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Toren, Tolga

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TOLGA TÖREN

Johannesburg, 2010

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Supervisor: Roger Southall

Johannesburg, 2010

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of master at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.

Tolga Tören

The 15th of January 2010

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AALC: African American Labour Center
AATUF: All African Trade Union Federation
AEU: Amalgamated Engineering Union
AFL: American Federation of Labour
AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFRO: African Regional Organisation
AIFLD: American Institute for Free Labour Development
ANC: African National Congress, South Africa
ATUC: African Trade Union Confederation
CGT: Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (General Confederation of Labour)
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CIO: Congress of Industrial Organizations
CIT: Confederacion Interamericana de Trabajadores (Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers)
CNETU: Council of Non-European Trade Unions
COD: Congress of Democrats
COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPC: Coloured People's Congress
CPSA: Communist Party of South Africa
CTAL: Latin American Confederation of Labour
DGB: Deustscher Gewerkschaftsbund Bundesvorstand (Confederation of German Trade Unions)
ESCOM: Electricity Supply Commission
FOFATUSA: Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa
FRELIMO: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
GATT: General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GM: General Motor
IBM: International Business Machines
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IDC: Industrial Development Corporation
IDF: International Development Foundation
ILGWU: International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
ILO: International labour Organization
IMF: International Metal Workers Federation
IMF: International Money Fund
IMS: Iron Moulders' Society of South Africa
ISCOR: Iron and Steel Corporation
ISF: International Solidarity Fund
ITSs: International Trade Secretariats
KFL: Kenya Federation of Labour's
MIEUSA: Motor Industry Employees' Union

MPLA:	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAC:	National Action Council
NCR:	National Cash Register
NP:	National Party
ORIT:	Inter American Regional Labour Organization
PAC:	Pan Africanist Congress
PAIGC:	Partido Africano Para a Independência da ***Guiné*** e Cabo-Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PALLA:	Pan American Labour in Latin America
SACP:	South African Communist Party
SACTU:	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SAEWA:	South African Electrical Workers' Association
SATU:	South African Typographical Union
SATUC:	South African Trade Union Council
TL&ATIU:	Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Industrial Union
TLC:	South African Trades and Labour Council
TUC:	Trade Union Council
TUCSA:	Trade Union Council of South Africa
UAW:	United Automobile Workers Union
UK:	United Kingdom
US:	United States of America
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USSALEP:	United States - South Africa Leadership Development Programme
WCL:	World Confederation of Labour
WFTU:	World Federation of Trade Union

Chapter I

Introduction

1.1. Aim of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine US policies towards the South African labour movement through the American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and US official institutions, such as the State Department and the Labour Department of the United States, US universities etc. with particular focus on the period between the 1960s and mid-1970s.

The reason for choosing such a research topic is the idea that the capitalist classes of advanced capitalist countries have periodically used labour organizations, which have not opposed capitalist relations of production, to guarantee the profitability of their investments. In the post Second World War period, the most powerful agent in the implementation of such policies was the United States because of its huge production power and hegemonic position. These policies always followed the US investments and aimed to create labour organizations which would not oppose capitalist relations of production and US investments. These policies were introduced under the auspices of with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1949 and continued with the establishment of the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD) in 1962 and the African American Labour Center (AALC) in 1964 following the expansion of US investments in the Latin American countries and African continent. Significantly, in parallel to the increase in US investments began in South Africa in the sixties, US overseas labour policies also intensified in the country through AFL-CIO, the US

State Department, and the US Labour Department. During the period, the AFL-CIO and official departments of US established important collaborative relations with the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). Therefore, the study is shaped as a case study. In a word, in the study, the labour relations between the US and South Africa in the beginning of the 1960s and the middle of 1970s are examined by specifically focusing on TUCSA.

1.2. Historical Background

After the Second World War, the world economy was restructured. The fundamental reason of this restructuring was that the US, which had accumulated massive capital during the period between two world wars, sought to obtain a hegemonic position within the world capitalist system following 1945. At the same time, there were additional factors, which also played a significant role in the restructuring process of the world political economy. The existence of the Soviet Union as a representative of an alternative world order, political independence of former colonies, the establishment of socialist governments in East Europe were some examples of this situation. Such conditions, which constituted serious challenges to the legitimacy of capitalism, forced the US as the hegemonic power of capitalist system to create mechanisms to counter the risks. The first of such attempts was the formation of international institutions such as the International Money Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that all them were aiming to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation under the leadership of the US (Glyn, 2006: 8; Peet, 2007: 39).

Nevertheless, these attempts were not enough to ensure capital accumulation around the world because, especially in Western countries, the power of left wing political parties, anti-capitalist social movements as well as of militant trade unions was increasing. In addition, these countries were also suffering from the problems in their capital accumulation process because of destructive effects of the Second World War. Therefore, the second attempt became the introducing of Marshall Plan by the US to re-build capitalist relations of production in the Western European countries in 1947. The Plan also played a crucial role in the restructuring of the international labour movement (Block, 1978, O'Brien, 535, Cox, 1971: 562). This process began with the formation of the ICFTU, after the breaking up of the World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU), in 1949. The WFTU had been established in 1945 under the leadership of British Trade Union Council (TUC), trade unions from the Soviet Union and the CIO from the US. Under the WFTU umbrella, different trade union understandings and political lines came together. For instance, the TUC was the supporter of British colonial policies while there were many socialist and communist trade unionists within the CIO. As for the influence of the Soviet Union, its labour organizations were the most influential agents in the WFTU. The aim in the formation of the WFTU was to create a working class international. However, because of the different ideological positions and policies in the organization, some organizations, especially British TUC, tried to have a dominant position within the WFTU. Despite all these efforts, the WFTU remained a leftist organization by taking a critical stance against capitalism as well as against the hegemony of the US because of the efforts of the Soviet Union (Southall, 1995: 36-38; Wahl, 2007; Cooper, 1996).

This situation led the US to evaluate the WFTU as a threat to its hegemonic position and capitalism since the most powerful country within the WFTU was the Soviet Union. Therefore, the US tried to undermine the WFTU by forcing the CIO and TUC to leave the organization and

by playing a leading role in the formation process of the ICFTU in 1949 (Southall, 1995). In the beginning process of the Marshall Plan, the WFTU had criticized it by arguing the US was trying to undermine independent development process of the Western European countries. Further, especially in Italy and France armed struggles and strikes had been organized against the Plan by trade unions affiliated to the WFTU (Tören, 2007). However, for the capitalist classes of these countries, the Marshall Plan was very vital in order to revitalize collapsed production of the region. As result, under the cloud of dust of Marshall Plan discussions, the WFTU was broken and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was established as a new international labour organization under the leadership of the US. The TUC and the CIO also joined the ICFTU.

Within the ICFTU, two main tendencies challenged each other: The anti communist ideology of the AFL (after 1955 AFL-CIO) and social democratic stance of the unions in Europe. In addition to ideological differences, the ICFTU also witnessed rivalries between old and new hegemonic powers of the world capitalism, namely Britain and the US. The Britain, as colonialist power of the pre-war period was trying to protect its old position. The aim of the US was to guarantee the interest of its capitalist class especially in former colonies of Britain which relied upon the expansion of capital accumulation all around the world. Therefore, during the post Second World War era, the US used a discourse of anti-colonialism to undermine British rule. These two powers also sought to have a dominant position within the ICFTU as they did in the world economy. However, this competition was gained by the US because of its huge economic and military power (Southall, 1995: 39-45).

Another dimension of the restructuring of the labour movement was the overseas policies of the developed capitalist countries and the ICFTU to create anti-communist and pro-capitalist labour organizations in different regions where they had investments. For instance, in 1960, the ICFTU established the Inter American Regional Labour Organization (ORIT) in Latin America

in order to support non-communist and non-political trade unionism. The ORIT played a crucial role in this aim. In addition the US decided to launch its own independent labour program in Latin America by establishing the American Institute of Free labour Development (AIFLD) in 1961. Like ORIT, the AIFLD was also financed and directed by the AFL-CIO, USAID, CIA and business community of the US. The AIFLD played a crucial role in creating non-political, anti-communist, pro-capitalist and pro-American labour organizations by supporting military coups against leftist governments, by undermining socialist political movements and by organizing / supporting paramilitary activities (Southall, 1995: 42; Thomson and Larson, 1978:22, Scipes, 10; Spalding, 1976:53).

By the sixties, US investments began to increase in the African continent and US overseas labour policies aimed to create non-political, anti-communist trade unions in the region followed these investments. In fact, the US had not a previous existence in the continent. Therefore, firstly, it used the ICFTU to create non-political trade unions in the continent. However, in 1964, the US launched its independent overseas labour policies in Africa by establishing the African American Labour Center (Southall, 1995; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963). The Center, which had relationships with CIA, US governments and US business community, tried to spread 'bread and butter' and 'business' unionism, which suggests a narrow and non-political view of unionism, and which deals with the labour organizations as sectoral interest groups that should focus on economic issues throughout the world (Godfried, 1987; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Southall, 1995). It organized many activities from Botswana to South Africa, such as meetings, education for unionists by using the money provided by US governments, CIA, USAID and US business community. It also took role in CIA operations in the region (Godfried, 1987; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980).

These activities found their counterpart in US relations towards South Africa. In other words, as in other regions and countries, when US investments began to increase in South Africa in the beginning of the sixties, overseas labour policies of the US in this country also intensified through the AFL-CIO and other US institutions.

After the Second World War, the most important phenomenon in South Africa was the apartheid administration. Following the arrival of the National Party in power in 1948, the majority of South Africans were faced with a high level of oppression. In addition, during the apartheid era, South Africa witnessed important capital inflows; profits increases; and significant opportunities provided to white classes to accumulate more and more capital. On the other side of the coin there were policies put into practice by the National Party government which led to serious reductions in the real wages of black workers and affected their living conditions negatively (Innes, 1995: 211-224; Southall, 1995; Pampallis, 1995:211).

The labour movement of South Africa also encountered a number of new developments. The first of these was the establishment of TUCSA in 1954. TUCSA assumed the role of the primary representative of industry based unions. At the same time, only registered trade unions were accepted as members by TUCSA. Although it described itself as an anti apartheid organization (Imrie, 1979), it followed a discriminatory policy and excluded the blacks from its ranks. In 1962, it changed this policy and tried to organize black workers by forming an African Section. However, in 1967, the policy of the union altered and it excluded black workers again (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996:30; Southall, 1995).

On the other hand, the black working classes issued a robust response to discriminatory labour policies by establishing the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955. SACTU, as a first formal alliance between African unions and other races, played an important

role during the period with its political unionism perspective (Friedman, 1987:27; Lambert, 1988; Luckhardt and Wall: 1980).

Another development within the South African labour movement was the formation of the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa, FOFATUSA in 1959 as an alternative African trade union federation to SACTU. The formation of the FOFATUSA was supported by the ICFTU, in which the US had a hegemonic position, in collaboration with TUCSA during the 1960s. This was because SACTU's understanding of political trade unionism and relations with antiapartheid powers was not acceptable to them. Therefore, they supported the FOFATUSA by financing it. The establishers of the FOFATUSA argued that their trade unionism understanding relied upon non-political trade unionism. However, the FOFATUSA had important relations with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which was a nationalist African organization. Not surprisingly the FOFATUSA never collaborated with SACTU because of its political stance but had strong relations with TUCSA. Further, when the TUCSA decided to admit the African workers, some member unions of the FOFATUSA joined the TUCSA. It also had critical relations with ICFTU and the US (Southall, 1995: 103; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; SADET, 2006: 712).

In 1960, the PAC organized a protest against the pass laws of apartheid. The protest, ended in the shooting deaths of 69 and injuries of around 180 Africans. After Sharpeville, the African National Congress (ANC) and PAC were banned and the leaders of SACTU were forced into exile (Myers, 1980: 66; Mokoena 1993: 14). However, TUCSA remained untouched and kept its position of being the biggest labour organization of the country. The Massacre also became a turning point in terms of international economic and political relationships of South Africa. After the Massacre, international actors started to pay greater attention to the nature of the apartheid regime. Many social movements, institutions and states in the world reacted strongly.

One of the reactions was the withdrawal of foreign investors from the country (Rogers, 1976: 102).

However, the United States had important relations with the white government of South Africa and these relations continued. Additionally, so many US firms, who were marginal in South Africa before the Second World War realized new investments (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:11). During the sixties and seventies, these investments revitalized the economy by providing important technological know-how and developing new management methods (Rogers, 1976:125; Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 88). Foreign capital and political relations between the US and South Africa provided important possibilities not just for the economy but also for the military capability of South Africa (Rogers, 1976: 102, Culverson, 1999: 40).

Simultaneously, by the beginning of the 1960s, the leading organizations of the US labour movement, the AFL-CIO, and other official institutes attempted to extend their influence over the labour movement of South Africa, especially over TUCSA, just as they had done in different regions, such as Latin America and Europe after the Second World War. TUCSA was the most suitable trade union organization for the US to deal because of its ideological position and stance relying on the idea of business unionism. During the sixties and seventies, relations between the TUCSA and US labour/official organizations mentioned above ranged from information sharing about economic and political conditions to organization of educational programs for trade unionists and black workers, to overseas visits, publication sharing, academic activities. All these policies implemented by the US over South Africa during 1960s and 1970s constitutes the argument of this thesis. In other words, in the study, it is argued that US tried to shape and control the South African labour movement through AFL-CIO and other US institutions in order to support non-political and anticommunist trade unionism, and to ensure the profitability of its investments in South Africa. In addition, the TUCSA was the most suitable partner for US labour

operations in South Africa because of its anticommunist stance and obedience to bread butter unionism.

1.3. The structure of the study

The study is composed to six chapters. Following the first two chapters devoted for introduction and literature review, the developments of the post-Second World War era, such as the internationalization process of capital accumulation around the world, the cold war and the formation process of new international organizations, such as the IMF, the IBDR and the GATT are dealt with. The re-structuring process of the international labour movement under the cold war conditions and the development of overseas labour policies of the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO are also handled in this chapter.

In the fourth chapter, the capitalist development process of South Africa in the post Second World War Era is discussed. The capital accumulation process under the apartheid and the developments within the labour movement, such as the formation of TUCSA, SACTU and FOFATUSA, are the main issues dealt with in this chapter.

In the fifth chapter, US investments in South Africa between the beginning of the sixties and the mid seventies and the effects of these investments in the capital accumulation process of South Africa are evaluated.

In the last chapter, the main focal point of the study, US labour relations with South Africa between the 1960s and the middle of the 1970s will be focused on with particular reference to the relations between TUCSA and the US labour institutions including the AFL-CIO and other official organizations of the US. Among the basic focal points of the chapter there are overseas

visits, trade union training programmes, vocational education programmes and leader exchange programmes and information sharing.

As for the methodology of the study, a historical framework is developed by focusing on developments in international scale and South African scale. In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, extensive literature on international labour, capitalist development of South Africa, labour history of South Africa and US investments in South Africa is given to elaborate the issue. The sixth chapter, which is the main chapter of the study, will be relied principally upon archive materials of TUCSA which are accessible in the Cullen Library.

Chapter II

Literature Review

2.1. Overseas Labour Programs in a General Context

In the literature on international labour relations, foreign interventions by cold war powers into third world countries have been subject of many studies since the end of the Second World War. The focal point of these studies ranged from the ideological effects of foreign intervention policies to financial aid, to overseas visits of the educational organizations of interventionist powers aiming to organize labour activities from one country to another. Different assessments mostly derived from the varying ideological position of scholars. Indeed, the most important determinant of the frameworks developed by the scholars paying attention to the issue was their ideological positions. Some scholars focused on the international labour policies implemented by developed Western capitalist countries in different regions by describing them as *labour imperialism*, as *part of the hegemony strategy of American capitalism* or as *a part of imperial relations*. To be sure, one of the most important focal points of these studies was the negative effects of the activities of the US labour movement in collaboration with US governments and businesses.

Some scholars concentrated on the communist risk to the third world countries and regarded the labour organizations of Western capitalist countries as the representatives of a free world. Such studies focused on the negative effects of the Soviet Union and the role of communism in third world countries defining it as a threat to the freedom of third world countries. In these studies, the authors who can be described as *cold war social scientists*, the US and its labour movement were seen as attempting to prevent the negative effects of Soviet

Union's policies. However, although the studies conducted by *cold war social scientists* just focused on the international labour policies of the Soviet Union and ignored the negative effects of the overseas programs of the US in general, some of them dealt with the issue within a broader framework and tried to examine the negative impacts of overseas programs in a more general context. Nevertheless, it is not to say that these kind of studies paid equal attention to the overseas program of the US and Soviet Union. In contrast, although they provided important explanations in terms of the negative effects of overseas program, the most dangerous agent of overseas labour policies was again the Soviet Union in their views.

2.1.1. Cold War Social Scientists

Four representatives of *the cold war social scientists,* Saposs, Steinbach, Lichtblau and Windmuller dealt with the issue by focusing on the policies of the Soviet Union, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the social conditions in third world countries. According to Saposs (1966), the Soviet Union tried to have an influence through WFTU by manipulating trade unions of third world countries and fanning anti Western ideologies in these regions. Additionally, he drew attention to their chaotic social conditions, such as anticolonialist hangover, xenophobia, poverty, disease and illiteracy on provoking bemused social thinking and a formless radicalism. Saposs stated that these events in the third world had provided suitable conditions for the policies of communist powers. In contrast, the aid policies of Western labour movements had functioned to solve the negative effects of these events (29-33).

Steinbach (1966) compared the two international labour organizations, the ICFTU and the WFTU by focusing on their discourses and concepts. In contrast to ICFTU, ICFTU rejected concepts such as class struggle, centralization and changing of the economic system (40). It saw the concept of class struggle as a reflection of Soviet Union policies which relied upon the idea of proletariat dictatorship. Moreover, communist powers, particularly the Soviet Union emphasized liberation from colonialism. This helped communist powers to come to power on the wave of nationalism (ibid, 40-41).

Lichtblau (1966) also concentrated on the policies of WFTU and underlined the importance of WFTU originated from its position within the agenda of Soviet attempts to have an effect on the political atmospheres in countries beyond Soviet influence, particularly in the underdeveloped and ex-colonial regions. According to Lichtblau, the major objective of WFTU was to have a significant role in the political and social reorganization of these regions by targeting particular groups, such as youth, students, professional groups, women etc. and to do these by combining special group' interests with common political purposes. Anti-imperialism, peace, freedom of association, social welfare, anti capitalism and nuclear disarmament were some patterns of these political purposes. Because of the external aids and patronage policies of the WFTU, Lichtblau argued, the Soviet Union was able to use its influence power to create anti-Western nationalist labour organizations (51-54).

According to Windmuller (1963), even if British and French had tried to implement same policies later and even if the International Labour Organization (ILO), as an international labour body, had been established in 1919, the most important and biggest attempt to affect labour organizations was attempted by the Soviet Union in the interwar period. The most vital arms of the Soviet Unions' policies were the national communist parties and different organizations operating in collaboration with the Soviet Union (ibid, 560). Windmuller also argues that the

Soviet Union was the only regime with a particular international labour policy, except for the colonial powers before World War II. However, towards the end of the war the larger triumphant powers including the United States targeted the reform of labour movements of the countries they occupied with armed powers. Moreover, labour policies made up a vital element of hegemony policies in Italy, Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea and Eastern Europe. In so much as that, the US government became more important agent for international labour after the Marshall Plan (ibid, 563). According to Windmuller, the Soviet Union attempted to form a hierarchical communist society, by building up centrally directed state whilst the purpose of the Western powers was to establish democratic processes through the liberation of unions from the governments and political parties. Policies aiming to improve the living standards of workers and increase in the income in these countries had also been supported by the Western powers (ibid, 571-572).

Yet, they were ignoring the reality of the post-Second War period. This is because that in the period, the US, as a hegemonic power of the capitalist world economy, had also interests in applying international labour programs as well as the other programs, such as the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. Additionally, these international policies had ideological aims as well. However, *the cold war social scientists* never paid attention to the ideological dimension of these policies. In other words, according to them, Western labour movements definitely represented the voice of *free world* and functioned in favor of the working classes of third world countries as well as their own working class. As for Soviet Union, in their opinion, as a threat for the workers and the independence of third world countries, it was attempting to have political dominance in these regions by undermining democratic ideals. This was because the Soviet Bloc and its labour bodies were working with dogmatic ideologies such as class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat while the Western labour bodies had a non-ideological position. It is equally important

to note that they ignored the fact of an anti-colonial discourse through different propaganda methods used by the US to undermine other official labour bodies of the Western countries.

