

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In theory, perhaps, it is time to reconsider the impact of **PR** on elections in emergent democracies, especially in Africa, by avoiding to generalise excessively on the basis of the cases known best. In practice, this two - case study has been challenging such pattern, by making reliable inter-area comparisons across different political developments, historical trajectories and economic potentialities.

The degree of **PR** on electoral outcomes found in these two societies, was so minimal or residual that it provided the empirical basis for another theoretical development, in the hope that further analysis may be of value in developing a more encompassing approach not limited solely on the suggested monocausal explanation, i.e., the impact of the **PR** system on electoral outcomes and peaceful transitions.

The outcomes of elections can to a significant degree, be affected by the national context in which elections occur. But the context per se does not dictate or determine the outcomes of the electoral results. These are normally mediated through their respective political actors and processes. Future studies should continue to investigate factors that facilitate better election outcomes. Such studies will make a valuable contribution to the advancement and development of the democratic transition processes in Africa.

The findings negate the explanation of the link between **PR** and electoral outcomes and peaceful transitions in this two - case study. Peaceful transition of an electoral process is not due primarily to the link with the **PR** system. **PR** system is not the only factor shaping the conditions for a peaceful democratic transition.

Research demonstrated that there is no compelling reason linking the **PR** system with electoral outcomes. Instead commitment to the peace process and leadership behaviour played a key role in the outcomes of elections, whereas Lijphart and Reynolds depart from the positional variable that stresses that **PR** has a great effect on electoral outcomes. This research introduced and examined other variables such as political and particular social conditions, and the political economy to test the nature of **PR** in influencing the electoral outcomes. This is not to suggest, however, that Lijphart and Reynolds' contributions are of secondary importance.

The **PR** theory still provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the role of the **PR** system on electoral outcomes in some countries. In other countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, it requires an extended theoretical framework that includes other variables which strengthens the causal link between the **PR** system and the electoral outcomes.

These varied variables increase the understanding of the electoral outcomes. Far from diverting the attention away from the dynamics of the electoral process, the variables focus on the empirical findings of this two - case study.

These findings seem to have two important implications for the study of elections and electoral outcomes. First, all countries are different and their political processes and political economies equally so; Second, a theoretical model of elections is not linear. On the basis of this two - case study to assume that all countries that undergo the **PR** electoral system should have the same electoral outcomes, given the **PR** electoral study done on 123 African countries by Lijphart and Reynolds, is inconclusive and can be misleading and wildly unreasonable.

From the findings, there is no evidence to suggest that List **PR** had either through its procedures, rules and regulations or through its apportionment method in this case, the D'Hondt formula applied in Angola and Mozambique, produced any mechanical effect of disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats in the legislature. However, Reynolds (1994:181) acknowledges that the D'Hondt formula is the least proportional and often gives a slight bonus to the largest parties. Whereas both Hare and Sainte-Lague formulas are the most proportional and lean towards the smaller parties, the Droop system is therefore considered to fall somewhere between the first three formulas.

In order to ask more questions such as what other factors, other than the **PR** system, may have had an impact on electoral outcomes, the research adopted what Knottnerus,

1987:113, calls “path analysis”⁷¹ or regression methodology that focuses on other factors which may influence electoral outcomes. This becomes relevant in the theory of democracy built under the notion of the will of the people which in some cases by struggling to adapt to a true democratic culture, negate a peaceful political change by resuming the war, like the losing opposition did in Angola, and in other cases like Mozambique, the losing opposition embarked on a more open political culture based on peaceful replacement of government which recognised the legitimacy of the electoral outcomes and assured the process of democratisation to be effected.

In examining the first ever electoral experiences of Angola and Mozambique, it becomes evident that for political transitions and emergent democracies to survive and prosper, it is clearly desirable and critically important to avoid anything that should accentuate divisions and set one party up against the other. This was precisely what the major opposition party did in Angola. By resorting to war and not accepting the electoral results, **UNITA** gave the impression that electoral outcomes, the electoral process and the **PR** system were altogether flawed.

However in Mozambique, the major opposition seems to have had a truer understanding of the democratic game and an increased sentiment of national unity. The major Mozambican opposition cooperated with the efforts to peace and assured that the democratic life of Mozambique depended mainly on a stable and peaceful environment to which all parties had to be held responsible.

Furthermore, in Angola, the major opposition party undermined the role of the opposition party in a pluralist contest by acting not so much as a national movement but as a political group fighting at any cost, for the rival political hegemony of that country. By advocating war instead of peace and harmony, **UNITA** destroyed the very democratic nature of the **PR** system and inspired and promoted the rise of a post-electoral crisis which that country then faced.

