

COMMUNIST CHINA'S AID TO AFRICA 1956-1980

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines, evaluates, and analyses the rationales for, and the performance as well as results of Communist China's aid to Africa between 1956 and 1980. Several predictions on the future course of Communist China's aid activities are ventured.

This study is, *inter alia*, based on published Communist Chinese sources.

The main purposes of Peking's aid activities in Africa are as follows: gaining diplomatic recognition, securing membership in the United Nations, forcing the Republic of China out of Africa, extending Peking's influence into Africa, and striving to move into a leadership position in Africa.

After twenty five years of involvement, Peking has achieved its objectives of gaining diplomatic recognition and of securing U.N. membership. It has succeeded in forcing the Republic of China out of most of the African states. However, its success in extending its influence into Africa has not been impressive. Neither has it succeeded in its quest for leadership, because of the constraints of its own internal problems, African nationalism, Western challenges, and Soviet competition.

Communist China's aid policy towards Africa is undergoing certain changes. It will continue to make aid promises, but these will decline in magnitude. These are likely to be substituted by trade, sports, cultural and educational exchanges, etc. However, as South Africa is the last target of its revolutionary activities in Africa, Peking's military assistance to South African "liberation movements" will form a major part of its future aid commitments. Though Peking's influence may increase, it is unlikely to move into a leadership position in Africa.

# DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

Yun-sheng Chi

李韻聲

15th October, 1984

## DEDICATION

To my wife, Jo-chin. Without her encouragement and support, I could not have completed this dissertation.

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I am greatly indebted to Professor D.T. Kunert, my supervisor, for his constant help and guidance, and also for his extra patience with me as a foreign student whose problems included the matter of language.

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## PREFACE

Three reasons stimulate my interest to do this study. The first reason is the growing importance of Communist China in the world arena. Prior to the late 1950s, Communist China was regarded by the Western world as an intimate ally of the Soviet Union. Its role in the international arena was viewed by the West as a subordinate to the Soviet Union and seen as an integral part of the Communist bloc. Therefore it faced the containment imposed by the United States which led the West against the Soviet Union in Cold War. However, since the 1970s Communist China's importance in international politics has risen dramatically because of three intertwined causes: the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute; the inclusion of Communist China in the United Nations; and Western illusions about Communist China.

In 1969 Chinese armed forces confronted Soviet military forces on the Sino-Soviet border. This incident revealed the long existing hostility between Communist China and The Soviet Union to the Western world. The illusion of Communist solidarity was shattered and western decision makers, especially those of the United States, were quick to capitalize on the knowledge that they could use the rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union and ally with Communist China to check the

power of the Soviet Union and to contain the Soviet threat. Therefore the United States immediately embarked on a policy of rapprochement with Communist China. America's new gesture towards Communist China did give China an opportunity to make use of the intense international situation resulting from the US-Soviet confrontation and to emerge as a third power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally the American new policy not only brought Communist China into the U.N., but also conferred upon Communist China the seat of permanent membership in the Security Council in 1971. With the veto power in the United Nations, Communist China's attitudes towards international issues began to have a decisive effect on the operations of this international organization. Under these circumstances anyone who is concerned about international affairs cannot ignore Communist China's activities in the world.

The second reason which arouses my interest to do this study is the fact that Communist China is not a developed and rich country, while it extends aid to other countries. Since the aid to Egypt in 1956, Communist China has extended promises and aid to numerous African states. But unlike other aid-giving powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union, Communist China itself is a poor, aid receiving, country. Its average living-standard is below that of some of its aid-recipient countries in Africa, for example Congo, Zambia and others.

Even in 1956 Communist China still received aid from Soviet Union. Its economic activities were largely dependent on Soviet assistance. Chou En-lai, the Premier of Communist China then, frankly confessed that "It is difficult to imagine that we can coop ourselves<sup>2</sup> up and do without aid". In order to get Soviet aid, Communist China had to bear severe repayment terms. All aid from the Soviet Union was delivered to mainland China as a debt, not free of charge. Communist China had to<sup>3</sup> repay the debt by :

- (a) gold or international currency like U.S. Dollar or pound,
- (b) agricultural products; and
- (c) important metals.

The Soviet goods extended to Communist China were priced higher by the Soviets than those goods in international<sup>4</sup> market .

Communist China's economic situation has not much improved even up to the late 1970s. According to the World Bank, the standard of living in Communist China falls into the lower one-third or middle of the world<sup>5</sup> nations . One of Communist China's official newspapers openly admitted in its editorial that a serious economic and financial crisis existed in mainland China. The Chairman of its National Planning Council, Yao Yee-lin,

reported a 12 billion JMP (1 JMP = 0.5 \$) deficit in 1980 budget<sup>6</sup>. Considering the past and present economic standing of Communist China, its overtures of economic aid towards Africa, which is far away from China, become increasingly interesting.

The third reason is the growing importance of the African states in world politics and their involvement with Communist China.

After World War II, the former African colonial empires of Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal collapsed as new independent African states emerged. The newly-formed African states were granted U.N. membership and form a new group in the U.N. They can exert an influential effect on the decisions of the U.N. through the "one nation one vote" principle which is the basic principle of that international organization. Considering the fact that there were 45 African members in the U.N. in 1979<sup>7</sup>, which was nearly one third of the 152 full membership of the U.N., we cannot ignore the important role of African states in international politics. Hence the impact of Communist China's aid policy to Africa and the reactions of African countries to Communist China's aid are worth our attention.

Footnote

1. George Kurian (ed.) The Book of World Rankings (London: The Macmillan, 1979) P. 83
2. Jan Delayne, The Chinese Economy (London: André Deutsh 1973) P. 24
3. H.K. Kao, The Development of Communist China's Foreign Policy (Taipei: Cheng Chung, 1978) P. 48
4. Ibid
5. World Bank Atlas (Washington D.C.,: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1969) cited from John F. Copper, China's Foreign Aid (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1976) P. 1
6. Selected Documents of Communist China's Affairs (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1982 March 31) P. 31
7. Year Book of the United Nations 1979, P. 1335

## CHAPTER ONE

### Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

#### PART I

#### The Definition of Foreign Aid

Although "foreign aid" has been practiced for more than three decades since the end of World War II, it is difficult to define the term "foreign aid". The term appears to have been first used to describe the Marshall Aid Plan, the assistance that the United States extended to European countries after the Second World War. Because the plan (Marshall Aid) was created for a specific purpose and for a definite period, its meaning and scope were precise and clear<sup>1</sup>. From its beginning in 1948, the development of the concept of foreign aid has become quite complex. American aid, for example, has undergone several changes since the Marshall Aid Policy, moving from its basic economic nature to military aid and then back to economic aid<sup>2</sup>. The changes in the nature and purpose of aid have made a definition much more difficult than that used to describe Marshall Aid. Professor Hans Morgenthau explicitly expresses that "of the seeming and real innovation which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than aid"<sup>3</sup>.

John White also indicates the difficulty in defining the

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meaning of foreign aid as follows :

"As it happens, 'aid' is rather hard to define. If we define it statistically — say, grants and loans on very generous terms - we have to include all sorts of things, such as bribes or supplies of military equipment, which most aid - givers prefer not to discuss. If we fasten on the aid-givers' motives, saying that only those resources which are provided with the intention of promoting development should be called aid, we are perpetuating the old illusion and ignoring the fact that the aid-givers' motives are inevitably mixed. If we allow that motives are mixed but demand that the term 'aid' should only be used for those transactions which do in fact promote development, then we are saying that aid never fails, because if it failed, it would not be 'aid'".

However, foreign policy scholars are still trying to describe the essence of foreign aid. Professor Hans Morgenthau points out in his study that there are six types of foreign aid. i.e.:

- (1) Humanitarian foreign aid;

- (2) Subsistence foreign aid;
- (3) Military foreign aid;
- (4) Bribery;
- (5) Prestige foreign aid; and
- (6) Foreign aid for economic development .

Although Hans Morgenthau seems to regard the payment to a foreign minister or ambassador from a government as aid—an aspect not generally accepted by other scholars like John White,—it is obvious that there are two crucial elements necessary to describe foreign aid in Morgenthau's definition. Firstly: a transfer of money, goods and / or services; and secondly: transfer from one nation to another .

Although John White evades a definition of foreign aid, he proposes methods for assessing the results of a heterogenous collection of transactions, and states that :

"The term 'aid' will be used to cover any transfer of resources from rich countries to poor countries which the former choose to call 'aid', i.e. any transfer the effectiveness of which is publicly assessed, though perhaps hypocritically assessed, in terms of the benefit to the recipient".

An obvious flaw exists within this description put forward by John White, i.e. the transaction must take place between a rich and a poor country. This precludes any assistance—aid—given by one poor country to another, or by a poor country to a rich one. However, aid does exist between two poor countries or by a poor country to a richer one. An example of this is Communist China's aid to Africa. According to World Bank classification, Communist China is a poor country whose GNP per capita in 1976 was only 410 which was lower than that of Ghana (580), Morocco (540), Congo (520) and Zambia (420)<sup>8</sup>, but we cannot deny that the transfer of Chinese resources to these African countries is aid. Despite this, White's description does reveal two important features of foreign aid: (1) the transfer of resources and (2) the effectiveness in terms of the benefit to the recipients.

