

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

## HISTORY WORKSHOP

---



STRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE MAKING OF APARTHEID

6 - 10 February 1990

AUTHOR: M.J. Lebelo

TITLE: Apartheid's Chosen Few : Urban African Middle Classes  
from the Slums of Sophiatown to the Northern Suburbs of  
Johannesburg - 1935 -1985

# AFRICANA LIBRARY

One of the strategies the state and white capital pursued in recent years to deal with urban unrest and stabilise the conditions for further capital accumulation was to allow for the development of an urban African middle class. Recent studies on the urban African working class's potential to bring about a revolution have focused on the constraining influences exerted on these communities by sections of the co-opted African middle classes. Scholars have argued that the emerging African middle class is deliberately created by the state and white capital and would be unlikely to enter into meaningful alliances with the African working class.

The underlying assumption in this argument is that throughout the twentieth century, African middle classes have appeared and disappeared at the whim of the state. And the Nationalist government, having cleared the city of all African communities, and used the amended act, (the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1945) to deny urban Africans entrepreneurial opportunities thus making them almost all dependant on wage labour. (1). Reacting to the crisis of the mid-1970s, the Vorster government attempted to introduce some reforms in 1975. After the 1976-1977 countrywide uprisings, the government hastened the reform programme it started in 1975. The most significant shift in government policy started in 1975 was granting urban African communities thirty-year leaseholds on their properties. These legislative enactments and administrative measures helped the government to destroy completely an African middle class (from 1955) and then recreate it after 1975 because it was politically expedient to do so. But, one does not have to attain high levels of analytical and theoretical sophistication to know that "legislative enactments and administrative fiat never created classes and have little force in shaping the substance and context of class struggle unless the material conditions are also propitious" (3) (own emphasis)

When the government re-opened the Western Areas Scheme in 1950 and completed it in 1960, it had set itself the task of undermining the material conditions of the Western Areas communities so as to rationalise its crisis-ridden labour supply policies of the 1940s and the 1950s. The destruction of Sophiatown and its sister suburbs, Newclare and Martindale would have and contribute toward the resolving of this crisis. The free-hold suburb's role in generating a crisis of labour is not a mystery. Most Africans entering the urban areas, especially Johannesburg between 1935 and 1945 were from white farms. During the second half of the 1940s, labour shortage on white farms had reached alarming proportions. On the other hand, white semi-skilled and unskilled labourers were threatened by this massive labour reserve. These

two classes would be served best by a more rigorous policy of influx control. But, in the context of the 1940s and 1950s, any policy was destined to fail unless the free-hold townships were destroyed. This would deprive all Africans of free-hold rights and they would cease to own property and thus swell the ranks of the working class. Secondly, because locations would be easy to administer, those who did not qualify under section 10(1)(a) of the Natives (Abolition and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952, would be easily apprehended, charged for contravening pass regulations and sentenced to farm labour. (4) This would guarantee an even supply of labour to farms and manufacturing industries in the towns. (5) These gains on the part of the government became evident in the 1960s. The boom of the 1960s was accompanied by a calm and acquiescence reminiscent of the years of "anguished impotence". (6) Then came the economic slump of the 1970s accompanied by worker action culminating in the 1973 Durban strike and the nation-wide protest three years later.

During this period the Apartheid government applied the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1945 within the broadest framework outlined in the Sauer Report. (7) However, this was executed in a piece-meal manner, with repeated amendments to meet the requirements of the time. The first of the major amendments came in 1959 when the minister of Bantu Administration and Development stressed that African entrepreneurs should be persuaded to transfer their assets to the Bantustans" (8) Again, further restrictions were introduced in 1963 limiting the number of businesses Africans could own to one and allowing them to sell only daily essentials for Africans. In 1968, much more stringent legal restrictions were placed on African entrepreneurship. These included the granting of arbitrary powers to the Administration Boards in the control of African entrepreneurs. These powers included allocating trading sites, approving alterations to existing buildings and finally, to show proof of homeland citizenship.

This policy was reversed when in 1975, "after a meeting between the prime minister, Department of Bantu Administration and homeland leaders, certain reforms affecting African traders were introduced" (9) Henceforth, licencing of African businesses was brought more in line with that for whites; 30-year leaseholds were reintroduced; Partnerships were legalised and homeland citizenship no longer entailed forfeiture of certain enterprises. The pace of these reforms quickened in the second half of the 1970s against the backdrop of the country-wide unrest of 1976-1977. One of the major consequences of these reforms has been the emergence of an African middle class in the 1980s with a considerable growth potential. But because the Apartheid state can easily "absorb the demands of the urban African bourgeoisie...it is chimerical to continue proposing, and hoping to establish an alliance of all 'nationally oppressed' classes which has as its aim the overthrow of Apartheid." (10)

The fragmentation of urban African working class communities is strikingly evident in African townships adjacent to Johannesburg. Throughout the 1980s, Soweto has been characterised by an obvious lack of appetite for confrontation. The significantly large middle class in Soweto has, no doubt, contained the militancy of the working class. But the emergence of this class cannot only be explained by changes in the legal restrictions imposed on urban Africans. Attempting to understand why Soweto was different from other African urban townships during the country-wide unrest beginning in 1983, J. Seekings has focused on sectoral and occupational categories applying to Soweto's residents. (11) Compared to urban Africans in the PWV area, Soweto's "household incomes are higher, chances of individual occupational mobility greater and the possibilities for workplace organisation (whether formal or informal) reduced." (12) Within Soweto itself, "processes of economic differentiation are particularly marked and are increasingly reflected in the social geography of Soweto." (13) And, "the pattern of employment of Soweto residents is important because it interacts with residential patterns and demands placed on township organisations." (14) However, the most crucial distinction Seekings has identified, is that between "Soweto's Southwestern townships (Naledi, Moletsane, Mapetla and Tladi) and Chiawelo, inhabited by more recent arrivals, Sotho/Tswana and Shangaan-speaking respectively, with slightly lower educational qualifications and incomes," (15) which contrast sharply with the predominantly middle class districts of Pheteni, Dube and Mofolo. By the end of the 1970s, "elite housing areas" in Soweto were Dube South, Orlando West Extension (Beverly Hills) and Rockville. (16)

To this latter group of townships should be added Diepkloof's oldest residential areas established between 1957 and 1959 when the government persuaded Sophiatown's intransigent African property-owners to accept the slightly bigger houses in Diepkloof on the understanding that they are offered on a 30-year leasehold (17), as compared to the insecurity of tenure attached to the Meadowlands housing scheme. Finally it would be curious to note that most families in this latter group of townships (especially those living in Dube, Rockville and Diepkloof) were former Sophiatown property-owners up to the time the township was destroyed. Most families in Orlando-West Extension (Beverly Hills) are the middle classes of the 1950s within Soweto. Dube South, as SM. Parnell has pointed out, was set up in 1946 by the United Party government as a model township for the urban African middle class. At first the houses were occupied by Soweto residents who could afford the higher costs attached to them. But after 1953, when it had become clear that the struggle for freehold tenure in Sophiatown was lost, some property-owners sold their stands and moved to Dube. (18) These decided to sell their properties even before the removals began in 1955 and settled in Dube.