Additionally, although they claimed that the Soviet Union exploited the poor living conditions in the third world countries to agitate masses for communism, they never examined the reasons of poor living conditions existed in these countries or the relations between the capitalist mode of production and bad conditions of third world countries. In contrast, they insisted that capitalist mode of production built up by the US in collaboration with its institutions in the third world countries would provide freedom and better living conditions to these countries whilst the Soviet Union was offering little more than propaganda. Such an approach to the issue derived from the ideological position of *the cold war social scientists* relying on the idea that the capitalist mode of production represents freedom while communism or non-capitalist opinions symbolize totalitarianism.

Carlton (1959) developed a more comprehensive framework. He focused on the changing structure of the post second war era, the necessities of competition with communism and the role of unions, particularly American unions in this process, again by describing the communist countries as dictatorial and the Western countries as the representatives of democratic world. According to Carlton, after the Second World War, US economy had entered into a new stage, of which big corporations became one of the most important agents (278) At this time, tendency was in the direction of less unfairness in wealth and income. Therefore, Carlton pointed out that trade unions would become more and more beneficial to capitalism (ibid, 280). Accordingly, the roles of unions were significant to overcome the competition with communist countries. What was necessary in this project was collaboration between management and labour against the totalitarian nations (ibid, 281). In other words, the most important risk of the period was the question marks on the legitimacy of capitalism, and so the labour movements of US had to play a

leading role in collaboration with the business community and government. In addition, the American unions had to promote the idea that the world would advance under capitalism because of the methods of US capitalism in combating poverty, disease, and ignorance. Thus, labour organizations, government and business community of US had to commit important tasks (ibid, 282-283). The first task, Carlton suggested, was to convince the African and Asian countries that the free West was in support of freedom and democracy of African and Asian countries. In this regard, labour organizations of the free world might demonstrate that the free world aimed to guarantee better living conditions by struggling for more food, shelter, clothing, freedom, dignity, and education for every part of the world (ibid, 283). In other words, Carlton argued that US trade unions should be a part of the cold war against the Soviet Union.

2.1.2. The Critics of the Overseas Labour Policies Implemented in Latin America

By the 1960s, the discussions over the overseas labour policies went beyond the arguments cited above. One of the most important developments of the period was the role played by multinational corporations because of the internationalization of capital starting from the end of the Second World War. In parallel, there were also some new developments within international labour movement. The first was that there were struggles for hegemony between different ideological positions within the Western bloc, in addition to the rivalries between the WFTU and the ICFTU. The second was the acceleration and intensification of the overseas labour programmes of the Western capitalist countries in Latin America and later in Africa because of the hegemony struggles mentioned above. Because of these new developments, many

scholars studying the international labour literature began to pay attention to the overseas labour programs of the Western capitalist countries and developed a critical framework by focusing on the negative impacts of these overseas labour programs.

One of the common points of these studies was to concentrate on the financial resources devoted by the donor countries to these overseas programs. They also concentrated on the activities and institutions organized by the labour organizations of capitalist western countries in the third world countries. Their focal point in explaining the rationale of overseas policies ranged from internationalization of productive capital to the protectionism of developed capitalist countries to the establishment of US hegemony through overseas labour programs. Labour institutions, education and training programs and overseas visits were some examples of them. Another common point was to examine the negative impacts of activities organized by the Western capitalist countries in the name of labour solidarity. Some scholars highlighted the ideological and anti-democratic dimensions of such activities while some of them tried to explain the interests of donor countries in implementing such kind programmes. However, it is significant to note that the most important common point of these studies was to be critical of overseas labour policies of the Western capitalist countries.

According to Olle and Scholler (1984), the main reason of overseas labour policies was the protectionism of national trade unions of developed capitalist countries because their basic aim was to save jobs by keeping investments at home. Olle and Scholler argued that after 1965, because of the internationalization of productive capital and the role played by multinational corporations, trade union internationalization was characterized by the protectionism of national trade unions. The policies of the AFL-CIO, the exaggerated protectionist standpoint of the West German and the British trade unions were some examples of this situation (ibid, 51-54).

Spalding (1976) concentrated on the effects of rapid globalization after the Second World War. According to the author, rapid growth and centralized global economy dominated by advanced capitalist countries of the world shaped the interventionist labour policies of developed capitalist countries. The most important agents of such policies, which aimed to control and manipulate the labour movements of the third world countries were the US business, labour and other private institutions. However, according to Spalding the aim of overseas policies was to ensure the capitalist mode of production (ibid: 45-46).

Scipes (2000) compared the different agents' overseas policies of the AFL-CIO. According to Scipes, the characteristic of the traditional AFL-CIO overseas policy of the Meany and Kirkland regimes was the recognition of US domination in the third world countries. Meany and Kirkland had promoted the idea that the control of the world economy by US corporations was good for American workers. Therefore, alliances with the governments and corporations pursuing anti labour policies in the US were put into practice by them. However, his explanation in terms of the reasons of the overseas labour policies was similar to Spalding, and Olle and Scholler. Accordingly, the major aim of these policies, put into practice in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was to secure the investments and profitability of US companies by supporting pro-American labour leaders, pro-capitalism policies and principles. The most important argument for these operations was the communist threat which would allegedly destroy freedoms (Scipes, 2000: 5-9).

Cox (1971) focused on production relations affecting the overseas labour policies internationally. After the Marshall Plan, national labour policies and the role of trade unions had gained major importance in Europe and many trade unionists had began to play a role in the determining process of national economic policies which relied upon the maintenance of full employment. Cox argued that some attempts to export this model to the less developed countries,

particularly to the Latin American countries, came to the agenda in the next period. To be sure, the most important agent of these attempts was the US (ibid, 561). According to Cox, since the 1960s, US corporations had intensified their investments in 'dependent' countries, and this had led to appear new structural dynamics connecting industrial and labour interests in 'metropolitan' and 'dependent' countries (ibid, 576). In his later article, dated 1977, Cox used the concept of hegemony developed by Gramsci to explain the overseas programs of AFL-CIO. Accordingly, a new structure relying on the concept of *corporatist state* had appeared in the US since the 1930s. One of the most important features of this new structure was the attached structure of labour to business administration and government (388). In other words, American organized labour was an important supporter of the expansion of the American capitalism. From this point of view, Cox described the AFL-CIO as a soldier of American capitalism (ibid, 394-396).

O'Brien (2000) defended a similar approach. However, he used the concept of *productivity* to emphasize class compromise between working class and capitalist class. According to O'Brien, during the Cold War era, the majority of Western unions joined the politics of productivity. According to the idea of politics of productivity, an appropriate technical organization of the economy would generate the conditions for wealth by eradicating the requirement for damaging distributional confrontations. This policy had also an international dimension which relied upon the formation of international institutions and regimes in which domestic conciliation was supported. O'Brien borrowed the concept of 'embedded liberalism', which was first described as the compromise between a liberal international economy and national welfare by Ruggie. According to the compromise, US model would be extended around the world through monetary diplomacy, the Marshall Plan, and hostility to leftist parties (O'Brien, 2000: 537).

Haworth and Ramsay (1984) pointed out that colonial powers used their national labour bodies to manage and control embryonic labour organizations in their colonies by indicating the activities of AFL-CIO and CIA in Latin America (81).

In terms of the negative effects of overseas labour policies, imperial, antidemocratic and elitist character of these policies and class compromise were the most important points highlighted by these scholars. For instance, Thomson and Larson argued that these centers were mainly a symbol of governments and few worker movements were allowed to constitute a democratic image and to make governments adequate for International Labour Organization's technical aid funding. Moreover, the centers established by developed countries affiliated to the ICFTU as well as to their own national trade union centers. Therefore, they became a barrier for labour solidarity in different countries (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 36). Wedin (1984) also drew attention to the negative effects of the overseas labour policies in terms of their antidemocratic and elitist character. Accordingly, the activities of AIFLD boosted antidemocratic and elitist tendencies within the labour bodies, and made the democratization of labour movement more difficult (ibid: 24-29). The same point was also highlighted by Spalding (1976). In addition, he pointed out that the influence of US labour movement had to be examined within the larger framework of imperialism. In other words, institutions, such as universities, government agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and clandestine policy bodies like CIA had to be covered by the studies seeking to understand the role of US labour (ibid, 46).

Press (1984) focused on the concept of class compromise, the antidemocratic nature of overseas labour policies and bureaucratization process in labour movements as a result of overseas labour policies. According to the author, one of the key actors formulating these policies was the full time officers of these organizations, because of the structure of these regional

organizations relying upon an oligarchic process within the labour organizations. Press also stated that the activities of international unions were shaped by those organizations. Therefore, participatory democracy was absent altogether in the international organizations. Press underlined the fact that this enforced the limits of international trade unionism and created international organizations that were more vulnerable in terms of national or regional capitals' policies leading to negative external effects. Furthermore, even if global industrial restructuring produced a more solid basis for labour to internationalize its struggles, the international institutions of labour functioned to state the accommodation of working class with capital, rather than proposing any instrument to go beyond the class compromise (ibid, 102).

2.1.3. The Influence of US Overseas Policies in the African Continent

In comparison to Latin American countries, the African continent received less attention from US labour organizations. Nevertheless, some academics tried to understand the relations between US labour and labour movements of African countries.

One of them, Godfried (1987), focused on the trade union education issue in the third world countries, with particular reference to the African continent. Using the concept of 'corporatism', Godfried (1987) argued that after the Second World War, the US organized labour movement and international labour institutions manipulated by the US tried to form 'bread and butter' and 'business' unionism in developing countries. In a word, the internationalization of American capitalism was endorsed by the AFL-CIO and the other unions of the US by focusing on the distribution issue. The basic aim of these policies was to spread American corporatism in the third world. Godfried mainly dealt with the education programs of the AALC with particular

reference to the years between 1965 and 1971 (ibid, 55). Godfried also stated that American labour, capital and the state cooperated with each other to create, encourage and operate pro-US foreign policy institutes and this derived from the corporatist structure dominant in the US labour relations (ibid, 59).

Another scholar, Yevette (1998) concentrated on the overseas policies of the US in the African continent and dealt with the issue by focusing on the relations between African-American labour leaders working together with the AFL-CIO and African labour leaders. According to Yevette, because of the common ethnic and cultural familiarities, Africans and African-Americans might work together for some common goals. However, such kind relations had never been experienced between African and white labour leaders (ibid, 3). Yevette stated that the position of African-American labour leaders was strongly anti-communist because of their citizenship within a nation which directed many countries to fight against communism. Some parts of African labour, resented the inadequacies the ICFTU and attempted to form relations with the AFL-CIO and the AFL-CIO benefited from this situation by giving economic aid to strikers, labour and political activists in Africa (ibid, 9).

As for South Africa, although there has previously been extensive study on relationships between the United States and South Africa with particular reference to political and economic relations, the relations between international labour organizations and the South African labour received little attention in comparison with the many countries in Latin America. This situation was also spotlighted by Eddie Webster. In his study, dated 1984, Webster pointed out that "the role of international trade unionism in the development of black worker organizations in South Africa was a subject that received little attention (177)". Indeed, although, many academics and researchers devoted some chapters of their studies to the issue, only a few of them directly

focused on the relations between international labour movement and the South African labour movement or the overseas policies of the US in South Africa.

In their work focused on the investments of multinational corporations in South Africa, Seidman and Seidman (1977) dealt with the policies of the AALC and the AFL-CIO, and stated that the formation of the AALC followed the increase of US investments in the Southern Africa. According to Seidman and Seidman, the AALC's function did not aim to activate African workers against apartheid but to have an effect on African struggle to ensure the status quo (ibid, 119).

Luckhardt and Wall (1980) also dealt with the issue of international labour relations of the South African labour movement. Actually, their work focused on the history of the SACTU. Therefore, main concern of the study with regard to international labour issue was to examine the international relations of the SACTU with the WFTU, the ICFTU, and the ILO. These authors also displayed important patterns of hegemonic international labour relations. Luckhardt and Wall pointed out that the SACTU always tried to find support from all international labour organizations. Therefore, it formed relations with the ICFTU and the WFTU. However, the ICFTU, the South African labour organizations backed by the ICFTU, the SATUC (later TUCSA) and the FOFATUSA, had not given support SACTU's struggle against apartheid, although they criticized apartheid in words (ibid).

Webster (1984) also handled the imperial relationship between the International Metal Workers Federation (IMF) and the emerging unions in the 1970s in South Africa. The IMF worked with the status quo by not supporting the establishment of independent black worker unions until the Durban strikes waves in the middle of 1970s. However, after the strikes, its policies changed and it began to support black unions (ibid, 227). Although he provided a very useful framework for comprehending the role played by the IMF in South Africa, Webster did

not aim to deal with the imperial labour relations comprehensively, but focused on a specific case.

As stated above, many scholars studying on the history of the South African labour movement devoted a chapter or wrote up the articles on the issue, but only a few of them concentrated on all the issue comprehensively. The two studies conducted by Trewhela (1991) and Southall (1995) developed a broad framework with regard to the issue is among these few studies.

Trewhela (1991) mainly focused on the anti-communist policies of the AALC in the Southern Africa, the relations between the AALC and the CIA, the contacts between the white and non-political unions in South Africa and the AALC, and pointed out that before the formation of the AALC, the US had developed an anticommunist policy framework for the African continent. Nevertheless, after the foundation of the AALC, these policies became more obvious. This was because that the idea in the formation of the AALC was to vaccinate the working class movement against radicalism and to guide it in a way accepted by the American administration (ibid, 74). Trewhela also argued that, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, the AALC had worked in collaboration with the white and '*de facto'* racist trade union in South Africa, the TUCSA, and with anti-communist, anti-SACTU black trade unionists. Moreover, Trewhela argued that the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU had supported the racist policies in this period. On the other hand, after the Durban strikes, the AALC and the AFL-CIO changed their policies (ibid, 81-82).

Southall (1995) also dealt with the international relations of the South African labour movement and argued that WFTU developed a comparatively unified face to the world. However, Southall maintained, Western labour organizations composed a combination of national trade union tendencies. In a word, on the Western side, there were different positions

ranging from the conservative position of the AFL-CIO to the left wing leaning supporters of social democracy within European trade unions (Southall, 1995: 27). According to Southall, while before the 1970s, the relations between South African labour movement and international labour organizations relied heavily upon a kind of labour imperialism, after the re-appearance of black trade unionism in the middle of the 1970s, solidarity started to replace labour imperialism (ibid, 360).

2.2. Different Perspectives Regarding the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)

Even if the TUCSA has received little attention from scholars dealing with the labour history of South Africa in comparison with the other labour organizations of the country such as SACTU and COSATU, those who have studied the policies of TUCSA put forward different arguments. Some of them have directly charged the federation as an example of racist and pro-apartheid trade unionism, whilst others tried to understand its policies by focusing on the changes in the labour process of the country in the sixties. Nevertheless, almost all scholars dealing with TUCSA have accepted that it was a conservative, non-political and pragmatic union.

Luckhardt and Wall argued that the TUCSA had followed the policies of the apartheid government and kept out African trade unions from its ranks. Besides, it had also chosen to be in opposition to SACTU rather than the apartheid regime (Luckhardt and Brenda Wall, 1980). According to Luckhardt and Wall, the main concern for TUCSA was to protect white workers from the competition of unorganized and cheap African labour. On the other hand, TUCSA had preferred to display a paternalistic and opportunistic attitude towards the African workers

(Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Similar to Luckhardt and Wall, also for Baskin, TUCSA was enormously antagonistic to SACTU as well as the ANC and had reacted weakly against the racial legislation of the apartheid government during the 1950s and 1960s. Although, Baskin pointed out that TUCSA was against the racial separation in words, in fact, it had properly fit with the apartheid practices by pushing out African unions from its ranks (Baskin, 1991: 160).

Lipton approached to the issue by looking at the history of relations between the white and black working classes of the country and highlighted that "white workers actively promoted many apartheid policies, particularly the job bar which gave them a monopoly on skilled jobs and preferential employment in other jobs (Lipton, 1986: 184)". Nevertheless, according to Lipton, the following separation of the working class generated problems for white workers as well. As for TUCSA, Lipton pointed out that in general, the members of the council were conservative and its main concern was the economic disadvantage of its members (ibid, 194-195). Godfried also argued that TUCSA had hesitated to count black unions within its ranks. Moreover, Godfried maintained that the council might take into account black unions only if such a policy would provide advantage to its white members (Godfried, 1987: 57). Steinhardt also described the TUCSA as a racialist union by arguing "in the early 1970s, a spontaneous revival of trade union activity within South Africa challenged the racialist principles of TUCSA" (Steinhart, 1988: 1). According to Webster, on the other hand, the TUCSA was "the only pro capitalist moderate union grouping with black membership" (Webster, 1995: 273). Southall highlighted that the establishment of the TUCSA in effect had backed apartheid into the trade union field (Southall, 1995: 52).

To be sure, there were different positions taken by different scholars with regard to the TUCSA. For instance, Peter Alexander (2000) pointed out that although the TUCSA tried to form some relations with pro-apartheid unions, these attempts were not successful. Although for

Alexander, it was possible to criticize the TUCSA for abandoning the African unions and for the weakness of its resistance to the job reservation, this author did not agree with Lipton who described the union as pro-apartheid trade union (125).

Crankshaw (1987) focused on the relations between the labour process and the ethnically exclusive trade union policies accepted by some unions within the TUCSA during the sixties. His argument was that the relations of production represented in a specific labour process shape the broad limits within which certain kind of trade union strategies could be efficiently used. However, Crankshaw suggested that many non-class or political and ideological relations were important in determining the result of trade union struggles. The supply of labour, government legislation, the nationalist/racist position of white union members, the structure of state, the executive structure of trade unions, the relations between trade union leaders and its members and trade union ideology were some examples of this (1-10). According to Crankshaw, TUCSA had tried to organize cheap African labour to prevent the undercutting of white workers by cheap African labour power. However, Crankshaw stated that state and right wing trade unions opposed these attempts. The labour process and the racial division of labour were other reasons for the conflicts within TUCSA (ibid, 19-21). In his later article, Crankshaw (1990) dealt with the TUCSA by focusing on the building industry. According to the author, after the time economic expansion of the sixties, the undercutting process of skilled white workers by cheaper and less skilled African labour had speeded up. Therefore, the policies of the apartheid government to maintain the segregation of cheap labour had become more important for white workers (1). At the period, TUCSA had opposed the policy of job reservation. However, because of this stance of it many affiliated unions started to withdraw from its ranks (ibid, 10-15). Therefore, it was not the pro-apartheid nature of the union federation, but different dynamics, such as demands of its

members, the policies of the apartheid government had played a significant role in the shaping process of TUCSA's policies.

Clercq (1979) also approached to the issue by dealing with the demands of white workers and argued that during the 1950s and 1960s, the main aim of many South African trade unionists, especially who those worked within the TUCSA was to ensure and enhance the benefits of their members. According to Clercq, even if they announced that their purpose was to incorporate African workers, the unions working within the ranks of TUCSA took actions for their self-interests, which were effective for TUCSA's policies (72-74).

Coupe (1995) also concentrated on the position taken by the white workers and production relations of the post Second World War era in South Africa. In this study, Coupe stated that the post Second World War political economy of South Africa had witnessed clashes around the role of white labour. Besides, because of the development of mechanized production relations, the most important matter for white labour had been the continuation of the industrial colour bar. According to Coupe, "TUCSA was ill-equipped to take the plunge into radical trade unionism (ibid, 467)".

According to Imrie (1979), who was a leading member of TUCSA, and who provided an official history of the TUCSA; the union was one of the few patterns of the organizations mirroring real and triumphant collaboration between different ethnic groups. In other words, Imrie argued that TUCSA had been created by workers coming from different races and economic conditions and even if it had faced with pressures from the left-wing, the right-wing and its own members, it might take a position on the centre of the political sphere (1-2). However, in the next pages of her study, Imrie revealed that TUCSA had held a political stance on slightly right of centre but because of TUCSA's antagonism to apartheid, it had been identified for many times as 'left-wing' (ibid, 50). Imrie also revealed that the main focal points

of the union were the bread and butter or economic matters, including wages, prices, working conditions, inflation and taxation issue, pensions, housing, transport. However, because of the apartheid policies of government, it was not able to realize all of its aims (54).

