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# The theory and practice of military disengagement: Nigeria 1975-1979

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proceedings and evaluation for a future Nigeria. To this end foreign instructors at the C&SC have been slowly eliminated so that they are no longer a factor. Ogwu said that the Nigerian officer corps has an orientation (rather than ideology) which is essentially economic. This is not seen as a capitalist ideology per se. Such a conclusion would of course be challenged by such socialists as Edwin Madunagu, a member of the Guardian's editorial board.

General Olusagun Obasanjo said in a television interview reported in the Daily Times, 17 January 1979, that he did not believe in the wholesale adaptation or adoption of the way of life of any society. 'I believe that our search should start from inside and that does not mean that what is good in other societies cannot be adopted and adapted to our society.' Theoretically, this appeared to open the door to an external ideology. But the primary emphasis remained with an indigenous orientation.

40. The reconstituted SMC announced by Murtala Muhammed on 30 July 1975 contained nine Brigadiers, one Commodore (Navy), four Colonels (one Air Force), two Captains (Navy), one Inspector General (Police), three Lieutenant-Colonels, one Commissioner of Police, one Lieutenant-Commander (Navy) - a total of twenty-two service officers.

41. See A.B. AKINYEMI, R.A. AFINDELE, M.A. VOGT, I. ALUKO & O. EDE, Disarmament and Development: Utilization of Resources For Military Purposes in Black Africa, (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs), Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria, 1986, p.71. The Military Balance (The Institute for Strategic Studies, London) puts the number at 200,000 in the 1975-1976 issue (p.42) and at 221,000 in the 1976-1977 issue (p.43). There is no explanation given for the recorded increase. It seems likely that accuracy and source of tabulation were questionable. Most Nigerian sources put the figure at 250,000 for 1975.

42. Professor Adekanye places the figure at over 500 officers purged. See J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE, The Retired Military as Emergent Power Factor in Nigeria, Ibadan: Hienemann, forthcoming. This work examines the period from 1970 to 1985, during which over 10,000 individuals were dismissed or retired. In trying to ascertain the criteria by which such a purge could proceed, I was informed by university staff at one of Nigeria's campuses that many were dismissed because they had been either too vocal or visible for their own good. Their political associations were also a factor. But it was agreed that many of the dismissals had no apparent logic and could only be seen as arbitrary, i.e. quotas for dismissals had to be fulfilled.

Under Gowon university staff had been threatened with dismissal if they did not desist in vocal political pronouncements against his regime; this began in 1973.

43. See Brigadier O. Obasanjo's speech to Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Departments in O. Oyediran & A. Gboyega, op.cit., pp.251-253.

44. The rationale for this move followed that of the Brazilian relocation of their capital to Brazilia. Even the layout of the city would have the same butterfly configuration.

45. With regard to the economy, M.O.A. ADEJUGBE writes: 'The Mohammed/Obasanjo rule was little more than a continuation of the previous one. The economic policies did not appreciably alter.' See 'Nigeria's Industrial Policies and Performance in the Military Era', in F. Kayode (ed), The Nigerian Economy Under the Military, (Proceedings of the 1980 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society), 1980, p.266.

46. A steel project had long been discussed and the Gipromez report was submitted in 1967. Actual construction began in the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) and by September 1989 more than N28 billion had been invested, with the World Bank recommending that it be abandoned. See Daily Times for 6 September, 1989.

47. The public services are more vulnerable and visible to the charge of waste and corruption. They are also less capable of exercising leverage in their defense in a developing society that earmarks its investments for potentially productive sectors of society.

11

# STRUCTURES AND THE EXECUTIVE PHILOSOPHY

## STRUCTURE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Post-independence politics in Nigeria have elicited various responses by the institutional military including intervention. If one observes Nigerian socio-political-economic developments it becomes clear that accommodation has been made for ethnicity, as for example in the creation of new states. Increased political activity has followed and with the exigencies generated by a petroleum-based economy one can accurately speak, but with certain qualifications, of an increasingly internationalized and complex socio-economic context.

J. 'Bayo Adekson[1] writes that:

> After 1970, with the gargantuan task of post-war reconstruction that had to be tackled, the idea of rapid economic and technological growth, aimed at optimum utilisation of the country's potentialities both human and material with the view to making her the most prosperous and powerful in Black Africa, came to receive its most enthusiastic support from the military.

There is a growing complexity of government administration more, and more interaction with technocratic elements, and an increasing pool of socio-political experts and elite. This increasing complexity of national life as a whole has necessitated specific administrative adjustments and specialization on the parts of both civilian and military governments. To facilitate our study of the military's response to this increasing socio-political economic diversity, Figures 11.1, 11.3 and 11.4 reproduce Jemibowan's comparison of the organisation of different military administrations prior to military disengagement on 1 October 1979. Figure 11.2, by comparison, is taken from the 1967 Nigeria Year Book.

Figure 11.1

Administrative Structure adopted by Major-General Ironsi




* Decree No. 34 of 24 May 1966 replaced the former regions with provinces.[2]

Source: As Figure 11.4.

Figure 11.2

Composition of the National Military Government




Source: Nigeria Year Book 1967, A Daily Times publication, Apapa, Nigeria: Times Press, p.49.

Figure 11.3

Administrative Structure adopted by General Gowon




* Decree No. 14 of May 1967 divided Nigeria into twelve states.

Source: As Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.4

Administrative Structure adopted by General Muhammed




* Note that the attorney-general was a civilian participant.

Source: David M. Jemibewon (Brig.), A Combatant in Government, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria), 1978, pp.49-50.

From the military administration of General Ironsi to that of General Muhammed/Obasanjo there is an expanding structure of government. There is also an expanding participation of civilians in these structures so that in the example of the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration one witnesses not only the intricacies of the decision-making processes of the military in government but also a government with a largely civilian cabinet.[3]

With the assassination of General Muhammed on 13 February 1976[4] the newly established structure of government did not change. However a quick decision had to be made as to who would replace General Muhammed as the new Head of State and Commander-in-Chief. In the coup preceding the coup of July 1975 power had been vested, by the coup planners themselves, in the hands of three senior officers, namely Brigadiers Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma. After some debate concerning whether there would be a one-man or shared rule the arrangements were made. The coup planners of July 1975 had conceived a certain system of administrative responsibility. Lindsay Barrett[5] writes:

> Already the coup planners had voiced the opinion that Brigadier Danjuma should become the Chief of Army Staff because they felt he would command the greatest respect, and have the greatest effect as Army Chief. They also originated the idea of the Head of State and the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, sharing power at the administrative level.... The system was accepted and a new Government was born.

On 14 February 1976 General Obasanjo, who had been the Deputy Head of State as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, emerged as the new Head of State as selected by the SMC. This was the first time that a Yoruba had become Head of State. In the deliberation prior to this decision Obasanjo had wanted Danjuma to become the new Head of State. But Danjuma told Obasanjo to head the government while he (Danjuma) would give him his loyalty and take care of the Army.[6]

The administrative demarcation of political and military responsibilities created by the conspirators of 29 July 1975

continued under General Obasanjo as it had under General Muhammed. David Jemibewon writes:

> Instead of imposing himself on the armed forces, Muhammed/Obasanjo allows the chiefs of the armed forces the freedom to run their organizations. Questions of promotion, discipline and purchase of armed forces equipment and materials are looked into by the defence council and not the head of state as in Gowon's case. On the whole, the slogan of the administration is collective responsibility - a radical departure from the one-man show which Gowon represented.[7]

There is increasing evidence that the designation of separate political and military spheres of responsibility enabled the military to function in both roles with the minimum of polarization into governing and institutional adversaries, such as occurred in Brazil or under Gowon.

The SMC under General Obasanjo contained within itself several levels of influence. As a whole it continued as a consultative body proposing and debating issues affecting the nation and the military. The coup plotters of July 1975 continued to wield considerable influence in these deliberations. According to one source, 'Council conclusions in many cases did not follow consensus thus showing that many things were becoming precor[8]

The military government co[illegible] in the main the SMC, the Federal Executive Council (FEC), [illegible] the National Council of States (NCS) (see Figure 11.4). The SMC was the most powerful, acting as the executive and a Supreme Court. It concerned itself mostly with nationa[illegible] issues. The FEC was responsible for the day-to-day running of government mines, parastatals, etc. It normally met every week, barring the absence of the Head of State, for example on overseas trips. The NCS was a forum for the nineteen military governors, who provided input to the regime and carried out decisions made at higher levels. It met quarterly. All three councils, especially the FEC and the NCS, were subject to convene on demand. The President was head of these three organs of national leadership.

As mentioned above, the SMC contained several levels of influence. At the core there was the 'Dodan Mafia' of Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, and Danjuma. Olusegun Obasanjo had previously acted as negotiator for Muhammed, and there was no distinction in policy between them.[9] They were also the prime movers for the program of military disengagement. During the Muhammed/Obasanjo era General Danjuma was given the wherewithal to pursue the military agenda, which was largely conceived or modified by Danjuma himself.

The troika of Obasanjo-Yar'Adua-Danjuma was the supreme political and military authority within the structure of government. Obasanjo was substantive Head of State with Yar'Adua acting as his right hand man for political affairs, that is, in pursuance of the regime's political agenda. Yar'Adua, being of Northern origin, also acted as liaison for Obasanjo on issues concerning Northern interests. For example, in 1977-78 General Obasanjo decided to reduce the amount allocated for the Haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) from its high level of N150,000 ($234,000). To accomplish this the Head of State sent Yar'Adua, his Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, a Northerner and Muslim, to speak to Northern leaders. The decision to reduce funding for the Haj was thus effectively expunged of the ethno-religious connotations it would have had if the 'Christian-Southern' Head of State had tackled it alone. Consequently, expenditure for the Haj was reduced to N50,000 and to N20,000 ($31,201) immediately before the 1979 exit by the military. General Danjuma was Obasanjo's right hand man for military matters. His areas of concern could be broadly generalized as the institutional and professional development of the Army. He acted as both administrator and innovator in the restructuring of the Nigerian Army.

The Obasanjo-Yar'Adua-Danjuma (Dodan Barracks) Mafia was the critical element of the SMC core, which comprised six officers, the other three being Vice-Admiral Michael Adelanwa; Air Vice-Marshall John Yisa-Doko and Inspector General of Police, M.D. Yusuf[10] (see Figure 11.5).

Around this core were the other members of the SMC, not all of whom commanded equal authority and respect. In one of the peculiarities of militaries the world over, SMC members attributed greater status, that is, credibility and respectability, to those



The SMC Core, 1976-1979, (From left to right) Vice Admiral Michael Adelanwa (Navy); Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua (Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters); General Olusegun Obasanjo (President); Lt. General T.Y. Danjuma (Chief of Army Staff); Air Vice-Marshall John Yisa-Doko (Air Force); M.D. Yusuf (Inspector General of Police).

Photo: Lindsay BARRETT, Danjuma: The Making of a General, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1979.

officers who had had field commands during the Nigerian Civil War. Combat experience was thus a prerequisite for a semblance of equality among SMC members. It was also a prerequisite for influence. Those officers within the SMC who had not had the opportunity to be assigned field commands, through no fault of their own, were given less credence during council deliberations. To illustrate this point, there was an occasion on which a member of the SMC voiced his opinion during a discussion on policy. The SMC leadership, not approving of the officer's position on the issue under discussion, dismissed the officer by saying 'Be quiet [officer's first name],

Figure 11.5

Supreme Military Council (July 1975 - October 1979)

| | July 1975 | May 1976 | April 1977 | May 1978 | May 1979 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Head of State Commander in Chief | Brigadier Murtala Muhammed | Lt-General Olusegun Obasanjo | Olusegun Obasanjo | Olusegun Obasanjo | Olusegun Obasanjo |
| Chief of Staff Supreme HQs | Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo | Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua | Shehu Yar'Adua | Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua | Shehu Yar'Adua |
| Chief of Army Staff | Brigadier T.Y. Danjuma | Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma | T.Y. Danjuma | T.Y. Danjuma | T.Y. Danjuma |
| Chief of Naval Staff | Commodore M. Adelanwa | Rear Admiral M. Adelanwa | M. Adelanwa | M. Adelanwa | M. Adelanwa |
| Chief of Air Staff | Colonel John Yisa Doko | Air Commodore John Yisa Doko | John Yisa Doko | John Yisa Doko | Air Vice-Marshal John Yisa Doko |
| Inspector-General of Police | Alhaji M.D. Yussuf | M.D. Yussuf | M.D. Yussuf | M.D. Yussuf | M.D. Yussuf |
| GOC 1st Div. | Brigadier J.A. Akinrinade | Major-General J.A. Akinrinade | J.A. Akinrinade | | J.A. Akinrinade |
| GOC 2nd Div. | Brigadier M. Adamu | Major-General M. Adamu | M. Adamu | M. Adamu | |
| GOC 3rd Div. | Brigadier E. Abisoye | Major-General E. Abisoye | E. Abisoye | E. Abisoye | E. Abisoye |
| | Brigadier, (LGO) John Obada | Major-General (4th Div) G.S. Jalo | G.S. Jalo | G.S. Jalo | G.S. Jalo |
| | Colonel Joseph Garba | Joseph Garba | Brigadier Joseph Garba | Joseph Garba | Joseph Garba |
| | Lt-Colonel Shehu Yar'Adua | | | | |
| | Brigadier James Oluleye | Major-General James Oluleye | James Oluleye | James Oluleye | James Oluleye |
| | Brigadier Iliya Bisalla | Colonel (4th Div) M.I. Wushishi | Brigadier M.I. Wushishi | M.I. Wushishi | |
| | Colonel Ibrahim Babangida | Ibrahim Babangida | Ibrahim Babangida | Ibrahim Babangida | Brigadier Ibrahim Babangida |
| | Lt-Colonel (NAF) Muktar Muhammed | Muktar Muhammed | Wing-Commander Muktar Muhammed | Muktar Muhammed | |
| | Colonel Dan Suleiman | | Brigadier A. Mohammed | A. Mohammed | A. Mohammed |
| | Captain (NN) Olufemi Olumide | | Colonel M. Buhari | M. Buhari | Brigadier M. Buhari |
| | Captain (NN) H.H. Abdullahi | | Wing Commander I. Alfa | I. Alfa | |
| | Commissioner of Police Alhaji A. Suleman | Adamu Suleman | Adamu Suleman | Adamu Suleman | Adamu Suleman |
| | Lt-Colonel Alfred Aduloju | Alfred Aduloju | Colonel Alfred Aduloju | Alfred O. Aduloju | Brigadier Alfred O. Aduloju |
| | Lt-Commander (NN) Godwin Kanu | | Captain V.L. Oduwaiye | V.L. Oduwaiye | Commodore V.L. Oduwaiye |
| | | | Lt-Commander O.E. Ukiwe | | Commander N. Nkanu |
| | | | Buba Fika | Buba Fika | Buba Fika |
| | | | | Brigadier D. Bali | D. Bali |
| | | | | Commander Chijioke Kaja | Chijioke Kaja |
| | | | | | Group Captain Dan Suleiman |
| | | | | | Commodore H. Abdulahi |
| | | | | | Group Captain Mouktar Mohammed |

you're not a real officer!' which was followed by laughter.[11] This would be repeated on another occasion.

The officers who lacked combat experience were also subtly squeezed out of the SMC over time, although according to Danjuma not altogether consciously.[12] These officers were the marginally influential members of the SMC, who on occasion volunteered their opinions during SMC deliberations, who held portfolios of national interest with attendant institutional experience and in some instances technical expertise, but who did not possess decisive influence in determining the outcome of these deliberations. We can imagine the relative influence of SMC members in the form of concentric circles (see Figure 11.6) in which the innermost circle (A) represents the decision-making. The second band or circle (B) represents the most influential SMC members whose opinions have considerable hearing among the decision-making core; in fact interaction between this core (A) and the most influential band (B) is the greatest. The last band or circle (C) indicates the marginally influential members of the SMC. We can term this de facto structure of power within the SMC the concentric circles of influence.

Figure 11.6
The Relative Influence of the Supreme Military Council




A - Head of State, Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Chief of Army Staff
B - service chiefs
C - other officers

It is important to note that the membership of the concentric circles of influence does not correlate with the coup plotters and active participants in the 29 July 1975 overthrow of the Gowon regime. Real power was bestowed by these officers on their professional superiors and colleagues who had not participated in the coup. There was thus a distinction between the administrative

structure of government and the de facto structure of influence. The newly assigned military governors were much involved in the events of July 1975. However, their political assignments as governors effectively immersed them in the administration and politics of state government. While members of the NCS, and associated with other July plotters and participants, they were nevertheless formally, and to a real extent, removed from the very center of power, which lay in the SMC.

Some authors such as Moses E. Akpan[13] explain the issue of gubernatorial exclusion from the SMC somewhat differently, saying that the Head of State perceived it as a problem of regionalism, and therefore, in order to reduce the power of the regions, prevented the governors from possessing formal influence within the SMC. According to Akpan, 'this arrangement tipped the balance of power in federal politics to the Supreme Military Council'. This implies, inter alia, that prior to this decision the SMC possessed less administrative hegemony and feared that it would become less consensual through the vicissitudes of intra-military elite rivalries. There may well have been the further concern that the governors would be in a real position to affect policy formation adversely if they were admitted to the SMC. Administratively, the SMC saw little value in overextending their colleagues within the context of their political assignments; the affairs of state administrators would prove sufficiently taxing.

The rationale of specialization of responsibility in effect entailed a subsidiary role for the governors within the hierarchical structure. Thus the NCS and the FEC were positioned as subsidiary organs of the SMC.

The collective responsibility or rule by consensus as practised by the SMC must be further qualified by the fact that certain items were not subject to council discussion. This was the case, for example, with General Yar'Adua's official journey to Brazil which was reported directly to the Head of State.[14]

According to Yar'Adua,[15] in its four years of existence the SMC acted as a cabinet. The military was viewed as a component of government[16] and the powers for the Head of State were the same for the military head and the civilian head who came in - in other words,

no power was withheld from the incoming civilian president.

Within the central core of the SMC (see 'A' above) power was effectively compartmentalized. The COAS Lt-Gen Danjuma was in charge of charting the course and pace of military development and readiness. His superior, General Obasanjo, as head of state, pondered and directed the course and pace of all political matters, of which the fulfillment of military disengagement was preeminent. The COS SHQs Brigadier Yar'Adua acted as the liaison officer between the center of SMC power and the states, essentially assisting General Obasanjo on political affairs while others carried out the work and directives flowing from this interaction.[17] This demarcation of responsibilities was understandably corporate and military and sufficiently compartmentalized that the COAS Lt-General Danjuma had little involvement in the formulation of political policy.[18] It was not a matter of exclusion but rather of preference and effective concentration of effort.

SATURDAY MORNING MEETINGS

During the Obasanjo administration (1976-1979) the Head of State inaugurated an unofficial forum for policy debate and formulation known informally as the Saturday Morning Meetings. One Nigerian academic says that Obasanjo would gather together academics and businessmen to brainstorm an assortment of topics.[19] The participants were not publicly named but included eminent intellectuals from the University of Ibadan, the University of Nigeria (Nsukka), and Ahmadu Bello University (ABU).[20] It is speculated for example that Nigeria's foreign policy shift in November 1975 vis-à-vis Angola was due to the deliberations within this forum.[21]

General Obasanjo admits that these meetings were held bi-weekly at Dodan Barracks for the purpose of exchanging information, and of interaction beyond the established forums and norms. The Head of State could call on experts in such areas as housing, economics, business, etc. These meetings covered all areas related to military disengagement.[22] The importance of this forum is corroborated by Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua who related the fact that SMC members

and ministers were able to participate according to the items in question.[23] Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma puts the number of participants at any given meeting at between twelve and fifteen individuals. As the COAS General Danjuma participated in the Saturday Morning Meetings from time to time. However he found these sessions too theoretical.[24]

One Nigerian sociologist says that this forum often emphasized economic issues in which case the Minister of Finance and the Central Bank were present. As the meetings were ad hoc there was no fixed agenda.[25]

The ad hoc nature of the meetings is illustrated by an example. A meeting was convened involving individuals concerned with housing, including the Commissioner responsible for housing. The Federal Housing Authority had been directed to assist the states in their development projects. The states in turn were to provide monthly reports on their progress. On one occasion a report had been sent to the SMC stating that housing was not available as planned. Thus various officials were called in to redress the situation which was seen as a hindrance to the process of military disengagement.

General Obasanjo states that during the Saturday Morning Meetings he acted informally as the Head of State, soliciting discussion on a variety of subjects. If for example the topic concerned indigenization and management of the economy the General would call in the Chamber of Commerce with five or six of its members. To balance the discussion he would call in individuals on the government side. The ensuing debate would provide the grist of policy formation in this specific area. This is presumably the backdrop to the enactment of the Indigenization Decree of 1977 affecting foreign investment in Nigeria, which is an amendment to the Indigenization Decree of 1972.[26]

A final example of the Saturday Morning Meetings is provided by General Obasanjo. On one occasion a problem arose at the Lagos Teaching Hospital/Orthopedics Hospital. The General convened a meeting at the hospital itself taking with him the Provost of the hospital as well as directing the Administrator of the hospital and the University Chancellor to attend the meeting. During this session the Commander-in-Chief asked 'Who's responsible for the mess?' And

'Who should be shot?'[27] It should be noted that the Orthopaedic Hospital had become a teaching hospital by government, thus indicating the nature of a military directive and the subsequent interest in its successful implementation and continuity.

A final note on the Saturday Morning Meetings is that it provided a forum in which General Obasanjo could test policy papers and speeches after they had been composed by specific ministerial experts briefed with the points the General wished to emphasize.[28] This manner of soliciting and debating ideas as a prelude to specific policy formulation was unique to the Obasanjo administration. In great part it was due to the character and intellectual qualities of the man himself and has not been repeated in subsequent military administrations. Much more could be learned about the actual impact of the Saturday Morning Meetings and their relationship with the official organs of government. These meetings formed a significant element in the overall structure of influence during the Obasanjo military administration. Since the substance of the meetings is not officially documented information of the actual details and actions pursued will more than likely be published by or perish with the surviving participants.

## SOME BACKGROUND AND IDENTIFICATION FIGURES OF THE SMC CORE

It is worth noting that the individual members of the SMC identified, as have other men, with the life and ideas of historic personages. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma admires Abraham Lincoln for his strength of character and determination throughout the American Civil War. Considered brilliant by many in Nigeria, General Danjuma is a man of deep reflection who does not mince his words. He was a direct entry short-service trained officer, learning much of English standards and authors while attending the Mens Officer Cadet School. However the most lasting impression was made by the American president. A Northerner from the present day Gongola States, Danjuma's father had converted to Christianity from Islam. Danjuma, himself an Anglican, attended Catholic services for their musical quality.

The realities of the American Civil War and its aftermath had

been known by Danjuma prior to the Nigerian civil conflict. The character, humanity and statesmanship of the American president impressed him in the light of some similarities with the pressures and post-war difficulties encountered in the Nigerian experience.

Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua, another British trained officer, when asked what military, political and philosophical thinking has influenced him most, especially within the context of 1975-1979, stated that with regards to military influence he greatly admired the American generals Douglas MacArthur and Patton.[29] Patton he admired as a strategic thinker who had accurately predicted the realities of the Cold War. In addition Yar'Adua admired John Locke for his political treatises and understanding of the workings of government. Napoleon he admired for his military prowess and not for his brand of statesmanship. Yar'Adua saw many of the military personages he admired as 'democrats in uniform' and as such worthy of emulation. Yar'Adua is himself a serious Muslim and a Northerner. As with the majority of other SMC members he found affinity with American and British personages. Although external models, these lives and characters were considered pertinent to the Nigerian environment both in war and in peace. The amalgamation of military professionalism and statesmanship was looked upon most favorably, given the reality of prolonged military rule in Nigeria. The models remained Western and there was little or no reference to indigenous examples.

General Obasanjo was greatly impressed with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The latter he considered as epitomizing the American attitude and concepts. General Obasanjo also admired President Lincoln for his foresight. The General emulated this American especially at the end of the Nigerian Civil War with the idea of 'no conqueror, no victor' as a means of assuaging the wounds of a divided nation. This effort was seen by General Obasanjo as genuinely linked to the concept of a distinct American attitude and as such an inspirational and motivational element. Admittedly, General Obasanjo tried the idea 'on the ground' which proved different and more difficult in its realization.[30]

A Baptist and a Westerner (Yoruba), General Obasanjo states that the object of his greatest admiration is the person of Jesus Christ.

Expounding his faith, General Obasanjo related that one of his greatest experiences and privileges was when he worshiped at a Baptist service in the United States with his great friend President Jimmy Carter.[31] General Obasanjo is a man of faith and admits to his Christian convictions and inspiration.

During his tenure as Head of State General Obasanjo was known for his thoroughness and investigative propensities when tackling policy issues. Consistent with an increasingly academic penchant General Obasanjo solicited various sources of expertise[32] and did not rely on an exclusive and limited body of authoritative voices. Intellectually curious the General applied due caution and balance to the various perspectives having access to his ear.

Taking this small but most influential sampling of SMC membership, one can observe the consistent theme of admiration for American leadership, specifically in connection with the conduct and aftermath of the civil war.[33] The affinity is one of practical emulation with regards to rational reconciliation. Other sources of identification appear to be with military professionals-cum-statesmen. And with General Obasanjo, there is an enhanced religious commitment. All in all the picture produced is an eclectic one with a strong admiration for things American. For example, during General Bernard William Roger's (Chief of Staff of the United States Army) official visit to Nigeria from 27 August to 1 September 1978, his counterpart Lt-Gen Danjuma 'urged the US Army to assist the NA to build a high and efficient force'.[34] This predilection is further appreciated in the pursuit of an executive presidency as opposed to premiership, as well as the structures of government to be bequeathed by the military administration upon military disengagement. Thus the sources of personal identification for the men in power take on an added significance.

## SMC PREFERENCE FOR A PRESIDENTIAL OVER A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

Professor Ayadele Aurajabi of the University of Lagos, at a public lecture in Lagos in 1978, classified Nigerians into four political categories:

1) The educated and politically aware (e.g. teachers, government officials and clerks),

2) The uneducated and politically aware (e.g. market women),
3) The educated but politically unaware (e.g. government officials and politically naive lecturers, and
4) The uneducated and politically unaware (e.g. farmers in the villages).

Professor Aurajabi explains that those included in categories 1) and 2) are keen on how they are governed, while those in categories 3) and 4) are described as being passive, and as such are the enemies of society though they may not know it.[35]

The call from both military and civilian quarters was for a democratic process for changing government as the means of avoiding bloodshed and instituting a participatory democracy. The debate was thus focused on what form of democracy would be more suitable for Nigeria.

The debate that ensued was whether Nigeria should adopt a Prime Ministerial system of government or an Executive Presidency for the Second Republic. In an article in the Nigerian Observer (Benin) for 4 December 1973, General Gowon had commented that:

> We must re-examine the Westminster model because of its shortcomings in the Nigerian situation.

In fact the proposal that Gowon continue after 1976 as executive president had been debated within the SMC.[36] Obviously, these reflections by the Gowon administration had taken place prior to the discarding of his regime's declared intention for a return to civilian rule by 1976. However, the likelihood of his establishing an executive presidency within the context of a personalist transformation by Gowon himself could be plainly discerned.

As most educated Nigerians understood, the Prime Ministerial system entailed the separation of the Head of State and the Head of Government, and a plural executive represented by the cabinet system, in which the government would reside within a cabinet of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister. By contrast, an Executive Presidency would confer both real and formal authority on the President. The President would hold the locus of concentrated power in his triple

role as Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

In his address at the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) on 18 October 1975, General Muhammed plainly stated the SMC recommendation - 'the conclusion that we require' - for an Executive Presidential System of Government.[37] The CDC subsequently endorsed this proposal, as did the majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly,[38] following the public debate over the draft constitution published by the CDC.

The SMC was committed to introducing an Executive Presidency in a post-MD Nigeria. The SMC believed the Parliamentary system was disruptive, resulting in a winner-takes-all situation.[39] Furthermore, the Parliamentary system created a government and an opposition, which in the Nigerian context with its attendant political culture was destabilizing.[40] Given the Nigerian and African experience, the Prime Ministerial system of government is a recipe for chaos. At the Head of State level it will always be the President versus the Prime Minister.[41] Many Nigerians considered the Prime Ministerial system as unworkable in Africa. As members of the Constitution Drafting Committee put it:

> The system presupposes a non-political Head of State, but the lesson of African experience with the system is that if non-political Heads of State are not already in existence, mere constitutional provisions alone will not bring them into being.[42]

But the key difficulty for the SMC regarding the Prime Ministerial system was precisely the concept and record of Government and Opposition. Nigerian political history had demonstrated that an opposition, official or otherwise, was suppressed and considered intolerable. The opposition, on the other hand, had little concept of being loyal and saw its role exclusively as one of opposing. Consequently there was no cooperation between the contending parties.

Under the Parliamentary system the practical result was to use party functionaries in ministerial positions. The SMC did not see this as favoring participatory democracy within the Nigerian

setting. As such the Parliamentary system posed more of a threat to the process and eventuality of military disengagement than the enhancement of Nigerian political development, according to the SMC.

The Presidential system, on the other hand, was seen as more stable. It would allow the recruiting of individuals into the administration on the basis of competence and not necessarily because of party membership. The issue was one of maximizing participation which was sorely needed.[43] Turi Muhammadu provides the following observation:

> One of the merits of the Executive Presidency, the supporters of the system further claimed, was that the single executive has the merit of unity, energy and despatch. A President with executive power and elected by the whole country provides an ideal symbol of national unity and national purpose 'the like of which we have never experienced in the past'.[44]

ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY

Dr. Ebrahim Tahir, member of the Constituent Assembly for the Bauchi Constituency, spoke out strongly against the executive presidency. To begin with, Dr. Tahir was of the opinion that the provision of an executive presidency, as contained in the Nigerian Draft Constitution, was capable of converting the 1979 constitution into 'a coup factory'.[45] He was concerned that the system made no distinction between the state and the government, thus dangerously consolidating power at one center.

Dr. Tahir opinioned that since the Army owed its allegiance to a person who would not be above partisan politics, the result of the then Draft Constitution would be to return the military to politics.

There was the further conviction that it was impossible to expect a person elected to office on the basis of a party platform to be at the same time a symbol of unity. Nigerian politics had seldom yielded such a logic and warranted such expectancy. Dr. Tahir argued that the danger of combining the powers of state and government lay in the fact that any serious dispute over politics became a dispute

about the state.[46] The logic of this argument was clear. It anticipated that the state would not be sufficiently institutionalized and legitimized in the eyes of political functionaries and Nigerians in gene al to rise above predatory politics; in other words, the state would not possess any real or mystical position of ascendancy above trench politics. It would therefore simply be a target of opportunity.

Dr. Tahir's final assessment was that Nigeria wanted most not a presidential system but a modified form of the Westminster parliamentary model of democracy. In addition, he held that executive power would be vested in a parliament of freely elected representatives of the people with the chief executive being elected from among members of parliament.

Those in favor of the parliamentary executive saw it as a safer venture than the executive presidency. In their view the real risks of the executive presidency did not warrant such a complete shift away from the parliamentary orientation previously pursued.

Despite arguments of this nature being tabled publicly, the decision to pursue an executive presidency became the order of the day for the various governmental organs established for the purpose of ensuring the success of the program of military disengagement.

The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), which was brought into being through Decree No. 73 of 1977, was given this orientation towards the Presidential system as it embarked on its duties.[47] FEDECO, which was chaired by a retired civil servant, Chief Michael Ani., was to conduct elections, accept nomination papers from political parties and candidates, and organize actual balloting. The new constitution entrusted the registration of parties and candidates to the Electoral Commission.[48]

## THE EXECUTIVE PRESIDENCY, THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1979

The Gowon administration's orientation had been markedly towards constitutionalism (in the teleological rather than the formal sense).[49] If one compares the constitution of 1963 with that of 1979 the latter contains three major differences. 1) The President

is the de facto Commander-in-Chief, Section 198(1); 2) the President appoints the Chief of Defence Staff as well as service chiefs, Section 198(2); and 3) the composition of the armed services 'reflect[s] the Federal Character', Section 197(2).[50]

Details of the office of the Executive are to be found in Chapter VI of the 1979 Constitution. Sections 122 through 139 describe the entire Executive, sections 122 through 129 being specifically concerned with the establishment, qualification, election, and tenure, inter alia, of the President himself. The power of the Presidency is, however, only partially expounded in the Constitution.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President would have the power to determine the operational use of the armed services. However, he was authorized to delegate to any member of the armed forces his powers relating to the operational use of the armed forces. Adding to the authority of the executive, the President was not required to obtain the confirmation of the Senate in exercising his powers to appoint a person as chairman or member of the Council of State, the National Defense Council, or the National Security Council - Section 141(2).

The SMC desired to redress deficiencies in the conduct of public officers in view of the sort of politics that had occurred during the First Republic. During the 1960-1966 period the rules incorporated in the constitution which governed the conduct of office were neither obeyed nor effectively enforced. Consequently, the civilian government began to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of both the popular citizenry and the military. The fragile sense of political community was undermined and the military corporate identity and professional calling endangered.[51]

In an effort to produce more congenial civil-military relations under the new constitutional arrangement it was deemed necessary to provide a clear definition of roles and an understanding and acceptance of such roles both by the military and the forthcoming civilian government. The lack of clearly defined roles was seen as having contributed to military intervention.

For the maintenance of order amidst the exigencies of political transformation, the Public Order Decree was promulgated on 16 February 1979 providing a common set of rules governing such matters

as 'the proper and peaceful conduct of public assemblies, meetings and provisions'.[52]

The role of the armed forces is set forth in Part III of the Constitution (see Appendix C). It places the armed forces under federal authority with its conventional role of guarantor of internal and external security. The substance of Section 197 was not made subject to amendment by the SMC prior to military disengagement and therefore could be said to satisfy in good measure the call by the civilian elite, in particular the press, for a reorientation of the military so that it would understand, accept and respect the instituted norms of civil-military relations as laid down by the new constitution.

It is worth noting the manner by which the role of guarantor of internal security was seen as the time for military disengagement drew nearer. In an address to graduates of the then Army Command and Staff College, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Commodore J.N. Yisa-Doko, opinioned that:

> the role of soldiers at the completion of the military political program shall be [that of] umpires of security and not [that of] political umpires as it is now. At that time, all soldiers shall be returned to the barracks.[53]

The Air Commodore further urged that the Armed Forces should be at the ready to ensure that the political climate would not degenerate into a 'critical destabilizing situation' due to any of the politics, intemperate utterances and writings during the period of transition.

The emphasis by the SMC was on ensuring long term political stability-cum-internal security while preserving the military's corporate identity and professionalism. The constitution was to encompass this emphasis.

Efforts at producing a genuine reorientation of the military in observing constitutional norms would entail an internal indoctrination cadre (Public Relations Department), money, consensus, sufficient and effective coordination of effort, and time. Cognizance would have to be taken of any institutional lethargy, and/

or resistance against this new orientation. It was understood that the reorientation would completely evaporate with only one successful coup d'état. It was also understood that the middle-grade and Senior Officers would have to adapt to this new orientation as much, if not more, than the ORs if the constitutional dispensation was to endure beyond a few years after the completion of military disengagement. In the event, this recommendation did not prove feasible and the army intervened again.

