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Masters Research Report

**JOHANNESBURG'S MUSLIMS AND THEIR VIEWS
ON KEY EVENTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.**

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
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in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg.

DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work, unless indicated otherwise. It is being submitted for the partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.



(Zayd Dadabhay)

On this 14th day of February in the year 2012

"A person who goes in search of knowledge,
he is in the path of God
and he remains so till he returns."

To all who accompanied me on my journey.

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Two aeroplanes striking the very nucleus of Western capitalist democracy radiated frissons through global society. This was not necessarily because of public concern for the lives that were lost in the 11 September 2001 attacks, nor essentially as a result of the audacious assault against the lair of the global hegemon. The illustration which ensnared the imaginings of society was that of a new global adversary, bearded and unsophisticated and heartless, rising from the caverns of the post-Soviet world with the iniquitous tails of its turban infesting every region and every village. The impious employ of sacred canon to justify the slaughter of innocents convinced many that such was the true nature of Islam.

The repercussions of that autumn morning in New York included the invasion of Taliban-administered Afghanistan by the United States-led forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”); the ‘unilateral’ invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States (“US”) and its allies; a so-called “War on Terror”; public defamation of Islam and Muslims; the institutionalised usage of racial, ethnic and religious profiling to identify suspected terrorists; as well as arbitrary and extra-judicial detentions, extraditions, torture, and assassinations.

The immediate and persisting reactions of Muslims to these events have been all but homogenous. Worldwide reactions to violent extremism have ranged from utter revulsion and condemnation to partial or even total support.¹ It is this apparent lack of cohesive response by the Muslim *ummah* (nation/ brotherhood) that has launched academic investigations into the mind-sets, behaviours and understandings of the Muslim community worldwide. As academics began to realise the importance of understanding the dynamics within and around Muslim communities, the homogeneity of Muslim opinions about the Middle East began to be questioned.² States and societies felt a need to understand the growing Muslim voices in their midst as international political developments began to have marked effects within their own borders, thousands of kilometres away from the source. Of particular interest to academics have been the attitudes and opinions of Muslim minorities living in Western societies as compared to their religious brethren in Muslim-majority states.

South Africa’s Muslim population, being proportionally and numerically inferior to many other minority Muslim communities, has largely escaped such rigorous academic scrutiny. However, they

¹ Kohut, A., et. al., “Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics - Islamic extremism: common concern for Muslim and Western publics, 17-nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey”, Pew Research Center, Washington, 14 July 2005.

² See The 1990 Trust, Muslim views: foreign policy and its effects,

http://www.blink.org.uk/docs/muslim_survey_report/screen.pdf, October 2006, Retrieved 19 April 2007, p.2.

have by no means been unaffected by the global events that have shaken the roots of society. Domestically, media and academics alike have relied on the views of a limited number of Muslim community and religious leaders as representing the opinions of South African Islam. Furthermore, these views have been tainted by research that is based on the experience of Muslims in foreign lands.³ The 1990 Trust, for example, recorded increased academic activity regarding Muslim opinions in the United Kingdom (“UK”) in the wake of the 07 July 2005 bombings and a concurrent increase in often sensationalist media reports regarding Muslim British citizens.⁴ Without a meticulous investigation into the attitudes of ordinary South African Muslims, no effective and reliable comparisons can be made with other research in the field, nor can one be certain that the views which are publically expressed by community leaders are truly representative of their constituents.

As the financial hub of South Africa, and a continental powerhouse, Johannesburg witnesses influx of persons from around the world. The approximately 96 000 + Muslim nationals that populate the streets of Johannesburg⁵ are complemented by thousands of others that make their way to the ‘City of Gold’ from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. The various blends of Islam and attitudes thus created provide fertile ground for religious, social and political dialogue amongst Muslims that may often spread to other parts of the country. Hence, an investigation into the attitudes and opinions of the Muslims in Johannesburg towards events that take place in international politics is likely to provide a solid foundation for further research into the views of the rest of South African Muslim society.⁶

1.1) Rationale

There is an ambiguous, at best, disjuncture between perceptions about Muslim attitudes towards international political developments, and the reality at the coalface. It is this indeterminate disconnect that is at the heart of the present study. To examine effectively the differences between the views of South African Muslims, their leaders, and those of the wider *ummah*; if indeed there are any; it is imperative that we endeavour to understand the factors that influence the formation of such mind-sets.

³ See Chapter 2).

⁴ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit., p.2.

⁵ City of Johannesburg, Interpreting the Figures, <http://www.joburg.org.za/content/view/404/52/>, Retrieved 22 March 2011.

⁶ Future research into this area becomes even more critical when one considers that Cape Town has the largest concentration of Muslims in South Africa, while Durban too has a sizeable population. Smaller towns within the country have communities with their own views and beliefs.

It is hypothesised that there exists a correlation between social and demographic variables, such as gender, age, religiosity and economic status, and the opinions that the subjects of the study have about international political events. The perceptions of these events may be influenced by the subject's sources of information. Although subjects may perceive political events to have an impact on their lives in South Africa, the reasons for such perception are not interrogated in this study.

Emanating from this hypothesis, two crucial questions will be answered by the research. Firstly, what attitudes do Muslims in Johannesburg hold towards post-9/11 political developments in the international arena? Secondly, how do social and demographic variables affect these attitudes?

To decipher the findings and contextualise them in an international and domestic environment, two further questions are answered: How do these attitudes compare to other Muslim populations around the world? Moreover, what is the value of understanding these attitudes for South African foreign or domestic policy?

The consequence of the “war on terror”, driven by the administration of former US President George Bush, was the forced binary classification of people, and especially Muslims. Individuals either supported terror or opposed it; they were either good or evil, peace loving or warmongers, extremists or moderates. Yet, this was founded on a naive and unsophisticated understanding of the religious and social imperatives that drive the way in which Muslims understand religion and practice religious law publically and privately. While researchers around the world probed the perceptions and opinions of Muslims regarding critical emerging international issues it appears that in South Africa, the Government, media, national stakeholders, and society relied almost wholly on foreign research and news reports, and statements made by leaders of religious organisations and community groups to form an understanding of local Muslim perceptions.

The use of extra-territorial sources of information provides an erroneous and unreliable image of South African Muslim opinions. Consider the fact that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, studies concentrated on the factors that drove people to commit acts of violence, and the general belief – fuelled by public statements made by Islamic extremist leaders – that the escalation of violence was a direct result of the plight of Muslims in the Middle East⁷. By no means do these provide an

⁷ Bin Laden, O., [Osama bin Laden Speeches](http://www.september11news.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm), September11News.com, <http://www.september11news.com/OsamaSpeeches.htm>, 7 October 2001, Retrieved 29 March 2011.

understanding of the factors and influences behind such views, nor can they be assumed to be of relevance to South Africans.

Further afield, researchers, commentators and academics began to ascertain the nuances of Islamic jurisprudence (*shari'ah*) and its related impact on the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims. It has become more apparent that certain interpretations of Islamic law are used to motivate everything from non-violence to the slaughter of all those who are at peace with the 'infidels'.⁸ Thus it becomes important for these varied understandings of Islam to be studied in the South African context, not for the purpose of isolating and profiling potential 'terrorists', but instead to provide insight as to why individuals hold certain views. However, that is the limit of this study and its ethical mandate. To go beyond the study of attitudes would be to venture into the examination of resultant behaviour and an inevitable contribution to the creation of racial, ethnic, and religious profiles to identify and even modify such behaviour.

1.2) Relevance to the South African context

The present account is of benefit to the field of international relations as it provides a basis from which South African policy-makers may engage the Muslim community nationally on matters that are of importance to them. Furthermore, it will allow Government to engage with Muslim and other stakeholders to refine South Africa's understanding of, and policies towards, key foreign states, international organisations, thematic areas and political developments. Various theorists have shown, in this regard, that perceptions regarding social and other factors strongly influence the public's policy preferences. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins⁹, for example, conclude that in order to attain a refined political grasp of the dynamics of intergroup attitudes and relations within a state, and accordingly allocate national vigour and resources, a detailed examination of the social organisation of minority and majority communities is mandatory.

The insatiable and incongruous howls of Civil Society Organisations ("CSOs") during the administration of former President Nelson Mandela was one of the factors, according to le Pere¹⁰,

⁸ See for example: Casciani, D., Islamic scholar Tahir ul-Qadri issues terrorism fatwa, BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8544531.stm>, 2 March 2010; and also some points of debate in: Malka, H., "Must innocents die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks", in Middle East Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp.19-28.

⁹ Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V., "Minority group members' theories of intergroup contact: A case study of British Muslims' conceptualizations of 'Islamophobia' and social change", in British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 45, 2006, p.262.

¹⁰ le Pere, G., "South Africa's regional and Africa Policy: Impulses of a hegemon or partner?", in Bekker, S., & Leildé, A. (eds): Occasional Paper No.15: The African Continent: new perceptions and new policies? Case studies in Gabon, South Africa and Togo, University of Stellenbosch, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, 2004, pp. 14-24.

that drove Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, to adopt a more pragmatic and Africa-friendly foreign policy. The Government, it seems, was and still is grappling with the quandary of demystifying and amalgamating the concerns of new non-State actors into a multifarious foreign policy which itself functions in a fluid multilateral system.

Furthermore, South Africa's foreign policy has, as one of its central tenets, a firm belief in the importance of the promotion and protection of human rights for all its citizens, as well as the universal practical enjoyment of these rights.¹¹ In light of recent accusations levelled against South Africa for its status as a transit point for international terrorist groups, and Muslim violent extremists in particular,¹² this becomes paramount. National policy needs to take into consideration the various sentiments that prevail within South African Muslim society in order to establish fora for dialogue which may positively contribute to the discovery of effective solutions to protect South African national interests domestically and internationally.

Establishing the reality behind Muslim attitudes and perspectives will facilitate such national engagements to protect the rights of Muslim citizens, as well as both legal and illegal Muslim immigrants, congruous to the State's international obligations and domestic imperatives. South African President, Jacob Zuma¹³, has already taken steps towards such an integration of CSO interventions and national policy. He re-emphasised the significance of South Africa being a "state that responds to the needs and aspirations of the people". To this end, his Minister of International Relations and Cooperation had committed to enhancing "partnership[s] and cooperation with non-state actors"¹⁴.

As far as the stated national foreign policy objective of the promotion of the African Agenda¹⁵ is concerned, the views of South Africans and their relations with – particularly – the Islamic states of Arab North Africa (the "Maghreb"), is critical to inter-state cooperation and agreement. Recent estimates suggest that approximately 432.39 million Muslims reside on the African continent.

¹¹ Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Strategic Plan 2010-2013, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, 2010, p.7.

¹² Stuijt, A., UK cracks down on South African passport holders from March, <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/266934>, Digital Journal, 10 February 2009, Retrieved 03 August 2010; also see Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, United States Government, US Department of State, 2008.

¹³ Zuma, J. G., State of the Nation Address by His Excellency JG Zuma, President of the Republic of South Africa: Joint Sitting of Parliament, Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 11 February 2010.

¹⁴ Nkoana-Mashabane, M., Address by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation to the National Assembly on the occasion of the DICO Budget Vote, 18 June 2009.

¹⁵ Strategic Plan 2010-2013, Op. Cit., p.7.

Twenty-one of the continent's fifty-three states have Muslim majorities, while seven other states have Muslim communities equivalent to twenty – or more – percent of their total population.¹⁶

South Africa's actualisation of the opportunities for the pursuit of national interests through concerted multilateral fora cannot be achieved if the influence of Islam within the country and continent are discounted. Academics debate the efficacy of liberalist efforts at multilateralism,¹⁷ yet South Africa's extensive and successful engagement with nations of the global South through multilateral structures such as: the non-Aligned Movement ("NAM"), the Group of 77 and China ("G77"), and within the United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA"); has often proved to be contingent on its continental support.¹⁸ Moreover, bilateral interactions are used to reinforce multilateral engagements with formations of the Global South. Many of these states are Muslim-majority, many have large Muslim populations, and others are grappling with the effects of violent Islamic extremism.¹⁹ To achieve the critical number of votes to pass its proposed UNGA resolutions, for example, South Africa often relies on its African Union ("AU") and Organisation of Islamic Conference ("OIC") allies, as these states combine to form an effective voting bloc.

The empowerment of South African diplomats, politicians, and policy-makers to understand the mentality of their own citizens, and to compare these views with foreign publics, will facilitate international cooperation that is not bound by binary or simplistic understandings of the nature of their foreign and domestic interlocutors. This principle, indeed, is equally applicable to all South Africa's international engagements and at all levels of Government.

There are on-going debates raging within the global multilateral system on an array of issues that have arisen since the 9/11 attacks. Torture, renditions, arbitrary detentions, racial, ethnic and religious profiling, and defamation of religions are just some of these.²⁰ Even the very definition of terrorism remains a hotly debated topic.²¹ While the new US administration of President Barack Obama has ushered in some positive changes to previous US policies, the US and other NATO states are still at the forefront of international attention due to their controversial positions on these

¹⁶ Extrapolated from: Lugo, L., et. al., "Mapping the global Muslim population - A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population", Pew Research Center, Washington, 2009.

¹⁷ Klarevas, L., "Political Realism", in Harvard International Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2004, p.6. See also: Waltz, 2000, pp. 18-26.

¹⁸ Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2010, Op. Cit..

¹⁹ Kohut, A., et. al., Op. Cit..

²⁰ United Nations Organisation, Press Conference on World Public Opinion on Torture, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2008/080624_Torture.doc.htm, 24 June 2008, Retrieved 29 March 2011.

²¹ Without delving too deeply into the debate, there is a brief description on: Eye on the UN, There is no UN definition of terrorism, Hudson Institute: Eye on the UN, <http://www.eyeontheun.org/facts.asp?1=1&p=61>.

issues, as well as their continued involvement in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Concerted and informed bilateral and multilateral endeavours will enhance South Africa's engagement with the Global North in order to best realise its own national objectives.

1.2.1) *Public diplomacy*

This is an age where technological advances in the field of communications far outstrip the ability of most states to develop concrete and effective methods for controlling their communication environments. By controlling its communications environment, a state is theoretically able to influence the views and opinions of its audience – the citizenry. Three scenarios describe the phenomenon of modern public diplomacy in a digital environment.

Firstly, states are no longer able to censure the information that flows to its citizens from the outside world. For example, in 2010, the internet company Google responded to attempts made by Chinese government hackers to retrieve personal information of human rights activists in China by threatening to pull out of Beijing.²² This marked the first time a large corporation actively took a stance to condemn violations of human rights in the People's Republic. Ultimately, Google closed their offices on the mainland and re-routed all its search-engine based traffic through its offices in Hong Kong, which allows greater freedom from the Chinese intelligence services and restrictions on human rights related search terms.²³ Though some terms remain censored, political activists and average citizens have been finding ways of circumventing information restrictions, hence the covert attempts by the Chinese to subvert open internet. Further, during the 2011 Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, television news stations such as Al Jazeera and Al 'Arabiyyah had a profound impact on keeping the public informed about political developments within these countries. It was not uncommon for viewers of these stations, especially in the cases of Egypt and Libya, to see live contrasts between the pictures being broadcasted by the 'free press' and the propagandistic images being shown on state-owned television stations. Despite the desperate efforts of state machinery to show that the revolutionaries had little support amongst the wider public, the reality of the situation on the ground was constantly being beamed to the citizens.

²² Neate, R., [Google in China: we're closing tomorrow](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/digital-media/7490223/Google-in-China-were-closing-tomorrow.html), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/digital-media/7490223/Google-in-China-were-closing-tomorrow.html>, The Telegraph, 20 March 2010, Retrieved 29 March 2011.

