

estimated that the real figure covering diamond exports should have been in the region of US \$ 700 m. Fraud, however, was believed to account for a loss to the share in excess of US \$ 300 m a year. Finally the trade was estimated to be worth \$ 20 m to \$ 30 m per month, and is thought to be Mobutu's main source of income, thanks to his best friend Jonas Munkamba who was running the diamond company for a decade until the collapse their empire.

In addition, Zaire became in 1975 a producer of offshore petroleum operating from fields off the Atlantic coast and at the mouth of the River Zaire. Output averaged around 30,000 barrels a day during the second half of the 1980s, with output in 1988 totalling 10.7 m barrels. Output declined to 9.9 m barrels in 1989, recovered to 10.9 m barrels in 1990, but fell back to 9.9 m barrels in 1991.

The involvement of the state in economic life is impressive. Table 36 indicates that the level of Zaire's official participation in the mining of the country's sub-soil is very high. Shares involved are mainly state-owned.

The sector's importance has been reinforced since independence. That is partly because of an overall drop in other production activities, especially in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, but mining production itself has expanded. State participation in the mining industry guarantees it easy access to revenues. The mining sector is concentrated and organized and relatively easy to control - though controls are breaking down in the diamond industry. Mining contributed 69,9% to state revenues (see Table 38). States which can exploit relatively sophisticated economic "enclaves" are able to maintain their coercive predomination despite administrative weakness.

of 471,600 tons in 1985, production fell steadily to 440,600 tons in 1989.

TABLE 36: Mining production 1989-1993

Category	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Copper (000 tons)	460	3555	2915	147	48
Cobalt	9.4	10	8.8	6.6	2.4
Zinc	54	38	29	20	4.1
Diamonds (ml carats)	17.6	19.4	19	15	15
Gold (kg)*	1400	-	-	-	-

* Note: Gold output in 1988 was 3.5 tons but dropped to just 1.4 in 1989. However, rehabilitation work was begun in 1989 at the main gold mine, the Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO) in early 1990, two foreign companies were given management contracts for OKIMO and output is expected to increase steadily during the decade.

Sources: *Africa Review 1986*, and *Africa South of the Sahara 1994*.

Despite the breakdown of the system as a whole, Zaire remains one of the world's top mining producers. The country was the world's biggest producer of cobalt (13,000T a year in the 1980s, but currently 2,200T), the second-largest producer of industrial diamonds (19,4 m carats in 1990) and usually the fourth largest copper producer in the Western world. But copper output had declined from 506,059T in 1986 to just 46,000T in 1994. With the exception of diamonds, these minerals have been hit by weak world demand in recent years. In 1988 minerals accounted for US \$ 1,075 m of the US \$ 2,178 total exports.

Diamonds are mined on a commercial scale by the MIBA company at Bukwanga (Mbuji Mayi), but artisanal diggers account for almost half the total output. The sector contributed 9% to GNP in 1993 with an annual production in excess of 15,000,000 carats. Earnings from diamond and gold exports in 1994 came to US \$ 296 m, although government sources

TABLE 35: Contribution of various sectors to GDP (in % of GDP at factor cost)

Sector	1959	1964	1969	1974	1979	1984	1988
1. Primary, incl. MINING	48 10	43 10	37 12	42 24	48 16	58 25	50 22
2.Secondary	30	23	30	14	7	7	8
3.Tertiary	22	34	33	44	45	35	42
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Annual Reports, Bank of Zaire, 1967-1989

The importance of Zaire's mineral exports is a clear indication of the extent to which the country's entire economy depends on the mining sector (see also Table 37). From 1959 to 1988, the percentage of GDP contributed by mining rose from 10% to 22%, while the contribution of the mineral exports to total export earning increased from 53.4% in 1958 to 78.2% in 1988. Clearly, no other sector in the country's production system, whether it be agriculture or the secondary sector, now challenges the dominant position of mining in the Zairian economy.

In 1990 mining mineral processing and petroleum extraction accounted for about 17% of gross domestic product (GNP) and around 75% of total export earnings. The most important mineral resources remain copper, cobalt and zinc (Shaba), diamonds (Kasai), gold (Kisangani), cassiterite, wolframite and columbo tantalite (Kivu). The state-owned mining corporation, the Generale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES) is the dominant producer, accounting for more than 90% of copper output, and all output of cobalt, zinc and coal. According to Diana Hubbard, in 1990-93 production was further hampered by strikes, technical problems (particularly a cave in at the Kamoto mine in September 1990) and the worsening political situation (*Africa South Sahara*, 1994:953) with the removal and deportation of Kasains from Shaba where they constituted a strong workforce for the GECAMINES. From a total output

maintain operations. However, by the mid-1970s projections of Zaire's export growth and its potential human results indicate a net gap between projections and reality especially as after 1975 investments had slowed because of political and economic instability (see table 34). This downward trend has accelerated over the years.

TABLE 34: Mineral Projections, 1970-1990 as seen in 1974 (per 1,000 metric tons unless indicated)

Category	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1985	1990
Copper	385	428	491	530	740	815	950	1185
Cobalt	13.9	13	16.4	17	20.5	25	31	39
Zinc	-	72	72	72	72	72	72	72
Tin & Cassiterite	-	5892	5500	5200	4900	4600	4000	-
Manganese	347	369.5	330	330	330	330	330	-
Gold (kg)	-	4300	4000	3600	3000	3000	2200	-
Diamonds (million carats)	14.1	13.4	-	15	15	15	16.6	-
Oil (bn of bar.)	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-
Per capita GNP	-	100	85	87	100	103	117	126

Source: GUY GRAN, *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, 1979:15.

From 1990, the situation has been disastrous in the mining sector. This bad situation is the result of a prolonged phase of crisis, turmoil, corruption and mismanagement whose end point is not yet in sight (see Table 33). Nevertheless, the major exports of Zaire continue to derive from the exploitation of its mineral resources, a sector which dominates the economy (Table 35).

Categ.	1960	1961	1962	1963	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989	1990
Com. Agricul	-	-	-	-	-	79	84.1	82.9	93.5	106	-
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	211.2	242	220.4	261	250	-

Source: W.J.Leslie, "Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State", 1993:102.

Data from this table highlights agrarian decline. After independence, the place of export agriculture in the overall economy had dropped sharply. As demonstrated developments in the agricultural sector have had a serious impact on the development of the country's economy as a whole. Most analysts (Kankwenda,1993:288-117; Young and Turner,1985:309-325;leslie,1993:125-132) have agreed that in the first seven years after independence, production dropped by 40%. A little later, from 1968 to 1970, after the 1967 monetary reform, it began a remarkable recovery that brought annual growth rates to an average of 7%. But from 1968 to 1984, the overall average growth rate was 1.2%. That is to say, in practical terms the sector stagnated. From 1928 to 1959, average annual growth in commercialized agricultural output was 5.35 percent. In 1958, 41 % of the export value came from the agricultural sector, as compared with 11.2% in 1974 - and even less in the following decades.

Before independence, the country easily fed itself, and even exported a small surplus. But by 1970, for example, food imports cost \$US 40 million, and by 1977, \$ 300 million. A country that has the capacity to be self-sufficient in food has been a massive importer for a number of years. On the export side, it should be noted that out of some 20 agricultural products exported before 1960, fewer than half now appear on the list of Zaire's current agriculture exports.

The Mining Sector

While there was shrinkage in real terms in the agricultural sector, (with the exception of coffee), mineral production remained intact for about three decades as expatriate personnel in the mining sector remained in place, in contrast to other areas of economy. Companies such as Union Minière continued to receive technical assistance and financing from abroad to

colonial era in which sustained, broad-based improvements were made in the well-being of most of the populace. Real wages and agricultural prices rose substantially. At the same time, intangible income became available in the form of access to welfare services. The severity of the coercion and sanctions imposed by the colonial government softened markedly. Forced agricultural and public works labour was reduced, and later. The historical period immediately preceding the independence of Zaire was a considerable improvement over earlier phases of the colonial period, Young concludes.

But in the post-colonial situation, the power relations between the state, the capital and the peasantry mainly related to the agriculture sector that had been neglected, had changed. The chaos and uncertainty of the immediate post-independence period had a serious effect on the economy. Plantation agriculture in some instances was interrupted, making it impossible to transport products from the interior to the urban centers. Overall production of major export crops fell between 10 percent and 40 percent a year between 1960 and 1965 (see table 36). Furthermore, the state apparatus itself had changed. The new state no longer had the economic resources formerly available to the colonial state. Neither could it use the same methods.

The colonial administration granted huge concessions to the big mining and plantation companies, as well as an unusual degree of support for obtaining land and labour. The multinational companies such as the Société Générale de Belgique, Unilever, and a British Company, Tanganyika Concessions, entrenched in this period, still dominate Zaire's economy. At independence, the Belgians handed over political but not economic control of the state, while ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big foreign mining and plantation companies, as articulated by J. Mac Gaffey (1991, 27).

After the political and economic chaos that followed independence, Mobutu took over the state. Under his leadership, the state increased participation in the productive sector, taking over Union Minière, the giant Belgian copper mining company in 1966-67 and turning it into the 100 % state-owned corporation GECAMINES. Many observers have noted that the period between 1968 and 1974 was a period of economic growth due to high copper prices.

But in the earlier seventies, unwise public investments in prestigious luxury or military

TABLE 32: GNP: 1990-1993

Categ.	Unit	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
GNP	US \$ bn	10.6	10	9.2	7.6	n.a	n.a
GNP	Per Capita	300	280	260	117	n.a	n.a
GNP	Real Growth	0.6	-6	-8	-16.4	n.a	n.a
Inflation	-	81.3	2154.6	4130	2173.9+	4,000*	8500

SOURCE: *Africa Review 1995-1996*:217-221; * *Africa: South of the Sahara 1994*:959; + World Bank Report 1994.

The country's overdependence on mineral exports for foreign exchange and the predominance of plantation agriculture, which were established with the arrival of the Belgians, were structural weaknesses that remained unchanged. Vulnerability to world market prices has been complicated by rapidly escalating debt, corruption, and generally poor economic decision-making.

Economically, the Belgian colonial state was highly extractive. According to scholars (Young, 1986:129; Leslie, 1993:101) by the early 1950s the Congo was second only to South Africa in terms of industrial development. In 1953 it was Africa's leading producer of cobalt, diamonds, tin, zinc, and silver, as well as the second largest producer of copper after Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). The economy had a dual nature - an industrial sector heavily dependent on imported capital equipment and foreign expertise, and a rural sector based on subsistence and plantation agriculture. Finally the economic resources of the state, including land, were overwhelmingly in the hands of the giant corporations operating locally. The financial fortunes of the colonial government were tied to the mining sector. Union Minière alone provided the government with 70 percent of its foreign exchange needs and 50 percent of its budget revenue. At independence, in the absence of any serious thinking on the issue, the colonial accumulation model has continued.

