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New deals for the past: the Cold War, American archaeology, and UNESCO in Egypt and Syria

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ABSTRACT

From the 1930s to the late 1970s, American archaeologists pursued a paired agenda of science and salvage such that their focus on logical positivism converged with US foreign policy towards international technical assistance. River basin salvage archaeology, pioneered in the US by the Tennessee Valley Authority and exported to the Middle East in the 1950s, was a prime example of American Cold War techno-politics that accompanied other international aid and technical assistance programmes. Amphitheaters of archaeology along the Nile and Euphrates were fertile testing grounds for the development of what became known as the 'New Archaeology', but also new deals, new science, infrastructure, and agriculture within a Cold War setting, so that monumental heritage and dam projects became flashpoints between American visions for the Middle East and attempts by UNESCO to maintain the spirit of internationalism.

KEYWORDS

Agricultural revolution; Nile; Euphrates; Middle East; TVA; Point IV; World Food Program

We walk today in the midst of ruins, ruins not only of American policy as it applies to the Middle East, but also of institutions that were created out of the hopes, we believed, of a western world. Will the United Nations be more than a ruin in days to come? Will NATO survive? Is an idealistic devotion to peace sufficient to determine our own course of action? Is there any alternative to power-politics other than passivism?

Introduction

Archaeologist and director of the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute Charles H. Kraeling wrote the words in the opening quote of this essay on 1 November 1956, a mere three months after Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal.¹ By January 1957 the US had announced the Eisenhower Doctrine, proposing a scheme of technical assistance to protect developing nations from what it perceived as the clutches of communism (Lesch 1992; Little 2008). Eisenhower's plan was only the latest version of US intervention that prioritized river basin development on a global scale (Ekbladh 2011; Sneddon 2015). In a parallel development, the United Nations

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pursued a 'new agricultural revolution' in the Middle East that aimed to surpass the first agricultural revolution from antiquity. This time 'better' science – larger dams and canals, tractors, fertilizers, and pesticides – promised to eradicate poverty and hunger as well as provide a foundation for democracy. The discipline of archaeology, specifically its scientific and salvage capacities to collect data from sites in imminent danger of destruction, would also be drawn into and form a vital component of these larger international ambitions. Archaeologists from American institutions would aid in the documentation and recovery of a shared human past along the world's great river basins in preparation for the future. Such efforts further complemented UNESCO's international consultancy programmes for monumental restoration, conservation laboratories, museums, and tourism infrastructure.

Here we investigate the juxtaposition of the international cooperation pledged by UNESCO in archaeological fieldwork and technical assistance within the contested Cold War landscape of the Middle East. American expertise in salvage archaeology had emerged from back-to-work programmes for archaeologists during the US New Deal and salvage contracts with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The US's 1950 Point IV and 1954 Public Law 480 assistance programmes would go on to implement the 'Authority Model' abroad, and foster American credibility and create momentum for US foreign policy (Ekbladh 2011; Lagendijk 2015, 2019). In the Middle East, the so-called Arab-TVAs were deployed to combat the infrastructural efforts of Soviet Russia. Yet despite this seemingly winning combination of American political, economic, and military hegemony (Scott 1999, 270), they were soon confronted with the realities of Arab nationalism. American engineers, like their archaeological counterparts, had to further navigate the legacies of colonialism; yet they were confident that science and technology would be the great unifier that could overcome the past. The reality they faced, however, was far more complex, whether from regional factions or fierce multilateral competition over development schemes that aimed to achieve an overly zealous vision of modernity (Scott 1999; Citino 2017; Lorenzini 2019).

American archaeologists took little time to reckon the scale of the opportunity presented to them. They modelled their research aims such that salvage for infrastructure projects could be set within broad-scale field surveys that addressed questions about the evolution of agriculture. International expeditions such as these provided the perfect laboratories to test, implement, and normalize developments in American archaeology. By examining the case studies from Egypt and Syria through the lens of river basin development and archaeology, we reveal how and why technical assistance schemes informed and shaped the relationships between American archaeologists, policy makers, and UN agencies like UNESCO. Following Mitchell (2002, 37) we suggest that 'the projects themselves formed the science'. We demonstrate that the amphitheaters of archaeology along the Nile and Euphrates were fertile testing grounds for not only the 'New Archaeology', but also new deals and new science within a Cold War setting, so that monumental heritage and dam projects aligned with not only post-war American visions for the Middle East, but also UNESCO's attempts to maintain an air of internationalism. We argue that the US did not simply export their specific understandings of development, modernity, and democracy through infrastructure-driven aid, but also promoted their particular brand of archaeology driven by positivism and technical innovation.

A new deal for archaeology

In 1933 American President F.D. Roosevelt rolled out his New Deal to mitigate the crises of the Great Depression. As part of a programme to stimulate industrial growth and investment opportunities at home and abroad, public corporations were established. Notable amongst these was the Tennessee Valley Authority, or TVA, which was responsible for building dams and massive infrastructure projects across the United States (Selznick 1949). Archaeologists were some of the first to benefit from the New Deal legislation (Pritchard and Ahlman 2009). In 1933 the Federal Emergency Relief Administration approached the Smithsonian to send two archaeologists to supervise a crew of more than a hundred labourers excavating prehistoric mounds in Louisiana (Patterson 2001, 81). The Civil Works Administration then asked the Smithsonian to provide additional archaeologists for projects in California, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee. In that year some 2,000 people had been employed in archaeological salvage sponsored by the TVA. As Patterson (2001, 81) describes, archaeological fieldwork became integral to the Work Projects Administration from 1934 to 1943, in part because it was labour-intensive yet produced no commodity that would ultimately compete with the private sector.

Professional oversight in river basin development was a significant catalyst for the establishment in 1934 of the Society for American Archaeology (SAA) (Dye 2016). With generous federal funding, government archaeologists found themselves at the forefront of the discipline (Patterson 1986, 13). Over the next decade the SAA, the National Park Service (NPS), the Smithsonian Institution, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Anthropological Association appealed to the US Corps of Army Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation for salvage assistance prior to the construction of hydroelectric dams. In 1945 the River Basin Surveys programme found a home with the Bureau of American Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution (Jennings 1985). As David Lilienthal (1944) outlined in *TVA: Democracy on the March*, the internationalization of the TVA soon followed, with government-backed financial incentives for US corporations and investment banks to expand overseas into new markets (Ekbladh 2011; Lagendijk 2019). Just as these technocrats were open to contract, so too were American archaeologists, with their newfound expertise in river basin salvage archaeology. Harvard archaeologist John O. Brew, a leading figure in the US Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains, described the work as 'harrowing and arduous', yet pivotal for the profession, and necessary for posterity (Brew et al. 1947). Americans were now embarking on salvage archaeology on a vast scale, though it was not the first venture of its kind.