²³ Gardner, D., [Google defies China censors by moving to Hong Kong](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1259966/Google-defies-China-censors-moving-Hong-Kong.html), <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1259966/Google-defies-China-censors-moving-Hong-Kong.html>, Mail Online, 24 March 2010, Retrieved 29 March 2011.

Secondly, states are no longer capable of absolutely restricting the outflow of information from their citizens to the rest of the world. A case in point is the outflow of information from Iranians during their national elections in 2009.²⁴ The Iranian government was unable to assert its control over the reports of unrest, state abuse of power, and electoral dissatisfaction. Images, ‘tweets’ and videos of peaceful demonstrations being met with violence were distributed through the internet to the global community. Youth activists taking part in the Arab revolutions of late-2010 and early-2011 learnt valuable lessons from their Iranian counterparts, by putting to effective use internet and social networking applications such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to rally domestic and – importantly – international public opinion to support their efforts at democratic reform. They were able to update the international public on a minute-to-minute basis about the violent and repressive measures used by the states in question to squash public dissent.

Lastly, states cannot totally restrict the communications between their citizens. This is once more underscored by the recent, innovative, and effective usage of internet and social networking sites by Arab youth activists to organise mass demonstrations against their autocratic rulers. Despite shutting down mobile and internet communications in Egypt, the regime of Hosni Mubarak was unable to control internal communications between democratic activists. Activists used the broadcasts of the international media contingent, internet-based services, and even dial-up networking protocols to bypass state-imposed restrictions and communicate with each other.

Despite these communications challenges, states can, through an understanding of the way in which its citizenry – or portions thereof – react to government communications, develop communications strategies that are able to transmit the key messages and policy positions of the state with improved efficacy. For example, the South African government, by appreciating the nuances of its domestic Muslim audience, could use its communications to garner support for national policies and programmes that may have an impact on that group.²⁵

The Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak attempted, though unsuccessfully, to counter communications efforts by democratic activists. State Security in Egypt coerced Vodafone, a leading mobile communications provider in Egypt, to transmit text messages to subscribers asking

²⁴ Christensen, C., Networking Revolt in Iran, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=33037=33037&format=0>, Middle East Online, 3 July 2009, Retrieved 02 August 2010.

²⁵ Klarevas, L., Op. cit., p.6.

them to cease the demonstrations and support Mubarak.²⁶ While the Egyptian government failed to communicate its messages through television and other media, their failures serve as a guide for other states who wish to counter anti-government sentiment on any issues relevant to a particular state. We learn that in states with burgeoning youth populations, such as South Africa, it is increasingly necessary for governments and public office bearers to interact with their audiences via popular modern media such as text messaging, social networking, and even e-mail. To exemplify this recognition of modern communications, the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in the days after taking control of the state from ousted President Hosni Mubarak, went about setting up a Facebook page to communicate with the youth and other democratic activists. Since it was set up on 17 February 2011, the page had received more than 846 000 ‘likes’, which is indicative of the vast array of audiences available and accessible to the Supreme Council via this communication medium.²⁷

The Arab revolutions are far from the only examples highlighting the inability of governments to respond to the communications challenges posed by the rise of digital activism. Entire websites have been dedicated to chronicling the power of the mobile communications network in bringing about social and political change.²⁸ The US administration has been quick to notice this, and now ‘tweets’ from senior White House officials are a common occurrence. Even in South Africa, the Presidency and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, for example, have their own respective Facebook pages, which they use to provide insights into Government policy, and communicate with their increasingly tech-savvy, and tech-hungry, audiences.²⁹

It thus becomes clear why the battle for public diplomacy is being fought in the ether, and more importantly, why it is necessary to understand the new audiences with whom states are required to communicate.

²⁶ Cassidy, K., Egypt Officials ‘Behind Vodaphone Texts’, <http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Egypt-Vodafone-Text-Messages-With-Pro-Mubarak-Propaganda-Sent-By-Government-Officials/Article/201102115922330>, Sky News, 03 February 2011, Retrieved 29 March 2011.

²⁷ Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Official Page of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, <http://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces>, Facebook, Retrieved 22 March 2011.

²⁸ See, for example, the blog MobileRevolutions, <http://www.mobilerevolutions.org/>

²⁹ See: The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa: <http://www.facebook.com/PresidencyZA>, and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Department-of-International-Relations-and-Cooperation>.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The views of Muslims around the world have been studied in detail in the post-9/11 era to gain a firmer understanding of some of the communities that have brought forth violent extremists to whom the sanctity of life is seemingly meaningless. The role of South African Muslims in the larger picture has yet to be sufficiently assessed and comprehended.

Research comparable to the current project has been conducted in Turkey³⁰, the United Kingdom³¹, and in the United States³². Muslim communities were surveyed on their views about various foreign policy issues and international events.

Research conducted by the International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO) in Turkey³³ focused on threat perceptions relating to Turkey, perceptions of Turkish allies, and the perceived efficacy of Turkish foreign policy. The survey showed that the US, Israel, and the UK placed in the top five countries thought to be most threatening to Turkey and placed the same three countries at the top of a list of countries most threatening to world peace. Interestingly, though, respondents found the European Union (“EU”) to be Turkey’s best long-term partner, and rated the US, Israel, and the UK amongst the top 10 countries most likely to assist Turkey in a time of crisis. No distinction was made, in the available documents, between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. Since Turkey is a Muslim-majority state, the results may be useful for only a cursory comparison with the present research.

In the UK, researchers from the 1990 Trust³⁴ focused on several foreign policy questions, including questions about the opinions and ideologies of the Muslim respondents. Several sets of data are relevant to the questions posed by the present study. For example, 91.4% of respondents felt that the Government of the UK did not represent their views on foreign policy,³⁵ indicating the disjuncture between the State and public which has been extensively dealt with by Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins³⁶, who essentially relate it to a rudimentary political understanding of intergroup contact between the Muslim minority, and the non-Muslim majority.

³⁰ Laçiner, S., ISRO 2. Foreign policy perception survey, International Strategic Research Organisation, Ankara, October 2004.

³¹ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit.

³² Council on American-Islamic Relations, American Muslim Voters: A Demographic Profile and Survey of Attitudes, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Research Center, Washington, 2006.

³³ Laçiner, S., Op. Cit., pp. 4, 9.

³⁴ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁶ Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V., Op. Cit.

Dispelling the myth created by sensationalist media reports which indicated strong Muslim support for terrorism, the study showed that when the terms are defined in terms of their motives and their intended targets, 86.5% of respondents strongly felt that acts of terrorism against civilian UK targets were not justifiable.³⁷ Concerning the media, 40.4% thought that the Government influenced the media, which is particularly significant to the earlier discussion on public diplomacy.³⁸ This would not have been a condemnation against the State had another 35% of respondents not felt that the media was biased.³⁹ When combined, just over three-quarters (75.4%) of the respondents felt that the media was not providing a balanced account of events.⁴⁰ The research showed that no significant proportion of respondents obtained their information from religious clerics or the *masjid* (mosque). Only 10.9% of respondents in that survey indicated that they did not feel included in the Muslim *ummah*.⁴¹ This indicates a strong perception of kinship with Muslims in other parts of the world.

Kull, et al., found that US public misperceptions about the war in Iraq were closely related to their sources of information. That study found, for example, that 80% of persons who obtained their information about the War in Iraq from Fox News were likely to have misperceptions about the war as opposed to 47% who got their news from the print media.⁴²

The 1990 Trust also asked British Muslims whether they felt that, “the ‘War on Terror’ (was) a war on Islam”. In that survey, 50.7% of respondents strongly agreed that it was. A further 30.9% agreed.⁴³ While only 27% thought that the 2006 Israeli war with Lebanon was caused by Israel, 62.7% thought that the Israelis, the US and the UK caused the war. Of the respondents, 92.5% positively viewed Israel as a terrorist state.⁴⁴ The internet and television were polled as being the most common sources of information on the Middle East, with responses of 34.3% and 33.4% respectively. Newspapers followed with 17.8%, while clerics and *masaajid* (mosques) were sources

³⁷ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit., p.3.

³⁸ Ibid., p.21.

³⁹ Loc cit.

⁴⁰ Loc cit.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.15.

⁴² Kull, S., et. al., Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War, Program on International Policy Attitudes, The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, Maryland, 2003, pp. 12-14.

⁴³ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit., p.13.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.17.

of information for a meagre 1.4% of the respondents.⁴⁵ The significance of these statistics is discussed further on in the research.

Several sets of data, relevant to this study, emerge from the Council on American-Islamic Relations' (CAIR) report on the demographics and attitudes of American Muslim voters. Generally, the Muslims surveyed were found to be younger and better educated than other Americans were. They were predominantly middle-class and had a diverse level of religiosity.⁴⁶ Much like their British counterparts, 55% of respondents felt that the 'War on Terror' was a war on Islam. Democratisation by force was a notion rejected by 90% of respondents. A just resolution of the Palestinian issue was indicated as a factor that would improve US relations with the Muslim world by 69% of those surveyed. Support for a normalisation of relations with Iran was cited by 66% of the population studied. An astonishing 88% felt that the US invasion of Iraq had been worthwhile. Significantly, 89% of the respondents were politically active in terms of regular voting, which compared almost equally to the national US figure of 88.5% voter participation.⁴⁷

The Pew Research Center regularly conducts research into the views of religious communities around the world⁴⁸. Such research focused specifically on the threat of terrorism, Islam in the politics of the surveyed states, support for terrorism, and other key Islam-related international issues.

Surveys conducted in 17 countries in 2005 indicated that younger people in various Muslim-majority states held a more favourable view of the US. This ranged from 22% in Jordan to 53% in Morocco. There were noticeable differences between male and female respondents in this regard as well. Women generally held more favourable opinions of the US than their male compatriots did; this ranged from 20% of females in Jordan (versus 21% of males) to 52% of females in Morocco (versus 47% of males).⁴⁹

The 2006 report suggests that, at that stage, Muslim publics around the world generally viewed violent Islamic extremism unfavourably.⁵⁰ Suicide bombings against civilian targets in order to

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.20.

⁴⁶ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit., p.1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.16.

⁴⁸ Kohut, A., et.al., (2005), Op. Cit.; and Kohut, A., et. al., Europe's Muslims More Moderate - The great divide: How Westerners and Muslims view each other, Pew Research Center, Washington, 2006.

⁴⁹ Kohut, A., et.al., (2005), Op. Cit., p.14.

⁵⁰ Kohut, A., et.al., (2006), Op. Cit., p.24.

defend Islam are not supported by the large majority of Muslims surveyed, though this figure varies from as much as 83% in Germany to 43% in Jordan.⁵¹ German Muslims similarly held the highest estimation of the prospects of democracy in Muslim countries (80%), while Spanish Muslims were the least enthusiastic (57%).⁵²

However, the demographic influences on Islamic communities and their perceptions of international events have not been sufficiently elucidated in the available literature. Where such analysis is available, the research is entirely focused on a single specific demographic marker. For example, Hansen, in a study of Muslims of Gujarati Indian descent, examines some of that group's characteristic views on international events.⁵³

The increased "Arabicisation" of Muslims of Gujarati origin after the 9/11 attacks on New York, Hansen argues, are part of a discernible battle for Islam between liberal, conservative, and working class (often immigrant) Muslims. Though he recognises that there are significant changes taking place within Islamic communities in South Africa, he criticises the continued racial prejudice which plagues the communities of Muslims originating from the Indian sub-continent.

The author recognises that the racial and ideological problems highlighted by Hansen to be apparent in the communities of Muslims in the Durban area, have resonance within Muslim communities in Johannesburg and indeed other parts of the country. However, numerous organisations and persons based in affluent Johannesburg areas with large Muslim communities have emphasised the measures they have in place to build relationships with, and provide support to, the Muslims and Islamic institutions in the so-called 'townships' and informal settlements to precisely counteract the Apartheid era-entrenched racial and religious stereotypes. These include individuals and groups from across the ideological divides. Hansen maintains that the "everyday life and religious identity of most Muslims" within Durban and its surrounds "are still embedded in their linguistic and racial community."⁵⁴

While steering clear of examining the ideological differences within the Johannesburg Muslim community, the present study examines the racial and socio-economic aspects of the communities

⁵¹ Ibid., p.57.

⁵² Ibid., p.46.

⁵³ Hansen, T. M., 'WE ARE ARABS FROM GUJARAT!' the purification of Muslim identity in contemporary South Africa, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 2003.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.34.

studied. Although the Muslim ‘Gujarati’ community forms a large portion of the total Muslim population and plays a very active role in Islamic matters, the Cape/Malay Muslim community is the largest in the country, and in Johannesburg the influence of immigrant Muslim communities is rapidly growing⁵⁵.

The present research aims to address both the linkage between demographics and perceptions, and the outstanding survey of Muslim perceptions within a South African context.

⁵⁵ Rawoot, I., The new new Muslims, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-08-the-new-muslims>, Mail & Guardian Online, 08 April 2009.

CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

The epistemological pursuit of identifying the connection between social and demographic variables on one hand, and the attitudes of a selected population on the other, needs to be firmly established within a quantitative methodological framework. The advantage of selecting a primarily quantitative approach to the research allows for a wide applicability of the results to similar populations.⁵⁶

3.1) Methodological approach

A quantitative methodological approach will primarily dictate the data collection techniques used to extrapolate the necessary information about Muslim attitudes towards international political events. However, to rely solely on a survey of Muslim views obtained by means of a quantitative questionnaire would not necessarily allow for the most accurate presentation of information. At face value, a quantitative methodology presents at least four challenges to the accuracy of information a researcher is able to achieve; namely: reliability, validity, researcher bias, and margins of error.

Reliability refers to the measure of a variable within the study. If the measure is reliable, it may be applied to similar variables in a similar population and still deliver consistent results. Validity is the linkage between reliability and a concept. Since a concept is prone to interpretation, and a measure is strictly based in factual data, validity measures the degree to which a specific measure and a defined concept relate to each other. Absolute validity is not possible within a social science environment, yet a high level of validity will indicate a strong relationship between a measure and a concept, thus enabling a researcher to examine the relationship with a degree of confidence.

Researcher bias poses the greatest risk to a research study in the assessment of data. It is the interpretation of meaning by the researcher, coming from their own social constructs, which may alter the results and examination thereof. Quantitative research allows little room for researcher bias as opposed to qualitative research which lends itself to skewed interpretations of data based on the reality of the researchers own view of the world. A margin of error is a statistical expression relating to the likelihood that the results obtained from a sample population does not accurately represent the results which would be obtained from a survey of the entire population. In order to make survey research practical, a small portion of a target population (in the present case, Muslims in Johannesburg) are surveyed in order to apply the results to the entire group. Aside from a

⁵⁶ Neuman, W. L., Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (3rd ed.), Allyn and Bacon, Needham Heights, 1991.

national census, in which an attempt is made to survey every single individual within a state, most polls and surveys choose a small proportion of the population to survey, and hence apply the results to the wider group. The higher the margin of error, the less applicable the results are to the population.⁵⁷

The measures taken to minimise the aforementioned risks are explained in the sections which follow. Firstly, however, it is necessary to explain the modalities of the study.