In retrospect, the period 1950-1960 was a veritable golden age. It was the only period of the

temperate zones. This combination of good soil, favourable topography and excellent climatic conditions puts Zaire in a position to grow equatorial, sub-tropical and temperate crops. This makes the country as a whole suitable for agricultural pursuits of all kinds, including food crop farming. Even in Central Africa, Zaire's agricultural resources are unmatched: reasonably organized, this country could feed all Africa.

Apart from agriculture, the resources of Zaire are immense: the forests, if rationally exploited, could yield excellent results; the abundance of water should eventually be useful to industry and agriculture; the network of waterways is naturally navigable; and hydroelectric resources are considerable in the whole of the Zaire basin. Finally there is considerable mineral wealth. Its output places it among the world's top producers, with particularly high levels of mineral production. The country itself has been called a "geological scandal". The principal minerals are copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, zinc, manganese, coal, petroleum, etc... This list is not exhaustive; with the exception of minerals actually mined, other reserves currently untapped have been reported to iron, methane gas, bauxite, nickel, phosphates, chrome etc...(Kankwenda,1993:319-20).

Despite all its abundant resources, Zaire remains an underdeveloped country with a per capita income of \$US 117 in 1993. That is to say 65 % less than compared with that of 1958 (World Bank. Report, Nov.4,1994). Current figures show that life in Zaire is worse among the populace. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is falling by around eight per cent each year, only \$US 9,2 billion in 1992, and living standards for the country's 41.35 million people have fallen for more than ten years. Schools and clinics are closing across the country. Over 85 per cent of the country's road system has reverted to bush (Africa Review 1996:217-21). Between 1990 and 1995, the Gross National Product (GNP) as well as the annual inflation have progressively decreased.

wider conflicts in Zaire. While Mobutu issued orders from his sickbed in Switzerland, his army was routed in Kivu. The Zairian generals, hoping to inherit the state, if Mobutu failed to recover, had been unable to galvanise their badly paid and equipped forces. The crisis sent a signal to anti-Mobutist and secessionist forces across the country. there was a power vacuum and the state was unable to defend itself (*Africa Confidential* 37, no22, 1 Nov.1996:3). Thus Laurent Kabila's invasion was only the culminating episode of a process which began with army mutiny/riots in 1992/1993 which effectively destroyed any form of centralized administration beyond Kinshasa. Mobutu himself increasingly spent less time in his capital, preferring instead to stay at his palace in Gbadolite. Zaire's provinces began to assume the character of independent statelets as communications with Kinshasa became more and more difficult. Kabila and his group kept the initiative so far and there was no little sign of the Zairian army reversing the trend. The Zairian armed forces were finished.

4.2.2. The Extractive Capacity:

While there was substantial regulation of the political process of Zaire, and considerable regulation of information, as we shall see, there was less in the economic sphere. Although there were isolated instances of economic performance, viewed as exceptions which proved the general rule that while setting the outer limits of economic activity and encouraging certain types of economic development, the Zairian government did not tightly regulate the economy of the country. Whereas the extractive capacity of the colonial state was strong, that of the post-colonial state remained very mixed: weak at independence due to economic disruption (1960-1966), impressive during the "golden era" of the Second Republic (1967-1974), before shrinking when the Zairian crisis deepened in the late 1980s.

However, with an area of 2,345,409 sq km (905,365 sq miles), Zaire is the third largest country in Africa after Algeria and Sudan. Nature has endowed no other African country so generously. Unlike Algeria or Sudan, Zaire has not a single hectare of desert. As far as natural resources are concerned, Zaire is among the most richly endowed of African countries. The entire country is covered with forest vegetation or savanna grassland, thanks to generous rainfall. The soil itself is rich. Some of it, in fact, is weathered volcanic lava. Lying across the Equator, Zaire has varied climate, from full-blown equatorial zones to tropical and humid

(see table 31).

TABLE 31: The size of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ).

CAT.	1960	1966	1970	1975	1980	1988	1992	1994
Army	23100	25000	38250	36960	22100	26000	29000	28000
Gend.	-	-	20000	29040	35000	25000	25000	21000
Guard		-	-	-	-	25000	10000	10000
Tot		25000	58250	66000	55100	76000	64000	59000

Source: Africa Contemporary Record from 1969 to 1989; Record of World Events, 1995, vol. 41.; Young & Turner, "The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State", 1985:86.

It must be noted that the FAZ was the overall title for the army, navy, air force, gendarmerie and the Civil guard, numbering 10,000. The Civil guard has been created in 1984 for security and anti-terrorist operations. All of which were supervised by the Ministry of National Defence and directly subordinate to the president, who was commander in chief. Although the FAZ's main duty was to defend Zairian territory against external aggression and to preserve the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, reality has shown that the army's experiences in Angola in 1975, in Shaba in 1977 and 1978 and recently with the Banyamulenge rebellion (1996) indicate clearly that Zairian security forces were usually less than successful when they confronted armed external opponents. As evidenced by Schatzberg, these forces thus seemed to receive most of their "combat" experience against essentially unarmed peasants, students, women, schoolteachers and dissidents. In this regard, their record was stellar.

The tightness of control of Zairian political life should be as tight as necessary to ensure the stability of the regime. However, although the army was the pillar of the regime, it underscored in the same time the very weakness of the regulative capacity. Recent story shows that securities forces failed to prevent the final collapse of the Mobutu empire. In a sense, the Banyamulenge explosion in Sud-Kivu on 18 October 1996 threatened to spark

Protection (SNIP). These three were the major branches of the state that operated with amazing efficiency, in terms of terror and intimidation. Over the years these three branches of the security forces have been involved in political repression against opponents of the regime and have inflicted gross human rights abuses on the population.

But the DSP (20,000), as the security arm of the army organized to protect Mobutu and his family, was the most important coercive arm. The DSP was an elite, Israeli-trained force with sophisticated technology at its disposal. It was quite adept at spreading terror. Since 1989, it has been used extensively to quell growing civil unrest demanding political and economic change. In the early 1990s, it progressively moved from the national army to become an armed militia under Mobutu's direct control. Members were recruited from the Ngbandi, Mobutu's tribe in Equateur province, and allegiance to *Le Marechal* was all the more assured as DSP commandos were well compensated, in contrast to other security forces (FBIS June 27, 1990:6; Leslie, 1993:48).

Here, the framework of the patrimonialized state was clear. Within such framework personal loyalty to the president became the prime criterion for top military office. As Young has expressed, "it has led to the repeated purges which have cost the armed forces the services of many of their ablest officers and personal loyalty has inevitably introduced an element of corruption into the armed forces", until now considered as a strong-hold of the Equateur contingent. The reason was simple. For Mobutu the army has been from the outset a political instrument: his power base in the First Republic, his vehicle for seizure of power and rule in the second. The very importance of the military in Zairian politics made it so dangerous to Mobutu, and it was this threat precisely, the necessary fear of the military, which resulted in Mobutu's extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise de-institutionalize and de-professionalize it (Young and Turner, 1985:274).

Finally, before closing with the legal framework, I would like to emphasize the size of the armed forces. Typically, they were small in relation to the size or population of the state, however, they were considerably larger than the colonial armies they replaced. Over the past three decades, the size of the Zairian army has increased - primarily for purposes of Mobutu's security - and its equipment has been upgraded. Recent figures confirm this trend

In addition, one can note that it was in the educational sector that the Zairian political system has exhibited its weak distributive system. The most rapidly expanding segment of the public sector has been the school. By the 1970s education was consuming nearly a quarter of the state budget. However, the expansion of this sector was in large measure an urban phenomenon, especially at post-primary levels, as table 39 shows it.

TABLE 39: Rise in School Enrolment

Level	1959-60	1974-75	1983-84	1985-86
Primary	1,644,044	3,429,076	4,654,000	4,993,525
Secondary	37,388	430,735	2,151,900	3,198,051

Source: Statistical Documents, Planning Board, Ministry of Education, 1985-1986.

The effect of the new policies, remarks E. Kisangani (Kankwenda:1993:140), taken in tandem with a strong demand for education, was a spectacular rise in school enrolment (see table 39), especially at the secondary level as well as the primary. Between 1960 and 1984 the number of students in institutions of higher education rose from 763 to 22,139. As Leslie noted, as at 1980 enrollment ratios at the primary and secondary levels compared favorably with sub-saharan Africa as a whole (see Table 40), but these figures masked persistent inter-regional differences, dropout rates at all levels, and administrative and financial problems.

According to data from the Ministry of primary and secondary education, staffing and enrolment facilities have deteriorated steadily. The number of primary school teachers dropped from 130,758 in 1978-9 to 111,461 in 1985-6. The number of schools decreased from 10,806 to 9,968 and the number of classes slid from 137,414 to 111,466. The decline was less sharp at secondary school level. In fact, the trend there was generally upwards. Still, the number of teachers dropped steeply, from 43,459 in the 1982-3 to 41,550 in 1985-6. The number of schools also decreased, from 3,972 to 3,852. While enrolment rose by almost 50% from 2,151,900 to 3,198,051.

What led R.H.Jackson and C.G.Rosberg to note that "so extreme was the corruption that observers have had to invent new phrases to describe it; Zaire has been referred to as "an extortionist culture" in which corruption was a "structural fact" and bribery assumed the form of "economic mugging". It has been estimated that as much as 60 percent of the annual national budget was misappropriated by the government elite (1986:268), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But the pervasiveness of this phenomenon also led too Larry Diamond to conclude that "corruption is manifestly the primary mechanism of dominant-class formation ... It is not an aberration, but rather the way the system works in the typical African state" (Harsh,1993:37).

Hyacinthe Sarassoro has claimed that "in Africa, in less than three decades of independence, corruption has given birth to colossal fortunes, to multi-millionaires, while plunging into misery nearly half a billion human beings. By diverting public funds to their profit, many African leaders must be held responsible, at least in part, for the enormous misery and persistent unemployment in which nearly all the continent's inhabitants are mired" (see Harsh,op.cit.,p.32). A man like the millionaire Mbemba L'olona, the head of the Scibe-Zaire group of commercial, construction, and industrial enterprises would not emerge without the nurturing effects of state policy and favours and by corrupt dealings. He owed his present wealthy and rise to the direct support of president Mobutu, "in whose shadow he was able to patiently foster and develop his business. Mbemba's case confirms the assertion "in Mobutu's Zaire class formation was shaped by power relations, not by production relations and that the political class itself was dependent on the state for privilege and wealth, and the focus was on extraction for personal profit rather than on investment in the productive resources of the state" (Harsh,1993:38).