In relocating the Sophiatown community in Soweto, the government made ethnic division a priority. However, to blunt the edge of resistance, class interests could not be completely ignored. The property-owners were given a better option (as compared to Meadowlands) to rent sites and build their own houses in Diepkloof and Dube on a thirty-year leasehold; or buy a house built by the government in Diepkloof. The Western Areas Resettlement Board's "strategy seems to have followed the line of least resistance." It began by moving tenants of non-African landlords, these being followed by African traders occupying Indian and Chinese-owned stands and finally, "from 1957, the by then isolated African property owners. (19) The latter group was split into two sections: one resettling in Dube South (Dr. Xuma was among these) and a significant number, together with a relatively wealthy tenant class resettled in Diepkloof. In the light of these developments starting from 1950 (when the Apartheid government re-opened the Western Areas Scheme) and 1973 (when new reforms were initiated by the Vorster administration) ceasing to view Africans as temporary sojourners in the urban areas it would be harshly simplistic to assume that under the sway of an increasingly repressive ideology, the homogeneity of Soweto's residential landscape was assumed after 1955.

By 1980, most Soweto residents (except for those born in the townships) came from either Sophiatown or Alexandra (as a consequence of the destruction of free-hold townships) (20) Others, especially those in Orlando, had moved into the area in the 1930s, when the government destroyed inner-city communities, relocating them to Orlando (21); and finally, as pressures increase on rural economies, there is a constant flow of people into the urban areas. At different times, these finally settled permanently.

Sophiatown has impressed itself upon the popular consciousness as a classical case of the consequences of community destruction. Community destruction is more common than obverse process of community formation in South Africa. (22) However, examining the process of community formation in Sophiatown offers fascinating insights.

Much has been written already on the historical origins of Sophiatown as a free-hold township. (23) What follows is a sketchy outline that places emphasis on demographic changes and how these shaped patterns of socialisation, family structures and forms of political mobilisation. Also, the changing racial, ethnic and social character of Sophiatown will be examined as variables that determine the form of community that the government destroys between 1955 and 1960. (24) Finally, it will be argued that from its origins, Sophiatown is characterised by a distinctly middle class culture that contrasts sharply with the working class and lumpen-proletarian culture of the slumyards that were destroyed from 1935. While I concede that the impact

of the shebeen culture of the slumyards cannot be ignored, I am particularly intrigued by the fact that historians chose to ignore the staying power of Sophiatown's early middle-class culture. This middle class culture also had a profound influence on both the rural Africans entering urban areas for the first time and those that had slipped into Sophiatown as the inner-city slums had been cleared. In a short story titled The Suit, Can Temba attempts to demonstrate how, even men of limited means strove for a middle class existence. More intriguing is the assertion that there was no material basis for the existence of a middle-class. (25), and also that the social and occupational proximity of landlords and tenants denied the former any opportunity to develop separate class and political identities. The history of Sophiatown and its "successor townships in Soweto" (Dube, Rockville and Diepkloof) is testimony to the capacity of African middle classes to adapt their threatened material basis to changing political and economic conditions and navigate the stormy seas. Indeed, "class interests and demands are always shaped by the specific conditions obtaining at a given moment in a society...and these cannot be overlooked when explaining the specific strategies pursued by agents in order to realise these goals." (26)

Working class communities tend to form around inner areas of the city. (27) Often, a working class culture evolves and finds its exponents mainly among an artisanal class that is capable of shaping a distinctly working class ideology. This is typical of working class communities in Britain and the United States. (28) But, South Africa is exceptional in this respect. Working class communities do form around the periphery of the city. (29) However, the questions raised in this paper are: Was Sophiatown a working class community? If it was, what processes allowed this working class to reach such levels of maturation? Was Sophiatown a community in a much more ideal sense of having developed an inner defensive unity and community solidarity in the face of an external threat?

Sophiatown, when first laid out in 1905 was reserved for occupation by Whites. (30) However, as early as 1912, the Chairman of the Parks and Estates Committee had observed that: "There are in Johannesburg suburbs some of the stands of which were sold to white men, and where Africans can now obtain ownership of stands on very reasonable terms." (31)

The community that grew in Sophiatown between 1912 and 1925 was of a mixed race. The 1921 census, however, show that Africans rapidly outnumbered other racial groups, reaching 1457 in that year; Coloureds numbered 900 and Whites slightly below 600. Asiatics numbered a mere 79 suggesting there were fewer of them buying up property throughout the 1910s. The 1921 census does not break down these figures to indicate the proportion of tenants to property-owners in respect of each racial group



However, it seems as if most Africans settling in Sophiatown in the 1910s would have been buying properties than renting single rooms, although tenants were also significant. This could be explained by the fact that wages were characteristically low in the 1910s and besides, it would have been more expensive commuting between Sophiatown and the workplace daily. Finally, the cost of renting a room in Sophiatown would have acted as a deterrent. Life in the slumyards, on the other hand, was much cheaper and did not entail an added transport cost. Rent, in most cases, did not feature as expenditure because employers provided accommodation in the backyards. When the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 was passed, and came into effect on 1 January 1924, the slumyards ceased to be a haven for recent arrivals in Johannesburg. (32)

Henceforth Sophiatown looked attractive to Africans entering Johannesburg for the first time starting from 1925. However, some of those entering the township come from the inner-city slumyards. By 1928, the population of Sophiatown had risen to 12 000 - a 300% increase from 1921. It took almost a decade before the Johannesburg City Council (JCC) could engage in full-scale slum clearance. (33) In spite of the empowering provisions of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, the Council had its proclamations declared null and void by the Supreme Court. So, the slumyards remained. This meant that represented in this massive increase of the population between 1926 and 1936, were the recent arrivals from the white farms. According to the Tomlinson Commission, by 1936, 46% of the urban black proletariat came from white farms and 8% came from the Bantu areas. Only 29% came from the town itself. Proctor estimates that by 1926, 600 families were entering Johannesburg. By 1931, Sophiatown's population had swelled to 17 000.

