

INTEGRATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

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ABSTRACT

In February 1990 the then State President put 42 years of apartheid ideology to rest and put the country on a new path of hope, by un-banning the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). Negotiations for a democratic South Africa were initiated and were as inclusive as possible culminating in the Congress for Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The parties concerned negotiated an acceptable political solution for South Africa and in November 1993 the Transitional Executive Authority (TEC) was established. Subsequently the Sub-Council for Defence (SCD) was created. It later created the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council, which was charged with the integration process of all armed forces presented in the TEC. In 1994 the integration of seven military establishments who were former adversaries began in South Africa.

This study examines the integration process of these seven armies and the demobilisation of those ex-combatants who could not be integrated into the new South African National Defence (SANDF). The seven armies that were integrated were uMKhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military wings of the ANC and PAC respectively; the former Bantustan Armies of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; and the South African Defence Force (SADF). The experiences of Zimbabwe and Namibia are also examined in order to deepen the understanding and analysis of this research paper. These countries have, been chosen because of their similarities with the South African situation. The ex-combatants of these countries have not only shared camps with MK and APLA, but have also inspired them.

The study contends that while the South African integration process was relatively incident-free as compared to Zimbabwe's, it was nevertheless, flawed. It points out some racial incidents in the SANDF that can be attributed to flaws in the process. It further alludes to the fact that the non-integration of SADF and moreover its role as a referee, player and linesman in the process not only left a sour taste in the mouths of ex-combatants but has created perceptions and problems. It advocates that equal treatment and participation in an integration process is a precondition for a fair process. It makes it clear that there was a lack of proper planning, preparation and consultation.

The process is a national issue and all the stakeholders including non-governmental organisations, religious groupings and community-based organisations should have been involved. Given the experience of Zimbabwean and Namibian veterans' mass demonstrations against what they perceived to be unfair demobilisation in their respective countries. South Africa should brace itself for the possibility of experiencing the worst. A properly planned and executed integration process with the profiling of the needs of the ex-combatants eschews their resorting to crime later. The research concludes that the South African integration process has contributed to destitution by demobilising a large number of ex-combatants. The majority of them have not found employment and this is alarming given the high rate of crime in the country. Given the possibility of serious challenges that may face South Africa in future, there is a need to research further the integration process in SANDF and all other countries that have undergone the process in the Southern African Region so that the region and the continent do not repeat similar mistakes.

DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Public and Development Management) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
BDF	Bophuthatswana Defence Force
BICC	Born International Center for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CDF	Ciskei Defence Force
CMF	Common Wealth Monitoring Force
CPR	Certified Personnel Register
CSANDF	Chief of South African National Defence Force
DDR	Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DOD	Department of Defence
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JHC	Joint High Command
JMCC	Joint Military Coordinating Committee
MK	uMkhonto we Sizwe
NDF	Namibian Defence Force
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NSF	Non Statutory Forces
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PF	Patriotic Front
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia

PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SF	Statutory Forces
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SCD	Sub Council for Defence
SIPE	Social Security Programme for Ex-fighters
SEED	Soldiers Employed in Economic Development
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWATF	South West Africa Territorial Force
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TEC	Transitional Executive Authority
TDF	Transkei Defence Force
UNAVEM	United Nation's Verification Mission
UN	United Nations
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
VDF	Venda Defence Force
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe Africa National Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Force

ZNLWVA

Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

INTEGRATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Background

The integration of former adversarial armies in South Africa heralded a new era for the country, especially the defence community. The world is still trying to learn from South Africans how they have managed such a sensitive and mammoth task. The integration of armed forces has played a positive role in assisting with the achievement of South Africa's political settlement. It is this political settlement that has seen South Africa being regarded by some as one of the continent's better prospects for a stable democracy. This has made international businesses start to recognize the Southern African Region for potential investments. Apartheid had created political, economical, cultural, social, and military problems. The existence of autonomous armed formations are a recipe for disaster in any country or political set-up as evidenced presently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa was no exception.

The repressive apartheid regime was supported by a strong military arm in the form of the South African Defence Force (SADF) that was deployed in the townships from time to time to quell any resistance from the African majority. As a result of this and other factors the SADF had become very influential in the South African political scene. The larger majority of South Africans feared and hated the SADF because it tended to act with impunity. Despite all these political and military powers, oppressing a disenfranchised majority proved challenging and difficult, as a result puppet homeland armies had to be created to act as buffer zones against the forces of liberation.

The Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, Defence Forces (TBVC) were established by apartheid South Africa. On the other hand uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the then military wing of the African National Congress and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the then military wing of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, were born out of necessity and painful history. They represented a shift from passive to armed resistance after the realisation that even peaceful protest was met with brute military force.

Integration of former enemies was viewed by the democratic government as an illustration of its commitment to national reconciliation, unity and transformation. Integration was two-dimensional; the first being the integration into SANDF of all personnel whose names appeared in the Certified Personnel Register (CPR) listing Statutory and the Non Statutory forces (with the subsequent inclusion of APLA). This was coupled with education and training of all SANDF members in line with international standards and competencies. APLA and MK were referred to as Non-Statutory Forces (NSF) while SADF and TBVC forces were referred to as Statutory Forces (SF). Statutory Forces were those forces that came into being as a result of law while Non-Statutory Forces came into being as a result of the liberation struggle (Ministry of Defence 1996, 1998:21).

The second dimension was a civic education programme and bridging training to bring all integratees on par in terms of rank suitability and mustering. The Department of Defence (DOD) upheld three governing principles for integration; namely, respect, dignity and equality as enshrined in the constitution. It was deemed necessary that there should be equitable representation of the constituent integrating forces in all ranks. Checks and balances were therefore put in place from the Defence Secretariat and Joint Standing Committee on Defence to integrating committees, up to Arms of Service level (Ministry of Defence 1996, 1998:6-21).

The British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) was responsible for ensuring fairness of the process. The Defence Amendment Act of 1995 provides for a restructured Department of Defence, which comprises the civilian Defence Secretariat and the SANDF. The Secretary for Defence, a civilian, heads the Defence Secretariat as the accounting officer and principal advisor to the Minister of Defence on policy matters. A Joint Standing Committee on Defence as established in parliament has a supervisory role of the SANDF and makes recommendations to parliament on issues of governance etc (Ministry of Defence 1996, 1998:6-21).

On demobilisation, the White Paper on Defence realises the need to compensate those who fought in the liberation struggle through the Demobilisation Act of 1996 and Special Pensions Act of 1996. The Cabinet also approved the establishment of a Service Corps to upgrade the education and vocational skills of ex-combatants and to assist in their re-integration into civilian society. The Service Corps was mandated to offer counselling, training and resettlement schemes to assist members in finding employment outside the SANDF or DOD and was seen as a project of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Ministry of Defence, 1998:21-23).

The Service Brigade, as the Service Corps was initially called at its inception, was first mentioned by General Meiring on 15 November 1993 in Pretoria. It was formally launched on 31 January 1995 in the East Rand and had a capacity to train 5 500 persons. According to Motumi and Hudson (1996: 121-123) the Service Corp did not operate at envisaged capacity right from the start. By mid-1995 the Service Corps expected an intake of 1 800 with a capacity for 5 500, but instead only 318 people were trained.

It seems that the Service Corps was finally launched because of the realisation that something had to be done about those who could not be integrated into the SANDF.

The dilemma for the administration of the assembly areas was what to do with those who could not be integrated while those integrated left in batches for bridging training. Surely the numbers of those who could not be integrated for academic, health or age reasons were increasing. This was also proving costly to the SANDF (Motumi and Hudson, 1996: 121-123).

The concept of a “service Corp” was indeed a noble one that never really materialised fully: not for a lack of commitment but perhaps because there was no mechanism in place to monitor and evaluate the on-going progress in the Service Corps. Its intended output has not positively impacted on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) or demobilisation as set out in the White Paper for Defence. According to the Chief of Policy and Planning Mr T Motumi, “this is but one area where the DOD has failed to live up to expectations and this is possibly due to lack of experience on the part of the department in selling the idea of Service Corps to potential candidates” (Interview with Motumi, 2004).

Africa’s downfall has always been the non-implementation of good policies or their monitoring and evaluation. Policies are meaningless if they cannot be implemented and constantly evaluated and monitored. In some cases policies with good objectives were instead ambiguous and therefore open to various interpretations. Africa has also been plagued by a lack of capacity to implement these policies. A policy can be how good but if its effects, intended and unintended cannot be monitored and evaluated then it is useless as it will never serve the intended purpose (Mutahaba *et al*, 1993:43-60).

The then National Party-led government came under tremendous pressure economically due to sanctions and the massive exit and disinvestments from South Africa, towards the end of 1980s by international corporations. South Africa was finding it difficult to get loans abroad and loans through third parties were proving very expensive for the dwindling economy.

South Africa was experiencing the deepest financial crisis of its history. Politically the United States of America (USA) and Britain were also under pressure to persuade South Africa to abandon apartheid policies and to accommodate Black Nationalist parties in some form of a dispensation. In particular, the British Government was put under pressure by the Commonwealth Countries. Adding to the woes of the South African government was the political unrest, which was continuing unabated and fuelled through established underground structures of the liberation movements. Business confidence was at its lowest ebb and it was clear that the country could not go on in its destructive way endlessly (Sparks, 1995: 98-100).

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s as a superpower had a tremendous influence on world politics. The Angolan political settlement that saw the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops, as a precursor to Namibian independence, was also an eye opener through which the South African Government realised that it was not impossible or the heavens would not collapse when a Black Nationalist government take over the country. It does not necessarily lead and plunge a country into political chaos and black onslaught against whites, as had been propagated to brainwash the moderates and, especially white South Africans. It was then President F.W. de Klerk who took the bold step of freeing the political prisoners and unbanning political organisations such as the ANC, PAC and others (Sparks, 1995:98-100).

On 2 February 1990, State President F.W. de Klerk laid 42 years of the divisive apartheid ideology to rest and gave all South Africans a glimmer of hope for the

dawning of a new South Africa. He spelt out his vision for a new South Africa and talked of a vibrant economy for the country, which offered hope for its entire people and introduced South Africa as a global player. This caused a lot of confusion to the people simply because a lot of them were completely taken by surprise by de Klerk's bold moves and utterances and just could not believe what they were seeing or hearing (Cilliers, 1998: 29-40).

Negotiations were organised and all parties were, invited to participate in 1993. The ANC's military wing, MK suspended the armed struggle as a principal form of struggle whilst APLA refused to do so despite the fact that it was clear to all that the writing was on the wall, signalling the end of the oppressive apartheid rule, and that the change was irreversible. All the seven armies namely, APLA, MK, the TBVC armies and SADF had an intrinsic capacity for violence and could have caused chaos in the country had they elected to do so. It was fortunate that a sense of responsibility had prevailed and hence peace triumphed. The newly instituted and necessity-driven Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) composed of all or most political parties of South Africa negotiated an acceptable political solution for South Africa, and in November 1993 established the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) with a Sub- Council for Defence (SCD) created within the network of sub-councils. The SCD was charged; amongst other things, with levelling the playing fields and promoting free political participation. This SCD later created a sub-sub-council named the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) that formulated decisions for the integration of opposing forces (Frankel, 1998:18).

All political parties were not equal or the same in-terms of support and legal status, negotiations were all encompassing. The Nationalist Party was the government of the day, all its structures were legal and this applied to all Bantustan Parties as well. The Liberation Movements and especially their military wings were viewed as being illegitimate. Levelling the playing field meant that all

military wings to the parties that took part in the negotiations in CODESA had to be treated equally and fairly.

Central to this mammoth task was the planning of the integration of armed formations represented at the negotiations. The Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) was established and comprised representatives of all participating armed forces except for APLA, which had not yet joined the negotiations. The JMCC was to advise the SCD on military issues and particularly on integration and peacekeeping. The JMCC played a key role in integration as they provided the framework for integration and demobilisation through the now famous JMCC Decisions (Williams 2002: 18-20).

1.2 Presentation of the Problem

This study is motivated by the need to retrace the integration process of military forces into the present-day SANDF and to analyse the very process of integration. It will also be important to examine the then prevailing conditions that could have compelled the powers that be to apply a completely and uniquely South African solution that had never been tested anywhere else in the world.

This research will also compare the Zimbabwean and Namibian experiences that definitely had an influence in the mind frames of the former guerrillas of MK and APLA. What further complicated the situation was that South Africa's history had led to complex racial and ethnic divisions in the armed forces, involving the intra as well as inter-racial group divisions, such as the English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking whites. Despite these glaring differences the South African seven armies integrated into one defence force with some hiccups that were resolved amicably, at least on the surface (Mills and Woods, 1993:1).

Former guerrillas had sacrificed their youth, their education, their families and their lives to dislodge the white oppression. They had been oppressed as a

people socially, politically, economically and culturally and yet they were expected to integrate. On the other hand SADF members were expected to integrate with people they were taught to despise as being inferior, terrorist who killed kindergarten children; enemies who had killed worshippers in churches and families in restaurants and bars.

Although the integration of the seven armies into a single South African National Defence Force has been, hailed as a success, racial fault lines persist that may be a legacy of integration. An example of such is what has become known as the Tempe killings (in Bloemfontein), where a 28 year-old, Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela, a former APLA guerrilla had received permission to go and bury his father in the Transkei, from his unit commander a Major Reynecke. He obtained this absence of leave on a weekend for he had received the news of his father's passing away while on course and therefore there were no leave forms filled. There was a change of unit commanders and Major Lourens replaced Major Reynecke and he was told about Lieutenant Madubela official leave but marked him absent without leave (AWOL). Officially, Lieutenant Madubela was supposed to be back at the unit on the 30 August 1999 but his salary was, stopped on the 28 august 1999 (Ministerial Committee Report, 2001:1-10).