The violent form of the major opposition in Angola was based on the ill-fated thinking that “ A guerilla army that is not defeated has in essence won the war”⁷². This was reported to have been said by Elias Salupeto Pena, Chief of the **UNITA** delegation at the Joint Political and Military Commission, overseeing the installation of peace and democracy.

Clearly this did not encourage the building process of mutual trust, tolerance for diversity and a propensity for accommodation and compromise between the opposition and government. This political behaviour shaped by the spirit of armed violence, made the peaceful transition in Angola inviable.

As Lodge et al (2002:224) put it correctly: “Most important, however, despite their mistrust of each other and their stalling tactics, the contending parties in Mozambique (in Namibia too) ultimately demonstrated their will to implement the peace agreement-a factor that was unfortunately absent in Angola. Both Frelimo and Renamo were thoroughly aware of the fact that neither of them commanded the resources to enforce a

military solution to the conflict and therefore realised that neither them nor the country could afford an abortive transition to peace and democracy”⁷³.

A far-reaching conclusion of this work lies in the findings which show that in theory, **UNITA** embraced the Bicesse Peace Accords but in practice, even before the elections it was implementing the use of violence through delaying tactics by occupying more municipalities and adamantly rejecting to handover the territories under its occupation to the government. This was asserted on April 3, 1992, by deserted **UNITA** Generals N’Zau Puna and Tony da Costa Fernandes, former Minister of Interior and Minister of External Relations, respectively, who claimed that “in the Likua region near the Namibian border, **UNITA** had a secret army ready to resume the war”⁷⁴.

This and other events demonstrate quite clearly that the outcome of the elections or the transition to democracy in Angola had already been devised by one of the contending parties even before the elections or the **PR List** system could be applied. The difficulties experienced in completing the demilitarisation process had a negative influence on the completion of a successful electoral transition in Angola.

Because, as it was said elsewhere in this work by Ottaway (1991:71), political parties should not have armies, given that the monopoly of legitimate force belongs to the state in a democratic system of government and administration.

What accounts for the difference in democratic transition outcomes in these two countries with the same national **list PR** electoral system, can be attributed first to the different

levels of organisation of elections in Angola and Mozambique and their different social and political and economic context. Secondly, the role of opposition political parties in these two countries are sharply dissimilar. The two major political parties in Angola and Mozambique, **UNITA** and **RENAMO**, respectively, appear to share very similar views in terms of campaigning strategies. Nonetheless, **RENAMO** had the ability not to disrupt the outcome of the elections, and “...overwhelmingly, Mozambique wanted peace”⁷⁵.

The results of this study underpin that, in terms of the theory that underlines that **PR** facilitates peaceful transition in a war-torn country, a rethinking of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the democratic processes in Africa is necessary. This work has confirmed that election models in Angola and Mozambique did not operate differently from Western models. But all what is needed is to locate and analyse the proper democratic context in which an election model operates.

What is remarkable in this comparative study is the fact that Angola’s democratic transition was not peaceful but its democratic nature should not be questioned. The Angolan experience whose list **PR** had no threshold, was perhaps better than in the Mozambican case where it had a threshold of 5%. As a result of this, there was no great encouragement for party polarization in Angola. Rather it provided a multitude of different parties across the country (see Appendix 1, pp. 113). Evidence equally shows that what seems to have undermined the electoral outcomes in Angola, were the conditions within which the elections under the **PR** system were held. For instance, should the demilitarisation process have been fully completed and the losing party had

accepted the electoral outcomes without the resort to war, certainly the transition would have been as peaceful and democratic as in the Mozambican case .

Furthermore, the overall additional conclusions about this comparative study can be seen at three different levels: political, economic and military, as these provide evidence to validate the assertion why in Mozambique the outcome of ‘founding elections’ was accepted and in Angola it was not.

In political terms, in Mozambique, political actors and the international community were committed to avoid a replay of the Angolan situation, i.e., the post-electoral crisis. Such a situation was not desirable and would have set a bad precedent for neighbouring countries with young democracies, including South Africa. Therefore, both international and regional actors effectively put pressure on the parties (**FRELIMO** government and **RENAMO**) to comply with the Rome Peace Accords. Particular engagement was made on the part of the UN, and the South African, Italian and Zimbabwean governments for the peace process to hold. Foreign powers, especially the USA and Italy, financed a special UN-administered Peace Fund to support **RENAMO**’s transformation of guerrilla movement into a political party.