Outside of this small group of individuals, access to education and economic opportunity were denied to most Zairians because of lack of resources for either fees or bribes. In other words, while a small few benefited - using their privileged position in the bureaucracy to get richer - the vast majority of Zairians was not, in Gould's terms, "uplifted, assis' enriched, or developed, but rather, peripheralized, repressed, impoverished, and underdeveloped". Instead of the management of social change, there was the management of mass discontent, the "logic of repression". This resulted in the instability and the fragility of the political system.

patrimony.

To buttress the interests of a local bourgeoisie, Mobutu felt he had to satisfy demands emanating from the class of people whose support had helped him come to, and stay in, power, and whose continuing loyalty he needed. His continuous granting to top administrators of access to corruption was ...vital to his success and ... survival. That is why the main beneficiaries, officially known as *les acquéreurs*, were all members of the ruling class, and their slice was proportional to their closeness to the president, the biggest beneficiary of the "operation".

In other words the self-serving nature of the Zairianization measures, clearly shows that the top beneficiaries of the measures everywhere within the country were virtually identical to the top leadership of the ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The loyalty of this class had to be constantly bought by money or access to money. The result was the increased "privatization" of the state apparatus. The control of this dominant class of the administrative structures was used so as to consolidate the class members's individual, and above all their class interests. In the same fashion, E. Harsh argues that while the state itself accumulated, ostensibly in pursuit of national interests, some of its personnel diverted a portion of these revenues and assets towards their own ends, a form of unauthorized "privatisation".

This situation inevitably led to unfair practices, such as corruption identified as theft, embezzlement of funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payments and privileges, as argued by Joseph S. Nye, quoted by Harsh(1993:33). This was the approach to corruption's multi-dimensional character that prevailed in Zaire. The country where, for D. Gould, corruption has been central to the entire system of government and economic activity. The embezzlement of state funds, tax evasion and other dishonest practices have facilitated the "consolidation of the economic base of the bourgeoisie", one that has largely arisen out the state bureaucracy.

Zaire was one of the worst cases of administrative decay and corruption, where the state's resources have been plundered and regulations abused by government officials at all levels.

to render such service led to dismissal. Those in high office were not simply servants of the state, they were primarily clients of the ruler. The power of the ruler depended upon his ability to maintain the clients in a state of permanent dependency. The loyalty of this class had to be constantly bought by money or access to money.

Many writers like Callaghy have examined the Zaire's patrimonial aspects. Drawing heavily on Max Weber, they labelled the state itself as "patrimonial" or "clientelist", viewed their leading occupants as a "political aristocracy" and considered political life to be "prebendal", in which state power was treated as "a congeries of offices which could be competed for appropriated and then administered for the benefit of individual occupants and their support groups (Harsh, 1993:31-48).

It is important to point out that the administrative system played a significant role in this sense. Through its control of the state apparatus, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" was able to direct the process of capitalist accumulation and to determine the conditions of its relationship with the world system. Use of state power was the means used by members of this class to insert themselves in the structures of capitalist property, not only as administrators of state or mixed enterprises but also as individuals with the high income that came with the lofty positions they hold, as Peemans has observed. The struggle was hard because the class that won the battle for control of the state apparatus, which controlled the bureaucracy and the "goodies" this gave access to, will dominate society like Mobutu's class, cutting the masses out of the distribution of the benefits available.

By using public policy making, the Zairian policy makers have involved what Gould called "consistent public choice" in favour of systematic distribution and redistribution of the nation's wealth to a small class of administrative office holders. In practice, this was a series of decisions, such as investment policy, administrative or management reforms, or nationalization of businesses, that systematically in their application favour the few over the many. This class could also influence the structures of public order to derive maximum benefit from its public policies. The most notorious case remained that of the "Zairianization measures" of 1973. Most scholars have agreed that these measures transferred a vast swathe of the economy in the agricultural and mercantile realm to Zairian owners, as presidential

of the West" to hang on to power, a Zairian bourgeoisie gravitating around the seat of power emerged (Kankwenda, 1993:103).

In practice, the core was made up of members of the president's family (Ngbanda Honoré, Felix Vunduawe, GI Baramote, Litho, Moleka, Wazabanga) along with a few henchmen, usually foreigners or others of dubious Zairian nationality (the late P'isengimana Rwema, Kengo wa Dondo (actually Prime Minister), Seti, Mbemba Saolona, Engulu) plus a few dozen managers of giant nationalized corporations (Uniba Kyamitala: Gécamines (copper and cobalt), Tshongo Tshibi: Regideso (water distribution), the late Bingoto: SNEL (electricity), the late Bokana: OKIMO (gold), Jonas Munkamba: MIBA (diamonds), or "big shots" in the military (GI Etuki, GI Baramoto, GI Mossala, Admiral Mavua Mudima, GI Babia, the late GI Mayele, GI Bolozi or state apparatus (Nendaka, Mbomboko, the late Mpinga Kasenda, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, Anzuhuni). For them, opportunities for embezzlement were merely fantastic and they seemed immune from prosecution (Nsinga, Kamitatu, Mungul Diaka, Ndele, Tshimbombo, etc...). The list is not exhaustive.

On the other side, was the lower class, the proletarian masses and the rural peasant (over 70%), majority of Zaire's population : the overwhelming majority of the Zairian population lived without privileges and thus live very badly, and as Gould has expressed, be they the severely underpaid urban or rural workers and their families or the lumpen proletariat, unemployed and beginning to constitute an increasingly dangerous element for regime stability in the large cities.

In terms of economic rewards, that was the scheme that has been followed for the allocation of wealth in Zaire. It should be mentioned that privileged groups have made considerable contributions to the current breakdown of the economy. One may acknowledge that in a patrimonial state system like that of Zaire, the political elite were tied to the ruler (Mobutu) by bonds of individual clientship. High office was awarded in return for personal service to the ruler. Moreover, the office holder was provided with substantial benefits linked to possession of the post. These included not only a generous official remuneration but also occult revenue gained through venal exploitation of office. In return, the office holder has an absolute obligation of total fidelity to the ruler and of effective discharge of his duties. Failure

government often proclaimed its commitment, political and economic, to careers open to talent, but the tight control over the decision-making apparatus and the arbitrary assignment of rewards militated against the actualization of these aims.

The wealth of the system was allocated highly inequitably. This was due primarily to the fact that a small group of advisers and top officials gravitated around the office of the president, and because of their political and economic importance, received a disproportionate amount of those awards. With independence, and mainly during the Second Republic, the power of the political centre to disburse its rewards increased rapidly, for it was now able to provide to the supporters interest-free loans, tax benefits, substantial salaries, and land. Those in government service soon became a new class, easily the most privileged group among wage earners". This group, as R.H.Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg pointed out, by its top positions in "inflated and consumption-oriented government administrations", enjoyed a standard of living far in excess of the national average, weighing down the already overburdened and sluggish economy which was simply exploited to support the political class (1986:270). Due to patrimonialism, class differentiation in Zaire developed rapidly.

On the one side we find a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" or the "political bourgeoisie" viewed by scholars - notably David Gould Nzongola, and Young - as the dominant ruling class in Zaire today, with an identifiable entity, conscious of its own existence, and aware of its class interests. These writers, in their analysis on class formation in Zaire have noted that - and it is verifiable even today - this class was characterized by its command of the levers of bureaucratic power in the state apparatus and on the related parastatal and state-licensed companies, including the army, the MPR, and the administration. Despite the demise of Mobutu's party-state, nothing has changed. This ruling class in business, was comprising (1) the presidential clique or the president's most trusted kinsmen, occupying the most sensitive and lucrative positions and (2) the presidential "reigning confraternity", an elite representing every major tribe and holding.

As a class, the political bourgeoisie owed its existence to past and continued foreign support. Thanks to the determination of Western powers to maintain their colonial advantages through continued control of Zaire's economy, and to their regular support which helped the "friends

figure. Here, however, people literally run when they see him approach. Once again, the *advantages* of the chief results in brutality by the bureaucrats and suffering for the people (1980:73).

Precise calculations of the fiscal pressure of the state on the peasantry are impossible to make, observe Young and Turner, as the incidence of indirect taxes - export duties, or artificially low agricultural prices imposed by government decision, not to mention illicit taxation - is beyond the range of exact measurement. It does not seem an exaggeration to estimate that as much as 50 percent of real and potential village income was extracted by the state or its representatives (1985:96).

Young argues that the decline of state integrity reinforced the decline of its competency - defined as the ability to use resources effectively for public purposes. The effective resources of this state in decline were chiefly concentrated on those segments of its apparatus most crucial to its survival: its security police; elite units of its armed forces; presidential services; and agencies that dealt with the external financial and diplomatic world. Nzongola quoted by Young has argued that the ultimate priority of an eroding state apparatus was to assure its own continuity (Young, 1986:146). The process of this sort of "economic development" was deeply embedded in the distributive capability of Zaire.

4.2.3. The Distributive Capability:

Despite the magnitude of its extractive capacity, the Zairian political system has failed to create a social framework for the distribution of national wealth. Even during the "golden era" of the regime in the early 1970s, life was harsh and viewed as a constant struggle affecting ordinary citizens especially.

Distribution of wealth in Zairian society contained more elements of ascription than that of achievement. The patrimonial aspects of the regime remained an important factor in Zairian life. The patronage of the Zairian politics, the importance of local clan connexions, and the inability of the central government to eliminate nepotism all inhibited the allocation of the goods, services, and status available to the political authority on the basis of achievement. The

taxation, in the final analysis it was paid by the peasant producer. The extent of this fiscal burden was illustrated by the palm oil case. The palm oil is the major cash crop in the Kwilu area.

In 1975, the World Bank listed five different taxes on this commodity: (1) export duty, from 2 to 15 percent of export value, depending on the price level; (2) a turnover tax of 6.75 percent of export value; (3) a research tax of 2 percent; (4) a statistical tax of 1 percent; (5) an inspection tax of 20 makuta per ton. The palm oil price, held stable from 1967 to 1975, applied to the domestic market only, but the government forced palm oil companies to sell at least half of their output on the domestic market at prices far below prevailing international levels. This policy not only drove a number of palm oil companies out of production, thus diminishing the number of buyers for village palm producer; but also drove down prices paid by companies to villagers. Import duties have ranged from 12 to 68 percent, prices of some goods - clothes, household and farm implements - were affected by these duties. The state also levied a turnover tax at each stage of the distribution chain - a fiscal charge automatically incorporated into consumer prices. Beyond regular fiscal charges and levies for services, taxations through penal mechanisms has been a significant drain on Zairian village resources. Failure to plant acreage quotas or to participate in required unpaid labor on state projects, or contravention of sanitary regulation could bring fines.