George Kurian holds a similar viewpoint to John White's. He defines aid as:

"Foreign aid is broadly defined as the flow of financial resources from developed market economies to developing countries expressly intended for the economic and social development of the latter and which is concessional in character"<sup>9</sup>.

According to this definition, aid consists of the following features:

- (1) the flow of financial resources;
- (2) the flow must exist between developed and developing countries;
- (3) the purpose of the flow is intended for the economic and social development of the recipient countries; and
- (4) the flow is concessional in character.

The defect of the first feature is that it restricts the aid to that of financial undertakings only. Numerous examples show this to be untrue, i.e. a large proportion of United States assistance to foreign countries under the Mutual Security Act takes the form of military aid. The second feature of this definition implies a similar qualification on the status of donor country as John White's. Once again Communist China's aid to Africa is discounted because the latter is classified as a developing country. The third feature of the definition limits the purpose of aid to social and economic development of the recipient countries. Although this is true in most instances, it does not necessarily hold true for all. It can be argued that aid to belligerent countries is not for social and economic development but for political ends. Once again, the definition should not be dismissed out as hard as the fourth feature - i.e. the flow is

concessional in character — does distinguish aid from other transactions involving the flow of resources.

A further description of foreign aid by Edward S. Mason is put forward as:

"A transfer of resources from the government or citizens of one country to those of another on terms that, from the point of view of the receivers, are easier than could be obtained on the capital market. This would exclude foreign private investment and suppliers' credit unless the terms on which these flows were made available were softened by reason of government schemes guaranteeing repayment or in other ways absorbing part of the risk. It would include, of course, in the private flows, grants, soft loans, and technical assistance from foundations, churches, and other charitable institutions" <sup>10</sup>.

This definition is more comprehensive than the former ones. It proposes a clear measure to distinguish aid from other transfers of resources - i.e. easier terms than those available on the capital market. However, it includes foreign private investment which is softened or guaranteed by a government's repayment, while it neglects the modern trend of governments' sponsorship and encouragement

of private citizens' overseas investments so that its own development is achieved. This private investment cannot be regarded as "foreign aid".

As the United Nations is the most important international organization, a definition stated by this body should be considered. The United Nations has defined aid<sup>11</sup> as :

"All transactions (of a country or an international organization) which result in a permanent net addition to total resources available for economic development (of another country)"

According to this definition, the units of aid are countries or international organizations. The flow of resources takes place between governments (or international organizations). A transaction between individuals or a government and an individual is not considered as foreign aid. Once again the definition may be faulted as it suggests that aid must produce "a permanent net addition to total resources available for economic development of another (the recipient) country". Although most transactions between countries and/or international organizations usually produce a net addition to the total resources of the recipient country,

this is not always true. The donor may provide the recipient country with resources which do not result in a permanent net addition due to mismanagement and misappropriation. For instance, a corrupt government may channel its foreign aid into the pockets of its politicians.

From the above discussion, it is evident that no single definition seems to cater for all the aspects of foreign aid. I propose my definition of foreign aid as the transaction of resources which consists of the following characters: firstly, the donors of aid must be governments, international organizations, or political groups; secondly, from the point of view of the receivers, the resources are obtained on terms easier than in capital markets; thirdly, the transfer of resources is intended to bring in a net addition to the total resources of the recipients, but this outcome is not assured.

Perhaps this definition still does not satisfy everybody, but all kinds of aid discussed in this dissertation such as military aid, economic aid, technical and agricultural assistance programmes which Communist China has extended to Africa fall within this definition.

## PART II

### Aid As An Instrument of Foreign Policy

The reason why a country would give aid to another is worth exploring. In an examination of the studies on the motives of foreign aid, we find that they fall primarily into two types:

- (a) Aid with foreign policy; and
- (b) Aid without foreign policy.

The scholars of the first type consider aid as an instrument of foreign policy to be devised, implemented, and evaluated in terms of political concept—its purpose is, or ought to be, the attainment of very specific political, ideological, and strategic advantages for the donors. The protagonists of the second point of view contend that the donors should not look for any specific aim or direct advantage from aid, they regards aid as an end-in-itself. With regard to this point of view, aid supposedly performs the two main functions of supplementing domestic resources and of generating additional domestic resources for the development and social transformation of the recipient countries.

- (a) Aid with Foreign Policy

Professor Hans Morgenthau, Edward S. Mason, John D. Montgomery, Raymond F. Mikesell are amongst the supporters of the first school of thought<sup>12</sup>. They argue that aid is related to national policies or domestic politics<sup>13</sup> and that foreign aid may serve several national objectives ranging from direct economic, or security, aims to the promotion of world peace and stability<sup>14</sup>. Edward S. Mason in particular holds that the principal purpose of US foreign aid is to promote the security of the United States<sup>15</sup> insofar as its security is dependent on other countries. This argument is supported by the practices of American postwar aid policy. For instance, in the 1940s and the early 1950s US aid programmes were largely devoted to the reconstruction and recovery of Western Europe, with a view to preventing it from falling into the Communist camp. At that time the independence, defensibility and prosperity of Western Europe were regarded of crucial importance to the security of the United States<sup>16</sup>. The national security objectives which encompass foreign aid programmes of the United States are also clearly evident in their dealings with Vietnam, Korea, Thailand and the Republic of China. Under the Mutual Security Programme in the late 1950s, where the United States has provided these countries large amounts of assistance designed to enable them to maintain a military establishment capable of dealing with actual or threatened aggression which would lead either

to foreign domination, or to domination by a group under foreign influence, regarded as inimical to US political and security interests<sup>17</sup>.

The US aid record shows evidence to support this viewpoint. The total request for funds for foreign aid of financial year 1964 was \$4525 million, of which half was allocated to "strategic assistance programme" which included military aid, supportive assistance, and contingency funds. Of this programme, three quarters of the military aid went to nine countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union and Communist China borders<sup>18</sup>.

Table I (see page 17) shows the allocation of US foreign aid between 1948-1972. A study of the table indicates that during the Marshall Plan period, US aid was mainly extended to Europe and those countries bordering on the Soviet bloc. Aid to Africa and Latin America only started in 1952, after the recovery of Europe, and as the Cold War gathered momentum.

Besides security consideration, aid programmes are sometimes a result of straightforward political and/or ideological goals. The Americans believe that their system and institutions (political, economic and social) are better than those of other countries, and have a more universal moral validity and practical applicability. Hence, the United States has an interest in using aid as

an instrument to bring about a conversion of systems  
 19  
 amongst recipient countries , and to influence their  
 behaviour in the international forum. Aid is also used  
 to strengthen American cultural and historical ties with  
 selected regions and to propagate American social modes  
 to the recipient countries.

TABLE I

TOTAL US AID EXPENDITURE BY REGION 1948-1972  
 (Millions of Dollars)

|                                    | U.S.<br>Fiscal<br>year | Near<br>East<br>and<br>South<br>Asia | Latin<br>America | Viet-<br>nam | East<br>Asia | Africa | Europe |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------|--------|
| Marshall Plan<br>Period            | 1948 a                 | 12                                   |                  |              | 1            |        | 192    |
|                                    | 1949                   | 118                                  |                  |              | 334          |        | 3,871  |
|                                    | 1950                   | 175                                  |                  |              | 54           |        | 3,189  |
|                                    | 1951                   | 179                                  |                  |              | 31           |        | 2,596  |
|                                    | 1952                   | 359                                  | 10               |              | 157          | 2      | 1,646  |
| Mutual Security<br>Acts<br>Periods | 1953                   | 298                                  | 23               |              | 192          | 3      | 1,301  |
|                                    | 1954                   | 260                                  | 17               |              | 302          | 7      | 831    |
|                                    | 1955                   | 366                                  | 27               | 129          | 864          | 24     | 566    |
|                                    | 1956                   | 387                                  | 55               | 193          | 634          | 13     | 279    |
|                                    | 1957                   | 381                                  | 66               | 251          | 615          | 19     | 160    |
|                                    | 1958                   | 351                                  | 65               | 212          | 505          | 41     | 118    |
|                                    | 1959                   | 495                                  | 87               | 179          | 425          | 81     | 128    |
|                                    | 1960                   | 537                                  | 96               | 181          | 421          | 147    | 78     |
|                                    | 1961                   | 539                                  | 119              | 146          | 452          | 178    | 112    |
| Aid<br>Period                      | 1962                   | 599                                  | 285              | 112          | 326          | 200    | 93     |
|                                    | 1963                   | 894                                  | 316              | 144          | 307          | 157    | 37     |
|                                    | 1964                   | 834                                  | 282              | 158          | 244          | 145    | 19     |
|                                    | 1965                   | 775                                  | 430              | 184          | 209          | 175    | 10     |
|                                    | 1966                   | 657                                  | 495              | 287b         | 216          | 212    | 1      |
|                                    | 1967                   | 637                                  | 569              | 468b         | 219          | 189    | c      |
|                                    | 1968                   | 530                                  |                  | 384          | 420          | 144    |        |
|                                    | 1969                   | 372                                  |                  | 293          | 397          | 150    |        |
|                                    | 1970                   | 362                                  | 431              | 354          | 233          | 186    |        |
|                                    | 1971                   | 478                                  | 331              | 386          | 218          | 161    |        |
|                                    | 1972                   | 37                                   | 325              | 555          | 543          | 219    |        |
| Total Assistance                   |                        | 10,631                               | 4,029            | 4,617        | 8,318        | 2,455  | 15,227 |

Source: U.S. Economic Assistance Programs Administered by the Agency for International Development and Predecessor Agencies, 3 April 1948 - 30 June 1972, p. 7

- (a) April to June only
- (b) Excludes administrative and program support costs for Vietnam excluded from the noregional data.
- (c) Less than \$5000,000

Aid programmes are sometimes explained in terms of the donor's commercial and economic interests. Economic arguments are based on the recognition of the growing economic interdependence of the world's nations. Developed and developing nations need ever increasing markets, if they are to sustain growth. It is argued that aid can promote the donor's exports; it can facilitate the outreach of donor's private investors; and it can improve its access to needed materials<sup>20</sup>. It is therefore in the interest of the developed nations to assist in facilitating the economic development of the poor countries, so that their import capacity for products from the developed can likewise increase.