This angered Lieutenant Madubela and on 16 September 1999 he went on a shooting rampage; killing six white officers, non commissioned officers (former SADF) and a white civilian he thought had something to do with the suspension or stopping of his salary. He had tried to see the Officer Commanding Tempe Base in Bloemfontein Lieutenant Colonel Jan Wessels but he was told that he was in Pretoria. These racial murders sent shock waves in the SANDF, the government and indeed the country. Reaction to this calamity from society was unfortunately along racial lines. Some criticised the slow pace of transformation in general and in SANDF in particular (Ministerial Committee Report, 2001:1-10).

It is reasonable to assume that Lieutenant Madubela wanted to discuss his frustrations with the OC but unfortunately he was not available on the 16 September 1999. These racial incidents are a manifestation of lack or inadequate policy or policies to eschew and address racial incidents in the SANDF. These incidents can be attributed to negative perceptions and attitudes, which are proving difficult to change. Commanders of SANDF failed to level the playing field, prior, during and after the integration process. In most if not all, racial incidents, there are two common denominators and that is ex-SADF and ex-combatants. This clearly demonstrates the suspicions, misplaced hatred and wrong perceptions that still exist in the SANDF.

In 1996 a white officer (former SADF) locked three former guerrillas in a room and sprayed them with a tear gas. As a result of this incident all three officers left the SANDF disillusioned and bitter against the system for a lack of proportional disciplinary action against the white officer who claimed that the action was a joke and had no racial intentions behind it. This was despite the then existing operational orders as adopted from SADF on handling of weapons and such materials in living quarters. Lieutenant t (ret) Manelisi Luxande who was one of the three officers is still very bitter against the system. He feels failed by the system and helpless to defend his inalienable right to work in a safe environment and to be treated with dignity. He stated during an interview that “ I feel grossly betrayed by the government I fought for, ex-SADF are enjoying the fruits of my labour toil and blood while I and many other ex-combatants feel the pain”. (Interview with Luxande, 2006).

Currently a treason trial of people said to be of a right wing agenda is underway in the Pretoria High Court. In this case, one of the accused is a white Lieutenant Colonel based at Army Battle School until the time of his arrest with others, for conspiring to overthrow the democratically elected Government of South Africa by violent means, and of killing people in Soweto in a bomb blast. This has surprised many in the SANDF, especially those who are prepared to serve and

die for this country's population irrespective of race, colour or creed. This has inadvertently created insecurity among the soldiers along racial lines as evidence by remarks such as the following: "The question that every soldier asks is who to trust, when a fellow soldier looks at you does he see an enemy/target or a comrade to die for?" (Interview with Mofokeng, 2005).

This topic has been researched before but it is the researcher's personal conviction that it needs more attention. Ordinary members of the SANDF have not discussed integration thoroughly and openly, especially the problems associated with it, probably for fear of reprisals. It is hoped that analysis and information gained through this research will help the SANDF to generate a healthy debate around these issues. By end of 1997, 3 770 former MK and APLA soldiers had opted for, or were forced into demobilisation. They were paid small sums of money that were to allow them to venture into and establish small businesses and self help projects. This group forms an important aspect of the integration in that most of the youth were demobilised purely or mainly for a lack of academic qualifications. They expressed disappointment and pointed out that when they were fighting the apartheid regime, they were good enough, but now that the country is free they are regarded as illiterate and not good enough to defend it (Shelton *et al* 2001:68-69).

According to JMCC decisions, demobilisation was to consist of three key elements: a once off gratuity; two week's counselling on personal issues, career prospects, social services and finances; and an opportunity to join the Service Corps for an eighteen-month training course on what was described as life skills and adult literacy programmes. There was no comprehensive counselling or any job placement offered to the former guerrillas on completion of Service Corps training (Shelton *et al*, 2001:68).

There is a school of thought, which maintains that demobilisation is a package that should not just be a gratuity, but should rather be a settling in package which

should include clothing, building materials, some initial counselling, agricultural tools and seeds, school fees for children, medical provision for a certain period of time and transport to the home community. This short term social integration was conspicuously lacking in the South African integration process. The weaning of the combatants from what they know best, the military, was not done (Cilliers, 1996:4-5).

It is advisable to develop militarily and academically defence force members, as military equipment and wars themselves are become sophisticated. It is also a fact that the country needs a lean, professional, credible and affordable force as stipulated in the White Paper for Defence (1996:7-22). The researcher has in this respect found the following statement by Williams (2001:10) very profound; “the major problems of demobilisation do not come back to haunt governments in the immediate aftermath of a conflict but, more often than not, in the following decades”. It would then be prudent for South Africa to try and avoid major problems of demobilisation in future by ensuring reasonable reintegration into the society of those that were demobilised.

It is also the intention of this paper to argue that integration is a human resource issue because it entails investment in human resource development. It will further argue that investment in human resource and human resources development are policy issues. Sustainable development will remain a pipe dream for as long as there is no stability and there cannot be stability unless there is security.

National security stems from sound policies that do not come back to haunt the nation decades later (Williams, 2001:10), but lead to peace, stability and prosperity. It is a reasonable assumption that South Africa would not be where it is had it not been for the successful integration of the statutory and non-statutory seven armies into a formidable South African National Defence. However, the nagging question is: will national interests be threatened in future by issues stemming from the very integration?

1.3 Purpose of the Research

The study will hopefully assist the SANDF to assess the process of integration, and draw lessons from it for the South African deployments currently in Africa, and for the assistance with integration it is providing in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If mistakes were made, then corrective measures where possible, can be devised as well as avoiding them in future deployments and or involvements continentally and globally. It may provide answers to lingering questions about racial killings, racial divisions and unequal or preferential treatment, perceived or real in the SANDF.

Since the SANDF is increasingly becoming involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is important to render an impartial advice that encompasses lessons learnt from the SANDF's experience and elsewhere in the world in the form of a research paper. This paper endeavours to explore weaknesses, failures and strengths of the policies that informed the integration processes of Zimbabwe, Namibia and in particular South Africa. It will also try to compare and contrast the circumstances under which integration and demobilisation took place in these various countries with the intention of contributing to policy inputs for the future. While it is obvious that different conditions and circumstances prevailed in these countries and that the political settings and agreements were different, there must be some commonalities in the process. It is crucial to examine these differences and commonalities and examine the challenges. The criteria used in each country to determine who the ex-combatant is and therefore eligible for integration and demobilisation is important. What do these countries have in common and what is the common will of these governments?

1.4 Selection of the Research Problem

Despite the fact that the South African integration of seven armed forces into one credible force has been fittingly described as a miracle, there are worrying factors in the SANDF corridors of power. The Tempe killings, the involvement of a former SADF officer in a coup plot and other incidents, are raising many questions that need answers. Is the South African integration a lasting one or will the bubble burst in the near future? Can South Africa be trusted with policing responsibility in the region and bring about stability as the programme of peacekeeping unfolds or will the region have to instead quell fires of discontent in South Africa?

Inadequate demobilisation packages raise the prospects of banditry or politically inspired violence by the ex-combatants, as was the case in Mozambique and Angola in 1993 to 1995, Dada (2006:2). In some cases there are different forms of social disruptions like protests, mass demonstrations and mutinies, as was evident in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia in 1994 to 1995 as clearly stated below. In South Africa, former guerrillas have also been associated with crime that is said to be committed with military precision though this allegation has never been substantiated with evidence.

1.5 Limitations of the Research

It is impossible to go beyond the already identified countries namely Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This is due to time constraints and limitation of resources at hand and the challenges of reaching informants from Namibia and Zimbabwe. It is also prudent to keep the research manageable. The study will rely substantially on written and available information as well as on interviews with the key and available personnel involved in the integration process in South Africa and where possible in some other countries that are also being studied. It is acknowledged that integration and demobilisation policies have created

animosity and generated a lot of anger especially in the Southern African countries being mentioned in the study.

CHAPTER 2

DEFNITION OF TERMS

2.1 Introduction

For the purpose of this research, in order to reach a common understanding some definitions of the terms used are explained below.

2.2 Integration

Integration is understood to mean the coming or bringing together of disparate or former enemies to form one force. This clearly means that the new force would compose of all elements of other forces. This is critical for the integration to succeed or to be acceptable. Integration is usually executed after there has been some cessation of hostilities and political negotiations and agreement between the warring factions of a given country. *Modus operandi* of the process would have been thrashed out and agreed to during the political negotiations. Divergence on issues of, for example political, military or religious nature would have been worked out and accommodated in the political settlement to guide the integration process. For instance in South Africa the integratees were to undergo some bridging training to bring them on par with the members of the SADF. This paper will later argue whether the SADF members integrated as per definition of the term or other forces were absorbed into the SADF. According to Motumi (2002:22) integration brings together ideologically, racially and religiously diverse components. Mills and Wood (1993:1) further argue that the integrated are not divorced from the communities they are drawn from but reflect them. There

seems to be agreement between these writers that integration in its totality does not only involve military structures but also a change in the entire society at large. The military act either as a catalyst, lead, reinforce or their actions are reflected in the society. The questions of ethnicity, racism and religious intolerance have to be addressed by integration (Motumi, 2000:22; Mills & Wood, 2005:1)

2.3 Demobilisation

Demobilisation may be preceded by cantonment in which ex-combatants are confined into certain areas/camps and are registered. Health care is normally provided or administered to them. Demobilisation can best be implemented in phases and demands commitment of government, ex-combatants and the defence force with a possible national demobilisation strategy. World Bank describes demobilisation as the process whereby armed forces of either a government/opposition or non-statutory force like guerrilla armies either downsize or disband completely. Success or failure of demobilisation is associated to some varying degree with the prevailing political situation in a given country (World Bank, 1996:13).

Demobilisation is a process by which ties binding the former combatants to their military command structure are severed and this is irrespective of whether the structure is formal or informal. This is also described as an initial step of reintegration of an ex-combatant into the society or into a legitimately agreed on armed force that is representative or recognised by the entire society it serves. Demobilisation is often sandwiched between the end of the conflict and integration phase. This phase is not only limited to disarmament and encampment but there may also be needs assessment, counselling, educational and skills training programmes (Westphal, 2002: 11).

According to Kingma and Sayers (1995:16) citing the Ugandan experience (1993-1995) as an example, demobilisation may be accompanied not only with

reorientation and counselling, but also with such issues as to how to open a bank account, projects that can generate cash and how to initiate them, environmental and legal issues. Ex-combatants may also be taught about family planning and HIV/Aids related issues. In Uganda the package was not only money, but also included payment of fees for school going children of ex-combatants for a period of one year. Food, household utensils, civilian clothes, building material, seeds or agricultural implements may form part of the package.

Demobilisation is also described as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at individual level, can be described as the process of releasing combatants from mobilised state. It is the weaning of soldiers from the military culture into the civilian way of life. This should include the assembly of ex-combatants to ensure their participation in the programme of demilitarisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) into the society. This is either to offer soldiers alternative viable means of income other than fighting or integration into the new defence force. This process usually includes the screening and skills audit of the ex-combatants as well as assessing their preferences in terms of jobs. According to Hitchcock (2004:37), they should at least spend three months in the assembly areas to ensure their confidence for reintegration into the society.

Motumi and Mckenzie (2002:2) quoting Bon International Center for Conversion (BICC) define demobilisation as the significant reduction of personnel employed by the armed forces and it is inclusive of civilian and paramilitary personnel. It may also incorporate the process of disbanding the opposition forces, sometimes after their integration into the (new) regular armed forces. Demobilisation is said to occur as a result of a number of reasons such as cessation of hostilities and reaching of a political agreement or development imperatives. They describe the process as being both physical demobilisation of a soldier from the military with some short-term assistance and a longer-term social integration process.

Demobilisation is not possible when there is no complete cessation of hostilities either through a political settlement that is monitored or outright victory of one of the contending parties. It is also possible if one of the warring factions realises that it is no longer possible to pursue political goals or objectives by use of military means. Demobilisation can be most effective if it is part of the broader peace agreement or political settlement. The agreement should institutionalise a framework for the execution of the demobilisation exercise. For the process to be effective it usually requires the presence of a credible central authority, which would guarantee the safety of those disarmed individuals. Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration form a continuum of phases and their success is interdependent as the various phases are closely related. Where possible it is advisable to bring all warring factions into a unified national defence prior to demobilisation. This has a psychological effect on the soldiers to be demobilised, as it is believed to give them a sense of being identified with victors. Some demobilised members especially if they are from the defeated armed formation may suffer humiliation from the communities when they return. This is said to also contribute to stability of the country (Kingma and Sayers, 1995: 13-15).

2.4 Demilitarisation

This can be described as a situation or process when the state moves away from the situation of military dominated society. This is said to be a long term activity and activities like demobilisation or downsizing, determine a shift in fiscal spending towards programmes that assist the country realise sustainable development. This may include or may be as a result of more emphasis in national education, health, poverty alleviation, reduction of unemployment and better service delivery in general. Also the question of civil military control, accountability and professionalisation of the defence force may influence the decision (Westphal, 2000:12).

Disarming the warring factions in a conflict can be the first and most symbolic step in the transformation from a military to a civilian life and it usually precedes the demobilisation process. There have been a number of failures, with Mozambique during United Nations Operation for Mozambique (UNOMOZ) as one example, where it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of small arms are still available and are said to be often bartered for goods or sold for furtherance of criminal or political conflict in South Africa (Cilliers, 1996:5).

Disarmament as earlier alluded to precedes demobilisation and, therefore, enhances the focus for governments and African governments in particular on human development. It tends to allow more funds that would otherwise be used to maintain security for development, and actually increases stability and security. It contributes to the national stability and security policy which are considered the so-called “peace dividends”. It is crucial that appropriate methods and procedures are worked out prior to the commencement of the actual process. Transparency is vital to successful disarmament (BICC, 2000:4-5; Kingman and Sayers, 1995: 17).

Disarmament is associated with activities that facilitate disbanding of military fighters and easing their transition back to active civilian or socio-economic life. It refers to any programme that is meant to disarm in general and in particular systematic disarming of individual soldiers. In intrastate conflicts this may include irregular forces and all armed formations to the conflict. Disarmament does not only occur in conflict situations but, also when a state down-sizes or right-sizes its armed forces due to a number of reasons like economic imperatives dictating prioritisation of scarce resources for socio-economic development. It varies from country to country and may include handing over of weapons, their storage and subsequent destruction and physical relocation of ex-combatants from assembly areas to other areas of choice and reintegration into the society (Alusala and Thusi, 2004:18-19).