This remarkably high level of extraction persisted in part through inertial force; the sundry fiscal and regulatory habits and mentalities of the colonial state lived on. Indirect taxation benefits from its relative invisibility, and only few villagers were able to understand the operation of the export or turnover taxes. What was widely recognized was the decline of the value of services rendered and amenities provided by the welfare state of the 1950s, which served as a reference point.

Financial autonomy also provided the framework in which lower-level functionaries such as chiefs, police officers, and party youth, often not even paid their meager salaries because of high level corruption, "resorted to violence to extract money from the population". Schatzberg concluded that "tax collection in Zaire", was a brutal affair in which the police and partly youth wing often collaborate with greater gusto. In no society is the tax collector a well-liked

substantial tax concessions.

Finally, a World Bank report of 1990 shows that the main export earners revenue in Zaire remain copper (\$ 1,001m), diamonds (\$ 240m), petroleum (\$ 227m) and coffee (\$ 120) (*Africa South of the Sahara* 1994:954) . Obviously, the extractive capability of the Zairian state remains considerable but at the same time very weak due poor economic decision-making and the vulnerability of the country to uncontrollable fluctuations in world commodity prices, thanks to its high dependence on a few primary exports for foreign exchange earnings.

Broadly speaking, the revenue imperative of the state was to be met by sharpening increases in fiscal imposition on the colonial corporate sector, a silent perpetuation of the crushing panoply of fiscal extraction devices imposed upon the peasantry and by drawing in major new resources from abroad through loans, aid, and investments as well as by mortgaging the rich natural resource base. Furthermore, it became customary for local officials to extort levies from residents in the eight hundred collectivities of the "reformed" local administration. This "financial autonomy", wrote Mamdani (1996:58-59), was abolished with the territorial reform enacted on 5 January 1973. But the law was never implemented, for the center never had funds to take over the financial administration of Zaire's more than eight hundred collectivities. The collectivities continued to enjoy financial autonomy, meaning they continued to levy a diverse panoply of taxes on residents with the consent of the subregional commissioner. As described by Michael Schatzberg (1980:63,72), in the city of Lisala (Equateur) in 1974-75, this general pattern included taxes pertaining to birth, marriage, and divorce certificates, transit permits, land tax, water consumption tax, social tax, and even a boutique tax. the range of taxes would expand in a fashion totally arbitrary.

Young and Turner (1985:94-97) have noted that the state has continued to enforce not only low prices, but also production quotas. As in colonial era, coercion has been applied not only through acreage quotas, but also through taxation. All adult household heads were required to pay a *contribution personnelle minimum* (CPM), successor of the colonial head tax. In addition to relatively heavy direct local taxation, peasant incomes have been affected by other state fiscal and economic policies. Substantial export taxes are levied on all cash crops destined for foreign markets. Although villagers may not perceive the incidence of this

production in Zaire due to difficulties in the two leading producer countries, Angola and Brazil. Official coffee exports (robusta and arabica) in 1960 were 58,600, 74,000 in 1972, 109,500 in 1976 and 60,000 in 1988. In 1985, it contributed 9% of export revenue. The following year, it rose to 25% and then declined again to 9% in 1987 and by 1990 accounted for only 4.2% .

At the end of 1994, the Zairian agrarian system was incapable of feeding the population. For *The Africa Review 1995:213*, the food shortfall was becoming chronic and Zaire was increasingly dependent on external food supplies by importing over 125,000 tons of food annually. Over the decades, South Africa became an important supplier of food to Zaire.

Industry:

The third sector of the economy is industry which contributed only 8 per cent to GNP in 1992 and employed 10 percent of the workforce. Approximately three-quarters of production is centred around Kinshasa or in Shaba province, due to the availability of electricity and adequate transport facilities in these areas. Riots in September 1991 wrecked much of Kinshasa's industrial and business base. Output is geared towards the domestic market and is mainly concentrated on brewing, food processing, textiles, consumer goods, construction industry inputs and transport equipment.

Besides, heavy industrial activity is concentrated in the mining sector and in Gécamines refineries in Shaba province. Prior to the decline in copper production of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Shituru refinery processed about 225,000 tons of copper ore per year. However, Gécamines copper operation in Shaba suffered severe damage during unrest in the region from 1990 to 1993; rehabilitation costs were estimated at \$ US 1,000 m. This sector has been consistently burdened on two fronts: firstly by the lack of foreign exchange to import badly needed spare parts and, secondly by the continuing decline in domestic purchasing power. Lacking industrial and manufacturing sectors of any significance and being highly dependent upon imports, Zaire is caught between the certainty of its demand for foreign goods and the uncertainty of its ability to earn the foreign exchange to pay for them. The government is attempting to increase production by encouraging foreign investment and offering

sector employing 8,845,000 persons, approximately 65% of the active workforce estimated at 13,568,000 at mid-1991. From the 1920s, the agricultural sector functioned effectively as a labour pool for the capitalism system in general and for the urban sector in particular. Yet, as Table 38 has demonstrated, the agricultural sector has suffered both from the widespread expropriations of privately-owned plantations in the early 1970s and the subsequent decline in output and, more importantly, from one of the economy's most damaging structural deficiencies: lack of infrastructure for the transportation of agricultural produce.

TABLE 38: Contribution of Various Sectors to GDP (as a % of GDP)

Sector	1959	1964	1969	1974	1979	1984	1988
Primary	48	43	37	42	48	58	50
incl.Agricul.	38	33	25	18	32	32	28
Secondary	30	23	30	14	7	7	8
Tertiary	22	34	33	44	45	35	42
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Annual Reports, Bank of Zaire, 1967-1989.

Figures from tables 37 and 38 prove clearly that before 1960, agricultural exports brought in over 40% of total export earnings. Since then the percentage has dropped steadily until today, it stands at 15.2% including 5.6% in contraband exports. Likewise, in 1958, agricultural production accounted for 38% of GDP and it was the most important economic sector, outweighing all others. By 1974 the output fell to 18%, before recovering to 28% in 1988. The impact was particularly hard on per capita GDP, considering the deterioration of living conditions in the rural areas, the inevitable rural exodus that followed, the reduction of the active population in the rural areas, and the lack of innovation in production techniques, as Kankwenda Mbaya has expressed.

Despite the 1974 drop, agriculture did achieve a recovery in the second half of the decade, rising above 30% thanks mainly to the result of the coffee boom which boosted coffee

TABLE 37: Percentage of Total Export Earnings: 1958-1988.

Product Categ.	1959	1962	1966	1970	1974	1978	1980	1984	1988
<u>1.Min. Prod.</u>									
Reg. Exports	53.0	75	81.7	82.3	85.1	74.0	33.5	66.0	62.9
Cont.Exports	0	0	0	1.1	0.4	1.7	0.4	1.4	8.3
<u>2.Agri.Prod.</u>									
Reg. Exports	41.0	25	16.4	15.8	13.1	18.6	11.8	13.3	9.6
Cont.Exports	0	0	0	0.1	0.0	5.1	0.9	1.1	5.6
<u>3. Ind.Prod.</u>	5.6	-	1.9	0.7	1.4	0.6	3.4	18.1	6.6
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Annual Reports, Bank of Zaire.

Agriculture:

On the agricultural side the sector contributed 38 per cent of GNP in 1992. Only about half of this is derived from subsistence farming even though this provides the livelihood of 57 per cent of the population. The main food crops are cassava, maize, rice and plantains, grown mainly by small-scale subsistence farmers. Cash crops include coffee, palm oil and palm kernels, rubber, cotton, sugar, tea and cocoa, many of which are grown on large plantations.

Agricultural analysts think that Zaire has the potential to be not only self-sufficient in food but also to be a net exporter (Leslie,1993:126). In addition, with the exception of some parts of Kivu, it has escaped the droughts which have caused such great damage in other parts of Africa in the last 20 years.

Meanwhile the share of agriculture's contribution to GDP remained almost constant throughout the 1980s, standing at 32% in 1981, 33 % in 1985 and 32% in 1989, with the

nation. Towards the democratization process in the early 1990s Mobutu has lost all credibility in the written press; but confiscated the National Television which remained under MPR control and was seen as the monopoly of Mobutu's followers.

In addition, before the democratization movement, there was no independent press in Zaire. From the institutionalization of the MPR in 1974, the official media was the primary link between the government and its citizens. The government news agency (AZAP), the "Voice of Zaire" or the government-supervised radio and television complex, defended and justified the actions of the regime, and therefore, as Leslie has observed, the distinction between information and propaganda was more fictional than real. "Mobutu was the news", and his domestic and international manoeuvres were defended and lauded, even for the major daily newspapers.

With the political reforms of 1990, an independent press emerged led by four prominent newspapers - *Umoja*, *Le Potentiel*, *Le Phare*, *La Reference*, all were highly critical of the government and the quality of life in Zaire. As at 1991, Zaire had 104 newspapers officially recognized, 67 of which were being published in Kinshasa. As seen, a controlled system of mass media can be a powerful force in shaping political beliefs, and can provide bases of support as important to a authoritarian state. Finally, the impact of any information depends upon its force and content, the receptivity of the decision-makers, and the level at which the information enters the system. In order to survive, the political system must accept a stream of information, process it in a rational way, and utilize it in the decision-making process.

4.2.5. The Symbolic Capability:

In contrast to the rejuvenative capacity, the symbolic capability represented a major support for the regime and the system even though it, too revolved around the presence of Mobutu Sese Seko. Before the abolition of the party-state system in April 1990, Mobutu had acquired an array of praise-names daily reiterated in the regime media as we have seen. He was the Father of the Nation, the Founding President, the Helmsman and even the Messiah. As a leader, he was credited with remarkable accomplishments: it was he who restored order from chaos, who rehabilitated the state and renamed the country and its currency. The gigantic

became victims of harassment and were banned from television thanks to their sympathies with the Zairian opposition.

Because of the severity of these restrictions and the frequency of their application, analysts have ranked Zaire's press at the bottom of the scale in press freedom. Relations with the foreign media reflected a similar intolerance. From time to time certain issues of foreign magazines were banned by the government. For instance, the magazine *Jeune Afrique* was often censored because of its virulent criticisms of Mobutu. An AFP (Agence France Presse) correspondent was expelled from the country in 1980 for writing articles critical of the government. The government banned, seized, and censored these "depending upon the offence".

Furthermore, the government press agency, Agence Zaire Presse (AZAP) was one of the news agencies in Africa. It was, even now, the sole transmitter of news from abroad and the government, through its ownership of the country's printing facilities and its control of television, radio, and the press, was able to disseminate or withhold information if it desired. Although censorship was used selectively, if the matter was of great enough importance, the regime did not hesitate to suppress whatever information it deemed necessary.