3.2) Theoretical Conceptualisation

The foundation of research into attitude and perception formation lies in the field of social psychology. As sociological theories and psychological phenomena began to interact, academics attempted to find explanations for the dynamic nature of the relationship between individuals and their environments. Demographic variables have formed an integral part of this expanding field of research, and serve to allow for in-depth assessments of people and their influences. While it is important to understand the theoretical basis of all contemporary forms of opinion research, it is beyond the reach of this paper to engage in social psychology theories. The most important points from the field that are relevant to the current research are: 1) attitudes and attitude change are affected by an individual's real or perceived position in society, and 2) social influence plays an important role in the formation and definition of the individual's understanding of their position in society. Hence, demographic factors play an important role in how people view the world around them.⁵⁸

Based on the research questions posed in the previous section, it is possible to extrapolate and define the relationships between various variables that will be studied. Van Evera's classification of variables is helpful in defining these relationships.⁵⁹

The perceptions (the Dependent Variable (DV)) of international political events in the Middle East (the Independent Variable (IV)), that are held by Muslims in Johannesburg are influenced by two factors. Intervening Variable A (IntVa) in this study is a combination of demography and socio-economic factors. Intervening Variable B (IntVb), on the other hand, indicates the media through which information is obtained. Thus, attitudes held about political events are projected here as being influenced by demography and information media in line with the research questions.

⁵⁷ See section 4.1) below for detailed calculations.

⁵⁸ Ritzer, G., Sociological Theory (4th ed.), McGraw-Hill, Singapore, 1996, pp. 400, 403, 435; and Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V., Op. Cit., pp. 245-264.

⁵⁹ Van Evera, S., Guide to methods for students of political science, Cornell University Press, New York, 1997.

The IntVa is a function of a numbers of Condition Variables (CVs) that may ultimately colour Muslim opinions. These are age, gender, race, nationality, religious adherence (religiosity), income, employment, and education. The specific measures of these CVs combines to either positively or negatively influence the DV. The Study Variable (SV) is the DV. There is a dynamic relationship between each of the CVs, while both intervening variables have an equal potential to override the influence of the other. This relationship is indicated in Figure 1.




Figure 1 - Variable Diagram

3.2.1) *Demographic Variables*

The demographic variables which have been included in the study relate to some of the measures and findings of the previously related investigations. These are explained below.

3.2.1(a) Age

As a basic demographic indicator, *age* was one of the variables included in the study. Several age categories were included, these were: 14-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and over 60. Categorisation was considered to be of greater value to the research than asking individuals to indicate their exact age in that it allowed respondents a certain amount of freedom to answer accurately while maintaining some anonymity. It has already been shown that similar research has found noteworthy differences between the responses provided by persons of differing age groups.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit.; and Kohut, et al., 2006, Op. Cit.

3.2.1(b) Gender

As with *age*, gender has been shown to have an impact on responses received in foreign research studies.⁶¹ Tessler and Warriner found that Middle Eastern women were more likely, in most circumstances, to adopt pacific opinions of international conflict than the males within their society.⁶² The present study aimed to test whether this remains true in the Johannesburg Muslim context.

3.2.1(c) Race & Nationality

Since Muslims in Johannesburg originate from many regions and countries, the examination of linkages between *race & nationality* and attitudes is primarily exploratory. Although there may exist divergences between the views of the different groups as shown by Hansen⁶³, this remains to be proven through quantitative research.

Racial categorisation was not based on specific anthropological classifications and was instead an expanded version of the traditional classifications used in South African studies: Black, White, Indian, and Coloured. The categories were designed to be easily understandable by respondents, as inoffensive as possible, descriptive, and to allow persons to self-identify with what are regarded by many as arbitrary categories. An open-ended 'race' question was unfeasible as respondents, during the pilot research study, indicated their race as being anything from their nationality and religion, to their Islamic sect or preferred school of Islamic jurisprudence.

- Black African: following the pilot research study, and after discussions with some of those respondents, it was found that many considered themselves to be African regardless of their 'racial group'. North Africans consider themselves Arab rather than Black, but also consider themselves Africans. Black African, in the sense of this study, refers then to persons from primarily sub-Saharan Africa who consider themselves Black.
- Arab: as indicated, some North Africans preferred to be regarded as Arab than Black. A category was thus provided to allow for such.
- East Asian: this may relate to all persons from states as diverse as China, parts of Russia, and Indonesia, and was included on the basis of the principle of self-identification.

⁶¹ Kohut, et al., 2006, Op. Cit.

⁶² Tessler, M., & Warriner, I., "Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes Toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East", in World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1997, pp. 250-281.

⁶³ Hansen, T. M., Op. Cit

- White/Caucasian: it is understood that some anthropologists may consider persons of Indian origin to be Caucasian, but within the South African context, it is generally understood to refer to persons of European origin, more so when linked to the category of ‘White’ persons.
- Coloured and Malay: the study specifically separated these two categories. Traditionally, both groups were regarded as Coloured by the Apartheid state. However, increasingly Coloured persons trace their heritage to Khoisan indigenous groups in the country, whereas Malay people trace their heritage to indentured slaves from the Indonesian region. Some Malay individuals indicated their offence at being forcibly considered Coloured.
- South Asian: this category was created to refer to persons originating from the Indian sub-continent. It was found in the pilot study that South African citizens whose heritage traces back to the sub-continent do not regard themselves as being ‘Indian’, and many took exception to that categorisation. Some respondents chose to identify as South African Indians, while those whose heritage traces to what are now Pakistan, Bangladesh and the like, preferred to either indicate the country name or identify as South African. Muslim respondents were generally opposed to the inference that they were ‘Indian’, and perceived it as a reference to their affiliation with the Republic of India.
- Other: given the sensitivities of arbitrary racial classification, respondents were given the option to indicate their own race based on self-identification.

3.2.2) *Socio-economic variables*

A number of socio-economic variables were included in the research survey. These included factors which may or may not have an impact on the perceptions of respondents, such as: religiosity, secular and Islamic education levels, income and employment status.

Pilot study respondents were asked to rate a number of common religious activities based on the importance they play in the individuals life. It was discovered that the respondents found the section cumbersome and difficult to understand. Taking from similar research into Islamic religiosity⁶⁴, the final survey questions were amended to ask persons three direct questions about how they view their own adherence to Islam. The scores were aggregated to determine a final religiosity score. This is in accordance with basic Islamic principles that no human can judge another’s relationship with *Allah* (God). The advantage to this method of questioning was that Muslim persons would not be offended by the line of questioning and fears of ‘being judged by the researcher’ would be

⁶⁴ Tessler, M., & Warriner, I., Op. Cit.

dramatically reduced. While this limits the ‘accuracy’ or ‘objective assessment’ of the religiosity of respondents, it provides insight into how the respondents perceive themselves. It also assists in reducing any opportunities for researcher bias to creep into the examination of results.

3.2.3) *Information and media*

Assumptions have been made by researchers and journalists that an individual’s source of information influences their opinions. This has been specifically expounded in the post-9/11 era, specifically in relation to the argument that Muslim opinions were being radicalised by Islamic clerics and other community members as they congregated at the *masaajid*. Research has already shown⁶⁵ that in the UK a very small percentage of Muslims rely on the information they receive from such sources. In the US, it has been shown that misperceptions, and hence attitudes, of individuals are related to their sources of information.⁶⁶ The sources of information of individuals may indeed play a role in attitude formation, and that is what the present study investigates in the context of Johannesburg’s Muslim communities.

3.3) Data collection

3.3.1) *Methods*

The questionnaire was administered to 110 respondents in and around the central region of Johannesburg, in which Muslim communities are most concentrated. Persons were randomly approached and asked if they were willing to participate in the survey. The survey form clearly stipulated that the research was focused on Muslims in the Johannesburg area. Respondents were asked to indicate their religion in case some of those approached did not identify with Islam.

To overcome challenges to the validity and reliability of such a limited survey, some respondents were surveyed in the broader Johannesburg area. Researchers visited randomly selected areas and sought out the nearest Muslim place of prayer. There local persons were asked to point out a few Muslim homes in the area, and these families were then canvassed. They were also asked to recommend other Muslim homes in their neighbourhood, in an *ad hoc* snowball-survey manner.

Snowball sampling was also used via e-mail. Survey forms were electronically distributed through e-mail networks and returned directly to the researchers private e-mail address. To ensure the

⁶⁵ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit.

⁶⁶ Kull, S., et. al., Op. Cit.

highest levels of confidentiality, e-mail respondents were asked not to include personal information in their replies. Once the survey documents were printed, the e-mails and all electronic copies of the accompanying documents were securely deleted from their locations. The printed responses were deposited in a sealed box that was opened after all responses were received, to ensure that even the researcher was not aware of the individual responses. The combination of these data collection methods ensured that diverse ranges of responses were received.

Additionally, as the study is not limited to South African nationals or English-speakers, a small proportion of the questionnaires were translated into key languages used by Johannesburg's Muslim community, such as Urdu and Arabic.

Initially, it was envisaged that a focus group would be convened in order to triangulate the research and overcome the limits posed by quantitative research methods. While developed to overcome shortcomings in qualitative research, the method of research triangulation⁶⁷ may equally be applied to quantitative research as way to allow for a varied methodological collection of data⁶⁸.

However, there was a general unwillingness, on the part of those requested, to engage in public discussions of a sensitive and controversial nature, despite indications that all measures were to be taken to protect the views and identities of those involved. The open-ended questions at the end of the survey form, however, proved to provide a fertile ground for obtaining qualitative responses from respondents. These have thus been incorporated into the research to balance the 'blind' understanding which quantitative research may provide.

Although triangulation in the context of the present research was not possible, the open-ended qualitative responses complement quantitative data obtained through the administered questionnaires. Different sources of data collection and the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were thus used to obtain more precise information about what Muslims in Johannesburg think about international political events.

⁶⁷ Webb, E. J., et. al., Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1966.

⁶⁸ Denzin, N. K., The Research Act in Sociology, Aldine, Chicago, 1970.

3.3.2) *Ethics*

There were three important ethical considerations that needed to be accounted for in order to ensure the cohesiveness and precision of data collected through all techniques that were employed in the research study. Firstly, the privacy and confidentiality of all personal information about respondents was of paramount importance. Unless the respondent was absolutely certain that their anonymity was ensured, they would not freely and frankly respond. Additionally, some of the information provided may have led to communal harassment and other negative consequences for the respondent if ever such information were released. To assist in building a trust relationship with the respondents, questionnaires were anonymous, and were deposited into a sealed collection box once the respondents had completed. The nature of the survey was explained to all respondents, and once their free and prior consent was obtained, the survey was administered. Some respondents requested that they be allowed to respond verbally, while the researcher noted their responses. This occurred most frequently when the respondents were unable to read or were otherwise occupied. As indicated, strict measures were taken to ensure that e-mail responses could not be linked to the individual respondents.

Secondly, the personal and religious nature of some questions required – to a greater or lesser extent – the respondent to either define their religiosity (dealt with previously) or alternatively to divulge information about their personal and possibly ‘controversial’ opinions. It should be acknowledged that not all Muslims responded in the same way to the manner in which these questions were posed. Where concerns were raised, these were dealt with by the researcher on an individual basis. Some of the concerns raised will be recounted in later sections below.

Finally, in the post-9/11 era, and taking into consideration that Muslims in Johannesburg have diverse origins, experiences, and affiliations, there was some reluctance from respondents to provide input for fear of being linked to Islamic extremist organisations or movements. Even the fear of being perceived as supportive or not supportive of such groups necessitated the utmost care in the handling, assessment, and presentation of the data collected. It is for this reason that the research does not investigate in great detail the combined effects of multiple socio-economic and demographic factors on the attitudes of Muslims. It is necessary to re-iterate the author’s moral and ethical abhorrence of contributing to any efforts aimed at the creation of racial, religious, and ethnic profiles of persons.

Approval for the research was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee (non-medical) of the University prior to the survey being conducted, to ensure that the researcher received an ethical mandate for the conduct of the research.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The following section examines the results of the surveys which were conducted between 01 March 2011 and 26 March 2011 in the Johannesburg area. The sample size was 110, as previously indicated.⁶⁹

The population in Johannesburg, based on the 2001 National Census, was 3 225 309.⁷⁰ In 2007, the population of Johannesburg was 3 888 180.⁷¹ That amounts to an approximate increase in population size of 20.5% over the 6-year period, or an annual increase of 2.93%. Assuming that the population growth rate has remained constant over the period 2007-2011, the approximate population of Johannesburg in 2011 would have been, 4 364 296 at a growth rate of 2.93% per annum over the four-year period.

If we apply the overall growth rate of Johannesburg to the Muslim population of 96 000 as it was in 2001, we can approximate that in 2011, the Muslim population in Johannesburg was 128 142.⁷² Based on these values, and assuming a worst-case percentage for accuracy of 50% with a confidence level of 95%, the confidence interval for the study would equate to 9.34%. Essentially, this indicates that there may be a margin of error of 9.34%.

The high margin of error limits the conclusions which can be deduced from the research. However, this does not necessarily restrict the examination of responses provided. It is merely symptomatic of caution that needs to be applied in relating the results to the wider population. As such, the following sections focus on areas where differences of greater than 9% were seen in responses. Where smaller differences in responses occur, these have been recounted for illustrative or comparative purposes, bearing in mind the 9.34% margin of error, unless the statistics relate to the entire sample.

4.1) Basic demographics

The following section provides a cursory overview of the respondents in the research project, based primarily on socio-economic and demographic markers. Section 4.2) below then closely examines

⁶⁹ For brevity, only results which significantly vary from the mean response patterns, or alternatively the highest and lowest scores within a specific category, are recounted in the following sections unless otherwise stated.

⁷⁰ Statistics South Africa, Community Survey, 2007, Basic Results: Municipalities, <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/p03011/p030112007.pdf>, p.10.

⁷¹ Loc. cit.

⁷² It need be noted that these are only approximate figures as no further official figures have been released since the 2001 Census.

the responses to the key questions posed in the research. In total, 25% of responses to the survey were submitted electronically, via e-mail. Although the differences between electronically and otherwise submitted surveys were not accounted for as a variable in the study, some intriguing data emerged as an unintended consequence of the two varying data collections methods. These have been highlighted in section 4.2) below.

Various methods were used to collect data from the 110 respondents. Despite the employ of strategies to discover equally the opinions of both genders, male respondents made up 56% of the sample. A number of females, when approached for responses, indicated that they “don’t talk about politics”. Some prospective female respondents opted to have their male spouses or family members respond in their stead. As one woman, in declining to respond to the survey, indicated, “I agree with whatever he thinks”. These reactions are likely linked to the perceived and cultural roles of women in Islamic communities. Cultural patriarchy is common amongst Muslim communities worldwide⁷³, and South Africa has not been immune to this. Of the responses received from women: 65% indicated that they were employed, 70% of those who indicated their income level, fell into the upper-middle and upper income categories (>R153601 per annum)⁷⁴, and 79.2% had received an education beyond Grade 10. Comparatively, of male respondents: 78.3% were employed, 46.5% indicated that they fell into the upper-middle and upper income categories, and 88.1% received education after Grade 10.

The difference in employment levels between genders may be attributed to the fact that 19.6% of female respondents were students, whereas only 5% of male respondents were students. Nevertheless, the key differentiating factor appears to be income level. Women who chose to respond to the survey were ultimately more likely to be wealthier than those who chose not to respond (though no data was recorded regarding ‘non-replies’); arguably, the financial independence of the women surveyed was directly proportional to the likelihood of them expressing their views on international politics.

⁷³ Monshipouri, M., & Karbasioun, K., “Shaping Cultural Politics in the Muslim World: Women's Empowerment as an Alternative to Militarism, Terror, and War”, in International Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2003, p.341.

