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Sustaining the Unsustainable? Political Accountability and Development in sub-Saharan Africa's Resource Economies

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted to fulfil the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in International Relations at the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. To the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted before for any other university degree or examination.

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XA Ndlovu

To my late parents, Linah and Norman Ndlovu, with whom I began this journey. The memories of your unconditional love and support kept me going.

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List of Abbreviations

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolution Council.
ANC	African National Congress.
ANS	Adjusted Net Savings.
BSAC	British South Africa Company.
CHRAJ	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice.
CNU	Caprivi African National Union.
CoD	Congress of Democrats.
CPP	Convention People's Party.
CRC	Constitution Review Commission.
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s).
DA(s)	Development Agreement(s).
DNGM	National Directorate of Geology and Mining.
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo.
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States.
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

EMA	Environmental Management Act.
ENH	Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos.
EPL	Exclusive Prospecting Licences.
ERP	Economic Recovery Program.
EU	European Union.
FCN	Federal Convention of Namibia.
FDD	Forum for Democracy Development.
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment.
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.
GHETI	Ghana Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative.
GNI	Gross National Income.
GNP	Gross National Product.
GNPC	Ghana National Petroleum Corporation.
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy.
GSFP	Ghana School Feeding Programme.
HDI	Human Development Index.
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus.
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
INAMI	Instituto Nacional de Minas.

LIED	Lexical Index of Democracy.
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals.
MIREME	Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy.
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.
MMDA	Mines and Minerals Development Act.
MP(s)	Member(s) of Parliament.
NDC	National Democratic Congress.
NDC	National Democratic Convention.
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission.
NEC	National Electoral Commission.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation.
NHIS	National Health Insurance Scheme.
NLC	National Liberation Council.
NP	National Party.
NPI	National Petroleum Institute.
NPP	New Patriotic Party.
NRC	National Redemption Council.
NUDO	National Unity Democratic Organisation.
ODA	Official Development Assistance.
OPC	Ovambo People's Congress.
PDM	Popular Democratic Movement.
PF	Patriotic Front.

PI	Party Institutionalisation Index.
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council.
PP	Progress Party.
PR	Proportional Representation.
PRMA	Petroleum Revenue Management.
RDP	Rally for Democratic Progress.
SADC	Southern African Development Community.
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes.
SMC	Supreme Military Council.
SNDP	Sixth National Development Plan.
SWANU	South West Africa National Union.
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation.
TSEA	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration.
UDF	United Democratic Front.
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention.
UK	United Kingdom.
UN	United Nations.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.
UNIP	United National Independent Party.
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
UP	United Party.
UPND	United Party for National Development.

US	United States of America.
VDEM	Varieties of Democracy project.
ZANUPF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front.
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines.
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation.
ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority.

Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa's development challenge is to 'sustain the unsustainable'–using non-renewable resources to initiate long-term development processes that outlive the short-term proceeds of resource extraction. Literature has highlighted how differences in political institutions help determine whether natural resources help or hinder development. However, there is disagreement on which political institutions account for the variations in development outcomes. This study clarifies whether political regimes, electoral competitiveness, and party institutionalisation matter for inclusive and sustainable development using a sample of all sub-Saharan African countries for which data is available from 1990 to 2018. Specifically, do democracies perform better or worse on average than non-democracies? Do electorally competitive democracies perform better or worse than dominant-party (but still multiparty) democracies? Do more institutionalised party systems perform better or worse than less institutionalised party systems? In general, how, if at all, do different political accountability mechanisms affect inclusive and sustainable development?

The study uses 'nested' analysis, which combines cross-national statistical analysis and case studies of four resource-rich democracies in Africa: Ghana, Zambia, Namibia, and Mozambique. The cross-national analysis shows that party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for social inclusiveness, and all political variables do not improve or worsen economic sustainability. On the other hand, resource rents are negatively associated with social inclusiveness but do not predict economic sustainability. Meanwhile, the non-rent sectors contribute positively to both dimensions of development, highlighting the potential significance of income levels in explaining the cross-national development patterns in Africa.

Evidence in the case studies shows that electorally competitive democracies outperform dominant party democracies on social inclusiveness. The risk of being removed from office incentivises incumbents to provide public goods and increase social welfare. However, the impact of political accountability mechanisms on economic sustainability is ambiguous and may depend on sectoral institutions, policies and actors. The study contributes to (and bridges) two groups of literature, one investigating the economic consequences of politics and institutions and another accounting for the resource curse. It also considers both the inclusivity and sustainability aspects of development and highlights contextual factors from case studies, often overlooked in cross-national analyses.

1. Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa's development prospects depend heavily on how well the region harnesses its natural resource wealth. When managed prudently, oil, gas, and mining investments and their vast revenues can sustain development efforts and positively impact citizens' lives. Global demand for Africa's minerals and metals is predicted to increase to support the transition to renewable energy. The World Bank's 2020 report, 'Minerals for Climate Action' indicates that the production of metals and minerals such as cobalt, lithium, platinum and manganese could increase by 500 per cent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean energy technologies (Hund et al. 2020). For example, the large lithium reserves in Namibia and the significant natural gas discoveries in Mozambique present a renewed opportunity for resources to play an essential role in supporting the countries' and continents' energy and industrial development strategies (International Energy Agency 2019).

Though the region will become even more dependent on the proceeds of resource exports, resource-rich countries cannot assume that their resources will translate into consistent and reliable revenues to support development goals in the future (International Energy Agency 2019). The changing global energy dynamics and growing uncertainty over long-term demand, especially for oil, will likely pressure development plans that rely on hydrocarbon revenue. The uncertainty underscores the need to ensure that governments use revenues to promote inclusive and sustainable development, that is, using resources to improve welfare broadly throughout society and invest in forms of production that can outlive the depletion of natural assets.

Resource-rich and resource-poor countries are faced with promoting human development and achieving economic sustainability. However, problems of inclusiveness and sustainability are more pronounced in resource-rich countries, including those that are democratic. Since the 1960s, resource abundance has been associated with poor levels of economic development (Auty 1998). Resource booms and increased export earnings in Africa's resource-rich economies have not supported broad-based growth (African Union 2009). Resource booms tend to encourage the over-extraction of resources, raise the value of being in power and increase the misallocation of resources in the rest of the economy (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006).

Bucking predictions of a resource curse that afflicts countries with abundant resources, resource-rich countries are now, on average, more democratic, registering high levels of growth, and some are investing and saving their proceeds more than others (Collier and Hoeffler 2009). However, the challenge for Africa's resource-rich countries is not simply to achieve economic growth but to achieve patterns of development that can be sustained beyond a resource boom. Reliance on non-renewable mineral and fuel deposits is inherently unsustainable because deposits can only be depleted once. Resource-rich countries must find ways to transform these non-renewable resources into patterns of development that can be sustained economically, socially, and environmentally even after the resources are exhausted (World Bank 2011; Barma et al. 2012). Thus, the development challenge in Africa's resource economies is to 'sustain the unsustainable', that is, to use non-renewable resources to initiate long-term development processes that outlive the short-term proceeds of resource extraction.

The relationship between natural resource abundance and development has been widely explored. Early studies emphasised tendencies for natural resources to harm economic growth, inspiring the notion of a 'resource curse' (Sachs and Warner 1995). Subsequent economic critiques have questioned the theory and evidence behind these claims, casting doubt on whether natural resources directly cause poor economic performance (Stijns 2005; Lederman and Maloney 2008). Some research has highlighted how differences in political institutions help determine whether natural resources help or hinder development (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006). Though disagreements persist about how and why political institutions matter, broad agreement exists that we cannot adequately analyse the economic effects of natural resources without considering the political and institutional context.

However, applying insights from general studies of natural resources and development to sub-Saharan Africa is more complex. Significant empirical trends in the region have not been taken into account and do not fit neatly with the existing literature: First, many of the fastest-growing economies in the region are resource-rich, and on average, resource-rich countries have been growing faster than resource-poor countries. This growth contradicts economic versions of the resource curse hypothesis (Sachs and Warner 1995; Ross 1999; Frankel 2010). The problem is not to explain why resource-rich countries are not growing but to identify the conditions that can contribute to inclusive development.

Second, the basic sustainability of growth patterns in African resource economies varies widely. The problem is not to explain economic growth rates in isolation but to explain differences in the sustainability of broader development patterns. Some countries use the proceeds from the resource boom to save for (and invest in) the future, while others do not. Economic growth grounded on depleting non-renewable resources, causing environmental damage, and neglecting human capital is not sustainable (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009; World Bank 2011).

Third, the configurations of political institutions in resource-rich African countries vary widely. These political institutions, which often promote political accountability, may include democratic regimes, competitive elections, and institutionalised party systems. In 1990 barely any African countries were democratic, while today, more than one-third meet the minimum standards of democracy (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Importantly, as of 2009, resource-rich African countries have been equally likely to be democratic as resource-poor African countries were (Wantchekon 2002; Ndlovu 2012). The problem is not to explain why resource-rich countries are less democratic but to analyse the effect of different configurations of political institutions on development outcomes. The emphasis on political institutions accounting for the wide variations in governance and development levels has been the focus of much research (Alence 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Scholars agree that political institutions matter for economic growth and development but disagree about which institutions matter most.

Fundamental questions about the sustainable development of Africa's resource economies remain unresolved. Amongst these is whether observed development outcomes should be attributed to political regimes per se or other practices and institutions. Even amongst resource-rich democracies, it remains unclear where the accountability mechanisms lie. For example, if democracy is a 'sham' or if there is an 'electoral fallacy', where does political accountability, if any, come from in Africa's resource-rich democracies?

1. Do democracies perform better or worse on average than non-democracies?
2. Do electorally competitive democracies perform better or worse than dominant-party (but still multi–party) democracies?

3. Do more institutionalised party systems perform better or worse than less institutionalised party systems?

4. In general, how do different political accountability mechanisms affect performance on various dimensions of development?

The study is essential for theoretical and practical reasons. The study addresses questions at the intersection of two extensive and evolving literatures, one investigating the economic consequences of politics and institutions and another accounting for the resource curse. However, only a few studies consider this intersection (Collier and Hoeffler 2009). Political regimes and elections have received much attention in comparative literature; however, their effects on development are ambiguous or inconclusive. On the other hand, the impact of party institutionalisation has not been adequately considered in the resource curse literature.

Democratic regimes are essential in resource governance because they represent a constellation of institutions that are said to matter for managing the natural resource wealth. Also, democratic regimes provide accountability mechanisms and processes to review the government's use of resource revenues. The effects of regimes and electoral competition still warrant further investigation because they are not separate from the role of political parties and party institutionalisation. Parties tend to have a substantive role in democratic regimes. They cement the advantages of democracy and elections. Therefore, the institutionalisation of parties and the party system must also be part of the accountability arsenal. Understanding the nature and character of parties competing for power periodically and between elections is critical. Thus, from an analytical perspective, political regimes, electoral competition, and party institutionalisation are closely linked. Investigating these political accountability mechanisms is thus nested within a more considerable and evolving debate about the economic consequences of political institutions.

The research questions are also of significant practical concern. First, sub-Saharan Africa has historically struggled to consolidate its democratic institutions and harness its resource wealth. The widespread historical failure of resource-rich countries to use resource revenues prudently to achieve growth and development is the basis for a resource curse, so the imminent resource boom predicted by the 2020 World Bank report should be a cause for concern. Resource booms have occurred in Africa, and oil, gas and mineral revenues have previously driven economic growth (De La Briere et al. 2017). However, several characteristics of resource-rich countries complicate the relationship between political institutions and development. The revenues are more volatile than other sources of income. The size of revenues may be disproportionately large compared to other sources, and lastly, the revenues are prone to rent-seeking behaviour (Torvik 2009; Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov 2011). Natural resources also differ from other sources of income in their time profile and political and legal status. They are volatile and exhaustible and belong to all citizens of the country where they are exploited.

Second, the taxation-accountability thesis suggests that the type or composition of public revenue influences the character of the state. Governments that rely on revenue from taxation have different incentives than those that rely on exploiting natural resources. The exploitation of natural resources is a form of revenue generation that does not require the participation of citizens. Governments that depend on resource rents tend to tax their citizens less and are less accountable to their demands (Herb 2005; McGuirk 2013). The lack of accountability demands from citizens affects democratic consolidation and the quality of governance. As a result, resource revenue affects how governments face institutional constraints (Baskaran 2014).

Finally, external factors, such as the role of foreign aid and Chinese investments in Africa's resource sectors, though outside of the scope of this research, influence the continent's governance trajectory. For example, foreign aid has been shown to result in rent-seeking behaviour similar to the one found in natural resource-dependent economies, negatively affecting political institutions (Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008). Meanwhile, Chinese loans to African countries for infrastructural developments in exchange for resources, but with no conditionalities attached, may alleviate some constraints that may otherwise have been placed on the ruling elites (Alden and Alves 2009).

1.1. State of knowledge

A large body of research provides explanations for poor economic performance in Africa's resource-rich economies. Historically, natural resources were a blessing to countries that could use them to forge a path to sustainable economic growth. This view changed when literature that challenged the idea of an absolute resource blessing emerged (Badeeb, Lean and Clark 2017). Scholars have observed that resource-rich countries in developing regions such as Latin America, Africa and the Middle East have tended to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts, inspiring the notion of a 'resource curse' (Sachs and Warner 2001; Ross 2015). The resource curse is the idea that resource abundance leads to adverse developmental outcomes. Although this study does not aim to test the resource curse hypothesis, the contentious debate surrounding the curse is an important starting point for investigating how politics affects development in resource-rich countries. Thus, I refer to this literature for context and as it relates to the research problem.

The resource curse idea has been studied for more than two decades, but the empirical results, of which the bulk focuses on non-renewable resources, are mixed and far from conclusive. Early and recent studies have highlighted the tendency of resource-rich rich countries to underperform in several political and economic outcomes, such as economic growth, conflict management, institutional quality, and environmental sustainability (Sachs and Warner 1995; Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Smith 2004; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Ross 2012; Andersen and Aslaksen 2013). Using regression analysis that measured per capita growth, Sachs and Warner (1995) first presented empirical evidence to support the idea that resource-rich countries tend to perform poorer than their resource-poor counterparts. Their evidence showed that raw commodities as a share of exports were negatively correlated to growth between 1970-1989.

Studies inspired by the notion of a resource curse also propose several channels through which resource abundance may affect development outcomes. They tend to overlap between economic and political explanations. Economic mechanisms include the Dutch disease, the volatility of commodity prices, and poor economic policies (Corden and Neary 1982; Sachs and Warner 1997, 1999; Auty 2001; Fredirick Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). Political explanations include rent-seeking, corruption, weak institutions and unsustainable public policies (Gylfason 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Vicente 2010; Frederick Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2010; Brollo et al. 2013). Although these economic and political shortcomings may exist in resource-poor countries, they are more pronounced in resource-dependent countries (Di John 2011).

Subsequent critiques have questioned the theory and evidence behind the resource curse claims, casting doubt on whether natural resources directly affect economic performance. The revisionist view proposes that the impact of natural resources on development is either non-existent (Haber and Menaldo 2011) or conditional on several factors, such as the political and institutional setting (Stijns 2005, 2006;

Lederman and Maloney 2008; Dunning 2008; Mehrara 2009; Collier 2010; Alexeev and Conrad 2011; Aytac, Mousseau and Orsun 2016). Some scholars conclude that the role of institutions in the resource curse is insignificant (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). However, a large body of literature emphasises politics and institutions' role in helping mitigate the resource curse (Karl 2006; Larsen 2006; Kolstad 2009; Van der Ploeg 2011).

A smaller category of resource curse literature directly relevant to my research questions has focused on questions of institutional design, such as democratic and electoral rules, as alternative measures to institutional quality and performance (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1998; Andersen and Aslaksen 2008). Much of the focus has been on regime types and their effect on economic performance, which has also been undertaken outside the resource curse debate. Outside the resource curse debate, studies find a weak and negative overall effect of democracy on growth (e.g. Barro 1996). Others find significant and robust positive effects of democracy on growth (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2019).

Within the resource literature, an analysis of a dataset of more than 100 countries found strong evidence that higher levels of democracy are associated with higher growth levels in resource-dependent countries (Korhonen 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2009) studied 131 countries between 1970 and 2001 and found that democratic developing countries outperform autocratic governments without resource rents. In the presence of large resource rents, autocracies outperform democracies. The combination of resource rents and democracy in resource-rich countries is thus growth-reducing, though strong checks and balances can mitigate this process (Collier and Hoeffler 2009).

Meanwhile, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) differentiated between democracies and non-democracies, presidential and parliamentary democracies, and proportional and majoritarian electoral systems. They found reasonably robust results that the form of government (presidential vs parliamentary) matters more for the effect of natural resources on growth than being democratic or non-democratic.

The previous studies focus on gross domestic product (GDP) growth as an indicator of economic performance. However, studies focusing on genuine saving rates (a measure of economic sustainability) also found evidence of a positive effect of democratic institutions (De Soysa, Bailey and Neumayer 2010; Boos and Holm-Mueller 2013). Democratic governments tend to deplete natural resources less and invest more in human capital (Boos and Holm-Mueller 2013).

The electoral competition encourages governments to use resources for the collective good rather than personal benefits (Humphreys and Bates 2005). The risk of being removed from office incentivises incumbents to provide public goods and increase social welfare should they wish to maximise their chances of being reelected (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017). Meanwhile, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) argue that checks and balances matter more than electoral competition.

Although there is growing consensus around the broader dynamics of the democracy advantage and its effects on development, far less work has been done on the role of political parties and their degree of institutionalisation in resource economies. Outside of the resource curse debate, a study covering 169 countries found robust evidence that party institutionalisation improves welfare arrangements. Significantly, the relationship exists in different regime types but is more pronounced in democracies (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2021). Bizzarro et al. (2018) found that political parties affect economic development independently of other institutions. They tested their theory on data from 150 countries observed annually between 1901 and 2010 and found a large and significant causal effect of political parties on development, regardless of regime type.

Despite these advances in academic literature, several limitations inspire this research. First, while there is much research on the relationship between institutions, natural resources and development, much concern is usually with institutional quality and performance. Scholars often use indicators such as corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, property rights and the rule of law to measure institutions (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). By focusing on the quality and performance of institutions, the literature largely ignores the conditions under which institutions are formed and changed (Szalai 2018, 185).

While conventional institutional quality and performance measures are usually linked to democratic governance, institutions and democracy do not always overlap (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). We should distinguish between the effects of democratic political institutions and institutions of a higher quality, which we can find in different regime types. Scholars have also criticised measures of institutional performance, such as the level of corruption, for being endogenous to growth and development. Higher levels of economic growth would enable a country to invest more in institutional infrastructure and, as a result, improve the quality of institutions (Bakwena et al. 2009, 16).

Second, the studies focusing on the effects of institutional design rather than institutional quality or performance tend to use economic growth, especially GDP growth or GDP per capita over time, as a measure of economic performance. Furthermore, such measures ignore income inequality and regional disparities within countries. Some focus on sustainable development without considering the inclusivity aspect. However, development may be sustainable but not necessarily inclusive.

Third, most studies linking political regimes or institutions and development base their findings on cross-national evidence. Although these studies report a robust association, their causal stories remain suggestive. Comparative case studies can provide room to explore other contextual factors not accounted for that may also affect development outcomes.

Lastly, studies have overlooked the existence of resource-rich democracies in Africa. Academic and policy literature now suggests that resource-rich countries with democratic political systems are more likely to govern natural resources prudently than their non-democratic counterparts (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth (2003) studied the political economy of fiscal policy and economic management in oil-exporting countries. They distinguished between different regime types, but their democratic category did not include African countries. Nigeria was the only African case in the study but was classified as a predatory autocracy. Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006) also presented a political-economy analysis of the impact of natural resources and development, noting that many resource-rich countries are not democracies with elections, thus extending their model to dictatorships.

To address the limitations in the existing literature, I focus on political regimes, electoral competition, and party institutionalisation, which provide a framework for political accountability. These political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation, influencing development outcomes. I also employ a two-dimensional measure of development, encompassing economic sustainability and social inclusiveness, a move away from only using conventional indicators such as GDP growth. To account for the limitations of the cross-national analyses and a focus on authoritarian regimes, I conduct case study research focusing on resource-rich African democracies.

I test my multi-hypothesis theory using 'nested' analysis, combining two observational testing methods: Large-N or cross-national statistical analysis and case studies (Lieberman 2005). I use multiple regression and related estimation techniques to test the empirical relationship between the different political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes using a sample of all sub-Saharan African countries for which data is available. I then analyse four nested country cases: Ghana, Zambia, Namibia and Mozambique. The cases are nested in that they were selected based on the statistical analysis of the three main independent variables. They also focus on resource-rich democracies with different electoral competition and party institutionalisation levels. I use the method of structured, focused comparison for data collection and comparison of case studies (George and Bennett 2005). Since much of the cross-national evidence from the existing literature is ambiguous or inconclusive, case studies allow more robust tests than the Large-N methods (Van Evera 1997).

Through regression models, I answer whether democracies perform better or worse on average than non-democracies, whether electorally competitive democracies perform better or worse than dominant-party (but still multi-party) democracies, and whether more institutionalised party systems perform better or worse than less institutionalised party systems. The cross-national findings show that party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for inclusive development but not economic sustainability. Regime type and electoral competition do not reveal statistically significant effects on both dimensions of development. Also, natural resource rents are not positively associated with more inclusive and sustainable development patterns compared to the non-rent sectors.

Through case studies, I explore potential explanations for the different performances on inclusiveness and sustainability in each country and how political accountability mechanisms have impacted policy making, implementation, and, thus, development outcomes. I use prediction ellipse plots and structural time trend graphs to set the scene for country studies. The ellipses show whether the country over or underperforms on inclusiveness or sustainability relative to the "expected" values from the regression analysis. The time trends explain the outcomes and hint at the case-specific politics, governance and policy details that need further elaboration.

Evidence in the case studies reveals differences amongst the democracies that account for the variations in the inclusiveness and sustainability of development. Ghana and Zambia have experienced turnovers but have different degrees of party institutionalisation. Ghana moderately overperforms statistical expectations on inclusiveness. Electoral competitiveness incentivises public officials to embark on policy reforms which improve social inclusiveness. However, the country underperforms on sustainability despite its relatively consolidated regime and moderate party institutionalisation. Electoral competitiveness affects patterns of spending rents and expected revenue as populist policies lead to high and unsustainable spending around the election period.

Meanwhile, Zambia substantially outperforms expectations on both development outcomes despite a low degree of party institutionalisation and a fragmented party system. Like in Ghana, populist spending improves social provision and, thus, inclusiveness. However, Zambia's mining policies have limited the rents accruing to the government, leading the country to use loans to contribute to expenditures that positively impact economic sustainability, such as education.

Namibia and Mozambique have had the same ruling party since their first multiparty democratic elections. Despite the relatively institutionalised party system, Namibia moderately underperforms expectations on social inclusiveness due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The country also underperforms expectations on sustainability due to the diversion of resource revenues to politically-connected elites. Mozambique also moderately underperforms expectations on inclusiveness but moderately overperforms expectations on sustainability. Corruption scandals have led to an economic crisis and reduced donor support, adversely impacting social inclusiveness. Moreover, like in Zambia, Mozambique has not captured sufficient rents to embark on an unsustainable path due to the influence of mining regulations.

In general, the cross-national and case study findings are mixed. There are three takeaways from the findings. First, it is unrealistic to expect political accountability mechanisms to fully account for the economic performance of resource economies. However, because of the case study analysis, I reject the arguments that democracy, electoral competition and party institutionalisation do not influence development outcomes in Africa's resource-rich economies. The second is that competitive and dominant party democracies bring distinctive strengths and weaknesses to achieving inclusive and sustainable development. There may be a tradeoff between social inclusiveness and economic sustainability. Still, it is possible to devise and implement sector-specific policies, which may shape development outcomes in either political order. Third, democratic regimes guarantee the presence of other horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms, like parliaments, the judiciary, civil society and the media, which support the effectiveness of vertical accountability mechanisms like elections. Though their strength or effectiveness is not guaranteed, they are relatively more effective in electorally competitive democracies with a higher degree of party institutionalisation, like Ghana.

1.2. Roadmap

In the next chapter, Chapter Two, I present a theoretical framework for analysing how political accountability affects development outcomes. I discuss the concept of political accountability and the factors that constitute the political accountability framework. I also state the hypotheses about the key causal relationships. In Chapter Three, I discuss the research design, variable measures, data sources, and case selection. Though the measures are defined mainly for cross-national statistical analysis, some are also useful for tracking time trends within the case studies. In Chapter Four, I present cross-national evidence through regression models and interpret the findings.

I investigate how political accountability mechanisms have impacted resource governance and development in Ghana, Zambia, Namibia and Mozambique in chapters Five through Eight. I also consider the impact of other possible explanations I may have overlooked in the statistical analysis, such as the role of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms, like parliaments, civil society and the media. In Chapter Nine, I compare the findings from the case studies and discuss their potential implications. In the concluding Chapter Ten, I recap the findings from the cross-national analysis and case studies, explain the study's contributions and propose avenues for taking this work forward.

2. Theory: Political Accountability and Development in Resource Economies

There is a broad consensus that politics plays a central role in shaping all dimensions of development. Politics can matter in different ways for development, for example, by affecting growth, the provision of basic services, and social protection (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2016). Examining why some nations are poor and others are rich, in their book, "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty," Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) proposed that countries with inclusive political and economic institutions are more likely to have sustained growth when compared to countries with extractive institutions. However, cross-national evidence on the role of democratic institutions in ensuring development in resource-rich countries is mixed (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). Thus, much work remains to be done to understand better if and how politics affects development, especially in resource-rich countries.

The presence of democratic institutions, specifically political accountability mechanisms, can promote development by encouraging politicians to build broad electoral constituencies and focus on providing public goods. However, there is considerable variation in the role of political accountability in development. The key pattern is that mature democracies with strong accountability mechanisms, such as parties, interest groups, civil society, and mass media, tend to manage resource wealth better than less democratic societies (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). Thus, if society could hold their governments politically accountable, they would achieve inclusive and sustainable development. Moreover, if societies are getting less than expected levels of development, then there must be a problem, and political accountability is breaking down somehow.

In this chapter, I build a framework for analysing how political accountability affects development outcomes. I discuss the concept of political accountability and the factors that constitute the political accountability framework, and how they affect the inclusiveness and sustainability of development in resource-rich countries. I then state the hypotheses about the key causal relationships.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between political accountability and development in natural resource economies. The ellipse represents natural resource economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Resource wealth shapes how political accountability mechanisms function and, as a result, affect prospects for development. I present the mechanisms as different factors; however, they reinforce each other in practice. The three mechanisms whose effects I investigate are political regime type, electoral competition, and party institutionalisation.

The levels of development in natural resource economies also vary, especially with respect to economic sustainability and inclusiveness. Thus, this approach suggests that political accountability mechanisms should influence development outcomes and that these effects may differ in countries with abundant natural resources. In other words, whether natural resource wealth is good or bad for development depends on the interaction between natural resources and the political and institutional setting.

Figure 2.1.: The 'Political Accountability' approach



I also consider the possibility that differences in sustainable and inclusive development in Africa have deeper historical origins, including the effects of colonialism and ethnic fragmentation.

2.1. Political accountability

The political accountability approach broadly falls within the tradition of democracy studies investigating the socio-economic consequences of political regimes, where democratic politics, competitive multiparty elections and government alternation incentivise a political system to adjust to popular demands and produce better outcomes than in autocratic regimes. The meaning of accountability in development policy is far from precise, but accountability is crucial to development. Political accountability generally refers to the "constraints on executive power and comprises the mechanisms for holding an agent accountable and the means to apply sanctions when a principal (citizens) transfers power to an agent (government)" (Walsh 2020, 2). The concept of political accountability is used not only to refer to removal mechanisms but also to indicate that citizens have confidence in the re-elected party. Besides, there are also constraints in the removal processes of politicians in parliamentary and presidential democracies.

Under democratic regimes, citizens can use different mechanisms such as voting, protests and written responses to reward or sanction the government. When such mechanisms work, the government may be accountable to citizens and use resources to promote inclusive and sustainable development instead of doing whatever it wants without consequences (Easterly 2010). However, accountability is not limited to democratic regimes or political spaces. In politics, accountability involves a relationship of representation (through parties, for example), but representation is not always limited to democracies (Adam, Stokes and Manin 1999; Kitschelt 2011). Therefore, democracies are only one specific way of organising representation and accountability relations, especially where representation relies on periodic competitive elections and not the appointment of political officers through co-optation.

Scholars often distinguish between vertical (electoral), horizontal, and diagonal (social) accountability. Vertical accountability consists of institutions and actions that make the government accountable such as elections or political parties. Horizontal accountability refers to the checks and balances used by different state institutions to hold the executive accountable such as the legislature and judicial branches (Mechkova, Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019; Walsh 2020). Diagonal accountability includes the strategies used by media and society, such as holding the government accountable through protests, withdrawal of support, and other forms of activism (Luhrmann, Marquardt and Mechkova 2020).

I focus on analysing the role of vertical political accountability mechanisms in statistical analysis and, in the case studies, probe deeper into the variety of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms in the broader vertical accountability environment. Still, my approach could be interpreted as limited. Electoral incentives may position development merely as a strategy to maintain power in the face of political competition (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2016). Also, other influential studies suggest that what matters is not formal political institutions such as political parties and elections but the underlying forms and power relations that shape politics. This argument is explained under the concept of political settlements and has grown over the years (Di John and Putzel 2009; Behuria, Buur and Gray 2017; M. H. Khan 2018; Kelsall 2020). Political ideology has also been described as a significant influence on public spending and social provision patterns. Ideas can shape how politicians accumulate and distribute resources (Afzal and Considine 2015). Furthermore, the "fallacy of electoralism" - the tendency to hold elections while ignoring other existing political realities - is well documented (Karl and Schmitter 1991).