A final word can be said with regard to the shift in emphasis towards and preference for the Presidential system. Abiola Ojo lays emphasis on the crucial elements of time and orientation/ indoctrination in transition beyond military disengagement

> In spite of the new dispensation, the Westminster mode of thinking can still be discerned in the style and operation of government. With time, we believe that our politicians will mature into presidential thinking.... I believe the Presidential system should be given a chance to develop.[54]

As with the reorientation of the professional military the Presidential system would not be given a chance to develop. We can return to Turi Muhammadu who provided a prophetic word which effectively explains the eventual recurrence of military intervention:

> The President will be exposed to powerful but conflicting interests. The result will be a drifting President who would be pushed to take arbitrary actions and when that stage is reached, it would be a perfect invitation for the military to return to power.[55]

NOTES

1. J. 'Bayo ADEKSON, Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System, England: Gower Publishing Company, 1981, p.6.

2. Provinces are known for example as the 'Mid-West Group of Provinces'. Nigeria Year Book 1967 lists the provinces (p.48) and provides the following numerical breakdown: Northern Provinces, 14; Western Provinces, 7; Eastern Provinces, 12; and Mid-West Provinces, 2. Decree No. 34 also dissolved 81 existing political parties, prohibited the establishment of new ones and banned 20 Tribal Unions. Section eight of Decree No. 1 established the Supreme Military Council as well as an Executive Council.

   It is interesting to note that the Nigeria Year Book 1966, p.17, contains a one page description of the structure of civilian government and a smaller section on the Nigerian Army consisting of five battalions of the then Nigerian Regiment. The relative insignificance of the armed forces is reflected in the Nigeria Year Book 1965, p.31, where under the heading 'Police and Armed Forces' top billing is given to the 'Nigerian Police', followed by the 'Armed Forces' then the 'Nigeria Naval Force'. Only beginning with the Nigeria Year Book 1966 are the Armed Forces listed separately in the index of contents, although entries for the Armed Forces, Nigeria Naval Forces, and the Nigeria Police (now last) are exactly the same save for a few commanders' names. It is the age of indigenization and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Nigerian Army is now Major-General Aquiyi Ironsi whereas the previous Year Book records the GOC as Major-General E.W. Welby-Everard.

   Due to the civil war the Nigerian Year Book 1968 does not provide data of the Armed Forces.

3. See Foreword by Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, in David M. JEMIBEWON, A Combatant in Government, Ibadan: Hienemann Educational Books (Nigeria), 1978, p.ix.

4. Of the 125 people arrested for their involvement in the abortive coup most were from General Gowon's region. This regional affiliation was potentially a volatile factor.

5. Lindsay BARRETT, Danjuma: The Making of a General, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1979, p.81.

6. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, in an interview with the author, 14 November 1989.

7. D.M. Jemibewon, op cit., p.52.

8. According to SMC member Major General James J. OLULEYE in his book Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979, Ibadan: University Press, 1985, p.178.

9. General Olusegun Obasanjo, in an interview with the author, Ota,

13 November 1989.

10. In an interview with the author on 7 November 1989, Dr. Soleye, a sociologist from the University of Ibadan, said that the SMC core group consisted of five members. Dr. Soleye did not include Inspector General of Police Alhaji Maigori Yusuf. In discussion with Lieutenant-General (rtd) Danjuma, however, the importance and influence that Yusuf had as a sounding board, especially for issues affecting the Northern traditional hierarchy, became clear: he was himself of royal lineage. Dr. Soleye's figure is one derived from impression rather than investigation, as he made clear to the author.

11. This story was related by Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, in an interview with the author, Kaduna, 14 November 1989.

12. Ibid.

13. Moses E. AKPAN, 'The Nigerian Military and National Integration, 1966-1979', in Journal of African Studies, vol.15, nos.1&2, 1988, pp.40-46.

14. In an interview with the author on 14 November 1989, Kaduna, Major-General (rtd) Shehu Yar'Adua noted that his six day visit to Brazil in the mid-1970s was not very productive. He said that the Brazilians were in the midst of their economic reconstruction which was of interest to the SMC. There was interest in Brazilian economic achievements and strategies. In an interview with the author on 16 November 1989, Ota, General Obasanjo confirmed that not much resulted from Yar'Adua's official visit to Brazil, at least in terms of any military interaction. General Obasanjo also cited the difference in language as a factor hindering deeper relations. In the light of this, further discussion within the entire SMC was not warranted.

15. Interview with the author, 14 November 1989, Kaduna.

16. Lieutenant-General (rtd) T.Y. Danjuma, in an interview with the author, 14 November 1989, Kaduna, called the army a 'party' of sorts and referred to himself, for the sake of comparative analysis, as the president of the chief party in the government - the army. This as if to say that within the structure of government he represented the interests of the institutional military.

17. Danjuma interview 14 November 1989.

18. Ibid.

19. Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye, discussion with author, 19 October 1989, University of Ibadan.

20. Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye, discussion with author, 27 October, 1989.

21. Here I refer to the Nigerian government's support for the MPLA as opposed to its prior commitment to a government of national unity representing Angola's three liberation movements (MPLA, FNLA, UNITA).

22. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, 13 November 1989, Ota. The former Head of State was visibly surprised that the author had heard of the Saturday morning meetings as little to nothing has ever appeared in print regarding them; their activity has remained as the level of hearsay.

23. Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua, interview with author, 14 November 1989, Kaduna.

24. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, interview with author, 14 November 1989, Kaduna.

25. Dr. Soleye, interview with author, 7 November 1989, University of Ibadan.

26. The Decree empowered the government to acquire, by law if necessary, equity participation in a number of strategic industries that would be specified from time to time. See Hamilton O. ISU, '"Country Risk" and Foreign Investment in Nigeria 1970-1984: A Critical Appraisal', in Nigerian Forum, July/August 1987, vol.7, nos.7&8, (NIIA), pp.213-215.

27. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, 16 November 1989, Ota.

28. This according to Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye, discussion with author, 19 October 1989, University of Ibadan.

29. Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua, interview with author, 14 November 1989, Kaduna.

30. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, 13 November 1989, Ota.

31. Ibid.

32. As, for example, via the Saturday morning meetings.

33. A partial explanation for the identification with the Americans as opposed to the English lies in the fact that the American civil war of the 19th century seems more immediate as compared with the more distant and less pertinent English war of the 17th century. Thus their affinity would lie with the Americans despite the fact that a good many of the Nigerian officers had been trained under the British or their associated institutions. Obasanjo himself is a short-service trained officer from the Mons Officer Cadet School and received his psc from the Pakistan Staff College, Quetta.

34. SOJA, October 1978, p.1.

35. See article by Dipo Adegbite in SOJA, October 1979.

36. Ian CAMPBELL, 'Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal', in Keith Panter-Brick (ed), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, London: Frank Cass, 1978, pp.66-67.

37. See O. OYEDIRAN & A. GBOYEGA (eds), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975, Ibadan: University Press for NIIA, 1980.

38. Its 230 members, of which 203 were elected, first met on 6 October 1977, its deliberations ending on 16 December 1977.

39. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, Ota, 13 November 1989.

40. Ibid.

41. Turi MUHAMMADU, The Nigerian Constitution 1979: Framework for Democracy, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1982, p.28.

42. Quoted by Turi Muhammadu, op.cit., pp.27-28.

43. Dr. Soleye, interview with author, University of Ibadan, 7 November 1989. General Olusegun Obasanjo offered the identical rationale in interview with author, Ota, 13 November 1989. For further discussion of this issue see G.W. DOMHOFF, Who Rules American Now? Englewood Cliffe, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984.

44. Turi Muhammadu, op.cit., p.28.

45. New Nigerian, 15 December 1977, p.1.

46. New Nigerian, 15 December 1977, p.25.

47. Electoral Decree 1977. Supplement to official Gazette Extraordinary No. 61, Vol. 64, 29 December 1977, Part A. The decree makes comprehensive provisions with respect to the registration of voters and with respect to the conduct and other matters pertaining to elections to be held in the country.

48. Oyeleye OYEDIRAN (ed), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1978-79, Lagos: NIIA with Macmillan Nigeria, 1988, p.26.

49. Graham N.B. DOUGLAS, 'Fundamental National Objectives and the Sustenance of Nigerian Constitutionalism', in J.A. ATANDA & A.Y. ALIYU (eds), Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since Independence, Zaria, March 1983: Vol.I, Political Development, Zaria: The Panel of Nigeria Since Independence History Project, p.336.

50. See New Nigerian 10 January 1979.

51. New Nigerian 10 January 1979.

52. As cited by Claude S. PHILLIPS, 'Nigeria's New Political Institutions 1975-9', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.18, no.1, 1980, pp.16-17.

53. As recorded in SOJA, September 1978.

54. Abiola OJO, 'Constitutions and Constitutional Changes Since Independence', in J.A. Atanda and A.Y. Aliyu (eds), op.cit., pp.346-361.

55. Turi Muhammadu, op.cit., p.28.

12

# CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Henry Bienen and Martin Fitton[1] point out that the early writings on the military in Africa overlooked the role of civilians in military regimes. The emphasis was on analyzing military intervention and the internal features of the military. In time the focus shifted to the relationship of the armed forces to society and the effects thereof on national development. However, the processes of national administration were mostly neglected, owing, in part, to the difficulty of obtaining the required information. The manner by which decisions are made by military governments, the character of the deliberation processes, the ways 'factional and institutional alliances' are formed - all these elements remained hidden to the outsider.

By the middle to late 1970s some attention was drawn to civilian participation in military administrations, which was instrumental in eliminating the standard dichotomy between civilian and military regimes. There was an increasing examination of civil-military relations: the interaction between civilian and military actors whether under civilian or military rule. The most notable civilian participants within this arrangement were usually politicians and civil servants. However, as I intend to show, this characterization and understanding of civil-military relations can be augmented to enhance our appreciation of the interactions involved.

Niccolo Machiavelli writes that

> Many are now of the opinion ... that no two things are more discordant and incongruous than a civil and military life.... But if we consider the institutions of the ancients, we shall find that there is a very close, intimate relation between these two conditions, and that they are not

> only compatible and consistent with each other, but necessarily connected and interrelated.[2]

As one moves to a more intimate understanding of civil-military relations it is helpful to keep in mind that which ideally distinguishes civilian political from military hierarchical activity, namely compromise and persuasion in the former as compared to authority and obedience in the latter. The extent to which there is interaction between these two often mutually exclusive societies can reveal the relative intensity of their respective convictions (ethical norms) vis-à-vis each other. Before we examine this interaction, however, it is important to recognize the respective ethos of each actor. Perhaps D.C. Rapoport puts the difference in perspective most appropriately, by saying that

> We [the First World audience] commonly maintain that 'politics', especially in a 'democratic' community, involves relationships between 'equals'; it implies compromise and persuasion to reconcile groups which can rarely destroy one another. War, on the other hand, is resolved through the application of brute power in which one contending group is completely crushed. The successful military organization, consequently, will have a clear hierarchical form, emphasising the superiority of officers and the unquestioned obedience of the lower ranks so that a maximum pressure can be exerted at any given point.[3]

The difference between civilian and military ethos provides much of the substance of civil-military relations and our focus of analysis.

The actual dynamics of civil-military relations can be depicted by use of rudimentary to more intricate models, the purpose of which is to clarify the configuration, direction and level of this interaction. Let us then consider three models in particular.

## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS MODELS

When one refers to civil-military relations there is the general

perception of the corporate military with its interests in juxtaposition with civilians and their distinct interests. There appears to be an invisible hand dividing the two camps, which are mutually tolerant or hostile. This perception may appear reasonable to most but lacks accuracy to the point of distortion.

A more accurate view identifies the military elite (senior officers) in interaction with the civilian elite (economic, political, academic and traditional personalities). There is also interaction between the military cadres and non-elite civilians (the general populace); this represents perhaps the greater part of civil-military interaction but not necessarily the most decisive. The two combined represent the true civil-military relations of a nation. This can be depicted as follows:

Figure 12.1
'True' Civil-Military Relations




From the point of view of political theory this demarcation of civil-military interaction provides interesting speculation. 1) If the military cadres identify with the interests of the general populace then we're dealing with a class argument which undermines the hierarchical military structure. 2) If power resides essentially and conclusively in the hands of the civil and military elite then we're dealing with the elite model. 3) If power is concentrated within the military in general or with their civilian counterparts then we're dealing with the pluralistic model. I do not see any of these three hypotheses as completely representing civil-military relations.

A revised version of this 'true' civil-military relations model takes into account that military cadres, as well as having shared interests with the general civilian populace from whom they originate, also experience a formal and corporate-ethical identification with the military elite. However, the ethno-religious

identification may in fact prove stronger than the hierarchical structure (chain of command) of the corporate military. At the same time, a strong ethno-religious identification is also often experienced between the general populace and the civilian elite. This situation is more indicative of a Nigeria in which loyalties are being contended for and have yet to crystallize along institutional lines. This situation can be depicted as follows and represents a 'truer' reflection of civil-military relations.[4]

Figure 12.2
'Truer' Civil-Military Relations




In this 'truer' model the horizontal arrows between the military cadres and the general populace represent both general communal interaction, that is, between military base personnel and surrounding community, and ethno-religious linkages. In the former there will usually be a greater ethno-religious diversity while the latter will be more homogeneous.

As stated above, the hierarchical structure between the military elite and the ranks may be weakened as the military cadres identify more strongly with the general population and their interests. The corporate military must achieve a stronger identification in the hierarchical relationship between its elite and cadres to avert its own disintegration. There is therefore competition for loyalty. One may say it is the corporate military versus ethno-religious linkages. Compared to the socialization process of civilian life over many years, the military has had less time to supplant the ethno-religious loyalty of its members and shift the primary allegiance from clan to company. In Latin America, for instance, this shift has occurred and was perhaps facilitated by a more homogeneous religious factor.

Ernest Lefever writes that the primary identity of African peoples is the traditional tribe which seriously limits social

loyalties and the view of the larger world. Lefever also observes that one of Africa's most intractable problems has been how to integrate different tribes into a modern nation without a democratic framework. All African states have had this problem though its dimensions and urgency vary from state to state.[5] The ethno-religious factor would appear to militate not only against the realignment of loyalties but also against the prospects for a viable democracy, which after all is the purpose of military disengagement.

In comparison to Ernest Lefever's position, William F. Gutteridge makes specific reference to the military in Africa, stating that military professional training and indoctrination acts as a melting pot which produces a highly homogenous corps that owes its primary allegiance to the state, thereby becoming effectively detribalized and alienated from the traditional value system.[6] Neither a 'highly homogenous' or 'effectively detribalized' corps emerges in our examination of the Nigerian military in civil-military relations. Neither can one realistically speak of the military being 'alienated from the traditional value system'. As the models of civil-military relations have thus far demonstrated the issues of homogeneity and detribalization are very much in the balance. Furthermore, there is no evidence that it is the Nigerian military's intention to alienate its soldiers from the traditional value system. If anything the military leadership would hope to foster and harness its most compatible values and imbue its soldiers with mutual respect and tolerance for their diverse ethno-religious backgrounds (essentially traditional value systems).[7]

A final interaction within civil-military relations should be considered. There may be instances where military cadres may identify with a member of the civilian elite such as a national figure. Or there may develop a situation in which the general population identifies more closely with a member of the military elite, for example, Murtala Muhammed. In such a case there is horizontal, vertical and diagonal interaction and/or identification. It is still a fluid situation and one of competition for loyalties and not the hallmark of any sort of mutually supportive system of national strength as would be argued in Western societies and militaries. In an effort to provide an even more accurate model I

would term this last situation 'truest' civil- military relations, depicting it as follows:

Figure 12.3
'Truest' Civil-Military Relations




In this mix one is unable to apply either elite, group or class theory to the exclusion of the others. Loyalties are shifting. Of the various permutations possible the most enduring to date has been the ethno-religious linkages between the civilian elite and the general populace. This has been accentuated at moments of national crisis and electoral competition in the post-independence period.

Writing in the late 1960s A. Zolberg stated that

> nowhere [i. Africa] does the military itself constitute an elite or stand which is clearly differentiated in terms of socialization, recruitment, and behaviour, from other groups which contain potential rulers.[8]

In the 1970s Claude Welch and A.K. Smith augmented this point by stating that:

> The military do not exist in a vacuum. It is a part of the larger social system, and both affects and is affected by the role structures of other organizations.[9]

T.O. Odetola is of the opinion that due to this mutual effect between civil-military actors, 'the military elite is part of a comprehensive national leadership elite subject to the same influence and pressures'.[10]

Nigerian B.J. Dudley assessed the situation in Nigeria during the late 1960s as follows:

> The army officer or soldier is no more 'detribalized' or 'alienated' than the University don; no more modernity-oriented than the civil servant, nor is he more nationally conscious than the party-politician or the intelligentsia in general.[11]

The message from this sampling of reputable authors is one of civil-military interaction that appears to challenge effectively the idea that the military is sufficiently insulated from society at large to enable it to inculcate its own distinct set of values and perspectives, and that these influences are inevitable and permeate the military as a whole. However, no distinction is made in the analyses between the ranks and the military elite. Moreover the factor of mutual effect appears to be conceived of as a static phenomenon both intractable and of undetermined consequences.

Past events substantiate this view in great part. But the situation is not a static one. The ethno-religious influence is indisputably evident. The issue is whether this influence is a permanent and deterministic one. Nigerian military administrations have expressed the hope that it is not.

Theoretically, the absence of fractionalization of the military along ethno-religious lines during social upheaval would be evidence of the 'detribalization' of military personnel in as much as soldiers and officers did not openly ally themselves to any group other than the military itself during times of civil disturbances. If this is true, primary allegiance would be to the chain of command. The chain itself would have to prove itself 'neutral' in crisis situations. The dilemma is that any form of military action against social upheaval, intended to secure order, may well be construed as favoring a particular people because such actions take place in an ethno-religious environment.[12] The demographics of Nigeria, and Africa, are replete with ethno-religious content. The West does not generally, apart from glaring exceptions like Northern Ireland,[13] perceive civil-military relations as being within a determinant ethno-religious environment.

The preeminence of the ethno-religious factor dictates that the civil elite and military elite are not homogenous given Nigerian

realities and the subsequent standard of Federal Character. It may well be argued that given the ethno-religious heterogeneity of the military elite itself it may in fact be carrying the seeds of its own destruction. This seed was already present in the 1975-1979 period. The hierarchical structure of the military is thus affected both by ethno-religious linkages between the cadres and the general populace and by diversity within the military elite itself. As stated above it may collapse in a crisis situation. Hierarchical structure is thus in an ethno-religious sense more tenuous, apparent, and unproven in other than administrative operations.

The significance of civil-military relations to the practice of military disengagement is demonstrated in the degree of mutual trust or antagonism at the elite and grassroots levels. Timetables are met but the perceptions and disposition of civilian-military communities continue over many years. This memory of civil-military relations affects the extent of actual cooperation. It also affects the receptivity of the corporate military towards future possibilities of military intervention and the manner in which military governance once again attempts a correction to the national polity. And this naturally leads to the form of military disengagement.

## THE MILITARY'S RESPONSES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

It is worth examining the military's disposition and efforts at both levels of civil-military relations. Beginning with the grassroots level one observes concerted and in some respects sophisticated efforts to enhance civil-military ties. In the news bulletin of the Nigerian Army - SOJA - for March 1977 we read the following revealing excerpt:[14]

> The fact that needs to be appreciated, however, is that although the soldier is a member of the Army, the Army nevertheless forms part of the society together with all other institutions in the country, and the society can only function effectively when its component parts are mutually supporting and cooperate with one another.
>
> And this is why the rather enigmatic tradition of

> hostility between some members of the public and soldiers is uncalled for. The strains and tensions in the civilian-military relations are no doubt a product of the lack of understanding and mutual suspicion ... [a] dangerous phenomenon in our society.

The above was written following civil-military disturbances at Makurdi, Benue State, and directed to the officers and men of the Army for which SOJA was created under the Gowon regime in 1974. The troops were then directed to 'ensure the security of life and property of fellow Nigerians and to regard civilians as their brothers'.[15] The article goes on to say:

> Good relationship between civilians and military is not a difficult thing to achieve. It is a question of both parties erasing certain deeprooted prejudices and stereotypes and deal with each other with a sense of understanding and tolerance.

The bulletin reminds the reader of the avenues created to enable complaints to be lodged against army personnel, this with the goal of 'bringing about cordial relations between the Army and Civilians'. Both the Military Police Units and the Army Public Relations Departments were instituted for this purpose.[16]

The Army's Public Relations Directorate, with headquarters in Lagos, initiated a full-scale mobilization of manpower and professional assets to ensure a long-term resolution of civil-military misunderstanding. Within the Army itself efforts were directed towards a high-powered campaign of public enlightenment. This campaign made use of posters, newsletters, hand bills, radio programs, lectures, seminars and, on occasion, television programs. These efforts and others were directly related to the issue of political culture but at this stage it was not usually expressed in such terms. The objective was the harmonization of civil-military relations that would in turn assist the nation in its development.

There had been incidents of civil-military violence in Ugep[17] (Cross River State), Epe (Lagos State), Orile Agege and Kano, to

name but a few. One serious source of civil-military strife was the widespread practice of extortion by service members stopping vehicles illegally and demanding a dash (payment). This practice was also carried out by ex-service members in uniform. There was also the practice of non-service members using uniforms for the same purpose. It is thus difficult to determine the extent to which actual service members contributed to the military's poor image and its negative effect on civil-military relations. This practice was seriously addressed by the military elite after considerable civilian protest.[18]

The cause of other incidents was often tension between local landlords and soldier-tenants living in their houses. Civil-military relations at the grassroots level were markedly affected by the shortage of military housing. In this regard increased civil-military interaction at this level did not result in increased civil-military tranquillity for the elite.[19]

Another source of civil-military strife, and by far the most violent, were the occasions when troops would retaliate against the local populace for the death or injury of a soldier at the hands of a civilian.

One such incident took place on the evening of the 5th of December 1977 when soldiers of the 146 Battalion, 3rd Infantry Bde, 1st Div, stationed at Bukavu Barracks, Kano, rioted following the death of a private Adekola Akanbi, who was killed by a hit-and-run driver. In what was a somewhat bizarre reaction soldiers set twenty-five civilian vehicles on fire. Thirty persons were left injured. Private Akanbi had been killed on the Katsina-Kano road near Bukawu Barracks. The soldiers went out to the road and stopped motorists, who under threat of being beaten to death abandoned their vehicles. Thereupon the cars were set ablaze.

There was almost a second riot a fortnight later when a soldier's daughter was knocked down near the same barracks and on the same road. When news of the girl's death reached the barracks soldiers trooped out but on this occasion their officers ordered them back to their quarters.[20]

Before the end of the week in which the rioting took place the COAS Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma personally addressed the 146

Battalion.[21] The 9 December address on the Kano riot is significant for it represents the substance of the military elite's response to the behavior of its subordinates. The address speaks of the soldiers' indiscipline, shame, lawlessness, collective accountability, the leveling of mandatory reparations, the prospect of future disciplinary action, and the goal of peace in Kano, inter alia. The address itself is worth quoting at length for the emphasis coming from the higher command:

> I have come here to Kano to see things for myself this afternoon.
>
> I have been able to see some of the damage done by troops living in this location....
>
> I have been able to determine that very grave acts of indiscipline have been perpetrated by all of you.
>
> I am very very ashamed of you. You should be ashamed of yourselves. You should be ashamed that you belong to the Unit in which some soldiers who burnt those vehicles are. You should be ashamed of yourselves because that act of burning vehicles is primitive and barbaric.
>
> You as soldiers, uniformed men, are supposed to be disciplined men. You are supposed to be more disciplined than your brothers who are outside the uniform.[22] You are bound not only by military law but also by civil law. So that, if you take the law into your hands, you will have not only the wrath, the anger of the military authorities against you, but also the civil law courts.... I myself, am very very disturbed and I am sick and tired of me and my officers having to go around to defend some of these acts of lawlessness and indiscipline by soldiers.
>
> No matter what the excuse is, no matter what the provocation is, you have no right, absolutely no right, to take the law into your hands as happened....
>
> Now let me tell you right away what I intend to do. Every one of you in this barrack is guilty of the offence of burning those vehicles. Everyone of you will contribute compulsorily, towards making good all the vehicles that were lost in this incident. Is that clear!...

In future, if we have any similar incident in any of the units, we shall deal even more ruthlessly with any of the soldiers involved. We may even decide to disband the Unit concerned. You have to get this quite clear in your minds and in your heads. We will no longer accept any more acts of lawlessness and indiscipline by any soldiers in the Nigerian Army.

Those who are actually involved in burning these vehicles, if and when they are found out, will be dealt with very severely. We may even have to set a Special Tribunal to try them. And I think you all know what happens during such Tribunals and after.

I hope this will be a warning to every one of you.

And I expect every one of you to be of good behavior and you will be confined to the barracks for an indefinite period until we feel that there is enough peace in and around Kano to allow you to go out.

That is all.

This address is also significant in that the army chain of command is able to determine, issue, and enforce disciplinary action against its cadres. This is not at all a mean development in the Nigerian Army. Officers were also capable of ordering their men back to the barracks and in this way averted a second riot at the same locality.[23] Relations between the military elite and cadres proved sufficiently strong in this instance.

What is intriguing in the Kano riots is that military socialization appears to have motivated soldiers to a corporate response against a corporate perpetrator in the absence of, if not in addition to, the individual civilian responsible for knocking down Private Akanbi. And the military elite enforced corporate punishment on the unit involved.

In the light of civil-military disturbances I wondered whether it would be accurate to describe civil-military relations as varying by region and military command, so that one could speak of poor civil-military relations in Kano while concluding that there were good civil-military relations in, for example, Enugu. General Danjuma

addressed this inquiry by stating that incidents of civil-military disturbances were promptly investigated and that one could not really state that there were some regions experiencing better civil-military relations than others.[24] It is difficult to establish conclusively the existence of a demographic pattern of civil-military relations for the 1975-1979 period. But one may consider such a possibility as we continue to examine other examples of local civil-military relations.

In late 1977 the GOC of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major-General E.O. Abisaye, expressed his satisfaction over the civilian-soldier relationship at Shendam (Plateau State). The GOC was paying a courtesy call on the Chief of Shendam[25] when making this assessment. In support of this view the chief criticized a news report in a national daily about civil-military disturbances in the area, labelling it 'irresponsible journalism'. Chief Dongkwap went on to reassure the GOC of 'a continuous amicable coexistence between his people and soldiers in the area'.[26] He thanked the Federal Military Government for stationing the military unit in Shendam, which he described as an instrument of development. The socio-economic dimension of civil-military relations at the local level was made clear when Chief Dongkwap proffered the observation that 'unprecedented development' had occurred in Shendam as a result of the soldiers' presence. Further civil-military cooperation was observed in that some soldiers assisted their landlords in completing their houses. The infusion of income from the garrison was the most valued aspect of the situation and acted as an incentive and cement for more cordial civil-military interaction.

In May 1978, the commander of the NA Armoured Corps, Colonel I.B. Babangida, advised soldiers to avoid any act that would tarnish their reputation. The Emir of Gombe (Bauchi State), Mallam Abubakar Umar, told the commander that there existed a 'cordial relationship between soldiers and subjects' (presumably meaning citizens). Colonel Babangida thanked the Emir for the efforts and cooperation provided by his people to the officers and men within the Gombe area.[27]

Cordial civil-military relations were also claimed by the civil and military elite in the 2nd Division area.[28] This evaluation was

given some ten months after a civil-military clash along Nike Road, Enugu (Anambra State), in which three vehicles and a bicycle were burnt after the death of two soldiers' children and a soldier's wife at the hands of motorists, which prompted the soldiers to go on a rampage. The sum of N14,126.25 ($22,602) was provided in compensation to five civilians during an official ceremony. Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, one of the recipients, Mr. S.N. Onuchukwu, thanked the officers and men of the unit for the apparent show of magnanimity. He expressed the hope that this unprecedented gesture would go far in strengthening relations between soldiers and civilians in Enugu.[29]

In Calabar (Cross River State) some 190 kilometers south-east of Enugu, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua, expressed great appreciation for the efforts of the local commander in ensuring cordial civil-military relations.

The COS (SHQ) urged the officers and men 'to learn to live with civil rule like civilians had learnt to live with military rule'.[30] Here we see General Obasanjo's chief assistant on political affairs lending his voice to the strengthening of civil-military relations. And on such occasions one observes a mutually supportive interest and cooperation by officers with political assignments (GOCs and local commanders). The chain of command also assisted in this regard as a superior officer visited and encouraged officers and men of lesser rank despite their not being under his immediate area of jurisdiction. Prior notification and coordination had been secured between the COS (SHQ) and the COAS both of whom occupy positions at the centre of SMC leadership. There was thus no conflict between governmental and institutional military interest and action.

## STRENGTHENING CIVIL-MILITARY BONDS

The military's efforts at enhancing civil-military relations were also directed towards the elite. One Nigerian author proposes that interaction between the military and civilian elite can come in four main forms:

1) Civilian employment of retired soldiers;

2) Joint activities in professional associations or clubs;
3) Direct participation of retired soldiers in partisan politics;
4) Co-option of civilians in military regimes.[31]

Our interest here lies in elite civil-military interaction within the context of military rule in the process of military disengagement. As such our attention is drawn to the second of the four forms. An example of this form occurred in December 1978 at the honorary inception of eight eminent persons to the Army Headquarters Command Officers Mess. The inductees represented a broad spectrum of mostly civilian elite. They included such prominent figures as Adeyinka Oyekan (Oba of Lagos), Sir Dudley Alexander (Chief Justice of the Federation), Dr. Bolaji Akinyemi (Director International Affairs), E.O. Ukiwe (Administrator of Lagos State), and Colonel Haywood Jnr. (U.S. Defence Advisor), a Black American.

During the dining-in the COAS Lieutenant-General Danjuma said that the membership of these individuals would promote cordial interaction with the Army and would provide a 'little window' to the world through which constant contact and dialogue on non-military matters could continue most especially when the Army returned to the barracks. The idea was the cultivation of civil-military relations that would in practice provide a forum in which members of the civil and military elite would have access to information and opinions concerning each other's affairs. This exercise was rendered manageable by the small number of active participants. Replying on behalf of the honorary members the Chief Justice expressed the hope that the national stability brought about by the military regime would continue after 1979 (1 October being the scheduled date of return to civilian rule). He praised the role of the Army and expressed delight at the organizational ability of the armed forces.[32]

Another window was established in late 1978 when the newly established Army Command Staff College (later known as the Command and Staff College (C&SC)) provided opportunities for senior government officials and eminent personalities to make speeches on topical military, economic and political issues. In the words of the COAS Lieutenant-General Danjuma soon before his retirement:[33]

> These [speeches] were directed to stimulate your minds to further pursue such issues in greater depths and thereby make you more aware of your future responsibilities as Staff Officers and Commanders in planning and implementing your military programmes. There is no doubt that this college will continue to give such eminent personalities opportunity to bring such issues before you for examination and discussions. I urge you both staff and students of this college to take advantage of such unique opportunities.

In general terms the force of this pronouncement reflects the military's desire for elite civil-military exchange and a resulting measure of harmonization with access to the elite in various socio-economic-political fields. It was envisaged that with increasing inter-elite association, cordiality and dialogue there would be increased stability for the nation. The military's institutional interests would be transmitted informally via these conduits to other members of the elite.

But Danjuma's address reflects another dimension in civil-military understanding. In its condensed form it may be described as the military wanting to know what the civilian elite are thinking and, more importantly, willing to act upon affecting the nation and their own sectarian interests.

Somewhat surprisingly, but consistent with the logic of mutual understanding, the military elite permitted their civilian counterparts access to their socio-professional milieu. This development stands in contravention of the preponderant view of social scientists that the military is inveterately self-secluded, secretive and chauvinistic. The nature of the exchange is mutually revealing and intended to function in the last resort as a civil-military red phone between each camp but under ordinary circumstances as an inter-institutional information and perceptual network.

With regards to its actual capacity to stabilize civil-military relations one must keep in mind the relatively small number of elite, both civil and military.[34] More significantly the pronouncements of most of the civilian elite indicate that on the whole there exists a rather rudimentary understanding military intent and aspirations.

This understanding on the part of the civilians is crucial in assessing probable military response to socio-economic tensions and upheavals. The possibility of securing civil-military stability is thus diminished both by an element of ignorance and by the size of the elite group without touching upon political culture.

However, there is an appreciation on both sides of the nature and depth of the continuing decay of national life, combined with an acknowledgement that both groups have inherent, if not inherited, methods, capacities and limitations with which to pursue a social-political program to abate such decay.

The utility and benefits of civil-military dialogue (little windows) at this level was unquantified during the short period between its inception and the completion of military disengagement. Nevertheless it remained a desirable feature of elite civil-military relations beyond the completion of military disengagement and was perceived as supportive of the programs of military disengagement and subsequent civilian rule.

If we compare the Brazilian experience in elite civil-military relations one naturally considers the significance of the Superior War College (ESG) and its success in producing approximately twenty-five per cent of its graduates, since the 1950s, in the fields of industry, commerce, finance, academia, and the church. The result is one of increased appreciation by civil and military elite of the complexity of policy formation and the need for national development, although without unanimity of perspective or execution.

## FURTHER OBSERVATIONS

It becomes increasingly clear that civil-military relations, as a whole, are complex interactions transcending the activities of the elite alone. Interaction at this level is often more visible to the non-African observer. However, the Nigerian military has paid considerable attention to civil-military relations at other levels, as reflected in the interaction between garrison and town, depot and village, base commander and traditional ruler and local government leader. For national development purposes this is the locus and focus of what is understood by and desired in civil-military

relations. The military's corporate-institutional interest is fundamentally tied to the fostering of cordiality and restraint vis-à-vis the vast majority of civilians who are obviously not elite. Antagonism, coercion, and other more overt forms of social control are seen as inimical to the Nigerian Army. This, I grant, runs counter to the popular view that on a day-to-day basis the military maintains its control of the populace with a heavy boot, or put another way, that the Army has little concern for and exercises little effort towards fostering mutual respect between civilian and military communities. This is simply not the case. Civil-military relations at the grassroots level is inextricably linked to a substantive public relations effort and unit discipline. Troops and units are disciplined, codes of ethics disseminated,[35] regulations[36] made clear. The civilian population will thus monitor any actual change in civil-military realities. Here one can examine the quality of these relations with a reasonable measure of accuracy.[37] This interaction at the grassroots level will affect the character of civil-military relations at the elite level.

The character of elite civil-military relations is better understood bearing in mind that the military elite is subject to ethno-religious influence. In the SMC of 1975-1979, however, this appears to have been well contained and thus one can speak of a unified military leadership. By and large the ethno-religious factor did not play a major role in decisions on major issues and disagreements within the SMC were not regionally based.[38] The degree of corporate unity within the SMC was by all objective standards considerable.

This however did not preclude certain influential members from assisting their kinsmen and associated political party. One member of the inner core of the SMC engineered trips for his people ostensibly for national security purposes. This same officer leaked information from SMC deliberations to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) about political decisions that would affect party politics in the process of military disengagement; information that was extremely valuable if obtained in advance.[39] This partisan activity saw efforts at influencing the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) by

conducting briefings and providing instruction in a semi-official capacity; that is as a known and influential member of the SMC but not under authorization. Thus an unusual mixture of SMC cohesion and political moonlighting by at least one SMC member was able to exist. And the process of military disengagement was able to proceed to its completion. The effect of this ethno-religious bias by one SMC member is not completely understood but it did not appear to advance the Nigerian military's efforts at socializing its corporate membership away from its traditional allegiances. If anything it demonstrates the reinforcement of ethno-religious linkages despite its clandestine manifestation.