Sometimes disarmament may not come as, a result of agreement of the warring parties or victory of one of the parties or factions involved in a conflict. This is called a coercive disarmament. In the case of Somalia, in 1993 the United Nations took a decision that coercive disarmament was the only viable solution to bring peace. Unfortunately this was not to be, and the process failed dismally (Alusala and Thusi, 2004:18-19).

2.5 Reintegration

This is the process whereby ex-combatants are, reintegrated into the society. Normally the society would first have to be prepared to accept the combatants. Combatants are sometimes re-skilled to fit into the society and not be an economic burden for their survival and acceptance by their various communities. This is a long-term process and normally includes financial assistance, farming and provision of other implements for various trades. Training and education in various portable skills, job placements, services and health may also be part of reintegration if it is to succeed. This is sometimes considered as a sixth phase of demobilisation (Kingma, 2000:27).

This is the process that involves not only ex-combatants but also their family units and can be divided into three parts. Social reintegration is the process through which an ex-combatant and his or her family not only feel accepted by the community but also part and parcel of them. This process therefore needs careful planning as it involves not only the ex-combatant and his or her family but also the community. There is political reintegration whereby the ex-combatant and his or her family become part of the decision-making stratum. Economic reintegration refers to a situation wherein the ex-combatant household builds up its livelihood through production or some other type of gainful employment. It is important to consider and positively prepare not only the integratees but also the community attitudes before reintegration as they (Some members of the

community) may envy and dislike the special support granted to ex-combatants and their families (Kingma, 2000:28).

It is clear that social reintegration of former combatants is an integral part of post-conflict, peace-making and peace-building exercise, and that it is long term. Demobilisation; disarmament and integration of ex-combatants either to the defence force, the police or to the society have a direct link to stability, security and development. These processes are actually a *sine qua non* to development (Cilliers, 1996:4).

Motumi (2000: 22) defines social reintegration as the process of assisting ex-combatants transition from military to civilian life. This process may include investment in the economy; social infrastructure, and education, training and development of ex-combatants. This would be to prepare and assist them to fit socially and economically into the civilian life and to prevent destitution that may lead to crime.

Reintegration process can be defined as a process in which ex-combatants find their livelihood outside the military. This can be extremely hard in countries and situations where unemployment is rife. Land for agricultural use may also not be readily available for those wishing to venture into agriculture. Structural adjustment policies may also not do any favours to the demobilised individuals. Among other measures already mentioned above is the ability of ex-combatants to access credit facilities in order to finance envisaged programmes and projects (Kingma and Sayers, 1995:19-20).

It is common for countries to demilitarise the society after a war, as weapons that a government cannot control can be detrimental to its policies and programmes aimed at uplifting the economic being of the inhabitants. That the whole process of integration, demobilisation, disarmament or demilitarisation and reintegration

needs proper planning cannot be overemphasised, for this is a very sensitive issue and the agreements are usually fragile. Any feeling of rejection or being undermined by either party can lead to a resumption of the war. Good and visionary leadership that is totally committed to change is essential during this period. Any formal disbanding of military formations, the process of individuals moving from a mobilised state to a demobilised state has to be fast and, efficiently executed if the process of integration is to succeed.

2.6 Ex-combatants

The term ex-combatant is mainly associated with freedom fighters or veterans of the liberation struggle and excludes all other former soldiers. In the South African context an ex-combatant is inclusive of those who were involved in quasi-military structures such as internally trained, self defence units and self-protection units or right-wing paramilitary units. The inability to demarcate the battlefield in South Africa in particular and in any given “people’s war” situation is problematic. This is precisely because it becomes difficult to differentiate between civilians and combatants. Military trained and armed civilians may blur the distinction between a civilian and a combatant (Gear, 20002: 10).

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

Empirical evidence has demonstrated that integration can be conducted according to concrete conditions prevailing in that particular country at the time of integration. It is necessary to conduct integration swiftly and in a manner that is perceived to be fair by those affected. Ex-combatants can pose a security threat in a country. As instruments of war, the likelihood of resorting to what they know best is always there, should they be disgruntled.

3.2 Background to Integration Process

It is the intention of this research to argue that while the process of integration differs from country to country there are similarities and that the overall intention is to make sure that the process is fair and seen by the concerned parties to be fair. If there is discontent among the parties concerned and the process is perhaps, seen as favouring one of the parties at the expense of others that can cause problems later. As it is often said, streams today can be rivers tomorrow; policies guiding the process should therefore be guarded against disgruntlement that can later threaten national interests. On attainment of independence and freedom, governments have a responsibility to improve the social and economic well being of their populace while making sure that the environment will be able to serve generations to come. The reconciliation programme and economic

reconstruction should therefore be the national will of the people without any internal threat that can reverse the gains of freedom.

Africa as a continent has neither shortage of intrastate wars nor peace accords, but such peace accords have not always been honoured. Some political analysts including academics and journalists, often either predict that the accord is not worth the paper it is written on or that the ink may not dry before there is an eruption of fighting between the warring factions. Angola is the typical case where there have been a number of attempts at peace in 1975 at independence, in 1991-92, the Lusaka Agreement in 1994, and again peace was in jeopardy in 1997 Kingma and Sayers, (1995: 41). In most cases leaders tend not to negotiate in good faith but to accede to pressure of main political and/or military backers. In some instances they accede to economic sanctions or some form of political pressure. The lack of political will as in the Angolan case can be problematic.

3.3 Namibia Integration

After 23 years of armed conflict by Namibians against South African occupation and oppression; urged by their desire to take their rightful place among the nations of the world, a negotiated peace settlement was reached in 1988 in terms of United Nation's (UN) Resolution 435 of 1978. This came about because of the willingness of the parties' concerned and international involvement. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was not only a peacekeeping mission but also assumed numerous advisory and administrative tasks in respect of the country. The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), led the war on behalf of the Namibian people. At independence the Namibian Government had no targeted programmes designed for reintegration of demobilised ex-PLAN

fighters into the society. It took frequent demonstrations from angry PLAN fighters for the government to have a reintegration policy in place. This policy for reintegration lacked in content and criteria for participation and measurable goals for success or failure (McMullin, 2005:1-2).

PLAN was confined to some camps in Angola as well as inside Namibia where it was disarmed. Members were then integrated with the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). What is important is that two criteria were used to determine ranks of the PLAN members and these were previous appointments in PLAN and level of training received abroad. The British Military Advisory Technical Training Team (BMATT) and UNTAG were responsible for the integration process of soldiers in Namibia and both parties accepted them as neutral enough for the Namibian Defence Force to be entrusted with the important job of securing the nation and its borders (Interview with Amupolo, 2005).

Most members of PLAN were integrated and some absorbed into the ministries of the new government. There are those that could not be integrated due to factors such as disabilities sustained mainly during the struggle, age, being non-members of PLAN or those who received only basic training from PLAN and had spent most of their years in exile outside the military environment. For example those who had worked at SWAPO offices as drivers or cleaners (Interview with Amupolo, 2005).

Soon after integrating the armed formations into the Namibian Defence Force, the Namibian Government was faced with the dilemma of having tens of thousands of ex-combatants who could not be integrate into the new Namibian Defence Force and were thus 'excess labour' that did not have sellable skills. Moreover the small Namibian industry was labour saturated. The most suitable solution was to train these people and give them portable skills that they could use either for, accessing employment or self-employment. These ideas

developed into a concept of a Development Brigade to provide the necessary skills to ex-combatants. The Development Brigade was initially put under the Ministry of Lands, Resettlements and Rehabilitation. The ministry funded the brigade but with the time this proved too much for the Ministry and managerial skills were lacking in the Brigade (Shikangalah, 1996: 70).

The demand was so high that the Brigade had to be involved in some projects for generating funds to augment the budget allocation from the government. This created problems, because the Brigade could not be involved in purely commercial activity as a government entity. These blockages were resolved by converting the Development Brigade into a parastatal organisation. This was, achieved through Act 32 of 1992 (Interview with Amupolo, 2005).

The Act 32 of 1992 allowed the Development Brigade to trade as a business or parastatal and generate profit. This is good as the profit can, be used to generate more jobs and develop more skills. In essence, the brigade will be able to absorb more people with time and good managerial skills. This is one solution that South Africa could perhaps learn from Namibia in its effort to create employment for its ex-combatants and mould them into a viable workforce that contributes meaningfully to the economy.

The Brigade was involved in a number of projects like water drilling, brick making, poultry farming and construction of houses. These projects like any business entity needed managerial skills and these were apparently in short supply in the country. (Shikangalah, 1996: 70-71). This can be attributed to a lack of proper planning and vision on the part of the government. There were no clear-cut goals when the idea was hatched, nor were evaluation and monitoring mechanism developed for continuous improvement.

According to Batchelor and Kingma (2004:5) the official termination of conflict in the Southern African countries, including Namibia. brought high expectations of

good life but this was not to be. The ex-combatants expected to live sustainable livelihoods after independence as fruits of freedom and sacrifice. The concentration of effort of these governments perhaps understandably was on policies to stabilise and readjust the economy. The tightened macro-economic policies led to fewer jobs in the public sector and this led to rationalisation in order to trim the bloated public sector.

Motumi (2000:15) also describes the situation as the dilemma of the new governments, who are suddenly confronted with social and economic realities and obligations. The realisation that the economic cake has to be divided wisely among the national demands, social and economic responsibilities often leads to frustrations on the part of the ex-combatants. On the other hand particularly in Africa governments have to contend with weaker economies and especially given the transition period. As a result, resources allocated for demobilisation and reintegration into the society in the Southern African States have been inadequate.

In Namibia the ex-combatants were paid a nominal once-off gratuity of R1 400 in 1991, with the anticipation that this gratuity would be complemented by the succeeding two-year (1991-1992) Development Brigade that later became Development Brigade Corporation's Training Programmes. These programmes were designed to impart various portable skills sufficient to sustain the ex-combatants. Access to the land was one of the problems faced by the ex-combatants who were not treated as a specific preferential target group under the national land reform programme (Dzinesa, 2006:5).

The Namibian reintegration programme partly failed and this presented a potential threat to stability and national security. In mid-1990's there were public disruptions and demonstrations by the disenchanted ex-combatants. According to Amupolo (2005) this came about when the ex-combatants of Namibia heard that their counterparts in South Africa were given demobilisation packages. This

demonstrated clearly to the government that the ex-combatants were organised and that they still relied on their command structures of the liberation struggle period and this, understandably, was a source of worry for the Namibian government. As a result of these demonstrations, 900 ex-combatants were absorbed into the public service under a programme called Peace Project that was aimed at affirmative job placements.

The Namibian integration of its ex-combatants was in contrast to the South African experience in that all former combatants were first demobilised and an equal number from both sides integrated. The contending forces were PLAN and SWATF and the criteria for integration have already been discussed above. In many ways this was seen to be fair by all parties concerned for they were put on an equal footing and the UN was the neutral force or at least was seen as such to the satisfaction of all concerned (Motumi, 2000:44 and Interview with Amupolo, 2005).

The following table by Motumi (2000:46) illustrates the breakdown of numbers as regards Namibian integration, demobilisation and benefits granted.

Armed Force	Composition in Numbers	Integrated into NDF	Demobilised	Nature of demob benefits
PLAN	26 000	7 500	18 500	Cash; building; training through Development Brigade
SWATF	23 500	7 500	16 000	pensions
TOTAL	49 500	15 000	34 500	

Table1: Illustration of Namibian integration, demobilisation and benefits (Source: Motumi 2000: 46).

3.4 Zimbabwe Integration

All parties involved in the war in Zimbabwe signed the Lancaster House agreement on 21 December 1979. The Patriotic Front Forces had seven days within which to move to predetermined assembly areas in the then Rhodesia up to until 4 January 1980. Elections were set for 27, 28 and 29 February 1980. The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), comprising 1,548 troops predominantly from Britain and included small numbers of Australians, New Zealanders, Kenyans, Canadians and Fijians had to plan and monitor the encampment of 22, 000 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) combatants. ZANU Forces were the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU's were Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The planning was so poor that sheltering and feeding the combatants was completely forgotten until the necessity to shelter and feed them arose. What to do with the encamped combatants after the elections was also not thought of earlier on (Westphal, 2002: 46).

Only ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) were expected to integrate into the new Zimbabwean Defence Force, other forces like Bishop Muzorewa's Auxiliary Forces were not to be integrated as per Lancaster House Agreements. The RSF, as the only conventional force in Zimbabwe, was used as a yardstick in terms of standardisation of training, which was conducted by the British. The ex-combatants had no experience of conventional training and their training was fragmented as per countries that rendered support to ZIPRA and ZANLA (Interview with Dzhiwema, 2005).

One of the biggest challenges facing Zimbabwe was that there were four different armies, though Muzorewa's Auxiliary Forces were controlled by RSF. ZIPRA had South African MK members amongst them in assembly areas and ZANLA had the backing of about 500 Regular FRELIMO troops and an unspecified number of Tanzanians. Both ZIPRA and ZANLA had about a third of their forces outside the assembly areas poised for any eventuality (Rupiya, 1995:1).

The RSF was supported by a sizeable number of Mozambique National Resistance Movement at Odzi, some mercenaries of a company strength and South African Forces that operated independently or were integrated as volunteers into the RSF. This had the hallmarks and a possibility of erupting into a civil war and was a concern for all. Moreover it seemed as if every contesting party expected to win the elections. The visible military deployment of ZANLA forces around the Assembly areas and throughout the country somehow acted as a deterrent to any conceived civil war (Rupiya, 1995:1).

While the RSF was not physically integrated, as soon as the process was over they were to be integrated into the new four brigades formed by ZIPRA and ZANLA forces. The High Command members of both ex-combatant groups were not physically subjected to integration process but were automatically integrated into the new Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) lock stock and barrel. CMF had other functions:

- The maintenance of contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces (RSF).
- Monitoring agreed border crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with the agreed conditionalities.