Chapter III

A General Review of the Post Second World War Era

3.1. Restructuring of Capital Accumulation Process Around the World

After the Second World War, the world economy was restructured. The fundamental cause of this phenomenon was that the US, which accumulated massive capital during the period between two world wars, had huge production power. At the end of the Second World War, its economy had a growing market, great productive capacity and a strong currency. For example, it had three-quarters of the world's existing monetary gold. In 1950, it produced about 60 percent of the total output of the biggest seven capitalist countries. Its manufacturing industry was two, three and nine times more productive than the manufacturing industries in following countries respectively UK, Germany and Japan. In addition, all these combined with its huge military power (Glyn, 2006: 8; Peet, 2007: 39).

Additional factors also changed the global landscape, such as the advance to political independence by countries which were colonies in the past, the existence of the Soviet Union as a representative of an alternative world order, the increasing influence of social democratic and socialist parties in the Western Europe and the establishment of socialist governments in the Eastern Europe. Another factor affecting the economic and political atmosphere of the post Second World War period was Western European countries' economic problems. First of all, in these countries, production had decreased sharply from prewar levels. The scarcity of certain goods, work force shortages, displaced people, and the collapse of transportation and

communication systems as well as of trade were among other economic problems. In 1946 and 1947, the shortage of coal, which was the most important energy source of the Western Europe, also affected production negatively (Block, 1978: 77). In addition, before the Second World War, trade relations between the two parts of Europe were very intensive. However, after the establishment of socialist governments in the Eastern European countries, trade between two regions sharply fell down and this made important contribution to the economic problems in the Western side (Block, 1978: 77).

In Western Europe, since the thirties, right wing policies and politicians had lost their credibility because of their economic failures and their widespread collaboration with fascism in the thirties. However, leftist parties had gained an important prestige because of their struggles against fascism. Economic and social conditions of the post war period also strengthened the legitimacy of leftist policies and led left political movements to gain popularity. As a result of the popularity of leftist political movements, strong demands for social reforms and social justice, brought to the agenda by trade unions and leftists parties, became one of the most important element of the Western European political atmosphere (Block, 1978:78).

Such conditions forced the US, as the hegemonic power of the world capitalist system, to create mechanisms to counter the risks which were required to sustain global capitalism. The first attempt was the establishment of international institutions and regulations, such as the International Money Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction (IBDR) and the General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT), to ensure the continuation of capital accumulation process under the leadership of the US. In fact, the Bretton Woods Conference, of which outcomes were the establishment of the IMF and the IBRD in 1944, and the GATT in 1947, was a mutual plan of the US and Britain. However, the US dominated the conference and directed it to the line of its national interests benefiting from the economic

weakness of Britain. By doing so, the US was able to establish a hegemonic monetary order centered on the dollar. This also meant that the world leadership of Britain ended whilst the US emerged as new hegemonic power (Peet, 2007: 39, 53).

The other attempt of the US to ensure continuation of capitalist system was the introducing of the Marshall Plan, which aimed to strength capitalist production relations in the Western European countries. During the period, in addition to the problems mentioned above, one of the most important economic problems of the Western European countries was the deficit in dollar reserves because of collapsed production and export opportunities in these countries. This was also an obstacle for a multilateral trade between the US and Western European countries. In other words, the persistence of difficulties of the Western European countries in earning dollars might lead to strict controls on foreign trade and exchange on dollar imports in these countries and this would mean that the US could lose an important market for its overproduction. Additionally, the Western European countries' economic and social problems might lead to communists coming to power. Therefore, the US provided financial support to vitalize their economies in a U.S.-dominated multilateral world economy. This project was realized in two steps: to enhance the Western Europe's capacity to earn dollars by increasing export and expanding US private investments in the region. In other words, private sector or US business would play a significant role in the process (Block, 1978: 88-89). The second dimension of the Marshall Plan was to create an anticommunist political atmosphere. Under the Marshall Plan discussions and implementations in the Western European countries, different institutions were established, communists and leftists were suppressed, military capacities were strengthened, private capital flows from the US to the Western Europe was encouraged, and all economic policies were regulated in favor of multilateral and liberal trade relations. By doing so, a suitable atmosphere for US model capitalism was created, the influence of leftists/communists was

diminished, and the positions of US corporations in the European market as well as liberal trade relations between the Western European countries were guaranteed[1] (Block, 1978, O'Brien, 2000: 535, Cox, 1971: 562).

Although discussions on the Marshall Plan led to splits between a number of organisations, such as trade unions and left wing political parties in the Western European countries, the US did not encounter strong oppositions to the creation process of US style capitalism (Marglin, 1990: 6). Therefore, in the US as well as in the Western European countries, many important changes occurred in economic and social life in this process. The class compromise between capital and working class was only one of them. Accordingly, the decisions of enterprises, such as increases in compensation together with labour productivity, working conditions and job security would be taken by the managements of corporations unilaterally. However, trade unions would also make cooperation with the management. The compromise also relied upon the idea that the unionized workers would have advantage in comparison with non-unionized part of the working class. Although some working class organisations such as WFTU and its members around the world demanded the socialization and democratization of the ownerships of the means of production, within the Western side, labour movements accepted the delimiting the power of capital through regulations and reforms. At the same time, they accepted the legitimacy of capitalism (Wahl, 2007; Gordon at all, 1986: 48-49). All these developments in the relations between capital and labour contributed to intensification of labour segmentation along job, gender, and racial lines (Wahl, 2007). Additionally, one of the most important components of production process (as well as of trade union movements) became bureaucratization because of increasing bureaucratic control by the army of management cadres devoted to supervision and discipline production process (Gordon at all, 1987: 48-49).

[1] The Marshall Plan had important effects in terms of international labour movement but these effects will be dealt within following chapter.

Another effect of the post Second World War era was the indisputable superiority of the US and its organizations around the world. During the period, the US economical, political and military institutions played a significant role in world political economy. They dominated foreign suppliers of the goods needed by the production in the US and buyers of the goods produced by US corporations (Gordon at all, 1987: 49). In other words, almost all the rules of game were determined by the US and its institutions alone.

3.2. Restructuring Process of International Labour Movement

After the Second World War, the international labour movement was also restructured. This process began with the establishment of WFTU in a conference held in London in October 1945. In the conference, of which the CIO from US, the TUC from Britain and the Soviet labour organizations were participant, the WFTU was established as a single worker international. The assertion of the WFTU was that it was the representative of 67 million workers from 56 countries. Therefore, in the same year, following its demand, the WFTU was recognized as a representative of world labour at the meeting of the United Nations (Southall, 1995: 36-37, Thomson and Larson, 1978:13, O'Brien, 2000: 536).

The formation of the WFTU led other labour organization of the US, the AFL, which was strongly anti-communist and had strong relations with US government, business community and the CIA, to take an anti-WFTU stance. In contrast to the CIO, in which communist trade unionists were working since its formation after the New Deal policies in the thirties, the AFL and its leading managers argued that the WFTU was not a representative of world labour but an unusual amalgamation of British colonialism and Soviet Communism. For example, according to

George Meany, who was one of the most important managers of the AFL, although there were fifteen British dominions in the WFTU, seven of them did not have a real labour movement. Further, British imperialism had six million votes whilst the voting power of the Soviet Union was 27 million. In other words, the most important communist power of the world had a significant position within the organization. Therefore, the existence of the WFTU as a labour international was not acceptable to AFL (Thomson and Larson, 1978:6-13).

The British side had a different stance. The TUC, which supported British colonial policies by expelling communist-led/left wing unions from its ranks, had played a significant role in the formation of the WFTU. However, for it, the importance of the WFTU was coming from the idea that the imperial position of Britain in colonies might be saved through the WFTU. From this point of view, the TUC sought to have a hegemonic position within the WFTU. However, the WFTU remained as a leftist organization and brought the socialization and democratization of the ownerships of the means of production to the agenda (Southall, 1995: 36-38; Harrod: 1972; Cooper, 1996, Wahl, 2007).

In fact, the US rivalry against the WFTU and the TUC's policies within the organization were representing two important signals that the merger of labour under the WFTU umbrella would not able to have a long life. Three dynamics played a significant role in the undermining process of the WFTU. The first was the policies of the AFL against the WFTU. In 1947, many communist and leftist trade unionists were forced to leave the CIO through the efforts of the AFL. This was the first step of the AFL's policies to force the CIO to work with the AFL (Southall, 19995: 34-37). The other step would be the merger of two unions in 1955. At that time, the anticommunist stance of the combined organizations, the AFL-CIO, would also be guaranteed by writing to the AFL-CIO's constitution the following sentence:

> *…to protect the labour movement from any and all corrupt influences and from the undermining efforts of communist agencies and all others who are opposed to the basic principles of our democracy and free democratic unionism (Windmuller, 1956: 422).*

The second dynamic was the policies of other international labour organizations working in collaboration with the AFL to undermine the WFTU. Many labour organizations operating under the umbrella of International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), which was a trade and industry based international labour model established in 1889, were example of this situation. The third was the withdrawals of the British TUC and the CIO from the WFTU. As pointed out above, the TUC had played a significant role in the establishment process of the WFTU. However, when communist trade unionists gained a hegemonic position within the WFTU and the critiques against Britain's imperial policies were brought to the agenda by the communists, the TUC decided to leave the organization. This decision was realized under the Marshall Plan discussions, to which the WFTU took a very critical position. At the same period, the CIO also left the WFTU. In short, the first result of the undermining process of the WFTU was the withdrawal of the TUC and the CIO from the WFTU under the debates of the Marshall Plan in 1948, leaving it as a communist-led international labour organization. The second result would be the establishment of a new and rival international labour organization under the leadership of the AFL (O'Brien, 2000: 536; Southall, 19995: 34-37; Press, 1984:89).

After the breaking of the WFTU, in 1949, a new trade union international, the ICFTU, was established under the leadership of the AFL. The CIO and the TUC also became members of the new organization. To be sure, one of the most important aims in the establishment of the ICFTU was to battle against communist labour organizations around the world. In other words, the ICFTU committed itself to undertake an anti communist mission. At the same time, there

were different attempts of the AFL in collaboration with the US intelligence service, the CIA, as well as with other military institutions and business community in different countries, to support the formation of new and anti-communist national labour organizations. For example, during the Marshall Plan discussions in the late forties, the AFL financed and encouraged anticommunist political groups to boost non-communist trade unions in France, Germany and Italy (O'Brien, 2000: 537, Southall, 1995: 37, Cooper, 1996, Cox, 1977: 395).

These developments led to several unfavorable results for international and national movement labour movements. The first was the isolation of the Eastern labour organizations from the Western labour organizations. The second was that after the breaking of the WFTU, a new division, relying heavily upon communist or non-communist ideological positions between labour organizations, came up in many Western countries. In short, trade unions in different countries came to duplicate global ideological, political and economic rivalries (Southall, 1995; Cooper, 1996, O'Brien, 2000: 536). As for the third, because of the cold war between labour organizations, trade unions weakened and encountered important problems in Western countries. O'Brien argues that there was a causality relation between this phenomenon and following political factors. The first was the expulsion of communists and other radicals, who had played a major role within the trade union movement since the 1920s. This meant the sacrificing of militant trade unionists from the ranks of labour movement. The second was the conservative structure of the established trade unions. This situation also strengthened the bureaucratization of trade unionism. The third was that trade unions in the Western countries might be charged as rebels or communists when they developed militant strategies to ensure workers' rights. Therefore, they had to show their faithfulness to the ideological position and social order of the Western side (O'Brien, 2000: 537).

As mentioned above, in the post-Second World War era, trade union internationalism tended to replicate global ideological, political and economic rivalries and concerns. During the period, there were four different trade union ideologies: Communism/socialism, social democracy, Christianity and business unionism. Each of these ideological positions was represented by different international organizations. For example, as pointed out above, the WFTU was the representative of communist or left wing trade unionism, while the ideological position of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) hinged on the Catholicism. As for the ICFTU, even if conservative, liberal and pro-capitalist AFL had a significant role in its formation, in respect to its majority, it was a representative of European social democracy (Press, 1984: 89). However, differences between the European trade unionism and American trade unionism within the ICFTU also led to some controversies. Within the ICFTU, there were two different political tendencies linked to the given four ideologies. The anti socialists, anti-social democratic and conservative ideological position of the AFL (later AFL-CIO) and the social democratic position of the European trade unions. The AFL's trade unionism understanding relied heavily upon the concept of business unionism or bread-and-butter unionism. According to Harrod, American unionism could be described with following names: business unionism, philosophy of no-philosophy unionism, non-political unionism, pragmatic unionism, practical unionism, pure- and-simple unionism, and bread-and-butter unionism (Harrod, 1972). The most determinant idea for the US labour was that the capitalist mode of production is the best for workers. Therefore, labour organizations might suggest some reform but should never try to change the system. Additionally, according to this model, labour organizations should be operating as interest groups concentrating only on economic issues and be dependent on the tripartite structure composed by the government, business community and worker organizations (Godfried, 1987: 52; Spalding, 1976: 45-46). Moving from such an ideological position, the AFL (and after the merger the AFL-

CIO) promoted the internationalization of US capitalism. It also worked for the legitimacy of productionist and distributionist notions through 'bread and butter' unionism. Of course, in such a trade unionism understanding, the most important partners of it would be the US state and its organizations, such as the CIA, USAID, state departments, universities as well as multinational corporations (Godfried, 1987: 52).

After the introduction of the Marshall Plan, the importance of trade unions in US foreign policy increased. Especially by the 1950s, under the effects of the internationalization of capital and US economical and political hegemony, the AFL-CIO operated in regions where US corporations had important investments or military relations. AFL-CIO's policies relied heavily upon two basic principles. The first was to support pro-capitalism policies whilst the second was to work in collaboration with anti labour agents, governments, business community and intelligent services at home and abroad (Spalding, 1976: 46, Scipes, 6-10, Southall, 1995: 45). Of course, this kind working style embraced by AFL-CIO affected the relations between the AFL-CIO and other trade unions working within the ICFTU.

The AFL's policies seeking to have a dominant position within the international labour movement had a major impact upon other labour organizations working within the ICFTU. The basic concern for the AFL was the ICFTU's 'soft' stance on 'communism threat'. Additionally, according to the AFL, the TUC might try to dominate the organization and this might lead the ICFTU to advocate colonialism. To be sure, the continuation of colonialism would not be suitable for the American interests in colonial regions. Therefore, the AFL tried to undermine the TUC's position within the organization. For example, at the second congress of the ICFTU in Milan in 1951, Victor Tewson, the general secretary of TUC, was elected as the president of the ICFTU. After the election, the AFL boycotted the ICFTU for two years (Southall, 1995: 39). From this point of view, it can be argued that the most important sides of hegemony struggle within the

ICFTU were the AFL and the TUC, because of their determining positions in the world political economy. In other words, while the US as the new hegemonic power of the world was trying to undermine Britain's position in colonial regions and TUC's position in labour area, the TUC's aim was to function in order to save its old hegemonic position in favor of the colonial role of Britain. However, the winner of this struggle was American side because of its huge financial possibilities coming from anti-labour presidents, the biggest US corporations and the CIA. In addition, after the merger with the CIO in 1955, the AFL-CIO's influence and weight within the ICFTU increased (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 5).

3.3. Hegemony Struggles within the Western Bloc and the Beginning of Overseas Labour Policies in the Post-Second War Era

Historically, many colonial powers embraced overseas labour policies in order to control the labour movements and social order in their colonies before the Second World War. For example, the 1920s and the 1930s represented a period that Britain had an important influence over the Indian labour movement and in the African countries during the Second World War through the TUC and full-time labour officials (Haworth and Ramsay, 1984: 81). It also encouraged the establishment of trade unions. For example, in 1930 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Passfield, notified colonies that the development of trade unionism in the colonies was a desirable and legitimate characteristic of industrial and social development. At the same period, France also applied a similar policy in its colonies (Windmuller, 1963: 562).

The US also used a similar method in different regions around the world. For example, in 1918, the AFL helped the formation of Pan American Labour in Latin America (PALLA). The basic aim of the AFL in helping to the formation of PALLA was to show the way implemented by the AFL in the labour area (Windmuller, 1963: 560-563). Between the two world wars, the AFL's overseas policies relied on anti-fascism. In the next period, however, the most important target in its international relations became anti-communism. For instance, during the Second World War, the AFL had strong relations with one of the most important nationalist and communist-led trade union organization of Latin America, Latin American Confederation of Labour (CTAL), which was affiliated with the WFTU. However, after the Second World War, this situation changed rapidly. Some labour attaches, including Irving Brown, who operated in almost all continents as a cold warrior in favor of US interests in the post Second World War period, were appointed to the region to develop relations with non-communist labour organizations. As a result of these efforts, in 1948, the most important national trade union disaffiliated from the CTAL. Subsequently, the Confederacion Interamericana de Trabajadores (CIT) was established as a rival WFTU and the pro-Peronist Argentine Labour Confederation (CGT), which was described as a 'fascist' organization by the AFL. However, the new non-communist organization could not survive for a long time because of new developments within international labour. It amalgamated with the other non-communist labour organizations of the region within three years and its name was changed to the Organizational Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (the Inter American Regional Labour Organization-ORIT), which became an affiliate the ICFTU (Scipes, 2000: 9, Spalding, 1976: 50, Bethell and Roxborough, 1992, 27-28).

ORIT was also a means of controlling the Latin American labour movement. Many governments and intelligent services of the Western capitalist countries benefited from ORIT in terms of controlling labour in the continent. In particular, US government in collaboration with the AFL-CIO played a significant role in the internal and external policies of ORIT. For example, the AFL-CIO always tried to dominate the ORIT through its financial resources (Thomson and Larson, 1978:40-43). Further, ORIT's stance was a reflection of AFL-CIO's ideology and so its first aim was to struggle against communism by rejecting the existence of class antagonisms. According to the ORIT's official policies, Latin American labour was an interest group like other professional groups, such as military, church or landowners, but not was a social class. Additionally, it addressed reforms within the existing system, but rejected the existence of class oppositions (Wedin, 1984: 26; Spalding, 1976: 50).

ORIT's activities ranged from trade unionist education to the formation of schools for trade union leaders at different universities, to special trade union institutes in collaboration with US government agencies, such as the State Department, US embassies and to the formation of different social facilities, such as libraries, offices, restaurants in different regions. It also organized several paramilitary activities, supported dictatorships and tried to split left resistance movements (Spalding, 1976: 51; Thomson, and Larson, 1978:39-40). For example, it supported a US financed military coup against the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and the Bay of Pigs attack, which was organized by US backed Cubans against Castro in 1961. The coup against Brazilian president Joao Goulart in 1964 was also supported by the ORIT (Spalding 1976: 51)

It also had strong relations with many national and international institutions, such as the USAID, the Organization of American States, the Inter American Development Bank, ITSs, the labour departments of US embassies, the International Development Foundation (IDF), the Council on Latin America and many private institutions (Spalding, 1976: 52). As for its financial

resources, although British and European trade union leadership provided an important financial resource for ORIT, its most important financier was the US institutions, including, the CIA and the AFL-CIO (Thomson and Larson, 1978:39).