This kind of economic justification for foreign aid was explicitly expressed by the late U.S. president, John Kennedy. Referring to the Republic of China, Columbia, Israel, Iran and Pakistan, as nations whose import patterns had been dramatically affected by American foreign aid, he said:

These used to be the exclusive market of

European countries..... too little attention has been paid to the part which an early exposure to American goods, American skills, and American ways of doing things can play in forming the taste and desires of newly emerging countries — or to the fact that, even when our aid ends, and trade relations last far beyond the termination of our assistance<sup>21</sup>

(b) Aid without Foreign Policy (The Purist Rationale)

The Purist School — aid given without any specific or direct advantage for the donor country — believes that economic development should in itself be the only goal and not the aim of foreign policy. This argument undoubtedly reassures aid supporters of the morality and the importance of their cause. Three aspects of this argument are worth noting<sup>22</sup> : Firstly, the purist rationale emphasized the general relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries and stresses that development is an extraordinary long-term process. According to this argument, the case of aid was typically phrased in terms of foreign needs rather than donor's purposes. A second key proposition in the purist rationale is that economic development assistance should, as one memorandum states it, "be treated as separate and independent

from the short-term political and economic goals which both donors and recipients pursue as a matter of immediate national advantage"<sup>23</sup>. Thirdly, the supporters of this argument also state that not only the economic development should be pursued independently of political goals but that economic development is the only legitimate goal in economic assistance.

However, this idealized viewpoint or aid held by the purists seldom happens in practice. In fact a government aid programme often needs to be directed towards specific objectives which can be achieved within particular periods. Otherwise aid programmes cannot gain support from the political leaders of the donor countries, and are deemed to be unsuccessful.

It is also unrealistic to separate aid programmes from short-term political and economic goals. For instance, a number of provisions are included into the U.S. Aid Act to prevent aid from going directly or indirectly to politically unacceptable countries. In the 1962 legislation, a section was added — the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment—which requires the president to suspend assistance to the government of any country which nationalizes or expropriates<sup>24</sup> US property without adequate compensation.

French aid policy also clearly reflects the relationship between aid and political aims. This is

depicted by the fact that its aid has been exclusively concentrated in its former colonies for the purpose to maintain French influence within these former countries .<sup>25</sup>

In a similar fashion, the rapidly increasing Japanese aid has been directly tied to the efforts of the Tokyo government to extend Japanese commerce and investment in Asia .<sup>26</sup>

Humanitarian motive is sometimes claimed as a reason of aid in the second category. As President Johnson expressed in his Aid Message to Congress of January 14, 1965:

For our security and well-being, and as responsible free men, we must seek to share our capacity for growth and the promise of a better life, with our fellow men around the world. That is what foreign aid is all about .<sup>27</sup>

President Eisenhower also stated this attitude in his letter to the Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for the fiscal year 1960 (AID, Agency of International Development) as follows:

We have had as our goal the promotion of peaceful change for millions of people in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East who are seeking domestic tranquility and

a better way of life. We have responded to the hope of these millions for a decent future for themselves and their children through well-convinced programmes of economic and technical assistance.... Our common safety has been of equal concern....

Although both of these two statements indicate the concern of humanitarian reason, they do not exclude a consideration of US national security. Furthermore, humanitarianism itself has become self-rewarding: it has strengthened the U S voice and influence in the international forum<sup>28</sup>.

Besides the two categories mentioned above, a third category with regard to the purposes of aid is presented by the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. According to OECD, aid is given to maintain a viable global system which is aimed at: the improvement of mankind's shared interest in peace, and the prevention of a nuclear holocaust<sup>29</sup>. This school of thought may be initially seen as differing from the former two, but a closer examination reveals that it is actually similar to the first category, as it aims to build a world of "mutual interest" which, needless to say, is a world suitable for the donor country.

Finally, George Liska's observations on aid add

considerable weight to the argument that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy"

Foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy. In the Cold War, foreign aid is usually used as a weapon of economic war. During the thermonuclear stalemate, the total war is retreated as a technique for resolving conflicts and economic war has substituted the total war. Economic war does not only perform the same function - to test relative strength and capacity to use strength in the national interest; it also is able to achieve the same result as total war - complete control of one state over another based upon a decisive superiority in power and capability.....Economic war between the two superpowers (USA and USSR) takes place within two concentric circles. The inner circle is the competitive rate of economic and technical growth. The outer circle represents their ability to stimulate the economic growth of other countries, chiefly the allied and otherwise related ones. Through these, they can compete in international organization such as United Nations. And Foreign aid is easily used as an instrument in winning the war .

### PART III

#### The Nature of Communist China's Aid

If aid is always performed as an instrument of foreign policy by the Western countries, then the attitude of Communist China in extending aid to other countries will not be an exception to the norm. However, since Communist China does not disclose its real intention on extending aid to other countries and since Communist China is a member of Socialist camp, it is advisable to understand Communist China's attitude towards aid within the context of Marxism-Leninisms.

Socialist writers always insist that the character of the economic and commercial relations between developing countries and socialist countries is different from that between developing countries and economically advanced Western nations. They assert that they do not seek any special advantages in extending aid. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, stated that "the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases <sup>31</sup>". Another Socialist writer, Arnost Tauber, also points out that:

"The socialist countries consider it a moral obligation to aid the young nations in their struggle for political and

economic independence. They believe that mutual economic cooperation produces new elements and factors which accelerate the development of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, increase the dynamics of their progress, and paralyze the monopoly of the developed Western countries as main suppliers of the means of production<sup>32</sup> and as creditors ".

These socialists try to convince people that the "moral obligation" is the reason behind socialist countries' assistance to the Third World. However, their arguments are not altogether convincing when we consider the fact that the Soviet Union's economic policy towards its most powerful allies has been as imperialistic as anything devised by the most avaricious firms in the West towards the developing countries<sup>33</sup>. Marshall I. Goldman's study reveals that the most important consideration underlying Soviet aid policy is that of political self-interest<sup>34</sup>. He argues that all Soviet economic relations with the less developed countries are subservient to political calculations. It is only when confronted with competition for prestige or influence that the Russians will respond with any meaningful assistance. Soviet aid to Communist China suggests that self-interest rather than moral obligation was the decisive reason for the

Soviet Union to extend aid to Peking. It is also argued that Soviet aid decisions towards Africa are shaped with a view to gaining strategic benefits: bases, landing and resupply rights, and access to strategic raw materials for itself and/or denial of such benefits to its military rivals<sup>35</sup>. Leonid Brezhnev's comment on Soviet aid to Africa that "the Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate aspirations of young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation"<sup>36</sup> implies that to eradicate Western influence in the Third World is the objective of Soviet aid policy.

Therefore, we can clearly discern that in the minds of the policy makers of socialist countries, of which Communist China is one, foreign aid policy is designed to advance their own political interests in the recipient countries, so as to gain superiority in a polarized world. The moral explanation is merely a ruse for their own real intentions.

Although moral approach is rejected by Western scholars as the unique or major reason of Socialist aid undertaking, Western scholars do not think that political purposes are the only benefits socialist countries want to achieve. They believe that economic or trade considerations are among the reasons for socialist aid policy. Marshall I. Goldman and John D. Esseks are two of them<sup>37</sup>. An African scholar, G. Munin,

also holds the same opinion. He says:

"While it would be rather impossible to state whether the socialist bloc is purely political motivated in its expansion of trade with and extention of financial and technical aid to Africa in particular, and developing areas in general, or whether economic considerations are the predominant motives, it is safe, however, to conclude that both of these factors enter into the decision making <sup>38</sup> ".