⁷⁴ Based on Bureau of Market Research indications, which are in turn based on the 2001 National Census. See Roux, A., “South Africa’s Burgeoning African Middle-class: An Explanatory Note”, in Economics, Vol. 14, No. 01, Institute for Futures Research, University of Stellenbosch, January 2006, p.2. See also Van Wyk, H de J., National personal income of South Africans by population group, income group, life stage and lifeplane, 1960–2007, Bureau of Market Research, Unisa, Pretoria, 2004.

A high proportion of both male (88%) and female (86%) respondents admitted to closely following events in the Middle East. This is indicative of the regions perceived importance within the community. Results between the genders differed very little in terms of religiosity, sources of information, and perceptions of media bias.

There were marked differences in secular and Islamic education levels between the two groups. Some 16.7% of women received a secular education below grade 8 as opposed to 6.8% of men. Between grade 8 and university post-graduate levels, the differences are mostly negligible (<3%). Although, 12.5% of women attained a university degree while 18.6% of men had earned one, it is interesting to note that at a post-graduate level, women surpassed men by 2%.

Islamic education levels, however are vastly different. Up to class 10, more women received instruction in Islamic education. However, whereas 16.7% of male respondents had received Islamic education at a tertiary level, only 4.5% of female respondents had received the same.




Figure 2 - Age Group

A variety of responses were received from respondents in various age groups, as depicted in Figure 2. Of female respondents, 12.5% fell into the lowest 14-19 age category, and only 1.6% of male respondents were between the ages of 14 and 19.

A number of gaps in the data became clear when correlating responses from the different age groups with factors such as race (Figure 3), and nationality. For example, all white respondents fell into the 14-19 category, while

all respondents who identified as being Arab fell into the 20-29 category. This is largely insignificant given the size of the population and the random data collection methods employed.

It is interesting to note, however, that all respondents in the 40-49 age group indicated that they follow events which take place in the Middle East. What makes this curious is the fact that for all other age groups, between 8% and 25% of respondents did not follow these events. There may be a number of explanations for this.

Firstly, the 40-49 age group would have reached their teens beginning around 1972 (arguably an age when they would have




Figure 3 - Race

become more aware of the world around them). At the time, the attention of the world was focused on the closing stages of the Vietnam War, and the idealised American anti-war movements. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) had also taken increasingly aggressive measures to draw the world's attention to the plight of the Palestinian people. The Yom Kippur War between Israel and its neighbours had ended, and Egypt had made peace with Israel.

A second explanation for the noticeable interest in the Middle East could be the arrival of television in South Africa, around 1976. The television sets were prohibitively expensive for most of the 'Indian' and 'Coloured' communities under Apartheid when they first appeared on the market. Since all respondents within the age group identified as being of Asiatic descent, Malay, or 'Other', few would have had immediate access to this new source of information. However, later in the 1970s and early 1980s such box sets became increasingly accessible to these communities.

The confluence of these two factors may provide some explanation as to why the 40-49 age group pay particular attention to the events in the Middle East. A further argument could be made that the Apartheid system in South Africa forced many of these young people to consider the effects of injustice, cruelty, and oppression. Given that the PLO and other Palestinian groups and their allies touted the situation in the Middle East as being an issue of injustice, it is not far-fetched to imagine that the 40-49 age group felt an added bond. The close relationship between the Palestinian liberation movements and the African National Congress (ANC) are common knowledge among South African Muslims, and this is an additional factor to consider.

The racial distribution of respondents is not necessarily indicative of the population of Muslims in the Johannesburg area. While persons of South Asian descent provided the most responses, there were a number of factors which explain lower than expected responses from other groups.

Language barriers played a critical role in the responses received. Despite Arabic and Urdu questionnaires being made available to respondents, this was insufficient given the variety of languages spoken by Muslims in Johannesburg. Aside from the English-speakers, those persons who primarily spoke any of the remaining 10 official South African languages may have been unwilling or unable to communicate responses to the researchers effectively. Further, as indicated previously, the wide range of Muslim immigrants from across the African continent each speak their own languages. To provide translated versions for the numerous dialects and languages was unfeasible in a study of this size, and thus inherently exclusionary.

A factor that further limited the diversity of responses was the issue of nationality, citizenship and legal status. As identified earlier, some persons wary of engaging with researchers clarified their hesitancy as being related to fears surrounding their legal status. Some were concerned that authorities may be able to obtain or use the information they provided to their detriment. This was despite assurances being given that no personally identifiable information was being requested or recorded in any way.




Figure 4 - Citizenship

Amongst foreign nationals, 85.7% of respondents were male and 61.5% were employed. Half of the foreign nationals earned an income of between R38 401 and R614 400 per annum, which placed them in the middle- to upper-middle class income categories. This may seem surprising, but the data easily correlates with the fact that 42.8% of foreign respondents had received an education level of grade 11-12, with a further 21.4% having achieved a university post-graduate degree.

South African respondents were spread out more widely over the education-level spectrum, but fared considerably lower in the grade 11-12 category with only 27.7% of South Africans having completed grades 11 or 12 at the peak of their formal secular education. However, 17% of South African respondents received university degrees as compared to 7% of foreign respondents.

The data presented in **Error! Reference source not found.** lend credence to the notion that Johannesburg indeed houses a wide variety of Muslims from across the globe. Even a limited study such as the present one can identify eight unique nationalities from across three continents present in the Johannesburg area. These figures naturally exclude the numbers of Muslims who were unable to respond to the questionnaire due to language barriers. It is these barriers, and the low response rate amongst foreign nationals, which prevents detailed examinations of responses based on country of origin of the respondent, and for this reason, no distinction is made between foreigners in later assessment of responses.

Nevertheless, the data from the survey does point to the three perceived largest groups of Muslim immigrants. Somali, Malawian and South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) communities are considered by Muslim communities in Johannesburg to be the largest immigrant Muslim communities. Although Pakistani and Bangladeshi persons are poorly represented within the survey, it is clear that the immigrant South Asian Muslim community in Johannesburg is one of the larger groups present.




Figure 5 - Foreign Nationals

The high presence of Canadian Muslims, and the absences of the prominent Nigerian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, is an anomaly created by the previously recounted limited and limiting nature of the research project.




Figure 6 - Employment Status

The employment figures for the survey provide a mixed bag of results. The imbalance in employment levels between the sexes is noticeable. Sixty-five percent of females were employed, 13% were unemployed and 19% were students. Their male counterparts, however, had an employment rate of 78%, an unemployment rate of 11.6%, and 5% of them were students.

Of the students surveyed, 58% fell within the 14-19 age group, with the remainder falling into the 20-29 age group. The largest group of unemployed persons, who were not students, fell in the 20-29 age group. This may be indicative of a market place reluctant to employ inexperienced workers.




Figure 7 - Annual Income

In terms of racial groupings, South Asians made up 63% of the employed; Black Africans made up 50% of the unemployed; and South Asians accounted for 30% of the students, followed closely by Black African (20%) and Malay (20%).

South African citizens accounted for 89% of employed persons and 61.5% of those unemployed. Approximately 30% of employed persons had received education at a grade 11-12 level, while a further 29% of employed persons were university post-graduates. The largest unemployed categories in terms of education levels were those whose education did not pass grade 8 (some 30% of the unemployed). Thirty-eight percent of those with a grade 11 or 12 education were also unemployed.

Just under two-thirds of respondents chose to indicate their income level. It was not uncommon that respondents felt uncomfortable in providing such seemingly personal information. The categorisations of annual income, used for the purposes of this study, were as follows:⁷⁵

- Low: <R9 600,
- Low-middle: R9 601 to R38 400,
- Middle: R38 400 to R153 600,
- Upper-middle: R153 600 to R614 400, and
- High: >R614 400.

The 23% of respondents who made up the largest upper-middle income category tended to also be those who submitted surveys electronically. Sixty-eight percent of upper-middle income individuals electronically submitted. The majority of respondents between the ages of 20 and 59 earned an income of more than R153 600 per annum. Sixty-one percent of South Africans earned more than R153 600, as compared to 38% of foreigners. University post-graduates accounted for the largest number of responses, and 52% of them fell into the upper-middle income category.

⁷⁵ Roux, A., *Op. cit.*, p.2.

The second largest group were those who had received no education beyond grade 11 or 12. Thirty-




Figure 8 - Secular Education

five percent of this group earned less than R9 600 every year. An important trend which emerged from these categories related to whether or not individuals followed politics developments in the Middle East. Those who followed events in the Middle East most often were middle-class or higher. Some of the middle-class and those in lower categories tended to not indicate concern for developments in foreign lands.

Islamic education seemed to have little significant bearing on employment levels.

Figures tended to mirror the previously indicated high levels of interest across the board. However, in terms of employment, 25% of unemployed persons and 18% of students indicated that they did not follow events that occurred in the Middle East as opposed to 9% of those who were employed.




Figure 9 - Islamic Education

Figure 8 highlights the secular education levels of the respondents. It is interesting to note that respondents who had not received any secular education were as likely to follow developments in the Middle East as not. Based on secular education levels, this was the only category which displayed such ambivalence to this region. All other categories responded positively to following Middle-Eastern politics ranging up from 70% (grade 8-10 category).

Respondents were asked to indicate the highest level of Islamic education that they had attained. Figure 9 shows the itemisation of the responses to this question. Almost all respondents had received some level of Islamic education. A number of organisations have documented the

integration of Islamic studies into secular education institutes in the Muslim world.⁷⁶ In the secular South African context, no such education is compulsory. This partially explains why the only respondents who had not received an Islamic education at any level were all South African citizens.

No further discernible trends emerge from comparing the various categories of Islamic education to other demographic factors. A noteworthy departure from the evenly spread distribution of persons within the various Islamic education categories is provided by a gender-based examination of Tertiary-level education. Eighty-three percent of the respondents who had received Islamic education at a tertiary institute were male. This disparity in the Islamic education received by the different gender groups is a recognised phenomenon. Although historically some of the greatest Islamic scholars were women, cultural influences over time have dissuaded many women from aspiring to academics within the Islamic context.⁷⁷ The research reflects this trend.




Figure 10 - Combined religiosity score

Respondents were asked to rate their personal level of religiosity on a scale of one (low score) to five (high score) based on three statements. Figure 10 depicts the distribution of the combined scores for individuals across the three measures of religiosity. The majority of respondents (59%)

⁷⁶ See, for example, Rabassa, A., "Islamic Education in Southeast Asia", in Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, Vol.2, Hudson Institute, <http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/islamic-education-in-southeast-asia>, 12 September 2005; and Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, Strengthening Education in the Muslim World: Country Profiles and Analysis, USAID, <http://www.devtechsys.com/assets/Uploads/docs/publications/strengthening-education-in-the-muslim-world-country-profiles.pdf>, April 2004; amongst others.

⁷⁷ See Suleman, M. and Rajbee, A., The Lost Female Scholars of Islam, http://www.emel.com/article?id=&a_id=828, Emel.

considered themselves to be strongly religious and fell within the 80%-100% category. A further 31% of respondents fell into the high neutral category (between 60% and 79%).

	Strongly Disagree		Neutral		Strongly Agree	Invalid and Blank
a. You are religious.	1%	2%	23%	24%	49%	1%
b. Practicing religion is important to you.	1%	1%	9%	13%	75%	1%
c. You regularly take part in religious activities.	4%	4%	29%	20%	40%	3%

Figure 11 - Religiosity: distribution of responses

The un-combined religiosity scores bear out the same trends. Figure 11 shows the distribution of responses across the three measures of religiosity measures. There were only a few instances, throughout the substantive questions of the survey, where religiosity appeared to impact on responses. These results have not been recounted since, in fact, only 1 or 2 respondents were responsible for any marked differences from the norm in any given category. For example, where a single individual felt that practicing religion was unimportant and also felt that they were unaffected by events in the Middle East; it would be irresponsible to note that 100% of those who downplayed the importance of religious practice wildly disagreed with the rest of the sample on this issue.

4.2) Thoughts and perceptions

This section deals with responses to questions unrelated to demographic or socio-economic markers. It responds to questions about the opinions of Muslims in Johannesburg about events in the Middle East, and the manner in which they accumulate such information.




Figure 12 - Monitoring of events in the Middle East

4.2.1) *Monitoring of political developments*⁷⁸

Some of the responses provided when persons were asked whether they followed events which took place in the Middle East, have already been recounted. Overall, 84% of individuals answered affirmatively. Eighty-nine percent of South Africans kept abreast of developments in the region, along with 76% of foreigners.

Respondents who submitted surveys via e-mail strongly indicated that they followed events (96%), and even though responses provided in-person were slightly lower (85%), both values indicate that respondents placed a high level of importance on the region.

Demographic and socio-economic variables that showed any significant variations from the mean have been previously discussed in 4.1) above.

4.2.2) *Media and bias*

Respondents were asked if they thought that the media was balanced in the reporting of political developments in the Middle East. Respondents were also asked to indicate where they sourced their information from, although in the questionnaire it was linked it to whether respondents followed events in the Middle East.




Figure 13 - Media and balanced reporting

The results presented in Figure 13 indicate that the large majority of persons felt that the media is not balanced in its reporting of Middle-Eastern politics. The research does not venture to delineate the manner or direction in which the perceived bias occurs.

In the UK, British Muslims displayed similar mistrust of the media when it came to reporting on events in the Middle East. In the respective survey, only 2% of respondents felt the media

⁷⁸ Respondents were asked to answer either yes or no to the statement: "Do you follow events that take place in the Middle East?"

provided a balanced opinion of the Middle East.⁷⁹

Eighty-two percent of male respondents, and 76% of female respondents perceived some media bias in reporting. This sentiment was mirrored in 89% of electronically submitted responses, and 77% of written ones.

On the high-end of the spectrum, all respondents in the 14-19 age group felt that media reporting was not balanced. Conversely, only two-thirds of those in the 60+ age group felt the same way. Race group, citizenship, employment status, Islamic education levels, and income group seemed to play little role in these perceptions with the exception of those who indicated their employment status as “Other”. Based on the data these were, for the most part, pensioners.




Figure 14 - Sources of information

Only 33% of these individuals believed that the media reporting was balanced.

Another divergence from the mean was witnessed amongst respondents who had received secular education levels of grade 8 or less. This category of respondents was split down the middle with regards to whether the media were balanced or not.

By correlating the information in Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 with the previous responses, we can extrapolate a clearer understanding of the role that media sources play in perceptions of bias.

⁷⁹ The 1990 Trust, *Op. Cit.*, p.4.




Figure 15 - Most balanced media sources

Most respondents received their information about the Middle East from television, while a high percentage relied on the internet for their information. In Britain, 34.2% of Muslims relied on the internet for their information on the Middle East.⁸⁰ Interestingly, only 6% of all respondents in the present survey indicated that they got information about the Middle East from religious leaders or other community members. The 1990 Trust, reflected similar results in their research.⁸¹ This seems to contradict suspicions about the radicalising role played by religious leaders in Muslim societies, certainly so within the South African context.

Across all age groups, television was the highest scoring source of information. The departure from this was the 20-29 age group which chose the internet as its preferred source of information, though only marginally (3%).

It is clear, from Figure 15, that opinion was largely divided on which media sources provided the most balanced views of Middle-eastern developments. Al Jazeera seemed to stand out from the

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.20.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.5.

cacophony. It is significant that 13% of respondents felt the internet was a reliable source for balanced information while 7% were more cynical and said that no media sources provided a balanced view. In fact, when it comes to the internet, a staggering 96% of respondents who obtained their information from the internet felt that the media were biased.




Figure 16 - Least balanced media sources

Despite the fact that 25% of respondents got their information from television and 14% from newspapers, 16% of respondents felt that television was the least balanced in its portrayal of events in the Middle East and 11% felt that newspapers were biased. The data further points to the distinct juxtaposition between Al Jazeera, as providing a balanced view, and CNN, as providing an unbalanced view, of the Middle East.