As mentioned above, ORIT played a significant role in the creation of non-communist labour movements and supporting anticommunist governments in Latin America. However, the formation and existence of ORIT as a non-communist and Western-led organization did not solve the problems between Americans and Europeans, especially between the AFL-CIO and the TUC. One of the most striking indicators of this was the discussion on the International Solidarity Fund (ISF) towards the end of the fifties. At the 1957 Congress of the ICFTU in Tunis, a decision was taken to form an international trade union solidarity fund, which would be managed by the general secretary of the organization. At the conference, a fund committee was appointed. The chairperson of the committee was Jacob Oldenbroek, who was from Netherlands and the General Secretary of ICFTU. However, the committee also comprised members from Canada, West Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and the US. The aim of the fund was to gather two million pounds over the next three years period. For such an aim, US contribution to the fund was important. However, there was a question mark about whether the US, which was intending to launch its own independent plans to establish a labour school in Africa, would try to dominate the fund's policies. In the meeting of committee members a few months later, Vincent Tewson, who was the TUC's General Secretary, was elected as chairperson of the fund. Later, the AFL- CIO was convinced on the idea that it would convert 50.000 dollars, which would be invested into the African labour centre and would also provide a grant for the ICFTU's plan. Additionally, the AFL-CIO agreed to give a million dollars to the fund (Thomson and Larson, 1978:19, Southall, 1995: 39). However, in return for this grant the AFL-CIO demanded a more powerful position within the fund by using its financial power and by threatening the ICFTU with leaving the fund

to run its own independent program. In doing so, the aim of the AFL-CIO was to force Oldenbroek to resign. Therefore, after the 1959 Congress of the ICFTU, Meany pointed out that they could withdraw his men and money unless Oldenbroek was taken away (Thomson and Larson, 1978:20-21, Southall, 1995: 41). However, since Oldenbroek had a significant support from the European trade unions he was able to save his position. As mentioned above, the AFL-CIO had some serious problems with the TUC. For example, although they worked together under the ICFTU umbrella for a long time, they had different organizational strategy understandings, especially in Latin America and Africa. The TUC's strategy was to build up grass roots organizations, while the US aimed to create national centers. However, in fact, the problem was much beyond the difference between organizational strategies. They were worried about each other's plans and influences in Latin America and Africa (Southall, 1995: 41; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963). This situation also continued after the retirement of Tewson. When he retired in 1960, George Meany replaced him as chairperson of the fund and promised that the AFL-CIO would not carry out its own independent program. However, this time, the TUC declined to pay money to the fund for the period between 1961 and 1963, arguing that financial resources had been wasted (Southall, 1995: 40; Thomson and Larson, 1978:21). Furthermore, when the ISF had first begun, the ICFTU claimed that activities should be financed by union funds. However, the AFL-CIO sought to have a hegemonic position within the fund, and in the last, it became successful. Subsequently, the AFL-CIO's struggle for hegemony in labour area in Latin America and Africa was won by the US and AFL-CIO, especially by the sixties (Southall, 1995: 41-43; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980; Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963).

Towards the end of the fifties, American unionists had organized several activities in Latin America. For example, in 1959 Joseph Beirne, head of the Communications Workers of America (and later one of the top officials of AIFLD) launched a training program for Latin

American trade unionists. Because of the success of this initiative, he suggested to George Meany to organize a similar trade union program on behalf of the AFL-CIO. The following year, George Lodge, the Secretary of Labour, released a statement advising that bilateral organizations might be more effective than multilateral ones in the labour field in Latin America. Subsequently, the AFL-CIO Executive Committee organized an Education program for Latin American trade unions. In the frame of this project three hundred non-communist unionists would be given three months education in the United States (Spalding, 1976: 53-55). However, the AFL-CIO and the US State Department avoided organizing a fully independent program in Latin America almost until the 1960s, believing that Latin American labour movement must be kept secure against communist influence. However, the Cuban Revolution in January 1960 became an important turning point. After the revolution, in 1961, the AFL-CIO decided to form an independent AFL-CIO trade union foundation named the American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD). Consequently, in 1962, the AIFLD was launched. The creation of AIFLD meant that the AFL-CIO broke its promise to the ICFTU by entering its own independent route (Southall, 1995: 42; Thomson and Larson, 1978:22, Scipes, 10; Spalding, 1976:53)

Although the AIFLD was established as a non-profit corporation, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees was a millionaire J.Peter Grace, who was Chief Executive of W.R Grace and Company, which was a multinational with huge holdings in Latin America (Thomson and Larson, 1978:43). Therefore, the Institute was financed by different profit organizations at the same time. For instance beside the AFL-CIO and the US government as non-profit institutions there were also several American corporations, including W.R.Grace&Company, Anaconda Company and Pan American World Airways as financiers (Cox, 1971: 555). Among its other important sponsors there were the USAID and the CIA. For instance, between 1961 and 1963, it received nearly one million dollar just from the CIA. Within the period between 1962 and 1967,

89 percent of its funds was provided by the USAID. However, the contribution of the fees from members was about 6 percent while the contribution of business represented by grants from over 70 corporations was only five percent. During this period, the US government made almost 16 million dollars contribution to AIFLD (Spalding, 1976:54). By the end of the sixties, its annual budget reached almost seven million dollars and by 1971, it became the fifteenth largest recipient of largesse from USAID with 7.593 million dollars (Wedin, 1984: 25; Spalding, 1976:54). In addition to its financial power, the AIFLD was a very important political institution in the US foreign affairs. For example, in some countries even it was able to overrule the wishes of US ambassadors (Thomson and Larson, 1978:43).

The AIFLD had two basic functions. The first was the training of labour leaders on a non-communist and non-political trade unionism basis, by aiming to create free *trade unions* while the second was to support the activities of US companies in the region. Additionally, for all activities organized by the AIFLD, a tripartite structure, which meant the alliance between labour, corporations and government, was the key point (Scipes, 20009). Besides, unions trained by the AIFLD had to be critical against communism but should not be critical of the United States, US corporate investments and the regional governments where these unions existed should have good relations with the US (Scipes, 9, Spalding, 1976:54, Wedin, 1984: 26). For the AIFLD there were two different type countries around the world: the *totalitarian* countries like the ones behind the *Iron Curtain* and the *democratic* ones like Western capitalist countries. As for the Latin American countries, they were *autocratic* countries, and not dangerous as the *totalitarian* countries were. This was because that they did not have total regulation and control over the lives of their citizens (Wedin, 1984: 27).

One of the most important aims of the activities organized by the AIFLD was to create labour leaders embracing AFL-CIO's criteria. Therefore, it organized many visits for trade unionists to the US in order to show the American way. Educational and social projects, regional and local training activities, regional or local periodic educational meetings, books, pamphlets, educational and technical assistance programs from union to union, visitor exchanges, new institutions to strengthen the national labour bodies were some examples of its activities (Spalding: 1976:52-55, Scipes, 2000, 9-10). For example, its main educational program was organized in Chile. Through these education programs, 5963 Chileans attended in the seminars organized by the AIFLD. By the end of 1972, another 2874 people were trained. At the same time, 108 Chileans graduated from the AIFLD course at Front Royal, Virginia (Scipes, 2000, 18). In Columbia and Peru, the AIFLD trained almost five percent of all union members. The candidates who became successful were additionally presented a three-month course in AIFLD's training centre at Front Royal. Furthermore, these people remained on the payroll for a more nine months, after the course was completed. 'The Inter America and International Labour Movement', 'Adult Education, Instruction in Co-operatives', 'Time and Motion Study', 'Credit Unions', 'the Co-operative Movement: Techniques and Problems', 'the AIFLD Department of Social Projects', 'History and Structure of North American Labour Movement', 'Political Systems: Democracy and Totalitarianism' were among the subjects of Front Royal (Thomson and Larson, 1978:43).

To sum up the AIFLD' policies played a significant role in the creating process of weakened, divided, 'yellow' trade unions (Wedin, 1984: 27). The AIFLD also played an important role in inspiring other countries to create overseas labour programs in Latin America. In other words, after the AIFLD, many countries, such as Germany and France, tried to strength their positions in developing countries by using the ICFTU for trade unions or their own national

foundations for national political purposes. For example, in the beginning of the sixties, Germany launched its independent overseas labour policy operated by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the Social Democratic Party, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Christian Democrats and Neumann Foundation of the Liberal Party. Activities of these organizations were financed by the German government, businesses and trade unions (Thomson and Larson, 1978: 28). However, because of its dominant position the US labour movement would have a distinguished and a more strong position in Latin America and, in the next period, in Africa.

3.4. Overseas Labour Programs in Africa

For the US, the establishment of the new hegemony in Africa was also important because of the strategic position and rich agricultural and mineral sources of the latter. However, national liberation, communist and labour movements were very important actors of the era in all over the world. In many countries, they were struggling against colonial policies of the past, trying to establish a non-capitalist order or aiming to gain political independence. This was also fact in the African continent. From the 1960s, many African nations gained their political independence from the British and French colonial empires, and revolutionary and Marxist movements played important role at this process. Therefore, the US tried to establish its hegemony in Africa over and above that of the incumbent colonial powers. In short, the US drive to achieve hegemony in Africa became one of the most important phenomena of the period (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 9-11).

Policies to realize this aim ranged from the investments of multinational corporations to the operations of the CIA. Clandestine political and paramilitary activities also played a significant role in the process of creating a new order in Africa. The use of businesses as an intelligence cover was one of the examples of this tendency. Otherwise, US objectives were pursued through political advisers, subsidies to individuals, financial support and technical assistance to governments, support of private organizations including labour unions and corporations, secret propagandas, exchange of persons, economic operations, paramilitary or political actions to support African regimes etc. Through these kinds of policies, the US tried to undermine the liberation movements on the continent according to the logic that white minority rule in Southern Africa would best serve American interests in terms of profits and containing communism (Davis, 1978:285-289; Lemarchand, 1978:345). In 1969, this policy reached a new level. Under the growing struggles against colonialism in Southern Africa, the US official policy reached a conclusion through National Security Study Memorandum 39 ordered by Henry Kissinger. Accordingly, the Whites would stay in Southern Africa and constructive transformation would be realized only through whites. Additionally, blacks should not hope to change current political situation by using violence. The best policy was to relax the US stance against the White regimes and to counterbalance the political costs of such an approach by extending support to other Southern African states (Southall, 1995: 186).

During the 1960s, US overseas labour policies also extended towards African states. However, although the AFL-CIO had an important power in Latin America, in the African continent the situation was different. In other words, in Africa, it had a limited influence. Therefore, it used the ICFTU to extend its influence within the African labour movements. The ICFTU was important for the AFL-CIO's overseas programs in Africa because approximately 57 per cent of organized workers in Africa were members of the national labour organizations

affiliated to the ICFTU as of 1957 (Southall, 1995: 40). However, this did not mean that the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU worked in accord with each other. In contrast, the AFL-CIO tried to undermine the ICFTU to have more strong position for itself in the region. For example, in 1957, the ICFTU organized an African Regional Conference in Accra, Ghana. The conference witnessed conflicts between the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU. In the conference, the AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer, William Schnitzler, gave a speech criticizing colonialism. Because of the speech, the French observer Marcel Babau criticized the ICFTU secretariat for not reviewing the speech before. He also charged US representatives of trying to organize political action. According to Babau, the presence of AFL-CIO representatives in the conference was also a problematic because the AFL-CIO had not contributed to the ICFTU regional fund, which had funded the conference. British TUC was also worried about the potential impact of the US in general. In the conference, although a decision to establish a labour school and an African regional organization was taken, the ICFTU was not able to succeed these proposals before than AFL-CIO's attempts (Yevette, 1998: 8). Some American trade unions, especially International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), managed by Springer, had begun to give some financial support to some African unions to support strikers or other labour activists. Besides, in the next period, in Kenya, the Kenya Federation of Labour's (KFL) trade union center and solidarity house were established with the AFL-CIO's financial supports. Some African trade unionists were also offered a labour scholarship program to attend a trade union education program at the Harvard labour Management Industrial Relations Center (Yevette, 1998: 9). However, the AFL-CIO continued to work under the ICFTU umbrella.

In 1960, the ICFTU established the African Regional Organisation (AFRO) to diminish the effects of radical and left wing African trade unionists (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 130; Southall, 1995: 41). As a response to the formation of the AFRO, in May 1961, in Casablanca,

radical and leftist trade unionist from different African countries established the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) which was supported by the WFTU. Their main argument was that African trade unionism should be based neither on the Eastern trade unionism nor on the Western trade unionism. They also highlighted the importance of working class unity and the independence of trade unions, rejection of external interference, internationalist policies and solidarity with working class around the world, workers participation in the regulation and management of development programmes (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 132; Southall, 1995: 41). After the establishment of the AATUC, the AFRO and other non-AATUF labour organizations established the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) which permitted to its member organizations to become affiliate in other labour internationals (Southall, 1995:42).

In fact, in the African continent, the AFL-CIO's basic target was to weaken the TUC's position. Therefore, it attacked colonialism and attempted to set up and finance national trade union centers from a top down approach. However, the TUC seemed doubtful about the AFL-CIO's political connections (Southall, 1995: 41). For example, according to Tewson, who objected the Americans by arguing that they were equating the TUC with British colonialism in Africa, the TUC would not abandon Africa because of five reasons. First, they believed in trade unionism. Second, in their view trade unions could cut across racial, ethnic and religious diversities. Third, the managing of routine trade union problems was vital for African workers and it was an important training opportunity for handling the wider national difficulties. Fourth, trade union organization could make important contributions to economic stability of the region and this was important for the newly independent countries in the region. Fifth, free and democratic trade union would guarantee democratic systems (Thomson, and Larson, 1978:51). However, especially after the beginning of the sixties, ICFTU's and TUC's influence in the African continent declined (Meynaud and Salah-Bey, 1963: 92).

. In 1964, the African American Labour Center (AALC) supervised by Irving Brown from New York, was formed by the AFL-CIO. The formation of the AALC followed the increase of US investments in Southern Africa. This meant that conflicts between the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO reached a different stage. As a result of new stage, in the next period, for example, the AFL-CIO left the ICFTU (Southall, 1995: 43). As mentioned above, the US had developed an anticommunist policy framework for the African continent. However, after the foundation of the AALC these policies became more obvious (Trewhela, 191: 74). Its function was not to activate African workers against the policies of minority regimes in Africa but was to have an effect on African struggle to ensure the status quo by vaccinating the working class movement against radical powers (Seidman and Seidman, 119). This aim had two different dimensions: Economic and social. In the economic dimension, the aim was to create a working class movement, which would not oppose to the investments made by the US corporations in the continent. As for the political dimension, what was desired was a labour movement, which would be used against governments when it was necessary like in the Latin American countries (Trewhela, 191: 74).

The AALC had important relations with the US government, other organizations managed by the US government, US business community and the CIA. For example, its budget was provided by the US state through the USAID (Trewhela, 2001: 77). Almost four fifth of dollars were given by the US government whilst the contribution of US labour movement less than 20 per cent. However, in fact, the CIA, which spent more than 100 million dollars for overseas labour policies in different countries in the sixties, worked with the AALC by using the USAID as a means of covering its operations (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 121).

The AALC managed and financed over 100 projects in different countries between 1965 and 1971. The number of project financed by the AALC reached almost 200 until 1974. These projects were implemented in 34 countries (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 120; Godfried, 1987:

55). Vocational training activities, cooperatives and credit unions, social services, information and communications, study tours and visitors programmes, workers education and leadership training programs, material assistance, literature and equipment, the establishment of labour colleges were some examples of its activities (Thomson, and Larson, 1978:57; Seidman and Seidman, 120- 121). For example, the AALC and Nigeria's United Labour Congress jointly established a Trade Union Institute for Economic and Social Development, which was directed by American trade unionists proposed by the AALC, in 1966. In 1971, a trade union education programme was given start in Botswana and the salaries of the staffs of the center were paid by the AALC. In the same period, in Ghana, the AALC assisted to the Ghana Trade Union Congress to set up the Ghana Labour College. Many headquarters for national centers were established in Ethiopia. American trade union literature was also handed out to many African organisations (Godfried, 55; Thomson, and Larson, 1978:57). Additionally, many African trade unionists went to the US to attend activities in American universities, especially in the Harvard University (Godfried, 1987: 55). These programs played a significant role in creation of a labour aristocracy. The AALC also attacked the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), which had strong relations with the WFTU and accepted a *revolutionary* stance (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 121). As a conclusion, all AALC policies led to decline of ICFTU's influence in African continent (Thomson, and Larson, 1978:57).

Chapter IV

The Post Second World War Period in South Africa

4.1. Apartheid, Law and Suppression of Black Working Class

Undoubtedly, after the Second World War, the most important phenomenon in South Africa was the arrival of apartheid administration. Following the arrival of the National Party (NP) in power in 1948, the majority of South Africans were faced with important suppressions of rights by the government. Under the apartheid, the NP and its allies tried to crash all opposition movements by restricting political activities, excluding blacks from the parliamentary system, imposing police state applications and enacting many acts, which all intensified racial discrimination (Pampallis, 1995: 207; Southall, 1995:19).

One of the first major instruments introduced by the NP government was the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. Under the Act, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was outlawed and many members of the party, who were also members of trade unions, were arrested and/or banned from being involved in political and trade union activities. Although the African National Congress (ANC) was not outlawed, it was also among the targets of the legislation. Act also banned African trade unions from being recognized by the government (Southall, 1995; Pampallis, 1995: 207, Baskin, 1991; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29; Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 33). The act defined communism so broadly that it gave the government virtually indiscriminate power to arrest people, whether communist or non-communist. For example, the Minister of Justice had such wide authority that he/she could restrict or ban people only by

arguing that they engaged in *communist activities*. A banned person by the ministry could not speak in public and come together with other banned people, but they could also be forced to live in a certain region or prevented from attending activities. Under the Suppression of Communism Act, many African trade unionists, political activists, leaders and progressive people, white or black, were harassed, jailed, banned, tortured and even killed (Pampallis, 1995: 207; Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 32-3).

The racial categorization of people was one of the most important policies of the apartheid government. Therefore, in 1950, the apartheid government enacted two acts, 'the Population Registration Act' and 'the Group Areas Act', in order to classify the population of the country by different race groups. According to the Population Registration Act, people living in South Africa were divided into four racial groups: 'Native (later named as 'Bantu'), European' (later named as 'White'), coloured and Indian (later named as 'Asian'). The Group Areas Act obliged different racial groups to live in different urban areas. Therefore, after the act, hundreds of thousands of black people were removed from their homes and businesses to different townships (Pampallis, 1995: 208).

In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act, another important law to strengthen apartheid, came into practice. This act abolished the Native Representative Council and provided for the formation of 'Bantu Authorities' headed by chiefs with limited administration power who were appointed by government. The apartheid government gave extensive administrative power to the traditional chiefs and, by doing so, constituted indirect rule (SADET, 2004: 150; Pampallis, 1995: 207). However, the hierarchical structure, such as regional, territorial, executive and judicial powers constituted by the act, was still controlled by whites (Butler at all, 1977: 20). Moving from this point, it can be argued that, the basic aim of the act was to control the black population of the country by giving them some limited rights.

The Native Act enacted in 1952 relied on the decision that the passes that Africans had to carry since the 1920s would be combined into a single passbook. These single passbooks would be issued over a few years by the government and had to show owner's information, such as name, address, photograph, identity number, ethnic grouping, authorization to be in a specific area, tax slip and the monthly signature of employer. The act also forced women to carry passes for the first time since 1920. According to the act, the passbooks had to be presented to police officer when demanded. People, who do not or cannot exhibit their passbooks to police officer, would be imprisoned or fined (Pampallis, 1995: 209).

The Black Labour Relations Act of 1953 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 ensured the exclusion of black workers from the formal industrial relations system by establishing a repressive labour regime. According to the Black Labour Relations Act, black workers were not defined as employees. Therefore, African trade unions could not be recognized as legal organizations (Webster, 1995: 268; Ncube, 1985: 88; Waddington, 1999: 138). The Industrial Conciliation Act went one more step by bringing the job reservation system and banning the establishment of racially mixed trade unions. By this act, certain races could work only in certain jobs (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29; Webster, 1995: 268; Ncube, 1985: 88; Coupe, 1995: 455; Friedman, 1987: 28). The aim of such a rule was to protect white workers from the competition of cheaper black workers and to divide the union movement as well as working class (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 29). For example, according to the act, coloured people could be members of registered trade unions, but could not have administrative jobs over whites. Additionally, they were subject to segregation into separate branches. The act forced the unions to be divided into racially exclusive branches. As a result, unions desiring to be racially mixed could only have white members on their administrative committees (Crankshaw, 1990: 7). Another feature of the act was that African trade unions, which could not be registered according

to the act, did not any right to negotiate with employers. The only institution, with which African trade unions could negotiate, was the Work and Liaison Committees, which was dominated by employers. The act also compelled employers to pay higher wages to white employees (Pampallis, 1995: 210; Lulat, 2008: 66).

Under such political conditions, important changes, which consolidated capitalist accumulation process, occurred in South Africa. During the apartheid period, South Africa saw significant capital inflow; the profits of the South African capitalists as well as of foreign investors, especially from Britain, increased considerably; white capitalist classes gained important opportunities to accumulate further capital (Innes, 1995: 211-224; Southall, 1995; Pampallis, 1995:211). Capitalist farmers, who were guaranteed favorable prices for their products; white small entrepreneurs, who benefited from lower wages and from the removal of Indian traders from certain places; and white workers, who benefited from job reservations, were other beneficiaries of apartheid policies. Additionally, the apartheid government provided many advantageous government contracts to Afrikaner businesses. The savings and money of government departments, local administrations as well as of state companies were deposited in Afrikaner banks. The government massively extended the influence of the Afrikaner business community, appointing them into important official economic boards. Therefore, during the period, many Afrikaner businesses, such as, Sanlam, Rembrandt, Volkskas, gained influential positions in the South African economy. However, English-speaking capitalists also had power (Pampallis, 1995: 212).