If economic explanation suits the Soviet Union's aid policies, it does not necessarily have the same implication for Communist China's aid policies, because China is an agricultural country, its economy does not depend on trade or foreign resources to the extent that the Soviet Union's does. We cannot deny that in some cases Communist China, like other socialist countries, does gain economic benefits from its aid recipient countries, but in most cases it gets little or no economic reward at all, after spending large sums of money on countries of which some are even better-off than it is. If it wants to seek economic benefits from aid-giving, it will not pay in most cases. A typical case is its aid to Tanzania and Zambia to build a railroad linking these two countries. It invested more than \$400 million, out of which the economic benefit is its

access to Zambia's copper, which is apparently out of proportion to the cost it expended. From this we can assume that economic considerations, if there are any, form only a minor motive in Communist China's aid policies. Political considerations are the primary intention.

John D. Montgomery is one of the scholars who holds the viewpoint that Communist China gives aid to achieve political aims. He says that:

For the United States, promoting a peaceful and just world order is a major aim of foreign policy, and foreign aid has been used since its inception in hope of minimizing causes of world tension. The USSR and especially China (Communist), of the other hand, have offered strategic aid in order to increase tension because fundamental change is essential to achieve the desired communist world order ... their aid devotes special attention to finding ways to increase the scope of government enterprise, to support mass movements, and to encourage the industrialization of agricultural activity along Soviet lines .

This argument is a valuable pointer toward an understanding of Communist China's rationale behind it of

foreign aid. Once again, it is important to note that since all Communist China's policies are subordinate to political considerations and objectives, so is its aid policy. Since it is the declared objective of Communist China to "bury capitalism and communize the whole world"<sup>40</sup>, Chinese Communists do not hesitate to use foreign aid as a means to this end.

Footnote

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## CHAPTER TWO

### The Roots of Communist China's Aid Policy

#### PART I

#### Chinese Historical Background

The origins of Communist China's foreign aid policy lie in Chinese historical background. As Robert G. Wesson points out, in the formation of a foreign policy the "makers of the foreign policy are guided largely by the experience of the past.<sup>1</sup>" This is particularly true for an ancient society like Chinese in which tradition has played an important role in the formation of its foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> Professor King C. Chen also argues that

"It seems impossible that after some 2600 years of cultural continuity, a revolutionary regime like the one (Communist China) could completely reject tradition.... It is quite obvious that Chinese tradition has played a significant role in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy.<sup>3</sup>"

"In order to understand the continuity and change of Chinese foreign policy one must equip himself with the background of traditional system of Chinese foreign relations.<sup>4</sup>"

The traditional system of Chinese foreign relations with other countries is based on the thought of the world order of Sino-Centrism and the practice of tributary system<sup>5</sup>. Before China had contact with Western countries, China's foreign relations were limited to its neighbouring countries. This is a central theme in the formation of Sinocentric World Order. Since China was superior to its neighbours culturally and was isolated from the West geographically, the belief in a Sinocentric World Order developed<sup>6</sup>.

Culturally, the societies of East Asia-China, Korea, Vietnam, Japan and the small island Kingdom of Liu-Chiu (Ryukyu) have all stemmed from Ancient China and developed within the Chinese culture orbit<sup>7</sup>. In Chinese terminology, China is a cultural rather than a territorial concept<sup>8</sup>, hence the cultural influence is of obvious significance in traditional Chinese world order. As early as Chou Dynasty (1112-247 B.C.) the Chinese believed they were combined together under one culture and regarded other peoples outside the Chinese civilization as barbarians<sup>9</sup>. The fact that Chinese Culture was superior to its surrounding nomadic tribes - i.e. Jung in the west, Yee in the east, Dee in the north and Man in the south - enabled China to spread outwards from north China by absorbing the surrounding territories, mainly the southern territory, this superiority was supported by her size, age and wealth.

During the long period of ancient Chinese history, except for a very short period, China was the major power in East Asia, and hence the center of East Asia World<sup>10</sup>.

Besides cultural superiority, natural geographical barriers assisted in the formation of the Sinocentric world order. Geographically, China is guarded on the west by almost endless deserts; on the southwest by the Himalayan Mountains; and on the east by vast oceans. This geographical isolation cut China off from other centers of civilizations and left it free from the challenges of the outer world. This geographical isolation made Chinese feel that the world they knew and dealt with was the only existant world.

The Sinocentric world order did not only prevail during China's period of military superiority but continued during the invasion of China. In Chinese history, China was only twice subjected to foreign administration. The first time was during the Mongal Dynasty (1279-1367 A.D.), and the second one was during the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911). Although these two foreign regimes conquered China by force, they did not alter Chinese tradition and culture, but rather were themselves absorbed into the Chinese culture. This fact reinforced the Sinocentric world order.

Within this world order, Chinese emperors regarded themselves as "Tien-tzu" - the sons of Heaven - to govern "Tien-hsia" (all under Heaven) which embraced the whole world including everything outside of China (Chung-<sup>12</sup> kuo, the Central State or the Middle Empire) , and a set<sup>13</sup> of assumptions were formed :

(1) The Chinese internal order was applied to the international field. As the Chinese considered themselves as the center of the world, international intercations were seen as internal affairs. Hence, the world order reflected China's internal order-it was hierarchical, not egalitarian. The concept of equality, or the sovereignty of individual political units in the world order did not exist. All political units arranged themselves hierarchically. China was at the apex of the hierarchy and therefore the central authority of the world.

(2) The world hierarchy was universal. There were no other hierarchies and no other sources of power on the international scene. Because of the absence of alternative powers, no concept of the "balance of power" ever developed in Chinese minds. All units within the system were subservient to China, and those political units which were geographically too

distant to participate simply lived in a kind of limbo, or international political vacuum, and had more freedom in their own affairs.

(3) China's centrality in the world order was a function of its civilization and virtue, particularly the virtue of the Chinese rulers. The world order was as much an ethical as a political phenomenon. Harmony on the international scene, as on the domestic, was the product of the emperor's virtue.

(4) National power was the reflection of national virtue. Power was a result derived from the possession of virtue. "Right" and "Might" were synonymous. According to Chinese philosophers, e.g. Confucius and Mencius, "might" could not produce "right", conversely "right" could produce "might". Hence the use of might was justified by the very existence of right; without right there was no might.

(5) International society was an extension of the internal society. Since China was the center of the world and Tien-tzu was the ruler of the whole world, "international" or

"interstates" concepts did not exist. What boundaries there were, were cultural.

(6) The principle of the interaction between China and the "barbarian" was lai-hwa (come and be transformed by the superior blessings of Chinese civilization). China's philosophy was that Lai-hwa had to be carried voluntarily rather than compulsorily. If the barbarian did not like to Lai-hwa, then they could remain uncivilized.

(7) Since the Lai-hwa was voluntary, if non-Chinese rulers wanted to participate in the Chinese world order, they had to observe the appropriate forms and ceremony (Li) in their contacts with Chinese emperors.

According to the concept of the Sinocentric World Order and hence world order, a tributary system was gradually formulated. This system was instituted during Ming (1368-1644 A.D.) and Ching (1644-1911 A.D.) dynasties <sup>14</sup>.

Under this system the tribute-presenting countries sent envoys or kings to present tributes to Chinese court in acknowledgment of the Sinocentric World Order. To carry out this tributary system certain procedures had

to be followed. During the Ching Dynasty, the following  
15  
procedures had to be met and practised :

(1) Non-Chinese rulers were given a patent of appointment and an official seal for use in correspondence.

(2) They were given a noble rank in the Ching's hierarchy.

(3) They dated their communications by the Ching's calendar, that is, by the Ta-ching dynastic reign-title.

(4) They presented tribute memorials of various sorts on appropriate statutory occasions.

(5) They also presented a symbolic tribute of local products.

(6) They or their envoys, were escorted to court by the imperial officials.

(7) They performed the appropriate ceremonies of Ching court, notably the kotow.

(8) They received imperial gifts in return.

(9) They were granted certain privileges of trade at the frontier and at the capital.

(10) The tributary missions had fixed frequency and routes to China. Table 2-1 shows the regular Ching's tributaries in the order listed in 1818 edition of the Collected Statutes (Ta-Ching-hui-tien), together with the expected frequency and routes of tribute missions.

Table 2-1  
Ching Tributaries as of 1818

| COUNTRY                                             | FREQUENCY OF MISSIONS                                                                                        | ROUTE                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Korea                                               | Tribute four times a year presented all together at the end of the year                                      | via Mukden and Shanhaikuan    |
| Liu-ch'iu                                           | Tribute once every other year                                                                                | via Foochow                   |
| Annam                                               | Tribute once in two years, sending an envoy to court once in four years and to present two tributes together | via Chen-nan-kuan and Kwangsi |
| Laos                                                | Tribute once in ten years                                                                                    | via Yunnan                    |
| Siam                                                | Tribute once in three years                                                                                  | via Canton                    |
| Sulu                                                | Tribute once in five years or more                                                                           | via Amoy                      |
| Holland                                             | Tribute at no fixed period; the old regulations were for tribute once in five years                          | via Canton                    |
| Burma                                               | Tribute once in ten years                                                                                    | via Yunnan                    |
| Western Ocean<br>(Portugal, the<br>Papacy, England) | Tribute at no fixed periods                                                                                  | via Macao                     |

This tribute was regarded by Chinese emperors as a symbol of Li (ceremony) rather than an economic token. Chieng-lung, an emperor of Ching dynasty, once explicitly expressed this attitude towards the British envoy Lord Macartney. He said that his empire "does not value rare and precious things .... nor do we have the slightest need of your (Lord Macartney) country's manufactures"<sup>16</sup>. Therefore when Chinese emperors received tribute goods from foreign envoys, they often gave these envoys imperial gifts in return and the imperial gifts bestowed in return<sup>17</sup> were usually more valuable than the tribute goods. In the emperors' minds, doing business with foreigners was a favour to foreigners, hence they usually permitted foreign merchants accompanied by envoys to do trade with Chinese at the frontier. However, the Chinese insisted that the foreign envoys had to observe the Li which tributary countries had to obey in dealing with the "son of the heaven".