In 1907 the Egyptian government initiated archaeological survey and excavations with construction of the first Aswan Dam, conducted by British and American archaeologists George Reisner, Cecil Firth, Aylward Blackman, and Oric Bates. A second salvage effort directed by British archaeologists Walter Emery and Lawrence Kirwan was launched in 1929 and extended to the Sudanese frontier (Adams 1977). These early international initiatives, coupled with the uptick in salvage along river basins in the US, influenced research strategies of archaeological survey abroad. During the 1930s Director of the American Schools of Oriental Research William F. Albright, along with Nelson Glueck and Robert Braidwood from the University of Chicago, oversaw surveys from southeastern Turkey to Transjordan (Albright and Glueck 1937; Braidwood 1937). In the Americas,

William Duncan Strong at Columbia University and Gordon Willey at Harvard University explored Central and South America (Strong 1935; Strong, Willey, and Corbett 1945; Strong and Evans 1952). The resulting datasets would become benchmarks for comparative, global inquiries. Even so, a competitive and nationalistic element soon emerged. In Chicago at the 1946 Symposium on River Valley Archaeology, prominent American archaeologists called for an urgent, coordinated approach to this ‘world problem’ before the Soviets beat them to it (Strong 1947, 211). Brew and his colleagues rallied to the call of duty: ‘the great obligation with which we are faced, and the tremendous opportunity with which we are presented’ (Brew et al. 1947). By attaching themselves to mega modernist projects abroad, American archaeologists also attached themselves to the promise of US development aid.

In 1948 British biologist Julian Huxley, UNESCO’s first Director General, took an extended archaeological odyssey through the Middle East, which was informed by reading excavation reports and scientific publications. Subsequently published in his popular book *From an Antique Land* (1966), the tour featured some of the most extraordinary archaeological sites in the Middle East (Meskell 2018, 1–2). This trip came after Huxley had visited TVA projects across the US. His *TVA: Adventure in Planning* (Huxley 1943) praised the democratic ‘principles of persuasion’ in river basin development (Luke 2019, 80–82). Huxley’s ‘scientific humanism’, a secular philosophy advocating science, democracy, and compassion over religious belief, fit nicely within the TVA arc of fostering democracy (Sneddon 2015, 55). Following Lilienthal’s ideal, for ‘development and planning, especially in arid regions such as the Middle East, large dams offered a way to build not just irrigation and power systems, but nation-states themselves’ (Mitchell 2002, 44). Technical assistance programmes led by US and UN programmes along rivers in the Middle East coincided not only with monumental salvage projects where ancient sites were threatened by dam construction and flooding culminated in a florescence of major international projects, but also with how Americans and UNESCO envisioned their participation in these efforts.

US foreign policy goals for river basins quickly found a niche in the academy. Prominent Columbia University professor Julian Steward applied Karl Wittfogel’s ‘hydrologic hypothesis’ to his analysis of ancient civilizations: ‘the productivity of farming was limited only by the amount of water that could be used in irrigation’. He presented grand schemes for how arid and semi-arid environments had been, and could be, transformed ‘by digging-stick and irrigation farming’ (Steward 1949, 7). This perspective aligned with the establishment of rigorous scientific methods in academic research during the Cold War (Patterson 1986, 14). Founded in 1951, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) intended to give US scientists an edge over their Soviet counterparts (Collor-edo-Mansfeld 2002). In 1954 the NSF incorporated archaeology into their division for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences. That same year Braidwood received the first multi-year NSF grant for diachronic archaeological survey abroad. He proposed to explore the micro-regions along the ‘hilly flanks of the Fertile Crescent’ (Braidwood and Braidwood 1949).² The embrace of logical positivism and universal truths was further propelled by the centennial events of Charles Darwin’s 1859 *On the Origin of Species* in England and a November 1959 conference, ‘Evolution after Darwin: The University of Chicago Centennial’. Huxley gave the Convocation Address, ‘The Evolutionary Vision’.³ The conferences solidified how the ‘New Archaeology’ would contribute to developing

law-like generalizations for archaeology, rather than writing particularistic and diverse histories for humanity. Galvanized by scientific advancements developed during the Second World War, proponents of the New Archaeology programmes advocated rigorous scientific methods to overcome the limitations of the fragmentary archaeological record. In fact, Gordon Willey and Philip Phillips had already outlined this paradigm shift in their landmark 1958 publication *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (Willey and Phillips 2001; Leventhal and Cornavaca 2007). Archaeologists like Colin Renfrew (1987, 5) believed that methodological advancements would lend 'greater authority and accuracy about the ecology of past societies, their technology, their economic basis and their social organization'.

This new disciplinary position in archaeology aligned with expanding US ambitions to export technocratic prowess and liberal developmentalism to undeveloped nations with the further aim of fighting communism, particularly given the burgeoning Soviet aid for the construction of hydroelectric dams and agricultural programmes. In contrast, the American approach to development purported to be far more holistic and integrative. The TVA model for rural agricultural development became the pillar of US policy in the Middle East. As the primary financier, the US oversaw the establishment in 1944 of the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Such efforts responded to growing needs of the 1943 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and later by the 1949 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA): TVA models shaped both programmes.⁴ These initiatives also paralleled the 1947 US Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey and the 1948 US European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan. From his helm at UNESCO, Julian Huxley convinced Gordon Clapp, former Director General of the TVA, to lead the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East (Kingston 2013; Rey 2013). Results from this survey shaped US President Truman's 1949 'Bold New Program' for the world: the US Technical Cooperation Assistance, also known as Point IV (Olden and Phillips 1952; Kingston 2002). In 1954 the US added the Agricultural Assistance Act (Public Law 480/Food for Peace) to its aid package, which would eventually serve as the template for the United Nations World Food Program (1961).

Democracy by conversion created a ripple effect through the energy, agriculture, transportation, and extraction sectors in the Middle East (Lesch 1992, 17–41; Alterman 2002; Little 2008, 195; Black 2016). By 1953 more than 1500 Point IV technocrats circled the globe (Paterson 1972, 125). A decade later, the 1964 July–August issue of the UNESCO *Courier* ran essays such as 'The International Hydrological Decade', 'Underground Water – A Wasted Treasure', and 'Hydraulic Civilizations'. Two years later, in April 1966, the *Courier* pledged a new UN programme, 'Education for a New Agricultural Revolution'. Archaeological data legitimized the promise of the policy, and archaeologists used salvage contracts to fund their research as well as to promote their discipline, their institutions, and their countries.