Regarding development of the capitalist relations in the country in post war period, one of the most important sectors of South Africa was agriculture soon after the Second World War thanks to the investments made by Afrikaner capitalist class during the war (Davies at all, 1976: 25). State subsidies, such as suitable credit conditions, research support, agricultural extension

services, irrigation, tariff protection, marketing opportunities and price controls played a significant role in the developing of agriculture (Lulat, 2008: 68-70). As a result, agriculture dominated by white South African agricultural capitalists became one of the most developed agricultural sectors around the world (Lulat, 2008: 69).

State owned enterprises as well as state subsidies also played an important role for the South African economy during apartheid era. First of all, the state's role was very important in infrastructural investments, which were vital for capital accumulation process as well as for industry (Lulat, 2008: 70). However, the role played by state owned enterprises were not limited only with these kinds of investments. In contrast, state investments spread to different areas of economy, ranging from defense to industry. For example, in 1951, in addition to the existing state enterprises established in the 1920s, such as The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), two new state enterprises were established: the South Africa Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation and the Phosphate Development Corporation. In the next period, many new state enterprises, such as South African Airways, National Finance Corporation, Klipfontein Organic Products Corporation, South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation, and Defense Ordnance Workshops, were established and all of them played a significant role in the creation of the physical capital of the country (Lulat, 2008: 67-70).

Another critical sector was mining, which was one of the most important contributors to the GDP growth of the country. During the apartheid era, three new gold areas were launched. As parallel to mining sector, metal production in the country also developed. The expansion of these sectors accelerated mechanization and led to the concentration and centralization of capital (Innes, 1995: 224; Lulat, 2008:70).

South African industry also attracted a considerable amount of foreign direct investment in early apartheid period,. For example, it was in this period that one third of total industrial capital was provided by foreign investors. Foreign investments also concentrated in mining sector, especially in gold mining, and engineering sector. This played a crucial role in the transformation of the national character of manufacturing sector. However, it is not to say that all the South African economy was dominated by foreign investors. In contrast, local capitalist classes as well as foreign investors were important agents of the capitalist development process of the country (Davies at all, 1976:5-6, 25).

The apartheid system had two main characteristics. The first was the job and living segregation while the latter was the formation of the Bantustans and migrant labour system. The main aim of the Bantustan system was to continue the reserve army of labour working for low wages in the borders and white areas. For example, under the implementation of the system, a significant amount of unemployed population was clustered in Bantustans. In the Bantustan system, blacks had to migrate to white areas to work in factories, mines or on farms. However, they had to leave their families in the *homelands*. For that reason, in 1970, 6.9 people million stayed in the Bantustans whilst eight million blacks were compelled to leave to look for work in white areas. Another function of the Bantustans was to protect the white population by removing unemployed Africans from the vulnerable cities (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 25-32). In other words, the system functioned as a social control mechanism through the Bantustan administrations and ensured contracted labour needed by employers through labour bureaus (Legassick and Wolpe, 1976:95). In addition, blacks were not allowed to work in 'white collar' jobs (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 23).

There were important differences between the working conditions of white workers and black workers. Firstly, as mentioned above, racial discrimination was a determining feature of labour market of the country in favor of white workers, of which positions can be described as labour aristocracy (Lulat, 2008:70). For example, in many sectors, especially in mining sector, a few well-paid and extremely skilled white workers were employed in technology intensive areas as supervisors or managers whilst many unskilled politically as well as organizationally repressed black workers were employed as unskilled labour power (Lulat, 68: 2008; Davies, 1979: 182). All these policies helped to reduce labour costs and constituted important differences between white and black workers in terms of wages, working and living conditions. For example, in building construction sector, whites were earning R282 monthly while African workers were earning R45. In wholesale trade, whites were earning R245 while Africans were earning R48 (Mackler, 1972: 37). This, of course, affected income distribution between whites and blacks. In 1969, for example, the average monthly per capita income among Africans, who constituted 69 percent of the population, was US 9.80 dollars, while the average per capita income among whites, who constituted less than 19 percent of the population, was 133.00 dollars. In other words, whites' living conditions were thirteen times better than blacks' and almost equal with many Western industrialized nations' citizens (Lulat, 2008: 68; Mackler, 1972: 35). Additionally, Africans had to pay tuition in schools, whilst education was free for whites (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 23).

As mentioned above, during the period, numerous black workers migrated to South Africa. For example, about four fifths of the miners were brought from neighboring countries and they were forced to live in crowded dormitories, sleeping on concrete bunks (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:88). However, South Africa's white workers, in addition to their higher wages and proper positions they had in work place, enjoyed the lowest unemployment rates in

comparison with the workers of developed countries because of the apartheid government's policies providing important job opportunities for white population (Lulat, 2008: 66-68).

4.2. Developments within the Labour Movement of South Africa

4.2.1. The Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA): An organization to control the black working class

Since the 1930s, South African labour movement had organized itself under the South African Trades and Labour Council (TLC), which had a non-racial posture, affiliated with African trade unions and claimed legal rights of African trade unionists. However, the organization of trade unions under the TLC was a delicate unity (Lewis, 1984: 1).

In 1947, six pro-nationalist trade unions split from the TLC because of its admission the African unions. In 1948, the TLC suggested the coming together of African unions in a consolidating body under its own leadership. However, in the next period, especially in 1949 and 1950, nationalist and pro-apartheid stance strengthened within the TLC and it decided on the exclusion of African trade unions from its ranks by arguing the formation of parallel African organizations (Southall, 1995: 52). At the time, the NP government also tried to affect the TLC's policy-making process by using the Supression of Communism Act to defuse the TLC's left wing (Southall, 1995: 52). In its 1954 conference, the TLC called for the reunification of the registered trade unions by establishing a Unity Committee including the leading members of the TLC, the SAFTU, the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions, and the AEU. However, the African unions were excluded from the process. In the same year, the South African Trade Union Council

(SATUC, after 1962 TUCSA) was established and the majority of the TLC took place in its formation (Baskin, 1991: 13; Lewis, 1984: 157).

The TUCSA described its stance as "promoting and advancing the economic, social and cultural well-being and rights of all South African workers through responsible and recognized collective bargaining and free negotiation" (Godfried, 1987: 57). According to the leading members of the TUCSA, the union was one of the few examples of the organizations mirroring real and triumphant collaboration between different ethnic groups because it had been created by workers coming from different races and from economic conditions (Imrie, 1979: 1-2). In addition, its main focal point were the bread and butter or economic matters, including wages, prices, working conditions, inflation and taxation issue, pensions, housing, transport. As for its ideological position, the TUCSA had held a political stance on right of centre (Imrie, 1979: 50-54).

However, in fact, the reality was very different, especially in terms of its anti apartheid stance. First of all, although the TUCSA, which assumed the role of the primary representative of industry based unions, admitted coloured and Indian workers in mixed trade unions, it excluded the African workers from its ranks and accepted only registered trade unions as members (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996:30; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Besides, although it claimed that it had an aversion to the explicitness, ideological implications and firmness of the apartheid government, and although it was against racial separation in words, it followed a hesitant and vague policy by reacting very weakly against apartheid as well as against job reservation. In addition, it never supported an amalgamation policy with black workers (Lipton, 1986: 194-195; Baskin, 1991: 160). On top of all this, it even tried to form some relations with pro-NP government unions (Alexander, 2000: 125). Therefore, as Southall points out, apartheid and its racialist policies were conveyed into labour movement by TUCSA (Southall, 1995: 52).

There were different reasons for such policies of TUCSA. Firstly, the most important priority of TUCSA was to protect its member's interests no matter what. The second was its ideological position, which was strictly opposed to 'political unionism' as well as to left wing ideology of antiapartheid movements. As mentioned above, white workers of South Africa had gained important benefits from the industrialization process of the post Second World War era. Especially, African migration and the job bar had provided them a monopoly of skilled jobs and preferential employment in other jobs (Lipton, 1986: 184; Rogers, 1976: 61). Therefore, white workers supported the continuation of the industrial colour bar as well as apartheid in general (Coupe: 1995, 451; Rogers, 1976: 61; Lipton, 1986: 184). This situation affected TUCSA's stance against the apartheid policies because, as underlined above, its main concern was to protect its members from the competition of unorganized and cheaper African labour (Clercq, 1979: 72-74). For example, one of the leading members of the TUCSA had pointed out that they had to put the interest of its members first (Rogers, 1976: 61). Further, as Rogers points, the TUCSA was dealing with the South Africa's political structure as an "off the cuff hand out for white workers" (Rogers, 1976: 61). Therefore, they did not have any objection to racial separation policies of the apartheid regime (Lipton, 194-195).

During the sixties, in the South African economy, the labour process and division of labour were re-organized with the introduction of new machinery and equipments. For example, between 1964 and 1968 capital-intensive investments in the metal sector increased 141 percent, despite the fact that increase of wages was 52 percent and the increase of employment was 18 percent (Webster, 1985: 115). This process also led to the undercutting process of white workers by cheaper and less skilled African labour. Additionally, during the period, one of the most important problem of the South African economy was the shortage of skilled and semi skilled

labour power. The solution found by capitalist class of the country was to reduce dependence on white labour. However, there were some differences between the positions of skilled or semiskilled white workers. Skilled workers enjoyed with higher wages because of the shortage of skilled labour, whilst semi-skilled white workers began to lose their positions since they did not have the power to negotiate with employers. Therefore, they had to compete with African workers working for lower wages in semi-skilled jobs. In addition, even if during the 1950s, de facto employment of the African workers on numerous positions of skilled jobs had been started, this was still illegal (Crankshaw, 1990: 12). This provided advantageous to skilled workers, but many corporations, especially operating in building sector were outsourcing in order to break out of the controls on the employment of semi-skilled African workers (Crankshaw, 1990: 12). In other words, the capitalist class of the country had been successful in reducing its labour costs by replacing white workers with Africans.

After the capitalist classes started to be successful in breaking the power of white worker organisations by employing black workers in semi-skilled and unskilled workers, skilled white workers' organisations demanded to organize the African workers in order to protect their own interests. For example, at the time, TUCSA affiliates, in which skilled white and coloured workers were organized, lobbied within the council in order to organize African workers as well (Crankshaw, 1990: 15). However, although they supported the organization of the Africans under the TUCSA umbrella, they never supported the political struggles of Africans. In contrast, they supported the preservation of whites under apartheid administration (Ensor, 1988: 216). Nevertheless, the situation was very different for semi skilled white unions, which did not have a chance to avert undercutting by African and coloured workers. Therefore, their strategy was dependent on state power (Crankshaw, 1987: 11-12; Crankshaw, 1990: 12). In other words, they supported the exclusion of blacks from TUCSA.

The TUCSA discussed the issue for a long time and decided to organize the African unions in 1962 by establishing an African Affairs section to organize the blacks in separate (parallel) unions in 1962. At the same period, it also began to criticize the policy of job reservation. In 1963, many African trade unions affiliated with FOFATUSA, which was a non-political African trade union, joined its ranks (Crankshaw, 1987: 20; Webster, 1985: 114; Crankshaw, 1990: 10-15; Du Toit, 1981: 230). However, the aim of this policy of TUCSA was to protect its members rather than solidarity with the blacks. In fact, such a hypocritical policy was usual for TUCSA, because it had taken into account black workers only if such a policy would provide advantage its white members (Godfried, 1987: 57). In addition, despite it tried to organize Africans after the decision taken in 1962, it had always subordinated them to the registered unions through parallel unions and liaison committees[2] (Clerq, 1979: 72-74; Ensor, 1988: 221). For instance, its first African *parallel* union was the African Sheet Metal Workers Union. It had established a parallel union in this sector because in this sector, the intensity of black labour employed illegally was very high (Webster, 1985: 114).

TUCSA's decision to organize the blacks led to a clash with the state and pro-apartheid trade unions affiliated with the TUCSA. Some TUCSA affiliates, such as the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the Motor Industry Employees' Union (MIEUSA), the Iron Moulders' Society of South Africa (IMS) and Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Industrial Union (TL&ATIU) criticized the admission of Africans (Webster, 1985: 114; Crankshaw, 1987: 25). Some of them, such as AEU and MIEUSA even withdrew from its ranks (Crankshaw, 1987:

[2] According to the act, which institutionalized the liaison committees, the African workers would be prevented from being the members of trade unions but would be represented in liaison committees, which comprised employers and employees. However, white trade unions organized in the same industry would also negotiate with employers for the African workers. This situation was called 'parallelism' in South Africa (for details, see MacShane at all, 1984: 31; Du Toit, 1981: 330)

25-26). In 1966, South African Electrical Workers' Association (SAEWA) and South African Typographical Union (SATU) also started to insist upon the exclusion of African unions (Crankshaw, 1987: 26). The apartheid government also opposed the policy of organizing the Africans. For example, in 1967, M.Viljoen, the Minister of Labour, pointed out that:

> *It is evidently TUCSA's policy to organize so many Africans that the Government will be forced to recognize them. …The Government will not tolerate this undermining of our national policy. If TUCSA wants to undermine Government policy and create new problems then it must take note that the Government will not hesitate to take the necessary measures (quoted by Crankshaw, 1987: 20).*

TUCSA never resisted the government's pressures and it excluded the black unions from its ranks again in 1967 (Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 30; Crankshaw, 1987: 19).

Although the TUCSA encountered with reactions from the apartheid government as well as from some member unions, it is not possible to argue that the reason for its hesitant stance against the apartheid just derived from the reactions of its member unions and the apartheid government. In contrast, its ideological position, which relied upon the idea of non-political unionism and anti-communism, played a crucial role in this situation. This can be understood from its relations with anti-apartheid and left wing organizations. First of all, TUCSA had chosen to be in opposition to the SACTU[3] which was a leftist and racially mixed trade union organization, and to the ANC which was leading anti apartheid organization in the country, rather than the apartheid regime. There were two reasons for the enmity of the TUCSA against the SACTU. The first was the approach of the workers belonging to TUCSA. As mentioned above, many unions affiliated to the TUCSA had chosen to keep their relatively privileged positions under the apartheid regime. In addition, the majority of its members were conservative (Lipton,

[3] SACTU will be dealt with in the next subchapter in a more detailed framework.

1989: 194-195). The second reason was TUCSA's right-wing political stance, the opposition to the political unionism of the SACTU and disturbance from its growing influence between the African workers (Baskin, 1991: 160; Luckhardt and Brenda Wall, 1980). Therefore, the TUCSA never collaborated with SACTU but always tried to undermine it. For instance, although some individual member unions of the SACTU and SACTU itself applied for assistance or cooperation in different matters to the TUCSA because of its influence, the TUCSA never assisted SACTU (Ensor, 1988:223-225).

TUCSA also left the SACTU alone in the campaigns organized by international labour organizations against the South African regime. For instance, the Workers' Group of the ILO accepted a resolution against South Africa by describing its labour system as a modern slavery system and by condemning the apartheid regime as well as foreign corporations in the country. In 1963, the South Africa was also expelled from the ILO thanks to the efforts of the SACTU members. After this development, J.A. Grobbelaar who was the general secretary of the TUCSA, criticized this decision. According to Grobbelaar, foreign trade unions were representing a basic threat to South Africa because of their policies, such as boycotts for South African ships and aircrafts and the other actions against South Africa. According to Grobbelaar all these policies would be foolish (Rogers, 1976: 254).

As for the international relations of the union, the TUCSA had also good relations with the British TUC, the German labour movement, the Deustscher Gewerkschaftsbund Bundesvorstand (DGB) and the AFL-CIO, in addition to its indirect connections with different powerful international trade union groups. Therefore, many leaders and officials had attended the TUCSA meetings and many officials of TUCSA had attended overseas trade union conferences (Imrie, 1979: 44). Moreover, according to its leading members, the main purpose of TUCSA was

to become the largest, the best and the most effective trade union body in South Africa and the most important patterns of such aims were the AFL-CIO and the TUC (Imrie, 1979: 98).

In the 1970s, TUCSA changed its exclusive policy and readmitted African trade unions again. This decision of the TUCSA was a result of Durban strike waves at the beginning of the 1970s (Baskin, 1991: 17). The action wave started with bus drivers' strike in Johannesburg in 1972. During this strike 300 people were arrested. However, their service was very critical in terms of daily transport of 120 thousands African workers. Therefore, at the end of the strike they were able to win a wage increase of 35 percent. The strikes spread to other industries soon and especially, in Durban, they became very influential. By the end of 1973, the numbers of strikers in Durban reach about 100.000. Additionally, the strikers also gained the support of many groups ranging from white students to intellectuals (Macshane at all, 1984:21-23). Although TUCSA changed its exclusive policy in the 1970s, it was still not an ideal organization for black workers. This was because that the African workers would be organized in parallel unions, which was dependent on the decisions of parent unions in terms of finance management (Macshane at all, 1984:36). However, in the new process, the TUCSA could not satisfy its members in terms of its organizational route and especially by the beginning of the 1980s, the number of its members considerably declined. As a result of this decline, it decided to disband in 1986 (Webster, 1995: 27).

4.2.2. South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU): An example of political unionism during the early apartheid era

The black working class issued a robust response to discriminatory labour policies. This was the establishment of their own trade union centre in the form of fourteen registered unions which left from TUCSA, uniting with the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) in

order to establish the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955 (Friedman, 1987:27). SACTU, as a first formal alliance between African unions and other races, played an important role during the period with its political unionism perception (Friedman, 1987:27; Webster, 1995: 268). Almost 31 trade unions representing a little bit more than 37.000 members in nine industries attended the first congress of the SACTU. Eight of them constituted four-fifths of the membership of the SACTU with their 29.326 members. The number of their individual memberships was between 2000 and 9000. The other trade unions joining the SACTU were relatively small trade unions (Lambert, 1988: 118).

According to SACTU, working class' struggles should move forward alongside political struggles. In addition, trade unions were an essential element of decolonization and national liberation struggles. From this point of view, it made contact with left wing and progressive social movements in South Africa as well as internationally. In South Africa, SACTU established critical relations with the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which was re-established as an underground organization in 1953. The SACP had so vital a role within the SACTU that many leaders of it were leading members of the SACP. After the formation of SACTU, its many organizers also joined the SACP. In addition, many SACTU members suffered under the Suppression of Communism Act (Lambert, 1988: 53-54; Friedman, 1987:27; Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 372; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 32)

In 1953, one of the most important discussions of the anti-apartheid fighters was to launch a campaign which would sustain the anti apartheid struggles that had been started before. As a result of the discussions a decision to release a manifesto was taken. The ANC also gave support to the idea at its national conference in 1953. The outcome of this process became the establishment of the National Action Council (NAC), to which eight members from all individual organizations would join. The member organizations of the council were the ANC, Indian

Congress, the Coloured People's Congress (CPC), and the Congress of Democrats (COD) (Lambert, 1988: 130-131). These organizations also constituted the Congress of the People in 1955 and accepted the Freedom Charter. Although it was a nationalist text including some transitional socialist demands, for the SACTU leadership, the Freedom Charter was a means of reaching socialism through national liberation struggle (Lambert, 1988: 144-149). Therefore, in its first congress, the leadership of the SACTU took a decision to become a part of the alliance (Lambert, 1988: 130-131). According to the leadership of the SACTU, such a decision was to take the struggle beyond the bread and butter unionism by establishing relations between trade union struggle and political struggle (Lambert, 1988:130-131). In many regions, but specifically in Natal, many SACTU organizers worked on the regional councils of the NAC. They also organized daily factory visits to increase the popularity of the Freedom Charter (Lambert, 1998: 134).