If the military appears intent on enhancing civil-military relations we may be observing experiments of a military with a humane face. If such a possibility cannot be imagined, nor digested, then any subsequent analysis in pursuance thereof will certainly not attract much attention. Nevertheless, let us for the moment embrace the leper. The military regime of 1975-197° is better understood in this light.

One can conclude a great deal about the nature of a military regime by the manner in which is disciplines its own cadres and cultivates grassroots civil-military relations. And the exercise of discipline reflects the basic structure, institutional accountability, ethos, authority, cohesion, purpose, self-perception and perspective of society. And when we speak of transition to civilian governance we are definitely speaking of either a 'rough' of a 'smooth' transition: of a program of military disengagement predicated either upon poor civil-military relations at either or both levels, or upon essentially cordial relations. The nature of these relations at the time of transition will have a direct bearing on the subsequent state of civil-military relations under civilian governance. The program of military disengagement must attempt to resolve this question, not so much to ensure technical completion of an established timetable, for this is a 'relatively simple' exercise, but to foster the prospects of an enduring and stable socio-political structure once the military returns to garrison. It is no exaggeration that the spirit of goodwill of civil-military relations is in the short and mid-term the more important factor. It therefore

becomes apparent that the state of civil-military relations is the undercurrent to the character of the MI-MG-MD continuum and extends as previously mentioned into the era of civilian rule.

## EDUCATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

We now move on to discuss the relationship between the educational level of the soldier and the character of civil-military interaction, a relationship which is closely connected with the issues of political culture and professionalism.

If one takes for instance the educational standards of Nigerian intakes for the 1975-1979 period they tended to be poor. A navy officer-instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) at Kaduna, in conversation with the author, observed that there existed a further relationship between 'a limited capacity of sophistication' and poor civil-military relations. The 1970s saw this reality at play. Conversely, good educational quality or heightened sophistication of intakes would presumably facilitate better to good civil-military relations.

During the period leading to military disengagement officers were accepted at only 3rd class and pass standard, a situation that would subsequently improve.[40] There is a consensus among Nigerian military officers that the better educated officer possesses more respect and sensitivity towards civilians. And in a revealing comment indicating something of the motivations of many aspirant officers during the 1975-1979 period, the same officer at the NDA stated bluntly,

> Officers no longer enter the military knowing he can become a VIP in 5 to 10 years, pushing his weight and authority around. . The military created its own bad reputation in the past.[41]

When applying the factor of education with its impact on civil-military relations to the cadets at the NDA one can postulate that poor cadet educational qualification and selection leads to poor civil-military relations while good cadet educational qualification

and selection facilitates good civil-military relations. This maxim that educational qualifications affect the character of civil-military relations may be applied to both officers and cadres.

There is a further implication, namely, that higher educational standards may decrease the likelihood of military intervention, while lower educational qualifications are more likely to lead to military intervention. However the question arises as to whether educational qualifications of themselves are sufficient to favour or deter military intervention or whether their effects must first be felt at the level of civil-military relations before either military intervention or military disengagement become distinct possibilities. Such a dynamic would in effect indicate an intermediary function of civil-military relations. Moreover, educational qualifications of officers and men alike fundamentally affect the nature of military governance and military disengagement as well as the prospects for military intervention.

Society as a whole holds the belief that the productiveness of an individual is a function of formal education.[42] It must however then be recognised that productivity within a military environment may well possess a less quantifiable character and thus bear little relationship to the civilian perspective. Our understanding of the effects of education on civil-military relations is further complicated by the difference between formal and technical instruction within society and within the military. We possess little understanding of the degree to which they are transferable from one environment to another nor of their capacity for producing political neutrality especially within the military. What remains is a perception that the 'capacity for sophistication' is a facilitator for enhanced civil-military relations and thus for the primacy and longevity of civilian governance. The substance of producing the apolitical soldier would then lie in the area of political culture as infused within the context of professional development.

NOTES

1. Henry BIENEN with Martin FITTON, 'Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants', in Keith Panter-Brick (ed), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, London: Frank Cass, 1978, pp.27-57.

2. Quoted in J. 'Bayo ADEKANYE, 'Machiavelli And The Military': The Prince and the Psychology of Empty Power', in The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Arms Control and International Security (CSACIS), Lancaster, 1982-83, p.2.

3. D.C. RAPOPORT, 'A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types', in Huntington (ed), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York: Free Press, 1962, p.78.

4. As with the observations on political theory I am indebted to Professor J. 'Bayo Adekunye for his comments on the model presented and for proposing the revision which he termed 'truer' civil-military relations.

5. See Ernest M. LEFEVER, Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa, Washington: Brookings Institute, 1970, p.1.

6. See William F. GUTTERIDGE, Military Institutions and Power in New States, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964; and The Military in African Politics, London: Methuen & Co., 1969.

7. One must qualify this statement by pointing out that among the Yaruba peoples, for example, there are both Muslims and Christians. The religious content is thus superimposed upon a traditional culture which effects a difference in the value systems observed. In fact over time the religious value system increasingly replaces the influence of traditional values if by these values we mean the indigenous or pre-colonial beliefs of the Nigerian peoples. Thus ethno-religious values are not necessarily traditional values. And the ethno-religious values of Christian Yarubas are not synonymous with those of Muslim Yarubas.

8. A. ZOLBERG, 'Military Rule and Political Development in Africa', in Van DOORN (ed), Military Profession and Military Regimes, The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1969, p.198.

9. Claude, E. WELCH, & A.K. SMITH, Military Role and Rule, North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press, 1974, p.40.

10. T.O. ODETOLA, Military Regimes and Development, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, p.12.

11. B.J. DUDLEY, 'The Military and Politics in Nigeria', in Van Doorn, op.cit., p.208.

12. A case in point is the so-called 'Maitatsine' riots in Kano in early 1981. The soldiers at Bukavu Barracks were ordered out to crush a rebellion led by Alhaji Mohammed Marwa, - ...s 'Maitatsine'. The Army bulletin SOJA for February 1981, pp.11-12, reports on 'Operation Aatia' which ended 'three weeks of rioting by a group of religious fanatics'. SOJA goes on to say that Marwa assured his followers of 'a free passage to paradise if they should die in the struggle against government forces'. Marwa and many of his followers were killed. This action took place in the Muslim north and the local commander who ordered the military response was censured by Muslim leaders. The situation was seen by these leaders as a Christian commander taking revenge on a Muslim sect. There was pressure that the commander resign.

13. Even in Ireland one does not generally refer to the ethno-religious factor in civil-military relations, i.e., of a British (Protestant) Army and a Catholic civilian population. The crisis is located primarily in inter-civilian ethno-religious relations.

14. SOJA, March 1977, p.12.

15. This brings to mind President Raul Alfonsin's efforts at shoring up civil-military relations in Argentina during his tenure in government during the 1980s following the Falkland/Malvinas war.

16. The Army's public relations efforts had been sufficiently serious that it included sending fourteen soldiers (three from the Public Relations Department) to West Germany to study media techniques. See SOJA, July 1977.

17. Soldiers were accused of cutting the locals' raffia palms without permits and of assaulting women.

18. Only the police force was the object of greater complaints in this regard, as it still is. The increase of extortion appeared to be associated with increased economic austerity.

19. For example, in Bauchi a dispute arose between landlords and their soldier-tenants in which the former ejected the latter over rent disputes and complaints about living conditions and amenities. This situation was brought to the attention of the 23rd Brigade Headquarters, which immediately triggered efforts by the Brigade Captain in a public relations effort to settle the dispute. The Bauchi town landlords were asked to co-operate with their soldier-tenants during a meeting held at the Bauchi Local Government Authority Secretariat; see SOJA, June 1977. This instance of civil-military tension was typical before adequate military housing was made available.

20. See Daily Times, 9 December 1977, p.28, and 21 December 1977, p.40. It must also be mentioned that death and injury due to hit-and-run accidents are common in Nigeria even now. Individuals will attempt to cross major expressways in peak traffic hours even when overhead walkways are available. I have

witnessed this on many occasions. During his presidency General Obasanjo referred to this situation and to the fact that bodies were often left for hours on the roads

21. See Oyeleye OYEDIRAN (ed), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976-77, Lagos: NIIA with Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd, 1981, pp.123-124.

22. One is reminded of M.D. FELD, The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces and Social Systems, Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1977, in his description of the sociological and symbolic distinctions between the military and civilians. On p.31 Feld states that 'the soldier has conventionally been presented as the servant of some aspects of the ideal. This idealization has furthered the process of the isolation of the soldier as a distinct social type..... [Dedication] to the techniques of war has created patterns of behaviour and outlook sufficiently coherent and explicit to bind the practitioners of these techniques into a distinct exclusive social entity.'

23. Compare this to the rupture of the chain of command after the July 1966 coup in which commands of senior officers such as Ogundyse, a Yoruba, were ignored by ORs of Northern origin.

24. This conclusion was given to the author during an interview with General Danjuma at his Kaduna home in November 1989.

25. Mallam Long Geomai, the Shaldas Dongkwap II of Shendam (this being his full title).

26. See SOJA, August-October 1977, p.12.

27. See SOJA, May 1978, p.3. Colonel Babangida would become Head of Government in the in-house coup of 1985.

28. See SOJA, July 1978, p.13. This report also claims that in towns where troops were moved out to other locations community leaders pleaded with Divisional Headquarters for retention or replacement of the soldiers.

29. Ibid., p.25.

30. SOJA, April 1978.

31. Arthur NWANKWO, Civilianized Soldiers: Army-Civilian Government for Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1984, p.31.

32. SOJA, December 1978, p.5.

33. Address by the outgoing Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen T.Y. Danjuma on the 1st Anniversary celebration of the founding of the C&SC, Jaji, 22 September 1979. Recorded in SOJA, October 1979, p.126.

34. Here we are reminded of Professor Janowitz' observation that the relatively small size of the armed forces of the new African States served as a serious limitation on their effectiveness once in power. The civil-military elite for the 1975-1979 period was to find itself in the same predicament with regards to assuring national stability. Civil-military elite and civil-military non-elite do not dine in the same messes.

35. See Appendix 2.

36. Such as NA Act 1960 embodying military regulations.

37. Contrary to the popular view, there is substantial evidence for the case that the military during the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime was interested in cordial civil-military relations. This military administration did perceive civilians as 'unarmed citizens', and themselves as 'uniformed citizens' (incidentally in September 1989, Colonel Omar Kudafi changed the name of the Libyan Armed Forces to that of 'armed citizens') and both as 'brothers'. The heart of the Nigerian military machine must be assessed for having other than a cynical motivation. This is not to say that military coercion did not exist during the 1975-1979 period. It did and will continue to exist in any military lacking discipline, accountability, and a clear appreciation of institutional and societal interest. There is the additional allowance for the possibility of civilian provocation which influences the civil-military equation. In the process of national development both indiscipline and provocation prove injurious. Ethnocentric analysis will in most instances admit the existence of military abuse but the essential absence of civilian provocation. Such a First World analysis exposes a fundamental ignorance of the Nigerian civil-military realities. Another iconoclastic notion I would like to propose is that a military assessment of actual civil-military relations is not necessarily rendered invalid by definition, i.e., because it originates from the military.

38. This was not the case with future military regimes. The attempted coup of 22 April 1990 against the military government of General Ibrahim B. Babangida is a case in point, in which the conspirators reportedly acted against the Northern-Islamic bias of said administration.

39. The information concerned the requirement that a party have offices established in a certain number of states in order to fulfil the legal standards of the electoral authority. Obviously such information in advance would enable a party to organize its financial resources and manpower accordingly.

40. In conversation with Lieutenant Oriri, instructor at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna, 9-10 October 1989.

41. Lieutenant Oriri, NDA, Kaduna, 9-10 October 1989.

42. S.G. IKOKU, Nigeria's Fourth Coup d'État: Options for Modern Statehood, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985, p.114. Ikoku sees this popular belief as a platitude and myth that has proved inappropriate in its practical application and experience in Nigeria. Arthur Nwankwo however observes that low productivity has resulted from 'miseducation and indiscipline', op.cit., p.39.

13

ACTORS AT THE STATE LEVEL

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## STATE DYNAMICS IN THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT[1]

We now turn to a consideration of how military disengagement affected the running of government at state level. To do this it is helpful to examine first the example of housing development, which brings into light other factors.

The national military leadership wanted the states of the Federation actively involved in the process of military disengagement. This desire would see the state governors called in and informed that x, y and z must be done.

As part of the transition to civilian rule, the SMC directed that every state must have parliament buildings before 1 October 1979. This directive was issued a year to a year and a half prior to that date. Furthermore, the SMC informed their military subordinates acting in their capacity as governors (in so-called political assignments) that if they failed it would be regarded as an act of sabotage! The governors were also directed to construct accommodation for the incoming assemblymen. Regardless of a state's financial status the work was to be completed. The SMC saw the successful construction of such housing as supportive of a smooth transition to civilian rule. Thus if housing money was not available there was to be a reallocation of state revenue to accomplish the task.

In a further development expressing the desire to ensure the viability of the states after military disengagement there was a revenue allocation issued by the FMG in September 1979. It released money to the states through the Federal Pay Office to the figure of N20, 30, or 40 million, depending on the size of the state. The money was actually sent two weeks before the completion of military disengagement and held by the Central Bank of Nigeria. From there the money was sent to the accountant general of the state. The

governors were told not to spend a Kobo (cent) of this money, which was designated for use by the incoming civilian government to begin their administration.

The accountability of individual states prior to military disengagement can be observed in the requirement that states had to submit reports to the FMG on what they were accomplishing with national funds in areas such as construction. To verify these periodic reports inspectors were sent out to investigate the actual use of funds. Reports themselves were subject to particular influences originating from different agencies. The significance of these reports extended beyond the financial use of resources to the specific emphasis and recommendations made by the agencies affected in project implementation. One result of this situation was occasional competition in the reports submitted concerning specific areas. For example, a report could be sent to the SMC by the Ministry of Works and Housing or the Housing Corporation, the latter being a parastatal established by an act of government.

There were instances, albeit the exception, where the parastatal would insist that the Ministry of Works and Housing, to which it was accountable, forward its report intact and without amendment, the rationale being that the Housing Corporation possessed superior expertise. Problems could arise under such circumstances because the Ministry of Works and Housing had the right to inspect and amend reports produced by the Housing Corporation.

The extent of accountability is further highlighted by the following. If for example a directive was issued requiring that each state construct 100 houses and the state reports revealed that in fact only 30 units had been built, the SMC would convene a meeting of the state governors and require them to explain the deficiency. If it was found that the 30 units had been built luxuriously with an expenditure of N30 million out of the allocated N90 million then the 70 units outstanding would have to be built with the remaining monies.[2]

The allocation of housing funds was intended to benefit a representative segment of society and thus enhance civil-military relations in general but most significantly at the grassroots level. eighty per cent of housing construction was earmarked for lower

income citizens while five per cent of housing was generally targeted for higher income citizens.

As mentioned above individual states were required to submit reports whenever the FMG allocated funds. Federal Ministries were also subject to scrutiny and accountability. A ministry was a direct arm of government. The commissioners usually met three times yearly as in the case of such agencies as the National Councils of Education, Health, Industry and Commerce, while the National Council of Works convened on a monthly basis.[3] The extent of projects and the monies allocated as well as socio-political pressures determined the degree of Federal scrutiny and contact with subordinate agencies.

The ministries also worked in conjunction with related parastatals, for example, the Ministry of Works and Housing with the Housing Corporation. The parastatals themselves were, as stated previously, accountable to their respective ministries. However, their internal organization was somewhat different in that a parastatal contained a board without a managing director. Decisions by these boards were made faster than by their opposite numbers in the ministry, who were by contrast more deliberate, some would argue ponderous, in their recommendations and decisions.

If we take the Ministry of Agriculture, for an additional example in ministry-parastatal relations, we can observe that its related parastatal enjoyed on the whole better personnel, greater expertise and higher pay than the ministry. However, in this instance the parastatal did not meet as a board. Parastatals, regardless of their organizational arrangement and management, had to defer to their supervising authority and thus were not autonomous agencies in ultimate decisions concerning policy and revenue allocation. The SMC had placed itself at the pinnacle of the structure of accountability or a veritable chain of command over the non-military or political affairs of government. Paradoxically this arrangement did allow for competing proposals, albeit not frequent, and a mechanism by which such contrasts in perception could be transmitted. There was no fundamental effort by the SMC to eliminate opinionation altogether. The emphasis remained on an orderly, accountable and hierarchical form of government. The SMC perceived that without this there would

be a real threat to the process of military disengagement, that is, withdrawal from above would be jeopardized.

A word or two should be said regarding the disposition of the SMC towards traditional rulers[4] throughout the Federation. As with the independence constitutions of such states as Uganda and Kenya, that of Nigeria was one of a loose federation with the central government left very much weaker as a result of special powers being given to the ethnically- or tribally-based local governments.[5] Ironically, this structure of authority represents the continuity of traditional or indigenous influence that was so adroitly used during colonial administration, an influence that was neither alien nor completely autonomous. Such authors as Muwanga-Barlow and Beatriz Wahrlich[6] speak of these administrative frameworks as reflecting 'perhaps the most crippling legacy' in so far as they are not wholly divested of the logic or spirit from which they were previously fashioned. Even allowing for the perpetuation of native authorities and their courts, the objective of the colonial administrators had not been one of instituting self-determination as understood in the Western democracies. The military administrations were thus immediately faced with having to work with an indigenous authority, locally and regionally based, that it hoped would prove amenable to federal authority and directives.

Unlike the whimsical and sceptical manner in which some of Nigeria's elite have treated the role of the institution of traditional rulers,[7] the Obasanjo administration endeavoured to improve the involvement of traditional chiefs with the governors. The need for such involvement was not seriously questioned although the demarcation and scope of authority was more precisely fixed than in the past. In fact, some members of the SMC did not see the efficiency of traditional rulers in the process of national development and military disengagement. The Inspector-General of the Police and one of the more influential members of the SMC, Alhaji M.D. Yussuf, criticized the titular rulers, in camera, saying that they wasted money. This observation is more revealing when one considers that the Inspector-General is the son of the late Emir of Katsina and thus comes from the ruling class. The SMC was not interested in, nor did it conceive of, a Nigeria without traditional

rulers, as they were often seen as bulwarks of moral and social stability.[8] Moreover, the modernizing officers of the SMC had no intention of disassociating themselves from their ethno-religious backgrounds. Disassociation was practically impossible given the strength and influence of the extended family network throughout Nigeria's diverse communities. This influence was experienced by the Head of State himself. The traditional system acts as a source of motivation and pressure for all its members. According to one Nigerian academic, the Obas (traditional Yoruba chiefs) pressured General Obasanjo to enact decisions that would benefit his people during the process of military disengagement.[9] The leader was not immune to this pressure and there was no attempt to extricate himself from it and the traditional system. One such influenced decision was the location of the Ogun state capital at Abeokuta as opposed to Sagamu, the latter appearing more logical from the standpoint of centrality and existing infrastructure. Abeokuta was however the Head of State's home town.[10] In effect the Obas saw General Obasanjo as one of their own in power, whose decisions must benefit his people.[11]

Mindful of these realities, that affected all the members of the military government, the SMC saw the desirability and efficiency of defining and channeling the role of the regionally based traditional rulers into line with national priorities and objectives. In effect, it was an effort at harnessing the activities of traditional rulers in conformity with the bigger picture of national development and the concomitant requirements leading to military disengagement. Chiefs would be notified of particular proposals and brought in for advice on decisions made. Let us take as an example the Western State before its reorganization into the States of Ogun, Ondo and Oyo. The military governor instituted various measures in chieftaincy matters to include the reconstitution of the council of Obas and Chiefs. This was done in order to bring about a greater degree of representation within the Council itself. There had been instances where council members were, traditionally, outranked by some of the paramount rulers which they were said to represent. This situation resulted in dissatisfaction among many Obas and paramount rulers.[12] New criteria for council membership were established

which provided a more streamlined and hierarchical structure of actual traditional authority and accountability. This was to the advantage of traditional rulers, the state and the FMG. Thus in the Western State the Council of Obas would become the organ of consultation between traditional centers of societal authority and the military government. There was a measure of deference given to the traditional rulers, be they Oba, Obi or Emir, but little to no formal power. To the FMG this development represented an enhancement of the program of military disengagement although somewhat less direct and immediate in effect.

The manner by which actual power is systematically realigned away from the traditional rulers and towards the state and central governments can be seen in prior military administrations (in fact one may look to the colonial period for its initiation.) During the first military administration (January-July 1966) the issue of the Native Courts System was approached by means of reorganization. In February 1966, the then Governor of Northern Nigeria Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan U. Katsina announced the Government's intention of reorganizing and taking over the Courts. What was done in practice was that the Commissioner for Native Courts was placed under the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the Region. The Chief Justice in turn established a committee consisting of experienced jurists and administrative officers to provide recommendations for the implementation of the government policy and for improvement of the performance of the Native Courts. In short, the Military Government had decided that it would increase its supervision and control of the Native Courts by 1 April 1968.[13]

On 1 April 1967, the Gowon administration abolished all Emirs' and Chief Courts. All Native Courts in the then Kaduna Capital Territory were brought under government control. Further fashioning of the judicial structure a year later on 1 April 1968 with the Area Courts Edict formally curtailed the influence of the Native Courts.

During the Ironsi regime efforts at judicial realignment did not prove propitious, given the increasing suspicions that would soon escalate into ethnic-regional revenge.

The Gowon regime, if anything, pursued similar efforts at judicial realignment but only in the aftermath of considerable civil

bloodshed and during the civil war itself. Moreover, the realignment was being conducted through the leadership of a Northerner. These efforts, it may be argued, were compatible with the general philosophy of military disengagement as subsequently unveiled by the Gowon regime and as embodied in his nine-point plan. There was a consistent pattern of greater 'federalization' of the nation with the enhancing of the federal government's jurisdiction over the various administrative and legal institutions interwoven in Nigeria's traditional socio-political fabric. This effort by the military authorities was not altogether unwelcomed by the traditional rulers themselves. In fact, the successive governments of Northern Nigeria had been much concerned with the unsatisfactory set-up of the Native Courts.[14] The difficulty was that for any measure of reform or realignment within these courts to be achieved the central government has to specify precise boundaries of jurisdiction and to ensure enforcement in the event of infractions.

The importance of having a sound Native Courts system was well understood by the SMC. Many people considered that one of the causes of the collapse of the First Republic (1960-1966) was the unsatisfactory judicial system, particularly the Native Courts, which were used as a lethal weapon in the hands of the people in authority to crush criticisms and opponents.[15] The implications for an enduring military disengagement were obvious to the SMC. This necessitated the realignment of these courts; without this the prospects for civilian rule and its longevity would be undermined.

As if to legitimize the military administration's efforts vis-à-vis traditional rulers and its quest for viable political stability after military disengagement, the Emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Sulu Gambari, warned that traditional rulers would intervene 'if the leaders of five political parties fail to play a clean game and resort to causing confusion in the country'. In an article entitled 'Royal warning in Kwara' the Emir waxed patristic and appeared to be in possession of sufficient authority to state:

> As fathers of the people we will not allow the unity and stability of our country to be at stake and the masses to suffer.... We are not interested in partisan politics, but

we are interested in peace, unity and stability.[16]

The import of all these events is well summarized by Theophilus O. Odetola when he observes:

> The military cannot effectively rule without due regard to the problems of equity and fairness among the various groups, while attempting at the same time to keep national interests in focus. It has to give local initiative to state governments ... while simultaneously ensuring uniform application of national policies It cannot will away problems by simple and direct commands. The Nigerian military has superimposed its organizational structure on the polity.... The military ... has had to also rely ... on its ability to generate compromise by persuasion and to induce cooperation.[17]

NOTES

1. For an overview of the reform of local government and the creation of new states during the Muhammed/Obasanjo period see Claude S. PHILLIPS, 'Nigeria's New Political Institutions 1975-9', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.18, no.1, 1980, pp.10-34.

2. Such a situation could, and did, arise as a standards issue, i.e. as a result of using the most expensive means of wiring, for example, conduit versus surface wire. This inefficiency of resource allocation was common until spotted and corrected. Savings could subsequently be realized through the use of Nigerian building technology.

3. Individual states contained their own ministries with comparable responsibilities at their level of jurisdiction. If we take Oyo State as an example there is the following list of ministries (in alphabetical order):

   1) Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
   2) Ministry of Education
   3) Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
   5) Ministry of Health
   6) Ministry of Justice
   7) Ministry of Local Government and Information
   8) Ministry of Trade, Industries and Co-operatives
   9) Ministry of Works and Housing

4. Abubakar KOKO refers to this segment of indigenous leadership as the non-Westernized elite which seems better placed to influence the rest of the communities particularly in matters of culture and ideology (a common perspective). See 'National Ideology and Nigerian Integration', in Mahmud Takur & Tunji Olangunju (eds), Nigeria in Search of a Viable Policy, Conference on Institutional and Administrative Perspectives for National Development, Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bella University, Zaria, 1972, p.84.

5. C.H. MUWANGA-BARLOW, 'The Development of Administrative Sciences in English-Speaking Africa', in International Review of Administrative Sciences, no.1-2, 1978, pp.93-105.

6. Beatriz WAHRLICH, 'Evolución de las Ciéncias Administrativas en America Latina', in International Review of Administrative Sciences, no.1-2, 1978, pp.70-92. Speaking of Latin America, Wahrlich states that 'the administrative technology of the region is basically of foreign origin, although in some cases its operation has experienced adjustments which reveal a certain originality of conception' (p.70 - my translation). It is this 'originality of conception' that the Nigerian military authorities sought to apply in addition to its ambitions for a new national politics.

7. See Habibu A. SANI, of Abu, Zaria, on traditional rulers, in New Nigerian, 1 April 1977, as recorded in The Great Debate: Nigerian Viewpoints on the Draft Constitution, 1976-1977, a Daily Times Publication, Lagos, 1977.

8. Arthur NWANKWO points out this is not the case in some communities, as was demonstrated in the former East Central State, where peoples were 'afflicted by cancerous communal rifts and litigations arising from conflicting claims to chieftancy stools'. See Civilianized Soldiers: Army-Civilian Government for Nigeria, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1984, pp.60-61.

9. Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye, University of Ibadan, in discussion with the author, 23 October 1989. The Professor does not associate nepotism with corruption. Nwankwo by contrast sees them as symbiotic.

10. Professor Adekunye points out that in another sense the Abeokuta decision did not just ignore what appeared to be unalterable foundation. By this he means that the logic of colonial administration had established most of the present day infrastructure and urbanization. Can we say with certainty that these imposed economic determinants are the foundation upon which to build? My impression of Professor Adekanye's analysis is that the ethno-religious linkages have greater significance than an outsider would consider necessary in pursuing economic logic. The Buhari and Babangida administrations have their own examples.

11. The influence of the traditional system is quite impressive to the Western observer. I will provide three short examples. While I was sitting with Professor Adekanye in his office, guests who were traditionally related to him would often come from far off districts. The young men would bow low in the usual Yaruba fashion while women would kneel. They had come to visit to request assistance in matters or admission or employment. At the University of Lagos I observed a young lecturer of socialist political beliefs, from the Department of Political Science, bow low to his elder and less academically educated chief librarian. The third example is of a young university graduate who bowed nearly prostrate to an older servant woman arriving at the young woman's family home to begin her duties.

12. See David M. JEMIBEWON, A Combatant in Government, Ibadan: Hienemann Educational Books (Nigeria), 1978, p.139.

13. See Musa YAKUBU, 'The Nigerian Legal System Since Independence', in J.A. ATANDA & A.Y. ALIYU (eds), Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since Independence, Zaria, March 1983: Vol.I, Political Development, Zaria: The Panel of Nigeria Since Independence History Project, pp.385-405.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. As reported in the New Nigerian, Wednesday, 31 January 1979.

17. Theophilus O. ODETOLA, Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978, p.20.

14

DECREES

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THE LEGISLATION OF DECREES : DECREES AS LEGISLATION[1]

It has been observed that the FMG of 1975-1979 ran the government, from local to state to national level, like a military structure or chain of command.[2] This may well bring to mind a variety of images which in part or in their entirety may be impressionistic rather than reflect an accurate understanding of the manner of governing, especially as regards military legislation (decrees). For clarity let us then consider the 'legislative process' entailed in the promulgation of decrees under the military governance under examination (1975-1979).

The SMC viewed the use of decrees as more expeditious than the Acts enacted in the 1960s prior to military governance. The length of a decree could be anything from 2 to 20 pages depending on the issue, situation and deadline involved. There were occasions on which decrees were left open for further input and deliberation.

A security related issue would be considered more promptly and a decree enacted quickly. For example e Police could present a request for greater power due ' xd robberies which would rece..ve a quick audience within .. If deemed necessary then the decree would be issued empower..g the Police.

The motivation by the Head of State and/or AG determined when a decree was issued. Depending on the urgency and content of a proposed decree, the President could assign a deadline for its formulation; for example, during a Thursday meeting of the SMC the directive would be given that reports on a proposed decree should be prepared and issued by the following week in order to promulgate the decree.

A decree could also be issued in anticipation of a forthcoming event, for example, so as to stop a strike. Civil disturbances could see a decree promulgated on the same day.

By contrast, a decree could take a relatively long time to issue as in the case of the formation of a press council.[3] The character of civil-military relations as well as the desire for laws which could be shaped in the process of military disengagement, with its attendant effects, were taken into account in the formation of the decree. A decree was not simply tantamount to a totalitarian edict.

The manner and sequence by which decrees are enacted can be illustrated in what I would describe as the seven stages of the decree originating and finalization process:

1) Someone desired to register a professional body, for example, quantity surveyors, or a medical association. In the case of the latter, then
2) the request for registration had to emerge from the Ministry of Health. Once the request is made, then
3) the request was passed on to the Ministry of Justice. It then had to
4) go to the legal draftsman. After his work was completed the legal draftsman then
5) returned the request to the Ministry of Justice. At this stage the Ministry had the law taken, and it then
6) went to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) which could approve the proposed legislation (decree) but could not pass it. If the FEC approved it then
7) the legislation was sent to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) for final decision.

A decree could originate from the SMC itself but as one can see with the above example this was not necessarily the case.

Another path by which decree legislation could be pursued is seen when the police, for example, reported that robbery was becoming uncontrollable. A proposal for a decree to deal with crime was forwarded to the Ministry of Justice. If the decree proposal had implications for the States of the Federation, then the legislation was passed on from the Federal Executive Council to the National Council of States (NCS). The NCS could in turn amend the legislation with its own memorandum prior to passing it on to the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The SMC then usually passed the legislation, that is, issued the decree.

The processes described thus far do not indicate that decrees were promulgated in an arbitrary manner but rather that there was an integrated system reflecting national administrative interest and, to a certain extent, collaboration and consensus. All levels of government participated and made their suggestions known within this process of decree legislation. There was no expressed purpose of exclusion in this process. There was instead an emphasis that final decision be made by the SMC, usually, however in agreement with subordinate recommendations. The SMC did not see itself as capable of, nor did it see any advantage in, controlling all facets and levels of the decree legislation process.

## THE DECREE RECORD

From this description of the process of formulating decrees we now turn to an analysis of the number and content of the decrees themselves.

Military governance is often associated with vast quantities of decrees intended for the maximum exercise of power through social control. In fact, the majority of military legislation is not directly related to security matters but reflects, on the whole, a more administrative character that addresses many of the issues usually linked to civilian governments. One also observes that the quantity of decrees enacted on a yearly average by the Nigerian military is roughly comparable to the average number of Ordinances and Acts recorded under civilian rule.

When looking at the number of decrees listed for the entire span of military rule (January 1966-October 1979) we discover a total of 823 Federal Military Government Decrees (see Table 14.1). This sum does not include the even larger amount of subsidiary legislation enacted at state and local levels which for the purposes of this study is to be understood as a separate category not under examination.[4]

A cursory examination of the decrees passed for the 1966 to 1979 period of military rule reveals a yearly average of 60.04 decrees. For the relatively short period of civilian rule (October 1960 - January 1966) the number of government ordinances and acts totaled

Table 14.1

Number of Federal Military Government Decrees, 1966-1979

| Year | Number of Decrees | Military Administration |
|---|---|---|
| 1966 | 88 | Ironsi (till July) Gowon |
| 1967 | 52 | Gowon |
| 1968 | 60 | " |
| 1969 | 55 | " |
| 1970 | 62 | " |
| 1971 | 58 | " |
| 1972 | 51 | " |
| 1973 | 45 | " |
| 1974 | 41 | " |
| 1975 | 42 | Gowon (till July) Muhammed/Obasanjo |
| 1976 | 59 | Obasanjo |
| 1977 | 71 | " |
| 1978 | 35 | " |
| 1979 | 104 | " (till Oct) |
| Total | 823 | |

262, which gives a yearly average of 49.53.[5] The Ironsi and Gowon military administrations recorded the lion's share of decrees with the sum of 531 for a yearly average of 55.89. This is closer to the civilian average of ordinances and acts. With the exception of 1979, which saw the enactment and amendment of the new constitution as well as being a backlog year,[6] the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration managed a yearly average of 45.19 which is less than the pre-military legislation level.

I now proceed to an analysis of the decrees of the Muhammed/Obasanjo years, in order to identify the regime's policy emphasis. Two warnings must be made with regard to interpreting the results.

Firstly, decrees themselves are not wholly reflective of policy emphasis. Much policy can be enacted by a powerful administrator with a supporting administrative structure and staff. For example, for the period under review, few decrees can be directly traced to the advancement of the military's institutional interests. However, the authority and autonomy of the Chief of Army Staff was indisputable. Decrees were not required for policy to be enacted within the military itself.

Secondly, categorizing the decrees is difficult in that there is much interrelationship between categories. For example, the exclusively economic decree does not exist; there is inevitably social or governmental content as well. Or to take another example, does one classify Decree No. 8 of 8 March 1979 (Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria Decree 19?? ; as media legislation or a security decree? Ostensibly Decree No. 8 sets up zones and zonal boards 'for the purposes of effective coverage and variety'. Nigerian observers claim that the establishment of zones and their boards was to facilitate regime control over this portion of the media while effectively eliminating the radio as a weapon against the regime from any quarter. Agreement with this assessment would have one classify Decree No. 8 of 1979 as a security decree in keeping with the thrust of the regime's intent in enacting such a measure.

In keeping with this intermixing of prime facie and underlying intent each decree is classified in what follows according to its more comprehensive nature. The categories selected are intentionally few in number so as to arrive at a less elaborate yet fairly comprehensive outline of policy emphasis under the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime.

The categories selected are Economic (including finance, banking, appropriations, property, petroleum, industry and agriculture), Social (including education, health and the media, inter alia), Government (including electoral, judicial, legal and administrative matters, inter alia), and Military and Police (which includes pensions, appropriation, security, sabotage and censorship, inter alia).