When UNESCO appealed for international collaboration to salvage sites along the Nile, and then along the Euphrates, it was within this larger context. For UNESCO, missions to Egypt and Syria became material attempts to overcome emerging Cold War fissures and inculcate a culture of peace and prosperity. Portraying the mission as a vast international cooperation with unrivalled grandeur, UNESCO hoped that saving Nubia might potentially relegate the 1956 Suez Crisis to history. In turn, the Nubian mission framed future

salvage projects, including those in Syria, as opportunities to manufacture much-needed harmony in the Middle East and thereby demonstrate once and for all that culture could contribute to perpetual peace. Partage agreements allowed the West to acquisitively recapture the materialities of ancient civilization under the guise of sharing global history. In this great amphitheatre of archaeology, however, it would be the principles of river basin development, salvage, and science that ultimately gained ground, with America's particular brand of internationalism casting a long shadow in both Egypt and Syria.

Civilization, containment, and the Cold War in Egypt

On 26 July 1956 the Suez Canal was nationalized, prompting an invasion by Israeli, British, and French forces. The three nations colluded in an attempt to wrest the Suez Canal from Egyptian control and remove Nasser from power. Earlier that same month, on 19 July, the Americans, the British, and the World Bank had withdrawn their pledge of funding for the Aswan High Dam. Nationalization helped Nasser quickly gain control over revenue that he could put forward to secure a Soviet contract for the dam, which was signed in 1958. This was not what the US had planned upon. Adriano Daninos had fostered a TVA-inspired model, and until this point significant funds from Point IV and PL 480 had been invested in Egypt (Johnson et al. 1983; Shokr 2009, 18–21). Post-Suez and with a Soviet contract for the dam, Nasser spun the situation to his advantage. His vision was that Egypt should take its rightful place in the modern world (Betts 2015). Commanding the Nile was the 'opportunity to reorganize and concentrate into fewer hands a series of further circulations – hydraulic, electrical, political, chemical, and agricultural' (Mitchell 2002, 33). Coupled with the transformation of modern Egypt, the dam would also have profound effects on ancient Egypt and its wealth of archaeological sites. Infrastructure, development, colonialism, international politics, and archaeology would all be brought together around the issue and impacts of the Aswan High Dam. US intervention in the archaeological work along the Nile then became a deliberate attempt to counter Soviet influence.

Saving pharaonic temples, and the much-touted victory that accompanied their uplift, was a perfect counterpoint to the massive impending inundation of civilization at the hands of Soviets, as Americans would present it. In 1955 Luther Evans, the new American Director-General of UNESCO, travelled to Abu Simbel and pledged support for the necessary technical assistance to save the monuments (Betts 2015, 108). By the end of 1959 UNESCO's Executive Board had agreed to launch an international appeal and authorized preparatory work to begin on the two Abu Simbel Temples in Egypt and, as a matter of urgency, archaeological work in Sudan. Nasser himself was originally indifferent to the rescue project but soon rallied:

we pin our hopes on the preservation of the Nubian treasures in order to keep alive monuments which are not only dear to our hearts we being their guardian but dear to the whole world which believes that the ancient and the new components of human culture should blend in one harmonious whole.⁵

The fractious Middle Eastern setting was seen as crucial for UNESCO. Director-General Vittorio Veronese could not resist lauding that 'from a land which throughout the centuries has been the scene of – or the stake in – so many covetous disputes should spring a

convincing proof of international solidarity'.⁶ Yet there was much less to celebrate for the living people of Nubia, who were displaced and their own modern heritage submerged. Their eventual resettlement was far from their ancestral home, further alienating them from their traditional lifeways and means of subsistence. Some 100,000 people were affected: UNESCO could claim no great achievements there, no uplift, despite being the agency charged with social and cultural matters within the UN system (Meskell 2018, 56; see also Mossallam 2014; Scudder 2016).

Luther Evans believed that UNESCO was a technical agency and that advancing peace need not be accompanied by ideological or philosophical positions (Meskell 2018, 52). Directed by the Americans, UNESCO would become an intergovernmental organization more concerned with technical assistance than cultural or educational reform of the mind (Pavone 2007, 81). From the American perspective, they were driving the Nubian Campaign, a position commonly espoused by their archaeologists in the field. The US was the largest single contributor. They had prestigious universities involved on the ground, plus many active players at UNESCO, and an energetic National Commission busy raising substantial funds through a voracious public relations campaign. Archaeologist and veteran of the TVA William Y. Adams (1992, 3) purported that American archaeologists 'were more or less frankly "in it for the money"; that is they came to Nubia simply because money was made available to do so'. In 1959 UNESCO employed Adams (1968) to conduct fieldwork in Sudan, where he became known in somewhat colonial parlance by UNESCO staff as 'our man in Nubia'. In fact, Adams was a Southwestern specialist who began his career in reservoir salvage archaeology and had no expertise in Egyptian archaeology. The Americans considered that they excelled in the scientific and salvage aspects of prehistoric archaeology, their efforts now underwritten by the NSF. And the agency made their institutional intent, and historical bias, crystal clear: 'We feel that the preservation of monuments of the Dynastic period and other problems of classical Egyptology do not fall within the accepted range of the Foundation's interests'.⁷ In his 1960 letter to UNESCO, Director of the Social Science division at NSF Albert Spaulding endorsed funding research projects based in the sciences spear-headed by American universities.⁸ In many cases, those teams had cut their teeth during US salvage programmes.