SACTU also took a stance against the policies of the hegemonic powers of the world capitalism. For example, it condemned the interventions of imperialist powers in Egypt, opposed the closure of the Soviet Consulate in South Africa as well as of atomic tests in the Sahara by western powers, especially by France and it also supported the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. SACTU activists also paid favourable attention to the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnam War and supported the Cuban Revolution. For instance, it defended the independence of South Vietnam by condemning US policies. Moreover, almost for all of these international developments, SACTU directly reacted against the United States. For example, it directly sent a letter to US president Kennedy, accusing the US, highlighting its solidarity with working class around the world and demanding the withdrawal of US financial aids, advisers, troops and arms on 23 March 1962 (Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 372). A statement made by one of the leaders of SACTU gives an important opportunity to understand the SACTU's main idea: "We affirm that

peace will not come to workers as a gift but must be won through their own efforts" (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980: 372). The SACTU also established strong relations with progressive unions in Australia and New Zealand. It supported armed national liberation struggles of the Movimento Popular da Libertação de ***Angola*** (MPLA) in Angola, the Partido Africano Para a Independência da ***Guiné*** e Cabo-Verde (PAIGC) in Guine and The Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique (Luckhardt and Wall: 1980: 376).

SACTU also established factory committees aiming to democratize and politicize the existing trade unions and to build up new trade unions. One of the most important functions of these committees was to engage with new potential members and to deal with their problems in workplace by being their representatives. The committees were also seen as a means of realizing the minimum and maximum demands of the communist party. In other words, in SACTU leaders' view, the committees would play a crucial role in socialist transformation in South Africa (Lambert, 1988: 164-177).

SACTU organized basic and advanced level educational programmes, in which Marxists analysis was taught, to strengthen its members' theoretical knowledge. Democratic participation of workers or democracy in workplaces, class-consciousness and socialism were some content of these education programmes (Lambert, 1988: 231-243).

After its formation, the SACTU decided to affiliate to WFTU. However, it never paid any affiliation fees because of political security. This membership remained as a kind of mutual ideological support with WFTU (Southall, 1995: 102). According to the SACTU, the ICFTU was an outcome of the Cold War and means of controlling of the labour movements of third world countries in favor of British and US imperialism. In spite of this, it always tried to take support from all international trade unions and federations. Therefore, between 1955 and 1963, it contacted with the ICFTU and WFTU (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980: 371-381; Ncube, 1985: 98).

In the mid 1950s, SACTU and Congress Alliance launched a boycott campaign against the South African regime demanding international solidarity. However, neither the South African labour organizations, such as TUCSA (and later FOFATUSA), nor the ICFTU supported the campaign, although the ICFTU gave a support to the black working class in theory. To be sure, the problem for the ICFTU was the political unionism and ideological positions of SACTU (Luckhardt and Wall, 1980:381).

The Sharpeville Massacre, following a protest led by the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) against the pass laws, ended in the shooting deaths of 69 and injuries of 180 unarmed Africans on March 1960 in a township, and became a turning point in terms of South African political sphere. After the Sharpeville, the ANC and PAC were banned, eighteen thousand people were arrested and more than five thousand were sentenced to terms in jail. At the same time, almost all leaders of the SACTU were banned in terms of trade union activities and forced into exile (Myers, 1980: 66; Mokoena 1993: 14; Lulat, 2008: 70; Finnemore and Merwe, 1996: 32). However, it did not mean for SACTU leaders that the struggle came to end. In contrast, they maintained their struggle against apartheid in exile as well.

4.2.3. Federation of Free African Trade Union of South Africa (FOFATUSA): The result of the control policies of TUCSA and US through the ICFTU

The growing influence and political unionism of the SACTU was not acceptable for the apartheid government, the TUCSA and the international trade union organizations. Therefore, they, especially the ICFTU and the TUCSA, tried to undermine the SACTU by helping the

establishment of FOFATUSA. In fact, until the 1957, except its condemnation of the South African regime at the ILO in 1954 and 1956, the South African affair was not taken to the agenda by the ICFTU (Southall, 1995: 103).

In 1957, the General Secretary of the ICFTU visited Johannesburg and had a meeting with the TUCSA executive members. The subject of the meeting was the organizational problems of African workers. During the visit, they also had a meeting with the executive members of the SACTU. The intention of the SACTU was to affiliate with both international labour organizations, the ICFTU and the WFTU, in order to receive their support against apartheid (Ken and Wall, 1980:382). However, after the discussion with the SACTU, the ICFTU delegation was not optimistic about the relationship between the ICFTU and the SACTU because of different ideological positions between the two organisations. According to the delegation, the SACTU's stance was parallel with the communists and national liberation movement of South Africa. Moreover, the SACTU had made application to WFTU for affiliation (Southall, 1995:103; Ncube, 1985: 98). Therefore, the ICFTU delegation reached a double conclusion that on one hand something should be done to prevent the SACTU from being affiliated the WFTU while the ICFTU support to encourage the formation of black trade unions should be provided through the TUCSA because of its non-political stance on the other (Southall, 1995: 103; SADET, 2006: 712).

Two years later, in 1959, another delegation from the ICFTU attended the TUCSA's annual conference. At the conference, a decision to organize all races in the country and to form an Interracial Organizing Committee was taken (Southall, 1995: 103). The ICFTU also started to support the attempts of the TUCSA in organizing African trade unions, as parallel organizations. However, according to ICFTU officials, the TUCSA had to change its image by following a more

militant route. The TUCSA welcomed these proposal because it needed to improve its position at the International Labour Organization (Ncube, 1985: 98).

The ICFTU had offered 30.000 pound to the SACTU. However, at the same time, it had also proposed two conditions for its financial and political support to the SACTU: Firstly, SACTU had to cut its political relations with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. Secondly, SACTU had to separate the economic and political struggle. However, the SACTU had neither accepted to embrace a non-political stance nor the financial aid from the ICFTU. In addition, SACTU had reacted against the attempts of the ICFTU (Southall, 1995: 103-104; Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Therefore, the funds proposed by the ICFTU were given to the TUCSA to organize black workers (Nair, 2001: 163). The result of this process became the creation of FOFATUSA with support of the ICFTU and the TUCSA as a an alternative labour organization to SACTU less than four months after the ICFTU delegation left the country (Southall, 1995: 104; Luckhardt and Wall,1980).

FOFATUSA was established by five African trade unions which all opposed the political stance of the SACTU and its relations with the South African Communist Party and the ANC (Du Toit, 1981: 229). This federation never collaborated with the SACTU by arguing that FOFATUSA was interested in industrial politics and the wealth of workers through non-political and bread butter unionism, and not in party politics. However, it had important relations with the PAC, of which the formation was a reflection of Africanist anxiety about white domination of the national liberation movement as well as in labour movement (Du Toit, 1981: 229; Macshane at all, 1984: 32). For example, after the formation of the FOFATUSA, Nyaose, its president, was elected as labour secretary on the PAC's national executive. Further, he was arrested because of his involvement with the PAC activities in 1960 (SADET, 2006: 712).

FOFATUSA had an opportunistic and pragmatist stance. For instance, although it followed a nationalist policy, it affiliated to ICFTU and collaborated with TUCSA (Du Toit, 1981: 229). Further, when the TUCSA began to admit the African trade unions into its ranks, five African trade unions affiliated with FOFATUSA joined TUCSA in 1962 (Du Toit, 1981: 218,230). In fact, the admission of African trade unions to TUCSA was an outcome of the struggles with SACTU and the other progressive forces. However, the collaboration between the TUCSA and FOFATUSA was different from working class solidarity. Rather, it was an example of the pragmatist stance of the TUCSA and the FOSATU because African trade unions were being organized in order to improve TUCSA's image in international arena (Nair, 2001: 163).

FOFATUSA had also relations with the AALC and the AFL-CIO. Although the AALC did not open its South African office until the 1980s and did not become directly involved in South Africa until the late 1970s, it always supported bread and butter unionism in South Africa through the ICFTU, TUCSA or the FOFATUSA. The main concern of them was to create "responsible trade unionism", which meant non-political and bread butter trade unionism as well as non-critical trade unionism against US investments in South Africa. There might be two examples of their interpretation regarding responsible trade unionism in South Africa: The TUCSA and the FOFATUSA. Therefore, the AALC and the AFL-CIO used these organizations as a means of the creation of the *responsible trade unionism* (Godfried, 1987: 57).

The position of the leader of the National Union of Clothing Workers of the FOFATUSA was one of the best examples of this situation. Lucy Mvubelo, General Secretary of the National Union of Clothing Workers and a former vice-president of the SACTU, was a supporter of non-political unionism. In addition, she was in opposition to the withdrawal of US corporations operating in South Africa. According to Mvubelo, these companies were creating new jobs for blacks by respecting their collective bargaining rights. In the next period, her union joined the

TUCSA as a ‘proof of the TUCSA's non-racial character’. Not surprisingly, in the 1970s, the AFL-CIO described her as a *black ambassador for US trade unions* (Godfried, 1987: 57).

As mentioned above, the Durban strikes was a turning point of the South African labour movement. After the strikes, the ICFTU and the AALC began to implement a new South African policy, which relied upon the idea of creating non-political trade unions in South Africa. For instance, Brown, who was the administrator of the AALC, announced that “the time had come for closer contacts with people and trade unions of South Africa” (quoted by Southall, 1995: 186). After this statement, the AALC firstly financed the trip of Mvubelo to participate to the International Trade Union Conference against to apartheid in June 1973. Secondly, Mvubelo was invited to the annual conferences of the AALC and AFL-CIO in Miami (Southall, 1995; Godfried, 1987).

FOFATUSA, which existed during the period between 1959 and 1965, could not seriously challenge against apartheid and did not have a considerable influence within the South African labour movement (Macshane at all, 1984: 32; Godfried, 1987). However, it became a means of the control policies of the AFL-CIO, the ICFTU and the TUCSA. When the TUCSA, which had liaison committee with the FOFATUSA readmitted the African unions to its ranks, the FOFATUSA joined to the TUCSA by annihilating itself (Nair, 2001: 163).

Chapter V

US investments in South Africa in the 1960s

As mentioned above, the Sharpeville Massacre became a turning point in terms of South African political sphere. Sharpeville was also an important threshold in terms of international economic and political relationships of South Africa. After Sharpeville, many international actors started to pay greater attention to the South African regime. Many social movements, institutions and states around the world showed great reactions against the massacre (Rogers, 1976: 102). For example, in 1962, the United Nations passed a resolution, which was accepted by a vote of 67 to 16, with 23 abstentions. The Resolution included economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as arms embargo (Culverson, 1999:37). However, the US tried to restrain the extent of sanctions. According to the US, the Sharpeville Massacre was an internal problem of South Africa. Additionally, official US South Africa foreign policy relied upon the idea that public recognition of the legitimacy of African protest would lead SA to limit US access to strategic minerals or close its ports to US fleets. Consequently, the result became a partial embargo limited with only weapon sales to South Africa in 1964 (ibid, 37).

One of the reactions was the withdrawal of foreign investments from the country because the massacre had broken the confidence of foreign investors. According to many foreign investors operating in South Africa (although US investors were largely an exception), the Sharpeville Massacre might have been a herald of revolution (Lulat, 2008: 70). As a result, after Sharpeville, South Africa was faced with a major foreign capital outflow. In fact, during the period between 1957 and 1959, South Africa had already encountered a net capital outflow. However, after the Sharpeville Massacre this outflow considerably accelerated. In so much as

that, in 1960, approximately 271 million dollars or almost 50 percent of foreign exchange reserves were withdrawn from the country. This tendency continued during following years. In early 1961, a further 63 million dollars left from SA. Again with the exception of US capital (which largely stayed put), these withdrawals continued until 1964. Finally in 1964, the government was able to put a stop to withdrawals of foreign capital thanks to implementation of regulations aiming at exchange controls, which were introduced in 1961 (Rogers, 1976: 96-102; Lulat, 2008: 70). However, the most effective factor in stopping capital outflows was not exchange controls but was US investments and financial support which prevented an eventual deep recession in South Africa (Lulat, 2008: 70-71).

Although President Kennedy and his successor Johnson had criticized the apartheid practice of the white government of South Africa, the United States did not accept the embargo, economic sanctions and reactions against the country (Culverson, 1999:37). In contrast, it established important relationships ranging from energy issues to economic and political supports to and military relationships with South Africa (Culverson, 1999:42). After the 1960s, especially, when the role of Britain in South Africa started to weaken and after South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth in 1961, operations of American corporations as well as political institutions became increasingly important elements in the South African economic and political process (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 11). In this context in December 1961, for example, the US and South Africa signed an agreement to establish missile range tracking facilities in South Africa. Moreover, the United States started to sell military equipment to South Africa. However, according to the agreement, the military equipment was for 'external' use rather than for use against internal opponents of apartheid (Culverson, 1999:41). Relationships between two states, from submarine selling to uranium enrichment programs, to the establishment of NASA facilities and to delivery of nuclear reactors continued for mny years. In

other words, although the United Stated tried to be seen as an opponent of apartheid, it maintained very strong, and critically important, relations with the White governments of South Africa (Mokoena, 1993:14-16). In addition,, the CIA also started to play a significant role in the country. One of the activities of the CIA was to coordinate and train South Africa's intelligence services. Additionally it assisted the anti-communist white government to infiltrate and destroy liberal as well as radical opposition groups. The agency also helped the South African government in the capture of Nelson Mandela underground leader of the ANC in August 1963 (Culverson, 1999: 42).

After the Sharpeville Massacre, another concern for the South African government was to gain legitimacy, create an acceptable image and promote the country as an attractive place for foreign investments for US capital. To realize these aims, a semi official South African institution, the South African Foundation established offices in New York and Washington after the Sharpeville Massacre. Additionally, the South African Government hired a number of American public relations companies, published periodicals and brochures, and broadcasted films through the information office which had been established in 1948 which was funded to the extent of $4,459,000 during 1965-1966 by the NP government. Between 1963 and 1964, officials from the information office participated in 60 television shows and gave 50 radio interviews and 100 lectures in New York (Culverson, 1999:41; Hull, 1979: 81). From the point of view of the apartheid government, there were different reasons for such a public relations campaign in the US. Firstly, foreign capital and US official support would provide information, technology and managerial knowledge to the South African regime, and these would help to the modernization of its economy. Secondly, foreign capital would create a dynamic economy, because of that the South African regime would defend itself against African nationalism, which been an important element of the African political sphere since the late fifties and which led to the end of white

minority regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe in the mid-seventies. In other words, the apartheid regime would be able to sustain its racist socio-economic and political system thanks to this policy (Lulat, 2008: 70-77). Thirdly, US investments and official support would lead South Africa to gain legitimacy in the African and world political arena (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 12).

On the other hand, South Africa was an indispensable investment area as well as a political partner for the US for a number of reasons. This indispensability of SA for the US derived from some features of the country. Firstly, South Africa had noteworthy mineral resources which were very important for the US. This can be understood from a statement, made by Andrew Kamarck the former economic advisor on Africa at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-World Bank. According to Kamarck, World War II had resulted in a significant shift in the US position in the world economy. Thus, although the US was a large net exporter of raw materials before the war, it became a large net importer after the war as a result of the economic boom of the post Second World War era. Therefore, it needed to look abroad for raw materials (Mackler, 1972: 43). Another dimension was illustrated by Paul G. Hoffman who worked as Marshall Plan Administrator for long time. Hoffman highlighted the necessity for the United States to find new external sources of raw materials. According to Hoffman, the US economy was increasingly dependent on different places around the world for raw materials (Mackler, 1972: 43). Besides, an official American government report published in the mid-1950s indicated that if relationships with the nations which supplied mineral sources to the United States were destroyed, it would pose big risks for the US (Mackler, 1972:44).

Another important feature of South Africa was its cheap labour force which derived from unequal living and working conditions between white and black workers. These racial inequalities provided a high level of exploitation of the black working class. The significance of

cheap labour for US investors can be understood from a statement made by the president of the Jeffrey Company of Ohio, which opened a new factory in Germiston in 1965. The president stressed that they had complete faith in the soundness of the South African economy, and so they were making further investments all in good care (Mackler, 1972:27). The attraction of South Africa for foreign investors was also evident from colonial period that many colonial states in early periods wanted to settle in the country. The country's strategic geographical location, rich agricultural resources and satisfying climate were among the most basic reasons of why foreign investors were racing to invest in SA (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 9)

Given the combination of these various factors, the American business community considered the country as an investment paradise with cheap labour and rich natural resources. According to them, South Africa, with its very cheap labour force, offered a highly attractive investment atmosphere and so could offer big profit opportunities for them. In addition, many American journals or magazines in the US described the country as having "a good investment climate". In particular, four reasons were indicated to investors: low wages for Africans, plentiful unskilled labour, rarity of strikes and high returns (Mackler, 1972:27). The study mentioned above, also clarified this situation. Accordingly, African labour was cheap and if African workers had been paid as much as white workers, and if skill differentials had been narrowed, the wage costs of an employer would have increased enormously (Mackler, 1972:37).

As a conclusion, the US capitalist class and the South African regime had overlapping interests in the development of economical and political relations between two countries. In other words, the intention of the administrators of the South African regime was to strengthen their racist social regime through economical and political support of the US government; in return, the aim of US investors was to benefit from the investment advantages offered by apartheid conditions (Lulat, 2008: 77). Additionally, because of apartheid with its very strong anti-

communist stance, the US, one of whose most important aims was to fight against communism around the world, would be able to have an anti-communist partner in the African continent. Obviously, white governments in the African continent, especially the apartheid government, were very suitable partners for such a political aim (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:11).

Under these circumstances and political developments, while many international actors reacted against the South African government, American corporations continued to make direct and indirect investments in South Africa. After the capital outflows of the post-Sharpeville period in 1960s, American capital, seeking cheap labour power, new natural sources, raw materials, profitable investments areas and new markets for their huge production, provided net capital inflow into South Africa thereafter (Rogers, 1976:102, Seidman and Seidman, 1978).

Thus American investments and businesses in South Africa played a significant role. For US based multinational corporations and financial institutions, this was a very suitable period to access South Africa. Many US firms, which were marginal in South Africa before the Second World War, realized new investments in the country (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:11). US corporations applied three methods to assist the South African regime. Firstly, as mentioned above, they made their investments at a very critical period. Secondly, they invested in economically strategic sectors, such as heavy industry, defence and automobiles. Thirdly, they provided very high-level technology and equipment to South Africa and by doing so they helped the apartheid regime (Lulat, 2008: 71).

One of the most important industries in which US investments were important was the automobile sector, which had been described as key industry by the apartheid government because of its strategic and military importance, and manufacturing industries (Lulat, 2008: 72). Starting from 1959, US investments in manufacturing industry had grown four times reaching to 50 percent of the US total in the 1970s (Rogers, 1976:125). Similarly, the automobile industry

and its profitability were also important for US investors. Therefore, during the apartheid era, many big American corporations, such as Ford and General Motors, kept their investments, whilst a number them established new factories in South Africa (Rogers, 1976:125, Culverson, 1999: 40). Specifically, three big US corporations, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler played a significant role in the South African economy during the period (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 98). In fact, General Motors and Ford had established their first factories in South Africa after the World War I. However, they increased their investments in South Africa after the Sharpeville Massacre in contrast to other foreign investors. For example, Ford's first factory in South Africa was established in 1923, as a subsidiary of its Canadian subsidiary. The company expanded its investments especially in the 1960s (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 99). Chrysler, which was the third largest US auto manufacturer of US, established its first factory in South Africa in 1958. In 1967, it established a new factory close to the Tswana Bantustan. The reason for establishing the factory in that region was to benefit from the large unskilled black labour reserve (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 99). During the 1960s and 1970s, these three auto companies made many investments in South Africa because of the national requirement of SA that over half the elements of vehicles had to be locally produced. However, there was another reason to make so much investment in that they competed with each other to sell vehicles to the South African army and police force (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 98). Therefore, by 1970, General Motors' South Africa investments reached $220 million; whilst the investments of Ford and Sigma investments (Chrysler's South African partner) reached $245 million and $117 million respectively. These three companies expanded so rapidly that after the sixties they controlled nearly 50 percent of the automobile market in South Africa (Rogers, 1976:125, Culverson, 1999: 40). In addition to these companies, many US companies, such as Union Carbide, Newmont Mining, Phelps Dodge,

Kennecott, American Metal Climax, made indirect investments in the South African automobile sector (Lulat, 2008: 72).