While the criticism of formal political institutions, especially the role of elections, is justified, I emphasise vertical political accountability mechanisms such as elections for two reasons. First, promoting vertical/electoral accountability protects and reinforces other accountability mechanisms (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020), and strengthening horizontal and diagonal accountability will only succeed if vertical accountability is strengthened (Walsh 2020, 2). There is evidence that institutions of horizontal accountability, such as parliaments, independent courts, and other oversight bodies, evolve late in the sequence and build on progress made in vertical and diagonal accountability (Mechkova, Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). For example, competitive elections act as "insurance" by confirming executive support for judicial constraints and creating uncertainty regarding the prospects of staying in power

(Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020). Thus, other accountability mechanisms, such as civil society, do not operate as independent sources of constraint but are guaranteed by the robust competition in elections that confirm the protection of freedoms of association and expression needed by the media and civil society (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020).

Second, in many resource-rich countries, the government, specifically the executive branch such as the head of state, the cabinet, ministries and key civil servants, manages the production and distribution of resource revenue. Since the wave of nationalisations of the 1970s, much of the resource revenue has gone directly to the governments and their executive, creating an incumbency advantage in some respects (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). These political actors decide at what pace the government should extract resources and how the proceeds should be used. Such decisions have a long-lasting impact and can affect citizens in the immediate and long term (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Thus, controlling the executive's management of resources through vertical accountability mechanisms is crucial for development.

Finally, governments lack accountability without competition and party turnover, the institutionalisation of parties, and a broad political environment of freedom and transparency (LeVan 2015, 9). Effective democratic politics, electoral competition, and government alternation incentivise a political system to adjust to popular demands and produce better outcomes than in closed regimes. Even outside of meeting the minimum standards of democracy, multiparty elections can have a progressive political impact, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where mechanisms for holding leaders to account are in short supply (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017). Democratic regimes, in this case, become a proxy for the presence of political and institutional mechanisms that enhance the performance of governments.

The approach I describe implies that stable democracies will generally perform better than unstable dictatorships, but applying it to contemporary Africa is not straightforward. Table 2.1 is a two-by-two table illustrating the range of possibilities in Africa.

Table 2.1.: Democracy vs. Autocracy, Stable vs. Unstable

Stable democracies	Unstable democracies
Stable autocracies	Unstable autocracies

The region has experienced significant political changes since 1990 that have left it with diverse institutional arrangements (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Most countries now have institutions that bring a degree of inclusiveness and stability, many even meeting conventional minimum standards of electoral democracy, but these institutions remain fragile and highly imperfect. Moreover, important differences exist among African democracies. For example, some are competitive, and the fact that it is easier to remove governments that are not performing may contribute to greater accountability but shorter time horizons. Others are dominated by a single party, which may give governments longer time horizons but may also make them less accountable, despite free and fair elections.

Another complication is the impact of natural resources on how political institutions function (Collier 2010). Though many resource-rich countries in Africa have transitioned to democracy, the influential "rentier state" argument suggests that when a government receives most of its revenue from resource rents, it becomes more autonomous and less accountable to the people. Furthermore, the resource sector becomes an "enclave" from which only a small elite benefits (Ross 1999; Auty 2006). The rentier-state argument implies that the relationship between political accountability mechanisms and inclusive and sustainable development may be nonexistent in resource-rich countries. Also, in resource-rich countries, governments have strong temptations to deplete their natural assets more quickly than developmental considerations would dictate, making it difficult to establish and maintain institutions that restrain their authority (Bates 2008; Kolstad and Wiig 2009).

Table 2.2.: Hypotheses about political effects on development outcomes

	Development outcome	
	Inclusiveness	Sustainability
Democratic political regime	Positive	Ambiguous
Electoral competitiveness	Positive	Negative
Party institutionalisation	Positive	Positive

Table 2.2 highlights the expected/hypothesised relationships between specific variables, followed by a discussion of the logic behind the hypotheses in the upcoming sections. Cross-national evidence suggests that political constraints, especially in democratic regimes, can influence the use of resource revenues for development. Increasingly, the effects of resource booms depend on the political institutions that promote politicians' accountability and state competence. These political institutions determine political incentives and, thus, policy outcomes (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006, 450).

2.1.1. Political regime: democracy vs. autocracy

A long-standing debate in comparative politics concerns the impact of political regimes on development and vice versa (Przeworski et al. 2000). A regime is an ensemble of patterns that determine the method of access to public offices, the characteristics of the actors that are included or excluded from office, the strategies actors may use to gain access to office, and the rules followed to make public decisions that are binding (Karl and Schmitter 1991, 4). Regimes affect how leaders take and leave power, how long they remain in control and what they do while in office (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017, 6).

Scholars often use the terms authoritarian, autocracy, and dictatorship interchangeably to refer to a political system where power is concentrated in a single leader or a small elite that is not constitutionally accountable to the citizens (Kelsall 2014). Autocratic regimes are usually repressive, and decision-making is usually hidden from the public and cannot be scrutinised. There is very little or no free press, public opinion, and open party competition (Frantz 2018). The most predatory autocracies tend to have unstable governments legitimised by military force; they also tend to have short-term horizons, policy instability, low savings, high pro-cyclical spending, and high government consumption (Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth 2003).

Saez and Gallagher (2009) highlight that scholars of East Asia have argued that authoritarian governments are more capable of achieving development than democracies. This view was based on the premise that democracies focus on short-term gains that do not foster development. Notable countries cited are Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s, South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s, Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s, and China. However, studies on the relationship between political regimes and growth outcomes are inconclusive (Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Saez and Gallagher 2009). Some argue that democracy causes growth (Acemoglu et al. 2014) or that growth rates in democracies surpass those in dictatorships (Schiffbauer and Shen 2010), especially in countries that have been democratic over a long period (Gerring et al. 2005).

On the other hand, secure autocratic regimes may provide public goods, but this provision may not last due to the inherent uncertainty of succession in such regimes

(Olson 1993). In autocratic governments, citizens cannot even trust a leader with a long-term view as he may decide to confiscate capital when needed, thereby discouraging savings and investments. In other words, 'the promise of an autocrat is not enforceable by an independent judiciary or any other independent power...' (Olson 2000, 27). Many dictators have had short time horizons as they have tended to unexpectedly confiscate the wealth of their citizens without considering the long-term economic effects of such actions. However, they also have the potential for a long-term view when they do not feel threatened (Olson 1993, 571). An autocrat who has a long term view of the future will encourage a high rate of investment that will benefit the economy in the long run. Still, to do this, citizens must be confident that their property will be protected (Olson 1993, 569).

Inclusive 'political institutions distribute power broadly in society and place constraints on the exercise of this power instead of power vested in the hands of a narrow elite' (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 81). Democratic governments are assumed to be more inclusive of society in the political decision-making process and ensure that contracts are enforced by an independent judiciary, thereby leading to greater political efficiency. Democracies also 'codify and institutionalise mechanisms of accountability that involve all competent citizens of a polity' (Kitschelt 2011, 1).

Democratic rule differs from non-democratic rule by the norms determining how rulers come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions. In modern democracies, rulers are "held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Karl and Schmitter 1991, 76). There are procedures whose presence is indispensable to the persistence of democracy. These procedures include citizens choosing officials in frequent and fair elections, where coercion is not common and where citizens have the right to form independent associations such as political parties (Karl and Schmitter 1991). Although there are many channels of representation in democracies, the electoral one is the most public and visible accountability mechanism. Through this mechanism, democracies can ensure that politicians govern in the electorate's interests. All democracies also involve a degree of uncertainty about who will be elected and what policies they will pursue. Even in dominant party systems, the possibility of change through elections exists (Karl and Schmitter 1991).

Political leaders in democracies arguably have shorter tenures and time horizons when compared to leaders in autocracies. The political business cycle theory predicts government public investment decisions given certain political constraints (Nordhaus 1975). The seminal work by Nordhaus (1975) established the behaviour of democratic political systems, which face a choice between present and future welfare using the tradeoff between employment and inflation (taxation) measures. He concluded that in a perfect democracy, where voters evaluate parties retrospectively, government decisions would work against future generations. Often, the incumbent employs austerity measures at the beginning of his term and then redistributive policies closer to the election. Lindbeck (1976, 11) also argued that "as the time to the election approaches zero, the discount rate for the future economic variables goes to infinity". Like Nordhaus, Lindbeck emphasises that expansionary monetary policy should be expected before elections. However, when democracies are stable and secure, and the succession is predictable, as in dominant party systems, long-term contracts are possible (Olson 1993, 42).

Democracies tend to deplete fewer resources and invest more in human capital (De Soysa, Bailey and Neumayer 2010). Corruption tends to also be more pervasive in resource-rich countries below a certain threshold of democratic quality, so strong democratic institutions can help suppress corrupt practices. Furthermore, governments can achieve inclusive development through political inclusion, and democracy is the regime often associated with this inclusion (Teichman 2016).

Suppose political regimes can shape whether governments pursue inclusive and sustainable development. In that case, I can establish the following general hypotheses for autocracies and democracies:

On social inclusiveness *Democracies are expected to outperform autocracies on social inclusiveness.* Democracies require broader constituencies, thus promoting government responsiveness to popular preferences via potential costs. They also encourage self-interested politicians to deliver more public and programmatic goods.

On economic sustainability *Democracies have "intermediate" time horizons, while autocracies can have either very short or very long-time horizons depending on how secure their hold on power is.* Governments in democracies face electoral cycles that last several years. They may behave opportunistically in the run-up to elections ('political business cycles'), but politicians and parties may also have incentives to maintain their reputations across electoral cycles.

2.1.2. Electoral competitiveness: competitive vs. dominant party systems

While there are generally democratic and undemocratic political regimes, there are also variations within these general classifications. For example, some democracies have competitive and dominant party systems. Democracy is commonly understood in the context of competitive elections, which determine how a government acquires power (Collier and Hoeffler 2009). Elections remain the primary mechanism available in democracies to translate citizens' interests into public policies. A central model of democracy assumes that regular elections make politicians responsive to voter preferences (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016, 336). However, holding elections does not necessarily result in political accountability. It is thus essential to consider party competition and turnovers to understand the probability of rulers losing power through an election to account for this shortcoming.

Party systems are composed of political parties, a group organised to gain government control by winning elections. Parties also mediate interests, mobilise citizens, and link the states and society (Riedl and Dickovick 2014). Parties are essential for democratic regimes, and democracies cannot function without parties. Parties are also the most widespread political institutions worldwide and are found in democratic and autocratic settings and dominant and competitive electoral contexts. Therefore, political parties are an important institutional characteristic of political regimes (Bizzarro, Hicken and Self 2020). Moreover, the representative role of parties is crucial to making democratic systems responsive.

Dominant party systems are widespread in Africa, and lack accountability (Bogaards 2000). There has also been a general dissatisfaction with the low level of competitiveness in the region. Competitive politics that occur within agreed rules and social norms improve the ruling government's accountability, responsiveness, and performance, help guard against corruption, and provide oversight of policy formulation and implementation (Johnston 2002). A strong opposition can keep the government in check and offer a political alternative for citizens seeking change (Johnston 2002).

Competition is so desirable that electoral crafting to create a competitive environment includes instituting an electoral law that restricts the number of parliamentary seats for the winning party to a maximum (to limit its dominance) and artificially bolstering the opposition party's position (Bogaards 2000). However, it is equally important to note that electoral competition does not always lead to political accountability. Citizens can replace a poorly performing leader or party with another poorly performing leader or party. Incumbents could also deliberately manipulate macroeconomic policies to influence the outcome of national elections. Votes can be 'legally' bought through tax reductions, transfer payments/increases in social welfare, farm subsidies, and public funds appropriation to serve incumbent legislators' interests and the people they represent (Tufte 1978). In such cases, scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (2009) argue that checks and balances are more critical for constraining the use of government power than the electoral competition. Elections are easy to introduce, are once-off events, and parties participate as a route to gaining power. In contrast, checks and balances are a process that functions continuously with focused efforts.

If the alternation is consistent, one should expect positive outcomes and the strengthening of a democracy (Lijphart 2012). However, there are numerous cases where there has been no alternation in government for extended periods. The lack of alternation is undoubtedly the case in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique. The problem of dominant political parties is even more acute in societies divided along ethnic, racial or religious lines. When societies are not homogenous, they tend to have political parties and interest groups closely aligned to these divisions, such that electoral politics in Africa are often viewed to be based on ethnic differences (Lijphart 2012). Clientelistic relations also prevail in monopolistic politics, where there is a dominant party or group (Kitschelt 2011). Also, democratic pessimists argue that many leaders have used ethnic identities, patronage and clientelism to manipulate electoral processes; however, there has been evidence of sustained political competition and sophisticated voters on the continent (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014). The sub-Saharan Africa region has experienced numerous turnovers. Eleven turnovers took place in the region between 1990 and 1994 (Block 2002, 206). Before 1990, only one African ruler, President Ramgoolam from Mauritius, was successfully replaced through electoral means (Block 2002, 206).

For some, party competition can have damaging effects by increasing clientelist politics. For example, intense political competition in Ghana has threatened fiscal sustainability. After discovering oil (and leading up to the 2008 elections), the major political parties competed on how they would use oil revenues to benefit society. The rivalry led to high expectations from citizens, unsustainable spending when oil prices were high, and a budget shortfall when prices were low (IDEA and NRGI 2018).

In general, competitive multiparty elections and alternation in office have resulted in a better political space and could potentially translate to better development outcomes. Political party competition has increased the provision of health and education when parties try to outperform each other (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2016). Through a cross-national and time-series design, Carbone and Pellegeta (2017) found that competitive multiparty elections and turnovers in government are associated with higher levels of social welfare spending. They argued that electoral competition and alternation help citizens in Africa improve their leaders' accountability. The risk of being removed from office creates incentives for incumbents to provide public goods and increase the level of social welfare should they wish to maximise their chances of being reelected (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017).

Political parties operating in a highly competitive context may behave differently from those operating in a dominant party system. Competitive multiparty systems improve the likelihood of parties and Members of Parliament (MPs) holding the executive accountable than dominant-party systems, which have more cohesion between the executive and legislature (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). At the same time, periodic elections help opposition parties monitor the ruling party's behaviour.

Suppose multiparty competition, where defeat is a real possibility, is crucial for governments to perform. In that case, I expect the following in dominant and competitive party systems:

On social inclusiveness *Competitive party democracies are expected to outperform dominant party democracies.* Elections are a weak accountability mechanism when removing a government through an election is improbable. The pressure to win re-election strengthens electoral accountability and the need to provide public goods.

On economic sustainability *Dominant party democracies should have longer time horizons than competitive party democracies.* In this case, dominant party democracies behave like 'secure autocracies', while short tenures present a challenge to competitive party democracies.

2.1.3. Party institutionalisation: high vs. low degree of party institutionalisation

Institutionalisation is also a key feature of parties and party systems (Mainwarring and Scully 1995). Repeated elections require an institutionalised party system to function effectively as an accountability mechanism (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016, 336). The more institutionalised a party system is, the more likely parties will compete based on policy foundations and provide higher levels of political accountability and identifiability. Likewise, political parties in weakly institutionalised systems compete based on short-term populist policy goals that lack consistency and continuity over time (Jones 2005).

Regular elections have sometimes failed to align public officials' interests with those of voters, so party institutionalisation plays an important role in conditioning the effectiveness of elections as an accountability mechanism (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016, 316). Institutionalised parties can check themselves internally as their accountability extends beyond voters. When general elections fail to remove parties, parties can remove their leaders, especially in dominant contexts. Internal party processes of selecting or removing leaders can be critical for achieving accountability in democracies and thus enhance development outcomes (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016).

Institutionalised party systems also tend to have programmatic political parties. Programmatic parties have 'a coherent collection of policy positions that are used to compete in elections, inform policymaking and communicate with constituents...' (IDEA and NRGI 2018, 2). Programmatic parties are also well-positioned to address challenges with resource abundance, such as short-time horizons and citizen expectations. They can also contribute to sector reforms and policy implementation, whether in power or opposition (IDEA and NRGI 2018). Thus, institutionalised parties with linkages that foster inclusive and accountable governance can contribute to long-term development.

In many developing countries, voters face the challenge of holding their leaders to account in poorly institutionalised and unstable party systems. The parties are short-lived or constantly change their electoral alliances (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016, 316). In Africa, the level of institutionalisation is generally low and varies widely (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001). Some parties and party systems are stable, others are fluid, while others have de-stabilised (Lindberg 2007). Stable parties are established and institutionalised, while in an unstable state, parties are more provisional and can disintegrate at any time (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013). This diversity testifies to the general fragility of parties and party systems (Erdmann and Basedau 2008).

Using examples of Mozambique and Zambia, Pitcher (2017) showed how the stability vs fragmentation variation in party systems had affected policy choices and economic outcomes in Africa. Pitcher (2017) argued that economic policy design and implementation are predictable in stable systems, while fluid systems have difficulty with consistent policy content and continuity. The variation in party and party system institutionalisation has implications for development. When repeated democratic elections fail to curb government corruption or promote accountability, party institutionalisation may play a critical role (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016). If party institutionalisation plays a vital role in development, I expect the following effects:

On social inclusiveness *Democracies with a high degree of party institutionalisation are expected to outperform democracies with a lower degree of party institutionalisation.* Institutionalisation allows parties to develop reputations and for voters to identify and sanction poorly performing incumbents. Parties can also hold the incumbent to account through internal processes. Institutionalised parties are also better coordinated and can effectively deliver public goods.

On economic sustainability *Parties with a high degree of institutionalisation should have longer time horizons.* Institutionalised parties are established and have stable alliances and party affiliations, and formalised decision-making processes. They are, therefore, likely to be enduring. The longevity and predictability can give leaders a long-term perspective on policy making.

The study will also account for competing perspectives that challenge the primacy of politics and institutions over other variables, such as colonial legacy and ethnic fractionalisation. For example, studies identify high levels of ethnic fractionalisation as a source of slow economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997). When populations are heterogeneous and polarised around religious, ethnic or tribal backgrounds, politicians have incentives to pursue goals related to these polarising issues at the cost of inclusive development (Soubbotina 2004, 84). Others consider the unfavourable role that geography (climate, location, and disease environment) has played in promoting institutions that undermine growth in African economies (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Such explanations may account for the development differences within African countries.

This chapter has proposed that political accountability mechanisms could shape the incentives that determine whether leaders use resource rents to promote inclusive and sustainable development. Empirically analysing if and how the different political accountability mechanisms affect development is complex and requires creating models to test the hypotheses. I employ the 'nested analysis' strategy to test the expectations, which combines cross-national analysis with nested case studies of Ghana, Zambia, Namibia, and Mozambique. In the next chapter, I define the variables (dependent and independent) and analyse their measures. I also present descriptive statistics.

3. Method: 'Nested' Analysis

In this chapter, I discuss variable measures and evidence requirements for statistical analysis. Though the measures are defined mainly for cross-national statistical analysis, some are also useful for tracking time trends within the case studies. Statistical research requires collecting and analysing quantitative data to examine cross-national trends. Case-study research requires the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data to provide a more nuanced explanation of how political accountability mechanisms affect inclusive and sustainable development.

The research will use 'nested' analysis, which combines cross-national statistical analysis with structured, focused case studies of four resource-rich African democracies (Lieberman 2005). The cross-national analysis will use multiple regression and related estimation techniques to clarify the empirical relationship between political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes using a sample of all sub-Saharan African countries for which data is available. The four case studies are 'nested' in that they are selected on the basis of statistical analysis. The rationale is to illustrate/represent different political accountability mechanisms and how they play out with respect to development outcomes. All four case studies will focus on democratic countries with abundant natural resources. The goal is to use more detailed analysis of specific countries to enrich the understanding of the broader cross-national patterns (George and Bennett 2005).

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the concepts, measures, and data sources. The second part presents summary statistics to illustrate the patterns in the cross-national data, and the final section discusses the logic of case selection.

3.1. Concepts, measures and data sources

3.1.1. Dependent variable: development

The World Commission on Environment and Development developed the most widely cited definition of sustainable development. The Commission defined it as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (Brundtland Commission 1987). The Commission acknowledged that realising development would require a political system that allows for citizen participation in decision making, an economic system that is self-reliant and a production system that respects the environment (Blewitt 2008).

Despite the widespread use of the word development, it is a concept that is highly contested, and vague and refers to a set of generalised beliefs and assumptions about what constitutes social progress (Escobar 1995; Robinson 2004; Cornwall and Eade 2010). The concept of development also remains contentious and has been subject to considerable debate in the academic and policy sphere (Sen 1999; Rakner and Svasand 2004). However, a broad agreement exists that development is a multi-dimensional concept encompassing economic, social and environmental goals. The idea is not fixed but an evolving one in which the exploitation of resources and institutional change should consider present and future needs (Brundtland Commission 1987). I employ a two-dimensional measure of development, encompassing '(economic) sustainability' and '(social) inclusiveness'.

3.1.1.1. Economic sustainability

There is a move to go beyond treating economic growth as a valid indicator of national well-being and development (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009). Conventional indicators alone, such as GDP, do not capture how countries embark on sustainable development paths. The national economic accounts give a distorted picture of the economy's health as they report the contribution of mining to the economy but not the simultaneous depletion of mineral wealth (Lange 2003b, 5). It is important to consider natural resource depletion and social aspects of development alongside conventional economic ones. Countries can achieve economic sustainability by investing resource revenues in forms of production that can outlive the depletion of natural assets. For example, the World Bank has developed "green accounting" measures that incorporate mineral and forest depletion, carbon emissions, and changes in human capital (World Bank 2011).

Sustainability assumes that environmental assets are substitutable for produced assets and that maintaining a non-decreasing total value of both produced and natural assets would ensure positive welfare over time. Similarly, Lange (2003b) noted that sustainable economic development requires wealth to be non-decreasing over time. Countries that fail the savings rule by having persistent negative genuine savings will most likely fail to meet the criteria for strong sustainability (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). Thus, economic sustainability is a precondition for sustainable development (Hamilton 1995).

The most widely used measure of sustainable economic development is the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) indicator, also known as genuine savings (Lange 2004; Hanley, Dupuy and McLaughlin 2015). ANS monitors whether the depletion of natural capital, such as minerals, is compensated for by investment in other assets such as human capital (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). It attempts to overcome the lack of data on wealth by measuring changes in assets from national savings adjusted for some environmental factors and expenditures on education. The education expenditure includes public current operating expenses in education, including wages and salaries and excludes capital investments in buildings and equipment. Conventional measures such as GDP do not have this information (Lange 2004, 25).

I measure economic sustainability as ANS as a percentage of GDP – adjusting for diamonds, averaged for the years 2014 to 2018 (formula in appendix A.2). ANS equals net national savings plus education expenditure minus energy depletion, mineral depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide, excluding particulate emissions damage. The depletion of natural resources is equivalent to liquidating assets and is not a positive contribution to net savings. Including human capital can be significant in that accounting for education expenditure can bring genuine savings close to zero for many countries in Africa (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). If ANS is negative, a nation is depleting its capital stock, and there is a threat to future well-being. If ANS is positive, a country is adding to its overall wealth, and its economic growth is on a sustainable path (World Bank 2011).

The data for ANS is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. I also use ANS estimates in the World Bank's 'The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium' report to address the gaps in missing ANS values for Zambia (1990-2008) and Mozambique (1990-2004) (World Bank 2011). Zambia's ANS value for 2009 was missing in both sources, so I interpolated the average of its 2008 and 2010 values.

The limitation of the ANS method is that it does not measure other factors that influence the value of natural capital, such as discoveries, changes in resource management, or production technology. A decomposition of natural asset values, over time, indicates that these factors are essential and often outweigh the effect of depletion on asset value (Lange 2004). ANS also measures a country's national wealth and not per capita income, so it is unclear whether individual welfare increases or declines. Development requires increasing national and Per Capita wealth to boost average social welfare or compensate for population growth (World Bank 2011). Furthermore, collecting data and constructing sustainability indices is challenging without better-defined concepts and simple models, especially models that are without criticism (Pezzey 1989, 3). For a further critique of genuine savings as an indicator of sustainability, see Boos (2015).

Still, the benefits of using the ANS measure outweigh the costs. Information about the value of natural capital helps construct accounts for national wealth and provides a more accurate assessment of economic performance and sustainable development (Lange 2003a). ANS is an incremental measure sensitive to policy and can change rapidly. The results will be visible immediately if governments spend more on education or introduce policies that increase private sector investment. It thus provides an early warning signal for the direction of the economy (World Bank 2011).

ANS is also the most policy-relevant measure of economic sustainability (Hamilton 1995). The measure emphasises the importance of domestic savings and sound macroeconomic policies. It also highlights the fiscal aspects of environment and resources management, such as resource royalties and pollution taxes. It thus offers policymakers an indicator for sustainability and a means for presenting resource and environmental issues in a way that is familiar to finance and development planning ministries (World Bank 2006).

3.1.1.2. Social inclusiveness

Inclusiveness refers to using resources to improve welfare broadly throughout society. Although the value of wealth may be similar for countries, the well-being of citizens may be different due to factors that are non-economic. Societies need to use resource revenues to spread benefits broadly, and investment in human capital, for example, is an integral part of the development process (World Bank 2011). The World Bank’s Wealth of Nations Report found that intangible capital makes up 60 to 80 per cent of total wealth in most countries. Human capital is about improving the skills and knowledge of a labour force. It can be increased through education expenditure and investments in health and nutrition. Investments in health and education promote social inclusion as they ensure equal opportunities for citizens to participate in economic and political life (World Bank 2006).

The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) first Human Development Report in 1990 noted that Africa had the lowest life expectancy, the highest infant mortality rates and the lowest literacy rates of all developing regions (United Nations Development Programme 1990). A lack of human capital continues to present significant challenges, and there is a need to include it in the assessment of development, especially in developing countries (Lange 2004). I, thus, consider social inclusiveness as the second dimension of development, in addition to economic sustainability.

The UNDP initiated the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990. Its purpose was to complement the orthodox approach to development as economic growth, measured by GDP, GNP, and per capita income (Hirai 2017; Klasen 2018; Ghislandi, Sanderson and Scherbov 2019). The HDI has gained global prominence and is now amongst the most well-known and accepted development measures. However, income remains an essential part of HDI as it is still a dominant measure in mainstream development policy. HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (health), being knowledgeable (education), and a decent standard of living (income).

The index is the geometric mean of normalised indices for each of the three dimensions (United Nations Development Programme 2018). It measures conditions that create a conducive environment for people to develop their full potential, either through accessing knowledge or living a longer life (United Nations Development Programme 1990). It is meant to be an approximation that captures dimensions of human choices beyond income. The selection of dimensions is not purely descriptive. Still, it reveals some value judgement about an essential composite index and in the transformation methods, standardisation, and weighting system. Furthermore, the HDI makes value judgments as explicit as possible to facilitate public discussion (Hirai 2017)

The HDI data is from the UNDP's Data Centre. The UNDP draws on various data sources from international data agencies to calculate the index. The UNDP measures the health dimension using the life expectancy at birth (years). Measures like life expectancy are a proxy for other vital human development indicators such as access to nutrition and good health care. The education dimension is measured by aggregating the mean of years and expected years of schooling, while the standard of living is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI index gives equal weight to each dimension (United Nations Development Programme 2019a). An explanation of the calculation is included in appendix A.3.

I measure socially inclusive development using only the health and education dimensions of HDI, the Income-Adjusted Human Development Index, averaged from 2014 to 2018. The economic sustainability measure includes education expenditure, such as public spending on wages and salaries, as a proxy for investment in human capital. However, the education measure in HDI focuses on education as an outcome rather than an input variable, allowing me to check whether the investment in education is producing the desired results in expected and mean years of schooling for each country.

While the growth in national production (GDP) is necessary for development, it is also essential to study how it translates into human development. I exclude the national income per capita in the regressions because I control for non-rent GDP, a proxy for economic development. Also, although helpful, the national income measure does not reflect the composition and beneficiaries of the income. Many societies have achieved high levels of human development at modest per capita income levels. Some societies are rich in natural resources and therefore have high average income levels but have failed to translate this income into consummate levels of human development (United Nations Development Programme 1990). Thus, the link between income (from natural resources and other sources) and development is not automatic (United Nations Development Programme 2013b). There needs to be deliberate policy and action that enables people to participate in and benefit from the development process (United Nations Development Programme 2013a).

The HDI measure, despite its success, has been widely criticised for being too limited to encompass the concept of human development using just three dimensions. Its national averages conceal regional and local disparities (United Nations Development Programme 1990). For example, on average, rural areas on the continent have had less access to education, health, and sanitation services when compared to urban areas. Also, there may be vast differences in literacy between men and women. Though I do not model these local disparities in the cross-national analysis, I highlight some of them in the case studies.

Furthermore, disadvantages in health and education interact with one another, may start at birth and even compound over an individual's lifetime, leading to persistent inequalities (United Nations Development Programme 2019a). Thus, life expectancy, gross national income (GNI), and education are highly correlated, empirically and conceptually, which suggests that the composite index might not reveal more than its single components (Ghislandi, Sanderson and Scherbov 2019). However, the correlation is not surprising because educated people tend to earn more and have longer life spans.

Another criticism is that the measure is crude as we cannot examine the quality of healthcare and education. Though it would be ideal to have many variables to measure human development comprehensively, there is a shortage of comparable data. For instance, reliable estimates of inequality are scarce due to a lack of transparency and availability of information. The Gini coefficient is only available for some countries (United Nations Development Programme 2019a). In Chapter one, I noted that the study is of both theoretical and practical concern. Thus, too many variables could produce an unclear picture, making it difficult for policymakers to focus on significant trends.

In general, indices are not as broad as the concepts they represent (Hirai 2017). Also, simplification is inevitable in creating development indices: the more indicators, the more data is needed, and the less universal application. The simplicity of the HDI index allows it to be universally comparable. Thus, the measure is a compromise between comprehensiveness and measurability (Ghislandi, Sanderson and Scherbov 2019). The advantage of simplicity does not mean the measure cannot be refined or improved. The HDI has gone through various developments since its inception. Many revisions have been made, and innovative and experimental work is unfolding to make systematic and comparable use of statistics; however, coverage remains limited (United Nations Development Programme 1990, 2019a).