4.2.3) *Israel and Palestine*

The data in Figure 17 represent the distribution of responses where respondents were asked to rate the corresponding statements on a scale of 1 (low score) to 5 (high score).⁸² Although these findings

⁸² The table excludes invalid or blank responses, which make up for the outstanding differences in the various categories. Page | 43

were anticipated, the results were less homogenous than expected. Figure 20⁸³ examines the arithmetic mean and standard deviations for the substantive Likert-scale responses in the questionnaire⁸⁴. The closer the mean is to three, be it less or more than three, the more neutral the opinions of respondents in general. Standard deviation measures the degree to which positive and negative responses differ from the mean. Standard deviations of less than one are indicative of largely homogenous views. The greater the figure is above one, the more varied the responses are amongst the population.⁸⁵

Israel and Palestine	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
a) Israeli and Palestinian states can peacefully coexist	41%	9%	14%	21%	12%
b) Countries with Muslim majorities should have normal relations with Israel	43%	14%	13%	10%	15%
c) Israel was justified in going to war with Lebanon in 2006	67%	7%	12%	1%	7%
d) Fatah maintain power in Palestine by Israeli and US support	15%	9%	27%	8%	29%

Figure 17 - Israel and Palestine

4.2.3(a) “a) Israeli and Palestinian states can peacefully coexist”

The first statement was designed to measure perceptions about the outlook for peace in Palestine-Israel region. The results show that the Muslims in Johannesburg largely have a pessimistic outlook for the future of peace between Israel and Palestine⁸⁶. However, a third of respondents, displayed some optimism regarding the future of relations between Palestine and Israel.

Those responding to the survey electronically had a more pessimistic outlook than other respondents did. Whereas 39% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the two states could co-exist, only 20% of electronic responses favoured such a view. Female respondents also seemed to have a more positive outlook for the region; 43% of females saw little hope for peace as opposed to 58% of males. However, 11% more women than men held a neutral opinion on the matter. Respondents who were 50 years or older tended to hold more optimism for the future of the states; between 51% and 60% of the 50-59 and 60+ categories respectively felt this way.

⁸³ See Addenda page 77.

⁸⁴ See question 14 of the survey, Addenda page 76.

⁸⁵ SPSS Techniques Series: Statistics on Likert Scale Surveys, Information Technology Services, University of Iowa, <http://www.uni.edu/its/support/article/604>.

⁸⁶ Mean of 2.51, with a standard deviation of 1.5.

Coloured, Malay, and ‘Other’ race groups also held opinions that are more favourable for the region’s future. Employment, race, income group and religiosity categories played little role in deviation from the mean. However, half of the respondents who were not educated beyond grade 8, and half of those who had received no Islamic education, said they somewhat agreed with the statement that the two states can peacefully coexist. Most respondents who did not follow events in the Middle East either strongly agreed to the statement, or remained neutral. Respondents who obtained their information from newspapers or other community members interestingly tended towards positive opinions in this category. Thirty percent of respondents who believed the media provided a balanced view of events in the region were pessimistic about peace, 30% agreed that there could be peace, while only 5% were optimistic.

4.2.3(b) “b) Countries with Muslim majorities should have normal relations with Israel”

The second statement was intended to examine the manner in which respondents believe that Muslim countries should ideally interact with Israel. Most (57%) believed that Muslim-majority states should not have normal relations with the Israeli state, to varying degrees⁸⁷. Yet, a quarter of respondents seemed to favour the normalisation of relations between Muslim countries and Israel.

Written submissions differed from electronic submissions in that 55% of written responses indicated strong opposition to the normalisation of relations with Israel. Electronic responses indicated that 40% of persons merely agreed that relations should not be normalised. Females tended to hold a more negative view of open relations between Muslim states and Israel. Continuing the trend of breaking from the mean, those in the 60+ age group favoured relations with Israel. South Africans showed a more nuanced view of relations than their foreign counterparts did; 44% of South Africans and 64% of foreigners indicated strong opposition to cordial relations.

There were no noteworthy differences between responses based on race, employment status, secular education, Islamic education, sources of information, or religiosity. Those who indicated an income level of less than R9600, however, were split. Forty percent of those respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, while a further 40% strongly agreed. Respondents who did not follow Middle-

⁸⁷ The mean for this category was 2.38 with a standard deviation of 1.53.

eastern politics, and those who believed that the media were balanced in their representation of the Middle East, tended to hold a favourable opinion of normalisation.

4.2.3(c) “c) Israel was justified in going to war with Lebanon in 2006”

This statement measured the perception of violent actions taken by the Israeli government. Johannesburg Muslims perceived Israeli aggression against Lebanon in 2006 to be unjustified; two-thirds of respondents felt this way. The strong feelings regarding this statement are evidenced by the largely negative views of the statement (a mean of 1.67), and deviation from this position at 1.21.

As with the responses to other statements, the reaction against Israeli actions was found to be higher amongst electronically submitted responses by 13% and amongst men by 9%. The only divergences from the standard response distributions were found amongst persons who earned less than R9600 annually, and amongst those who did not monitor events in the Middle East. The former category found 44% of respondents fervently agreeing that Israeli actions were justified, while 46% of those in the latter category chose to remain neutral on the issue. Sixty-seven percent of persons who had not received any secular education also preferred to remain neutral while the remaining third in the category felt Israeli actions were unjustified.

Muslims in the UK held equally strong sentiments about the negative role played by Israel. In a survey, 92.5% of British Muslims regarded Israel as a terrorist state, and 27% felt that the invasion of Lebanon in 2006 was caused by Israel.⁸⁸

4.2.3(d) “d) Fatah maintain power in Palestine by Israeli and US support”

The final statement, in some ways, reflects the confidence that Muslims place in the leadership of the Fatah government as the intermediaries between the Palestinians and Israelis, and ultimately reflects the perceived legitimacy of the organisation. While 29% of respondents said that Fatah was essentially only in power through foreign support, a telling number of respondents were undecided about Fatah’s sincerity, while 15% supported the legitimacy of the Fatah government. Confirming the diversity of opinions, the standard deviation was a relatively high 1.45, while the mean hovered around the neutral level (3.31). The low number of respondents to this question (96) relates directly to a lack of knowledge of Palestinian politics. During the survey process, respondents often indicated that they did not know what Fatah was. This may further explain the high levels of

⁸⁸ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit., p.17.

neutrality. However, due to the anonymous nature of the surveys, no information was collected about respondents who were unclear about the question.

South African citizens tended to be in agreement with the statement, unlike their foreign counterparts. Sixty percent of foreigners said that Israel and the US did not maintain the Fatah government in power, whereas only 20% of South Africans believed the same. When responses are analysed based on the employment status of the respondent, respondents were either neutral or negative about the statement aside from those who were employed. Forty-seven percent of employed persons agreed with the statement.

Lower, lower-middle, and upper-middle income categories mostly agreed with the statement. Those who fell into the upper income category largely remained neutral (64%), while the second largest demographic in this group agreed (28%). Respondents in the middle-income category were equally divided in terms of positive and negative responses.

Respondents who had been educated to grade 11 or 12 levels, and those who had obtained post-graduate degrees most strongly supported the statement. Persons educated below grade 8 most strongly rejected the statement (50%), while respondents who obtained diplomas were exactly equally split. In terms of Islamic education, respondents in the class 0-7 category tended to reject the statement; those who had received no Islamic education and those who had received tertiary-level Islamic education were split; and the rest mostly approved of the statement. Although maintaining an overall positive regard for the statement, individuals who followed events in Middle East were more varied in their responses than the ones who did not follow these events.

4.2.4) *The War on Terror*

The War on Terror	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
e) The United States-led 'War on Terror' is a war on Islam	5%	5%	6%	15%	65%
f) The United States were justified in invading Iraq	74%	7%	4%	2%	10%
g) President Barrack Obama will help improve relations between Muslims and the United States	44%	20%	19%	10%	4%

Figure 18 - The War on Terror⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The table excludes invalid or blank responses, which make up for the outstanding differences in the various categories.

The second portion of Likert-scale responses relates to the so-called ‘War on Terror’. The response distribution is indicated in Figure 18. Respondents were decidedly more aligned in their responses to these statements. The standard deviations amongst these three statements were relatively low compared to other statements in the study, as indicated in the sections that follow. Results seem to indicate strong anti-US sentiment amongst Muslims in Johannesburg. This is corroborated by responses in the qualitative sections of the survey.

The statements in this portion of the survey were intended to measure communal reactions to the events which have transpired since 9/11. They particularly focus on the role of the US, perceptions of anti-Islamic (as opposed to anti-terrorist) conspiracy, the supposed impact of the actions taken to rectify the ‘terrorism’ situation, and the presumptions for the future.

The results in this section do not tie in with other public opinion research. Kohut et. al.⁹⁰ found that women and younger people tended towards more favourable opinions of the US. However, in the present study, no such discernible trends were recorded over the perceptions of the US in terms of the War on Terror.

4.2.4(a) “e) The United States-led ‘War on Terror’ is a war on Islam”

This statement was envisaged to quantify how strongly Muslims felt that their religion was under attack from other nations. An astonishing 80% of respondents felt that Islam was under siege, and that the War on Terror had little to do with violent Islamic extremism. Although the standard deviation for the responses to this statement was 1.13, it was the lowest recorded standard deviation in the study, and mirrored the positively skewed results. Furthermore, with a mean of 4.36, respondents clearly felt strongly about this matter. Across all other categories, the results were equally tilted towards the positive.

Similar results were observed in other countries. In the US, for example, 55% of voting Muslim respondents also felt that the ‘War on Terror’ was a war on Islam.⁹¹ These feelings may be related to increasing Islamophobic perceptions within “Western” non-Muslim communities. A report analysed by Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins⁹² found that Islamophobic sentiments were fuelled by a general perception of Islam as being essentially incompatible with Western values and beliefs.

⁹⁰ Kohut, A., et.al., (2005), Op. Cit., p.14.

⁹¹ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit., p.15.

⁹² Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V., Op. Cit., p. 252.

Thus, on the other side of the coin, Muslims seem to recognise this prejudice and fall back on their own binary assessment of the relationship. They construe the relationship between Islam and the West as the timeless struggle between good and evil, truth and falsehood.⁹³ One respondent linked this directly to the perception that the West holds a “hat(red) for Islam” in the qualitative response section.

The feeling that states were attempting to suppress Islam spread was not unique. In Britain, more than 81% of respondents felt that the War on Terror was a war being waged against Islam.

4.2.4(b) “f) The United States were justified in invading Iraq”

Related to the previous question, this statement mirrors the measurement of concern that Muslims have about the *bona fides* of Western, and particularly American, actions in the Middle East. Eighty-one percent of respondents rejected the notion that the US had legitimate cause to invade Iraq. Even though responses varied to a large degree, respondents felt equally as strongly about this as they did in the previous measurement.⁹⁴

Two categories emerge that seem to buck the trend. Persons whose income was less than R9 600 were split regarding their views. Forty percent indicated strong agreement with the statement, 30% strongly disagreed, 10% agreed, and the remainder were neutral. Individuals who had not received any secular education were equally divided on the issue.

American Muslim voters echo the sentiments of the Muslim in Johannesburg with regard to the war in Iraq. Eighty-eight percent of them indicated negative sentiments towards the invasion.⁹⁵

4.2.4(c) “g) President Barrack Obama will help improve relations between Muslims and the United States”

Respondents were slightly less cohesive regarding the role of US President Obama as bridge-builder between Islam and the US, with a standard deviation of 1.18 and a response mean of 2.09. Nevertheless, these figures still indicate that respondents had a strong negative view of the statement. Once more, the results concern the views of America as an honest broker in the region,

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.254.

⁹⁴ The mean in both questions *e* and *f* measured 1.36 in difference from neutrality (plus or minus 3). This variance is indicative of the level of sentiment of the respondents.

⁹⁵ Council on American-Islamic Relations, *Op. Cit.*, p.15.

and they indicate a general cynicism over US involvement regardless of which president is in the White House.

Females and electronic-submitters took a less negative view than males and written-submitters respectively. The same is true for those who did not follow events in the Middle East. The <R9600 income group again remained divided equally between positive and negative views.

4.2.5) *General*

General	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
h) Muslim suicide bombers are terrorists not martyrs	35%	11%	21%	10%	18%
i) The Taliban offered a good representation of Islam	28%	5%	21%	14%	26%
j) Shari'ah (Islamic Law) is the solution to Muslim problems	7%	4%	18%	13%	55%
k) Democracy will bring stability to states in the Middle East	15%	6%	23%	25%	28%
l) Iran is a threat to peace in the Middle East	30%	20%	22%	9%	14%
m) The South African Government understands and responds to the needs of Muslims in this country	5%	15%	18%	36%	24%
n) Events that happen in the Middle East affect me in South Africa	12%	4%	14%	18%	49%

Figure 19 - General perceptions⁹⁶

The final portion of Likert-scale statements sought to measure the general perceptions of Muslims. The results are in many ways linked to each other, but are treated separately in the sections which follow.

4.2.5(a) “h) Muslim suicide bombers are terrorists not martyrs”

Comparable statements to this have been used in some research projects to examine the radicalisation of Islamic communities. This is an inaccurate assessment of the statement, and results from other projects have found that views of suicide bombers need to be closely examined for various reasons.⁹⁷ This statement was intended to dispel the myth that Muslims revered suicide bombers. While apparently the results seem to bear out this fact, upon closer examination and consideration of qualitative responses, the results indicate a level of disdain for suicide attacks.

⁹⁶ The table excludes invalid or blank responses, which make up for the outstanding differences in the various categories.

⁹⁷ The 1990 Trust, *Op. Cit.*

There is vast disagreement amongst Muslims in Johannesburg on whether suicide bombers are terrorists or not. Twenty-eight percent agreed that such persons are terrorists, while 46% disagreed with the statement. The standard deviation from the mean of 2.64 was a high 1.53, reflecting the discrepancy.

This variance reflects debates on-going throughout the Muslim world. It is unnecessary to delve into the canon of Islamic jurisprudence for the purposes of this study, but some of the key arguments are cursorily recounted. For the most part, the debate boils down to the way in which separate ideologies classify legitimate targets. Violent Islamic extremists use the justification that suicide bombers are attacking targets (civilians) who are complicit in either supporting or enabling the oppression of Muslims in various places. This is regardless of whether such persons are doing so actively or merely inactive in their opposition of such perceived oppression. This group regards military and state structures of the ‘oppressor’ as legitimate targets. Thus, a suicide bomber who attacks these targets is regarded as a martyr.

The majority of Islamic scholars, however, strongly oppose that view. Debates within this group are sometimes divided on whether or not military and state apparatus of the ‘oppressor’ are legitimate targets. Yet, it is agreed that the destruction of infrastructure – even to the extent of harming trees or animals – is utterly prohibited. The lives of civilians, be they men, women or children, are sacrosanct. Thus, any suicide attack on these targets is wholly forbidden, and suicide bombers in this case are vile terrorists.

To contextualise the results in this study, a number of respondents sought to clarify their views after submitting their responses. It emerged from the discussions that followed that respondents were totally opposed to suicide bombings in Muslim countries and any attacks against Muslim populations. Similarly, many clearly indicated their opposition to attacks which target any civilians; in a number of interactions, particular reference was made to attacks against Israeli citizens in this regard. When probed, opinion was split when it came to attacks against Israeli state apparatus. The few who saw such attacks as a tool of a beleaguered legitimate resistance movement differed on whether the suicide bomber was foolhardily throwing their life away, or if they were heroes to be commended for their sacrifice. As one respondent, indicating their dismay at the use of the term ‘suicide bomber’, relates, “suicide in Islam is not permissible and neither has it ever been encouraged”.