- Maintaining liaison functions in Zambia and Mozambique and they were deployed throughout Zimbabwe where there were encampments of forces (Interview with Dzhiwema, 2005.

Below follows a table by Motumi (2000:35), which illustrates the breakdown of numbers as regards Zimbabwe's integration, demobilisation and benefits.

Armed force	Total number of force	Number integrated into ZNA	Numbers demobilised	Nature of demobilisation Benefits
RSF	23 000	15 500	None	State Pensions
ZIPRA	23 005	9 750	13 255	Cash (Z\$185X 24months; education and training; land co-ops; special state pensions (since 1998
ZANLA	27 750	9 750	18 000	Cash (Z\$185X 24months;education and training; land co-ops; special state pensions (since 1998
TOTAL	73 755	35 000	31 225	

Table2: Zimbabwe's integration, demobilisation and benefits
(Source: Motumi, 2000: 35)

A cabinet level committee was established for demobilisation and reintegration in April 1980 by the new Zimbabwean government after the departure of CMF. It was under the chairmanship of the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. A Demobilisation Directorate was also established to administer both demobilisation and reintegration. The Ministry of Education was to oversee formal education programmes for reintegration (Nyambuya, 1996: 40).

The demobilisation process was initially chaotic, no skills audit was done nor were the goals of those who were to be demobilised sourced. The main aim of the programme was to defuse political tension in the country and not to cater for the needs of the individuals. Lancaster House had prescribed that RSF members were to be given pensions on demobilisation as they had contributed to it, and nothing for Patriotic Front Forces (PF Forces) as they had contributed nothing. The government nonetheless did pay PF Forces, calculated on length of years of service and age (Interview with Dzhiwema, 2005).

One of the conditions agreed to at Lancaster House was that socio-economic structures were to remain intact for at least ten years. This left the new ZANU (PF) government with little room to manoeuvre with regard to funding the integration of the various armed factions into one national defence force. Moreover, state coffers were depleted and this was a stumbling block in their endeavour to embark on national reconstruction and resettlement. Fragmented security forces can be a threat to national security, worse still if they have been fighting each other not so long ago, and especially when they become disgruntled (Rupiye, 1995:2-3).

This condition was grossly unfair to the government that was basically put in power by the very forces it was expected not to economically compensate. This would have caused more serious problems for Zimbabwe. This can be interpreted to demonstrate the fact that Britain never really had the Zimbabwean

interests at heart, but that it wanted to absolve itself of any responsibility towards Zimbabwe as soon as possible. Any problems that would crop up would be the new government's problems. The Lancaster House Agreement made no provision for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-Zimbabwean combatants, but for the RSF to receive their pensions on demobilisation. To demobilise RSF members would ruin Zimbabwe economically and, it was costly even to demobilise ex-combatants of ZANLA and ZIPRA despite their non-eligibility to pensions (Rupiya, 1995:2-3).

According to Nyambuya (1996:39-40), there were some problems that were encountered during integration these included cases of ill-discipline within the assembly areas that at times degenerated to mutinous acts. Forces in the assembly areas became impatient. The forces in the assembly areas were not briefed about progress and as a result relied on rumours that were most of the time counter productive. This could be attributed to lack of adequate and efficient lines of communication. The Joint High Command (JHC) soon realised the importance of adequate and efficient lines of communication to quell perceptions and rumours. The JHC's assistance in the task of integration by the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) at the request of Zimbabwean Government was quite unique.

Lieutenant General Peter Walls, who was the former commander of RSF and the first Commander of JHC, was tasked with overseeing the integration process. It was soon realised that he was not serious about integration and Minister Emerson Munangagwa the then Minister of State Security took over as the Chairman of JHC with a nine-person committee chaired by the Minister of Public Works. This committee was established to supervise and accelerate integration of the forces (Rupiya, 1995:5).

The Zimbabwean Government was concerned with the wholesale transformation of the Zimbabwean society. Dzhiwema (interview :2005) puts it : "The situation of

former combatants was somehow put at the bottom of the list as a not so important issue". This was a serious oversight which came back to haunt the government several times. Some ex-combatants opted for the Z\$556 lump sum and as soon as they were had spent it all they showed up for the monthly grants. This demonstrated that the handouts or payments were not a lasting solution. The amount mentioned above was granted only to those ex-combatants who preferred a lump sum to the monthly grant of Z\$185

The government introduced Operation Seed (Soldiers Employed in Economic Development) . This programme was more related to agriculture and somehow, this turned out to be the undoing, for ex-combatants interpreted their being involved in agriculture as by implication, meaning they were not suitably qualified for the new defence force. This programme is said to have failed due to lack of resources. As part of reintegration efforts, seven schools with a capacity of 2,000 students were set up for ex-combatants. The government equipped the schools and about 5,700 ex-combatants went to the schools for secondary or university level courses. "The question of education for ordinary soldiers never arose and some of them could hardly read or write but were integrated into the new Zimbabwean Defence Force" Dzhiwema (2005). NGOs also assisted in various forms and, as a result, an NGO called Zimbabwe Project funded 100 cooperatives that employed ex-combatants. About 40 % of these cooperatives failed due to poor management, lack of business and supply chain problems (Westphal,2002:55).

This is backed by Rupiya (2005:10) who says "opportunities were presented to members of the armed forces to attend various educational and vocational courses in the country's educational institutions with full pay". On average, the Army is said to have had over 50 students enrolled in different faculties at local and international universities. This policy on the development of human capital is applaudable, in that it helped members of the armed forces to stand a better chance of being promoted. The other possibility and likelihood was for them to

get better offers from the industry as the policy had prepared them for the world of industry. An important aspect in this regard is that human capital development leads to capacity, especially if the skilling is as a result of a skills-audit and is focussed. The nation is likely to benefit from such human capital investments.

Some members of the General staff of the two liberation movements and some of other commanders had held high positions in exile but had limited educational qualifications. This was a challenge during integration as some of these commanders received low ranks compared to those they had commanded in exile. Forming the 5th Brigade and Presidential Guards, which absorbed these commanders at appropriate ranks, solved this problem (Interview with Dziwema, 2005).

The exodus of the white members of RSF to South Africa led to a number of administrative problems for the former guerrillas. The failure of the Lancaster House Agreement either deliberately or inadvertently, to cater for provision of training in the administration of units became costly to the new government. The cheating by guerrillas, with some claiming double allowances in exploitation of the chaotic situation, also added to the confusion. The self-cheating by members of the public who assembled in the camps for pay when they were not ex-combatants also compounded the problem (Rupiya, 2005:6-10)

The sharp and antagonistic political differences between ZANU and ZAPU led to the fighting outside a camp on 30 October 1980 by ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Commanders from both sides quelled this incident down. Fierce fighting at Entumbane followed this incident and elements of RSF Army and Air Force were assigned to subdue the fighting. The Minister of Defence closed Bulawayo on 14 February 1981 as a result of this event. Some arms caches were discovered and seized on properties and farms owned by ZAPU. This resulted in the arrest of ZIPRA Joint High Command and Nkomo the leader of ZAPU was expelled from the government and he fled temporarily to London. ZIPRA members deserted with their weapons after which the scale of banditry increased in the country. The

ZANU Government tried to appease ZIPRA by promoting some of their officers to no avail (Rupiya, 1995:7-8).

The Fifth Brigade came about as a result of a donation of over Z\$ 12 million dollars worth of arms and equipment from North Korea accompanied by 106 military instructors to train local Zimbabwean officers in their use and maintenance for a period of four to eight months. Unfortunately this occurred during the period of heightened tensions between the two liberation movements and as a result only ZANLA forces were trained. Early in 1982 President Mugabe unleashed the Fifth Brigade against the ZIPRA forces in Matebeleland. An estimated 10,000 civilians lost their lives and thousands more were harmed by the brigade until the signing of the Unity Accord by ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 (Dzinesa, 2006:2).

The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was established in 1987, after the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU. It offered them a platform from which to launch their demands. The collapse of the cooperative projects initiated at reintegration and inability of the Zimbabwean economy to absorb the demobilised, led to unemployment and destitution. This cascaded to a groundswell of discontent. The suspension of the War Victims Compensation Fund established in 1980 by the government to cater for all war-injured persons compounded the problem. The fund was suspended in order to stop further abuse by its administrators by President Mugabe, who appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to report on its administration. This led to mass demonstrations by the ZNLWVA in 1997. The government reacted by implementing the second policy on demobilisation and reintegration and paid the 52,000 war veterans, unbudgeted gratuities and lifetime pensions with an initial outlay of Z\$4.5 billion (Dzinesa, 2006:2).

The Zimbabwean case is a classical case of lack of planning with the hope that the problem would disappear. It is a typical lack of pro-action but instead reaction

to ex-combatants demands. It is important for governments especially in Africa and the region to understand that it is important to be proactive and avoid having to accede to demands of ex-combatants. If governments accede to some demands this may be seen as victory by ex-combatants and nothing stops them from making more demands reasonable or unreasonable. The government should have a clear policy supported and owned by ex-combatants to deal with their reintegration and it has to be a project with a timescale. Ex-combatants have to be involved in the strategic planning and running of their day-to-day affairs with proper training and necessary support.

The land invasions in Zimbabwe began months before June 2000 elections and according to Dzhiwema (2005), the question of land invasion in Zimbabwe was started by former combatants who occupied farms by force and chased the white owners away. At first the Zimbabwe Government forcefully removed them from the farms until they mobilised a chief in Marondera and his entire village to occupy the white farms. This is corroborated by Marisa (Interview: 2006) whose view is that the government did not act against ex-combatants, because, the invasions happened just before the elections. The government would have lost support and that would instead popularise ex-combatants and that was too high a political price to pay. Land invasion in the Zimbabwean context can be described, as the hostile take over and occupation of commercial farms, from white farmers by ex-combatants or blacks.

There is a different view by Zabalaza Agreement Magazine (2002), which claims that it was actually orchestrated by President Mugabe incidentally a patron of ZNLWVA, in order to win war veteran's support for the elections. It claims that a wealthy Chief of the Air Force, Perence Shiri a North Korean trained former commander of the Fifth Brigade and who is a cousin of President Mugabe was behind the invasions. He had been tasked by the President to organise the ZNLWVA under Hitler Hunzvi to occupy 1, 600 farms. It claims that of the 7,000

plus invaders 1, 500 were former Fifth Brigade members and the Central Intelligence Organisation of Zimbabwe.

Lowe (2002:1) seems to be in agreement with the fact that some of the so-called war veterans are actually supporters of ZANU-PF and that war veterans who support the opposition do not benefit from the land redistribution programme. All ex-combatants should be the main beneficiaries of the programme. There is also the question of women being marginalized as they are not recognised as the ex-combatants worth benefiting from the programme. He does not question the need for redistribution of land in Zimbabwe but its implementation, which he says benefits mostly ZANU-PF leadership and army officials.

Chirambo and McCullum (2000:1-2) quoting Professor Moyo the director of the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS), who is one of the leading experts on land reform, maintain that land redistribution is generally violent by nature as has been the case in Asia, India and Latin America. They hold that blame should not be apportioned only to ZANU-PF or war veterans but to all stakeholders, including the farmers themselves who have refused to cooperate with the government on willing buyer-seller model. They allude to the fact that while invasions and violence cannot be condoned, they are indicative of the urgency of the land question.

CONCLUSION

It is explicit that policies that inadequately address the question of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants tend to lead to unemployment, crime, violence and misery. Zimbabwe is a typical case in question; the land invasion practise has not changed the welfare of the majority of the people for the better but for the worse. It is irrelevant whether ZANU-PF is using war veterans for its leadership gains or not, but rather that the demobilisation and reintegration policy has not adequately addressed the needs of the war veterans. Liberation wars are

mainly about the dispossession and redistribution of the land and are supposed to address the injustices of colonialism and or settler colonialism. When government policies fail the war veterans they create an environment, which renders them (the veterans) vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous politicians for their own selfish gains. Such policies usually meet with all forms of resistance by the ex-combatants who are generally left with no choice but to act. Both Namibia and Zimbabwe did not come up with comprehensive demobilisation policies despite the involvement of Non-Government Organisation (NGOs) immediately after independence. The involvement of all stakeholders is meaningless if they are not partners in the solutions and formulation of sound policies to address the needs of the demobilised. Market assessment and profiling of the needs of ex-combatants is crucial, as Kingsma (2000: 26-34) has alluded to.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The background and literature survey clearly demonstrate the undeniable need for coherent policy intervention strategies in the planning and execution of integration. Analysing the reasons behind the demonstrations that took place in Namibia and Zimbabwe, it is crystal clear that South Africa may face similar challenges. Although the integration process is over, it is the legacies of integration that have practical significance. The lack of proper benchmarking as well as demobilisation and rationalisation or rightsizing due to budgetary constraints and ambiguous policies are likely to come back to haunt South Africa. It is the intention of this research therefore to make a comparative analysis of the processes in the countries under study that will serve as the basis for policy recommendations.

4.2 Research Aims

This study intends to determine the failure or success of the integration process in South Africa by comparing with the above-mentioned neighbouring countries . It also aims at identifying possible best practices in integration and demobilisation of armed forces, so as to be able to benefit other countries, particularly fellow African countries, that may have to undergo the process of integration, demobilisation and rationalisation. It will also point out shortcomings, if any, in the execution of the processes in the countries in question. The main purpose of the exercise will be to demonstrate how South Africa has committed similar mistakes

to the countries in question. These are mistakes that could have been avoided and that have been common in all these countries. The similarities and contrasts in the processes in these countries will also form the basis for argument and to draw lessons learnt from the experiences.

4.3 Research Questions

The research questions will be explored in this study:

- 4.3.1 To study and analyse the integration process in South Africa with reference to the experience in other two countries and draw some lessons for future usage.
- 4.3.2 To establish the extent to which, sound policy framework, planning and preparations were put in place. To also determine whether the South African process of integration has been an appropriate solution.
- 4.3.3 To explore best practises, given the experience of these countries that can equip and inform policy practitioners in government and other relevant institutions.