High-profile American archaeologists like Brew, Adams, and Fred Wendorf were all involved in TVA schemes before transferring their expertise to Egypt, a point embraced by their European colleagues. The French Minister for Culture, André Malraux, exhorted that one 'could not too highly praise your having conceived a plan so magnificent and so precise in its boldness one might say, a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority of archaeology'.⁹ Cultural resource management, whether in the US or in Egypt, was required for the hundreds of sites and thousands of artifacts submerged by dams and threatened by large-scale infrastructural development. Egyptian Minister for Culture Sarwat Okasha (1968) described how the 'modern world of machines and technicians invaded, en masse, the world of Rameses II'. It brought a new era of archaeology to the Nile. Yet, not all agreed. Classicist Gilbert Murray and other British diplomats mocked the American 'New Dealers ... and their Tennessee Valley Authority nostrums for the organization of international society' (Mazower 2012, 199). British Egyptologist Walter Emery complained that some highly qualified field archaeologists were brought in *de novo* and essentially knew nothing about Nubia.¹⁰ Indeed, this exactly fit the American archaeological ethos of the time that valued the position of 'science' as much, if not more than, historical

specificity. Brew questioned Director-General René Maheu 'if it could be true that UNESCO was not interested in scientific work'.¹¹ Brew cautioned Maheu that 'academic people in the United States are by no means solidly behind the schemes for moving and preserving monuments'. In a striking blow, American Egyptologists and museum curators like Bernard von Bothmer and William Hayes were openly apathetic or even hostile to the salvage project and the Egyptian government,¹² considering the work pseudoscientific and that the Egyptian 'treasures' on offer were instead ordinary items with no merit.

Letters of complaint sent to UNESCO officials describe how American academics flaunted their national wealth, suggesting that given their thousand colleges at home they could easily pay to save the Abu Simbel Temples (Meskell 2018, 53).¹³ Adams wrote wryly to his collaborator Ralph Solecki at the University of Columbia that 'our proposed contribution to the Nubian project is not really costing us a cent, since we are merely earmarking money which Nasser owes us, and which would probably otherwise never get repaid!'¹⁴ Chicago University Egyptologist John A. Wilson (1967, 270) argued that American participation in both fieldwork and financial contribution was far greater than that of any other foreign nation. Moreover, there was the US National Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments: its officers presented more than 200 public lectures. That committee claimed the credit for the allocation of US \$16,000,000 to the Nubian campaign. There were also substantial funds derived from American credits through the sale of surplus grain to Egypt, given international call-out by US President Kennedy in his 7 April 1961 speech. In exchange for their commitment, the Americans considered which temple should be theirs. Such attitudes of appropriation developed out of specific forms of colonial modernity that emerged during the international scramble to control 'Egypt's Pharaonic artifacts and, with that, the power to interpret its ancient past' (Colla 2007, 277).

During the official US Senate hearings in 1962, the national motivations behind the competitive gifting were laid bare by politicians like Senator Roman Hruska from Nebraska:

Here Russia builds the dam. They get all the glory and the credit, and the Egyptian people think the Russians are fine. And then, under the guise of a United Nations suborganization, Uncle Sam furnishes the bloodstream financially and gets no credit whatsoever.¹⁵

Other politicians stated publicly that without US support the Nubian scheme was doomed to failure. A more moderate view, albeit one infused with long-standing cultural imperialism (Said 2014), was that rather than offering Egypt any favours these 'monuments are great historical roots of all Western civilization. We are doing our own future generations in this country a favour, insofar as we are helping preserve their own historical roots'.¹⁶ The deep (pharaonic) past was thus appropriated from distant shores to serve the fictive construction of a common humanity. For America and its increasing vigilance in Middle Eastern affairs, participation in this world-making project was paramount, and the UNESCO archives reveal that they did not want to be shown up by the Dutch, Germans, or Russians:

During a period when the United States is attempting to improve its relations culturally with other peoples, the denial of support for a project of acknowledged great cultural significance would result in a serious setback in this important arena of foreign relations.¹⁷

A common humanity in the past would be paired with a common responsibility for the future.

In the context of the Cold War, however, UNESCO was keen to stress the solidarity that international collaboration had fostered, materially overcoming the antagonism among nations in the name of a common purpose (Betts 2015, 116). Indeed, hundreds of archaeologists from more than 20 nations launched more than 30 survey and excavation projects across Nubia. This was largely dominated by European and North American teams, but also included Egyptian, Russian, Argentinean, Ghanaian, Indian, and Pakistani archaeologists. Solidarity was strengthened by an obligation towards another African state, in the case of Ghana, or another non-aligned country, in the case of India (Säve-Söderbergh 1987, 89). Teams of archaeologists from East and West, North and South worked within UNESCO's framework: Russians, Americans, Finns, Hungarians, Czechs, and East and West Germans, as well as Indians and Pakistanis who had been embroiled in numerous conflicts from the 1947 Partition to the War of 1965.

The Soviet Union offered a team from Leningrad University that they sought to integrate into other expeditions. The Egyptians felt they could not press for more support given the Soviet Union's extraordinary efforts in constructing the dam (Okasha 2009). But the Russians were keen to monitor the progress of other missions in Nubia and UNESCO used this to their own advantage. In 1961 an internal memo advised that 'Mr Tolstov and Mr Petrovitch should be kept informed more frequently on developments in the Nubian Campaign. For instance, a letter from Mr Van der Haagen giving details of the recent American archaeological discoveries would be opportune'.¹⁸ Despite being part of the Soviet bloc, the Polish Mission, under the expedition leadership of archaeologist Kazimierz Michałowski, were keen to establish their neutrality in Sudan and avoid deep political divisions. Irrespective of the prevailing communist ideology at home, the Polish discoveries were the subject of a vast media outpouring, their international character standing in direct contrast to the political restrictions on ordinary Polish citizens for travel abroad (Klimowicz and Klimowicz 2012).

Archaeologists were, however, strongly tethered to their own governments, funders, and institutions, and national interests routinely trumped internationalist efforts. For the Americans, their participation was also intimately linked to surveillance and mapping, employing new aerial survey techniques and photogrammetry. Postwar American technologies could be tested out and showcased during these missions, including radiocarbon dating and neutron activation analysis (NAA). Indeed, J. R. Oppenheimer himself suggested the possibility of using NAA to determine the provenance of archaeological materials (Speakman and Glascock 2007, 179). Vertical technologies of rule, namely mapping and monitoring, were also shrouded in redemptive claims of restoring civilization (Meskell 2020). More overtly, archaeologists like Mark Papworth were approached by the US State Department and asked to record troop movements around Khartoum. He later revealed that such requests did not strike him as unusual at the time: 'this was just the sort of thing one did during the Cold War. They had us jumping at our own damn shadows' (quoted in Price 2003, 31). William Langer, CIA analytical division chief, regularly enlisted archaeologists to use fieldwork as a cover for intelligence-gathering (Price 2008), a practice that the British (among others) had long mastered (Richter 2008). Taken together these examples underscore the effective workings of archaeological techno-politics, namely

the 'kinds of social and political practice that produce simultaneously the powers of science and the powers of modern states' (Mitchell 2002, 312).

