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ADMINISTRATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LESOTHO

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Roma and Zomba

1979

I declare that the dissertation which is herewith submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, is entirely my own work and that it has not been submitted previously for a degree in any other University.

Signed .....D. S. Hirschmann.....

Date .....1 June 1979...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge with deep appreciation the financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, the African Studies Institute of the University of the Witwatersrand, and the Senior Bursaries Committee of the University of the Witwatersrand.

I wish further to express my very sincere thanks to my Supervisor, Professor A.W. Stadler, Head of the Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, for his helpful criticism and guidance; Mr S. Montsi, Director of the Central Planning and Development Office of the Government of Lesotho (for the duration of the research) for his cooperation and encouragement; Professor T.J.D. Fair of the Urban and Regional Research Unit of the University of the Witwatersrand for his comments and advice; the Lesotho Government for permission to carry out the research; the members of the Central Planning and Development Office of the Government of Lesotho for their patience and constructive assistance; all those people in the Lesotho Government and foreign aid agencies (many of whom are included in the list of interviewees) who helped in numerous ways with the research; and my wife, Spona, for her consistent support and for typing the various drafts of the thesis.

ABSTRACT

The central focus of this thesis is on the machinery of planning in the Lesotho Government and the tasks which it endeavoured to initiate and administer. One objective of the study has therefore been to furnish a detailed internal history of those departments of Government (in particular, the Central Planning and Development Office) principally concerned with planning. The primary purpose, however, has been to use this case study to provide an insight into the nature of the bureaucracy and, more specifically, into its attitude toward, and capability of initiating, reform. The study thus relates to one of the major issues of concern to political and administrative analysts of underdeveloped and recently politically-independent states: namely the compatibility or otherwise of the 'bureaucracy' with 'reform' and 'development'.

Planning was selected as an appropriate focal point for this analysis, since it had generated such great expectations in the early post-colonial period. It was common to the administrative experience of many new states that the establishment of a central planning office was considered to be one essential early step toward change and progress.

The detailed case study covers the administration of planning in Lesotho for the ten years between 1965 and 1975. It commences immediately before the establishment of the Planning Office, observes its establishment, the problematic early years of minimal advance and, later, its more rapid growth and relatively enhanced efficiency. A portrayal of this history as a subunit struggling to increase its influence in conflict and competition with other subunits of a large bureaucratic organization, presents a more accurate representation than one

which suggests the evolution of the planning machinery as part of a systematic exercise in administrative reform.

The next section, which relates and discusses the views and concerns of the participants themselves, is intended to offer further insight into the 'official mind' of the Lesotho bureaucracy, and thus to supplement the case study.

A brief examination of the principal features of Lesotho's economy follows. This reveals clearly that the main trends are towards a deepening state of underdevelopment and a steadily growing dependence. The record of a deteriorating economic predicament is juxtaposed with the strengthening of the planning machinery and so throws into question the role of the bureaucracy in a situation of this nature.

At the close, three approaches to public administration in underdeveloped countries are discussed as a means of interpreting what, exactly, has been observed.

The first conclusion is that the case study reveals a strengthening of the planning machinery which would satisfy the very modest requirements of reform as understood by the 'African Public Administration and Management' movement. Taking note of the manner in which the planning machinery has grown and also of certain practices and policies of the civil service as a whole, the second conclusion is that the changes observed fall far short of the demands of the 'development administration' movement; there was little serious interest in the type of reform which that movement proposed.

A brief discussion of the 'bureaucracy' and the 'migrant worker', set against the background of economic deterioration and increasing dependence, leads to the final conclusion. This confirms the 'underdevelopment and dependence' movement's perception of the role of the bureaucracy in the post-colonial era. Lesotho's civil service was gaining material advantage from, and serving to abet, the forces of underdevelopment. In the final analysis, therefore, the case observed is one of administration for underdevelopment; that is, underdevelopment administration.

INTERVIEWS

In preparation of this study, numerous interviews were conducted with senior civil servants and aid officers resident in the country. References to interviews are indicated in the text by a number preceded by a + sign. These refer to a confidential list which has been supplied to the Supervisor of the study.

A list of interviewees is given at the end of the thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in the thesis :

AAPAM	African Association of Public Administration and Management
'APAM'	'African Public Administration and Management' movement
BDPC	Budget and Development Planning Committee
cpo	central planning office
CPO	Central Planning Office
CPDO	Central Planning and Development Office
DA	District Administrator
DDC	District Development Committee
DOC	Development Operations Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAPO	Food Aid Programme Office
gdp	gross domestic product
gnp	gross national product
IAPAM	Inter-African Public Administration and Management Seminars
LNDC	Lesotho National Development Corporation
PS	Permanent Secretary
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Childrens' Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States of America

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION : BUREAUCRACY, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING

The first Chapter offers a brief note on the use of the term 'bureaucracy'; an analysis of three divergent approaches to the study of administration in underdeveloped countries (with particular attention to Africa); and a short introductory discussion of planning.

1. 'BUREAUCRACY'

One well-established but continuing issue of concern in political and administrative studies in western societies has been the compatibility or incompatibility of 'bureaucracy' and 'democracy'. In recently politically-independent and underdeveloped countries, much attention has come to be focused on the relationship between 'bureaucracy' on the one hand, and 'reform' and 'development' on the other.[1] Initially much of the literature was optimistic that such a relationship would be a positive one; more recently, analysis and observation has become increasingly pessimistic.

The central focus of this thesis is on the machinery of planning in the Lesotho Government, and on the various tasks it was set up to initiate, coordinate and administer. Yet the study has to be observed in its 'bureaucratic' context. This

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1. Lack of agreement on the definitions of the key concepts presents a problem which is neither novel to political or administrative studies nor one which has ever impeded research or study.

is essential to an understanding of the particular way in which the agencies concerned with planning evolved, and the impact which they made. Moreover, the broad purpose of this thesis is to use the detailed study of planning to provide an insight into the nature of Lesotho's bureaucracy and its attitude toward, and capability of initiating, reform.

The possible hazards of employing the term 'bureaucracy' are readily acknowledged. One authority on administration in underdeveloped countries has warned against a usage which equates the term with administration in general, pointing out that it refers to a particular style of admin stration. He goes on to suggest that 'it is likely that administration in less developed conditions will not be bureaucratic'.[1] And it is common to much of the literature on public administration in poor countries to conclude that the evolving public services or civil services do not approximate very closely to Weber's ideal type of legal-rational organization.[2] Nevertheless, these organizations are regularly referred to as 'bureaucracies' and those who man them as 'bureaucrats' or (as a group) 'the bureaucracy'.[3] A full explanation of, or justification for, the particular way in which the term is being used, has not always been considered necessary.

Yet, as Albrow has shown, the term has attracted a 'plethora of competing concepts'. From the numerous definitions

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1. B.B. Schaffer, The deadlock in development administration, in C. Leys (ed.), Politics and change in developing countries, 1969, p. 189.
2. S.N. Eisenstadt, Problems of emerging bureaucracies in developing areas and new states, in N. Raphaeli (ed.), Readings in comparative public administration, 1967, pp. 225-6.
3. For example, M. Fainsod, The structure of development administration, in I. Swerdlow (ed.), Development administration. Concepts and problems, 1963, pp. 1-23; E.W. Weidner, Technical assistance in public administration overseas: the case for development administration, 1964, p.168; L. Adamolekun, Towards development-oriented bureaucracies in Africa, International Review of Administrative Sciences, No. 3, 1976, pp. 257-265.

in past or current use he draws out seven main themes; while Crozier discusses three main usages.[1]

Albrow notes a further duality in interpretation. 'Bureaucracy' has been used not only to refer to a form of government but also as a 'collective designation' for the officials. From relatively early on, writers on the subject recognised that this new form of government or style of administration was also related to a new element in the system of social stratification.[2] And it is in this sense that social scientists concerned with development and underdevelopment are increasingly employing the term.

Abrahamsson has accused Albrow of failing to evaluate the multiplicity of definitions and of 'terminological overgenerosity'.[3] Nevertheless, in arguing the case that Lesotho's

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1. Albrow lists 'seven modern concepts of bureaucracy'. These are bureaucracy as 'rational organization', 'organizational inefficiency', 'rule by officials', 'public administration', 'administration by officials', 'the organization', and 'modern society'. The first usage cited by Crozier is the traditional political science interpretation, which means government by bureaus, that is, departments of state staffed by appointed personnel and functioning without popular participation. The second originates with Weber and means the rationalization of collective activities through a system of impersonal rules for the definition of responsibilities and the ordering of careers. The third corresponds with the 'vulgar' use evoking a sense of slowness, ponderousness and routine. Crozier bases his own work on the last of these interpretations: for example, he defines 'a bureaucratic system of organization [as one] where the feedback process ... does not function well ... [one] that cannot correct its behaviour by learning from its errors'. See M. Albrow, Bureaucracy, 1970, pp. 84-106; and M. Crozier, The bureaucratic phenomenon, 1964, pp. 3 and 186-7.

2. Albrow, op.cit., p. 20.

3. B. Abrahamsson, Bureaucracy or participation. The logic of organization, 1977, p. 23.

civil service may fairly be described as a 'bureaucracy', it will not be possible to satisfy all interpretations. For reasons which follow, the term is, however, considered appropriate.

Though Weber's 'ideal type' is considered by many authorities to be an abstraction of particular tendencies, rather than a descriptive category, it nevertheless remains surprising to what extent the Lesotho civil service conforms to that type, and even more surprising the extent to which it strives to conform. It is a relatively large complex organization of paid officials working in more than a dozen ministries which are in turn further divided into divisions and subdivisions.[1] The Basotho civil servants are subject to the authority of the service only with respect to their impersonal official obligations. They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices, each having a fairly clearly demarcated sphere of competence. Selection is in the main based on merit, though there are frequent breakdowns in the form of favouritism and nepotism and appointments when no-one of sufficient merit is available. They are remunerated by fixed salaries according to a salary-scale graded in great detail, and have a right to a pension. The office is treated as the primary, if not the sole occupation of most incumbents. The civil service constitutes a career and promotion is normally (again with exceptions) granted according to seniority or achievement (usually seniority; it is also limited to those not openly antagonistic to the political leadership). The civil servants cannot appropriate their positions and are separated from the means of administration. On paper they are subjected to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office, though in practice surveillance is irregular and the required discipline often absent.[2]

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1. See Chapter V for further details of the Lesotho civil service.
2. Application of points from M. Weber, The essentials of bureaucratic organization: an ideal-type construction, in R.K. Merton et al., Reader in bureaucracy, 1952, pp. 19-22.

Formally, the Lesotho civil service is structured along these lines although breakdowns and circumventions of standards are fairly regular occurrences. Practice varies from office to office and situation to situation; and an officer who may take advantage of the 'rules' to refuse one client, may overlook them for another.[1] Yet it is true of Lesotho's - as it is of many other civil services - that whenever a department gets into trouble, the first reaction usually is to look for 'divergencies and return to a structure which is as close as possible to the Weberian model'.[2]

How rational this all is in terms of means and ends is very difficult to say. The ends are often not clearly defined, and declared ends diverge from intended ends. The ends of different departments, for example the Planning Office, the service section of the Post Office, and the Department of Community Development, differ qualitatively, and what may be rational for one may not be for the other. Furthermore, the objectives of the organization as a whole, those of the subunits and those of the individual civil servants will vary. It will be argued in the final Chapter that, in view of the national needs and resources of a country as poor and underdeveloped as Lesotho, the bureaucratic organization of the civil service does not appear appropriate, advantageous or rational. Yet, it seems to be serving the interests of the bureaucracy well enough.

In addition to the formal structure of the civil service, one observes in its operation the characteristic 'pathologies' or 'dysfunctions' which find their source in the bureaucratic

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1. Cf. G. Hyden, Social structure, bureaucracy and development administration in Kenya, The African Review, 1, 3, 1971, pp. 127-8.
2. A.R. Hoyle, The changing environment of administration, International Review of Administrative Sciences, No. 1, 1976, p. 68.

style of administration.[1] Rules which appear to have been designed as means take on a life and justification of their own. In the prevailing atmosphere of interagency conflict and competition for resources, subunit goals are often pursued more urgently and strenuously than overall organizational goals. And slowness, impersonality, caution and red tape are a feature of the functioning of the Lesotho civil service. This is not to say that all its weaknesses find their origin in bureaucracy: some result from a failure to live up to bureaucratic standards, exemplified in practices such as nepotism, and in the loss of documents and lengthy delays caused by lack of conformity to procedures. Yet the overall structure together with the general manner of operation manifest both the substance and flavour of bureaucracy.

Finally, this group of paid officials, by far the largest body of people in paid employment inside Lesotho, does form a clearly identifiable and very significant group in the evolving social structure of the Basotho people. 'The bureaucracy' is an appropriate 'collective designation' for it.

The broad purpose of stressing this is to indicate the extent to which bureaucratic structures, procedures and attitudes have taken hold, and the unlikelihood of any proposed reforms significantly altering the style of administration.

The more specific purpose is to establish the administrative context in which Lesotho's Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO) was set up. For it is in the very nature of bureaucracy (including its dysfunctional aspects) that some of its main problems can be explained. Two examples of the way in which typical bureaucratic traits affect planning

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1. See, for example, N.P. Mouzelis, Organisation and bureaucracy. An analysis of modern theories, 1967, p. 55; and Crozier, op.cit., pp. 186-7 and 199.

will suffice. Vested interests characteristic of such organizations tend to oppose 'any new order ... which ... makes uncertain the differential advantage' which civil servants derive from current arrangements.[1] Second, in the face of uncertainty, a bureaucracy may respond by closing the system boundary or, if that is impossible, by creating special cells to deal with and contain the disturbing elements. Such cells may have to operate in a non-bureaucratic fashion, but this is seen as a 'small price to pay for stability' in the rest of the organization.[2] In the early years after independence, senior civil servants perceived newly established planning offices as a threat to their security and position, but nevertheless essential to the needs of political independence and foreign aid. While necessary, therefore, these special cells should disturb the rest of the civil service as little as possible. This is evidenced by the regularity with which planners and their foreign advisers have complained about antagonism and non-cooperation from other ministries, and about the failure of governments to appreciate that planning should permeate the whole administration.

This context also helps to account for the behaviour of the CPDO itself as it attempts to increase its power and overcome resistances. For, from the outset, it is placed in a 'power situation' in which it has to establish its own influence and to 'generate processes of power on its own behalf'.[3]

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1. R.K. Merton, Bureaucratic structure and personality, in Merton et al., op.cit., p. 367.
2. Hoyle, op.cit., p. 68.
3. S.N. Eisenstadt, Bureaucracy, bureaucratization and debureaucratization, in Raphaeli, op.cit., p. 359. Although Eisenstadt refers to governmental departments, he is in fact principally talking about the relationship of the whole organization to its 'environment'. Crozier, op.cit., p. 157, uses Dahl's definition of power: 'the power of person A over person B is the ability to obtain that B do something he would not have done otherwise'.

The civil service should therefore be seen as an organization, and departments (including the CPDO) as components or subunits of the organization,[1] all competing for power, acceptance and resources in a continuing process. In this competitive situation the subunits will engage in various techniques including open conflict, quiet resistance, cooperation and compromise; they will cultivate in their members a commitment to subunit goals above that to the organizational programme; and they will seek 'by fitting its policy into the official doctrine of the large organization to legitimise its demands'.[2]

As has been the case in many other African countries, Lesotho's CPDO was not placed formally in a superior-subordinate relationship to other departments, but in a lateral position in which the element of hierarchical authority was absent.[3] In reality it was forced into a somewhat lower level than many of the divisions in the ministries. In order to improve its position, it set out to raise its status and increase its control, resorting in the process to the use of various props. It turned to the politicians and called for the backing it understood it had been promised. It employed an ideology of 'planning and development', arguing that this accorded with the Government's stated primary objectives. It referred repeatedly to official instructions which formally required departments to follow planning procedures. It brought to bear any expertise which it possessed and others lacked. And it attempted to use its strategic position in

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1. Cf. F.R. Riggs, Organizational structures and contexts, Administration and society, 7, 2, 1975, pp. 153-4.
2. J.G. March and H.A. Simon, The dysfunctions of bureaucracy, in D.S. Pugh (ed.), Organization theory, p. 36, discussing Selznick's model.
3. N.W. Chamberlain, Private and public planning, 1965, pp. 10-11.

aid negotiations to further these ends.

In its efforts to strengthen itself through winning donor support, the CPDO had certain advantages; but competition remained strong. White, in this connection, points out that a recipient government should not be seen as an 'identifiable and coherent entity' but as comprising separate institutions with various roles to play and interests to serve. As the principal role players involved in aid negotiation, he gives particular attention to the planning office, the finance ministry and the implementing ministries. The latter, for example, will use foreign advisers to gain direct access to donor agencies, employ on-going projects to tie in donors for purposes of expansion, and pit their technical expertise against the planners' economic expertise. In this whole exercise, a portrayal of the central institutions (such as a planning office) as 'devoid of institutional interests, concerned only to subjugate the interests of the sectoral ministries to the "national good", is to give a travesty of reality'.[1]

Furthermore, the term 'bureaucracy' as used to define civil servants as a group within the country's class structure, has additional value in explaining their role in society at large. This does not conflict with anything said so far; on the contrary, much of the bureaucratic behaviour of the civil service is a function of, and accords with, its class interests. The whole career system with its strictly graded range of salaries and benefits, promotion opportunities, security of tenure and pensions; the demand for conformity, reliability and the reduction of uncertainty; and a narrow view of clients and their problems are not isolated organizational characteristics. With their impact on income and income

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1. J. White, The politics of foreign aid, 1974, pp. 82-8 and 258.

opportunity, standard of living, financial and psychological security, and status, they serve as significant mechanisms for the creation, protection and consolidation of privilege. The bureaucrat's opposition to change becomes therefor both internally and externally focused.

Non-Marxist analysts of administration acknowledge the phenomenon of social stratification and the bureaucracy's tendency to become an identifiable group striving to retain its position among society's privileged strata. Merton observed that with increasing bureaucratization,

> it becomes plain t all who would see that man is to a very importan degree controlled by his relations to the instruments of production... This can no longer seem only a tenet of Marxism, but a stubborn fact to be acknowledged by all, quite apart from their ideological persuasion.[1]

Writing about public administration in underdeveloped countries, Dube refers to the bureaucracy as a privileged class with distinct vested interests, 'sensitive to all threats to its position and privilege'.[2] For Pye the higher civil service represents values, prejudices and ambitions of a 'very definite and limited stratum' of society;[3] while Swerdlow speaks of the bureaucrats as elites who 'consciously and unconsciously fight to retain their position by making the process

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1. Merton, op.cit., p. 363.
2. S.C. Dube, Bureaucracy and nation-building in ional societies, in Raphaeli, op.cit., p. 214.
3. L.W. Pye, The political context of national development, in Swerdlow, op.cit., p. 36.

of modernisation more difficult'.[1] Finally, Schaffer locates the bureaucracy among the actual or potential beneficiaries of the new state institutions, distinct in this regard from the peasants and subsistence food croppers.[2]

Those who employ class analysis along Marxist lines do not unfortunately adhere to a uniform model. While there is a general similarity, they differ in the catgories they isolate, in the groups included in these categories, in the manner in which they segment the class horizontally and vertically, and in the clarity with which they draw the various distinctions. This is not surprising. Not only do views differ on the most appropriate application of class structure to underdeveloped societies, but the actual nature of the class structure will itself vary from country to country, depending primarily on the extent to which and the manner in which capitalism has penetrated these societies. The following represents a tentative and, for the sake of brevity, a somewhat schematic, model for Africa.[3]

At the pinnacle is situated the metropolitan or international bourgeoisie, which continues to dominate the means of capitalist production and exchange. Directly below it is located the national bourgeoisie. This locally-based class owns

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1. I. Swerdlow, Economics as part of development administration, in Swerdlow, op.cit., p. 104.

2. B.B. Schaffer, The politics of dependence, in P. Selwyn (ed.), Development policy in small countries, 1974, pp. 36-7.

3. Based on J. Bardill, The theory of class struggle and its application to Africa, in Production, liberation and society, 1977, pp. 26-9. Also see, for example, I. Wallerstein, Class and status in contemporary Africa, in P.C.W. Gutkind and P. Waterman (eds.), African social studies: a radical reader. 1977, pp. 277-83; and J. Woddis, Is there an African national bourgeoisie?, in Gutkind and Waterman, op.cit., pp. 268-76.

and controls at least some of the means of production (usually in fields not competitive with the international bourgeoisie). It is commonly divided into three fractions, namely commercial, rural and bureaucratic, and includes the highest level of each. Because this class remains auxiliary to, and dependent on, the international bourgeoisie, some writers dispute its presence, and include it as the top level of the petty bourgeoisie. Here there is the possibility of theoretical and factual differences. In southern Africa, for example, a white national bourgeoisie exists in South Africa, whereas certainly no more than a petty bourgeoisie exists in Lesotho.

Should one accept the notion of a national bourgeoisie, then below it is found the petty bourgeoisie, whose main role in Africa is to perform certain services - commercial, educational, professional and public - but which also includes small-scale productive-artisan type of work. Three layers are commonly distinguished: an upper layer - very close to the national bourgeoisie - consisting of professionals, high-level civil servants, prosperous traders and farmers; a middle level consisting of secondary school teachers, middle-level civil servants and shopkeepers; and a lower level of primary school teachers, small shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen, and low-level employees in the civil service.

These groups are seen as beneficiaries of the system. Those that follow below are classified as the disadvantaged, subordinate classes. The most important numerically are the peasants (a[illegible], a category which has caused considerable debate), who may also be differentiated into a number of levels, depending on their circumstances. Then there is the working class of which there are several categories: the relatively highly paid, urban, skilled workers, frequently employed by expatriate firms (who, one could argue, belong with the beneficiaries of the system); the poorly paid, semi-skilled and unskilled urban workers; the poorly paid rural workers, usually dispossessed

ex-peasants; and migrant workers whose domicile is in the rural areas but whose work may be in rural or urban areas. Finally there are the unemployed or irregularly employed in both urban and rural areas who provide a reserve army of labour, and whose presence weakens the bargaining power of the employed workers.

The implications of this class structure for the study of public administration in Africa will be discussed further in this Chapter. For the moment, it should be noted that the bureaucracy with which this study is concerned, is located as part of the bourgeoisie, the essence of whose relationship with the vast majority of the people is exploitative.

2. APPROACHES

A. Development Administration

Public administration, as a field of study, involves a close link between research, training, advice and practice and the personnel engaged in these activities. It is their interests and their interrelationships which largely determine the content and nature of the discipline, the directions it follows, and the impact it makes. The study of administration in underdeveloped, non-industrialised countries (in Latin America, Asia and Africa) follows this pattern; with the important additional complication that communication between governmental, non-governmental, international and academic agencies and personnel takes place across national boundaries and between people in widely different sets of circumstances.

As a field of study relatively distinct from public administration, 'development administration' has a brief history. Although studies of colonial administration produced much in the way of publications, documents, records and personal accounts,[1]

1. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The contribution of public administration to African studies, Journal of Administration Overseas, 16, 4, 1977, pp. 258-64.

the study of public administration in the politically emerging states of the third world gained momentum only in the second half of the fifties. The immediate and obvious cause for this was the surge towards political independence of the colonial territories. The major source of ideas, however, of the 'development administration movement'[1] was provided by American academics.

Raphaeli has suggested reasons for this rapid rise in American interest: the 'romantic attraction' developing nations have for westerners; the fact that these countries presented 'virgin territory' for research; the availability of funds to support travel and field research; the requirement of American aid agencies (having experienced setbacks in their efforts to transfer western administrative practices and institutions) to know more about conditions in the countries they were attempting to advise; and the need to equip political science with norms capable of handling the new problems and issues raised by the emerging states.[2]

This list excludes direct concern for the administrators and people of the newly-independent countries. This would not do justice to the intentions of all the academic participants in the movement. Yet this exclusion by a writer who is wholly sympathetic to the movement and has no intention of detracting from it does add strength to a view of the movement as heavily biased toward serving American interests. Research was financed by United States government agencies, foundations and universities.[3] The Government which lacked colonial experience was experiencing unexpected problems with its aid programme which in turn was harming its foreign policy objectives: it urgent-

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1. See Schaffer, The deadlock in development administration, op.cit., pp. 177-211, for an extremely useful discussion of the movement.

2. N. Raphaeli, Comparative public administration: an overview, in Raphaeli, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

3. Schaffer notes the extent of US interest in technical assistance for public administration in B.B. Schaffer, Administrative legacies and links in the post-colonial state: preparation, training and administrative reform, Development and Change, 9, 2, 1978, p. 183.

ly needed to learn why. For the American academic, backed by large financial resources, it provided a new, exciting and open field for research and conceptualisation.

Even Riggs, who more than most wished to stress a theoretical ('nomothetic') rather than a practical case-study ('ideographic') approach, who directed attention to administrative ecology[1] and who came to attack technical assistance for public administration as negatively effective, was ultimately concerned with policy, particularly American policy. He argued against 'premature translation of tentative findings into dogmatic prescriptions'; once tested and proved, however, the research findings should be of an applied value.[2] Elsewhere he submits his 'sala' model as a contribution to research, but also as a 'potentially useful weapon for those more particularly concerned with administrative development'.[3] Writing in 1975 about 'contexts' of organizational structures, he again stresses its contribution to organizational theory, and its potential practical utility to the United States Government:

> To the extent that the United States officially engages in promoting organizational development overseas it behooves us to improve our understanding of how the context of developing countries affects the establishment and prospects of formal organizations ... with practical advantages for foreign aid of the United States.[4]

Definitions of 'development administration' abound. Weidner wrote that it was a 'process of guiding an organization toward the achievement of development objectives', adding that it was action-oriented and placed administration 'at the centre in

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1. F. W. Riggs, Administration in developing countries. The theory of prismatic society, 1964, pp. 99 and 428-9. Riggs stressed the necessity of penetrating the non-administrative subsystems which 'intertwined' with the administrative subsystem, of identifying the 'sensitive' variables in the environment, and of demonstrating at least 'plausible patterns of correlation between those variables and the administration.'
2. Ibid., p. 400.
3. F.W. Riggs, The "sala" model: an ecological approach to the study of comparative administration, in Raphaeli, op.cit., p. 432.
4. Riggs, Organizational structures ..., op.cit., pp.153 and 188.

facilitating the attainment of development objectives'.[1] Meadows described it as 'public management of economic and social change in terms of deliberate public policy'.[2] Esman, writing some years later, added his idea of what the 'development' aspect meant: 'activities of government that foster economic growth, strengthen human and organizational capabilities, and promote equality in the distribution of opportunities, income and power'.[3] This attention to distribution indicated a changed perception of what development meant. Weidner, for example, later acknowledged the narrow nature of his own earlier definitions.[4]

These definitions do not elicit clearly enough the 'onerous array' of new responsibilities which the public services of new countries were expected to handle, nor their deficiencies and problems. Fainsod pointed to the acute problems and great handicaps and the fact that capacity falls 'far short of urgent needs'.[5] Schaffer has put this clearly: 'The peculiarity of development administration lay exactly in that inconvenient combination: extensive needs, [illegible] capacities, severe obstacles'.[6]

Technical assistance for public administration provided another important focus of concern for the movement. Weidner, having observed twelve years of American technical assistance,

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1. Weidner, op.cit.. p. 200.
2. P. Meadows, Motivation for change and development administration, in Swerdlow, op.cit., p. 86.
3. M.J. Esman, Administrative doctrine and developmental needs, in E.P. Morgan (ed.), The administration of change in Africa: essays in the theory and practice of development administration in Africa. 1974, p. 3.
4. E.W. Weidner, The goals, strategy and environment of development, in J. Barratt et al. (eds.), Accelerated development in southern Africa. 1974, p. 8.
5. Fainsod, op.cit.. pp. 3-4.
6. Schaffer, The deadlock in development administration, op.cit., p. 184.

concluded that the attempted transfer of western 'Weberian, or presumed Weberian, rationality' to poor countries must be replaced by something new, innovative and action-oriented, that is development administration.[1]

Above all else, though, the movement was interested in administrative reform, not gradual or incremental but something more dramatic; not merely a change in degree but a change in kind. It should take account of the special weaknesses and strengths, opportunities and challenges which prevailed, and break from the western preoccupation with 'rationalist reference orientations and the accounting austerities of capitalist economies',[2] from the 'old efficiency and economy school of thought' with its emphasis on budget management, personnel management and organization and methods.[3] While there was no accepted programme of change, recommendations included redrawing hierarchical arrangements, increasing programme and field units, improving lines of communication and changes in the service structure.[4]

By the late sixties the movement had reached 'deadlock';[5] the causes of which arose essentially from the nature of the movement.

First, it originated as and remained an American-dominated approach, so much so that the very people required to implement the changes were often overwhelmed or left out or left behind by both the recommendations and the concepts. Most of the innovative leaps were made by American academics; if adopted, they would not have amounted to reforms conceived of by the practitioners but adaptations of exogenously-originated ideas. Fur-

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1. Weidner, Technical assistance ..., op.cit., p. 206.
2. Meadows, op.cit., p. 100.
3. Weidner, Technical assistance ..., op.cit., p. 205.
4. V.A. Pai Panandiker, Developmental administration: an approach, in Raphaeli, op.cit., pp. 205-10.
5. Schaffer's term. See, The deadlock in development administration, op.cit.

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ther, the situation was one of academics, secure in their home and work environment, calling on distant bureaucrats to dispense with established procedures, alter their behaviour and take chances which might well endanger their own (frequently fragile) security.

Second, the movement's central concern with reform had to lead to self-questioning and doubt, once it became clear that few experiments were being seriously attempted, and still fewer succeeding. If development administration was not so much a study of administration in poor countries as a discipline concerned with reform, then what the academics were interested in, and what was actually occurring were two different things. In this situation the movement began to lose some of its relevance.

Third, the movement concentrated not merely on reform, but on substantial changes in administration. Government services which saw themselves as struggling to maintain their position as viable entities providing a reasonable level of service, were somehow expected to initiate and sustain large-scale structural and procedural innovations. In a politically uncertain environment the impact of such changes was unpredictable. What the bureaucrat saw as problems, the academic interpreted as challenges. Some academics listed conditions for change such as uncommitted money, time and skill. Here was 'the rub: these conditions do not exist. A bureaucracy which could meet these requirements would by definition already be developed'.[1] If the movement's attention to reform made it appear less relevant, then its requirement of (and optimism about) large-scale change made it appear less than realistic.

A fourth cause for doubt arose from conflicting views on technical assistance for public administration. With recurrent failures and negative responses by recipients the role of such

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1. Raphaeli, op.cit., p. 19, discussing V.A. Thompson's article, Bureaucracy and innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 9, 1, 1965, pp. 1-20.

advice came to be seriously questioned. Some of the movement's members criticised aspects of it,[1] and Weidner pointed out basic weaknesses in its content; but Riggs went further to argue that even if successful it was likely to lead to negative development. In his view the new patterns of administration introduced 'exogenously' from 'diffracted' into 'prismatic' societies, would enable the bureaucracy to increase its capacity to control the power structures. This would undermine political development, weaken political control of the administration, and render the bureaucracy less efficient and less responsive to public needs. Ultimately this could lead to cataclysmic revolutions and/or totalitarian governments.[2]

This division in the development administration movement was also indicative of a split between social scientists and advisers on administration. The title of Hanson's review article, 'Professor Riggs and Mr Waterston on development administration' effectively personified this aspect of the deadlock. Waterston's book on planning displayed the old-fashioned, self-confident 'wisdom' of people who never delved beneath the surface of social phenomena. While Waterston would argue that one could not wait for total understanding before offering advice, Riggs was concerned lest his analysis influence the attitudes and practices of his readers in underdeveloped countries.

> To put the matter aphoristically, Waterston will encourage even when he is wrong, while Riggs will discourage even - and perhaps particularly - when he is right.[3]

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1. E.g. D.S. Brown, Strategy and tactics of public administration technical assistance: 1945-1963, in J.D. Montgomery and W.J. Siffin (eds.), Approaches to development. Politics, administration and change. 1966, pp. 185-223.
2. Riggs, Administration in developing countries, op.cit., pp. 227 and 423-4; and F.W. Riggs, Administrative development: an elusive concept, in Montgomery and Siffin, op.cit., pp. 252-5.
3. A.H. Hanson, Planning and the politicians (and other essays), 1969, pp. 246-50.

Hanson went on to say that the distance between advisers and social scientists was presenting a real crisis in the study of underdeveloped countries. Clearly it was. But surely an even more fundamental crisis lay in the much wider gap between western social scientists and the senior civil servants of the poor countries themselves.

Schaffer, in attempting to get beyond the deadlock, suggested that a distinction be made between 'administrative reform' (internal incremental changes) and 'development administration', not anti- or extra-administrative but major changes of the administration itself and its relationship with society. He made specific suggestions about alternative civil service career structures, new organizational forms, means of eliciting public participation, etc. A few years later Esman proposed changes of a similar nature which emphasised performance rather than procedures, task-oriented structures and the active participation of clients.[1] Some of their points will be taken up in the final Chapter.

These recommendations too have been confronted by the hard evidence of bureaucratic incapacity or unwillingness to initiate or sustain, or win political support for, such changes. The question is: Why? Why after all those years of advice, in situations which appear to demand imaginative and novel responses, do these suggestions make so little headway? Frankenberg and Leeson too, writing about the health services of Zambia ask why obvious solutions are not applied even when they are perceived. The 'requirements are simple, the arguments for them cogent and convincing, and the costs relatively small. Yet they are rarely put into effect and those who advocate them are ignored almost to the point of persecution'.[2] It is intended that some

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1. B.B. Schaffer, The administrative factor. Papers in organization, politics and development, 1973, pp. 248-9; Schaffer, The deadlock in development administration, op.cit., pp. 207-11; and Esman, op.cit., pp. 16-20.

2. R. Frankenberg and J. Leeson, The sociology of health dilemmas in the post colonial world: intermediate technology and medical care in Zambia, Zaire and China, in H. Wolpe Kadt and C. Williams (eds.), Sociology and development, 1974, p. 275.

tentative answers will emerge from this study, particularly from this and from the concluding Chapter.

B. African Public Administration and Management (APAM)

It is not accidental that the name selected to denote this movement coincides closely with that of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), inaugurated in 1971, and the Inter-African Public Administration and Management (IAPAM) Seminars[1] held annually since 1962. The Association and the Seminars have played a central role in the development of this movement. But beyond that, and of more significance, the terms themselves provide useful pointers to its nature. It is intended to be African (and not western, particularly not American) dominated. 'Public', while possibly selected as a conveniently neutral adjective, clearly also testifies to a very different and markedly more conservative approach to administrative reform than that proposed by the development administration movement. Finally, the addition of 'management' demonstrates a fairly recent but fast growing interest in management techniques and skills.

The particular institutions, and the linkages between them, from which this movement derives its character, are apparent. Political independence in Africa set off an urgent and large demand for administrators. This led to the establishment in many countries of departments of public administration at universities, and institutes of administration attached to, or independent from, universities. Initially their purpose was to to train as many administrators as possible as quickly as possible.

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1. Originally called the Inter-African Public Administration Seminars.

As African governments came to feel reasonably satisfied that Africanization of the civil service was proceeding relatively well in quantitative terms, they and the training institutions began to look more closely at the relevance of the training and the quality of its products. Governments are the principal financial supporters and clients of these institutions and, while the latter retain varying degrees of autonomy, education and research have had to be geared increasingly to government needs. Training is intended to provide personnel in the fields and at the levels which fulfil official manpower demands. Research needs to be aimed at solving the immediate problems of administrators or at producing information which enhances the local content of teaching materials. Researchers, to facilitate their field work, find it convenient to comply (or appear to do so). University students, usually on government scholarships, have a shrewd idea of prospects in the civil service and press for the type of training which will assist their careers. The practice of admitting growing numbers of mature-age students with experience in the civil service adds to the pressure. Finally, governments have strengthened the links with training by establishing more practically-oriented, skill-imparting institutions such as the Institutes of Development Management and Financial Management in Tanzania.

This close tie-up between the purposes of research, training and practice at the national level has been bolstered by close and reinforcing contacts at the international level (training institutions, multilateral and bilateral technical assistance and, increasingly, consultancies) and by the establishment at the African level of AAPAM. Together with the African governments which take it in turns, the AAPAM Seminars have been co-sponsored from the beginning by the Ford Foundation. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation assisted with the thirteenth and fourteenth seminars (and possibly others) while the Rockefeller Foundation helped with the International Conference on Trends in University Teaching and Research in Public Administration in Africa, held in Ife in 1970 and with a sub-

sequent volume on research methodology. Clearly the American foundations see the deliberations of the APAM movement as constructive in their terms, while the senior African bureaucrat's hostility to American academic approaches to development administration does not extend to any broader opposition to American interests.

Hanson illustrated the nature of a division of opinion by referring simply to Waterston and Riggs. Professor Adebayo Adedeji's name could be equally well used to personify the APAM movement. Not only has he written prolifically on the subject - he is undoubtedly the most consistent contributor to the APAM Seminars - but he also has experience in all the relevant institutions. He has served as President of AAPAM, university professor, senior international African civil servant and Cabinet Minister in the Nigerian Government.

Obviously not everyone who has participated in, or contributed to any of the movement's activities or to publications on public administration in Africa[1] has the same approach to administration. Nonetheless some clear trends emerge, and these point in a very different direction from that set by the development administration school.

Central to the APAM approach is its focus on African administration, specifically on the problems and issues which high-level African civil servants judge worthy of attention. It stresses that at this stage of the continent's development, policy-oriented research, designed to assist governments in finding solutions to problems, needs emphasis. It resists the

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1. The purpose of the argument about the APAM movement which follows is to try to distil some of the principal directions which high-level African bureaucrats appear to be stressing. The quite considerable body of material - books, articles, monographs - on African public administration is too broad and varied to be satisfactorily compressed in this way. Yet much of it does share a common feature of being oriented toward giving practical advice to senior civil servants and those in power, and providing useful material for those involved in training Africa's administrators and future administrators.

application of externally-evolved - most pointedly, American - theories to administration in Africa. Adedeji warns against the contamination of the universalistic theory-oriented public administration research strategy of American scholars which diverts attention 'from the areas of urgent research needs to one of low priority; namely model building'.[1] This would have the effect of locating research inside a foreign culture-bound framework, and result in devoting time to 'correcting, developing and extending' American ideas about African administration, so precluding 'the emergence of a coherent body of knowledge about administration in a particular society'. African administrators do not have the time to wait for Riggs to develop and test his theories; research must have 'an immediate value'.[2]

The movement also sees merit in case studies of particular countries and institutions. According to Murray, case studies augment knowledge and understanding of the subject by providing 'studies of the particular, where little has previously been done in depth'. They demonstrate the 'great variation' and 'manifold complexities' involved in specific circumstances, suggest questions for further exploration and lay the foundation for comparative analysis at a later stage. Furthermore, such studies assist teaching, by complementing more generalised and abstract discussion, and confronting the student with the 'complexities ... of real life situations'.[3]

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1. A. Adedeji, Education and research in public administration in Africa - an overview, in A. Adedeji and C. Baker (eds.), Education and research in public administration in Africa, 1974, p. 16.
2. D.J. Murray, The strategy for basic research, in Adedeji and Baker, op.cit., pp. 313, 317, 320 and 321.
3. Ibid., p. 318; and D.J. Murray, The importance of the case study method, in A.Adedeji and G. Hyden (eds.), Developing research on African administration. Some methodological issues, 1974, pp. 20 and 21.

Clearly, too, some leading participants are wary of any move away from bureaucratic procedures. Gardiner, pointing to corruption, nepotism and inefficiency argues that general orders and regulations were not merely a 'European invention designed to keep a tight grip on the population'. If there is to be a consistency of administration and systematic advancement towards goals, such regulations are essential. 'The time for the disregard of general orders, rules, regulations and procedures is past'.[1] Adu, while urging increased flexibility and dynamism, stresses the importance of the 'old qualities' of integrity, objectivity, impartiality, etc., which characterised 'the old Public Service'.[2]

The movement's ideas about reform - in line with general trends in African states - are unambitious. It acknowledges that little significant in the way of administrative change has been undertaken. Robert Ouko, First President of AAPAM, observed:

> One could go on and on about what we have considered should be removed, done or changed. Yet how far we have succeeded in actually doing, removing or changing these things remains a matter of debate.[3]

Kirk-Greene, reviewing the proceedings of the IAPAM Seminars, makes a similar point: '... beyond the limits of what the new African administrator is thinking and saying ... there lies the question of what he is actually doing. There has been the rub. Platitudes, even reforms, come more easily in symposium proceedings ... than in practice.'[4]

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1. R.K.A. Gardiner, From colonial rule to local administration, in A.H. Rweyemamu and G. Hyden (eds.), A decade of public administration in Africa, 1975, pp. 14 and 20.