Table 14.2 shows the decrees enacted in each of the Muhammed/Obasanjo years according to the above categories. The decrees are referred to by their numbers. This data can be further collated according to the yearly totals and percentage for each category - see Table 14.3.[7]

Table 14.2
Decrees of July 1975-September 1979 by Category and Year

| | Economic | Social | Government | Military & Police |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | 25,26,29,37, 39,40,41,42 | 20,37,28,33 | 22,23,24,31, 32,34,36,38 | 21,30,35 |
| 1976 | 5,14,15,18, 24,25,26,27, 32,33,34,35, 36,37,38,39, 47,49,55,58, 59 | 9,13,19,21, 28,30,31,48, 56,57 | 3,4,6,7,10, 12,22,29,40, 41,42,43,44, 45,46,50,51, 52,53,54,60 | 2,8,11,16, 17,23 |
| 1977 | 1,3,6,8,14, 20,21,28,29, 30,31,33,34, 35,36,37,38, 42,44,47,49, 55,61,63,64, 71 | 5,7,9,10,11, 16,24,43,45, 51,58 | 13,17,19,22, 23,32,40,41, 48,50,52,53, 54,56,62,65, 66,67,70,72, 73 | 2,4,12,18, 25,26,27,39, 57,59,68,69 |
| 1978 | 8,9,11,13, 16,24,27,28, 29,30,35 | 1,2,4,5,6, 7,10,21,22, 31,34 | 3,14,15,17, 18,19,20,23, 25,26,32,33 | 12 |
| 1979 | 4,10,11,12, 16,24,28,30, 31,38,40,44, 50,62,70,71, 86,87,89,94, 95,97,99 | 3,6,8,13,18, 25,29,33,52, 53,55,60,65, 67,68,69,72, 73,76,78,79, 80,81,82,83, 84,88,90,91, 101 | 7,9,15,17,19, 20,21,22,26, 27,32,34,35, 36,37,39,41, 42,43,45,46, 47,48,49,51, 54,56,57,58, 59,61,63,65, 74,75,77,85, 93,98,100, 103,104 | 1,2,5,23, 64,92,96, 102 |

Table 14.3

Decrees of July 1975-September 1979: Total and Percentage by Category and Year

| | Economic | Social | Government | Military & Police | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | 8 (34.8) | 4 (17.4) | 8 (34.8) | 3 (13.0) | 23 |
| 1976 | 22 (37.3) | 10 (16.9) | 21 (35.6) | 6 (10.2) | 59 |
| 1977 | 26 (36.6) | 11 (15.5) | 22 (31.0) | 12 (16.9) | 71 |
| 1978 | 11 (31.4) | 11 (31.4) | 12 (34.3) | 1 (2.9) | 35 |
| 1979 | 24 (23.1) | 30 (28.8) | 42 (40.4) | 8 (7.7) | 104 |
| 1975-1979 | 91 (31.1) | 66 (22.6) | 105 (36.0) | 30 (10.3) | 292 |

The figures immediately indicate a Government and Economic bias, those two categories accounting for 67.1 percent of the 292 decrees issued during the Muhammed/Obasanjo period. The remaining third of the decrees fall under the Social and Military & Police categories.

Slightly more than a third of the decrees were amendments to previous legislation, dating mostly from the years of military administration, although there were also amendments to legislation passed prior to the era of military intervention, as well as amendments affecting decrees issued earlier in the same period, e.g., Decree No. 18: Legal Aid (Amendment) Decree 1979 relates to Decree No. 56: Legal Aid Decree 1976. (See also Decree No. 16 of 1978 with Decree No. 33 of 1977, Decree No. 24 of 1978 with Decree No. 8 of 1978 and Decree No. 71 of 1979 with Decree No. 26 of 1976).

In addition to amending previous legislation, decrees were used as administrative instruments to effect transfer of functions (see Decree No. 28: Cooperation and Social Development Decree 1976), change of title (Decree No. 41 of 1976), repeal of previous legislation (Decree No. 62 of 1977, Decree No. 26 of 1978) and

dissolution of particular bodies (Decrees Nos. 17, 18 and 23 of 1978), inter alia.

The smallest number of decrees are tabulated under the Military and Police category, representing approximately one tenth of all decrees for the 1975-1979 period. While there is a genuine concern for the maintenance of domestic security through public order (Decree No. 5 of 1979) there are other concerns represented in this category.

The Anti-sabotage decrees (Decree No. 35 of 1975, and Decrees Nos. 57 and 59 of 1977) are for the protection of the Nigerian economy; to this end they are essentially prophylactic rather than overtly repressive.[8]

There is a limited measure of censorship (Decree No. 11 of 1976, Decree No. 12 of 1978). Greater emphasis is placed on the functioning of military tribunals, (Decree No. 8 of 1976, Decrees Nos. 2 and 18 of 1977), Courts (Decrees Nos. 4 and 68 of 1977, Decree No. 2 (Special Powers) of 1979), and the nascent Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) (Decree No. 16 of 1976).

In a supportive role is the enactment of decrees intended to facilitate administrative efficiency (Decree No. 17 of 1976, Decree No. 27 of 1977, Decrees Nos. 23 and 64 of 1979), and the well-being of service members (pensions) (Decree No. 2 of 1976, Decree No. 25 of 1977, Decree No. 102 of 1979).

The enactment of classic public security legislation such as Decree No.1: Public Security (Detention of Persons) Decree 1979 appeared to weigh less heavily on the minds of the SMC than the bolstering and protection of the national economy, and the establishment and continuity of responsive administration.

The numbers and categories of decrees provide an approximation of regime emphasis. In real terms the administration of government grows in the affairs of the nation. In turn the military administration hopes that this growth translates into the support of economic policy.

The relatively minor need for decrees in Military and Police belies the common wisdom that military governments will emphasize this category above all others. In the process of military disengagement investment is made rather in the realms of government and economic development.

We have also observed that socially related degrees appear underrepresented. In view of political and economic demands and forecasting this is understandable especially in a Third World environment. However, the risk apparently taken is to invest in more tangible political and economic projects rather than in areas of less immediate benefit. Unresolved in this apparent strategy is how to foster the social virtues or political culture that is required for stable government administration in a post-military disengagement milieu. The SMC hoped for the best in political behavior after 1 October 1979. However, to a man the SMC membership admitted to its collective miscalculation in this hope.

Although great emphasis has been laid on the need to enhance Nigerian political culture, which is perceived as a social problem, the dilemma remains as to how to achieve such an enhancement. If decrees cannot legislate it into being then the national elite are left to a process of trial and error in a most volatile ethno-religious environment. This reality has continued to breed a particular brand of national uncertainty and confusion that does not augur well for future social developments.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Dr. Soleye, Acting Head, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, who provided much valuable insight in an interview with the author 7 November 1989, Ibadan.

2. In an interview with the author on 21 September 1989, A.O. Banjo said, 'The military ran state governments like a chain of command.' This does not imply a system of oppression but one of exclusivity.

3. Decree No. 31: Nigerian Press Council Decree 1978. Supplement to Official Gazette, No. 561, Vol. 65, 16 November 1978, Part A. 'This decree establishes the Nigerian Press Council to promote high professional standards for the Nigerian Press; to register persons for the practice of the profession of journalism, to prepare a code of conduct for the guidance of journalists and to deal with complaints emanating from members of the public about the conduct of the press and journalists in their professional capacity.' See FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Annual Volume of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Containing Decrees and Subsidiary Legislation Made in the Year 1978, Lagos, 1980. Summary of decree also listed in Oyeleye OYEDIRAN (ed), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1978-79, Lagos: NIIA with Macmillan Nigeria, 1988, p.352.

4. If one examines, for example, 1975 one will find there are 123 separate pieces of subsidiary legislation (using the generic term), of all which are intended to support, clarify and/or amend current or previous legislation.

5. Ordinances were passed for 1960. In that year there were a total of 55. From 1961 to 1965 the distribution of Acts was as follows: 1961: 72; 1962: 42; 1963: 23; 1964: 33; 1965: 37.

6. In an interview with the author at General Obasanjo's Ota farm, 16 November 1989, the former Head of State described the decrees enacted in 1979 as actions intended for 'clearing the tray for civilians'.

7. The following decrees do not appear in Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976-77 and 1978-79: Decree No. 1, 1976, Decree No. 15, 1977, and Decree No. 60, 1977. Our analysis and totals therefore exclude these numbers.

8. Another piece of legislation which the regime perceived as anti-sabotage in nature was Decree No. 69: 'Trade Dispute (Essential Services) Amendment Decree 1977, which was intended to punish persons 'whose acts are calculated to disrupt the economy or the smooth running of any essential service'.

# THE MILITARY AGENDA

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIVIL WAR FOR THE DUAL AGENDA AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) exposed many deficiencies within the armed forces, and the rectification of these deficiencies constituted much of the military's agenda in the post-war years and throughout the period of transition to civilian governance. The civil war proved to be the catalyst for organizational and administrative innovations in anticipation of national security requirements. The implications of the war were indeed far-reaching. The military administration of 1975-1979 sought to rectify the most significant problems before 1 October 1979 for it perceived that this would afford the maximal chance of success of military disengagement. The fulfillment of that portion of the military agenda derived from the experiences of the civil war was also seen as integral to Nigerian strength and development. It should be understood that military disengagement represents the aspiration both for a viable democracy and for viable and credible armed forces. To a great extent the performance and experiences of the military during the civil war provided a practical antithesis to future Nigerian armed forces despite the victory gained by the Federation.

Major-General S. Shelleng points out that during the civil war the collation and circulation of intelligence within the Federal Armed Forces was poor, the main sources being situation reports (SITREPS) or interrogation of POWs.[1] There was an absence of an effective intelligence network: no effective human intelligence (HUMINT), no signals intelligence (SIGINT) and little in the way of psychological operations (PSYOPS). Processing and analysis was primitive by any standards. The Nigerian Air Force lacked any means of aerial photography and air-photo interpretation. By contrast the Biafrans (seccessionist Eastern Nigeria), who were badly outnumbered in men and resources, operated an effective intelligence network.[2]

The civil war had highlighted battlefield deficiencies and inabilities in intelligence collection, processing and analysis. The military agenda would attempt to redress this situation with respect to military preparedness. It would not be until the assassination of Murtala Muhammed in February 1976 that intelligence requirements would include a capacity for internal surveillance primarily for the security of the SMC. The civil war had revealed deficiencies in the military rather than the political dimensions of intelligence capabilities.

One of the most glaring deficiencies throughout the civil war lay with command and control. General Shelleng elaborates:

> Except in Two and possibly Three Divisions where GOCs at one time exercised effective command and control over their Divisions by displaying personal courage and exemplary leadership, it would probably be right to say that the GOCs were generally not in absolute control.[3]

For the purpose of illustration perhaps one example would suffice.[4] During the conflict a young Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary grade) Danjuma discovered two things on receiving reports about the disposition of troops and the conduct of the war. The first was that Divisional Headquarters was inordinately distant from Brigade Headquarters at the front. Consequently, there was little direct communication between them, with the added complication that they kept issuing totally unreasonable orders to the battle troops. These orders were promptly ignored. The second was that the battle objectives given to the officers were not beyond their reach but that there was insufficient coordination of tactics in their moves. In many instances such a situation persisted. An exception to this was Lt-Col Danjuma's initiative in which he called a series of brainstorming sessions at Brigade Headquarters where he canvassed advice from every officer regardless of rank, at the end of which the commander had conceived of a general strategy to be pursued. In this instance it was a general strategy for a swift push by federal troops to Enugu.

In recent interviews with the author, Major-General James J. Oluleye and the COAS Lt-Gen T.Y. Danjuma[5] spoke of Divisional commanders as 'warlords' who prosecuted the war as they saw fit, with Lagos having minimum influence on their decisions. This claim runs counter to any pretence at command and control coordination. The GOCs were indeed not in absolute control and the Obasanjo administration sought to redress a situation that persisted throughout the Gowon years and which in any army would be considered a potential for disaster. This was clearly a military agenda item with obvious implications for national security.

The civil war revealed serious logistics problems. There was no maintenance and repair system for the newly acquired military hardware. There were shortages of drugs and facilities to treat casualties. The military lacked expertise, officers and technicians, in the Ordinance Corps. Consequently, there were accounting and procedural difficulties as civilians and soldiers worked together, the former partner being accused of 'muddling things up'.

This lack of expertise coupled with distribution deficiencies affected the Nigerian Army Engineers making them the most ill-equipped corps of the war. Equipment such as boots, uniforms and web gear were all in short supply. Insufficiencies were often experienced with rifles, which meant that soldiers relied significantly on captured weapons. This insufficiency applied to combat support equipment as well.

At the war's end the Federal Army stood at approximately 250,000 soldiers. Lt-General Danjuma made it clear in 1975 that the Army's 'unplanned growth' was due to battlefield requirements rather than a longterm need or any given strategy. This combined with what was seen as an inordinate defense expenditure created an unpopular peace time force that was subject to mounting criticism. The need for demobilization became a premier topic in subsequent military administrations. The Gowon regime essentially delayed any serious moves towards demobilization. This indecisiveness towards demobilization was one of the grievances of the 1975 conspirators. Demolibization was considered a politically delicate item; many within the military feared that if pursued too seriously or quickly it would invite societal dislocation and possible military

intervention. And in the absence of an adequate formula for demobilization the issue was left unaddressed. It remained therefore a pressing issue to be taken up by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime, who were clearly sensitive to the need for demolibization in order to enhance military preparedness and professional development. The issue was produced by the civil war and weighed heavily in their thoughts and strategies for military disengagement. Largely through the efforts of the COAS General Danjuma demobilization was effectively addressed at various levels. By October 1979 army strengths would stand at 160,000, a reduction of 90,000 soldiers over a period of nine years. The SMC considered the optimum size and attendant strength of the armed forces as inseparable from the idea of national strength and the pursuit of domestic and international policy.

Symbiotic to a productive demobilization is the reorganization of the armed forces. The need for reorganization was also felt immediately after the civil war by the Gowon regime, which interpreted it in terms of the three Rs of 'reconciliation', 'reconstruction' and 'rehabilitation'. Under the Muhammed/Obasanjo period reorganization was to emphasize, inter alia, the following developments which were integral to the process of military disengagement and specific items contained within the military agenda:

1) The redeployment and structural reorganization of three former Infantry Divisions into four, with each stretching from North to South, straddling old regional boundaries and the newly created States so as to insulate them from political pressures, and to make for effective command and control, easier logistical support and maximum utilization of resources for tri-service operations involving the Navy and the Air Force;
2) The acquisition of sophisticated military hardware that would transform the Army into an effective fighting machine;
3) The training and retraining of military personnel to satisfy the Army's needs for more skilled and technically oriented manpower;
4) The effort to provide adequate barracks accommodation to ensure the minimum standard of comfort necessary for maintaining the morale of officers and men; and

5) The adoption of a new Order of Battle (OB) envisaged to establish strong combat-ready units capable of reacting with speed, accuracy and effective firepower to any military threat or whenever the need arises, and flexible enough to adjust swiftly to numerous c.anging circumstances of defense.[6]

These and other military agenda priorities would in fact be initiated and to a large extent accomplished during the period of transition to civilian rule. This is not, however, an attestation of the quality or effectiveness of these accomplishments. This is the subject of much debate. But it is fair to say that the Nigerian armed forces had never experienced such an extensive and real upgrade in the welfare and preparedness of its members and facilities.

The civil war affected the treatment of certain categories of officers to include their retention within the service. During the war a system was devised to grant 'Field Commission' to a good number of Warrant Officers and senior non-commissioned officers. At the war's end army headquarters made the decision to retain these field officers with a view to granting them full commission. The serious intent behind retaining these officers was reflected subsequently when standardization courses were organized for them at training depots in Abeokuta and Zaria. After these courses, a commissioning board (headed by Brigadier Gordon Alabi-Isama) sat through the formations from November 1974 to April 1975 to recommend those suitable for commissioning. The Muhammed/Obasanjo administration continued this policy and based on the report of the commissioning board of the previous military administration the successful officers gained their commissions in September 1975.[7] As military professionals the Gowon and Muhammed/Obasanjo governments sought to retain battlefield experience through an instituted post-war commissioning mechanism. The civil war had produced this pool of potential career officers. The identification, selection and instruction process became a priority of the military agenda.

Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma has stated that the civil war produced two classes of officers, namely, those with combat experience and those without.[8] Had it not been for the authority exercised within the SMC by those with combat experience there would

have been a serious possibility of a fractionalized military leadership. Instead there emerged a situation where the unofficially stratified officer corps rewarded and promoted those with combat experience while affording fewer such benefits to those without this valuable wartime experience. This class stratification meant that the military government would be run by men of a different perspective and disposition both vis-à-vis civilian leaders and their military colleagues lacking combat experience.[9]

By and large the experience of the civil war had produced the military's vision of future national strength and the fulfillment of Nigeria's 'manifest destiny' in its role as leaders in Africa if not internationally.[10] Consequently great emphasis would be laid on the level of military preparedness as one of the primary vehicles to fulfill national greatness.

Despite the belief held by many observers that Nigeria had emerged from the civil war politically unified,[11] which technically speaking was correct, the war had in fact accentuated existent divisions among the many peoples of Nigeria. The military government had to address continued negative attitudes, prejudice and discrimination between ethnic groups. It became very apparent that it would be difficult to achieve the common goals on which the stability of the nation would depend. The war had been prosecuted to 'keep Nigeria one' and the Gowon regime had indoctrinated Federal soldiers to observe a specific code of conduct in the operational areas, which was certainly effective in averting genocide.[12] Nevertheless the reality of ethnic identification would persist unabated. As one Nigerian psychologist plainly warns in this regard:

> So long as we continue to see ourselves as Hausas, Ibos, Yorubas, Fulanis, Efiks, Idomas, Edos, etc., or, as in recent times, indigenes of Kaduna, Imo, Ogun, Plateau States, etc., it will not be possible for Nigerians to develop a national identity which is necessary for the political, social, moral and technological growth of their country.... It is obvious that conflicts will continue to be generated where our ethnic differences are allowed more latitude than our similarities. We may yet witness another collective violence if this trend is not checked.[13]

The Muhammed/Obasanjo administration was very interested in fostering a sense of national identity, especially throughout the armed forces, which would not at the same time depreciate ethnic linkages. This paradox was and remains a subtle one which has not proven altogether resolvable in the Nigerian context.

At the war's end a national army was fashioned from both federal soldiers and a portion of the former Biafran forces, although many of the latter would be retained at a reduced grade and seniority.[14] The need for a national identity was obvious. The manner of initiating such a possibility was through corporate identification of a multi-ethnic military. Corporate identification would nurture a national identity, the latter being a considerably more esoteric concept, and as such a more elusive objective, given the real pressures and demands from ethno-religious relations. Corporate identification was thus seen as a intermediate and vital step towards a national identity at least for the members of the armed forces. The SMC would establish complementary structures to influence other segments of society to this new way of thinking. The difficulty still lay in bringing the majority of Nigerians to a real national identity transcending ethnic contention and suspicion. The war had brought to the fore the critical need for national unity and the reality of its absence. The process of military disengagement had to incorporate various means by which to address an unresolved situation; a situation that became inseparable to both the military and political agendas.

The war had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the armed forces that the military was in fact the main pillar of state power[15] and occupied this position whether in or out of military rule. The military also saw much of its activities and development as institutional preparedness so that once under civilian authority it would serve as a shadow or alternative government in the event of a national crisis.[16] This is not to imply that the military was eager to return, for the record would indicate otherwise,[17] but that it saw preparedness as insufficient if not taking into consideration every real contingency. More urgently, the armed forces saw its efforts as increasing its overall capabilities, both military and administrative, within its own environment.

## RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE

In August 1976 the COAS Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma stated, 'Historians and future generations will reckon that we owe our unity today to the Nigerian Army.'[18] This was said in relation to military development and its contribution to the nation: 'The contribution of our army to development cannot be over emphasized.' This conclusion was in large part due to an examination of the army's post-war reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure.

The then Brigadier Obasanjo and his engineers provided repairs to roads and bridges from the Orlu-Owerri axis extending to Port Harcourt and northwards to Onitsha. As Lieutenant Sam Ade Wyse points out, the army engineers rebuilt most of the damaged bridges and roads in the post-civil war era, helping to reconstruct hundreds of kilometers of roads in Imo and Anambra states as well as other parts of Nigeria.[19] Logically most of the reconstruction took place in the East where the war had been concentrated.

In conjunction with these efforts the Signal Corps contributed to the reestablishment of communications in various areas. Their involvement extended to assistance in traffic control. Further assistance was rendered in the running of railroads, support to the ports authority, and in the restoration of lights in cases of emergency.

The Muhammed/Obasanjo regime hoped to expand these infrastructural gains as revenues became available. This category of reconstruction was also viewed in terms of what is more commonly regarded as civic action: a deliberate attempt to gain the hearts and minds of those benefiting, thus fostering national unity. An additional hoped-for benefit was the enhancement of civil-military relations, which is reflected in the analysis of one service member:

> If civilians see soldiers as builders of a nation, as law abiding citizens and last but not the least, as guardians of our nation's security, the conflict between civilians and soldiers would cease.[20]

DEMOBILIZATION

One of the first steps taken by the new regime was the demobilization of an oversized and cumbersome army that was not only immobile but included soldiers who had also served in World War II, had been recruited out of retirement for service in the civil war and were literally dying of old age. From a standing army of 250,000 officers and men in 1975 demobilization reduced the figure to 221,000 by 1977, 180,000 by 1978 and 160,000 by 1979.[21] General recruitment, which had been suspended at the end of the civil war, was still not resumed, although steady but small intakes continued.

As a precautionary measure General Danjuma articulated his basic views (which meant those of the regime) concerning the demobilization and modernization of the Nigerian army so as to inform the public of the rationale involved, in anticipation of the discharge of soldiers into society at large. It was extremely important to depoliticize the whole process of demobilization. The military hierarchy wished to avoid the potentially disastrous development of producing a mass of disaffected ex-service members. The history of unemployed ex-service members was not a favorable one in the politics of West Africa and the continuity of regimes.

From a strictly military perspective, Danjuma's assertion was that while manpower was the basic asset of any good army, manpower without adequate firepower was a waste. He also believed that not only the numbers but the level and type of manpower in the Army were in need of change. There was a need for new blood and new ideas to be brought into the Army. Danjuma held that excessive manpower was too expensive in terms of wages and the monies that should be allocated to equipment and increasingly sophisticated weaponry with enhanced firepower were being squandered on social services. He declared that under his command this situation would be reversed.[22]

Demobilization was facilitated by a direct plan of action after careful consultation and assurance of coordination. The Commander-in-Chief Order of the Day No. 7 was issued to all arms and services through the COAS in June 1976. The background for this directive is seen in the explanation provided:

> By this exercise, willing and volunteering members of the Army will transfer to other sectors of the economy without a loss of salary or status.... It can be seen that since the war ended six years ago, no general recruitment into the Army has taken place whereas like any dynamic organization, the Army should regularly be fed with new entrants so that at no time do all the members become too old to be ineffective.
>
> Secondly, with its present size the cost of maintaining the Army will certainly inhibit the provision of amenities and the needed development of the country.
>
> Thirdly, it is not in the interest of the individuals concerned to keep the Army at its present size because as it is, promotion to a higher rank cannot be easy for the men as long as both the old, the effective and non-effective holding ranks of the establishment of a unit remain perpetually on the strength of that unit.
>
> It must be appreciated that as at the moment all units are holding ranks surplus to establishment.[23]

The issues of concern to the military emerge as military preparedness and effectiveness. This is followed by the conclusion that such a large force curtailed increased benefits for service members to the detriment of institutional and national development, the former perceived as interlaced with the latter.

The importance of avoiding promotional bottlenecks is well-known to the institutional military. Just as there is a danger of producing disaffected ex-service members so there is also the risk of discontent among officers and men alike in seeing limited career possibilities. Such a stagnant situation would afford a natural breeding ground for military insurrection and national upheaval.

The SMC also authorized a committee to be set up to look into the ways and means of hastening payments of pensions and other benefits to soldiers willing to retire voluntarily and those willing to transfer. This supporting effort was to facilitate a rational demobilization with minimum adverse social, economic and political impact on Nigeria.

The details of these benefits were announced to the soldiers, who according to General Obasanjo were free to make their choice. If one is to measure the success of these efforts by the numbers opting to leave the service then one would have to conclude that the program of demobilization at this stage proved enormously successful, so much so that a halt had to be ordered during the Obasanjo administration to avoid a detrimental exodus of army personnel. Throughout the NA discharges had been taking place in groups of several hundreds as a norm. For example, 320 soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Brigade, Port Harcourt (Rivers), were discharged in February 1977. This instance was multiplied many times throughout the NA which presented an alarming exit of men and qualified trainers. Ultimately therefore the demobilization process had to be arrested.

REHABILITATION

The Nigerian civil war had produced thousands of disabled soldiers who were in need of skills before being released into civilian life. Prior to the war's end the Gowon regime had enacted the Pensions and Gratuities War Service Decree No. 49 of 1969 to assist veterans in various circumstances in their return to civilian society. But the specific programs employed had proven inappropriate in addressing the needs of disabled soldiers who desired eventual discharge from the service.

The SMC identified three reasons for the failure of the previous administration's showcase Armed Forces Rehabilitation Centre, Oshodi: 1) The concept of rehabilitation had been misdirected, with an emphasis on urban training, which bore little relationship to the social background of the Nigerian soldier of rural areas. Tools and equipment proved too sophisticated and expensive. 2) Decree No. 49 (previously cited) made employment after discharge more of an avocation than a means of livelihood. 3) The duration of the scheme averaged three years, creating an unacceptable waiting list, which had an adverse effect on discipline and morale. Of the three defects, this proved the most harmful to the NA.

The Obasanjo regime thus commissioned a review of the military's

rehabilitation scheme through the Technical Committee of the Rehabilitation of Soldiers established in October 1976. The review covered the trades being taught at Oshodi and was to suggest faster means of rehabilitating the disabled and old members of the NA.[24] Subsequently, the chairman of the Technical Committee, Dr. O.O. Olaifa, disclosed that the Rehabilitation Centers at Agege, Kachia (Kaduna), Iseyin (Oyo) and Shendam (Plateau), had started with the first course of six months duration. Previously, the first group of 2,000 disabled soldiers had taken three years to graduate at the Oshodi centre while the second intake of 2,025 took between eighteen months and two years to graduate because of the interim measures taken by the Obasanjo government. The need for the six month course was made clear by the fact that there remained some 7,500 disabled soldiers waiting in various army units to be trained.[25]

The emphasis of training at the Oshodi Center was shifted away from such subjects as electrical engineering, carpentry and painting to training in basic practical agriculture. Between June and July 1977 four Agricultural Rehabilitation Centres were established to cater for disabled soldiers, with each Division of the NA hosting a centre. The Agricultural Rehabilitation Centres offered basic courses in poultry rearing, piggery, rabbitry, horticulture, and food and cash crops with emphasis on the practical side of training. As with demobilization and as will be seen in the section on expenditure (below), the availability of monies had facilitated the existence of the Rehabilitation and Agricultural Centres with their wide range of course options. This development would assist the disabled soldiers in their transition to civilian existence with minimum adverse social, economic, and political effects. This was the scenario envisaged by the SMC and as such these discharged soldiers provided support for the process of military disengagement through social stability, political loyalty and economic utility. In fact there appeared to be a simultaneous benefit for the process of both military disengagement and national development.

## REORGANIZATION AND REARMAMENT

Major-General I.B.M. Haruna clairs that 'the Nigerian Army had to be reorganized, with a view to decongest the concentration of troops in the Eastern States'.[26] Although undoubtedly a true assertion this was not the full nor the principal rationale for reorganization.

One of the main purposes behind the redeployment of the infantry divisions into north-south zones, as mentioned above, was to cut across natural ethno-religious boundaries and thus preclude any geo-political identification with particular units. Three divisional areas were created according to this plan, with a new fourth division centered on Lagos and the surrounding area. 3rd Division Headquarters was moved from Port Harcourt (Rivers State) to Jos (Plateau State) in 1976. (Incidentally, this transfer was in progress when the abortive coup of 13 February 1976 took place.) The division was thus identified more centrally in the eastern third of the country. Brigade headquarters were stationed in Enugu and Port Harcourt. Ibadan and Kaduna would serve as divisional headquarters in the western and central areas. The SMC wanted a unit in each of these regionally important cities. In General Obasanjo's words:

> We organized the reorganization so as to avert the identification of a particular unit with a particular people. It was to ensure that the army transcended ethnic, state, and regional boundaries, i.e., was a national army.[27]

This represented a calculated effort at depoliticizing the army and advancing national identification in the overall process of military disengagement.

Previously, the 3rd Division had been seen as Eastern, others as Hausa, Yoruba etc., in other words, as geo political units. The restructuring of the army into formations began after the relocation of divisional headquarters, that is in 1977-1978.

It is worth examining this reorganization in more detail to appreciate the geographic spread that was effected. In March 1977

the 3rd Division Artillery began its relocation in conjunction with troop movements so as to decentralize units. Concurrently, there was an reassessment of these units. Under the reorganization program, 3rd Division Artillery was scheduled to have nine regiments with Air Defense and Support units. While addressing troops at Makurdi (Borno State) the Commander of 3rd Div. Arty, Lieutenant-Colonel A.M.I. Sedenu, stressed the importance of 1) military preparedness and 2) civil-military relations, the former being the profession, the latter its foundation.[28]

The Commander disclosed the new locations of various regiments and batteries. One Artillery Field Regiment would be stationed in each of the cities of Ogoja (Cross Rivers), Gboko (Benue), Biu (Borno), and Jalingo (Gongola), thus observing a wide geographical spread. Due to strategic considerations the Air Defense Regiment was located at Maiduguri (Borno), the Support Regiment at Bauchi (Bauchi), and the Medium Regiment at Pankshin (Plateau), while HQ Battery remained at Jos (Plateau).

Despite this relocation of various units and troops, reorganization did not affect the dismembering of the divisions as a whole. The 3rd Infantry Division, for example, had only eight of its battalions affected by the reorganization program with these troops being absorbed into other units within the NA.[29]

Also affected by the reorganization program was the 4th Infantry Division, which inherited the Headquarters of the former Lagos Garrison Organization, and units under it. In addition, both the Brigade of Guards and the 9th Infantry Brigade came directly under its command, thus extending its area of operations over the entire Lagos state and beyond.

Concurrently with the organizational restructuring of the armed forces, a reammament program was initiated. With regards to the Defence Industries Corporation (DIC) established in 1964, the SMC began moves so as to put this neglected parastatal on a new footing in which it could actually meet the basic requirements of the armed forces in munitions and weapons systems.

For the 1975-1976 reporting period the Federal Ministry of Information recorded that:

> Good progress continues to be made with the planned reorganisation of the NA, and a number of units have moved to their permanent locations. This process will be speeded up as the barracks now under construction become available for occupation. The expansion of the Nigerian Navy has also proceeded as planned, and three further vessels ordered during the past year will shortly be joining the Fleet. These will facilitate the effective patrolling of Nigeria's territorial waters. The major development of the NAF has been in the fields of maintenance and training, with emphasis upon the achievement of independence from foreign expertise.
>
> The training and re-equipment of the forces is currently being pursued so as to enable each Service to operate, with full logistical support, in an internal or external role.[30]

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Mention has already been made of the training offered to disabled soldiers and soldiers about to be demobilized. We now turn our attention to the training of the remaining members of the army, which was an integral part of the whole process of upgrading and reconstruction.

In his broadcast of 21 September 1978, General Obasanjo fused the objective of military disengagement with the logic of the military's agenda:

> As professional military men, we believe that the greatest heritage we can leave behind, apart from a united, stable and economically strong country, is an untarnished Armed Forces, Armed Services that are professionally competent to protect and defend the country in peace and war.[31]

The fulfillment of the military agenda was intended to improve military infrastructure and political culture within the actual military milieu. One author states that 'the purpose of improvement

is to ... modernise training facilities and drill methods and introduce a wide-spread competitive spirit'.[32]

The purposes and desires surrounding the military's reorganization program is put in perspective by S. Babajimi Peters' caveat:

> There is no way one can talk about upgrading the fighting capability of the armed forces without examining what is going on in terms of training the men to becoming fully professional.[33]

The issues of training and professional development are intrinsic to the institutional military. They are also, most often, associated with the structure of and opportunities for education, technical or otherwise, within the military itself, for officers and men.

The SMC was determined to create a modern professional military. It recognized the need for 'balanced development not just in terms of structure, weapons systems and productive capability, but also in terms of the training requirements of its officers'[34] and men.

The training of officers would be pursued through the NDA, the newly established Command and Staff College (Jaji), and the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (Kuru) established soon before the process of military disengagement was completed. The instruction given in these establishments emphasized military subjects, particularly the NDA, which concerned itself with producing future platoon and section commanders.[35] The Command and Staff College (C&SC) and the Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) were more concerned with providing a more comprehensive analysis and understanding of the domestic and international environments in which the professional officer must operate.

Further support structures were provided for the military and technical instruction of enlisted personnel especially during the latter period of the Obasanjo administration.

Consistent with the views of much of the SMC leadership one Nigerian analyst has observed that it appeared that the military establishment as a whole was moving further away from the British model and closer to the American model.[36]

On the training of the NA, the COAS Lieutenant-General Danjuma made it known in December 1978 that from 1975 to 1978 the emphasis had been on the training of senior and intermediate officers and that it had yielded good results. Consequently, this would now allow the emphasis to be shifted to the training of other ranks. Danjuma announced that the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) in Jaji was in the process of being adequately equipped to cope with the training of junior commissioned officers and other ranks.[37] The SMC th revealed a prioritization of training senior and intermediate officers first, other ranks or enlisted personnel second, closely followed by the enhanced training of junior officers. As with the strategy for the upgrading and reorganization of the armed forces, available monies would not allow for the simultaneous training of all service personnel. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the SMC understood that senior and intermediate officers had to be taken care of first, owing to their traditional ability to organize and execute military intervention, whilst junior officers posed the least threat to the stability of the armed forces and society in general. When money allowed, therefore, the training of other ranks was the next priority to ensure a stabler and more pliable majority, which would of course be more conducive to good civil-military relations at the grassroots level. The SMC was however aware of the need to provide good training for the future leadership of the armed services so as to advance the military's institutional interests. Training of the junior ranks was therefore delayed for as short a time as possible.

The variety of training courses offered to its personnel by the Nigerian Army was indeed large. 'No organization in the world can boast of having series of courses like the Nigerian Army' proclaimed one Nigerian Army publication in 1978.[38] By July of that year, the year in which emphasis shifted to the enhanced training of ORs, there were about ninety-nine trades represented in the NA. These trades were concentrated at formations, arms and services, and the corps.

Among the many occupational skills within the NA are those of gunner technician, meteorologist, gunner, radio technician, draughtsman, electrician, signal operator, crypto, linesman, terminal technician, mechanic, carpenter, mason, painter/decorator, plumber,

fitter machinist, blacksmith, shoemaker, tailor, laboratory technician, radiographer, physiotherapy technician and dental hygienist.

Most of the courses are conducted through the various branches which make up the NA. The following list shows the number of courses provided by each branch for officers and men: Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NSAI) - 11; Engineers - 5; Signal Corps - 6; Pay Corps - 6; Supplies and Transport - 8; Ordnance Corps - 7; Electrical Mechanical Engineering (EME) - 13; Nigerian Army Physical Training Corps (NAPTC) - 6+; Nigerian Army Band Corps - 2+, Nigerian Military Police Corps - 4; Artillery Corps - 12; Infantry Corps - 4; Intelligence Corps - 7 (see Appendix B).

Training also took place at foreign military establishments. In May 1978, 13 ORs of the NA Band Corps left Nigeria for musical courses in Pakistan.[39] By November 1978, 20 instructors from various ordnance depots attended a six month course at the Indian Army Ordnance Corps School in Jabalpur.[40]

On occasion soldiers attended courses of instruction which had limited practical value. In March 1978, 3 warrant officers and 1 staff sergeant completed a six month course held at Rank Pullin Control Company Ltd., in Debdean, Essex, England.[41] The course covered optics and night vision equipment. The NA, however, did not possess a night vision inventory.