In Angola, given Unita’s close relationship with former President Mobutu, Unita still drew considerable logistical advantages from, then, Zaire and even from Zambia under President Chiluba. Also in Angola, the international community lacked significant leverage over the situation because, instead of retraction, Washington and Moscow

continued to exercise substantial influence on **UNITA** and **MPLA** as done in the Cold War. The UN's mandate and resources in Angola had been inadequate for the magnitude of the task of restoring peace in such a vast country with 1.246.700 square kilometers. Angola was got only 350 military observers, 90 police monitors and about 400 civilian election observers. The time-frame of 16 months for accomplishment of the provisions of the Accords in Angola had been too short, considering the complexity of the tasks to be carried out, the distrust between the two parties, the logistical obstacles and lack of infra-structures.

At economic level, contrary to Mozambique, the post-electoral crisis in Angola was also motivated by the war's economy on resources. Whereas the **MPLA** government controlled oil-producing areas, **UNITA** controlled the main diamond-producing areas to generate substantial revenue from diamond sales, for funding the war.

At military level, contrary to Mozambique, elections in Angola had not been conditional on the fulfillment of the military tasks. For instance, despite many UN Resolutions, **UNITA** did not allow the extension of state administration to any area under its control. In Mozambique, because of the incomplete process of cease-fire, demilitarisation and demobilisation of government and rebel forces, the UN-supervised elections that were due to be held in October 1993, resulted in elections being postponed to 27 October 1994. At the time of launching the peace initiative in Angola, **UNITA** was considerably strong having its guerilla activities spread almost across the country and holding many localities

under its control. This fact, combined with the situation of incomplete demilitarisation and demobilisation of its troops, made them think that the best option in case of losing elections was the military one. In contrast, in Mozambique at the launching of the peace initiative, **RENAMO** was not as successful as at the beginning of its armed struggle, being confined to the central province of Sofala. Partly because being a rebel movement very much dependent on foreign sponsorship in terms of finance, armaments and logistics. Such material and financial support ceased to exist. Therefore, **RENAMO's** upperhand was not the same as that of **UNITA**.

In evaluating the main research question for this research is: "Can we understand the political settlement and the relatively stable politics of modern Mozambique on the one hand and on the other, the enduring conflict since 1992 in Angola, as both being partly the consequences of the adoption of a particular electoral system, i.e., List of Proportional Representation? If this is the case, why did similar electoral arrangements lead to such different outcomes?"

The political settlement and relatively stable politics of modern Mozambique and the enduring conflict in Angola after the 1992 elections rest on the fact that Mozambique's major opposition party, **RENAMO**, in spite of some initial reluctance in accepting the electoral results, later agreed that the best way of building a democracy was to give practical meaning and essence to the Rome Peace Accords by transforming the politics of

armed opposition into politics of consensus and into a strong and vibrant opposition in Parliament.

Contrary to Angola where **UNITA**, by rejecting the electoral outcomes and resorting to war, compromised the principles on which free and fair elections are founded. **UNITA** as the major opposition party in Angola preferred bullets to ballots as a means of contestation for the transfer of state power, thus demonstrating disregard to the peace and reconciliation programme devised in the Bicesse Peace Accords and this shaped and dictated the electoral outcomes.

The first related question is: “How far did the use of List Proportional Representation contribute to the development of democracy in Angola and Mozambique?”

The lessons drawn from Angola and Mozambique are that the **PR** system choice was generally helpful by ensuring multipartyism and democratisation. For instance, List **PR** system did not benefit dominant parties such as **MPLA** and **UNITA** in Angola or **FRELIMO** and **RENAMO** in Mozambique but parties who represented minority positions.

The findings do not demonstrate or suggest that List **PR** may have caused any anomaly in the electoral outcomes in Angola, although there was some concern by respondents about the 5% threshold imposed by the **PR** electoral choice in Mozambique. Instead list **PR** was effective and responsive in producing a degree of proportionality in the translation of

votes into seats especially for the minority parties, in Parliament, which enables this legislative organ to express the full range of views in a democratic society.

In relation to the second related question: “In a war torn-country like Angola would the **PR** electoral incentives have been sufficient to prevent the post-electoral crisis?”

The findings in Angola by withdrawing the burden of the post-electoral crisis from the electoral choice, suggest the renewed support for the List **PR** system as it allowed greater access to the legislature by minority parties which they would not have achieved in a majority or plurality constituency system.

Certainly, had a majoritarian or plurality constituency system been applied small parties in Angola and Mozambique alike would have been excluded and **MPLA** and **FRELIMO** would have obtained a majoritarian democracy which is prejudicial to democratic transition and would relegate the minority parties to permanent political subordination. As Lijphart (1994:85-104) acknowledges that majoritarian systems tend to yield not only more disproportional results than **PR** systems, but also gives results that fluctuate more in their degree of disproportionality from election to election. There are more parties in **PR** systems than in plurality and majority systems.