My measure of development is an improvement over earlier conventional measures that relied on national wealth as an indicator of development. There is growing consensus that we must integrate national wealth with other development indicators. Life expectancy and literacy are commonly measured, but they are hardly studied with economic sustainability. Thus, there is merit to a two-dimensional measure of development that captures the natural environment and well-being indicators.

[1]

Using readily available data, Figure 3.1 illustrates the importance of considering natural resource depletion and social aspects of development in Africa. Each country is plotted based on the horizontal (social inclusiveness) and vertical (economic sustainability) axes. The horizontal solid line marks a zero point for economic sustainability. Countries above the horizontal line have positive natural and social savings, while those below have negative natural and social savings. The vertical solid line marks the average point for socially inclusive development. Countries before the vertical line perform below average on health and education outcomes, and those after the line perform above average.

Distinguishing between economic sustainability and inclusive development is crucial because only looking at health and education outcomes fails to capture a country's natural and social savings rate and vice versa. For example, a country like Ghana has above average social inclusiveness outcomes. Yet it has achieved this only while depleting its natural resources and neglecting investment in human capital. On the other hand, a country like Zambia has similar social inclusiveness outcomes to Ghana but has had less natural and social savings depletion, placing it at the top-right of the graph.

1. Liberia was dropped because it is an extreme 'low' outlier on economic sustainability, scoring -66.19. Thus figure 2, excluding Liberia, zooms in on the cluster of countries, making it easier to see the differences. The plot, which includes Liberia, is in the appendix, section A.1.

Figure 3.1.: Two dimensions of development: economic sustainability and social inclusiveness



3.1.2. Independent variables

Political arrangements play a role in facilitating development. Economic sustainability and social inclusiveness may be impacted by the regime setting, free elections and multi-party political systems. I examine two sets of explanatory variables in the regression models. The first set includes the primary explanatory variables: political regime, electoral competition, and party institutionalisation. The second set operationalises economic, demographic and historical factors that need to be held constant when assessing the impact of political accountability on development. I include these variables based on previous research findings, most of which I reviewed in Chapters One and Two.

3.1.2.1. Political regime

Regimes can be differentiated by the differences in the degree of inclusiveness practised in political decision making (Levy 2014). A governance structure is inclusive if it considers the costs and benefits of the entire population when it decides on the levels of public goods. It is less inclusive when it only accounts for the costs and benefits of a select part of the population (Deacon 2000).

There is no consensus on how to conceptualise democracy, and the goal of having a universal measure seems impossible (Coppedge et al. 2011). For the statistical analysis, I define democracy as a regime where leaders are selected through contested elections (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius 2015). In this type of contestation, there is a likelihood that the opposition will win elections (Alvares, 1996). The definition of democracy that focuses on inclusive elections under multiparty competition is considered minimalist, procedural or thin. It is minimalist because the main focus is on the electoral model of democracy and not other non-electoral aspects such as freedom of speech and the rule of law (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020). However, I will highlight this broad range of features of democracy in the case studies.

While it is a significant challenge to appropriately measure the characteristics of political regimes in political science (Bizzarro et al. 2018), the discipline has many measures of regimes, especially the concept of democracy . Existing measures have often been used in studies covering the last few decades, but there continue to be inconsistencies in empirical findings. Some of the prominent datasets include the Polity dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010), the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2011), Freedom House, and the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009).

I use the Lexical Index of Democracy (LIED) to classify political regimes into democratic and non-democratic (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius 2015). LIED arranges electoral democracy attributes so that each serves as a necessary and sufficient condition within an ordinal scale. I use version 5.1 of LIED, published in 2020, covering all independent countries and semi-independent politics from 1789 to 2019. I also check the measure against Polity IV and Freedom House measures to see any strange or inconsistent countries. LIED operationalises electoral democracy as a series of necessary and sufficient conditions. The index has 7 levels (0-6) and 6 conditions. Each successive level consists of an additional condition, which cumulatively defines the scale (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius 2015, 1496). The levels on the index identify qualitative differences; thus, a 3 is not a midpoint between 2 and 4; each level on the scale can be considered a subtype. The conditions include whether a country has had elections, whether the elections were one-party, multi-party, or had no party, and whether they were for the legislature, executive or both. The conditions also consider whether the elections were minimally competitive and had full male, female or universal suffrage.

I use these conditions to classify the regime types. First, I collect and analyse data for elections in the region between 1990 and 2018. I use data from the African Elections Database which uses a variety of internet sources, including official government documents and electoral observer mission reports African Elections Database (2012). I also use the Elections Guide website provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Second, I create a LIED dummy variable to filter minimally competitive elections (opposition groups are free to organise and participate in elections and can win government power) and are inclusive (with universal suffrage) and those that are not. The rationale for the filter is that a country can have multiple elections, but they may not all be democratic or free and fair. Countries with a LIED score of 6, that is, have minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage, are coded as 1. All others are coded a 0.

I then consider a country democratic if it fulfils two conditions: First, elections must have been minimally competitive and inclusive (or meet the 6 LIED conditions). Second, they must have happened at least three times in the 28 years under study (coded 1). Countries that do not meet these two conditions are considered non-democratic (coded 0). For example, Zimbabwe had seven elections between 1990 and 2018. None of the elections are classified as democratic according to the LIED measure. As a result, Zimbabwe fails to meet the first condition and is thus classified as non-democratic. Similarly, Nigeria has had six elections, of which only two are classified as minimally competitive and inclusive. Therefore, Nigeria does not meet the second condition (three or more democratic elections) and is thus not a democratic regime. Thus, although minimalist, the measure is quite strict.

The reason for placing a condition for elections to have occurred multiple times (at least 3 or more) between 1990 and 2018 is that officials must be elected at regular intervals to promote political accountability. Furthermore, a democratic election stock is critical for advancing development. Gerring et al. (2005) argue that previous studies have overlooked the importance of institutional maturity and propose looking at regimes as historically informed rather than as contemporary variables. This can be achieved by measuring a country's accumulated 'stock' of democracy because institutional effects unfold over time and are cumulative. They argue that the longer a country remains democratic, the greater its physical, social, and political capital, which positively impact economic performance. Their findings show that democracy advances human development only when considered a historical ('stock') variable (Gerring et al. 2005).

3.1.2.2. Electoral competitiveness

Elections must exist before distinguishing between competitive and dominant party systems. Also, elections can be competitive and occur regularly but with no party turnover. Thus, some argue that democracies become truly consolidated after the founding party succumbs to a peaceful transfer of power through the vote. Most classifications of party systems are based on scholars such as Duverger et al. (1954), Blondel (1968), and Sartori (2005), who employ a comparative approach to classifying party systems into distinct types. Although there is a lack of consensus on conceptualising the party system (Bogaards 2004; Enyedi and Bertoa 2011), many authors converge around Sartori's definition of a party system as "a system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition" (Sartori 2005, 39).

Dominant party systems, occur when one party manages to win three consecutive absolute majorities of seats in parliament (Sartori 2005, 175). A competitive party system exists where the party that took over power in the initial election loses a subsequent election, turns over power to the winning party, and when the winning party does the same in the next election (Huntington 1991). When there is no alternation and there exists a disparity of resources among parties, the system is considered dominant. A dominant-party system can exist in a pluralistic context and differs from a ‘hegemonic’ party in non-democracies. In a democratic contest, there are opportunities for open dissent even if there is no alternation (Sartori 2005). Similar to LIED’s concept of minimally competitive elections, Sartori views ‘alternation’, hence electoral competitiveness, as the ‘expectation’ rather than the ‘actual’ occurrence of turnover.

I measure electoral competitiveness as the actual (and not potential) occurrence of a turnover. First, I collect and analyse election data from 1990 to the latest elections for each country until 2018. Second, I use the LIED measure to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic elections. Third, I then create a dummy for party competitiveness. Countries that experienced alternation in power, that is, have one or more democratic electoral turnovers between 1990 and 2018, are coded 1 and considered competitive party systems. Countries with no party turnover since 1990, where a single political party won all democratic elections, are coded 0 and are considered dominant party systems. For example, Ghana had seven elections between 1990 and 2018, of which only six were democratic according to the LIED measure. The country then experienced three turnovers in the six elections and thus passed Huntington’s two-turnover test (Huntington 1991). On the other hand, Mozambique had five elections, of which only three were democratic, but the same political party won all three elections. Mozambique, therefore, has a dominant party system.

3.1.2.3. Party institutionalisation

Political parties have an essential role in ensuring that resource rents are managed prudently and in the long-term interests of society. They also play a crucial role in helping countries adopt policies that promote long-term development (IDEA and NRGI 2018). Without well-developed political parties or credible national leaders, all voters can rely on is promises of targeted favours in making electoral choices (Soubbotina 2004). Different features of party institutionalisation enhance the incentives and capacities of parties to pursue welfare policies (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2021). Parties, however, are complex and multifaceted and do not invest an equal amount of time and resources in activities such as election campaigns.

The degree of institutionalisation of political parties matters, and it can be high even in countries with dominant party systems, such as Namibia. For example, Basedau and Stroh (2008) found differentiated degrees of party institutionalisation in Africa, and the overall levels indicate deficits in party institutionalisation. Furthermore, the variation occurs more between individual parties than between national aggregates.

The Varieties of Democracy project (VDEM) developed a country-level index measure of party institutionalisation as the first global index, covering 110 countries from 1900 to 2018 (Bizzarro, Hicken and Self 2020). The Party Institutionalisation Index (PI) is two dimensional and measures 1) the 'degree to which party organisations are routinised and 2) the extent to which voters and party elites value the party label and program' (Bizzarro, Hicken and Self 2020, 2). Party routinisation refers to 'the extent to which parties constitute stable, permanent, autonomous institutions'. Value infusion refers to the 'extent to which political elites, party members, and voters assign intrinsic value to belonging to a party' and can sacrifice the individual elite's short term goals for the party's long term goals (Bizzarro, Hicken and Self 2020, 2). Parties are institutionalised to the degree that they approximate this ideal type, that is, stable parties that have a long-term perspective and lasting connections with voters (Bizzarro et al. 2018). The data is based on input from an expert panel and is thus a measure of perceptions.

VDEM poses questions related to the number of political party organisations with permanent organisations, local party branches, available party platforms, legislative party cohesion, and party linkages to investigate the proportion of parties with features that resemble an institutionalised party at a country level. The list of questions or indicators is included in the appendix, section A4. In essence, the assessment captures the scope of party institutionalisation in a country, the proportion of parties that reach a threshold of minimal institutionalisation and the depth of institutionalisation (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2021, 1211).

I employ the VDEM PI Index data (version 10) to measure the perceptions of the degree of party institutionalisation in different African countries. Like political regimes, I take a historical approach to the quantitative analysis of the PI Index because institutional maturity matters (Gerring et al. 2005). In other words, I measure the accumulated effect of PI because the longer a country's political parties remain institutionalised, the greater the impact on development outcomes. I create a stock of party institutionalisation by averaging each country's VDEM score from 1990 to 2018, with a 5 per cent depreciation rate, making the earlier years count less than the later years.

The concern with the VDEM approach is that to calculate the index, the authors standardise each component as a z-score, average the z-scores, and then calculate percentiles (e.g. 0.92 on the index would mean that a country's score is higher than 92% of the other countries). The issue with the approach is that it depends on the empirical distribution of values in the data set. Thus, every time the data set changes (for example, scores for a new year are added), it would require a recalculation.

3.1.2.4. Non-renewable natural resources

Africa is rich in natural resources; whether these resources have been good for Africa's overall economic and political development remains controversial. The 'rentier state' hypothesis predicts that a government which receives most of its revenue from external sources such as resource rent tends to tax its citizens less. As a result, it is likely to lack accountability, be more autonomous, and be detached from its citizens (Ross 1999). Natural resources are important for social inclusiveness and economic sustainability. A study found a statistically significant negative relationship between natural resource dependence and abundance and public health spending as a percentage of GDP over time, even after controlling for other factors (Cockx and Francken 2014). Another found a negative relationship between natural resources and education (measured by human capital) (A. Manning 2004).

Positive ANS is only possible when mineral depletion is offset by investment in other forms of capital, such as health and education. Countries with negative ANS deplete their natural capital without replacing them and subtract from social welfare over time (World Bank 2011). The depletion of natural resources is, thus, in effect, the liquidation of an asset and should not appear as a positive contribution to net savings (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). Hence, the natural resource variable is expected to be negatively associated with development indicators. Governments in resource-rich countries may have strong temptations to deplete their natural assets more quickly than developmental considerations would dictate and have little or no institutions to restrain their authority, especially in non-democratic settings.

In recent literature, natural resources have been defined and measured in various ways, such as resource abundance (stock), which estimates the endowment of resource deposits, and resource dependence, which refers to the extent to which a country relies on resource revenues (Badeeb, Lean and Clark 2017, 127). I define natural resources as revenues minus extraction costs (including the cost of capital), that is, 'resource rents' (Lange 2003b; Barma et al. 2012; Laporte and Quatrebarbes 2015). Natural resources are scarce. Therefore, there is an economic return to the resource itself above the return needed to cover intermediate input costs, labour costs, and the opportunity cost of capital invested in the business (Lange and Motinga 1997).

I measure resource rents as the proportion of rents per capita, averaged from 2014 to 2018. The data is also logged to make it more symmetric. A measure of resource rents subtracts the cost of production from the commodity price instead of measuring the abundance of natural resources by the degree of dependence in terms of exports. This resource rents measure is more attractive as it gives a much clearer picture of the revenue that accrues to the government. For country trends, I express rents as a percentage of (non-rent) GDP to make the trend more easily comparable to the ANS (economic sustainability) trends, which are also measured as a percentage of GDP. The alternative measure allows me to check if an increase in rent extraction drives a deterioration in ANS. The World Bank's Wealth of Nations dataset provides the data for natural resources. The country-level data provides wealth and non-renewable resource rents indicators for over 150 countries (World Bank 2011). The resource rent component is made up of oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and iron and diamonds.

Although my measure of rents includes diamond rent estimates from Alence (2015), most accounts exclude mineral resources such as diamonds, uranium, and lithium because of a lack of data. These excluded resources are essential for certain countries. Information about stocks of crucial minerals is mainly confidential and cannot be reported in public documents. Specific information needed to calculate rent for each mineral, such as the value-added information for uranium, is confidential

(Lange and Motinga 1997, 11). Usually, information about the volume and value of annual production is available, but data needed to calculate the asset values, such as reserves and production costs, is unavailable. Thus, natural capital tends to be underestimated (World Bank 2011).

An added disadvantage of the rent estimate is that it is based on private costs of extraction. Yet, the social costs of extraction, and the social value of rents, may vary from the private value. For example, the capital costs incurred by governments could push the extraction costs high enough to result in near-zero or negative rents for most years. Also, mining may cause substantial damage to the environment (air and water pollution and the disruption of natural habitats) through mining operations or infrastructure projects, such as roads and railways. Including these other costs would reduce the value of rents, but there are no estimates of these costs (Lange 2003b, 10).

Nonetheless, the recovery of resource rents by the government is essential. For non-renewable resources, there is a need to tax resources and reinvest part of the rents in other economic activities so that a country has alternative sources of income once the resources are exhausted. National income needs to be sustained over time by substituting other economic activities for mining, even though the resource is not sustainable (Lange 2003b).

3.1.2.5. Control variables

There are other competing explanations for the varying development outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. The empirical association between political accountability mechanisms and development is estimated by controlling for the non-rent GDP per capita component of a country's GDP, ethnic fractionalisation, political stability and colonial type. I select these variables based on the expectation that they are empirically associated with political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes.

Non–resource GDP per capita Resource rents tend to crowd out non–resource GDP per capita, which increases due to fiscal expansion. In the long run, resource revenues negatively affect the GDP growth of the non-resource sector. However, the effect is not significant after controlling for government spending (Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov 2011). Democracy is also crucial for moderating government spending. The more accountable and inclusive governments are, the better support for non-resource sectors by reducing government spending inefficiencies and improving resource allocation (Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov 2011). I use net GDP per capita minus resource rents or non-rent GDP per capita (real US dollars, 2015; log scale) averaged for 2014 to 2018 as a proxy for a country's economic development. The data is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. A country's non-rent per capita component is expected to be positively associated with political and economic variables.

Ethnic fractionalisation Ethnic fractionalisation affects outcomes such as economic growth and the quality of governance. Structural theories predict that social identity cues such as ethnicity strongly influence behaviour and the institutional configurations that emerge in a country (Norris and Mattes 2003). Also, Easterly and Levine attribute some of Africa's governance problems to ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine 1997). Existing data indicate that ethnic diversity is correlated with low levels of education and negatively affects economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003). Ethnic diversity may increase polarisation and hinder consensus about the provision of public goods. Highly fractionalised countries are more likely to have difficulties maintaining politically inclusive institutions and attaining development outcomes. Alesina and associates compiled the fractionalisation dataset. The dataset covers 215 countries and measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries (Alesina et al. 2003).

Political stability The political stability indicator, averaged from 2014 to 2018, measures the perceptions of the likelihood of motivated political violence, including terrorism. It measures the possibility of the government being destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional means (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Mature democratic institutions provide political stability and improve economic development (Heo and Hahm 2015). Thus, this approach gives ‘credit’ to democracies because they tend to be more stable. The measure of political stability is from World Governance Indicators, which measures six governance dimensions between 1996 and the present. The aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of variables from existing data sources. The data reflects perceptions of governance by respondents and public, private and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector experts worldwide (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). The standard normal units of the governance indicator range from around -2.5 (lowest) to 2.5 (highest) among all countries worldwide.

Colonial type Colonial type is an essential source of exogenous variation in political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). I control for differences in colonial type to estimate the impact of colonial legacies on development. I distinguish between the island, settler colony, non-British and non-settler, British and non-settler colonies. European rule and particular types of the colony affected post-colonial economic development in sub-Saharan Africa (Austin, 2010). For example, Europeans settled in some territories and either established inclusive institutions such as the rule of law or extractive institutions to transfer resources to the metropole.

Furthermore, whether or not a country became a settler or non-settler colony was determined by the feasibility of the environment or whether Europeans would have high mortality rates (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Where the conditions were conducive, Europeans emigrated and settled in several colonies and tried to replicate institutions such as property rights and checks against government power. Generally, there were fewer controls on state power in non-settler colonies such as the Congo. The colonial powers set up authoritarian states to maintain control and extract natural resources. Such colonial institutions have persisted even after independence (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001).

3.2. Descriptive statistics

Table 3.1 provides basic summary statistics for the variables I use in the empirical analysis (Hlavac 2022). The sample in the study includes all countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which data was available. The total sample size is 48. The table summarises both quantitative and qualitative variables. I summarise the continuous variables using measures of central tendency (mean and median) to describe the central value and dispersion (standard deviation) to describe how spread out the data is. Dummy and categorical variables are summarised using proportions. The table also provides Minimum and Maximum values to represent a variable's lower and upper limits in the dataset. Some variables have missing values, and the variable with the highest number of missing values is economic sustainability, with seven countries not represented in the measure.

Most countries typically perform above average for the social inclusiveness measure. Mauritius, with a 0.78 (Max) HDI index is an outlier and outperforms the other

Table 3.1.: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
Social inclusiveness	47	0.55	0.08	0.40	0.55	0.78
Economic sustainability	41	-1.35	15.27	-66.90	1.76	21.38
Rents Per Capita	46	301.78	871.24	0.00	54.38	5,374.89
Non-rent GDP Per Capita	46	2,247.90	2,994.97	110.24	1,222.99	13,875.81
Political regime	48	0.44	0.50	0	0	1
Electoral competition	48	0.33	0.48	0	0	1
Party institutionalisation	47	0.46	0.18	0.05	0.45	0.83
Political stability	46	-0.58	0.84	-2.35	-0.48	1.01
Ethnic fractionalisation	45	0.66	0.23	0.00	0.74	0.93
Non-British, non-settler	46	0.50	0.51	0	0.5	1
British non-settler	46	0.22	0.42	0	0	1
Settler	46	0.17	0.38	0	0	1
Island	46	0.11	0.31	0	0	1

countries, while countries such as Chad, with a Min value of 0.40, have below-average HDI values. The data for economic sustainability is skewed to the left. Liberia is an extreme outlier, with a Min value of -66.9 which is well below the majority of the observations and causes the mean to decrease below what would otherwise be the central value. The median (1.76) and IQR (15.47) are better measures of central tendency and dispersion, respectively, as they are less affected by extreme outliers. On average, countries in the sample have positive and low values of ANS as a percentage of GDP. Ivory Coast has the highest value of economic sustainability at a Max of 21.4%. The IQR value indicates there is high variability in the data points. 50% of the countries have economic sustainability percentages between -8.14 and 7.33.

I use the log of resource rents per capita and non-rent GDP Per Capita in the bivariate analysis and regression models, but the summary table displays the original values of the variable. The data is skewed to the right, and there is high variability in resource rent per capita values. Most countries have rents per capita between \$1.3 and \$164 (IQR = \$163). Oil-rich countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are outliers, pushing the mean value to \$302. The median (\$54.4) is thus a better indicator of the average rents per capita. The distribution of the levels of economic development, measured by non-rent GDP per capita, is skewed to the right. 50% of the observations have GDP per capita between \$615 and \$1753 (IQR = \$1138). Countries such as the Seychelles and Mauritius represent high non-rent GDP per capita values compared to the rest of the countries in the sample.

The proportion of countries classified as democratic in the sample is 44%, while only 33% have had at least one turnover. The level of party institutionalisation is low, given a mean of 0.46. The measure for political stability ranges from around

-2.5 (lowest) to 2.5 (highest). Most countries have scores between -1.08 and 0.09. Thus, countries in the sample are perceived as politically unstable on average. The region also has a high level of ethnic fractionalisation on average. For colonial types, non-British, and non-settler colonies have the highest proportion of countries (50%).

After investigating the patterns in the data, the next step is to check the interactions between some of the numerical variables and their values. Figure 3.2, the correlogram, represents the correlation for selected pairs of variables. Positive correlations are displayed in blue and negative correlations in orange. The intensity of the colour is proportional to the correlation coefficient. The stronger the correlation (i.e., the closer to -1 or 1), the darker the numbers. The colour legend on the right-hand side of the correlogram shows the correlation coefficients and the corresponding colours. When the correlations are not significantly different from zero at (α=5%), the numbers tend to be much lighter and almost invisible in the box. That is, there is no 'linear' relationship between the two variables in this instance.

I also conducted correlation tests for each pair. The variables with moderately strong positive correlations (above 0.60) have p-values less than 0.05. For example, the association between social inclusiveness and party institutionalisation is statistically significant. Resource rents per capita and electoral competition vary in opposite directions and have a p-value less than 0.05.

3.3. Selecting case studies

The extent to which the measures precisely capture political and economic variables is open to challenge. Numbers and indicators are often inadequate in understanding developing countries and there are often problems with missing data (Jerven 2016). The quantitative investigation is not the boundary investigation; there is a need to have case studies to evaluate what may not be measured at the macro-level.

Figure 3.2.: Correlogram



For example, Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2015) emphasise the impacts of natural resources at the regional and community level. Thus, if there are any adverse effects at the macro level, the micro effects (for example, harmful effects of mining on the environment) could be more pronounced.

A nested analysis is a research design where statistical analysis can guide the case selection. The theory-testing approach requires the selection of the cases that are well predicted by the best-fitting statistical model (Lieberman 2005). Furthermore, the cases must be based on the widest degree of variation in the independent variables central to the model (Lieberman 2005, 444). In this way, one can demonstrate the robustness of the causal arguments and identify the evidence of the relationship between political accountability mechanisms and development.

Figure 3.3 includes countries that have had democratic elections since 1990. I filter cases according to being resource-rich and democratic. I consider a country as resource-rich if its resource rents per capita as a share of GDP is greater than 0.025. The degree of party institutionalisation and electoral turnovers between 1990 and 2018 determine the position of the countries on the graph. The cases selected for further investigation are coded in green and blue.

Zambia and Ghana are electorally competitive democracies in that they have had two democratic turnovers of the ruling parties. Namibia and Mozambique are dominant party democracies and have had no turnovers since 1990. The case studies examine what it is about resource-rich democracies that lead to different development outcomes. The major differences between democracies and non-democracies are examined in the statistical analysis.

The case studies rely on quantitative and qualitative evidence about political and economic variables. The evidence includes time-series graphs to represent political and economic trends in each country, a review of the literature on the political eco-

Figure 3.3.: Case selection



nomy of each country and the use of primary sources, such as official documents and over 50 personal semi-structured interviews, conducted in 2014 and 2015, with government officials, representatives of interest groups, political parties, and policy experts. I collected important information remotely through library and internet sources and made short visits to each country to supplement publicly available information.

There are challenges to the case study approach, including constraints on time, resources, and the feasibility of delivering an in-depth analysis. Furthermore, it is challenging to establish precise guidelines for evidence collection within the case studies as causal processes are highly heterogeneous. Since the sources of information are different for each case study, there are no precise coding rules; thus, it will not be easy to repeat data collection and analysis for case studies (Lieberman 2005). However, to address this challenge, I employ the logic of structured, focused comparison for case study research (George and Bennett 2005). The research method is structured in that I ask the same questions of each case study to guide and standardise the collection of data for systematic comparison.

The method is focused because I investigate variables of theoretical interest (in the causal model of the thesis). I analyse the same independent and dependent variables for all case studies over the same period (1990 - 2018). Specifically, I analyse how changes in electoral competition, party institutionalisation, resource rents, and non-rents GDP have affected development (HDI and ANS) in each country as determined by the theoretical framework. Investigating the same variables does not prevent one from identifying and addressing distinctive aspects of each case, so a rigid application of the method is not advisable (George and Bennett 2005).

The next chapter presents the empirical evidence for the relationship between political accountability mechanisms and development at the cross-national level. After which, I will present evidence from the case studies.

4. Cross-National Evidence

The previous chapter presented the sample, measures, data, and descriptive statistics. This chapter presents inferential statistics. I use multiple regression techniques to clarify the empirical relationship between political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes. I do so while controlling for the level of economic development, political stability, ethnic fractionalisation and colonial type. The approach is well-suited to the chapter's objective, answering the question: which political accountability mechanisms affect inclusive and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa? Specifically, do democracies perform better or worse on average than non-democracies? Do electorally competitive democracies perform better or worse than dominant-party (but still multi-party) democracies? Do more institutionalised party systems perform better or worse than less institutionalised party systems? The three factors, which together provide a framework for political accountability, can, in different ways, affect political incentives and, thus, the inclusiveness and sustainability of development.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first section presents two main regressions and indicates whether fitting the regression models for political mechanisms on development supports the hypotheses. The second section discusses the findings. To test hypotheses at the cross-national level, I adopted the alpha level of 0.05 as the standard for establishing statistical significance and rejecting the null hypotheses.

4.1. Regression models

Table 4.1 presents multiple linear regression estimates, with socially inclusive development as the outcome variable (Hlavac 2022). Column 1 contains estimates of the baseline model, including the following variables: political regime, electoral competition and party institutionalisation from 1990 through 2018. It also includes rent (logarithmically transformed) and non-rent income per capita averaged from 2014 to 2018. Column 2, the preferred model, contains the same model but excludes political regime and electoral competition. Column 3 includes a four-category typology of colonial history (British non-settler colonies, settler colonies, Island and non-British non-settler colonies (reference category), and ethnic fractionalisation. Column 4 re-estimates the baseline model (Column 1) but adds the political stability variable from 2014 through 2018.

Table 4.1.: Explaining social inclusiveness

	Dependent variable:			
	Socially inclusive development			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political regime	-0.009			-0.026
	(0.030)			(0.030)
Electoral competition/turnover	0.022			0.021
	(0.031)			(0.030)
Party institutionalisation	0.148**	0.140**	0.144**	0.129*
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.064)
Rents	-0.009**	-0.011***	-0.007	-0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Non-rents	0.052***	0.053***	0.041***	0.039***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)
British non-settler			-0.0002	
			(0.023)	
Settler			0.038	
			(0.024)	
Island			0.060	
			(0.049)	
Ethnic fractionalisation			0.022	
			(0.043)	
Political Stability				0.033**
				(0.014)
Constant	0.142**	0.144**	0.189**	0.265***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.090)	(0.080)
Observations	45	45	44	45
R^2	0.631	0.624	0.659	0.678
Adjusted R^2	0.583	0.596	0.593	0.627
Residual Std. Error	0.055 (df = 39)	0.054 (df = 41)	0.055 (df = 36)	0.052 (df = 38)
F Statistic	13.321*** (df = 5; 39)	22.674*** (df = 3; 41)	9.934*** (df = 7; 36)	13.329*** (df = 6; 38)
Significance levels				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The goodness-of-fit statistics show that the variation in social inclusiveness in Africa is predictable, with adjusted R-squared values consistently greater than 0.5. Differences in party institutionalisation, rent and non-rent per capita income are partly responsible for this predictability. The estimates in Columns 1 and 2 show that with a dummy variable set to 1 for democratic and 0 for non-democratic, the political regime coefficient turns out to be negative and statistically insignificant. The electoral competition variable also does not affect the outcome.

Party institutionalisation and non-rent income have a weak but statistically significant positive effect on social inclusiveness. Rent income has a weak negative and statistically significant impact on social inclusiveness, which suggests that rent income does not contribute to health and education outcomes. The colonial history variables in Column 3 do not affect social inclusiveness but slightly weaken the effects of the other variables to the point where the rent coefficient is no longer statistically significant. The estimates in Column 4 exclude colonial history but introduce political stability. The estimates show that political stability has a weak but statistically significant positive effect on social inclusiveness, and its addition reduces the PI coefficient. The positive impact of political stability is not surprising as more stable countries tend to be more democratic, perhaps with more institutionalised party systems, and can implement development policies.

This section analysed the impact of political accountability mechanisms on social inclusiveness. First, the overall effect of political regimes on social inclusiveness is weakly negative and statistically insignificant. Second, electoral competitiveness is weakly positive and statistically insignificant. Third, party institutionalisation has modestly positive and statistically significant effects on socially inclusive development. Non-rent income positively contributes to social inclusiveness compared to rent income.