The most dramatic increase in the Western Areas' population occurs between 1937 and 1950. During this period, the population increases from 35 000 to 66 000 and Sophiatown absorbed more than half the population of the Western Areas. (35)

As the African population of Sophiatown increased, its white community decreased considerably. By 1937 there were only 13 whites living in Sophiatown. What these statistics do not reveal about each of the racial groups making up the Sophiatown community is the occupations, income levels, types of families and average numbers of these families. Nor, as stated earlier, whether the majority were tenants or owned the properties on which they lived. But, on the basis of available evidence, some generalisations could be made about the social character of Sophiatown in the 1910s and 1920s.

The white community in Sophiatown hardly features prominently in the political upheavals of the 1910s and the 1920s. For instance, there is no evidence of a link between the events of 1913



to 1914 and Sophiatown's white community when white labour militants went on strike. Nor is there anything that suggests that they could have been drawn into the Rand strikes of 1922. They seem to be of a middle class character in the context of the time. Throughout the 1910s and 1920s they are hardly ever prominent in any political activity. They contrast sharply with working class and poor white communities of Vrededorp and Doornfontein. The fact that very early on the live side-by-side with Africans show that they do not feel threatened by their neighbours until after 1925. Whereas it was white working class communities in inner-city slums who dealt in illicit liquor during the height of the Prohibition, the white community of Sophiatown was unaffected. As Sophiatown's African population increases, whites felt threatened and left. What developed as a serene, almost idyllic suburb in the 1910s and 1920s was fast becoming a ghetto. Developments after 1925 prompted a councillor, Colonel Jackson, to remark that "slums have been created in a township which in point of position and space could be made into a model Native suburb. Yards, quiet as they were yesterday are known to be the drinking dens of Sophiatown's week-ends." (36) The Rand Daily Mail ran a series of articles publicising the disease-ridden overcrowded and dilapidated conditions of the township." (37) These sentiments expressed the concern for the preservation of a middle class atmosphere that hitherto characterised Sophiatown. When the police station was set up in Newlands, the JCC declared that it would protect the interests of both Whites and Africans in the area. (38)

Similarly, the African population of Sophiatown, in the first two decades, seem to be steeped in middle class values. The hypothesis made earlier, that most of them may have been members of property-owning families is significant. Given the higher cost of living in Sophiatown as compared to the slumyards, most people resident in Sophiatown would have either been wealthy landlords or relatively well-to-do tenants, with ambitions of one day owning their properties. Although there is little evidence of social interaction between them and their white neighbours, there is a possibility that they assimilated some of the middle class values upheld by the latter. This is reflected in such behaviour traits as temperance, regular church-going, emphasis on education for children and an impending covetousness. (Interview with Mr. Rabetele). More significant is the fact that these lived in whole and sometimes extended families (Interviews with Mr. Lekgeni and Mr. Diale in Diepkloof, Zone 1). In some cases, tenants were close relatives for whom rural impoverishment was more dramatic. It is these middle class attributes that were threatened by the new influx into Sophiatown. But, the irony of it all is that the influx of families into Sophiatown ensured continued survival of the landlord class. Exorbitant rents charged on single-rooms rented to families were a significant



factor in the engendering of a cash crisis. Moreover, it was possible to repay bonds and save the family from going down under. Throughout the period 1935 to 1950 Sophiatown property-owners (the core of the township's middle class) were trapped in a 'catch-22' situation. Their middle class existence was threatened by recent arrivals, yet the latter brought relief from total ruin.

The specific political strategies pursued by this distinct middle class are also significant. In 1926 they organised themselves into the Non-European Ratepayers Association. (39) In the context of Sophiatown at the time, there was no immediate threat to their interest so as to necessitate organised action. The Association concerned itself with petitioning the local authorities for improved services. However, there was yet another, though deferred, reason to be alarmed. The JCC's futile attempt to implement proclamations provided for in the 1923 Act, once successful in the slumyards, would extend to Sophiatown. This alarm proved to have been real when, in 1933, the whole of Johannesburg, with the exception of Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare was proclaimed. (40) Henceforth the property-owners were locked into serious conflicts with the JCC over the extension of proclamations to the free-hold suburbs. This struggle, though highly significant, has been given little attention, being mentioned only in passing.

The JCC and other major urban authorities made an urgent representation to the government in 1935 to review the question of residence of natives in urban areas. (41) One of the demands of local authorities was to have control over influx control and fees derived therefrom. (42) The Young Commission, set up to enquire into and report on the questions objected strongly to these demands. The objections were based on fear of alienating "that vital controlling force, the African petty bourgeoisie. (43) Finally, the amendments to the original demands made by the local authorities became law in 1937. It still did not confer to the local authorities the control of influx except where the supply of labour greatly exceeded the demand. (44) The net effect is that Africans easily found ways round influx control regulations and increased the urban workforce. (45)

With the African petty bourgeoisie (especially the Sophiatown property-owner) having won a reprieve, courtesy of the central government's fear of alienating it, they used their resources - properties - to their fullest capacity. And their fullest capacity was not determined by the government, but by themselves. As the population of the Western Areas almost doubled in the thirteen years between 1937 and 1950 (rising from 35 000 to 66 000) the number of built-up stands increased from 2103 to 8352

during the same period. (46) This new lease on the lives of Sophiatown's landlords was also characterised by a calm atmosphere conducive to making maximum gains out of rack-renting - and they did (interview material). In 1939, the Second World War broke out, forcing the government to completely suspend influx control regulations in 1942 until the end of the war in 1945. The consequences were that families began migrating into Sophiatown in large numbers - placing housing facilities at a premium. But this gain was accompanied by tensions and conflicts between landlords and tenants which became decisive in breaking resistance to removals in 1955. It is to these tensions and conflicts that the paper now focuses.

The first assault on the serenity of Sophiatown's atmosphere, in the late 1920s proved to be of limited significance. The second, starting from 1935 was more dramatic, but is often exaggerated. In this section I examine the tensions that characterised the old and the new from 1935 to 1955 when Sophiatown was relocated.