As Schatzberg has reported (1988:79), to read the local press, one would never think a national budget existed. Instead, one would receive the impression that all expenditure, even for routine matters such as the construction of new administrative buildings or the replenishment of a hospital's supply of pharmaceutical products were a consequence of presidential magnanimity. Even though the national budget was a misleading document and the presidency directly controlled the lion's share of resources, it was still fatuous to assume that "all" could possibly come from his hands. Nevertheless, that was precisely how the media portray these things. Over the years, this impression has been deliberately reinforced by Mobutu himself with gifts from his "personal" funds (*dotation présidentielle*) that he bestowed on the population in his trips around the country.

Although the MPR ideology had largely lost its appeal, the government-owned media attempted to perpetuate the false image of Mobutu's benevolence toward his "family", the

the President-Founder to his children, the Zairian population. All Zairian media actively glorified the president through a consciously orchestrated personality cult (Schatzberg, 1988:77).

For example, if issues such as corruption were addressed, the blame was attributed to the system rather than the regime. Drawing on the notion of the supreme role of the African chief, the press designated Mobutu as the Zairian leader, the one chosen by God and the ancestors to lead the state. As such, he had unlimited power and, being above the law, had no accountability. Further, the image of father and family permeated all levels of political thought and discourse. This image, as Schatzberg has demonstrated, was constantly cataloging the Guide's magnanimous paternal solicitude through each material progress, each infrastructure development. All these were "gifts" from the "father" to his "children". These "gifts" subtly reminded people of their moral obligation to reciprocate the father's generosity. This created an implicit moral and material debt, a system in which all he received was but the demonstration of a culturally embedded concept of mutual exchange. Mobutu then can extract billions of dollars from his "children": no theft, no corruption, no exploitation; only grateful "children" repaying their generous "father" (Schatzberg, 1988:81). Mobutism, like authenticity before it, exalted the authoritarian state and the president as the agencies of "national renovation, national independence and peace" and had served to legitimize Mobutu's form of personal rule (Leslie, 1993:35).

In addition to total ownership of the press, the Mobutu regime exercised a whole range of statutory controls over all forms of communication. Journalists may be imprisoned for showing "disrespect" to the government, and criticism of the president was considered a criminal offence. No journalist may practice his profession unless certified and licensed by the government. All articles and opinion pieces had to be reviewed by a government review commission before and after publication. Zaire had also highly restrictive libel and sedition laws and preventive detention acts without the possibility of judicial remedies because the judiciary was subject to executive control. Not only did these laws exist in the statute book, but they were invoked fairly often in order to intimidate journalists. During the 1980s there were a number of journalists arrested for criticisms directed against even local and regional officials. In the midst of the National Conference in 1991, a group of young journalists

malaise pervading the politics of Zaire and the brooding presence of president Mobutu in the background, concerned only to manipulate so that he may retain power, made it almost impossible to tackle Zaire's economic and social problems effectively, mainly the education sector. The weak aspects of the rejuvenative capability was the result of serious attempts from the regime, in its pursuit of legitimacy, to gain control on the youth, especially students.

Furthermore, the tightness of control of Zairian political system to ensure the stability of the regime was also reflected in the Zairian regulation of *mass media*. According to "World Press Encyclopedia" (Kurian, 1982:1108-9), from the beginning of the seventies, all mass media were owned or directly controlled by the government, especially the radio and television *La Voix du Zaire* (Zaire's Voice) with over 3,650,000 (radio) and 40,000 (TV) listeners and one of the most powerfully equipped in Africa with 16 transmitters. For a country of its size and resources, Zaire had a small and underdeveloped press. Until 1990, only four dailies were published in the country: *Salongo* and *Elima* (Kinshasa), *Mjumbe* (Lubumbashi) and *Boyoma* (Kisangani). Zaire was also one of the earliest African countries to nationalize its press and one of the 14 African countries in which a non-governmental press did not exist. During the "authenticity" campaign launched by Mobutu in the mid-1970s, the names of the newspapers were Africanized even though they were being published in French.

Indeed, in Mobutu's Zaire glorification of the president, (Zairian mass media was state controlled), the press followed explicitly the line that ruling authorities had traced in such matters and portrayed nation and party as an all-inclusive family. In 1974, the Ministry of Press and Information was renamed the Department of National Guidance (Orientation Nationale) in the promotion of "authenticity", as defined by the "Founder President". This phase of concentration of power peaked with the promulgation on 15 August 1974 of a revised constitution institutionalizing the MPR. At this time, emblematic of the extravagant pretensions of the Mobutist state was the ban on the press to use the names of any state official other than the president. The press reinforced the image of Mobutu as father by constantly cataloging the Guide's magnanimous gestures. More generally, the press treated virtually all Mobutu's deeds as actions of an enlightened and benevolent father figure. Whenever a new development project was completed - be it a renovated building, a new construction road, or hospital - the press presented the new or rebuilt facility as a gift from

A number of scholars emphasize the fact that the Belgian colonial administration's late commitment to education beyond the primary level, coupled with the monopoly that the catholic and protestant churches had over the Congolese education system until the 1950s, meant that seminaries and technical schools were the only avenues for higher education. Indeed, at independence in 1960 there were only 30 university graduates, compared with 1,000 priests and pastors and 400 specialists in medicine and agriculture. This lack of cadres who could contribute to nation-building efforts was a structural weakness that would plague the Zairian state well into the Second Republic.

Although the Belgians left a legacy of an extensive primary school system with high enrolment in 1960 (70%), there were high dropout rates, and the majority of schools provided only the first two grade levels. The Mobutu regime tried to "take the educational system to the country" by bringing symbolic rhetoric about the need to bring education under government control, making it more accessible and responsive to the needs of Zairians and introducing more reforms. The educational watchword became "collective advancement", meaning a school system geared to the rethinking and replanning of the social and economic environment for the benefit of the entire community. But at the university level, innovations came in 1971 in the form of nationalization after student protests. Higher education was brought under state control and the three universities fused to create one entity: the national university of Zaire (UNAZA).

Lack of effective government control over the salary payment process has resulted in wastage and corrupt practices. Consequently, schools were unsupervised and have to fend for themselves while campuses were almost empty. A large part of the school system, even today, seems to be in a condition of advanced decay; buildings are derelict, and even the most basic equipment is lacking. Yet the country counts its graduates in ten of thousands and has specialists in practically all the usual disciplines. Paradoxically, the country continues to slip ever more deeply into underdevelopment. And despite the magnitude of the crisis the system succeeded to operate and to produce "output" as Turner and Young argue. Brief, the school system has deteriorated to such a degree that quality instruction has become impossible.

During all the period of the so-called democratization process and Kabila's victory, the deep

state agencies was a further incentive to public affirmation of fidelity on such occasions as support marches or public meeting. Even in universities "militancy" would be a factor for promotions.

The MPR functions of recruitment existed not only at the top of the social scale, where they focused on membership in the Political Bureau and Central Committee (after 1980), but also at the bottom. Further, army recruitment, particularly for the elite Presidential Guard, has focused on Equateur and excluded areas such as Bandundu and the Kasais, viewed as half-hearted and anti-revolutionary provinces. In a March 1990 memorandum from civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and condemning the regime, it was noted that individuals from Equateur made up 19 percent of the Central Committee, 27 percent of the Executive Council, 46 percent of the officer corps in the Army, and 34 percent of Zaire's diplomatic representatives.

In particular, the educational system was deeply hampered by patrimonialist forces and young graduate students were not able to gradually reduce and then dampen the power of these forces.

As in most African countries educational recruitment was biased towards urban males. Further, the kind of education provided was itself a matter of debate and observers have pointed out that the educational system was not geared to the needs of Zairian society. By the end of the independence decade, it was clear that the existing school system was ill suited to development needs. It encouraged a small elite to concentrate on individual success and the urban lifestyle.

Although the educational system in Zaire was in crisis, it was still viewed by many as one of the avenues for social mobility. Yet the general crisis of the system, and that of the school system in particular, were incomprehensible outside the overall context of the country's history. The Belgian colonial structure remained as the basis of the system: six years of primary education, beginning at age six and it was officially compulsory. Secondary education which was not compulsory, begins at 12 years of age and lasts for up to six years, comprising a first cycle of two years and a second of four years, and five to six years of university.

through all levels of Zairian society. Formation of a patron-client relationship was based not only on reciprocal advantage, but on some principle of affinity which supplies a social logic to the network. Kinship and ethnic affinity were the most frequent bases for network formation, although other bases were possible. The nature of the Zairian state and the ongoing crisis in Zairian society were potent generators of client ties.

The activation of patron-client ties was a game with undeterminant rules. Let us look how the system worked. This complex of relationships, founded upon asymmetries of power, status, and wealth, related the weaker to the stronger through ties of dependency. The client accepted a submissive, subordinate relationship to his patron, and the obligation to provide his patron with services; in return, the patron provided favors to the client which he would not otherwise be able to obtain. Each party was likely to seek benefits from the linkage. At the same time, the operation of patron-client networks were constrained by social ideologies. A well-placed patron could not easily evade claims of a kinsman in acute distress, a client could not readily reject demands of a patron for social support, because obligation was not only prescribed by the contingent requirement of the patron-client dyad, but also under-written by the social values of reciprocal duties.

It is arguable that the extent to which a political system is structurally differentiated and the relative autonomy of its roles and subsystems will affect the performance, or capability patterns, of the political system. Thus, a political system which has specialized roles for the extraction of resources will be able to extract resources more efficiently than one which lacks these specialized roles. The ways in which individuals are recruited into political roles similarly will affect the capabilities of political systems. Administrative officials chosen on the basis of performance criteria tend to be more effective in the performance of these specialized functions (Almond and Powell:1966:49). This was not the case for the Zairian society.

The function of kinship clientage in the social sphere help understand why corruption and administrative inefficiency were prevailing in Zairian politics. The MPR, as a legitimating institution, provided the regime with a useful vehicle to achieve the recruitment process. For instance the use of the concept of "militancy" as a criterion in personnel evaluation within the

The program for the de-ethnicization of Zairian politics can be summarized in three points: (1) suppression of institutional arenas which ethnicity could be mobilized; (2) apparent exclusion of overt ethnic patronage within the state; (3) prohibition of articulation of cultural ideologies. Open appeals to cultural solidarity were stigmatized as subversive, and were a mortal danger to any visible leader advancing them; sackings were frequently justified as a punishment for tribalism.

While the strategy of demobilizing ethnicity and depriving it of institutional channels for political articulation has been successful in reducing the saliency of cultural pluralism in the formal realm, it failed to remove ethnic connotations from mass perceptions of the exercise of power. The total centralization of state power and the concentration of authority in the presidency, made the state remaining a vast patrimonial domain, but the distribution of prehends and benefices was above all a presidential prerogative. There were three major reasons for this: (1) the regional character of the inner security coalition that was the heart of power maintenance; (2) the inevitable regional-ethnic connotations corollary to the personalization of political power; (3) the linguistic policies and ambitions of the regime, with the exclusive official use of Lingala, the language of the military.