4.4 Research Methodology

The study has used mainly a qualitative method of research that is said to always attempt to study human action from the insider's perspective. The goal of the research is describing and understanding instead of explanation and prediction of human behaviour. This implies trying to understand issues from the viewpoint of the interviewees. This includes observational methods such as structured and unstructured interviews (Babbie and Mouton, 2002:499-502).

Methodology can be understood to mean the philosophy of the research process and this includes assumptions and values that will serve as a rationale for the research as well as standards and criteria for reaching conclusions. According to Leedy (1997:25-30), methodology not only controls data, but also dictates the acquisition of the data, arrangement in a logical relationship, and a means of refining raw data. Some statistics have, also been used to strengthen the argument. Structured questions were, used for interviews (attached as appendix B). The qualitative method was used to provide an understanding of the individual subjective action and social interactions, as well as the value of the integration process. The method allowed scope for interpretation of social processes as well as adaptation by the researcher. The data collected was structured accordingly to assist the researcher to come up with a crucial and an objective product. The processes of integration in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe were, examined comparatively with the aim of unearthing issues that are common and those that could have, either been avoided or done better. As stated above the study is intended, to contribute to an informed policy development. A total number of 20 people were interviewed as primary sources of information. Some of them were involved in the integration process and two of them had been demobilised. These people were chosen for their direct experiences in the process.

4.5 Data Collection

Information was acquired from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources in this instance means direct sources like interviews. These were conducted with leading former members of the different forces, people from different backgrounds who were one way or the other involved in the process. Two Colonels from Zimbabwe and Namibia Defence Forces who were directly involved in the process were interviewed. The experiences of the interviewees in the integration and demobilisation processes were examined. Others had either undergone the process or had also commanded forces that formed part of

integration. Some were command cadres of the various integratees and all of them are either in the middle or top management. Some of them have some expertise in the integration process, either, through research and policy analysis, direct involvement or work experience. It should also be noted that there might be a number of other people who have made contribution to the process but whose information, for various reasons could unfortunately not be tapped.

The secondary sources comprise the literature of all types on the subject. Some papers delivered by former SADF members were also used. It was felt necessary to interrogate Zimbabwe and Namibia processes for comparative reasons. Various publications on integration in general and on South African integration in particular have been gleaned for useful information and organisations like the Institute for Security Studies and Safer Africa have been used to acquire publications and articles on the subject. A tape recorder was used in most interviews and these were later transcribed and analysed for common themes and issues, as well as differences.

4.6 Data Analysis

The problem solving methods of analysis were used by formulating problems as part of a search for solutions. Although questions were structured, same questions were asked differently to different people to establish validity. In asking various relevant questions, problems that had initially appeared insoluble were reformulated and subsequently solutions became clear. Problems facing the integrated and demobilised personnel in South Africa were analysed from socio-economic and political point of view while, while making some comparisons with other similar countries in the region. The existing theories were therefore used as a point of departure for analysis. Sources of data were identified and classified as direct and indirect. Interviews on tape were played over and over again to identify slight and fundamental trends, similarities, ambiguities and disagreements, amongst the interviewed. Conclusions were then drawn based on the

researcher's understanding, interpretation and analysis of available data. Research questions were kept in mind throughout the analysis. A detailed account of methods and procedures used was kept and re-examined to try and find out whether there was a better way of collecting data. Academic friends and colleagues were asked to ascertain if the goal of the research was achieved and to judge the validity of the intended aim with the information available. The research has made an attempt to detach himself from the situation so as to enhance objectivity of the study. Questions were constantly asked about the relevance of certain information.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH RESULTS: INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

5.1 Introduction

Empirical evidence and literature have explicitly and implicitly demonstrated that integration, if it is to succeed whether in Europe, Asia or Africa needs proper planning, preparations and execution (Williams 2002:25; Dzinesa 2006:7). All stakeholders should understand and agree on the process and it has to be executed with some urgency and speed. It is also clear that all parties concerned should understand that there is no alternative or plan “B”. There is no chance of resorting to armed struggle should the process fail. Every effort should not be spared to make it a success. It is prudent and imperative to avoid delays in the assembly areas and that ex-combatants should resume bridging training as soon as possible, and if possible a neutral force should conduct the training.

The White Paper on Defence is very clear on what type of defence force South Africa should have. According to this document the SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory, institutionalised culture as a constitutional imperative. It is important to note that this new democratic and progressive culture has to be institutionalised and applied evenly and equally to all groups. The composition of the SANDF should reflect the composition of South African demographics. It (SANDF) should respect the right and dignity of its members. This should be within the constraints of military discipline and culture (Ministry of Defence, 1996: 21-25).

Defence policy is a component of policy hierarchy and not an objective itself. It is the view of the author that Defence policy serves national, foreign and security policy and not the other way around. It should reflect the values of the society. For an example from looking at the defence force it should be possible to analyse

whether the society is totalitarian or democratic. The diversity of a nation should also be reflected in its defence force. Evidence from literature advocates inclusive policy and a much more broader approach in these issues that affect national security. Unless it is not foreseen, it is always advisable to prevent dissatisfaction, and feeling of hopelessness that can spark mutiny and sometimes, violent confrontation. The core of any successful integration is transparency; buy in by all stakeholders, fairness and consultation.

The South African history and SADF in particular is unfortunately one of divisions along ethnic and racial lines, hence the Bantustan armies, separate ethnic battalions, Indian and Coloured units. These divisions that have been encouraged over decades cannot be expected to disappear overnight. This is the reason why some people saw integration of the forces in South Africa as the most controversial, for they were wondering at the form integration would take and the end result or force the country would decide to have (Mills and Wood, 1993:1-7).

5.2 The Process

In November 1993 a Transitional Executive Authority was established by all political parties concerned in the Council for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) including the PAC. As stated earlier on, within the network of sub-councils, a Sub-Council on Defence (SCD) was established, to oversee defence and all different military formation's activities. APLA was at this stage not party to this arrangement, but was in a way bound by this agreement by virtue of PAC being a member and signatory to the TEC. Both SADF and MK were worried about APLA on the left and military formations on the right (Frankel, 1998: 17).

The planning and staff responsibility for the management of the pre-integration planning process was delegated to the JMCC under the authority of SCD. JMCC was responsible for the strategic planning of the integration process to the last

detail. This organ or body was co-chaired by General George Meiring, Chief of SADF and General Sphiwe Nyanda MK Chief of Staff. A number of work-groups were established to expedite the planning process like logistics and personnel. Personnel for the JMCC and also for the work groups was drawn from SADF, MK and Bantustan armies that had in terms of Section 224 (2) of the Interim Constitution (1993) submitted their certified personnel registers before midnight of 26 April 1994. All these forces were automatically members of the new SANDF. APLA had unwittingly excluded itself from the process (Williams, 2002:19; Mortimer, 1995:1).

APLA's self exclusion worked against it in that they were not party to the decisions that were to later bind them. Had they been involved in the process from the start, they would have taken a number of common positions with MK and this would have strengthened the liberation movements position. They would have been a natural ally of MK because they had a lot in common as former freedom fighters.

It is worth mentioning that the mandate of SADF with regard to their participation was to try and keep their structures, doctrine, training and organisational culture intact. To this end the SADF succeeded mainly because MK lacked experience of a regular army working procedures and staff working methods, and standing operational procedures. The TBVC armies on the other hand were victims of an inferiority complex. Given their history they expected MK to take the lead on almost all issues for fear of being reminded of their origins. They did not want to be seen to be trying hard to ingratiate themselves with either party. Having been trained by SADF they lacked confidence (Williams, 2002: 19-20; interview with Matanzima, 2005).

APLA started negotiations after the first democratic elections in 1994 and a work group called APLA work group was formed. In theory SANDF was already in existence and top MK commanders like General Sphiwe Nyanda were already

appointed generals. It is noteworthy that APLA work group was made up of APLA and SADF members only, neither MK nor Bantustan armies participated in the negotiations. This clearly demonstrates the role played by SADF in the integration process that of a player and a referee. The negotiations were about the *modus operandi* of APLA's integration into the SANDF by about July 1994. Major General Mortimer led the SADF delegation while Brigadier General Fihla led the APLA delegation (Interview with Fihla, 2005).

The most contentious issues debated were the question of APLA members integrating as individuals. This meant that they would be treated the way SADF used to treat its normal recruits. APLA members were to be subjected to HIV testing, and that they would only receive R10 a day for subsistence. It was explained that they were treated as a special case, and not as equal partners as they had not submitted their Certified Personnel Register (CPR) by 27 April 1994. APLA rejected in no uncertain terms all the conditions except the R10 a day, which they grudgingly accepted as discriminatory as it applied only to them. The issue of R10 a day applicable only to APLA while MK was getting about R800 a month is significant in that it played an important role in cementing ties between MK and APLA (Interview with Ntabeni, 2005).

MK was encamped in Wallmansthal just outside Pretoria while APLA was to be encamped at Debrug near Bloemfontein. The first MK intake was about 3, 563 and APLA about 1, 200. These were supposed to be leader groups that would be processed first in order to be part of placements boards for MK and APLA respectively. It is these men and women who braved all the perceptions they had about SADF, and agreed to go in first in order to be able to facilitate the integration of their comrades.

Tents in Wallmansthal were not electrified while at Debrug were; and that was a fundamental difference. The APLA leader group arrived at Debrug in July 1994 and were quickly processed while the MK had to spend months before they could

be processed. According to Col Mokhothu, MK was to blame for the delay as it failed to produce CPR. The waiting was very frustrating to MK personnel and the fact that they stayed for so many months under such inconducive and uninhabitable conditions. Among those in the assembly area were MK veterans and senior commanders who mostly later became generals in the SANDF (Interview with Mokhothu, 2005).

The following table shows the composition of SANDF in 1994

Military Formation	Number
MK	20 000
APLA	6 000
TVBC	10 000
SADF	85 000
Total no	121 000

Table 3: Composition of SANDF per force at integration in 1994, (Source: van Zyl- Loedolff, 1994:2)

MK soldiers got tired of waiting and finally 2 500 of them marched to the Union Buildings in September 1994 to demand their immediate integration, this march happened after General Nyanda's car was set alight. 265 members never returned to Wallmansthal, because the conditions were just not conducive for encampment. The following remark by Mokhothu indicates the intensity of the situation: "One wonders why there were no lights for instance at Wallmansthal given the fact that SADF was used to accommodate larger numbers of conscripts yearly". About 2, 000 former MK soldiers smashed windows in Durban and overturned dustbins (Interview with Mokhothu, 2005).

MK demonstrators demanded that they be integrated into the SANDF and that APLA be treated the same way as MK, as they had equally fought for the

liberation of the country. They added that MK and APLA fighters were not only from the same neighbourhood and families, but they had trained together in Uganda. This patriotic and bold step by MK forces is not only remarkable but cemented ties between the two NSF armies forever. This is further illustrated by the following sentiment: “While the senior members of APLA feel that promotion does not often favour them, junior members have not forgotten the spirit of comradeship splendidly displayed by MK in Wallmansthal and will never forget it” (Interview with Ketye, 2005).

The fact that MK was encamped with quite a number of their leaders and veterans actually helped to inspire the general members at Wallmansthal. It is amazing that MK was able to endure 3-4 months without lights and that they all slept in tents. General Nyanda later confirmed that the presence of these leaders played an important role in uplifting the spirits of the younger members and to a greater extent, influenced their generally good behaviour under the circumstances (Interview with Nyanda: 2004).

APLA, as stated earlier, had failed to submit a certified personnel register by midnight 27 April 1994. They were therefore integrated outside the legal framework and this was later rectified by the new constitution, Act 108 of 1996. This act provided for APLA or any armed force, which submitted its personnel list after the commencement of the interim constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) to be treated equally. The main condition was for such military force’s political wing to have been part of the TEC. According to Mortimer (1994:2), APLA members could join the SANDF as individuals requesting enlistment and would be evaluated and placed, with adjudication by BMATT according to qualifications, experience, knowledge and potential. As explained above, APLA rejected this approach and were subsequently integrated like MK and after MK’s protest march APLA was indeed treated equally in all respect (Interview with Fihla, 2005).

It should be pointed out, though, that there were serious problems with the CPRs, and the Audit Report of 13 September 2000 by the Minister of Defence to the Portfolio Committee on Defence in Parliament says it all. 6% of MK names and 33% of APLA names were not reflected in the CPR. It was also found that although some members' names appeared in the original CPR, they were missing from the consolidated CPR. There was confusion in the CPRs, which was probably a result of a human error when reading the names into the computer. SADF, MK and APLA personnel had worked for long hours on the CPRs and a human error was most likely. The possibility of deliberate sabotage from SADF personnel cannot be ruled out completely (Ministry of Defence, 2000:1).

On reporting to the assembly areas and Personnel Management Office Reception Depot (PMORD) ex-combatants were to submit birth certificates, identity documents, qualification certificates and employment documents where applicable. Integratees had to be finger-printed and medically examined before being pronounced fit to be integrated and all this was done by the SADF. JMCC decisions had given SADF the mandate to be a player, a linesman and a referee. This had a terribly negative psychological effect on MK and APLA. On the other hand, it assured SADF members that the more things changed the more they stayed the same (Williams, 2002:2-3).

Some ex-combatants were arrested for political crimes as a result of finger-printing done by SADF and this created a problem for NSF commanders with some members refusing to integrate for fear of victimisation. Some APLA members saw the decision to integrate into the SANDF as a sell-out position and the arresting of members at assembly areas as a result of their being finger-printed strengthened this view. Letlapa Mphahlele, a former APLA Director of Operations, is one of the people who felt strongly against integration. There are other members of the High Command who also felt strongly against integration

but were overruled by the majority of APLA leadership who felt that there was no patriotic alternative to integration (Interview with Ntabeni, 2005).