2. A.A. Adu, The administrator and change, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op.cit., p. 29. Also see W.N. Wamalwa, The role of public service commissions in new African states, in the same volume, p. 53.

3. R. Ouko, The African Association for Public Administration and Management, Journal of Administration Overseas, 11, 3, 1973, p. 148.

4. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The new African administrator, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 1, 1972, p. 106.

The response to the early unpromising experience has not been to seek alternative directions but to persevere with gradual and incremental reforms along established lines. Being underdeveloped, by definition, is said to exclude the capacity to carry out a comprehensive package of reforms. The necessary skills required for improvement should therefore be 'secreted over the years as reform measures, introduced one by one, become effective and eventually internalized'.[1] In this regard, the movement also fully accepts that there will be no progress unless the 'political and administrative elite' is receptive to the idea.[2] Without full political backing at the highest level any strategy for reform has little chance of succeeding.[3]

Though less apparent, there does appear to be an underlying restiveness against the politicians. Far from a firm commitment to political leaders and their programmes, Africa's senior civil servants distance themselves, and blame the politicians for many of Africa's and their own woes. They accuse them, inter alia, of interfering with and downgrading rules and regulations and of representing sectional rather than national interests. In many of the Seminar papers it is clear that the African bureaucrat is accusing the politician of being a principal stumbling block to administrative reform.[4]

Finally, the movement's interest in management and professionalization should be noted. Africanization was the first task of administrative training. Professionalization should follow to prepare senior administrators to cope with their increasingly large and complex responsibilities.[5] This amounts

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1. A. Adedeji, Strategy and tactics for administrative reform in Africa, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op.cit., p. 226.
2. Ibid., p. 225.
3. The Swaziland Paper, Strategy and tactics for administrative reform in Africa, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op.cit., p. 217.
4. Gardiner, op.cit., pp. 18 and 20; and G. Hyden, The changing role of the African administrator, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, p. 5.
5. See H.A. Green, Bureaucracy and professionalization: toward management improvement in Nigeria, Journal of Administration Overseas, 16, 2, 1977, pp. 86-97.

to a call for advanced training in a field dominated by western, especially American, concepts and practices, developed originally in the large-scale corporate atmosphere of private companies, though applied and developed further in government agencies. It lays great stress on what Chege refers to as 'comprehensive, omniscient systems-oriented techniques borrowed from the frontiers of management science'; worked out for situations in which outcomes are far more predictable than they are say in the case of project implementation or rural development in Africa.[1] It is true that African administrators need specialist training, and that with careful application western management practices may be helpful. Yet the growing regard for management underlines a point made earlier: when the APAM movement denounces the inappropriateness of American administrative concepts, this is really limited to the development administration movement.

The case made out in support of greater professionalization of the administrator is similar to that in support of advanced management training. But here the intention is not only to upgrade the civil servant's capabilities, but also to raise his status in society. Adedeji suggests a programme involving a first degree in the social sciences, followed by a two-year post-graduate course, internship of one or two years, an intensive specialist course and then entry into a professional association with its own rules of ethics and code of conduct.[2] It is possible that he put forward this extended programme for purposes of discussion, although he does not say so. Yet the effect of the moves to greater professionalization would be to raise the senior bureaucrat yet higher into a more select elite, protected both by his advanced training as also by his professional association.

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1. M. Chege, Systems management and the plan implementation process in Kenya, The African Review, 3, 4, 1973, pp. 597 and 609.
2. A. Adedeji, The professionalization of public administration in Africa, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op.cit., p. 140.

David Anderson, the Ford Foundation representative closely associated with the IAPAM Seminars described AAPAM as an 'association of senior practising civil servants drawn from the non-specialist administrative class and from anglophone African countries'. A 'sense of belonging to a common profession, with common or recognisably similar problems and threats ... led to the development of an intimate clubbish atmosphere'. He goes on to note that many of the participants were aware of the danger of the seminars 'sinking into an annual gathering of elderly civil servants, decreasing in numbers and declining in relevance'.[1] The latter fear has not been realised: there are many new officials ready to replace the older senior civil servants, and the bureaucracy which continues to be represented at the Seminars has certainly not declined in relevance, if this refers to the operations of African states and economies. Nevertheless in making these few points he has come close to the heart of the Association and of the movement. Its membership comprises high level government officials, experienced in the practical problems of public administration in Africa, on the whole frank about their lack of success in initiating reform, realistic about the limited scope for change, essentially conservative in nature, and protective of their own interests. The Association serves as their trade union, attending to their problems and experiences, and in a very limited way strengthening their position at home as against other competing or threatening forces. And the function of the APAM movement, which in the final analysis they dominate, is to provide the information they need and suggest answers to the problems they face.

C. The underdevelopment and dependence movement

This school of thought is concerned with the international and domestic political economy of underdeveloped countries, rather than the field of public administration. Yet the impli-

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1. D.A. Anderson, Foreword, in Rweyemamu and Hyden, op.cit., pp. x and xi.

cations of this approach are of fundamental significance to the study of administration in these countries.

The full force of this approach reached English-speaking, western academic development studies circles in the second half of the sixties, after André Gunder Frank 'stormed onto the scene in the guise of an academic Che Guevara'.[1] The model of metropolitan-satellite relations which he used to demonstrate the structural cause of underdevelopment was a simple one; much of what he said was not new; and he has been severely criticised by both Marxists and non-Marxists. Arriving when it did, however, its clarity and simplicity were basic to its impact. The results of the development effort in the third world were extremely disappointing: economic growth in real terms was limited and the distribution of benefits (now a crucial aspect of any definition of development) was becoming increasingly uneven. Western theories of modernisation were losing some of their pertinence and their proponents some of their conviction. Thus it was that this alternative approach deriving largely from latin America was taken up so enthusiastically.

Hopkins has fired 'a red warning flare' against the 'importationof Frank into Africa'.[2] But the movement in both its theoretical and applied orientations has gone a long way beyond Frank, in the process becoming a strong, well-established and influential school of thought on development. The support base for the movement in both the west and in Africa is predominantly academic: this indicates both its strength and its potential limitations. Not tied to the interests of politicians and administrators it is free to question the underlying bases of social and economic relations. On the other hand, the thrust of its

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1. E. de Kadt, Introduction, De Kadt and Williams, op.cit., p.2. See A.G. Frank, Capitalism and underdevelopment in latin America, 1967 and Latin America: underdevelopment or revolution, 1969.

2. A.G. Hopkins, On importing André Gunder Frank into Africa, African Economic History Review, 2, 1, 1975, p. 13.

case constitutes an embarassement and a serious potential threat to the ruling class in Africa. In alienating this class it is endangering its access to the rulers themselves and to research material. Governments are likely to become increasingly wary of and antagonistic towards research of this nature, and suspicious of academically-oriented research in general. The movement's vitality is unlikely to be sapped for a long time, however. So far there are still governments which are unaware of the theoretical framework within which these researchers are working, while some see certain advantages in permitting some degree of freedom of research. The quantity of 'raw' material available for analysis is substantial and growing. And the accumulating evidence of increasing polarization between rich and poor countries, and between the rich and the poor of poor countries, will continue to furnish it with the empirical evidence to support its case.

A few key elements of this approach will be briefly listed. As opposed to the view that political independence of the former colonial territories would lead towards economic development and independence, the movement argues that what is in fact occurring is deepening underdevelopment and growing dependence. The structures established to serve the interests of the colonial power at the expense of the colony continue after independence with certain institutional rearrangements but with similar impact. The significance of the historical development of this relationship is stressed because it reveals how the colonial forces clashed with and distorted the nature of indigenous economic and social structures, so initiating and then entrenching the exploitative relations which still continue. In this process these societies lost their visibility, coherence and autonomy, becoming locked into a dependence-dominance relationship with the advanced metropolitan states. A full understanding of the political and economic predicament of these countries therefore requires that far greater attention be given to their international linkages than has been the case with 'conventional' western development theories.

There are a number of interrelated elements of this approach

which impinge more directly on the central focus of this study, namely the bureaucracy, and which therefore require rather more attention. It dismisses the argument that classes are not forming in Africa. While acknowledging the continuing role of ethnicity and regionalism and the very limited size of the urban population, it argues on theoretical and empirical grounds that classes are indeed emerging. The social formation may not yet be mature or rigid, and the classes 'classes-in-themselves' (that is, at a low level of cohesiveness and consciousness) rather than 'classes-for-themselves'; nevertheless, the process is under way.[1] The essential difference between the Marxists' perception of class relations and western social scientists' identification of social strata, is that the former are interested not only in the results of exploitation but more so in the relations of exploitation.[2] Classes are not merely socio-economic strata, but categories of people involved in a dynamic and conflicting relationship.

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1. See Kitching, op.cit. The notion of class structure which he uses concentrates on economic inequality largely produced by income differentials, in turn determined largely but not wholly by occupation. While this demonstrates clearly enough for the purposes of this study the social divisions with which we are concerned, it lacks the precision required by class analysis which focuses on the ownership of, and relationship to, the means of production. According to Lenin, classes are 'large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production, by their relation ... to the means of production; by their role in the social organization of labour, and consequently by the dimensions and mode of acquiring the share of social wealth of which they dispose'. V.I. Lenin, Selected works. 1970, Vol. 3, p. 248, quoted by Bardill, op.cit., p. 22. Both Kitching's and Bardill's articles furnish very useful analyses of the relevance of class analysis in Africa.

2. De Kadt., op.cit., p. 4.

It follows therefore that western theories of the state, which envision it as a guardian of the people's interests and a neutral arbiter in their conflicts, are rejected. The underdevelopment school's view of the state is that beneath the guise of the common interest and the 'camouflage of general welfare', it is used to manipulate and deflect the consciousness of the subordinate classes, in serving the interests of the politically and economically dominant classes.[1]

It does differ though (if only in degree) from the classical Marxist interpretation which saw that state as 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' and political power as 'merely organised power of one class for oppressing another'. Marx was concerned with societies in which an indigenous bourgeoisie had created the institutions of state as it ascended to power. In the colonies an external bourgeoisie established the state apparatus to serve its own ends, and then relinquished direct control at the time of political independence. The class structure in the post-colonial period is ill-defined and characterised by divisions: the exact influence of the emerging and fractionalised domestic bourgeoisie is therefore uncertain. Further, while the interests of the foreign and domestic bourgeoisies (and those of the various segments of the latter) converge, they are not identical. All this results in the state - potentially at least - having rather more room for manoeuvre and its role being somewhat less predictable.[2]

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1. Discussed by M. Duverger, The influence of political forces, in M. Kriesberg (ed.), Public administration in developing countries, 1965, pp. 8-9. He states that in very underdeveloped societies, 'the Western theory of the state ... is almost impossible to uphold and does not correspond to the population's idea of power'.

2. See H. Alavi, The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, New Left Review, 74, 1972, pp. 59-81. See further for refinements and criticisms: J. Saul, The state in post-colonial societies: Tanzania, The Socialist Register, 1974, pp. 349-72; C. Leys, The 'overdeveloped' post-colonial state: a re-evaluation, Review of African Political Economy, No. 5, 1976, pp. 39-48; and J. Saul, The unsteady state: Uganda, Obote and General Amin, Review of African Political Economy, No. 5, 1976, pp. 12-38.

The direct implication of this is that the bureaucracy[1] (already at independence the largest and most significant component of the emerging bourgeoisie) has scope for increasing its influence both in intra-class competition, and also - on behalf of its class - at the expense of the majority of the people. The bureaucrats' initial advantage derives from their membership of the very small section of the population which receives a regular and secure salary. Typically, too, their salary structure is based on that of the outgoing colonial service. Thus, from the outset, their income absorbs a disproportionate share of government resources and creates a wide divergence in living standards. As members of the largest and usually most cohesive segment of the domestic bourgeoisie, one on which political leaders depend, they are very well placed to press for salary increases from time to time. Using the principle of 'comparability' (that civil service salary levels must be comparable with those in the private sector, in multinational corporations located in the country, and with those paid for similar posts abroad), and the threat, implied or explicit, of leaving unless this level is achieved, they are able to maintain and reinforce their originally advantageous position.[2] The salary received, at least by the upper echelons of civil servants (together with their better access to credit), enables them to become property owners, through urban land purchases and house-building for residence or for hire; the acquisition and development of farm land; and the launching or expansion of business ventures. Their position is strengthened by their control over commercial regulations, the granting of permits and licences, and in the selection of contractors' tenders. Increasing state participation in the economy through the widespread establishment of marketing boards, public corporations and parastatals extends their influence and diversifies and expands the managerial opportunities available to them.

For our purposes the argument is briefly as follows: there are classes emerging in Africa; class consciousness is growing and class conflict will increase; the state acts not as an arbiter of the whole nation's divergent interests but as

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1. The main criterion for membership of the bureaucracy is occupation of a position in the central government apparatus, including public corporations and marketing boards.
2. See M.Godfrey, The international market in skills and the transmission of inequality, Development and Change, 6,4,1975, pp.5-23.

a mechanism serving the foreign and local bourgeoisie's interests (and in particular circumstances mediating their differences); and the bureaucracy itself, as both state functionary and state beneficiary, plays a key role in the preservation of its own and its class' privilege. As such its interests conflict with those of the majority of the people. In these conditions the term 'development' as espoused by most African governments is no more than a smokescreen, the purpose of which is to maintain the status quo.

This perception of the role of the bureaucracy in poor countries directly contradicts the hopes of the development administration movement and the declared intentions of the APAM movement, both of which see the civil service or 'the administration' as the key to development. This replay of Schaffer's earlier deadlock involves far more than a serious clash of opinion. There is a basic difference in the questions asked, the answers sought, the terms used and the authorities referred to; on causes, effects and solutions. There are contrasting opinions on the possibilities of reform and the necessity of revolution.

Just three examples will be cited. They are intended to demonstrate how the different levels of focus and frameworks of analysis relate to specific issues of concern to the study of public administration in poor countries.

The first can be found in the opposing views of Adedeji and the 1975 IAIAM Seminar on one side, and Ake on the other, on the subject of indigenisation of the private sector. For Adedeji, the pragmatic, non-doctrinaire approach of the Nigerian Military Government was making progress step by step. For others at the Seminar, improvements could be sought through firmer negotiations with multinational corporations, management training and the securing of local finances. Ake, by contrast, denies that the African bourgeoisie, including the very people attending the Seminar, has the will to take any meaningful step which might prejudice the interests of the international bourgeoisie. Using Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria as examples, he concludes that the steps taken have served to clarify the respective areas of exploitation available to the international and the

local bourgeoisie, and to consolidate class rule and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. For him the essential precondition to the indigenisation of African economies is the overthrow of existing relations of production.[1]

Divergent approaches to the problems of planning and budgeting provide a second example. Caiden and Wildavsky have recently referred to the numerous uncertainties resulting principally from domestic conditions characteristic of poor countries - economic poverty, political instability and financial fluctuations. These uncertainties are severe enough to make the production of satisfactory annual budgets difficult, let alone permit of long-term planning. On this basis they set out recommendations for simplifying planning and concentrating on continuous budgeting.[2] Chege, in his review of the book, notes that this type of literature is being constantly 'exposed for its supportive rôle in the domination and exploitation of the Third World within the international capitalist set-up'. He finds that though the plight of the planners and budgeters is correctly described, the causes suggested are however 'woefully inaccurate'.

> In short, the term 'uncertainty' as used in the book serves to mystify, on the one hand, a variety of mechanisms for neo-colonial subjugation and exploitation, and on the other the class struggles between the beneficiaries and victims of western capital in the Third World.

And since the 'root sources of underdevelopment are so misperceived', the prescriptions which follow must, in his view, be 'facile'.[3]

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1. A. Adedeji, Indigenisation as a factor of rapid economic development, in The fourteenth Inter-African Public Administration and Management Seminar (1975), 1976, pp. 53-70; Summary of discussions, in the same volume, pp. 21-36; and C. Ake, The indigenisation of African economies: a perspective on political constraints, in the same volume, pp.81-98.
2. N. Caiden and A. Wildavsky, Planning and budgeting in poor countries, 1974.
3. M. Chege, Review of Caiden and Wildavsky's book, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 15, 1, 1977, pp. 153-4.

Finally, one may compare the approach which Gould adopted at the start of his research into local administration in the Shaba Province of Zaire with the position he held at its conclusion. Initially he based his work on the idea that the administration could be the spearhead of change, but later came round to the view that the administration had to be placed within the larger socio-economic system. This, he found (echoing Chege's criticism of Caiden and Wildavsky), showed the limitations of any strategy for improvement which fails to solve the underlying structural constraints to development. On the basis of his findings, he criticises the 'particularly conservative nature of public administration theory, much of which is practical and pragmatic, thereby internalizing its ideological bias by focusing on how to improve existing systems rather than calling them into question'.[1]

The underdevelopment and dependence approach, as has been said, is not directly concerned with the structures and procedures of administration. While it takes full cognisance of conflicts between the various segments of the bourgeoisie, it does not occupy itself with competition and disputes between and within the departmental subunits of the bureaucracy. It would not, for example, give the detailed attention to the inner administrative workings of the civil service which this study attempts. It would also not be overly interested in the formidable array of practical problems to be overcome in initiating administrative reform, were the will to do so present. Its primary relevance to this thesis - and it is believed, therefore, to the study of public administration in Africa - lies in its explanation of why that will is in fact lacking. Any answer to the question raised earlier, of why the proposals of the development administration movement have been generally ignored in practice, will contain a number of elements, relating both to the internal and external predicament of the bureaucracy. It is, however, the analysis of the bureaucracy in terms of the dynamics of class and the processes of underdevelopment which furnishes the underlying and more definitive element of that answer.

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1. D.J. Gould, Local administration in Zaire and underdevelopment, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 15, 3, 1977, pp. 349-78.

3. PLANNING

In attempting to offer some insight into the character of the Lesotho civil service (and its approach to reform) the planning machinery was selected for examination. Throughout the third world, planning generated great expectations and attracted considerable attention in the early post-independence years. Planning and the many dimensions relating to its formulation and implementation soon became well established foci of concern for academics, international agencies and governments of the newly-independent countries. As Weidner has observed, it was commonplace to assume that 'one of the first actions to be taken to further development [was] to establish a central planning agency'.[1] African governments certainly believed the launching of a planning office and the production of a plan document should be among their early priorities, leading one observer to note that Africa has become 'the continent of plans ... The plan has become the symbol of independence'.[2]

This almost universal acceptance of planning throughout Africa (and most of the third world) has been variously linked to the influences of socialism, to Soviet experiences with control planning, to wartime and anticyclical planning in the west, as well as to the intellectual climate prevailing in Britain after World War II. Of relevance too to the ex-British colonies was the 1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act which required colonial administrators to prepare ten year plans to facilitate the allocation of the available sums.[3]

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1. Weidner, Technical assistance ..., op.cit., p. 209.
2. A.M. Kamarck, The economics of African development, 1971, pp. 254-5. See also Bibliography, Economic and social development plans of African countries, 1968, UNECA, E/CN. 14/LIB/SER. c/14.
3. See A. Ben-Amor and F. Clairmonte, Planning in Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 3, 4 1965, p. 475; D. Ghai, The machinery of planning in Kenya, in M. Faber and D. Seers (eds.), The crisis in planning: Volume two, The experience, 1972, p. 120; J.K. Galbraith, Economic development in perspective, 1963, p. 32; and J. Tinbergen, Central planning, 1964, p. 4.

But more important even than these, it was the promise of planning which made it so attractive to the leaders of the new states.[1] The widespread and urgent nature of the difficulties they inherited and the meagre resources available to overcome them, intensified their need for some simple answer to their predicament. Planning appeared to provide the ready solution they were seeking. It was recommended as the only way of breaking with the past, as the only alternative to continuing inertia if not decline. In effect the planning experts advised the new leaders: 'tell us what you want, and we will tell you how to get there'. Progress, they were informed, would not occur fortuitously, or from policies made 'along the way in response to immediate pressure of circumstances, powerful interests or blind market forces'.[2] Rather, development must be directed in the light of 'rational' and informed forethought, local pressures must be replaced by long-term objectives and personal whim by the criteria of national plans.[3]

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1. There are numerous short definitions of planning, such as 'the systematic management of assets' (N.W. Chamberlain, Private and public planning, 1965, Preface, p. vi); or 'consistent and coordinated economic policy articulating explicitly and specifically its means and objectives' (P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Planning within the nation, in M.E. Rozen (ed.), Comparative economic planning, 1967, p. 1). At greater length, Katz identifies five dimensions of planning. First, it must be purposive - directed at realising stated development ends, economic, political, social or ideological. Second, it must be action-oriented - directed at realising the actions necessary to achieve the stated ends. Third, it involves making choices - preferred ends and appropriate means need to be selected. Fourth, planning is concerned with time horizons, which include both time preferences and time sequences; and fifth, it must be considered a continuous process, comprising two aspects: formulation (reformulation) - preparing a matrix of decisions (and adjusting the decisions as new information becomes available) - and implementation (re-implementation) - executing the decisions (and then the reformulated decisions) (S.M. Katz, A systems approach to development administration: a framework for analyzing capability of action for national development, 1966, pp. 4-10).
2. Caiden and Wildavsky, op.cit., pp. 170-180.
3. Ibid., p. 228.

The more specifically economic justifications for planning were based on the inability of the market alone to overcome the deepseated rigidities of backwardness and take the 'great strides forward' with the required urgency.[1] The prices of goods and factors did not truly reflect their social opportunity costs, and 'external benefits and costs which are regarded as so important' lay outside the market mechanism.[2] It was further pointed out that a lack of an entrepreneurial class (particularly indigenous), a lack of private savings (specifically local), distortions arising from the operation of monopolistic and monopsonistic tendencies and factor immobilities,[3] all rendered the operation of the market inadequate if not prejudicial to the objectives of the poor countries.

Once a more prominent role for government was accepted, it followed that a detailed programme of action became essential. This would avoid the government squandering opportunities through uncertainty of objectives, shaky intersectoral and inter-temporal coordination and lack of standards for measuring performance and referring competing demands.[4] National parameters reflecting national priorities were required on which formulators and evaluators of individual projects could base their analyses and judgements.[5]

This then was the promise of planning. The application of its modern, scientific techniques would yield and select the necessary data, account for all variables, clarify alternatives and determine quantitatively the costs and benefits of all proposals. By so doing it would inject economic rationality into

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1. UN, Planning for economic development, 1963, p. 1; and Galbraith, op.cit., p. 35.
2. G.M. Meier, The development decade in perspective, in R. Robinson (ed.), Overcoming obstacles to development, 1965, p.47.
3. T.T. Thahane, Planning for development, in Barratt, op.cit., p. 448.
4. Chamberlain, op.cit., p. 93.
5. P. Dasgupta, A. Sen and S. Marglin, Guidelines for project evaluation, 1972, p. 121.

decision-making and provide a sound basis for progress from poverty to development.

In addition, it was made clear that planning was essential in order to induce the flow of foreign aid. Important donors such as the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) all pressed for development plans before assisting would-be recipients.

In order to achieve their purposes, planners were required to undertake certain specified planning tasks. Among the very first demands on the planners was the preparation of a medium-term (3, 5 or 7 year) plan.

> A plan may be defined as a document which contains a set of coherent figures projecting the development of the economy during some future period ... in order to steer the economy towards certain agreed goals. It will be based, of necessity, upon an analysis of the present state of the economy, a forecast of the way that state will change if policy is constant, and an estimate of the effect upon those changes of alternative policy.[1]

The symbolic importance of these documents was initially so great that their preparation was equated by some with the planning process as a whole. It soon became clear, however, that while the production of a medium-term plan marked the conclusion of an important phase in planning, it was neither its culmination nor its final objective.[2]

Planners were also encouraged to prepare plans covering different time periods aimed at serving different purposes. It was recommended that perspective plans covering 10, 15 or 20

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1. G.C. Moodie, Government organisation, economic development and politics, in G.C. Moodie (ed.), Government organisation and economic development, 1966, p. 165. See UNECA, Economic planning in Africa, in J.S. Uppal and L.R. Salkever (eds.), Africa: Problems in economic development, 1972, pp. 76-8 for typical plan objectives.
2. R.C. Pratt, The administration of economic planning in a newly independent state: the Tanzanian experience 1963-1966, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 5, 1, 1967, p. 39.

years be prepared in order to clarify basic objectives and provide a broad framework for the more detailed medium-term plans. Few countries in Africa made a sustained attempt at such long-term plans. Annual plans too have been suggested. Their purpose is to systematically update the medium-term plan, to divide it into specific annual segments for implementation, and to link it to the annual budget.[1] As both the uncertainties associated with five year planning, and the need to make planning more operational became more apparent, advisers placed increasing stress on such short-term plans.

As the early emphasis on plan formulation gave way to increasing stress on plan implementation so more attention was given to strengthening the project content of plans. It was found that without well-designed project memoranda planning remained non-operational. Planners were thus advised to improve this aspect of their work, and to prepare memoranda containing the following sorts of information: general background about the country and the sector; more detailed socio-economic data; relationship of the project to other projects; full justification based on cost-benefit analysis; duration of the project; phasing of operations; organizational aspects and financial arrangements, etc.[2]

Experience also taught that while the 'accuracy of some "original" forecast' was important, it was perhaps less important than its prompt correction whenever developments indicated inaccuracies.[3] To this end systems of progress reporting and evaluation had to be established. Annual economic reports, annual planning, problem-identification and problem-solving, and timely corrective action all depended on accurate and punc-

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1. See for example Chamberlain, op.cit., p. 155; and Hanson, op.cit., p. 193.
2. See e.g. A.A. Lazaris, Guidelines for project preparation (with special reference to the development problems of Lesotho), 1969, pp. 24-45; and S.P. Hayes Jr., Evaluating development projects, 1966, pp. 20-41.
3. Chamberlain, op.cit., p. 157.

tual reporting from ministries, districts, projects and public corporations.

Finally Governments were advised (and they did not need a great deal of persuasion) that an important function of the planning process was to expedite the flow of foreign aid. It was pointed out that 'aid flows through a multiplicity of agencies, from a variety of sources, in so many different forms, to so many different destinations', that in order to avoid 'duplications, misuse or waste' a central agency was essential.[1] Substantial expertise should therefore be built up in order to understand and keep abreast of changes in donor interests and sensibilities and to utilise gainfully the complicated procedures involved.[2]

To carry out these tasks - governments were advised - it was necessary to create certain additional departments and agencies. A central planning office was the first and most urgent requirement. Its role would be pivotal to the whole process. Initially it would have to bear the burden of most of the work, but it should aim eventually to have an overall-national and coordinative role, leaving project preparation and sectoral programming to others. Initially too it was necessary to employ expatriates as planners, but with time the intention was that local officers would replace them.

Following the establishment of a central planning office, governments should proceed to set up planning units in the ministries. They would have joint responsibility to, and act as a link, and buffer, between the central planning office and the ministries in which they were located. Their job would be to consider, improve and add the economic aspects to projects identified in the divisions, and consolidate them into a sectoral

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1. R. Robinson, Difficulties in central administration, in Robinson, op.cit., p. 27.
2. See O.S. Knowles, Planning the receipt of aid, in Robinson, op.cit., pp. 84 ff.

programme. They would also take responsibility for negotiating their ministries' proposals with the central planners, and monitor progress on project implementation.

Once planning units were under way, governments were then urged to turn their attention to the appointment of provincial planning officers or district development secretaries. Their function would be to strengthen the planning capacity in the districts and take planning one step closer to the people. Their work would be similar to that of the ministerial planning units, except that their joint responsibility would be to the central planning office and to the provincial/district authorities (and possibly political party) and the projects and programmes to which they would attend would be those of their particular district.

There were a number of other suggestions as well: for example, a cabinet economic committee, a subcommittee of cabinet consisting of those ministries closely concerned with development; a national economic advisory board, set up to bring the private sector into the planning process; a budget and planning committee, consisting of the most senior civil servants and required to reconcile differences arising during the preparation of projects and plans; departments of physical planning, district development committees, village development committees, etc.

For all the advice on the tasks and machinery of planning, and on the policy, content and techniques of planning, it soon became clear that planning was not going to fulfil its great promise. The number of reasons which had been given in support of planning paled next to the number and variety of criticisms which soon began to be heaped upon it. From one side it was denounced on the basis that the market - for all its faults - remained a far more effective instrument of economic development. According to Johnson, the consequences of planning proved to be a 'mish-mash' of expensive inconsistencies and inefficiencies whose main effect is to keep an inordinately high proportion of a scarce supply of educated talent immobilized in unproductive

(but élite) employment in the civil service'.[1] From the opposite side, control planners judged the indicative and partial planning in which most African governments engaged as an 'anathema', as an attempted synthesis of the principles of planning with capitalist tenets and without legal backing.[2]

Some critics found the sophisticated model building undertaken by certain planners inappropriate in the circumstances of poor countries. It was argued that errors arising from a paucity of statistics and unreliable information would be compounded as they were threaded into models: 'What can be said for a forecast of the future based on data about the present which are known to be inaccurate?'[3] Objections were raised that models placed an exaggerated significance on capital; that simplistic answers resulted, consequent upon the limited number of variables used; that linear relations were assumed when non-linearity was far more common; and that economies were described in terms of aggregates when their dualistic or triplistic nature required two or even three aggregates.[4] The more advanced the economic analysis, it was said, the less was it capable of incorporating non-economic elements. 'But the less developed the country, the more does the efficiency of planning depend on non-economic factors'.[5]

On the other hand, pragmatic and incremental planning, beginning rather modestly with the preparation of projects and

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1. H.G. Johnson, The western model of economic development, World Development, 2, 2, 1974, pp. 9-10. Also see his article, A word to the third world. A western economist's frank advice, Encounter, 37, 4, 1974, p. 6.
2. S. Kaichar, Implementation problems of economic development plans, African Today, 20, 2, 1973, pp. 68-9.
3. A.B. Waterston, Resolving the three-horned planning dilemma, 1971, p. 9.
4. See Kamarck, op.cit., p. 272; and A.B. Waterston, An operational approach to development planning, in M. Faber and D. Seers (eds.), The crisis in planning, Volume one, The issues, 1972, p. 87.
5. Meier, op.cit., p. 50.

attempting to build on experience was also found deficient: it lacked direction, it excluded important variables, it was 'ad hoc' or 'shopping list' planning, etc.

Then there were the more detailed criticisms based on experiences of the actual preparation and implementation of planning. For example, Kamarck found the process of plan preparation in various countries 'depressingly similar' : a team of foreign experts arrived, constructed a model of the economy and then departed before implementation began. At that point, some governments simply filed the plan away, others requested a new one, and most gave lip-service while paying little attention.[1] Seers found the normal training of planners deficient in its stress on pure economics when the requirements were multidisciplinary.[2] Leys observed that the fixed period of medium-term plans - usually five years - was too short for some purposes, too long for others and generally inappropriate to varying sectoral demands.[3] Similarly the nature of the plan document did not satisfy the divergent needs of its numerous clients - political parties, citizens, legislatures, foreign aid agencies. Stone found a high proportion of development plans were 'non-functional' in that they did 'not incorporate the measures, organizations, procedures and other elements essential to their implementation'.[4]

Insufficient effort has been made to involve people outside of government ministries in the preparation or to

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1. Kamarck, op.cit., p. 265.
2. D. Seers, The prevalence of pseudo-planning, in Faber and Seers (1), op.cit., p. 75; and Seers, op.cit., pp. 25-6.
3. C. Leys, A new conception of planning, in Faber and Seers (1), op.cit., p. 75; and Seers, op.cit., p. 27.
4. D.C. and A.B. Stone, Creation of administrative capability: the missing ingredient in development strategy, in J. Barratt et al. (eds.), Strategy for development, 1976, p. 200.

spread the contents widely among the populace.[1] Plans tended to be optimistic about the amount of aid forthcoming and the time required for negotiating such assistance.[2] They have lacked detailed investment projects and failed to stress the centrality of successful project implementation.[3]

The list could be continued. Caiden and Wildavsky concluded that in the final analysis planning failed because the planners lacked two basic requisites. They lacked the causal knowledge necessary to predict confidently that if men, resources and institutions were mobilised and related to one another in particular ways and at successive stages in time certain results would follow and definite objectives would be achieved. They also lacked the necessary power (defined as the ability to make people act in different ways than they otherwise would have) to transform their proposals into reality. Ultimately, the planners have not changed their environment, as they set out to do, but have been swallowed by it. They have displaced their own objectives: instead of development targets, their aim has become their own survival.[4]

Despite the general consensus that planning has not succeeded, there is far less agreement on what criteria to apply in assessing its impact. The potential and actual correlation between planning and development remains uncertain. The Sussex conference on the 'crisis in planning' revealed that the statistical base for evaluating the impact of planning was weak and that the indices for comparing

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1. Ben-Amor and Clairmonte, op.cit., pp. 494-5.
2. United Republic of Tanzania, First year progress report on the implementation of the five year development plan, 1965.
2. United Republic of Tanzania, First year progress on the implementation of the five year development 28. 1965.
3. Chege, System management ..., op.cit., p. 595.
4. Caiden and Wildavsky, op.cit., pp. 201-3 and 228.

countries which plan with those which do not, or establishing whether a country really did plan or not, or what constituted success, were undefined.[1] Rosenstein-Rodan concluded after a detailed study that it was difficult to draw a specific conclusion as to the degree of success due to planning and to other coincidental measures.[2] Van Arkadie, in suggesting five possible different sets of criteria, pointed out that development may take generations, and thus the long-term effects of initial plans cannot be satisfactorily judged. Even if targets are not achieved, plans may still have considerable impact, while much growth may have taken place 'plan or no plan'.[3]

Simply put, too much was expected of planning. It offered too much and achieved little. Yet it is really development that has been disappointing and planning, because it purported to offer a solution, attracted the blame.

The question is whether the planning experience in underdeveloped countries provides a case of unfulfilled promise, or whether it has been a 'bureaucratic fantasy' from the outset. Van Arkadie, arguing within the underdevelopment and dependence framework, asserts:

> While the fabric of neo-colonialism remains unaltered the attempt at planning can be little more than bureaucratic fantasy. The area within which the local government can move is so restricted and the locus of real economic decision-making is so

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1. Faber and Seers (1), op.cit., p. 108.
2. Rosenstein-Rodan, op.cit., pp. 14-15.
3. Van Arkadie, op.cit., p. 90.

> remote from the planning authority that the plan of such a government is like an ambitious campaign strategy for an army of toy soldiers.[1]

The notion of 'fantasy' should however be qualified. For there is something undoubtedly real about an activity of government which absorbs a good deal of energy and the attention of some of the most able and highly qualified civil servants, which mobilises substantial sums of capital, both external and domestic, and which then allocates those resources into numerous projects, large and small, in every sector of a broadening area of governmental activity. Lessons have been learnt too from the early mistakes made, and planning in many countries has become more efficiently organized, better informed and more appropriately related to the circumstances in which it operates.

One moves, however, into the realm of the unreal when planners assert and begin to believe that the basic causes of poverty and underdevelopment can be removed through planning. For this false expectation of planning, the many expatriate planning advisers - operating through multilateral or bilateral agencies or as consultants, and often in strategically located policy-making positions - must be held at least partly responsible. Planning gave the illusion that development might flow from 'techniques', rendering unnecessary serious economic and social reforms.

Planning also gave leaders an illusion of much greater control over their economies. Yet, as Tanzania found in its early experiences of planning, despite a rhetorical commitment to socialism and a technical commitment to neutral policy tools, the results achieved were capitalistic.[2] To the extent that economies are dominated by external interests, planning

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1. Ibid., pp. 108-9.
2. Ibid., p. 111.

remains a very restricted exercise and its apparently 'objective science' ultimately serves foreign interests.

A third assumption of planning which proved to lack foundation was its conception of the bureaucracy as the main 'agents of modernization'. Western advisers saw the senior civil service as the 'bearers of rationality' (contrasted, for example, with the demagogi parochial politicians)[1] and as the 'key to development'. As a result they concentrated a great deal of attention on training and advising, and vetting the projects of, the bureaucracy. In the event, the civil service has not played the anticipated role. The bureaucracy has its own interests and those of the beneficiary classes to attend to and protect; and planning and implementation of plans become subordinated to these requirements.

Caiden and Wildavsky have concluded that the tasks set the planners were awesome and the demands too great. In commenting that 'planning is nothing less than the ability to control the future by current acts',[2] they point to yet another area of unreality, and one which relates closely to Lesotho's predicament. For this assumption has been sustained in circumstances in which the governments concerned have very limited control over the present, let alone the future.

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1. Alavi, op.cit., p. 70.
2. Caiden and Wildavsky, op.cit., p. 201.

CHAPTER II : CASE STUDY : ADMINISTRATION OF PLANNING IN LESOTHO

1. MID-1965 TO JUNE 1967 : PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PLANNING OFFICE

2. JUNE 1967 TO OCTOBER 1968 : ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE

3. OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1968 : THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

4. NOVEMBER 1968 - MID-1971 : CHANGING STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST PLAN

5. AUGUST 1971 TO APRIL 1974 : THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PLANS

6. APRIL 1974 TO JUNE 1975 : STRENGTHENING OF THE CPDO AND THE SECOND PLAN

CHAPTER II CASE STUDY - ADMINISTRATION OF PLANNING IN LESOTHO

Chapter II consists of a case study describing the evolution of the machinery of planning, and the undertaking at different stages of a number of planning tasks. The subject matter which covers the decade from mid-1965 to mid-1975 is dealt with chronologically and divided into six periods.

As will emerge from Chapter IV, the economic circumstances in which planning operated were both circumscribed and harsh beyond the norm of most African countries. In addition to the paucity of resources, the deteriorating situation in the domestic economy and comprehensive dependence on neighbouring South Africa (all dealt with in Chapter IV), planners were also confronted by donor dominance of the capital development programme. From independence in 1966 until 1973/4, Lesotho was unable to contribute to its own capital programme, requiring assistance even for its recurrent budget, which had to be subjected to foreign scrutiny. Being totally dependent on aid for all development projects placed the Government (and the planners) in an extremely weak negotiating position, and encouraged a tendency to accept offers irrespective of local priorities, and to adopt procedures to suit the divergent demands of donors. Beyond the complexities and delays involved in negotiation with donors, Lesotho's planners were also faced with numerous administrative obstacles and serious shortcomings in statistics and information.

By way of background to this case study, it is also necessary to note that the post-independence political history of Lesotho has been unhappy and divisive. A highly politicized population existing in an environment of abject poverty and

negligible potential for satisfying popular expectations', the Basotho have employed 'their energies in political battle'.[1] The principal parties, the ruling Basutoland National Party (which won 31 out of 60 seats in the 1965 pre-independence election, but only 41,63% of the votes) and the more pan-Africanist Basutoland Congress Party; a very conservative and influential section of the Catholic Church; and the Monarchy, dissatisfied with a purely constitutional role, have combined to produce bitter political conflict. Serious crises occurred just before independence, a few months thereafter, in 1970 after the defeated Basutoland National Party annulled the election results, and again in 1974 when opposition members attacked a number of police stations. In these conditions the ruling party has had a continual struggle to retain control and gain legitimacy.

1. MID-1965 TO JUNE 1967 : PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PLANNING OFFICE

This period - from mid-1965 through independence in October 1966 until June 1967 - reveals a confused situation characterised by unclear and unsatisfactory divisions of responsibility, extremely limited capacity to accomplish much in the way of planning (most noticeably in the preparation of projects) and, towards the end, increasing debate (predominantly among expatriate officials) about the role, functions and structure of the proposed planning machinery. In April 1965 the Chacko Mission

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1. R.F. Weisfelder, Power struggle in Lesotho, Africa Report, 12, 1, 1967, p. 6. See also R.F. Weisfelder, Lesotho and South Africa: diverse linkages, Africa Today, 20, 1, 1973, p. 48.