Similar results in an international survey indicate that when Muslims are asked specifically about whether they believed it was justifiable to commit acts of terror against civilians in their country, 96% responded that such actions were objectionable.⁹⁸

We turn once more to the distribution of responses. Electronic respondents were equally divided in their opinions, 30.7% of whom remained neutral on the matter. Fifty-four percent of men and forty-one percent of women rejected the statement. Approximately 40% of those between the ages of 20 and 39 rejected the statement. However, these were the lowest results when age was taken into account. Forty percent of the lower income group negatively viewed the statement while 30% viewed it positively. Individuals with an Islamic education background of class 0-7 responded positively to the statement (57%). Fifty-five percent of respondents that regarded the media as being balanced also agreed or strongly agreed that Muslim suicide bombers were terrorists and not martyrs.

There was disagreement between Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries over their support for suicide attacks. When asked whether suicide bombings in defence of Islam was justifiable, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that majority of persons in Lebanon and Jordan believed so in 2002, but by 2005, only Jordanian Muslims still believed so.⁹⁹ This divergence between Muslims in Muslim-majority states and those in Western countries may be related to the exposure of publics to democratic solutions to conflicts. Those in Western societies, and South Africa may be included in this category for this comparison, recognise the existence of viable non-violent peace and reconciliation measures in conflict resolution. Indeed, the growing optimism in the Muslim world regarding the viability of democracy noted by the Pew Project in 2005 may have something to do with the lower public tolerances of violent Islamic extremism.¹⁰⁰ Another variable, which may be drastically reducing the support for violent extremism, may be the previously recounted stance taken by Islamic jurists and academics in publically condemning such violent acts. Hence, while some Muslims still consider such attacks favourably, the majority of Muslims are increasingly questioning the Islamic legality and legitimacy of violent extremism as a form of resistance.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.3.

⁹⁹ Kohut, A., et.al., (2005), Op. Cit., p.2.

¹⁰⁰ Loc. cit.

4.2.5(b) “i) The Taliban offered a good representation of Islam”

Muslims were divided regarding their views of the Taliban and its brand of Islam. Given that the mean is 0.9 from the neutral, and the standard deviation is the highest recorded in the study, it seems that there was likely a wildly varied understanding of the statement. The statement was, in fact, specifically worded to allow for its wide interpretation. The results show that respondents had mixed feelings about the subject.

Forty-eight percent of men affirmed the statement, while 42% of women rejected it. The high negative response by women points to a possible preponderance of the treatment of women under the Taliban administration. One female respondent commented that, “(the) Taliban treated women as prisoners, and women should not be treated so badly in Islam.” Men, on the other hand, may have focused on the perceived legal and social order brought about under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Given the responses to the statement in the following section regarding the implementation of Islamic law, it is probable that the Taliban’s implementation of *shari’ah* played a significant role in determining the responses to this question.

Respondents in the 60+ age group strongly rejected the idea proposed by the statement (70%). Foreign nationals (54%) more fervently supported the notion than their South African brethren (44%) did. Those whose income exceeded R614 401 strongly disagreed with the statement. In fact, three-quarters of this group felt that way. University post-graduates and those in the <grade 8 categories mostly rejected the statement, as did those who did not receive an Islamic education and those who fell into the class 0-7 category.

Persons who followed news from the Middle East tended to agree with the statement while the opposite is true for those who did not. The majorities of individuals who got their information from radio and other community members supported the statement (56% and 75% respectively). Forty-four percent of those who believed the media were biased approved the sentiments expressed by the statement, alongside 35% of those who believed the media were unbiased.

4.2.5(c) “j) Shari’ah (Islamic Law) is the solution to Muslim problems”

The mean response to the statement regarding *shari’ah* law was 4.10, indicating strong agreement with the statement in general. Respondents saw *shari’ah* as a means of addressing the societal problems facing the world. Yet, given the previously recounted high levels of self-perceived

religiosity, it could be argued that this stems from the very manner in which Muslims understand their religion. One respondent summarises it as follows: “It is a fundamental tenet (*sic*) of the Islamic faith to believe that shariah (*sic*) law will bring peace and justice to the world.”

Under such circumstances, it is difficult to differentiate between respondents who felt that there was an intrinsic value in the perceived order which Islamic law could offer to society, and those who supported *shari’ah* law due to some religious imperative. Regardless, the perception remains that Islamic law would provide answers to the difficulties facing Muslims. Across all variable categories, the majority of respondents responded positively to this statement.

In Muslim countries, with the exception of Turkey, the majority of Muslims viewed an increased role of Islam in politics positively.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, even where support for political Islam was recorded, respondents sounded warnings with regards to the rise of violent Islamic extremism.¹⁰² In some countries, the public viewed the legal imposition of *shari’ah* law as a form of Islamic extremism.¹⁰³

4.2.5(d) “k) Democracy will bring stability to states in the Middle East”

Fifty-three percent of respondents were optimistic about the value that democracy would add to peace in the Middle East, although the degree of optimism varied. Given that the research was conducted at the height of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ democratic revolutions across the Middle East, one could have perhaps expected a greater degree of optimism, especially considering the fact that many respondents blamed the political problems in the Middle East on corrupt Arab autocrats in the open-ended questions at the end of the survey.

Almost half the respondents in the lower-middle income category held a more dim view of the role that democracy could play in stabilising the Middle East. For all other markers, respondents tended towards optimism.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.22.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.23.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.24.

4.2.5(e) “l) Iran is a threat to peace in the Middle East”

Of those who responded to this statement, 50% believed that Iran did not pose a threat to peace in the Middle East. The qualitative responses received clarify this high level of disagreement. Respondents were asked whether there were any threats to peace in the Middle East. The results were almost unanimous in their condemnation of Israel and the US as the largest threats to peace in the Middle East. Respondents further raised concerns regarding the pursuit by developed countries of oil and other resources in the Middle East as a key factor in undermining peace in the region. However, some respondents did point out other areas of concern which are briefly examined in section 4.2.6(a) below.

Although no information was taken from respondents regarding whether they identified as being *Sunni* Muslims or *Shia*, the *Shia* community in Johannesburg is known to be relatively small compared to the established and predominantly *Sunni* Muslim community of South Asian descent. Given the long historical struggles between the two different groups for the hearts of the Muslim faithful, it is expected that those who saw Iran as posing a threat to peace in the Middle East may have been considering the centuries-old feud between the two groups.

This seems to be contradicted by the fact that only 20% of South Africans disagreed with the statement whereas 46% of foreigners felt that Iran was a threat to peace. Based on race group, Iran was seen as a threat by 43% of Black Africans, 24% of Coloureds/Malays, and 24% of South Asians. Fifty-one percent of those in the lowest income group similarly felt that Iran posed some threat to peace and stability. Of those who regarded the media as unbiased, 48% felt Iran was a threat, compared to 18% of individuals who were untrustworthy of the media.

The affinity of respondents towards Iran is something which has been found in the US, where 66% of a sample of Muslim voters indicated they favoured a normalisation of relations with the Islamic Republic.¹⁰⁴

4.2.5(f) “m) The South African Government understands and responds to the needs of Muslims in this country”

The response to this question was largely positive. Sixty percent of respondents (with an overall mean of 3.60) felt that the South African Government was responsive to the needs of its Muslim

¹⁰⁴ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit., p.15.

community. The low standard deviation of responses (1.17) points to a low level of disagreement between the respondents on this subject.

Of those in the lower-middle income category, 58% negatively viewed the responsiveness of the Government. Positive responses dominated the other variable categories.

These figures are encouraging especially when compared to responses in other countries. Muslim British citizens were asked whether they felt their government represented their views on foreign policy.¹⁰⁵ An overwhelming 91.4% of those respondents did not believe so. The respondents in that survey indicated the highest levels of disagreement with their government was on foreign policy issues.

4.2.5(g) “(n) Events that happen in the Middle East affect me in South Africa”

Respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they felt affected by events in the Middle East. The results indicate that there is a close perceived link between Johannesburg Muslims and the occurrences which shape the lives of the people in the Middle East.

Those between the ages of 20 and 39, and those over 50 years of age showed some degree of difference in attitude, though the groups tended towards the positive opinion. Interestingly, the 40-49 category respondents either all agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Similarly, aside from 14% who remained neutral on the matter, those younger than 19 shared this sentiment. As previously discussed, there may be a number of reasons for the high sentiment within the 40-49 age group. It is unclear whether the heightened sense of attachment is due to the group's close following of events in the Middle East, or whether they closely monitor the Middle East because of a strongly perceived connection.

Research done in the US¹⁰⁶ has shown that Muslim voters ranked events in the Muslim world to be more important than social welfare and other domestic issues, but less important than their own civil liberties and education. In that study however, the fact that only 28% of the citizens who responded were born in the US may have had some impact on their attachments to the Middle East.

¹⁰⁵ The 1990 Trust, Op. Cit., p.3.

¹⁰⁶ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit., p.14.

In the UK, Muslims also displayed a certain level of connectedness to the rest of the Muslim world.¹⁰⁷

4.2.6) *Qualitative responses*

Respondents were given an opportunity to express their detailed feelings about the topic in two qualitative questions. The first asked: “Are there any threats to peace in the Middle East? Explain.” The second allowed for respondents to enter general comments about the research. The two sections below examine the responses provided.¹⁰⁸

4.2.6(a) Threats to peace in the Middle East

Respondents most strongly felt that the US was the most important threat to peace in the Middle East. Twenty respondents singled out the US in their assessments. The reasons for this belief focus on US support for Israel in the Palestinian conflict, which is seen by many respondents to be one of almost blind support for the Israeli state. Another reason for the US being fingered as the key culprit in Middle-Eastern unrest is the perceived drive to secure the region’s natural resources. Eight respondents argued that oil was the motivating factor for EU and US involvement in the region.

One individual summarised, in their response, a combination of factors that other respondents had independently identified. The US threat to peace in the Middle East, according to them, was because of:

1. “America’s Middle East policy,
2. “America’s partiality towards Israel,
3. “America’s supporting dictators in the Middle East, (and)
4. “(A)merica’s non-intervention in Israel’s strangle hold (*sic*) on Palestine, ...”

While respondents blamed the US, and to a lesser extent the EU and other US allies, for threatening instability in the region due to their perceived pursuit of natural resources, the bulk of the liability was placed on the manner in which these states support Israel and scupper unbiased mediation efforts. Respondents point specifically to the disparity of treatment between Israel and the Palestinians in the peace processes. Similarly, respondents alluded to the perception created by international media coverage of global events that the lives of Muslims, being killed by Israeli, US and allied military forces in the region, were not weighted equally with the lives of non-Muslims. It

¹⁰⁷ The 1990 Trust, *Op. Cit.*, p.5.

¹⁰⁸ Where necessary, poor grammar and typographical errors of a non-significant nature have been corrected.

was believed by many that any loss of life is grave, but for some reason, greater attention was focused on the injuries and deaths suffered by non-Muslims while the hundreds killed across the Islamic world were poorly regarded.

It is Israel, judging by the responses received, which holds the unenviable second most threatening status in the eyes of Muslims in Johannesburg. Those responses which elucidated on why Israel posed a threat naturally pointed to the Palestinian situation as the primary reason. The opinion is that the Israeli state: illegally occupies Palestinian lands, sabotages peace through the expansion of settlements, forces the starvation and illiteracy of the Palestinians, commits terrorist acts against the meagre Palestinian infrastructure, and rejects the right of return of Palestinian refugees. There was a perceptible level of anger aimed at Israel. Respondents, in general, seemed to favour notions of peace based on the 1967 borders. However, a couple of respondents took a stronger stance and questioned the right of Israel to exist as a State. Zionism was also blamed for threatening peace in the region.

The pursuit of oil and other natural resources in the region was also seen as a threat to peace. Some persons blamed the US and its allies for their reckless quest, while the other respondents who listed resources as a threat tended to hold that there was some form of global conspiracy to strip Muslims of the wealth of their lands, and kill them in the process. One respondent went so far as to explain that though some may regard this as paranoia, those “in the know” were aware that this was merely a smoke screen for “control and domination”. This also ties in with the idea that the War on Terror was a war on Islam. The general feeling gauged from responses was that Israel and the West sought to use every measure and justification available to subdue Islam in the Middle East.

The besieged mentality of Muslims extended to the idea that previous dictatorial and autocratic regimes were propped up by the West for this specific purpose. To take it further, the US, Israel and their allies in the West would determine the fate of these states once the dust from the revolutions settled, and thus wrestle control from the legitimate democratic states.

Democracy in itself was highlighted as a threat to regional stability. These views likely explain the minority pessimistic views of democracy explained in section 4.2.5(d) above. It may be that democracy, as opposed to *shari'ah* rule, was a concern for respondents, but given the levels of distrust of “puppet regimes” and fears of Western control of Arab governments, it is far more likely

that individuals feared that true Arab democracy would not be allowed to flourish. This further links to pessimistic views of the Fatah government recounted in 4.2.3(d) above. It was recognised that even though Hamas legitimately won elections in the Gaza strip in the elections of 2005¹⁰⁹, the fact that the US and other states refused to recognise their legitimacy¹¹⁰ due to their support of violence against Israel tended to support the notion that true Arab democracy will not be allowed to succeed.

Despite these views, not all respondents pointed blame to the West for threats to regional stability. A number of respondents recalled poor education and development levels within the Middle East as being a partial threat to harmony. The feeling was that with better education and social services, the ‘machinations’ of foreign countries would have a more profound impact on securing peace in the region. Religious fundamentalists were also apportioned blame for volatility in the region, and this may relate back to the 28% of respondents who felt that Muslim suicide bombers were terrorists.

One individual noted that “Iran(‘s) want(ing) to bring Shia rule to the Middle Eastern states” was a cause for concern. This supports the argument made in section 4.2.5(e) above that distrust of Iran amongst respondents harks back to the Sunni – Shia conflict within the context of the Middle East.

4.2.6(b) General comments

The general comments provided by respondents often reflected what they or others said in their examination of threats to the Middle East. The section appeared to be an extension, for the most part, of the previous comments. For this reason, comments which mirror what has been recalled in the preceding section are not repeated here.

It emerges from an examination of the answers provided that Muslims recognised that peace and stability in the region was an achievable goal. Various recommendations were made as to how this should or could be achieved. Increased unity between Muslims in the region stood at the forefront of solutions to the problems plaguing the region. Respondents additionally believed that Israeli and Palestinian citizens, as opposed to their respective governments, could realistically join to overcome their differences. However, most respondents proffered Islam as the solution to the volatility. They differed as to whether that should take the form of *shari’ah* law being implemented in its totality, or

¹⁰⁹ “Big Hamas win in Gaza’s election”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4214375.stm, 28 January 2005.

¹¹⁰ Frost, M., “Hamas”, <http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/hamas2.html>.

whether political Islam should take a more influential role in the democratic systems which emerge from the ashes of the revolutions.