Table 4.2 presents regression estimates, with economic sustainability as the outcome variable (Hlavac 2022). Column 1 contains estimates of the baseline model, similar to Column 1 in Table 1. Column 2 has the same model but excludes political regime and electoral competition and includes a four-category typology of colonial history and ethnic fractionalisation. Column 3 re-estimates the baseline model but excludes political regime and electoral competition and adds political stability. Column 4 is the preferred and ultra-simplified model, with non-rent income as the only predictor. This model is preferred as all others have no statistically significant associations between the explanatory variables and outcome.

Table 4.2.: Explaining economic sustainability

	Dependent variable:			
	Economic sustainability			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political regime	-0.267			
	(8.245)			
Electoral competition/turnover	4.280			
	(8.408)			
Party institutionalisation	21.045	23.286	26.314	
	(19.872)	(20.100)	(18.510)	
Rents	-0.323	-1.154	-1.010	
	(1.131)	(1.415)	(1.043)	
Non-rents	2.899	5.137	4.926	3.939**
	(3.429)	(4.419)	(3.574)	(1.787)
British non-settler		-3.192		
		(6.346)		
Settler		-6.725		
		(6.896)		
Island		-15.786		
		(13.738)		
Ethnic fractionalisation		-12.114		
		(12.040)		
Political stability			-4.839	
			(3.782)	
Constant	-32.675*	-34.084	-48.494**	-28.025**
	(19.113)	(26.190)	(22.566)	(12.955)
Observations	41	41	41	40
R^2	0.170	0.208	0.193	0.113
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.039	0.103	0.090
Residual Std. Error	14.868 (df = 35)	14.962 (df = 33)	14.459 (df = 36)	10.713 (df = 38)
F Statistic	1.435 (df = 5; 35)	1.234 (df = 7; 33)	2.147* (df = 4; 36)	4.859** (df = 1; 38)
Significance levels				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The estimates show that many factors believed to be important determinants of economic sustainability have surprisingly little combined explanatory power. The joint explanatory power of all the models, except column 4, is weak. A notable contrast between the two sets of estimates (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) is that the estimated effects of rent income in Table 4.2 are negative but somewhat larger than in Table 4.1. However, they fall well short of conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests that rent income may contribute more negatively to economic sustainability.

In column 4, non-rent income has a strong positive and statistically significant effect on economic sustainability, but only if other confounding explanatory factors are not obscuring the impact. Most adjusted R-squared statistics are below 0.10, showing a poor fit between predicted and actual economic sustainability scores. Thus, the overall fit is poor, confirming that all explanatory variables combined account for very little of the differences in economic sustainability scores.

This section analysed the impact of political accountability mechanisms on economic sustainability in Africa. The main finding is that all political variables and rent income do not affect economic sustainability. Non-rent income is the only variable with a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome. Given the low Adjusted R squared for non-rent income, observed economic sustainability scores can be attributed to other explanatory variables that have not been examined. As in Table 4.1, economic sustainability in Africa is poorly predicted even by various structural variables such as colonial history and ethnic fractionalisation. In this sense, the estimates suggest that economic performance, specifically income levels, may be crucial in explaining the cross-national pattern of economic sustainability.

Regression simulation: Socially inclusive development density plots

Since economic sustainability is not affected by political variables or natural resources, the following section presents a regression simulation with socially inclusive development as the outcome. I generated a simulated dataset that follows the model assumptions from table 4.1, column 2, but includes the political stability variable to give democracies 'credit' because they tend to be more politically stable.

Figure 4.1.: Regression simulation



Figure 4.1 is generated from a data frame with 'made' x values for two hypothetical cases: resource-rich non-democracy and resource-rich democracies. The x values include party institutionalisation, regime type dummy, electoral competition/turnover dummy, rents, non-rents and political stability. For party institutionalisation, I use a prediction based on democracy. I set resource-poor to zero and resource-rich to the 90th percentile (6.37). The non-rent variable is set to the mean for all cases (7.72). There are more resource-rich non-democracies compared to resource-rich democracies. However, the density plots illustrate that the expected HDI scores are higher for resource-rich democracies. The expected HDI mean for resource-rich democracies is higher than the overall mean and the expected HDI mean for resource-rich non-democracies. Similarly, resource-rich democracies are expected to have higher than average scores on socially inclusive development compared to resource-rich

non-democracies.

The first section has provided answers to the empirical question that motivated the analysis: which political accountability mechanisms matter for development? The central finding is that party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for inclusive development. The political variables do not improve or worsen economic sustainability. On the other hand, resource rents are negatively associated with socially inclusive development but have a statistically insignificant effect on economic sustainability. The non-rent sectors make positive contributions to both dimensions of development. This finding holds in simple bivariate associations and the more complex multivariate models. More broadly, the multivariate estimates showed that development in Africa is poorly predicted even by 'structural' variables such as colonial history and ethnic fractionalisation. The estimates highlight the significance of income levels in explaining the cross-national patterns of development in Africa.

4.2. Discussion

I proposed that democratic governments, subject to competitive elections, with institutionalised parties, may be more politically accountable and thus more likely to produce inclusive and sustainable development. This political accountability mechanisms framework presumes that governments make policy decisions anticipating citizens' responses, especially electoral responses. The empirical evidence presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicates that party institutionalisation may improve levels of socially inclusive development. However, I fail to find evidence that democracies with competitive electoral processes are independently positively associated with inclusive and sustainable development. Furthermore, the regression results give a consistent picture where non-rent income has positive and significant coefficients for inclusive and sustainable development.

In this section, I offer four possible interpretations of the results. First, the most direct interpretation is that political regimes and competitive elections have no impact on development. In other words, conventional political accountability mechanisms fail to induce government restraint and positively impact development outcomes. The empirical relationship between institutions and growth rates is usually not strong. So even when there are improvements in political and economic institutions, the resulting growth levels tend to be lower or nonexistent (Rodrik 2014). However, the proposition that political accountability mechanisms do not matter is contradicted by empirical evidence from previous studies and party institutionalisation results. The regression simulation in Figure 4.1 also illustrates the importance of democratic political regimes for resource-rich countries. The density plots demonstrated that expected HDI scores are higher for resource-rich democracies.

In the existing literature, scholars have found that higher levels of democracy are associated with higher growth levels in resource-dependent countries (Korhonen 2004). Further, electoral competition encourages governments to use resources for the collective good rather than personal benefits (Humphreys and Bates 2005). For example, political party competition has increased the provision of health and education when parties try to outperform each other (Hickey, Sen and Bukenya 2016). Through a cross-national and time-series design, Carbone and Pellegeta (2017) found that competitive multiparty elections and turnovers in government are associated with higher levels of social welfare spending. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between democratic institutions and genuine saving rates (a measure of economic sustainability). That is, democratic governments tend to deplete natural resources less and invest more in human capital (Boos and Holm-Mueller 2013). Thus, it would be challenging to deny the merits of democratic regimes and the essential constraints they place on governments solely based on the results of this study.

The second interpretation is that the relationship between political accountability mechanisms and development may be nonlinear. Democracy and electoral competition may have positive indirect effects, such as greater stability. The most well-known institutional causes often have the fewest immediate effects but more long-term and nonlinear contributions (Gerring et al. 2005). For example, Fosu (2013) found evidence that Africa's transition toward democracy has resulted in better economic outcomes but that the relationship may be non-linear (Fosu, 2013). According to Fosu, when African countries have reached a level of 'advanced democracy', we expect increased levels of development. For example, democracies are advanced when they can hold the executive branch of government in check. Pro-reformers have also championed competitive elections within democracies. In this case, the logic of political accountability is to capture links between political institutions and public policy outcomes, where these institutions induce governments to use their power in ways that benefit society (Bates 2006a).

We can reasonably expect political stability to contribute to growth and development positively; however, particular institutional arrangements, such as democratic regimes, allow for this political stability (Jutting 2003). Still, the shift to competitive politics is said to increase political disorder and instability, lowering incentives for refraining from predation, especially when resource rents offer economic immunity from the costs of state failure (Bates 2006b). Fosu (2013) has argued that conflict is more prevalent in resource-rich democracies. On the other hand, political elites can provide goods to respond to the threat of violence or a revolution (Engerman and Sokoloff 2008). The political stability measure can tell us something about the discount rate or a government's assessment of its political risk (Bates 2006b). Political accountability mechanisms can only give rise to development-enhancing incentives depending on the government's discount rate, affecting the government's value on future benefits from office.

A third interpretation is that politics, primarily democratic and competitive politics, provides the 'umbrella' for development. There is a hierarchy of institutions where the role of political regimes, such as democracies, is to set the stage for economic activity and policies that affect development, including shaping the effect of other political and economic institutions (Flachaire et al., 2014). Thus, political accountability mechanisms may be hierarchical, reinforce each other or interact at different levels (Jutting 2003). After all, regular elections have sometimes failed to align public officials' interests with those of voters. Hence, party institutionalisation plays an essential role in conditioning the effectiveness of elections as an accountability mechanism (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016). I also noted in Chapter Two that promoting vertical accountability protects and reinforces other accountability mechanisms (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020), and strengthening horizontal and diagonal accountability will not succeed if vertical accountability is not strengthened (Walsh 2020). There is evidence that institutions of horizontal accountability, such as parliaments, independent courts, and other oversight bodies, evolve late in the sequence and build on progress made in vertical and diagonal accountability (Mechkova, Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). Thus, other accountability mechanisms do not operate as independent sources of constraint but are guaranteed by the robust competition in elections that confirm the protection of freedoms of association and expression needed by the media and civil society (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020).

A fourth and final interpretation is that the results suggest conceptual or measurement weaknesses and model specifications. Previously, estimating the effect of institutions on growth or development through cross-national analysis has been plagued by challenges related to data availability and quality, measurement errors, possible omission of variables, and reverse causality problems between regressors (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 21). Exploring the causal link between political accountability mechanisms and development can prove extremely difficult through Large-N analysis, as interpreting the evidence on development using institutional measures is not straightforward (Jutting 2003). Furthermore, the implicit assumptions imposed by standard approaches may be too constraining and may not allow us to identify the impact of these accountability mechanisms. For example, I estimate regression models where all countries in the sample have the same development outcome measures. However, political regimes and turnovers may not affect development per se, but how different covariates impact development (Flachaire et al., 2014). The magnitude and significance of the effects may vary by specification and as a function of the samples and equations we employ (Bates 2006a).

After controlling for some structural determinants of development prevalent in literature, much variation in development levels remains unexplained. The predictive value of the impact of institutions can also be uncertain due to complex relationships and the need for a significant number of variables to be considered (Engerman and Sokoloff 2008). There can be several alternatives to particular sets of economic problems with different trade-offs. Several accountability mechanisms have yet to be accounted for, such as differences in federal and unitary forms of government and the degree of centralisation in expenditure and regulation. Varying political structures may lead to different outcomes (Engerman and Sokoloff 2008).

The results for democracy and competitive elections are not striking, given the inconclusive evidence in the literature and the contentious debates around the role of elections. It is also worth noting that my measure of democratic regimes was deliberately strict for theoretical reasons, though minimalist. There could be different results with a less stringent standard. However, to avoid providing an interpretation of findings that is vague, general, and maybe not useful to scholars and policymakers, it is critical to draw concrete lessons from these cross-national results.

First, the party institutionalisation result indicates that institutions and democracy do not always overlap (Ahmadov and Guliyev 2016). Scholars must simultaneously measure the quality and performance of institutions and the conditions under which the institutions are formed and changed. Second, resource-rich democracies cannot be overlooked. The regression simulation indicates that they may be more likely to govern natural resources prudently than their non-democratic counterparts. I specifically investigate such cases in the following chapters of the thesis.

Third, Large-N analysis can give important insights but may not be the end goal for a more precise development agenda in country-specific contexts. The desirable institutional and accountability mechanisms may have an element of context specificity arising from differences in the political economy of different countries. Thus, the key benefits of this study may come from mapping various political accountability mechanisms in specific contexts rather than a precise prediction of the relationship between accountability mechanisms and economic outcomes.

Lastly, more than two decades earlier, Przeworski and Limongi (1993, 65) found that political institutions matter, but something else, rather than regimes, captures the relevant differences. The 'something else' may include actual rules and procedures, such as mechanisms at the sectoral level that policymakers can manipulate (Glaeser et al. 2004). Thus, it is possible that governments only bind themselves in response to particular 'alarm bells'. The question mark in Chapter Two, Figure 2.1 (causal diagram), is for exploring potential variables that link political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes in country cases.

To conclude, regression analysis narrows the range of hypotheses that require further investigation by indicating which assumptions have little empirical support (Lieberman 2005). Rather than ending with a great level of uncertainty, as per the existing literature on the effects of regime types on economic performance, the following chapters present evidence from the cases of Ghana, Zambia, Namibia and Mozambique. Most studies linking political regimes and development focus on cross-national evidence. The comparative case studies can provide room to explore other contextual factors not accounted for that may also affect development outcomes. Given that many accountability mechanisms exist in democratic regimes, a combination of mechanisms may be necessary to provide the basis for inclusive and sustainable development. In the following four chapters, I further investigate the proposed framework and other possible explanations I may have overlooked in the statistical analysis, such as the role of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms within the broader vertical accountability environment.

5. Political Accountability and Development in Ghana (1990 - 2018)

In Chapter Four (statistical analysis), I determined whether political accountability mechanisms affected the inclusiveness and sustainability of development in African countries, controlling for potentially confounding factors like prior colonial type, economic development, and ethnic fractionalisation. I found that development in Africa is poorly predicted by structural variables such as colonial history and ethnic fractionalisation. Party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for social inclusiveness, and all political variables do not improve or worsen economic sustainability. On the other hand, resource rents are negatively associated with social inclusiveness but do not affect economic sustainability. Meanwhile, the non-rent sectors contribute positively to both dimensions of development, highlighting the potential significance of income levels in explaining the cross-national development patterns in Africa.

This chapter is the first of four chapters to present case study evidence. It investigates how Ghana's political accountability mechanisms have impacted resource governance and development. I also consider the impact of other possible explanations I may have overlooked in the statistical analysis, such as the role of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms. Ghana was selected as a resource-rich democracy as its resource rents per capita as a share of GDP is greater than 0.025. It is also considered a competitive democracy, with more than one electoral turnover and a moderate party institutionalisation level of 0.61, when averaged between 1990 and 2018. The institutionalisation value is above the region's average, considering that the mean for sub-Saharan Africa is 0.48.

Ghana is generally regarded as a relatively consolidated democracy. It has experienced several peaceful alternations between its two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), since its return to democratic rule in 1992 (Abdulai and Crawford 2010; Botchway 2018). Investigating the impact of political accountability mechanisms through case study analysis is essential for the study's approach, which assumes that, in general, competitive multiparty elections and alternation can potentially translate to inclusive development outcomes.

Perspectives on the potential impact of Ghana's competitive multiparty democracy on development outcomes differ. Pro-reformers have championed competitive elections within democracies to capture links between political institutions and public policy outcomes. These institutions induce governments to use their power in ways that benefit society (Bates 2006a). Thus, party competition affects policy making and implementation (Pitcher 2012).

Others argue that Ghana's competitive democracy has had an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, it has enabled several interests to be considered in policymaking decisions. On the other, it has led to fiscal deficits around election time and a tendency for parties to backtrack on policies (Resnick 2016). The literature on political business cycles suggests that government spending on activities with short-term payoffs is likely to increase during an election year to retain power. Earlier work done by (Nordhaus 1975, 183) shows that any politically optimal programme for the party in power maximises votes for the incumbent, given the economic constraints. Overall, excessive budget spending in election years negatively affects socioeconomic development as it translates into less desirable economic conditions for the poor.

These different perspectives imply that there are still disagreements about how Ghana's competitive democratic regime has affected development outcomes. More importantly, the perspectives do not consider how these effects play out in the context of natural resource economies, given how resource rents complicate the stakes. Governments in resource-rich countries may become more autonomous and less accountable to the people, with the resource sector becoming an 'enclave' from which only a small elite benefits (Ross 1999; Auty 2006). They also have strong temptations to deplete their natural assets more quickly than developmental considerations dictate (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006; Bates 2008; Kolstad 2009).

According to cross-national estimates, Ghana's development record overperformed on indicators of inclusiveness but underperformed on sustainability. The 'bullseye' in Figure 5.1 centres on the country's statistically 'expected' levels of inclusiveness (as measured by health and education) and sustainability (as measured by adjusted net savings).

The solid and dotted circles are 80 per cent and 95 per cent confidence intervals. The dot represents Ghana's actual performance on the two indicators: the extent to which Ghana's residuals are positive or negative and by how much. The dot is located in the lower-right quadrant near the solid circle, showing that the country modestly overperforms statistical expectations on health and education by about 4 per cent. However, the country is below the statistical expectations on adjusted net savings by 9 per cent of GDP but still falls within the 80 per cent confidence ellipse.

Thus, Ghana's performance reasonably fits the regression estimates.

Figure 5.1.: Ghana case prediction ellipse



A central aim of this chapter is to explore potential explanations for why Ghana has modestly overperformed on inclusiveness and underperformed on sustainability despite its relatively consolidated regime and institutionalised party system. Notably, why did HDI increase steadily for the whole period of democracy but with an acceleration between 2004 and 2008? Meanwhile, ANS turned consistently negative at about the same time, nearly six years before resource rents (from oil) started to increase sharply. In general, the chapter analyses the interaction between Ghana's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes after the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1992.

Ghana's competitiveness and party institutionalisation promote inclusiveness, as governments can be voted out regularly, and voters have a consistent list of political parties from which to select. The acceleration in HDI coincides with the first turnover from the NDC to the NPP in 2000. The NPP's initial rule from 2000 to 2008 introduced extensive health and education reforms. However, competitiveness also incentivises political actors to prioritise policies that enhance their political survival in the short term, adversely affecting sustainability. Ghana tends to have excessive budget or patronage spending in election years, especially observed in 2012, which negatively affects sustainability as there is less investment in productive assets.

The evidence provided in this chapter, and subsequent case countries, will include time-series graphs to represent political and economic trends between 1990 and 2018, literature on the political economy of the country and the use of primary sources, such as official documents and personal semi-structured interviews with government officials, representatives of interest groups, political parties, and policy experts.

The first part focuses on unpacking time trends in the key political and economic variables from the cross-national analysis; it presents changes in electoral competition, party institutionalisation, non-rents GDP, resource rents, inclusiveness, and sustainability. The second part of the chapter explores more fine-grained evidence on how political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation.

5.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms, resource rents and development outcomes

Modern-day Ghana is often considered the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence in 1957. It was formed by merging the Gold Coast and Togoland trust territories (Berry 1995). Today, Ghana has a population of over 30 million and possesses major mineral, hydropower, and agricultural resources. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports are significant sources of foreign exchange (Central Intelligence Agency 2019).

Ghana's political transitions have mainly been influenced by economic conditions and policies (Jeong 1998; Aryeetey, Harrigan and Nissanke 2000; Hoeffler, Fosu and Bates 2006; Debrah 2008). Historically, state control over prices, wages, marketing boards, and exchange rates were at the centre of political leaders' patronage networks. Governments would lose power or suffer from a military coup if the support of this network was lost (Acemoglu 2013).

Figure 5.2 represents political accountability mechanisms and development changes from 1990 to 2018. I use the time trend to provide a structure to the descriptive background and unpack the dynamics and trends over the 28-year period. The basic logic is that the political variables (electoral competition and party institutionalisation) are on top, the economic variables (non-rent GDP per capita and resource rents) are in the middle, and the outcome variables (ANS and HDI) are at the bottom of the figure.

5.1.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms

5.1.1.1. Political regime

Ghana had a crisis of legitimacy for many of its successive governments from independence to 1981. The country had nine different governments (three civilian and six military) within the first 35 years of becoming an independent state and before its fourth return to multiparty democracy in 1992 (Berry 1995). The country had civilian rule in the First (1960 -1966), interludes of civilian rule in the Second (1969-1972) and Third (1979-1981) Republics (Abdulai and Crawford 2010). Kwame Nkrumah became the first independent president in 1960 through a plebiscite. Thus,

Figure 5.2.: Ghana time trend graph: 1990 - 2018



the First Republic was inaugurated with Nkrumah as the first elected president. He removed constitutional barriers to authoritarianism, inhibited political opposition, and declared the country a one-party state in 1964 (Berry 1995).

The Nkrumah government lost popularity in the face of repression, economic mismanagement, and declining cocoa production and prices (Debrah 2008). A coup was staged by the National Liberation Council (NLC), which included the army and police officers (Krennerich 1999). The national assembly was dissolved, political parties were banned, and the constitution was suspended. The NLC was replaced in 1969 after a ban on political parties was lifted. Competitive elections were held, and Kofi Busia's Progress Party (PP) won the National Assembly elections (Berry 1995; Abdulai and Crawford 2010). The return to civilian rule marked the constitution of the Second Republic (1969-1972), which provided for a unicameral parliamentary system with a President as Head of State.

Busia's reign lasted for only 27 months before another military coup was staged in January 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC), consisting of army officers led by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) replaced the NRC as the state's highest legislative and executive body and forced Acheampong to resign in response to political pressure for more change in 1978. He was briefly replaced by Frederick Akuffo, who lifted the ban on political parties (Krennerich 1999).

The SMC, now made up of elected civilians and appointed military members had promised to hand political power to a civilian government to be elected in 1979. However, shortly before the elections, the SMC was ousted through a violent coup in June 1979, led by Junior officers from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), formed under the chairmanship of lieutenant Jerry Rawlings (Berry 1995). However, the scheduled elections took place in September 1979, and Hilla Limann's civilian government was inaugurated in the Third Republic. The Third Republic's constitution provided a unicameral parliament and a presidential system (Krennerich 1999).

The economy continued to decline, and Rawlings staged a second coup in 1981 and suspended the constitution (Haynes 2003). The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was formed and had full executive and legislative powers, with Rawlings as the chairman. Under international and domestic pressure, the PNDC conceded to return Ghana to civilian rule. Through the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ), various organisations mounted pressure on the Rawlings government to return the country to civilian rule (Berry 1995; Abdulai and Crawford 2010). The Ghana Bar Association called for the PNDC to implement a referendum that would allow Ghanaians to express openly the form of government they wished to have. The PNDC created a Consultative Assembly to discuss Ghana's new Constitution, and a national referendum approved a draft of the new Constitution in 1992. The 1992 Constitution strongly emphasises human rights, given the violations by previous military regimes; it also provides for a separation of powers among the President, Parliament, the Cabinet, Council of State and the Judiciary (Berry 1995).

Since 1992, Ghana has held several successful multiparty elections. Presidential elections were held in November 1992, and in January 1993, Rawlings transitioned from military leader to elected president of the Fourth Republic (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). While international observers declared the elections as generally free and fair, major parties boycotted the elections, and the opposition protested the overwhelming win and cried fraud. When the opposition withdrew from the parliamentary elections in 1993, the National Democratic Convention (NDC) won almost all the seats (189 over 200) in the largely uncontested election (Arthur 2010). Despite Rawling's human rights abuse record and the impact of the Economic Recovery

Program (ERP) in the 1980s, a public opinion poll suggested that PNDC was more popular in urban areas than initially thought. The PNDC was perceived as having improved the country's infrastructure and government spending habits. Even though some members of the public said that their living standards had not improved, they thought things could have been worse without the ERP (Arthur 2010).

The newly inaugurated government faced the persistence of economic difficulties and the need to institutionalise democratic practice and implement the constitution in a climate where a single party dominated parliament. Since the opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections, they fuelled the reality of the legislature as the weakest institution out of the three branches of government. Thus, if the opposition was not in parliament, it could not act as a government in waiting (Berry 1995). The withdrawal by opposition parties also meant that they had little political influence from 1993, when the Fourth Republic was constituted, until the next elections in 1996 (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). Despite parliamentary representation, opposition parties played a constructive role outside of parliament and formed the Great Alliance, which brought together the two main opposition parties (Krennerich 1999).

The return of multiparty democracy in 1992 also provided the political space for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to influence government policies. Previously monopolised by the state, the media could now demand accountability and responsiveness from public officials (Abdulai and Crawford 2010). For example, the media not only disseminates information and creates political awareness; it has also investigated, reported on political activities, and mobilised the public to make democratic demands on corruption issues (Arthur 2010). The country's primary democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, the parliament and the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), continue to develop, and the move to formal democratic politics and the improvement in the political space for non-state actors serves to reinforce democratic consolidation (Arthur 2010).

The discussion thus far does not suggest that there are no challenges. Financial and capacity issues constrain civil society's role. There are strong calls for media professionalism and accessibility by those in remote areas. On the other hand, CSOs may play a destabilising role as they lack funding and are dependent on external support. The competition for resources means that some may not be independent but act as agents of political elites, and have limitations in experience and capacity (Arthur 2010).

5.1.1.2. Electoral competitiveness

Elections have been an integral part of post-independence African politics and democratisation. Ghana's political history since independence has been marked by frequent alternations of military and civil rule (Krennerich 1999). The country has had seven general elections between the period 1990 to 2018. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020. The NDC won the 1992 and 1996 elections. The NPP won the 2000 and 2004 elections. The NDC returned to power in 2008 and 2012, and the NPP won the 2016 and 2020 elections. Since 1990, the elections show a trend of competition for power between two main political parties.

The founding 1992 elections, won by the NDC with Jerry Rawlings as the inaugural president, were protested by major political parties and were generally regarded as not free and fair as Rawlings and his supporters were accused of fraud by opposition parties (African Elections Database, 2012). Still, in 1996, Rawlings was re-elected, defeating John Kufour of the (NPP). The NDC's second victory, at 53 per cent, was not as overwhelming, but the elections were regarded as being generally free and fair. Furthermore, this was the first time in Ghana's history that an elected government had completed its term and was re-elected in a competitive election (Krennerich 1999).

The next election held in 2000 was significant for several reasons. It marked the first alternation in power since the founding elections and the exit of Rawlings, the longest-serving head of state in Ghana. Rawlings was prohibited from running as he had already served the maximum of two terms stipulated in the 1992 Constitution (Country Watch 2016). The election also occurred when there was widespread disenchantment with the ruling NDC, especially in urban areas. Unemployment, inflation and the depreciating currency had become unbearable (Debrah 2008). These problems were compounded by government corruption reports (Ayee 2002). The NPP won 45 per cent of the parliamentary vote, with John Kufour winning the presidential election after a second round (African Elections Database 2012). Kufour and the NPP also won a second term in 2004; since then, Ghana has experienced three alternations of power (Van Gyampo, Graham and Yobo 2017; Botchway 2018).

The 2008 election was the closest in Ghana's history and was hailed by national and international observers as a model for Africa (Jockers, Kohnert and Paul 2010). The national debates for the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections were about the general state of the Ghanaian economy (Centre for Policy Analysis 2009). The discovery of oil and the expectation of oil revenues also raised the stakes of this election. John Atta Mills of the NDC and Nana Akuffo Addo of the NPP had a runoff election since neither received more than 50 per cent of the vote. Atta Mills won the election by a margin of less than 1 per cent after unsuccessful attempts in 2000 and 2004. The successful resolution of this election was also significant for the continent as there were allegations of fraud that resulted in violence in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe and coups in Mauritania and Guinea. However, some observers have argued that the success of this election was a 'myth'. For instance, electoral malpractice, including inflated voters' registers, block voting, 'ethnicization' of Ghana's politics, and the proliferation of vigilante groups, were cited as concerns (Jockers, Kohnert and Paul 2010; Boakye 2018).

The NDC retained power again in 2012. John Dramani Mahama, who took over after Atta Mills's death, won the presidential elections. The election was marked by violence and threats to security (Abdallah 2012). The opposition alleged a tempering of election results by the Electoral Commission and widespread violations of statutory provisions. The NNP's presidential candidate, Akufo-Addo, his running mate and the party's chairman, filed a petition at the Ghanaian Supreme Court to review the election results (Asante and Asare 2016). After several legal battles, the overall judgment was that Mahama was validly elected president, and the case was dismissed. The petitioners accepted the ruling, which eased tensions in the country (Asante and Asare 2016).

The 2016 election saw the third turnover when the NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo was elected president on his third attempt. These were the seventh consecutive elections since the establishment of the Fourth Republic and the first time a sitting president had been voted out (Botchway 2018). The 2016 election showed that the electorate could vote out a poorly performing government, and successive power transfers indicated that governments could be replaced. Furthermore, the open political atmosphere allowed political parties to campaign in rival regions, and public officials were committed to the 'rules of the game', bucking the advantages of incumbency (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2017). The 2020 elections are not part of the study period, but incumbent Akuffo-Addo and the NPP were re-elected in the first round after securing a majority vote.

5.1.1.3. Party institutionalisation

Ghana has witnessed a stable period of political party development and institutionalisation since 1992. The 1992 Constitution prohibits the establishment of a single-party state and the unconstitutional overthrow of governments (Abdulai and Crawford 2010). Thus, multiple parties have competed in Ghana's democratic elections, but the Fourth Republic has seen the institutionalisation of a strong two-party system dominated by the NDC and the NPP (Osei 2012). These parties have remained stable throughout the four Republics. They have been used to express citizens' interests and mediate political, economic, ethnic-regional and international issues (Morrison 2004).

Ghanaian political parties have a long history, such as campaigning for the independence of the Gold Coast in the 1940s. For example, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), led by J.B Danquah and later Busia, organised itself in 1946 with the aim of independence in the shortest time possible through legitimate and constitutional means (Fobih, 2008). Kwame Nkrumah's Convention people's Party (CPP) also aimed to redistribute resources and ensure equity (Morrison, 2004). Thus, the formation of parties at independence traced back to the emergence of the UGCC and the CPP has influenced the patterns of party development in Ghana (Osei 2012).

It is important to note that party politics were banned in times of military government, which dominated almost 20 years of Ghana's independence (Berry 1995). It took the PNDC more than ten years to lift the ban on political parties. The subsequent party system was rooted in shallow political soil, given that parties were not formally active for an extended period. Party politics existed during civilian government, but their involvement was limited and mainly based in urban areas. Personal networks, ethnic and local ties and other patron-client relations dominated national politics and institutions (Berry 1995).