2. See B.M. Khaketla, Lesotho 1970. An African coup under the microscope, 1971; also, for example, Koeha News, 23/9/71; The Star, 24/6/71, p. 3; Mochochonono, 21/11/74, p. 4 and 6/3/75, p. 6.

found a total lack of expertise and information available for planning and identified economic and statistical support as one of the country's highest priority needs.[1] As late as May 1967 the PS, Finance wrote:

> In terms of economic planning and appraisal and the related fields of coordinating external aid and technical assistance, Lesotho is moribund. In relation to these matters there is a total lack of every management function: Leadership, Planning, Organization and Control. The present rudderless situation cannot continue without serious damage to Lesotho's image abroad and increasing chaos, confusion and stagnation at home.[2]

In the second half of 1965 a UN economist arrived in Maseru to join the Economic Planning Unit. During his two-year term he was assisted part of the time by a British adviser and part by a UN associate expert. In his final report he wrote that his assignment could not be described as a 'great success', primarily because of the 'almost complete lack of machinery and information' relevant to planning. He also mentioned the 'distractions' attendant upon the attainment of independence and arising from 'political difficulties'.[3]

Despite an extremely modest capital programme, the principal tasks which the CPDO would later perform - preparation of plans, development estimates and projects and the coordination of aid - were split among no less than five different agencies. The Economic Planning Unit prepared a five-year plan for 1967-72 (representing 'the maximum demands of the Ministries ... unevaluated and unphased')[4] primarily as a basis for negotiation for British aid; as well as the first domestically-produced document analysing the economy and the potential role of plan-

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1. Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, Report of an economic and technical assistance mission (Chacko Report), May-June 1965, p. 60.
2. Ministry of Finance Memorandum, Economic Planning and development and the coordination of external aid, 22/5/67 (referred to hereafter as the May 1967 Memorandum).
3. D.L. Giles, Final report to the Government of Lesotho, 10/3/67, p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 9.

ning.[1] At the commencement of 1967 it bore responsibility for preparing a more satisfactory medium-term plan and the annual development estimates. (In January of that year, both functions came to an abrupt halt in the face of a proposed crash programme, mentioned below). The Unit was not, however, concerned with coordinating aid.[2]

Responsibility for foreign assistance, as also for implementing development projects in certain areas, lay with the Ministry of Economic Development, Commerce and Industry;[3] this Ministry, with a total middle- and senior-level staff of four, dealt with commerce, trade, industry, tourism, labour and foreign aid. It was judged a serious weakness to combine, in one office, executive responsibility for specific subjects with a more general, coordinative and planning function.[4]

In addition, the Ministry of Finance was involved through its already closely working contact with the British Government, its control over the recurrent budget, and the necessity for it to step in and take over certain tasks such as project preparation.

On paper there was an Economic Committee of the Cabinet, but this did not function. Finally, there existed, in accordance with the Constitution,[5] and with the purpose of including in the planning process a broader spectrum of opinion, a National Planning Board, under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Economic Development, Commerce and Industry. Article 1 of the Board's Internal Regulations provided for a membership comprising three members appointed by the King, three by the Minister res-

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1. Economic Planning Unit, The framework of the economic and financial policies of the Government of Basutoland, 1967-1972. 2/6/66.
2. See PS, Economic Development to Training, ED/DEV/16-25 15/6/66, which stated that the Unit was responsible only for planning. It was concerned with aid only insofar as it was necessary to ensure that it fitted into development plans.
3. A Cabinet Circular, CA/5 of 20/4/66, placed external aid under this Ministry.
4. May 1967 Memorandum.
5. Basutoland Order 1965 Constitution, Section 85 (i) and (ii); and Lesotho Independence Order 1966, Section 90.

ponsible for land, three by such other Ministers as the Prime Minister might designate and three by such other organizations representative of local government as might be designated by the Prime Minister. Article 6 laid down its functions to include advising on the goals, objectives and policies of development, on the formulation, supervision and execution of development plans, and on the coordination of technical assistance and foreign aid.[1] The Board met regularly during the second half of 1966 through till February 1967, but it did not meet again until December 1967. It discussed a wide range of developmental subjects such as mining policy, land tenure, a development plan, agro-ecology of Lesotho, tourism, preventive medicine, industry, trade and the feasibility of establishing an abattoir.[2]

There was substantial confusion as to the division of planning responsibilities between the Economic Planning Unit, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Board. For example, the Board's regulations and the Constitution both placed responsibility for preparing plans with the Board, whereas the Unit was given the task in practice.[3] There was disagreement between these two agencies over whose job it was to prepare the manpower requirements of the proposed five-year plan.[4] There was also lack of clarity about their intended relations: at a meeting in December 1966 the Chairman of the Board said there was 'no connection whatsoever between the two bodies' and advised 'the Board to carry out its functions as if the Economic Planning Unit did not exist'. The members felt, however, that the two should be brought into a closer functional relationship to avoid duplication of effort and waste of money.[5] Further, while the

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1. Internal Regulations of the National Planning Board, 1966.
2. National Planning Board, Minutes of third meeting, 23/9/66, fourth meeting, 15/12/66, sixth meeting 2/2/67 and seventh meeting, 20/2/67.
3. Internal Regulations of the National Planning Board, op. cit., Article 6(a).
4. National Planning Board, Minutes of seventh meeting, 20/2/67.
5. National Planning Board, Minutes of fourth meeting, 15/12/66.

Cabinet had given the Ministry of Economic Development the task of coordinating aid, the Economic Planning Unit was emphasising the need for all aid to conform to Government policy and the development plan. In its view this could 'best be ensured by previously referring all requests for aid, or offers of aid, to the EPU'.[1] Further confusion is apparent in the preparation of project memoranda and the development estimates. The Unit commenced preparation, but stopped in January 1967 because of the 'crash programme' concept. It was continued thereafter by the Ministry of Economic Development, and as progress remained slow, the Ministry of Finance took over and completed the task about halfway through the financial year.[2] The CPO, which had by then been established, accepted Finance's initiative and congratulated it on producing memoranda from 'very sketchy' and 'very raw' material.[3]

This unsatisfactory situation, together with an urgent plea from Lesotho's Permanent Representative to the UN to establish a committee to deal with foreign aid,[4] resulted in the Cabinet meeting of 15 November 1966 requesting Finance to prepare a memorandum on planning and aid. Accordingly, in December, that Ministry presented a paper proposing a unified planning agency under its own control, to include the Economic Planning Unit and the foreign aid functions of the Ministry of Economic Development (which would become the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour). It also recommended the reactivation of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.[5]

In January 1967 'these proposals vanished behind a smoke-screen of the Crash Programme';[6] it was suggested that a

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1. Draft, Development policy, 1967-1972, p. 4.
2. Giles, Final report ..., op.cit., p. 4.
3. See Finance to CPO, FIN/REV/C.7 28/7/67 and the reply from CPO to Finance, CPO/DEV/2 1/8/67.
4. Economic Development to Cabinet, EC/AID/1-2 6/12/66.
5. Ministry of Finance, The coordination of economic development and external aid, December 1966 (referred to hereafter as the December 1966 Memorandum).
6. May 1967 Memorandum.

national development corporation be established with extraordinarily wide powers of planning and implementation, in order to execute a crash programme of development. Although the idea was soon rejected in favour of a development corporation of a more conventional nature, the short period of its consideration saw all work in the Economic Planning Unit cease. During April of that year, urgent discussion on the creation of a cpo recommenced. It is worth focusing on three topics which emerged from the memoranda and correspondence on the subject; namely, the reasons for the establishment of a cpo, the siting of the proposed new agency, and the status of its director.

Reasons for the establishment of a planning office A document prepared by the Economic Planning Unit in June 1966 listed a number of advantages of a plan as an alternative to a 'piecemeal public sector shopping list approach to economic development':

1) a plan can provide an estimate of the order of magnitude of the effort required of capital and manpower;
2) without overall guidance, departments are apt to undertake too little to promote a significant rate of growth and not to look beyond the current year;
3) by allocating capital between sectors a plan can restrain extravagances;
4) an annual review of performance as compared with the plan, encourages systematic thought and directs attention to the principal restraints on growth;
5) potential donors of aid frequently enquire about the overall plan into which their contribution could fit.[1]

The May 1967 Memorandum pointed to the need to prevent chaos, confusion and stagnation at home, and the necessity of providing machinery for overall direction and top-level decision-making.[2] Yet it was clear from the repeated stress on the need to secure foreign assistance that aid was in fact the most urgent and primary concern of the Government in establishing a central planning agency.

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1. The framework of economic and financial policies of the government ..., op.cit., pp. 14-15.
2. May 1967 Memorandum, op.cit.

For example, the PS, Economic Development wrote to Cabinet in May 1967 pointing out that a World Bank mission would be arriving soon and that without a plan and a planning agency 'our chances of loans will be very small'.[1] Finance's December 1966 Memorandum argued that economic development in Lesotho would depend on attracting and using external aid, while pointing out that Lesotho was only one among many developing countries competing for limited resources: 'donor countries are attaching ever increasing importance to the existence in the receiving country of adequate machinery for the effective use of aid given'.[2] Directly related, was the immediate need to increase the capacity to prepare projects, most urgently since much of the British aid allocation threatened to be wasted.[3]

Siting of the CPO The two Ministries most closely concerned were both keen to assume responsibility of the new agency. Finance's December 1966 Memorandum argued strongly for placing planning under the Ministry of Finance. It reasoned that in all developing countries the pace of capital development was largely determined by the degree of restraint imposed by recurrent budget considerations. This was seen as consequent upon two factors: the extent to which recurrent costs arising from the implementation of development schemes and projects can be absorbed within the recurrent budget; and the extent to which it is possible to generate savings on current account as a source of capital funds for development purposes. It pointed out, further, that a strict distinction between recurrent services and capital development could be maintained only at 'the risk of financial chaos and development stagnation' and that economic planning should be vitally concerned with both the capital and recurrent sides of government expenditure. It concluded therefore that finance and planning must be the responsibility of one portfolio

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1. Economic Development to Cabinet, EC/DEV/1 9/5/67.
2. December 1966 Memorandum, op.cit.
3. See, for example, Economic Development to Prime Minister, EC/DEV/2 25/5/67.

and that this must fall under the Ministry of Finance.[1]

The Ministry of Economic Development opposed this proposal; at first on the basis that no such drastic reshuffle had been called for by the Cabinet, and that the UN representative's request could be met by establishing a Committee on External Aid consisting of the Minister of Economic Development, the PS to the Prime Minister, the PS, Economic Development and the Head of the Economic Planning Unit.[2] Later the PS, Economic Development argued that it is 'generally agreed' that planning and implementation 'should be closely connected', preferably in one ministry.[3]

The PS, Finance replied that this would be 'nothing short of disastrous. I cannot stress too strongly that all the world authorities on the subje t of planning organisation are adamant that the planning body must be a separate organisation and not have responsibility for any other subject'.[4] He had also come round to the view that if the decision remained 'a matter of choosing between two Ministers', this would 'bedevil the whole thing', and argued (quoting W. Arthur Lewis at length) the case for placing the Planning Office under the Prime Minister: 'the imposition of a centrally determined pattern upon all the Ministries required that the Minister responsible for planning must be superior to other Ministers. Unless the Prime Minister backs the Planning Agency, achievement of its goals is impossible'.[5]

The compilers of the May 1967 Memorandum decided to make no definite recommendation on this to Cabinet, merely stressing that it must be a separate organization with its own staff and offices. The Cabinet then took the decision - which accords with the most common practice - of placing the CPO under the

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1. December 1966 Memorandum, op.cit.
2. PS, Economic Development to Cabinet, EC/AID/1-2 6/12/66.
3. PS, Economic Development to Cabinet, EC/DEV/1 9/5/67.
4. PS, Finance to Cabinet, FIN/DEV/C 15-17 25/5/67.
5. Ibid.

Prime Minister.

Status of the Director Despite the view that the planning agency would require strong backing to be effective, there appeared to be general acceptance that the Director's status should not differ from that of any head of department, that is, under a PS;[1] it would appear that the status of the Minister responsible, rather than that of the Director, was considered relevant. Further, the person who had been identified for the post was the PS, Economic Development, and it was intended to let him retain that position at the same time as directing the new Planning Office.

2. JUNE 1967 TO OCTOBER 1968 : ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE

On 12 June 1967 the Secretary to Cabinet submitted a draft circular to the PS, Finance and PS, Economic Development for comment; and on 15 June - with a number of issues still unsettled - the Central Planning Office was set up. Despite the availability of only three trained economists, all foreign and two on the point of leaving the country, the Office was given responsibility for a full range of planning tasks: 'development planning, preparation, coordination and evaluation of development projects, control of their implementation, and coordination of all external aid and technical assistance'. Its primary task was 'to construct an economic plan ... in the light of the Government's declared objectives, and see that it was carried out'.[2] It was placed under the Prime Minister, was to be headed by an expatriate, and staffed as follows:

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1. Memorandum. Planning and development (undated, presumably late 1966) was the only document to suggest that he should have the status of a PS.

2. Cabinet Circular No. 14 of 1967, Cabinet Office, CA/DEV/5, 'Development Planning'. Also see Sections 10 and 16 of Government Gazette Extraordinary, No. 24 of 8/7/67.

Director of Planning

Chief Economist	Principal Assistant Secretary
2 Economists	2 Assistant Secretaries
2 Planning Officers	Supporting Executive and Clerical Staff

The professional staff was to handle all planning, project analysis and evaluation, implementation and control. The administrative staff was to take responsibility for the administration of the Office and the administrative coordination of aid and technical assistance. The circular also established a Cabinet Economic Planning Committee, and stated that further information on inter-ministerial working committees and the National Planning Board would follow.

Machinery

CPO There were a number of obstacles hindering the translation of this circular into an operational planning office, and the first year-and-a-half saw disappointingly slow progress. To begin with, there were certain questions not finalised; for example, the number and membership of the working parties and the relationship of the National Planning Board to the Planning Office.[1] Further, the fact that the Director of the new agency remained PS of a separate operational ministry was seen as creating an 'impossible' situation which would 'seriously weaken the effectiveness of the CPO'.[2] The staffing position was both unsatisfactory and unpromising. The Director had been appointed, as had the Chief Economist and one of the Economists, but only for a few months after the Office was set up; the two Planning Officers' posts were vacant as was that of the Principal Assistant Secretary. Mr E.T. Manaro, who was transferred from Commerce and Industry to take up one of the posts of Assistant Secretary, was the only Mosotho in the Office; and it was thought unlikely that local 'material of the right quality' would be found to fill the two planning officers' posts and that of

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1. Cabinet to PS, Economic Development, CA/DEV/5 15/6/67.
2. PS, Finance to Cabinet FIN/DEV/C.15 23/6/67.

the other Assistant Secretary.[1]

Thus two months after its establishment, the CPO was described as existing 'still on paper';[2] four months after, the planning machinery still had 'to learn to work in practice' and the organization thereof was proceeding 'very slowly';[3] and a year after, it continued to be described as 'weak' and its staffing as 'inadequate'.[4] The staffing situation remained poor until well into 1968; the two UN economists who departed were replaced by one. The Office received no cooperation when it asked Government to pay for the return trip of a junior planning officer who had completed a Master's Degree in Canada, causing the Director to complain of 'inflexible, primitive methods of recruitment'.[5] Eventually assistance had to be obtained from a donor to pay the costs, as Finance refused a request to use its own travel vote.[6] During 1968, with the recruitment of Messrs. Rakhetla, Thahane and Moitse, the Office's capacity increased, as did the strength of the local contingent.

Accommodation (in a small house in the King's garden) was inadequate.[7] After a number of letters and reminders,[8] at a meeting of Cabinet, Finance and CPO it was agreed to provide new accommodation.

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1. Ibid.
2. Giles, Final report ..., op.cit., p. 1.
3. C.P. van Ryn, First report, CPO, 23/10/67, pp. 19 and 20.
4. S. Tan, An annotated outline of the first five-year development plan of Lesotho, 1968, p. 30.
5. CPO to Cabinet, CPO/ONC/5/1 26/9/67.
6. CPO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1 27/5/68.
7. Van Ryn, op. cit., p. 20.
8. CPO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1 21/7/67; CPO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1 28/7/67; CPO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1-50 28/9/67.

Without consulting the Planning Office, however, this project was replaced by another, and CPO wrote to Cabinet asking 'who changed these projects and on whose authority'.[1] Despite a reminder six weeks later,[2] no reply was received.

September 1967 Circular In September 1967 the Planning Office (having received comments on an earlier draft)[3] issued a Circular containing a detailed description of the intended planning machinery.

On top was the Cabinet, which would be responsible for all final decisions, but would normally only consider economic matters on the recommendation of the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee.

The Cabinet Economic Planning Committee would make decisions or recommendations to Cabinet on matters referred to it by Cabinet and on proposals submitted by CPO. It could refer matters requiring study direct to the Working Parties. Its full members were the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry, PS, Agriculture, PS, Works, Director of Planning, and Managing Director of LNDC.

CPO's role was stated to be: to receive proposals from the Working Parties for submission with comments on overall implications to the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee, to initiate and conduct studies of general economic problems, and make recommendations to the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee.

Five Working Parties were to prepare detailed proposals for projects in their own fields for submission to the CPO. The Working Parties designated were: A - agriculture and livestock; B - manufacturing, cottage industries, commerce, manpower, mining, credit; C - transport, communications, construction, works, water, electricity; D - education, training, health, social services; E - police, prisons, administration (including district administration).[4]

The most notable aspect of the document was that the CPO had reduced its own role considerably to that of a somewhat passive link between the Working Parties and the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee. The latter could refer matters directly to the Working Parties without consulting the CPO, and there was no mention of preparing development plans, coordinating aid,

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1. CPO to Cabinet, CPO/DEV/78 13/10/67.
2. CPO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1 29/11/67.
3. CPO Circular No. 67/1 11/7/67; and, for example, Cabinet to CPO, CA/DEV/5 25/9/67.
4. CPO Circular Notice No. 67/1 (Revised), 28/9/67.

etc. Further, the document failed to make any mention of the National Planning Board (as had been promised in the June circular).

Working Parties The idea behind their establishment was to fully utilise the expertise of the technical people available[1] for the purpose of preparing detailed proposals 'on the ground'.[2] It was hoped that they would play an educative role in making departments development- and aid-minded; and have an 'effect on the thinking and attitudes of those who propose and make decisions'.[3]

Some of the Working Parties did commence meeting. For example, at the first meeting of Working Party C, discussion centred on the purpose of the Working Party, on the development estimates and a proposed plan for 1968-1972 and on Works' plans for electricity, roads, water, sewerage, training, manpower and appropriate education;[4] while the fourth meeting of Working Party D dealt with community development and agriculture, and the problem of whether community development efforts in water supplies overlapped the responsibilities of Works.[5]

There were, however, numerous obstacles hindering their effective contribution to planning. For example,

1) Representatives from the Ministry of Education complained that the functions outlined by CPO for their Working Party were already being implemented by the Standing Committee of the Central Advisory Board of Education.[6]

2) According to the Establishments Office, which attended Party E, members had insufficient guidance as to the form required or the details necessary for preparing projects, nor how to

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1. Giles, Final report ..., op.cit., p. 1.
2. Circular Notice No. 67/1 (Revised), 28/9/67.
3. CPO to Finance, CPO/BUDG/89 27/9/67.
4. Working Party C, Minutes of first meeting, 28/8/67.
5. Working Party D, Minutes of fourth meeting, 22/10/67.
6. Working Party D, Minutes of fifth meeting, 12/1/68.

relate projects to other projects, and were capable of preparing only 'the vaguest outlines'. Further, they were too large to accomplish the function required of them.[1]

3) Members were senior officers, heavily burdened with administrative, technical and other tasks not closely related to planning, and they lacked supporting staff able to assist in preparing projects.

4) The Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Industry did not cooperate. Working Party B, which should have been convened by Commerce and Industry, did not meet, despite numerous reminders from CPO ('which received neither acknowledgement nor reply').[2]

5) It had been considered unnecessary to establish a special Working Party on Finance, which it was felt could be adequately covered by Finance attending all meetings. However, it failed to attend any meetings, or, at most, fewer 'than 10 per cent'.[3]

The system ultimately ground to a halt, having produced little in the way of projects or sectoral programmes. The CPO received no support in its attempt to make the system work, and thus senior officers devoted their attention to what were deemed other more pressing tasks.

National Planning Board As mentioned above, the Board was overlooked in the September 1967 circular, and it was obviously a foundering agency. It failed to meet between February and December 1967, and at the December meeting, its members complained that it had no defined lines of communication to other planning agencies, and that it was being totally ignored: '... since its establishment the Board has made many varied recommendations to Government or Cabinet which have hitherto not provoked the slightest response'.[4] These sentiments were conveyed to the Prime Minister,[5] and repeated at the Board's ninth and last meeting.[6] The pre-independence Chacko Mission had foreseen that some of the functions given the Board in the Constitution would clash with those of the CPO when established;[7] and this indeed

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1. Establishments to CPO, EST/ETM/DEV 15/8/68.
2. CPO to Finance, Commerce and Industry, CPO/DEV/1 27/5/68.
3. CPO to Finance, CPO/DEV/67 16/10/67.
4. National Planning Board, Minutes of eighth meeting, 19/12/67.
5. Chairman, NBP to Prime Minister, CPO/NBP 24/4/68.
6. National Planning Board, Minutes of ninth meeting, 24/4/68.
7. Chacko Report, op.cit., p. 60.

occurred. Since the Board comprised the only institutional link between Government and private interests, its demise ended any involvement of the private sector in planning.

Programming Units Although these were first suggested by Tan (see below), there were in fact already two embryo units in operation; there was a UN agricultural economist in Agriculture and a UNESCO educational planner in Education.[1] In December 1967 the PS, Agriculture requested the creation of a post of Planner because his Ministry was 'weak in the field of coordinated, detailed planning'. The CPO originally opposed this, arguing that the Working Party on Agriculture, the Principal Assistant Secretary, Agriculture, and the CPO itself would cover agricultural planning adequately.[2] After some discussions, the Planning Office accepted the idea of a Planning Unit in Agriculture 'to coordinate the forward planning' of the Ministry and 'liaise with the CPO'.[3] However, when it came to detailing the Unit's terms of reference, the CPO approach was very restrictive.[4] This is surprising in view of the Office's later support for such units, but possibly at this early stage it feared that by sharing some responsibilities it might dissipate the little influence it had thus far been able to muster.

Relations with Finance Further, the Office's relations with its senior partner, the Ministry of Finance, were proving troublesome. CPO found Finance too dominant and too quick to take over planning tasks; while Finance judged the Office as still incapable of carrying out the responsibilities entrusted it. Not only did Finance prepare the estimates for 1967/8, but it also reallocated projects in the supplementary estimates without consulting the Planning Office.[5] CPO responded angrily that it

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1. See e.g. Finance to Cabinet, FIN/DEV/C.15 23/6/67; CPO to Education, CPO/WPD/31/8/67 and Education to CPO, 5/4/68.
2. CPO to Establishments, CPO/AGRIC/1 22/12/67.
3. CPO to Agriculture, CPO/AID/2/4 18/1/68.
4. CPO to Agriculture, CPO/AGR 27/2/68.
5. Finance to CPO, FIN/DEV/C.7 30/8/67.

could not see how it was to supervise projects, when it did not even know which projects had been approved.[1] Finance also sent out the call circular for capital estimates and project memoranda for 1968/9 which laid down the following procedures:

1) Ministries must obtain approval in principle for each project direct from the Director of Planning.

2) Project memoranda are to be prepared in accordance with a format drawn up by Finance; and Works must be informed when it is the executing Ministry.

3) Finance must then examine it to see if the information is satisfactory for financial control.

4) Then it goes to the Director of Planning who examines it in order to determine priorities, and sends a list to Finance.

5) The PS, Finance will then prepare the estimates and pursue the provision of funds.

Finally, the format required that all project memoranda be signed by the initiating ministry, the executive ministry, PS, Finance, and the Director of Planning.[2] In practice, as soon as the departments experienced delay in obtaining responses from the CPO, Finance advised them to consult it.[3]

In 1968/9, CPO played a more active role in the preparation of the capital estimates, but final responsibility for the estimates lay with Finance, as also with the guideline documents used for negotiation with the British.[4] Furthermore, conflicting requests from the two Officeswere being received by the High Commission.[5] It is clear too from the tone of some of the correspondence between the two, and from the conclusions of visiting experts that the discordant relations between them was

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1. CPO to Finance, CPO/DEV/2 1/9/67.
2. Circular Savingram, PS, Finance to PSs and Heads of Departments, FIN/EST/4/1 17/7/67.
3. See Finance to CPO, FIN/EST/4/1 11/8/67.
4. Introductory memorandum, Development estimates, 1968/1969, and Finance to CPO, FIN/EST/70 18/1/68.
5. CPO to British High Commission, CPO/DEV/89-17 18/6/68.

impeding the new planning procedures.[1]

Tasks

In this period the Office suffered because it had no plan and no coherent policy framework within which to work. One adviser commented that it was 'rather like a taxi with a driver who has not been told where to go'.[2] Furthermore, it was not being consulted on, or informed of, major policy decisions. It was left in the dark over questions of housing policy, tax reform, South African aid, diamond diggers and the Oxbow scheme,[3] and it had to read in the Lesotho Times of an education policy decision on automatic promotion of pupils.[4] In addition, departments were not responding readily to its foreign aid role. For example, the agreement with the Peace Corps was negotiated by the PS in the Prime Minister's Office and the Prime Minister's Private Secretary was appointed liaison officer with the Peace Corps. Again, the CPO knew of this only through reading the newspaper.[5]

Development estimates and project preparation As is clear from its relations with Finance (noted above), the Office faced considerable problems in carrying out these tasks. In the first financial year of its existence, Finance carried out the work, to which CPO acquiesced.[6] The following year, in June 1968, CPO sent out a circular for the 1969/70 estimates, stating that projects would be accepted until mid-July.[7] This met with no response, and the deadline was extended, again without response. The Office was therefore obliged to send out a second circular

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1. G. Oka-Orewa, Report on certain aspects of the organization framework for development in Lesotho, 1969, p. 4.
2. Giles, Final report ..., op.cit., p. 3.
3. CPO to Finance, CPO/BUDG/89 27/9/67.
4. CPO to Finance, JWB/AFL 28/9/67.
5. Ibid.
6. CPO to Finance, CPO/DEV/2 1/8/67.
7. CPO/Circular Notice/1, CPO/DEV/90-10 17/6/68.

setting yet a third deadline,[1] which elicited indifferent reaction.

Foreign aid coordination Although the June 1967 circular establishing the CPO (and the relevant Government Gazette)[2] had placed responsibility for coordinating aid with the Planning Office, departments continued to seek and secure aid without reference to it: for example, Agriculture was negotiating with Canada, Health with UNICEF and the University with Canada.[3] To formally re-emphasise this role of Planning, standing instructions on the coordination of aid and technical assistance were issued with the approval and signature of the Prime Minister. Article 2 read:

> To ensure proper coordination, Ministries and Agencies of Government shall not initiate or negotiate foreign aid with foreign aid agencies, except with regard to matters of technical detail and feasibility. Discussion of all development projects and technical assistance programmes shall only be held under the auspices of the Central Planning Office.

The CPO was also given full responsibility for evaluating all requests for aid, assisting ministries in preparing documentation, ensuring conformity with the regulations of donors, obtaining information on sources of aid, reviewing and adjusting priorities according to development plans, and evaluating annually all aid programmes and projects.[4]

Yet despite the Prime Minister's authorization, ministries carried on as if the circular did not exist. Some examples of this were provided by Agriculture bypassing CPO and negotiating

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1. CPO/Circular Notice/2 Ref. CPO/DEV/90 29/8/68.
2. Government Gazette Extraordinary, No. 24, op.cit.
3. CPO to Agriculture, EC/AID/17-133 11/10/67; CPO to UNDP, CPO/AID/2/8 13/12/67; CPO to External, CPO/AID/7 21/12/67.
4. Kingdom of Lesotho, Standing instruction on coordination and control of foreign aid: to be read with Circular Standing Instruction No. 1, Distribution C, CPO/AID/1 19/12/67.

with a donor;[1] Education bypassing it and dealing directly with Cabinet;[2] and External Affairs inviting Austrian surveyors to advise on road building, when CPO had already requested Italian advisers on the same subject.[3] There were numerous other illustrations too; and the CPO admitted that for at least a year after the circular was issued it lacked the staff to give the matter any serious attention.[4]

Outline for a first plan From December 1967 to January 1968, Mr Stephen Tan visited Lesotho and prepared an annotated outline for a first five-year plan. He identified as the major problems confronting Lesotho, lack of agricultural productivity, severe soil erosion, paucity of industrial activity, heavy dependence on foreign budgetary aid, and serious inadequacies in public administration. The document is significant not only because of the outline provided for a medium-term plan, but also for its analysis of the administration and of the planning machinery in Lesotho. He noted, inter alia, the inadequate operation of the National Planning Board, the lengthy intervals between meetings of the Committee of PSs, the failure of the Interdepartmental Committee on Community Development to meet at all, and the ineffectiveness of District Development Committees. Providing an early example of a foreign adviser attempting to strengthen the planners' case, he pointed to the error of not appreciating that planning had to be a function of the administration as a whole. He recommended that, first, the status of the Planning Office should be raised so as to have easy access to political authorities and to facilitate negotiations with government departments; second, that there should be a staff of four economists, each attached to a local counterpart, each pair to form a 'task force' responsible for specific subjects; third, that 'at least' in Agriculture and 'perhaps also' in Works, programme units should be set up at a high administrative level; and

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1. CPO to Agriculture, CPO/AGR/1 29/2/68.
2. CPO to Education, CPO/AID/2/8-52 18/4/68.
3. CPO to External, CPO/AID/12-13 17/5/68.
4. CPO to British High Commission, ETM/AFL 1/5/68.

fourth, that a Budgetary Coordination Committee should be established to consider and reconcile development and recurrent estimates.[1]

In summary, this first period saw a very limited advance in the establishment of the planning machinery or in the tasks of planning. The CPO's staffing position improved, notably in localising some of the posts, and the Office took greater responsibility for the preparation of the capital estimates and projects. However, it received little cooperation from the ministries who were unwilling to surrender any of their autonomy, least of all in the area of aid. Its relations with Finance whose influence it could not match and from which it received no support were unsatisfactory. Various parts of the supporting planning machinery, namely the Cabinet Economic Planning Committee, the National Planning Board and the Working Parties were either non-operative or functioning unproductively. The Planning Office thus had received an early lesson that it was not as central to Cabinet interest as the fanfare with which it had been established had suggested it might be. It had learned too that formal government instructions, even signed by the Prime Minister, did not automatically confer effective authority.

3. OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1968 : THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

The Cabinet had clearly not yet finalised its policy on the CPO, for among the various agencies which the Jones Reorganization Commission was required to investigate, was the Planning Office.[2] Finance was also dissatisfied with the ability of the Office to prepare projects satisfactorily and timeously. Apparently Cabinet, Finance and the Reorganization Commission decided to reconstruct the CPO along different lines. The CPO itself was not consulted.[3]

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1. Ibid., pp. 7, 17, and 35-6.
2. Cabinet Circular Notices No. 10 of 1968, 4/6/68, and No. 16 of 1968, 15/7/68.
3. See e.g. CPO to Establishments, CPO/ORG/1-94 5/9/68.

On 27 September 1968 a circular established the Department of Planning and Development, as from 1 October,[1] to replace the former CPO which was now considered to have 'ceased to exist'.[2] The Department (which was to remain under the Prime Minister) was to be subdivided into three subdepartments:

1) The Development Office, to be headed by a Development Secretary (a British citizen, transferred from Finance), to be responsible for producing a plan, coordinating aid, implementing the plan and providing administrative services.
2) The Office of the Economic Adviser (to be manned by the previous Director of the CPO), which was to be responsible for an annual economic review, for economic advice on policy and plans and for research.
3) The Bureau of Statistics which was to move into the Department, although retaining its administrative arrangements and accommodation.

The experiment failed. Among the principal factors accounting for this was that the new structure had been imposed on the CPO without consulting it. The former Director read about the change in Koena News, and had no idea of what it meant in terms of his status and role.[3] Lack of clarity as to who was head of the Office - the Development Secretary or the Economic Adviser - caused additional problems. Further, the local officers in the CPO had their own ideas about restructuring the Office, among which was that it was time to localise the Director's post. There was a background of resistance to the idea of including British personnel in the Office, let alone permitting one to head it. As one of the local officers had written earlier: '... because of our former colonial-metropolitan ties with Britain, a person from Britain may already come here with certain prejudices or preconceptions; moreover the UK is not a country of planners'.[4] This strong resistance accentuated personal dif-

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1. Establishment Circular Notice No. 26 of 1968, 27/9/68, 'Directions for the organization of the Department of Planning and Development'.
2. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 30 of 1968, CA/ADMIN/1 9/10/68.
3. CPO to Prime Minister, CPO/P/2068 30/10/68; Koena News, 29/10/68, p. 3; and CPO to Finance, CPO/DEV/1 11/12/68.
4. CPO, Staffing position in the CPO, 10/11/67; CPO, Is there a case for a Project Officer from ODM?, 10/11/67.

ferences and after six weeks the Development Secretary resigned and returned to Finance. The pointedly aggressive response of the local officers had effectively thwarted the functioning of the new structure, but it left the Planning Office in a state of disarray, aggravating its uncertain situation in the administration.

4. NOVEMBER 1968 - MID-1971 : CHANGING STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST PLAN

The most frequently quoted phrase from the First Plan, produced in this period, was that it was 'preparatory and to a large extent an exploratory plan'.[1] The description 'preparatory' and 'exploratory' also seem appropriate to the broader evolution of planning in this period. Although the structure of the Department was not formally altered until June 1970, in practice the Office reverted to the procedures and structure of the former CPO, although it was now effectively headed by a local officer. There was considerable debate about the planning machinery and a number of efforts were made to strengthen it through Planning Units, the Development Operations C ee, c.., and through instituting new procedures - for e , progress reporting and technical .sistance reviews.

Reports

A number of reports and proposals aimed at strengthening the position of the planners and increasing their capacity to carry out the tasks given them, were produced, principally in the earlier half of this period. These consisted most notably of a series of progress reports by a UN adviser, Dr A.A. Lazaris, a report by an Economic Commission for Africa consultant, Mr G. Oka-Orewa, and a couple of papers by the CPO staff. It is worth mentioning briefly the major points of these documents, on which there was a remarkable degree of agreement.

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1. Kingdom of Lesotho, Lesotho first five-year development plan 1970/71-1974/75 (referred to hereafter as the First Plan), 1970, p. 19.

1) The CPO should be re-established, and the Department of Planning and Development and the post of Economic Adviser both abolished. The autonomy of the Bureau of Statistics should be restored to prevent its merger with the CPO distorting its functions.[1]

2) The CPO should remain under the Prime Minister. 'In view of the important role which planning has to play in the activities of governments ... it is but reasonable' that it should be close to him to acquaint him with economic trends in the country'.[2]

3) The Director of Planning should be a local officer with an intimate knowledge of local social and economic conditions, able to build on his experience (which would be lost to the country were an expatriate to hold the post) and ensure 'continuity and increasing efficiency'.[3]

4) The status of the Director must be raised to that of a PS, in order to provide him with easy access to political authorities, particularly the Prime Minister, and to enhance the authority of the Office and so strengthen its coordinative capacity.[4]

5) Planning Units should be established to replace the ineffective Working Parties. Their task would be to improve project preparation, integrate proposals from departments of the ministry into sectoral programmes and to act as the main channel of communication between the CPO and the ministries. While members of such Units were to be on the staff of their ministries the Director of Planning should be responsible for their professional competence.[5]

6) The private sector should be involved in planning, since the existing communication gap made it impossible for Government to appreciate the manpower and infrastructure needs of that sector, and for non-governmental bodies, charitable or commercial, to comprehend the Government's plans.[6]

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1. A.A. Lazaris, Second report, 20/2/69, p. 5; A.A. Lazaris, First Report, 12/12/68, p. 3; and CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame for policy decision on planning and economic development (undated, but from second half of 1969), p. 6.

2) Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 3; CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame ..., op.cit., pp. 2, 3, and 6; also Tan, op.cit., p. 7.

3. CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame ..., op. cit., p. 4; Lazaris, First report, op.cit., p. 3; and Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 8.

4. Ibid.; A.A. Lazaris, Final report, July 1971, p. 4; CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame ..., op.cit., pp. 4 and 5.

5. Ibid., pp. 7, 8 and 11; Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 6.

6. Ibid., pp. 9 and 10; CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame..., op.cit.. pp. 6 and 7.

7) The professional staff needed substantial strengthening since the Office was barely coping with the constantly growing pressure of work, let alone improving on its capabilities.[1] The CPO proposed a professional staff of fifteen: a Director, a geographer, a cartographer, a documentalist, a lecturer, an agronomist, six economists/planning officers, and one Principal Assistant Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries for coordination of aid and administration.[2]

8) The supporting staff was also in need of urgent improvement, since the registry system, the classification and storing of reports, documents and correspondence and the lack of typing capacity were all retarding the work of the Office.[3]

9) The districts should be included in the planning process so as to channel communication from the villages to the Planning Office, to broaden the source of identification of new ideas and facilitate implementation of projects.[4]

10) Relations between the Planning Office and Finance (which one report described as 'discouraging' and another as the source of 'difficulties and misunderstandings')[5] were in need of amelioration. One of the principal recommendations was the setting up of a Budget and Economic Planning Committee, to consist of the Secretary to Cabinet (Chairman), PS, Finance, PS, Agriculture, PS, Works and Director of Planning to examine recurrent expenditure and development proposals on their merits and in relation to each other.[6]

A few other points, though raised not more than one paper, are of relevance:

a) CPO must encourage the establishment of a Planning Unit in Interior in order to prepare a national plan for community

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1. A.A. Lazaris, Fourth report, 8/7/69, p. 2; and A.A. Lazaris, Fifth report, 3/10/69, pp. 6-7.
2. CPDO, Proposals for governmental organization, Central Planning and Development Office (undated, about 1968 or 1969), Appendix; also Oka-Orewa, op.cit. 7.
3. CPDO, Proposals for governmental anization ..., op.cit., Appendix; Lazaris, Final report. op.cit., p. 6.
4. CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative fra...,op.cit., pp. 10-11; Oka-Orewa, op.cit., pp. 12-13; A.A. azaris, Progress report (March-July 1970), op.cit.; Lazaris, Fifth report, op.cit., p. 9; and also CPDO, District Development Committees (undated, produced during this period for a commission on district administration).
5. Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 12; A.A. Lazaris, Third report, 26/4/69, p. 6.
6. CPDO, Constitutional, legal and administrative frame ..., op.cit., pp. 2-3; Lazaris, Third report, op.cit., p. 6; Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 4; also Tan, op.cit., pp. 35-6.

development to be included in the national plan.[1]

b) Non-governmental organizations should be involved in the planning process since there is a tendency for them to embark, without consultation with CPO or Finance, on relief projects which Government is expected to take over.[2]

c) A manpower planner for the private and public sectors was urgently required.[3]

d) There was a total lack of research into socio-economic questions.[4]

e) The collection, utilisation and evaluation of foreign experts' reports required improvement.[5]

Machinery

Professional staff The period saw an advance in terms of the localisation of the staff. From December 1968, the Office came under the Directorship of a Mosotho, at first in an acting capacity, later officially. Furthermore, it was joined by a number of young graduates from the University. However, it lost two of its relatively more experienced officers, Mr Moitse in July 1969 and Mr Manare in March 1970, both of whom were promoted to other departments. By mid-1971 there were six local planners in the Office. For most of the period they were assisted by a UN economist, Dr A.A. Lazaris, and a Special Commonwealth Adviser, Mr P. Selwyn.

These two expatriates left behind extremely valuable reports on their work in the CPDO. Lazaris prepared regular progress reports and additional papers aimed at assisting with the training of local planners. Selwyn wrote one report towards the end of his term, but also prepared a number of policy papers for Government consideration. It is noticeable that Lazaris, while generally realistic, is more optimistic and positive about progress than is Selwyn. This may have resulted from the different ways they viewed their tasks and the response they received from

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1. Oka-Orewa, op.cit., p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., pp.11-12.
4. Lazaris, First report, op.cit., pp. 5-6; also CPDO, Proposed plan for future work, 13/12/68, pp. 2-3.
5. Lazaris, Second report, op.cit., p. 4.

heir colleagues. Lazaris (who arrived late in 1968 when the ...nning Office was at a very low ebb) clearly saw one of his objectives as the fostering of self-confidence among local officers. Thus while he pointed out deficiencies and failures, he managed consistently to indicate in his reports some degree of progress. He was well accepted in the Office. Selwyn, by contrast, found his period in the Lesotho CPDO both unsatisfactory and disappointing. Amongst other things, most of the working papers he submitted for consideration were ignored, and he came to feel that as an adviser he was both under- and mal-used.