As a result, Mobutu attempts to maintain an ethnic balance within the state institutions failed and further promoted ethnicity by reinforcing ethnic consciousness. This effort quickly gave way to ethnic "favoritism" with respect to his own region, Equateur, for state appointments. It was widely perceived with much resentment on the part of Zairians that the political elite under the Mobutu regime was composed almost exclusively of individuals from Equateur. In turn, these government officials discriminated with respect to their subordinates on the basis of ethnicity.

In terms of political recruitment, this process may be based on universalistic criteria or particularistic criteria, as seen. Recruitment by ascription or particularistic criteria was a salient feature of Zairian politics. Office holders have been required to hold loyalty to their ruler above loyalty to family, clan, or status groups. In Mobutu's Zaire, the prime qualification for office was *fidelité au Guide*. As Young and Turner pointed out, one set of intercept channels, linking the streams, consisted of patron-client networks, which ramify

inspire allegiance to the system, and the symbols of nationhood must be deeply inculcated if the individual is to maintain his belief in the system in the face of electoral fraud, capricious law enforcement, rapacious tax collectors, or insensitive army garnisons (1970:20).

During the Mobutu era, the ethnic particularisms were accentuated, and the process of nationalization and class stratification of culture were acquiring momentum. Ethnicity was not encouraged by the Belgians because of the imperatives of political control. Nonetheless, with increasing urbanization during the colonial period, ethnically based organizations developed as support mechanisms vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. Rivalries long held in check by the colonial administration were unleashed with the departure of the Belgians, and ethnicity became highly politicized. Individual still identifies himself vis-à-vis his ethnic group above all and not to the society. There are at least 200 ethnic groups in the various regions of the country.

According to scholars, Mobutu's early efforts at unification were clearly in response to the ethnic fragmentation of the 1960-1965 period and were aimed at muting ethnic differentiation in favor of a national identity. In addition to promoting nationalism through a common ideology, initially termed "Zairian nationalism authentic", "authenticity" and then "Mobutism", the regime attempted to create common linguistic identification. From colonial times already, French was made the official administrative language of the state, which chose to formally recognize only four of Zaire's many languages (at least 400): Kikongo, Tshiluba, Swahili, and Lingala. Political parties and ethnic associations were made illegal. Finally, Mobutu attempted to remove regionalism and tribalism from the political arena through the transformation of provinces into purely administrative units and the assigning of territorial officials away from their regions of origin.

It should be noted, although overt ethnic competition has been suppressed by the state, ethnicity was still a salient issue and has in fact been heightened. The majority of the population resides in rural areas where tradition and custom are still strong, though altered in varying degrees by colonialism, and primary allegiance is to the family and the group rather than the larger society.

salaries averaged \$50, \$80 in 1990, \$20 in 1993, \$5 in mid-1994 and \$1 at the end the year. The situation was worse in higher education with teachers gaining more or less \$5 per month. Nevertheless, salaries were unable to keep up with increasing inflation, and as a result, many teachers sought employment elsewhere, take part-time jobs, or extort money from students to supplement income.

Finally, it should be argued that the distributive capacity of the Zairian political system was weak and exclusive. The relative pool of goods and services available for allocation, the importance of patrimonial forces in that allocation, and the lack of central control over the distribution of resources all combined to reduce the effectiveness of this capability.

4.2.4. The Rejuvenative Capability:

The difficulties inherent in the distributive capacity were reflected, and to a certain extent, magnified in the rejuvenative capability. This capability suffered from the tensions between an ascriptive or patrimonial view of society on the one hand and achievement orientation on the other. The educational aspects of the regulative process was of some importance for the Zairian political system.

The process of political socialization in Zaïre may be observed in three general areas: the political process, education and communication. The first area being the most important in term of positively reinforcing the citizens' commitment to the system. Education was also of importance, for Zaïre has concentrated on the premise to bring education under government control and making it more accessible and responsive to the needs of Zairians.

However, one can note that in societies such as Zaïre - parties, interest groups, and mass media - have been imposed upon highly traditional societies. Mobilization and exposure to modernity have been confined to a small elite. Although political awareness may have been aroused through independence movements and through the gradual diffusion of the idea of economic improvement, political attitudes remained for the most part caught up in a web of traditional family and community ties. Here, Potholm reminds us that attachments are primarily local to begin with, the central authority must take consistent and specific steps to

further politicize it. University administration, staff recruitment, and student admissions mirrored the weaknesses in postcolonial Zaire. A regional bias in favour of Equateur was soon reflected in hiring and admissions practices. Top university personnel formed part of the privileged elite loyal to MPR and exploited their positions for private gain. As a result, sporadic student protests against the regime and poor economic conditions led to frequent closures of the university campuses and the drafting of students into the army. As pointed out by Leslie, education has thus been used by the regime as an instrument of political control (see Table 41).

At the low level, the extensive involvement of the church in primary and secondary education resulted in its nationalization, as part of the regime's effort to control the church. Indeed, by 1973, 85 percent of enrolment at the primary level and 60 percent at the secondary level was in schools controlled by religious organizations. Nonetheless, by 1979 financial constraints and administrative inefficiency caused the regime to invite the churches to once again take charge of their former schools.

TABLE 41: Tertiary Education: Students and Staff Teaching Number

All Tertiary Institutions					
Total Students				Students per 100,000 pop.	Total Teaching Staff
1960	1970	1984	1988-92	1988-1992	1988-1992
763	12363	22139	61422	176	3873

Source: UN Development Programme (UNDP), 1994.

Government expenditure on education at all levels declined, particularly since the onset of the economic crisis in 1974. According to UN data, expenditure as a percentage of GNP declined from 2.4 % in 1960 to 0.4 in 1986. The situation was particularly acute with regard to salaries. As subsequent years would indicate, teachers were poorly and irregularly paid, often going without wages for six months and more. Twelve months in 1993. In 1987 teachers'

TABLE 40: School enrolment ratios, Zaire and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1965-1988 (%)

Category	Zaire			Sub-Saharan Africa		
	1965	1980	1988	1965	1980	1988
Primary School:						
Male	95	114	84	52	87	n.a.
Female	45	82	65	30	67	n.a.
Total % enrollment	70	98	76	41	79	n.a.
Secondary School:						
Male	8	51	32	6	21	n.a.
Female	2	19	14	2	10	n.a.
Total % enrollment	5	35	22	4	16	n.a.

Source: W.J.Leslie, Zaire: Continuity and political Change in an Oppressive State, 1993:77.

World Bank data from 1988 puts primary enrolment at 76%, one of the highest rates in francophone Africa, but only 55 % of the student population had completed primary education. Of the school age population, 22% actually go on to secondary school, and only 13 percent complete the six year cycle. Over the years, despite the increasing number of well trained young graduates, the educational sector became weaker quantitatively as well qualitatively.

As recent studies on the educational system have indicated (Leslie,1993:78); Kankwenda,1993:144), the nationalization of higher education in 1971 and that of primary and secondary levels brought about many problems. Over the years, unification failed to facilitate reform of the system but served to increase political control over the student population and

Africa. Its capacity for effective rule is equaled only by a few other African governments, notably Botswana. In contrast, states like Zaire, possess sovereignty in name only. This sovereignty is not comparable to that of older states. If it were not for Western aid, loans, and grants, many sovereign African states would be in an even more parlous condition than they are at present.

South Africa, however, has always managed without foreign assistance either of the humanitarian kind or developmental loans. Despite a history of profound tensions, the South Africa's economy during the early apartheid period underwent rapid expansion. Today it is experiencing a modest upsurge after a decade of stagnation caused by capital flight and escalating public expenditure on defence and unsuccessful socio-political reform. Even at its most depressed point, though, in the 1980s, South African economic recession could not compare with the disintegration of Zairian economic life and the reversion to subsistence activity by many Zairians.

South Africa both resembles and differs from the black states of modern Africa. South Africa faces many of the same economic, social, and political problems that confront the black states and has also chosen many of the same solutions to them (including a heavy reliance on the state, the use of parastatals in the economy, and until 27 April 1994, an authoritarian and undemocratic form of governance and in the 1980s, deficit funded public expenditure). But the differences between South Africa and most sub-Saharan African states are equally striking. In most African countries, the state is often ineffective; it is run by what scholars term "predatory elites", while in South Africa, the state machinery works after a fashion. The state effectively enforces its laws and can provide goods and services. The bulk of its officials are relatively capable and responsible. Economically speaking, despite severe fluctuations the country has experienced from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the South African economy displayed a remarkable resilience.

This state of things has been made possible by the existence of what Leftwich terms "an elite oriented to development and investment", and clearly the bureaucracy. In comparison with Zaire, the bureaucracy is undoubtedly a formidable force in South Africa. It should be argued that South Africa possesses a bureaucracy insulated from society, a society which is

On the economic side, as official economic organization and infrastructure have deteriorated until they barely function, and a parallel unofficial system has arisen. Production and distribution for the second economy has expanded, and people have organized transportation, information systems, and means to finance their enterprises for themselves by utilizing personal ties. The scarcity of goods was overcome by personal supply lines or by connections to persons in charge of allocation. Lack of foreign exchange was remedied by the parallel money market, which was supplied through smuggling networks. In general, the reciprocal favors of personal relationships help to solve the problems of the breakdown of the political system's capacities. As a consequence, the state was unable to implement laws and regulations and the economic activity was outside its control on a huge scale.

Visiting journalists provide a graphic picture of Zairian civic despair. They report a collapsing economy, deepening poverty, growing hunger, pervasive mismanagement, rising ethnic tensions, scarcity of formal economic activity, infrastructure which has virtually ceased to exist, widespread misappropriation of state funds, embezzlement of remarkable amounts of public sector funds, virtual abandonment of economic reform, pillaging of several cities that has accelerated decline, economic decay, corruption having virtually bankrupted the public sector - annual inflation skyrocketing to over 6,000%. A government which can rarely afford to pay its own workers. Neighborhoods littered with piles of rotting garbage and backed-up sewers. Families could not afford to bury their dead. Recovering patients held hostage in hospitals until they can pay (Collins, 1996).

Even the reemergence of civil society which is taken by some observers to represent a glimmer of political relief offers no real hopeful portent for state renewal because popular voluntary associations tend to disengage from the state, and to attempt build a civic order out of its reach, on the periphery of the realm of the state's remaining effective authority.