The UNESCO archives further reveal how American archaeologists were embroiled in bitter disputes and rivalries over areas granted as archaeological concessions and expected to take the lead in decision-making committees. The US anticipated leading the International Action Committee and bemoaned the Swiss appointment, blaming the political situation and need for neutrality at UNESCO. According to John A. Wilson (1967, 269), committees were political bodies and often debates over technical issues were subsumed by national agendas. Furthermore, he claimed (1967, 270) that

most of the Europeans and all of the Egyptians considered that they were the official representatives of their governments. This was less true of the archaeologist from Great Britain, and it was not at all true of myself. Not only was I independent of any American government agency, but I was not even commissioned to speak for a learned society or my own university. For seven years I have found it impossible to persuade my colleagues on these committees that I speak for myself alone and not for the United States.

American archaeologists continued to assume the lead in terms of archaeological expertise and oversight. The sustainability of salvage and UNESCO's commitment to long-term fieldwork with specific research questions waned. The only conference to discuss the scientific results throughout the entire eight years of the Nubian Campaign was held 24–28 August 1964 at Bellagio, Italy, sponsored by the Society for American Archaeology in partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation and held in their Bellagio Center (SAA 1965; Meskell 2018, 39). International expeditions sent their national representatives to the conference, as did the SAA, NSF, and UNESCO, along with the governments of Egypt and Sudan. While genuflections to internationalism via political, economic, and cultural cooperation were *de rigueur* at UNESCO, the American contribution to the Nubian Campaign was instead inflected with nationalistic fervour.

Along the Nile one could almost see reflected the desire of the post-war powers for the United Nations: the construction of the Aswan Dam and rescue of the temples combined the scientific technocracy of the New Deal with the political reach of the nineteenth-century alliance system (Mazower 2012, 213). As Mitchell (2002, 42) brilliantly elucidated in his own work on Egypt, techno-politics is always a technical body, an alloy that emerges from a process of manufacture: in this case salvage archaeology, dam infrastructure, and cold war technics were sutured to saving the material vestiges of the past. The UNESCO campaign effectively united, on a grand stage, development and large-scale infrastructures with international economics and politics, while playing off former colonial and Cold War tensions, within a peopled landscape where the archaeological past held ambivalent connotations. We can witness in Egypt's efforts, alongside the US, the USSR, and every other nation involved, the performance of an intense nationalism within the sphere of internationalism. There were considerable economic, political, and cultural gains of global proportions to be harnessed not only in Nubia, but also along the Euphrates.

Engineering along the Euphrates

UNESCO's international campaigns coincided with increasing US Cold War involvement in the Middle East (Meskell 2018, 32), coupled with a positivist strain in Americanist

archaeology. Cold War containment paranoia played out in Syria when construction of the Tabqa Dam in the Raqqa Governorate, also financed by the Soviets, threatened ancient sites along the Euphrates River. Ever critical of what it deemed the increasing politicization within UNESCO (Graham 2006), the US dispatched its own expeditions from prestigious universities to conduct salvage archaeology, once more with support from the NSF.

For decades British and French experts claimed that channelling the waters of the Euphrates could revitalize northern Syria. A great advocate for Point IV in the Middle East, Afif Tannous argued that TVA-inspired programmes could achieve 'the emancipation and welfare of the people' as 'the primary target and objective for democracy in its new role of constructive expansion into the underdeveloped areas of the world' (Tannous 1951; Citino 2011, 163). Growing increasingly suspicious of the US, especially Point IV, Syrian leaders followed the lead of President Nasser, and thus the contract for Tabqa went to the Soviets (see Lesch 1992, 19–20). And similar to the situation in Egypt and Sudan, salvage of the archaeological remains was undertaken primarily by Euro-American archaeologists.

American experts leveraged the promise of agrarian liberalism in the Middle East to argue that strategic assistance could redress a historically regressive social order dating from the Ottoman Empire and continuing under French and British colonial occupation (Citino 2014).¹⁹ Themes of social evolution within the New Archaeology continued to play strategically in academic discourse from American archaeologists researching the Middle East, including northern Syria. Urban centres, they argued, arose not only because of the increased efficiency in early food-producing villages, but due to the development of social, political, moral, and religious forces that enabled integration of the growing population into a functioning civilization (Patterson 2001, 118). These themes defined Braidwood's 1954 NSF proposal: 'our present understanding of the real facts of the ecological situation in which the foundations for civilization were laid is practically zero' (cf. Yellen and Greene 1985).²⁰ In claiming that Middle Eastern antiquity remained largely *terra incognita*, American archaeologists hoped to position themselves as leaders who were directing both disciplinary and regional futures.²¹ To achieve this in Syria, they harnessed the broader programme initiatives of UNESCO and the UN.

In 1947 Syrian Foreign Minister Faris Khouri declared that 'the United States was out to railroad' the Arabs (Little 1990, 53). By 1950 Syria had requested funding from the World Bank for the Ghab Project, the first international river basin proposal submitted to the Bank (Caponera 1993, 632). Then in 1951 Syria rejected the US Point IV programme. This earned Syria a reputation in the US of being a 'particularly sensitive danger spot' and a 'witch's brew now simmering' (Little 1990, 66). On 17 April 1955 the Soviet *Pravda* reported that the primary threat to Syria was not the Soviet Union, but rather

those powers which, on the pretext of 'guaranteeing security,' are creating aggressive blocs in the Near and Middle East in an attempt to convert countries of this area into their military and strategic springboards and to reduce them, economically, to the status of colonies or dependent territories. (Stahl 2014, 212)

A month later that sentiment was reflected at UNESCO when Syria requested that their technical assistance programmes be aligned with the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.²² By the next year, the infamous US-British mission code-named 'Operation Straggle' attempted to overthrow the Syrian regime by galvanizing 'indigenous anticommunist

elements in Syria' and targeting pro-Nasser groups. The coup ultimately failed and both the Americans and British were deemed *personae non gratae*. By October 1957 Syria had signed an aid agreement with the USSR that included river development and electrification schemes (Horvath 1970, 628).