Members of NSF were to go for ranking at the Placement Board once they had undergone the process of integration. The board was composed of all constituent forces with BMATT as the adjudicator. It is here that ex-combatants would sometimes become agitated on receiving lesser-than-expected ranks. It is also here that a number of people would settle for lower ranks out of ignorance, because sometimes a friend had earlier on received a similar rank (Interview with Ketye, 2005)

The biggest problem in the South African integration can be identified as poor planning that had a cascading effect on the following (Interview with Kok, 2005):

- Poor facilities for encampment e.g in Walmansthal
- Inadequate Information Technology (IT) support.
- SADF members were not psychologically prepared by the leadership to make a paradigm shift.
- MK and APLA members were to a comparative degree, ill prepared to make a paradigm shift.
- Too many and confused versions of CPRs that were open to abuse by the NSF members and in some cases bona fide members were inadvertently left out.
- Failure to use the media as a vehicle or medium for the preparation of the nation for the reintegration of the ex-combatants into the society and to drum up support for legitimacy.

- Lack of periodic briefings in assembly areas to ex-combatants and SADF staff in a unifying, honest and transparent manner.
- Centralisation of the process though it was later decentralised to regions and thus made the process to run smoother.
- Crisis management as opposed to proper planning

One of the biggest difficulties was the use of combat names in exile by ex-combatants, which made it difficult to determine which were the real names in the CPRs. The SADF staff worked daily for long hours without overtime payment resulting in low morale. BMATT should have been asked to conduct the integration process instead of SADF to remove negative perceptions of the absorption process and for the sake of unity. This would have put BMATT at the driving seat of integration as a neutral body that had been tested in Zimbabwe and to some extent in Namibia. This would have dispelled any misgivings about absorption into the SANDF and would have contributed towards harmonising relations between the former adversaries.

SADF was a constituent army (party) in the integration process but did not integrate like MK and APLA. It instead, played a leading role in the integration process. It integrated others and actually took critical decisions about the fate of the ex-combatants who could not do the same. This made it a referee, a player and a linesman. For instance when APLA negotiated its late inclusion, MK and TBVC armies were excluded from these negotiations. This is despite the fact that legally they were members of SANDF already. TBVC armies did not integrate but they were translated into SANDF by the same SADF. As a result, their force numbers are just like those of MK and APLA as they start with 94, whereas SADF maintained their old force numbers for they never integrated or translated into SANDF. Translation means verifying a member's qualification and

experience to see whether he/she qualifies for the rank he or she is holding. For an example “on integration SADF wanted officers to produce a matric/standard 10 certificate to qualify or write what they termed potential test and all this was administered by them. It is very strange that not all former SADF members have matric/standard 10 certificates. As Mofokeng (Interview, 2005) put it ” the biggest question is, do all former SADF officers have matric/standard 10 and the answer is definitely no”. There are a number of senior SADF NCOs who have become majors after 1994 and surely they do not qualify to be officers according to the criterion prescribed by SADF for everybody else except for themselves.

van Zyl-Loedolff (1994:7-8) gave the framework for integration as that, the approved posts of erstwhile SADF form the initial basis for integration and that:

- all members of SANDF shall hold positions on a temporary basis until the rationalisation process is complete.
- supernumerary members will be accommodated in vacant or additional posts whilst orientation or bridging training occurs.
- the placement process and the evaluation norms will be evaluated with the assistance of BMATT.
- members will be identified in accordance with the CPR.
- those not on CPR and those not meeting the minimum requirements (i.e. younger than 16 and older than 60 years, medically unfit, illiterate etc) will not be accepted into SANDF but will be given the opportunity to join the Service Brigade (later known as Service Corps).

- some of the older members may be able to register for Special Pension with the relevant state department, in terms of section 189 of the Interim Constitution.
- each member's abilities and special skills shall be evaluated.
- NSF members shall have a right to consider and accept the proposed rank, service system and proposed remuneration.

There were other conditions for NSF in addition to the ones listed above; however they were not as controversial. It is a reality that members of former SADF were never affected by rationalisation. For the first time in 2004, 77 white colonels and former SADF members and one former APLA member were classified as supernumerary. This caused such a political storm that it was discussed in parliament. There were a number of responses from the black community and one was from an ex-combatant who suggested that black officers have ill treatment meted out to them so excessively that they have no alternative but to shoot at white officers (*Sowetan* 2004, November, 08, p15).

This issue demonstrated a few things; one is how decisive and influential a defence force is to the society. How important it is for a defence force to be united in the interest of the nation as the last line of defence for the nation. People have a right to feel insecure when their defence force is said to be divided along racial lines. The Tempe issue keeps rearing its ugly head whenever there is a racial issue involving the defence force. People do not seem to be raising the issue in order for the incident never to be repeated. Instead they seem to be saying that is why it happened and that is a dangerous situation for the country.

As earlier on alluded to SADF managed and directed the integration process despite the fact that they never underwent the process of integration nor had

their status translated. This means that they occupy most of the strategic positions as they had occupied them before 1994. It is an undeniable fact that some positions were given to NSF and the TBVC defence members but the bulk of the strategic positions are in the hands of former SADF. This is clearly demonstrated by the figures released by the Department of Defence in March 2005, which are in Table Four of this research report. Most of the key managerial positions that are crucial in the day to day running of the organisation are occupied by former SADF members . Ranks that are not crucial to decision making are predominantly occupied by Africans (Interview with Mofokeng, 2005).

Many people think that they got a raw deal as far as ranking is concerned, especially the first groups. As a result, a few years down the line they were allowed to appeal against their ranks, thanks to Lieutenant General Matanzima and most of them were successful. A typical example given to the author was that of an MK officer Major General Solly Mollo who had tertiary education. The man was offered the rank of a lieutenant and he rejected it and after high-level intervention he was made a colonel. At present he is a Major General and one of the most talented intellectuals and strategists in the armed forces. An APLA Member who in his training, trained with Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and had spent two years fighting alongside PLO and was in his forties was also made a lieutenant and due to the appeal process was made a major. This is but the tip of an iceberg. Only those members who were in the first and second groups to integrate in 1994 and early 1995 or otherwise known as APLA and MK one and two could appeal (Interviews with Ketye and Majola: 2005).

A commission ordered by the Minister of Defence after the Tempe shootings reported that the skewed racial representation at the SANDF management and at operational levels fuelled racial tensions and contributed to overt racist incidents between white and African members of SANDF. This was refuted By General Nyanda in his address of March 2001 to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and

he said that the report had generalised based on a series of isolated incidents. BMATT report of 1998 was also critical of racial tensions and racism in the SANDF (Ministerial Report, 2001: 4-10).

The intellectual approach to soldiering of the ex-combatants was completely ignored. According to Brownlee and Liebenberg (1995:4-6) the advantage of ex-guerrillas is that their socialised thought patterns are analytic, creative, adaptive and pragmatic. The imposed dictates of material conditions make guerrillas masters of economy (saving) of human resources and sustainment. Guerrillas always seek to preserve their personnel and (logistics) other resources as they are always in short supply. This was not considered at all by the SADF, which was completely left in the driving seat of the process. The experience of ex-combatants in the application of guerrilla warfare was also ignored for reasons best known to SADF.

The fact that the integration process relied upon SADF structures, practices and doctrine, rightly or wrongly, created the impression that the integration process was nothing else but an absorption process of NSF and TBVC armies into the new structures of SADF. The fact that none of the other forces had an institutional power base within SADF created serious obstacles to free and fair integration. According to Williams (2002:7), in 1994 nine non-SADF generals (three lieutenant generals and six major generals) were appointed to a number of staff positions within SANDF and for a number of reasons these positions were just tokens rather than factual. This he attributes to the fact that SADF staff gave them very little support, if any, and that they found themselves in an unfamiliar environment with new unfamiliar procedures and were therefore afraid of making mistakes or were deliberately kept away from decision making by SADF staff.

5.3 The Translation of Statutory Forces

The first Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, had explicitly made it clear that integration was not absorption and that SADF members were also to integrate in keeping with spirit of the decision of the negotiating parties before the 1994 elections. A verification process to determine whether they were ranked properly and that they qualified for their posts would soon follow. Unfortunately this was abandoned midstream (Ministry of Defence, 1996:9).

TBVC armies were not integrated by law but as per Presidential Proclamation of 1994, they were just translated into the SANDF, on audit or verification of their qualifications, status and merits according to South African public service standards. Placements in the ranks of SANDF followed this verification. Due suspicion prevailed in the TVBC forces about this verification. They felt that their standards were being questioned by the very SADF that was their main trainer over years. The other challenge was that SADF was not being translated. These TBVC members received new force numbers that portrayed them as having joined the defence force only in 1994. This caused serious problems as they felt that the translation, as the programme was called, was demeaning to them. (Frankel, 1998:17-19).

The biggest concern of TBVC armies was that they had to go through a verification process that was conducted by SADF, which was not subjected to the same treatment. TVBC armies were mostly trained by the very SADF, which seemed to be questioning their ranks and military qualifications. This raised concern that SADF members were receiving special treatment. SADF members were in their efforts trying to undermine and discredit TBVC members' courses even to an extent of derecognising their own courses. In Bophuthatswana all courses were either conducted by SADF or BDF instructors used SADF syllabus. When a BDF member was due for promotion ex-SADF would put stumbling block by saying he or she has to do this or that course. If one produces a certificate to

prove that he or she actually did the course they would say it was outdated. Mothlabane's case is a classical example. When she was due for promotion to a rank of a captain she was asked to undergo a Military Law course that she had successfully done in BDF. There are many similar cases that were infuriating and frustrating for ex-TBVC members (interview with Mothlabane, 2006).

The then Chief of National Defence Force General Sphiwe Nyanda was asked by the researcher if it is true that some former members of SADF did not have the very matric/standard 10 they wanted as prerequisite for officer ship from NSF. He responded that he was not aware of such cases but even if there were such cases, SANDF does not have legislation to use, to force verification of SADF. He alluded to the fact that NSF went into the negotiations and integration process relatively unaware of how a democracy and a government functions. In about 2001- 2002 there was a verification process of former SADF and that is said to have revealed that some SADF officers did not have matric /standard 10. NSF and TVBC members conducting the process felt frustrated and left when they realised that it was a fruitless exercise, due to lack of action from authorities. (Interview with Nyanda, 2005).

There were quite a number of NSF members who were illiterate at integration and were forced into demobilisation, as they had no choice. Only those members of NSF who were 35 and above at the time of promulgation of the Demobilisation Act of 1996 could successfully apply for Special Pension. Both MK and APLA had never used literacy as a prerequisite for joining their ranks, and they were powerless to intervene in this issue. The meagre payments made to the demobilised could not reintegrate them into the society. It is the view of the author that most people who were in exile needed counselling and most of those who were forced into demobilisation were not counselled. Exile had a negative psychological effect on most members, as some had to for example witness their comrades die from malaria, vehicle and natural accidents like drowning. Some had been brutally tortured by the enemy, dehumanised or maimed. There are

those who survived enemy raids in the Frontline States. Operating at the front meant that one did not know whether tomorrow he/she would still be alive. This sombre picture is also aptly captured by the following remarks: "Living on handouts also had a negative effect, you would want to buy a cold drink because it is hot but you could not, because you were not paid a salary and you were always penniless. You would talk about your family only to learn later that you no longer have a family" (Interview with Matolweni, 2005).

The following table from SANDF HR illustrates ranks per race in the SANDF:

	Africans	White	Coloured	Indian	Total
Gen	1 = 100%	-	-		1
Lt Gen	6 75%	2 25%	-		8
Maj Gen	24 58.5%	15 36.6%	-	2 4.9%	41
Brig Gen	63 37.5%	96 57.1%	6 3.6%	3 1.8%	168
Col	228 26.9%	590 69.7%	24 2.8%	5 0.6%	847
Lt Col	432 24.9%	1 202 69.4%	81 4.7%	18 1%	1 733
WO 1	331 13.6%	1 812 74.2%	250 10.2%	49 2%	2 422
Lower Ranks	Exclusively Black				

Table 4: Ranks in the SANDF per race (Source: SANDF HR Division 15 March 2005)

The situation has not changed that much, whites at officer level are still dominating and that is a serious problem for SANDF leadership as Professor Cawthra correctly points out in his interview with the Pretoria News (2005, April 12). He describes the dominance of the ranks middle to top management, by

whites as a grave imbalance of representivity. This perhaps depicts not only a lack of progress in the transformation process but also the dilemma facing the SANDF. They are desperately trying to balance issues by not moving too fast and losing experienced and skilled manpower they may not be ready to replace. On the other hand there is pressure from society to transform. The question is when will the SANDF fully reflect the demographics of South Africa with 64% Africans and 24%Whites as stipulated in White Paper on Defence (1996) if, after 11 years, the SADF component still dominates the top management level.

5.4 Demobilisation and Reintegration

As already pointed out the gratuities granted the demobilised combatants were not sustainable. It is thus safe to say they (demobilised) were thrown into abject poverty and had to fend for themselves. South Africa has failed to draw lessons from Zimbabwe and Namibia and is committing similar mistakes as these countries. It has given the ex-combatants the reason to come back to the government years down the line and demand assistance. It has failed to realise the so-called peace dividends. Mortimer (1995: 2) argues very eloquently that during initial implementation stages it was crystal clear that some members of MK and APLA did not want a career in the SANDF. Their intention had been to liberate the country and now that it is liberated they would leave the defence force. Although this statement is considerably valid the view expressed does not analyse the type of people who did not want to be soldiers.

The first category were young people who thought that demobilisation payouts were a lot of money only to learn within a few weeks that it could not sustain them. These youngsters actually needed proper counselling and guidance. The second category were professionals who were either employed somewhere or could get employment and therefore did not want to integrate. The view expressed by Mokhutu (interview, 2005) is very compelling "The fact of the matter is, that, the bulk of comrades had no choice but to demobilise as they

were illiterate and therefore could not integrate". It is impossible for ex-combatants to successfully integrate into the society, when that very society has not been prepared to accept them. The parsimonious behaviour of the government has also made re-integration into the society impossible. How can people with families to raise, children to school, clothe and to feed them be able to successfully re-integrate into the society when they are jobless.

In Zimbabwe as shown above there were illiterates but they were able to integrate into the Zimbabwe National Defence. It is difficult to understand why the JMCC agreed to such an exclusion. According Cock (1993:1-2), discontent among demobilised soldiers have the potential to destabilise the country politically or through criminal activities.

