implemented a number of migration initiatives and policies. It is a participant of the joint Africa-EU Declaration on migration and Development. Under this Declaration, signatory members agree to commit to a partnership between origin, destination, and transit countries to better govern migration in a holistic, comprehensive and cohesive manner through shared responsibility and cooperation (IDCM 2009, 27). Ethiopia has also signed the African Union Convention for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. The aim of the convention is to protect the human rights of IDPs. In addition, Ethiopia has ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, as well as the OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of the Refugee problem in Africa (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 114). The Ethiopian constitution grants asylum or refugee status and protects them against expulsion or return to their countries where their lives and freedom are threatened (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 114). The 2004 Ethiopian Refugee Convention prohibits government from refusing entry to refugees or asylum seekers (Ethiopia CRR 2011, 114).

Ethiopia's domestic refugee laws do not make mention of property rights of refugees. Domestic refugee laws also limit the refugee's right to work by imposing restrictions and conditions to foreigners (World Bank 2015, 24).

Durable solutions to the IDP and refugee challenge remain elusive due to insecurity and lack of socio-economic development in affected areas, where the majority of affected people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2013).

Summary

Given its geographical location and developments, Ethiopia is prone to receive a large inflow of refugees – particularly from neighbouring countries. The government continues to commit itself to protecting and assisting refugees. Despite the government's open-door-policy as well as its partnership with humanitarian organisations, the large inflow of refugees has placed strain on human and financial resources, thus limiting the government's ability to assist refugees. Ethiopia's own internal conflicts further stretch these limited resources. Taking all of these factors into consideration it would be in the best interest for the Ethiopian government to avoid and prevent any inter-state conflict as this will exacerbate the current fragile migration crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The promotion and institutionalisation of effective governance of migration in Ethiopia will be difficult to actualise as forced migration trends and patterns in Ethiopia are not triggered by a single source. Ethiopia has the difficult task of dealing with the effects of droughts and floods, IDPs, refugees, internal conflict, potential conflict with neighbouring countries. It is also in Ethiopia's best interest to contribute to peace-keeping in neighbouring countries such as South Sudan and Eritrea as it is subject to direct spill over effects. The available human and financial resources are not enough to adequately address all of these challenges. Increased assistance from regional and international organisations will go a long way in distributing the burden.

KENYA: VIOLENT CONFLICT AND FORCED MIGRATION, 2005-2013

Country overview

Historically, migration in East Africa was primarily characterised by forced and unforced movement to plantations and mines in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Migrants mainly originated from Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC to countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (countries that had coffee, cotton and sisal plantations) (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016, 8). To date, migration movements in East Africa is largely caused by forced migration and countries such as Kenya and Tanzania – which are considered stable countries- remain top destination countries for

conflict stricken countries such as Burundi, Somalia, and South Sudan (Fioramonti and Nshimbi 2016, 8).

Kenya is an East African nation and is home to one of the largest refugee population in the continent. It is also home to some of the world's oldest refugee camps (IOM 2015) and is a neighbour country to Tanzania, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia and has a population of 46.1 million (World Bank 2016). According to the World Bank, Kenya's population increases by an estimated one million a year (World Bank 2016). Kenya's ethnic and religious diversity makes the country rich in culture and heritage but it is also a source for conflict. Other pressing issues include increased militant activity by the Islamist militant Al-Shabab movement, which has recently launched attacks in Kenya, including the 2013 Westgate shopping mall and the 2015 attack on Garissa University College (BBC News 2016).

Internal displacement in Kenya

Since gaining its independence in 1963, Kenya has repeatedly experienced internal displacement which is primarily caused by political, ethnic and land related violence, natural disasters and development projects (IDMC 2014). Violent conflict in Kenya creates more IDPs than refugees.

Political violence has become a common feature in every election since Kenya held its first multi-party elections in 1992 (Mwiandi 2008). The most intense election related violence was the December 2007 presidential election which forced 664,000 Kenyans to flee their homes and left approximately 1,300 Kenyans dead, while 640 families found refuge in Uganda (IDMC 2014; UNHCR 2015, 9).

Kenya has made great efforts in mitigating national displacement. For instance, they have formulated a comprehensive legal and policy framework on national displacement. In October 2012, the cabinet endorsed a draft on national policy on internal displacement, and during the same month, parliament adopted a new Act on IDPs (IDMC 2015, 10). These acts and policies have merely been formulated and are still in the draft stages and have not yet been implemented. Displacement can only be adequately addressed once the Kenyan government implements these frameworks as they will be a stepping stones in guiding the government's response to the protection and management of IDPs.