The quest for education and training was perceived as having at least a theoretical relationship with a decreased likelihood of military intervention. There was and is a belief in some quarters that the need to ensure that the armed forces keep up to date in a rapidly changing technological environment is sufficiently demanding to preclude military involvement in politics. The educational/ training element in buttressing against military intervention is seen among the military leadership itself as helpful but not determinist.

In addition to professional training the Federal Military Government also made efforts to offer elementary schooling to all its uneducated soldiers. This approach would minimize the possibility of military intervention whilst strengthening the institutional military at the grassroots level. Of the three services the army had the highest rate of illiteracy. During the civil war educational

standards for entry into the Army had been repeatedly lowered to meet battlefield requirements for manpower. Illiteracy thus persisted among many soldiers who had decided to remain in the military. It was not uncommon for NCOs to use their thumbprint when asked to sign their name. The Army was thus committed to meeting minimum standards of literacy through its certificate of education. The education of all soldiers was addressed through the establishment of Army Certificate of Education (ACE) courses in every army unit. From this level of instruction the soldier would advance accordingly.

Subjects taught were Mathematics, English Language, Health Science, History, Geography, Government, Current Affairs and Map Reading.[42] Beginning in the 4th Infantry Division area in and around Lagos, the ultimate aim was for every soldier to reach a minimum educational qualification. If the standard was not met the soldier involved would theoretically be subject to release from the service.

In 1975 Army Headquarters announced its decision to set up examination centers in Akure, Ibadan, as well as in other localities, where the Army could conduct the West African School Certificate (WASC) General Certificate of Education (GCE) for its soldiers.[43]

As late as 1978 there was no guarantee in the army which allowed for university education among other ranks. Most soldiers were refused sponsorship by their unit commanders, even after they had obtained a university place. Some are known to have deserted in desperation in order to take up the places they had been offered.

There were however instances where approval was forthcoming to those seeking further education. For example, the SMC itself permitted 79 military personnel posted to post-primary institutions in Anambra State to attend the orientation course at the Teachers Training College at Nsukka.

A concurrent development at this time was that the army was experiencing an exodus of instructors who opted for appointments in the civilian sector. Consequently, the NA education instructors were promised an improvement in their working arrangements by the Director of the Army Education Corps, Brigadier T.B. Ogundeko.

The army could certainly not afford to lose any of its approximately 1,500 school teachers. As well as being obliged to

provide elementary education to so many of its soldiers, as described above, it was also responsible for over 500,000 army children. Material and human resources were insufficient to educate all these children properly. There was a need for more classrooms, furniture, textbooks and teaching aids. Despite the introduction of Universal Free Primary Education (UPE) on 6 September 1976 by General Obasanjo not all the army's children could be absorbed in public schools, and the army proceeded with the construction of its own schools in different locations throughout the country. The institution of Command Secondary Schools appears to have drawn criticism from some observers, who saw them as intended to reinforce the structures of a separate military society.[44] Brigadier Ogundeko maintains that the need for these schools only arose because there were not sufficient schools in the country to cater for the children of soldiers. Admission to the schools was via a competitive entrance exam opened to soldiers' and civilians' children alike.[45]

The importance attached to education in general in Nigeria at this time and its perceived quality as social stabilizer is reflected in one contemporary commentary:

> Nigeria is at present suffering from mass ignorance of Western education and from politics of poverty. Until there is wide-spread education and reduction in the level of present politics of poverty, ideologies will be misinterpreted and misunderstood and the resultant conflict can lead to chaos and open physical violence.[46]

Education is thus represented as assisting military development and non-political involvement and civil stability. Both military and political agendas are supported.

In addition to addressing the inadequate provision of classrooms and materials the army sought to provide sufficient transportation for the children involved. This need had also arisen for the soldiers of particular units. For example, the soldiers of the 127th Battalion, Owode (Abeokuta), were in need of buses to convey them from their homes in town to their place of work a few kilometers away from the main town.[47] The question of transportation for children

and soldiers alike is clearly connected with the issue of accommodation (military housing), to which we now turn.

BARRACKS DEVELOPMENT

The NA was in dire need of adequate accommodation for its soldiers. As with many other difficulties having to be addressed this problem had persisted since the end of the Nigerian civil war. With his Order of the Day No. 13, General Obasanjo in early 1977 set up a special task force to pursue the barracks development projects throughout Nigeria. The Head of State reiterated the willingness of the FMG to give barracks development 'priority attention' in 1977.[48]

The need for barracks development was clearly seen in the frequent instances of civil-military conflict due to poor tenant (soldier)- owner (civilian) relations. The COAS, Lt-Gen Danjuma stated that one of the solutions for the problems in civil-military relations lay in the provision of barracks, which was therefore not to be seen as a withdrawal from society. Without such a provision tensions would continue. In Danjuma's words, 'it is the government's awareness of this that led to the establishment of the armed forces barracks development projects'.[49] The COAS committed himself personally to do all in his power to ensure that adequate barracks accommodation would be provided for most soldiers by the scheduled date of military disengagement (1979).

These efforts to ensure adequate accommodation for soldiers should be understood against the backdrop of serious shortages, civil-military conflicts, and an increased need for corporate discipline and vigilance against potential conflict. Many unquartered soldiers and their dependents had built and/or settled into a 'basha' or make-shift house. Problems with discipline and morale arose that affected both military institutions and the surrounding community. In response to this situation army barracks were constructed throughout the country, such as in Ahoada and Sabi Hill, Ilorin.

In March 1977, the Second Barrack Development Project was launched in Lagos by Lt-Gen Danjuma at the office of the Permanent Secretary, Armed Forces Development Projects. The COAS disclosed

that there were to be a total of fourteen military barrack projects.

Addressing contractors, Danjuma said his presence was intended to underline the importance he and his staff officers attached to the urgent need for barrack development throughout the country.[50] So as to lend further weight to his words, Lt-General Danjuma was joined on this occasion by the GOC 4th Infantry Division, Brigadier M.I. Wushishi; the Quarter-Master General of the NA, Brigadier Olu Bajowa; and some other staff officers out of Army Headquarters.

In the same month, the FMG also disclosed that it had provided approximately N2.5 million (US$3.8m) to construct the required barracks. By 1 October 1979 almost all soldiers of the NA were permanently quartered. The barracks projects had been for the most part successfully pursued by the Army Barracks Project Tender Board. There were some instances of construction delays and poor workmanship but the bulk of the NA was actually housed by the end of military rule. Elementary as this statement may appear, the process of military disengagement is assisted by troops having actual barracks to return to.

EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL STRICTURES

By July 1978 much of the army's reorganization program had been completed,[51] including the expansion of the Arms and Services of the NA to eighteen in number, which reflected increasing specialization and training opportunities within the institutional military. This increase was facilitated through available revenues. Placing these developments in economic perspective, Claude Welch says[52] that 'petroleum revenues enabled the government to carry out ambitious programs of military re-equipment concurrent with disengagement' (see Table 15.1). Reorganization, re-equipment, enhanced training and professional development opportunities, as with armies throughout the world, were prompted by a combination of institutional and national security requirements and available resources (see Tables 15.2, 15.3). In fact there were some financial constraints, in particular the servicing of a mounting foreign debt (see Table 15.4) which meant the federal military government could not afford to develop all three services simultaneously.[53]

Table 15.1

Oil Revenue as Proportion of Total Revenue, 1975-1979

| Year | Total Government Revenue (N million) | Oil Revenue (N million) | Oil Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | 5,861.6 | 4,175.0 | 71.2 |
| 1976 | 7,070.3 | 5,548.5 | 78.5 |
| 1977 | 7,652.5 | 6,436.7 | 84.1 |
| 1978 | 6,815.2 | 5,006.1 | 73.5 |
| 1979 | 11,809.1 | 8,931.1 | 75.6 |

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements, various issues.

Table 15.2

Nigerian Defense Allocations under Muhammed/Obasanjo Military Administration, 1975-1977 (current prices and exchange rates)

| Fiscal Year | Total Defense Allocations | Defense as % of Federal Budget |
|---|---|---|
| 1975/76 | *N 547,0532,020 (US$ 846,831,300) | .... |
| 1976/77 | N 582,182,117 (US$ 931,491,387) | 16.16 |
| 1977/78 | N 663,932,715 (US$ 985,898,469) | 13.57 |
| 1978/79 | N 586,951,123 (US$ 942,136,634) | 12.91 |

* provisional

Source: Report of the Accountant-General of the Federation together with Financial Statements (Lagos), various issues.

Table 15.3

Allocations for Reorganization of the Nigerian Army (current prices and exchange rates)

| Fiscal Year | Expenditure (estimated/available) | Expenditure (actual) |
|---|---|---|
| 1975/76 | ... | *N 550,000 (US$ 851,393) |
| 1976/77 | N 27,000,000 | N 18,759,798 (US$ 30,015,676) |
| 1977/78 | N 18,000,000 | N 6,713,904 (US$ 10,441.530) |
| 1978/79 | N124,629,400 | N122,635,214 (US$196,846,250) |

* provisional

Source: Report of the Accountant-General of the Federation together with Financial Statements (Lagos), various issues.

Note: Figures for reorganization of the NA first appear for fiscal year 1972/73.

Table 15.4

Nigeria's Outstanding External Public Debt, 1975-1979

| Year | Total (N million) |
|---|---|
| 1975 | 349.9 |
| 1976 | 374.6 |
| 1977 | 364.2 |
| 1978 | 1252.1 |
| 1979 | 1611.5 |

Source: Federal Office of Statistics Annual Abstract of Statistics 1981 and 1982. As recorded in G.O. OLUSANYA and R.A. AKINDELE (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986, p.24.

In keeping with what was perceived as a national security need the SMC decided to upgrade the Nigerian Navy more quickly than the army itself. The navy had come out of the civil war with 3,000 men, three major capital ships, one frigate (the Nigeria), two MK3 Corvettes and five Seaward patrol craft. When the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime came to power, nine new missile armed capital warships were ordered, thereby bringing the navy into the missile age. Further orders were made for two roro tank landing crafts able to carry a battalion of soldiers and their equipment.[54]

With regards to the Nigerian Air Force, the SMC had hoped to upgrade its capabilities, which lacked aircraft with strike or counter strike ability. The force needed to enhance its posture of deterrence as well as create an offensive capability. The air force also lacked any effective means of interdiction and air reconnaissance. Appropriations were needed but were not sufficiently forthcoming during the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration to redress these deficiencies.

Given the increased perception of potentially hostile regional neighbors, the military establishment saw the desirability of creating armed forces sufficiently capable of defending Nigeria from external aggression and with the ability to project power beyond its own borders. The logic for developing such capabilities is clarified in the light of the main policy issues pursued during the 1975-1979 period. One of these issues was making Africa the centerpiece of Nigerian foreign policy. This would entail a strong military establishment with its attendant capabilities as well as an energetic and calculated diplomacy with any deficiencies on either side undermining the credibility of the other.

Just as there exists a strong relationship between demobilization and reorganization in which the need for the former in large part determines the direction of the latter, we also find that much of the military agenda is coterminous with the logic of the political agenda. And both agendas must fall in line with the pursuit of military disengagement.

The emerging truism is that despite money constraints the military agenda was made possible through Nigeria's petroleum revenues. This in turn facilitated the advancement towards military

disengagement. This interrelationship between allocations and the agenda may well represent a simple yet inexorable reality.

The preceding developments must not, however, be equated to the thesis of 'military modernizing function' advanced by James S. Coleman, Manfred Halpern, Guy J. Pauker, Lucian W. Pye and Edward Shils, who believed Third World armies were repositories of technical skills and had the capacity to advance economic development.[55] The military modernizing function is not to be mistaken for the policies and directives related to the process of military disengagement. They do in practice overlap but our concern here is with the military and political constraints and liberties related to funds available. The difference is admittedly a subtle one, yet it is real.

It is not our intention here to deal with the issue of the legitimacy or utility of defense expenditures which has been more than adequately done elsewhere.[56]

## SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

While on his 'Thank You' tour of Oyo state and the units of the 2nd Infantry Division, General Obasanjo said at Letmauk Barracks Ground that 'although the NA was still short of some essential equipment and basic amenities, it compared favorably with any Army in the World.'

The Head of State commended soldiers for their high sense of discipline, devotion to duty and good relationship with their civilian brothers and sisters. He noted with satisfaction that there had been a remarkable improvement in the provision of soldier's uniforms, barracks and equipment and in reorganization and training within the armed services. This listing of military priorities, which had largely been successfully addressed, for the wellbeing of ORs was cause for institutional satisfaction and stability. General Obasanjo expressed the hope that these 'good welfare programmes' would continue beyond 1 October 1979 for the comfort of the Armed Forces.[57]

The shortage of some essential equipment was the result of at least two interrelated developments. First, federal revenues were not always available as scheduled, which resulted among other things

in unpredictable patterns and quantities of equipment distribution. On occasion there would be the apparent windfall turned disappointment as in the case of the purchase of military surplus from America's Vietnam inventory which could not be used nor maintained beyond a year or so after its arrival in Nigeria. Second, there existed serious problems with corruption and a credible mechanism of accountancy within the armed forces. The new pay system introduced for soldiers prior to military disengagement was established precisely because of fraud and stealing which were becoming rampant in the NA.[58]

In December 1977, 13 army officers, including two majors and one captain, were dismissed from the Army. They were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment with effect from 1 October of the same year. All the officers were tried by a court martial and found guilty of offenses related to public property.

Eight officers ranging from second lieutenants to the two majors received prison sentences ranging from six months to five years at hard labor, the maximum sentence being meted out to a Major Arikpo.[59]

The extent and depth of accountancy deficiencies can be seen in the following examples. It was discovered that names of officers who had left the service due to retirement, resignation, dismissal, etc. had remained on the payroll, which resulted in overpayments totalling some N19,208.49 (US$29,871.68) for 138 officers who had left the military between 1975 and April 1977. The audit and subsequent identification of such a problem demonstrates some capacity and intent for ensuring accountability within the administrative structure of government. The point is that the military government was both interested in curtailing such deficiencies and highly susceptible to its occurrence. The problem was not so much one of a torpid accountancy mechanism as the ubiquitous absence of a viable mechanism itself.

Within the Ministry of Communications, one officer was paid his salary for over eight months while on study leave without pay. The Permanent Secretary was subsequently informed of this error.

A review of military allocations revealed discrepancies existing in the following units of the NA which reflect a national

geographical distribution: 32nd Brigade (Bauchi), 3rd Infantry Brigade (Kano), 1st Infantry Division (Kaduna), 30th Infantry Brigade, NAOC, Ogoja (Cross River), 130th Infantry Brigade, Keffi (Plateau), 186th Infantry Battalion, Mokola (Ibadan), 46th Infantry Battalion, Ile-Ife (Oyo), Mil. 49, Signal SQN, Minna (Niger).

At the Pay and Record Office of the 11th Infantry Division of the NA, Kaduna, it was observed that several contracts totalling N128,395.83 (US$199,682.47), of which none was less than N5,000 (US$7,776), had been awarded between August and September 1976 without tenders. These included contracts for construction works, supply of rations, furniture, sports equipment, renovation of buildings, etc. No explanation was forthcoming for the contravention of the financial regulations governing the awards of contracts of N5,000 and above.

The final illustration depicts the losses of materials as typically experienced throughout the NA. The list below was part of a physical survey of the store of the 123rd Infantry Battalion at Minna, which revealed the following deficiencies:[60]

| Line Item | Quantity Unaccounted For |
|---|---|
| D.M.S. Book | 130 |
| Comforter Cap | 660 |
| Jungle Boots | 318 |
| Hand Towel | 934 |
| Omo Powdered Soap | 59 packets |
| Flannel Cloth | 60 yards |
| Iron Bed | 53 |
| Rubber Foam Mattress | 40 |
| White Bedsheet | 47 |
| Easy Arm Chair | 6 |
| Dunlop Rubber Pillow | 60 |
| Standing Fan | 4 |
| Blanket | 12 |
| Pillow Cover | 4 |

No explanation could be given as to the whereabouts of the above articles. The FMG was thus committed to producing a new generation of supply officers with attendant accountancy skills that would

change the complexion of this situation throughout the NA. Although each of the more blatant cases of pilfering was investigated this was not seen of itself as sufficient. Due discipline was enforced on the offending service member, if discovered, but the solution would lie in adequate and effective professional development as pushed by the SMC. The SMC was not interested in leaving such a situation to the likelihood of further professional degradation.

In his address during the passing out of the QM/Executive Commissioned Officers (Course 1) at NASI, Jaji, Kaduna, on 30 April 1976, Lieutenant-General Danjuma said the following:

> I find this occasion particularly important because the field in which you are commissioned is the field in which the Nigerian Army is least equipped; it is the field in which we are most deficient; namely Quartermaster/Executive Commission.
>
> We are so weak that we were even considering bringing foreigners for assistance, to ensure that money paid to us by Government is accounted for properly; to ensure that stocks brought for us are the right quality and looked after properly; to ensure that our vehicles are maintained properly and made roadworthy at all times and that fuel supplied to us are not stolen.[61]

By the first quarter of 1976 QM/Executive Commission officers were channeled into three available avenues - Pay Corps, Supply and Transport (S&T) Corps and Ordnance Corps. In this manner all available technical expertise, excluding that of ORs, would be focused in those areas of greatest deficiency and object need.

Lt-Gen Danjuma concluded his 30 April 1976 address by stressing the need for professional honesty, which is not so easily instituted:

> No amount of classroom teaching will stop a man who is basically dishonest from being so.... Please be honest with yourself and quit, thereby saving us the trouble of having to lock you up. We must clean the army and we cannot do it if we spend all our time chasing criminals.... Any superior

> order that is illegal or manifestly illegal should not be obeyed....
>
> I want you to hold your heads high, uphold your personal honour all the time and look after whatever is entrusted to you.[62]

Without directly putting the chain of command in disrepute the COAS, nevertheless, admitted to the existence of disreputable superiors by stating that 'illegal or manifestly illegal' orders were not to be obeyed. Danjuma went on to say that if such orders were obeyed the officers involved would be charged without recourse to the fact that pressure may have been brought to bear on the junior officer. The only protection for the junior officer was to report such incidents through the proper channels.

These developments involved issues of professional and ethical development within the armed forces. The SMC was aware that such professional improvements were intrinsic to object improvements in the maintenance of supplies and administration. Without such improvements there existed an internal threat to institutional stability, accountability and effectiveness. Traditional claims of the military's ethical superiority would become the object of institutional cynicism and popular ridicule. The price to be paid for such unchecked practices within the military itself would be incalculably expensive to the legitimacy of the armed forces both as moral agent and national guardian.

As an internal institutional need the SMC addressed the above deficiencies in maintenance and supplies with due dispatch. The problem was addressed in the early stages of the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration. But as one of the peculiarities of a distinctly civilian as opposed to military perspective - the parallax view - there were many civilian observers that were not aware of the military's internal maintenance and supply problems. Consequently, civilian observers were prone to draw conclusions based exclusively on the military regime's effectiveness at national administration as opposed to in-house effectiveness.

One civilian observer stated in 1978 that:

> The military's directness, swiftness, and assured lack of opposition had an electrifying effect on operational efficiencies. It got things done and in sharp contrast to the party system style of leadership.[63]

The military hierarchy did not see its own internal improvement in such terms. The process was rather one of ferreting out all injurious practices and elements within the body corporate. The pace and effect of such a process was seen as something less than electrifying. However, it was methodical, increasingly comprehensive in scope, and not without results.

If we look, for example, at the short term objectives of the aforementioned new pay system, which were: 1) Elimination of fraud, 2) Accurate determination of the strength of the Army,[64] 3) Reduction of work load of unit commanders whose time was spent on pay duties, and 4) Restoration of the Army's integrity, one could accurately conclude that these goals were essentially achieved. The long term objectives were, however, in the process of being accomplished and would thus remain military priorities, with regards to the NA pay system, beyond the date of military disengagement. The long term objectives were: 1) Abolition of 'pay day', 2) Establishment (building) of commercial banks in military units, 3) Encouraging soldiers to save, and 4) Mechanization (computerization) of ORs' pay.

NOTES

1. Abdullahi SHELLENG (Major-General), 'The Nigerian Army in the Civil War', in Tekena TAMANO (ed), Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since Independence, Zaria, March, 1983: Vol.III. The Civil War Years, Zaria, Nigeria: The Panel of Nigeria Since Independence History Project, p.70.

2. General A. Shelleng, op.cit., states that the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) had sufficient expertise to prevent surprises by Federal forces in their operations against the rebels.

3. Shelleng, op.cit., p.72.

4. This account is taken from Lindsay BARRETT, Danjuma: The Making of a General, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1979, pp.64-65.

5. Interviews on 29 September and 14 November 1989, respectively. During the civil war General Oluleye was General Staff Officer I at military headquarters and was responsible for liaison between the operational areas and headquarters.

6. This listing is provided by Major-General David M. JEMIBEWON, 'The Nigerian Army in Perspective', in T. Tamuno (ed), op.cit., pp.94-95.

7. SOJA, July 1976, p.2.

8. Danjuma, in interview with author, Kaduna 14 November 1989.

9. In Brazil there was also a differentiation between officers with and without combat experience, the former having gained their experience as members of Brazil's expeditionary force that fought in Italy during World War II. The views and ambitions of these officers with combat experience were markedly more visionary for the nation as a whole and for its role internationally. One Venezuelan observer - my father, Cerilio Enrique Pacheco - spoke of the disdain that the few combat-experienced officers felt towards their experienced colleagues as they returned from Europe after the war. They considered their superiors shortsighted and unworthy of respect.

10. This belief in Nigeria's 'manifest destiny' goes back at least to the military administration of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi and remains a constant theme throughout Nigeria's military regimes. See, for example, Jimi PETERS & A.L. AMINU, 'The Armed Forces and Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Reflections on Past Experiences and a Note on the Future', in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol.12, nos.1 & 2, 1986, pp.88-99.

11. Okion OJIGBO, Nigeria Returns to Civilian Rule, Lagos, Nigeria: Tokion Company, 1980, p.48.

12. An individual who had lived with his family in Biafra through the civil war said to this author that they had expected to be killed when the federal forces appeared on their small farm. When the soldiers saw the family they signaled to them to raise their hands in surrender, after which they immediately came up to them and with smiles shook everyone's hands saying 'Now we are one!'. Needless to say the effectiveness of the indoctrination received by federal soldiers was impressive. There was at least one occasion on which a federal officer was executed by firing squad for sexually abusing a women in the operational area.

13. Ambrose C. MBANEFO, 'A Psychological Analysis of the Nigerian Civil War : Future Implications for Unity and Nationhood', in T. Tamuno (ed), op.cit., p.18.

14. This author knows of at least one instance of a Biafran captain who was reduced in rank to a sergeant and after 18 years of service retired at the grade of a First Lieutenant.

15. I.B.M. HARUNA, (Major-General; rtd), 'The Military Revolution - The Nigerian Experience, 1960-1983', in Tekena Tamuno (ed), op.cit., p.147.

16. See Major-General Haruna, op.cit., p.147, for his observation on the relationship drawn between military preparedness and an alternative government.

17. In fact in interviews with General Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, Danjuma and others, I detected the considerable hope that the military would not have occasion to return. There was a genuine and sincere belief among these officers that the civilian politicians would do well and administer the affairs of state in a responsible fashion. They were genuinely surprised that a kleptocracy actually emerged in the Shagari administration.

18. SOJA, August 1976, p.5.

19. SOJA, February 1977, p.8.

20. SOJA, February 1977, p.8. This same unnamed individual goes on to say: 'Since the end of the civil war the socio-economic relations between the civilian and the soldier has deteriorated. The cause of this, is nothing but ignorance by the public of what the army is and the role of soldiers in a fast developing nation like Nigeria.'

21. See The Military Balance, London: The Institute for Strategic Studie from 1975-1976 through 1979-1980. These figures differ from those provided by A.B. AKINYEMI, Disarmament and Development: Utilization of Resources for Military Purposes in Black Africa, Lagos, Nigeria: NIIA, p.71, which are themselves taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979, Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982. This source provides the following figures in thousands for the Armed Forces: 270(1975), 270(1976), 300(1977),

204(1978), 164(1979). The figure for 1979 represents a good reduction from early in the year when the figure stood at 180,000 according to The Daily Times (Nigeria), 18 January 1979.

22. See Lindsay Barrett, op.cit., pp.81-82.

23. Speech by Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo as recorded in SOJA, June 1976.

24. SOJA, July 1977.

25. It was estimated that with eighteen months to two years training it would not be until 1985 that the NA could dispose of all its disabled men, in other words an additional eight years.

26. I.B.M. Haruna (Major-General, rtd), op.cit., p.146.

27. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, 16 November 1989, Ota.

28. SOJA, March 1977.

29. SOJA July 1977.

30. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Recurrent Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1975-1976, Lagos: 1975.

31. Nigeria Year Book 1978-1979, Apapa, Nigeria: Times Press, pp.9-20.

32. Essien ETENG, writing in SOJA, March 1977, p.9.

33. S. Babajimi PETERS, 'Nigeria's Defence Establishment, in Nigerian Forum, vol.2, no.12, December 1982, p.919.

34. Jimi PETERS, 'The Professional Soldier and Political Rule: The Nigerian Experience', in A.O. SANDA, Olusola OJO, & Victor AYENI (eds), The Impact of Military Rule on Nigeria's Administration, Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1987, p.307.

35. Major O.A. Owadia (Military Assistant/military wing), interview with author, NDA (Kaduna), 10 October 1989.

36. Jimi Peters, op.cit. at note 34. This was borne out by my own observations made when speaking with Nigerian academics and university graduates, who expressed evident admiration for the United States and its political and economic structures. This appreciation for America was due in large part to the academic training that many Nigerians received in the States, for example, Akinyemi at the American University, Adekanye at Brandeis and Oyediran at Pittsburgh. Most of the military hierarchy at one time or another received instruction at American military institutions. However, the traditional links with Britain, although lessened initially through the Nigerianization of the

officer corps and the diversity of training schools throughout the world including Eastern Europe, proved important as Nigeria sought to establish its own institutions of higher military studies.

37. See SOJA, December 1978.

38. SOJA, July 1978, p.25.

39. SOJA, May 1978.

40. SOJA, November 1978.,

41. SOJA, March 1978, p.4.

42. SOJA, April 1977.

43. SOJA, April 1978.

44. Command secondary schools were placed for the most part in urban areas to ease administration and to take advantage of existing infrastructure.

45. SOJA, February 1978.

46. J.S. Olawoyin writing in Daily Times, 16 April 1977. In The Great Debate ... op.cit., pp.600-602. The politics of poverty refers to the practice, inter alia, of politicians buying votes from the citizenry. For example, a candidate may offer anything from beer to scholarships to a prospective constituency in order to gain office.

47. SOJA, April 1977.

48. SOJA, February 1977, p.1.

49. Address of Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, as recorded in SOJA, March 1977, p.10.

50. SOJA, March 1977, p.12.

51. Although reorganization is a continuous process it was officially completed in November 1981.

52. Clause E. WELCH, 'Military Disengagement from Politics: Lessons from West Africa', in Armed Forces and Society, vol.9, no.4, Summer 1983, p.552.

53. Despite the impressive increase in available revenues (see Table 15.1) these gains were nevertheless insufficient to meet all the demands contained in the military's upgrading and reorganization program.

54. S. Babajimi Peters, op.cit. at note 33, p.918.

55. See John J. Johnson (ed), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. The Nigerian publication Renaissance, 29 July 1973, under the sub-heading of 'Political Advantages of the Military', writes (p.13): 'Even the least organised of the armed forces in any of the developing countries possesses superior quality of organisation than the most organised political party in any given state. The unique technological and organisational position of the armed forces make them a state within the state, with all the services of government duplicated.'

56. For an examination of this issue one can refer, for example, to the concept of military extractive ratio (MER) as first advanced by J. 'Bayo ADEKSON in his work 'On the Theory of Modernising Soldier: A Critique', in Current Research on Peace and Violence, vol.viii, no.1, 1978, and later - as ADEKANYE - in Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System, Aldershot, Hants: Gower House, 1981. Adekanye defines the MER as 'that proportion of national wealth more or less forcibly appropriated to and unproductively utilised by the military members of society at any given time' (p.55).

57. SOJA, October 1979.

58. The new pay procedure had been written as early as 1975. Until 1979, ORs in the NA received cash payment on a paytable, on a monthly basis. The old procedure involved the movement of large sum of liquid cash from the banks through a chain of paymasters/ paying officers to the sub unit Commanders who paid their soldiers.

    In 1978 the decision was taken to pay soldiers through commercial banks, which proved successful.

    SOJA for May 1982, p.13, records that under the old pay system: 'There were so many fraudulent cases, reported and unreported, that the Army was bogged down in trying offenders. It got to a stage where the system could no longer be relied on to detect, arrest, investigate and punish those perpetrating these fraudulent activities and some GOCs had to employ all means, ethical or otherwise, to arrest the situation....

    Court martials were convened to try, in some cases, as many as between 15 and 20 officers and other ranks at once. Officers and other ranks of all descriptions were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Try as the authority could, their action did not deter other soldiers from attempting to defraud the Federal Government of large sums of money. The money lost by the Army through these fraudulent practices was simply colossal.'

59. See New Nigerian 29 December 1977, p.1.

60. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Annual Report of the Auditor-General of the Federation on the Accounts of the Government of the Federation of Nigeria for the year ending 31st March, 1977, Lagos, p.17.

61. 'Lt-Gen. Danjuma's Charge to New Officers' as recorded in SOJA, June 1976, p.6.

62. Ibid.

63. Theophilus O. ODETOLA, Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978, p.59.

64. Determining the accurate strength of the NA was no mean accomplishment. Efforts made by the authorities to produce an accurate figure proved irreconcilable at first. This was due to the fact that one figure came from the Army Records Officer, another from Command Pay Office and yet another from Headquarters NA 'A' Branch (AHQ 'A'). The problem resulted from the fact that cash requisition for soldiers' pay was calculated according to the strength of units and formations. This exercise was handled by the same personnel. It was therefore easy through collusion/ conspiracy to falsify documents in order to steal. The new pay system addressed the twin problem of fraud and the strength of the army as requisition of money for troops pay was no longer linked to strength return figures.

16

## THE MEDIA, REASSIGNMENTS AND RETIREMENTS IN MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

### THE MEDIA AND MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

The media were assigned specific roles by the FMG. These roles encompassed the traditional function of dissemination of information as well as assisting in national development, political stability and security; this last item was pursued with a reorganization analogous to that of the Nigerian Army.

The role of government owned and directed media would reflect the philosophy of the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime. The military in government would insist on certain standards to assist the maintenance of government such as in advocating loyalty to the state but it also perceived a role for the media in the context of military disengagement. The media were expected to assist in fulfilling the scheduled change and in ushering in a new and more disciplined political culture. It is this emphasis on introducing the new standard that distinguishes the role of the media in the process of military disengagement from that of a normal appendage or megaphone of official government policy.

It is interesting to examine the role of television as perceived by the military elite within the process of military disengagement. Nigerian television produced its first transmission in November 1959 thereby gaining the distinction of being the first in Africa. By 1 October 1979, Nigerian Television (NTV) at Jos becomes the first TV station to transmit in color in Nigeria.

TV stations were located at state level and by a directive of the FMG all stations in the country were brought under one umbrella on 1 April 1976 when NBC-TV became NTV. 1 April 1979 also marked the beginning of NTV Network News produced by NTV Lagos and broadcast nationwide. This was the advent of a centrally telecast news program and represented the increased centralization, control and coordination of television facilities. Previously individual

stations at state level were known to have telecast opinions and positions of particular individuals and groups not sanctioned by the FMG. Apart from any embarrassment this may have created for the federal government if such sectarian views ran contrary to federal policy, there was a much greater concern that individual TV stations would be used to foment political instability and so threaten the federal authority. It thus became imperative that any potential threat from this quarter, including the use of TV as an instrument of military intervention, be prevented through centralization. This was accomplished with the inauguration of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) in 1977, effectively a year after the first major moves to centralize all stations under one coordinating body.

The Gowon administration had sought to harness television as a means of enlightenment but encountered difficulties in its appropriate application.[1] At this stage television was still a nascent technology.

During the Muhammed/Obasanjo period television was also seen in the role of helping the 'character formation' of the people.[2] Although this desire for expanding the quasi-educational frontiers of Nigeria culture was apparent there was a more serious objective in sight for the FMG.

In December 1975, four months after the ousting of the Gowon regime, the Federal Commissioner for Information, Brigadier I.B.M. Haruna, spoke extensively on the role of the media. According to the Brigadier, the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration

> firmly believes that the control of mass media in the country is of necessity dictated by the spirit of the revolution.[3]

Through Brigadier Haruna the regime was speaking of the media's utility for increasing the mobilization of the people as well as the modernizing process to which the FMG was firmly committed. This would only be accomplished through a concerted effort and participation in the media by the government itself, according to Haruna.

The establishment of NTV and NTA in April 1976 and April 1977 respectively represented the government's take-over program in which the Federal broadcasting authority would take control of TV stations and have responsibility for drawing up guidelines to collate and collaborate the various aspects of their production and control.

Six main TV stations were set up under the new program to increase the cooperation among the various states towards enhancing the social, cultural and artistic perception of their citizens. Speaking on behalf of the FMG, Brigadier Haruna said that the people had no need to be afraid of the centralization of the mass media as long as there existed goodwill between the government and the people. The implication of poor civil-military relations was that the mass media would have to be used for the propagation of government pronouncements advancing social and political stability at the expense of cultural-educational telecasts. The priorities were set in place with the military's traditional concern for order, stability and control at the forefront.

In March 1978 the NTA approved the establishment of a new zonal structure and new boards for all television facilities. Under the new structure Ibadan, Ikeja and Abeokuta, to take one example, were each designated a production center while together constituting one zone with Ibadan as zonal headquarters.[4]

A total of six zones were organized with their corresponding membership on the Zone Boards: Ibadan Zone, Benin Zone, Enugu Zone, Kaduna Zone, Maiduguri Zone, and Sokoto Zone. The production centers provided broadcasting that extended beyond state boundaries. As with the Army's reorganization scheme the FMG, through the NTA, had dispersed TV production centers so as to preclude the identification of such stations with its immediate geopolitical surrounding. There was the additional benefit of effectively limiting the use of television in the event of military intervention, i.e. conspirators would not be able to effect a nationwide broadcast unless of course they proved successful. The successful completion of military disengagement would not see any marked difference between the federal government's control over TV stations and that executed by the FMG.[5]

In so far as the FMG was interested in harnessing the potential

military disengagement, it continued to provide TV stations throughout the country with modern equipment in order to improve their services.

The military governor of Sokoto State, Colonel Umaru Alhaji Mohammed, stressed the importance of radio and television as an effective means of bringing the government closer to the people as well as the government knowing the problems and aspirations of the people.[6] Governors at the state level understood this interaction as complementing the process and aspirations of military disengagement but also enhancing civil-military relations at the local level.

In December 1977 the announcement came that all radio stations with shortwave and powerful medium-wave transmitters were to be taken over by the FMG as from 1 April 1978. In effect the radio stations came under control of the FMG while continuing their normal transmissions. 1 April 1978 was also the date by which all the states were scheduled to have stations installed in their capitals by order of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). A panel was appointed to examine ways of implementing the decision to restrict non-federal broadcasting organizations to medium-wave bands and to provide the FMG with appropriate recommendations.[7]

These developments marked the establishment of national and state radio programming and government apparatus for policy dissemination and education. But more pertinent to the matter remained the issue of security. As one Nigerian academic puts it:

> The reason that the military took over shortwave stations was that no state could broadcast anything against the central government in Lagos. Therefore there would be no challenge (to the regime) through broadcasts and lessoned stability that could be created.[8]

Consistent with the desire to maximize social stability during the period leading to military disengagement was the regime's disposition towards the Nigerian press. The Constitution Drafting Committee had submitted Section 32 on freedom of expression, better known as the section on freedom of the press, for national debate.