Regardless of the failed coup and Cold War tensions, Syria continued to see value in UNESCO's commitment to international collaboration and approached the organization to seek expertise in hydrology, electrification, and agriculture. Experts came from Russia, West Germany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands – reflecting the agency's commitment to internationalism. In fact, UNESCO's flagship 1954 Participate Program for culture began in Syria (Luke and Meskell 2019). In 1953 Paul Collart and Amando Dillon advised on museums and conservation laboratories in Damascus and Aleppo. UNESCO-funded experts such as Alexandre Lezine, Abd el-Kader Rihaoui, and Helge Finsen further advised the government on tourism routes and heritage restoration efforts at key cultural nodes, such as Aleppo, Bosra, Damascus, and Palmyra. Yet the 1958 UNESCO report pointed to inefficiencies in government leadership and wasted development dollars. Under the United Arab Republic (UAR, 1958–1961) Damascus became beholden to Cairo, and cultural programmes in the UAR's 'Northern Province of Syria' played second fiddle to salvage along the Nile.²³ Finsen's scathing Eurocentric reports from 1960 to 1961 portrayed a region in crisis,²⁴ foreshadowing the 1961 coup d'état and restoration of an independent Syrian Republic.

It was also during the late 1950s and early 1960s that UNESCO firmed up its commitment to prioritizing technical assistance, rather than field research. In 1959 UNESCO had rejected Syria's request for a Neolithic cultural specialist from Damascus.²⁵ Research-driven surveys along the Euphrates were then undertaken by the international academic community. Following in Braidwood's footsteps, in 1965 and 1966 Ralph Solecki and Maurits van Loon proposed to the NSF an investigation of village-farming subsistence in semi-arid environments and subsequent conflicts over water.²⁶ Their arguments showed uncanny parallels to the political agendas of US assistance schemes, the UN Arid Zone programme, and the UN World Food Program. In part, these modernization programmes intended to foster international solidarity and stability to make way for the West once the Soviets had completed the Tabqa Dam. Rural Syria became a test case for UN 'pilot projects using food as aid to economic and social development, particularly when related to labour-intensive projects and rural welfare' (Dawson 1964, 100).²⁷ In America, development policy linked notions of cultural hierarchy to containment policy, thereby aiming to stem Soviet influence and shape emerging societies in America's image (Khalil 2016, 184).

In 1970 Syria approached UNESCO again, this time for a major campaign of salvage archaeology. Again, their request was denied. In its place, on 21 January 1971, UNESCO issued an international appeal: 'UNESCO Director-General Launches Appeal to Rescue Cultural Treasures in Euphrates Valley'. It targeted 34 countries and offered favourable policies for *partage*.²⁸ Dutch, Indian, Iraqi, Swiss, and West German teams responded first, paralleling the national interest shown in bidding for the dam (Dutch, Swiss, and German firms), particularly the case for Iraq and the transboundary waters of the Euphrates. Commitments eventually included institutions from Britain, Canada, Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and the United

States – many of the same countries that had deployed teams to Nubia. For instance, UNESCO wrote to the Finnish delegation:

Unesco has not forgotten the help given by the Finnish archaeologists ... during the excavations which took place in Sudanese Nubia in the framework of the Scandinavian Joint Expedition ... [and now the] decision to co-operate to this great work of international cultural solidarity.²⁹

President Assad, however, would use the cultural call to arms to craft an image of Greater Syria that challenged current political boundaries. Assad drew upon the legacies of prehistory, claiming connection to the world's first civilizations as well as Islamic history, and promoting the importance of Abbasid Raqqa (Jones 2018). Assad also strategically sutured modernity and the dam to showcase his commitment to Syria's future (Luke and Meskell 2019). When the Tabqa Dam opened on 3 July 1973 and waters began filling Lake Assad, there was increased urgency for salvage archaeology. UNESCO's inaction became apparent. As they had done in Nubia, American institutions capitalized upon the opportunity to enhance their own collections. Enticed by the region's Roman and early Islamic remains, Dumbarton Oaks (Harvard University) and the Kelsey Museum (University of Michigan) sponsored excavations at Dibsī Faraj. The Curator of Near and Middle Eastern Archaeology at the Milwaukee Public Museum, Rudolph H. Dornemann, applied for a concession at Tell Hadidi (van Loon and Dornemann 1969; Dornemann 1985).³⁰ When the US National Endowment for Humanities rejected his funding application, the citizens of Milwaukee stepped in to finance the expedition (Henry 2015).

Private sponsorship, however, would not be sufficient given the scale and urgency of the task. Pressure mounted for the archaeological teams in Syria to act quickly on behalf of the international community. In July 1973 the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance of the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a request for 'Assistance in a Project for Economic and Social Development' to the UN World Food Program (WFP).³¹ It was funded along with another request in 1975. Despite calls for the World Food Program to promote programmes to enhance capacity for social mobility and self-sufficiency (Costa 1973; Garzon 1984), such proposals offered little, if any, promise to local people for long-term, transferable skills. In fact, both Syrian proposals acknowledged the failures that accompanied salvage archaeology. In the race against the waters, manual labour was necessary for excavation and, given the high unemployment, the WFP approved the projects. Local citizens became the engine of salvage tallied in 'man-hours' and 'man-days'. By April 1975 Lake Assad was rising by 25 cm per day: within weeks the sites were submerged.

Over 300 contemporary settlements were inundated, displacing some 60,000–70,000 people (Lange 2019, 324–325). Similar to modernization projects in Turkey (Luke and Cobb 2013), communities were forced to abandon seasonal migration patterns to become 'settled' and 'proper' farmers and thus 'fix' their 'backwardness'. In his June 1977 report, the British Ambassador to Syria, James Macqueen Craig contrasted the horrid conditions of the Rumeilan oil fields with the new 'powerful, beautiful, clean and orderly' Russian-built dam. His report did not discuss the housing crisis, only the new towns at al-Thawra and Raqqa (designed by the Polish; see Stanek 2020, 21–22). In fact, thousands of people were resettled in the 'so-called "Arab belt" in the largely Kurdish-populated Syrian Jazīra'. This illustrates how tribal groups were 'sacrific[ed] to and

simultaneously profit[ed] from larger Arabization schemes in Syria's Kurdish Northeast' (Lange 2019, 325). These lived realities were elided from the official narrative, as presented in a bilingual Arabic-English booklet, 'The Euphrates Dam Project'. The Syrian government promised a 'foundation for the creation of a new developed society based on social justice and socialist cooperation'. While the contemporary villages in the flood zone were literally washed away, deep history was not to be forgotten: 'The great civilization picture of the dam is completed by the great historical towns and castles in the area'.³² The Syrian leadership pledged support for tourism at sites that had not been flooded, such as Rasafi, Jaabar Castle, Tal Hariri, Abu Hureyra, and Maskaneh, as well as new plans for the Balikh Valley.