Mining and smelters, petroleum, machinery, equipment production and information technologies were among other investment areas of US corporations. After Sharpeville, about 10 percent of the American corporate investments were made in mining and smelting. Consequently South African mines and smelters doubled from about $78 million to $158 millionr from 1968 to 1973 (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:87; Davis, 1978: 291). Meanwhile, the involvement of American corporations in the petroleum sector reached 44 percent during the 1970s. In dollar terms, petroleum was the second most important investment area of US corporations in South Africa (Seidman and Seidman, 1979: 107-8). Petroleum investments also provided critical support to the South African regime, for the apartheid government were to face a blockade on oil imports, the South African economy, especially its modern industry, would face serious problems (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 107). John Deere, General Electric, Caterpillar, Dresser, Firestone and Goodyear, Motorola, ITT, Kodak, 3M were examples of US investors investing in machinery and equipment sector. They produced different goods, including agricultural equipment, diesel locomotives, electrical and electronic products, rubber products, construction equipment, communication equipment, especially for the police force and the army, film and film materials. Some US companies also made investments to operate nuclear reactors in South Africa. As for information technologies, Control Data, Burroughs, Sperry Rand, International Business Machines (IBM), Hewlett-Packard, National Cash Register (NCR), Mohawk Data Sciences, and Computer Sciences were some examples of corporations making investments in the sector (Lulat, 2008: 72; Davis, 1978: 291; Lulat, 2008: 72-73).

Almost every companies invested in South Africa had relationships with two big Rockefeller Banks, namely The First National City Bank and Chase Manhattan Bank. US companies' integration into the South African economy was facilitated by these banks, while they themselves had their own investments in South Africa (Seidman and Seidman, 1978:82). The Chase Manhattan Bank had opened its first branch in South Africa in 1959. In 1965, the openings of three new branches followed. The First National City Bank, which had started to make investments in South Africa one year before the Chase Manhattan Bank, also opened eight new branches especially in industrial centers in 1973 (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 114-115). Further, these banks also became a part of the consortium organized by Charles Engelhand, who was largest single investor in South Africa with direct control of twenty-three major enterprises including gold and uranium mining through chairmanship of Rand Mines, to provide 40 million loans to the South African government just after the Sharpeville (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 116).

Engelhand also played a critical role in terms of political and economic relationships between the US and South Africa. He was in a position to contribute effectively to this goal for two reasons. The first was that two years before Sharpeville, when the white government encountered important economic problems, he established the American-South African Investment Corporation aiming to attract American capital back into the Republic. Engelhand also served on the board of two official South African agencies, the Witwatersrand Native labour Association and the Native Recruiting Agency. Additionally he was the founder of the South Africa Foundation as well. During the period, especially, after the 1960s, many US companies proclaimed their faith in South Africa's future because of the work conducted by this organization (Culverson, 1999:38-39; Seidman and Seidman, 1978:89). In other words, Engelhand had key relationships with the white government in South Africa and made significant

contributions to the apartheid regime (Culverson, 1999:39; Seidman and Seidman, 1978:88-89). The second reason was that he also had relationships with US policy makers as well as with its investors. For example, he had very close relationships with US president Johnson and made serious financial contributions to the Democratic Party of US. In other words, as a racial liberal at home he supported and benefited from racial oppression in a different country (Culverson, 1999:39; Seidman and Seidman, 1978:89). After the Sharpeville massacre, Engelhard arranged a $35 million loan by the United States banking interests. Additionally, the First National City Bank supplied two more loans amounting to $25 million dollars for two state owned enterprises of South Africa, Eskom and the South African Railways in September 1961. Moreover, under the leadership of Engelhand, a group of American entrepreneurs and international financial institutions including Chase Manhattan Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, First National Bank, City Bank, and some investors not publicly identified raised a $150 million dollar loan for the South African government (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 88; Culverson, 1999: 39; Rogers, 1976:102-103; Lulat, 2008: 70). Engelhand's critical support for the apartheid government indicated that South Africa's relationships with American investors and public sector policy makers were firm and fast. As such, they constituted a major obstacle confronting anti apartheid activists (Culverson, 1999:39).

Another actor, which played an important role in terms of relationships between American capital and South Africa, was the Anglo American Corporation. This company worked with Engelhand and other foreign investors, and by doing so, it gained important advantages in the post Sharpeville era by strengthening its position in mining and defense (Culverson, 1999: 40). Although Harry Oppenheimer, the major owner of the company, was one of the financiers of the Progressive Party which was the opposition party of South Africa, his behavior can be cited as hypocritical as can be illustrated by the following sentence:

> *...civilized standards which were brought to Africa by Europeans, can by no means be reduced to the doctrine of manhood sufferance or anything approaching it, instead of being a guarantee of individual liberty, it would lead directly to inefficiency, corruption and tyranny. [Therefore] what we should not do is to put uneducated people, still in a semi-barbarous state, in charge of a developing country like South Africa (Lulat, 2008: 78-79).*

What was important for Oppenheimer was the safety of capitalist system, which was being threatened by black resistance movement (Lulat, 2008: 79).

As pointed out above, after 1960, US direct and indirect investments in South Africa started to increase and these investments played a significant role. For example whereas in 1961, direct American investments were $23 million, this increased to $448 million in 1962 (Culverson, 1999:40). American investments in South Africa increased by $964 million in 1971 and reached $1240 million in 1973. In other words, in the period between 1962 and 1973 American investments saw an almost 340 percent increase (Rogers, 1976:124). By the end of the sixties, the total foreign investment in South Africa was $4.86 billion, and about one fifth of these investments were made only by U.S. corporations (Lulat, 2008: 71). Towards the end of the 1970s, the US became the second largest investor of South Africa. At that time, 17 percent of all foreign *direct* investments, and 33 percent *indirect* investments in South Africa were realized by US investors. Accordingly, the amount of US direct investments was $ 1.665 billion, whilst the amount of US indirect investments in South Africa a little more than $2 billion (Lulat, 2008: 71). In South Africa, US multinational corporations' investments were generally made for the long term. Their investments represented 20 percent of all total foreign long-term direct investments and only about 10 percent of total foreign indirect investments (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 75).

The number of corporations invested in South Africa was between 250 and 300[4] including nine of the ten largest corporations in the Fortune 500 list. Twelve of the corporations made up

[4] Different scholars give different amounts with regard to the number of US investments. For example, according to Lulat (2008), it was 275, according to Davis, it was 250 and according to Rogers (1976), it was 300.

70 percent of all American capital invested in South Africa, and no more than 30 corporations were the most significant in terms of total capital invested. For example, the three auto companies, Ford, GM and Chrysler represented together over 25 percent while Mobil Oil's investments constituted around 13.6 percent of all investments (Rogers, 1976: 126). However, the leading American investor in South Africa was General Motors, which was the biggest single corporation in the US (Davis, 1978: 291; Lulat, 2008: 71; Rogers, 1976: 126; Davis, 291).

As a conclusion of these strong economical and political relations, in 1978, the US became the leading partner of South Africa , replacing Britain. In that year, South Africa's export to the US reached $ 2.34 billion from $ 108 million in 1960, whilst its export to Britain remained at $1.08 billion (Lulat, 2008: 71)

In retrospect, it is clear that US investments played an important role in the capital accumulation process of South Africa. Indeed, direct and indirect investments made by US investors financed 11 percent of South Africa's gross domestic investment, and its share in new investment in industrial sectors increased from 24.4 percent in 1956 to 33.7 percent in 1970. The loan which became possible thanks to Engelhand, was very critical for South African economy particularly because of withdrawal of foreign capital from the country after Sharpeville. For example, because of $98.4 millionr transferred by the US to South Africa in 1970, South Africa's foreign reserves multiplied by four. This was a major fillip for the Republic (Rogers, 1976:96).

Foreign capital and relationships between the US public policy makers provided vital possibilities which could not be undervalued not just for the economy but also for the military capability, technological development and infrastructure of South Africa (Rogers, 1976: 102, Culverson, 1999: 40). For instance, because of US investments, ESCOM, one of the most important state-owned enterprises, was able to reduce its dependency on oil by building facilities using nuclear power or coal. This also provided additional opportunities for South African

industry, because as mentioned above, South Africa did not have enough oil reserves so it had to import petroleum from abroad (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 107). The apartheid regime also benefited from US investments in mining where low paid migrant workers were employed in general. US investments and supports provided modern technologies to this industrial sector which helped to maximize profits (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 88). In terms of military capacity of South Africa, in addition to the military and strategically important agreements between the US and South Africa in the beginning of the sixties, especially investments of US companies in information sector guaranteed another important opportunity to control black population. The fingerprinting of fifteen million Africans, which was two-thirds of all African population, was recorded and kept by the apartheid government in a data bank in 1978 thanks to the information technologies. Additionally, with the great help of US information technologies investments the apartheid government's intelligence services and police force became able to watch and record almost all anti apartheid activities (Lulat, 2008: 73).

American investors also obtained significant profit opportunities thanks to the cheap labour force and natural sources in South Africa. 90 per cent of the profit made by the US manufacturing companies in the continent was coming only from South Africa (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 96). Additionally, the most influential US companies invested in South Africa had an important contacts with the apartheid government as well as with the private sector of South Africa. On these grounds, American corporations would be able to become a part of the decision process of the country (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 111).

However, new investments and industrialization process did not mean better living and working standards for the majority of the country. In contrast, the incomes of the Africans working in factories, mines and farms were far less than the incomes of whites. Additionally, almost all US corporations were paying black workers below the effective minimum level

(Rogers, 1976:147). Therefore, four fifths of unskilled urban African workers suffered from undernourishment whilst one-third African infants died before celebrating even their first birthday (Seidman and Seidman, 1978: 19-23). Moreover, US investors complained about various restrictions imposed on the use of black labour but their concern was profit rather than the problems of black workers themselves. Not surprisingly, they had no agenda for the establishment of negotiating for machinery or higher wages for blacks. They also had a positive stance about 'job fragmentation' (Rogers, 1976: 153). In an interview with an American businessmen who had investments in South Africa , it became clear that American investors were unanimously opposed to trade unions for Africans (Rogers, 1976: 154). One of the managers of the Good-Year Tire Company, which had made huge investments in South Africa, pointed out that US economic activity in South Africa had to be 'counterrevolutionary' by opposing radical political changes within the system (Lulat, 2008: 70-71). The general idea behind this perspective was that they were just responsible for their shareholders, who invested their money in the belief that the management of the corporation would consider the interests of shareholders (Rogers, 1976: 149).

Despite the increase in US investments, the South African economy started to experience problems by the seventies. A first major problem was the rise in black resistance movements against apartheid. The intensification of the repression of blacks through apartheid had led to the intensification of black resistance against the system. Although, the apartheid government's response against the resistance movement came with different attempts to oppress antiapartheid movements, all these pressures led to an intensification of black resistance movement (Lulat, 2008: 77). For foreign investors in the country, all these meant more vulnerable, unsafe and instable investment environment. In addition to the increasing political struggle against apartheid, South Africa also faced problems in terms of capital accumulation process in this process

(Davies, 1979: 184). After the sixties, South Africa had encountered an overproduction problem. During the period, although whites' purchasing power considerably increased, this was not enough to realize suitable profit rates because of very low purchasing power. In other words, the size of the market started to become insufficient for foreign investors. In addition, there was a skilled labour shortage in certain production areas (Lulat, 2008: 77; Davies, 1979).

These problems led to a reduction in profit rates. As a result, the South African economy began to lose its attractiveness for foreign investors because it could not provide premium rates of return for foreign investments. Political risks, derived from the antiapartheid movements, in the country also fed this situation (Davies, 1979: 188). Therefore, especially after the mid-seventies, many US companies began to look for new investment areas in the African continent and they made important investments in Nigeria and Libya. For example, the return of US capital invested in these countries went above that US capital invested in South Africa in 1976. Towards the ends on the seventies, foreign investors became more critical oft the South African regime. One of the basic focal point of these critiques was that the South African government should create a more attractive environment by repealing the job reservation system and similar legislation (Davies, 1979: 191). In other words, both domestic and foreign investors started to oppose to the apartheid system (Lulat, 2008: 78). Consequently, the apartheid system had reached its natural and structural limits because of its ineffectiveness for capitalist class in a specific historical period of accumulation process in the country.

Chapter VI

US Labour Relations with the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), 1960-1973

As during the 1960s and 1970s, US investments in South Africa increased, so US overseas labour policies carried out by the AFL-CIO also increased in the country. In other words, US overseas labour activities in South Africa followed US investments. However, at the beginning of the 1960s, there was a problem for the AFL-CIO about which labour organization would be the most suitable partner in its activities in South Africa, one which would be anti-communist and non-political in terms of trade unionism understanding, and influential in terms of the number of its members.

The potential partner of the AFL-CIO had to provide a possibility of influencing the black workers in line with business trade unionism. The AFL-CIO had three options: SACTU, TUCSA and FOFATUSA. As showed above, SACTU's trade unionism understanding relied heavily upon political unionism and it had strong relations with the Congress Alliance. In addition, after the Sharpeville Massacre, many members of SACTU were forced into exile, arrested and killed. Further, some of them joined the Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was the armed wing of the ANC. Not surprisingly, given the state of political oppression, SACTU was by the late 1960s inactive in the South African labour movement (Braverman, 1967: 54-58). However, if it had been an active agent of the labour movement of South Africa in the 1960s, it still would not have been a suitable partner for the AFL-CIO because of its political and leftist trade unionism understanding. The second option, FOFATUSA, in whose formation the AFL-CIO had played a significant role

through the ICFTU, could be a suitable partner for the overseas labour activities of AFL-CIO because of its non-political trade union understanding, anti-communist stance and relations with the ICFTU, in which the AFL-CIO had a dominant position during the 1960s. In fact, the AFL-CIO maintained strong relations with FOFATUSA through the ICFTU after its formation, notably via Irving Brown, who was one of the most important people within the overseas operations of AFL-CIO (Braverman, 1967: 54-58). However, FOFATUSA did not have a major influence over the South African labour movement because of the number of its members.

As for TUCSA, firstly, it was the biggest trade union federation of South Africa. Secondly, as showed above, it had a non-political/business trade unionism understanding and anti-communist stance as the AFL-CIO had. Therefore, it was a suitable partner for the AFL-CIO. However, there was a problem that TUCSA was not accepting blacks as members and because of this situation, it could not affiliate to the ICFTU. In addition, TUCSA's discriminatory policies were not suitable for the AFL-CIO in controlling black workers through this federation. Therefore, the AFL-CIO pressured the TUCSA through the ICFTU to begin to admit blacks. As a result, TUCSA amended its constitution in the beginning of the 1960s and began to accept blacks as members (Braverman, 1967: 54). Additionally, during the 1960s and 1970s, TUCSA declared its stance as anti-communist in every possible situation (Braverman, 1967: 57-58). All of these aspects meant that there was no longer any problem for the AFL-CIO in establishing relations with TUCSA and thus to influence the South African labour movement. Therefore, during the 1960s and 1970s, relations between the AFL-CIO and TUCSA intensified and the AFL-CIO supported TUCSA and member unions in different manners (Trewhela, 1991: 84).

The AFL-CIO maintained its relations with TUCSA directly or through different US institutions including the US State Department and US Labour Department. Besides, these relations relied heavily upon the idea that TUCSA was the most important representative of

South African labour. As following sentences of an official from the US consulate in South Africa show,

> *TUCSA is the only truly representative trade union federating body in the republic. Those unions or federating bodies which exclude workers from their ranks on the basis of colour violate the basic precepts of trade unionism and deserve little or no considerations from the international movements, except the scorn, criticism and denunciation they are so rightly accorded. Because TUCSA is the only real trade union in this country, all the burdens fall on its shoulders. It, as the one body representing only a portion of all workers in South Africa, must do a job which is presently taxing all the facilities of the AFL-CIO in the US (TUCSA Newsletter, May 1967).*

At the same time, the US Embassy in South Africa, which always employed labour officials, played a significant role in the relations between the TUCSA and US organizations, as news about Ed Splain, who was a labour official in the US Embassy in South Africa, from TUCSA Newsletter shows:

> *...He was closely associated with TUCSA and its affiliated trade unions, and has played an important role in the United States and other overseas countries in building up the co-ordinating body's reputation as a progressive minded organization and the leading voice of the South African workers (TUCSA Newsletter, 14-16, May 1967)*

One of the examples of the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO was the formation of TUCSA's research bureau with the support of AFL-CIO. In 1965, at its eleventh congress, TUCSA decided to establish a research bureau. After the decision, Grobbelear, who was the General Secretary of the federation, sent a letter to the AFL-CIO, asking how such a bureau should be constituted. Grobbelear also asked a question about how a suitable staff would be for such a bureau and whether the AFL-CIO could recommend a suitable person for the bureau, stating that although there were some qualified economists in South Africa, it was not possible to find a suitable person because of the lack of concentration on the needs and

requirements of labour movement among South African economists (Letter from J.A. Grobbelear to George Meany, May 1965). In the next period, the AFL-CIO made important contributions to the establishment of TUCSA's research bureau.

TUCSA's Education and Training Department was also established and headed by labour consultants recommended by the AFL-CIO. In 1965, for example, Eugene Gene Weisman, who was a trade union educator, labour expert and the former president of the Retail Clerk's International Association in the United States, with which TUCSA established strong relations during the 1960s and 1970s, came to South Africa for five months to assist the establishment of education department of TUCSA (TUCSA Newsletter, May 1965). In 1966, Weisman visited South Africa again to advise and help the launching of TUCSA's national educational and training programme. Wiseman played so critical role in the formation of the Education and Training Department of TUCSA that in the next period, he was accepted as honorary life member by three TUCSA unions, the Federation of Leather Trade Unions, the South African Council of Transport Workers, and the South African Boilermakers', Iron and Steelworkers', Shipbuilders' and Welders' Society. Furthermore, in 1967, he was awarded with a gold medal by the President of TUCSA, T.P.Murray, at TUCSA's Thirteenth Annual Conference in Cape Town (TUCSA Newsletter, May 1967).

During the 1960s and 1970s, TUCSA's education and training department organized many activities whose theme was anticommunism in collaboration with the AFL-CIO. For example, in 1965, the department launched a study class. In the first lecture of the class, what was discussed was the role of communism in South Africa and in the world. In the next period, the department made many publications attacking communism to distribute overseas as well as to the members of TUCSA. For example, according to one of the brochures publicized by the TUCSA

Education and Training Department, enlightened capitalism was better than communism for workers in terms of the earning of workers (Braverman, 1967, 57-58). In these publications, TUCSA was showed as at the forefront of the struggle against communism in South Africa. Besides, during the period, TUCSA organized many anti-communist activities. Almost all of them were supported by the CIA through the AFL-CIO as well as by the apartheid government (Braverman, 1967, 58).

In addition to educational activities, information and publication sharing was one of the most important elements of relations between TUCSA and AFL-CIO. During the 1960s and 1970s, TUCSA took many publications from the AFL-CIO to circulate AFL-CIO's opinions in different matters to its members. For instance, in 1962, Dick Long from the AFL-CIO suggested some AFL-CIO and the US Department of Labour publications to TUCSA through Donoghue, who was the General Secretary of TUCSA, for circulation among African workers. The first of them was "Technical Assistance Aid No 5: Electing Union Officers" and the second was *"How to Run a Union Meeting"*. Copies of the items suggested by the AFL-CIO[5] were distributed to TUCSA through the American consulate in South Africa (Letter From P. O'Donoghue to Ed. Splain, 18 June 1962; Letter from American Consulate General to O'Donoghue, 19 June 1962). Another example of publication sharing between the AFL-CIO and TUCSA was that in the early 1960s, US government offered to pay the subscription fees of some American journals and magazines to TUCSA, including National Geographic, Holiday, Harper's, Yale Review, Current History, Forbes, American Economic Review, Theatre Arts, New Yorker, Foreign Affairs, International Affairs (Letter from American Embassy to Scpheepers, undated). In the same period, the AFL-CIO offered TUCSA some movies produced by the US Information Service, stating that the number of movies produced by US Information Services, under the head of

[5] Long suggested the TUCSA 200 copies. However, the TUCSA demanded 50 copies.

Industry and Labour, would be free for South African groups through free registration with the United States Information Services (USIS) film library (Letter From O'Donoghue to the Secretary of TUCSA, November 1962). In 1968, the administrators of TUCSA were invited to a special showing of showcase American documentary films organized by the US Information Service through the Consulate General of the United States of America. In the activity, two movies, '1776', which was about the declaration US independence, and 'Garden of Eden', which was about the history of the motion movie and the role of craftsmen who made the motion picture, were screened (Consulate General of the United States of America, undated). A month after this activity, TUCSA's General Secretary Grobbelear asked for a film produced by a local trade union in the US to screen to trade unions in South Africa (Letter from Grobbelear to United States Information Service, 27 February 1968).