Another point which emerged from the two qualitative questions was the distrust of the UN. Some said that the UN acted as an agent of the US in particular, and also sought to protect Israel from international scrutiny. Yet, some respondents indicated that they felt that the reason for the UN acting unequally was due to the control of the Security Council, and they still held the rest of UN structures in high regard.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The research project, when formulated, sought to answer two questions. Firstly, what do Muslims in Johannesburg perceive of events in the Islamic world, focusing on the Middle East in particular. Secondly, it aimed to examine whether various socio-economic and demographic variables played any role in the opinions that this group held regarding the specified international political events. It further proposed to investigate the comparison between responses in Johannesburg with responses in other parts of the world. It was also posited that the sources through which Muslims obtain their information on the Middle East impacted the opinions of respondents. Finally, it intended to delineate the value of the research for South African policy makers in terms of domestic and foreign policy. The following sections summarise the findings of the research project and respond to the hypotheses listed above.

5.1) Perceptions of Muslims in Johannesburg

Half of the Muslim respondents in Johannesburg felt that Palestinian and Israeli states could not peacefully co-exist indicating that they held little hope for the future of the region. Thirty-three percent said that they did hold hopes for peace; 21% only somewhat felt this way while the remaining 12% felt strongly optimistic about the outlook. This stems from a strong perception that Israeli motives are anything but peaceful, based on their expansion of settlements, the construction of the “Apartheid wall” (as one respondent put it), Israeli state-sponsored terrorism, and the economic stifling of the Palestinian people. In this vein, 57% of Muslims said that Muslim-majority states should not have normal relations with Israel, while 25% argued that they should.

Respondents took a more critical view of Israeli actions in terms of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006. Reflecting the perception that Israel is an aggressive state, 74% of those surveyed regarded the Israeli incursions into Lebanon as unjustified. The majority of individuals (37%) held that the Fatah government held onto power in Palestine due to American and Israeli support, relegating the administration of Mahmoud Abbas to another “puppet regime”. However, a sizable number (27%) remained neutral on the issue with the remaining 24% supporting the independence and legitimacy of Fatah.

Eighty percent of the sample indicated that the War on Terror was in fact a crusade against Islam. The indication was that the US and its allies sought the destruction of Islam, and merely used the excuse of violent Islamic extremism as a means to divert attention from their true aims of the suppression of Islam. However, not all held this view. Some indicated that natural resources were

the primary objective of Western interventions and politics in the Middle East. Oil was perceived as playing a large role in this. The invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies was thought to reflect this plundering of “Muslims natural resources”. Eighty-one percent of respondents thought that the US unjustifiably invaded Iraq. Given that no weapons of mass destruction – the insipid excuse provided as justification for the invasion – were found, this may too have played some role in the responses, though no such suggestion was gleaned from the qualitative research responses.

Belief in the promise of the presidency of US President Obama as a bridge-builder between East and West was limited due to a general mistrust of the US and implied anti-US sentiment. Sixty-four percent said that President Obama offered little hope in improving relations between Muslims and the United States.

Muslim suicide bombers were regarded as martyrs by 46% of those questioned, while 28% regarded them as terrorists. The apparently shocking results, however, are greatly tempered by the debates in Islam about the subject. Once consideration is given to the fact that respondents almost entirely rejected the notion that suicide bombings against civilians were justified, the results then read differently. In this scenario, the positive view of suicide bombers relates to those who attack state security and military apparatus of regimes perceived as being oppressive. No distinction in such an analysis, or in other research conducted globally, indicate that the regime is necessarily oppressive against Muslims only. Thus, it could be said that most of the 46% of respondents support suicide bombings as a form of resistance against ‘legitimate’ targets of an oppressive regime, while decrying the use of such violence against civilians.

Forty percent of the surveyed population thought that the Taliban portrayed a good representation of Islam, while 33% felt the opposite was true. Respondents were mostly critical of the Taliban’s treatment of women in Afghanistan, while others argued that the endeavour to implement *shari’ah* law – however warped such an implementation was – was nonetheless commendable. Given the grave concern that respondents had for the problems facing Muslims around the world, and correlating closely with perception of a US-led global war against their religion, it is non-too surprising that 68% of respondents felt that *sharia’ah* law was the solution to Muslim problems. It is also clear then why so many showed some admiration for the Taliban initiative. Numerous respondents pointed toward a need for Muslims to turn back to the roots of their faith in times of such difficulty. Concomitant with this return, *shari’ah* is seen by some as a religious imperative necessary for the establishment of peace and justice.

It may seem, on the face of it, contradictory then that 53% of respondents believed that democracy would bring peace to the Middle East. The Arab uprisings that were sweeping across the *Maghreb* and Middle East at the time of the survey likely influenced this strong perception. Yet upon consideration of research conducted in other parts of the world, the support for *shari'ah* law and democracy are not necessarily contradictory. A strong case can be made that respondents recognise the need and value of democracy, but simultaneously feel that political Islam and indeed Islamic law should play a role in any democratic Muslim society.

Results of the research indicate that 50% of individuals did not believe that Iran was a threat to peace in the Middle East. When probed further regarding this in the qualitative sections, respondents pointed to the US, Israel, Palestinian situation, oil, and other causes as offering greater threats to the region. The 23% who felt that Iran was a threat, likely believed so based on traditional beliefs of conflict between Sunni Muslims and Shias which have wrought destruction in the Middle East for almost 1400 years.

Muslims in Johannesburg tended to favourably view the interaction between Muslims and the South African government. Sixty percent of respondents felt that the Government understood and responded to the needs of Muslims. This may represent a number of important facts. Given the nature of the research and questions posed, individuals may have viewed the question in two ways. Firstly, the question could have been understood on its face value to relate to South Africa's domestic treatment of its Muslim community. Secondly, respondents could have taken the context of the other questions in the survey to understand the statement in terms of Muslims' foreign policy needs. The approval rating of 60% is a positive assessment of the Government regardless of the manner in which the question was understood.

Government may understand this approval to relate closely to its foreign policy principals since 67% of Muslims in Johannesburg tended to feel that events in the Middle East impact on their lives in South Africa. Further strengthening the argument is the research from the UK and US which have shown that Muslim approval ratings for governments were linked closely to Muslim views on the foreign policy of their state.

5.2) The impact of socio-economic and demographic variables, and the role of the media in perception formation¹¹¹

The results show that at least some of the study variables had an impact on the perceptions of Muslims in Johannesburg with regards to international political events. The results were not consistent for any of the variables. Depending on the question posed, the variables which played the largest role in attitudes varied. Future research may find it insightful to look into the reasons why results seemed to differ sporadically between respondents in the various categories listed below.

In terms of gender¹¹², there were a few marked differences between the opinions held by each of the sexes. Women had a higher mean (2.30) than men (1.87) when considering the impact that Barack Obama would have on improving relations between Islam and the US, thus tending to have a less negative view of the role that he could play. As indicated previously, women tended to a lower mean (2.64) approval of the Taliban's representation of Islam as compared to their male counterparts (3.38). Women also tended to believe that democracy could bring peace to the Middle East more than men.

An examination of the means of each of the different age groups for their responses to the statements shows a mixed-bag of results.¹¹³ For the first statement, it appears that as respondents' age increased, so did their tendency towards believing that Israel and Palestine could co-exist peacefully. Those in the 50-59 age category tended to feel that Muslim states should not have normal relations with Israel, while those over 60 years of age were neutral; other age groups fell somewhere in-between. Those in the 20-29 age group held a less negative view of Israel's invasion of Lebanon than other groups. The most neutral criticism of the US invasion of Iraq came from those in the 14-19 category. Persons in the over-60 category indicated the least hope for President Obama as mediator between Islam and the West, and similarly showed the strongest opposition to the insinuation that the Taliban offered a good representation of Islam. Individuals in the 14-19 category (4.43) most strongly believed that the South African government understood and responded to their needs as opposed to those in the 30-39 category (3.23). Those in the 40-49 category felt most closely linked to events in the Middle East, while those in the 20-29 category felt the smallest such connection.

¹¹¹ Bracketed figures in the following sections indicate the mean score of responses unless otherwise indicated.

¹¹² See Table 1

¹¹³ See Table 2

The responses received in terms of race group are more difficult to analyse given the low number of respondents who fell into a number of categories.¹¹⁴ There was only one respondent in the ‘White’ category, and one in the ‘Arab’ category. For this reason, only the ‘South Asian’, ‘Black African’, and ‘Malay’ categories are examined here. Malay persons tended to believe, more so than Black and South Asian respondents, that Israel and Palestine could peacefully co-exist. Black Africans held more neutral views of the US justification for its invasion of Iraq. Malays held more negative views of the Taliban, and South Asians felt more neutral about the role of *shari’ah* in solving Muslim problems. Black Africans also tended to feel less attached to events in the Middle East.

Citizenship did seem to impact on the opinions held by respondents.¹¹⁵ For example, South Africans (2.40) tended to view Iran as less of a threat to peace in the Middle East than foreign nationals (3.15) who tended towards neutrality. However, the differences between the groups, in general, related more to the strength of their views rather than indicating opposing views of South Africans and foreigners.

The employment status of respondents appeared to have some role in their perceptions.¹¹⁶ Due to a low number of responses in the ‘Other’ category, as well as among students, these have been excluded from examination. The greatest effect of the employment status of respondents was to modify the degree to which they felt a certain way about the relevant statement. To illustrate, unemployed persons held a more negative view of President Obama’s role in mediation (1.38) than those who were employed (2.20).

Like their citizenship status and employment levels, the income level of respondents seemed to play a large part in the perceptions that they held.¹¹⁷ Unlike those two categories, however, the difference in income had a more noticeable effect on opinions. For statements ‘c’ and ‘f’ on the survey, which relate to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the United States’ invasion of Iraq respectively, there was a clear trend indicating that opinions progressed from neutral-positive in the lowest income group (3.56 and 3.10 respectively) to strong disagreement with the statements amongst the highest income category (1.08 and 1.00 respectively). Thus, for these statements, it seems that the greater a respondent’s income, the greater the chance that they strongly disagreed with the statement. Another trend that emerged related to the lower-middle income category. Respondents in this category

¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, Table 3 shows the mean comparison for these all groups.

¹¹⁵ See Table 4

¹¹⁶ See Table 5

¹¹⁷ See Table 6

viewed most negatively the statements relating to: Muslim-Israeli relations, Barrack Obama, suicide bombers, democracy, Iran, and the South African Government.¹¹⁸

While there were differences in responses received based on the secular education levels of respondents, no clear trends emerged.¹¹⁹ In general, responses followed the direction and magnitude of the overall mean. Similar results were found when comparing mean scores based on the Islamic education levels of respondents.¹²⁰

Whether or not respondents monitored events which took place in the Middle East impacted on the magnitude of their opinions on the relevant statement.¹²¹ Those who did not follow such news, for example, tended to be more neutral or positive (3.23) than those who did follow such news (2.28) about the need for Muslim countries to have normal relations with Israel. Further to this, the differences between those who believed that the media provided balanced reporting of the Middle East and those who did not believe so were negligible.¹²²

5.3) Final thoughts

Although the data reflects the views of Muslims regarding their status in the wider globe, the survey shows¹²³ that Muslims in Johannesburg do not necessarily judge their situation in South Africa in the same light. On a global scale, Muslims feel besieged by prejudicial views of their religion and have adopted a similarly oppositional stance towards non-Muslim communities in response to this. In South Africa, however, the comprehensive Constitutional protection of religious freedoms differs from the lack of explicit religious protection in the US and UK. Thus, Johannesburg Muslims seem less concerned with strong religious identification.

In the two reports from the US¹²⁴ and UK¹²⁵, Muslims' responses seem to be driven by their Islamic identity. In this survey, it was found that religiosity had almost no effect on the responses chosen by respondents.

¹¹⁸ These correspond to statements b, g, h, k, l, and m.

¹¹⁹ See Table 7

¹²⁰ See Table 8

¹²¹ See Table 9

¹²² See Table 10

¹²³ See 4.2.5(f).

¹²⁴ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Op. Cit.

¹²⁵ Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V., Op. Cit.

A concern for the author is the un-contextualised publishing of articles, in South African journals, of articles relating to Muslim communities worldwide. Without providing a frame of reference regarding the situation in South Africa, academics often may find themselves providing narratives about Muslim communities in other countries. Though they may not intend to do so, the result may be that readers begin to incorrectly associate phenomenon witnessed elsewhere as having resonance amongst South African Muslims. It is hoped that this research will assist in providing some framework for contextualisation.

To illustrate this, a report published by the South African Institute of International Affairs (“SAIIA”) focused on the radicalisation of Islamic societies worldwide. While the author focuses on the growing concern of Western countries regarding the perceived radicalisation of their Muslim citizens, they provide a litany of untruths in their assessment. What is most concerning is the perception that the article creates that Islamic leaders are responsible for radicalisation, that Islamic educational institutes are responsible for radicalisation, that younger people are being radicalised, and that Islamic communities in Western countries are inherently dissatisfied with their national values and Western liberalism in general.¹²⁶

The present survey, and indeed similar research done in other countries have largely found these accusations to be baseless. As previously indicated, only a handful of Muslims in Western countries tend to get their information from Islamic leaders. The present survey also, for example, found very little correlation between the age groups of respondents, and any of their opinions and perceptions. Similarly, there was virtually no correlation between Islamic education levels and the perceptions of Muslims regarding events in the Middle East. Further, research in the US and UK show that Muslims disagree largely with the foreign policy of their respective governments, and that such disagreement has nothing to do with the national values of those countries. Even though Besada argues that Muslims are disgruntled with the lack of responsiveness of governments to their religious needs, none of the research studied for this paper, nor indeed the present findings corroborate these claims.

This study has investigated the perceptions of Muslims in Johannesburg regarding various events in the Islamic World, particularly focusing on the Middle East. In doing so, it is shown that the sources used by respondents, and indeed how they perceive media bias, have little to do with their views.

¹²⁶ Besada, H., “Radicalisation of Islamic Societies Worldwide and its impact on negative Western perceptions of Islam”, in Wheeler, T. (ed.), South African Foreign Policy Monitor, South African Institute of International Affairs, March/April 2006, p.1.

While differences exist in the responses provided by individuals falling into the various categories of socio-economic and demographic variables, these tended to impact most on the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with statements posed by the research. Income levels, citizenship status, and employment status all showed a greater degree of impact on perceptions than other variables. Future research would need to examine closely the reasons behind the differences in opinion recorded across the various categories of variables to deepen the understanding of the Muslim community in Johannesburg.

The South African Government, while noting the generally positive attitude of Muslims towards it, should take into consideration the seemingly increasing view that Islam and Muslims are ‘under siege’. Muslims, both citizens and foreign nationals, play an active role in the Johannesburg community. The creation of mechanisms and fora to engage with this religious community may be helpful in dismantling the weight of the fear and prejudice which is bearing down on Muslims. To improve South Africa’s standing with the Muslim populations in other countries, the successes of the South African Government in addressing the domestic and foreign policy concerns of Muslims needs to be studied and shared with states around the world, and with African states in particular.

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ADDENDA

ANNEXURE A - QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. It has been designed to record the attitudes that **Muslims in Johannesburg** have towards events in the Middle East. We are not going to collect any personal information about who you are; the survey is totally **anonymous**. **Please don't write your name, address or contact details anywhere on the questionnaire form.** No personal information will be passed on to any third party. You may select which questions you wish to answer. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to ask the person conducting the survey. [Turn over for more information. You can tear off and keep this section.]