British and American missions who visited the area warned that the restoration required to develop tourism would be impossible without paved roads, petrol stations, hotels, and further attention to cleanliness and comfort. Success in these areas was crucial for regional security: water wars threatened instability along the Euphrates, from Turkey to Iraq. While the UN focused on the rural social engineering components, Europeans and Americans sent missions to scope contracts for arms, ports, agro-industries, petro-chemicals, and the privatization of electricity.³³ Imperial aspirations and legacies lingered, as seen in a May 1977 report by a British diplomat:

Aleppo was, I understand the first British Consulate ever established in the whole world – by Queen Elizabeth in something like 1583 – and the original premises, the Khan Burghul, which was also the headquarters of the Levant Company are still there and in good repair.³⁴

After the 1979 Iranian revolution pivoted Syria closer to Soviet assistance (Hinnebusch 2018),³⁵ British diplomat John C. Moberly wrote on 4 March 1980 that Syria would be a turnkey in the future of the Middle East and therefore continued assistance was advised:

Our partners calculate, as I believe we should, that by maintaining a strong aid (and cultural) effort here, they can help the Syrians themselves to maintain their somewhat precarious balance between East and West, and encourage the very strong natural preference which most Syrians have ... for the West.³⁶

In many ways, the success of the Euphrates project would be measured in the years to come, and the decline in comprehensive river basin development opened up a space for other considerations, and ultimately failures (Lange 2019). Future archaeological research would consider particular, place-based histories, whether for early prehistory or the Islamic period (Wilkinson 1998; Challis et al. 2004; Hritz 2013b). Importantly, Hritz (2013a, 2013b) has argued for the importance of understanding this region over time from the perspective of mixed economies, seasonal agriculture, and annual flooding, stressing the critical role of micro-environmental diversity, a very different position from the global TVA-style model proposed under the Point IV programme.

Conclusion

In this paper we have traced the genealogy of salvage archaeology in two Middle Eastern Cold War settings through the lens of UNESCO's utopian technical assistance programmes and American liberal developmentalism. Both, we suggest, quickly became entangled in national and international political agendas. While Egypt and Sudan skilfully negotiated between UNESCO, the UN, and the US, Syria was more circumspect, adopting a harder

line on what the regime viewed as neo-imperial agendas. The TVA invested early in Egypt and, through these endeavours, American archaeologists such as J. O. Brew and William Y. Adams, experienced in archaeologies of mitigation but lacking regional expertise, played a strategic role in UNESCO's safeguarding mission along the Nile. International archaeological teams rallied and were funded through UNESCO, albeit predominately underwritten by the Americans. In contrast, the Soviets had largely financed the construction of the Aswan Dam, stepping in after the US failed to maintain their commitments, despite initial investment in planning by the TVA and Point IV. As the UNESCO mission progressed, the US archaeological attachment to research-driven, scientific archaeology became mired in schemes of technical assistance for the rehabilitation, removal, and resurrection of temples along the Nile. That effort would be physically extracted from Egypt, exchanged, and transferred to the US as diplomatic gifts.

In contrast, Syria never embraced the TVA-style development packages and explicitly rejected large-scale assistance under Point IV. Turning to Soviet aid during a period of rising US power in the Middle East created problems for raising emergency funds for salvage archaeology along the Euphrates. The UN had entered a diplomatic quagmire. Unlike the Egyptian case, European and American publics were far less captivated by a past scarcely known to them and in a region hostile to American presence. The Syrian regime played a delicate game by partnering with the Soviets and Eastern Bloc countries for infrastructure and technical expertise (funded in part by the UN), yet also holding steadfast to Arab nationalism and anti-Zionist agendas. When the Tabqa Dam became a reality, archaeological salvage along the Euphrates was guaranteed through the efforts of Middle Eastern experts like Robert Braidwood, Ralph Solecki, and Maurits van Loon, advancing the New Archaeology paradigm and backed by the US National Science Foundation. Technocratic approaches to irrigation and agriculture abroad under the banner of progress justified the expenditure by the US agency for US academics. Additional support from European institutions and private funders on both sides of the Atlantic was directed towards understanding the initial phases of human settlement and agriculture in river basins of the Middle East. When tensions emerged to undermine these funding streams, the UN was able to justify their renewed support through technocratic assistance by means of the World Food Program.

In reviewing these two case studies through the lens of river basin development and archaeology, we show that technical assistance schemes had a major impact on the relationships between American archaeologists and policy makers and UNESCO. We demonstrate that TVA legacies, UNESCO's narrative of technical assistance, and the utopian promise of science writ large played a central role in archaeological salvage and infused initial projects in Egypt and Sudan with a decidedly American flavour. Evincing a high-modernist ideology, we see how Western institutions with a newfound self-confidence based upon their scientific, industrial, and technical progress sought to expand production, design new social orders, and master both nature and culture (Scott 1999, 4). Streams of funding supported an influx of archaeo-technocrats specializing in salvage and dams, many having trained with the Smithsonian River Basin Surveys programme. American archaeologists supported the promise of progress under the 'new agricultural revolution', in part as a show of American power, but also to bolster the internationalism promulgated by UNESCO and the UN. Even so, the New Archaeology did not survive as the prevailing paradigm, eventually replaced by more socially and politically

nuanced approaches, nor did the global promise of Point IV transform river basins into democratic nexus points.

Finally, this research raises questions about the role of hegemonic aspirations under programmes of ‘assistance’. The destruction to the archaeological record that ensued from the Aswan and Tabqa infrastructure projects created major opportunities and ideological choices for archaeologists, such as Brew, Adams, Solecki, and van Loon. On the one hand, there was a rupture in field practice between technical assistance and scholarship; on the other, the Cold War theatre propelled archaeological sites into the international spotlight and indeed the crosshairs of Middle East politics. As we understand further the initial premises and priorities of these monumental projects, coupled with the role of turnkey policies such as the US New Deal and Point IV programme, we can dig further into the politics at play in the internationalism of salvage and uplift in the Middle East.