Even with this shaky party system background, three major political traditions identified with their founders emerged in Ghana in the 1950s (Morrison 2004; Fobih 2008). The Nkrumahist tradition is considered “leftist” and “progressive”, the Danquah-Busiaist tradition is more “rightist” and “conservative”, and the Rawlingsists are referred to as “populist” and “progressive”. Although in practice, the dominant personalities and ethnic origins distinguished the three traditions over their ideological orientation (Berry 1995). The NPP declared that it belonged to the Busia-Danqua tradition and was a descendant of the political tradition of the United Party (UP). However, the NDC is a continuation of Rawling’s PNDC, and though similar to the populist Nkrumah tradition, it has not labelled itself as such (Wahman 2014).

Several turnovers have occurred since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992. The party institutionalisation measure peaked in 1992. The competition pattern between the two major parties resulted from and mimicked the early split of the first political party, UGCC, when Nkrumah left to create the more radical CPP, which led Ghana to independence in 1957 (Osei 2012). The NPP represented the revival of the Busia-Danqua ideology with other Nkrumahist parties once the ban on parties was lifted in 1992. The NDC initially placed itself in the middle of the older traditions but soon filled the leftist space. Ideologically, the NPP is regarded as a pro-market, pro-business party, while the NDC is viewed as populist and socialist. NPP ideology is seen as biased towards protecting the private property of the wealthy and foreign investors compared to the basic needs of the poor. In contrast, the NDC is focused on distributive justice and eliminating inequality (Abdulai and Crawford 2010).

The two parties arguably differ not in ideology but in ethnic orientation. Voters primarily view them as representing Ewe (NDC) and Ashanti/Akan (NPP) interests even though the 1992 Constitution requires that parties maintain a national character by ensuring that membership is not ethnic or religiously based. The evidence for the ethnic basis of the parties is reflected in their roots (Osei 2012), and the ethno-regional patterns of voting and the allocation of political positions by ruling parties (Abdulai and Crawford 2010).

Even though the two main parties have been dominant and have well-established regional voting patterns, they also rely on voters on the margins to win elections (Morrison 2004). Gyampo (2014) argued that Ghanaians do not easily switch political camps. Still, the relationship between ethnic politics and partisanship is complex, and often, other factors, such as socioeconomic issues, dominate voting patterns (Jockers, Kohnert and Paul 2010).

The time trend indicates that party institutionalisation increased again in 2000 when Ghana experienced its first electoral turnover. At this stage, Ghana had a relatively institutionalised party system, and parties had stable roots in society. The election was won by the NPP, a stable and strong party with a distinct political programme and culture (Wahman 2014). Notably, the NDC remained a viable threat and could function as a viable party between elections. It was also through the institutionalised parties that there was support for a free press and a more independent Electoral Commission (Wahman 2014).

Overall, the time trend shows that Ghana has made significant progress in consolidating its democracy over two decades. It has evolved from a history of military regimes and gross human rights violations to competitive multiparty politics. The successive democratic elections from 1992 to 2016 resulted in three peaceful power transfers and allowed Ghana to pass Huntington's two-turnover test (Huntington 1991). The party institutionalisation level has continued to increase steadily from the first elections in 1992 to the last elections, 2016, under study. The bipartisan nature of Ghanaian politics provides incentives for parties to invest in party organisation, as dominant parties need more than their core voters to win, making their presence nationwide (Osei 2012).

5.1.2. Trends in economic performance: non-rent GDP and resource rents

5.1.2.1. Non-rent GDP

Despite evidence of consolidating democracy, Ghana still faces economic challenges, and the government has had to request economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015). Former President Rawlings noted that 'the condition of the national economy must be the foundation of Ghana's democratic aspirations and remains the government's greatest challenge' (Berry 1995, 229). Thus, the failure to address economic challenges has made each successive government vulnerable to being deposed (Guseh and Oritsejafor 2005).

After the Fourth Republic's inauguration, Ghana's GDP was 6.1 billion, with a per capita income of USD$380 (Berry 1995). Agriculture was the economy's most important sector, with cocoa as the main cash crop. Overall, the non-rent GDP per capita trend shows that from independence until 1993, economic growth in Ghana was largely stagnant. The performance has improved since 1993 when Ghana undertook several structural reforms, and the Ghanaian economy has performed relatively well in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2018). Various economic factors have contributed to long-run growth in Ghana, including export earnings, physical capital formation, oil and mineral rents, and government spending. Although Ghana's economic performance has positively impacted development outcomes, inequalities in income exist, and significant regional imbalances remain between the North and the South (Darko 2015).

The first 25 years of independence have proved to be challenging in Ghana. There was political instability, and the economy experienced intermittent negative growth rates between 1966 and 1983, some of which were the lowest growth rates ever experienced in Ghana's history (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015; Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). The poor performance was attributed to various factors such as economic mismanagement, political instability, severe droughts, shifts in the country's terms of trade, and the oil shocks of the 1970s (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015).

After independence, Nkrumah's government embarked on massive socio-economic development and industrialisation projects. The government had a seven-year development plan to speed up economic growth through import substitution and national reliance (Killick 2010; Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). Nkrumah's socialist policies were abandoned in 1983 when Rawlings sought the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF (Berry, 1995). The PNDC government adopted an ERP under the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) initiated by the World Bank and IMF in 1983 (Adom and Zogbator 2015). Phase One of the ERP received a significant injection of aid from donor countries. The plan's first phase emphasised the export sector and fiscal discipline, which led to steady growth in GDP, low inflation, a budget surplus and increased export earnings after 1983 (Darko 2015). Growth increased to 8 per cent, the highest increase since the 1960s (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

The second phase of the ERP was implemented between 1987 - 1990 to remove price distortions and redundant public workers, implement privatisation and improve institutional quality. The pursued policies included increased health and education fees (Boafo-Arthur 1999; Resnick 2016). In the short- term, the policies led to noticeable growth in the national economy, such as GDP increasing by 5.3 per cent earlier in 1986 and agricultural output increasing by 4.6 per cent. However, the reforms did not bring about a structural transformation or reduce the reliance on international support for domestic and external deficits (Fosu 2009). Instead, the reforms focused investment mainly on mining, and as a result, gold overtook cocoa as the most significant foreign exchange earner (Boafo-Arthur 1999).

Ghana's Vision 2020 was implemented in 1996 to make Ghana a middle-income country, focusing on human development, stimulating economic growth, rural and urban development, infrastructural development, and attracting investments (Vordzorgbe 2006; Tandoh-Offin 2013). The objectives stated in Ghana's 2020 Vision, which is now defunct, have remained the cornerstone of development within a liberal political and economic framework. Although the implementation of the Vision was replaced, a policy consensus exists that desires middle-income status for Ghana, with an emphasis on the ideas of good governance, macroeconomic stability, private sector and infrastructural development (Mensah et al. 2013; Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014).

The period from 1983 to the 2000s was essentially a period of economic recovery as the country had positive growth records on average with low variability, which reflected a relatively stable economic and political environment and a more robust macroeconomic performance aided by foreign aid (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015). Non-rent GDP per capita growth slumped to below US$300 in 2000. The growth was at the lowest level in about a decade. The poor performance was attributed to deteriorating terms of trade as prices for the main exports (gold and cocoa) fell, leading to a severe drop in the country's foreign earnings (World Bank 2018).

The NDC was defeated in the 2000 elections, and the NPP took power under John Kufour. Kufour adopted the global development approach of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and global peace (Adom and Zogbator 2015).

The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I (GPRS I) replaced Vision 2020 after the Kufour government signed up for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 2002, which would forgive a country's debt if specific reform goals were achieved. The economy peaked again in the 2000s as a result of price booms. Thus, economic growth between 2002 and 2008 averaged about 6.1 per cent per annum, improving non-rent GDP per capita to above US$800 (Adom and Zogbator 2015). The acceleration was due in part to higher prices for the country's primary commodities, such as cocoa.

The second phase of the GPRS (II) began in 2006 and ended in 2009 to further the mandate of GPRS I, to improve human development and achieve macroeconomic stability and good governance. As a result, GDP was 8 percent in 2008 due to increased spending and investment (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). From 2011, the economy grew at an unprecedented rate of 14.4 per cent, owing to oil production, which started in 2010 and positively impacted other sectors of the economy. Government consumption increased in 2012 and led to a huge budget deficit in the history of Ghana. The fiscal crisis persisted in 2013 and has been a significant concern since then (Darko 2015). Growth declined again in 2015 due to declining commodity prices, energy rationing, and a fiscal crisis in 2012/2013 (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015).

5.1.2.2. Resource rents

Ghana's economic performance has been linked to the mining sector, particularly large-scale gold extraction, since the introduction of the ERP in 1983 (Van Gyampo, Graham and Yobo 2017). Under the ERP, the government aimed to enhance the mining and petroleum sectors' profitability. The World Bank and IMF policies called for a systematic transformation of the sector, which led to the creation of the

Minerals and Mining Law (PNDCL 153). The law afforded generous tax reductions and breaks, variable royalties between 3 and 12 per cent, a reduced mining tax, and the removal of import duties on designated goods to be used in mining to attract investment. However, the reforms happened without significant emphasis on the institutions to manage the mining revenues (Van Gyampo, Graham and Yobo 2017).

Another significant development was the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007, which is now a significant source of export revenue (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015). The oil was discovered in the country's Western Region in what became known as the Jubilee field. The field is named Jubilee because oil was discovered 50 years after Ghana's independence (Ayelazuno 2014). More than 100 million barrels of crude oil were exported after three years of oil production. Oil had overtaken cocoa as the second-largest export commodity and contributed massively to GDP growth. Oil production increased GDP growth from 7.9 percent to 14.0 percent in 2011. Furthermore, Ghana achieved its highest economic growth level due to the commercial production of oil and the high process of its primary commodity exports, including gold and cocoa (Darko 2015). By 2014, Ghana had received over US$2 billion from its share of crude oil (ACEP report, 2014). Apart from Gold, oil now constituted the largest single item in Ghana's exports. Thus, resource rents as a percentage of GDP have been increasing due to oil exports (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

The economy hit a bumpy road in 2012, with growth declining to 3.5 per cent in 2015. The decline was due to several factors, such as macroeconomic policies. For example, in 2012, there was a large expansion in the fiscal deficit driven by increased spending and over-optimistic revenue projections from oil (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015). Furthermore, the gold price began to decline at the end of 2012, and the energy supply was affected by low rainfall. The drastic decline in commodity prices since 2012, with gold being the hardest hit, decreased the mining sector's contribution to domestic revenue in 2016 (Aubynn 2017). Nonetheless, the resource sector still maintains its position as a significant contributor to revenue generation in Ghana.

5.1.2.3. Policies and institutions governing rents

Policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks within which natural resources are exploited are essential for determining whether a country can maximise its benefits from resource exploitation (Boakye et al. 2012; Van Gyampo 2016). In the current framework, all minerals are vested in the president on behalf of the people. So regardless of who owns the land with minerals under it, the state owns all minerals within Ghana's land and sea territory.

Mining

Mineral policy in Ghana has mainly focused on mining gold, diamonds, bauxite and manganese for export. The current regulatory framework in the mining sector was part of the deregulation adopted under the SAPs of the early 1980s when economic indicators continued to decline (Aubynn 2017). The objective of the regulation in the mining sector since the early 1980s has been to promote sustainable development and poverty reduction, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and increase production (Garvin et al. 2009; Aubynn 2017).

The institutional framework for mining governance is complex. The state level includes the presidency, parliament, central government ministries, and various departments and agencies such as the Mineral Commission (MC). At the local level are the District Assemblies (DAs) and Traditional Institutions (Ayee et al. 2011). In addition to state actors, other non-state actors are small-scale mining companies, international agencies, and citizens and their communities. At times, these actors have different and contradictory perspectives, and policymaking is often centralised with national institutions that might not have direct accountability to communities (Ayee et al. 2011).

Key legislative frameworks for mining in Ghana are found in the Minerals and Mining law (PNDCL 153), passed in 1986 and focused on providing an open incentive system to promote capital inflow and new investments (Berry 1995; Tsikata 1997). The Minerals and Mining Law of Ghana (Act 703), amended in 2012, required large-scale mining companies to contribute 5 percent of their gross revenue as royalties to the government. The central government retains 80 percent of the royalties; 10 percent is distributed to the Minerals Development Fund (MDF), which the government established in 1992 to benefit the communities affected (Tsikata 1997). Of the 10 percent, 1 percent is paid to the office of the stool Lands administrator, and the remaining 9 percent is allocated among DAs, traditional councils, and affected stool. Mining operators are also required to pay 35 per cent of profits in corporate tax (Aubynn 2017).

Regulations are not only a matter of technical design, so new institutions were also created to support the capacity of existing frameworks, such as the Minerals Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), established in 1986 and 1994, respectively (Aubynn 2017). The decentralisation policy from 1988 also sought to promote good governance and accountability (Ankamah 2012). The decentralisation of mining revenue is legislated as ‘compensation’ for communities affected by mining. The policy is that a proportion of mining rents is distributed among the local government authority, the traditional leaders, and other parties affected by the mining operations (Tsikata 1997; Standing and Hilson 2013). Ghana is one of the few African countries with a policy for redistributing a proportion of rent directly to communities (Standing and Hilson 2013). The MDF is used to help fund public mining institutions, fund ad hoc projects in the mining community, and compensate communities for mining costs (Appiah and Buaben 2012; Standing and Hilson 2013).

Petroleum

Legislation in the oil sector originated in the 1980s, but the discovery of oil in 2007 saw the development of more robust regulatory mechanisms (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018). Many laws regulating oil and gas industries focus on ensuring transparency, accountability, and environmental sustainability. Institutions for managing oil revenue include the Petroleum Commission, the Petroleum Regulatory Authority, and the Long-term National Development Vision (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

The Ministry of Finance, the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), and the Bank of Ghana are the key institutions that report on oil production and petroleum revenues (ACEP report, 2014). These institutions have a role in enhancing transparency and accountability in the oil and gas industry. The integrity of the data is based on these institutions providing accurate and unambiguous data without discrepancies. Unfortunately, discrepancies have sometimes existed between reports published by the Government and the GNPC on the one hand and the Bank of Ghana on the other (Adam 2014).

Apart from constitutional stipulations, several laws have also been passed to regulate Ghana's oil and gas sectors. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) (Act 815) of 2011 provides a framework for mobilising, allocating, and managing petroleum revenues (Graham 2016; Van Gyampo 2016).The law prescribes two types of spending on petroleum: spending by the GNPC, the national oil company, and spending by the central government through the Annual Budget Funding Amount (Adam 2014). The PRMA answers essential questions about how much the government should spend, where it should spend and how to invest revenues efficiently. The spending objectives of the PRMA are to maximise the rate of economic development, promote the equality of economic opportunities, and undertake a balanced and even development of the regions (Adam 2014).

The PRMA made provision for establishing the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). This oversight body has been mandated to monitor and evaluate governments' and other institutions' compliance with the Act in the management and use of petroleum revenues. Other objectives of the PIAC include providing a space for public debate on how revenue is spent and providing an independent assessment of the management and use of the revenues. The committee was inaugurated in 2011 and has been required to publish semi-annual and annual reports since 2012 (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018, 276). Accountability institutions such as the PIAC and the Ghana Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative (GHETI) source their published data from the government. Civil society has called for these institutions to conduct independent assessments of the management of revenues as mandated by Section 51 of the PRMA (Adam 2014).

Even with all these impressive laws, effective implementation of regulations remains challenging. The management of petroleum has been marked by greater transparency but low accountability. Implementing the PRMA has faced challenges such as forecasting problems, interpretation of sections of the law, and poor resourcing of the PIAC (Adam 2014). There is a need for the independent financing of the PIAC as budgeting for an institution and releasing the needed funds are two different things (Adam 2014). For example, an official from the PIAC complained that he had not been paid an allowance for seven months as no funds had been released from the Ministry of Finance (PIAC Official 2014).

Even with solid legislation, key powers remain with the president, the executive, and key ministers who are politically appointed. For instance, ministers have the power to grant or terminate mining titles. Calls for a review of the 1992 Constitution have been made to reduce the executive power of the Fourth Republic (Asante 2014). An official from the PIAC argued that the constitution was written to 'suit Rawlings', hence there is too much power given to the President (PIAC Official 2014). Still, the task of governing resources is challenging. Government has to deal with multiple regulations across sectors, and regulators sometimes lack capacity, or there is a lack of political will, or at times, interference in implementing regulations.

5.1.3. Trends in development outcomes: ANS and HDI

Despite macroeconomic growth from resource rents, Ghana still has high poverty levels and a growing poverty divide between the South and North. The expenditure from oil rents has contributed modestly to socioeconomic development. In 2013, the resource sector represented 25 percent of the country's export trade. However, the country still suffered from low levels of human development (Standing and Hilson 2013). In a survey which asked the Ghanaian youth how they would want the oil revenue to be used, human capital development came first. There was also a preference for the state to move from a road and growth-centric framework to a broader vision of social and sustainable development (Obeng-Odoom 2015).

Concerns have also been raised about the harmful effects of mining on water supplies and other aspects of the community (Tsikata 1997). In addition to the displacement of farmers due to mining activities, other environmental impacts include cyanide and dust pollution, land degradation, deforestation, and socioeconomic impacts such as human rights abuses, the loss of land and resources due to relocation, and decreased access to public services (Garvin et al. 2009; Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

We can use the time trend to understand Ghana's development outcomes. The ANS time trend is better analysed with the resource rents time trend. For example, if the government neglects resource sustainability, every time rents increase by 1 per cent of GDP, we expect a similar decrease in ANS. Hence, the two graphs look like upside-down versions of each other.

Ghana's challenges with a deteriorating ANS arose between the 2004 and 2012 elections and were accompanied by accelerated improvement in HDI. The sustainability trend was sharply downward from 2004 to 2012, though offshore oil was discovered in 2007 and started pumping in 2010. The downward trend was due to excessive budget spending in the election years of 2004, 2008 and 2012. The spending patterns have reflected political considerations.

World oil prices dropped with the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, and the country had to get an IMF loan in 2009. Resource rents were still increasing at this stage, but not as quickly as expected. Government consumption increased in 2012 and led to a budget deficit (Darko 2015). Ghana's deterioration in ANS is thus mainly due to the rent increase but without an increase in savings and investment. The decrease in ANS and the increase in rent during this period are around 10 per cent of GDP.

Concerning HDI, the Nkrumah administration institutionalised free healthcare in the immediate post-independence period (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). The implementation of SAPs under Rawlings in the 1980s meant state expenditure on public services and social welfare had to be cut. Fees for health and education were introduced, and access to the poor was reduced. When multiparty politics were introduced in 1992, health care and user fees became significant political issues. When the NPP came to office in 2000, they pursued the issue of a nationwide insurance plan more forcefully. The National Health Insurance Act was passed in 2003, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was launched the following year, and implementation began in 2005 (Carbone 2012). The economy also improved in the 2000s due to higher prices for the country's primary commodities and the implementation of GPRS II, which began in 2006 to further the mandate of improving human development and achieving macroeconomic stability (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

HDI continued to accelerate from 2011, most likely owing to spending from oil revenue. For example, during a party debate in the Western region in 2012, the NPP presidential candidate announced that oil revenue would be a significant source of funding for the party's high school education policy and quality health care for all Ghanaians. On the other hand, the NDC prioritised infrastructure development as a strategy for transforming the Ghanaian economy in its 2012 manifesto (Graham 2016). A considerable part of Ghana's annual national budget, about 8.1 percent of GDP, was allocated to the educational sector and increased by another 4 per cent in 2012 (Owusu-Nantwi 2015).

In 2017, public spending on education made up 6 percent of the GDP and 21 percent of the government budget. These figures are within the upper limit of education expenditure worldwide (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). Thus, Ghana's HDI value increased from 0.46 to 0.59 between 1990 and 2017, placing the country in the medium development category (United Nations Development Programme 2018).

To date, Ghana has one of the highest education expenditures as a percentage of government spending in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) area. The significant investment in Ghana's education sector has improved the standards and the quality of productivity of the labour force in the country, thereby enhancing economic development and growth. Nevertheless, Ghana still exhibits high levels of youth unemployment. Addressing unemployment requires improving the quality and accessibility of education (Owusu-Nantwi 2015). Due to a low and slow increase of per capita income for long periods, the absolute amount of expenditure per student is low, especially given the high levels of enrolment growth

(Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017).

5.1.4. The interplay between political accountability mechanism and development in Ghana

The backdrop of Ghana's democracy is a history of military regimes. Since the 1957 independence of the Fourth Republic, six of the ten governments were made up of military regimes that came to power via a coup (Berry, 1995). The economic development trajectory was mired by political instability, different development paradigms, and policy reversals depending on who was in power (Ayee et al. 2011). The need to achieve political stability and sustain economic growth has thus been at the core of Ghana's political and economic history since its independence (Owusu 1992). This section aims to analyse the interaction between Ghana's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes after the inauguration of the Fourth Republic.

5.1.4.1. Vertical political accountability mechanism and development outcomes

The Ghanaian political system is a clear example of a competitive two-party system in sub-Saharan Africa. The two largest parties, the NPP and the NDC, have won more than 80 percent of the votes in all parliamentary elections since 1996 and all presidential elections since 1992 (Kopecky 2011). Moreover, competitive elections have maximised voters' capacity to influence policy by holding public officials accountable for the outcomes of their decisions (Carbone 2012, 158). The competition also incentivises opposition parties to investigate corrupt behaviours and monitor the ruling party's actions. Meanwhile, the ruling party is incentivised to establish regulatory and oversight institutions that limit corrupt behaviour for themselves and the opposition that will likely be in power in the next election (Kopecky 2011).

Electoral competition and party institutionalisation have played a significant role in the direction and implementation of policies in Ghana (Little 2010). Resource allocation in Ghana's education sector was shaped by the incentives generated by Ghana's electoral competitiveness (Abdulai and Hickey 2016). Education expenditure increased because of popular demands in the context of competitive elections. For example, the NPP created a long-term plan for education (2003-2015), introduced a grant scheme to remove the need to pay school fees, and established the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) (Little 2010; Grebe 2015). After 2008, the NDC largely continued the implementation of these reforms in addition to introducing other programmes (Grebe 2015).

Competitive pressure has also motivated the government to create and adopt an ambitious health reform, and a content analysis of election manifestos of Ghana's major parties revealed that health was a key focus of electoral contestation (Carbone 2012). Previous health policy and financing arrangements were disliked by Ghanaians and became the platform on which the opposition (NPP) could challenge the ruling NDC party (Carbone 2012). The NDC appeared too slow in answering the public's outcry and calls to dismantle the "cash-and-carry" system during its rule from 1992-2000. The NPP capitalised on this and introduced a health insurance policy for universal coverage after winning elections, even though its liberal orientation would have made the party the least likely actor to adopt such a socially oriented initiative (Carbone 2012). The introduction of the universal health insurance scheme in 2003, after the NPP defeated the NDC in 2000, replacing the user fee/cash and carry policy was a remarkable social policy measure adopted during the country's two decades of democracy(Agyepong and Adjei 2008; Carbone 2003;

Grebe 2015).

Ghana's democratic regime and intense electoral competition have also been costly. While it has enabled several interests to be considered in policymaking decisions, it has also led to fiscal deficits around election time and a tendency for parties to backtrack on some policies (Resnick 2016). The evidence since 1993 shows that large fiscal deficits have existed in each election year, followed by hard fiscal adjustment afterwards, and those implemented in 1992, 1996, and 2008 were particularly destabilising (Anaman 2016). Patterns of spending from an oil fund also differed between an election year and the year before the election. For example, before the 2012 election, the 'capacity building' of the president's office accounted for less than 1 percent of spending from the oil fund. While in 2012, the election year, the spending increased to 22 percent. Such a spending pattern reflects political considerations in that less privileged regions have the least allocation of resources (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018). Excessive budget spending in election years also negatively affects socioeconomic development as it translates into less desirable economic conditions for the poor. The tendency for lack of macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline during and immediately after elections prevents economic sustainability (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014).

The winner-takes-all nature of elections increases the stakes and promotes the logic of political survival over the welfare of the citizens (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). The winner-takes-all system may slow growth and promote inefficiency. The winning government has the right to appoint ministers, presidential staff, and parastatals board members and award contracts in the mining sector. Contracts awarded under previous administrations are often cancelled or renegotiated, and opposing parties rarely complete projects initiated under a different administration (Atta-Mills 2018). Public sector reforms have also suffered from the wholesale removal of public servants associated with a previous political regime; this strategy has led to policy discontinuities that undermine the impact of reform initiatives that require extended periods to produce benefits (Appiah, 2017). Thus, the competitive nature of the party system means that political parties are unlikely to stay in power long enough to benefit from the accumulated investment. The competitive system usually involves regulatory uncertainty, which occurs in the aftermath of political change (Amankwah and Anim-Sackey 2003).

Although political competition can promote short-term goals linked to re-election, intense competition also has other advantages, such as self-scrutiny, self-correction, and adherence to the law among ruling elites (Odijie 2017). Since Ghana has two strong political parties, the parties scrutinise each other for electoral purposes, encouraging the incumbent to promote transparency and accountability. When a political party loses power, its past activities are scrutinised, which leads to a self-correction strategy between governments (Odijie 2017). For example, the NDC officials suspected complacency between Kufuor's NPP government and Kosmos Energy and launched several investigations. Likewise, when the NPP suspected the NDC of corruption, they promised to do an audit as soon as they regained power and did the audit in 2017 after winning the elections (Odijie 2017).

5.1.4.2. Horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms and development outcomes

Democracy has many assumptions, but without oversight institutions, it is futile (Kan-Dapaah 2014). Parliament is a primary institution for checks and balances (Amundsen 2013). The legislature can establish the political and institutional 'rules of the game' and the distribution of material benefits. Parliament is responsible for raising and using public funds and checking the government's spending of public funds. As an institution, parliament is integral to preventing the resource curse in that it can balance the powers of the president and ruling elite, redistribute income, and even reduce wasteful expenditure favouring the ruling party (Amundsen, 2013).

Ghana's parliament has been described as having a weak supervisory role over the years because of excessive partisanship and the influence of the executive (Bebbington et al. 2018). These weaknesses have raised questions concerning the effectiveness of parliament in performing its oversight duties to ensure that resource revenues are utilised appropriately. Since elections have become competitive, elected Members of Parliament (MPs) have been pressured to distribute public goods to their communities in line with their political goals rather than planned policy strategies. MPs thus spend a lot of their time and resources on constituency service and the distribution of private goods instead of their core functions of executive oversight, legislation and constituency representation (Lindberg 2010; Ayee et al. 2011). For example, the deputy minister of education was once accused of attempting to channel many school-related projects to his constituency when he was a parliamentary candidate for the ruling NDC in 2012 (Abdulai and Hickey 2016).

Some MPs argue that personal assistance improves their ability to know more about their constituency's issues to become better lawmakers and consider development projects in their communities as the primary concern (Lindberg 2010). Consequently, the office of the MP has developed a hybrid character where the MP does his formal duties as required by parliament and acts like the head of a family for his constituency through services such as paying for school fees and healthcare (Lindberg 2010).

The constitution requires the president to select most ministers from the existing MPs. Presidents use this opportunity to co-opt their party members and independents. MPs are thus reluctant to exercise their oversight duties as cabinet ministers or when they have ambitions to become ministers in future. MPs usually vote along party lines on presidential initiatives like borrowing and investment agreements to continue to receive benefits and be noticed for positions (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012; Brierley 2012).

MPs are said to lack the knowledge and understanding of the complex system of oil revenue management (Gyampo 2010). Ratification on oil contracts has been reduced to window dressing (Adam 2014). The government can use petroleum revenues as collateral for loans, raising the risk that foreign debt would be driven by political goals (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). The production of oil thus intensified the relationship between party politics and competitive clientelism (Odijie 2017). Moreover, the job of an MP has become a “reward for no work” (Prempeh 2014), given that they are more interested in discussing issues that allow for policy continuation (Parliamentary Editor 2014).

Some representatives of civil society I interviewed believe that the competition between the two dominant parties is a conspiracy and that the Ghanaian system has an internal model of consensus where there is much agreement between parties in parliament, policy dialogue, and behind-the-scenes consultation (Manteaw 2014; Kuyole 2014). The system is set up to provide golden handshakes that protect the interests of those who lose the presidential and parliamentary elections (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2017). The two-party system has been reduced to convenience (Adam 2014). For example, it was claimed that those who initially opposed the establishment of the PIAC were members of parliament from both major political parties and not just the ruling party. Though an official from the Ministry of Energy claimed that the establishment of the PIAC was premature and that even though an allocation of funds to the institution was important, it was not clear what proportion should be allocated and how the committee intended to work as an entity

(Official Ministry of Energy 2014).

It has taken a long time to reach a consensus on a long-term development plan because of the prevailing competitive system, which incentivises political actors to prioritise policies that enhance their political survival in the short term. The 1992 Constitution provides long-term intergenerational national development planning through its various stipulations for sustainable development (Republic of Ghana 1996; Adu-Gyamfi 2014). However, the government must also present coordinated economic and social development programmes every four years to the parliament. These two long and short-term objectives pose a challenge for designing a development plan incorporating intergenerational equity.

The government's ability to focus on intergenerational issues is compromised by the legitimate concern and focus on the four-year electoral cycle (Vordzorgbe 2006). The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) has made numerous attempts to launch a legally-binding 40-year development plan. The two main political parties opposed the plan because it would limit their ability to implement their party manifesto. Opposition to a long-term plan exists even though the PRMA requires that the spending on oil revenues be guided by a mid-term framework aligned with a long-term national development plan (Bebbington et al. 2018).

The priority of winning elections needs to be consistent with economic sustainability. For example, when the PRMA was designed, the NDC favoured rapid extraction and oil rents for rapid development instead of saving the funds for the future (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018). The NDC's victories in the 2008 and 2012 elections were said to have been influenced by those who thought the NDC would be better at governing oil in the national interest (Ayanoore 2018). Furthermore, a mining policy that was drafted in 1994 was only launched in 2016. Since the policy is essential for articulating the role that natural resources are expected to play in a country's development, Ghanaian policymakers paid little aspect to this when they passed a mining law before finalising a mining policy (Gyampo 2010).