It cannot be disputed that destitute war veterans will apply the only trade they know for survival. "I would like any job as long it will help me to survive and contribute at home" this sounds desperate and if this ex-combatant cannot find a job the worst could be expected (Cock, 1993:3).

"Human instincts usually kick in when confronted with hunger and desperation the will to survive comes automatically". The desire to live often dictates the limited options open for survival and desperate situation often invites desperate measures. The country will have to brace itself for the worst to come, especially given South Africa's unemployment rate (Interview with Mofokeng, 2005).

This view is further reflected in the following remarks by one of the ex-combatants: "Our situation is desperate, we have to live from hand to mouth since 1997 and we are prepared to go and work in Iraq, just as long as we can get money." Vusi was demobilised in 1997, after spending about three weeks in detention for a suspected theft from a comrade in Walmansthal. He is prepared to do anything to earn a living even if it means risking his life in Iraq. When asked how could he be prepared to risk his life in Iraq when it is almost certain that he

would not return he replied “ it is better to die trying to earn a living than to fight with the children for bread and always to be reminded that you fought for nothing but your poverty”. He has just got a temporary job with the Johannesburg Municipality planting trees in Soweto. Vusi and a group of other young former SANDF soldiers pleaded with the researcher to organise them some training from Service Corps. They claim that some of them had stayed for up to about six months without any training from Service Corps in 1997 (Interview with Sangweni, 2006).

As already stated above, members who were eligible for demobilisation were only those members who had been members of either MK or APLA and who could not be integrated either voluntarily or due to medical reasons or lack of education. Those who integrated and did not have the academic certificate with them had to write a test. It is this test that positively or negatively decided the fate of many freedom fighters. The need to demobilise some ex-combatants is not questionable, perhaps the method used.

The defence force has to be professional, affordable, balanced, effective and efficient as stipulated in the White Paper for Defence, The balance in terms of race and colour seems to be quite elusive perhaps not due to a lack of trying but may be due to a lack of dedicated leadership within the SANDF to vigorously drive the process. The Minister of Defence announced demobilisation on 21 August 1995. It seems that demobilisation came as an afterthought when it was realised that something had to be done with those who could not be integrated into SANDF (Motumi and Hudson, 1996:120-122).

This table illustrates the demobilisation gratuities paid to ex-combatants of APLA and MK:

Categories	Yrs of service	Amount	Total Demobbed	Gratuity
A	1/1/ 1961- 31/12 1972	R42 058	171	7 191 918
B	1/1/ 1973- 31/12 1976	R34 313	144	4 941 072
C	1/1/ 1977- 31/12/ 1982	R28 721	1 090	31 305 890
D	1/1/ 1983- 31/12/ 1989	R20 201	1 877	37 917 277
E	1/1/ 1990- 26/3/ 1994	R12 734	2 643	33 655 962
*z			1 413	52 973 686
TOTAL			7 238 (All categories)	R167 985 805

Table 5: Illustration of demobilisation payments up to 1 April 1998, the z reflects pay out made as a result of deductions for tax or departmental debts, of the 7 238 demobilised 1 413 were either taxed or had to pay the department back some money: (Department of Defence, HR Division).

In terms of section 189 of the South Africa's Interim Constitution, veterans and vulnerables as well as some of the members referred to as categories 1,2 and 3, who did not qualify for integration into SANDF were to be demobilised first. Vulnerables are those who were medically unfit to integrate into the SANDF. Provisions were also made for some of these people to receive not only a once-

off gratuity, but also special pension. Veterans, refers to those persons of MK and APLA who could not be integrated due to old age, mostly between 50 and 65 years of age (Motumi and Hudson, 1996: 122-123).

At Emndeni in Soweto, the researcher asked the demobilised and discharged former MK and APLA soldiers how many would be willing to work in Iraq and he was promised 50 former soldiers within a week. Several telephone calls were made to the researcher asking about the Iraqi employment. This is despite explaining to them that he was just asking the question to gauge the desperation. One of the demobilised was asked if he had used a perfume and he replied: “a perfume is a luxury that we do not even care about anymore, what we want is soap, food and clothes to cover our bodies, we do not want steal yet”. Please make sure that the MK and APLA veteran’s office and Service Corps find us some jobs or do not blame us, we have families to feed”. These were alarming utterances and pleas from some young ex-combatants in Soweto, who accused those who were in command in exile, of being selfish and unable to defend them against SADF victimisation into demobilisation. The net effect of demobilisation to some of ex-MK and APLA is a demeaning effect of helplessness and a never-ending cycle of poverty. Most of the young men and women who had gone to exile were those from poor families for they had nothing to lose and wanted to break the vicious cycle of poverty but in vain (Interview with Wanda, 2006).

According to Mashike, 2000: 94-97) lack of availability of economic resources to a demobilised soldier may lead to resentment by the family and society in general and cause stress for the soldiers. He elaborates that at the end of the war soldiers often return as heroes, but when they fail to provide materially they may be viewed as losers by their families and communities, and some may resort to among other things drinking. The worst scenario for the soldiers he describes as losers would be to resort to crime.

Demobilisation of ex-combatants is a sensitive issue in that these people were not paid a salary and therefore did not have pensions and any package for them had to take this fact into consideration, and not merely be an exercise undertaken to save the department and government money. In the South African situation special pensions was introduced. These gratuities were not enough and that only those who were 35 years old in 1996 when the act was passed were eligible.

Mashike (2004:94) argues that the lack of financial management on the part of the demobilised, created the potential to squander the meagre gratuity received from the SANDF. They would feel rich and as a result buy presents and throw parties to please their families, friends and relatives. This would in the short-term give the ex-combatants a false sense of social reintegration, as they would often be seen as heroes. As soon as the demobilisation gratuities were exhausted, they were rejected and thus sank to the lowest level of destitution. The fact that men who fought for this country are even prepared to go and die in Iraq instead of enjoying the fruits of their sweat, blood and tears speaks volume about their plight (Mashike, 2004: 94).

Mashike, (2004: 100) further argues that apart from the infamous Colin Chauke, former MK combatant who was, identified as the kingpin of cash -in-transit robberies, there is also a case of a former MK combatant who, was hired to shoot at Golden Arrow busses, by some Western Cape taxi owners for R50 and R350 for each attack. What drives a former ex-combatant to kill his own people for between R50 and R350, the very people he had fought for? Destitution has the tendency to increase the potential for ex-combatants to resort to crime. The media has on a number of occasions, implicated the ex-combatants by claiming that robberies are carried out with military precision, though this has not been substantiated with any other evidence

5.5 The Service Brigade /Corps

Initially the idea of a Service Brigade, which later became the Service Corps, was to create employment for the demobilised at local, regional and even at international level. It was formally launched in the East Rand on the 31 January 1995 and was to provide an 18 month vocational training on a voluntary basis. It was to have periodic intakes to its full capacity of 5 500 but from the start it has never operated even to near-capacity and there are few results for the nation to see (Motumi and Hudson 1996: 122-124).

According to Motumi and Hudson (1996:122-123) the Service Corps at inception had a number of objectives and was also expected to train the unemployed and the youth:

- To help prepare people for civilian life through assessment and career profiling.
- To help trainees investigate career path options.
- To assist trainees to reflect and gain more self-knowledge.
- To provide information about career options inside and outside the Service Corp.
- To sensitise trainees about issues in the broader environment that have an impact on the decisions they make

Mr Modise, the then Minister of Defence only announced the demobilisation process 16 months into the integration. As earlier stated this can be correctly construed as an after thought resulting from enquiries from the SADF personnel, that were involved with integration as to what to do with the ex-combatants who could not be integrated. He defined demobilisation as a voluntary release of

former NSF members who are constitutionally part of SANDF but who do not wish to integrate or are unable to do so (Motumi and Mckenzie, 2002:15 quoting media briefing, 21 August 1995).

According to Motumi and Hudson (1996:119-120), Minister Modise and the military had for many months toyed with the idea of demobilising all ex-combatants of MK and APLA whether integrated into the SANDF or not, but say this could have been illegal and would have caused a lot of animosity in the SF camp. This implies that the feelings of NSF members were irrelevant and immaterial on the matter. Secondly, the illegality of such action is baseless and cannot be substantiated, not when other civil servants from other departments demobilised. The action seems to have been more to appease SADF component than factual. Motumi when asked why all ex-combatants were not demobilised “Motumi said the idea was there but its just one of those grand ideas that were never pursued” (interview with Motumi, 2005).

The failure of Service Corps can be attributed to a number of problems, lack of counselling and skills audit of the demobilised as chief among them. According to the Robinson and Robinson (1989:3-9), if you have not done a skills audit and market assessment you are not training for impact but for activity. This means that you are not transferring skills that empower your learners to do a job better but rather training them for the sake of training. You have no goal to achieve in your training but simply training because you have to do it. Training has to improve either the way things are done, or introduce a completely new and better way of doing things. It has to introduce a better, effective and efficient way of either production or rendering of service. The Service Corps trained for activity, for it cannot proudly point out viable projects that its graduates are running or efficient and effective service they are rendering in return for profits. There was a lack of vision in the division and this is perhaps due to a lack of clear guidelines. There were no clear objectives linked to the performance agreement of management. Progress could not be monitored and evaluated because there were no criteria to be used.

The cascading effect of the failure of Service Corps is the failure of the reintegration phase of the integration process. According to Kingma (2000:18-75), demobilisation is not an event but a complex process that has to be carefully planned and executed. While the process may be costly, its failure may be even more costly for the society and even for the region. She states that a complex relationship seems to exist between security and social development. The human development concept enlarges people's choices in terms of economic, social and political dimensions constituting the ultimate objectives of development. Therefore, it sets standards norms and goals to be achieved by human resource policies. The planning of policies and design of effective projects should then be based on existing skills, competencies, qualifications and experience of ex-combatants. It is most unfortunate that the inadequately addressed socio-economic needs of the ex-combatants may have a domino effect on the national security policy later. Given the possibility of ex-combatants receiving pensions, this was a grand idea except that it excluded the majority of the people who were actually doing the fighting on the ground. As earlier alluded to, only those who were 35 or more years old in 1996, were eligible for special pensions and that is a great disservice to many of those who did not qualify. The non-involvement of Civic and Community Based NGOs was a blunder, as they would have used their experience for the betterment of the process. They could also solicit donor funding for the process.

According to a research by Gear (2004:1-2), most ex-combatants were demobilised against their will. They had hoped for integration into the SANDF but instead they had to write a test, which decided their fate and were unceremoniously cast aside. They felt as being used and betrayed by the politicians who are not keen to meet and discuss their plight with them. The bitterness is compounded by perceptions that there were weaknesses in the process, fraught with unproductive procedures, corruption, inefficiency and

abusive behaviour by ex-SADF members. They are not happy that only NSF members were, evaluated as part of the integration process.

the exclusion of underage ex-combatants for special pension was also regarded as a deliberate barrier to deprive NSF members of well-deserved benefits. Some claim that when they arrived at Springs (Service Corps Training Centre) they were told to choose courses and when they chose motor mechanics they were told: "no, monkeys are not suitable for motor mechanics but for bricklaying and carpentry courses" Gear (2004; 1-2). There were several problems at Service Corps allegedly acknowledged by Service Corps staff. Training would be scheduled but would either not take place or would not be delivered in full. Trainees would wait for two years for a promised call-up for a course, which would not anyway materialise. The attitude of the Service Corps staff that thought the ex-combatants were done a favour was clearly problematic

The Service Corps was supposed to provide 18 months of training comprising three months of literacy and adult life skills training, three months of vocational training and a year of experiential training. Life skills, included communication, conflict handling, life planning, problem solving, social interaction, self esteem, decision making, personal stock-taking and work ethos. By end of 1997, 788 including 44 women had received training (International Research Development Centre, 2002:2).

It could be argued that The Service Corps should have been placed under another government department or made a quasi-government body. Chief among these is the question of funding, which is from limited coffers of the SANDF. Secondly the division is unable to raise funds as it is. This is the same problem that faced the Namibians as stated above. The military by its nature has a commanding approach, and therefore it applies this approach to the very people it regards as rejects who have failed the test to enlist in the SANDF (International Research Development Centre, 2002:2).

These are people who are bitter against the system and therefore very negative towards being commanded. If lessons were properly drawn from the Namibian and Zimbabwean experiences, SANDF would not be repeating similar mistakes. In Namibia, the question of funding forced the government to register the Development Brigade as a parastatal in order to secure funding. The question is, did the South African Government and SANDF have to commit similar mistakes as Namibia and Zimbabwe or should they have avoided them? The ex-combatants are treated as second-class citizens or nonentities and they cannot access medical attention at state expense while ex-SADF veterans can access medical services of SANDF.

5.6 Evaluation

It is the researcher's strong view that the JMCC decisions that allowed the SADF to be a player, linesman and a referee were grossly flawed. Both Namibia and Zimbabwe contracted the services of an outsider. South Africa could have requested one or two countries to monitor the integration or should have actually given BMATT a much wider role than just to adjudicate. The fact that NSF members had to appeal against their ranks clearly shows that the process was not entirely fair to them.

It is a fact that most of the ex-combatants were the 1976 and the 1980s group. The 1976 group left the country for exile as a result of the 1976 uprising/riots and were mostly youth (*oqiniselani*). Similarly, the 1980s group left at the height of resistance by the oppressed South African population against the repressive apartheid regime. This implies that firstly, they left the country before completing their studies and secondly, most of them were young when they left and when they returned to the country. Therefore, a number of ex-combatants especially the 1980s group, could not be expected to be 35 years of age when they demobilised. Some of them had either been born into the struggle in exile or had

left the country with peers at an early age because it was simply seen as correct to do so, without really knowing what they were getting themselves into. Some were inadvertently, pushed by the system to leave the country before they were really conscious of their social being. The liberation movements did not completely encourage people to go and study in exile, their very existence depended financially on people fighting and numbers in camps to prove support internally (South Africa) to the UN and OAU in return for their material support.