Siting of the Office, and status of the Director In June 1970, a circular notice set new directions for the organization of the CPDO.[1] This overlooked entirely two of the main recommendations of the reports emanating from Planning (discussed above), that the status of the Director be raised and the Office be sited under the Prime Minister. It was henceforth to fall under the Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry, with the PS, Finance serving as its public service head and exercising supervision over it. This amounted to a diminution in status, since the Director was now responsible to the PS, Finance, instead of the Senior Permanent Secretary. It was clear that again the planners had not been fully consulted on this altered structure.[2] With the political uncertainty in the period following the annulment of the 1970 election results, the Prime Minister's Office took on the added responsibilities of Community Development and District Administration. In these circumstances it may have been felt that his Office should be relieved of the task of supervising Planning.

Accommodation remained unsatisfactory. Until July 1970 the CPDO was housed 'temporarily' in a building which had been 'condemned' and in which office facilities were extremely poor.[3] In July,

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1. Public Service Circular Notice No. 38 of 1970, Ref. ON/2/7 11/6/70; and Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. V, 22/7/70, No. 16, p. 147.
2. See CPDO to Finance, CPO/ORG/1-57 31/3/70.
3. Ibid.

it was transferred, again temporarily, to the National Assembly Building (as Parliament had ceased meeting after the election crisis) which premises proved both inadequate and inconvenient.[1]

Relations with the ministries Although the CPDO spread its contacts more broadly and became more of a reality within the administration, it emerged clearly to the planners that 'deeply rooted attitudes could not change overnight'.[2] Departments continued to be unresponsive and unsupportive. For example, in preparing the First Plan, the call circular[3] elicited little reaction. (The CPDO erred in giving ministries only five weeks in which to prepare their first submissions). As a result the Office had to make personal contact with individuals in the ministries, which meant mainly foreign advisers.[4] The Office continued to meet difficulties in getting ministries to follow the prescribed foreign aid procedures, and to submit progress reports, while project memoranda continued to come in late and contain inadequate information; and there was a lack of interest, even antipathy, towards the setting up of Planning Units.

Supporting staff and the registry continued to impede the tasks of planning throughout this period. Lack of typists remained a consistent bottleneck,[5] restricting the output of the Office. Concerning the administration of the Office, Selwyn commented on the 'underestimation of the importance of good administration - a tendency to equate orderly administrative procedures with the deficiencies of the old colonial regime'.

> Thus when I suggested that it would be desirable if more use were made of minuting on files, I was accused of proposing "bureaucratic" procedures - bureaucracy apparently being the worst sin in the development canon. But

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1. Public Service Circular Notice No. 40 of 1970, Ref. OM/8/1 27/7/70.
2. Lazaris, Fourth report, op.cit., p. 1.
3. CPO Circular Notice No. 5 of 1969, Distribution C, CPO/PLAN 10/3/69.
4. See below, this section, under Tasks.
5. Lazaris, Final report, op.cit., p. 6.

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3. CPO Circular Notice No. 5 of 1969, Distribution C, CPO/PLAN 10/3/69.
4. See below, this section, under Tasks.
5. Lazaris, Final report, op.cit., p. 6.

> without proper minuting it is impossible for anybody new to find out what has been going on or to take rational action. A symptom of this underestimation of the importance of good administration is the astonishing degree to which deficiencies in the registry system are accepted. A registry which has no proper record of incoming and outgoing mail, which has no diary and therefore no system of arranging checks on the fate of outgoing correspondence, and which does not even have a complete and up-to-date list of files in existence, must always be a hindrance to the proper running of the Office ... as long as registry work is underpaid, underregarded and undergraded, it will be badly done.[1]

Planning Units — The June 1970 Circular directed that planning units be established initially in Agriculture, Education, Works and Health.[2] The unit was to act as the main channel of communication between the CPDO and the ministry concerned and its functions were: 1) to assist the ministry in the preparation and implementation of projects; 2) to combine and integrate projects and proposals of the ministry into sectoral programmes for inclusion in annual, long- and medium-term plans; 3) to submit these to CPDO; 4) to submit progress reports to CPDO; and 5) to prepare applications for technical assistance and advise the ministry on their effective utilisation. In view of the shortage of qualified people, and of restrictions on the recurrent budget, the staffing of these units was to be found from within the ministries, and a minimum qualification was to be a Cambridge 'A' level or Joint Matriculation Board. These transitional provisions gave clear warning of the problems in the way of implementing the directive.

Members of the planning units were to be on the staff of the Ministry in which they served. They were, however, to work in close association with the CPDO, and the Director of Planning was to be responsible for their 'professional competence'. The CPDO was to undertake training of the planning unit personnel and rotational duties in the Planning Office would provide them with an overall view of the country's planning problems.

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1. Selwyn, Report on assignment to Lesotho, 1971, p. 6.
2. See also First Plan, op.cit., where they are referred to as 'Sectoral Programming Units' on p. 39.

The response of the ministries concerned was sluggish; and the CPDO was accused of 'empire-building' and of 'trying to put its boys in the ministries'. By July 1971, that is thirteen months after the Circular, only Agriculture had a functioning Planning Unit, and it was struggling to establish itself and communicate with the operational divisions. In Works, there was agreement that the Engineer-in-Chief would head the Unit, and in January 1971 two posts in the Unit were advertised; by July, however, no appointments had been made. Health and Education took no steps to set up Planning Units.[1]

Ministerial Project Review Committees were provided for in the First Plan.[2] They were to consist of the PS of the ministry concerned (Chairman), heads of departments, technical officers and representatives of the Planning Units; and their purpose was to ensure full evaluation of projects, with an emphasis on technical aspects. Only Agriculture set up such a Committee, which commenced operating in May 1971;[3] despite initial enthusiasm, however, its existence was shortlived. In all the other ministries, less formal arrangements were said to be considered satisfactory.

District Development Secretaries The proposals of the Planning Office were accepted by the Cabinet and included in August 1970 in new directions on district administration.[4] These replaced District Administrative Secretaries with District Administrators and created the post of District Development Secretaries, who were to coordinate development activities in the Districts, prepare development programmes and projects, supervise the effective working of the District Development Committees, and

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1. CPDO to Cabinet, CPO/ORG/1 16/7/71; also Lazaris, Final report, op.cit., p. 7.
2. First plan, op.cit., p. 39.
3. Agriculture to CPDO, AG/PRO/23/1 18/5/71; and CPDO to Agriculture, CPO/DEV/23 16/6/71.
4. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 13 of 1970, CA/MIN/77 10/8/70.

maintain close cooperation with the CPDO. By early 1971 the Planning Office was in a position to forward sufficient names of young graduates (more having administration than economics majors) to fill all nine posts.[1] Despite the Cabinet having agreed that only qualified people should be appointed, it completely ignored the Planning Office list, making a series of 'political appointments' of people who had neither experience nor training for the task.[2] Thus any hopes for district planning were quashed immediately.

Constructional Capacity Committee The proposal to establish such a Committee was accepted by Cabinet in the first half of 1970,[3] and formally initiated in the Plan.[4] Its purpose was to consider constructional inadequacies and suggest means for overcoming them. However, it did not operate, and thus a serious impediment to project implementation remained unattended.

National Planning Consultative Council On 11 August 1969 the Prime Minister addressed a gathering of private organizations on the purposes of the proposed First Plan, and stated that the above Council would be established. This was confirmed in the Plan.[5] It too did not function, so effectively excluding the private sector from involvement in planning.

Budget and Development Planning Committee In July 1969 Cabinet agreed to the setting up of this Committee, and it was included in the First Plan.[6] It consisted of the Secretary to

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1. CPDO, Proposed list of Development Secretaries (undated); see Lazaris, Fifth report, op.cit., p. 3, and Final report, op.cit., p. 8.
2. See Appendix V for background information and District Administrators' views.
3. Lazaris, Progress report, op.cit., pp. 5-6.
4. First Plan, op.cit., p. 40.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 38. Referred to as the Budget and Economic Planning Committee.

the Cabinet (Chairman), PS, Finance, PS, Agriculture, PS, Works and the Director of Planning. The Committee did commence functioning, but it met irregularly with lengthy intervening periods. Thus it did not make any significant impact on solving problems arising from implementation or preparation of projects, or in harmonising the work of the Budget Office and the Planning Office. For a while also it was eclipsed by the Development Operations Committee, the respective roles of the two having become confused.

Development Operations Committee The above-mentioned Committees were all formally accepted, yet were either non-functional or ineffective. By contrast, this Committee was neither recommended in the various reports nor included in the Plan. Yet it was established (in August 1970)[1] and became the most effective body concerned with interministerial coordination, planning and development. Its purpose was to ensure that full and effective use was made of development funds, by following up administrative and other project implementation problems.[2] It met regularly (though it slacked from meeting weekly to less than once a fortnight) and maintained continuity. In the haste to get it started, some structural errors were made (for example, appointing one member of the Committee to carry out certain tasks for which someone in the CPDO was already responsible);[3] but these problems were cleared up.[4] Meetings were based on progress reports prepared in the Planning Office which dealt with the state of project preparation and implementation, and other related matters. Examples of questions discussed by this Committee were: British complaints that a number of livestock centres were closed

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1. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 16 of 1970, Cabinet Office, 18/8/70.
2. Lazaris, Final report, op.cit., p. 8.
3. CPDO to Cabinet (DSPS), 1/9/70; Cabinet (DSPS) to CPDO, CA/MIN/10/1 3/9/70; Cabinet to Finance CA/MIN/10/1-117 11/9/70.
4. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 25 of 1970, Ref. OM/3/19 17/9/70.

for lack of staff and that two farmer training centres were occupied by the police;[1] delays in the issuance of expenditure warrants; urban land tenure; civil service housing;[2] poor response to a call for progress reports;[3] sluggishness in the preparation of development estimates and in getting projects started;[4] and the state of approval of projects, revotes of funds and continuing projects.[5] Despite this relatively promising start, the Committee did not continue functioning much after the end of this period.

Tasks

Suspension of British aid After the abortive January 1970 election, the British Government suspended aid to Lesotho, a decision which it rescinded in June. For this brief period, however, the work of the CPDO faced a number of obstacles. The annual development estimates had to be reconsidered and a 'skeleton programme' involving an amount of R0,5 million was prepared to avoid total losses on continuing projects and the breach of contractual agreements.[6] Preparation of the First Plan, which was at an advanced stage, was postponed, so delaying its publication even longer, and repercussions on the timely administration of planning were felt well into the next financial year.

Preparation of the First Plan Perhaps the major achievement of this period was the preparation of the country's first medium-term development plan. Divided into sixteen chapters, and containing maps and numerous tables, the 262-page document was characterised by three principal structural features: it was

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1. Development Operations Committee (DOC), Progress report No. 6 as at 5/10/70.
2. DOC, Note of meeting, of 12/10/70.
3. DOC, Progress report, No. 7 as at 16/10/70; and DOC, Note of meeting, of 19/10/70 and 22/2/71.
4. DOC, Note of meeting, of 30/11/70 and 8/2/71; and Progress report, No. 18, as at 31/5/71.
5. DOC, Progress report, No. 13 as at 3/5/71 and No. 16 as at 16/5/71.
6. Lazaris, Progress report, op.cit., p. 1.

'preparatory and to a large extent an exploratory plan'; it was 'primarily a public investment plan'; and it concentrated 'on the annual increment of labour'. It set out eleven major objectives; for example: the attainment of a five per cent annual growth rate of gross domestic product (gdp), a marked increase in agricultural productivity, promotion of small-scale indigenous industries, preparation for the full exploitation of the country's natural resources and the creation of 10 000-15 000 new jobs. It proposed a total capital expenditure of R28,8 m., and in addition estimated that R25 m. would be spent on construction of the Malibamatso River project.[1]

As an exercise, the process of plan preparation (which lasted from March 1969 to December 1970) was unsatisfactory, principally because of a scarcity of statistics and information which 'provided a background of ignorance concerning many major economic and social elements in the country's situation',[2] and a dire lack of planning capacity in the ministries. Selwyn wrote afterwards that much of the content had been prepared inside the Planning Office 'because of the inability of the Ministries to produce drafts'.

> This has the unfortunate effect that some Ministries are committed to implementing policies with which they do not feel involved. They may have agreed with the drafts in a negative way (i.e. they did not actively disagree with them) but they do not feel that the policies are their own, or that they need make any special effort to implement them.

He went on to note that within the Office itself the major share of the work was borne by the two expatriates who would not be present in Lesotho to assist with implementation.[3]

From a study of the relevant documents, drafts, memoranda and correspondence, one is able to make a number of observations: 1) most ministries had little idea of exactly what the

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1. First Plan, op.cit., pp. 19, 23-4 and 43.
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. Selwyn, Report on assignment to Lesotho, op.cit., p. 21.

CPDO had in mind in terms of direction, strategy, sectoral allocations or format; 2) most ministries lacked the capability to prepare satisfactory sectoral programmes or accompanying project memoranda; 3) most ministries felt very seriously disadvantaged by the paucity of data available to them and by the limited time given them to collect and analyse information; 4) in most ministries submissions were prepared not by local officers who would have gained valuable experience thereby, but by expatriates; 5) the CPDO lacked the staff to maintain consistent supervision of the process and relied heavily on its expatriate members (providing an advance warning of the limitations it was to experience in its attempt to monitor plan implementation);[1] and, 6) finally, the Office did strive to involve a wider range of departments and officials - and more frequently - than is generally acknowledged by government officials.[2]

A few examples taken from interviews with people who participated (or who gave post facto opinions) and from office files follow:

> I was given forty-eight hours to write the Works section of it. I don't know why it was so rushed. I also know that we had no information to work on whatsoever ... I did feel there was a lack of direction ... we were virtually just working in the dark.[+1]

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1. See below, section 4.
2. For examples of expatriate-prepared submissions (which also demonstrated lack of anything like a uniform understanding of CPDO requirements) see: M. Evans, Notes on agricultural credit, 1969; P. Moran, Role of cooperative education in a development plan for Lesotho, 1969; G.P. Bus and W.J. Schrekenberg, Survey. Poultry industry in Lesotho, June 1969; E. Linusson, Individual views on a five-year development plan on nutrition activities in Lesotho, 19/6/69; J. Broadhurst, Report on livestock development in Lesotho, June 1969. Examples of quite extensive contact between CPDO and ministries can be found in files on Education, e.g. CPO to Education, CPO/PLAN/EDUC/1 19/5/69 and 2/6/69; and Education to CPO, Ref. ED/CPO/DEV-231 17/6/69 etc.; on Health, e.g. Health to CPO, H/ACC/3/1 8/5/69, CPO to Health, CPO/PLAN/HEALTH 14/5/70 etc.; on Works e.g. Works to CPO, W/A/POL/13/1/1 7/5/69, CPO to Works, CPO/PLAN/WORKS 14/5/69, Works to CPO, W/A/POL/13/1/1 12/11/69, etc. Lazaris, Third report, op.cit., pp. 1-4 lists numerous meetings which were held.

We, the DAs, were not consulted at all about the first plan.[+1]

In the Coops Division of Agriculture there were certain things that they were supposed to implement but they knew nothing of that.[+2]

The figures on livestock are twaddle... See page 84 on Livestock ... we don't have any idea of where the figures come from or who invented them.[+3]

I have a very shrewd s' clon - I was not there then - that the Health sectio. was never written in Health.[+4]

The time allowed for the preparation of this first draft was entirely inadequate ... for any meaningful submissions to be made... It is regrettable that the production of a document of this importance and significance cannot be allotted the time it deserves; it hardly augurs well for the value of the final product.[1]

Except for a few cases for which investigations have already been carried out in the past, present estimates only give an indication of costs and may require drastic revision in the light of proper investigations. For the same reason it is not possible to indicate priorities of construction at this stage.[2]

There may be a lot of items left out in my hurry to give you a rough idea of what future development in this Department may cost if we are not going to remain stagnant.[3]

Lazaris, while noting numerous difficulties experienced in the preparation of the plan, concluded on a far more positive note than did Selwyn. He found that the Office had used the opportunity to 'develop its coordinative and advisory work to a considerable extent' and as a result it had in the process ceased to be 'an isolated passive institution'.[4] Further, he wrote:

..."development planning" is now a well established concept within the administration ... the procedures followed ... have given the opportunity to most government departments to participate in various plan acti-

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1. Health to CPO, H/ACC/3/1 8/5/69.
2. Works to CPO, W/A/POL/13/1/1 7/5/69.
3. Broadcasting to CPO, PM/BRS/ACC/9 26/10/70.
4. Lazaris, Fourth report. op.cit., p. 1.

vities...[1]

There are few people in government who would be as unequivocal about the progress achieved. Nevertheless, it is true that for the first time the CPDO had made some impact on the whole administration and in the process of introducing the idea of planning it did at least mobilise some departments to action. Moreover, many serious inadequacies in information, a number of useful insights into the operation of the economy and the country's technical assistance requirements were identified in the process. Finally, with the increase in implementation capacity towards the end of the five-year period, the Plan proved to be a more accurate document than had been anticipated earlier by many of its critics.[2]

Preparation and management of project memoranda As Planning Units did not really become operational, sectoral submissions showed only marginal improvement on the previous period. In addition to being inadequately prepared, project memoranda continued to arrive much later than the CPDO required, so delaying the presentation of projects to donors.[3]

> Frequently, projects involving expenditure during a particular year, have been prepared only during that year. By the time that approval has been given, it is frequently too late for the project to be implemented during the year, and funds which have been committed for the project are not spent.[4]

Through the introduction of a card-index system on projects (a

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1. Lazaris, Final report. op.cit.. p. 3.
2. Converting totals to 1974/5 prices, the Second Plan computed that R30,2 m. out of R43,5 m. had been spent. Kingdom of Lesotho, Second Five Year Development Plan 1975/76 - 1980/1. Vol. 1, 1976, p. 17, Table 2.4.
3. E.g. CPDO to Interior, CPO/INTER/01 22/1/70; also Lazaris, Progress report, op.cit.. p. 1; DOC, Note of meeting of 12/7/71; CPDO to Finance, CPO/PLAN/1 27/4/71.
4. Finance Circular Notice No. 10 of 1971, CPDO 2/3/71.

system which did not however last long), the maintaining of a record of the status of projects and regular reporting to the Development Operations Committee, the CPDO's management of this task showed some improvement. However, it continued to lack the ability and muscle to ensure, for example, that ministries consulted with each other on items of common concern, and with Works on the construction elements of their projects.[1]

The CPDO itself was guilty of inadequate consultation and communication. For instance, because of the Office's unsatisfactory record of informing other concerned departments, it was decided in November 1969 by the Budget and Development Planning Committee that the copies of all project memoranda should be sent to Finance and Establishments, allowing them sufficient time to scrutinize the documents. Thirteen months later, Finance noted that the CPDO had made no effort to implement this instruction.[2] Audit complained further that the inefficient procedures and inadequate contents made the supervision and control of expenditure extremely problematic. In 1971, for example, it complained that it had received only 19 copies of a total of 77 projects; while in its 1970 aid statement to Britain it explained that for the above reasons 'it has not been possible to verify in many cases that the expenditure incurred was on and for the purposes provided in the approved project memoranda'.[3] The Accountant-General expressed similar complaints.[4]

Foreign aid coordination After an initial stage of confusion over procedures, the CPDO's function of coordinating aid did show some enhanced effectiveness.[5] However, this was the period

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1. Finance Circular Notice No. 8 of 1971, CPDO 2/3/71; and CPDO to British High Commission, CPO/AGRIC/51/10; Justice to CPDO, J/GEN/9/17 10/1/70; and DOC, Notes of meeting of 7/6/71.
2. Finance to CPDO, FIN/EST/4/2, Vol. I-133 16/12/70.
3. Audit to Finance, A/REP/3/67/68-20 4/2/71; and letter quoted in Finance to CPDO, FIN/DEV/8, Vol.II-76 (date unclear).
4. Accountant-General to Finance, T/DEVF/472/70-71-56 4/1/71.
5. Lazaris, Fifth report, op.cit., p. 18.

before donors came to insist on departments channelling aid negotiations through the Planning Office and there thus continued to be numerous cases of the Office being bypassed. This was true in all three areas of capital aid, technical assistance personnel and training.[1] In one case a Minister negotiated with a donor and when the CPDO heard - completely by chance - of this, it had to request information on the negotiations in order to avoid 'any embarassment consequent upon ... duplication'.[2] In another instance, the CPDO replied to a request for information on the utilisation of overseas scholarships, that it could not possibly keep a record as long as it was not informed or consulted.[3] Finally, by way of illustration, in March 1971, after one ministry had repeatedly ignored the required procedures, the Planning Office wrote accusing it of 'deliberately failing to comply' with procedures and pointing out that the delays and frustrations which resulted were costly to Government in terms of both time and money.[4]

Progress reporting The Planning Office's attempts to introduce a regular system of reporting failed. After a total lack of response to a particular format, the Office produced a simpler one, and in September 1970 it sent out a circular requiring ministries to submit returns monthly on approved projects, and every two months on projects in preparation.[5] The first replies were to be in by 1 October 1970. By the 5th of the month, only one department, Statistics, had acceded to the request; by the 16th, just one ministry and only three departments of other ministries had complied; and Works had submitted its normal quarterly report which did not conform with these requirements. For November, only two ministries, both small,

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1. CPDO to Training, CPO/TRAIN/Vol.IV 347 21/1/69; CPDO to Establishments, CPO/AID 13/1/69; and CPDO to Cabinet, CPO/AGR/1-59 10/1/69.
2. CPDO to Agriculture, CPO/AID/15 3/7/70.
3. CPDO to Public Service (Training), Cabinet (SPS) and Foreign, CPO/AID/2/1 21/5/71.
4. CPDO to Commerce and Industry, CPO/AIDER D.H. 19/3/71.
5. Finance Circular Standing Instruction No. 20 of 1970, CPO/PLAN/2 4/9/70.

and eight divisions of ministries replied. For December, no progress reports at all were received. For the period 1 January to 19 February the same two small ministries and five divisions responded; this meant that nothing was received from Agriculture, Works, Education, Health and the departments under Cabinet (except Broadcasting).[1] After this the idea was once again abandoned. An indication of the consequences of such failures to maintain information procedures is provided by a request from the High Commission to the CPDO for a report on a seed and fertilizer project. The High Commission pointed out that since the project had been in operation for six-and-a-half years it should be possible to supply some concrete evidence of the subsidy's effects on agricultural production. The Planning Office found itself unable to offer any useful information on the project.[2]

Technical assistance survey and requirements In 1969 the CPDO, in cooperation with UNDP, undertook a survey of UN technical assistance personnel in Lesotho, sending out questionnaires to the experts, their counterparts, and heads of departments. The questionnaire requiredthe following: general information, formulation of project post, programme of work, government support, conclusions and recommendations.[3] The most common problem raised was lack of counterparts, but there were difficulties too concerning transport, lack of communication within ministries, and lack of clear guidelines for their operation.[4] This was a successful undertaking and laid the ground for improved surveys of UNDP personnel in the years following.

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1. DOC, Progress report No. 6 as at 5/10/70; DOC, Progress report No. 7 as at 16/10/70; DOC, Progress report No. 8 as at 9/11/70; DOC, Note of meeting of 28/12/70; DOC, Progress report No. 12 as at 19/2/71.
2. British High Commission to CPDO (Agric. I), 29/7/70; and CPDO to British High Commission, CPO/AGRIC/503 5/8/70.
3. Survey of assistance in Lesotho administered by the UN and its specialized agencies (undated).
4. Because of the confidential nature of the replies, they may not be referred to in detail.

Later in this period the CPDO also successfully undertook a survey of technical assistance requirements of all departments.[1]

Other initiatives During this period, too, one saw a number of papers - discussing specific problems and recommending solutions - emanating from the Planning Office, indicating that it was moving toward a more active ro e in the administration. One paper, for example, analysed the administrative weaknesses of the civil service; another made proposals on strengthening both the executive and planning capacity of the districts; another provided guidelines for project preparation and appraisal; and others dealt with cheaper alternative building methods, increased use of local contractors, housing policy, criteria for granting concessions to investors, and a more development-oriented university.[2] Further, the Office cooperated with an adviser and Statistics in preparing manpower surveys of the private and public sectors.[3] In listing these efforts to function more positively, it should be noted, however, that few of the proposals made significant headway and that the major share of work in preparing the documents was done by the two expatriates.

5. AUGUST 1971 TO APRIL 1974 : THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PLANS

This phase covers the period from the completion of the budgetary functions in 1971 (which followed and were delayed by the late publication of the Plan) and the commencement in 1974 of preparation of the Second Plan which coincided with the

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1. CPDO, Technical assistance requirements for Lesotho 1971-1973, 1971.
2. CPDO, Some failures in administration (undated), prepared by P. Selwyn; CPDO, District Development Committees, 1970; A.A. Lazaris, Guidelines for project preparation, 1969; CPDO to Works, CPO/WORKS/12 2/3/71; CPDO to Cabinet (SPS), CPO/HOUS/1 2/3/71; Selwyn, Report on assignment to Lesotho, op.cit., mentions this and a number of other reports which he prepared; A.A. Lazaris, Preliminary suggestions regarding a more development oriented readjustment of the UBLS, 25/11/68.
3. A. Beattie, First report on the 1971 public sector manpower survey in Lesotho, November 1971.

strengthening of the CPDO staff position.

Tasks

Progress monitoring and evaluation As has been noted, the First Plan was prepared without the prior establishment of a functioning planning machinery, which was thus ill-equipped to control and monitor progress on plan implementation. Dr Lazaris, the UN adviser in the Office, warned of the 'damaging implications' of allowing such a situation to continue.

> What ... is not probably fully realized is that the very position of the CPDO may finally be irreparably undermined, if such conditions are allowed to exist for long. Planning not followed by plan supervision and control is a one sided operation which will gradually lead to complete polarization of plan preparation activities. The Office will lose contact with reality and sink gradually into a position from which it would be virtually impossible to play its coordinating role effectively.

In his view this 'was the most urgent task' facing the Planning Office.[1] The significance of this function appeared to be appreciated by the CPDO, and in August 1971 the Director of the Office wrote:

> Conditions and circumstances which underlie Development plans are always changing and it is important for Governments to know immediately where, how and why changes occur. For this reason Planning Offices generally engage, among other things, in evaluating progress on plan implementation in order to advise Governments on the remedial action to be taken and on modifications to be made to the Plan. Unless this is done, Plans become mere documents with no relevance to the course of action being pursued by the Government.[2]

At that stage he admitted that evaluation 'as a deliberate systematic process' was absent and therefore it was impossible to recommend remedial action if and when necessary.[3] A year-and-a-

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1. Lazaris, Final report, op.cit., pp. 22 and 9.
2. CPDO, Evaluating progress on plan implementation, 27/8/71, prepared by the Director of Planning for the information of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance.
3. Ibid.

half later, that is about halfway through the quinquennium, he observed that progress reporting was rudimentary, there were no arrangements for appraising reports, and instructions for corrective action were haphazard.[1] This situation continued through 1973[2] and 1974[3] and constitutes one of the principal setbacks to planning in this period.

An even more adequate planning establishment, however, would have been severely hampered by the statistical deficiencies which faced Lesotho's CPDO: gaps, errors, delays in publication, and non-comparability of more recent with earlier sets of figures. For example, the National Accounts for the years 1966/7 to 1971/2 were produced only in March 1975. They superseded those for 1966/7 and 1967/8 published in 1968 which were said to be deficient in certain respects, and were not comparable with those for the period 1954/5 to 1965/6 compiled earlier.[4] The full extent of the errors in the First Plan's chapter on agriculture became evident with the production of the 1970 Agricultural Census which dealt with the first year of the Plan, but was published in 1973. Figures in the Plan on areas under cultivation were seen to be out by 15 per cent for maize, 3 per cent for sorghum, 10 per cent for wheat, 50 per cent for peas, 86 per cent for barley and oats, but accurate for beans. In terms of productivity (kilogrammes per hectare) there were inaccuracies of the order of 11,5 per cent for sorghum, 7,4 per cent for wheat, 42,2 per cent for beans, 30,9 per cent for barley, though accurate for peas.[5] This meant that halfway through the period of the Plan, most targets were found to be meaningless in that some had been achieved before the

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1. Thahane, Planning for development, op.cit., pp. 458-9.
2. K.C. Sen, Development planning in Lesotho, February 1973; and K.C. Sen, Re-organisation of the CPDO, CPDO, October 1973.
3. CPDO, Reorganisation of the CPDO, 1974, prepared by the Acting Director of the CPDO.
4. Lesotho. National Accounts. 1966/67-1971/72, March 1975, p. 11.
5. B. Westman, Production targets in agriculture, 1969-70, April 1973, pp. 4 and 6.

commencement of the quinquennium, whereas others were impossible to achieve.

There are three techniques (not necessarily organizationally distinct) for monitoring, evaluating and supervising progress which the CPDO did attempt to carry out at various stages: institution of a regular system of progress reporting; preparation of annual plans, backed up by annual economic reports; and a mid-term review of plan implementation.

Operating effectively, a system of progress reporting would greatly facilitate the preparation of annual reports and plans, which in turn would simplify a mid-term review. However, the unsatisfactory situation described in the previous period continued; the obstacles which arose then were not overcome, and eventually they stifled further efforts at progress reporting. Various *proforma* were attempted, but the ministries in general remained uncooperative. In the Ministry of Agriculture, the Planning Unit made a concerted effort to elicit reports from the divisions and submitted these to the CPDO.[1] However, the Unit met such strong opposition fro[illegible]e divisions, who felt that no advantage ensued from the [illegible]cise, that it soon gave up. Education, too, submitted r[illegible]rts for a while, but terminated the practice on the basis of lack of reaction from CPDO.[2] While it continued in existence, the Development Operations Committee was unable to secure regular returns, and thereafter the Budget and Development Planning Committee met too irregularly to make any effective impact in this regard. For a period, the Deputy Senior Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office sought to carry out this task, but the Planning Office - constantly on guard against its responsibilities being usurped - objected to this move, despite its own chronic inability to perform the function.[3] Works continued to submit quarterly reports on the progress of construction, while brief annual reports on continuing

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1. See for example, CPDO to Agriculture, CPO/DEV/23-16 5/8/71.
2. See Chapter III, section 3 b.
3. CPDO to Cabinet (O&M), CPO/DEV/12 17/8/71; and DOC, *Progress report*, No. 23 as at 30/8/71.

projects were required, but not regularly pursued, by the British.[1]

The Planning Office made one serious effort (for 1972/3) to prepare an annual plan and report. It had previously managed to produce tables comparing projects in the Plan with approved projects, but this merely indicated progress on procurement of funds not on physical implementation.[2] During 1972 it approached and later prevailed upon ministries to supply the necessary information for an annual plan.[3] The document which was produced indicated progress in the previous year in the major areas of concern, and proposals and projects for the coming year.[4] However, it was completed in December instead of May and the Office decided not to issue it.[5]

Similarly, the CPDO tried to produce a mid-term review of the First Plan. In 1972 it had succeeded in compiling a useful though uncomprehensive report on plan implementation, technical assistance personnel and the execution of British-aided projects.[6] During 1973 the Office made a more thorough attempt: questionnaires were sent to all departments,[7] and again after much coaxing the information was received. The data was processed (mainly by an expatriate on a one-year contract) into a series of papers under the general title of Mid-term review of the Five-Year Plan: these covered subjects such as national accounts, prices, capital formation, savings and credit, policy measures,

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1. For example, Circular savingram, CPDO to all Ministries, CPO/DLV/34 9/2/73. See also discussion of the Budget cycle in Appendix X.
2. Evaluating progress on plan implementation, op.cit., Annex 1.
3. For example, CPDO to Education, CPO/EDUC/1 9/3/72; and CPDO to L.E.C., CPO/DEV/23 8/8/72.
4. See CPDO, Notes on the 1972/73 annual development programme (undated).
5. See Chapter III, 4 b for suggested reasons for this decision.
6. CPDO, Report on progress on plan implementation and expenditure, and approvals on British development aid for 1970/71 (undated).
7. Sen, Development planning ..., op.cit., Appendices 12 and 12A.

trade, agricultural production and a comparison of actual and planned investments.[1] Yet again, however, the Planning Office failed in the final resort to collate these papers into an official document for distribution to the rest of Government.

In these two instances, the Office had set in motion time-consuming undertakings which it had been unable to bring to fruition. This reinforced the view of many of the departments that the Planners were simply wasting their time eliciting information which they lacked the capacity to evaluate or employ for any useful purpose.

With the firm backing of the UNDP, the CPDO did manage to institute review procedures of UN projects and personnel. From the outset, the CPDO based its appeal to the ministries on the UNDP Administrator's responsibility to his Governing Council for the funds entrusted to him, and his consequent determination to be kept informed and maintain the effectiveness of the programme.

> In addition to the tough attitude of Governing Council and the Administrator, Lesotho, as one of the least developed of the developing countries has been selected for an intensive study by UNDP to determine the real bottlenecks to development and how they could be overcome. International attention will thus be focused on Lesotho in the forthcoming annual review.[2]

The first set of reviews consisted of in-depth evaluations of all ongoing projects, and it was carried out by the CPDO, the UNDP and the relevant Government departments. Meetings were based on questionnaires completed by the UN staff and the associated Government staff, and interviews were conducted with the UN personnel, and with all counterparts, heads of departments and PSs associated with each project.[3] Discussion dealt not only with the obstacles experienced in particular projects

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1. See National Accounts 1966-1971, 22/6/73; Prices, 18/6/73; Gross fixed capital formation 1966/67-1970/71, 15/6/73; Savings and credit, 6/6/73; Main policy measures and institutional reforms 1970/73; Trade, 13/7/73; Production targets in agriculture 1969/1970, April 1973; and A comparison of planned and actual investment undertaken by the Lesotho Government 1970/71-1972/73, 19/10/73, compiled by B. Westman.
2. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 17 of 1972, CPDO, CPO/AID/3/1 12/6/72.
3. Kingdom of Lesotho. The 1972 annual review of the country programme proposals for UNDP assistance 1972-1976, August 1972.

and suggested solutions, but more broadly with continuing constraints which emerged and new needs which were identified.[1] With slight alterations in reporting requirements the exercise was repeated in 1973. The form of review varied from a simple round-table discussion to a three-day study, including a visit to the project.

These two experiments were judged to have had a marked effect in promoting implementation of UNDP assistance. All recommendations made in 1972 were checked on in 1973 and with few exceptions were found to have been implemented. These reviews involved Government effectively in the projects, updated the CPDO's knowledge and facilitated the more immediate use of the findings. Further, they encouraged frank and critical discussion, permitted a joint assessment of the performance of projects and allowed for an overall review of the continuing relevance of the UNDP programme.

Also of assistance was the establishment by the British Government of the Southern African Development Division in Blantyre. By timing visits to Lesotho to coincide with reviews of the British capital programme, the Division's personnel enhanced the CPDO's ability to monitor progress on British projects.

Eliciting foreign aid In this period the Planning Office, as also other departments, set out actively to interest new donors in participating in the country' development. As indicated by Table I, this yielded promising results. In addition the CPDO managed to gain acceptance in principle from a number of donors of the concept of programming aid over three-year periods, in place of the ad hoc project-by-project approach in

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1. The reports of UN personnel are of a confidential nature and may not be quoted in detail. It is clear, however, that their most consistent problem was a lack of qualified counterparts. Other problems included, inter alia, lack of office space, being used for the wrong tasks, etc.

practice at the time. Such programmes had reached differing stages of negotiation with Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Norway. In the list of proposals, reference is made to past contacts between recipient and donor, to Lesotho's needs, and to the donor's interests and undertakings in other countries; and the intention is expressed of using points of common interest in the most profitable manner.[1] The preparation of these cooperative programmes (as well as the UNDP country programme) provided the planners with their only real medium-term planning exercises during this period.

Project management Although this phase witnessed some improvement insofar as the output of the Office and the planning machinery grew, yet with the associated increase in the quantity of work, the actual extent of the advance was unsatisfactory. As will be noted in Chapter III, the CPDO came in for a barrage of condemnation for its incompetent management of documents.[2] This is also evidenced by correspondence on the subject: for example, a letter from Agriculture complaining that delay on a project proposal in the CPDO had resulted in the loss of a full irrigation season and 'bitter discouragement' to the intended participants in the scheme;[3] one from Statistics warning that further retardation of a memorandum would defer implementation of a project until the winter months which would disrupt field work and escalate costs;[4] and an appeal from Community Development to the Senior Permanent Secretary to ensure that the CPDO did not continue 'sitting on projects for six months'.[5] One also noted protracted delays in response, consequent upon the absence of the addressee in the Office (usually

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1. For example, Proposals for a Lesotho-Canada cooperative programme, 1973-1976; and Proposals for a Lesotho-Sweden cooperative programme, 31/12/73.
2. See Chapter III, 6.
3. Agriculture to CPDO, AG/PRO/01/11-32 24/2/72.
4. Statistics to CPDO, STAT/FIN/ID 29/8/72.
5. Community Development to Cabinet (SPS), CD/CAB/12 17/10/72.

the Director) , and the subsequent failure to inform him of the correspondence - in one case for four-and-a-half months,[1] in another for eight months.[2] In addition, the failure of the CPDO (even when acting in timely fashion and as required) to keep departments informed of progress on their applications came in for severe criticism.[3]

It was also clear that the Office was not in a position to satisfactorily test most project memoranda, and examples were observed of even simple arithmetical errors being overlooked:[4] on a border-post construction project the memorandum requested R90 000 whereas the capital estimates stipulated R63 000 (the High Commission had to point this out).[5] The US Embassy had, in addition, to bring to the attention of the CPDO that it had submitted more self-help projects than could be accommodated within the amount available,[6] that certain projects which had been approved many months previously had still not commenced,[7] and that in some cases execution of projects was incomplete (for example, the village had failed to roof a self-help school).[8]

While the capacity to utilise more aid, particularly British, increased over these three years, the Planning Office remained unable to elicit, appraise and submit a programme early enough to prevent late approvals and delayed implementation. Thus one continued to see such examples as: a project concerned with an extension to Maseru sewerage submitted to the High Commission with only two weeks left in the financial year;[9] a

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1. CPDO to Statistics, CPO/DEV/2/1 28/8/72.
2. CPDO to Agriculture, CPO/AID/11 19/10/71.
3. E.g. Statistics to CPDO, STAT/EST/5 28/2/74; and CPDO to Statistics, CPO/18/04/7 4/3/74.
4. See also Chapter III, 4 c.
5. See CPDO to Cabinet (DSPS), CPO/DEV/34 13/3/73.
6. US Embassy to CPDO, 4/1/73.
7. US Embassy to Education, 6/3/73.
8. US Embassy to CPDO, 26/10/73.
9. CPDO to Works, CPO/WORKS/52/204 14/3/73.

memorandum on a subordinate court building in Mokhotlong three weeks before the end of the financial year;[1] and the Planning Office still seeking further clarification on an application for a waiver with only ten days to go.[2] Further, despite some improvement in the standard of project preparation following the establishment of Planning Units in some ministries, memoranda and technical assistance requests still arrived at the CPDO lacking even basic information: for example, overlooking provisions for transport, recurrent costs, housing,[3] and collection and use of revenue derived from the project;[4] lacking understanding of the conditions and effects of the British waiver regulations;[5] and repeated failure to explain the lack of counterparts to replace expatriates.[6] Several notices from the Cabinet Office, specifying certain procedures necessary before an expatriate could be applied for, continued to be ignored.[7]

Foreign aid coordination Ministries persisted in evading CPDO regulations on aid negotiations. One illustrative case (about which the donor concerned complained bitterly) occurred when, after a donor mission had visited Lesotho and left guidelines as to its interests, and the CPDO had submitted projects in accordance therewith, a ministry sent off its own list of requests which 'ignored totally the guidelines' of the donor and the Planning Office's projects.[8] During 1972 the CPDO thus felt it necessary to reissue the 1968 circular on foreign aid,[9] while

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1. CPDO to British High Commission, CPO/DEV/34 9/3/73.
2. CPDO to Health, CPO/9/06 20/3/74.
3. CPDO to Interior, CPO/AID/10/1 9/1/73; and CPDO to Works, CPO/AID/2/2/2 14/4/72.
4. CPDO to Agriculture, CPO/AGRIC/IR/1 11/11/71.
5. CPDO to Interior, CPO/DEV/12 17/9/71.
6. CPDO to Works, CPO/17/02 19/3/74 - the Ministry had applied for an expatriate diesel mechanic for a third two-year term.
7. See Cabinet Circular Notice No. 64 of 1973 (Personnel), CAB/REV/COM-244 29/5/73 - Employment of non-citizens in Lesotho.
8. CPDO to Education, CPO/EDU/23 28/12/72.
9. Circular Savingram, CPO/ORG/1 12/3/72.

at the end of 1973 it informed Cabinet that it was still finding it 'difficult to convince aid donors' that it was 'the channel for aid into Lesotho'.[1] It was forced also to remind donors on a number of occasions that aid negotiations should be channelled through it.[2] With few exceptions donors responded positively to these requests, and during the course of the three years came to provide the most effective support for CPDO efforts to operate as the sole channel for aid negotiation.