Landlords and tenants entered into complex new relations. In some instances, tenants remember some landlords as having been full of compassion and very kind. In an interview with Mrs. Mashao, she remembers that their last landlord before they moved to Soweto was so kind he even helped them carry their belongings in his truck. Mrs. Dakile, a lady teacher in Sophiatown and very prominent in both the erstwhile Sophiatown up to the end of the 1950s and in Diepkloof since then, confirms this compassion among some property-owners. She points out that she was a young wife in the 1940s and her husband owned property. Women tenants, some much older than her, deferred to her. "Some called me Mme (mother)" indicating a sign of respect. (47)

However, in the majority of cases, tenants and landlords were at each other's throats. Landlords controlled the most crucial resources - space. They had rooms for renting; water; access to toilets and finally, and most decisively, they held the key to the establishment of shebeens in their yards. I will examine each of these resources and demonstrate how they relate to patterns of political mobilisation, starting with the last.

Liquor and shebeens have been central to the Marabi culture of the slumyard. While this culture formed and matured around inner-city working class communities, it only becomes a feature of Sophiatown's convivial weekends after 1925. Clearly it offended the middle class sensibilities of some, if not most. Insisting on temperance, they would refuse to rent rooms to any tenant found brewing liquor and selling it on their premises. A classical example of such landlords is Mr. Raletsebele, who admitted in an interview to have refused to accept and promptly evicted tenants who brewed and sold illicit liquor.

A: My father had two properties, one in Miller Street, where we had our family house; and the other was n Gibson Street.

Q: Did you, like other property owners, lock your taps at intervals?

A: Initially I did. But in Gibson Street it became difficult because some tenants returned home very late at night...Then I decided that those tenants in Gibson Street should immediately with their brewing business. They did, but shortly after, they were at it again. I threatened to call on the police but that did not help. So one day, I called in the police and actually showed them where the beer was concealed. That is, how I finally put a stop to brewing on my property. (48)

Illicit liquor brewing and dealing was the cornerstone of slumyard economies. But, during the 1910s and 1920s, Sophiatown, as I have shown, was little touched by the shebeen culture, the Marabi. When the local authorities attempted to enforce prohibition, it was the poor whites and the unemployed among them (especially Afrikaans-speaking) who took to the trade and illicitly distributed liquor. (49) These poor whites were referred to as drankwesie, perceived to be at the base of white society and considered to be, socially, in closer proximity with kaf-firkwesi (50). The sharp contrast between the social character of inner-city slums and communities and Sophiatown is reflected clearly in the sentiment expressed by Colonel Jackson, quoted earlier. He laments the lost opportunity of developing an ideal African suburb. This sentiment reflected the general attitudes of most property owners and Mr. Raletsebele's is no exception.

Prohibition as enforced by property-owners was linked to the tension around restrictions on water. Property owners (especially African property-owners) were always alarmed that excessive use of water increased the rates charged by the JCC for services provided. Brewing, requiring as it does large quantities of water, was strongly resented by some property-owners. This was besides the fact that shebeens tended to draw into the yards persons some property-owners would consider of to be of dubious character. (A series of interviews with Mr. Raletsebele, Mrs. Dakile and Mrs. Nhlapho)

Throughout the 1940s, Sophiatown remained relatively calm. The tensions and clashes between landlords and tenants loomed large throughout the decade, while the JCC had momentarily called a truce between itself and Sophiatown property-owners - a truce forced upon the JCC by the Native Laws Amendment Act. However, a resolution was taken again in 1944 to have the Western Areas removed. But again this resolution was left in abeyance for another six years.

Prohibition on brewing and closure of taps, it has been shown, were two causes of resentment among tenants. The third, and often most devastating to tenants was eviction. Given the low wage

levels of the 1930s and 1940s (51), and the ubiquity of tragedy in tenant families, failure to pay rent was a constant threat. Added to these pressures was the third, which often manifested itself in far-reaching and serious consequences - the high labour turnover during this period. Men lost jobs in quick succession. The loss of a job and of income inevitably led to eviction. Landlords (especially African landlords) were notorious for their intolerance to rent defaulters. In some cases, whole families were evicted with disheartening consequences. Some tenants contested their evictions in court (Interview with Mr Morolong) though this occurred very rarely. The fact that most tenants could not contest evictions in court could be explained by the fact that they probably did not qualify under pass laws to be in the urban areas - or if they did, they were legally assigned to controlled townships. However, in the 1940s, when families migrated to urban areas, the number of tenants seeking accommodation grew tremendously. Landlords often offered rooms to the highest bidder. (52) This generated greater resentments among tenants who were at times forced to make way for tenants offering higher rents - or pay higher rents themselves.

This accumulated tradition of tension and conflict between African landlords and tenants in Sophiatown cannot be overlooked especially when the timid resistance to removals in 1955 has to be explained. It is not only these tensions that set these two social classes apart. But, some crucial elements such as family structure, forms of socialisation, educational opportunities, the degree of christianisation\*, work attitudes and perceptions about social and upward mobility. All these are crucial distinguishing features that help decipher the complex social character of Sophiatown's community. Most of these elements however, fall outside the scope of this paper. I will, only briefly, discuss three of these elements. 1. Family structure 2. Educational Opportunities 3. The Influences of Christianity.

#### 1. Family Structure.

A great deal of studies on the making of African working classes tend to neglect family structures and how they shape broader social patterns. But, recently recognition has been given to family as crucial in determining political responses of specific social classes. (53) And in Sophiatown, as in its successor townships, the influence has been so great that it is inexplicable why the subject has been neglected.

As already stated, the census of 1921 show there were 1457 Africans living in the Western Areas of Sophiatown at the time. I have shown that there is a higher probability that Africans in the Western Areas at the time would have been property-owning families - sometimes extended families, though the possibility of a residential tenantry has not been completely left out. Unlike families forming around slumyards, which are essentially loose,



"vat-en-sit" associations (54), property-owning families are based on carefully conducted marriages, often having been consummated in the rural areas. There are no statistics outlining the average age of all persons living in the Western Areas in the 1920s. Nor are there statistics outlining the average of heads of families and also their level and sources of income. But oral testimony has done a lot to suggest crude generalisations. There is a combination of migrancy and industrial employment involving whole families. Share-cropping and labour tenancy were still highly rewarding. Land or property was being purchased by the patriarch, probably still resident in the rural areas and working in an "akoord" with a farmer. Having several wives (often two to three), and sons, he would have the eldest occupy the house on the property so purchased. In this way, families begin to form rather earlier. During the course of the decade, as labour tenants were being progressively pushed off the land, a tiny minority had opportunities of investing in properties in the urban areas. But, they cease to be semi-migrant as labour tenancy becomes increasingly less rewarding. This process takes definite shape from the middle of the 1930s. In the 1920s these African property-owning families live in modest houses, having erected shacks in the backyard for a tenant or two.