Notes

1. C.H. Kraeling, 1 November 1956. The Oriental Institute Archaeological Newsletters, University of Chicago.
2. Robert Braidwood 1954 NSF proposal. Oriental Institute archives, University of Chicago.
3. Panelists included Clyde Kluckhohn, Alfred L. Kroeber, Robert M. Adams, Edgar Anderson, Julian Huxley, Herman J. Muller, Fred Polak, Julian Steward, Leslie White, and Gordon Willey.
4. United States Government Agencies – Tennessee Valley Authority – TVA – S-1301-0000-0224-00001. United Nations Archives. Stevens (1955); Belshaw (1947).
5. Confidential letter from Ali Vrioni to Louis Christophe, 30 January, 1963. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/Abu-Simbel Part IV from I/IV/62. Nasser’s quote appears in an article by Ritchie Calder, ‘Jacking Up a Mountain of Stone’, in the *UNESCO Courier*, October 1961 p. 6.
6. March 8 appeal by Vittorino Veronese, Director-General of UNESCO, *UNESCO Courier* 13 (May, 1960), 7 from Betts, ‘The Warden of World Heritage: UNESCO and the Rescue of the Nubian Monuments,’ p. 117.
7. Letter from Albert Spaulding at NSF to J. K. van der Haagen, UNESCO, re Clement Meighan, 10 October 1960. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/ 930.26. They were also ‘clear at the outset that the research divisions of the Foundation have as their primary function the support of programmes of basic research which originate in the universities and other institutions’.
8. Letter from Albert Spaulding at NSF to J. K. van der Haagen, UNESCO, re Clement Meighan, 10 October 1960. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/ 930.26.
9. André Malraux, ‘TVA of Archaeology’, in the *UNESCO Courier*, May 1960, pp. 8–11.
10. Letter from Walter Emery to J. K. van der Hagen, 1962, about Sudan. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) Nubia (624) Part I.
11. Letter from J. O. Brew to Director General René Maheu, 30 August 1961. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/ 930.26.
12. Lasalle. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) Nubia/A 02/17.
13. Letter to Louis Christophe, 19 February 1963, entitled Une porte où frapper Les Universités américaines pourraient encore financer le sauvetage d’Abou Simbel. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/Christophe Nubia – Correspondence with M. Christophe Part II.
14. Letter from William Y. Adams to Ralph Solecki, 3 May 1962. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (62) N/A 114/ 113 (73), Columbia University.
15. Senator Hruska, Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1962. Hearings before the Committee on the Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, First Session, p. 642.
16. Mr. Coombs from the State Department, Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1962. Hearings before the Committee on the Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, First

- Session, p. 647. See also the full text of the earlier US Senate Mutual Security Act of 1960 for further explanations of American self-interest; see <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101706169>, accessed 12 December 2019.
17. Excerpt from House Report, Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1962. Hearings before the Committee on the Appropriations, United States Senate, 87th Congress, First Session, p. 549.
 18. Memo entitled Co-operation with USSR, ODG/DDG Memo. 23.695. 22 May 1961. UNESCO Archives 069 (62) Nubia/A 02 Part III.
 19. On 30 March 1947, the British signed contracts for survey and design of the Aleppo water supply as well as infrastructure for the port of Tartus and management of the Euphrates (e.g. irrigation, agriculture, and hydroelectricity). Correspondence respecting Syria: part 1, 1947, National Archives London, UK.
 20. The original submission for the 1954 NSF was entitled 'for support of a research project on an investigation of the zoological, demographic, and ecological aspects of the natural history of human populations on the hilly flanks of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, lowland Turkey, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan)'. Braidwood files, Oriental Institute archives, University of Chicago. Yellen and Greene (1985) shortened the title to 'Human Population Studies in the Fertile Crescent'.
 21. Robert Braidwood, Jarmo, Chemchemal, Kirkuk Liwa, Iraq, 20 November 1950. Newsletters of the Oriental Institute, University of Chicago.
 22. Report on visit to Syria, Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, 18 May 1955. UNESCO Archives, file reference CA.12/137 069.72 (569.1) AMS Syria Part 1.
 23. Report from Malcolm Adiseshiah to Jean Thomas, 25 August 1958. UNESCO Archives, file reference 069 (560.1) AMS – Museums – SYRIA.
 24. Briefing for Syria and Jordan. 4 August 1961.
 25. Briefing for Syria and Jordan. 4 August 1961.
 26. The networks of both researchers are important. Solecki had already received NSF support for his work on Shanidar Cave in Iraq and had close connections with those at the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute; and he'd also participated in salvage work along the Nile. Maurits van Loon, a Dutch citizen, had done fieldwork with Braidwood, and after completing his PhD at Columbia University with Solecki became a researcher at the Oriental Institute. He also had ties to northern Syria via the Dutch company NEDECO.
 27. In addition, the UN oversaw the 1958 establishment of the Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD) in Damascus.
 28. The 34 countries were as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UAR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.
 29. G. Bolla to R. Tötterman. 15 March 1972. CA 12/137 069.72 (569.1) AMS Syria Part 4. UNESCO Archives, Paris.
 30. It is important to note Dornemann's training. As a PhD from the University of Chicago, he had worked closely with Braidwood and then later assisted van Loon.
 31. Request to the UN/FAO World Food Programme for Assistance in a Project for Economic and Social Development. Exploration and Restoration of Archaeological Sites in Syria, July 1973. Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, Syrian Arab Republic. CA 12/137 069.72 (569.1) AMS Syria Part 4. UNESCO Archives, Paris.
 32. W.R. Tomkys to A.J. M. Craig. 14 June 1977. Diplomatic Representation of the UK in Syria. British National Archives. FCO_93_1334. Euphrates Dam. 1977 Brochure. Diplomatic Representation of the UK in Syria. British National Archives. FCO_93_1334.
 33. Near East & North Africa. Visit of the COMET Mission to Syria, 1977, National Archives London, UK. D.A. Roberts to A.B. Urwisk. 3 February 1976. Arms for Syria. Political relations between UK and Syria, 1976, National Archives London, UK. 6 August 1975. US Embassy in Damascus to Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Egypt Cairo, Israel Jerusalem, Israel Tel Aviv, Jordan Amman, Lebanon Beirut, Saudi Arabia Jeddah, Secretary of State 1975 DAMASC03006_b. Wikileaks.

- US Embassy Damascus to Department of Commerce, Department of State, Iran Tehran, Jordan Amman, Lebanon Beirut, Secretary of State. 1975 DAMASC03072_b. Wikileaks. See also Report of the Director-General on the activities of the Organization in 1974, communicated to Member States and the Executive Board in accordance with Article VI. 3. b of the Constitution. General Conference Nineteenth Session, 1976. See also I. T. M. Lucas to J. A. H. Graham CMG. Syrian Iraqi Relations. 24 June 1975. External Relations of Iraq. FCO_8_2540.
34. British Consulate in Aleppo. A.J.M. Craig. 20 May 1977. FCO_93_1334. National British Archives.
 35. 2 March 1979. US Embassy Damascus to US Department of State. 1979DAMASC01384_e. Wikileaks.
 36. J.C. Moberly, 4 March 1980. AID: SYRIA. UK aid and technical assistance to the Near East, 1980. National Archives London, UK.

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