Working papers The Office produced a number of discussion and working papers: for example, on Cambridge school examination results, local costs of technical assistance, deployment of Lesotho's labour force, distribution of population, infrastructure and facilities, staffing position in the Ministry of Works and development possibilities in the Mokhotlong district.[3] While this indicated that members of the CPDO were willing to initiate research into problems of concern, the papers generally amounted to little more than introductions to their subject matter (intended for further discussion and investigation) which were not in fact pursued. As in the previous period, almost all of them were prepared by expatriates; there was therefore little likelihood of their being followed up. Finally most of them remained internal working documents which were not widely circulated throughout Government; since research of this nature needs not only to be done, but also to be accessible and usable, these efforts by the office did not serve to create an impression of an agency capable of thorough investigation and analysis. On the other hand, the CPDO was usefully involved in some immediately relevant questions such as training priorities, labour-intensive projects, analysis of the effects of the oil crisis, prospects for increased local brickmaking and use of heavy clay

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1. CPDO to Cabinet (SPS), CPO/O/01 27/11/73.
2. CPDO to US Embassy, CPO/AID/10 19/10/71; CPDO to UNDP, CPO/AID/2/2/2 9 3/72.
3. L.S. Cooley, Cambridge school examination results, 1973; L.S. Cooley, The local costs of technical assistance in Lesotho, 1/5/73; L.S. Cooley, The deployment of the labour force in Lesotho 1970, 1973; J. Jenness, Distribution of population and infrastructure in Lesotho, 1972; S. Chidambaran, Staffing position in the Ministry of Works, March 1973; and S. Chidambaran, Economic Development in the Mokhotlong District, 1/4/74.

deposits, and criticism of the national transportation study.[1]

Machinery

CPDO - staff and structure In mid-1971, the Office had a professional staff of six: a Director, a Deputy Director and four Assistant Secretaries. They were soon joined by two Assistant Secretaries and two expatriate rural sociologists (one specifically concerned with the proposed Malibamatso project); thereafter by a Peace Corps volunteer and two more Assistant Secretaries; and later in the period by two UN associate economists, one UN economist and another Assistant Secretary. However, the Office was losing its more experienced staff at roughly the same rate as it was gaining new members. In chronological order, it lost its Deputy Director (promoted to PS, Agriculture, and later to Minister of Agriculture); then a relatively senior officer (to the Foreign Ministry), one sociologist (who moved to Agriculture, once it became clear that the Malibamatso project was not proceeding), the Director (to establish the Lesotho mission to the European Economic Community, and then to join the World Bank), another Deputy Director (promoted to Budget Controller), one UN associate economist (at the end of a one-year contract); the UN economist (who left early because of an unsatisfactory working relationship with the rest of the Office, based on policy differences), and finally the Peace Corps volunteer (at the end of a two-year contract). Moreover, for periods of fifteen months it functioned without two Assistant Secretaries who were studying for higher degrees in the United States. Shortly after their return, and without warning or preparation, these two people were promoted to the positions of Acting Director and Acting Deputy Director.

Furthermore, it soon became clear to the new Acting Director that the internal structure of the Office was 'not conducive to effective action'. In his view it was responsible for rele-

1. Circular Savingram CPO/EDUC/2 25/7/73, 'Top training priorities, 1973-1976'; CPDO to Foreign, CPO/8/07 24/4/74; CPDO to Cabinet (SPS), CPO/120/06 17/12/73 and 6/2/74; CPDO to Commerce, CPO/COM/3 13/2/73; CPDO to Roughton and Partners, CPO/87/05 29/11/73.

gating the local Assistant Secretaries to budgeting and post-office-type functions, while leaving the more challenging work to expatriates. The structure was also partly responsible for the delayed preparation of projects and the absence of proposed corrective measures, and was therefore hindering the attainment of planned objectives.[1] In his opinion the following organizational inadequacies were constraining the Office's effectiveness:

(a) Direction All of the Assistant Secretaries have joined the Office immediately after their junior degrees. Lacking experience, they have needed direction and assistance to undertake the more challenging and critical tasks in planning. The present structure assumes that this direction and assistance will be provided by the Director of Planning. This has proven impossible. The Director has so many responsibilities that he has very little time to advise the Assistant Secretaries on their work.

(b) Delegation of responsibility The present structure has no middle level of professionals; almost all policy matters are centred on the Director. Given the magnitude of these, and other matters that call for his attention, the Director is overworked. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to entrust many of these responsibilities to the Assistant Secretaries as they do not have sufficient experience and their word does not have sufficient weight.

(c) Prospects within the Office Given that there is no middle level, Assistant Secretaries cannot look for promotion within the Office. They have no hope of moving up the ladder like their counterparts in other Ministries and Departments. There is clearly inadequate incentive within the Office to build up a strong spirit of competition and craving for achievement.[2]

To overcome these weaknesses the Office prepared detailed recommendations for Cabinet attention. It was able to back up its proposals with evidence of increased donor interest, and the argument that this would certainly wane were the capacity of the Office not strengthened.

In terms of external structural arrangements, the Office also recommended an alteration. As noted earlier, the CPDO had been placed under Finance in June 1970, despite agreement among

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1. CPDO, Reorganisation of the CPDO, op.cit., p. 1; also see, Re-organization of the CPDO, op.cit.
2. CPDO, Reorganisation of the CPDO, op.cit., p. 3.

the planners that it should remain with the Prime Minister. In December 1971 it returned again to the Prime Minister's Office.[1] Despite the fact that communication between the Director and the Prime Minister did improve considerably (a fact resented by a number of senior civil servants,, the actual channels of communication, and the role of the Senior Permanent Secretary were unclear. Further, when the Director was succeeded by a more junior officer the contact decreased immediately. It was also the opinion of participants that the Office was gaining little in terms of status from its connection with the Prime Minister, who was regarded as too busy to interest himself in the operations of the Office.[2] Thus at the end of 1973 the CPDO, of its own volition, requested to be re-sited under the Ministry of Finance.

Lack of clerical staff continued to hamper its work,[3] and ministries complained bitterly about the maladministration of the Office.[4] The CPDO admitted that 'delays in the Planning Registry could very easily result in retarding vital development work',[5] and requested additional supporting personnel. Accommodation continued to be inadequate. While in the National Assembly buildings, the Office lacked both storage and library space. Ironically, it had no room even to store copies of the First Plan when they arrived, no arrangements for handling their sale.[6] About halfway through this period, the Office was yet again moved to temporary quarters, this time to an old house on Kingsway (the main street), behind which were built a row of temporary rooms. This was an improvement since it provided more offices and space for a small library (which was not utilised).

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1. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 135, 22/12/71, 'Directions for the organization of the CPDO'.
2. See Chapter III, 2 C.
3. See Chapter III, 6.
4. Head 7, Prime Minister, Part II, CPDO, Financial reports and proposals, 1972/73.
5. Head 7, Prime Minister, CPDO, Proposal PM/13, Strengthening of administrative services, Draft estimates, 1973/74.
6. CPDO to Audit, CPO/PLAN/1 15/3/72.

Registry facilities remained cramped, with many current files being stored in the old bathroom and closed files being dumped in a small outhouse.

Planning Units This period did see some progress in the establishment of planning units in the ministries, but with uneven effects.

The Agricultural Planning Unit, which had been operating for some time, was considerably strengthened, principally through the addition of UN-sponsored personnel. A planning-marketing 'team' was established under an FAO Senior Agricultural Economist, consisting in addition of a counterpart for him, one local Assistant Secretary, an Animal Production Adviser, a rural sociologist, a Training Adviser and counterpart, a Land Use Planner, a Crop Marketing Adviser and counterpart, and a Livestock Marketing Adviser and counterpart.[1,+1] The Unit (by far the largest in the Government) made a promising start and for a period functioned more effectively than any other. However, certain defects in structure and differences among the personnel soon eventualised and by early 1974 its planning capacity had been reduced. This will be discussed in detail in the next stage.

In Education, the 'tradition' of a one-man Planning Unit continued (except for a short period when it was served by two). Without supporting staff and on his own the planner was unable to carry out many of his tasks; and he lacked too the seniority to make his views felt. In response to this situation, he put forward a detailed draft proposing the establishment of an education and statistics division. It called for a department consisting of one Chief Planner, three Education Planners, one Education Statistician, one Statistical Officer, one Careers Counselling Officer, four Statistical Clerks and one Copy Typist. In the circumstances this would appear an optimistic expectation, but it does indicate what the lone planner himself felt was required for effective sectoral planning. In the event, the pro-

1. See Kingdom of Lesotho, Country programme proposal for UNDP assistance 1972/1976, August 1971, pp. 21-23; and Working paper for the 1973 annual review of the UNDP country programme in Lesotho, September 1973, p. 10.

posal made no progress, and he was left to work on his own.

In Works, a Unit was established under the Controller of Works Services (an engineer), consisting in addition of an Assistant Secretary and a Higher Executive Officer. Being an engineering/construction-oriented ministry, primary responsibility for project preparation rested with division heads, and the planning role of the Unit was minimal. Its principal function was the collection of information for the preparation of reports on construction progress. By early 1974, it had almost ceased operating: the Controller of Works Services had departed and had not yet been replaced; the Assistant Secretary was undergoing training abroad; and the Higher Executive Officer had been promoted to another ministry.

A Health Planning Unit was established by a Fellow of the Overseas Development Institute, and continued by a second who was joined by a local graduate from the University. While it functioned with two people for most of this period, on the departure of the ODI fellow it was left to the one local planner to carry on. As with the Units in Education and Works, it suffered from lack of standing in the Ministry. In Posts and Telecommunications, a Unit was started by a young local officer. Its progress was however curtailed when he was arrested during the brief political upheaval in the country early in 1974. In Commerce and Industry, a UN Industrial Planner and a local counterpart, with some experience in that Ministry, commenced operations. Finally, in the Prime Minister's Office, a Planning Unit under the Deputy Senior Permanent Secretary (whose responsibilities vis-à-vis the CPDC were unclear) carried a heavy workload which included numerous non-planning tasks.

The period thus saw the planning unit concept introduced in a number of ministries. However, by early 1974 (the end of this period) the Units in Agriculture, Works, Education and Health were weaker than they had been in mid-1973. In general, rela-

tions between these units and the CPDO were irregular, and regarded by planning unit personnel as decidedly unhelpful.[1]

Other components of the machinery

Finance-CPDO For most of the period, relations between these two offices, and between the Budget Controller and Director of Planning, continued to be discordant, despite a meeting specifically called in an attempt to clear up misunderstandings and delineate responsibilities,[2] and an intensive course on budget-planning harmonisation, given by an Economic Commission for Africa adviser.[3] Relations between the heads of the Offices remained unsatisfactory and uncooperative and no one attempted to bring them together. Eventually, after a lengthy period both were transferred. Some improvement resulted from the establishment of a Budget-Planning Working Group at Assistant Secretary (rather than at a senior) level.

The Construction Capacity Committee which failed to begin functioning during the previous period, remained non-operational.

Project Review Committees were not utilised in the ministries, the general view being that informal meetings or meetings which dealt with other matters as well as planning were adequate.

District Development Secretaries These officers showed neither ability nor initiative to undertake any planning responsibilities. The Government made no effort to improve the situation.

The National Planning Consultative Committee remained inoperative.

The Development Operations Committee functioned for a few months into this period.[4] In 1972, however, it was felt that the tasks of this Committee and those of the Budget and Development Plan-

1. See Chapter III, 9.
2. Notes on a meeting between Finance and Planning officials held on 10/11/72, FIN/ORG/C.11 13/11/72.
3. I.A. Malik, Training course in budget-plan harmonization, op.cit.
4. See e.g. DOC, Notes of meeting of 30/8/71, and Progress report No. 25 as at 25/10/71.

ning Committee were overlapping, and that the latter should continue as the overall supervisory committee on budgeting and planning, and the former should cease to exist.[1] The BDPC, under the Chairmanship of the Senior Permanent Secretary and serviced by the Budget-Planning Working Group, thus became the most influential agency responsible for regulating ministerial differences, investigating complain by the CPDO and supporting the CPDO's efforts to coordinate planning and aid negotiation. However, it did not meet regularly enough to evolve into an effective part of the planning machinery. Towards the end of the period, however, it showed signs of increasing its efficacy.

Town and Country Planning (discussed in more detail elsewhere)[2] did not make significant headway, and by the end of the period its professional staff was effectively reduced to one volunteer.

Visible results

In addition to the noticeable increase in donor interest in Lesotho (for example by Germany, Canada, the United States, the African Development Bank and the Scandinavian countries), a number of feasibility and engineering studies and mineral and other surveys were completed during this period; for example, on air transport, telecommunications, diamonds, coal, water power, irrigation, sewerage, livestock, tourism, small industries, and roads.[3] These studies were of assistance both in increasing knowledge about the country and its potential, and in providing the detailed backup information essential to project requests to donors. As a senior member in Works remarked:

> We in this department have been in a bad position in that we have no money for investigations at all. To get an engineering project off the ground you must have

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1. Notes on meeting between Finance and Planning officials, op.cit.
2. See Chapter III, 9.
3. See B.W. Taylor, Report on development assistance 1973, Lesotho, UNDP, May 1974, p. 1; and, for example, Government of Lesotho, Ministry of Works, Water and Sewerage Branch, Report on Maseru sewerage scheme, Brian Colqhoun and Partners under assignment to ODA, February 1974; and Lesotho transportation study, Draft final report, Roughton and Partners, February 1974.

> an engineering report which can cost 1 per cent of the project. So the first thing is to find a donor for the report... Till now our projects have not been convincingly investigated. Once a report is in, however, a project memorandum is a very small job because the justi_cation is in the report.[+]

Further, scepticism about the Planning Office and its various activities began to diminish as certain relatively impressive projects became operational: the pilot agricultural project at Leribe was being transformed into the far larger Khomokhoana River catchment project, and the Thaba Bosiu Rural Development Project had commenced its work, as had the Senqu River Project in the south. Other examples were the Lesotho Bank, the Woodlot project, science laboratories for secondary schools, the construction of a number of roads, extension to Masera sewerage, district headquarters water supplies, expansion of the Agricultural College, police quarters, Maseru airport runway, border posts and housing.

According to the evidence available, these and numerous small projects were not having any noticeably positive effect on the country's economy. Yet they were creating confidence among civil servants that the planning machinery could produce results. The satisfaction which can be gained from an administrative exercise actually leading to an administrative output, irrespective of the broader impact on society, indicates the divide which exists between the bureaucratic milieu and the realities of the economy. This will be further illustrated in Chapter IV, and elaborated on in Chapter V.

A notable aspect of this period is the extent to which the CPDO came to rely on foreign support to overcome ministerial resistance. Ministries remained uncooperative about progress reporting systems and foreign aid procedures. The planners lacked the power to ensure compliance, and the capacity to encourage cooperation through helpful responses. It further lacked the available data to help it justify decisions, evaluate alternatives or measure progress. And the politicians still did not come to their rescue.

In this predicament, the CPDO turned to foreign aid agencies for backing. By contrast with its own unsuccessful attempts to initiate progress reporting procedures, or draw up an annual economic report, it was able with UNDP support, to carry out effectively reviews of UNDP personnel, and with British cooperation, to improve reporting on British projects. The preparation of three-to five-year cooperative programmes with donors enabled the Office to elicit some ministerial interest in medium-term planning. Only because of donor support was it able to enforce increasing ministerial support for its foreign aid procedures. To strengthen its case for improved statistics, it relied on arguments based on foreign criticisms of the Lesotho Government's lack of information, and the increased aid which would flow from a more convincing information base.[1] Lastly, in putting forward its case for an increase in planning staff and a new structure, it pointed to the growth in donor interest in Lesotho, and the urgent need to prevent this being wasted.

6. APRIL 1974 TO JUNE 1975 : STRENGTHENING OF THE CPDO AND THE SECOND PLAN

Machinery

CPDO Because of markedly increased government revenues - a consequence primarily of the combined effects of the operation of the new Customs Union agreement and of the greater earnings of migrant workers (see Chapter IV, 4 D and Table V for a further explanation), and encouraged by the number of foreign agencies willing to supply assistance to Lesotho, the Cabinet responded positively to the Planning Office's proposals for a staff increase. It also agreed to pay the costs of partitioning and fitting out the top floor of the new Lesotho Bank building in order to accommodate the larger staff of the Office. Thus for the first time the CPDO was able to position its personnel in

1. Cabinet Circular Notice No. 71 of 1972, The first annual review of the UNDP country programme for Lesotho (10th and 11th August 1972), CPO/AID/3/1 12/6/72; and CPDO to Cabinet (SPS), CPO/STATS/1 9/5/72.

terms of its internal structural divisions.

The reorganization (aimed at overcoming the defects listed in the previous section) entailed the creation of five new posts: three Senior Planning Officers, one Planning Officer (Assistant Secretary) and one Higher Executive Officer. This allowed for a total professional establishment of thirteen: a Director, a Deputy Director, three Senior Planning Officers and eight Planning Officers. The additional Higher Executive Officer was included to strengthen the administrative cadre and take over some of the routine work on technical assistance personnel from the Planning Officers. These additional posts involved an increase of over R22 000 per annum in the recurrent budget of the Office.

The responsibilities of the Office were allocated to four departments:


(i) Financial resources and economic cooperation This was to act as the CPDO division principally responsible for identifying and corresponding and negotiating with donors, bilateral and multilateral, as well as dealing with other departments of the Ministry of Finance and questions of internal capital resources.

(ii) Natural resources and community development This division was responsible for dealing with the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing, as also the Department of Community and Rural Development.

(iii) Industrial resources and economic infrastructure This section of the Office covered Commerce and Industry, Mines, Tourism, Posts and Telecommunications, physical planning, and the divisions of the Ministry of Works, chiefly roads, water, sewerage, mechanical and buildings.

(iv) Human resources and government services Human resources covered Health and Education as well as manpower planning, while government services dealt with a host of departments including Statistics, Police, Prisons, Aliens Office, Broadcasting, Information, Local Government, Justice and Interior.

The new structure could be represented as follows:



++ SPO - Senior Planning Officer
+ PO - Planning Officer

In addition to a larger staff and a more appropriate division of responsibility, the principal advantage of this new arrangement was seen to be the inclusion of Senior Planning Officers who provided the Office for the first time with a middle level of professional staff. This meant that intermediately placed between the Director and the Planning Officers (who are frequently junior and inexperienced) are officers with some experience and post-graduate training, able to assist with in-service training of less senior members of the staff and relieve the Director of at least some decision-making responsibilities. The post also provided an additional rung in terms of career advancement within the Office. The establishment of a separate division of the Office to deal with all donors assisted aid negotiations, since the previous system (with different divisions handling different donors) had led to confusion and imperfect preparation.

Some difficulty arose because of the heavy and diverse demands on the Deputy Director. The above structure required her to fill three roles: to substitute for the Director who was frequently absent for lengthy periods (when she too was required to accompany various missions abroad); to serve as Senior Planning Officer for one division; and to supervise the supporting administrative services. It was thus decided to appoint an additional Senior Planning Officer and so relieve the Deputy Director of responsibility for a division.


The Office employed five new Planning Officers and one new Senior Planning Officer, who transferred to CPDO from the Agricultural Planning Unit; and thereafter a further Senior Planning Officer originally from Botswana. It also increased its expatriate contingent considerably with two Overseas Development Institute Fellows, one UNDP Special Adviser (with special responsibility for preparing the Second Plan), an ILO adviser (with special responsibility for manpower planning) and later a World Bank economist to strengthen the Office's capacity to prepare major projects. During this period the Office had up to twenty professional officers (twelve local and eight expatriate). During the last six months, however, it lost its Deputy Director (promoted to PS in another ministry) and one Senior Planning Officer (who joined LNDC), while one Planning Officer was seconded to the Agricultural Planning Unit. Shortly after the period, it lost its Director (appointed Deputy Director of LNDC). While the general rate of turnover was not as alarming as in previous years (and the Office was able to boast four or five members with approximately four years experience) the loss of its three most experienced officers was a considerable setback. For, in addition, it should be re-emphasised that the expatriates were moving in and out of the Office on one- and two-year contracts.

The CPDO was also strengthened by the appointment of an experienced Administrative Officer and a Higher Executive Officer who set about improving administrative, clerical and filing practices as well as taking over a share of the routine work from the Planning Officers. Both men, who were beginning to make a useful contribution, were destined to leave after fairly short terms of service. Clerical and typing staff were also increased, although the heavy load involved in preparing the Second Plan proved beyond the Office staff's capacity.


Planning Units The planning units were not included in the changes to the CPDO and during this period they may actually have regressed.

As indicated in the previous section, the most important of these, the Agricultural Planning Unit, suffered a number of

serious reverses and by the end of the period had almost ceased to operate. The first structural problem concerned the relationship between the Senior Agricultural Economist and the Deputy PS. In 1971 the administrative structure of the Ministry of Agriculture could be represented as follows:



In 1972 a UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) adviser on agricultural administration recommended that the Chief Planning and Coordinating Officer be retitled Deputy Permanent Secretary and that he be responsible principally for coordination of implementation, while the Planning Unit should be directly responsible to the PS, as follows:[1]



1. A. McCallum, Organizational and administrative requirements for agricultural development, UN/FAO No. TA 3091, 1972, Appendices 1 and 2.

One of the few proposals of the report put into effect with reasonable despatch was that concerning the new arrangement beween the Planning Unit and Deputy PS. While the general division of activities appeared clear, in practice - particularly on specific projects - the work of the Senior Agricultural Economist at the head of the Planning Unit, and of the Deputy PS, overlapped. The personal difficulties which resulted were exacerbated by the following facts: both men were very senior; one was a local and one an expatriate; neither was required to consult with the other before proceeding to the PS; the PS made little effort to mediate in a deteriorating situation; and divisions on occasion exploited the confusion to use one person when they could not get satisfaction from the other.

The second problem (anticipated by the FAO report)[1] was that the marketing side of the Unit became immersed in executive tasks, at the expense of planning and project preparation. In fact the marketing personnel came to see themselves as a completely separate entity from the Planning Unit. This attitude was indicative of the uncooperative atmosphere developing in the Unit.

The difficulty might be explained formalistically, focusing on the definition of the word 'Team'. In FAO terminology 'Team' has a specific meaning which distinguishes it from a group of FAO individual experts. For example, with a 'Team', a saving on man-months in one section may be utilised elsewhere, while with separate individuals this is not the case. Second, with a 'Team', members are responsible to a 'Team Leader' who in turn is accountable to FAO headquarters in Rome, while individuals are each separately responsible to Rome. Originally, in February 1972, the Ministry applied to FAO for a Team. FAO, however, rejected this as cumbersome and recruited advisers separately to join these and the local officers already at work in Lesotho. Nevertheless the Senior Agricultural Economist saw the group as a Team and himself as Team leader,[+1] as did the

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1. Ibid., p. 16.

CPDO[+1] and the UNDP;[+2] and this is confirmed in the UNDP country programme proposal[1] and in the annual reviews of UN personnel.[2] However, the FAO personnel themselves denied that they were members of a 'Team':

> We are one-man projects, each responsible separately to Rome. There is no team and never has been one. I have never been to a team meeting and we were never briefed as a team.[3]

In addition, they were of the opinion that since the Senior Agricultural Economist was an adviser and not operational, he could not head the Planning Unit. Further, they tended to favour a project-by-project approach, whereas the Senior Agricultural Economist emphasised a longer-term programming approach.

Despite these numerous structural misunderstandings and differences of interpretation, there is no doubt that a cooperative atmosphere on a personal level could have prevented the various disputes. Clearly also, timely and firm intervention by the PS, Agriculture could have overcome the difficulties. As was the case with the Heads of the Planning and Budget Offices in the previous period, this conflict was allowed to linger on, and eventually the Unit ceased to function. The counterpart to the Senior Agricultural Economist resigned and joined the CPDO, while the most productive member of the Unit died. As far as submissions for the Second Plan were concerned, the Agricultural Planning Unit, instead of playing a major role, made no contribution. The divisions of the Ministry and the CPDO itself were forced to do this work.

In the Ministry of Works, the Planning Unit became defunct. As noted in the previous section, one Higher Executive Officer replaced another, but the Assistant Secretary in the Unit (who had recently undergone a year's training abroad) was promoted to Principal Administrative Secretary; thus the new Controller of Works Services found in effect no planning

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1. Kingdom of Lesotho, Country programme proposal for UNDP assistance 1972/1976, op.cit., pp. 22-3.
2. Kingdom of Lesotho, The 1972 annual review of the country programme proposal for the UNDP assistance 1972/76, op.cit., p. 4; Working paper for the 1973 annual review of the UNDP country programme in Lesotho, op.cit., p. 10.

unit to head. In August 1974, an expatriate economist joined the Ministry. After some initial confusion, the roles of the economist, the Principal Administrative Secretary and the Controller of Works Services were satisfactorily defined, and the management of both project and Second Plan submissions from Works showed very noticeable improvement. However, since no counterpart had been appointed to work with the economist, the continuation of this situation was not guaranteed.

In Health, the position continued as in the previous period, with one local officer manning the Planning Unit under unconducive circumstances. In Education, the Planner was promoted to PS, and was replaced by a younger man who in addition to serving as Planner was required also to fill the post of Education Officer for Mathematics teaching. In effect, the Education Planning Unit was thus reduced to about two-thirds of one person.

In the Ministry of Interior, the PS of his own accord requested, argued very strongly for, and established a post for a planning officer. In August 1974, a planner arrived and took over the planning functions from the Principal Administrative Secretary. For various reasons, he felt constrained to leave Government in March 1975,[1] thus leaving the Ministry without a Planning Unit. Since the PS himself was transferred, no immediate effort was made to find a replacement planner.

Other components This period saw no progress in planning in the districts, or with the Construction Capacity Committee, the Project Review Committees (although one or two ministries established small committees to supervise submissions for the Second Plan), the National Planning Consultative Committee (the private sector continuing to remain outside the planning process) or town and country planning (although a British proposal to strengthen physical planning was accepted).

The Budget and Development Planning Committee under the Chairmanship of the Senior Permanent Secretary and with the CPDO's Senior Planning Officer (Financial Resources and Economic Cooperation) acting as Secretary, met more regularly and functioned more effectively than ever before. It was not, however, as yet fulfilling the task of an authoritative agency

able to focus on, identify the factors involved, and specify responsibilities for disputes and defects, and thereafter vigorously pursue the matter. The progress made by mid-1975 may, however, have left some room for optimism, were it not for a number of relatively unpromising factors.

First, it appeared that the Committee was paying too much attention to details (so duplicating the work of the Finance-Planning Working Group) rather than to more important policy matters.[1] Second, while the Committee was under the Senior PS (the most senior civil servant in the PM's Office) its decisions were conveyed to the Minister of Finance by the PS, Finance, who served as an ordinary member of the Committee. There was potential for misunderstanding here, in that the PS, Finance thus had an important post-decision role where he might interpret and comment upon recommendations from Finance's point of view, rather than from that of the Committee as a whole. Further, the Secretary of the Committee was an expatriate and there was once again room for concern that no counterpart was being effectively prepared to replace him.[1] Finally, a few months after the research period, the Senior PS who was judged to be taking increasingly positive interest in the Committee was appointed Acting Vice Chancellor of the National University of Lesotho, and the attitude of his successor to the Committee was still uncertain.

Tasks

Project preparation and capital estimates[2] In March 1974 the Cabinet directed that a budget calendar worked out over the previous year be adopted as part of an official manual on budgetary practices.[3] The stated intention was to tighten

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1. An analogy may be seen here with the Development Operations Committee which functioned effectively while served by an expatriate secretary.
2. See Appendix IX for a fuller discussion on preparation of the budget.
3. Government of Lesotho, Manual of budgetary procedure. 1974.

financial control, improve cost-effectiveness, stress the capital component of the expenditure programme, and facilitate timely project implementation through punctual project and budget preparation.

The Calendar stipulates that a call circular be issued on 21 June, giving the ministries about ten weeks to return their detailed draft estimates. The circular went out five weeks late (this was earlier than the previous year) and left the ministries nine weeks for capital estimates and eleven for recurrent estimates.[1] A common problem was experienced in the ministry headquarters which delayed unnecessarily before forwarding the circulars to the divisions; in one case, Works, the delay was six weeks. The following list indicates the response of the ministries (deadlines were 30 September for capital estimates and 15 October for recurrent estimates):

Ministry	Submission date	Capital estimates - days overdue	Recurrent estimates - days overdue
Agriculture	9/1 /74	86	101
Health	25/11/74	31	46
Education	6/11/74	22	37
Finance	23/10/74	8	23
Commerce and Industry	23/10/74	8	23
Justice	10/1 /75	87	102
Interior	6/1 /75	83	98
PM's Office	11/11/74	27	42
Minister to the PM	19/11/74	35	50
Defence	30/ 9/74	15	30
Foreign	10/ 1/75	87	102
Works	18/11/75	34	49
Communications	8/11/74	24	39
Auditor-General	26/ 9/74	11	26
His Majesty's Office	13/11/74	29	44
Interim National Assembly	23/10/74	39	54
Public Service Commission	23/10/74	39	54 [2]

The worst offenders, Agriculture, Justice, Interior and Foreign had taken about 140 days instead of the 56 days stipulated. In

1. Circular Savingram, Finance to PSs and Heads of Departments, FIN/EXPDT/S.1 (75/76)-2 29/7/74.

2. Finance Circular Notice No. 1 of 1975. FIN/EXPDT/S.1(75/76)-8, Vol. 1, 14/1/75.

General this indicated an extremely unsatisfactory response, particularly since the content of a number of submissions required a considerable time for reworking.

There was also an attempt by the CPDO to set a deadline for the submission of project memoranda. Having projects arrive in good time would give the CPDO and the Budget Office the opportunity to study the documents and the High Commission and the British mission in Blantyre to peruse and approve them before the start of the financial year in which they should be implemented. Having projects arrive well in advance would add greatly to the meaning of the capital budget, which as it stands at present is little more than a contents sheet of projects at every possible phase of preparation and negotiation. Irrespective of British acceptance of the programme, no money may be released by Finance for implementation of British-assisted schemes until the British approve the individual project memoranda.

CPDO thus set a deadline at 30 November for project memoranda and progress reports. The circular warned that if ministries did not respond by then, the Planning Office could not guarantee that their projects would be included, and that a delay would lead inevitably to late release of funds. 'It is no good blaming the Central Planning Office and the Budget Division for the stop-go implementation which results from delays in submission'.[1] Additional incentive for early submission was provided by British officials agreeing to study documents arriving early in the formulation year which would increase the possibility of their being approved by the start of the next year. Only one division of one Ministry, namely Livestock, expressly tried to take advantage of the British offer, while only two Ministries, Works and Education, reacted positively to the deadline. Thus for the first time the Planning Office was able to forward what one British official described as 'large

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1. Circular Savingram, CPDO to PSs, CPO/36/05 24/10/74.

lumps of logical submissions' in the first half of January. Monthly checks with the four sections of the CPDO revealed, however, that after the promising start by a f w ministries, submissions slowed to a trickle. On 1 April 1975 (that is, the first day of the implementation year by which time all projects should ideally have been approved) only sixteen documents of the required fifty-seven (project memoranda or progress reports) had arrived at the High Commission, and not one project had yet received British approval to go ahead.

Preparation of the Second Plan[1] Preparation formally began in May 1974 with a CPDO circular calling on ministries to submit their material for consideration and later inclusion in the Plan. Starting on 1 June, the Planning Office's original work schedule allowed for approximately 42 weeks (till the end of March 1975) to have the documentation finalised and sent off to the printers. From the start work fell behind schedule. Not one ministry actually managed to comply with the first deadline of 31 August for a draft of general material and 'thumbnail sketches' of projects, and Works and Education were the only two to respond reasonably promptly (that is, about two weeks late). Most were ten to twelve weeks late, and Agriculture had still not submitted three and a half months after the deadline. At each stage preparation fell further behind; ultimately the plan came out twelve months late - June 1976 instead of June 1975.

From the outset it was clear that the planners had left the start of the exercise too late, and in consequence had allowed too little time. At the early stages too, they failed to provide any useful guidance about the intended content of the Plan and direction of development. A planning unit officer complained:

> They gave us some guidance about format but not about substance - nothing about what the CPDO would like to

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1. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Appendix X.

> sce in the Plan - that is a wicked evasion of responsibility.[+1]

The Planning Office had obviously erred in overestimating the material available for ready use by departments, as also their capacity to use what they had for plan preparation. Its evaluation of the state of progress in the ministries had been buoyed up by a number of large projects already under way or at an advanced stage of negotiation, and by the availability of a number of reports and studies by advisers and consultants. It underestimated the numerous areas which were un- or ill-prepared, and overlooked the fact that in some ministries planning capacity was so weak that they were hard put to translate the studies into sectoral projects and plans.

A further factor in which the CPDO's confidence proved misplaced was the contribution of the planning units. The section on Machinery (above) showed that planning unit capacity actually diminished at the very time when an expansion in its output was most needed. One planning adviser whose evaluation of the plan preparation was generally favourable, conceded that these units were 'essentially quite weak. It is only with great difficulty that the CPO has been able to get contributions from them for the plan'.[+2] Interior's one-man Unit existed only from August 1974 to February 1975, and the person concerned said that he did not, and had not been in a position to 'prepare any submission for the Plan'.[+3] In Education, the planner was promoted to PS and succeeded in November 1974 by a man who held another post simultaneously. Not only could he not devote his full attention to planning but he admitted that having arrived at that stage, he lacked the background to participate effectively in the formulation of his Ministry's programme.[+4] An expatriate adviser to another division of the Ministry undertook a considerable share of responsibility for the Education submissions. In Health the Planning Unit, while generally kept in contact with the proceedings, was neither centrally involved in nor fully consulted on the Ministry's drafts or negotiations with the Planning Office. The most serious disappointment was the performance of the Agricul-

tural Planning Unit from which much had been anticipated, and which in the event made a meagre contribution to the Plan. Tragically, the Livestock planner who had been particularly productive, died, and with his death the tenuousness of agricultural planning was exposed. For lengthy periods, no communication on the Plan was forthcoming from this Planning Unit and the arrival of documents from the divisions of the Ministry bypassed the Unit.

On the more positive side, the Works Planning Unit operated effectively and linked up well with both the Planning Office and the divisions. While there were material differences of opinion between the Unit in Commerce and Industry and the CPDO, that Unit did bear the brunt of its Ministry's work on the Plan. Finally, the Unit in the Cabinet complex, with responsibility not only for its divisions but also for public service buildings, enacted a wide array of Plan preparation tasks. On occasions, however, the Unit's non-planning duties were felt by the Planning Office to be postponing progress on the drafting and negotiating of the Plan documents themselves.

In addition to the weak contribution of the planning units, the other divisions of ministries did not cooperate as readily as the CPDO had hoped. They were reluctant to devote time to physical progress questionnaires, from which information was needed for the Plan; they delayed in the appointment of contact men, people with whom the CPDO could communicate directly whenever necessary; and their submissions were generally very late. The continual turnover of senior level officers and their frequent visits abroad slowed down progress further. 'In most cases, no arrangements for a fully briefed senior official to follow up work on the Plan was made' and as a result 'nobody would touch anything on the Plan with policy implications during the absence of the head concerned'.[1] Such turnover of staff and absence of senior members applied equally to the CPDO itself.

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1. CPDO, Report on progress on the preparation of the second plan, 17/12/74.

The Planning Office did not succeed in effectively involving the district authorities in the exercise. Aware of the criticism that the districts had been totally ignored in preparing the First Plan, the Office organized a tour (accompanied by representatives of LNDC and Interior) during 1974 to meet DAs and District Development Committees. The officers reported that the meetings were useful, while the DAs were encouraged by the interest shown. In accordance with the CPDO's suggestion, over the next two months the Districts submitted their list of proposals for the Plan. In addition, the Interior Planning Unit compiled a report containing the requests of the Districts, mainly concerned with abattoirs, cooperatives, dams, schools, clinics, water supplies, tourism, roads and bridges, which it sent to the CPDO.[1] Having made a promising start, however, the Office found itself too busy to follow up. A promised round of further meetings was first postponed and eventually not held, while the documents submitted by the Office did not receive serious attention. One DA said: 'The CPO once came last year to ask our advice on the Second Plan - we have no idea what happened to these ideas and have not heard from them again',[+1] while Interior got no reaction from the CPDO on its report.[+2]

Despite the faults in the CPDO's management and the obstacles which it confronted in the preparation of the Second Plan, those few officials who could recall the preparation of the First Plan felt that there had been substantial improvement.

> Preparation is much better this time. There is a definite idea that the Plan is being prepared. This time we have been asked questions in plenty of time by [our ministry] and we have given our answer ... and [the Planning Unit] has come back with a series of questions. There have been two meetings at headquarters ... The thing has been handled in a logical way. This Plan is going to be a lot more logical than the last and a lot more use.[+3]

The Planning Office was also complimented on its efficient organization of a donor conference, held in Maseru in April 1975, which was timed to coincide with a fairly advanced stage of

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1. Ministry of Interior, Planning Unit, Report on proposals for the second five-year development plan obtained from district tour, August 1974.

Plan formulation. The interaction between donors' representatives and the recipient ministries and departments was regarded by both as extremely useful.

> The meeting with the donors was a good step. We are able to understand how donors see projects and how best to present projects.+1

It is important, further, to appreciate that the undertaking was a far more ambitious one than was the First Plan - and not only in terms of total capital expenditure. This time the CPDO aimed to avoid one of the principal weaknesses of the 1970-75 Plan, namely the lack of specific projects to back up objectives and targets. The Second Plan was thus conceived as two volumes, the first to include general analyses and statements of policies, objectives and targets, and the second the outlines of all the projects with their approximate costings. Thus it was generally recognised that the content of this document would be superior to that of the First Plan.

Other tasks

The reviews of UNDP personnel and projects, discussed in the last section, continued according to similar procedures and with advantageous and applicable consequences.

In 1973 the CPDO had indicated to a visiting British mission that it wished to institute review procedures of British personnel. In October 1974 (after an initial negative response) the Planning Office was advised that the British were willing to cooperate on an experimental basis. In November of that year five British advisers were selected and their work evaluated.[1] It was uncertain whether this would be repeated or expanded.

The marked improvement in the Office's efficiency will be noted in Chapter III. In addition to opinions gained in interviews, this was attested to by fewer apologies in outgoing correspondence for delays and loss of documents, and fewer accusa-

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1. See CPDO to Cabinet (SPS), CPO/15/01 6/12/74.

tory letters coming in from departments.

Because of pressure of work involved in producing the Second Plan, few working papers were produced. There was, however, evidence of the Office analysing and critically commenting upon reports; for example, on the airport feasibility study[1] and on the proposals for a development studies curriculum.[2] Moreover, it was taking the initiative in suggesting and coordinating discussion on new project proposals such as small-scale production of simple agricultural machinery[3] and a local building materials industry.[4]

Difficulties concerning foreign aid procedures continued to manifest themselves: for example, students on fellowships being transferred from one institution to another without the CPDO or the sponsoring agency being notified;[5] ministries requesting technical assistance personnel and capital assistance for projects direct from donors without informing the Planning Office;[6] and donors occasionally not complying with the procedures.[7] Serious breakdowns in communication also occurred between CPDO and Agriculture concerning the Thaba Tseka Mountain Development Project and the abattoir scheme, with the Ministry - impatient at continuing delays - taking initiatives without consulting the Planning Office.[+1] In comparison with previous periods, however, the ministries were noticeably more cooperative about channelling aid through the CPDO.