Tenants, on the other hand, were often male and unmarried. The sex-ratio changed dramatically in the 1930s as more women entered the area and sought work as domestic servants in the Northern suburbs of Johannesburg. (55) These were predominantly Tswana-speaking and settled mainly in Sophiatown. Yet another group of women, distinctly Sotho-speaking from Lesotho gravitated toward Newclare. These women rented single rooms or moved in with close relatives while job-hunting. The latter case explains the origins of sub-tenancy. In some cases, this temporary arrangement became permanent whether the sub-tenant finally found a job or not. And the sub-tenant might be joined by a spouse and consequently two families emerge, living in a single room. (56) The tendency (especially among the Tswana), was to send children to their grandparents in the villages. (56)

The 1950 survey has revealed that Sophiatown had an obvious preponderance of single-member families (27%) over Western Native Township (7%). More striking is the fact that 79% of males in free-hold townships were of working age, and 67% of females were also of working age. (57). In Sophiatown, where village ties, especially among the Tswana were still powerful, meant that most children grew up away from parents. In Newclare, where the Basotho, mainly MaRashea predominated is unclear. Crudely speaking, single-member families (27%) were tenants. So, these hardly lived in family circumstances of generally acceptable standards. Again, because tenants, especially Tswana-speaking were tightly linked with the village economies, they tended to focus more on developments there. (58) In a new setting, therefore, these

groups tend to retain some aspects of rural ideologies and fuse these with those obtaining in a new setting. (59). This is clearly evident in the kinds of social networks they create. (60)

## 2. Educational Opportunities.

Property-owners lived with their children as early as the 1910s. Very early on education had become central to the upbringing of children in these families. By the 1920s and 1930s, a significant number of children of these property-owning families were in such prominent mission schools as Adams College, Marianhill in Natal and Maria-Zena in Matatiele. There is also the prominent Methodist school near Pietersburg. Finally there was the Institute Thaba-Nchu, Moroka Teacher Training Institute.

The urban African petty bourgeoisie of the 1940s and 1950s had a strong influence of mission education. Sophiatown was also significant in this regard. Hence, "at its (Sophiatown's) apex was a petty bourgeoisie, consisting of professional people, teachers and ministers, clerical workers as well as traders, craftsmen and landlords." (61) So, when the government moved in 1951 to take over the mission schools (62), it must have touched upon an issue too crucial and sensitive to this social group. However, there is no evidence of a clearly, consciously orchestrated opposition by this class to the introduction of Bantu Education. On the contrary, it appears to have derived support first from the under-classes before they themselves saw in Bantu Education an opportunity to have their children educated. (63) Throughout the 1960s and half of the 1970s, these boarding schools remained the last bastion of middle class education. When, toward the end of the 1960s Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana became independent, these families sent their children to schools in those countries in the 1970s. Schools like Maru-a-pula in Botswana and Waterford in Swaziland (with excellent academic standards) were the haven of children from such families. The ultimate ambition for these children would be university education either in the same countries or abroad - Britain and the USA. This became an increasing trend in the 1980s (Interview with Mr Diale). It is tentatively suggested that these form the core of the urban African middle class of the 1980s and 1990s.

## 3. Church and Christianity.

The impact of mission churches in Sophiatown have been depicted as having been almost dramatic. (64) To broaden their constituencies, mission churches provided education and set up other welfare structures. Some prominent clerics (Father Huddleston) are said to have wielded so much influence that most people became endeared towards him. In short, church was a powerful institution that affected residents at almost every turn.

However, caution is advised. Church also tended to reflect the broader social divide. Although church membership did cut across both tenant and landlord class, the latter had internalised Christian values much more profoundly (Interview with Mrs. Dakile). Tenants tended to respond to a different set of social and family problems which placed too high a premium on leisure time. "My tenants did not attend church regularly. They drank heavily over the weekends and spent more time fighting". (Interview with Mr. Dakile) Some respondents have suggested that weekends and holidays were spent with children and their grandparents in the countryside. (65) In a sense, many tenants attended churches, though Christian values were not fully internalised. Children from property-owning families on account of early experience with scriptures and fully appreciate Christian values. This also helped to shape their attitude to crime.

By the end of the 1940s, that is the type of community that has emerged. In any conflict there are winners and losers. Tenants who lost the battle against evictions tended to slide further down the social ladder. The ultimate fate of most of these was to join the servile class known in the township argot as diepamokoti (Interview with Mr. Webber) The literal meaning of this word is "trench-digger". Diepamokoti were found around shebeens. They were given free accommodation and food for performing almost all household chores. However, they derive their name from one major activity - digging trenches used to conceal liquor and having the responsibility of hiding barrels of illicit brew. The reason for this is simple. Where the wife of a landlord was also a brewer, she would not be caught in the act of hiding liquor. This was contrary to social convention. A seepamokoti (singular - seepa ; plural - diepamokoti) could be arrested, convicted and fined, where upon the landlord would pay the fine.

With these powerful centrifugal forces at work, Sophiatown was faced with extinction - when, in 1950, the JCC re-opened discussions on the Western Areas. What remained to be seen was whether Sophiatown would live up to its reputation as "the hotbed of African resistance". (66) Would the community, in defence of itself, draw on the accumulated tradition of defensiveness and inner unity? (67)

The years 1949-1950 represent a turning point in the political character of Sophiatown. In 1949 the community embarks on a massive boycott of trams that lasted for three months. (68). In 1950 there are three isolated incidents of clashes between residents and police. (69) The first is caused by the intransigence of a pass offender, whereupon the residents joined in the scuffle (70); the second arises from a policeman's attempt to arrest a man in possession of illegal brew. Again the crowd intervenes and a riot develops. The last, well organised action was the Nav

Day stay-away called to protest the banning of leading SACP and Indian Congress members. At the end of the May Day riot, thirteen people had died.

A closer analysis of these events would reveal that ascribing the spirit of community defensiveness and unity to the events is exaggerated. In respect of the tram boycotts for instance, the evidence tends to contradict the claim. Not all residents used trams. Those towards the centre of the township used buses and were unaffected by the rise in tram fares. In effect, because trams moved in routs running almost on the outskirts of Sophiatown, it was the residents of Western Native Township who were greatly affected (Interview with Mrs. Mhlapo)

Secondly, the arrest for the illicit brew occurs in Newclare, where brewing is more central to the local economy than in Sophiatown because of the preponderance of absentee landlordism\*.