The tension between long-term development goals and short-term political interests has led some observers to argue that democracy drives change, not the electoral competitiveness between the political parties. Democracy allows participation from all stakeholders, and stakeholders are calling for the right thing to be done (Amponsah-Tawiah 2014). Such an argument is also supported by a high-ranking public official, the Minister of National Security, who argued that reforms for accountability would never come from the political elite (Kan-Dapaah 2014). Political manifestos are not meant to grow the country as politicians tend to promise to build bridges where there are no rivers (Kan-Dapaah 2014).

The absence of a robust system of checks and balances has put pressure and responsibility on other institutions of accountability, such as the media, civil society, and credible elections, to ensure revenues benefit the nation (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012; Amundsen 2013). Civil society was critical in campaigning to pass the PIAC (Kuyole 2014). In 2012, the PIAC noticed a discrepancy between the financial forecast and outturn and criticised the NDC government for failing to adhere strictly to the requirements for oil revenue distribution (70 percent for the annual budget spending and 30 percent for saving in petroleum funds) (Odijie 2017). The media reported this outcome, and a public outcry led to the government providing the necessary funds and donating vehicles to the PIAC to enhance its effectiveness (Odijie 2017).

The PIAC has had its limits in ensuring the responsible use of resource revenues at the local level. Abdulai (2017) argued that ruling coalitions had allocated a large share of mineral rents to chiefs to secure political support from rural areas at the expense of socio-economic development. DAs have also been implicated in the mismanagement of funds earmarked for community development through the District Assemblies Common Fund (Standing and Hilson 2013). The challenge is that there are no mechanisms to promote accountability and transparency concerning funds paid to local authorities and chiefs (Standing and Hilson 2013). Joyce Aryee, a former CEO of the Chamber of Mines in Ghana, agreed that the state needs to hold the local districts accountable for local-level projects (Aryee 2014). Thus, the decentralisation of mining revenue still faces criticism as a vehicle for local economic development.

Progress has been made in social investments in health and education (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). Nonetheless, the benefits have yet to be shared widely. The North (Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions) has been lagging on human development indicators since colonial times. The regional differences were sparked by British policies that treated the North as a pool of cheap labour and delayed the introduction of European-style education until 1951 (Abdulai and Hickey 2016). Thus, priority should also be given to a fairer distribution of benefits across the country (Aryeetey and Kanbur 2017). Furthermore, there have been calls to earmark a particular amount of money to bridge the gap between the North and the South (Asante 2014).

5.1.5. Conclusion

This chapter analysed how Ghana's democracy, electoral competition and relatively institutionalised parties have impacted resource governance and development outcomes. In the statistical analysis, democracy and electoral competition did not affect development outcomes. However, the Ghanaian case illustrates that political accountability mechanisms have a significant role in shaping the development, direction and implementation of policies and the spending incentives of ruling governments.

Electoral competition and party institutionalisation incentivised political actors to develop and implement inclusive policies. Each ruling party is held accountable in that it can lose elections if it fails to deliver public goods (Koponski, Polus and Tycholiz 2013). The campaigns by the major parties have often focused on the provision of public goods, especially health care and education. Thus, the competitive electoral framework has forced elites to respond to distributional demands for public goods provision alongside private goods. Furthermore, the successive power transfer has convinced voters that governments that perform poorly can be replaced. Political elites have also accepted that should they lose elections, they will have an opportunity to win again. Meanwhile, the institutionalisation of parties facilitates the party's ability and capacity to implement policies and deliver on its promises.

Democracy provides the space for different interests to be articulated and for a strong civil society that not only acts as a counterbalance to the state but also contributes to strengthening legislation in the resource sector (Koponski, Polus and Tycholiz 2013). An open political atmosphere allows parties to campaign openly, even in territories of their rivals. Non-state actors, including the media, have proactively participated in the political environment and influenced horizontal accountability institutions such as the PIAC to continue to guard against revenue misuse.

Democratic deficits persist, and there are flaws in the constitution's design and provisions that promote the executive's dominance over other horizontal mechanisms of accountability, such as the parliamentary committees and the Judiciary. National institutions like the PIAC also have limited influence at the local level. Furthermore, many of these formal institutions operate under some constraints of informal institutions and ethnic politics, including the influence of traditional chiefs and historical cleavages. The provision of public goods also has a regional dimension with variations in educational and health attainments due to colonial legacies.

Tension exists between long-term development goals and the short-term interests of politicians resulting from pressure to remain in office in a competitive party system (Resnick 2016). High competitiveness between the two main parties has led to a high degree of vulnerability in power, which encourages unsustainable expenditure during the election period (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). Contrary to the statistical findings, resource revenues have contributed to health and education expenditures but have also been diverted for short-term political gains even when they are ring-fenced for long-term development programs (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018). For example, oil revenues have been a significant source of funding for the high school education policy and quality health care, though at the expense of macroeconomic stability. Therefore, there are incentive problems at the political level which have implications for the performance of the resource sector, local development and the economy at large (Ayee et al. 2011).

Ghana's efforts at development result from a relatively supportive institutional environment, with a political consensus on social investment. A stable democratic regime with electoral competition and institutionalised parties incentivises politicians to adopt policies that prioritise public goods and allocate resources towards the goods. More research is required to understand how countries like Ghana can promote accountability and transparency concerning funds paid to local authorities for community development. Scholars can also look into the role of external constraints in achieving economic sustainability, as, at times, conditionalities placed on loans have prevented excessive spending by the incumbent.

6. Political Accountability and Development in Zambia (1990 - 2018)

This chapter investigates how Zambia's democracy, electoral turnovers and relatively less institutionalised parties have impacted resource governance and development. I also consider the impact of other possible explanations I may have overlooked in the statistical analysis, such as the role of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms. Like Ghana, Zambia is a resource-rich, competitive democracy with more than one electoral turnover. However, in Zambia, the perception of the degree of party institutionalisation is low and averages 0.37 between 1990 and 2018, while Ghana's average is 0.61. The institutionalisation value is also below the region's average of 0.48.

Investigating the impact of political accountability mechanisms on development in Zambia is crucial because the country has experienced several peaceful elections since independence. However, it is considered to have a fluid party system with frequent fissures and fusions among parties which may impact its development outcomes. Party competition is unlikely to provide an efficient opposition in a highly fragmented party system. The competition must occur in a political system with stable, disciplined, and institutionalised political parties (Kopecky 2011). It must involve predictability or a level of institutionalisation of the system to be effective. Thus, the nature of the competition, rather than its extent, is what constrains patronage (Kopecky 2011).

Mbilima (2021) notes that Zambia's fragmented parties and often unstable party system have affected development outcomes, while the over-reliance on copper and the frequent booms and busts have raised issues of sustainability. Therefore, Zambia's development depends on how its democratic institutions interact with the governance and management of natural resources. It also depends on whether copper price booms are followed by considerable savings or are used to increase spending (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014).

There are limitations, however, to a highly competitive 'winner takes all' political system in countries with excessive presidentialism, weak checks and balances, and less effective devolution of authority to local government (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). In winner-takes-all politics, the ruling party often monopolises state resources and opportunities and usually excludes the political opposition from national governance (Van Gyampo 2015; Atta-Mills 2018). Usually, the ruling government has no incentive to build institutions that would constrain it, and evidence shows that unchecked power negatively affects economic development (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). Therefore, rules and institutions that provide a clear policy mandate beyond a single government are necessary.

In Zambia, democracy as a formal regime type matters as much as the existence of adequate checks on the unrestrained power of the executive (Carbonnier and Wagner 2011). Since executive power in Zambia is centralised in the presidency, there is limited parliamentary oversight, and the presidency becomes the main arena for decision-making (Van de Walle 2001). These perspectives about the influence of party system stability and electoral competition imply that Zambia's competitive democratic regime and fragmented party system may affect development outcomes.

Zambia's development record overperformed on indicators of both inclusiveness and sustainability, according to the cross-national estimates. The 'bullseye' in Figure 6.1 centres on the country's statistically 'expected' levels of inclusiveness (as measured by health and education) and sustainability (as measured by adjusted net savings). The solid and dotted circles are 80 per cent and 95 per cent confidence intervals. The dot marks Zambia's actual performance on the two indicators. Located in the upper-right quadrant near the dotted circle, it shows that the country exceeded statistical expectations on ANS by more than 10 per cent of GDP and on HDI by more than 5 per cent. The outcomes fall close to the 95 per cent confidence ellipse, meaning Zambia's performance is a substantial deviation from the regression estimates.

Figure 6.1.: Zambia case prediction ellipse



A central aim of this chapter is to explore potential explanations for why Zambia has outperformed expectations on inclusiveness and sustainability despite struggles to consolidate its democracy, the low degree of party institutionalisation, and the party system's fragmented nature. Particularly, why did HDI increase steadily in the 2000s? At the same time, the chapter explores why Zambia avoided a decline in sustainability when copper rents boomed in the 2000s, about the same time as Ghana, which experienced a decline. In general, I analyse the interaction between Zambia's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes after the inauguration of the Third Republic in 1990.

Similar to Ghana, Zambia's democracy and competitiveness promote inclusiveness. The electoral competition encouraged increased social spending in the context of debt relief and a copper boom. Though competitiveness promotes shorter horizons, adversely affecting sustainability, Zambia succeeded in staying on a more sustainable path when resource rents increased sharply in the 2000s due to pressure on the government to distribute wealth from copper gains. ANS monitors whether the depletion of natural capital is compensated for by investment in other assets, such as human capital, including education expenditures (wages and salaries). Public sector salaries were hiked during Chiluba's and Mwanawasa's regimes (1991 to 2008), which may explain the positive ANS values in the 2000s. Furthermore, though the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) dominated election results since 1992, it was challenged in 2001, and some of the pressure resulted in tax reforms which allowed the government to capture more revenue for social spending.

The evidence provided will include time-series graphs to represent political and economic trends between 1990 and 2018, literature on the political economy of the country and the use of primary sources, such as official documents and personal semi-structured interviews with government officials, representatives of interest groups, political parties, and policy experts.

The exploration proceeds in two parts. The first part focuses on unpacking time trends in the key political and economic variables from the cross-national analysis. This part clarifies dynamics over the full period from 1990 through 2018. The second part explores more fine-grained evidence on how political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation, in turn influencing development outcomes.

6.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms, resource rents and development outcomes

Zambia, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, was established and declared a British protectorate in 1924 and had a local population of roughly a million people (Sardanis 2014). Zambia's Western-style government began with Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC), which ruled from the 1890s until 1924 when the British government took over the administration (Tordoff 1974; Van Donge 2000; Fraser and Larmer 2010; Sardanis 2014).

The country gained its independence within the Commonwealth on 24 October 1964 and established a predominantly presidential system, with Kenneth Kaunda as the President of the First Republic. His party played a dominant part in the multi-party system of the First Republic (1964 - 1972) and usually faced persistent opposition (Krennerich 1999). Mining plays a central role in Zambia's economy and represents the largest share of exports throughout the country's economic history (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). To date, Zambia has one of the highest levels of urbanisation on the continent, and its current population is estimated to be over 17 million (Central Intelligence Agency 2020).

Figure 6.2 represents changes in electoral competition, party institutionalisation, non-rents GDP, resource rents, and development (HDI and ANS) from 1990 to 2018. I use the time trend to provide a structure to the descriptive background and unpack the dynamics and trends in Zambia over the 28 years.

6.1.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms

6.1.1.1. Political regime

Zambia's First Republic was established on 24 October 1964 after independence (Chikulo and Sichone 1996). The Second Republic was established from 1972 to 1990 and is known as the one-party 'participatory democratic system' where the decisions of the Choma Commission superseded the original 1964 Constitution. The Commission permitted the United National Independent Party (UNIP), under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, to be the sole political party and custodian of the people's interests (Chikulo and Sichone 1996; The Business Year 2015).

The impending poor economic and financial conditions, especially the rise in inflation and unemployment, motivated President Kaunda's imposition of a single party to avoid losing competitive elections. On the other hand, Kaunda argued that competitive elections would politicise social cleavages and encourage tribal politics, resulting in violence and instability (Chiluba 1995). The one-party state was therefore instituted to deal with internal conflicts and sectionalism based on tribal and ethnic divisions and to address the inefficiencies imposed by a pluralistic democracy (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). Kaunda created a complex system of patronage to keep disparate elements in the existing coalition and promised a better life for all, where the state would provide public housing, free healthcare, and education. The state planned to fund these services from copper revenue, which formed 80 per cent

Figure 6.2.: Zambia time trend graph: 1990 - 2018



of the country's foreign exchange earnings (Chiluba 1995). The government failed to deliver on these promises, leading to rising discontent among the citizens of Zambia in the 1980s (Chiluba 1995).

Zambia's Third Republic began when president Kaunda signed an amendment to the constitution to reintroduce multiparty politics in December 1990. Although Kaunda was firmly committed to the one-party system, the enormous political pressure and public demands for a plural system resulted in Kaunda signing the Amendment Bill to end close to two decades of one-party rule (Chiluba 1995). Political parties were legalised, and the first multiparty presidential and national assembly elections were held on 31 October 1991 (Chiluba 1995). The MMD, a broad movement of different social groups such as trade unions, students, churches, and business people, transformed itself into a political party on time for the 1991 elections and established itself as the main opposition party. Its presidential candidate was a trade union leader, Frederick Chiluba (Chikulo and Sichone 1996; Posner and Simon 2002; Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). The MMD won an overwhelming majority and dominated Zambian politics from 1991 to 2011.

Like in Ghana, the transition to multiparty politics in Zambia was in the context of growing socio-economic difficulties in the country and the external political environment. The collapse of socialist regimes and the decline of the Soviet Union, as well as domestic financial and economic difficulties, led to declining living standards. Economic mismanagement by the ruling government, an unfavourable world economy and rising debt also affected living standards (Chikulo and Sichone 1996). Economic policy failure was also attributed to a lack of political accountability in an atmosphere of one-party rule and the concentration of power in the presidency (Chiluba 1995).

To date, Zambia's political system features regular multiparty, competitive elections. However, while the country was heralded as a model for a peaceful transition in Africa, the democratic transition was soon undermined by measures of the new MMD government, which concentrated power in the executive and silenced dissent (Krennerich 1999). Initially, the MMD drafted a new constitution and opened freedom for the press to lay the foundations for multiparty politics. In the later years, the party used authoritarian tactics and clientelist methods to remain in power as Zambia's ruling party, to the extent that by the time it lost power in 2011, it had taken the one-party character of the party it sought to replace (Krennerich 1999).

Political and civic freedoms, such as freedom of the press and assembly, were restricted during the later years of MMD's rule. The political elite that promoted the democratic transition did not implement the democratic reforms promised during the transition (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Meanwhile, Chiluba attempted to amend the constitution to stand for a third term. After the MMD's rule, there was also the erosion of democracy and human rights under the Patriotic Front's (PF) rule, which began after the 2011 elections and continued until 2021. President Edgar Lungu and his government were accused of human rights abuses and shrinking the space for freedom of expression, assembly and association (Amnesty International 2021). Thus, the transition brought into question Zambia's democratic regime, with scholars describing it as a clientelist democracy (Siachiwena 2021) or a hybrid regime (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2011).

The country has struggled to consolidate its democracy mainly because the transition from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy in 1991 failed to deliver meaningful constitutional reforms. Executive power is used to exclude political opponents and increase patronage, with the president remaining the key decision-maker and exercising power and influence over key institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary (Banda et al. 2020). There are thus limited checks and balances on the president's power, which limits transparency and accountability. Moreover, governance and politics often reflect the personality and leadership style of the president (Banda et al. 2020). Thus, Zambia's democratic trajectory has been non-linear and has received mixed and contradictory signals, with some citing authoritarian regressions in the second half of its democratic transition (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003; Banda et al. 2020).

6.1.1.2. Electoral competitiveness

Zambia's independence constitution allowed multiple parties to participate in elections (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). Under Kenneth Kaunda's leadership, UNIP won the independence elections and was in power from 1964 to 1991 (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). Since then, Zambia has held seven general elections in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021. As per the time trend, several elections were regarded as unfair. Transfer of power from the first democratic elections has occurred between four political parties (UNIP, MMD, PF and the United Party for National Development [UPND]). The MMD won the first four elections after the transition, the next two elections were won by the PF, and the last election saw another transfer of power to UPND in 2021. The discussion will be limited to the 2016 elections, given that the study period is until 2018.

In the 1991 elections, the MMD won 125 out of the 150 seats in the national assembly. The two-thirds majority gave the MMD the power to change the constitution unilaterally, and in 1995, the party introduced the third constitution since independence (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). One of the changes included that anyone who runs for president should prove that their parents are Zambian, a condition alleged to have been instituted to prevent Kaunda from running for office (Momba 1999; Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). The MMD again won the 1996 elections again but was accused of misusing state resources, such as state-owned media, to campaign for the elections. UNIP and other parties boycotted the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, with some authors declaring the elections unfair (Momba 1999; Posner and Simon 2002; Kabemba and Eiseman 2004).

Burnell (2001) described Zambia's political party system since 1990 as one that resembles a 'predominant party system' as the MMD rule under Chiluba was similar to the one-party state of the pre-independence era and the Second Republic. The MMD's electoral dominance throughout the 1990s supported the claim by scholars that dominant party systems were prevalent on the continent, as well as the tendency for the transfer of power to occur within instead of between parties (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). Power in the MMD transferred between Chiluba from 1991 to 2001, Levy Mwanawasa until 2008, and Rupiah Banda until 2011.

Although new political parties emerged between the 1996 and 2001 elections, such as the Forum for Democratic Development (FDD) (a breakaway party from the MMD), and the UPND, they did not pose a threat to the MMD at the time (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). The UPND, formed in 1998, eventually developed into the strongest opposition party in parliament and a viable competitor against the MMD in the 2001 elections (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).

The 2001 elections were the most competitive after a decade of multiparty politics. The MMD won 69 of the 150 seats in parliament, while the UPND won 49 seats (Sishuwa 2020). Levy Mwanawasa was sworn in as President in January 2002 after narrowly defeating Anderson Mazoka of the opposition UPND. The MMD's new presidential candidate, Mwanawasa, won only 29 per cent of the presidential vote, and the party won less than half of the parliamentary seats (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). These were the first elections, since independence, that a ruling party and the president did not have a majority in parliament. Zambia came close to passing

Huntington's two-turnover test, while the results signalled that the Zambian electorate was able and willing to reject an underperforming ruling party (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004).

The results also showed regional patterns in party support. Ethnicity and urban or rural location largely explained support patterns for the incumbent regime (Posner and Simon 2002). Zambia has 73 ethnicities, mainly divided into four major groups: the Nyanja, Bemba, Tonga and Lozi (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). However, ethnicity is only one factor in predicting support patterns in Zambia and is less salient than in many other African countries (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). The UPND also used opportunities presented by factionalism in the MMD and PF to gather ethno-regional support and form an elite coalition (Beardsworth 2020).

The MMD was further weakened by the conflict over Chiluba's attempts to change the constitution so that he could run for a third term; the decade-long economic decline; a reputation of corruption and authoritarianism; a fraught process to select a successor, and the emergence of stronger opposition parties. However, the pluralism in parliament did not lead to party coalition politics. Instead, President Mwanawasa used a cooptation strategy to build his political base after receiving 29 per cent of the votes, one of the lowest electoral support outcomes on the continent in the era of political transitions (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004).

The MMD also won the 2006 elections. Mwanawasa led the party until he died in 2008 and then Rupiah Banda from 2008 to 2011. In the 2001 elections, when Chiluba's two terms in office ended, Mwanawasa emerged as the new presidential candidate to the dismay of Michael Sata, a long-standing minister and national organising secretary in the MMD. Sata left the party and formed the rival PF. The party attracted supporters of pro-poor populist rhetoric, and some members of the MMD defected to the PF. The PF came second place in the 2006 elections (winning

43 out of the 150 parliamentary seats), and Sata reinvented himself as a political outsider fighting against the MMD regime and representing the frustrations of the working class and urban poor (Siachiwena 2021).

Sata's PF won the 2011 elections after ten years in opposition, receiving 60 of the 150 seats in parliament, the most for any opposition party (Sishuwa 2020). Sata governed Zambia from 2011 but died halfway through his term, and Edgar Lungu, after an intense succession struggle within the PF, won the presidential by-election (Siachiwena 2017). The PF government included a 'social democratic' faction which supported the implementation of pro-poor programmes. The party campaigned based on lowering taxes and providing more jobs and adopted a more interventionist position (Siachiwena 2021). The PF's left-leaning manifesto, which marked a break from the MMD's neo-liberal approach, especially concerning the mining sector, saw an increase in mineral royalties and wages in the private and public sectors (Banda et al. 2020).

The 2016 elections challenged Zambia's prospects for democratic consolidation as they were not contested on an equal playing field. Lungu and the PF party were re-elected in the regular elections of 2016. Lungu won the elections by a small margin, and the elections were petitioned by the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND on the grounds of electoral fraud. The petition was dismissed (Siachiwena 2017). The Zambia police service applied a controversial Public Order Act to deny opposition from holding rallies. The incumbent used state resources such as Air Force helicopters for campaigns and restricted press freedom (Goldring and Michael 2016). Campaigns by parties during this period were linked to incidents of violence, and the election generally exhibited deficiencies often found in competitive authoritarian regimes, such as a decreased space for opposition parties, civil society and the media (Banda et al. 2020). Zambia experienced its third power transfer when the opposition, UPND, finally won the presidential and legislative elections in 2021.

Overall, the splits within incumbent parties and strategies of opposition parties (such as populist appeals) have influenced turnovers. These turnovers have not necessarily led to democratic consolidation but more uneven playing fields (Siachiwena 2020). There has also been the potential for ruling parties to fragment during transitions from one president to the other. Ethnic and tribal considerations also exist as parties have geographical bases. For example, leaders from different ethnic groups would complain that crucial positions in Chiluba's government were occupied by his ethnic group, Bemba speaking. The MMD internal factions have proved severe, and the party lacked internal cohesion and had no standard set of policies, leading to its demise (Siachiwena 2020).

6.1.1.3. Party institutionalisation

Zambia has a competitive and fluid political environment. The time trend plot shows party institutionalisation climbed after the 1991 elections, remaining stable until the 2001 elections, and dropping sharply after the 2016 elections won by the PF. This trend is contrary to Ghana's party institutionalisation trend, which has steadily increased since the 1992 elections. Several reasons are attributed to the weak institutionalisation of parties and the party system in Zambia. First, the dominance of the MMD since the initial elections in the 1990s and the weak democratic consolidation over time meant that opposition parties evolved slowly and were not a serious political threat to the ruling regime. The 1990s pattern of a dominant party system and its interactions with party fragmentation and ethnic-regional considerations was essentially a continuation of the single-party system that emerged after independence (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Thus, political parties have faced structural problems such as a lack of programmatic alternatives, active members, income, and effective organisation (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).

Second, weak party institutionalisation is attributed to the concentration of power within the president and the personalistic nature of politics (Rakner and Svasand 2004). Internal elections are often conducted top-down (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004), while party organisation can be personalised, informal, and depend on the politician's standing (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). According to a Zambian academic, the weak parties and party system can be blamed on the powerful president. He used an example of a school in a rural area to make a point of the excessive centralisation: a headmaster or teacher who is not performing well or facing dismissal demands would respond to despondent parents by saying, 'I have written to Lusaka, so let us wait' (Zambian Academic 2015).

Bratton (1992) argued that one-party rule, such as the one in Zambia during the Second Republic, instils a patrimonial culture where people are loyal to politicians in power and expect to be rewarded for unseating the incumbent. Rather than engaging in activism or opposition, those in opposition tend to join the ruling party, thus reinforcing a culture of loyalty rather than competitive elections. Indeed, the one-party state was dominated by strong personalities that either held senior positions in government or had enormous wealth, and there was a strong emphasis on the party president rather than policy choices. Internal criticism was hardly tolerated, and internal policy debates were discouraged (Simutanyi 2013).

The third reason is the lack of ideological cohesion within parties and the intense competition for leadership positions which triggers factions within the parties when internal elections are held (Burnell 2001; Kabemba and Eiseman 2004). For example, Sata left the MMD in 2001 to form the PF after his attempt to succeed Chiluba failed. Lungu was once part of the UPND at its inception in 1998 but left to join the newly formed PF in 2001 (Siachiwena 2017). During 2015 and 2016, some members of the PF, such as Miles Sampa and Guy Scott, defected to join the UPND. In the lead-up to the 2016 elections, Lungu allied with former President Rupiah Banda of the MMD to galvanise resources for his campaign. The partnership was unexpected as Banda favoured market-friendly policies compared to PF's pro-poor platform under Sata in 2011 (Siachiwena 2017). Instead of pluralism leading to party coalition politics, there was also a cross-party co-optation by leaders such as Mwanawasa and Sata, which was successful because of the weak party institutionalisation. The power struggles encourage a culture where parties are not divided along ideology but encourage fluid membership and self-interest.

Fourth, most of Zambia's political parties exist mainly in urban areas, even though most of the population resides in rural areas. Some parties lack an organisational and effective countrywide administration structure, and they are primarily dormant between elections but become active during the election period. The lack of funding for elections leads parties to depend on leaders' resourcefulness, further undermining democratic structures.

Lastly, the frequent by-elections have polarised politics and resulted in petitions in courts. For example, between 1991 and 1996, 48 by-elections occurred, and between 2006 and 2009, 10 by-elections occurred after defections from various parties or deaths of MPs (Sanches 2018). The frequency of these elections, though permitted by law, has an impact on citizens, the national budget, and the ability of parties to organise as they are in constant election mode (Sanches 2018). Finally, the weakness of accountability institutions such as the media, the courts and other public agencies, often used in favour of the incumbent, also weakened parties due to a lack of an even playing field (Rakner 2003).

6.1.2. Trends in economic performance: non-rent GDP and resource rents

6.1.2.1. Non--rent GDP

Zambia has had various economic development policies since independence, and like most countries on the continent, political and economic reform has had a strong external influence (Rakner, 2003). The government has implemented long, medium and short-term plans to support economic development since independence (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016). The economy's growth increased rapidly in the early years after independence, owing to the high prices of copper, and led to increased employment and living standards (Tordoff 1974). Although the country was one of the richest at independence, it soon became one of the most indebted countries in the world (Van Donge 2000). The country suffered one of the most rapid economic declines on the continent between 1975 and 1990, when GDP declined by 30 per cent (Rakner 2003).

The IMF instituted the Structural Adjustment Programme under Kaunda's UNIP in 1985. The government removed price controls and subsidies and devalued the national currency (Chikulo and Sichone 1996). The government failed to cope with the changes and abandoned the programme in 1987, triggering an economic crisis. The government then implemented a 'Growth from Own Resources' programme, and after it failed, they returned to the IMF to seek assistance in 1989 (Chikulo and Sichone 1996). The IMF placed similar, if not harsher, conditions on loans, including liberalising foreign trade and the privatisation of parastatals (Chiluba 1995). The measures resulted in economic stagflation, a rise in prices and unemployment and led to widespread protests (Chiluba 1995).

The reasons cited for Zambia's economic decline include the development of modern mining and the urban sector, which took place at the expense of the rest of the Zambian economy. The rural areas had been the most neglected by the colonial administration, yet there was a massive rural-urban migration after independence. Thus, the opportunity to use rural development for diversifying and relieving the economy from an over-reliance on copper was lost (Van Donge 2000). The deterioration of social conditions in the last decade of Kaunda's era thus contributed to the regime's removal (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).

When the MMD assumed government in 1991, the economy had declined at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent in the previous two decades (Posner and Simon 2002). The income per capita continued to decline even after the return to democracy, and overall absolute poverty rose after the transition (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Even with the reintroduction of multiparty politics, the gap between the government and the ruling party was small. It seemed like a reversal to one-party-state policies (Rakner 2003). Although market fundamentals from 1991 onwards drove the economy, there was a degree of continuity between UNIP's and MMD's policies. Both political parties had uneven implementation and limited commitment to policy reform, and commitment to a long-term strategy was not displayed despite the dominant electoral victory of the MMD (Rakner 2003).

The MMD also embarked on a programme of economic stabilisation and structural adjustment to restore macroeconomic stability, facilitate private sector growth, and liberalise trade and public monopolies (Rakner 2003). Zambia's economy grew slightly; however, income per capita declined. The structural adjustment policies did not improve living standards; they aggravated the economic and social crisis, and labour strikes in the public sector frequently occurred, albeit without threatening the regime (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).

The low levels of non-rent GDP per capita on the time trend between 1990 and 2001 are explained by the country's massive debt, and the percentage of GDP spent on servicing debt, which doubled between 1990 and 1999. In 2000, Zambia was classified as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and was eligible for debt reduction if it implemented a poverty reduction strategy (Thurlow and Wobst 2004). A higher growth average was achieved between 1999 - 2002 but averaged about 0.2 per cent for the 1990s (Thurlow and Wobst 2004). Still, the MMD government did not face serious opposition that challenged its dominance and economic policies between 1996 and 2001. Power was centralised within the executive office, and state resources were used for political gain (Rakner 2003).

The first term of Mwanawasa's presidency in 2002 included a shrinking economy inherited from the Chiluba regime. The country experienced mass unemployment from privatisation and closure of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, there was high inflation and a declining mining sector after Anglo American's announcement in 2002 that it was leaving Zambia's mining industry due to the declining price of copper (Sishuwa 2020). Zambia's economy improved in late 2005 after implementing austerity measures, and when the country qualified for almost 100 per cent debt relief. The savings from no longer having to service debt enabled the government to fund education and health and invest in physical infrastructure. The increase in copper prices also meant that Zambia experienced sustained economic growth averaging 5 to 7 per cent between 2005 and 2008. The economy continued to improve until the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009, which dropped copper prices (Sishuwa 2020).