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1. CPDO to UNDP, CPO/4/08 6/1/75.
2. CPDO to Education, CPO/77/01 3/1/75.
3. CPDO to Thaba Bosiu, Leribe and Senqu Projects, CPO/75/05 23/1/75.
4. CPDO to Cabinet, Works, Commerce, CPO/35/05 10/1/75.
5. CPDO to Cabinet (Training), CPO/28/03-347 29/11/74.
6. CPDO to UNDP, CPO/18/04/1 5/12/74.
7. CPDO to UNDP, CPO/18/04/3 26/11/74.

The Planning Office with twenty professional officers and a sizable supporting staff accommodated in a spacious and comfortable suite of offices, had come a long way since three planners, working out of cramped and temporary headquarters, launched it in 1967. The significance of this change will be assessed in the final Chapter, but a few closing remarks to this Chapter are required.

Despite the continuation of resistances and rivalries, the CPDO clearly had made headway in strengthening its own position and gaining greater acceptance of its role in the civil service. To a large extent this was a function of time, of increased availability of local graduates and of growth in Government revenues. The nature of the civil service too had altered since 1967, particularly insofar as the average age of its senior officers was lower than it had been, and more of them had received a university education. Having risen through a civil service of which planning was a part, they resented it less and were less suspicious of it. Also, the older officials who had remained on had gradually, if reluctantly, come to accept its presence.

The growth in the Government's recurrent budget allowed for a large increase in the staff of the CPDO (professional, administrative, clerical) at the very time when it needed this most urgently to handle the burgeoning responsibilities of aid negotiation. The enlarged professional staff, expatriate and local, furnished it with a greater concentration of expertise, so boosting its influence, particularly vis-à-vis the Budget Office.

Essential to its strengthened position was the steadily more consistent backing which it received from donors. It was their insistence which forced departments to concede the necessity of negotiating foreign assistance through the CPDO, and of cooperating to a limited extent with review procedures. The rising number of external agencies and governments willing to give larger quantities of aid to Lesotho raised the prestige of

the Office. Donors also assisted through a readiness to supply the CPDO and the planning units with advisers.

The CPDO in turn 'compromised' with the demands for efficiency and reliability made on it by the rest of the civil service. Its early disregard for bureaucratic procedures, which resulted in such serious condemnation of its work, gave way to a realisation that it would have to become more efficient, and operate as a conventional division, if it hoped to get some cooperation from the ministries. The nature of the change in the CPDO relates to size and efficiency, rather than to resourcefulness or capacity for innovation.

In comparison with the early years of its existence it had become a markedly more efficient organization handling a far more complex donor programme. In its first year, for example, funds for development (excluding the tarring of the main north-south road financed by a soft loan from the International Development Agency) totalled R1,85 m., of which R1,6 m. was British. Britain also completely dominated the technical assistance and fellowships programme. By 1975/6 (as can be seen from Table I) in terms of capital aid, both budgetary and directly funded, planners were handling approximately thirty countries and agencies, while negotiations on advisers and fellowships involved a further twenty countries and agencies. The capital budget for that year stood at R24,8 m. - although not all of it would be spent.

In terms of initiating and administering the various tasks of planning, the planning machinery made advances, but these were limited to those concerned with the procurement of foreign assistance (which the Lesotho Government viewed as of vital importance). As has emerged from the description of the last period in this Chapter, even in these tasks its own management and the responses which it received, left considerable room for improvement. Here again the character of any advances observed, and of any responses to chronic weaknesses or obstacles, indicated an attitude of 'more of the same' rather than an

TABLE I : SOURCES OF REVENUE 1975/76

(a) Sources of Capital Account Revenue (i.e. through the Budget)

British development grant	5 200 000+
Danish International Development Association Loan	300 000
Canadian International Development Agency	418 423
Swedish International Development Agency	263 000
USA-Ambassadors Fund	25 000
Republic of Korea	30 000
Iran	650 000
IDA - Thaba Bosiu Project	1 015 000
IDA - Training for Self-Reliance	1 120 000
SA Wool Board	12 000
SA Mohair Board	10 000
Oxfam	50 000
Unitarian Service Commission of Canada	72 000
Domestic resources	6 882 180
Maize Levy Fund	219 200
To be funded	200 000
	16 475 703

(b) Directly funded Projects

Swedish International Development Agency	495 000
USAID	969 000
Federal Republic of Germany	300 000
Danish International Development Association	560 000
Canadian International Development Agency	200 000
UNDP	592 000
UN Capital Development Fund	631 000
UNICEF	10 000
International Labour Organization[1]	50 000
World Food Programme[2]	2 341 000
UN Family Planning Association	92 000
African Development Fund	100 000
Anglo American Corporation	81 200
Goldfields Inc.	250 000
International University Extension Foundation[3]	70 000
World University Service	394 666
Catholic Relief Service[4]	1 100 000
Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere	8 000
	8 344 866
+ (a)	16 475 703
	24 820 569

Key: + Including 25% slippage allowance
1. In conjunction with Norwegian Agency for International Development
2. In conjunction with the Save the Children Fund
3. In conjunction with the International Extension College
4. Utilizing food donated by USA through PS 480.

Source: Estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the Kingdom of Lesotho for the year 1st April 1975 to 31st March 1976, Part 2, Capital Account.

ability to adapt or initiate any novel procedures which might be more effective.

Further, the CPDO made no advance in extending planning activities beyond the capital to the district headquarters, let alone further. It made meagre progress in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of projects and plans, and the impact of decisions, policies and programmes on the country and its people. Finally (as will be discussed in Chapter V) its potential influence on and relevance to central policy-making remained uncertain.

CHAPTER III : PARTICIPATORS' PERSPECTIVES : VIEWS OF ADMINISTRATORS AND PLANNERS

1. INTRODUCTION
2. POWER (FOR THE CPDO)
3. RESISTANCE (FROM THE MINISTRIES)
4. COMPLAINTS (BY MINISTRIES) AND RESPONSES (BY THE CPDO)
5. CONFLICT (WITH THE BUDGET OFFICE)
6. INEFFICIENCY (IN THE CPDO)
7. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING (BY THE CPDO)
8. 'FINGER-POINTING' (E.G. WORKS)
9. WE (CPDO) AND THEY (PLANNING UNITS AND TOWN PLANNING)
10. CONCLUSION

CHAPTER III PARTICIPATORS' PERSPECTIVES : VIEWS OF ADMINISTRATORS AND PLANNERS

1. INTRODUCTION

By varying the method of research and presentation, but retaining the focus (on the planning machinery), this Chapter seeks to provide further insights into the nature of the Lesotho bureaucracy. It is based on interviews and discussions with ninety persons working in and with the Lesotho Government. Almost all of them were senior civil servants, closely involved in the work of planning, about one-third of whom were part of the CPDO or ministerial planning units. Included too are the views of some resident aid officials whose work was related to planning. In recording these opinions, setting them off against one another, and commenting upon them, the intention is to indicate the participators' views on their own and their colleagues' problems and possible solutions to them. By quoting them, both the tone of the discussion and the working atmosphere which prevailed inside the offices of the Lesotho Government, are evoked.

The perceptions of these se[illegible]fici.ls are regarded as essential to an understanding o[illegible]peration of the planning process in the ministries. Negati.e view[illegible] held by one agency of another, however unjustified, off the ma[illegible]or even contradictory they may appear to the latter, constitute obstacles to cooperation and communication as dysfunctional as any more 'soundly based' criticisms. And from a wider perspective, as Robinson and Gallagher have observed (in seeking to explain 'the official mind' of imperialism), although the 'official idea' and the 'African reality' were worlds apart, it was the

idea and not the realities which moved the decision-makers to act or not to act.[1]

Certain characteristics of bureaucratic approaches and responses emerge from the individual topics raised here; yet, a few general features require introductory comment.

In a small civil service, possibly even more than in a large one, personal antagonism - which is not infrequent - can seriously distort evaluation by one official of another's work and proposals. Thus criticism was sometimes disguised by referring to 'such and such office' when 'so and so' was meant. Some of the officials were probably using the opportunity of an interview to get a variety of complaints off their chests. Yet, after listening to and participating informally in discussions over a fairly long period, it was clear that there was no discrepancy between discussion among the civil servants themselves, and those responses recorded here.

Many people interviewed were aggressive and unsympathetic towards the personnel of other departments (and their work). They were ready to criticise and downgrade others: this was observed so regularly that it should be seen as a broadly practised bureaucratic strategy - by diminishing others one builds oneself.

There was a minimum of effort made to show understanding for, or patience with, the difficulties experienced by other departments, while reasons were always available to defend or explain the deficiencies of one's own. In this regard a fairly regular pattern of response to administrative accusations was noted: quite often, some fault is admitted; then the accusing party and a variety of third parties are blamed for at least some part of the problem; further, it is explained that

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1. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians. The official mind of imperialism, 1961, p. 21.

such difficulties (or misunderstandings) arise from the nature of the agency's work; despite this, some improvements are disclosed; and the agency's particular personnel problems are listed by way of excusing deficient performance. All departments do appear to suffer to some extent from staff problems, and the failings of an official's own department are usually attributed to shortage of staff, lack of qualified staff, turnover of personnel, absence of the departmental head, etc. Other departments, however, are perceived as - to a notably greater degree - depersonalised institutions; as such, the impertence of their staff problems is discounted.

A readiness to defend one's own and criticise other departments represents that commonly observed bureaucratic phenomenon: namely, a primary commitment to the subunit, rather than to the organization as a whole. Thus, a participant's evaluation of planning would depend to an important extent on whether or not he was part of the planning machinery. One may compare this with Weidner's observation of inter-agency competition in India and Pakistan for control of the community development programme: as administrators moved from ministry to ministry so 'their views on where community development fits move[d] with them'.[1] One officer who shifted three times between 1969 and 1971 made the following divergent comments about the preparation of the First Plan: while he served in the CPDO, 'The approach was to allow ministries to submit individual plans which were then welded into the Plan with modifications and adjustments - after consultation with the ministries.' After he joined a ministry, 'The CPDO attempted to change what I submitted ... My submissions were watered down to such an extent that I could no longer see any connection between the Plan's programmes and my ministry's programmes.' Following a further transfer to another ministry, just after the publication of the Plan, 'I altered the plans of my ministry [so that] by and large they had no relation to the Plan and were totally ahead of the Plan'.[+1]

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1. Weidner, op.cit., p. 214.

A further feature was the almost total immersion of expatriate advisers in the inter-agency conflicts. As individuals they were temporary, but as a phenomenon the expatriate presence was a continuous and expanding one. Part of the reason for their importation is to boost the expertise, the prestige and influence of their departments, and they are therefore soon thrown into the fray. They participated fully in the competition, backing up complaints and charges against others, and defending their own departments. Their interests were not as comprehensively tied to these agencies as were those of the local officers; thus, at a different level - an expatriate and aid agency level - they criticised their local counterparts and colleagues and the support services provided by the Lesotho Government. Clearly, many of these criticisms were valid, but they also served to demonstrate the obstacles confronting the expatriate, to provide security against failure, and to enhance the significance of any successes. The general nature of the foreign contribution to the discussion added to its rather aggressive and negative texture.

2. POWER (FOR THE CPDO)

It is a basic tenet of much of the literature on planning that a cpo should be given firm political and administrative backing if it is to have any chance of making headway. A title, as Central Planning and Development Office, and the terms of reference normally given such an office, tend to have an apparent similarity to governmental declarations of commitment to planning and development. Thus planners tend to see themselves as central to government interest and vital to nation-building. They therefore set out in anticipation that the expected support will be forthcoming.

Other ministries, however - both central ministries such as Finance and the implementing ministries - are wary of any moves which extend the control of the planners. They are concerned with their own autonomy and their freedom to compete for

resources, local and foreign. An influential planning office might introduce new criteria for selection of projects of which they disapprove (openly or covertly), or new procedures which they do not fully understand; interfere with established routines; and become an arbiter in the competition for new resources and project . Thus as planners attempt to secure bases of support, they are closely observed by the rest of the civil service.

Three examples of the way the Lesotho CPDO tried to strengthen its position are noted here.

A. Political support The planners argued that they needed more political support: this had to be substantive, visible and consistent, not merely token.[1] In their view this was not forthcoming. One example of this lack was seen in the decision to place and maintain the Director of Planning at a lower status level than the Permanent Secretaries.[2]

> The head of the Planning Office has always been junior to the PSs, whose efforts in certain areas he is supposed to be coordinating - that makes for a built-in structural conflict and indicates lack of support for the Office quite clearly.[3]

Further indications were said to be the CPDO's exclusion from the selection of planning unit personnel, and the complete disregard for its recommendations on district development secretaries. A planning officer gave another example:

> What does happen now and then is that a Cabinet minister will address a pitso and promise the people a project when we have not secured the money for it - and then we have to beg for it.[4]

In consequence, the Office lacked the 'muscle' to elicit compliance with its requests to departments and was therefore seriously hindered in executing its tasks.[5]

> CPO is in a peculiar position because sometimes we don't have influence and sometimes we do and we don't always know where we are or what our impact will be.[+1]

Possibly the most serious disruptions in the work of the planners resulted from politicians requiring 'quick projects' to take abroad and present to potential donors.

> These are drawn, but are not well based because of the time factor. Also they tend to be small unimpressive projects [which] don't go down well and experts find criticisms and then there are delays and projects have to be reprepared ...[+2]
>
> ... politicians make us prepare projects in a very short time ... it is very embarassing and you can't do a good job of that because the collection of data and information and preparation and consultation take time. So we do it begrudgingly and not very well.[+3]

An extreme example of this sort was observed after the world oil crisis when Lesotho hastily mounted two aid missions, one to Libya and one to Iran.

> When those projects went off ... the whole planning process broke down. That was the big boys playing stupid games and there was nothing we could do about that. Everybody got gold in their eyes and started thinking money would flow like oil. Some bizarre things went off ... and of course they came back again... That was an exceptional period in which the whole structure got so overburdened with desire that everything collapsed.[+4]

In a process described as 'completely chaotic' projects were prepared without research, proper justification or consultation;[+5] the Ministry of Works knew nothing about their content, nor did the Budget Office nor Town Planning.[+6]

On the other hand, the ministries wanted to contain it. It was argued that had the CPDO performed better it would have earned and received more backing but it 'had made too many blunders'.[+7] Some agreed that the link between political leaders and planners should be closer than it was, but less to strengthen the CPDO than to discipline and control it.[+8] For a short period when direct contact was established between the Prime Minister and

the Director of Planning, a number of PSs are said to have objected.[+1]

It was also pointed out that in the political leaders' view the harvesting of increased aid was a vital method of contributing to the country's welfare. They therefore had no choice but to take advantage of opportunities as they arose. If the planning machinery was producing projects systematically - as it should do - there would be a stock from which Ministers could draw without causing a periodic flurry of unproductive activity.

B. Staff The CPDO argued that if one combined the attributes of numbers, qualifications and experience, then it was understaffed. This was particularly the case if it was expected to undertake a larger programme and send some members for further training.[+2]

There were mixed views on this. As ministries learned that donors were going to force them to go through the Planning Office, some came to see advantages in a larger Office. Others voiced doubts. 'Claims to be understaffed generally indicate that the work being produced is unsatisfactory or that it might be trying to do work they were not intended to'.[+3]

One of the rare attemots to relate staff size to some broader external requirements was made, inside the Planning Office itself, by a senior expatriate (a man much older than the rest of the staff, who attempted to plan on a more long-term and more comprehensive basis than they; eventually he became totally isolated and left after one year). In his view the staff was excess ve:

> If one compares the size of the CPO with certain relevant factors it is in fact too big. Ten local professionals and four expatriates are provided for. A capital development programme of R3-4 million per annum does not warrant that staff, nor does a recurrent budget of R10-R12 million ... Also for a population of one million and a small geographical area the CPO is overstaffed. With the staff that exists performance could be more effective and comprehensive.[+4]

C. Location As has been noted in Chapter II, the CPDO moved from the Prime Minister's Office to Finance and back on a number of occasions. In April 1974 it moved from the Prime Minister to Finance, a decision that was preceded by considerable discussion both inside and outside the Planning Office. Inside the Office, concern centred on finding a location which would give it more influence and therefore increase its effectiveness. Outsiders were more interested in a location which would improve coordination between the CPDO and Finance, so reducing delays and confusion.

Amongst the planners themselves, the following doubts about the CPDO joining Finance were very much in the minority:

> I am not sure about the authority of the CPO being strengthened because obviously the PM wields more influence. The reason for being under the Prime Minister was that we could report directly to him and he would be in a position to give directives. We needed the extra authority because we were aware that other ministries were criticising us for our youth and lack of experience.+1

> I think that if Planning went under the Ministry of Finance it will get swamped by short-term Ministry of Finance work and lose a good deal of the independence it has now by being directly under a PS, rather than having quasi-independence under the Senior PS and having access actually to the PM ... Planning should be as close to wherever policy [-making] is as possible, and with the PM it is closer than it would be with the Minister of Finance. It would aggravate the tendency toward one-year thinking, one-year planning and budgeting.+2

Most of them argued, however (and their view was confirmed by others), that they were gaining little additional authority from their formal link with the Prime Minister.

> The Prime Minister is too busy to take an active interest in the CPDO and therefore the advantage of being under him is hypothetical only.+3

> It is all very well for the Planning Office to be under the PM but they can't go round to him every five minutes or to the Senior Permanent Secretary or Cabinet. In theory, letters from CPO should have the weight of a letter from the PM but in fact people look at who signed it.+4

Civil servants outside the Planning Office tended to agree that the CPDO should be moved to Finance, but for different reasons. One official pointed out that the reason why the planners left Finance in 1971 was because the Minister was 'too firm' for them - he did not 'accept any monkey business'. So they joined the Prime Minister's Office where, because of his heavy workload, they could 'get away with more'. He thought it would be better for them to return to the Minister of Finance - a new man, but also firm and trained in economics.[+1] Another view held that since the major constraint on absorptive capacity was the recurrent budget (a widely held but not necessarily correct idea), the Budget Office and the Planning Office needed as a matter of urgency to coordinate their activities more effectively.[+2] A foreign adviser, in supporting this, pointed out that while the CPDO had agreed to his working in Lesotho, the Budget Office had not been informed: 'When I came here there was no house, no office, no counterpart and no allowance to buy a ballpoint pen'. He continued that, in his view, a closer relationship would assist both agencies:

> CPO should be in the same department as the Budget Office ... budget preparation involves all ministries, and this could be a starting point for coordination. The budget people tend to be fiscalist - and see everything in money terms only. By putting planning in with them, it would force them to think more broadly in economic terms and force cooperation between the two and coordination of the ministries. Further, because the CPO would then have budget control they would [also] have some control over plan implementation.[+3]

3. RESISTANCE (FROM THE MINISTRIES)

In their efforts to retain as much room for manoeuvre as possible, the ministries not only watched the CPDO carefully, but also used an assortment of means to slow down the spread of CPDO control and of planning procedures. They had at their disposal the influence of their ministers, the rank, experience and ability of their permanent secretaries and heads of divisions, and their technical expertise (of soil scientists, civil

engineers, etc.) One reason why resistances of this type can be sustained in a bureaucracy is that the 'communications system among the oldtimers is so subtle and effective that newcomers [in this case the planners] who are attempting to manipulate the organization ultimately feel that they are fencing with shadow men'.[1]

A different kind of response, but one with similar effects, stems from a lack of planning ability among officials called on to participate in planning tasks. Unable to carry out the new requirements, or finding them burdensome on top of their better established tasks, they engage in 'retreatism'; that is, confronted with a new and 'overdemanding situation' they choose to reduce their involvement.[2]

At the outset then, ministries resisted any expanding role for the CPDO, for which various reasons were given: they were 'very unkeen to surrender to the discipline of an outside body like the CPO';[+1] they did 'not understand the role of the CPDO nor did they know how to reconcile their own role with this new unit';[+2] or

> ... a number of people in the ministries feel threatened because they are not as capable; plus they don't want people poaching on their terrain... Also people not only think the CPO staff are bright, but they feel the CPO staff think themselves bright.[+3]

A. Foreign aid It was felt by the departments that the CPDO would merely be 'another channel to go through'.[+4] Thus despite a Circular on Foreign Aid negotiation signed by the Prime Minister, they bypassed the Planning Office whenever possible, arguing that this was essential to prevent unnecessary delay.

> Our experience taught us that if we follow that strictly we shall never get anything at all ... Every time I go overseas I talk to people and this is how we have

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1. Crozier, op.cit., p. 199.
2. M.A. Dimock, Bureaucracy self-examined, in Merton et al., op.cit., p. 403.

> managed to get the little progress we have. I ignore Planning, Foreign Affairs and everybody and go ahead.[+1]

Donors confirmed that departments were still ready to short-circuit the system, and would take advantage of any 'slips' by donors. However, donors were making it more difficult by insisting that negotiations had to be channelled through Planning, and this fact was being accepted.[+2]

B. Progress reporting Further (as was apparent in Chapter II), departments were uncooperative about any regular information or progress reporting procedures. The CPDO saw the problem in the following way:

> Whenever we go and ask for additional data and information they think that the Planning Office's main task is to collect some unwanted information; they keep saying: "Why do you come along and keep disturbing us for all this information, and what are you going to make of it?" This is mainly because they are used to routine sort of work - they don't feel like doing something new which is coming from Planning Office... But how seriously we need the data, they don't really know.[+3]

> People have just got too much other work and so they leave progress reporting till last, regarding it as a low priority... As a result any function of taking corrective action by CPO is weak because we don't have the information to take such action.
>
> I have had no success in getting progress reports. If you have to send a savingram requesting information they don't reply. If you phone and say you are coming to get it, when you get there they tell you they haven't got it. They look at you as if they wonder whether you think they have got nothing better to do than prepare information for the CPO.[+4]

In the Ministry of Agriculture, the Planning Unit made a concerted effort at one stage to elicit regular monthly reports from all divisions which it then sent to the CPDO. Ultimately, however, it felt that the resistance building up against the practice was detracting from its own acceptability in the Ministry and hindering its other tasks; so it gave up the practice - which resulted in an immediate improvement in relations with the rest of the ministry:

> Ultimately we decided to stop because it was a hopeless exercise and in turn it made the Planning Unit very unpopular. After we had sent a progress report /to CPDO/ stating all the problems in the implementation of projects, nothing used to happen. So when we got back to the divisions the following month and ask what are the problems - as you enter the door they say: 'What do you want? Progress reports? The problems are the same as before'. So it was not good public relations for the Planning Unit.[+1]

In most ministries there was no concerted attempt to improve progress reporting. Yet those that experimented (and those that did not used the same argument) claimed to judge it a waste of time and effort as long as there was no advantageous or useful response. The member of the Agricultural Planning Unit quoted above went on to note:

> CPO didn't react in the way of remedial action ... CPO did nothing ... we felt they just threw /them/ into the wastepaper basket ... when we stopped they did not ask until a donor agency would ask for information.[+2]

The idea that the Planning Office paid no attention to the reports was corroborated by another planning unit officer who did submit reports for a period:

> I used to do it but stopped: there appears no need, and no-one asks about it. I used to prepare reports every month because it was said 'the Cabinet needed it'. Nobody has bothered for a year to ask for a report and it appeared - as it does with other cases - that one was doing a lot of work which no-one ever looked at. No-one cares about progress reports.[+3]

A third planning unit complained that even in those cases (such as British projects) where some review of progress took place, the CPDO still failed to react or advise or assist.[+4]

A planning officer admitted that there was a weakness on both sides:

> Neither Planning nor the ministries have ever had the ability to develop adequate reporting systems that could be used for office evaluation; and over and beyond that nobody has gone into deep evaluation of projects... A reporting system can pay off but it takes a lot of work on everybody's part and these reports have to be used to make the world a little better, to make it worthwhile.[+5]

C. Planning Units Finally, by way of example of resistance, early reaction in the ministries to the establishment of planning units was unfavourable, even hostile. They saw these new units as an extension of an Office of which they were wary, and of a system with which they were not yet comfortable. Suspicion of the CPDO led a number of civil servants to conclude that it was trying to extend its empire by 'putting its own boys in the ministries'.[+1] Some more experienced officials were unable to see how it would fit in with established structures,[+2] and it was felt that the Planning Office should have gone to more trouble to explain the role of the planning units, and their intended relationships with the ministries and the CPDO.[+3] Then, in a few cases, insufficient effort was made to relate the terms of reference of these units to established departments and posts, causing some confusion in both Agriculture[+4] and Works.[+5] And finally, the element of mistrust of 'foreign' disciplines led professional people such as engineers and medical doctors to doubt the advantages of the economist's presence and perspective.

> I don't believe that an economist is necessarily the right planner. In fact I hold the opposite view. It is alright for him to work out the technical details and costing, but wrong for him to make decisions about priorities... They can never understand the machinations of our particular profession, and as a result they make errors.[+6]
>
> Professional people who understand the technical engineering side must be responsible for planning, coordination and implementation of jobs; for example, the costing, engineering, feasibility studies of a road project or water project could only be dealt with by professionals... There is no need for a Planning Unit here at all.[+7]

From the economist's side in turn one received this type of comment:

> Doctors are not planning kind of people. Professionally they deal with patients on a one to one basis and they are used to situations where they get the best that is around for each patient and don't see that as taking away from other patients. They are not used to statistical magnitudes, or to thinking ahead.[+8]

With the gradual decrease in hostility towards the Planning Office, suspicion of the planning units was said to be on the wane,[+1] and an example was given of one ministry of its own initiative requesting the establishment of such a unit.[+2] The PS in the ministry concerned explained:

> Unless this ministry gets a young graduate with a background in economics who works very closely with the CPO and is professionally responsible to me, I cannot get this ministry moving. We must have an economist. In order to do this I have done away with another post in the ministry.[+3]

It was clear that the PS was frustrated at the inability of his personnel to draw up project memoranda acceptable to the CPDO and donors. In spite of this example, and of a lessening of suspicion, in general the attitude of ministries was not positive. This became clear on a few occasions when the CPDO offered to second its own personnel to ministries who clearly needed assistance.[+4]

It follows from the general attitude which prevailed that once they were accepted officially, the planning units would face considerable obstacles in establishing themselves firmly in the ministries, in carrying out the tasks they were given and in getting other divisions to cooperate in these tasks. According to Waterston, a planning unit is 'essentially a microcosm' of a central planning agency, its relations with the divisions and with the head of the organization being fundamentally similar to and raising the same problems as the central planning agency's relations with operating ministries and the national political authority.[1] In Lesotho, such similarities were observed: in the obstacles faced, in the views held by (and of) the planning units, and in the claim of the planning unit personnel to urgently require more recognition and power than they were being given.

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1. Waterston, op.cit., p. 565.

> Planning units are not working as intended... They have low importance and status within their ministries because the ministries don't really accept them.+1

> The ministry doesn't take the planning unit as seriously as it should. They appreciate that it is there because they could not cope - in particular the Principal Administrative Secretary could not cope and so it was a relief to him. But the ministry doesn't give it much attention and they won't go to great trouble to find a successor to me... I didn't have any clerical help. I don't think they understand its role.+2

In the Ministry of Education, the low status of the Assistant Secretary (Planning) was seen as a long-term obstacle to improving ministerial planning. In order of standing the most important person is the PS; he is followed by the Principal Assistant Secretary (dealing with Finance); well below them are Education Officers, including one responsible for planning; and below them is the Assistant Secretary in the Planning Unit.

> The position of Assistant Secretary has no future and pays badly. So there is no hope of keeping a young man for long... The person responsible for planning must be given greater status. This would improve the decision-making process because at the moment he is junior and his decisions are subject to change by a number of senior people... This would also provide an incentive for those under him in the Planning Unit.+3

In the second half of 1974 a senior official in one of the branches of Works said that he had 'never found the Planning Unit' in the Ministry:

> We prepare our own projects right here - we send them to the Controller of Works Services who deals with them and sends them on to CPO, Finance, etc. I don't know of the existence of a Planning Unit in the ministry ... I never came into contact with it either in planning or preparing projects.+4

When questioned further he answered that he did know the people concerned but was unaware that they were playing any planning role whatever. About this time the Unit disintegrated and was replaced by an expatriate adviser, who called himself simply 'Economist, Ministry of Works'. Asked why he did not refer to himself as a Planning Unit (since there were others consisting

of only one person) he replied:

> I don't call it a Planning Unit because it does not work like one... A serious problem is that I am in an advisory capacity [and] there should be a local counterpart whom I can advise and who has executive responsibility. The Planning Unit has no Secretary and no Assistant Secretary... For a Ministry that spends more government money than any other, it appears that Works needs a Planning Unit...[+1]

Agriculture provided the only example of a ministry where a planning unit took hold and functioned as such. 'It took on', according to a member of the CPDO, 'because there a whole team got funded all at once - and so you had a real entity'.[+2] For reasons already discussed in Chapter II, the 'team' did not fulfil expectations and eventually regressed considerably in capacity and influence. One view was that because of its desire to 'get moving and get involved' so as to overcome the resentment of heads of divisions 'it took on too much':

> ... the divisions then expected too much of it, and were throwing things at it which did not belong within the planning machinery ... [so] ultimately we found that it was the Planning Unit doing everything and achieving nothing - it was not concentrating on actual planning.[+3]

4. COMPLAINTS (BY MINISTRIES) AND RESPONSES (BY CPDO)

A general evaluation of the Planning Office, particularly before April 1974, was that it was very weak, although only two people went so far as to suggest that it be 'scrapped altogether'.[+4] It was variously described as a 'bottleneck',[+5] a 'begging office',[+6] a 'post office', and an inefficient one at that,[+7] as a 'problem in the way of development',[+8] as 'lethargic',[+9] as 'dealing with everything and nothing',[+10] and as 'just waffling and not getting down to things'.[+11] There were a few people who found it of 'great assistance',[+12] and felt that the ministries would not cope with aid negotiations without the support of Planning;[+13] but in general comments were critical. There was some change in attitude after April 1974.

One extremely common criticism of the Planning Office concerned the youth and inexperience of its personnel, who were referred to as 'a kindergarten',[+1] 'small boys',[+2] 'children',[+3] and 'the kids on Kingsway'.[+4]

> The youth and the image of young-smart-qualified of the CPDO caused a lot of resentment. Middle-aged civil servants did not want someone else like [X] coming in and saying do this and do that. Often they would rather fill in the project memorandum badly than go and ask the CPO how to do it.[+5]
>
> ... you have a generation gap. CPO is staffed almost entirely with very young bright upstart college graduates and I think that people in the ministries - just because in Basotho society elders are held in great respect - cannot take these people seriously no matter what their qualifications.[+6]

Others were more concerned with the linked problem of inexperience, which they said resulted in the CPDO lacking any 'broad understanding of the administration',[+7] getting 'the wrong end of the stick' in misinterpreting issues and problems,[+8] and lacking confidence to take decisions and give final answers.[+9]

The Planning Office acknowledged the problem and the consequent resentment, but maintained that there was nothing that could be done about it so long as young people were qualified and older people were not.[+10] The situation was aggravated by the continuous promotion of its more experienced members to posts elsewhere in government, thus perpetuating the youth-inexperience element. On the other hand, the number of younger qualified people being appointed as PSs in government increased, so diminishing the age gap to some extent.

In the aspects of planning looked at in this section, the pattern of accusation and response suggested in the introduction to this Chapter, is repeated in a number of instances.

A. <u>Lack of planning</u> Anyone who thinks in terms of comprehensive, long-term planning would obviously find an almost total lack of it in Lesotho. Most senior civil servants and advisers were realistic about the sort of partial planning which could be achieved. Yet even on these limited terms, they complained

that the Office was not planning ahead, and was thus offering no guidance at all as to where they should be going.

> Since I have been here, I don't remember anything as far as planning is concerned.[+1]
>
> Planning is not producing a plan once every five years...[+2]
>
> CPO don't pass on any forward thinking to us.[+3]
>
> CPO don't assist us with future thinking.[+4]
>
> We are still living from hand to mouth - just when an idea comes up - e.g. an irrigation project we all flock there, we do the thing and see to it that ultimately funds are made available for its implementation, and then another idea crops up, e.g. wool washing - we flock to it. But in fact there is no planning.[+5]

Some people responsible for planning in the ministries felt that the CPDO, by devoting all of its time to project memoranda and not to planning ahead, was merely duplicating their work.[+6] Certainly, during the period of preparing the Second Plan, more forward thinking and efforts to programme projects were present, but here too the CPDO came in for criticism. For example, ministries felt that they had no idea of what resources would be available: 'the sky is the limit... This is eyewash, not policy and we would waste our time drawing up plans, designs, costing it etc. We did not get guiding parameters.'[+7] Another person said in this connection that CPDO had evaded its responsibility: 'The general attitude in the CPO is to ask others to plan for them ...'[+8]

Linked to the criticism of lack of forward planning was the suggestion that the CPDO offered little guidance or leadership:

> There is no stock of projects, and no direction to the projects.[+9]
>
> We are too undirected. We still tend to talk too much as separate entities instead of part of a national development plan. There should rather be a common approach.[+10]
>
> Another syndrome in Lesotho ... is they will take anything if it doesn't cost them any money, no matter

> how it relates to what is going on or what the needs are or what the cost will be in years to come... In these cases the CPO has not taken the lead but has acted as a mere rubber stamp for what comes from the ministries.[+1]

> It is terribly important that there be some focus - else with limited funds we run into the predicament where we are doing a little bit of everything all the time and it does not work.[+2]

A further almost universal and continuing comment on the CPDO was that its coordinative and informative functions appeared inoperative. A planning officer admitted that the Office often failed to tell 'the right hand what the left hand is doing'.[+3] Examples were given in the ministries where the planning units carried out this role in place of the CPDO.

> There is no coordination role ... our Planning Unit did the coordination - we brought the CPO in when necessary... We used to contact other planning units directly on our own when we thought it was useful or necessary as this was not done by CPO.[+4]

In another case, a number of elements were left out of a project memorandum, and the ministry bypassed the CPDO and called all the relevant people together to discuss it: 'If left to the CPO it would never have got anywhere'.[+5] This resulted on occasions in confusion over certain projects which were submitted, forgotten about, appeared under a new name, under a different ministry without people knowing where it came from or got to.[+6]

These comments provide an illustration of the contradictory nature of some criticism made about and pressures put on the planners. While some civil servants said they wanted them to take the initiative and lead, others preferred them to remain in the background and not interfere. Moreover, many of those who encouraged a more positive role, baulked at the idea of raising the Office's status and authority so as to enable it to exact compliance with its procedures. Yet others who expected it to carry out functions more actively and effectively, for example, to improve its coordinative function, were obviously unenthusiastic about being coordinated by it and

losing their room for manoeuvre.

In response to the above criticisms, the CPDO admitted a total lack of perspective planning and weaknesses in medium-term planning, but refused to accept that no planning took place at all. On the contrary, it argued that proceeding incrementally and realistically they were steadily improving in this task, giving as an example the cooperative, medium-term programmes it was structuring with donors.[+1] Further, it pointed out that in view of lack of capacity in the ministries, the idea that the CPDO could leave project preparation to them alone, while concentrating on longer-term planning, was unrealistic.

B. Annual Plans The lack of annual plans and annual economic reports was seen as further evidence that the CPDO was unable either to direct the course of development or keep track of what progress was being made.

> All we have is one document for five years. Reality gets further and further away from what is envisaged in the Plan.[+2]

During the course of 1972 one attempt was made at drawing up an annual plan, which went so far as a pre-final draft; but it was never issued. A member of the CPDO described the exercise:

> We produced one annual plan for 1972/73 but it came out in December instead of May. Its purpose was to clarify the capital estimates, explain what had been achieved in the previous year, what problems had been encountered, how much was spent, and then plan for the coming financial year. But it was late and not published.
>
> When we started working on it in March-April, we did not have all the relevant materials concerning projects. We had to go out and get information on past performance and it was very difficult. The next year would have been easier because government agencies would have known it was becoming practice and they would have kept records accordingly. I don't know why, but the issuing of that first [annual] plan was discouraged. The next year not a mention was made of producing another one.[+3]

Another planning officer suggested that one reason for its non-appearance (in addition to being so late as to have lost much of its usefulness) was that progress in terms of Plan objectives

had been very modest. The production of the document could at that stage have had a negative effect on morale:

> You want to be able to build on and do something better the next time round; but there is an inherent problem that you may hurt people at the same time.[+1]

CPDO also pointed out that it had not had the manpower to carry out this task systematically, nor had it been able to set up the information-collection procedures which would have facilitated its successful preparation. Members of the Office admitted that much was being lost as a consequence.

> ... you should stay on top. If you find one of the priorities you set was either unreasonable or wrong, then you should switch ... We have never published anything which said this is the way we think ... it should be going... It's a mistake to allow [new projects, new developments, changes] to go on outside the Plan. It would be much better to revise the Plan and incorporate these things periodically.[+2]

> A lot is lost in terms of consistency and discipline and helping to see what it is that is most felicitous to do next. It would have been worth the effort, but there was not enough manpower.[+3]

Most members of the CPDO would not accept, however, that this meant that the Office was totally at a loss on the state of project implementation. They mentioned the capital budget, the quarterly review of British projects and review of UNDP personnel as examples of 'fairly effective' methods of 'keeping the pieces together'.[+4] There was considerable difference of opinion among the planners, however, on the role of the capital budget as a substitute for an annual plan. One view held that it served to keep the

> ... coming year under reasonable control, not only from a financial point of view but from an intellectual point of view too. There is a great deal of ancillary work that has to be done with [its] preparation... [It] imposes more than just a framework or scaffolding upon which you can hang whatever you are going to do... It does assist with planning the year ahead as it does say what is going to be done.[+5]

The other view found it unsatisfactory as a substitute:

> The problem is that /it/ tends to be in terms of expenditure and not ... of physical targets... You run the risk of never thinking in substantive terms, and about refocusing and redirecting things.+1
>
> /It is/ just a list of projects which do not tell you anything - just titles /of projects/ - just a table of contents. They don't help much and are no substitute for producing an annual plan.+2

C. Project preparation and appraisal The preparation, appraisal and negotiation of project memoranda is the principal function of the planning process in Lesotho. Again, ministries were dissatisfied with the quality of the CPDO performance in this sphere. When questioned on whether they felt that the CPDO was 'testing' or 'challenging' the memoranda they submitted in any meaningful way, there were some qualifiedly favourable responses:

> They do test projects, mainly from the financial aspect. Technically one can't expect them to, because of the broad field covered by one person.+3
>
> They do make suggestions at the management and administrative level, which is the level of their competence.+4

In general, however, comments were less favourable:

> I prepared two projects for construction in the most appalling positions - fortunately the one got lost, but the other we have money for. It's in a very thinly populated, remote, inaccessible spot; some Chief was quite keen. The PS okayed it and CPO never queried the site. They just accepted it and passed it on. There was no road of any description and it was on the wrong side of a major river. CPO never asked what the basis of the decision was, nor for population figures, distance from other clinics, none of which had been explained.+5
>
> As far as I can see there is no questioning, pertinent or inane, either about specific projects or economic details or, obviously, on technical details or on the package as a whole ... there is no question of the C.O being a body really testing or challenging my work. I have a feeling that they don't even look at it properly.+6
>
> Meaningful appraisal is done by the UK team in Blantyre. They come up with the cogent and relevant questions that ... make you question yourself. These are the weighty questions and they are very valuable.+7

One person pointed out that it would save 'considerable time and disappointment' if the CPDO could identify weaknesses at an early stage, rather than awaiting replies and questions from the British.[+1] Another said that the natural consequence of this was that 'the requirements of the British ... guided him in project preparation, not [those of] the CPO'.[+2] A related allegation was that the CPDO was not correlating projects, either the package of projects from one ministry, or those of different ministries: 'In this regard it is acting more as a Post Office than a Planning Office'.[+3] It was also suggested that it was not harmonising projects with the availability of trained manpower:

> Lesotho is getting involved in too many projects; and its trained manpower in not increasing fast enough. One project is taking workers from another and this means expatriates can never be withdrawn, or if they are, supervision is going to break down.[+4]

It was confirmed by a field officer on a major agricultural project that the work was being impeded by lack of anticipated local personnel,[+5] as by the Ministry of Agriculture which found new projects draining its own staff.[+6]

The senior expatriate member of the CPDO who ended his contract early (see above) strongly criticised the standard of project preparation in the Office:

> There is no such thing really in Lesotho. Project preparation is taken only to a very early stage - one could describe it as project-pre-preparation ... [it] is not properly or fully evaluated, and this causes much delay later. The foreign donors then send out an expert who investigates one step further - a pre-feasibility ... a few months later a team of experts will come out ... it might even require a further team... A main role is budgeting and this duplicates the role of the Ministry of Finance... We should appraise projects not budget them.[+7]

Others in the Office listed obstacles to improving this aspect of the Office's work: continuing lack of data and information, inadequate preparation in the ministries, no alternative projects from which to choose,[+8] and the need continually to submit to donor interests:

> Lesotho Government has been in a position much more of a passive reactor than of active agent ... we have adjusted ourselves to the donor's procedures, mainly because we did not have procedures, and that led to terrible confusion.[+1]

However, the Planning Office felt that its capacity to prepare projects had improved considerably, as had its ability to relate projects and programmes. It was felt that the cooperative programmes drawn up with some bilateral donors, the country programme negotiated with UNDP and the preparing of the Second Plan provided evidence of this.[+2] They also felt that their approach to project preparation and planning was a realistic one in Lesotho's circumstances. 'Planners should begin with the present, locate projects and work towards preparing a good, sound 'battery' of projects and then attempt to evolve a strategy out of what appears to be feasible. 'To sit there and say we are going to have an X per cent rate of growth for the next five years' and try to plan on that basis would be 'just hot air'. 'We are in a sense building from the bottom up. That is the correct approach to planning at this stage. Build from the possible up, rather than from the ideal down.'[+3]

> In the case of a country as poor and small and underdeveloped as Lesotho, a CPO should ... work on the preparation of plans which should inherently be very flexible ... Flexibility is essential in a country in which there is as little known about what is going on as there is in Lesotho - you are working in the absence of fact. So if you start rather empirically - as you should do - with a project approach, as you develop more facts it becomes more clear where you can make investments that seem sensible.[+4]

5. CONFLICT (WITH THE BUDGET OFFICE)

As indicated in Chapter I, conflict between a central planning office and a budget office has been a regular feature of the administration of new, underdeveloped countries. Green described the planners as 'optimistic' and the treasury as 'cautious'; Lewis used the terms 'expansionary' and 'restrictive'; while Dasgupta des-

cribed the treasury as normally an 'old established organization with extensive powers' while the cpo is 'invariably a new body, lacking authority and established bureaucracy'.[1]

The conflict differs from that between a cpo and implementing ministries, in that here both are central agencies claiming a national rather than a sectoral perspective, both possess some economic and financial expertise, and their activities are meant to dovetail and be mutually advantageous (for example, on plans and budgets, on the capital and recurrent costs of projects, etc.) Yet the different roles they are required to perform leads them to divergent, often opposing, approaches to the use of resources.