Simply, the functions of tribute system can be seen from the viewpoint of the tribute-presenting countries or from that of the Chinese. From the point of view of the tribute-presenting states, commercial relations became inseparately bound up with tributary system. Trade was conducted by the merchants who accompanied the tributary envoys, or at times by the envoys themselves. Since commercial benefit was one of the major reasons

behind dealing with China and since tribute-presentation was an available pretext for trade with China, the tributary system became a necessary formality for Chinese trading partners whilst China itself considered it a politically defensive action. Dr. T.F. Tsiang described this interaction as follow

"That dogma (tributary system) asserts national security could only be found in isolation and stipulates that whoever wished to enter into relations with China must do so as Chinese vassal, acknowledging the supremacy of the Chinese emperor and obeying his commands, thus ruling out all possibility of international intercourse on terms of equality".

"Chinese statesmen before the latter part of the Nineteenth century would have ridiculed the notion that the national finance and wealth should be or could be promoted by means of international trade. On China's part the permission to trade was intended to be a mark of imperial bounty and a means of keeping the barbarians in the proper state of submissiveness <sup>18</sup>".

This practice continued until China's defeat by

Britain in the Opium War and the signing of the Nanking Treaty in 1842. For the first time China was forced to accept negotiated terms such as consular jurisdiction, negotiated tariffs, extraterritoriality and so on. After Nanking Treaty China was forced to renounce its traditional privileges and authority over its former tributary states Korea, Burma, Siam, all of Indo-China and so on.

Despite having to forego its traditional standpoint, China continues to use traditional notion as a basis for its modern foreign policies and continues to strive for the past glories of China<sup>19</sup>. As China has been under Western oppression for nearly a century, suffering the humiliation imposed by the West, a strong feeling has emerged in support of the revival of China's glory. Mao Tse-Tung's words "China is not an independent country,<sup>20</sup> it is a semi-colonial country" and that "It is evident that whoever can overthrow imperialism he can get people's support"<sup>21</sup> have generated strong support amongst the Chinese people for a change in China's international status. Aid, in Chinese traditional thinking, is an instrument to display donors' virtue and generosity, hence its present aid may be seen as a vague attempt by Mao to restore China's historical style of relations with other countries<sup>22</sup>, particularly the traditional tributary states. This explanation is illustrated in Communist China's aid to the Asian countries which were historically

tribute-bearing states. When Communist China initiated its aid programmes, aid was first sent to neighbouring states with which it had once carried out tribute relations. These countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, Burma and Nepal - have been all the largest recipients of Communist China's aid.

The impact of Chinese history on its aid policy can be perceived from the intercourse between Communist China and its aid recipient countries. Although Peking has sent a large number of aid missions abroad, and its diplomatic representation abroad is usually large, the greater portion of the aid agreements have been signed in Peking. This reflects the past tribute system. Many heads of states have visited Peking, and many have received promises of aid for their politeness. Apart from the one visit Mao Tse-tung made to Moscow, he remained in China during his 30-year reign. This reflects the traditional Chinese Tributary system where only foreign kings visited China whilst the Chinese emperor remained in China.

Another feature which reflects the tribute missions of the past relates to the important diplomatic business which is carried out during aid missions, or when grants or loans are made<sup>23</sup>. To the Chinese this is the ideal framework in which cultural exchanges, alliances, border settlements, etc., are discussed. The granting of aid

also involves considerable fanfare and ritual, as was  
true of the tribute missions<sup>24</sup>. It is through this  
fanfare and ritual that the credibility of the authority  
of Chinese leadership is seen to be depicted.

Other similarities which may be compared are:  
Tribute missions represented exchanges of loyalty and  
friendship and enhanced the prestige of ruling groups on  
both sides. Similarly visits to Peking by heads of  
state provide a measure of legitimacy and favourable  
publicity for Mao and his associates, as do return visits  
by Chinese diplomats to the guest countries. The tribute  
missions were more beneficial to the tribute bearers than  
to the Chinese because what China stressed was the  
superior position of China, rather than her commercial  
interests. Presently Chinese aid is given on quite  
generous terms by international standards. Foreign aid  
provides an avenue for the export of Chinese products.  
A large portion of Communist China's aid has been in  
the form of Chinese products or credit to purchase Chinese  
goods, rather than in foreign currency. This is perhaps  
due to Communist China's shortage of foreign exchange.  
However, tribute missions that visited China were given  
Chinese products which represented the advanced nature  
of Chinese culture, civilization, science and general  
achievement. Today, Communist China offers many aid  
projects, such as railroad construction and agricultural  
production, which are meant to demonstrate Chinese

technical skills. At present, Communist China particularly favours road and railroad projects. This is perhaps because of the fact that foreigners once built these in China, and Communist China wants to do the same to prove its ability .

From the comparisons mentioned above, Communist China's aid appears to be motivated much by political aims which originate from Chinese historical background.

## PART II

### The Ideology of Chinese Communists

The second root of Communist China's foreign aid is Communist ideology. Before we go further to discuss the implication of Chinese Communist ideology for its aid policy, it is necessary for us to have a brief look at the effect of ideology on a country's foreign policy.

As people are "thinking beings", ideologies play a central role in their behavioural patterns. Various definitions of ideology are put forward: Franz Schurmann defines ideology as a set of ideas which can be classified as pure ideology and practical ideology. He says, "pure ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious world view; practical ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational instruments for actions <sup>26</sup>." According to this viewpoint, ideology provides people with the ability to acknowledge the world and the motivation to act. In his book Ideology and Discontent, David E. Apter argues that ideology plays two major functions: Firstly, it is to bind the society together; and secondly, it is to satisfy individual personality formation. The first function, the function of solidarity, is to build solidarity in a society through shared emotions concerning equally valued ideas and objects. The second function, usually called the function of identity, serves to make the individual aware of his own social position and

the mission implicit in it. It is defined as "an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought; the tendency at a given time to make fact amenable to ideas and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image, convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity<sup>27</sup>." This argument clearly indicates that ideology has an important influence in the formation of a person's political beliefs.

The role of ideology is further described as a comprehensive function of binding a country together psychologically; as it provides a scale of values by which its people may know what to strive for and what to reject; enabling them to make sense of an otherwise bewildering world they inhabit and to justify a government's efforts to grapple with it<sup>28</sup>.

However, the influence of ideology to a country's policy is through the process of selection by the individuals who are in a position to make policy. It is said that the ideology of political leaders helps to determine both the methods that they adopt and the goals that they pursue in foreign policy<sup>29</sup>. Since all foreign policy makers are usually confronted with more information than they can possibly employ in making decisions, they need to select information according to some criteria of

relevance or importance. They often exclude information that does not agree with their current conceptions or reinterpret it so that it agrees with their current conceptions<sup>30</sup>. Decision-making becomes a process in which decision-makers choose the information and embark on the course of action they want to pursue or to preserve what they value. The measure they use in choosing information and making decision is their attitude towards things and their evaluation of things, or what is known as "their ideology".

In China, the effect of ideology in shaping foreign policy is possibly more embracing than in other countries. According to Professor E.R. May's analysis, there are two kinds of foreign policy. a calculated one and an axiomatic one<sup>31</sup>. A calculated policy, Professor E.R. May explains, is a specific policy based on a careful analysis of the ends desired and the means available to achieve them. An axiomatic policy, on the other hand, is broad, long-range, and is less clearly definable in terms of a specific set of variables. It is a more abstract definition of the ends-means equation, derived from a multitude of source, including national experience, deeply rooted in history and the broad national interest as conceived at the movement. It includes the broader intellectual assumptions about the nature of international society or the international order held by the policy-makers themselves as well as their own interpretation of international and national history. In other words, a

calculated foreign policy is more scientific and reasonable; an axiomatic foreign policy is less scientific and more emotional.