Section 32 would eventually appear, unaltered, as Section 36 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1979. It reads as follows:

> 36.-(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.
>
> (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section every person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions;
>
> Provided that no person, other than the Government of the Federation or of a state or any other person or body authorized by the President, shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless broadcasting station for any purpose whatsoever.
>
> (3) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -
>
> (a) for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of courts or regulating telephone, wireless broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematography films; or
>
> (b) imposing restrictions upon persons holding office under the Government of the Federation or of a state, members of the armed forces of the Federation or members of the Nigeria Police Force.

Representatives of the Broadcasting Organization of Nigeria, the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria, the Nigeria Guild of Editors and the Nigerian Union of Journalists proposed that Section 32 be amended, so as to explicitly prevent censorship and, under Section 32(2), permit private ownership of broadcasting stations through the constitution rather than by the decision of the President.

Here we come to the much debated issue of ownership.[9] Many of the Nigerian elite were posing the question of whether a free press could truly exist when most of the press, and effectively all of the

could truly exist when most of the press, and effectively all of the radio and television stations, were owned by the government. Amidst the voices for and against such a situation the economic factors involved appeared to weight heavily towards the status quo. No less significant was the political advantage that would accrue to the political body that would emerge victorious in the scheduled elections: political victory would mean control of the mass media. The military administration wanted the continuity of social and political stability. The economic reality was that Nigeria was not sufficiently developed to generate the needed advertisement revenue to support newspapers, radio and television.[10] In short, commercialization of the mass media was not, in economic terms, a viable option, and viable commercialization is the cornerstone of privatization. The FMG's concern lay in the real possibility that unqualified privatization would result in the mass media being owned and/or manipulated by the wealthiest Nigerians.

The issue of ownership of the press by the government was debated in the Constitutional Assembly for four days beginning on 28 April 1978. As mentioned above, Section 32 (to become Section 36) was left intact as proposed by the Constitution Drafting Committee.

Prior to the debate the FMG had been deeply concerned by the press coverage of the decision by the Bendel State Governor to establish a censorship board to monitor all news items and editorial commentaries to be published in the Nigerian Observer or to be broadcast on NTV (Benin) and Bendel State radio. There had also been what the FMG considered questionable coverage of the proceedings in the Constituent Assembly over the provisions of the Sharia in the Draft Constitution.[11] The FMG was also perturbed by the press coverage of the student crisis which led to the deaths of six students at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, and one student at the University of Lagos (UNILAG).

The Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua, met with the Chief Executives of all the government owned newspapers to express the FMG's concern. The government's view was that the coverage of these events had exacerbated the situati Yar'Adua warned the press: 'You must not destroy the nation.'[12]

A few days after this private meeting it became known that the

with authorities on articles dealing with government, Army, Police and religion. These guidelines were seen as censorship.

In mid-June 1977, Brigadier Yar'Adua further clarified the FMG's disposition towards the press. He stated that any journalist who found it difficult to comply with the policies laid down for government owned newspapers should quit. In his words:

> The only way out for journalists in government newspapers is either to conform or quit.... As pressmen, tell me of any newspaper in the world that is so free that its editors and writers have a right to say exactly what they want without any regard for its policies?[13]

In a comment recorded during the debate on the draft constitution in relationship to press freedom one Nigerian wrote on 19 January 1977:

> It is ludicrous that those 'wisemen' think they can transplant certain aspects of the American Constitution to this country (I mean the executive president) without the foundation on which it is based - the free press.[14]

It is apparent that a transplant was being attempted. Freedom of the press was, however, interpreted by the FMG to mean a highly disciplined and responsible journalism with minimal social disturbance.[15]

The military often saw the civilian mass media as biased and at times hostile to the armed forces. For example, at a lecture entitled 'History of the NA since 1960', the Director of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), Colonel S.K. Omojokun, considered all that was said in newspapers, the radio and TV about the demobilization of soldiers as 'careless, reckless and callous ... a disservice to those men who came forward when the slogan was: "To keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done"'.[16]

The military saw the professional ethos of the press and other media as unsympathetic and critical towards the armed forces. The process of military disengagement would not be served by such a

conflict. Therefore appropriate measures, including the muting of what was seen as a predilection for sensationalism, were introduced precisely to minimize the 'destabilizing effects' of the media.

## REASSIGNMENTS AND RETIREMENTS

We now turn to a description of the reposting and retirement of military officers engaged in governance, at both the state and federal level. This was pursued so as to leave the mechanism of government intact for future civilian administrators and to ensure the Nigerian military's institutional continuity and the professional development of the officers reassigned.

The actual issuing of and compliance to retirement and reposting orders speaks of the staying power and authority of the SMC over both the military in government and the regular institutional military. It should not be presumed that this exercise of repostings and retirements was perfunctory in nature. The African record has demonstrated the volatility of untimely political and economic retirements of military personnel. The SMC was quite aware that reassignments and retirements had to be conducted with the utmost prudence and the judicious exercise of its own authority. Again national stability and the successful completion of military disengagement were of utmost concern.

In March of 1977 the SMC retired several federal commissioners. It appeared that the retirement would proceed in stages up to October 1979 with the Federal Executive Council being affected first. The commissioners retired were Major-General I.B.M. Haruna, Federal Commissioner for Information; Major-General Olufemi Olutoye, Federal Commissioner for Social Development, Youth and Sports and Major-General O.F. Obada, Federal Commissioner for Works.

On 17 July 1978 the Nigerian Army announced what it termed the redeployment of its officers holding political appointments 'to facilitate lateral mobility within the Army'.[17] In this action, which took effect from 24 July, members of both the Federal Executive Council and the National Council of States were affected. However as the word redeployment implies the officers were not retired as in 1977 but received new appointments, said to have been based on merit and experience.

It is worth looking at the announced repostings to obtain an appreciation of the scope of this action:

- The Governor of Kwara State, Brigadier George Innih, was posted to Army HQ and made Quarter-Master-General.
- The Governor of Kano State, Colonel Sani Bello, was moved to the Army Command Staff College as Colonel-General Staff.
- The Governor of River State, Colonel Zamani Lekwot, became the Commander of 3 Infantry Bde.
- The Governor of Ogun State, Lieutenant-Colonel Ayodele Balogun, became Commandant of the School of Supplies and Transport.
- The Governor of Bauchi State, Lieutenant-Colonel Bello Khaliel, became Commandant of the Army Resettlement Centre.
- The Governor of Oyo State, Brigadier David Jemibewon, was posted as the new Commandant of the Nigerian Army School of Infantry.
- The Governor of Benue State, Colonel Abdullahi Shelleng, was assigned as the Provost Marshal of the Nigerian Army Corps of Military Police.
- The Governor of Gongola State, Colonel Mohammed D. Jega, became the Deputy Commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy.
- The Governor of Anambra State, Colonel John Atom-Kpera, became Commandant of the Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering.
- The Governor of Sokoto State, Colonel Umaru A. Mohammed, was posted to HQ, Nigerian Army Artillery, as Commandant of Corps of Artillery.
- The Governor of Cross River State, Colonel Paul Omu, was posted to Army HQ, 'G' branch, as Director of Army Staff Duties.
- The Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joseph Garba, became the Commandant of the Nigerian Defence Academy.
- The Federal Commissioner for Petroleum and Energy, Colonel Muhammed Buhari, was posted to Army HQ, 'A' Branch, as Military Secretary for the Army.
- The Federal Commissioner for Transport, Colonel Muhammed Magoro, was posted to HQ, 3 Infantry Division, as Colonel-General Staff.
- The Federal Commissioner for Education, Colonel Ahmadu Ali, was posted to HQ, 1 Infantry Division, as Assistant Director Army Medical Corps.

In all, four federal commissioners and eleven state governors

received new assignments with the 17 July 1978 announcement. It was also announced that all Army Military Administrators who took over from the governors were to assume command of various brigades or garrisons in their locations in addition to their state functions.[18]

This exercise is notable for redeploying many officers with political assignments to various high level administrative/teaching tours. At a glance this would appear to effect a near immediate transfer of the governmental institutional experience held by these officers to the heart of the Army's academic and administrative infrastructure. Command assignments to combat units were earmarked for more junior officers.

All in all one can speak in terms of a lateral transfer of administrative institutional experience from the halls of government to the HQs. The reassignments preserved this institutional experience as well as effecting withdrawal from governmental control. While the program of military disengagement would be completed as promised the experienced gathered by the military would represent a considerable potential and capacity, if not administrative competence, for military reentry: military intervention.

This manner of military disengagement through the use of reassignment does appear to describe a reality substantially different from the view that the relinquishing of power is due to the military's frustration and exhaustion over the problem created by having a portion of its officers in political assignments.[19] According to this view the governing military withdraws because it is unable to cope with the national demands of administration and with its own internal disunity and rivalry.

In September 1979, forty Senior Army officers[20] from a list of sixty-one officers were reassigned into various posts throughout the Nigerian Army with effect from 2 October 1979 - one day after the completion of military disengagement.

But most significant was the announcement of the retirement of the core of the SMC as well other officers. Ostensibly there were seven voluntary retirements: those of General Olusegun Obasanjo, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief; Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma,

Chief of Army Staff; Major-General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Chief of Staff Supreme HQs; Major-General James J. Oluleye, Federal Commissioner for Finance; Major-General Henry Adefope, Federal Commissioner for External Affairs; Major-General Mohammed Shuwa, Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing; and Major-General Abdullahi Mohammed, Head of the NA Intelligence Service.[21]

This final retirement exercise was the culmination, both symbolic and literal, of the program of military disengagement. However, it was not as voluntary as it appeared to be. As the program of military disengagement progressed there were officers who wished to continue in military service. General Obasanjo insisted that all members of the SMC would have to retire for the good of the nation and the success of military disengagement; there would be a clean break.[22] For Obasanjo, retirement represented the successful completion of a most rewarding career and the beginning of another. For Danjuma, retirement meant a welcome rest after a most rewarding and exhaustive stint as Chief of Army Staff.[23]

The core of the SMC had also considered the use of retirement as a contingency. In one meeting of the SMC the question had been broached as to what they should do in the event of an inconclusive election in preparation for military disengagement. The rules of the game were that a national election would have to return a presidential candidate capturing statutory representation in two-thirds of the existing nineteen states. General Danjuma proposed that if the elections proved inconclusive, that is, if no party candidate obtained sufficient votes in at least thirteen states, then the decision would have already been made to extend or abandon the program of military disengagement. Danjuma's recommendation was that if the military stayed on as a result of inconclusive elections the core of the SMC (himself, Obasanjo, and Yar'Adua) should still resign. This action would demonstrate to the Nigerian public that the Head of State and his closest associates had not prolonged military rule out of self-interest. The preference of the SMC was that the elections would preclude any military contingency whatsoever. In the event the retirement and reassignment exercise was able to proceed in conjunction with the successful completion of military disengagement.

NOTES

1. Daily Times, 29 June 1971, p.7.

2. Sunday Chronicle, 23 July 1978, p.7.

3. Daily Times, 27 December, p.13.

4. See Federal Ministry of Information, New Zonal Structure and Zonal Boards for the Nigerian Television Authority, Press Release No. 306, Lagos, 8 March 1978.

5. The Nigerian Tribune of 23 May 1980, p.8, records President Shagari's advisor for information disclosing, inter alia, that state governments whose television station has been taken over by the previous military administration would not be compensated. Chief Olu Adebanjo also suggested that the federal government should own nine radio stations for the dissemination of information to all parts of the country.
   The government would retain full control of the NTA in the then 19 states. Decrees establishing the NTA and Press Council, for example, would be reviewed; there was no hint of their dissolution.

6. New Nigerian, 28 June 1978, p.3.

7. See New Nigerian, 10 December 1977.

8. Professor J 'Bayo Adekanye, discussion with the author, University of Ibadan, 19 October 1989.
   I had contended that these controls on the radio stations were intended strictly as a security measure which was preemptive in nature, i.e., to prevent their use in the event of an attempt at military intervention. In fact, Professor Adekanye's observation and that of the author are facets of the same reality and therefore complementary. Professor Adekanye concurred with this last conclusion.

9. During the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration the New Nigerian, for instance, was 100 per cent Government owned and the Daily Times some 60 per cent Government owned. These two newspapers were the two most influential, largest and widest circulating in Nigeria for the 1975-1979 period.

10. Turi MUHAMMADU, The Nigerian Constitution 1979: Framework for Democracy, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1982, p.36.

11. Here of course we refer to Section 184 of the draft constitution which provided for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal. Section 184 gave provision to this Court to hear appeals from State Sharia Courts on issues governed by Muslim Personal Law. Section 184 with its 5 subsections attracted the widest and the most emotional opposition from its first publication in October 1976.

Opponents saw Section 194 as an attempt to elevate Islam above other religions, contravening Nigeria's secular status. The provisions for the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal were finally deleted from the draft constitution while the new constitution recognized the existing arrangement, whereby cases governed by Muslim Personal Law were heard in Area Courts and appeals from these courts would continue to go to the State Sharia Court of Appeal. This court, in turn, would have recourse to the Federal Court of Appeal. See also, S. OMOLAYO & B. AROWOLAJU, Elements of Government: An Introductory College Text on Political Science, Lagos: Freinds Foundation Publishers, 1987, pp.258-621.

12. As quoted by Turi Muhammadu, op.cit., p.41.

13. New Nigerian 20 June 1977, p.1. This had not been the first time that such an ultimatum had been made by a FMG. During the Gowon regime Nigeria has come to a watershed when Gowon gave his ultimatum to the universities that a 'Professor is to teach and if not resign'. In an interview with the author, on 21 September 1989, Mr. A.O. Banjo of the NIIA stated that this dilemma had never been encountered and that those that didn't have a house like himself could have been in an ethical crunch. He said most decided to protect what they had by speaking less politically in their professional capacity. By contrast, Wole Soyinka was incarcerated during this period despite international protest especially from the literary community.

14. The Great Debate, A Daily Times Publication, Lagos, 1977, p.144.

15. Shehu Shagari's advisor for information, Chief Olu Abebanjo, would exclaim in 1980 that 'the cherished freedom of the press would be meaningless if it was not accompanied by a high sense of responsibility and commitment to build and not to destroy'. See Nigerian Tribune 23 May 1980, p.8.

16. See SOJA, August 1978, p.4.

17. See SOJA for August 1978, p.16; and The New Nationalist, vol.5, nos.3 & 4, June & July 1978, entitled 'Towards Disengaging the Military From Politics', p.1.

18. SOJA, August 1978, p.16.

19. A proponent of this view is A.O. Banjo of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Interview with author, NIIA, Victoria Island, Lagos, 20 September 1989.

20. The forty senior army officers consisted of six Major-Generals, thirteen Brigadiers and twenty-one Colonels.

21. SOJA, September 1979.

22. Interview with author, Ota, 13 November 1989.

23. In an interview with the author, General Danjuma explained that being the COAS was all-consuming and that realistically he could not have continued at such a pace. To his mind his voluntary retirement was timely and appropriate.

17

EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS

THE NIGERIAN MILITARY SCHOOL (NMS)

The Nigerian Military School, located in Zaria (Kaduna), is the nation's first military institution which immerses selected youth in a highly regimented environment in preparation for careers as professional officers. The Nigerian Military School (NMS) acts as the primary entry point for these youths who upon graduation represent a significant source of students entering the Nigerian Defence Academy.

The cadets at the NMS are organized into five classes (from the most junior Class VI to the most senior Class I) with students entering as young as twelve years of age from throughout the country in keeping with the federal character of the school. These five classes are integrated into the school's six cadet companies (A through F) which are run by the student leadership itself. The structure and authority of the regiment attempt to instill both comradeship and appropriate inter-group competition. As with the regular armed forces there are responsibilities and benefits accruing to those within the chain of command beginning with the 'boy soldier' and ending with the Boy Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM).[1]

The education received is first of all a regimented one.[2] The curriculum consists of twelve subjects which include Mathematics, English, Languages with emphasis on French and the student choosing two or three Nigerian languages, Science, Social Studies, Business, Introductory Technology, Practical Agriculuure, Physical and Health Education and Music (piano, recorder, chorus, flute, bugle, drums) or Fine Arts (poetry, drawing, oils).

Military training consists of eight subjects; for example in Class II the subjects instructed are Map Reading, Signals, Field Engineering, Military Music, Drill, Weapons Training, Tactics and Military Physical Training. With 'tiny' exams administered every two

weeks on all subjects, three continuous assessments every term, and one main exam each term, the NMS strives to maintain academic reinforcement and retention.

Throughout the course of instruction much weight is placed on discipline, including the use of dismissal, suspension, and an actual guard room.[3] And from this early stage cadets are taught a specific professional ethic. Cadets are told that as graduates they are to improve the quality of the army. These boy soldiers are encouraged to mix and 'to be as one'. They are taught and tested on the 'soldier's creed' which lays emphasis on integrity and proper conduct. And above all the students are told to set an example for civilians.[4]

The emphasis laid down by the NMS has remained consistent throughout its more than twenty years of existence. Its character during the 1975-1979 period was essentially as described above, with many of the school's graduates going on to receive their commissions.

## THE SEARCH FOR SOUND INDIGENOUS PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

The training pattern for army officers from Anglophone African States is as follows: 1) basic military and academic education in a military academy; 2) platoon level command or equivalent; 3) branch basic course; 4) company level command; 5) branch advance course; 6) staff assignment at battalion or regiment; 7) staff college; 8) staff assignment at higher headquarters; 9) battalion level command; 10) war college; 11) command and staff assignments.[5] The Nigerian Army has followed a similar pattern during its post-independence history.

Professional development of officers included the use of overseas training facilities in addition to those military and technical training facilities available in the country itself. An officer will more than likely have graduated from the Nigerian Military School and subsequently from the Nigerian Defence Academy and then proceeded according to the pattern mentioned above. In the early years after independence there was still heavy reliance on the training of Nigerian cadets at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, as well as advanced training at the staff and war college level as far afield as Pakistan, India, and the United States. If one looks at the

expenditures for 'overseas training' and 'courses of instruction (overseas)' the outlays were substantially on the ascent (see Table 17.1).

Table 17.1
Expenditures for Armed Forces Overseas Training and Courses, 1967-1979

| Fiscal Year | 1967-8 | 1968-9 | 1969-70 | 1970-1 | 1971-2 | 1972-3 | 1973-4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overseas Training | £N* 8.636 | £N 8.735 | £N 35.626 | £ 60.049 | £N 199.544 | N** 253.689 | N 433.999 |
| Overseas Courses | | | 5.954 | 10.64.. | 14.83 | 1068.057 | 1368.682 |
| Total | 8.636 | 8.735 | 41.580 | 70.690 | 214.382 | 1321.755 | 1802.681 |

| Fiscal Year | 1974-5 | 1975-6 | 1976-7 | 1977-8 | 1978-9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Overseas Training | 1,154,430 | 1,200,000 | 2,094,995 | 1,112,437 | 2,777,296 |
| Overseas Courses | 2,356,871 | 4,000,000 | 2,154.909 | 5,948,524 | 3,662,975 |
| Total | 3,511,301 | 5,200,000 | ).904 | 7,061,161 | 6,440,271 |

Source: Report of the Accountant-General of the Federation together with Financial Statements, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, various years.

* In 1959, the Nigerian pound (£N) was fixed at par with the pound sterling and exchanged for US$2,80 till 14 August 1971, the exchange rate N = $ was determined via its gold parity.
** In January 1973 when the Naira was introduced, its value was fixed at 1,24414 grams of fine gold or US$1,52. One Naira was equivalent to one half the Nigerian pound, which it replaced (see Twenty Years of Central Banking in Nigeria, Lagos Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 1979, pp.171-2.)

The advanced training of officers had become inordinately expensive, which was but one result of Nigeria's quarter-million strong army at its peak and one motive for the somewhat streamlined version at the time of military disengagement.

Dependence on foreign training and courses had persisted throughout the post-civil war years. The military hierarchy had long dreamed of establishing and then strengthening Nigeria's own military institutions to curtail and, if possible, essentially preclude the need to send its cadets and officers overseas to receive basic and advanced instruction. Lessening Nigeria's dependence foreign instruction was considered of utmost importance in enhancing the country's strategic and economic position. It also represented the enhancement of institutional and professional development and pride.

Surveying the 1975-1979 period one continues to see the external connection at play. There are instances that reflect both the regrettable loss of expenditures due to lack of indigenous instruction as well as insufficient opportunities afforded by foreign governments for their own reasons. In 1975 we see Second Lieutenant M. Patrick attending the Hungary College of Physical Education. The Lieutenant was attached to the 2nd Infantry Division as a coach.

The Nigerian Defence Academy had been established in 1964 largely therefore to curtail Nigeria's dependence on sending its prospective officers overseas, primarily England. This action proved effective and by February 1977 there were only 2 Nigerians among 458 cadet officers who graduated from the British Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.[6]

What also became apparent was the dependence on foreign instruction in certain disciplines more than others. In June 1977 ten army captains completed a three-month course in personnel management at the United States Institute of Administration at Fort Benjamin, Harrison.[7]

In March 1977 a Joint Committee on Ghanaian/Nigerian military cooperation was signed into being, which nominated 2 Nigerian officers to attend a one year course of study at the Ghana Senior Staff College, beginning on 24 April 1978. Although by this time the FMG had moved to establish the Army Command and Staff College, inter-regional military cooperation was seen as facilitated through this use of foreign instruction.

The multifaceted importance of providing sound professional education during the period of transition to civilian rule was explained by Lieutenant-General Danjuma during the first anniversary celebration of the founding of Nigeria's own institute of advanced military instruction - the Command and Staff College. In the conclusion of his September 1979 address the Chief of Army Staff said:

> Let me, on behalf of the College Board, express our appreciation and gratitude to all those lecturers who have in the last year given the College the impetus in the search for wider understanding of issues affecting national security.... Your loyalty, dedication and devotion to duty should be your watchword. Your responsibilities to the nation at this period of transition will ensure that all officers and men under your command are gainfully employed and sufficiently motivated to take pride in their professions as soldiers, seamen and airmen. We cannot afford idle minds amidst us in the Armed Forces, we cannot afford to be lured into any situation that will slow down the process of the development of our Armed Forces. We look up to all of you for peace and tranquility in this country in the years ahead.[8]

As reflected in General Danjuma's address, the FMG wanted professional military instruction that was increasingly comprehensive, sophisticated and capable of producing a strengthened chain of command which would prove salubrious both to the nation and the military profession. This development, it was thought, would act as a safeguard for the nation and aid longevity of civilian rule after the departure of the military from government control.

## THE NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY (NDA)

> The Academy is the country's major source of future commanders of our various military services and organisations. No effort therefore should be spared to ensure that this Academy attains the highest standard.[9]

In April 1960 the Royal Nigerian Military Training College was established to conduct preliminary training of six months duration for officer cadets. Africanization was creating increased demands for training facilities at home. It became apparent that the nation needed to take full control of its own defence policy and its attendant educational orientation. Thus, by 1964 the post-independence Nigerian Military Training College had to alter its role from that of merely preparing suitable Nigerians for further overseas training to that of producing full-fledged military officers. Consequently, the College was transformed into the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) to train regular officer cadets for the Nigerian Armed Forces.[10]

The NDA came formally into being in January 1964 having as its first commandant Brigadier H.R. Varma of the Indian Army. Brigadier Varma and seven other Indian officers (five army, two navy) pioneered the establishment of the Academy as well as setting its standards. The first two cadet Battalion Commanders were also Indian officers - Lieutenant Commander M.S. Rawat from 1964 to 1969 and Lieutenant-General J.C.N. Jatar from 1969 to 1971. The first Nigerian commandant of the Academy was Major-General David Akpode Ejoor in 1968.

During the 1975-1979 period of military administration some innovations were attempted to meet some institutional needs of the armed forces although the Academy's essential organization had been settled (see Figure 17.2). These innovations were not merely additive in nature. For example, the Short Service Course (SSC) (a redesignation of the Emergency Commission Courses established during the civil war, a four to eight week crash program) was phased out in June 1977.[11] This decision was consistent with both the real needs of the army and the prevailing philosophy of demobilization in that the SSC owed its existence, albeit indirectly, to the war. The course's longevity was due more to bureaucratic inertia than to any real national security need. The Gowon administration had as with other items simply allowed the program to continue.

Figure 17.2

Organizational Chart of NDA, Kaduna




Source: NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY, NDA February 1964 - February 1989: Jubilee Celebration Book, NDA Press, 1989, p.5.

CB - Cadet Brigade (Cadet Battalion with four companies prior to September 1984)
DMT - Directorate of Military Training
DOA - Directorate of Administration
DOL - Director of Logistics
MA - Military Assistant
SSC - Short Service Course (established 1 March 1978)
WT - Weapon Training Wing.

In 1978, a six month course designated the Direct Short Service Course (DSSC) was introduced for the training of officers who were directly commissioned into the administration and service units of the Nigerian Army. The Obasanjo administration, seeing the obvious need for qualified officers entering these areas, saw the NDA as the logical venue to produce the required officers. The responsibility to train this category of officers was later transferred to the NA School of Infantry.

Prior to 1979 the Academy's Regular Courses, with the exception of the First Course, were of two and a half years duration, one and a half years for academic and one year for purely military training. The military hierarchy made a decision which took effect in 1979 that the course duration would increase to three years, two years for academic and one year for purely military training. This increase in academic training was consistent with the academic pursuit of the Academy at the time which was towards conferring the NDA Certificate of Education (NDACE) moderated by the University of Ibadan.[12]

In 1978 the Academic Board of the NDA made several decisions affecting both the structure and curriculum of the academy. The Academic Board decided that the NDA would remain a tri-service military institution. It also introduced compulsory General Studies, including military science and African history, in order to improve the general education and awareness of the cadets.

Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Idahosa in addressing a twelve-man military team from the Royal College of Defence Studies (headed by Rear Admiral J.A. Bell) told the British visitors that the role of the academy was to produce officers with clear knowledge of the needs of Nigeria, skill, awareness and leadership, which could make them efficient and effective officers for Nigeria's Armed Forces.[13]

The military recognizes the close relationship between education and professionalism. This is apparent at the NDA where professional continuity has been consistent over its history. Professionalism itself is predicated on the 'three pillars' of observing the constitution, legal command, and obedience to the chain of command as embodied in the Armed Forces Oath (see Appendix 4).

The constitution itself was taught by military instructors in 'a military way/perspective and less academically'.[14]

The FMG was keen to have the cadets of the NDA assimilate a professional ethos that would actually observe the 'three pillars' in their entirety. The SMC was well aware of competing influences and motivations that the cadet body had to face. In his 1977 address to the cadets of the NDA, SMC member Air Commodore Yisa Doko in the presence of fellow SMC associate and NDA commandant, Major-General G.S. Jalo, advised the cadets not to allow their personal ambition to

overshadow their pledges as loyal subordinates.[15] The implication was clear if these future officers did not pursue this standard. The SMC persisted in this manner of direct challenge and a warning to the younger officers acknowledging the realities of the ethical environment at large in which these officers would function. However austerely the SMC and subordinates presented its warnings and desired standards their words remained essentially a calculated moral appeal. The NDA would for its part continue to produce increasingly educated officers whose loyalty to the military would appear more compelling and familiar than to the somewhat more abstruse constitution and state. In fact if one reads the Armed Forces Oath it can be easily argued that the emphasis on obedience to authority, and in particular to the President and Commander-in-Chief, is an allegiance that is easily transferable to a military government. The oath does not read that allegiance is given to the Constitution, as it is for example in the oath of commission for officers of the United States. To what extent this distinction has any real import is uncertain.

Regardless of the eventual loyalties of NDA graduates the Academy received increasing sums for its continued operation and development throughout both civilian and military administrations. Taking the 1975-1979 period we observe the following allocations for what is designated as 'Total Staff and Emoluments':

| Fiscal Year | 1975-1976 | 1976-1977 | 1977-1978 | 1978-1979 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N | 2,397,500* | 3,378,306 | 2,598,746 | 2,855,811 |

Source: Report of the Accountant-General of the Federation together with Financial Statements (Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos), various years.
* provisional figures only.

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (C&SC)

He is select group
ACSC waits for him
Where he labours for Psc,
Chance grabbed and an extra hole
On each epaulette in anticipation
Of an extra star.

From the poem 'The Army Officer' by Captain J.G. Aleonewese.[16]

The Command and Staff College, Jaji, is the youngest of all Nigeria's Military Institutions. As mentioned above, the civil war's dramatic enlargement of the officer corps had made it increasingly difficult to obtain the required vacancies in overseas training institutions. Even more acute was the lack of required vacancies in overseas staff colleges. Consequently, plans were made to establish the Army Command and Staff College at Jaji, Kaduna.[17]

The establishment of a Command and Staff College (C&SC) had long been the dream of the Nigerian officer corps. The desire for such a college of advanced military education had existed long before the civil war but was not to come to fruition until the mid-1970s.

It must be said that among elements of the military agenda the Command and Staff College was seen as vital to the military's institutional and the nation's long term security needs.

The establishment of the Command and Staff College is considered by many the crowning achievement of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General Danjuma. There is little doubt that his vision and efforts saw the College come into being as an integral part of the military agenda during the period leading to military disengagement.

To Danjuma the military agenda was as important as the political agenda. Furthermore, the COAS saw himself as the army's 'party political leader'.[18] Through his efforts the C&SC was established, as well as schools, each with its boards of governors, for every corps within the Nigerian Army. According to Danjuma his predecessor as Chief of Army Staff, General Ejoor, had tried to do the same but Gowon would not let him. Instead Ejoor had settled for a retraining

program for officers who had missed the opportunity to attend Staff College abroad because of the civil war.

When Lieutenant-General Danjuma became the COAS the necessary steps to establish a staff college were taken. The need to make the College internationally comparable made the FMG seek overseas assistance. After negotiations between the governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom the latter agreed to provide a British Army Advisory Team (BAAT) to assist in the establishment of the College as well as act as Directing Staff.[19] An advance party with its team leader arrived in Nigeria with the purpose of composing the school's curriculum. According to Danjuma the team leader wanted to brainstorm. Danjuma said, 'I don't care how you do it. I want two stages - short courses for Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels (100 or so) then a full course.' The Britisher said the concept was new and had greater scope, which excited him. Consequently he returned home for discussions.[20] In effect Danjuma had a different idea than the expected one for the college. He simply changed it.

The COAS held a weekly meeting with Muhammed concerning military matters after which he (Danjuma) would meet with the British. On the day of one such meeting with the British, Friday 13 February 1976, Murtala Muhammed died in the abortive coup. The Command and Staff College would be established three and a half months later.

The C&SC opened on 29 May 1976 to run a senior Army Officers Course lasting six months; a second course was run from January 1977 for the same duration. Both sessions instructed Lieutenant-Colonels to Brigadiers. With its first intake on 2 June 1976 the Nigerian Army Command and Staff College became the first of its kind in black Africa.

While the FMG saw fit to establish the C&SC it had to use the services of foreign lecturers and instructors in conjunction with local lecturers. According to the College's first commandant, Brigadier G.O. Ejiga, this was due to the political and extra-military appointments being held by the NA's own most senior officers, who had become the chief administrators of the government.[21] Paradoxically, many of these same officers, particularly the military governors, were directed to attend the first two courses, upon completion of which they would return to their respective posts. The rationale for this move was provided by Lt-Gen T.Y. Danjuma:

> We wish to avoid the mistakes of the past whereby military officers holding political appointments became so removed from their profession and deficient in their military experience and training that they were scared of being re-assigned to purely military appointments.[22]

An interpretation of the COAS's observation is that the traditional conflict between the governing military and the institutional military is not derived from the fear of dominance of one faction over the other but rather through the gradual undermining of professional military confidence. Such a development would have an obvious negative effect for the chain of command (as regards superiors and subordinates) and for cooperation (among peers). This timidity factor would prove detrimental to the institutional military.

On 12 September 1976 the first full length (one year) Army Staff Course began catering for sixty-two NA officers, two NN officers, two NAF officers and two Army officers from Guyana - all junior Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors. Further expansion occurred on 24 April 1978 when the Army Junior Division opened to run its first course for Captains.

In January 1976 during the Senior Army Officers' Conference held at Ibadan it was announced that lectures at the C&SC would include global economic and socio-political studies. To this end, the college invited eminent domestic and foreign university authorities to conduct discussions on various subjects, military and non-military. The idea of staff college training was to broaden the intellectual horizon of officers and to prepare them for higher command. To augment this effort many senior army officers were also invited to talk to students on army problems not necessarily military in nature. It was hoped that this approach would assist the students to tackle very important staff duties from a broad-based stance.[23] This combination of applying intellectual rigor and practical instruction and discussion was in keeping with the military's ambition to produce a more sophisticated and functional officer. This would enhance the institutional military's future and preparedness.[24]

In his address to the first students of the Army Command Staff College on 2 June 1976, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma, provided further rationale for the establishment of the college. The COAS cited the serious problem posed by the lack of standardization arising from the use of various institutions for staff training. The Nigerian civil war had revealed a plethora of command and staff mistakes many of which could have been avoided had appropriate principles and precautions been applied. This civil war legacy had to be rectified.

The content and scope of the staff course were fashioned to suit the Nigerian Army. The course provided needed practical staff training and instruction in tactical procedures consistent with directives provided by the FMG. The military authorities were convinced of the desirability of a college whose standard would be comparable to that of the British Army Staff College at Camberley.

In keeping with the increasing emphasis on education and professionalism Lt-General Danjuma said:

> We believe that no knowledge is wasteful and we attach very great importance to systematic and continuous training for all ranks of the army, irrespective of seniority or appointment. We particularly attach very great importance to the establishment of this (AC&SC) institution.[25]

Addressing the first intake of 40 officers to the six month course, the college's commandant, Brigadier Ejiga, outlined the multi-disciplinary approach taken at the college:

> The idea of staff college is for army officers to study all the problems relating to the army and these include the medical, engineering, supply and transport and other services aspects.
> Even Padre and Imams do attend staff college.[26]

Emphasis was also laid on the need for international awareness. Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal J. Yisa-Doko, stated that the Nigerian Armed Forces could not totally exclude themselves from

studying and understanding the underlying factors that led to the various conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. Nigerian Armed Forces had since 1959 been committed to contributing to peacekeeping operations for the UN or OAU, and in order to achieve this members of the Armed Forces had to acquire the right knowledge not only of Nigeria's own services and organization, but of all the factors that affect national economic planning, fiscal policies and political developments within and outside the country. This would enable the military to understand more clearly the relevance of the military in national development.[27] The Chief of Air Staff also gave assurance that upon completion of the C&SC course officers would be sufficiently armed to participate in planning and organizing the implementation of National Defense and economic and political policies at various levels.[28]

The preceding pronouncements made specifically at the Command and Staff College indicate that the military elite considered that professional military education produces a constant state of readiness for the possibility of the Armed Forces in national leadership. In other words, the officers are to be educated in the disciplines required in the event of military intervention and subsequent military governance. It puts into effect military-cum-administrative preparedness. This doctrinal emphasis removes the administrative and technical apprehension often associated with and felt by the military in power. The primary fear or concern is for the military's institutional unity rather than for competence, the former being a matter of internal discipline and vigilance while the latter that of increasing educational and practical exposure. In this process the military becomes increasingly aware that it is in fact capable of national leadership. And through interdisciplinary education rather than merely military training and disposition, the military eventually come to monitor the indices of economic, political and social success by both military and civilian governments. It is difficult to say to which form of government this development appears most ominous. The military come to know political and economic theories, they come to know sociology, inter alia. And they become cognizant of an institutional-professional and increasingly academic sense of national well-being. The

establishment of the Command and Staff College and other military institutions of advanced studies accelerated this process of military self-awareness.