As observed in Chapter II, relations between Lesotho's CPDO and Budget Office did prove extremely problematic. The level of animosity reached such a peak that for a number of years the heads of the two Offices were not on speaking terms.

The Budget Office's concern with raising local revenues, with controlling recurrent expenditure and balancing the budget led to a subunit ideology of 'solvency': 'above all', the Budget Controller remarked, 'the Government has to remain solvent'.[1] The CPDO had the task of attracting and facilitating the spending of foreign money, with the purpose of accelerating the implementation of new projects. Its declared purpose was 'development', which in practice was equatable with 'expenditure'. Thus on the question of, say, recurrent costs of projects which had to be borne locally, the two Offices conflicted rather than cooperated. Furthermore, the Budget Office's task of controlling expenditure required substantial attention to and respect for routines, procedures and forms. The CPDO, particularly in its early years, saw this as an obstacle to implementation and progress.

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1. R.H. Green, Some problems of national development planning and foreign financing, in S.P. Schatz (ed.), South of the Sahara. Development in African economies, 1972, p. 244; W.A. Lewis, Development planning. The essentials of economic policy, 1966, p.244; and Dasgupta et al., op.cit., p. 240.

Differences were accentuated by an initial power differential. The Finance Ministry was well established by independence; it was staffed by senior and experienced officers; its procedures were fairly broadly understood; and its control over expenditure gave it a formidable lever of power. The CPDO with its younger, inexperienced staff, tried, without any comparable leverage, to introduce procedures which were not understood and were resented. The differences resulted in negative stereotypes: the Planners saw the Budgeters as old-fashioned, tight-fisted and rigid, while the latter saw the former as inexperienced, irresponsible and inefficient.

This situation was aggravated in the beginning by opposing attitudes towards the use of British advisers: the PS, Finance, the Budget Controller and a number of other senior officers in Finance were British; the CPDO members resented British influence and excluded it as far as possible. This was particularly relevant because of British dominance of the donor programme, the budgetary nature of negotiations between Britain and Lesotho and the history of financial arrangements between the two countries. A British official commented that 'for some peculiar reason, Finance seems to be responsible for British aid and the CPDO for other aid'. He suggested that the probable historic cause was that originally British money was used for recurrent expenditure and formed part of the budget.[+1] A CPDO officer confirmed that the role of the CPDO was 'much stronger in every other kind of aid than British aid':

> The reason for that is these other sources have developed largely since the CPDO has come into being. British aid dates back considerably longer. So there were channels of activity for British aid, both recurrent and capital, which relied much more heavily on the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet. That confuses the issue. The general working procedures tend to be different with the British estimates.[+2]

There were also continual accusations that each was encroaching on the other's terrain:

> The two offices were pulling in different directions, they were duplicating services, asking for the same information, requesting ideas on the same things ...

> On the substitution of projects [for the British grant] CPO should take the initiative but in some cases it does ... and in some cases Budget Office does.+1

> There is some duplication of activities. We are supposed to avoid it, but it is partly due to staff changes and partly it is very difficult not to. Especially in the review of development projects Budget Office finds the CPO might be late especially concerning the British development grant where quarterly reviews are required. So Budget Office sends its officials to get them, and CPO also sends officials ... [also] the Budget Office needed to know the state of progress as it has a bearing on recurrent costs.+2

This situation, sometimes of overlap, sometimes of non-communication, sometimes of one Office filling in for the other, caused considerable confusion among government departments. For example, a member of a planning unit complained:

> At one time we were very confused because we knew our role was to prepare the project without consulting Budget Office - it was assumed that it was the responsibility of the CPO to negotiate the recurrent side with the Budget Office. When we found out that things were not working out that way, we unilaterally approached the Budget Office to get their assurance that recurrent money would be available.+3

Relations between the two Offices eased somewhat during the course of 1973 and 1974, because the heads of each were eventually transferred and because one person, working in both, was acting as an effective link. This was a very tenuous arrangement, however, since it was in danger of breaking down when that individual, an expatriate, left.

Budget Office personnel, after the establishment of more cordial ties, gave examples of the difficulties still being experienced with Planning. One person said that although he was receiving copies of about fifty per cent of projects, this was not proving useful 'since the project memoranda were weak and did not give sufficiently accurate information on which recurrent implications could be based'.+4 Another officer complained that the memoranda were often submitted too late, after they had already been submitted to Cabinet or even to the donor, or sometimes only when Finance was required to release funds.+5

On this particular issue, the Budget Office had earlier drawn up a format which required its signature before a memorandum was forwarded. The CPDO later drew up another, omitting this requirement and enabling it to proceed without consulting Finance - a rather simple technique of reducing procedural steps and Finance's influence. Another example concerned technical assistance personnel:

> Terms of reference are also changed while they are out here and [we] are not informed. So an expert who is advisory becomes operational and more money is then required by Government. This can become very embarrassing.[+1]

Briefly, it may be noted that quite serious difficulties, also of a competitive nature, were experienced with the other major central agency, the Cabinet Office. An organizational problem revolving around the planning role of the Deputy Senior Permanent Secretary (also a senior British citizen), complicated ties between these two Offices and perturbed some departments. On the one hand this official substantially outranked the Director of Planning, while on the other he was also head of the Cabinet Office Planning Unit and was required to submit projects falling under his sphere of responsibility for CPDO approval.

> Cabinet has a double-hatted role. On the one hand there are a number of executive departments in the Prime Minister's complex and the Senior Permanent Secretary and the DSPS are responsible for these. On the other hand the Cabinet Office has the role of being liaison to the Council of Ministers and consequently being primus inter pares ... It was unclear at one stage whether the DSPS, doing something called 'Cabinet planning', was planning Cabinet's own projects which means Food Aid Programme, Broadcasting, Tourism, etc., ... or whether he was Cabinet's attempt to do overall planning for the various ministries in which case he was clearly duplicating the role of the CPO.[+2]

The lines of demarcation were contorted further by the special responsibility of the DSPS for government housing and building programmes. Since Works lacked the capacity to construct all building projects each year, the DSPS and Works had in practice determined the priorities, which was a significant planning

function. Further, some smaller ministries, such as Justice, whose planning was limited to building a few courts, worked through him. For reasons which were not clear, he was also responsible for dealing with one donor outside of the normal CPDO procedures, namely the Unitarian Service Commission of Canada. As with Finance, his role was expanded on occasions when he felt it necessary to step in and carry out odd tasks on which CPDO was delaying.[+1]

6. INEFFICIENCY (IN THE CPDO)

A stress on conformity and reliability which transforms an adherence to rules from a means to an end is a long-observed characteristic of bureaucratic organizations. Merton wrote about the 'familiar process of displacement of goals whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal value' and Crozier about 'ritualism' characterised by an emphasis on institutional means at the expense of overall goals.[1] Others argue, however, that this is one aspect of the negative bureaucratic stereotype and should not be uncritically applied: it occurs to a greater extent in some bureaucratic organizations, to a lesser extent in others, and the causes differ. For example, Blau points in one case study to insecurity rather than strong habituation as the main cause.[2]

While taking account of this warning, it is interesting to note that the particular weakness of the CPDO which generated most anger among Lesotho's senior civil servants - eliciting possibly the harshest remarks - related to the Office's inefficiency and tardy maintenance of documents. Efficiency in government administration is important: too much attention to procedures may divert attention from objectives, but failure to

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1. Merton, op.cit., p. 356; Crozier, op.cit., p. 198.
2. P.M. Blau, The dynamics of bureaucracy. A study of interpersonal relations in two government agencies, 1963, pp. 231-49; and J.A. Vieg, Bureaucracy - fact and fiction, in F.M. Marx (ed.), Elements of public administration, 1959, pp. 49-65.

follow procedures or keep records may equally hinder the attainment of the same objectives. Yet while over- and under-conformity may have similar impact, it seemed that the average official was more comfortable in the presence of the former. Thus the failure of the CPDO to comply with routines and its continual mislaying of documents were the cause of great frustration.

Further, efficiency assumes additional significance in the evaluation of departmental performance because it is an area of concern about which most administrators have sufficient 'expertise' to be able to make an assessment. In a civil service as small as Lesotho's, persons with technical competence operated in very small groups, if not alone. There was no large body of officials qualified to judge the professional proficiency of civil engineers or veterinary surgeons. For most civil servants too, a planner's ability to analyse the costs and benefits of projects, was beyond their level of competence. Thus efficiency becomes a common denominator for evaluation.

In these circumstances Lesotho's CPDO, initially a very small, fluidly organized agency consisting primarily of young local officers anxious 'to get the country moving', set out to plan with a minimum of paper work.[1] Not surprisingly, it failed. It had no way of storing, recording or retrieving papers, and was soon completely swamped by documents and correspondence which poured in, and by the criticisms of its poor organization.

> The Director [of Planning] thinks he can carry Planning's filing system in his briefcase.+1
>
> I think their filing system is to dump everything in the backyard that comes through the front door.+2
>
> Typical of what happens is: we'll write to them two or three times to find out the status of negotiations and get no reply, and then one day they'll phone us and ask what is happening. So we don't know if they even get the letters or if they read them because they don't acknowledge them, and then when they make contact it is as if they didn't read them.+3

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1. The negative response to Selwyn's suggestions about keeping minutes of meetings was mentioned in Chapter II.

The consequent delays were serious enough to have an adverse effect on aid negotiations and programming and phasing of projects,[+1] particularly when ministries forgot to 'prod' the CPDO on progress.[+2] There were complaints of considerable delays - 'unnecessary sitting on projects before forwarding them'; of failures to consult, resulting in important elements being overlooked;[+3] and of forgetting to inform ministries when money had been approved, so holding up implementation.[+4] One example was given where a department submitted a request to the CPDO for forwarding to a donor, and also at the same time wrote directly to the donor (since there was a deadline of an annual donor board meeting). Four months later, the department was informed by the CPDO that it had forwarded the request; on the same day the donor notified it that the request had been approved. Had it relied only on the Planning Office, the Board meeting would not have considered the matter and the application would have had to wait a year.[+5] Other examples occurred where CPDO's slow processing of memoranda had prevented the implementation of projects within the intended financial year.[+6] In a somewhat rare reference to the effects of inefficiency and delay on the world outside, an official in the Ministry of Works concluded:

> CPO don't realise or appreciate the urgency. They should be aware that every day they sit on a memo in their office is a working day less for implementing the project and when the rains start, for example, the men on the job curse people in offices for holding it up and they can't complete their work.[+7]

Moreover, CPDO had no procedure for acknowledging receipt of letters or for informing departments about progress in negotiations.[+8] Thus even when it was taking appropriate steps, the ministries were unaware of it.[+9]

> One does get a feeling that project memoranda are drifting all in different directions and not getting where you want them to get; for example, [X] project. On 8th March 1973 it went off and I never heard about it again [a year and a half later].[+10]

Similarly, an interviewee who was generally fairly approving of the CPDO stressed this as a major complaint:

> CPO don't tell us what is happening. We never get told anything in the in-between stages, i.e. from the time we send the project till we are informed it has been approved or not.[1]

Discussion with registry personnel in the Planning Office revealed that for a period in 1973 there had been only one person working in the registry. She was hopelessly overworked and no-one took much trouble to explain what she was intended to do. As a result some planning officers took to keeping their files in their own offices, resulting in a number of haphazard arrangements.[2]

> ... practices have been developed which are very difficult to administer. People here are not used to proper administration... There is no clear system of which files are kept in the registry and which ... in the various offices... It just sort of happened, and it is not the same in one office as in the other. Also there are no clear lines of communication and one gets conflicting instructions...[3]

An element of 'snobbery' between professionals and non-professionals was present, with the result that not much effort was made to understand and cooperate with the tasks of the registry.

In April 1974 the CPDO was strengthened.[1] The principal reason why ministries, as well as donors, appreciated the change was because the Office's efficiency improved considerably and it was able to handle more work in less time.[4] Obviously, not everyone was equally enthusiastic about this and one still heard references to the 'central blocking office',[5] and to the view that there had been no improvement at all[6] despite now being 'hopelessly overstaffed. People are crawling out of the windows'.[7] In general, however, most of those concerned with planning were positive about its improved efficiency, if less sure of its effectiveness, or the quality of planning. According to one donor:

> CPO has improved enormously ... more so since they have been given the people to do the work. I wouldn't know if the results in terms of development are more

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1. See Chapter II, 6.

> effective - I have my doubts. But they are efficient at moving documents. They know what they are talk'ng about. If I phone someone there and put a query, I'll get a reply quite soon about the document I am asking /about/. They never used to know what document you were talking about, they usually couldn't find it and they usually forgot to reply.[+1]

7. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING (BY THE CPDO)

A frequently expressed accusation against the Planners was that they did not understand the ministries. With few exceptions,[+2] senior civil servants felt that the Office lacked any real comprehension of the technical or administrative aspects of their work.[+3] This type of criticism was soundly based, and the officers had a great deal of supporting evidence. But it does also need to be seen as part of the on-going competition between all of them for a greater allocation of resources. For in effect what they were often saying was that CPDO not only lacked understanding of their technical and administrative operations, but that it failed to appreciate their particular department's 'singular contribution' to the development of the country. Without any very clear political directives, arguments in favour of giving priority to new roads or water supplies, or expatriate housing, could all be convincingly set out. On a number of occasions when interviewees were pressed for specific examples of CPDO's lack of understanding, the reply was: 'If they did understand us better they would give us more money'.[+4]

Government officials claimed that this deficiency resulted from the planners' lack of work experience in the ministries, their unwillingness to get out of their offices and go to the ministries or out to projects to talk to the people in the field.[+5]

> I doubt if any of them have ever been on an agricultural project to see and judge what are the practical problems of an extension officer and what the people think.[+6]

This view of the Planning Office received strong backing from the District Administrators.[1] It was clear that at least certain

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1. See Chapter V, and Appendix V.

officials saw no advance in this regard in the period after April 1974.

> There is no improvement in terms of the people who handle our projects, etc., in understanding our needs and requirements. Both technically and in terms of their understanding of the administrative requirements, it's just as it was.[+1]

The CPDO's response followed fairly established lines: it admitted that its knowledge of the operation of the sectors was inadequate, but that this accusation by departments had roots in the particular setting in which the Office was placed and the role it was required to play. For example, it would be a waste of manpower to include on the CPDO staff a person fully qualified to understand all the engineering implications of road or dam building, yet it was part of the Office's work to investigate and negotiate on projects of such a technical nature.[+2] It also tended to come in for this type of reproach each time it rejected projects or cut down on requests for capital or technical assistance personnel.[+3] In addition, the Planning Office was from time to time placed in embarassing situations by suddenly generous donors or politicians requiring quick projects. When CPDO forwarded such requests, departments judged this an indication that it had no appreciation of what was involved:

> Once CPDO was offered money for a road project. They phoned Works and said: Produce something for a road project in a matter of days... The fact that CPO can ask for a project off the cuff like that indicates a lack of understanding.[+4]

Finally, the planners pointed out, there often existed a divergent approach between planners and implementers which caused mutual misunderstanding:

> People who implement often complain about people who are planning, simply because the difficulties are qualitatively different, and it is easy for people doing planning not to appreciate the difficulties of implementers; and it is not a characteristic of implementers that they have planning capabilities. So there is reasonable ground for breakdown.[+5]

8. 'FINGER-POINTING' (..G. WORKS)

Dimock, in discussing characteristics of an 'amorphous' permanent bureaucracy talks of resistances which are 'so elusive' that it is next to impossible to spot where exactly the slowing down process occurs. 'It is as though each person has his finger pointed at the next person ... and no one individual can be pinned down'.[1] While accusations against, and replies from, the CPDO have already demonstrated this tendency, a clearer illustration arises from the role of the Ministry of Works in the planning and implementation process.

In preparing and implementing projects, Works takes responsibility at the design and costing stage and at the execution stage - either in preparing tender documents for private contractors or in undertaking the construction. Its intended r le is illustrated by the following case where a ministry admitted bypassing Works:

> We had got a grant to do some building by community labour which did not turn up; so we ended up hiring a contractor. One gave up; another charged too much; our accounting was weak; we overspent without completing the work. We hadn't prepared proper cost estimates. Our accounts staff was months behind; we were buying materials from the wrong source. It convinced me that we were not set up to do building so from then on building goes through Works.+1

However, Works was judged not to be carrying out its task effectively. Criticism of the Ministry for delaying an' hindering plans and construction was strong and almost universal,+2 and its meagre capacity was seen as a debilitating obstacle to executing projects.

> Works is proving a great bottleneck - and no-one seems able to do anything about it. The staff is inadequate and not well qualified.+3

> The lack of a Construction Capacity Committee is very important as the staff position in the Ministry of Works is chronically bad - they have no executive capacity... last year out of a total amount of R1,25 million wor'h of project construction they were allocated to spend on behalf of client ministries they managed only R500 000 which is extremely poor.+4

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1. Dimock, op.cit., p. 404.

Works responded that it was impossible to increase its capacity as long as it continued to be severely understaffed.

> It is all very easy to criticise the Architects' Branch - but there isn't an architect; ... at the moment there is a quantity surveyor trying to do the work of an architect; and because people address letters to them entitled 'Chief Architect' they think they have got a chief architect... [Similarly] at Works headquarters ... until the present Controller of Works Services arrived ... [it] operated for fifteen months without an engineer... It's an almost unbelievable situation. I think they have been without an architect for nearly nine months.+1

The first reason given for this shortage of staff was that the salaries offered were not sufficiently attractive for expatriates.+2 (The situation showed some improvement, particularly at senior professional level, with increased British and UNDP terms and after the salary review in Lesotho itself.) However, it was felt that at the level below, that is senior technical officers, clerks of works, etc., who had to work on Lesotho terms, the problem would remain acute. Second, insufficient Basotho were graduating in the fields required for training in engineering. Third, it was admitted in Works that the in-service training of local personnel at middle level was weak.+3 Fourth, it was pointed out that a few applicants for senior posts had been lost because of sluggish recruitment procedures, aggravated at certain times by a shortage of houses and the freezing of posts.+4 Fifth, it was felt that a few key people had left out of sheer frustration: both architects were said to have resigned in 1973 'because of continual delays in getting funds released to proceed with projects',+5 and because of repeated failures by ministries and CPDO to follow procedures requiring consultation with Works.

This failure - of ministries and of the CPDO to follow procedures relating to construction and to do so at the right time - resulted in much abortive work, continual redrawing of sketch designs, re-estimates, etc.+6

> Costing of buildings and planning of buildings outside Works causes considerable problems ... The ministries or CPDO will base costing on old costs

> and add five per cent per year. Or with one ministry, they put up buildings and no lavatories.+1
>
> ... very often the ministries don't consult .. [After British approval] you find that the estimates have been done by someone not costing the thing properly ... so there is not enough money ... so back to Britain and more delays.+2
>
> ... we expect client ministries to prepare a sketch drawing and/or explain what they want. But they don't do it. They give a general idea, then the architect draws it and they say 'no' ...+3
>
> ... late in the financial year a ministry will wake up and come rushing in and say 'we must get this project built or else we lose the money'. But it is too late...+4

On some occasions Works prepared no fewer than twelve sketch designs for one project and forty for another.+5

Works also argued that much of the blame for tardy execution of construction jobs should be attached to Finance, because it consistently experienced delays in securing the release of funds necessary to carry out its responsibilities. One official complained that 'an enormous amount of time' of a number of senior officers 'is wasted ... trying to find out why we haven't got cash and trying to get cash released'.+6 The Budget Division denied that delays were serious when ministries followed the correct procedures: 'There are procedures for obtaining release of funds. Any ministry can obtain funds for projects that have been passed under the correct heads'.+7 Works contested this: 'It is just not so for Finance to say that ministries can get release of funds within one day ... I have personally gone up there and waited two days and come away with nothing - and I cannot fathom the delay'.+8 Ledgers were displayed which clearly showed that projects had operated in the red for a whole year, the release of funds coming through on the last day of the year. While this had been done in previous years 'just to keep things going', it would not be repeated because of the Government's decision to surcharge individuals responsible for overexpenditure. Finance suggested that there might be people in Works who did not understand that money could not be released for implementation of British

projects until the British had approved the individual project memoranda. Whatever the case, Finance and Works remained adamant about their opposing positions.[1]

9. ME (CPDO) AND THEY (PLANNING UNITS AND TOWN PLANNING)

Both earlier observers and present administrators found a strong tendency for departments to operate in isolation without any feeling of collective action. Just after independence, Coutts wrote:

> I find the Ministries extraordinarily self-contained, unwilling to consult with other Ministries, and have a tendency to build Empires. A Government is the sum total of the energies of all the Ministries combined and until consultation becomes a regular habit at all levels your government will simply not function.[2]

At their inception, the CPDO's declared intention was that the planning units should be professionally responsible to it and administratively responsible to their ministries. This idea of dual responsibility did not get off the ground. The CPDO was excluded from participating in the selection of the planning unit personnel; and once chosen, it showed little interest in their progress. These ministerial planners complained that the central planners made no real effort to improve working relations or gain their confidence. Their 'loyalty' was therefore to their ministries.[+1] This is where they were employed and their most immediate promotion prospects lay. They criticised the CPDO further for making no effort to advise new planning unit officers, leaving them to 'flounder around and find their way'.[+2]

> CPO have not advised us on how to prepare project memoranda... When I came, I put in projects without consulting Works, without justification, etc.; they did not send it back.[+3]

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1. The inability to get to the source of the problem was one reason for undertaking a broader study of the budget calendar - see Appendix IX.

2. W. Coutts, Report on the structure and administration of the Lesotho Government, 1966, p. 17.

> I arrived here, was told my responsibilities /by the ministry/ and had to get on with it. No-one in the ministry gave me advice, nor did the CPDO. You get some advice from Planning when you work with them but they don't help at the beginning... They expect planning units to put up foolproof projects.+1

It was also pointed out by a member of a planning unit that in all the negotiation and preparation about restructuring and strengthening the CPDO (in 1974), the planning units had been overlooked completely:

> CPO did not consult with or inform planning units... They made no efforts - or appeared to give no thought to increasing the status of the planning officers in the ministries. They think of us only when they need information - but they don't concern themselves with us or our welfare at all... After all we do a lot of work for them and they just send it on.+2

The general attitude as expressed by members of the CPDO (and demonstrated by their actions) served to confirm the view held by the planning unit personnel. They said that they considered most of the planning units very weak:+3

> /They/ are inefficient and very slow. They don't have experience in planning... They don't think ahead, or really prepare projects well - all projects are not really justified - usually they just mention one or two direct or indirect benefits and send it.+4

Essentially, though, this was seen as 'their' problem, not the CPDO's. Despite repeated promises - and regular requests from the planning units - the Planning Office failed to call regular meetings with the planning units or to institute a system of rotation of planning officers between the CPDO and the ministries.

The Town and Country Planning Department did not conform exactly to the structure established for planning units, yet its position was similar insofar as it was a special cell concerned with a potentially important aspect of planning located in a ministry. The fact that it was concerned with physical planning, while the CPDO saw itself as concentrating

on socio-economic planning led to the CPDO showing even less interest in this Department than in the planning units.

The history of the Department has been one of ineffectiveness and neglect. Despite a number of attempts at preparing plans, there continued to be no master plan for Maseru, nor for the district headquarters. A plan drawn up for Maseru in 1967/68 by the first town planner was apparently perfectly adequate, but 'nobody cared about it too much' and it was not adopted.[+1]

> There is not much point in producing nice town plans unless somebody adopts them and has legislation to enforce them. What is required is ... just for somebody to decide to use the Monroe plan, and put some teeth into it in the way of legislation and force people to adhere to it. Then everybody would know roughly in what direction they were moving.[+2]

The second town planner was apparently unaware of the first plan, and produced a further plan, which is judged as somewhat inferior:

> ... it did not even try any population projections - he had no idea how much the town was going to grow; he didn't even take into account the whole town; he didn't include any of the peri-urban areas.[+3]

A year thereafter a third town planner arrived who, having accomplished very little, was accused of corruption and left the country. In May 1971 a UN associate expert joined the Department, followed by a second associate in January 1972. They carried out some research and preparatory work on plans for the district headquarters. During this period, the first Maseru town plan was rediscovered, but the third town planner refused to use it.[+4] During 1974 the first associate completed his contract, while the second committed suicide, leaving the department with one non-graduate volunteer, two draftsmen and three tracers, and still no plan for Maseru. For the period August 1973 till June 1975 (and certainly for some time thereafter) the country remained without a town planner. One UN associate expert in Town Planning complained about the CPDO's lack of interest:

> We have very little contact at all /with the CPDO/. I have the impression that the <u>where</u> of planning is

not really considered.[+1]

> ... people are coming down here to find a job or try for one on the mines of RSA, and meanwhile they have to live somewhere, and thus we have all the shanty-towns around... The Chief was in charge and he was allocating [a piece of] land to whomever he liked - it's almost impossible today to bring in any services like proper roads, access roads, water, sewerage ...[+2]

The consequences of this lack of attention to town planning were felt directly in those departments and agencies attempting to plan, design and construct the supporting infrastructure.

> What happens - and it happened in New Europa [a residential area of Maseru] - is we [Lesotho Electricity Corporation] had to plan for fifty houses. Then they built another forty and so we had to plan for that. And then they built a larger area partly surrounding both the others. If we had a forward plan of the whole thing we could have put in substations in centrally-placed situations maximising economies. This way, substations and lines have to be built and rebuilt. We are wasting Government money. Further, if we had a forward plan, we could plan our stock better.[+3]

> ... In regard to the design of Maseru water supply reticulation we are having virtually to guess the direction of expansion of the town ... we can't get any firm plan from anybody as to where development is going to take place - and it does complicate the issue when you are trying to design a pipeline to carry the water to an area of unknown size, of unknown number of people, of unknown standard of living ... we are working behind all the time, rather than ahead... So you tell where development is going by having a look.[+4]

When these matters were raised with members of the CPDO, the responses confirmed that there was little understanding of, or interest in understanding, Town Planning and its predicament. Essentially again the attitude was that it was Town Planning's problem, not CPDO's.

> Occasionally they say how badly we need a plan for Maseru and how nobody pays attention to the plans they make for Maseru, and occasionally I hear they are rushing off somewhere to survey something. I haven't been impressed that they do anything. I have no idea what they do, but whatever it is, they don't do very much of it ... and what they do nobody pays any attention to... As far as I am concerned, there is no Maseru town plan and there have been town planners wandering around Maseru for the last six years - it's a scandal.[+5]

> I have no contact with them. I don't understand what they are supposed to do. They don't have the staff or the equipment they need and they have trouble with personnel. It seems irrelevant to my work, but I have not bothered to find out.'[1]

10. CONCLUSION

There is a great deal more material of similar nature to report and comment on. Discussions and arguments continue all the time at all levels, and rumours are constantly started, spread, embellished and countered in offices, homes, bars, the club and at receptions. What has been attempted is to indicate something of the bureaucratic mind as it reflected on internal administrative problems and disputes and the tone and subject matter of criticism and response.

Observations by Hoyle and Arnold Brecht seem appropriate here. Hoyle commented on the degree to which civil servants, immersed in the day-to-day problems of their work, become insulated from 'the massive environmental changes which are affecting the whole fabric of life'.[1] Brecht concluded that 'a departmental headquarters that contains a thousand employees needs no outside world to be busy: they can keep busy all alone in intra-agency quarrels'.[2] Both, while harsh, are applicable. Because of the general nature of the questions put, it would be wrong to conclude from the contents of this Chapter alone that Lesotho's senior civil servants were more concerned with 'housekeeping' issues than with the impact of their activities on the world outside. Yet it is clear that a substantial amount of time, energy and thought was being devoted to such matters and to creating and overcoming such inter-agency resistances as have been described. Very rarely, in all the

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1. Hoyle, op.cit., p. 68.
2. A. Brecht, How bureaucracies develop and function, in Raphaeli, op.cit., p. 336.

interviews and discussions, did anyone volunteer the idea that all these organizational disputes and deficiencies had any relevance to the country and its people.

From the Chapter which follows this, it would seem that such scarce resources as the time, energy and thought of high-level officials might have been applied more usefully elsewhere. Relating Chapters II and III, primarily concerned with the bureaucracy's internal conduct and mentality, with Chapter IV on the economy, brings to mind Mannheim's discussion of the exclusive concern of the military bureaucrat for military action. This mentality, he says, is reminiscent of the joke about the specialist in the medical world who is reputed to have said: 'The operation was a splendid success. Unfortunately the patient died'.[1] Of planning and development in Lesotho, however, it might more accurately be said 'There has been some improvement in the surgical team's organization. Unfortunately, the patient's health continues to deteriorate.'

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1. K. Mannheim, Orientations of bureaucratic thought, in Merton et al., op.cit., p. 361.

CHAPTER IV : TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY : UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCE

1. BACKGROUND
2. THE LEGACY
3. DEEPENING UNDERDEVELOPMENT
4. INCREASING DEPENDENCE
5. CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IV TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY : UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCE

1. BACKGROUND

Despite the constitutionally distinct aspect of its history - as observed in Moshoeshoe I's rule, British protection from 1868 to 1966, non-incorporation in the Union of South Africa, and political independence recognised by the world community in 1966 - Lesotho's economy is very similar, in both its more historic and more recent trends, to those of the small African reserves dotted around southern Africa. In common with them, the changes in the Lesotho social and economic structure over the past 150 years or so have not occurred in response to its own domestically-derived logic, but rather, and essentially so, to demands generated by developments in other parts of the sub-continent.

An outline economic history of these indigenous southern African societies may, for the sake of convenience, be divided into six stages. In the first - a pre-colonial or pre-capitalist stage - there existed communities of stock-keepers and cultivators who worked land allocated by a chief who in turn took a share of the small surplus created. They were largely self-sufficient in that they were able to satisfy their own needs and reproduce their populations.

The second stage covers the early response of the African peoples of the interior to the colonial and settler presence. At and around the points of contact, an African peasantry emerged: agriculturalists producing according to traditional means and exchanging/trading their products with settlers and

traders. Initially this development was encouraged by the imperial and colonial authorities, the settlers and the missionaries. A settled peasant community provided a buffer against hostile tribes, profitable trade and useful products.[1] During this stage the self-sufficiency of the peasant meant that his participation in the money economy was 'discretionary' and not 'necessary'. Also, his decision to trade his products was based on a favourable effort-price ratio: that is, a modest effort reaped a satisfactory return.[2] These two essential elements of peasant survival were to be dramatically altered.

In the third stage - a period of low-level coercion - the growing land hunger of white farmers and their need for cheap labour saw increased pressure being exerted on African societies. The impact, while real enough, was limited. The white farmers, with only embryonic state institutions, were widely scattered and not always politically united. They had an uncertain relationship with the colonial authorities, whose policies in the interior were neither clear nor decisive. Taxes were introduced in many areas - a common method of forcing peasants further into the money economy. Various 'civilizing' measures were introduced with similar effect. To comply with these new legislative requirements, some Africans went to work on white farms and in white towns; but many responded by increasing agricultural production for sale. In many areas too white farmers, who had expropriated the land, allowed

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1. See C. Bundy, The emergence and decline of a South African peasantry, African Affairs, 71, 285, 1972, pp. 369-88.
2. These two concepts of necessary and discretionary participation in the money economy, and the effort-price ratio, are taken from G. Arrighi, Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianization of the African peasantry in Rhodesia, in G. Arrighi and J. Saul, Essays on the political economy of Africa, 1973.

Africans to remain on as de facto peasants paying a rent or fee for use of the land.

The fourth stage saw the application of a high level of coercion to the African communities. This commenced with the discovery and extraction of large quantities of precious minerals, first diamonds and then gold in the last third of the nineteenth century, and continued into the twentieth century. Large-scale extra-economic coercive measures[1] were initiated and intensified to force the peasant off the land and into the mines. At the same time, the fast-growing demand of the new towns for food transformed farming into a profitable undertaking and land into a commercially valuable asset. Land previously under de jure white control was now effectively taken over - the squatter-peasants becoming labourers - and new lands were expropriated, by force where necessary. As the African peasant was squeezed into drastically reduced areas of less productive land, increasingly overcrowded by both stock and people, and disadvantageously located in relation to the main markets, the effort price ratio was reversed. This process was intensified and accelerated by the size and convenient location of the white farms and the encouragement, subsidies and credit provided to the white farmers. The African's competitiveness and will to farm had been destroyed. Participation in the money economy had by now become necessary for many. Taxes had to be paid; new tastes encouraged by traders and developed when farming was profitable, and new requirements pressed for by missionaries, had to be satisfied; and the land itself provided less and less of these needs. The peasant became a migrant labourer. Labour bureaux were set up throughout the African areas to recruit and control the number and direction of workers.

Peasant economies had thus been transformed into labour

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1. See M. Legassick, South Africa: capital accumulation and violence, Economy and Society, 3, 3, 1974, pp. 253-91.

reserves. But the very processes set in motion to create this change threatened to destroy the advantages gained by South Africa's mines and industries. The fifth stage - a period of attempted conservation of the labour reserves - saw an effort to arrest the process of proletarianization. The system of migrant labour established was essential to the profitable extraction of minerals because it substantially reduced the costs of labour. The reserves supplied some of the worker's, and his family's, basic requirements. It provided a permanent home for him and his family, cared for the women, the young, the aged and the sick and for the miner when, physically spent, he returned home. It sustained a huge reserve army of unemployed labour whose presence disciplined those who were employed and kept down their wages. The traditional authorities fulfilled the political function of controlling the population in the reserves. Finally, the system prevented the evolution of a fully-fledged, organized and potentially powerful proletariat.[1]

But the logical effects of the processes of underdevelopment could only be postponed; they could not permanently be prevented. The final stage thus witnesses the accelerated corrosion of the reserve economies. 'Given the developed incapacity of the Reserves to generate a surplus produc . the limited area available, the increasing pressure of population ... congestion of land, the loss ... of a large proportion of the economically active adults to temporary employment in the capitalist sector ... inefficient farming methods and the tendency [to] overstock the land', irresistible pressures destroyed the delicate equilibrium between mine earnings and reserve production.[2] The reserves have become palpably incapable any longer of playing even their supporting role. To protect the interests of the capitalist economy and the white population, apartheid legislation and security measures were structured to resist the

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1. See I. Winter, The post-colonial state and the forces and relations of production: Swaziland, Review of African Political Economy, No. 9, 1978, pp. 27-8.

2. H. Wolpe, The theory of internal colonization: the South African case, London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers, No. 18.

huge uncontrolled influx of blacks and shore up the reserve economies through decentralised investment.

The above parallels very closely the history of underdevelopment of the Lesotho economy. In the first third of the nineteenth century, Moshoeshoe I brought together a diversity of tribes. Before the Basotho had time to establish clearly defined political relationships, they were beginning to respond to new forces represented by missionaries, settlers and colonial authorities. Some Basotho left to work for whites, some continued farming along traditional lines for subsistence purposes, while some began to increase production for sale - an exercise which proved very successful. An Orange Free State newspaper, The Friend, writing in the 1850s, commented on the inferiority of white-occupied land compared with the 'unsurpassed grazing grounds and cornfields of the Basotho' and referred to Moshoeshoe's kingdom as 'our principal granary'.[1]

A long drawn out conflict over this land between Boer and Basotho was already under way by then. Conflicts, disputes, opposing interpretations of the 'sale' of land, claims and counter-claims, raids and counter-raids, interspersed with outbreaks of war and with disputed arbitrations by the British, resulted in the steady reduction of the land available to the Basotho. The Napier Line (1843) was followed by the Maitland Line (1845), the Southey Line (1848 - not implemented), the Warden Line (1849), the Grey line (1858) following Senekal's War of 1356, and finally the Convention of Aliwal North (1869) after the 1866 Seqiti War. The 1869 Convention confirmed the loss of a large tract of land still referred to as the 'conquered territory' and still claimed by the Lesotho Government. This includes the present Orange Free State towns of Fouriesburg, Ficksburg, Clocolan, Ladybrand, Hobhouse and Wepener in a belt of fertile land running from north to south approximately thirty kilometres west of Lesotho's present western boundary, coinciding roughly with the land east of the Caledon

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1. Referred to in J. Kimble, Some aspects of the Sotho social formation: the 1850s, 1977, p. 2; and J. Kimble, Lesotho and the outside world: prelude to imperialism, 1977, p. 15.

River watershed.[1] The full significance of this loss becomes clear when it is seen against the fact that of the very small country left over, only 11 per cent is arable.

The British authorities which took Basutoland over as a Protectorate avoided any policies which involved government expenditure and allowed the country to become increasingly integrated into the South African labour market. The strategy of the colonial authorities was indicated in the Report of the Resident Commissioner of 1898/99:

> Though for its size and population, Basutoland produces a comparatively enormous amount of grain, it has an industry of great value to South Africa, viz., the output of native labour. It supplies the sinews of agriculture in the Orange Free State; to a large extent it keeps going railway works, coal mining, the diamond mines at Jagersfontein and Kimberley, the gold mines of the Transvaal and furnishes, in addition, a large amount of domestic services in the surrounding territories. The number of men who received passes for labour during the year under review amounted to 37,371. These facts are the best rejoinder to those who argue that Basutoland is a useless native reserve.[2]

According to the general pattern described, production and productivity declined steadily as the land available per person declined and deteriorated in quality, and by the end of the nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth century, Basutoland's principal economic function was as supplier of labour to South Africa. By 1921 there were 47 000 registered migrant workers, by 1936 101 000 and by 1956 154 000. In addition, it has been estimated that about 140 000 Basotho born in Basutoland were absorbed into the South African population between 1936 and 1956.[3]

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1. See D. Hirschmann, Changes in Lesotho's policy towards South Africa, African Affairs. forthcoming.
2. Report of the Resident Commissioner, Colonial Office Report No. 288, 1898/99, quoted by R. Leys, Migrant labour and population growth in Lesotho. 1974, pp. 7-8.
3. Discussion in R. Leys, op.cit. (The final set of figures is taken from G.M.E. Leistner, Lesotho: economic structure and growth. 1966).