In contrast with the comatose Mobutist state, the capacities of the South African state are impressive by African standards. Almost all studies - earlier or recent - on the state in South Africa have agreed with this fact. In South Africa, state institutions however coercive and brutal have a link with communities by fulfilling their primary function of implementing government policy. To scholars, South Africa is the only modern, capable state in sub-Saharan

As we have emphasized, the salient issue of the Zairian organizational incapacity lied on the patrimonialization of state power. The essence of the Mobutist authoritarian state was the centrality of personal rule and clientelization. The Zairian state was best portrayed by the Jackson-Rosberg model of personal rule defined as "a system of relations linking rulers not with "the public" or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the system". The system was "structured" not by institutions, but by the politicians themselves. In such system, it was not surprising that the public service has progressively lost its capacity to relate means to ends, and the ability to perform its accustomed functions, bringing about a loss of belief with civil society.

The result was the creation of mistrust between citizens and public bureaucracies. People found that this system became in many instances a humiliating experience as they were refused services by a personnel whose notion of the public service was restrictive in its application, if not nonexistent. In these instances, services were rarely delivered to those who need them most. They were rendered to those who need them less, following the preferences and pressures of better-off people. So the needs of the majority may go unperceived and unmet.

Thus individual did not feel a part of it and in fact, has lost interest in being part of it. Consequently, many Zairians no longer expect the public bureaucracy to respond to their social needs and have recourse to a variety of forms of solidarity and community self-help to meet those needs. The exit option. To Janet MacGaffey, the failure of the public sector, the decline of state's administrative capacity, impossibly low wages at all levels of society, and rampant scarcities of goods have contributed to a rapid expansion in "second economy" activities and to the increasingly predatory nature of the state (*ibid.*).

In dealing with the administration, the public tend to take shortcuts and to make their demands on particularistic basis resorting to and using intermediaries, often personal contacts, friends and relatives, or paying the public servants. In other words, this particularistic tendency went hand in hand with bureaucratic corruption and public maladministration, as Makolo and Gould have stressed.

According to Zairian scholars and especially Makolo (Nzongola, 1986:181-189), it is arguable that having evolved as an appendage to the colonial bureaucracy, the Zairian bureaucratic apparatus and decision making system tends to be concentrated in the capital city and other urban centres. The failure of bureaucracy in delivering services in Zaire should not be surprising considering the fact that delivery is based on an organizational model which assumes that major decisions should be centrally based. Far removed from the people and their needs, the delivery is implemented through structures intended to be more responsive to central direction than local reality. In regard to the size of the country, governing from a distance poses problem because of difficulties of communications between different levels of administration.

As shown by studies (Kadima and Kalombo, 1995:4; MacGaffey, 1994:189-204; Young, 1994), the administrative experience of the last three decades has produced substantial evidence that government agencies engaged in the process of development have totally failed. This is so because governments do not always have an adequate capacity to deliver services. To become *more effective*, improved delivery of services can be obtained by conscious decision, policies, and organizations aimed at altering the situation.

Makolo points out that while nation-building may required centralization in Zaire, development requires some degree of decentralization or local control. What is crucial is the building of administrative capacity, that is improving the ability of communities to deal with their problems. This implies building institutions, changing structures, developing practices and procedures in order to aid the communities to do things that are inadequately done by the local people. All this means that authority and decision-making should exist at the lowest level possible.

But Mobutu's Zaire was in a situation of crisis. It was experiencing a period of acute distress and pain during which the goals and objectives of participants were threatened. A period during which no institution could work and no national leader could translate people's expectations into reality.

seminar on decentralization maintained that "decentralization and centralization need not be conceived in terms of the centre losing and the periphery gaining. Rather, the matter could be interpreted as a process where both parties gain ... Conflict between centralization and decentralization was more apparent than real, and ... the need is for a practical balance between the two" (1985:143).

From this analysis, it clear that the Zairian state was unable to "prod, urge, and help", whereas a genuine political and economic development must involve a collaboration between the centre and the periphery.

Prisoner of the underlying nature of the state in Africa - the patrimonialism - the Zairian government embodied an authoritarian organization of domination, but a weak one. As Callaghy has demonstrated, despite the fact that Zaire has failed to perform most of its neocolonial functions since the onset of its joint debt-economic crisis in 1975, Mobutu's regime continues to survive in an international context, largely controlled by advanced capitalist states. The performance of this African patrimonial administrative state clearly highlights what Weber calls "the negative anticapitalist effect of patrimonial arbitrariness". The persistence of Mobutu's patrimonial administrative state was an ambiguous achievement, one beset by paradox. It was both hard and soft, authoritarian and lacking authority, extractive and strapped, coercive and loose. It was a Leviathan, but a lame one.

In short, the above argumentation has demonstrated the evidence of state's inability to dominate civil society. Its ideological initiatives were a striking indication of its weakness and insecurity. As a result, leaders were unable to produce political institutions with the bureaucratic capacity to perform any developmental functions.

Studies on the failure of the Zairian bureaucracy abound and there was a consensus that the system of delivery of services to the public was inadequate, inaccessible, ineffective, and unaccountable. Such a system could not adjust to the swift expansion of the public sector and this impression is strengthened by the very huge extent of the Zairian crisis.

As one has noted, our analysis has put much stress on administrative management problems because of the decline in the administrative capacity of the state and its impact in magnifying the crisis in Zaire. Our intention was to draw attention to the fact that many of problems today experienced by Zaire were closely linked to the management of the state apparatus. In short the Zairian crisis was caused by the absence of institutions that create stability and the failure of the post-independence rulers to fairly manage the country.

Hence the double quest in the early 1980s for new approaches to enhance institutional effectiveness on the one hand, and new ways of deconcentrating administrative services through various types of centralized federal arrangements on the other hand. The "administrative reform" of 1982, best known in Zaire as "decentralization", must be understood in this vein.

The aim of this reform was to bring the bureaucracy closer to the people, to increase the aggregate resources available to the state and to reduce central state responsibility in order to correct the "softness" of the state in various ways: allowing it to concentrate its scarce resources on a limited number of tasks at the centre, involving local organizations more fully in the mobilization of resources as well as in the decision and implementation processes; orienting public demands toward local-level decision-makers, thereby facilitating access and possibly reducing false expectations, and generally improving communications between the public and those in authority. These reforms were expected to offer a path to increased performance. But like everything in Zaire, it did not work.

Nonetheless, the movement towards decentralization had definite limits due to the characteristics of the authoritarian patrimonial administrative state in Zaire. Rothchild notes that such limits arose largely from the resistance of state functionaries who preferred central action and retained a corporate interest in continued central direction and control. Practically, the administrative reform of 1982, like other "reforms" before was short-lived because it was unable to operate in patrimonial administrative state and hitherto remained a mere myth.

Yet, remarks Rothchild, the move on the part of public authorities to organize decentralization should not be viewed as a weakening of the state itself. He notes that a United Nations

As argued by Jean-François Bayart, "30 November" was thus indeed a "class action". It was intended to sweep the patrimony of foreigners into the pockets of the politicians, whilst keeping popular appetites at a distance. It plunged the country into chaos. Nevertheless, its fundamental effects on social stratification were not undone, either by the "radicalisation" of 1975 or by the "clarifications" of 1977. In the eyes of the political scientist at least, the brutality of Zairianization has the advantage of illustrating in a cruel, but not stereotypical way, the nature of the nationalist wave which swept across the continent in the early 1970s (1993:83-85). For Young, Zairianization and radicalization constituted a "serious self-inflicted wound" (1986:141) .

This attack on private property rights caused an economic upheaval at the time of crisis in the world economy provoked by the 1973 oil crunch. Zaire was as hard hit as any nation. The blame was assigned to private investors who, losing confidence, cut down on investments, especially after the radicalisation of Zairianization measures. To boost confidence, it was suggested that a series of incentive measures be adopted, in the hope that they will entice investors back to their positions in the Zairian economy. However, the situation is such that the new incentives, although liberal, could at best only have a limited effect. At worst they could prove utterly useless.

In spite of the Investment Code and the relatively successful stabilization programs of the IMF that have offered the main incentive mechanisms in the 1980s, their yield has been negligible. Moreover, investors do not rush to invest in depressed economies. More importantly, the crisis has been worsened by real problems in economic and financial management, in particular the slipshod management of public finances, the country's foreign exchange reserves, economic loans, and the diversion of investments into peculiar channels.

Similarly, according to the World Bank, a major cause of the economic decline of Zaire and other subsaharan African countries in the 1980s has been the absence of efficient economic organization due to economic over regulation and mismanagement, corruption, administrative ineptitude, enormous bureaucracies, waste in the state sector, excessive government intervention and inflationary fiscal and monetary policies. All these combined factors are predominantly concerned with the aspect of management.

The effects of very rapid localisation of the civil service in the 1960s were accentuated by the negative impact upon the economy of "Zairianization" and "radicalization" measures in November 1973. The latter half of the 1960s had brought a period of ostensible economic prosperity, a consequence of the wave of investments in the late 1960s which lasted until 1974-75. Among the main reasons for this new wave there was the re-establishment of political calm and unity after the chaos and insecurity of the five first years of independence, the achievement of relative economic stability after the monetary reform of 1967, and the resumption of exports especially in the mining sector, and the publication of an extremely liberal Investment Code. During that short period, Zairean public institutions appeared to acquire a certain stability and competence and the development of the state based class (or bureaucratic bourgeoisie) began promoting a public sector strong enough to serve its economic interests.

However, this was interrupted by the passage of a series of events. The reasons for the failure of this strategy were complex. As pointed out by Janet Mac Gaffey, they include the colonial legacy of a low level of education and lack of experience in government or management for Zairians; economic policies carried over from the colonial period (which neglected food production and developed an economy to export primary raw materials); the seemingly unbounded greed of a powerful few in the governing class; falling commodity prices on the world market for Zaire's principal exports, along with the huge increase of petroleum prices; and a large national debt arising from extravagant investments during the economic boom of the early 1970s (1994:191). But above all there was the economic disruption caused by a disastrous indigenization of the economy in the Zairianization decrees of 30 November 1973 bringing selected private firms under state control.

In common with many other, though not all African countries, the absence of entrepreneurial elites outside the state who might have been expected to benefit from "indigenisation" of foreign assets helped to ensure that large sectors of the modern economy would cease to function according to commercial dynamics. In this context the historically unusual degree of state-capital inter-penetration during the Belgian colonial period was salient and helped to explain the peculiar weakness of local business classes.

PART FIVE: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to compare the developmental role played by the state in Zaire and South Africa, in other words, to investigate state capacity as a variable in economic progress. The focus has been on the quality of organisational structure and the ability of public institutions to undertake certain tasks. I have argued that without strong and effective administration no state can reach its goals. In coping with the state's capacity in policy making, it appeared that state capacities could be connected to the existence of such organization.