Sata's PF took over from Banda and the MMD in 2011. The PF inherited the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP), which focused on Sustained Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction but revised to incorporate PF plans, hence the revised SNDP (2013 - 2016) mentioned in the introduction. The SNDP and the revised version aimed to improve infrastructure and human development (Siachiwena 2021). GDP growth declined from 10.3 per cent in 2010 to 4.7 per cent in 2014. By 2019, GDP growth was at a low of 1.7 per cent. Sata's government had overspent on farm input subsidies in 2013 and 2014 by more than 100 per cent. It also overspent on by-elections by over 1000 per cent in 2013 and 4000 per cent in 2014 (Siachiwena 2021, 16).

In sum, Zambia's government reduced its expenditures drastically to support structural reforms from 1991 to 2000, which explains the low growth rates. The debt cancellation of 2005 helped improve the economy by reducing the current account deficit, stabilising inflation and the exchange rate and leading to sustained economic growth until 2013, during which copper prices also increased (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016).

6.1.2.2. Resource rents

Mining plays a central role in Zambia's economy. The country mines copper, cobalt, gold, manganese, iron, gemstones, industrial minerals, and energy minerals such as uranium, coal, and hydro. The mining sector and its related industries also provide employment and infrastructure to areas that would otherwise not have this impetus. The sector also contributes by attracting massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and is the base for the country's foreign exchange earnings (Zambia EITI Report 2019). Copper production dominates Zambia's mining sector and has been exposed to booms and busts (Bova 2012).

Copper was discovered in the early 20th century when Cecil John Rhodes was given mining rights through the BSAC (Sardanis 2014). At independence, the country was the third largest copper producer in the world and enjoyed high commodity prices until the first half of the 1970s (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). The international demand for copper accelerated mining through big companies such as the Anglo-American Corporation (Sardanis 2014). The presence of foreign capital and multinational companies led to the development of one of the largest mining complexes in the world, and the growth of mining led to urban and industrialised centres (Rakner 2003).

The Zambian government desired a majority stake in the mining industry following the copper boom in the early years of independence (Van Donge 2000; Fraser and Larmer 2010; Sardanis 2014). The two nationalised copper mines were joined to form the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), the majority owned by the state. Mining companies received large pay-outs for their shares, were retained on management contracts, and therefore secured their income irrespective of profit (Van Donge 2000). Between 1965 and 1975, copper accounted for 95 per cent of export earnings and 45 per cent of government revenue (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). Prices declined after the 1970s, leading to a highly indebted Zambia by the 1990s (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016). In the 1990s, copper accounted for over 90 per cent of export revenue, even though its share of exports declined steadily (Du Plessis and Du Plessis 2006).

After 1996, the government agreed to begin the privatisation process for ZCCM. The final sale of the mines was completed in 2000. The ZCCM became ZCCM-IH and a minority stakeholder representing government interests in the private mining sector (Rakner 2003). To complete the privatisation process, the government signed investment commitments with new mining companies in what would be known as Development Agreements (DAs). Adam and Simpasa (2009) argued that the state-owned model was poorly suited to managing a volatile global copper market. The privatisation of ZCCM would curb operation losses due to the public budget and increase investment in exploration and production so that the mines could be profitable and generate public revenue (Adam and Simpasa 2009).

Zambia's time trend shows that resource rents increased sharply after 2000 because copper prices increased considerably between 2003 and 2006 (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016). The government imposed a windfall tax in 2008 to secure revenue, but the price of copper fell again. The decreased revenue did not limit the significant infrastructural investment in Banda's term, which continued Mwanawasa's policies (Sishuwa 2020). Mining companies persuaded Banda's regime to abolish the windfall tax introduced by Mwanawasa in early 2008, which had increased taxation on mining profits from 31.7 to 47 per cent. When Banda's government removed the tax, prices rose again (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). The lack of strict implementation was in contrast with the period between 1964 and the 1970s when Kaunda's government enacted tax and institutional reforms to increase tax windfall revenue and state control of the mining sector (Du Plessis and Du Plessis 2006).

When the PF was elected in 2011, taxes collected from copper mining accounted for 35 per cent of total taxes, a significant increase from 1995 to 2000, when mines paid only between 1 and 2 per cent of all taxes (Siachiwena 2021). The PF government used the mining revenue to invest in energy, infrastructure and social provision. Still, PFs expenditure exceeded revenue, and the plans were financed through debt, as economic growth and copper prices were projected to be high (Siachiwena 2021).

In 2013, copper comprised 73 per cent of the USD$12.2 billion in goods exported (The Business Year 2015). By 2014, copper extraction accounted for 78 per cent of exports and 32 per cent of government revenue (Saunders and Caramento 2018). In 2015, mining contributed 12 per cent to the GDP, over a quarter of state revenue. Although copper contributes significantly to exports, its revenue has been relatively low due to the generous agreements the government signed with mining companies in the 1990s when it embarked on privatisation (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014)

6.1.2.3. Policies and institutions governing rents

Mining

Historically, mining sector reform in Zambia began with the enactment of the Mines and Minerals Act No.31 of 1995, which made provision for the private ownership of mining rights. The 1995 Act gave the Minister of Mines and Minerals Development discretionary power to decide on the DAs without the contribution of other cabinet members, such as the Minister of Finance and National Planning (Fraser and Larmer 2010). The capacity of the state to efficiently collect taxes was also affected by the limited ability and expertise of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), as they needed a good audit of the complex mining sector (Fraser and Larmer 2010). Following this, the Mines and Minerals Development Act No.7 of 2008 annulled the 1995 Act. It provided regulations for the administration of mining and non-mining rights, thus establishing a framework for the sector that was regulatory robust (The Business Year 2015).

The administration of the mining sector is regulated under the Mines and Minerals Development (General) Regulations, SI 7 of 2016 (Kragelund 2017). To date, the primary law governing the mining sector in Zambia is the Mines and Minerals Development Act No.11 of 2015 of the Laws of Zambia (MMDA), together with the Mines and Minerals Development (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 2016. The MMDA repealed and replaced the Mines and Minerals Development Act No.7 of 2008 and amended Mining Royalties between 2016 and 2019. The 2016 Amendment was also the first to introduce a statutory tool to define the scope of local content (Kragelund 2017).

The institutions that formulate and implement policies in Zambia include the Chamber of Mines, which represents the interests of its members, and the Ministries of

Mines and Minerals Development; Energy; Finance and Planning; Water Development, and the Zambia Development Agency. These institutions are also vital in formulating and implementing the Mines and Minerals Acts. Key institutions that regulate the industry include the Mining Licensing Committee, the Department of Geological Survey, the Mines Development Department, and the Mines Safety Department (Zambia EITI Report 2019).

Macro-level policies that have affected Zambia's copper industry and its links to development include the privatisation Act (1992), which led to the state-owned ZCCM being dissolved and new owners taking over (Rakner 2003). The ZCCM was divided and sold to foreign investors between 1997 and 2002, and the negotiation of contracts culminated in the DAs that stabilised the fiscal and environmental regulations (Fraser and Larmer 2010).

Under the Agreements, which were signed secretly between mining companies and the government, as they did not require approval from parliament, the royalty rate was negotiated at 0.6 per cent of gross revenue, and the corporate tax was set at 25 per cent instead of the stipulated 35 per cent in the Act (Bova 2012). The agreed-upon corporate taxes and royalty rates were among the lowest in the world (Fraser and Larmer 2010). The DAs were eventually published in 2007 and pressured the government to reform legislation in the mining sector (Bova 2012).

In 2007, the government tried to renegotiate the DAs so that royalties could be raised from 0.6 per cent to 25 per cent and corporate tax from 25 per cent to 30 per cent. The renegotiation was also to establish a windfall tax and to transfer fiscal policymaking to the Ministry of Finance (Fraser and Larmer 2010). The mines initially opposed but agreed to negotiate before Mwanawasa announced a unilaterally developed new tax regime in January 2008. The tax regime was passed into law in April 2009. Mwanawasa passed away shortly after the new regime was introduced.

He was replaced by Banda, who brought further changes to government policy and the mining sector's fiscal framework. The Ministry of Finance remained marginalised in tax negotiations in the Banda era as the centralised mode of government continued, and governance of the mining sector became personality-based (Fraser and Larmer 2010).

The financial crisis hit between 2007 and 2009, resulting in a fall in copper prices. The crisis put pressure on President Sata's regime, which later took over in 2011, to implement policies supporting the mining sector and companies. Sata passed on in 2014, and his successor, President Lungu, implemented unfavourable policies for mining companies. Lungu's regime increased taxes for mining companies across the board; it increased mining royalties to 20 per cent by the beginning of 2015, marking a significant shift in policy (The Business Year 2015). At the time, the mining sector employed about 90,000 people, some of whom could have lost their jobs had these taxes remained as companies were already struggling from declining copper prices. The government made a new decision mid-way through the year and reduced royalties to 6 per cent (The Business Year 2015).

Even with the existence of policies and institutions, the mining sector in Zambia has been plagued by poor controls, a weak legal framework, inefficient revenue collection and a lack of transparency and accountability (Caritas 2014). Mineral royalties have always been a source of contention, and even with the establishment of different Acts, their practical implementation has yet to be guaranteed (Sardanis 2014). As tax is a significant source of revenue for the state, there have always been heated discussions with the government and other stakeholders, and the country's Mining Tax Regime has undergone numerous amendments (Kragelund 2017).

Many analysts in Zambia continue to question the DAs and their effect on Zambia's ability to accumulate sufficient revenue from natural resources, especially since the country did not have a mineral savings policy or a stabilisation fund in place as of 2018 (Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018). The Agreements negotiated by the government with each mining company during the privatisation process contain a fiscal stability clause, without which it would have been difficult for companies to invest. Unfortunately, the incentives granted to the mining sector have had an effect where private mining companies, through profit repatriation, appropriated the bulk of mining windfalls (Zambia EITI Report 2019).

Petroleum

Zambia is exploring its petroleum reserves to diversify its metal-dependent economy. The discovery of oil in Uganda and Kenya inspired oil companies to explore the Zambian basins. Historically, two major exploration programmes by Mobil and Placid oil were undertaken in 1986 and 1991. The government has extended prospecting activities to various provinces and issued licences in 2011 and 2016 (Zambia EITI Report 2019).

The Minister of Mines, who has considerable power, can only act with input from the other regulators. The key institutions that regulate the petroleum industry are the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development, the Petroleum Committee, the Petroleum Technical Committee and the Hydrocarbon Unit (Zambia EITI Report 2019). The legal frameworks that govern the industry are the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2008; Petroleum (Exploration and Production) (General) Regulations of 2011; and the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) (National Petroleum Company) Regulations of 2011 (Kragelund 2017). The government generates revenue from oil and gas from exploration companies in the industry through taxation, and the petroleum sector operates as a licencing system rather than a contract regime and production sharing system (Zambia EITI Report 2019).

6.1.3. Trends in development outcomes: ANS and HDI

Most Zambians live in poverty, even though the country is rich in mineral resources. There are also high levels of inequality in the distribution of wealth, unemployment, and maternal and infant mortality rates (Central Intelligence Agency 2020). Therefore, the question of who should benefit from the extraction of mineral resources has remained crucial for the country's development (Van Donge 2000). The dependence on mineral resources also raises sustainability issues as policymaking and development depend on the price of copper in the global market, which is subject to fluctuations (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014).

Savings rates have generally been low for low-income resource-rich countries like Zambia and Mozambique (Venables 2016). Figure 6.1, the case prediction eclipse, shows that Zambia overperforms on ANS and HDI on average than the statistical model predicted between 2014 and 2018. However, Zambia has had low and sometimes negative rates of ANS when analysed from 1990 to about 2010. Zambia's dependence on copper exports and the government's insufficient reinvestment of the revenue from the depletion of natural capital is one of the significant reasons why the country experienced low levels of ANS between 1990 and 2010 (Boos and Holm-Muller 2016).

Patronage was also high at the end of the 1990s and increased in the 2000s, and revenues were being preempted to fund a large budget deficit created by public sector wage hikes. For example, public sector salaries accounted for about 40 per cent of the budget during Chiluba's and Mwanawasa's regimes. Generally, the resource rents were used to pay political supporters so the party could remain in power (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). The revenue was also used as collateral for international sovereign borrowing. Thus, the country accumulated debt; by 2002, Zambians were in a similar economic situation as they were during independence (Adam, Collier and

Gondwe 2014). Successive governments in Zambia did not use copper revenues to invest in productive assets; they used the revenue to finance consumption subsidies (Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018). The low fiscal contributions were accompanied by large-scale environmental and safety incidents, leading to widespread disillusion over the government's ability to capture rents and develop the country (Boos and Holm-Muller 2016).

Zambia is also one of the few countries with lower HDI indicators in 1997 than in 1975 (Rakner 2003). The HDI values were also low until the 2000s, when copper prices increased. The government drastically reduced public expenditure to accommodate IMF reforms between 1991 and 2002 (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016). Sardanis (2014) argued that Chiluba's administration from 1991 until the early 2000s was a wasted decade as social indicators were worse than during Kaunda's time. Social indicators regressed throughout the 1990s as some reforms needed to be implemented or implemented in a hasty way (Rakner 2003). To some, the nationalisation era (1964 – 1990) brought about redistribution for inclusive development and expanded service delivery. The political change of 1991 and the subsequent privatisation are argued to have brought lesser benefits from the extractives industry and have resulted in numerous grievances (Mbilima 2021).

Zambia's economy began to experience sustained economic growth around 2001 due to a rise in copper prices, which also improved the social indicators (Chirwa and Odhiambo 2016). Between 2005 and 2009, expenditures on education rose by 50 per cent as there was a move to seek budget support through external partners and donors. The Zambian government's slow pace of reforms, alleged irregularities, and reduced budget allocation led the cooperating partners to become critical and withhold support (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011).

With the PF taking over, a change in government in 2011 resulted in increased social service spending (Siachiwena 2017). The expenditure is relative in that Zambia's education expenditure as a percentage of GDP was one of the lowest in the world in 2012 (Hakooma 2017). Still, budget allocation towards the education sector has been on the increase. For example, allocation to the sector increased from 17.5 per cent to 20.2 per cent between 2013 and 2014 (Caritas, 2014). A key concern is that much of the funds were invested in infrastructural development, such as building new schools and houses for teachers (Caritas 2014). while investment in education has not kept up with the growth of the population (Sardanis 2014).

The Abuja Declaration of 2001, endorsed by African countries, including Zambia, has, as a norm, that at least 15 per cent of a country's annual budget must be spent on health. Between 2000 and 2010, Zambia's expenditure on healthcare was, on average, 6.4 per cent; between 2010 and 2012, 8.7 per cent, and only 8.9 per cent was allocated to health in 2017 (Hakooma 2017). Despite the relatively high expenditure, the outcomes have not been as impressive as the country compares poorly to other developing countries regarding child health and life expectancy outcomes (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014). The health sector in Zambia also suffers from inadequate medical staff, a high disease burden, unequal distribution of health facilities and weaknesses in the governance of the health systems. Access also remains a challenge, especially in rural areas with the highest mortality rates.

Overall, the HDI value increased from 0.422 in 1980 to 0.591 in 2018, resulting in medium human development status in the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme 1990). However, the country was still in the bottom quartile of the world's human development rankings (143 out of 189 economies) due to low expenditure on health, education and social protection. Moreover, though HDI helps us to assess the country's overall performance, it does not show regional and district disparities in human development in Zambia. For example, Lusaka, North Western Province, and the Copperbelt rank higher, while rural farming areas such as the Western and Muchinga provinces rank the lowest (United Nations Development Programme 2016).

6.1.4. The interplay between political accountability mechanisms and development in Zambia

This section aims to analyse the interaction between Zambia's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes after the inauguration of the Third Republic in 1991. The country has experienced several unfree and unfair elections, massive vote shifts in elections, high fragmentation and the frequent emergence of new parties and independent candidates (Conduto and Sanches 2019). Nevertheless, on average, the country has performed better than the statistical model predicted on both dimensions of development, owing to booms in copper prices that encouraged populist pressure on the government to distribute wealth from copper gains. However, the government has struggled to sustain gains from the booms as the proceeds are spent unproductively (Hinfelaar and Achberger 2017).

6.1.4.1. Vertical political accountability mechanism and development outcomes

Zambia has struggled to consolidate its democracy owing to the concentration of power within the executive and the silencing of political dissent after the independence elections. The later years of the MMD and PF rule brought about an erosion of democracy and human rights. Carbone (2012) argued that democracy as a formal regime type matters less than the existence of adequate checks on the unrestrained power of the executive. In Zambia, executive power is centralised in the presidency, and there is limited parliamentary oversight, with cabinets filled with party loyalists (Van de Walle 2001). The strong presidential system promotes an interventionist political culture. For example, government intervention in business is said to be rife, to the extent that major firms were expected to visit the president to discuss their investment plans (Fraser and Larmer 2010).

The locus of power and control since the 1991 multiparty elections is not new. Policymaking under Kaunda was highly centralised, and the Chiluba government had some continuities from the previous regime (Van Donge 2000; Fraser and Larmer 2010). Despite the constitutional reforms of 2016, which included changes to the rules for electing the president, the reforms have not reduced the excessiveness of presidential powers (Banda et al. 2020).

Zambia has also held several elections, some of which were considered unfree and unfair. The elections have been competitive since 2001, and changes in government have influenced welfare policy reforms (Banda et al. 2020). The electoral competition encouraged increased pro-poor spending in the context of debt relief and a copper boom. The competition between the MMD and the PF in the lead-up to the 2006 elections also significantly affected the MMD and government policy (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). For instance, the MMD adopted the PF's proposals of introducing a windfall tax on copper and mineral royalty tax to increase investment in social services after mounting criticism (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). However, the windfall tax was removed even though it accounted for a large share of the high growth at the time (Fraser and Larmer 2010).

The election of the PF in 2011 was a signal from voters that the previous MMD government had not met its expectations. However, Sata's government embarked on unsustainable spending due to pressure to satisfy the demands of citizens (Siachiwena 2021). In an interview, Robert Liebenthal, a development economist in Zambia, said, 'there is a track record in terms of democracy, but the flip side is that the short-term preoccupation is overwhelming. And, when I say short term, it is literally the day after tomorrow' (Liebenthal 2015).

The PF also directed resources to support clientelistic programmes that targeted the ruling parties' support base in the 2016 elections. Lungu's reversion to more clientelistic politics demonstrated the influence of electoral competition on policy choices and outcomes (Siachiwena 2017). However, excessive borrowing and lack of fiscal discipline slumped economic growth. The PF government drafted an economic recovery programme to restore macroeconomic stability and seek a bailout from the IMF by 2016. Nearly ten years after PF was elected, Zambia had an unsustainable debt burden even though it had managed to clear its debt in the mid-2000s (Siachiwena 2021).

Zambia's fluid party system has affected the stability of the political system and consensus over government policy priorities (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). Fred M'membe, a renowned Zambian journalist, who founded the country's first independent newspaper (Zambia Post), commented that the Zambian political players have been in almost all the parties that have governed (M'membe 2015). A Zambian academic supported this sentiment by stating that there are very few constant parties, and what exists is a ruling group. Furthermore, policies seem tied to the president, and what comes out in terms of the policy is what the president believes in (Zambian Academic 2015). Some argue that the fluidity of Zambia's party system partly results from the constitutional stipulation that a by-election must be held within 90 days following the death of a president instead of an automatic internal succession within the ruling party. The by-election often leads to a period of factionalism within ruling parties and the formation of new coalitions (Banda et al. 2020).

The continuous interaction of parties influences election campaigns and shapes government policy, meaning regular party competition can result in a more responsive government (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009). Party institutionalisation in Zambia is affected by the common defections among individuals and party structures, especially in the pre-election periods (Tobolka 2013). The opposition is often fragmented, and parties are unlikely to engage in opposition consistently for the five-year electoral cycle. On the other hand, MPs usually act as brokers between their constituencies and the executive coffers (Tobolka 2013)

Nonetheless, unstable party competition is still better than no competition. Although the MMD dominated election results from 1992, it was challenged in 2001, and some of the pressure resulted in tax reforms which allowed the government to capture more revenue for social spending. We should also recognise that even with the fragmentation, several cabinet ministers have risked their positions by opposing their president (Momba and Madimutsa 2009). Furthermore, no party in Zambia can win a majority without lobbying broader constituencies, so democracy strengthens and development becomes more inclusive (Sanches 2018)

6.1.4.2. Horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms and development outcomes

Effective checks on the power of the executive are critical for sustainable development, especially an effective legislature, judiciary, and the acceptance of other democratic institutions (Carbonnier and Wagner 2011). A weakness of other accountability mechanisms, such as the judiciary and parliament, accompanied the transition of the 1990s. The judiciary has been fragile, and its independence has been threatened. For example, in 1997, the government had a proposal in parliament to amend the constitution to allow for removing Supreme Court Judges who are charged with ‘gross misconduct’. It only dropped the proposal after senior judicial personnel threatened to resign en masse. Nonetheless, a justice of the Lusaka high court, Kabaso Chanda, was suspended for professional misconduct in 1997 in a move that was seen to intimidate outspoken members of the judiciary who opposed the government’s poor human rights record. Chanda had overruled efforts to get two prominent journalists arrested (Mphaisha 2000).

Various groups and organisations, such as churches, trade unions, law and economic associations, and students, opposed the one-party regime in Zambia (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Since colonial times, Zambia’s civil society has been dominated by the trade union movement, which comprised most of the workforce, such as the mineworkers of the Copperbelt. The trade union leadership, including former president Chiluba, was influential in starting the conversation about multiparty democracy, which resulted in the demise of the one-party regime and the democratic transition in 1991 (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003).

Zambia’s civil society had not maintained the same degree of mobilisation that it had before the country transitioned to democracy. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Zambia also faced financial constraints and a reliance on external donors (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Still, CSOs have played a critical role in Zambia’s political life. For example, organisations like churches and the Zambian Law Society successfully opposed Chiluba’s attempt to secure a third term in office in 2001 (Banda et al. 2020). Civil society has also led the campaign for constitutional and electoral reforms since 2003, and Mwanawasa appointed a Constitution Review Commission (CRC) in response to the calls for reform. Part of the recommendations of this work, completed in 2005, included that a presidential candidate should secure a minimum of 50 per cent + 1 of the total vote and have ministers appointed from outside of parliament. Mwanawasa backtracked on this and pleaded for more time as the 2006 elections drew closer (Sishuwa 2020).

The mining tax regime, made up of royalties and corporate tax, has been a highly contested terrain in Zambian politics and has led to polarised debates (Fjeldstad, Fundanga and Rakner 2016). Zambians and CSOs have accused foreign mining companies of depriving them of their wealth and that the government has distributed it unfairly (Fjeldstad, Fundanga and Rakner 2016). When the PF was in opposition, the party focused part of its campaign on reducing personal taxes and increasing mining taxes to respond to this pressure (Adam et al., 2014). The response to civil society groups shows that political campaigns in Zambia can take many forms beyond ethnicity and include forming coalitions with civil society on critical subjects that inform development, such as constitutional reforms and tax regimes (Sishuwa 2020).

Unfortunately, open debate and the efficient functioning of democratic and judicial control have not been strong (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). Civil society and media have increasingly become partisan and weakened (Banda et al., 2020). For instance, CSOs came under the same pressure as opposition parties when obtaining police permits to hold public meetings through the provisions of the Public Order Act. Anti-media legislation was also inherited from the one-party era by the MMD (Mphaisha 2000). At various points, Chiluba warned the media regarding reports unfavourable to the government and threatened to 'move in silently' on the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). Thus, there was no media freedom as the MMD had a significant grip on state-owned and state-controlled media (Momba and Madimutsa 2009).

The country has also been unfortunate in that the erratic movement of copper prices has made it difficult for the government to plan and time mining policies accordingly. The prices boomed after the mines were privatised in the 1990s, yielding profits for private firms to the dismay of the state (Bebbington et al. 2018). Furthermore, the controversial DAs have conditions that have prevented the government from adequately benefiting from the price or profit windfall (Fraser and Larmer 2010). Thus, the country must prioritise diversifying the economy; as former vice president Guy Scott noted in an interview, 'you cannot run everything on a few tons of copper; you need a bit more resources than that' (Scott 2015).

6.1.5. Conclusion

This chapter's main goal was to understand how Zambia's democratic regime, electoral turnovers and party institutionalisation have impacted resource governance and sustainable development from the beginning of the Third Republic until 2018. The explanatory model developed here has explored the challenges of democratic consolidation, electoral competition, and an unstable party system riddled with splits and factionalism. The analysis also highlighted the challenges of excessive presidentialism and weak checks and balances. Zambia has been more likely to have populist policies that focus on high spending rather than policies that would help to channel resource revenues into sustainable assets due to the competitive nature of politics (Adam, Collier and Gondwe 2014).

Policy implementation depends on the nature of domestic institutions and politics (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). The party system in Zambia is too fluid to preserve a democratic and inclusive political culture to channel social demands and to develop the economy beyond copper dependence (Sanches 2018; Boos and Holm-Muller 2016).

The competitive elections reveal ways in which the rules of the game are in constant flux, as incumbent parties tend to use state resources to bolster power by expanding their clientelistic networks. Elections also rely on wealthy individuals who have links to specific regional or ethnic groupings. Thus, the political conflicts have not been about the content of the policies but about access to resources. Such a political culture has been hard to change and remains a major stumbling block to development (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000).

Nonetheless, the constitution, frequent elections, and other democratic institutions charged with the representation of the people have encouraged parties to adjust to popular demands and promote greater inclusiveness while also encouraging unsustainable spending of resource revenues to satisfy citizen demands and to remain in power. No one group can capture a majority, and parties have to draw from a range of strategies to garner political support, such as populism, ideologies, and clientelism. Over the years, constitutional and electoral support has been debated fiercely, and various commissions formed for electoral reforms have engaged the population and civil society (Sanches 2018).

Overall, the chapter contributed to understanding the functioning of democratic (and competitive authoritarian) regimes in contexts of weak parties and fluid party systems which characterise other countries on the continent, such as Malawi and Kenya. The Zambian case makes us contend with questions around the degree, scope and nature of competition, party system institutionalisation and their effect on development outcomes. Further research should explore the paradoxical relationship of democratic progress in the context of unstable party systems and their impact on development in resource-rich countries.

7. Political Accountability and Development in Namibia (1990 - 2018)

This chapter investigates how Namibia's democracy, a lack of electoral turnovers and a relatively high degree of party institutionalisation have impacted resource governance and development. I also consider the impact of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms, such as the media, parliament and civic organisations. Investigating the effects of these accountability mechanisms in a dominant party context is essential because dominant parties tend to be exclusionary, opposition parties tend to be weak, and institutional checks and balances typically become dysfunctional, all of which adversely affect development (Bauer 2001; Kaapama et al. 2007; Melber 2015; I. Cooper 2016). Legislative dominance is also associated with the misuse of state resources, suppression of minority rights, and authoritarian tendencies (Lindberg 2007).

Namibia is a resource-rich democracy, with resource rents per capita as a share of GDP greater than 0.025. It is also considered a dominant party democracy since it has had no electoral turnovers since 1990. The perception of the degree of party institutionalisation is 0.82 when averaged between 1990 and 2018. It is relatively high compared to Ghana's 0.61, Zambia's 0.37, and the region's average of 0.48.

The dominance in government by a single party is an important factor shaping development outcomes in Namibia (Van Cranenburgh 2006; Blaauw 2009). The South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) has ruled and dominated elections in Namibia since its independence in 1990. Former liberation movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, have struggled to maintain electoral hegemony. SWAPO had managed to maintain its dominance in recent years, such as when it received 80 per cent of the vote share in 2014 (Melber 2015). The high share of votes could mean different things. First, it could mean that the party has an incumbency advantage and monopolises and uses state resources. Second, the impressive victories could mean liberation credentials are still crucial in Namibia's politics. Third, the voter turnout could suggest that the people of Namibia approve of and support SWAPO's policies and programmes for development (M. M. Khan 2009).

Despite the numerous reasons for SWAPO's electoral victories, the party's dominance is threatened by economic underperformance, high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). SWAPO has been battling to transform an ethnically diverse society, solve extreme economic inequalities and build a diverse economy (Fosse 1997). The long-term outlook to channel resource revenues into sustainable assets is, at times, threatened by concerns of corruption and a lack of accountability. There is also polarisation on sensitive issues such as land redistribution within and outside the party. The party's youth league has been challenging the government's policies on land since 2014 through legal and illegal means (Pinto 2019). Such structural constraints can undermine prospects for multiparty politics, where voters could choose to exit from electoral politics due to unmet expectations (Bauer 2001).

Namibia's development record underperformed on indicators of inclusiveness and sustainability, according to cross-national estimates. The 'bullseye' in Figure 7.1 centres on the country's statistically 'expected' levels of inclusiveness (as measured by health and education) and sustainability (as measured by adjusted net savings). The solid and dotted circles are 80 per cent and 95 per cent confidence intervals. The dot marks Namibia's actual performance on the two indicators. The dot is located in the lower left quadrant near the solid circle, showing that the country slightly underperformed statistical expectations on HDI by about 3 per cent and ANS by about 8 per cent of GDP.

Namibia's development outcomes are within the 80 per cent ellipse and thus reasonably close to the predictions. Though Namibia is slightly underperforming relative to the predictions from the regressions, the country's actual HDI value (0.61) is still slightly better than Zambia's 0.59 and on par with Ghana's value of 0.61. However, Namibia and Ghana have negative ANS values of -3 and -9, respectively, while Zambia has a positive value of 0.15. The two nations with negative values are depleting their capital stock, threatening the future well-being of their societies (World Bank 2011).

This chapter explores potential explanations for why Namibia has modestly underperformed expectations on HDI and ANS despite the high degree of party institutionalisation and a dominant party system. Particularly why was there a decline in health and education from around 1994 to 2010 and why did ANS begin to drop sharply from about 2015, together with a decline in the degree of party institutionalisation, even though it remained high compared to other countries? In general, how have Namibia's political accountability mechanisms impacted development outcomes since 1990?