Britain's acceptance of this process and its policy that expenditure should not exceed revenue (implemented from 1884 to 1960) together with a half-century of anticipation that Lesotho would be incorporated into the Union, left the country not only underdeveloped in regional terms, but also a colonial backwater.[1] From 1960 there was a rapid increase in government expenditure with which territorial revenue could not keep pace. The burgeoning deficit was made up by British grants-in-aid, which rose from R579 000 in 1959/60 to R5 492 000 (or 55 per cent of the recurrent budget) by 1966/67, the first year of independence.[2] Development assistance in this period amounted to R4,5 m. This assistance made little impact however: the increased purchasing power was concentrated on the civil service, capital development consisted mainly of public buildings in Maseru, while savings were siphoned out of the country.[3] The BCP leader, Mokhehle, complained that the money had merely financed government services and such other infrastructure 'as is conducive to Her Majesty's Government's concept of maintaining a colony. Not a single industry has been established'.[4] Both major pre-independence economic missions warned of the difficulties ahead and that there was no prospect of the country managing without considerable external budgetary assistance for many years.[5] In November 1971 Lesotho was identified, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 2768, as one of the 25 least developed of the developing countries; and the UNDP selected it as one of the 6 hard-core least developed coun-

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1. The framework of the economic and financial policies of the Government of Basutoland, op.cit., p. 4; and L. Rubin, The High Commission Territories: what now?, Africa Report, 9. 4, 1964, p. 10.
2. O.P. Horwood and L.P. McCrystal, Fiscal survey of Lesotho, Interim report on immediate measures to improve the financial position of the Lesotho Government, 1966, p. 1.
3. Chacko Report, op.cit, p. 58; and The development of the Basutoland economy, Report of the Ministry of Overseas Development, Economic Survey Mission (Porter Report), 1965, pp. 1 and 10.
4. Basutoland Times. 11/10/63, p. 7.
5. Chacko Report, op.cit., p. 59; Porter Report. op.cit., p. 2.

tries requiring special attention.[1]

The country's present predicament and the most significant trends in the economy derive directly from this history. The rest of the Chapter will show some of the disadvantageous consequences of this legacy, and demonstrate that the well-advanced processes of underdevelopment and dependency have proceeded steadily in the years since political independence was granted in 1966. The establishment and growth of political and civil service structures - including that of the planning machinery - will be seen to have made no apparent impact on the deteriorating situation.

2. THE LEGACY

A. Size

By any measure, Lesotho has been left a very small state both in real terms and by comparison with its neighbour. It is 30 333 square kilometres in size, with an estimated population of 1,2 million (1975) and a per capita gdp somewhere in the region of R50 to R60 (though a gnp which today is substantially higher), a very small domestic market and very limited natural or mineral resources.[2] South Africa, by comparison, has a population twenty times, a geographical area forty times, and

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1. Kingdom of Lesotho, The 1972 annual review ..., op.cit., p. 1; see also H. Hveem, Relationship of underdevelopment of African land-locked countries with the general problem of economic development, in Z. Cervenka (ed.), Land-locked countries of Africa, 1973, p. 278 on the criteria used by UNCTAD for classifying states as least developed. See also P. Selwyn, The least developed countries as a special case, 1974, for a critical analysis of the concept of least developed countries.

2. C.N. Vakil and P.R. Brahmananda, The problems of developing countries, in E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), The economic consequences of the size of nations, 1963, employ these elements in considering the size of states. T. Scitovsky, International trade and economic integration as a means of overcoming the disadvantages of a small nation, in E.A.G. Robinson, op.cit., p. 282, points to the distinction between technological and economic minimal sizes - Lesotho is small under both sets of conditions.

a gnp two hundred times as large, and produces 98 per cent of the total product of the Customs Union area.[1]

Politically, very small states are generally more vulnerable than large ones to pressure, experience a greater sense of helplessness and frustration and have to surmount greater obstacles in order to maintain any valid political options at all.[2] Economic analysis also notes certain disadvantageous tendencies for very small states. They are more likely to have a 'skewed distribution of factor endowments in relation to factor demand' (possibly resulting in, for example, the export of savings and import of long-term capital);[3] to lack large enough markets, economies of scale and a sufficiently diversified production to attain the full benefits of modern technology and establish vertical economic integration: and to produce and export a more limited range of goods to fewer customers, thus aggravating their economic vulnerability.[4]

These assumptions, however, apply more clearly to states whose national boundaries do in fact represent points of discontinuity, that is, of significant 'change in the degree of mobility of ... factors of production'.[5] Lesotho (like Botswana and Swaziland) is so effectively integrated into the larger

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1. B. Turner, A fresh start for the Southern African Customs Union, African Affairs, 70, 280, 1971, p. 275.
2. D. Vital, The inequality of states. A study of the small powers in international relations, 1967, pp. 3 and 34. On p. 90 he notes that 'coercion that is founded on the exploitation of economic vulnerability need not be put into full effect ... for the desired political results to be produced'.
3. P. Selwyn, Core and periphery. A study of industrial development in the small countries of southern Africa, 1973, p. 6.
4. See A. Seidman, An economic textbook for Africa, 1972, p.292; on pp. 295-7 she discusses the effects of small markets. See Lewis, op.cit., p. 26 on economies of scale; and Vital, op.cit., pp. 41, 47 and 54 on limited exports.
5. Cf. E.A.G. Robinson, Introduction, in E.A.G. Robinson, op.cit. p. xiv.

economy that factor mobility has 'wiped out' much of the discontinuity associated with political borders.[1] While its boundaries do have some effect on 'economic distance' (for example, on an investor's perception of risk and on labour legislation), theories about economies of scale and small markets appear less helpful in explaining Lesotho's position than those which concentrate on the wider region of which the small country forms part.

B. Landlockedness

One specific aspect of Lesotho's dependence is that it faces the problems of landlockedness in an aggravated form, being totally surrounded by one country, with whose Government it maintains an uneasy political relationship. A Botswana economist has commented: 'To be land-locked is difficult enough. To be black and land-locked in southern Africa is a lonely and expensive experience'.[2] Based on a matrix of constraints affecting landlocked states in Africa, Anglin concluded that Lesotho was in the weakest position to institute improvements.[3]

There were numerous examples of problems arising for South Africa's neighbours in consequence of their landlockedness: refrigeration trucks needed urgently by Botswana were 'required elsewhere'; 'cable breakages' prevented international phone calls; goods destined for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland received low priority; UN advisers, foreign volunteers and experts from countries 'not acceptable' to the Republic were harassed and inconvenienced in various ways, as were Lesotho officials. The three governments felt extremely vulnerable in this regard, and judged that Pretoria employed such stratagems to apply pressure from time to time.[4]

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1. See I. Svennilson, The concept of the nation and its relevance to economic analysis, in E.A.G. Robinson, op.cit., p. 1.
2. H.C.L. Hermans, Botswana's options for independent existence, in Cervenka, op.cit., p. 209.
3. D.G. Anglin, The politics of transit routes in land-locked southern Africa, in Cervenka, op.cit., p. 103.
4. See e.g. Koena News, 11/9/73; D. Kowett, Lesotho and the Customs Union with the Republic of South Africa, in Cervenka, op.cit., pp. 199 and 206. These points were raised in numerous discussions with officials in both Lesotho and Botswana.

Of particular concern was the South African legislation which required that any goods conveyed on journeys of over thirty miles had to be carried by rail. For Lesotho this had the following consequences: it raised transport costs of imports as competitive modes of transport were ruled out; similarly exports from Lesotho incurred a cost penalty; delivery times by rail were longer than by road; except in Maseru, the labour requirements for trans-shipment of goods did not provide employment opportunities; uncertain delivery dates complicated the coordination of despatch of goods with the departure of a ship from a port many hundreds of kilometres away; and the stimulus to Lesotho's own transport industry, were its trucks permitted to carry goods, was denied.[1]

C. Location

Not only is the country small and landlocked but it is located at substantial distance from any of the major growth centres of South Africa, while the major arteries of communication between those centres bypass it. The mountainous nature of the country discouraged the building of railway lines and roads across it. In addition, British policy excluded the possibility of incurring such expenditure while the South African Government clearly had no interest in doing so. This position helped to render Basotho agriculture uncompetitive with white agriculture. Even today, were it nearer to large-scale demand, there might be a stimulus to produce cash crops. But the distance is even more explicitly felt in its negative impact on the Government's efforts to industrialise. The difficulties in the way of attracting investment (and thereby creating jobs) caused by the distance from the major supply and demand points, delays with and additional problems in obtaining spare parts, indifferent service by South African Railways have been thorough-

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1. S. Chidambaran, Transport problems of land locked countries, A case study of Lesotho, 1973, pp. 1 and 4. S. Amin sees such landlocked states as subject to a form of 'sub-imperialism' since they are compelled to leave a margin of supplementary value to intermediary coastal states, UNCTAD III - a critical appraisal, 1973, p. 20.

ly surveyed and discussed by Selwyn.[1]

The underdevelopment framework used for analysing Lesotho's economy is thought to be more useful than Friedmann's spatial disequilibrium model, in that it explains how and why the present situation came about and the forces and structures that created and maintain that situation. Yet it is not surprising, having Lesotho and southern Africa in mind, to observe similarities in the two approaches. Friedmann's model divides the space economy into a dynamic, rapidly growing central region and its periphery. The growth of the centre is viewed as being subsidised in part by the periphery. The implicit structural relationship is 'colonial' in that it is accompanied by a series of displacements from the periphery to the centre of the principal factors of production: labour, capital, entrepreneurship, foreign exchange and raw materials. There is also a close resemblance between Friedmann's 'primate cities feed/ing/ upon the rest of the nation' and Frank's 'metropole suck/ing/ capital and economic surplus out of the satellites'.[2] The locational type model with its attendant concepts of 'backwash' and 'polarization' is generally applied to Lesotho by its political and civil servant leadership and by advisers.[3]

D. Production and resources

The size, major sectoral contributions and per capita average of Lesotho's gross domestic product (gdp) are characteristic of an underdeveloped economy. Gdp, consisting principally of agriculture (41,4 per cent in 1971/2) and public and private

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1. P. Selwyn, Industries in the South African periphery. A study of industrial development in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 1975.
2. J. Friedmann, Regional development policy. A case study of Venezuela, 1966, and Frank, op.cit.
3. See Giles, op.cit., p. 2; The framework of economic and financial policies of the Government of Basutoland, op.cit., p. 12; and Opening address by the Rt. Hon. the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, on the first annual review of the UNDP country programme, 11/8/72.

services (52,7 per cent), with mining, manufacturing and construction contributing a mere 5,9 per cent, rose from R40,5 m. in 1966/7 to R54,6 m. in 1971/2, while gross national product (gnp) (which includes recorded income from outside the country) increased from R44,8 m. to R62,9 m. With a growth in de facto population from 852 000 to 950 000 in the same period (2,2 per cent per annum), gnp per head rose from R53 to R66 in the per[illegible]. Lesotho's gdp at this stage was the second lowest in Africa, and gdp per capita was the eighth lowest.[1] Although official figures were still unavailable, it was generally assumed that with the substantial increases particularly in South African mine wages that gnp must have risen considerably by 1975 to as much as double the 1971/2 figure.

The country has only one exploitable mineral resource, namely diamonds, the export earnings of which have averaged around only 14 per cent of total exports. Thorough exploration has not yet revealed any new pipes, but De Beers have begun establishing a mine at Letseng-la-Terai at an estimated cost of over R30 million (more than Lesotho's total proposed capital expenditure for its first Five Year Plan). This more efficient method of mining will raise exports and eventually, after the mine has paid for initial investment, will bring tax and revenue advantages to the Government. But it has had an employment displacement effect since the mine employs substantially fewer men than used to dig the area privately. It also ties the country still more firmly to the Anglo-American/De Beers group of corporations on which it is already intensely reliant for job opportunities.

Lesotho's only other resource of note is water, whic[illegible] had intended to impound and export to the Republic. Negotiations failed, however, and the proposed project - by far the largest in the first Five Year Plan - did not leave the drawing boards.

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1. UN Economic Commission for Africa, African economic indicators, 1973, Tables I and II.

TABLE II

GDP AND GNP

	1966/7	1967/8	1968/9	1969/70	1970/1	1971/2
(1) GDP at market prices (R 000)	40 512	42 331	43 891	47 121	49 060	54 683
(2) Net income from abroad (R 000)	4 300	4 400	5 200	6 000	7 800	8 224
(3) GNP at market prices (R 000)	44 812	46 731	49 091	53 121	56 860	62 909
(4) 2/3 (%)	9,6	9,4	10,6	11,3	13,7	13,1
(5) De facto population	852 361	871 193	890 277	909 863	929 886	950 343
(6) GNP per head (R)	53,0	54,0	55,2	58,4	61,0	66,0

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Draft National Accounts, 1966/67-1971/72.

TABLE III

PERCENTAGE STRUCTURE OF GDP (AT FACTOR COST)

	1966/7	1967/8	1968/9	1969/70	1970/1	1971/2
Agriculture	45,5	41,9	44,4	43,4	40,9	41,4
Mining and Quarrying	1,8	2,6	0,7	2,3	1,7	0,5
Manufacturing and Crafts	2,1	2,1	2,4	2,4	2,7	2,8
Building and Construction	2,1	2,2	2,4	2,4	2,7	2,6
Commerce	12,9	12,8	12,2	11,6	12,2	13,1
Catering	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,4	1,9	2,9
Transport	0,7	0,7	0,7	0,6	0,7	0,9
Communication	0,8	0,7	0,6	0,7	0,8	0,9
Banking and Insurance	0,1	0,6	0,3	0,7	0,2	0,2
Business Services	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,2
Ownership of Dwellings	15,4	15,3	15,0	14,8	15,5	14,2
General Government	8,5	10,1	10,3	10,1	10,2	9,7
Education	4,2	4,9	4,8	4,7	4,5	4,8
Health	1,2	1,4	1,5	1,5	1,5	1,4
Goods and Services	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0	3,0
Electricity	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,4
Gross Domestic Product	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts 1966/67-1971/72, March 1975.

3. DEEPENING UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The two areas in which the process of underdevelopment continued most markedly were agricultural production and employment creation.

A. Agriculture

Trends in agriculture present a depressing picture. Eighty to ninety per cent of the population resides in the countryside, producing somewhere in the region of forty to fifty per cent of gdp off small fragmented holdings, averaging five acres in size. Only about eleven per cent of the country is arable and this coincides with areas of heaviest population density. Stock-farming (most stock-farmers possess herds of one to three cattle and one to ten goats or sheep) is practised mainly on the mountain slopes.[1]

Growing population density - 56 per square mile in 1950, 76 in 1960 and 90 in 1970[2] - revealed itself in the rising number of rural households without any land, from 8,5 per cent (1960) to 12,7 per cent in 1970;[3] and in fragmentation of fields, indicated by the number of holdings increasing from 149 800 (1950) to 161 250 (1960) to 187 421 (1970) and 200 152 (1974) with consequent decrease in the mean size of fields to 1,9 acres.[1] The

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1. D.T. Jadic, Present state and future development of agricultural statistics in Lesotho, 1972, p. 3. He states that 15 per cent of the country is arable. However, most reports accept 11 per cent as a more accurate figure, e.g. L.B. Monyake, Lesotho - land, population and food. The problem of growth in limited space, 1974, p. 3. Also, for useful background on agriculture in Lesotho, see N. Raditapole, Agro-ecology of Lesotho. 1974; and Project 544 expansion "Food assistance to post-primary educational and training institutions and to hospitals", Request to the UN/FAO World Food Programme for assistance in a project for economic and social development, FAP/WFP/5, May 1973.
2. T.N. Thokoa, Availability and optimal exploitation of economic resources and factors of production in Lesotho, 1974, Appendix 1.
3. Monyake, op.cit., p. 6.

area allowed to lie fallow to recoup fertility declined from 206 700 acres in 1950 to 128 470 acres (1960 - a drop of 38 per cent) to 94 800 acres (1970 - a further drop of 26 per cent). Further, yields have declined from 1950 to 1970: maize from 5,3 (200 lb.) bags per acre to 2,3 bags; wheat from 4,6 to 2,4; peas from 4,3 to 1,6; and beans from 1,6 to 1,0 bags.[2]

The number of rural households without any stock also rose from 53 938 or 31,2 per cent (1960) to 103 373 or 48,7 per cent (1970).[3] Of the 4,5 million acres of grazing land, about 2,5 m. is considered suitable for large stock and 2,0 m. for small stock. Considering the state of pasturage, the land should carry no more than 200 000 units of large and 1,25 m. of small stock. In fact it is carrying about double that number: 420 000 and 2 m. respectively.[4]

Soil erosion has become both cause and effect of the increasingly disadvantageous population-land ratio, and the consequent pressure on, and fragmentation of, lands. The mountainous nature of the country, poor soils, heavy downpours and poor farming practices have resulted in gully and soil erosion affecting as much as half the cultivable area.[5]

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1. P. Radford, A statistical synopsis of the agriculture of the Kingdom of Lesotho 1950 to 1974, March 1974, pp. 1 and 2 and Tables V and [illegible] Thokoa, op.cit., Appendix I.

2. P. Radford, Supplement to the statistical synopsis of the agriculture of the Kingdom of Lesotho 1950 to 1973, published 30th March 1973, 1974, p. 2 and Table IV. See also Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of economic data. Country: Lesotho, compiled in 1972, M72/190 B, pp. 3-4.

3. Monyake, op.cit., p. 7.

4. Dairy development in the Kingdom of Lesotho, Request for Danish assistance, undated, p. 3.

5. A.G. Brightmore, A report on a visit to Southern Rhodesia to study the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act, and what it means to the rural African, and its possible application to Basutoland, 1956; Application for a grant of R35 000 to meet transport costs for the food for work conservation programme, 1974/75, 1973; FAO, Development of a pilot agricultural scheme in the Leribe area, Lesotho. Watershed management plan for the Khomokhoana River catchment area, Vol. 1, 1972; Checko Report, op.cit., p. 60; and Ian Hamnett, Some problems in the assessment of land shortage: a case study of Lesotho, African Affairs, 72,286,1973,pp.37-45.

Additional constraints on production are found in irregular rainfall, periodic droughts, traditional attitudes to livestock, poor cropping techniques, ineffective marketing arrangements, use of dung for fires instead of for fertilizer, the absence and attitudes of migrant workers, and a proliferation of extension services confusing to the farmer and imperfectly administered.[1] The traditional land tenure system has been consistently criticised as a significant hindrance to agricultural development.[2] The Government, however, has felt it advisable not to alter the system fundamentally, arguing that it facilitates a more equitable distribution of income, it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate progress, and that the large displaced population resulting from such a change would cause tremendous social problems.[3] The system has, however, been adapted to support developmental programmes and projects.[4]

In consequence of deteriorating agricultural production, Lesotho has been increasing the quantities of food imports, including large amounts of staple foods like maize. The total value of food imported, including food aid, has been put at R5,5 m. (1968), R6,8 m. (1969), R8,4 m. (1970), R8,05 m. (1971)

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1. Project of the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Request to the Government of Israel, Training in extension techniques, 1973, p. 1; G. Bouscharain and A. Robinson, Report on a visit to investigate dairy production in Lesotho (Visit 22-29 August 1969), 1970, pp. 13-15; McCallum, op.cit., p. 2; E. Moody, Marketing in Lesotho, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 1, 1976, pp. 144-54.

2. W. Coutts, A report on the structure and administration of the Lesotho Government, 1966, p. 28; H. Kessels and H.J. Tonkins, Report to the Basutoland Government on a National Savings and Development Bank and monetary system and certain aspects of land tenure, 1966, p. 10; Porter Report, op.cit., p. 3; Chacke Report, op.cit., pp. 63-4; and Brightmore, op.cit., p. 4.

3. Lesotho Donor Conference, Eighth session: Other infrastructure and services, 16/4/75, p. 1; and Speech by the Rt.Hon. the Prime Minister at the closing of the Aid Donors Conference, 1975, p. 3.

4. E.g. Land Act 1973, Act No. 20 of 1973, Supplement No. 2 of Gazette No. 11 of 15/3/74. Inter alia, this removed some of the arbitrary powers of chiefs in the allocation of land. On chiefs' previous disregard for views of their people, see J.C. Williams, Lesotho, land tenure and economic development, 1972, p. 5. On further proposed adaptations see Lesotho Donor Conference, Eighth session, op.cit., p. 1.

and R14,61 m. (1972).[1] Lesotho, Botswana and Nigeria receive by far the largest supplies of food delivered by the World Food Programme to an African country: between 1963 and 1972, Lesotho received $22,7 m. or 10,4 per cent of all food distributed by the WFP to Africa.[2] In addition, the Catholic Relief Services donated substantial quantities of food.

B. Employment and Population

In 1891 the de jure population of Lesotho was 218 504, and this grew to 427 549 by 1911, to 661 809 (1936), 794 253 (1956) and 965 913 by 1966. Based on a 2,2 per cent annual growth rate, the Bureau of Statistics has estimated the population at 1 155 000 in 1974 and 1 207 600 in 1976.[3] At the present rate of increase, the population will double in the next thirty years. This means for example that 'every month an extra 2 000 mouths have tc be fed, every week some 500 people need housing and clothing ...'[4]

The growth rate also meant that between 10 000 and 12 000 people came onto the labour market each year, and that from independence till 1975 the labour force grew by approximately 100 000. The Government's effort to respond to this was severely limited by the fact that at independence it had virtually no

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1. Westman, Trade, op.cit.; and Monyake, op.cit., pp. 11-13.
2. Ten years of World Food Programme development aid, 1963-72, 1973, Table 10.
3. A.M. Monyake, Lesotho's population and its structural characteristics with special reference to their implications for the economy and social services, 1974, p. 1 and Tables I and II.
4. Speech by the Hon. the Prime Minister of Lesotho, moving the 1968/69 development fund estimates of revenue and expenditure, p. 4. See also J.M. Maloa, The ability of the educational system to meet national needs, with special reference to the maintenance of adequate literacy levels and the production of skilled manpower, 1974; and J.L. Molapo, Implications of population increases for the demand and supply of an adequate health service, 1974.

industrial base to build on. A total of approximately 600 persons were engaged in small manufacturing and artisan activities such as mills, abattoirs, bakeries, and printing and repair shops, contributing about 0,7 per cent to gdp.[1] It had no natural advantages to offer, and its adaptations of the land tenure system in urban areas - allowing for long leases and the declaration of 'development areas' for investment - as well as a wide array of incentives for investors, made it no more attractive than a number of the bantustans and countries in the region offering the same or better facilities.[2]

The Lesotho National Development Corporation, established in 1967 to administer these incentives and to attract investment, had by 1975 developed two industrial sites at Maseru and Maputsoe, employing about 2 500 people in generally small ventures with which it was associated, such as tyre retreading, diamond cutting, electrical fittings, candles, ceramics, handicrafts, and in tourism and catering. The building of a casino and major hotel saw the number of tourists jump from approximately 5 000 per year to well over 100 000 within a couple of years, and up to an estimated 175 000 by 1976.[3]

In addition to the 2 500 new jobs created by LNDC, about 4 000 had been created in Government services (including teachers). A total of approximately 6 500 jobs had thus been

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1. Tan, op.cit., p. 62; and Draft request for a project for the Government of Lesotho to be carried out by UNIDO, For the establishment and development of crafts and small industries, 1972, p. 11. See O. Mesaros, Final report on exploratory mission. First stage industrial survey. Lesotho, 1969, for discussion of various problems.
2. Chacko Report, op.cit., p. 75 and Kessels and Tomkins, op. cit., p. 26 on the early situation. See also Administration of Lands Act, Act No. 16 of 1973, Supplement No. 1 to Gazette No. 14 of 15/3/74 for the most recent adaptations in the land tenure system.
3. Mochochonono, 16/12/76, p. 4.

created during a time when 100 000 new job seekers had come onto the market.[1] When added to the backlog of well over 100 000 workers already absent at the time of independence, it becomes clear how little impact the Government has made on an unemployment problem of immense proportions.

4. INCREASING DEPENDENCE

The obvious consequences of Lesotho's paltry economic heritage and its worsening state of underdevelopment, has been a growing dependence on South Africa.

A. Migrant labour

In terms of migrant labour, the most crucial indicator of dependence, the situation has deteriorated since Lesotho became politically independent. In 1966 there were estimated to be about 120 000 migrant workers outside the country. By 1975 it was estimated that there were about 200 000, about 140 000 of whom returned home periodically.[2] Acknowledging that statistics on migrant workers are rather rough approximations, this seems to indicate that the ratio of Basotho employed in South Africa to those in paid employment inside Lesotho (about 27 000) rose from over 6:1 at independence to just over 7:1 in 1975. In the five-year period of the First Plan, about 75 per cent of the increase in the male labour force was absorbed by the Republic, while the first year of the Second Plan period confirmed this trend.

This export of such large numbers of workers continued to

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1. A CPDO investigation attempted to compute the number of people fully employed in Lesotho by adding those farmers who worked 8 acres of land (considered sufficient to keep one farmer busy) to those who earned from agriculture - livestock and/or crops - R150 a year or more (the minimum Government wage at the time) which gave a total of 21 036 or 5 per cent of the adult labour force. When added to the 45 000 employed in the modern sector this meant that 11 per cent of the labour force was fully employed. See L.S. Cooley, The employment of the labour force in Lesotho (1970), CPDO, November 1973.
2. CPDO, Employment and unemployment in rural and urban areas, Lesotho papers for Central and South African regional conference on problems of employment creation, 1975.

involve a substantial 'hidden subsidy' to the South African economy.[1] Miners' wages, even after considerable raises, were in 1974 still well below the estimated poverty datum line for a family of five,[2] which meant that crops produced at home and any other local means of earnings were required to fill this gap - or that the gap remained unfilled. The subsidy was raised further by the element of education and training which accompanies the workers, and by the social welfare burden borne by Lesotho when they return depreciated physically.

Further, the absence of so many able-bodied men had serious detrimental effects on the implementation of projects: one District Administrator said, 'Everywhere you go to the villages to talk about development, you talk to women; we can't develop the country with women only'.[3] Agricultural extension and community development efforts were adversely affected and so too was primary education, since young boys carried out their absent parents' work.[4]

Yet the labour forced continued, and will continue, to migrate. The income earned outside the country by Basotho workers was much greater (in 1974/5 approximately twice as much) than the country's gdp and was increasing. In 1975 Basotho on the gold mines alone may have earned as much as R57 m., boosting the assets of the Lesotho Bank which was entitled to hold 60 per cent of mine wages by way of deferred pay.[5]

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1. R. Leys, op.cit., p. 7. Amin refers to a study of migrant labour from Upper Volta, which indicates a transfer of approximately 15 per cent of gdp of that country to Ghana and the Ivory Coast (the recipients of the labour). He estimates that the transfer from Lesotho is substantially higher: Unctad III, op.cit., p. 19.
2. P. J. Th. Marres and C.A. van der Wiel, Poverty eats my blanket. A poverty study: the case of Lesotho, 1975, p.63.
3. See for example B.G. Buntegui (UN Population Programme Officer), Report on a mission to Lesotho from 4-17 September 1971, p. 3.
4. G.M.E. Leistner, Devaluation and BLS, Africa Institute Bulletin, 13, 9/10, 1975, p. 338.
5. CPDC, Employment and unemployment ..., op.cit., p. 2; and CPDC, Lesotho, Second Five Year Plan, Preview, 11/3/75, p.2.

Analysts of Lesotho's agricultural patterns and potential, regarded it as 'very shrewd judgement' to send at least one member of a family to the mines. Dryland farming has great limitations, is very risky and earned for a family an average of R20-R50 per annum. Average earnings of all Basotho in South Africa were probably less than R600 per annum earned on the gold mines; but it was clear - and this was confirmed by a survey of one large project area - that earnings from crops amounted to no more than 10 to 20 per cent of total earnings.[1] Thus even a doubling of productivity would leave agriculture of marginal importance to most Basotho earnings. Relating declining productivity at home to increased wages in the Republic, the CPDO calculated that whereas in 1969 it would have taken a miner 3,3 months to earn enough money to buy the total annual maize production of an average sized farm in Lesotho, by 1975 it would have taken only 1,2 months.[2]

B. The Customs Union

A second element of Lesotho's economic dependence on South Africa requiring some elaboration is the Customs Union. Despite many theoretical arguments favouring regional integration and enhanced economic cooperation among developing states, progress has been slow even among states at similar levels of development.[3] It is considered even less likely to succeed among states at very different levels of development, though carefully structured compensation devices may overcome some of

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1. CPDO, Employment and unemployment ..., op.cit., p. 3.
2. CPDO, Problems of employment creation in Lesotho. Employment and unemployment in rural and urban areas, Maseru, 1975.
3. H.M.A. Onitiri, African economic co-operation and Africa's relations with the European Economic Community, Report presented to a group of experts, Abidjan, February 1973, ADB/OAU/ECA/CONFMIN/SC/WP/6, pp. 4-5, suggests certain reasons for this: see also Streeten, The frontiers of development studies, op.cit., p. 11.

the disadvantages likely to affect the weaker members.[1]

The Southern African Customs Union originates in an agreement of 1889, formalised in June 1910, and renegotiated in 1969. The 1910 agreement apportioned customs collections on an estimate of the duty content of annual imports into the three Territories; which left them sharing 1,3 per cent, while South Africa received 98,7 per cent. Among the principal weaknesses of the agreement was the lack of control which Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland could exercise over customs and excise rates and policies, regarded elsewhere as a 'major source of government revenue and a powerful instrument of economic policy'.[2] By comparison with other countries at a similar level, Lesotho's earnings appeared low.[3] In addition, there was a loss of fiscal and monetary discretion consequent upon 'membership' of the non-formalised Rand currency area and no provision for sharing in the profits earned by the Republic in respect of currency in circulation in the three small countries.[4] There was no formal machinery for consultation, and Pretoria's unilateral decisions have periodically confused those responsible for projecting revenues and planning thereon. In the mid-sixties, for example, South Africa participated in the Kennedy round of negotiations, signed a trade agreement with Malawi, imposed increased import duties over a considerable range of items and relaxed certain restrictions on import licensing - all without liaising

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1. For a full discussion of disadvantages and methods of compensation, see F. Kahnert et al., Economic integration among developing countries, 1969. See also Seventh inter-regional seminar on development planning, UNECA, Planning Newsletter, No. 9, 1972, p. 7; Raichur, op.cit., p. 71; and P.V. Walker, Regional economic integration in Africa, in Uppal and Salkever, op.cit., p. 346. Walker also points out longer-term advantages - see p. 347.
2. P. Robson, Economic integration in southern Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, 4, 1967, p. 477.
3. Tan, op.cit., p. 40.
4. J.F. Parkinson and A.G. Perrin, A review of monetary and currency arrangements in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, February 1971, pp. 14-16; and Turner, op.cit., p. 271.

with Lesotho.[1] Lesotho's Minister of Finance noted that these decisions had made it impossible to gauge with any degree of accuracy what effect this was likely to have on the country's revenue.[2] Again, in March 1969, Pretoria announced sweeping changes in tax structure with profound implications for Lesotho's tax policies and, finally, by way of example, in September 1975 South Africa devalued the Rand by 17,9 per cent without warning - to which Lesotho reacted sharply.[3]

Nevertheless, the Lesotho Government was strongly advised to remain inside both the customs and currency arrangements; for example, the use of the Rand as a stable and recognised currency was said to be convenient since it removed many of the perceived risks of investors.[4] However, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were advised to renegotiate the customs agreement and a new agreement was signed in December 1969. 'The most significant victory for BLS was the implicit acceptance by South Africa of the principle of compensation' for trade diversion, polarization of development, price-raising effects and loss of fiscal discretion; it was agreed that the share of customs revenue for the three smaller members should be based on total imports and multiplied by a factor of 1,42. Further, the three were permitted to levy additional duties to enable new industries to meet competition, or maintain an existing level of tariff protection against competition from outside the customs area in respect of industries of major importance.[5]

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1. Giles, op.cit., p. 8.
2. Budget speech by the Hon. the Minister of Finance moving the estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1967/68, p. 24.
3. The Star, 24/9/75, p. 11; and Leistner, Devaluation and BLS, op.cit., p. 338.
4. Kessels and Tomkins, op.cit., p. 18; and Parkinson and Perrin, op.cit., pp. 12-13.
5. Turner, op.cit., pp. 273-4. Selwyn, Core and periphery ..., op.cit., pp. 164-6, gives the main elements of the new agreement. For fuller discussion see P.M. Landell-Mills, The 1969 Southern African customs agreement, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9, 2, 1971, pp. 263-81.

The compensation device, reinforced by rapidly improved collection of import statistics (at newly-built customs posts) and by the fast-rising imports consequent largely upon miners' salary increases, saw customs revenue rising to sixty or seventy per cent of total revenue. In addition, in 1974 an agreement was negotiated under which Lesotho receives compensation for currency in circulation inside Lesotho.[1]

While consultation did improve, it remained unsatisfactory, and Pretoria continued to take unilateral action in important areas. Management of currency remains entirely a matter for the South African Government and the external tariff structure, interest rates and lending policies are decided in terms of the needs of the Republic's economy. Funds continued to flow from periphery to core: the flow through building societies and banks to South Africa amounted in 1972 to 60 per cent of total deposits, or R5 m. (more than Lesotho's capital budget that year).[2] And Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland continued to contribute to the industrial development of South Africa as captive markets required to pay higher prices for imports from South Africa.[3]

C. Imports and exports (See Table IV)

Lesotho's fast-growing balance of trade deficit largely speaks for itself. The deficit which stood at R18 532 000 at independence had reached R69 311 000 by 1974 and R108 m. by

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1. International Monetary Fund, Surveys of African economies, Vol. 5, 1973, p. 141; Lesotho Donor Conference, Ninth session: Mobilization of domestic resources, 16/4/75, pp. 2-3. Leistner, Devaluation and BLS, op.cit., estimates that BLS received R48,9 m. in 1973/4 and R66,4 m. in 1974/5 from the customs union.

2. E. Westman, Mid-term review of the Five Year Plan, 1, National accounts, prices and savings and credit, 13/7/73, pp. 9 and 10; advances were largely in non-productive areas: in 1972, 80 per cent in wholesale and retail business, 2 per cent in agriculture, 3 per cent in mining, 5 per cent in manufacture, and 6 per cent in construction.

3. Hermans, op.cit., p. 205.

1975. The proportion of imports to exports was the worst in Africa.[1] Imports consisted principally of consumer goods - foodstuffs and manufactured goods - while exports comprised mainly wool, mohair, livestock and small quantities of diamonds. About 90 per cent of this trade was with South Africa.[2]

D. Government revenue (See Table V)

The Government's budgetary situation provided one of the few apparently positive features of the economy. At independence Lesotho required British assistance to support 55 per cent of its R9,6 m. recurrent budget, and foreign aid for all of its capital development. Through more effective domestic revenue administration (taxation increased from R3,1 m. in 1966/7 to R7,8 m. in 1974/5) and a relatively tightly controlled recurrent expenditure, but principally as a result of the dramatically increased customs revenues, budgetary dependence on Britain ended in 1973/4, when Lesotho for the first time mounted its own modest capital development programme of R1 m. This was repeated in 1974/5, and in 1975/6 (the first year of the Second Plan) Lesotho contributed R6,8 m. or 42 per cent of a substantially increased capital budget (see Table I, in Chapter II).

While this meant that the Government was in a stronger position to undertake new capital programmes on its own initiative, it was clearly related to the increase in imports. Thus to quite a large extent the Government's stronger budgetary situation was dependent on the size of the country's balance of trade deficit (and also increasing employment on the mines). It

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1. Economic Commission for Africa, African economic indicators. op.cit., Table XII.

2. See A. Ström, Can Lesotho reduce its economic dependence on South Africa?, in Cervenka, op.cit., p. 259; and M. Ward, Economic independence for Lesotho?, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, 3, 1967, p. 363.

TABLE IV

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (R 000)

	1966	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Imports	22 917	23 407	22 876	27 997	43 700	64 479	79 120	117 273
Exports	4 387	4 068	3 716	2 197	4 350	8 770	9 809	9 240
Deficit	18 532	19 339	19 160	25 800	38 450	55 709	69 311	108 033

Source: ECA, Summaries of economic data; Montsi, Brief review of plan implementation, op.cit., Table 2; and Bureau of Statistics.

TABLE V

GOV'T [illegible] REVENUE (R 000)

		Local	Customs	Total	Notes
Pre-First Plan	1966/7	3,1	1,6	4,7	Britain paid 55% of recurrent budget of R9,8 million.
	1967/8	3,4	1,9	5,3	
	1968/9	3,8	1,9	5,7	
	1969/70	4,0	5,0	9,0	Sales tax included in customs revenue
First Plan	1970/1	4,4	4,7	9,1	Britain's contribution to recurrent budget of R11,1 m. reduced to R8,4
	1971/2	5,2	5,9	11,1	
	1972/3	5,3	6,7	12,0	Customs revenue up to 55% of total domestic revenue
	1973/4	6,7	14,6	21,3	British budgetary assistance ended. Lesotho's capital programme R1 m.
	1974/5	10,3	17,3	27,6	Local includes R2,5 m. from monetary agreement.
Total First Plan		31,9	49,2	81,1	
2nd Plan (Projected)	1975/6	9,8	15,3	25,1	Lesotho's capital programme R6,8 m.
	1976/7	10,0	18,4	28,4	
	1977/8	11,0	26,4	37,4	
	1978/9	12,1	28,4	40,5	
	1979/80	13,3	29,9	43,2	
Total Second Plan		56,2	118,4	174,6	R25 - 30 million for Lesotho's capital programme

Source: Lesotho Second Five Year Plan Preview.

has also been suggested that a possible result of the high customs revenue might be to dilute pressure to curb imports and act as a disincentive to import substitution industries and the use of local products.[1]

5. CONCLUSION

In the nine years of political independence, 1966-1975, Lesotho's underdevelopment and dependence have both steadily deepened. The country's agricultural capacity, and therefore its self-reliance in feeding its people, was reduced. Its ability to create employment for its rapidly growing labour force proved negligible. Its dependence on South Africa to employ its people and provide for their needs became more urgent and more absolute. Although the Lesotho Government knew a good deal more about the country's economy than it did in 1966, it did not exercise greater control over it. The economy remained as vulnerable to external forces as ever, and the numerous trends - political, economic, technological - observable in Southern Africa, indicated that its future was very insecure, and probably bleak.

In the short term, uncertainties in the labour supply situation in southern Africa pointed to the growing need for Lesotho's workers. Labour from Mozambique had become uncertain and had already been reduced considerably. Malawi's withdrawal of its workers created a large gap in the labour supply. Even when they return they will be a less guaranteed source than previously. With the approaching independence of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe the continued availability of workers from there will be doubtful. These factors, together with the large increase in the price of gold and the opening up of new mines have all served to raise the demand for Lesotho's miners.[2]

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1. Westman, Plan implementation. General economy ..., op.cit.
2. See C Perrings, Gold and migrancy in the South African political economy, 1977, p. 1.

In the somewhat longer term, however, the situation looks far less promising. Of most immediate concern are the projections for employment on the gold mines (see Table VI). Based on likely international and domestic demands, on availability, grades and expected technological changes, it is estimated that the numbers requi by the gold m: es are going to drop off dramatically. Employment reached a peak in 1961 at 465 000 but has been declining ever since to a figure of 401 000 in 1976. It is estimated that it will fall more rapidly to about 148 000 by the year 2000. This slack in gold may be taken up to some extent by the fast-growing demand for labour in platinum and coal mines, but these are not nearly as important to the Basotho, nor are the Basotho as well established as in the gold mines. In addition, the growth in the total number of workers required in all kinds of mines will decelerate. Whereas the number employed grew by 200 000 between 1946 and 1973 (the peak year), it will increase by only 60 000 between 1973 and 2000. These are projections only, but the overall trends which they demonstrate are clear. Furthermore, they do not take into account the possibility of serious political upheavals which may affect the South African economy and reduce at very short notice the demand for foreign workers.

There are in addition a number of other factors which have to be considered. First, the South African Government has set out to employ a higher proportion of South African blacks in place of foreigners. In 1970 only 21,2 per cent of the black work force on the mines originated from within the Republic; by 1975 this had risen to 46 per cent.[1] The increase in mine wages, growing unemployment outside and the demands of inflation have combined to reduce the resistance of South African blacks to working on the mines. Second, the mining houses are investing some R150 m. over a ten-year period in research into mechanization of the gold mines. Although large-scale alteration of extraction techniques are complicated and costly, the mines

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1. J.E. Bardill, Labour migrancy and the state: South Africa and Lesotho, 1977, p. 49.

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Name of thesis Administration of development planning in Lesotho 1979

PUBLISHER:
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
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