The fact that carefully planned policies are a prerequisite for a successful integration process needs no mention here. It is crucial for the process to be as inclusive and transparent as possible. This is to win not only the hearts and minds of those involved but also the community as this builds a solid foundation for reconciliation and a national will for social improvement. Clear and concise policy on the auditing of the skills of the ex-combatants as well as assessing the market requirements before embarking on a project to cushion the demobilised is the way to go. In the long term this would save the government resources for its national socio-economic development.

The plight of the ex-combatants should not be viewed in isolation from other national commitments of the government as the ex-combatants have the ability to temporally reverse the gains of the revolution. War-generated identities should never be undermined or inadvertently encouraged. War generated identities means those who have fought together tend to gravitate towards each other in times of need and that they will resort to what they know best in desperate situations. Those who have commanded in war tend to command respect especially from peers and subordinates in peacetime. The reintegration process is supposed to wean these ex-combatants from the military in order to encourage and inculcate civilian solutions to their problems instead of by military means. The reconstruction and development policy should include the integration; demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, and funds should be solicited for this process.

The Helen Suzman Foundation (2006) quoting professor Cawthra, say that it is perfectly plausible that some former MK combatants have turned to crime. He was commenting on the failure to integrate a sizeable number of MK combatants into the SANDF or the wider society. Instead they had been thrown onto the streets thus compelling them to put their skills into crime and the same can be said of the 32 Battalion. He correctly points out that those demobilised and neglected despite their former sharp contradictions and enmity tend to gravitate towards each other in post-apartheid South Africa and join hands in crime for survival. This research has not been able to collect concrete evidence, of ex-combatants that are involved in criminal activities in an organised way except for isolated cases as earlier suggested.

5.7 Conclusion

The process of integration should not only be guided by a sound policy, but it should be coordinated at the highest possible level. All constituent forces should not only be equal but should be treated as such. Therefore no constituent force should be a player, a referee and a linesman. Planning and coordination of the process should be carried out long before commencement of the actual process. In Zimbabwe, and South Africa in particular, there was initially some confusion in the implementation of the process.

CPRs of the integrating forces should have been prepared in advance and before the commencement of the process. Both MK and APLA should have given more attention to compilation of the CPRs by dedicating more staff to the task. Again in Zimbabwe and South Africa there was confusion initially leading to some ex-combatants collaborating with non ex-combatants to cheat the system. The Audit Report by the Minister of Defence to the Portfolio Committee on Defence is evidence of this anomaly. The report stated that the integration and demobilisation processes were open to abuse, but it would be difficult or

impossible to pin it down to a group of people or individuals. South Africa did not benchmark enough with other countries that had undergone the process, but had instead overlooked glaring facts from the experiences of these countries. Moreover some members of MK were involved directly in the Zimbabwean integration as earlier stated. Given the facts the researcher is not convinced that South Africa will in future not experience the same problems of mass demonstrations by unemployed ex-combatants demanding compensation and or jobs (Audit Report, 2000).

Some of these mistakes are avoidable and savings from their avoidance can go a long way towards reconstruction and development. Training for activity and not for impact was also avoidable had South Africa spent some time to learn from the experience of its neighbours. Had the Service Corps done a skills audit and market needs assessment as well as the needs of those to be demobilised, it could have formed a partnership with the government in developing or building among other things houses for RDP, roads, electrification and pipe laying. Affirmative job creation for ex-combatants should be considered.

Had the process of demobilisation and reintegration of the ex-combatants been placed under another ministry, other than the Department of Defence whose hands were very full, the situation could perhaps have been different. This would have meant more brains to grapple with the issue. The country could have assessed the Zimbabwe situation and avoided the same pitfalls. Some projects failed in Zimbabwe due to a lack of skills on the part of the demobilised. In exile the combatants are known to have been involved in self-help or self-sufficiency projects for survival. With the better resources at the country's disposal attempts should have been made to skill the demobilised for various projects and their efficient management.

The exclusion from the special pensions of many ex-combatants can be a grave danger to the country. It hurts immensely even those who are enjoying the

benefits to see their fellow comrades destitute. History has a tendency to repeat itself during the second war Black South Africans fought for the Queen and England despite their oppression and came the end of the war, they were given bicycles as a reward for their participation, whilst their white counterparts are said to have received meaningful compensation such as farms. In South Africa it was decided that some were good for liberation struggle but not good enough to serve the country they have liberated in the way they know best.

Former members of MK and APLA who were working for the government in other departments including members of Parliament were allowed to demobilise. Members of SANDF who are former combatants were not allowed to demobilise because of an erroneous policy decision and discrimination. This may come back to haunt the country. The biggest question asked was, from what were these members demobilising and the answer was, and still, is, from MK and APLA. If other civil servants could demobilise, then why not members of the SANDF? Some people agree that all MK and APLA members should have received a demobilisation allowance, as former MK and APLA who entered government service in other capacities were able to receive this (Ketye, 2005).

Perhaps, understandably members of the SANDF are very quick in looking at issues through their racial coloured glasses, and this has to be eschewed. It is of cardinal importance that there is unity of purpose and cohesion in the SANDF. A divided defence force is a divided people. People should mirror themselves in their defence force as a true reflection of their society.

There have been flagrant displays of racism within SANDF and that these should be dealt with harshly so as to send a clear message to all, that racism will not be tolerated at all costs. SANDF should put mechanisms in place to avert such incidents. The strength of the SANDF should logically lie in its diversity. It is the research's conclusion that transformation should be speeded up, as the longer it takes, the more the SANDF and unfortunately the entire nation will suffer. If there

is lack of cohesion and unity in the SANDF, then the country's security policy is in jeopardy.

MK and APLA veterans should have access to SANDF medical facilities and be treated the same way as SADF veterans. Lessons learnt from the integration process should be compiled for future reference, as an assistance to those in need and for future generations.

5.8 Significant Findings

Integration of armed forces is not an event but a process that warrants careful planning and execution, as part of the reconstruction and development programme. While integration is a challenge, it is possible to turn it into a national strength and foundation for national reconciliation and self-determination. It should be seen as part of the post-conflict peace building process, and as a bedrock for the democratisation process. It should always be as inclusive as possible.

Integration is more than mere bringing together of physical beings, but is comprehensive and should interrogate issues like, where will forces assemble especially non-statutory forces and most importantly who is responsible for their security, well being or sustainment. It is sometimes prudent to use the statutory force infrastructure and standardisation of training. All the constituent forces should be treated and feel as being treated equally. In order to avert the creation of perceptions of the existence of injustice and unfairness a neutral body is always advisable not just to adjudicate as in the case of BMATT in South Africa but to oversee the process including bridging training.

Non-Governmental and Community Based Organisations should be involved as much as possible, especially when it comes to demobilisation of forces. These organisations were not involved in South Africa. They are vital for a successful

reintegration of ex-combatants into the society. Sometimes they can make a huge difference between success and failure of a programme. Zimbabwe had an extensive involvement of these organisation and they played a very positive role in assisting with projects and cooperatives. They should not only be told when to assist, but should be part of the demobilisation inter-ministerial committee.

It is likely that issues of racism in the SANDF are perpetuated as a result of absorption of other forces into SADF perceived or real. Correct and properly executed integration would have led to a joint SANDF doctrine and tactics, owned by all. It would have acted as a catalyst or would even have a direct influence on national reconciliation. Integration should leave no room for negative perceptions, as it should be a joint effort. Had there been a concerted effort by all commanders of the constituent forces to regularly brief the integratees and SADF in assembly points, unity of purpose would have been less costly. Given the history of this country which explains the attitudes and perceptions, every effort should have been in communicating unity as the only way forward.

5.9 Suggestions for Further Research

This research is by no means comprehensive or exhaustive, as it concentrated only in one country with the other countries mainly used as a base from which to premise it and for purposes of comparison. A lot more research is needed in the area under study in a much more extensive and exhaustive manner. This would warrant more time and resources. It would be interesting to track the unfolding of events in South Africa to see what will happen to the integrated and demobilised ex-combatants in the near future. History in the neighbouring countries used in the research has taught us that it sometimes takes decades to realise the effects or legacies of our actions and policies. Perhaps it would be wise to have a much broader research, that includes all the countries in the region that have undergone integration and demobilisation, to contribute to the already existing general knowledge in this field. This is precisely so because it seems as if each

integration process tends to contribute towards the swelling ranks of reserve labour force rather than the socio-economic development of the region.

5.10 Summary

The South African integration process has not been without incidents though in the overall, it has been smooth especially when compared with Namibia and Zimbabwe. There are a number of areas identifiable as the possible causes of concern:

- a. The process of transformation and affirmative action is not fast enough and this makes the SANDF lopsided in favour of the former SADF in areas of key making-decisions. This perpetuates the notion and or perception that Bantustan and non-statutory forces have been absorbed.
- b. Unlike in Zimbabwe, there has not been a big drive to develop the human capital of SANDF, which is its strength. This is indeed an uphill struggle that would change the culture of the organisation. It would also develop capacity especially from the previously disadvantaged groups in the SANDF.
- c. Demobilised members, including veterans do not enjoy same privileges as former SADF member, for example access to medical attention in the SANDF facilities.
- d. The exclusion of the former war machinery of NSF into a reserve labour force is not wise. This may encourage war-generated identities, which are prone to crime for survival when rendered destitute.

- e. It may not be too late to organise and encourage economic viable projects for the demobilised without admitting any responsibility for their welfare on the part of Department of Defence. This would contribute towards positive growth of the economy and much more profound economies of scale, as well as ensuring lasting security. The Defence Industrial Participation Programme (DIP) of the arms deal could be used to solicit machinery from obligors for producing uniforms for the SANDF for starters.

South Africa is pregnant with prospects for economic prosperity, social development and greater strides towards sustainable development. Funding for creation of projects for the demobilised can be generated internally or externally. This would assist tremendously in the treatment of main ailment rather than symptoms later.

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APPENDIX A

The list of informants is as follows:

Primary Informants

NAME	ORGANISATION AND COUNTRY
Col K.E. Amupolo	Namibian Defence Force (Cape Town, 2005)
Col E. Dzhiwema	Zimbabwe Defence Force (Cape Town, 2005)
Brig Gen (ret) M. R. Fihla	APLA Workgroup Leader and former Director in Defence Intelligence (Pretoria, 2005)
Col M.M. Ketye	Former APLA and one of the Leader Group Commanders at Debrug (Pretoria 2005)
Col G.S. Kok	Former SADF Integration (PMORD) (Pretoria, 2005)
Liutenant (ret) Manelisi Luxande	Victim of tear gas in Bloemfontein (Pretoria 2006)
Col R.T. Majola	Former MK Commander (Pretoria 2005)

Naome Marisa	A peasant from Mazoe , Zimbabwe (Pretoria 2006)
Lt Gen T.T Matanzima	Former Chief of Transkeian Defence Force and Chief of HR SANDF (Pretoria, 2005)
Col S.P. Matolweni	Former Chief of Staff Of APLA at DeBrug (Pretoria 2005)
Maj Gen D.M Mofokeng	Former APLA Commander and Chief of Defence Foreign Relations SANDF (Pretoria, 2005)
Col S. Mokhutu	Former MK and Co-Chairman of JMCC Personnel Workgroup (Pretoria, 2005)
Lt Col S. Mothlabane	Former BDF member and HR Staff Officer at Walmaansthal (Pretoria 2005)
Mr T. E. Motumi	Chief of Policy and Planning South African Department of Defence and a writer (Pretoria, 2005)
Lt Col A. Ntabeni (Ret)	Former APLA Chief Integration Officer and Secretary APLA Veteran's Association, (Pretoria, 2005)
Gen S. Nyanda	Former MK Chief of Staff and Chief of SANDF (Pretoria, 2005)

Dr P. Rakate

Director in the office of Secretary for Defence, co-writer of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone and other topics (Pretoria, 2005)

Vusi Sangweni

Demobilised former MK (Soweto 2006)

Vusi Wanda

Demobilised former MK (Soweto 2006)

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

It should be noted that questions for the Zimbabwean and Namibian Colonels were respectively slightly different

What is your name and rank ?

Which former force did you belong to ?

How did you experience integration and what was your role if any ?

In your opinion was it fair and can you elaborate on your answer ?

Has integration built cohesion in the SANDF, and can you elaborate on your answer ?

Would you say that the playing fields were level and why ?

Were integratees explained or given JMMC decisions and why ?

Why were SADF members never integrated ?

Why do members of the same force have different force numbers ?

Why are the ex-combatants not enjoying the same benefits as ex-SADF ?

Has transformation failed or succeeded, are there some target dates for its completion and why ?

Do you agree with the perception by ex-combatants and e-x TVBC members that they were absorbed into the SADF and why ?

How would you tackle the question of absorption ?

Some ex-SADF members feel that ex-Combatants are done favours in terms of ranks and promotion etc, what is your view?

Why was SADF system and doctrine adopted lock stock and barrel ?

What happened to the ex-SADF who teargassed three ex-combatants ?

Why a neutral force was not used to integrate all forces and for bridging training ?

Why are ex-combatants who integrated into SANDF prohibited from demobilising from MK and APLA ?

Why were conditions in Walmansthal uninhabitable for MK members ?

If there was lack of proper planning in the integration process then why, given SADF experience in National service ?

In your opinion was the Walmansthal issue deliberate ?

Files used to disappear in Walmansthal, why ?

Are there any mistakes that were made in the integration process.

Was the government not parsimonious when you look at the gratuity amounts comparing them with purpose of reintegration of ex-combatants into society ?

Those of SANDF members who live or originate from the townships are full of stories of destitution by ex-combatants, what is your view on this ?

Would you say ex-combatants are involved in organised crime ?

Looking at the Zimbabwean and Namibian experience would you say the process particularly the demobilisation, would not come back to haunt the government and why?

Can SANDF proudly show the success of the Service Corps ?

Why did South Africa opt for its model of integration ?

Are you bitter and against whom ?

When you look back what are issues that you would do differently and why ?

Are there any lessons learnt compiled from the integration process and if not why ?