SECTION A – Tell us about yourself

1. Area of Residence: _____
2. Religion: _____
3. Gender: <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male
4. Age Group: <input type="checkbox"/> 14-19 <input type="checkbox"/> 20-29 <input type="checkbox"/> 30-39 <input type="checkbox"/> 40-49 <input type="checkbox"/> 50-59 <input type="checkbox"/> 60+
5. Race Group: <input type="checkbox"/> Black African <input type="checkbox"/> Arab <input type="checkbox"/> East Asian <input type="checkbox"/> White/Caucasian <input type="checkbox"/> Coloured <input type="checkbox"/> Malay <input type="checkbox"/> South Asian (India/Pakistan etc) <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify): _____
6. Are you a South African citizen? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If not, what is your nationality? _____
7. Employment Status: <input type="checkbox"/> Employed <input type="checkbox"/> Unemployed <input type="checkbox"/> Student <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify): _____
a. If employed, please indicate how much you earn each year: <input type="checkbox"/> <R 9600 <input type="checkbox"/> R9601 - R38400 <input type="checkbox"/> R38401 – R153 600 <input type="checkbox"/> R153601 – R614400 <input type="checkbox"/> >R614401
8. The highest level of formal education you have achieved: <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> <Grade 8 (Standard 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Grade8-Grade10 <input type="checkbox"/> Grade11-Grade12 <input type="checkbox"/> Technical College <input type="checkbox"/> Diploma <input type="checkbox"/> University – Graduate Degree <input type="checkbox"/> University – Post-Graduate Degree <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify): _____
9. The highest level of formal Islamic education you have achieved: <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> Class0-Class7 <input type="checkbox"/> Class8-Class 10 <input type="checkbox"/> Class 10 > <input type="checkbox"/> Tertiary Institute (Islamic or Secular) <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify): _____

SECTION B – Media and religion

10. Do you follow events that take place in the Middle East? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No					
a. If you answered Yes above, from which TWO places do you get most of your information about the Middle East? <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Newspapers <input type="checkbox"/> Television <input type="checkbox"/> Internet <input type="checkbox"/> Religious leaders <input type="checkbox"/> Other community members <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____					
11. Do you think that the media are balanced in their reporting of events that happen in the Middle East? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No					
12. Which media source do you think is: a. the most balanced? _____ b. the least balanced? _____					
13. On a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree), please answer the following questions:					
	1	2	3	4	5
	Strongly Disagree		Neutral		Strongly Agree
a. You are religious.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
b. Practicing religion is important to you.	<input type="checkbox"/>				
c. You regularly take part in religious activities.	<input type="checkbox"/>				

If you want to know about the details of the study once it is complete, please provide an e-mail address or contact detail on the **separate list** provided by the volunteer conducting the survey. If you want more information, want to find out about the results, or want to lay a complaint, you can contact the researcher, ZAYD DADABHAY: E-mail: zayd.dadabhay@gmail.com; Tel: 082 889 5004. If you wish to register ethical or more serious concerns, you can contact the Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg on: Tel: 011 717 1234.

SECTION C – Tell us your views

14. Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree):

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
	1	2	3	4	5
Israel and Palestine					
a) Israeli and Palestinian states can peacefully coexist	<input type="checkbox"/>				
b) Countries with Muslim majorities should have normal relations with Israel	<input type="checkbox"/>				
c) Israel was justified in going to war with Lebanon in 2006	<input type="checkbox"/>				
d) Fatah maintain power in Palestine by Israeli and US support	<input type="checkbox"/>				
The War on Terror					
e) The United States-led 'War on Terror' is a war on Islam	<input type="checkbox"/>				
f) The United States were justified in invading Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/>				
g) President Barrack Obama will help improve relations between Muslims and the United States	<input type="checkbox"/>				
General					
h) Muslim suicide bombers are terrorists not martyrs	<input type="checkbox"/>				
i) The Taliban offered a good representation of Islam	<input type="checkbox"/>				
j) Sharia'h (Islamic Law) is the solution to Muslim problems	<input type="checkbox"/>				
k) Democracy will bring stability to states in the Middle East	<input type="checkbox"/>				
l) Iran is a threat to peace in the Middle East	<input type="checkbox"/>				
m) The South African Government understands and responds to the needs of Muslims in this country	<input type="checkbox"/>				
n) Events that happen in the Middle East affect me in South Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>				

SECTION D – Optional detailed answers

15. Are there any threats to peace in the Middle East? Explain.

16. General comments:

ANNEXURE B - MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION TABLE FOR SUBSTANTIVE LIKERT SCALE RESPONSES

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>St. Dev.</u>
a) Israeli and Palestinian states can peacefully coexist	106	1	5	2.51	1.50
b) Countries with Muslim majorities should have normal relations with Israel	104	1	5	2.38	1.53
c) Israel was justified in going to war with Lebanon in 2006	103	1	5	1.67	1.21
d) Fatah maintain power in Palestine by Israeli and US support	96	1	5	3.31	1.45
e) The United States-led 'War on Terror' is a war on Islam	105	1	5	4.36	1.13
f) The United States were justified in invading Iraq	106	1	5	1.64	1.30
g) President Barrack Obama will help improve relations between Muslims and the United States	106	1	5	2.07	1.18
h) Muslim suicide bombers are terrorists not martyrs	103	1	5	2.64	1.53
i) The Taliban offered a good representation of Islam	103	1	5	3.09	1.58
j) Shari'ah (Islamic Law) is the solution to Muslim problems	106	1	5	4.10	1.24
k) Democracy will bring stability to states in the Middle East	106	1	5	3.43	1.38
l) Iran is a threat to peace in the Middle East	103	1	5	2.54	1.40
m) The South African Government understands and responds to the needs of Muslims in this country	107	1	5	3.60	1.17
n) Events that happen in the Middle East affect me in South Africa	105	1	5	3.91	1.38

Figure 20 - Mean and Standard Deviation for substantive Likert scale responses

ANNEXURE C – MEAN COMPARISON TABLES¹²⁷

Gender		
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>Female mean</u>	<u>Male mean</u>
a (2.51)	2.70	2.38
b (2.38)	2.26	2.47
c (1.67)	1.75	1.60
d (3.31)	3.21	3.40
e (4.36)	4.48	4.24
f (1.64)	1.91	1.43
g (2.07)	2.30	1.87
h (2.64)	2.83	2.50
i (3.09)	2.64	3.38
j (4.10)	4.02	4.13
k (3.43)	3.74	3.23
l (2.54)	2.50	2.57
m (3.60)	3.53	3.64
n (3.91)	4.00	3.87

Table 1 - Mean comparison (Gender)

Age						
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>14-19</u>	<u>20-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60+</u>
a (2.51)	2.29	2.22	2.30	2.40	2.96	3.30
b (2.38)	2.14	2.74	2.23	2.53	1.88	3.00
c (1.67)	1.71	2.26	1.50	1.47	1.21	1.75
d (3.31)	2.43	3.15	3.45	3.55	3.33	3.75
e (4.36)	4.57	4.26	4.35	4.36	4.04	4.91
f (1.64)	2.43	1.93	1.35	1.33	1.33	1.80
g (2.07)	2.14	2.14	1.91	2.07	2.33	1.50
h (2.64)	2.14	2.81	2.81	2.71	2.58	2.00
i (3.09)	3.57	3.19	3.15	3.07	3.08	2.00
j (4.10)	4.29	4.04	4.22	3.80	4.04	4.20
k (3.43)	3.86	3.57	3.14	3.73	3.21	3.82
l (2.54)	2.14	2.76	2.76	2.67	2.21	2.18
m (3.60)	4.43	3.75	3.23	3.80	3.50	3.45
n (3.91)	4.43	3.56	3.82	4.73	3.74	4.00

Table 2 - Mean comparison (Age)

¹²⁷ The tables below compare the mean responses to each of the substantive statements ('a' through 'n') to the mean responses recorded in each of the respective categories.

Race								
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>Black African</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>East Asian</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Malay</u>	<u>South Asian</u>	<u>Other</u>
a (2.51)	2.33	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.25	3.58	2.28	3.00
b (2.38)	2.40	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	2.64	2.28	3.00
c (1.67)	2.53	.	1.40	1.00	1.75	1.50	1.61	1.00
d (3.31)	2.71	.	3.50	2.00	3.00	3.75	3.40	3.50
e (4.36)	4.47	.	4.80	5.00	4.75	4.69	4.07	4.40
f (1.64)	2.33	.	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.23	1.52	1.17
g (2.07)	2.00	4.00	1.20	1.00	2.25	2.38	2.17	2.00
h (2.64)	2.87	.	3.00	1.00	2.25	2.62	2.71	2.67
i (3.09)	3.47	.	4.00	5.00	1.00	2.46	3.09	2.00
j (4.10)	4.73	.	3.80	5.00	3.75	4.00	3.96	4.00
k (3.43)	3.07	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.69	3.37	3.67
l (2.54)	3.00	.	1.60	1.00	2.50	2.15	2.76	1.83
m (3.60)	3.87	5.00	3.00	5.00	3.50	3.38	3.52	3.83
n (3.91)	3.80	3.00	1.60	5.00	4.25	4.15	4.06	4.00

Table 3 - Mean comparison (Race group)

Citizenship		
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>South African</u>	<u>Foreign National</u>
a (2.51)	2.57	2.07
b (2.38)	2.44	1.86
c (1.67)	1.61	1.86
d (3.31)	3.52	2.23
e (4.36)	4.36	4.00
f (1.64)	1.56	2.14
g (2.07)	2.05	1.93
h (2.64)	2.62	2.85
i (3.09)	3.08	3.54
j (4.10)	4.06	4.21
k (3.43)	3.51	3.00
l (2.54)	2.40	3.15
m (3.60)	3.56	3.69
n (3.91)	3.95	3.54

Table 4 - Mean comparison (Citizenship)

Employment				
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>Student</u>	<u>Other</u>
a (2.51)	2.55	2.23	2.42	4.00
b (2.38)	2.44	1.77	2.58	3.00
c (1.67)	1.66	1.50	2.00	1.33
d (3.31)	3.50	3.15	2.73	2.00
e (4.36)	4.29	4.38	4.50	5.00
f (1.64)	1.55	1.69	2.17	1.00
g (2.07)	2.20	1.38	2.08	1.00
h (2.64)	2.82	2.54	2.33	1.00
i (3.09)	3.03	3.38	3.33	1.00
j (4.10)	3.97	4.31	4.42	3.33
k (3.43)	3.43	3.23	3.75	4.50
l (2.54)	2.54	2.58	2.00	3.50
m (3.60)	3.51	3.62	4.08	3.75
n (3.91)	3.84	4.15	3.83	5.00

Table 5 - Mean comparison (Employment Status)

Income					
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<R9 600	R9 601- R38 400	R38 401- R153 600	R153 601-R614 400	>R614 401
a (2.51)	3.10	2.00	1.92	2.63	3.25
b (2.38)	3.00	1.86	1.92	2.78	2.50
c (1.67)	3.56	1.71	1.54	1.40	1.08
d (3.31)	4.00	3.43	3.10	3.67	3.36
e (4.36)	4.10	4.14	3.77	4.63	3.50
f (1.64)	3.10	1.86	1.38	1.28	1.00
g (2.07)	2.78	1.71	1.92	2.08	2.25
h (2.64)	2.90	1.67	2.83	2.92	3.08
i (3.09)	3.38	3.43	3.77	3.16	1.67
j (4.10)	4.70	3.86	4.54	3.60	3.17
k (3.43)	3.67	2.71	3.00	3.60	3.92
l (2.54)	3.63	1.86	2.77	2.44	2.50
m (3.60)	3.30	2.71	3.77	3.48	3.42
n (3.91)	3.70	4.14	3.31	4.17	4.25

Table 6 - Mean comparison (Income)

Secular Education								
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>None</u>	<u><Grade 8</u>	<u>Grade 8-10</u>	<u>Grade 11-12</u>	<u>Technical College</u>	<u>Diploma</u>	<u>University Graduate Degree</u>	<u>University Post-Graduate Degree</u>
a (2.51)	1.25	3.25	2.10	2.48	2.33	2.67	2.13	3.00
b (2.38)	1.75	2.75	2.20	2.23	1.67	2.67	2.27	2.61
c (1.67)	2.33	1.43	1.30	1.86	1.67	1.22	1.94	1.43
d (3.31)	2.67	3.00	3.00	3.54	3.00	3.00	3.13	3.52
e (4.36)	4.25	5.00	4.40	4.27	4.00	4.63	4.18	4.17
f (1.64)	3.00	2.50	1.70	1.93	1.33	1.22	1.35	1.17
g (2.07)	1.50	1.25	2.10	2.06	3.00	2.00	2.24	2.26
h (2.64)	1.00	2.50	2.70	2.63	2.50	2.88	2.88	2.95
i (3.09)	4.00	2.63	2.90	3.48	4.50	3.63	3.18	2.30
j (4.10)	4.75	4.00	3.30	4.57	4.33	4.22	4.12	3.48
k (3.43)	3.25	3.38	3.55	3.47	3.33	3.50	3.29	3.70
l (2.54)	2.50	2.14	3.55	2.52	2.67	2.25	2.94	2.04
m (3.60)	4.00	3.13	3.45	3.68	3.33	4.13	3.76	3.26
n (3.91)	4.00	4.50	4.00	3.84	4.00	4.88	3.75	3.50

Table 7 - Mean comparison (Secular Education)

Islamic Education							
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Class 0-7</u>	<u>Class 8-10</u>	<u>Class 10+</u>	<u>Tertiary Institute</u>	<u>Other</u>	
a (2.51)	3.50	2.63	2.57	2.92	1.42	1.60	
b (2.38)	2.75	2.26	2.38	2.36	2.00	2.80	
c (1.67)	1.50	1.21	1.74	1.65	1.67	1.60	
d (3.31)	3.00	2.78	3.27	3.73	3.25	4.25	
e (4.36)	4.25	4.11	4.29	4.69	4.33	4.20	
f (1.64)	1.75	1.68	1.40	1.52	1.83	2.00	
g (2.07)	1.50	1.95	2.12	1.93	2.25	1.80	
h (2.64)	1.75	3.47	2.63	2.48	2.09	2.50	
i (3.09)	2.50	2.79	2.88	3.08	3.83	4.00	
j (4.10)	3.50	3.89	3.89	4.22	4.58	4.20	
k (3.43)	3.50	3.05	3.54	3.63	3.25	3.60	
l (2.54)	2.25	2.74	2.69	2.12	2.73	2.20	
m (3.60)	3.75	3.47	3.31	3.68	4.00	3.80	
n (3.91)	3.67	3.58	3.91	4.11	3.83	4.60	

Table 8 - Mean comparison (Islamic education)

Following of events in the Middle East		
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>Follow events</u>	<u>Do not follow events</u>
a (2.51)	2.57	2.38
b (2.38)	2.28	3.23
c (1.67)	1.48	2.62
d (3.31)	3.31	3.46
e (4.36)	4.32	4.46
f (1.64)	1.57	1.85
g (2.07)	2.03	2.23
h (2.64)	2.71	2.38
i (3.09)	3.15	2.85
j (4.10)	4.08	4.15
k (3.43)	3.43	3.15
l (2.54)	2.47	2.83
m (3.60)	3.62	3.38
n (3.91)	3.98	3.38

Table 9 - Mean comparison (Following of events in the Middle East)

Balanced Media		
<u>Statement (total mean)</u>	<u>Balanced</u>	<u>Not balanced</u>
a (2.51)	2.70	2.43
b (2.38)	3.10	2.21
c (1.67)	1.85	1.59
d (3.31)	3.37	3.37
e (4.36)	4.35	4.34
f (1.64)	1.95	1.56
g (2.07)	2.32	1.97
h (2.64)	3.60	2.49
i (3.09)	2.65	3.16
j (4.10)	4.10	4.09
k (3.43)	3.85	3.41
l (2.54)	3.47	2.36
m (3.60)	4.15	3.41
n (3.91)	4.25	3.90

Table 10 - Mean comparison (Balanced media)