Of these two types of foreign policy, ideology has more influence on an axiomatic policy since ideology is a set of ideas which is analogous to assumptions rather than to calculated analyses. Communist China's foreign policy tends to lend itself towards an axiomatic description rather than a calculated description. According to Thomas Robinson's study, it is doubtful whether Mao Tse-tung, the most important decision-maker of Communist China, understood the prevailing environment when making decisions<sup>32</sup>. Philip L. Bridgham claims that Mao's perception of reality was "simplistic and distorted"<sup>33</sup>. Edward Friedman and Mark Selden also believe that Chinese leaders generally did not see the world as it was when they made decisions before 1971<sup>34</sup>. Indications of this disregard for the "prevailing environment" are the launching of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 seemed to ignore the prevailing economic climate of that time, but launched itself on the emotional support of the people of Communist China. It later proved to be an economic disaster<sup>35</sup>. The Great Cultural Revolution, often described as a "big catastrophe" by several Chinese leaders, again depicts a policy made on emotional grounds.

These two examples suggest Communist China's policy tend to be axiomatic rather than calculated, as "there is a very low correlation between international reality and Peking's perception of it".<sup>36</sup> As an axiomatic policy maker, Communist China displays a greater and larger dependency on ideology as a platform in its international behaviour, and its decision-makers use Communist ideology to shape their world outlook and formulate their policy<sup>37</sup> whilst justifying their international activities.

The People's Republic of China has Communism as its ideological base, with the implication that this ideology<sup>38</sup> has a decisive influence on its foreign aid policies. The core content of Communism is the so-called "materialism", i.e. the main motivation of human progress is materialistic. This materialistic interpretation of history is clearly described by Mao Tse-tung:

"The history of man comprises the history of his struggle with nature, the history of class struggle, the history of science. Owing to the necessity to live and struggle, men have thought about the reality of matters and its laws, have proved the correctness of materialism and have found the necessary intellectual tool for their struggle — materialist philosophy. The higher the level to which social production develops,

the greater the development of the class struggle, and the more scientific knowledge reveals the secret of nature, the greater the development and consolidation<sup>39</sup> of materialist philosophy" .

According to the materialistic explanation of history, two structures exist in a society; a superstructure and a sub-structure. The superstructure includes political, intellectual, legal institutions, while the sub-structure is the economic conditions of the society. The sub-structure supports the superstructure. With an economic change, the political, legal and literatural institutions will<sup>40</sup> have to adjust to this change .

As Chinese Communism accepts Marxist doctrine<sup>41</sup> , the principles of materialism naturally have some influence on Peking's foreign policy. Economic forces are seen as being largely responsible for polictical and<sup>42</sup> historical trends and even specific events . Hence Communist China's foreign aid policies may be seen as an extension of this premise - i.e. by altering the economic structure of a country it would alter, or affect its political structure. (Chinese Communists believe that as they are able to purchase prestige from their former tributary states with the aid, it is possible that they

will be able to purchase other aims, with aid, from other states.) A supportive example is Communist China's aid to other Communist countries where solidarity is purchased through a common bond of ideology. As Communist China has affections on Communist bloc, it likes to see the solidarity of Communist countries. This feeling becomes particularly strong when a communist country is in danger of, or under attack from, Democratic group. Communist China's aid to North Korea and Vietnam was partly based on the consideration that they all belonged to the same ideological family. Its aid to Hungary in the mid-1950s showed similar tendency where Mao Tse-tung<sup>43</sup> believed the Communist country was being threatened.

Communist China not only employs aid to contribute to the consolidation of the Communist bloc, frequently it also uses aid to win ideological allies. For example, when the Soviet Union cut its aid and withdrew its technicians from China in 1960 as a result of the Sino-Soviet ideological schism, Albania was likewise considered a rebel by Moscow. The Kremlin also resorted to economic pressure against the Albanian government to force it to return to the Soviet ideological camp. Since Peking and Albania were in agreement in their ideological differences with Moscow, Peking promised to give Albania aid in 1961 with the purpose to prevent a change in Albanian ideological commitment through Soviet economic pressure<sup>44</sup>.

Another important feature of Chinese Communist ideology in the context of . . . aid policy is the concept of anti-imperialism or anti-capitalism. From a Communist viewpoint, capitalism constitutes the source of all evil. In a capitalist system, the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) are said to dominate. They employ workers and pay them so little that exploitation occurs. They control the state and use it both at home and abroad to defend and advance their class interest. At home they add political oppression to their economic exploitation whenever it is necessary to do so. Abroad they become imperialists. They believe that contradictions exist within the capitalist system and these contradictions within the capitalist system doom it to destruction. It is the Communist belief that they must organize and work to bring about the inevitable destruction of capitalism. As they see it, they are the agents of history, giving effect to its ineluctable laws. They must be willing to use any means available to realize this end<sup>45</sup>. Chinese Communists share this viewpoint. From its beginnings the Chinese Communist Party's primary foreign policy preoccupation has been with the issue of imperialism. Because of the oppression by Western imperialists in the past, combating imperialism has been seen as a major task of Communist revolution<sup>46</sup>. Mao Tse-tung explained the role of anti-imperialism in China's internal revolution as follows:

"These two great tasks (to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and to overthrow feudal landlord oppression) are interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot be terminated, because imperialist is its main support. Conversely, unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow imperialist rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry<sup>47</sup> is the main force in the Chinese revolution<sup>48</sup>."

Since Peking genuinely perceives the world as being engaged in prolonged, continuous and intense revolutionary struggle<sup>48</sup>, Chinese Communists have reacted to anti-imperialism not only internally, but also internationally. As soon as the Chinese Communist Party had seized power in China, they immediately, and enthusiastically, endorsed the current Soviet perception of a world sharply divided into two hostile camps. They claimed that

"The world today has been divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: on the one hand,

the world imperialist camp, composed of American imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world; on the other hand, the anti-imperialist camp, composed of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the National Liberation movements in China, Southeast Asia and Greece, plus the people's democratic forces of all countries of the world. American imperialism has become the bastion of all the reactionary forces in the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive forces....<sup>49</sup> "

In his article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Mao Tse-tung disclosed that China was to "lean to one side", namely to the Soviet Union, and to participate in an international united front based on an alliance among China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states<sup>50</sup> in order to spearhead the world revolutionary struggle . In another speech, he also asserted that the socialist system would replace the capitalist system in the end<sup>51</sup> and that revolutionaries would eventually triumph .

Chinese Communists not only applied the anti-imperialist posture internally but also in their foreign policy -

they regard the Chinese revolution as a model for Communist revolutions. As early as 1950 Liu Shao-chi insisted that the road taken by China should be followed by all people of colonial and semi-colonial countries so that they could achieve their independence<sup>52</sup>. In a speech to the Chinese Communist party, Deng Xiao-ping, the former Secretary General of C.C.P. stated that

"The Chinese Revolution is a component part of the socialist revolution of the world proletariat. It is a continuation of the great October Revolution..... It is an extremely heavy blow to the imperialist system. Victorious new China joined the Socialist camp..... and greatly added to the ascendancy of the world socialist system..... the Chinese people have carried the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution to the end.... This cannot but tremendously inspire all the oppressed nations in their struggle for liberation, people's democracy and a socialist future<sup>53</sup>".

They also regard themselves as the most likely force to liberlize the world and have called for world revolution.

"According to the principle mentioned above, Communists in all oppressed nations, which are imperialist, are firmly against their national rulers - they are an imperialist group, and exert every possible way to help the liberation movements in all colonial and semi-colonial area <sup>54</sup> ".

"All oppressed nations, proletariats, and all people's democratic forces must unite together; ..... with new democratic countries to combat American imperialist ..... <sup>55</sup> to liberlize all oppressed people ".

As previously mentioned the Communists see themselves as the agents of history and take the ultimate destruction of imperialist system for granted. They will use any means to promote this triumph, to realize world revolution and the defeat of imperialism. Communist Chinese leaders believe they should aid the "poor, oppressed countries" as well as the liberation movements. This was explicitly depicted by Mao Tse-tung in his address to the opening session of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party:

"We must give active support to the national Independence and Liberation Movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as to the Peace Movement and righteous

struggle in all countries throughout the  
<sup>56</sup>  
 world ".

Communist China's aid to North Korea in 1950 and its aid to revolutionary Vietnamese can be looked as a defence against imperialist invaders and their attempts to end "democratic revolution" as defined in term of the Communist ideology. Aid to guerrilla forces in African states is justified as fulfilling the "anti-imperialist" and "world revolutionary" duties although they are not the sole motivating factors behind Chinese aid policy. From April 1958 to the end of 1964, China had given the Indonesia government under Sukarno 176,2 million dollars of aid which included grants, loans, military and financial aid (see Table 2-2). One major reason for this aid was the anti-imperialist ideology espoused by both Mao Tse-tung and Sukarno. Against the background of a common ideology Communist China saw the need for unity among all potential revolutionary forces — domestic as well as international. J.D. Armstrong argues that towards the end of 1964 Communist China encouraged revolutionary tendencies within Indonesia through an alignment against  
<sup>57</sup>  
 external imperialism . Another argument advanced in favour of Communist China's aid was to assist Sukarno  
<sup>58</sup>  
 in suppressing internal anti-Communist activities .

Communist ideology is an important pillar of Communist

foreign aid policy in conformance with Marxist-Leninist principles. To Chinese Communists their ideological motivation is more than a mere rationalization. Peking's leaders do, in fact, see international affairs in terms of a world-wide revolutionary struggle. They feel a strong sense of duty to spread Marxist-Leninist principles and to speed up the "inevitable" course of world revolution, and in doing so expand the area of Communist political control<sup>58</sup>. Aid therefore becomes one leverage in this struggle.