Thirdly, the May Day stay-away was clearly well supported. But, whether there was clarity on the issues is an entirely different matter. The scepticism toward non-Africans may have been cleared at the level of leadership. But, it is doubtful whether the masses had adjusted to this shift from the policies of the 1940s. Indeed, the support may have been occasioned by the fact that one of the affected people - J.B Marks was popular in the Western Areas. On the other hand, it seems Marks was known more for his trade union work - especially among miners - than as a community leader. (71)

Ironically, the events of 1949-1950 had the effect of hardening the government's resolve in removing the Western Areas, (72) The JCC and the white community in adjacent suburbs cited the violence of recent months as reason for wanting to speed up the process of removals. Historians have responded insensitively to the "alarmist" nature of government reports. Unrest, prior to 1960, is always exaggerated in official records. The reason is simple - the government had to justify the need to remove Africans from the periphery of the city. The alarmist tone of government reports changed after 1976 - it always assured the white community that "the situation in Black townships is tense, but calm" when in some instances, scores of people had died with the government having full knowledge of the details.

By 1951 it had become clear that removals were a priority in both local and central government policy. (73) Once again, property-owners geared themselves for yet another round of struggle with the JCC. This time, the issue was not longer proclamation, but removal to Soweto. Property-owners re-constituted themselves and formed an "Action-Committee" (74) The ANC did not involve itself in the campaign until 1953 when the Defiance Campaign had dissipated. In that year the JCC, having laid the foundation for the removals sold Meadowlands to the central government, declar-



ing at the same time that it had no responsibility for the scheme. (75) Up until then, African Anti-Expropriation, Ratepayers Association (AAERA) had continued a " desultory and unrewarding correspondence with, firstly, the Minister of Native Affairs, and later, the City Council. (76) When they failed to make any impression, the plight of the Western Areas were publicised countrywide and internationally, and conferences were held as far afield as Durban. But the government, having dispensed with the JCC and set up the Western Areas Resettlement Board, moved relentlessly towards actualising removals. (77)

By the second half of 1954, the rhetoric of the resistance movement had changed - beginning to address tenants. Tenants were reminded that loss of free-hold rights for property-owners would remove any possibility of their (tenants) acquiring their own properties. (78) Nothing is heard of tenant participation until the first day of removals, when they load their goods onto trucks and headed for Meadowlands. Attempts were made to deploy youth gangs, with little success. (79) Frankly, there is no substantial evidence to show that the ANC had a plan to thwart the government's scheme at the very last moment. Equally contentious is the social composition of the marchers on the day of removals. Allegations that the Freedom Volunteers were sons and daughters of property-owners were not far-fetched.

As I mentioned earlier, property-owning families were often extended families and some relatives could at the same time be tenants. Diepamokoti (trench-diggers) would at times be fully incorporated into the family and even adopt the family name. The surnames they adopt would have been the landlord's surname. In this way they could be taken together with the family and resettled without falling prey to police-screening (Interviews with Meadowlands residents). However, this would not entail freedom from their servile duties.

In fact, the method of screening itself had too many loopholes. For instance, those who were applying for passes for the first time only had to prove they had been living in Sophiatown for five years and more. To qualify, the applicant had to answer certain questions about Sophiatown. (80) One would be asked questions like, "Whose house is the biggest in Toby Street?", whereupon the applicant would answer: "Dr. Xuma's" If you had been living in Sophiatown for five years or more, you would be familiar with such details and would thus easily qualify. (81)

It is at this time that a system of lodger-permits in the locations was intensified. (82)

Young single men in regular employment could apply for lodgers permits which were often readily granted. (83) It has to be borne in mind that at this stage the Western Areas Resettlement Board was eager to remove as many people than it was of screening

them properly. In fact, even those who had just arrived saw in registering themselves an opportunity of getting a house in Meadowlands. (84) The other option available to single, young men was the hostels. (The 1950 survey) That young unmarried men were alarmed by the prospects of being huddled into labour camps and therefore called for an armed resistance (85) only serves to deepen the myth that Sophiatown has been steeped in.

The powerful centrifugal forces that tore the community have either been deliberately downplayed (by Nationalist bourgeoisie academics) or taken for granted (by materialist historians). The general picture that emerges is one of a community - and community in the strictest sense. The underlying assumption is, as Nationalist theoreticians would like us to believe, that Sophiatown was a community that suffered national oppression and therefore was mobilised regardless of different class positions and interests. On the other hand, materialist historians have pointed to the narrowness of the material base. Hence, in South Africa, there are merely "black middle class" strata of tightly limited social mobility whose fate is linked with that of worker and peasant. (86) Evidence analysed in this paper shows that there were major clashes of interests as well as structural cleavages that could not be easily covered up by such popular issues as removals. The forces at play during the period 1935 to 1950 are crucial in determining the tenacity of "internal defensiveness" presupposed to be the hallmark of any community. Again, such "internal defensiveness" is often demonstrated by a cohesive response to an external threat. But in the case of Sophiatown, removals were a threat to free-hold rights (landlord's privileges) whereas Meadowlands provided an amelioration of declining housing standards (tenant's anxieties) Clearly, a consciously formulated strategy for an alliance between landlords and tenants was required. In themselves, the objective conditions could not miraculously produce such an alliance.

The argument that the African middle class in South Africa is having a narrow space in which to become upwardly-mobile and makes it undifferentiated from the under classes, is anomalous. This conclusion is arrived at on the basis of economic indicators. Income levels, property-ownership and the size of enterprises in Sophiatown have been characterised as having been so marginal that class differentiation has been completely ruled out. But, these economic indicators are not adequate explanatory tools to use in deciphering the complex class structure of Sophiatown's community. During the 1910s and 1920s, a significant proportion of Sophiatown's families were partly dependant on various forms of labour tenancy in the rural areas and industrial or mining employment in the towns. Hence, the material basis was more extensive than is often reckoned.