The Kenyan government (like a number of other African countries), finds itself in a vulnerable position. On the one hand they have the challenge of addressing the threat of violence by the militant group al-Shabaab and political related violence. On the other hand, it is faced with the continuous

influx of refugees from neighbouring countries. The Kenyan government does not only have to address internal threats and the needs of IDPs, but they also have to provide protection and attend the needs of refugees. This makes it difficult to adequately attend to the needs of all migrants as there are economic and infrastructure limitations. In comparison to refugees, internally displaced persons who are forced to move from their locations lack adequate relief support and security (Kenya CRR 2006, 111).

Refugees in Kenya

Kenya is the second largest refugee-hosting country in Africa. By September 2013, it was host to 530, 959 refugees and about 51, 817 asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015, 9). There is a significant imbalance between the number of refugees that violent conflict in Kenya produces and the number of refugees that it receives. Between 2005 and 2013, violent conflict in Kenya produced 27, 738 refugees and between the same time period it received 3, 538 214 refugees. Refugees account for approximately a third of Kenya's international migrant population (IOM 2015, 16).

The heat map (figure 2) shows that forced migration related words occur 6 times per 10 000 words in Kenya's APRM report. Forced migration is discussed in relation to the large influx of refugees from neighbouring countries as well as the difficulties that IDPs in Kenya face (Kenya CRR 2006, 115). In comparison to the APRM's findings, and in this particular case Kenya's CRR, it can be said that there is a discrepancy between Kenya's discussion on forced migration and existing literature and data on forced migration trends and patterns in Kenya.

Somali refugees constitute the largest refugee population in Kenya (472, 576 individuals in 2013) followed by Ethiopia (23, 084 individuals) and South Sudan with 19, 393 individuals (UNHCR 2015, 9). In June 2013, the Kenyan and Somalian government signed a Joint Commission Agreement for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees to safe areas in Southern Somalia citing security threats to Kenya and the region. Somali refugees have expressed concerns over their security in areas of concern (UNHCR 2015, 9). Like Ethiopia, an overwhelming portion of refugees in Kenya come from neighbouring countries – South Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Refugee camps in Kenya

Migration is a complex social issue that is characterised by many facets and can therefore not be understood and analysed in isolation. Xenophobia (particularly in South Africa and most recently in Zambia), is for example the result of the combination of lack of resources, poor migration policies and border management control. African governments have the challenge of addressing these challenges simultaneously. Failure to adequately understand these facets further exacerbates the challenges that migration imposes. Refugee camps in Kenya are another depiction of these complexities; they are also a reflection of how migration is governed. Moreover, they indicate that without the willingness, commitment and compliance from the governments of origin and destination countries, migration policies cannot fulfil their intention. With no foreseeable end to the violent conflict in Somalia, there is no possibility for refugees to return home without their security being threatened. This is beyond the purpose and capacity of policies; it is also beyond the government's control.

Kenya is home to the world's largest refugee camp (Mohdin 2015; IOM 2015, 17). There are two main camps in Kenya, the Dabaab refugee camp (which the oldest and largest refugee camp in the world which had a peak of 463,427 refugees in 2011) and the Kakuma refugee camp (IOM 2015, 17; Mohdin 2015). Refugees from the Debaab refugee camp mainly come from Ethiopia and Somalia. Refugees from the Kakuma camp have increased drastically – from 85,862 refugees in 2011 to 181,821 in March 2015 (IOM 2015, 17). The Debaab refugee camp is located 100 Kilometres from the Kenya-Somali border. Thousands of Somalis arrived at the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya in 1991, and the camp continues to grow every year. If it were a city, it would be the fourth largest in Kenya (Mohdin 2015). The camp was set up in the early 1990s following the civil war in Somalia and was initially intended to host a maximum of 90, 000 people.

Refugees are not allowed to leave the camp until they receive a special pass. There are no jobs, lack of permanent structures; there are temporary taps for water, the camp is unhygienic due to overcrowding (Mohdin 2015). The rise of al-Shabab and its high-profile attacks in Kenya has increased suspicion of refugee camps in Kenya as politicians believe that the camps are providing sanctuary and support to the Jihadists (Mohdin 2015). These aspects of migration highlight the fact that migration initiatives and policies that are in place and are intended to address the migration problem and promote and protect migrants are temporary solutions that have short term effects.

Migration legislation and policy initiatives in Kenya

Kenya plays a pivotal role in East Africa, thus any migration policy developments will not only structure migration systems in Kenya, but they will also affect migration structures in the rest of East Africa. The Kenyan government has drafted four key migration documents: The National Labour Migration Policy, National Diaspora policy, Kenya vision 2030 and the National Labour migration policy (IOM 2015, 21). Kenya has also drafted several regional agreements including: The Organisation of Unity governing the specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community and the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, however it has not signed or ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) (IOM 2015, 21).