Table 2-2

Communist China's Aid to Indonesia Under Sukarno

Unit: \$ Million

| AID                                     | DATE           | AMOUNT |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------|--------|
| Loan                                    | Nov. 1956      | 15     |
| Loan to oppress anti-Communist activity | April, 1958    | 11,2   |
| Loan                                    | February, 1959 | 30     |
| Loan                                    | April, 1961    | 20     |
| Military and financial grant            | December, 1964 | 100    |

SOURCE: H.K. Kao, The Development of Communist China's Foreign Policy (Taipei: Cheng Chung Books, 1978) P. 148

PART III

## Communist China's Foreign Policy

As previously indicated aid is usually employed by countries as an instrument of foreign policy, and Communist China is inclined to use aid to realise the objectives of its foreign policy. Communist China's aid policy is an integral part of the overall global foreign policy of Peking.

There are many classifications of objectives of a country's foreign policy. Robert E. Osgood has suggested a scheme<sup>60</sup> that applies to the goals a country pursues. According to his scheme the goals of foreign policy fit roughly into two broad categories, depending on whether they reflect national self-interest or national idealism. Goals of national self-interest relate to security or self-preservation, the protection and advancement of whatever matters are thought to be of "vital interest", the preservation or establishment of a position that permits an independent foreign policy, the preservation of national prestige and national honour, and finally national aggrandizement. Goals of national idealism, in contrast, emphasize the brotherhood of man, the importance of promoting human welfare, and the importance of resolving conflict through the application of reason,

morality, and law.

Arnold Wolfers suggests several other possible schemes for classification. He distinguishes between "possession goals" and "milieu goals".<sup>61</sup> Possession goals relate to values that are particular to the state — its rights, its territory, its prerogatives, its power — whereas "milieu goals" relate to the environment in which the nations operate and are not particular or exclusive, for example, the preservation of world law and order or the economic development of other states. Wolfers also describes "direct national goals" and "indirect national goals". According to his classification, national goals are "direct" when the nation seeks direct benefit and "indirect" when benefit to the nation is derived through individual benefit. He also suggests the possibility of classifying goals into three categories: "goals of national self-extension", "goals of national self-preservation",<sup>62</sup> and "goals of self-abnegation". Different categories of goals require different degrees of concern of power.

K.J. Holsti further proposes foreign policy objective categories that include three criteria: (1) the value placed on the objective, or the extent to which policy makers commit themselves and their countries' resources to achieving a particular objective; (2) the time element placed on its achievement; and (3) the kinds of demands

the objective imposes on other states in the international system<sup>63</sup>. According to this scheme, there are three types of objectives: (1) core values and interests (short-term objectives); (2) middle-term goals; and (3) universal long-term objectives. Core values and interests are goals for which most people are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. They are usually stated in the form of basic principles of foreign policy and become articles of faith. They are most frequently related to the self-preservation of a political unit. They are most vital and short-term objectives because other goals obviously cannot be achieved unless the political units maintain their own existence. Middle-term objectives normally impose demands on several other states. K.J. Holsti divides them into three types: the first type includes the attempts of governments to meet public and private demands and needs through international action; the second type is to increase a state's standing in the international system; and the third type includes the different instances of self-extension or imperialism. Long-term objectives are those plans, dreams, and visions concerning the ultimate political or ideological organization of the international system, rules governing relations in that system, and the role of specific nations within it.

If aid serves the objectives of foreign policy, and if the objectives of a state's policy are changing from time to time as Holsti states, it is a logical result that aid

will fluctuate in accordance with changes in a nation's goals. This synchronism is exemplified by Communist China's aid and its foreign policy objectives.

Communist China's foreign policy objectives can, by adopting Holsti's scheme, be succinctly  
64  
divided into three groups : (1) short-term objectives. It is apparent that fundamental aim of Peking's foreign policy is the maintenance of its territorial unification and national security , the promotion of its economic development, and the increase of national power, prestige and influence; (2) middle-term objectives: while some of the short-term and middle term objective overlap, Peking's desire to become the leading Asian power can be seen as a middle-term goal. Peking would like to establish Chinese-style Monroe Doctrine for Asia; (3) long-term objectives: Communist China's ultimate goal aims at world revolution and world leadership. Although Communist China's capability to achieve these ends may be questioned, Peking remains dedicated to these tenets despite internal difficulties and external obstacles. This desire manifests itself in its nuclear-missile development programme, its diplomatic and revolutionary engagement in the Third World and the continuing challenge it poses towards Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement.

The Chinese Communist Party seized power in 1949

and entered the Korean War in 1950. During this period, the Communist regime faced strong resistance from opposing forces on the mainland and the Nationalist military power of Taiwan. Internationally the problem of recognition by the international community remained for many years unresolved. Its paramount goals were to consolidate the newly acquired power, to retain territorial integrity, and national security. In its effort to realize its territorial objectives, given the fact that Peking continued to regard Taiwan as an indisputable part of Chinese territory, any method, peaceful or military, was likely to be resorted to this objective. With a view to establish national security, Communist China entered the Korean War and delivered aid to North Korea.

In terms of national security, China has an inner  
 65  
 and outer ring of defence. During 1950s the inner ring consisted of countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam which were ideologically, politically and almost militarily aligned to Communist China. They constituted the core of Peking's external security interests. These Communist regimes would be defended by Peking when they are threatened by other countries, even at the risk of war. In order to strengthen its Northern-East Security ring, after the establishment of its regime Peking immediately conducted negotiations with the North Korean Government on the joint construction of a dam project on the Yalu  
 66  
 River, and agreed to finance the project. This may be described as aid rendered in support of national security.

When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime was still weak and unstable, it confronted internal resistance and threats from Taiwan. Theoretically these problems were serious enough to absorb Chinese Communists attention and to leave no opportunities for the new regime's involvement in foreign disputes. However, as China believed its national security to be threatened, it decided to intervene in the Korean War, although economically weak, political unstable and under military pressure from Taiwan.

It has been argued that the North Korean invasion of South Korea was encouraged and supported by Communist China<sup>67</sup>. If it is true, the reasons for Peking's assistance may well have been the expansion of Communist influence through the support of a "fraternal" communist regime and the strengthening of the "inner-ring" of Chinese defence. It has also been said that Communist China's entry into the Korean War was prompted by a Soviet decision<sup>68</sup>. Whatever the case security considerations were uppermost in the minds of Chinese Communist leaders when they decided to send their military forces into the Korean battlefield. This viewpoint is supported by a statement issued by the Communist Chinese regime. The statement reveals as follows:

"It is known that although Korea is a small country, it possesses an important strategic

position. History tells us that the existence of Korea is greatly related to Chinese safety .... the Chinese people support the Korean people against the United States not only for the reason of moral obligation but also for the fact that Korea's fate has a direct effect on our country; It is decided for the reason of Chinese self-defence; therefore we must assist the Korean people in order to defend our country<sup>69</sup> ".

After the Korean War, Communist China's objectives have become enlarged extending from the issue of national security to the achievement of regional ambitions — a middle-term goal. This new trend in Communist China's foreign policy resulted from changing internal and external factors. Internally the Chinese Communist Party had gained a certain solidarity as during the war tens of thousands of suspected Nationalist remainders were sent to fight in Korea. Those not killed in action were repatriated to Taiwan by the United Nations at their request. This effectively undercut resistance. This allowed the Communist leaders to concentrate on the establishment of a central governing system. In January 1953 it was announced that a People's Congress would be convened at an early, but unspecified, date to approve

the first constitution of the Chinese Communist regime.<sup>70</sup>  
 The Congress was eventually held one and half year later .  
 The Chinese Communists had unified the country to an  
 amazing degree<sup>71</sup> . The Communist Party wielded effective  
 power over the whole country and faced little serious  
 challenge from any quarter, Mao's writings were widely  
 followed and were utilized by the Communist Party to in-  
 doctrinate the population. The first Five-Year Plan was  
 initiated in 1953 with Soviet support<sup>72</sup> .

Externally the Korean armistice relieved Communist  
 China of the heavy burden of war. Moreover, Peking's  
 intervention in Korea gained Soviet appreciation as it  
 was interpreted as a "bona fide" proxy exercise<sup>73</sup> . These  
 events, internally and externally, gave Communist China  
 the opportunity to pursue its regional objective.

To realize Asian dominance, Communist China has  
 attempted to expel both the American and Soviets, and  
 to reduce Japanese and Indian influence in this area to  
 the minimum<sup>74</sup> .

The American image of Mao Tse-tung as an Asian  
 "Tito", was destroyed by Peking's role in the Korean War.  
 Earlier the United States considered to recognize the  
 Communist regime as the legitimate government of China<sup>75</sup> ,  
 but after the Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean

War, the American China policy changed dramatically. Washington interpreted the Chinese intervention in the Korean War as final proof that Communist China was firmly allied to Moscow furthering Soviet expansionism in Asia. As a result, it discarded the belief of Mao Tse-tung as an Asian Tito<sup>76</sup>. Since then the United States began to view Communist China as a contender in the Asian Cold War theatre<sup>77</sup> and extended its containment policy from Europe<sup>78</sup> to include the entire periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. In fact, after the war, the United States regarded Communist China as its most dangerous enemy in Asia<sup>79</sup> and began to support non-Communist regimes in Southeast Asia to check Communist China's expansionism<sup>80</sup>.