In conclusion, I will tie up some loose ends in this paper. I argue, in the beginning that state legislation and administrative measures have limited force in shaping the "context and substance of class struggle" ( in the urban areas) as TJ Keegan has demonstrated in respect of capital accumulation in the countryside. It therefore cannot be assumed that during the period 1960 and 1975, through legislation, all Africans in urban areas, including the PWV area, were turned into working classes. Having assumed this scholars have been led to view the reform of state policy starting from 1975 as the first step towards creating a middle class. On the contrary I argue, the middle class of the 1940s and 1950s were not completely destroyed at the end of the latter decade. Because it survived in a variety of forms, chief of which was the ability to reproduce itself, though in limited quantities, through education. I have shown that they sent their children to relatively elite schools (to surviving mission schools - between 1960-1970) then to elite schools with excellent academic standards in Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. The ultimate for these has often been a degree in the USA or Britain and subsequently a top position in the corporate world in the 1980s. Though this is a crude generalisation, a more sensitive research will most likely reveal a picture that closely approximates the above generalisation.

Housing shows the limitations of legislation in shaping the context of class struggle. I proceed to examine how a geography of class emerges in Soweto. Relying heavily on Seekings's paper, I show that the class-divided landscape of Soweto in the 1960s and 1970s was a necessary concession the government had to make, to implement the thorny Western Areas Scheme from the second half of the 1950s to the end of the decade. I may add that it is no coincidence that those townships that Seeking has characterised as being middle class in the period 1978-1984, (Dybe South, Rockville and Diepkloof\*), are associated mainly with the government's pacifist policies toward Sophiatown's \*middle classes of the 1950s, especially property-owning middle classes. It is also no coincidence that in the Johannesburg area, it is children of families from these townships who dominate the corporate world and raise questions of the possible alliances they will enter into in the future. Crucial amongst these questions is whether they will enter alliances with the African working class or became instruments in the hands of the state and white capital. But, with the experiences of the 1950s (especially the removals issue), it is clear that class cleavages, whatever form they take, have to be given full recognition. The narrowness of the material bases do not necessarily preclude different class interests obtaining - each struggling for hegemony. I conclude here by pointing out that the early Sophiatown community, with its serene atmosphere and middle class pretensions, had twice suffered large-scale assault before the removals in 1955. In both occasions, it survived: first it was the dramatic impact that the slumyard culture had on Sophiatown in the late 1920s and

throughout the 1930s. But, Sophiatown middle classes tolerated this assault on their middle class sensibilities because it also meant more shacks, higher rentals and the sudden availability of cash to repay bonds.

The second assault on Sophiatown middle class culture, also begins in the second half of the 1920s. Recent arrivals, the majority of them from the rural areas settled in the township. Toward the end of the 1930s, and during the war, new waves of African people entered the freehold townships. According to the survey of 1950, Sophiatown absorbed more than half of these. I have shown how Sophiatown property-owners (enticed by financial rewards) welcomed this new intrusion. But, wherever they could, they defended their system of values, as in enforcing liquor prohibition on their properties.

The third and last assault on Sophiatown's community (on this occasion the community had grown to include the two distinct groups examined above) came in 1955 when the township was destroyed. This has far-reaching implications, especially for political mobilisation. By 1950, few people living in Sophiatown had been there for 20 years hence. The 1950 survey reveals that by the end of the 1940s, 66% of the heads of families had lived in Johannesburg for 10 years and over, and over 98% had lived there for more than 2 years. A community that is so fluid and transient could never have developed an inner defensiveness, let alone develop a tradition of political militancy. How then do we explain the highly glamorised tradition of existence if the Sophiatown community. Elsewhere in the paper, I have shown how the tram boycott was an issue more of Western Native Township residents than Sophiatown's community. Secondly, illicit brewing was more central to the Newclare's informal sector than it was to Sophiatown.

The other, almost neglected reason for exaggerating the extent and frequency of political protest prior to 1950 is the "alarmist" tone of the state records. There was a tendency to sensationalise African violence as this would fuel the urgent call to have Africans moved to the outskirts of Johannesburg. The tone of government reports after 1976, no matter how serious an unrest incident is always punctuated by: "All is tense but calm in the black townships." But, prior to 1950, the emphasis has always been on 'swart gevaar', which, the government and the JCC argued could only be kept contained when Africans have been removed to their separate locations. In consulting government records (especially reports by police departments based on information supplied by police informers), historians have to be weary of the alarmist tone of these reports. This is particularly true of the period between the wars, a period often characterised as one of "anguished impotence." Hence, when Sophiatown is threatened with destruction, there is no accumulated tradition to draw from to deal with this menace. In fact, the events of 1949-1950



described earlier, and the squatter movement of 1952 has been used by the authorities to justify the immediate destruction and removal of these communities.

The most important argument raised in this paper is that community-formation, though a neglected area of study, is also crucial. I examine the peculiarities of community-formation in Sophiatown, suggesting that during the first three decades of the twentieth century (1912-1932) an essentially middle class community has taken form. I argue that the township's middle class does not easily give way to shebeen culture of the slumyards, or to the essentially rural culture transmitted by recent arrivals. It even survives the post 1960 period.

3. Kuper, L.: "Sociological Theory, African Class Formation and the Native Land Act of 1913", in Kuper, L. and Kuper, A. (eds) *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa, 1913-1930*.

4. Hinde, D.: "The Pass System and the Formation of an Urban African Proletariat: A Critique of the Cheap Labour Thesis", unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 1985.

5. Hinde, D.: *Pass Control and the Urban African Proletariat*, Harlow Press, Johannesburg, 1987, pp. 85-87.

Here Hinde shows that different schemes were operated by the government to stabilize labour requirements of farmers. Though most were legally entering the urban areas, they were refused work-seeker permits and sent to farms. But, around labour predated on the farms from the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s.

6. Hinde, op cit.

7. Hinde and Sarikinsky, op cit., p. 112.

8. Hinde and Sarikinsky, op cit., p. 112.

9. Hinde and Sarikinsky, op cit., p. 112.

10. Hinde and Sarikinsky, op cit., p. 112.

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES:

1. Hudson, P. and Sarakinsky, M.; "Class Interests and Politics": The Case of the Urban African Bourgeoisie." in South Review, No. 3, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1986.

2. Hudson and Sarakinsky, recognising the emergence of an urban African middle class in the 1980s, argue that the state and white capital has, since 1975, deliberately and successfully nurtured this class. This is based on the assumption that because state policy was highly repressive between 1960 and 1975, urban African communities were denied any opportunity to rise above forms of wage labour. Having lost the battle for free-hold and its related sources of income, Africans could only become entrepreneurs to escape the harsh realities of full proletarianisation.