As shown above, the AFL-CIO provided many publications to TUCSA. However, TUCSA also provided important information to the AFL-CIO regarding different matters including South Africa's political developments and its labour movement. In addition, during the period, many labour experts and delegations from the US visited South Africa to gain information about the industrial system and labour movement of the country. Many of these visits were organized in collaboration with TUCSA or the visitors coming from the US were directed by TUCSA to where they could get information which they needed (African American Labour Center, 6 January 1972). In 1967, for example, Splain, who was a labour expert in the US Embassy in South Africa, made a tour, of which the aim was to meet trade unionists from TUCSA, to the Area Divisions of TUCSA including Western Province Area Division, Eastern Province Area Division, Border Area Division and Natal Area Division. All the arrangements of the tour were organized by TUCSA (Letter from L. Douwes Dekker to E.H.Splain, 23 June

1967). In the same year, Senator Robert Kennedy from the US visited South Africa and had a meeting with leading members of TUCSA including the president L.C. Scheepers; the General Secretary J.A. Grobbelear; the members of Officers' Committee, J. Daniel, T.M.M Alexander, B.J.Erasmus; James Mafuna, from the Engineering Industrial Workers' Union, Lucy Mvubelo, from the National Union of Clothing Workers and Sybil Hedley, from the Garment Workers Union (NEC Report, 13th Annual Conference, 1967).

During the 1960s and 1970s, many American institutions, academics, experts and researchers having relations with the AFL-CIO conducted research projects about the labour movement, industrial system and political environment of South Africa. For them, the first information source in South Africa was TUCSA. This meant that the AFL-CIO, other US institutions and researchers from the US tried to understand the labour movement of South Africa from the TUCSA's point of view. For instance, in 1965, Bush Kimberley, an academic from the US, conducted a study about the labour movement of South Africa and asked some questions to the General Secretary of TUCSA, Grobbelear, by sending a letter. In his response, Grobbelear provided TUCSA as the largest and most representative labour organization of South Africa by pointing out that SACTU was exposed to communist infiltration and FOFATUSA was only the representative of black workers of the country. Of course, he never mentioned discriminatory history of TUCSA or the privileged positions of the whites within TUCSA unions:

> *This council is the largest and most representative coordinating body of trade unions, with the Federation of Free African Trade Unions, functioning as an organization which caters solely for African members… Due to the extreme left wing policy, and what appears to be communistic infiltration, SACTU has received considerable attention from the South African government, and the security police… The Federation of Free Trade Unions is also in a rather difficult position, mainly due to the fact that the African trade unions do not seem to be mature enough… It is the intention of my council to intensify its effort to organize all unorganized workers…This council*

has, however, continued to function as non-racial organization… (Letter From Grobbelear to Kimberley, 16 August 1965).

In addition, TUCSA sent different information resources including conference reports, documents, resolutions taken in different activities etc. to the AFL-CIO and other US institutions, such as the US Embassy in South Africa. For instance, in 1960, TUCSA's conference reports, South African Trades and Labour conferences reports and the Trade Union Unity Conference reports were sent to the US embassy by TUCSA (Letter from General Secretary of TUCSA to A.J. Tressider Public Affairs Officer of American Embassy, 14 July 1960). In 1968, information about an agreement between trade unions and employers in the iron, steel, engineering and metallurgical industry was sent to the labour officer in the American consulate in Johannesburg (Letter from TUCSA to E.J. McHale, 1 July 1968). In the same year, following the request of US consulate in Johannesburg, selected examples of wage levels, including those of the South African Prime Minister, the members of Parliament, assistants considering gender and ethnicity, and clerks in different industries including commerce and , building, engineering, were sent to the US embassy (Letter from R.L. Kraf to E.J. McHale, 9 December 1968). Even the biographies of TUCSA members were sent to the US embassy in South Africa (Letter from Terence P. O'Donoghue to R.M. Long, Without Date).

Another dimension of the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO was the educational programs organized by the AALC in South Africa. For instance, in 1971, the AALC decided to launch a training course for African workers in South Africa in collaboration with TUCSA (African American Labour Center, 6 January 1972). The administrator of AALC, Irving Brown, asked TUCSA's opinion about what was needed by sending a letter to Grobbelear. In his

response, pointing out that TUCSA was ready to collaborate with the AFL-CIO and AALC, Grobbelear stated that what was necessary was the formation of education centers, which would allow workers to gain an appreciation of the trade union movements; the education of officials for the labour movement; and equipping officials in the movement. According to Grobbelear, the first step of such an education program had to be education of Africans in terms of industrial legislation and other legislation (Letter From Grobbelear to Brown, 19 March 1972).

In the same year, the AALC decided to organize another education program in collaboration with the US government, a university from the US and TUCSA in the Graduate School of Business Administration at the Wits University. The aim of the program was to invite some American labour consultants and the representatives of American labour as visiting professors (African American Labour Center, 11 October 1972). However, the program was postponed by the school because such a program could be against the South African Legislation. In addition, the University also pointed out that they did not have a budget for such an activity (Letter From Grobbelear to Spatz, 20 October 1972; African American Labour Center, 11 October 1972).

During the 1960s and 1970s, many US institutions including universities organized educational activities in collaboration with the AFL-CIO in the US and many unionists from TUCSA attended these activities. One of them was the Trade Union Program at the Harvard University. According to the official description of the program, it was organized "…for the purpose of educating to trade unions the same basic training in administration available to men in the field of business management" (TUCSA Newsletter, August 1965). In other words, the basic

aim of the program was to spread the idea of bread-and- butter or business unionism among trade unionist coming from different countries. Another indicator of such an argument was that George Meany, who was the leader of the AFL-CIO, and Walter Reuther, who was the leader of the United Automobile Workers Union (UAW), which was one of the most important union in the AFL-CIO in terms of foreign policy and overseas programs, were on the advisory committee of the program (Harvard University Trade Union Program, 15 March 1963).

The program was organized under the administration of the Bureau of International Labour Affairs of the Department of Labour. It was organized as two sessions -spring and fall- and consisted of three months training and two months travel for the purpose of learning about the US, and accepted 28 trade unionists from different countries. The other half of participants was from the US. The spring session would be held in the period between the 20th of February and the 17th of May and the fall session would be held in the period between the 11th of September and the 6th of December.

The international participants of the program were granted first class jet travel with 35 pounds excess baggage on their return flight from their countries to the US. The program also covered domestic travel in the US with same conditions. In addition, all participants were given $15 per diem and $50 allowance for incidental expenses during their stay in the US. Additionally, tuition fee of the course, $770 per person, was paid by the United States Government (Letter From Terence P. O'Donoghue to Ed. Splain 25 October 1962; Letter From Ed. Splain, to Terence 17 October 1962).

There were a number of criteria, which participants had to comply with. Accordingly,

- They had to be trade union officials or labour educators, but they could not be government officials,
- They had to be knowledgeable about the labour area,
- They had to indicate their desire to maintain a career in the trade union movement,
- They had to have successful experience in the labour movement,
- They had to speak English and know industrial relations (Letter from Ed. Splain to Terence P. O'Donoghue, 25 October 1962)

However, these were only official requirements. Embassies circulating the invitation of the program to potential trade unions demanded more information. For instance, Splain circulated the criteria of the 1963 Harvard Program to TUCSA, pointing out criteria like being South African citizen, good health and moral character, proficiency in English, experience, being emotionally and intellectually mature. Besides, he demanded some supplementary information, such as personality, political leanings, attitudes, feeling towards the US, in addition to biographical data (Letter From Ed. Splain to Terence, 17 October 1962).

As for the lectures of the program, they consisted of following headings: Problems in Labour Relations, Economic Analysis, Labour Law and Arbitration, Trade Union Administration, Wage Administration and Benefits, America Labour History, International Labour Affairs, Public Spending and Parliamentary Procedure, Collective Bargaining. According to the requirements of the program, the participants would report directly to Washington after the program finished

(Letter from Ed. Splain to Terence P. O'Donoghue, October 1962; Circular No. 20, 19 June 1963).

During the program, in addition to the lectures at the Harvard University, the participants had meetings with different US institutions, including the Department of State, the Department of Labour, the AFL-CIO officials, the National Labour Board, and the US Congress etc (Letter from Ed. Splain to Terence P. O'Donoghue, 25 October 1962). In addition, participants were encouraged to undertake individual travel for consultation and observation in the US. The program ended with a terminal seminar, evaluation and discussions on experiences (Letter from Ed. Splain to Terence P. O'Donoghue, 25 October 1962).

Many TUCSA members and administrators attended these courses in different periods. In 1963, four members of TUCSA, two members for each session, including Louis A. Petersen, the General Secretary of Garment Workers Union of the Western Provinces, attended the Harvard Trade Union Course (Circular No. 54/1962, 30 November 1962; Letter From Ed. Splain, to Terence O'Donoghue, 25 October 1962). Before Petersen went to the Harvard University, US embassy wanted to have a talk with him (Letter to L.A. Petersen, 12 March 1963). For 1964 program, Sydney John Spear from the South African Typographical Union (Bloemfontein Brunch) was selected as participant (Letter from P.O'Donoghue to E.H.Splain, 16 August 1963). In 1965, Christine Du Perez, General Secretary of the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers attended the program (TUCSA Newsletter August 1965). Her following words shows that one of the most important function of the program was to import US trade unionism understanding to the labour movements of other countries:

> *What forcible struck me was how the trade unions are lagging behind management in education and training. I hope that I will be able to import something of what I learned to the South African*

trade union movement here the TUCSA education programme is of vital importance (TUCSA Newsletter August, 1965).

Another activity organized by US institutions including the AFL-CIO was the US Foreign Leadership Grant, which was organized and financed by the Trade Union Exchange Programs Division of the US Department of Labour for the Office of African Progress of the US Department of State. The program included trade union visits, tours and meetings with different actors in the US (With the Compliments of the American Consulate General, without date and reference). In 1964, TUCSA was invited to send its members to the program, which was organized in South Africa by Splain, who was labour officer in the US embassy (Letter from Grobbelear to the Secretary of National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers of South Africa, 19 February 1965). As Grobbelear's following words show, the invitation was warmly welcomed by TUCSA:

This decision by the US authorities is not only an honour gained by this council, but also an honour to your union, since brother Erasmus evidently met with the requirements of the US authorities (Historical Papers, Cullen Library, AH 1426, Eb 4, 18/3/2, 17 June 1965).

Over the following years, many unionists from TUCSA attended the program. In 1965, for example, B.J. Erasmus, Trustees of the TUCSA and the president of the Johannesburg Municipal Transport Workers Union, attended the program. In 1966 and 1967, the General Secretary Grobbelear and the President Murray both attended (Historical Papers, Cullen Library, AH 1426, AV1, File 2, 8/24, 2 May 1967).

During the program[6], participants visited different cities in the US, including Washington, New York, Buffalo, Detroit, Michigan, Chicago, Illinois, Phoenix, Arizona, Los Angles,

[6] This is the 1965 program. However, the program had a similar content for other years.

California, New Orleans and Louisiana (With the Compliments of the American Consulate General, Johannesburg, Document About Foreign Exchange Leadership Grant, without date and reference). In these cities, the participants had meeting with different officials and attended activities organized by different institutions including the Trade Union Exchange Program Division Bureau of International Labour Affairs of the US Department of Labour, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the US Department of State, Executive Director of Washington International Center, Northern Virginia Center School of General Studies, Catholic University of America, Jewish Community Council, Foreign Visitors Office, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO, Special International Representative, International Association of Machinists and Aero-plane Workers, Washington International Center, Embassy of South Africa, International Affairs Department of the AFL-CIO, the US Department of Health and Education, New York City Transit Authority, Transport Workers Union of America were some examples of these institutions (ibid). Some examples of the activities organized by these organizations were discussions about US governments and politics, family and community, religious life in the US, the structure and objective of the unions, developments on the national level and the effects of automatization on trade union membership, the history and structure of the AFL-CIO, the role of US labour movement in the international labour movement, social insurance (ibid). In addition, the participants met many trade unionists through this program. For example, during his tour, Grobbelear met with Employee Relations, North American Aviation, Los Angeles Division; President of Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of America; Maritimes Trade Department of AFL-CIO; Assistant to President of International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forges and Helpers; the president of the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers and E.G. Weishan (Letter from Grobbelear to Montgomery, 19 September 1967; Letter from

Grobbelear to Thomas F. Murphy, 19 September 1967; Letter from Thomas F. Murphy to Grobbelear, 18 July 1967; Grobbelear to H.J. Buoy, 20 September 1967; Letter from Grobbelear to D. Mc Garvey, 20 September 1967).

By the beginning of the 1970s, the United States South Africa Leader Exchange Program (USSALEP) had organized different activities in South Africa, including academic activities and the visits of academics from the US. For instance, in 1966, USSALEP invited Prof. John James Jehring, who was the Director of Center for Productivity Motivation in the School of Commerce at the University of Wisconsin, to visit main centers in South Africa. The trip had three main objectives. The first was a study on productivity issues, with particular focus on relations between education and productivity, financial incentives, and creation of capital and social security. The second was to give lectures to the business community and academics on the importance of productivity, new approaches in the US, organizing economic enterprises, financial incentives for nonprofit organizations. The third aim of the visit was to contact with people from the business community, governmental agencies and trade unions. During his stay in South Africa, he also contacted and had meetings with Sphers and Grobbelear from TUCSA (Letter From Grobbelear to S.A. Program Director of USSALEP Inc., 25 February 1966; Letter From Moir to Murray, 19 January 1966; Letter from Grobbelear to SA Program Director of USSALEP, 9 February 1966).

In 1973, the USSALEP organized a symposium on "the Optimum Involvement of Manpower in Business and Industry" with particular focus on unskilled labour. Seventy people including trade unionists, businessmen, authorities in the field of management and the

representatives of the government attended the symposium, of which twenty-five of participants were from the US. Two people were invited by W.I.Grobler, USSALEP South Africa Director, from the TUCSA: Lucy Mvubelo and Robert Craft, economist and the Assistant General Secretary of the TUCSA. Lucy Mvubelo took place in the plenary session of the symposium with economist W.E.J.Steemkamp and business executive Bill Willson while Craft made a presentation with particular focus on trade unions and work committees on "Training and Communication" session (Letter from Grobler to Robert Kraft, 29 March 1973).

In 1975, Friends of the USSALEP meeting was held in Johannesburg with the participation of managers of US corporations in South Africa. Grobbelear from TUCSA also made a presentation evaluating the situation of the South African labour movement in the meeting. In the same year, the USSALEP invited Ralph Seward, who was an arbitrator in the US, for a month visit. During his visits, he had many meetings with trade unionists and all contacts of him with trade unionists were established by TUCSA (United States South Africa Leader Exchange Program Inc., 17 July 1975; Letter from Grobler, SA Director of USSALEP, to Grobbelear, General Secretary of TUCSA, Historical Papers, Cullen Library, AH 1426 Eb 4, 6 June 1975).

Conclusion

This study aimed to understand US labour relations with South Africa with particular focus on the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO in the period between 1960 and 1973. Therefore, in the study, firstly, a historical framework was developed to understand the restructuring process of capitalist production relations and international labour relations in the post Second World War era in the world scale and South Africa respectively. After this, overseas

labour policies in a general context and US overseas labour policies in South Africa with particular focus on the relations between TUCSA and AFL-CIO were dealt with.

After the Second World War, the world economy was restructured because of the hegemonic position of the US within in the capitalist world economy. However, additional factors, such as political independence of former colonies, the existence of the Soviet Union as an alternative hegemonic power, the establishment of socialist governments in East Europe, and the increasing influence of left wing political parties in the Western Europe, also played a critical role in the Post Second World War era. As a result of these developments, the US tried to create new mechanisms to ensure its hegemonic position and the continuation of the capitalist mode of production. The first step of these attempts was the establishment of international financial institutions and the introducing of new regulations, such as the IMF, IBRD GATT and Marshall Plan to rebuild capitalist production relations around the world. The second attempt became the restructuring process of the international labour movement. In fact, the restructuring process of the international labour movement had begun with the formation of WFTU in 1945. However, since the most influential country within the WFTU was the Soviet Union, the US evaluated the WFTU as a threat to its hegemonic position and capitalism. Therefore, after the formation of WFTU, the US tried to undermine WFTU by playing a leading role in the formation process of ICFTU. As a result, in 1949, under the leadership of the US and its most influential labour organization, AFL, the ICFTU was established as a rival labour international.

After the Second World War, another important development within the international labour movement was the evolution of the overseas labour policies of developed capitalist countries. The most important aim of these policies was to create anti-communist and pro-capitalist labour organizations in different regions where developed capitalist countries had investments. Therefore, during the period many regional labour organizations were established by

the developed capitalist countries in different regions, such as Latin America, Asia and Africa. Of course, the most important actor of this process was the US, as the hegemonic power of capitalist world economy.

In 1960, the Inter American Regional Labour Organization (ORIT), which had strong relations with the governments, capitalist classes and intelligence services of Western capitalist countries, was established by the ICFTU in Latin America to support non-communist and non-political trade unionism in the region. During the 1960s and 1970s, it organized many activities aiming to support anti-communist trade unions in collaboration with the ICFTU, AFL-CIO and US, which was the most influential country in the ORIT's policies and activities through its capitalist class and intelligence services. However, after the Cuban Revolution in 1960, the AFL-CIO decided to form an independent regional labour organization in Latin America: AIFLD. It was also financed by US through the AFL-CIO, USAID, CIA and the business community of US. In addition, it played a significant role in creating non-political, anti-communist, pro-capitalist and pro-American labour organizations in the region.

By the sixties, US investments began to increase in the African continent. However, at the beginning of the 1960s, the AFL-CIO and US had no presence in the region. Therefore, the influence of ICFTU in the continent was very important for them in gaining a hegemonic position in the region. However, in 1964, the US launched its independent Africa program by forming the AALC. Like ORIT and the AIFLD, the AALC also organized many activities aiming to support non-political and anti-communist trade unions in different African countries in collaboration with US government, US capitalist class and the CIA.

From the beginning of the 1960s, US investments began to increase in South Africa as well. Therefore, US overseas policies in South Africa began to increase in the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, by the beginning of the 1960s, the leading organization of the US labour

movement, the AFL-CIO, attempted to extend its influence over the labour movement of South Africa, especially over TUCSA, which was the most suitable partner for the US and AFL-CIO because of its ideological position and stance relying on the idea of business unionism.

The AFL-CIO maintained its relations with TUCSA directly or through different US institutions including the US State Department and US Labour Department. During the sixties and seventies, relations between the TUCSA and US labour/official organizations, especially the AFL-CIO, ranged from information sharing to organization of educational programs, overseas visits, publication sharing and academic activities. For instance, TUCSA always had strong relations with the labour experts employed by the US Embassy in South Africa and they played a significant role in TUCSA's relations with the AFL-CIO and other US institutions. Another example of the relations between TUCSA and the AFL-CIO was the formation of TUCSA's research bureau and education department. AFL-CIO and labour experts coming from the US played a significant role in the formation of TUCSA's research and education departments, which organized many activities against communism and political unionism in collaboration with the AFL-CIO.

During the 1960s and 1970s, AFL-CIO sent many publications, documentaries, movies to TUCSA. At the same time, TUCSA was an important information source for the AFL-CIO. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, many people including academics, experts and researchers from the US visited South Africa to conduct research projects or contact with trade unionists. Almost every time, the first information source of them in South Africa was TUCSA. Similarly, during the period, many trade union courses aiming to spread bread and butter unionism in different countries through participants coming from these countries were organized by the AFL-CIO or in collaboration with the AFL-CIO in the US. Many TUCSA members including its general secretary, president and presidents of member unions attended these activities. Thanks to these

kinds of activities, they contacted with many people and established important relations in the US.

All of these show that during the 1960s and the 1970s the AFL-CIO and US tried to shape and control the South African labour movement through TUCSA because it was the most suitable partner for US labour operations in South Africa because of its anti-communist stance and bread butter unionism understanding. To be sure, from the US point of view, the basic aim of this policy was to ensure the profitability of US investments and the continuation of capitalist production relations in South Africa.

However, these kinds of relations between the AFL-CIO and TUCSA were able to continue until the early 1970s because the emerging struggle of the blacks against the racist policies of apartheid and Durban strike waves in 1973 negated AFL-CIO existing plans towards the South African labour movement. Therefore, by the late 1970s, the AFL-CIO found it necessary to change its policies and to begin to forge relations with the emerging black trade union movement of South Africa – but that is another chapter to this story which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

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