Kenya has several key national laws relevant to migration which include the Kenya citizenship and Immigration Act and related regulations, the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals Management Service Act; the Security Laws Amendment Act; the Refugees Act; the Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act; and the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act (IOM 2015, 21). With regards to international legislation, Kenya has ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised crime and its protocol on trafficking persons and migrant smuggling (IOM 2015, 21).

The adoption, signature and ratification of migration related laws, treaties, frameworks and policies is evidence of great efforts and commitment taken by the Kenyan government to protect and attend to the needs of migrants; as well as efforts taken to better govern migration. As mentioned above, the effectiveness of migration policies is not only dependent on efforts taken by host countries, but is also dependent on the willingness of neighbouring countries to share the burden. The fact that Kenya is home to the world's largest refugee camp, and hosts the second largest refugee population in Africa, is an indication that there is a disproportional influx of refugees in countries such as Kenya. This makes it more difficult to attend to the needs of all migrants; it also makes it difficult to effectively govern migration.

CONCLUSION

The increase in political violence, land disputes, increased militant activity (both within their borders and in neighbouring countries) and natural disasters in Kenya has made it increasingly difficult to

address internal displacement. This heightens insecurity levels and it also makes it more difficult to manage who enters and leaves the country. The Kenyan government has however drafted, ratified and implemented a number of policies and frameworks on a national, regional and international level. These policies and frameworks are intended to improve the governance of migration on every level. Despite these efforts, Kenya is struggling to accommodate its own migrants as well as those from neighbouring countries. This highlights the fact that the formation of policies is not the sole solution to migration challenges in Africa and that the effectiveness of these policies need to be accompanied by shared commitment and will from neighbouring countries and the region as a whole.

As far as Ethiopia is concerned, it alongside countries like Kenya and Uganda have become unintended absorbers for growing conflict, insecurity and weak governance in East Africa. As a result, they are subjected to hosting thousands of migrants and in Ethiopia's case millions of refugees. In addition, Ethiopia has to also deal with environmental degradation resulting from floods and droughts, and diminishing natural resources. This does not only pose governance and developmental challenges in Ethiopia and its people, but it collectively affects the Horn of Africa region.

Migration in Ethiopia goes far beyond its borders. From this perspective, solutions to the migration challenge in Ethiopia and the region need to address cross-border regional issues so that risks and threats facing individual countries can be transformed into opportunities for regional stability. Regional stability requires the strengthening of security, governance, economic development, and local capacity.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The aim of the study was to analyse and better understand violent conflict and forced migration trends in Africa and the governance and development challenges faced by countries that are major refugee destinations over a nine-year period. This is the same period in which the first and most recent rounds of APRM Country Review Reports were compiled. An analysis of this time period enabled me identify, compare and contrast which African states identify forced migration as a governance and development challenge. This is an essential analysis for a region that is disproportionately affected by conflict-induced migration and one that has five of the top ten refugee receiving countries in the world.

I used the gravity model to help explain which countries in Africa are most exposed to larger refugee inflows. The APRM text mining allowed me to analyse the extent to which that exposure finds its way into official thinking about governance and development challenges. The regression model shows that violent conflicts in Africa between 2005 and 2013 have led to massive movements of forced migrants within and across borders. The continuous large inflow of refugees poses a security threat to the destination country, its citizens and migrants. Security threats include the militarization of IDPs and refugee camps, attacks against foreign nationals, a strain on infrastructure and public health. The model also shows that during violent conflict, migrants are primarily concerned with escaping the violence; they therefore migrate to countries closest to their country of origin, rather than migrating to ideal destination countries. This supports the argument that distance is a primary determinant in influencing migration decisions.

An analysis between findings from the gravity model and APRM text mining show that there is a discrepancy between reality and the APRM's thinking and reporting on the governance of migration as well as the developmental challenges associated with migration. This is a significant finding as it reveals that there is a fundamental misconception and misunderstanding about migration and its implications. An institution such as the APRM influences how migration is conceptualised, understood, and moreover it influences migration policies.

The contrast between Ethiopia and Kenya supports the argument that solutions to migration challenges cannot be generalised as each country is faced with similar migration related challenges, however these challenges manifest in different forms. Institutions such as the AU and APRM should be identified as platforms to thoroughly discuss and identify the complexities and overlooked factors and aspects of forced migration. These institutions should also be recognised as platforms for

innovative ideas and solutions to regional issues, this does however require the commitment, resources and collective will at a national, sub-regional and regional level.

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