From the Chinese viewpoint, the United States was perceived as distinct threat to China's security, independence and power ambitions in Asia. Chinese Communist leaders regarded American bases in Asia as a direct threat to Communist China. The same was true of the U.S. military alliance system with Asian countries, and particularly the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was formed in 1954. In order to assure its regional power status, Communist China had to rollback U.S. influence from Asia. Thus during the 1950s Peking used economic aid to prevent the neutral countries of Asia from joining SEATO or any other alliance with the United States. In some cases, aid promises or deliveries resulted in friendship pacts that stipulated

that neither side would join any alliance against the other<sup>81</sup>. This explains why during the 1950s most recipients of Communist China's aid were Asian countries, i.e. Cambodia, Burma, Nepal, Laos, Indonesia, Ceylon (present Sri Lanka) and Afghanistan received Chinese Communist aid in 1956, 1958, 1956, 1960, 1956, 1958 and 1965, respectively. Hence Communist China's aid to Pakistan (1964), the third recipient of Chinese largesse, can be seen in the context of Peking's efforts to pursue a balance of power policy on the Indian subcontinent because India has been regarded by Communist China as a major competitor in Asia<sup>82</sup>.

Ever since the 1960s, Communist China's ambitions have moved from the regional to the global level. Communist China clearly aspires to a leading role in the "socialist camp" and the international Communist movement. It aspires to be a model for all underdeveloped countries. This implies the ultimate exclusion of Soviet as well as American influence from the world's regions. It also hopes to make Communist China a superpower comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union by the end of the twentieth century<sup>83</sup>. In pursuit of these objectives Communist China has accused the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as being intent on establishing world hegemony through mutual co-operation<sup>84</sup>. Communist China also promulgate the theories of the

"Two intermediate zone" and the "Three Worlds". According to the first theory, Communist China has defined those countries independent, or striving for independence, in Asia, Africa and Latin America as the first intermediate zone; while the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and other capitalist countries together form the second intermediate zone<sup>85</sup>. By presenting the "Two intermediate zone" theory, Communist China poses as the leader of the first intermediate zone countries promising to help them to free themselves from U.S. imperialist and Soviet oppression, and incites the second intermediate zone countries to do their utmost to free themselves from U.S. control.

According to the second theory, Communist China contends that the world is divided into three spheres that, while interconnected, are antagonistic. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World; the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other places constitute the Third World; the developed countries, not included in the First and Third Worlds belong to the Second World<sup>86</sup>. Communist China accuses the two superpowers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) of the extensive international exploitation and oppression which will result in a new world war<sup>87</sup>. It not only tries to arouse the developing countries against the two superpowers by arguing that "the numerous developing

countries have long suffered from colonialist oppression and exploitation" <sup>88</sup> but also encourages them to oppose imperialism and Soviet socialism by insisting that "all of them still face the historic task of destroying the remnants of colonialism, of developing their national economy and consolidating their national independence" <sup>89</sup> . At the same time, Peking declares that "China is a socialist country and a developing country as well, and therefore belongs to the Third World", and publicly proclaims that "the Chinese government and people firmly support all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in their struggle to win, or to defend, their national independence, develop their national economy and oppose colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. This is our sacred duty" <sup>90</sup> . It is evident that Communist China regards itself as the leader of the Third World and is eager to achieve the position of a superpower.

In its efforts to convince the Third World that Communist China is totally committed to their aspirations, Communist China's aid has flowed to the developing, or underdeveloped, countries, particularly to the African states since 1960. Table 2-3 indicates that the major recipients of Communist China's aid after 1960 have been African states.

Communist China's aid policy to Cambodia may serve us

an example to illustrate the employment of aid as a means to accomplish foreign policy objectives.

TABLE 2-3

Unit: \$ Million

## COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY AREA

|               | 1956<br>to<br>1971 | 1956<br>to<br>1960 | 1961<br>to<br>1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 |
|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TOTAL         | 2196               | 180                | 543                | 73   | 118  | 52   | 54   | *    | 709  | 467  |
| AFRICA        | 1112               | 26                 | 247                | 27   | 41   | 22   |      |      | 454  | 295  |
| EAST ASIA     | 281                | 76                 | 87                 | 18   | 43   |      |      |      |      | 57   |
| SOUTH AMERICA | 44                 |                    |                    |      |      |      |      |      |      | 44   |
| MIDDLE EAST   | 275                | 20                 | 125                |      | 15   | 21   | 12   | *    | 43   | 39   |
| SOUTH ASIA    | 484                | 58                 | 84                 | 28   | 19   | 9    | 42   |      | 212  | 32   |

\* Less than \$ 500,000

Source: Leo Tansky: China's Foreign Aid: The Record in Current Scene, vol. 10, no. 9 Sept. 1972, P. 2

Prior to 1950 Communist China's first concern was for its own security, and Cambodia posed little or no threat to Communist China; hence no aid was extended to this country. However, since the end of the Korean War, the overriding concern of Communist China was the prevention

of a U.S. dominated alliance in Indo-China or the establishment of U.S. bases in the region. At that time, Cambodia faced a serious threat of being swallowed up by its traditional adversaries — Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia also had to content with internal Communist guerrillas and the Vietminh who supported the Communist ideology. In an effort to prevent Cambodia from falling under American influence, Communist China jettisoned the ideological bond between itself and the Vietminh. Chou En-lai was prepared to exert pressure on the Vietminh and Peking's Cambodian allies to moderate their demands for Communist control in Cambodia, on the assurance that Cambodia would remain neutral and not join SEATO<sup>91</sup>. In June 1956, after prince Sihanouk visit to Peking, Chou also promised to give Cambodia economic aid. Sihanouk announced that Communist China had agreed to restrain the Vietminh in Cambodia and he promised not to align himself with the United States<sup>92</sup>.

Communist China's relations with Cambodia were further strengthened after Sihanouk renounced all American economic and military aid on November 12, 1963. In response to Sihanouk's anti-American gesture Communist China issued a statement on November 21 expressing its resolute support for Cambodia, "The Chinese government solemnly declares that if the Kingdom of Cambodia, which has persevered in its policy of peace and neutrality,

of a U.S. dominated alliance in Indo-China or the establishment of U.S. bases in the region. At that time, Cambodia faced a serious threat of being swallowed up by its traditional adversaries — Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia also had to contend with internal Communist guerrillas and the Vietminh who supported the Communist ideology. In an effort to prevent Cambodia from falling under American influence, Communist China jettisoned the ideological bond between itself and the Vietminh. Chou En-lai was prepared to exert pressure on the Vietminh and Peking's Cambodian allies to moderate their demands for Communist control in Cambodia, on the assurance that Cambodia would remain neutral and not join SEATO<sup>91</sup>. In June 1956, after prince Sihanouk's visit to Peking, Chou also promised to give Cambodia economic aid. Sihanouk announced that Communist China had agreed to restrain the Vietminh in Cambodia and he promised not to align himself with the United States<sup>92</sup>.

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should encounter armed invasion instigated by the U.S. and its vassals, the Chinese government and people will firmly side with the Kingdom of Cambodia and give it our all-out support. U.S. imperialism must bear all the consequences arising there from" <sup>93</sup> .

Communist China's attitude towards the Sihanouk regime changed dramatically since 1967. At this juncture Communist China shifted its attention from regional power to international power, meanwhile, Cambodia began to court the United States and the Soviet Union. In June 1969 the Cambodia government resumed relations with the United States, hence Peking refused to offer further aid and reactivated its support the Cambodian rebels. This may be seen as a retaliation for Cambodian cooperation with the two superpowers. As Sihanouk pointed out in 1968

"The war has been imposed on us because I have not agreed to become the ally or <sup>94</sup> satellite of China" .

He specifically pointed out that Cambodia was punished by Communist China for receiving the U.S. mission headed by Chester Bowles, in January 1968, which discussed the issue of American "hot pursuit" of Vietnamese <sup>95</sup> Communist troops retreating into Cambodia .

When the Vietnam War was at its peak in 1970, Communist China sided with the Vietnamese Communists to combat the United States and South Vietnamese. When Sihanouk was ousted in 1970, to be succeeded by Lon Nol, Communist China initially tried to cut its commitment to the Cambodian rebels and to improve relations with the new Cambodian government. When Peking later realised that the new Cambodian government was not prepared to give Vietnamese Communist sanctuaries to the extent as had Sihanouk, Peking reverted to its previous stance<sup>96</sup> of supporting the "people's war" .

Communist China's aid relations with Cambodia graphically illustrate that Chinese Communist aid is extended to serve Peking's foreign policy objectives. When its foreign policy objectives contradict its ideological aspirations, the former always comes prior to the latter.

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