By-mid 1977 an increase in the number of students attending the Army Command and Staff College had already been approved. The scheduled increase began in September 1977 for the year long course (ACSC 1) and grew to 92 students for the course which began in September 1978 and 99 students for the September 1979 course (CSC 2). By the scheduled date of military disengagement - 1 October 1979 - a total of 450 students had graduated.[29]

On 1 September 1978 the Army Command and Staff College was redesignated the Command and Staff College to reflect its new joint service nature, following the decision to establish, with the assistance of a Royal Air Force Advisory Team an Air Faculty at Jaji for the staff training of senior Nigerian Air Force Officers, and a junior Command and Staff School at the Kaduna Air Force Base. The first twenty senior Air Force Officers did the first two terms of the next Command and Staff Course 1 (CSC 1) with their army counterparts. Three further short air staff courses were run between April 1979 and September 1980 before Air Force Officers began their full year's course of Staff and Command training. The junior Division of the Air Faculty was officially opened on 26 February 1979.

During the tenure of the first two commandants of the C&SC (Brigadier G. Ejiga, 24 September 1975 to 31 August 1978, and Major-General J. Olu Bajowa, 1 September 1978 to 15 December 1979) the college settled into a specific organization. The C&SC consisted of the College Headquarters, the Faculty of Joint Studies (FJS),[30] and the Army, Navy and Air Faculties (see Figure 17.3). As in the case of the Nigerian Defence Academy, the C&SC committed itself to being a triservice institution.

Figure 17.3

Organization of the Command and Staff College, Jaji




Source: 'Command and Staff College of Nigeria Celebrates 10th Anniversary 1976-1986, A Pictorial of 10 Years of Dedication to the Pursuit of Excellence', in The Nigerian Armed Forces, Jaji: C&SC, 1986, p.18.

With the exception of the FJS, the faculties each have a Senior and Junior Division. Examining the content of the Army Senior Division Course reveals seven designated objectives which emphasize professional knowledge and proficiency and, as the fifth and seventh objectives state, a broad knowledge of national and world affairs and the part military forces play in them, and the incentive and opportunity to read and think widely on a broad and varied range of relevant subjects.

The Army Senior Division Course exposes students to a wide-ranging syllabus divided into six terms. The terms reflect a concentration on staff theory, tactics and training with its supportive disciplines.

The 5th and 6th terms represent the military's perennial concern for security, and the need to meet management, command, control and coordination requirements:

> Term 5. Term 5 is largely devoted to the study of counter revolutionary warfare and covers a whole spectrum of operations ranging from civil disturbances in an urban setting to guerilla warfare in jungles and deserts and consequent legal implications. Police officers from the Police Staff College join the College for nearly a week to

> emphasise the roles of both organisations in internal security.
>
> Term 6. This final term of the course comprises a study of management techniques, an examination of all aspects of 'joint operations', a final look at some aspects of training and an examination of the forces of certain foreign powers. The term ends with another major indoor exercise designed to broaden students' knowledge of joint operations, staff duties and procedures and to practise selected officers in command appointments.[31]

In anticipation of the completion of the program of military disengagement, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, delivered an address to the students of the Command and Staff College on 20 December 1978. Heavy emphasis was laid on the adherence by both civilian and military authorities to their respective roles under the new constitutional dispensation. Yar'Adua pointed out that the greater proportion of the officers present at his address had neither served nor worked under a civilian administration. After briefly reviewing the difficulties that existed in civil-military relations prior to military intervention the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters proposed the proper role of the armed forces within the context of the new constitution:

> The role of the military in the next civilian regime will be influenced by the form the civil-military relations takes in the political system. I would like to suggest that this relationship should not be seen in terms of exclusion of the military from the political system. The military is an arm of government and a very vital arm indeed. As such, it is part and parcel of the political system of the country.
>
> For example, the nature of the military profession and the fact that the military was created to promote and protect the interest of the nation, have combined to ensure that the military will exercise influence in thebody politic of the nation. But such an influence must be within prescribed rules.[32]

Yar'Adua expressed the regime's belief that stability for the nation and for civil-military relations lay in the respect for those assigned roles or prescribed rules. And for the military to play its role effectively, he stated, it had to be re-socialized. This need, according to the Chief of Staff, reinforced the need for training and education for the military to play its politically subordinate role effectively. The responsibility for this lay with the military leadership which had to 'filter through the military its new orientation'.

Earlier in his address Brigadier Yar'Adua had stated that the military's task was to lay down structures that could 'guarantee responsible government'. Of interest to the Command and Staff College and for that matter to all institutions of military instruction was the implicit link made between the fostering of stable, responsible government and the advancement of professional military standards.

In the concluding portion of his address Yar'Adua said:

> I would suggest that what is required for the adjustment is a programme of professional training. By this I mean the acquisition of military expertise which enables a soldier to carry out his professional calling as well as to recognize the limit of political influence.... Both the civil and military leadership will have to make allowances for each other.... I am sure with understanding both will be capable of creating a stable relationship.[33]

In large part this would mean that the military could continue to upgrade its professional standards while the civilian authorities could practice responsible politics. To a greater or lesser degree both parties did pursue their particular interests after the completion of military disengagement, at least for a time.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (NIPSS)

Decree No. 20, officially the 'National Institute for Policy and

Strategic Studies Decree 1979. Supplement to Official Gazette, No. 27, Vol. 66, 14 June 1979, Part A', established the NIPSS to

> serve as a centre where representatives drawn from the highest levels in the civil service, the military, the universities, the professions, political organizations, commerce and industry and other sectors of our national life could gather by way of seminars, workshops and other action-oriented courses, studies and conferences to analyse and exchange views as to long-term national goals. The institute also provides advanced courses for such persons and awards certificates of course attendance.[34]

From its inception the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) was intended to fulfill a unique role in Nigerian development. General Obasanjo stressed that it should, with other bodies, assist in directing the course of the nation.[35]

Inaugurated on 28 June 1979, the NIPSS in accordance with the Decree establishing it was envisaged as a center where 'policy initiators and executors and other citizens of practical experience and wisdom in Nigeria would meet to reflect and exchange ideas on the great issues of society, particularly as they relate to Nigeria and in the context of a constantly changing world'.[36]

Established as a parastatal under the office of the President, the NIPSS would be overseen by a Board of Governors with a Chairman. The first eight-man board of governors was chaired by Chief Simeon Abedo, former Nigerian Representative to the United Nations and former member of the dissolved Constituent Assembly. Other board members included the Chief of Army Staff, civil servants, managers of parastatals, an economic consultant, and the Executive Director of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry.[37] In all, an august body of individuals, albeit not representing such areas as the university and labor, which were however represented in the student body.

At the formal opening of the NIPSS on 3 September 1979, the Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, described the prevailing

situation as one of an 'unintegrated and disjointed' approach by the elite to issues of national interest. He further categorized the elite into three broad groups - the intellectual, the public service, and the commercial. General Obasanjo was of the view that these three elite groups did not interrelate sufficiently with one another in their concern about national problems or share the same concerns about the fate of the society as a whole.[38] Consequently there was a need to bring these groups together or suffer the consequences of sectarian interest.

In an effort to link the NIPSS with society at large, the Chairman of the Institute, Chief S.O. Adebo, promised that the public would be kept informed on all the Institute's activities 'so that they could follow with intelligent interest what was going on and be in a position to comment'.[39]

During his 3 September 1979 address at the opening ceremony of the NIPSS General Obasanjo expounded on the need to 'translate' the need and pursuance of a self-reliant and self-sufficient Nigeria into an organizational framework for the purpose of realizing a self-reliant economy. The framework itself would have to be capable of harnessing Nigeria's human and material resources in order to achieve greater progress.[40]

The NIPSS was established in the desire to bring about the more immediate harnessing of human resources through greater interelite integration. After this, if indeed achieved, there would be an attendant body of recommendations on policy formation so as to assist the ministries and government organizations in their activities and objectives.

The role and ultimate ambitions of the FMG are evident in General Obasanjo's closing paragraph of his 3 September 1979 address:

> Ladies and Gentlemen, I have continuously stated my belief in and hope for a greater and better Nigeria which can make positive and significant contributions to our continent and our world. I have even stated that in order to create such a society we must necessarily create new economic and political structures based, no doubt, on our native values and ideas.[41] All along, we have been motivated by this

> belief, very soon it would be the responsibility of the future leadership groups to continue the task. By creating the National Institute, this Administration has created one more venue for the various leadership groups to meet, discuss and seek resolution of issues that relate to the continuing development and transformation of our society.[42]

One of the subtleties of General Obasanjo's address is that it aspired to establish a tacit socio-economic convention between the outgoing military and incoming civilian leadership, the understanding being that the military administration had set forth the socio-economic orthodoxy to be pursued by subsequent civilian governments. This agenda was not to be jettisoned without consequences. This is why a continuity of sorts between military and civilian administrations can be observed, with the preservation and pursuance of what the former has laid down as appropriate policy. This continuity of policy did not prove restrictive to incoming civilian leadership. The purpose of military disengagement is to leave sufficient structures in place to be effectively used for the national good. Adding to this structure will be an improved political culture which is admittedly far more problematic. The NIPSS would, logically, be involved in bridging the gulf between structure and political culture at least among the nation's elite.

Although the FMG repeatedly warned against applying or enforcing foreign ideologies the fact remained that it favored the development of a market economy, seeing such a development not in ideological terms, that is, not as capitalism per se, but as the engine for real progress.

Much interest was shown in the Brazilian economic miracle, so much so that on at least two occasions the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Yar'Adua, visited Brazil to gain understanding of Brazilian economic technique.[43]

Like the Brazilians the Nigerian FMG were interested in seeing the establishment of a 'capitalist ethic' in the country. It has been observed by at least one SMC member that socialism is seen as 'leveling', which goes contrary to natural structures which are

hierarchical.[44] Other observers have spoken in terms of Nigeria's capitalist oriented society.[45] The same SMC member previously cited states that there has long been a capitalist ethos in Nigerian society and that colonialism only accentuated it.[46] Whatever the case may be the FMG saw national progress, in large part, in terms of continued economic progress. The framework had to be established to ensure this progress and the NIPSS was born of necessity to become an agent or facilitator of this orientation.

The NIPSS, together with the increase in civil-military interaction among the elite and more political education, is said to have produced a more sophisticated officer. However, this would be the assessment after the completion of military disengagement on 1 October 1979.

Fashioned after the British Royal Defence College the NIPSS began its first course with 36 senior officers from the armed services, the Federal and state civil service, parastatals and the private sector. Taken as a whole the non-military participants of the course were in the majority.[47]

Commentaries in the Nigerian press provide additional perspective on the role and purpose of the NIPSS within the context of military disengagement. The Daily Times for 7 September 1979 stated that:

> In a word, General Obasanjo's interest in the Institute derives from his knowledge that governments subsequent to his will have a harder time running this nation. They will desperately need a national instrument through which fundamental national goals can permeate at least the higher reaches of society, and thereby reduce the scope of argument (and potential divisiveness) over public policy. That alone should be sufficient justification for the Institute's existence.[48]

The Nigeria Standard went so far as to compliment the Obasanjo regime in its editorial entitled 'Commendable Foresight':

> We congratulate the Federal Military Government for its foresight in establishing the institute and hope that its impact will be felt in and outside Nigeria.[49]

Although there would be occasions on which the NIPSS would come under criticism the need for such an organization went unchallenged.[50]

The FMG continued to stress the significance of education throughout various government institutions including civilian, military, and civil-military organs such as NIPSS, for both didactic and investigative reasons. NIPSS itself was tasked with special research responsibilities which were set out in Section 3(2), paragraphs (d) and (e) of Decree No. 20 of 1979. These two paragraphs involve, respectively, the identification of human intellectual-analytical resources, and inter-disciplinary research for formulating usable policy options.[51] NIPSS has produced various documents, both classified and unclassified, in an effort to fulfill its charter.[52] However, there have been no works on the process of military disengagement.

The FMG placed great emphasis on interdisciplinary and integrative education among Nigeria's elite. Fundamentally, the FMG saw education as achieving much in all sectors of society but particularly at this level, in so far as NIPSS can 'groom leaders, influence leadership and create awareness in the society based on the calibre of people it attracts and its access to strategic information'.[53]

NIPSS was founded in the absence of a comparable institution. Given the FMG objectives and vision for Nigeria as a regional and global force the creation of NIPSS was a logical outcome approved by the military and civilian elite alike.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF COLLEGE OF NIGERIA (ASCON)

The Administrative Staff College of Nigeria was established by Decree No. 39 of 1973. Originally, the College's objectives were to:

(a) provide higher management training for the development of senior executives for the public and private sectors of the Nigerian economy;
(b) provide and arrange for a comparative study and investigation, and for exchange of ideas and experiences and for promotion of a better understanding

between persons connected with management and administration in the various spheres of national life;

(c) conduct research into problems of management and administration arising in different spheres of national life;

(d) award grants, scholarships or travel fellowships for research in public administration and allied subjects;

(e) establish and maintain a library;

(f) undertake, organise and facilitate study courses, conferences, lectures, seminars and the like and to promote the aforesaid objects; and

(g) undertake and provide for the publication of journals and of research papers and books in furtherance of the aforesaid objects.[54]

Formal approval in principle that an administrative staff college be established was granted by the FMG in 1969 although some observers trace the origin of the college to February 1967 when a request was made by the Federal Government to the Institute of Administration, University of Ife, to undertake a survey of the training needs of the Federal Civil Service. At the time the Institute of Administration was considered the top management development institution in Nigeria.[55]

Shortly before the onset of the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime, the FMG signed a contract worth over N3 million for the construction of ACSON at Topo, Badagry (Lagos State); the signing took place on 12 July 1975.[56] The foundation stone was not laid until 26 November 1976, with the College conducting courses a year later.[57]

By November 1978 the FMG reviewed the history and modus operandi of the College and directed that it should thenceforth restrict its role to the training of public officers. This was done in order to enable the College to cope adequately and effectively with the training needs and requirements of the public service. After the completion of military disengagement the College would offer some sixteen courses ranging from three-week Introduction Courses to a nine month Post-Graduate Course for Public Administration. Augmenting this effort would be Occasional Workshops, Seminars and

Conferences on selected issues lasting from one to seven days for various levels and grades of Public Officers.[58]

G. Aforka Nweke of the University of Nigeria (NSUKKA) holds that for political-choice behavior to be rational it must conform to certain 'criteria of preference structure' and must prove compatible with national interest while being pursued in an efficient and effective manner. It is the rational development of the criteria of preference structure which concerns Nweke and is the reason for which the creation of certain institutions came about under t.e Muhammed/ Obasanjo administration.

Nweke quite pointedly remarks that skill acquisition is meaningless without skill application. Skill acquisition is associated with the stock of knowledge improved through scientific and technological progress which is diffused through the labor force by means of education, training, and experience. It is precisely for this purpose that the establishment of both the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), as well as the establishment of technological universities by the State and Federal Governments, took place; that is, to meet the challenge of skill acquisition for the years beyond the completion of military disengagement.[59]

The degree of effective and efficient application of skill has been generally wanting among decision makers in Nigeria. For example, in the diplomatic service the key foreign affairs ministry was often filled with executives whose knowledge of various disciplines was considered sufficiently inadequate as to undermine effectiveness.[60]

The Obasanjo regime was cognizant of the need to improve Nigeria's institutional capacity for skill acquisition and application. The national interest required the existence and development of such skill. Economic development and self-determination could be rationally pursued only with the existence of such a resource. New institutions were thus created with established ones such as ASCON realigned accordingly. Military disengagement and the prospects of viable civilian rule were thus in large part predicated on this strategy of institution creation and realignment with an attendant capacity for appropriate and efficient application of formulated policy.

NOTES

1. In fact a boy soldier receives a monthly wage of 8 Naira which goes towards the purchase of starch and Kiwi polish. The boy RSM receives 25 Naira a month for his position. Within the chain of command there is one Boy Command Sergeant Major (CSM), receiving N20; one Boy Staff Sergeant, receiving N18; and two sergeants per company, receiving N16 each. The commandant of the NMS is a regular army Colonel.

2. Although the daily schedule can differ for the five classes, a normal schedule will run as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| wake-up | 05:00-05:30 |
| clean up | till 06:00 |
| breakfast | 06:30 |
| parade ground | 07:00 |
| class | 07:30 |
| lessons start | 08:00 |
| five classes | |
| work ends | 14:00 |
| meal | 15:00 |
| muster parade prep. | 15:30 |
| prep. period (study time) | 16:00-17:00; 18:30-21:00 |

   Generally Mondays are taken up with military training. Class I however receives military education on that day. Tuesday through Friday are academic days.

3. A cadet found guilty of fighting, disrespect or cheating would earn one week in the guard room at lard labour, e.g., digging a pit. A student found AWOL would also receive time in the guard room. Suspension would be the penalty for such offenses as abuse (by senior boys) and stealing, the latter resulting in dismissal if severe enough.

4. This professional ethic was expounded to the author by a boy soldier interviewed on 28 August 1989.

5. Adapted from J. 'Bayo ADEKSON, 'Pay and Rank Differentiation between the Nigerian Army and Police Force: A Comparison', in The Nigerian Journal of Economic & Social Studies, Ibadan: Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, 1980, p.93. Adekson refers to the Encyclopedia Britannica, London, 1963, Vol.16, p.724.

6. The two Nigerians were Kolawole John Olu and Idi Danjuma.

7. SOJA, June 1977.

8. Address by the outgoing Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, on the 1st Anniversary celebration of the founding of the C&SC, Jaji, on 22 September 1979. As quoted by SOJA, October 1979, p.16.

9. SCTA, January 1977, p.8.

10. The Nigerian Economist, vol.2, no.26, 12-25 September 1989: Supplement on NDA, p.22.

11. The SSC course would be resuscitated in 1982 to fill the vacuum left by retired concessional commissioned officers. Note that this decision was taken by the civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari.

12. NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY, NDA February 1964-February 1989: Jubilee Celebration Book, NDA Press, 1989, p.3. The NDACE was eventually phased our and in October 1984 the current five year degree program was introduced; four years for academics and light military training and one year for purely military training.

13. SOJA, November 1978.

14. This according to Professor S.C. Ukpabi, NDA Provost, in interview with author, 10 October 1989, NDA, Kaduna. Professor Ukpabi said that beginning on 16 October 1989 the Nigerian Constitution Course would be taught in an academic way, more like a legal interpretation, by coopted civilian experts. There are also attempts at directly instructing the cadets to observe the '3 pillars' with the following courses: 1) The Nigerian Constitution, 2) Sociology, and 3) Military Sociology. This emphasis is directed towards supporting the development of a professional ethos within the context of military disengagement: an ethos that will preclude the reentry of the military into government. Cadets are told that they are not above the law; that if they break the civil law they will be discharged/expelled from the NDA and arrested by police. Cadets are further described and encouraged to see themselves as citizen-soldiers.
    The curriculum aims at gradually displacing arts and sciences with science. Thus in October 1989 two new departments of engineering were introduced.

15. SOJA, January 1977, p.8.

16. Captain S.C. ALEONEWESE, 'The Army Officer', in Colonel Mamman J. Vatsa (ed), Voices from the Trench, 2nd Edition, Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985, p.32.

17. See Command and Staff College, Jaji, Nigeria, Brief, CSCH Graduation, July 1982, pp.1-2. Nigeria and Britain had originally agreed that a staff college should be located in Lagos but for reasons unknown to the author the location was changed to Jaji, some 37 kilometers north north-east of the city of Kaduna.

18. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, interview with author, Kaduna, 14 November 1989.

19. The BAAT consisted of 15 Army Officers and a civilian: 1 Colonel, 12 Lieutenant-Colonels, 1 Major, 1 Captain. They worked in various technical and logistic departments in conjunction with

their Nigerian Army counterparts.

The presence of British instructors would be felt for some years. The majority of a group of 19 British instructors were replaced by Nigerians in the mid-1980s (see The Guardian, (Nigeria), 10 January 1987, p.3). In early 1989 the college became fully Nigerianized with the departure of the last team of 5 British officers (they had helped establish the Joint Welfare Department). The departure of the team ended the bilateral contract between the United Kingdom and Nigeria. From 1976 to 1986 there were about 56 British directing staff officers who worked in the college (see National Concord, 6 March 1989, p.2.).

20. Lieutenant-General T.Y. Danjuma, interview with author, Kaduna, 14 November 1989.

21. SOJA, June 1976, p.7.

22. SOJA, July 1976, p.5.

23. SOJA, June 1976.

24. In fact in discussion with the author in 1989, the former Federal Commissioner for Finance, and member of the SMC during the Muhammed/Obasanjo years, Major-General James J. Oluleye, said that officers during the said period were more confined to the military proper. An academic from the NIIA is of the opinion that the current military under General I.B. Babangida has a greater understanding of national development than their political counterparts. The general conclusion is that professional military development has occurred.

25. Address by Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma, to the first students of the Nigerian Army Command and Staff College on 2 June 1976. Full text of this address recorded in SOJA, July 1976, pp.5-6.

26. As recorded in SOJA, June 1976, p.5.

27. Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal J. Yisa-Doko, speaking at the Nigerian Command and Staff College, see SOJA, November 1978, p.3.

28. Ibid.

29. According to the FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION, Press Release No. 1140, 29 June 1985, the C&SC had graduated 1,014 officers by June 1985. Student composition was as follows: 975 Nigerians, 18 Ghanaians, 8 Tanzanians, 6 Zimbabweans, 3 Ugandans, 2 Guyanese and 2 Sierra-Leoneans. Of these graduates six were women (2 Army, 3 Air Force, 1 Navy) and 3 civilians (Ministry of Defence).

Commandant Major-General Paul Omu, speaking at the seventh graduation ceremony of the college on 28 June 1985, said that the admission and brilliant performance on the course had introduced a new area of cooperation between the Nigerian Armed Forces and

the civilian population of the country. This same sentiment was echoed by General Buhari, see Press Release No. 1134, 29 June 1985, Doors of Command and Staff College, Jaji, to be Opened to More Civilians.

30. The Faculty of Joint Studies is responsible for Environmental Geopolitical Studies, the Post Graduate Course (PGC) with its classified content, and all joint service matters, including the underdeveloped areas of joint tactical doctrine and combat development and research.

31. Command and Staff College, Jaji, Nigeria, Brief, CSCH Graduation, July, 1982, p.10.

32. New Nigerian, 10 January 1979, p.7. The full text of the address is to be found herein.

33. New Nigerian, 10 January 1978, p.11.

34. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Annual Volume of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Containing Decrees and Subsidiary Legislation Made in the Year 1979, Lagos, 1980.

35. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Late Press Release No. 980, Lagos, 28 June 1979.

36. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Press Release No. 985, Lagos, 29 June 1979.

37. New Nigerian, 29 June 1979, p.28, contains the names and specific positions occupied by the members of the NIPSS board of governors. See also Daily Times, 15 July, p.3.

38. New Nigerian, 4 September 1979, p.1.

39. Nigeria Standard, 7 September 1979, p.1. Address by Chief Adebo read on his behalf by one of the governors of the NIPSS, Alhaji Ahmed Talib, at the opening of the institute by the Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo.

40. New Nigerian, 6 September 1979, p.3.

41. An oblique reference to avoiding what are considered foreign ideologies, which in the Nigerian context means avoiding socialism to the detriment of capital formation.

42. New Nigerian, 6 September 1979, p.3.

43. See for instance New Nigerian, 19 January 1979, for reference to one of these visits. General Yar'Adua related to the author that his visits were strictly in the realm of economic interest to see how the Brazilians had done so well and if Nigeria could learn from them. 'I went in during their military disengagement in which there was economic reconstruction. This was of interest to us.... Their economic achievements and strategies were of

interest.' Interview, 14 November 1989, Kaduna.

44. Major-General James J. Oluleye, interview with author, Ikeja, 29 September 1989.

45. Jide OWOEYE, 'Nigeria and China', in G.O. OLUSANYA & R.A. AKINDELE (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, Ibadan: University Press, 1986, p.301.

46. Major-General James J. Oluleye, interview with author, Ikeja, 29 September 1989.

47. New Nigerian, 6 September 1979, p.27, contains the organizations and numbers of course participants.

48. Daily Times, 7 September 1979, p.3.

49. The Nigeria Standard, 8 September 1979, p.5.

50. For criticism from a former NIPSS student see New Nigerian, 11 March 1981, p.11.

51. See New Nigerian, 8 September 1979, p.3. Paragraphs (d) and (e) of Decree No. 20 of 1979 reads as follows:
'(d) to identify, encourage, stimulate, assemble, organise and help deploy to the best national advantage the country's intellectual talents and experienced policy analysts who are likely to make positive contributions to the treatment of complex policy problems;
(e) to organise and carry out, on an interdisciplinary basis, in intellectual support of those charged with making and implementing policy for Nigeria, research in depth into the social, economic, political, security, scientific, cultural and other problems facing the country, and to formulate and present, in usable form, the available options for their solution.'

52. The Institute's Stock List for 1989/90 records 31 major documents. In speaking with the Administrative Deputy Secretary of NIPSS, Dr. Adamu Mohammed, it was made clear to me that further sources beyond Stock List items would require an official request to the Director General of the Institute. These sources were from the Institute's library and varied in classification.

53. Innocent NWABUZOR & Johnson OGHUMA, 'NIPSS at 10: Economy Still Overwhelms Leadership', in Broad Street Journal vol.1, no.14, September 1989, p.7.

54. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF COLLEGE OF NIGERIA, 1983/84 Brochure of Courses, Lagos, p.5.

55. See Daily Times, 25 November 1976, p.18.

56. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, News Release No. 731, Lagos, 12 July 1975.

57. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, Late News Release No. 1509, Lagos, 24 November 1976, pp.1-2.

58. The Administrative Staff College of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.5-7.

59. G. Aforka NWEKE, 'The Domestic Structure and Processes of Nigeria's Foreign Policy', in G.O. Olusanya & R.A. Akindele (eds), op.cit., pp.48-49.

60. Ibid., p.49.

## THE CIVILIAN AGENDA: A BRIEF ACCOUNT

As the program of military disengagement drew to a close in 1979 certain government publications began to list what were termed 'some highlights' of the Muhammed/Obasanjo period. In addition to these highlights there was a listing of major achievements of General Obasanjo's regime. To all intents and purposes these published items represent in large part the civilian agenda as formulated by the FMG particularly through the SMC.

We begin with the highlights of the regime of Brigadier Murtala Muhammed (July 1975-February 1976). The highlights of this period according to the government were:

1) The purge of the Public Services and the retirement of all the Military Governors and other top ranking military personnel.
2) The initiation of measures to rid the country of corruption, laziness, idleness and waste.
3) The restructuring in February 1976 of the country into nineteen states headed by new Military Governors.
4) The decision to build a new Federal Capital Territory at Abuja and the declaration of Lagos and Port Harcourt as special Federal territories.
5) The initiation of a dynamic Foreign Policy which immediately put Nigeria in a premier position in Africa.
6) The setting up of a 50-man Constitution Drafting Committee to prepare a new Constitution to return the country to civilian rule in October 1979.
7) The checking of ostentatious living and the institution of a style of life known as 'low profile'.[1]

This list of 'corrective' measures represents the regime's more immediate concerns with some longer term implications especially for the program of military disengagement (item 6). The mechanics and substance of military disengagement were not yet fully disclosed at

this stage. Furthermore, there was no direct reference to overtly institutional-military interests. Item 1 comes closest to this in so far as the forced retirement of several hundred military officers was deemed necessary and in the interest of both the nation and the service. The military agenda remained for all practical purposes unknown, at this juncture, to the civilian elite and the public at large. Thus we can identify a real emphasis upon the presentation of the civilian agenda and the priorities therein.

We now turn to the highlights of the Obasanjo years. Nigerian publications have been consistent in asserting that General Obasanjo pursued the policies that he and his predecessor General Muhammed had laid down. The obvious impression is that all items of national concern had been determined by the two generals. But as we have demonstrated the administrative autonomy of General Danjuma was considerable albeit not generally understood by non-military Nigerian society. In addition to this is the fact that much of the civilian agenda was conceived by the conspirators of the July 1976 coup d'état, and that the influence of General Yar'Adua, Obasanjo's right hand man on political matters, was felt inside the SMC and among the civilian elite. His role especially after February 1976 should not be underestimated.

If a rather simplistic picture is painted of the actual architects of the regime's policy objectives it is due to a lack of information on the structure of influence within the SMC, which lies at the core of the FMG. It is therefore understandable that a distinction is often not drawn between a civilian and military agenda. Instead one speaks of the regime's highlights or achievements.

Generals Muhammed and Obasanjo are credited with having jointly formulated policies to clean up Nigerian society, to restore its dignity, to arrest the deteriorating state of the economy brought about, inter alia, by a slump in the oil market and to return the country to civilian rule in 1979.

The following events of the Obasanjo years reveal the thrust of these policies in greater specificity:

1) The launching of Operation Feed the Nation in 1976, a step intended to boost agriculture and self-sufficiency.

2) The launching of a scheme (U.P.E.) to make Primary Education free and universal in September 1976.
3) The promulgation of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Decree No. 3) in January 1977 to enable Nigerians to have more control of their economic life.
4) The successful inauguration of the Constituent Assembly in 1977 to debate and adopt a new Constitution for the country.
5) The reformation of the Local Government system throughout the Federation in 1977.
6) The promulgation of the Land Use Decree (Decree No. 6) of March 1978 to make land easily available for government projects and to a greater number of the population than hitherto.
7) The adoption of a new National Anthem in 1978.
8) A dramatic demonstration of the true intention of the Army to hand over power to a duly elected civilian government in 1979 by the replacement in July 1978 of all the Military Governors with Military Administrators.
9) The establishment of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) in October 1976 to screen aspiring politicians and their activities with a view to ensuring free and fair election of reputable politicians who would form the next civilian government.
10) The lifting of the ban on political activities in September 1978 and the formation of political parties from which the next civilian government of Nigeria emerged.[2]

Just as we have spoken of discernible military and civilian agendas we can also refer to a subordinating economic policy package of the military government. J.F.E. Ohiorhenuan proposes that perhaps the most convenient method of analysis is to place the developments derived from economic policy broadly under the oil sector, the industrial sector and the agricultural sector.[3] Although it is not our intention to elaborate on policy items that have been thoroughly examined elsewhere it is worth noting that many of the events listed above can indeed be conveniently analyzed according to Ohiorhenuan's categories or sectors.

Under the Agricultural Sector we have Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) which was intended to mobilize schools, colleges, universities,

military units and individuals to grow an assortment of food crops for personal consumption and trade.[4]

The Land Use Decree No. 6 of March 1978 was considered by many to embody the most important agricultural policy of the 1970s. According to Ohiorhenuan, the articulated objective of the decree was to assert and protect by law the rights of all Nigerians to the use of land in the country.[5]

Under the Industrial Section there is the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of January 1977 which reenacted the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972, introducing provisions necessary for the implementation of the next stage of the Indigenization Program.[6]

Other items on the list of events lie outside Ohiorhenuan's sectors and may be classified under the rubric of government-political developments.

Items 8 and 10 of the above list of specific events during the Obasanjo years are closely related and significant to the process of military disengagement. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where the lifting of the ban on political activity and parties as occurred in September 1978 could coexist alongside the office of and range of powers exercised by a military governor. Thus the replacement of all the Military Governors with Military Administrators in July 1978, two months prior to the unleashing of party politics, was inevitable if a real and uncontrolled transition to civilian governance was to come into being.

One agency in the Obasanjo administration provides the following list of the regime's major achievements:

1) From July to August, 1979, free elections were held throughout the Federation into the Federal and States Assemblies which resulted in the successful election of State Governors and the first Executive President of the Federation in the person of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.
2) In September 1979, some sections of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which had already been adopted but had not come into force were amended. The most important of these amendments

relates to the Presidential and Gubernatorial elections. It states that in the event of an inconclusive Presidential or Gubernatorial election the runoff election could be by popular election and not by electoral college system as previously stated in the Constitution.

3) True to their word the Military handed over power to a Civilian Government on the 1st October 1979. At a dramatic and moving ceremony at the Tafawa Balewa Square, Lagos, General Olusegun Obasanjo stepped down for Alhaji Shehu Aliyu Shagari who was then sworn in as the first Executive President of Nigeria.

4) The ex-Head of State General Obasanjo and all the Military Officers who held political appointments during the Military regime voluntarily retired from the Army with effect from October 1st, 1979.[7]

This list of major achievements can be divided into two groups. Items 1 and 2 on free elections and constitutional amendments are aimed at seeing conclusive elections to finalize the process of military disengagement. Items 3 and 4 represent the symbolic and actual culmination of military disengagement. Again the promotion of civil political activity necessitated the withdrawal of military officers with political appointments.

Well after the completion of military disengagement on 1 October 1979 General Yar'Adua would claim that the main policy issues of the 1975-1979 period were: 1) local government reorganization, 2) relocation of federal capital, and 3) constitutional changes.[8]

As such the regime's policy issues do not entirely reflect its eventual achievements. It appears that priorities developed from an initially concentrated or narrow perception of policy issues.

It is interesting to compare Yar'Adua's policy issues with those of General Obasanjo also as stated years after the completion of military disengagement. Obasanjo also lists three items as the main policy issues of his regime: 1) gradual and sustained political programs, 2) self-reliance and economic pursuit, and 3) Africa as the centerpiece of foreign affairs.[9]

This somewhat different emphasis in two men's recollections of the regime's main policy issues is understandable if one considers the fact that Yar'Adua's role was one of political liaison while that of Obasanjo more directive and outward looking. (As previously examined, the role or responsibility of Danjuma as Chief of Army Staff was exclusively the welfare and development of the Nigerian Army. Danjuma therefore was less concerned with the regime's overall policy issued than the advancement of priorities within a specialized field - the military agenda.)

When considering the many priorities developed and established before and during the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration, one is able to differentiate a general body of policy issues and its subdivision into socio-economic-political and military agendas, the former being concerned primarily with civilian matters while the latter represented a much narrower range of interests. The civilian agenda can be seen as the wide-ranging concerns of the military administration with non-military matters. In terms of personnel, offices, and monies involved the civilian agenda required far more investment than the military. The culmination of this investment was the completion of military disengagement in the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1 October 1979.

NOTES

1. FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF ANTIQUITIES, Nigerian Governments: Yesterday and Today, Lagos, 1979, p.19.

2. Ibid., p.22.

3. John F.E. OHIORHENUAN, 'Nigerian Economic Policy Under Military Rule', in Femi Kayode (ed), The Nigerian Economy Under The Military, Proceedings of the 1980 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, at Daula Hotel Kano on 1 May 1980, p.72.

4. See T.E. FORREST, Agricultural Policies in Nigeria, 1900-1978, paper for Political Science Seminar, Mimeo, Ahmadu Bello University, February 1979. For examples of military units participation in OFN see SOTA August 1976 (which lists 6 units from Battalion to Division level throughout Nigeria), July 1976 (4 Inf. Div.), January 1977 (crops harvested) February 1977 (26 Inf. Bn), & March 1977.