In the case of Zaire, the effects of state softness and the administrative low performance have proved fatal for the country. This was the result of the absence of effective and adaptable political structures capable of responding to the community's aspirations. From the mid-80s, governmental institutions entered into the phase of the quest for legitimacy during which politics seemed confused and chaotic.

The weakness of the state, though, was not confined to its inability to legitimate its authority through political processes. The state was also weak managerially, especially with regard to the allocation of resources and their effective deployment to achieve long term strategic goals. Adrian Leftwich has identified the presence of a strong planning elite within the top echelons of the administration as a crucial variable in the evolution of an effective "developmental state" (1995:400-425).

In Zaire the absence of long term planning and policy implementation has been a characteristic of the state since independence, a characteristic which was attributable to an extreme degree of patrimonialization of government structures. This patrimonialization can be explained with reference to both precolonial and colonial traditions which have helped to structure the modern state as well as the almost instant fragmentation of state power caused by the complete removal of the upper echelon of administrators from the central bureaucracy in 1961, a process through which the state became "territorialised". To date Zaire has not achieved significant economic development because its rulers were unable to innovate policy or to promote social and economic reform through state action. The country lacks the ability to assimilate successfully into the system the social forces produced by modernization.

consent became impossible. People were not confident in the government and did not believe in the effect of their participation and the exercise of their choice. From the early 1990s, nobody had faith in the government, not even most of its members. The only alternative which remained was the use of force, the logic of oppression. As analysts have observed, the hegemony of the state rested in part on ultimate coercive power, but the currency of force was devalued if it must be constantly applied.

Meanwhile, there was little symbolic flow from the political centre. There was a national anthem, *La Zairoise*, and a national flag of green, red and yellow. The green represented the prosperity, the red the blood of martyrs, and the yellow the riches of the country. But people did not believe in these symbols, and were waiting for legitimate institutions and a credible political system.

was a potent symbol.

The party progressively tried to fill all available political space and to serve effectively as a legitimating institution. It was indispensable in establishing an operative linkage with the masses. It did it through pre-emption and co-option. Since, one did not serve, the MPR filled the political space, its omnipresence precluded alternative political organization to which citizens might have effective ties, while its legal supremacy provided justification for prohibiting other movements. All organized groups or movements were assimilated into its framework. Women, students, trade unions, churches became an ancillary branch of the party and were subject to its control.

Associated with the party institutions was a national ideology that claimed to have exclusive hegemony. This doctrine bore the label of "authentic Zairian nationalism" which appropriated the symbols of Lumumbism and asserted the quite similar doctrines of national unity of the martyred Lumumba. MPR ideology aligned itself with the main themes of anticolonial nationalism elsewhere in Africa and insisting upon the imperative rights of the Zairian people to achieve full control over their political destiny and to determine the use and development of the natural wealth of the country. Mobutu succeeded in legitimating the program of his regime among many intellectuals as well members of the general population. In 1970 the ideology of the regime became "authenticity" which extended the logic of nationalism to the cultural sphere, and was vaguely defined as the invocation of ancestral values as a means of bursting the shackles of cultural submission imposed by the Belgians. In 1974, the national ideology was personalized and redefined as "Mobutism", and its doctrines were to be discovered in the words and actions of the president.

As pointed out by Young and Turner (1985:183), when ideology degenerated into a simple personality cult, its credibility neared the vanishing point. As time has gone by, there has been a corresponding deepening of the crisis of legitimacy for the political system. The corrupt exchanges which were the essential lubricant of patrimonial power became increasingly pervasive and visible. As a result, the state has thus lost the capacity to incorporate a public-regarding ethos into its daily behaviour. Behavioural studies of this legitimacy seem to indicate that basic support for the state was lost, if not the more important support. Rule by

development projects of Inga, the Maluku steel mill, the complex of "La Voix du Zaïre" and that of International Trade Center in Kinshasa, all of these were the personal realizations of a man whose powers bordered on the supernatural.

At the peak of his personal rule in 1974, when public ideology was renamed "Mobutuism", Mobutu embodied different strands of legitimacy which contributed to reinforce his political system. In Max Weber's definition of charisma, Mobutu qualified as a "certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he was set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Weber, 1957:358). The transfer of official charisma to Mobutu involved the imputation of extraordinary qualities of strength, courage, and heroism. Moments of exceptional martial accomplishment were recalled and extolled and his accomplishments were recited in countless political songs.

Meanwhile one can recall that the Second Republic was a product of military force, anti-constitutional by definition. After abolishing the political arena it legalized and legitimized itself. In his search for legitimacy, Mobutu had more extended ambitions and sought a formula for indefinite perpetuation of his rule and to gain a long term legitimacy. The aim for fulfilling the legitimacy imperative, unveiled in 1967, was the MPR, a single nation party, viewed as "the nation politically organized". Party and ideology were the two crucial realms for the pursuit of legitimacy. Young and Turner remark that "during the phase of ascendancy these legitimating forces appeared to have some real power, though far less than was claimed. But in the crisis years the regime party and ideology became increasingly irrelevant as responses to the imperative of legitimation" (Young and Turner, 1985:217).

The MPR claimed to be the supreme institution of the country through which popular sovereignty was exercised. Mobutu became the personal incarnation and authoritative interpreter of the general will. He led the party, appointed its key officials, and spoke in its name. The establishment of a political instrument certainly helped to win external legitimacy for the regime. The apparent similarities between the MPR and the earlier party concepts and ideals associated with "Lumumbism" were important in gaining the initial support of a number of intellectuals and politicians for whom the one-party state with its characteristic ideology

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and thus growth-generating economic activities. Further, to redistribute wealth and to fundamentally reform basic institutions and policies so as to permit faster growth. Like scholars, I can argue that the key to sustained democracy and growth in the face of inevitable populism will be found in the arena of "governance". Social reform and economic regeneration require strong government. If government can get its way through consensus so much the better, but it needs to be recognised that this is not always possible... All that requires a state which punishes as well as rewards. It is true for South Africa. It is true for Zaire.

one that is especially explosive politically because it coincides with a racial, and thus highly visible, divide. White wealth and black poverty in South Africa produces a Gini coefficient that is the highest of any of the fifty-seven countries in the world for which data were available in 1978. However, more recent calculations by the IMF suggest that a degree of greater equality was achieved in the early part of the 1980s. Yet the country's Gini coefficient remained higher than that of any of the developed Western economies, and only the Latin American cases that suffer highly uneven income distribution came close to the South African coefficient.

In addition, sixty percent of all black South Africans (80 percent of those living in former homelands) have incomes below the minimal living level (M^{LL}), according to a study by the Carnegie Commission. The basic contour of South Africa's poverty profile - the huge gap between white wealth and black poverty - was somewhat eroded during the 1970s but has been reinforced in the past decade.

As a result, the prognosis for economic growth in a country with a poverty profile like South Africa's, Price argues, is no better than for democracy. Majority impoverishment breeds an atmosphere of populism that is hostile to the adoption of growth-producing economic policies. Where mass poverty breeds desperation, the time horizon of the majority is not compatible with economic policies that would sustain growth over the long run.

The South African economy performed poorly, from the mid-1970s and that structural bottlenecks in the economy remain major problems for today's new leaders. Between 1946 and 1974, the South African economy grew at a real rate of 4.9 percent annually. However, over the next decade, growth dropped to 1.9 percent per year and for the decade of the 1980s, the economy expanded at a rate of only 1.5 percent. In the 1980s, on balance, no new jobs were created in the nongovernment sector.

But, despite the political consequences of its poverty profile, South Africa can be seen as possessing the most substantial social base for democracy and economic base for growth. The challenge for the new governing elite is now to manage populist pressures so as to simultaneously build legitimacy for democratic institutions and protect investment, production,

But this industrialization is overshadowed by inequality and extremes of wealth and poverty, in terms of distributive capabilities. This creates a particularly inhospitable environment to sustain democracy. According to Jeffrey Herbst, South Africa is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country with a per capita income of \$2,430 in 1990, which makes it comparable to Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As is now well known, the aggregate income figures hide significant inequalities, as shown in Table 42.

Table 42: Income Shares over Time

	1960	1970	1980	1990
African	19.9	19.8	24.9	33.0
Asian	2.1	2.4	3.0	3.9
Coloured	5.6	6.7	7.2	9.2
White	72.5	71.1	64.9	53.9

Source: Jeffrey Herbst, *South Africa: Economic Crises and Distributional Imperative*, in *South Africa. The Political Economy of Transformation*, 1994:30.

This Table provides a summary of income share over time by racial group. While there has been some improvement in black income shares lately, the society is still obviously unequal. Indeed, 53 percent of Africans live below the poverty line compared to 2 percent of all whites; and to further these inequalities, the government spent R2,910 for each white child in primary school compared to R660 for each African child. There are 307,000 vacancies in white schools despite the fact that 2 million blacks are without school places; there are 180,000 whites in managerial, technical, and professional positions compared to only 3,000 blacks; there has been one black mine manager in seventy-seven years; and there is not a single black actuary (Herbst, 1994:30).

On the other hand, Price in his study, stresses the importance of this phenomenon in South Africa. He notes that the profile of the country's poverty may well reflect the most extreme combination of affluence and impoverishment of any country in the contemporary world - and

subordinated to the state and a state which can combine repression, legitimacy and performance. This insulation was, of course, partly the effect of racism which isolated even government junior officials from the majority in society. In Zaire, on the other hand, the administrative limitations of the state apparatus as well as its situation in society and its lack of autonomy made it quite difficult for the state to become an effective engine of development.

Until the 1980s, the South African bureaucracy remained largely free from corruption. This gave it an immense - a little appreciated - advantage over most black African states in which the civil service and state corporations often became part of a nationwide system of patronage and extortion. There are a number of explanations for this phenomenon. In South Africa, private enterprise remained powerful, as did the press, the Parliament, and white public opinion. Moreover, the public service sector was never to the degree that it was in African one-party regimes; this constitutes a crucial difference between South Africa and the black states.

But, this degree of integrity may not have been maintained in the 1980s when corruption within one central government department prompted an official enquiry to comment that "billions" of Rand had been lost through theft, fraud and incompetence with the complicity of senior management. Diminishing administrative capacity in the 1980s included a series of major financial scandals affecting high levels of government and petty corruption at lower echelon administration particularly in the rural homelands and in black townships (Bekker, 1991; Keenau, 1986; Sing and Wallis, 1995; RSA 1991, 1992).

Africans in South Africa began beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, drawn and forced into a process of proletarianization and urbanization. African society, in very significant proportion, became part of a modern industrial order. The same cannot be said for the rest of Africa, whose societies emerged out of colonialism as still essentially peasant. Some thirty years after the era of independence, South Africa remains the only significantly industrialized country in sub-Saharan Africa (Price, 1994:181-198).


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