But, proclamations passed between 1959 and 1874, based on the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1945 effectively deprived urban Africans of any significant entrepreneurial opportunities.

3. Keegan, TJ; "Sharecropping Economy, African Class Formation and the Native Land Act on the Highveld Maize Belt", in Marks, S. and Rathbone, R. (eds) Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa, 1870-1930.

4. Hindson, D.; "The Pass System and the Formation of an Urban African Proletariat: A Critique of the Cheap Labour Power Thesis"; unpublished doctoral thesis; University of Sussex; 1983.

5. Hindson, D.; Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat; Ravan Press; Johannesburg; 1987; pp65-67.

Here Hindson shows that different schemes were operated by the government to stabilise labour requirements of farmers. Though most were legally entering the urban areas, they were refused work-seeker permits and sent to farms. But, prison labour predominated on the farms from the late 1950s and throughout the 1970s.

6. Hindson, *op cit.*

7. Hudson and Sarakinsky, *op cit.*; p172.

8. Hudson and Sarakinsky, *op cit.*; p172.

9. Hudson and Sarakinsky, *op cit.*; p173.

10. Hudson and Sarakinsky, *op cit.*; p182.



11. Seekings, J.; "Why was Soweto different: urban development, township politics and the political economy of Soweto, 1977-1984;
12. Ibid.; p2.
13. Ibid.; p2.
14. Ibid.; p3.
15. Ibid.; p3.
16. Ibid.; p3.
17. Lebelo, M.; "Sophiatown Removals, Relocation and Political Quiescence in the Rand Townships, 1950-1965", Honours Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand; 1988.
18. Ibid.; p100.
19. Lodge, T.; "The Destruction of Sophiatown", in Bozzoli, B. (ed): Town and Countryside in the Transvaal.
20. Lebelo, M.; op cit.; pp112-121.
21. Koch, E.; "Doornfontein and its African Working Class: A study of Popular Culture in Johannesburg."; MA; University of the Witwatersrand; 1983; p205.
22. Bozzoli, B.; "Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of South African Society", in Bozzoli, B. (ed): Class, Community and Conflict, p34.
23. Lodge, T.; op cit.; Proctor, A.; "Class Struggle, Segregation and the City: a history of Sophiatown, 1905-1940", in Bozzoli, B. (ed): Labour, Township and Protest.
24. Lebelo, M.; op cit.
25. Lodge, T.; op cit.; pp342-343.
26. Hudson and Sarakinsky.
27. Bozzoli, B.; op cit.; p27.
28. Bozzoli, B.; op cit.; p7.
29. Bozzoli, B.; op cit.; p27.
30. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p339.

31. Ibid.; p57-58.

32. Koch, E.; op cit.; pp203-205. According to Koch, the Proclamations of the 1930s reflected the central government's concern with the reproduction of the urban African proletariat and removed the provision that the JCC's slum clearance scheme should be preceded by the provision of housing for Africans so removed. However, this had other consequences for the patterns of settlement in the 1930s. It had become far more difficult for rural Africans to enter the city without proof of accommodation being available for them in a municipal location or hostel. They then slipped into the free-hold townships to avoid detection. Sophiatown absorbed more than half of these.

33. Ibid.

34. Proctor, SM.; op cit.; It appears that most of the recent arrivals in Sophiatown between 1925 and 1934 were from the white farms. The slumyards, due to the Supreme Court's decision to declare the proclamations made under the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 ultra vires, were not cleared until 1935. Consequently, most people entering Sophiatown were most likely to come from the white farms, until the orders were renewed in earnest after 1931.

35. Summary report on the 1950 Non-European Affairs Department Survey on the Western Areas of Johannesburg, pp3-7. (hereafter - survey).

36. See Proctor, SM.; op cit.; p63.

37. Ibid.; p66; This conflict reflects the strategic position that the African petty bourgeoisie held in the triangle of power between itself, the JCC and the central government. The latter, for fear of alienating this class, protected it from the JCC.

44. Proctor, SM.; op cit.; p67.

45. Ibid.; p68.

46. Survey, pp3-7.

47. Interview with Mrs. Dakile.

48. Interview with Mr. Raletelele, p8 of the interview transcript.

49. Eales, K.; "Class, Race and Liquor: Towards Understanding of Prohibition in South Africa, 1902-1918."; pp16-19.

50. Eales, K.; op cit.; p38.

51. Proctor, SM.; op cit.; p67.

52. JJ. Matlou, an ANC official in Sophiatown, told a public meeting that the malpractices of some landlords against would not be forgiven, though at that moment, he called on the entire community to unite against the government. Of the malpractices of landlords, the most resentful was the eviction of tenants to make way for those offering higher rentals.

53. See Bonner, P.; "Family, Crime and Political Consciousness on the East Rand, 1939-1955"; Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 14; no. 3; April 1988.

54. Koch, E.; op cit.

55. See Bozzoli, B.; Labour, Township and Protest.

56. Interview with Mrs. Dakile.

57. Survey, pp5-9.

58. Venable, H.; "Orthodoxy and Counter-orthodoxy in Bethel...".

59. Bozzoli, B.; "Class, Community and Ideology", in Bozzoli, B: Class, Community and Conflict.

60. Lebelo, M.; "Sophiatown Removals, Relocation and Political Quiescence in the Rand Townships, 1950-1965."

61. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p342.

62. Hyslop, J.; "A Destruction Coming In: Bantu Education As Response to Social Crisis".

63. Feit, E.; "Conflict and Communication: An Analysis of the Western Areas and Bantu Education Campaigns of the African National Congress of South Africa."; Phd. Thesis; University of Michigan; 1967.

64.

65. Interviews with Mrs. Dakile, Mrs. Malindi and Mr. Makoe.

66. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p346.

67. Bozzoli, B.; "Class, Community and Ideology.", in Bozzoli, B.: Class, Community and Conflict; p28.

68. Lodge, T.; op cit.; pp346-348.

69. Ibid.; p347.



70. Ibid.; p348.
71. Dunbar Moodie, T.; "The Moral Economy of the 1946 Mineworkers Strike."
72. Survey, ppl-3.
73. Lebelo, M.; op cit.; p352.
74. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p352.
75. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p352.
76. Ibid.; p352.
77. Lebelo, M.; op cit.;
78. Ibid.; p98.
79. Lodge, T.; op cit.; p356.
80. Interviews with Mr. Raletsebele and Mr. Webber.
81. Interview, Mr. Webber.
82. Interview, Mr. Webber.
83. Interview, Mr. Webber.