5. John F.E. Ohiorhenuan, op.cit., p.75. Ohiorhenuan continues: 'It was envisaged that the decree would put an end to urban land speculation and remove structural constraints on agricultural production. The decree stipulated the vesting of all the urban land of a state in the military governor of that state. All other land was to be controlled by the local government of the area in which the land is situated.'

6. The objectives of the 1972 decree were to :
   1) create opportunities for Nigerian indigenous businessmen;
   2) maximise local retention of profits; and
   3) raise the level of intermediate and capital goods production.
   See V.I. BELLO, 'The Intentions, Implementation Processes and Problems of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (No. 4) 1972,' in Nigeria's Indigenisation Policy, 1974, p.8.

7. Federal Department of Antiquities, op.cit., p.24.

8. Major-General Shehu Yar'Adua, interview with author, Kaduna, 14 November 1989.

9. General Olusegun Obasanjo, interview with author, Ota, 13 November 1989.

PART FOUR - QUO VADIS MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

19

# THE LESSONS OF NIGERIA FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

## THE THEORIES RE-EXAMINED

> 'According to the usual course the retreat is continued up to that point where the equilibrium of force is restored...'[1] - Carl Von Clausewitz

Our examination of Nigeria's experience of military disengagement for the 1975-1979 period is in the broadest sense compatible with much of the theoretical discussion set forth in chapter 6. But this compatibility remains most general and does not elucidate our understanding of the detailed interests and mechanisms involved. Many underlying realities and the more complex character of the military itself are neither inferred nor suspected. And in so far as theory does not allude to or make provision for as yet undetected realities one must acknowledge weakness in the theoretic framework. Even unqualified generalizations can be highly misleading and in the long term of little heuristic value. Our desire is to avoid any undue distortions and to provide for an increasingly accurate description of military disengagement. And I am inclined to believe that this accuracy of description is integrally related to a more accurate understanding of the militaries under which programs of military disengagement as conducted and finalized. Theory can be adversely affected by traditional impressions that go unchallenged.

To begin with military disengagement is not in essence a reactive phenomenon which appears to arise from ad hoc combinations of circumstances.[2] It is however true to say that it is often difficult to determine when disengagement can in fact be deemed successful. This is in part due to a generally undiscussed and therefore unresolved question of where our primary interest lies in the process of military disengagement. Is the quintessential element of military disengagement the return of civilian rule? Or are we

more concerned with the longevity of civilian governance? In which case one cannot determine the success of military disengagement but only its failure if a coup takes place at any time. Or is our ultimate requirement for success a combination of social stability and economic prosperity that endures throughout an indefinite period of time once civilian governance returns? In view of an uncertain standard of success for military disengagement we are left with a prevailing sentiment which yields the logic that military disengagement has failed whenever military intervention occurs. And military disengagement is at most tentatively successful with the longevity of civilian government regardless of the socio-economic condition of the nation. I will return to this issue of success in the concluding section.

Claude Welch is indeed correct in stating that 'disengagement is a process that is often protracted, always complex and rarely analysed from within'.[3] It is often protracted due to the complexity of the process involved rather than the desire to hold on to power. By its very nature any attempt at social engineering becomes time consuming. By contrast, a corrective approach is commonly perceived as being somewhat quicker and less problematic regardless of effectiveness. The architects of the Nigerian program of military disengagement can be reasonably associated with the more problematic school of social engineering especially after February 1976. The length of time to finalize military disengagement, approximately four years and two months from the date of military intervention, is protracted in a political sense but hardly so on the more theoretical plane of socio-economic engineering.[4] It is precisely at this juncture that the political demand for civilian rule directly impinges on the duration of any program of military disengagement. And the military's intentions must inevitably yield to civilian aspirations.

Our examination of Nigerian military disengagement from 1975 to 1979 brings to light in greater detail the inner workings of a program that was intended to have a lasting legacy. Samuel Finer's four necessary conditions for long term military disengagement are in some ways more impressionistic than deeply incisive. Contrary to Finer's first condition, the Nigerian experience of 1975-1979 does

not reveal that a leader was imposed as a result of military intervention (Murtala Muhammed was asked, and Obasanjo yielded to Danjuma's reasoning in the aftermath of Muhammed's assassination) nor that he strongly desired that his troops quit politics. As stated earlier in this work the conspirators of the 29 July 1975 coup had already decided that military disengagement would occur on an approximate schedule (see chapter 6). The issue was never selecting an officer that would desire that his troops would 'quit politics' for as we have shown (see chapter 12) the troops are not political activists and must be distinguished from their superiors in the chain of command. They will, however, follow their commanders according to orders. The issue was soliciting an officer of sufficient stature and command to lead both military and nation out of what was perceived as a general malaise and the unfulfilled promise of Nigerian greatness.[5] This rationale for an internal coup highlights the often overlooked fact that the military possesses an increasingly sophisticated historical perspective. And this perspective is not simply geared towards the acquisition, administration, and relinquishing of power.

Finer's second condition is that long term military disengagement is facilitated when the leader is able to establish a government capable of functioning without further military support. Such a development in a Third World setting is nearly impossible. Military support will be required either overtly or tacitly for the longevity of a civilian government. This requirement naturally leads to the continuing support of the armed forces by the new civilian regime (Finer's third condition). Thus Finer's second and third necessary conditions for long term military disengagement can be more accurately fused and analyzed within the realm of civil-military relations.

Finer's fourth necessary condition for long term military disengagement states that the military must have confidence in the leader who orders them back to the barracks. This condition is essentially indistinguishable from the first necessary condition. And while not belittling the importance of military confidence in the individual leader it is somewhat misleading to perceive that military disengagement is finalized by the orders of one man. The return to

barracks is a formality observed in ceremony once the more difficult task of consensus and orchestration for withdrawal have been secured.

Scott Mainwaring's categories of 'transition from above' as contrasted by 'transition through withdrawal' provide a helpful distinction between the two overall ways by which a military relinquishes power, namely, from either a position of strength or weakness, with gradations in between. Relative strength may be explained not so much in terms of brute military capability but rather in ethno-regional support coupled with the level of administrative acumen exercised by the regime in question.

It is Mainwaring's view that the degree of discontinuity in the political process is less in 'transition from above' as compared to 'transition through withdrawal'. There is no evidence that this is at all the case. Whether the military is dealing from a position of strength or not in the period leading to disengagement the degree of discontinuity in the political process is nearly total. Even among the retired military interviewed throughout this work there was a strong consensus that political development is retarded with the entry of the military. Similar to the option of going to war the decision for military intervention is seen as one of last resort having its trade offs. Optimally, the military hopes that a program of military disengagement will provide a more auspicious platform for post disengagement political activity. The issue of greater or lesser discontinuity of the political process is therefore inappropriate given that much of the military's effort in shaping military disengagement is precisely aimed at interdicting continuity.

Claude Welch's three factors contributing to military disengagement are generally accurate as well.[6] It is true that commanding officers must be firm in their resolve to step aside. And by commanding officers we must mean members of the ruling military council as well as field commanders. And in practice the former acts as the leadership supported by the latter which accedes to regime requirements.

Welch's second factor is the existence of a group of forceful, articulate civilians, who regularly remind the ruling military of their rhetoric of withdrawal. In the case of Nigeria for the 1975-1979 period, the military establishes various forums in which

the civilian elite are not confined to reminding the military of their rhetoric of withdrawal. The civilian elite joins in the debate for a new constitution and for the maintenance of civil order. The press itself will find itself in difficulties vis-à-vis military authority if it reports too vigorously on civil disturbance rather than openly reminding the latter of its rhetoric. The fact is that a program of military disengagement effectively redirects the manner and thrust of public dialogue away from the confrontational, in which the polemics of civil-military relations are reinforced, and towards what appears as a more cooperative mode in which civilian input becomes substantive rather than merely symbolic. We must also remember that the nature of interaction between the civil-military elite appears increasingly complex with the additional factor of mutuality of interest coming into play. Here we are dealing with similar ethnic, religious and educational backgrounds, and in more than a few instances familial relationships. These sociological linkages, if anything, tend to blur the boundaries between purely civil and military interests. Where they are absent one witnesses inter-regional tensions that supersedes the more conventional, if not convenient, demarcation of civilian and military rivalry. The peculiarity of such a situation will have one ethno-religious grouping reminding the military authorities of their need to be impartial in the affairs of state. Moreover, if indeed one can speak of unqualified Northern domination in the formation of national policies then a minority ethno-religious group will desire the lifting of military rule not because it is military per se but because it is not <u>its</u> military. To a minority military disengagement may represent the advent of greater political possibilities rather than a somewhat frozen political milieu in which the dominant region guarantees its advantage. However, greater political possibilities may represent little more than the advancement of parochial interest which again leaves the call for greater nationalism in its wake. These events provide a succinct description as to why military rule tends to hinder the process of political development. Needless to say the deregulation of political activity is not seen as an attractive alternative to the military.

Claude Welch posits that the most significant factor contributing to military disengagement is the belief that military effectiveness would be further impaired by remaining in control. This is a point well made and one that is seldom absent from the military psyche. The 1975-1979 period is one of unusual military discipline. Despite local instances of civil-military conflict the military was never under a serious threat of disintegration. Even the abortive coup of 13 February 1976 revealed the essential structure of authority within the armed forces which did not yield to the ambitions of a small group of officers and men. Nevertheless, prolonged military rule was not seen as in the best interest of the professional military. Both at the elite and grass roots level continued military rule was seen as tempting the inevitability of internal fragmentation among senior officers and the worsening of civil-military relations in localities adjacent to garrisons throughout the country.

The pursuit of a democratic political culture as part of the process of military disengagement, by definition, limits the degree of control a military regime is able to exercise in engineering a post-military political dispensation. The securing of suitable successors is not altogether certain.[7] Particular kinds of parties and candidates can be effectively marginalized. But the character and capability of candidates and their party machinery cannot be assessed beyond their ability to gather in the vote. For the military, the dilemma remains one of not being able to assess the extent of national commitment and vision that a candidate may possess. And if such a national outlook may indeed reflect a candidate's disposition there is the additional complication that the party faithful may possess little to none of this vision. In such circumstances the candidate does not in actual fact lead nor control a party with a nationalist character. And this can only be verified once the victors take office. Given this uncertainty of securing suitable successors, the military will at least secure its flanks by insisting that the successors will not intrude into its affairs. And the sensitivity of this issue over boundaries of autonomy remains an important indicator of the relative health of civil-military relations. The military continues to determine where this boundary lies regardless of the degree of nationalist character anticipated

from suitable successors.

Claude Welch is correct in his assumption that initial steps toward 'successful' disengagement are predicated upon mutually supportive beliefs of officers and civilians regarding the legitimacy of progressive disengagement.[8] The Nigerian experience of 1975-1979 does reveal mutually supportive beliefs among certain segments of the civil-military elite. However, I am unable to identify similar mutual support among the common soldier and the peasantry. The social dynamics and the perceptual standards of legitimacy are considerably different at the elite and grass roots levels. Interestingly, there is no distinction made between the initial steps toward successful disengagement and longer term measures. Theoretically, mutually supportive beliefs must be present throughout the entire process of disengagement and beyond.

While recivilianization places increased responsibility of policy formulation and action in the hands of civilian government it is a point of debate among Nigerian academics whether changes of government personnel should exclude the active, direct involvement of segments of the armed forces. A criticism that has been made against the 1975-1979 program of military disengagement was that the armed forces did not sufficiently involve themselves in he elections preceding civilian rule. Both academic and military authorities have commented that such a presence during the electoral process would have acted as a safeguard to impartiality. Lack of military involvement in the monitoring and counting of votes was interpreted by observers as prejudicial to the aims of military disengagement.[9] Whatever the case may be, what emerges in this instance is that the Nigerian military, as with militaries throughout the world, was not well versed in the art of electoral analysis. It remains fundamentally an alien discipline.

While great emphasis has been made about the issue of regime legitimacy, which is more abstract and amorphous than we would desire, our analysis is assisted by Luciano Martins' view that regime vulnerability is not due to lack of legitimacy but rather to criticisms from dissidents born from disenfranchised strategic groups.[10] The Nigerian program of military disengagement sought to provide structures that under civilian governance would function as

mechanisms for representing the interests of the organized as well as more diffused segments of society. Given a specific date of military exit and a program of disengagement the issue of legitimacy became less critical. To a great extent it metamorphosed into the maintenance of social order and the insistence that the military remain an impartial arbiter.

Welch provides an additional six hypotheses related to the initial decision to disengage, long term military disengagement, and attendant obstacles and incentives.[11] These hypotheses evince an increased understanding of the major factors related to the entire process of military disengagement. The importance of role perceptions is presented in light of the military's interaction with civilian counterparts. Closely associated with this interaction is the reduction of boundary fragmentation. The net result is one of increased interdependence among civil-military elite.

The funding and internal management of the military is related to military autonomy. But as this work has shown (see chapter 15) the internal management of the military also involves the establishment and maintenance of adequate systems of accountability. The military must produce its own specialists to operate within reorganized management structures. Military autonomy is rendered almost meaningless unless internal reforms effectively curb corruption and enhance efficiency while reinforcing the chain of command.

Military mission and deployment are closely related to the factor of internal strife. The prospects for military disengagement are enhanced with the assignment of a more classic defense mission. And such a mission must effectively avoid entanglements in political intrigue i.e., the calling in of troops to resolve essentially political disputes. And as the national police is better able to address internal disorder the very absence of the military in public will buttress the more classic mission. This in turn facilitates the move towards military disengagement and enhances the military's sense of relative autonomy. This mutual reinforcement of the classic mission by the non-activation of the army in domestic affairs works equally well in preventing military intervention regardless of who is in power.

The critical nature of economic trends is presented by Claude

Welch as his fifth hypothesis contributing to whether a move towards military disengagement takes place. Welch correctly identifies the central issue of whether stable patterns of income distribution are progressing. The question arises, however, whether equitable patterns of income distribution are realistically feasible in a volatile ethno-religious environment where the charge of regional dominance is often made?

Welch's final hypothesis of political conditions returns to the issue of the suitability of a potential successor. I believe that regardless of the seemingly eclectic nature of the prospective successor the severity of economic trends will reduce politics to the crudest of parochial interest. We are bound to recognize the coterminous relationship between economic trends and political conditions in the course of military disengagement. But this relationship will find its truer expression under civilian rule which does not hold the two factors in what amounts to the often artificial balance and order imposed under military rule.

The body of theory related to military disengagement can be viewed roughly as deductive in its thrust and articulation with minimum reference to the unique character of specific military regimes. Nevertheless, our understanding of what initiates and propels military disengagement is becoming more precise. The theoretical framework is also spotlighting underlying factors such as the quest for inter-disciplinary expertise, the monitoring of internal structures and behavior, the enhancement of the military's political culture, and the strengthening of decisive combat capabilities.[12]

I believe there are further insights to be gained in pursuing the investigation of the MI-MG-MD continuum (see chapter 9). As stated in the body of this work one tends to perceive military intervention, governance and disengagement as separate categories. And to do so undermines, to a great extent, one's understanding of policy formation and continuity which are in many instances historically rather than regime based.

The course of military disengagement is marked by a philosophical strain that may be unique to a particular regime. It behoves us to identify the specific ideological predilections of the individual

officers within the ruling council. This produces a composite ideological understanding of the regime itself. And as in the case of the SMC of Nigeria for the 1975-1979 period there emerges an essentially homogenous ideological perspective that is largely influenced by historic personages of Western origin; more specifically either American or British.[13] These role models are often of the soldier-statesman variety and include individuals adept at national reconstruction. The tone and substance of military disengagement cannot be fully understood without due consideration for this source of influence.

Our theoretical understanding of military disengagement will not only have to debate what constitutes success but also when one has arrived at what Samuel Huntington refers to as subjective or objective civilian control.[14] In a Third World setting the more immediate and realistic objective is that of establishing subjective civilian control subsequent to military disengagement. The longevity of civilian rule while highly valued may not reflect the actual existence of such control but rather a frustrated restraint on the part of the military. There are no proven methods on how to bring about such control within a program of military disengagement. But despite these uncertainties the stated objected is that of establishing constitutional control over the armed forces. From a theoretical point of view there appears to be a skipping of stages in which subjective civilian control is less seriously addressed by civilian authorities than the more symbolic objective civilian control. The former establishes the possibility of the latter and not vice versa.

J. 'Bayo Adekson is most correct in placing the Nigerian program of military disengagement for 1975-1979 under this constitutional evolutionary model.[15] This highlights the centrality of the constitutional vehicle in ascribing legitimacy and legality to the substance of programed disengagement.

## CONCLUDING PROPOSITIONS OF THE NATURE OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

Our exploration of military disengagement yields in some instances a consistent pattern of behavior which may represent an

orthodoxy of sorts. However, we must be careful to distinguish the fundamentally circumstantial or accidental from the true and reliable nature of military disengagement. It can be rightly argued that particular regimes contain their own tendentious features. But the accumulating record of military disengagement does reveal some natural traits.

In the discussion of civil-military relations (see chapter 12) it was argued that there are gradations of perception regarding what constitutes civil-military relations itself. Our discussion included descriptions of civil-military interaction as 'true', 'truer', and 'truest'. Social, political and economic pressures shape much of what a military can pursue in a program of military disengagement. There are usually an assortment of pressures that either constrain or give licence to the military's vision of national purpose. These pressures also determine to a great extent the duration of time permitted to achieve either an abbreviated or more ambitious program of disengagement. And while recognizing that a program of military disengagement is not easily classified as 'true', 'truer', or 'truest', I am inclined to believe that the combination of a comprehensive program and sufficiency of time constitutes a 'true' program of military disengagement. Again we may be returning to the issue of what constitutes 'success' in disengagement. But I believe there is a substantive difference that is based on the principles of sufficient opportunity and authority that give a program of disengagement its more idealized version. Subsequent successes attributed to the legacy of programed disengagement may provide evidence that a program was a 'truer' version or better. But this sort of analysis may become too conjectural and unhelpful. For now, it is sufficient to say that propositions concerning the nature of military disengagement should take into account the relative sophistication and duration of the programs under examination. And the propositions given below endeavour to describe the nature of military disengagement without resorting to the construction of various categories based on the duration and comprehensiveness of particular programs. With this said let us consider some propositions on the nature of military disengagement.

1. Military disengagement is facilitated by the egalitarian disposition of coup members towards one another. Our Nigerian example indicates that after successful military intervention the conspirators selected the new Head of State and submitted themselves to the structure of authority which ensued. Observance of the hierarchical structure of command meant the proper issuing and compliance of orders and directives. This produced enhanced legitimacy and support for the program and process of military disengagement.
2. Military disengagement represents a formalized agreement among the civilian and military elite in recognition of the inevitability of civilian rule. However, civil-military relations usually represent other formalized networks of relationships which may not be supportive of particular emphases within a program of military disengagement. However, both realities coexist to produce the character of military disengagement and the prospect for its success or failure.
3. Military disengagement by its very nature must endeavour to ameliorate those conditions that brought about military intervention. These conditions may find their origin in the military environment as well as in civilian society. While the former may require greater internal surveillance and submission to the chain of command, the latter calls for the increase of social order and economic opportunity.
4. Social protest, civil disobedience, and violence are not required to initiate nor propel the process of military disengagement. However, adjustments to the program of disengagement may result when confrontation occurs during scheduled elections, unsanctioned strikes, a controversial census, inter alia. Social unrest proves more instrumental in toppling particular administrations, whether of the military or civilian variety, which in many instances is the more immediate objective of those involved.
5. Regardless of regime type, military disengagement will contain a dual agenda of political and military priorities. The political agenda is embodied within the official and more publicized program of scheduled disengagement. By contrast the military

agenda is often more obscure outside military circles and less accountable to civilian scrutiny.

6. The military's professional emphasis within the process of military disengagement in on the improvement of internal management and institutional development. Paradoxically, while technocratic expertise is earmarked for the military's future development it is not required for the initiation and completion of military disengagement.
7. The military will introduce a code of conduct intended to ensure that its members refrain from corruption and lend proper support to scheduled disengagement.[16] The code of conduct and the enforcement of military justice are two major means by which the armed forces attempts to instill an improved political culture among its ranks.
8. Military disengagement does not require a pervasive security apparatus where there is the absence of insurgency. For the 1975-1979 period, Nigeria demonstrates that internal security became the protection of ruling council members following the assassination of Murtala Muhammed. Internal security also meant the enactment of legislation intended to safeguard the country's internal infrastructure from sabotage (see chapter 14). Internal security is thus not tantamount to Orwellian surveillance. And as alluded to above, the preservation of the nation's economic legacy is of the utmost concern during the process of transition.
9. Military disengagement and national development are not mutually exclusive if military and civilian elite share a common perception of national needs and strategic response. If so, military disengagement and national development may be economically and socially compatible in many respects.
10. Programs of military disengagement seem intent on instilling a capitalist ethos into the fabric of society.[17] Coupled with this goal is the fostering of a complementary ethos of accountability for society as a whole. These objectives are seen as integral to the development of political culture but are not usually so clearly associated to the process of military disengagement.
11. Military disengagement is facilitated through a relatively large

intelligentsia representing diverse ciplines. Where public debate becomes part of the process of disengagement the intelligentsia is indispensable in the shaping of a constitutional draft and the mobilization of certain portions of society whether in a political or private capacity. Officially sanctioned public debate appears to be the means by which a program of military disengagement can ensure the participation of the intelligentsia and other sectors of society.

12. Prudent military disengagement must endeavour to enhance civil-military relations at both the elite and grass root levels. This is to ensure maximum understanding and coordination of effort between the military and civilian sectors.
13. Military disengagement is obliquely affected by the existence and obligations of extended family membership. Family and clan patronage manifests itself in such ways as the redirection and construction of roadways and factories so as to benefit one's own people. Decisions are not subject to legislative review but to one's proximity to the center of power. However such developments are hidden under the guise of national development. National development, in turn, becomes more regionalized, but the diversity of ethnicity within the supreme council does produce a geographical dispersion of regime largess. Ergo, the emergence of both the appearance and reality of national development that may not make strategic sense but is politically acceptable.
14. Military disengagement is subject to the changing face of international political orientation. For example, a global disposition favoring multi-party democracy will find its approximation in programs of disengagement which permit the contesting of elections between two or more parties. This multi-party factor in the formulation of military disengagement must be taken into account so long as financial consequences are incurred by the decisions made.[18]
15. Military disengagement attempts to either contain or diffuse ethnic-regional tensions through such mechanisms as the creation of new states and the institutionalization of a federal character within the constitution, national government & administration, and educational structures.

16. The constitutional component of military disengagement appears in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, to follow neither the guardian model of Latin America nor the actual intermixing of political and military responsibilities expressed in the United States Constitution.[19] Instead, a constitution contains many articles and amendments intended to address a more comprehensive set of issues.
17. Military disengagement will see the creation and expansion of military, administrative, and educational institutions associated with national development. These institutions are often of an interelite character such as Nigeria's National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS).
18. One cannot imbue society with a given measure of political culture and development through a program of military disengagement. Instead, programed disengagement can provide possible antecedents for such a development. A more immediate possibility on the road to enhanced political culture is that politicians will develop a more sophisticated discernment of the military's disposition vis-à-vis particular issues and the likelihood of intervention.[20] This would prove consistent with the Latin American experience of civil-military relations. Furthermore, a protoculture may emerge from the interaction and cooperation among military and civilian elite. This may represent the truer locus from which subsequent political culture and developments are shaped and directed.
19. Finally, it becomes evident that the military is more capable of refining its own structures than creating its own enhanced political culture within a program of military disengagement.

The nature of military disengagement longs to redress and refine the state of a nation usually undergoing considerable social instability and rivalry. The nature of military disengagement also reflects the state of civil-military relations from which much of the national agenda and hope is derived. But in its essence, the process of military disengagement is born of the realization that a society should not be regulated through the profession of arms.

NOTES

1. Carl Von CLAUSEWITZ, On War, edited by Anatol RAPOPORT, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1985, p.359.

2. Professor J. 'Bayo Adekanye of the University of Ibadan, and Nigeria's foremost authority on military disengagement, strongly disagrees with the author's position. Instead, he is of the opinion that all programs contained in military disengagement are not the result of anticipated need and administrative continuity but rather the outcome of reaction to miscalculation and ineptitude. Any semblance of order and direction is merely coincidental.

3. Clause WELCH, 'Military Disengagement from Politics?: Incentives and Obstacles to Political Change', in Simon BAYNHAM (ed), Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p.68.

4. I am reminded of the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. T.Y. Danjuma's comment to the author that 'Given another five years under General Obasanjo's leadership Nigeria would have become a totally different nation.' However 1979 was the deadline that was complied with and there was no hint that the military should have broken its word.

5. This desire to see Nigeria's destiny fulfilled extends to the first military administration under Aguiyi-Ironsi. See, for example, Jimi PETERS and A.L. AMINU, 'The Armed Forces and Nigeria's Foreign Policy: Reflections on Past Experiences and a Note on the Future', in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol.12, nos. 1 & 2, 1986, p.90.

6. Claude WELCH, Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp.54-55.

7. In conversation with the former Chief of Army Staff, T.Y. Danjuma, this point was made very clear. The SMC considered Shehu Shagari a splendid man possessing a good deal of experience. However, the military leadership that stepped down on 1 October 1979 was completely surprised by Shagari's naiveté in surrounding his administration with individuals who General Danjuma called rogues. These were men who proved capable of embezzling literally billions of Naira.

8. See Claude WELCH, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, p.20.

9. One prominent Nigerian academic commented to the author that such a military presence should be employed during the current program of military disengagement to maximize the element of impartiality. This appears a classic paradox. At the same time

a former member of the SMC admits that it was a possibility that was overlooked. The consensus among SMC members was that the civilian politicians could be trusted with much of the electoral proceedings that had been set up by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO).

10. See Luciano MARTINS, 'The "Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil', in G. O'DONNELL, P.C. SCHMITTER & L. WHITEHEAD (eds), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.80.

11. Claude Welch, No Farewell to Arms?, op.cit., pp.21-26.

12. This does not, however, imply enhanced military doctrinal development. The 1975-1979 program of military disengagement did see reorganization within the armed forces in an effort to obtain optimal levels of troop strength and institutional development. More theoretical considerations as to the proper integration and use of service branches was not a realistic priority nor an important one. The difficulties addressed by the military concerning the armed forces were sufficiently taxing in their own right. Doctrinal development would have appeared as an extravagance of little use under such circumstances.

13. One naturally anticipates that this ideological affinity is partly related to a nation's colonial legacy. But there appears to be the narrowing of focus on those individuals that successfully lead their nations through domestic crises. These models, at least in the Nigerian experience, do not tend to be great theoreticians. The emphasis appears to be on emulating practical examples of leadership.

14. See S.P. HUNTINGTON, The Soldier and The State, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985, pp.189-192. Subjective civilian control refers to the self-regulating military ethic reflecting a non-interventionist disposition. Objective civilian control reflects the real preeminence of civilian leadership over the military.

15. J. 'Bayo Adekson proposes the existence of three major approaches to military disengagement derived from West African experience. See J.B. ADEKSON, 'Dilemma of Military Disengagement', in O. OYEDIRAN (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79, London: MacMillan, 1979, pp.213-218.

16. It should be noted that this emphasis to refrain from corruption is directly related to what is perceived as a shrinking window of opportunity as the period of military rule draws to an end.

17. In an interview with the author, the former Finance Minister and member of the SMC, Major-General James J. Oluleye expressed the view that capitalism was already very much a part of Nigerian society extending into pre-colonial times. In fact, General Oluleye stated that 'colonialism only accentuated the capitalist tendency in Nigerian society'.

18. In fairness to the Nigerians, their post-independence period has shown a preference for a multi-party democracy. Military regimes have shown this same preference while insisting on a more restricted field of parties in preparation for civilian rule.

19. See Samuel P. Huntington, op.cit., p.163, where he points out that

> 'The essence of civilian control... is a clear distinction between political and military responsibilities and the institutional subordination of the latter to the former. These are unknown to the Constitution, which mixes political and military functions, interjecting politics into military affairs and military affairs into politics.'

20. This interim development comes about once civilian elites recognize the relative permanence of the military's influence and autonomy. It cannot be wished away. Once realized, the civilian elite, particularly through its politicians, explore the ways by which to work with and around extant military influence and power. The system reaches equilibrium as the military itself grows in its understanding and sophistication vis-à-vis its civilian counterparts.

APPENDIX 1

BROADCAST BY MAJOR CHUKWUMA KADUNA NZEOGWU, 15 JANUARY 1966

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In the name of the Supreme Council of the Nigerian Armed Forces I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the Regional Government and elected assembly are hereby dissolved. All political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities together with all demonstrations and unauthorised gatherings, excluding religious worship, are banned until further notice.

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united, and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly military, but we have no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation by assisting the regime and not, repeat not, disturbing the peace during the slight changes that are taking place. I am to assure all foreigners living and working in this part of Nigeria that their rights will continue to be respected. All treaty obligations previously entered into with any foreign nations will be respected, and we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides with enemies of the revolution and enemies of the people.

My dear countrymen, you will hear and probably see a lot being done by certain bodies charged by the Supreme Council with the duties of national integration, supreme justice, general security, and properties recovery. As an interim measure all Permanent Secretaries, Corporation Chairmen and similar Heads of Department are allowed to make decisions until the new organs are functioning, so long as such decisions are not, repeat not, contrary to the aims and wishes of the Supreme Council. No Minister or Parliamentary Secretary possesses administrative or other forms of control over any Ministry even if they are not, repeat not, considered too dangerous to be arrested.

This is not, repeat not, a time for long speech making and so let me acquaint you with ten proclamations in the Extra-Ordinary Orders of the Day which the Supreme Council has promulgated. These will be modified as the situation improves.

1. You are hereby warned that looting, arson, homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery or corruption, obstruction of the revolution, sabotage, subversion, false alarm, and assistance to foreign invaders are all offences punishable by death sentence.

2. Demonstrations, unauthorised assembly, non-cooperation with the revolutionary troops are punishable in the very manner of death.

3. Assistance to wanted persons, attempting to escape justice, and failure to report anti-revolution activities are punishable in the very manner of death.

4. Refusal or neglect to perform normal duty or any task that may of necessity be ordered by local military commanders in support of the change will be punished by any sentence imposed by the local military commander.

5. Spying, harmful or injurious publications, and broadcasts of troop movements or actions will be punished by any suitable sentence deemed fit by the local military commander.

6. Shouting of slogans, loitering, and rowdy behaviour will be rectified by any sentence of incarceration or any more severe punishment deemed fit by the local military commander.

7. Doubtful loyalty will be penalised by imprisonment or any more severe punishment sentence.

8. Illegal possession or carrying of firearms, arms smuggling, or attempts to escape with documents, valuables including money or other assets vital to the running of the establishment will be punished by death sentence.

9. Waivering or sitting on the fence and failure to declare open loyalty for the revolution will be regarded as an act of hostility punishable by any sentence deemed suitable by the local military commander.

10. Tearing down an order of the day or proclamation, or any other authorised notices will be penalised by death.

This is the end of the Extraordinary Order of the Day which you will soon begin to see displayed in public.

My dear countrymen, no citizen should have anything to fear as long as that citizen is law abiding and if that citizen has religiously obeyed the major laws of the country and those set down in every heart and conscience since 1 October 1960. Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers, we are not, repeat not, promising you anything miraculous or spectacular, but what we do promise every law-abiding citizen is freedom from fear or other forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency, and freedom to reach the sky in every field of human endeavour both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian. I leave you with a message of good wishes and ask for your support at all times so that our land watered by the Niger and Benue between the sandy wastes and the Gulf of Guinea, washed in the south by the mighty Atlantic shall not, repeat not, detract Nigeria from gaining sway in great aspects of international endeavour.

My dear countrymen, this is the end of this speech. I wish you good luck, and I hope you will co-operate to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity.

Thank you very much and goodbye for now.

APPENDIX 2

NIGERIAN ARMY ORGANIZATIONS AND COURSES

NIGERIAN ARMY SCHOOL OF INFANTRY (NASI)

Company Commanders and Junior Staff Courses, Young Officers Course, Regimental Signal Officer Course, Surveillance Platoon Commanders Course, Jungle Warfare and Combat Survival, Direct Short Service Commission Orientation Course, Support Company Commanders Course, 82mm B10 Anti-Tank Platoon Commanders Course, Quartermaster Course and Medium Machine Gun Platoon Commanders Course.

ENGINEERS

Combat Engineer, Officers Plant Management, Construction Laboratory Operator, and POM O, and Survey Engineer.

SIGNAL CORPS

Radio Technician Advance, Radio Telegraphic Advance Operator, Support Company Commanders, Electric Maintenance Officer, C & E Staff Officer, and Tele-digital communication officer.

PAY CORPS

Cost Accounts, Transfer in soldiers, Transfer in Officers, Unit Pay Record Automatic Data Processing, and Finance Officer Advance.

SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT

MTO's course, Catering Administration and Management, Junior Officers Port Operations, Catering Advisers, MT Accounting Administration, ACC Junior Catering Officer Course, Trans Officer Advance Course, and All arms course.

ORDNANCE CORPS

Vehicle Specialist, Joint Work Study Practitioners, Armament Management, Inventory Management, Officer Management, Senior Management, and Ammunition Stg.

ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (EME)

Middle Management, REME Captain, REME Field Course, REME Staff Course, Artillery Weapons, CVR Instructors/Automatic/Armament Maintenance Management, Graduate Officers' Basic Electronic, EME Workshop Company Commanders Course, and Senior EME Officers Course.

NIGERIAN ARMY PHYSICAL TRAINING CORPS

Assistant PT Instructor, Advance PT Instructor, Probational Course, Gymnastic Performance, Officers Course, and PE Preliminary Course.

NIGERIAN ARMY BAND CORPS

Pupil Bandsmen, Advance Drum Major

NIGERIAN MILITARY POLICE CORPS

Provost Officers Course, MP Officers Advance, SIB Scene of Crime Course, and MP Officers Basic.

ARTILLERY CORPS

Sound Ranging, Observation of Fire, Meterologist, Survey Section Commanders, FA Target Acquisition & Surveillance Officer, Artillery Survey Specialist, ECT, Anti-Ballistic Meterology Observation, Artillery Repair, FA Officer Advance, FA Officer Easic, FA Canon Battery Officer, and C & E Staff Officer.

INFANTRY CORPS

*Infantry Advance, Airborne, and AG.*

INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Mapchart, Geodsey, Pyschology Operations and Civil Affairs, Interrogation Course, Security Course, Junior Officer Intelligence Course, and FGN Officer Course.

APPENDIX 3

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1979,
PART III, SUPPLEMENTAL, C - ARMED FORCES OF THE FEDERATION.

197. - (1) The Federation shall, subject to any Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, establish, equip and maintain an Army, a Navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of -

(a) defending Nigeria from external aggression;

(b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;

(c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and

(d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

(2) The composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces of the Federation shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria.

APPENDIX 4

ARMED FORCES OATH

I ... swear by the Almighty God/Allah/solemnly affirm that I will bear true and faithful allegiance to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces that I will loyally serve the Federal Republic of Nigeria as by law established as ... for ... years and that I will as in duty bound so serve for the period of my engagement and go where ever ordered by land, sea or air and that I will observe and obey lawful commands of the Government of the Federation and of the officers placed over me and will subject myself to all Acts, Subsidiary Legislation and Service Regulations which now are or shall from time to time be in force and applicable to the Arm in which I am to serve during the period of my engagement.

.....

Signature of Cadet

Sworn at _____ this _____ day

of _____ 19 _____

Before me

_____

_____

Signature of Officer

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