The high degree of institutionalisation has allowed SWAPO to plan and execute

Figure 7.1.: Namibia case prediction ellipse



broad-based development. However, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) epidemic, which became the largest cause of death by 1996, massively affected life expectancy and largely explained the drop in HDI from 1994 until the 2000s. It also coincided with a drop in non-rent GDP per capita in the late 1990s, which later accelerated after 2001. On the other hand, SWAPO's electoral dominance has limited the space for the opposition to compete and for the government to be held accountable for diverting resource revenues to politically-connected elites through the allocation of mining licences, thus affecting sustainability. Meanwhile, Namibia's party institutionalisation trend has remained stable since 1990 but began to decline since the conflict during the 2009 elections campaign, which challenged peace and stability and promoted a climate of repression.

The evidence provided will include time-series graphs to represent political and economic trends between 1990 and 2018, literature on the political economy of the country and the use of primary sources, such as official documents and personal semi-structured interviews with government officials, representatives of interest groups, and political parties.

The exploration proceeds in two parts. The first part focuses on unpacking time trends in the key political and economic variables from the cross-national analysis. This part clarifies dynamics over the full period from 1990 through 2018. The second part explores more fine-grained evidence on how political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation, in turn influencing development outcomes.

7.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms, resource rents and development outcomes

Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa, is located along the Southern Africa Atlantic coast and borders Angola, Zambia, Botswana and South Africa. It is one of the driest countries in sub-Saharan Africa and is sparsely populated, with a population of over 2.4 million (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019, 14). Most people are located in the major cities of Windhoek, Swakopmund and Walvis Bay. Windhoek is the largest city and also serves as the capital (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

Namibia was colonised when the British annexed the harbour of Walvis Bay in 1878 and by the Germans between 1884 and 1915, who subjected the Herero and Nama to genocide (between 1904 and 1907) (A. D. Cooper 2007) and dispossessed indigenous people of their land in the central and Southern parts of the country and called these areas the Police Zone (Forrest 1994; Bauer 2001; M. M. Khan 2009). The dispossession of property and the creation of a coercive labour system restructured political and social relations. The colonial period was violent, as the colonists gained control of land, minerals, and other resources through purchase, theft, and military power (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004; Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005). At independence, Namibia chose to pursue a mixed economy model of development, which brought in resources and international investments, especially in the fishing and mining industries (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009).

Figure 7.2 represents changes in electoral competition, party institutionalisation, non-rents GDP, resource rents, and development (HDI and ANS) from 1990 to 2018. I use the time trend to provide a structure to the descriptive background and unpack the dynamics and trends in Namibia over the 28 years.

7.1.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms

7.1.1.1. Political regime

Colonialism persisted longer in countries like Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa compared to countries like Ghana and Zambia, which had experienced the change from the 1960s. Colonialism in Namibia ended after Germany was defeated in World War I. In 1920, the League of Nations granted the Union of South Africa, a Britain dominion at the time, an administrative and legislative mandate. It required the country to promote the Namibian people's material, moral well-being and social progress (Forrest, 1994). South Africa instead annexed Namibia (Forrest 1994; Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004).

The South African government continued the German forced labour system, exploited mineral resources, and instituted racial discrimination policies of apartheid (M. M. Khan 2009; Zaaruka and Fedderke 2011). Resistance to South Africa's domination began in the 1950s, and SWAPO initiated an armed struggle in 1966 to oust the South African government (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005). Namibia eventu-

Figure 7.2.: Namibia time trend graph: 1990 - 2018



ally gained independence on 21 March 1990 and adopted a democratic system of governance (M. M. Khan 2009).

Namibia's decolonisation process had a significant international component (Melber 2003b). The country obtained decolonisation through a transition supervised by the United Nations (UN) and guided by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 (Kaapama et al. 2007). The negotiated settlement resulted in the 1988 international accord, which established the guidelines for Namibia's political leaders to determine the nature of the constitution and other democratic institutions (Bauer 2001).

Namibia's constitution was adopted in 1989 and was hailed as one of the most democratic in the world and a model for other developing democracies (Fosse, 1997; Bauer, 2001). The constitution established a unitary democratic republic and a government where the president exercises executive power to appoint a Cabinet from the National Assembly, leading to an overlap between members of the executive and the legislature (Forrest 1994). Thus, the National Assembly cannot effectively oversee and hold the government to account (Van Cranenburgh 2006).

Namibia's democratic regime has not been without challenges, and the rigid constitution has not prevented constitutional amendment. The requirement of a two-thirds majority is ineffective since SWAPO dominated seats, until 2019, by more than two-thirds (Van Cranenburgh 2006). In May 1997, SWAPO amended the constitution to allow the extension of the presidential term office from two to three terms. The party argued that Namibian people must be allowed to vote for the then-sitting president and founding member of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma. Nujoma's first election was through the Constituent Assembly in 1989 rather than a popular vote (Bauer 2001). The third term was approved and increased the concentration of power within the presidency, and SWAPO achieved what Zambia's MMD could not achieve in 2001.

Namibia has a unitary framework for the organisation of the state and a hybrid of both presidential and parliamentary systems of government. The presidential and regional council elections are decided by a majority of votes (plurality), while the national assembly seats are allocated through a Proportional Representation (PR) system (Kaapama et al. 2007). The PR system has been criticised for setting a pattern of non-accountability from elected representatives. Regional council members are said to be theoretically accountable since they are elected from constituencies in their regions directly by the plurality system.

The bicameral system has not been effective because of SWAPO's dominance of Regional Councils. Only a few leaders dominate decision-making, meaning that the Regional Councils may not be more representative (Kaapama et al. 2007). The quality of exchanges between the National Council (elected from Regional Councils) and the National Assembly is low and does not involve substantive policy issues. Members of the Council have complained that they do not have access to reports and documents tabled at the Assembly (Van Cranenburgh 2006).

Development Committees were established at the local, constituency, and regional levels to strengthen citizen participation at the sub-national level. The committees play a role in initiating and monitoring the implementation of policies, laws, plans and development projects at the local level. The committees are not constitutional bodies and have no legal recognition. Therefore, they exist on the government's will and cannot provide adequate checks and balances in a dominant-party context like Namibia (M. M. Khan 2009).

The dominant party system has affected various political institutions and strengthened executive dominance. The PR system, which allows for the representation of smaller parties, has not lessened the dominance of SWAPO (Van Cranenburgh 2006). Moreover, the features established to broaden the basis of social consensus, such as a rigid constitution and bicameralism, have not necessarily expanded democracy (Dibben, Klerck and Wood 2015).

7.1.1.2. Electoral competitiveness

The first universal franchise elections in Namibia were held a decade before independence in December 1978 as South Africa's strategy to prop up the legitimacy of its rule (Forrest 1994). Most Namibians boycotted these elections, and they were, therefore, contested between two white-led parties: The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and the National Party (NP). The next parliamentary elections were held in 1989 for the Constituent Assembly of Namibia, which became the National Assembly upon independence in March 1990 (Bauer 2001).

When the first elections were held in 1989, 97 per cent of registered voters voted. However, only 10 out of the more than 40 active parties before independence participated in the elections, and only seven parties gained seats in parliament. SWAPO won 57 per cent of the vote and 41 of the 72 seats in the Constituent Assembly. The official opposition, the DTA, won 28.6 per cent and 21 seats in parliament (Forrest 1994). Namibia's president was selected by parliament, and in subsequent elections, the president was elected by direct popular vote separate from parliamentary elections; hence the justification by SWAPO to provide the president with a third term (Forrest 1994).

Since independence, Namibia has held elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. SWAPO has won all elections and enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly since 1994 (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Melber 2015). Hage Geingob is serving his second term after being elected in 2014 and 2019. He is the third president after Hifikepunye Pohamba (2004, 2009) and Sam Nujoma (1989, 1994, and 1999). The party's electoral support has increased from an absolute majority to above 70 per cent. The 2014 elections were the peak as the party won 77 out of 96 voting seats, culminating in 80 per cent of the vote share (Melber 2015). The two-thirds majority was ultimately broken in the 2019 elections when the party won 63 seats (Likela 2019).

Opposition parties have failed to challenge the political dominance of SWAPO, and the party continues to be expected to win elections (Melber 2003b). For instance, the DTA, a confederation of ethnic factions created by the apartheid regime, came second in the 1994 National Assembly with just 21 per cent of the votes. Other parties, including the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN), received less than 10 per cent of the votes combined (Hunter 2005).

A possible electoral threat to the party emerged when the Congress of Democrats (CoD) was formed in 1999 by disaffected SWAPO leaders. The leading figure of the party, Ben Ulenga, had resigned as Namibian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (UK) in protest of SWAPO's presidential term extension, the lack of leadership on issues such as land reform and the country's involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war in 1998 (Bauer 2001; Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). President Nujoma and the SWAPO leadership accused Ulenga and CoD of being rebellious against the ruling party and whose defection was driven by personal ambition (Van Cranenburgh 2006).

CoD took sufficient votes from other opposition parties, especially the DTA, by winning seven seats in the national assembly, with 9.9 per cent of the vote in the 1999 elections, which was only second to SWAPO. The party increased its support and became the official opposition after the 2004 elections, but without penetrating SWAPO's support base (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Infighting amongst two leadership factions in 2007 undermined the party. It lost its spot as the official opposition in the 2009 and 2014 elections to the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP) and DTA, respectively (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009).

SWAPO's strong electoral support is attributed to the party's history as a nationalist organisation in the struggle for independence, access to state resources, strong support from the majority Ovambo ethnic group, and a lack of financial resources and ideological differences among other parties (Hunter 2005; I. Cooper 2014; Melber 2015).

SWAPO's history as the only organisation to have waged an armed liberation struggle creates a legitimacy that other political parties cannot match. The country comes from a traumatic history, and many people have immense respect and deference for SWAPO and former President Sam Nujoma who is regarded as the 'Father of the Nation' (Hunter 2005). Incumbent advantage is also used extensively to reinforce this narrative. For example, President Nujoma travelled to party rallies using an army helicopter in 1999, while in 2009, chiefs, recognised by the government, received an all-terrain vehicle and an unlimited supply of free petrol, factors that opposition party leaders cannot control (Melber 2015). Moreover, SWAPO's dominance is reinforced by the weakness, risk aversion, and limited ambition of opposition parties who use their scarce financial resources to pursue expensive and unsuccessful litigation against institutions instead of the challenging task of mobilising grassroots support for elections (I. Cooper 2014).

Opposition parties mobilise support along personality, ethnic and racial identity lines instead of ideological or policy issues (I. Cooper 2014; Melber 2015). Namibia has nine ethnic groups, the single largest being the Ovambo, at 49.8 per cent, with all others being less than 10 per cent, individually (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019, 17). SWAPO has many votes from the Ovambo group but also draws support from other ethnic groups (Hunter 2005). Some opposition parties have strong ethnic support bases with specific concerns such as cultural rights, decentralisation, land reform, and income inequalities. There is a shadow of ethnicity even though it is not necessarily politicised or politically salient (Du Pisani 2015).

In the absence of a viable threat to SWAPOs dominance, political contestation takes the form of intra-party competition. The internal party competition is often riddled with power struggles, factionalism, and rivalry over the control of the party machinery (Melber 2014). Furthermore, SWAPO suffers from the legacy of the liberation struggle, including secretiveness and reproduced authoritarian and hierarchical features of the previous colonial oppressive regime (Van Cranenburgh 2006). There is intolerance of diversity as the liberation movement enforced conformity by suppressing differences among its members in the name of unity (Melber 2015). Thus, the intra-party democracy stock is deficient (Melber 2014).

7.1.1.3. Party institutionalisation

The degree of party institutionalisation is crucial to successfully consolidating democracy (Bauer 2001). Vertical accountability requires the persistence of political parties, as voters cannot retrospectively evaluate parties if the political scene is constantly in flux (Lindberg 2007). Countries with legitimate liberation parties, such as Botswana and Namibia, have high party system institutionalisation as citizens continue to support the ruling parties at elections. The parties have early founding dates and long-standing constituencies, elections are usually free and fair, and party competition is stable (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001).

Namibia went through a century of colonialism and a prolonged armed struggle, with political organisations emerging in the 1950s to resist South Africa's domination. These organisations included the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), formed in 1959 (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009), and the Ovambo People's Congress

(OPC), which was regarded as the country's first modern nationalist movement. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) and the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) also emerged between 1962 and 1964 (Hunter 2005).

SWAPO was established out of clandestine groups formed by black nationalist politicians in the 1960s. The Popular Democratic Movement (PDM), formerly known as the DTA, was the main opposition party after independence and was sponsored by the South African government in the 1970s (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005). Several other parties, coalitions and alliances were also formed in 1989 ahead of the independence elections as part of transitional government politics, but most disintegrated after the elections (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005; Hunter 2005).

Namibia's political parties are relatively stable, while SWAPO has a lasting connection with voters. The number of parties competing and winning seats is few, seat volatility is relatively low, and several parties, such as the DTA, have consistently contested legislative elections since independence (Lindberg 2007). Nevertheless, institutionalised party systems tend to further democratic one-party dominant systems at the expense of competition and accountability. Thus, there is a trade-off between the high level of party institutionalisation and democratic competition (Lindberg 2007).

Defections are also common in Namibia's party system. For example, NUDO left the DTA in 2003, while the All People's Party, founded in 2008, split from CoD which emerged ahead of the 1999 elections (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). CoD collapsed over internal differences, power struggles and fights over resources. Former SWAPO leaders and cabinet ministers (Hidipo Hamutenya and Jesaya Nyamu) also broke away from the ruling party to form the RDP in 2007 after an unsuccessful bid to succeed Sam Nujoma as president. The party became the official opposition after the 2009 elections (Melber 2010).

Namibia's party institutionalisation trend has remained stable since 1990 but began to decline (but was still relatively high) due to conflict during campaigns for the 2009 elections, which challenged the peace and stability of the country in unprecedented ways. The tension had been brewing since the arrival of RDP in the political scene in 2007 (Melber 2010). The RDP was considered a serious challenge due to its affinity to SWAPO's regional stronghold. The party was denounced as having traitors and agents of imperialism pursuing regime change. Therefore, there was a climate of repression at the national and grassroots levels. For the first time since independence, an election campaign turned into violence, hate speech and intolerance (Melber 2010).

Several historical, structural and economic features continue to account for the opposition's weakness. To a large extent, the weakness of the opposition parties results from Namibia's independence struggle, which resulted in SWAPO being the sole representative of the Namibian people at the UN. The party also gained the official support of regional organisations and front-line states of Southern Africa. The external and material validation significantly increased the authenticity and legitimacy of the SWAPO domestically and internationally (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009).

Parties are complex and multifaceted and do not invest equal time and resources in election campaigns. Opposition parties in Namibia are driven by a desire to secure parliamentary seats, and presidential elections are regarded as a waste of time and resources (Cooper, 2014). Parliamentary representation offers attractive remuneration for opposition politicians.

Party funding is also an issue for smaller parties in a country with poverty and extreme inequality (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). The opposition parties have not attracted much private funding and continue relying on state funding calculated based on parliamentary representation. Since opposition parties tend to mobilise voters around ethnic lines, there is a proliferation of mono-ethnic parties and ethnic-nationalist sentiment (I. Cooper 2014).

7.1.2. Trends in economic performance: non-rent GDP and resource rents

7.1.2.1. Non-rent GDP

Namibia's per capita growth has been amongst the highest in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005; Kaapama et al. 2007; Melber 2018). The country experienced an international flood of goodwill at independence, bringing about good economic performance. Key economic sectors include mining, tourism, fishing, and agriculture, with the majority employed in the services (54 per cent) and agriculture (34 per cent) sectors (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). The government plays a leading role in economic activity through various parastatals that range from communication, water, and power supply due to physical and infrastructural imbalances before independence (Kaapama et al. 2007).

Namibia's economic development challenges include high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality due to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid (African Development Bank 2014; Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019). Poverty tends to be higher in rural areas among female-headed households, old-age pensioners, and subsistence farmers. Unemployment is also higher among the youth, women, and rural areas (Almeida Santos 2018).

Land reform remains highly contested, especially in the northern communal areas where subsistence households have limited access to land and income (Hunter 2005; Kaapama et al. 2007). When the country gained independence, the constitutional guarantees to existing property owners received little attention (Melber 2003b). One interviewee remarked that Namibia has a white community that does not care who is in power, as their assets are protected in the constitution (Anonymous 2015). A minority of mostly white farmers owned the majority of commercial land, and there have been different claims on the land by different ethnic groups (Hunter 2005). Due to the high level of unemployment and landlessness, national debates on how best the land should be allocated continue to be heated (Hunter 2005). Land-related protests and illegal occupations have also increased recently (Pinto 2019).

Over the years, redistributive policies and development plans have been introduced to reduce poverty and inequality. Since 1995, Namibian economic policies have been based on medium-term frameworks, which run for about five years, such as the first National Development Plan (NDP1) for 1995/96 to 1999/2000. The initial plan aimed to achieve a 5 per cent average growth rate, reducing unemployment, poverty and income distribution inequality (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002, 234). 1995 to 2001 had modest growth rates, sustained by export-oriented sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and mining. The government was also struggling to reach fiscal balance due to the burden of civil service expenditure, such as when it provided public sector jobs to 9000 ex-combatants in 1999. The drop in non-rent GDP per capita also coincided with the HIV epidemic, which became the largest cause of death and claimed 1 per cent of the population in 1999. The economic and social effects were significant and direct expenditure on HIV/AIDS accounted for 20 per cent of the health budget (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002, 239).

Namibia embarked on rapid growth acceleration between 2000–2015, primarily driven by an investment boom in the mining industry. There was also a rapid expansion of public expenditure from 2008, which fuelled growth and reduced poverty by 50 per cent (Hausmann et al. 2022, 13). Growth began to wane as investment and exports declined, and the unemployment rate increased from 27.9 0 to 34 per cent from 2014 to 2016 (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019, 11).

GDP, which had increased at a 4.8 per cent average rate from 2000 to 2015, declined at a compounded average rate of 0.2 per cent between 2015 and 2019. GDP per capita also declined from an average of 3.1 per cent to 2.1 per cent (Hausmann et al. 2022, 13). GDP per capita masks the unequal distribution of wealth within the country (Bauer 2001). The country has a skewed distribution of income represented by a high Gini-coefficient of over 0.6, making Namibia a highly unequal society (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019, 8). Concentrating economic and political power in the hands of a few elites has produced these inequalities and perpetuated poverty (Melber 2014, 148).

The latest NDP 5 came into effect for the period 2017/2018–2021/2022 and aimed to promote sustainable, inclusive and equitable growth (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). Previously, there had been no long-term national plan within which the short and medium-development goals were to be based. Vision 2030 was launched by President Sam Nujoma in 2004 and provides a long-term scenario for the future course of development in Namibia. It is meant to create synergies that link long-term goals to short-term planning. The first national goal outcomes focus on education, health, social protection and a transformational culture (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004).

Though the country has many pragmatic documents, such as Vision 2030 and NDP 5, they lack implementation and feasibility (Melber 2018). Development is undermined by the low levels of economic diversification and continued reliance on mining. The country's vast size and thinly spread population also present challenges for infrastructure provision such as roads, electricity and water (Bauer 2001; African Development Bank 2014). The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, food insecurity and weak governance capacity also affect long-term development (Hunter 2005; Kaapama et al. 2007).

7.1.2.2. Resource rents

The extractives industry remains critical for the Namibian economy and is integrated into all pillars of NDP5, as it plays a vital role in the plan's implementation (Humavindu and Stage 2013). Namibia's mining industry developed relatively early with the discovery of diamonds extracted onshore. Other metals such as zinc, copper, and lead were exploited after World War II, and uranium mining began in the early 1970s and gold in the 1980s (Lange 2003a). The country also produces lithium, cadmium and salt (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005). In 2011, the Cabinet announced a plan to declare uranium, gold, coal, diamonds and rare earth metals as 'strategic minerals'. Mining licences for these minerals would be reserved for the state-owned mining company, Epangelo, which would then negotiate joint ventures with private companies (Hopwood 2013).

Diamonds and uranium represent the most significant commodities, and Namibia is the fifth biggest uranium producer and among the top ten diamond producers (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019, 14). Several global players have invested in mineral resource exploration and exploitation. For example, diamonds are produced through Namdeb, a 50/50 joint venture between the government and the De Beers company (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). The majority of diamonds, about 60 per cent of total diamond production, are now offshore. As a result, looting is sporadic since diamonds are found in hard-to-access areas that are easier to defend and require significant capital investment for the expensive extraction process (Munier 2016b, 22). Big companies are also involved in the exploration of uranium, which has a long history of concerns about its environmental and health impacts (Melber 2014).

There are two active uranium mines, Rössing and Husab, and the Chinese-owned Husab mine is the world's second-largest (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

The government generates revenue from the mining sector through different mechanisms such as taxes, royalties, levies, equity and fees. Unlike in Zambia, the rates applied for taxes and royalties are primarily perceived as fair among the private sector and competitive with other Southern African Development Community (SADC) jurisdictions (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). "Diamond mining companies are taxed at an effective rate of 55 per cent, while other mining companies are taxed at a flat rate of 37.5 per cent. Oil and gas extraction companies are taxed at a flat rate of 35 per cent and are also subject to additional profits tax" (Odhiambo and Ziramba 2014, 4).

In the early years, mining was the single largest component of the Namibian economy, accounting for nearly 40 per cent of GDP and 50 per cent of exports in 1980 (Lange 2003b, 5). In the first decade of independence, Namibia recovered an average of 42 per cent of diamond rents. The amount is reasonable but lower than Botswana's 76 per cent, as Botswana has an explicit policy for the government to reinvest mineral revenues in public infrastructure, human capital and foreign financial assets (Lange 2003b, 3). By the 1990s, the country's mining industry appeared depleted. The main copper mines closed in 1998, most on-shore diamond reserves had been exhausted, and mining moved to predominantly off-shore reserves (Lange 2003b, 5). The Namibian government launched the Welwitschia Fund in 2022 to protect the country from economic shocks and save for future generations (Nhongo 2022).

Though the mining sector's relative importance has declined over the years, it still contributes significantly to the country's economy (Minerals Policy, n.d.). For example, the sector contributed about 15 per cent to the GDP and more than 50 per cent of total export revenue in 2010 (Melber 2014, 124). In 2012, the sector contributed over 11 per cent to GDP, with mineral exports accounting for over 55 per cent of all foreign exchange earnings (Hopwood 2013, 13). Mining accounted for over 12 per cent of the GDP in 2017 and provided more than 50 per cent of foreign exchange earnings (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). Thus, the sector's contribution to GDP is essential, owing to the significant investments in new mining operations (Almeida Santos 2018).

Even though the mining sector contributes a reasonable amount to GDP, it has had a limited impact on employment creation due to its capital-intensive nature and weak linkages to the rest of the economy (African Development Bank 2014). Namibia also faces challenges in value addition because of a shortage in local capital, scarce fresh water supply, technical skills, and long distances between the mineral deposits (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). The commissioner of the Inland Revenue Department at the Ministry of Finance noted that value addition had been a challenge as the Ministry of Mines is not well capacitated and laws are not adequately enforced (Mwafongwe 2015).

In December 2009, the government inaugurated the Epangelo Mining company, the first state-owned mining company, as the main instrument by which the state would play an active role in the mining sector (Melber 2014). Epangelo was designed to be a catalyst and partner in discovering resources and ensuring raw materials' beneficiation. Despite these stated intentions, the management of resources has remained opaque and highly secretive (Melber 2014).

7.1.2.3. Policies and institutions governing rents

Mining

The extractives industry in Namibia is mainly governed by different laws enacted in the years after independence. The Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act, No. 33 of 1992, is the mining sector's central legislation. It outlines the mineral rights in the country, sets out how the sector should be administered and the processes, procedures, rights, and obligations related to mining claims and licences (Ministry of Mines and Energy 2020; Hopwood 2013, 16) . The Minerals Development Fund Act 19 of 1996 establishes the Minerals Development Fund to safeguard production and earning power (The Republic of Namibia 2006).

The Minerals Policy of Namibia was adopted in 1992 to set a vision for the responsible development of Namibia's mining sector and to ensure a sustainable contribution towards socio-economic development (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). The Policy consists of objectives geared towards investors by creating a conducive environment for mining and maximising economic benefits for society (Hopwood 2013).

The Diamond Act was developed in 1999 since diamonds play a significant role in the sector. The Act proposes the establishment of a Diamond Board of Namibia to help manage the sector and a Diamond Fund to cover the costs of its operations (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). The Environmental Management Act (EMA) and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations govern the environment throughout the mining life cycle (Hopwood 2013). The country's Affirmative Action and Procurement laws are designed to promote domestic investment and ownership in the sector to align with development goals. In addition to the domestic policies and regulations, Namibia is a signatory to several international agreements and commitments relevant to the mining sector, such as the Kimberly Process, dedicated to promoting transparency and oversight to eliminate the trade of conflict diamonds (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) is mandated to regulate the industry in line with other legislation and policies. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance manages revenue from the mining sector. Other ministries and agencies are critical stakeholders in the management of the mining sector, such as the National Planning Commission and the Ministries of Health and Social Services and Environment and Tourism (MET)(Ministry of Mines and Energy 2020).

The governance of the mining sector faces challenges despite the existence of laws and policies. Key legislation and policy such as the Minerals Act and the Minerals Policy are mainly outdated and have been undergoing revisions. The legislative support is mixed, and the lengthy process of reviewing the Act and Policy is a source of uncertainty for investors and can potentially discourage investment. There also needs to be more clarity about the mandate of the state-owned company, Epangelo, as the company was not included in the Minerals Act or the Minerals Policy (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

The regulation of the mining sector has overlapping jurisdictions between ministries, and transparency needs to be improved in many respects. There is also concern about the discretionary power of individuals in the allocation process of licensing rights. Over the years, the MME licensing process has been mired by suspicion as there is much secrecy in issuing licences and signing extractive contracts. The Minerals Act does not encourage accountability of decision-making as transparency of licensing processes is not provided for, yet the preservation of secrecy is explicitly addressed (Links 2010). Section 6 of the Minerals Act calls for the preservation of secrecy by the Ministry of all matters pertaining to compliance with provisions of the Minerals Act (Hopwood 2013). For example, the shareholder agreement regarding a 50:50 Namdeb joint venture between the government and De Beers was never made public, even though diamonds are a public asset (Links 2010, 9).

Unlike in Zambia, mineral or mining agreements are not employed in Namibia. Standard conditions have been set for most large-scale permits. The challenge is that no mechanisms or provisions are in place to address commodity price volatility in Namibia. However, the minister of mines is empowered to impose special conditions before granting a mining licence, which could include provisions to improve the socioeconomic condition in Namibia (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). Still, there are no requirements in the Minerals Policy for building the capacity of communities to understand and engage the potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts of exploration to closure. Lastly, there are also limited links between issuing mining permits and licences and Namibia's national policy objectives as outlined in NDP5 and Vision 2030 (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

Petroleum

Namibia also has The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act which deals with oil and gas licences. The oil and gas explorations are dominated by well-established foreign companies which partner with local companies that usually lack the expertise and capital but have political connections or influence (Hopwood 2013). The National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (Namcor) is solely owned by the government and was established in terms of the Namibian Companies Act of 1973. The Petroleum Act outlines the functions of Namcor, including ensuring the maximum exploitation of petroleum resources, the meaningful participation of Namibian citizens, and protecting the environment (Hopwood 2013). Recent speculation is that TotalEnergies and Shell have discovered oil and gas in commercial quantities, likely in the billions of barrels (Gbadamosi 2022). More robust measures and stronger institutions will be required to manage the consequences of oil discovery (Hopwood 2013). However, adequate checks on the executive may be unlikely given the precedence of secrecy thus far in the extractive industry.

7.1.3. Trends in development outcomes: ANS and HDI

Colonial rule and apartheid affected Namibia socially, economically and environmentally. Apartheid policies led to a highly skewed distribution of wealth and unequal access to land and natural resources. Only a few non-white Namibians had access to adequate primary health care and education. As a result, independence came with a considerable skill deficit which has proven difficult to address (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004).

Namibia's constitution was also one of the first in the world to enshrine the protection of the environment and to promote the sustainable use of natural resources (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). Though renewable and non-renewable resources were extracted during colonial times, long-term planning and sustainability issues were largely ignored (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004). Unlike Ghana and Zambia, Namibia has a long-term development vision and short-term national development plans. There is a proposal to integrate the vision into the NDP process institutionally and procedurally (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004, 15).

Figure 7.1, the case prediction eclipse, showed that Namibia was slightly underperforming on ANS and HDI between 2014 and 2018. The value of ANS in Namibia has fluctuated between negative and positive values since 1990. ANS increased from around 2001, coinciding with Namibia's rapid growth and an expansion in public expenditure, driven mainly by an investment boom in the mining industry. ANS monitors whether the depletion of natural capital is compensated for by investment in other assets, such as human capital. Since the government significantly expanded its public expenditure, including education, the ANS value was positive (Hamilton and Clemens 1999; Hausmann et al. 2022).

Due to declining investments, ANS began to decline significantly after 2014 and was at its lowest in 2016. The country experienced two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth and plunged into a depression in 2016 (Weylandt 2018). The recession was exacerbated by slowing Chinese demand for raw materials and a generally turbulent global economy as crude oil prices plummeted around 2014 (Roberts et al. 2016).

Namibia's Vision 2030 also acknowledges that healthy and well-educated people are the nation's human wealth (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004). The government has been dealing with poverty alleviation through increased health, education, and social infrastructure spending while trying to reduce the budget deficit and maintain fiscal stability (Bauer 2001). Spending on health and education as a percentage of GDP is relatively high compared to other African nations (World Health Organization 2014). Namibia spends about 5.4 per cent on health and 8.3 per cent on education compared to an average of 2.4 per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively, that is spent by other African countries (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

Education and primary health care have received high budget votes since independence due to the enormous disparity along urban-rural and racial lines, primarily a legacy of the apartheid system (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Between 2010 and 2014, Namibia's education sector had a large share of the national budget, averaging over 23 per cent (Bobek, Moritz and Tatjana 2019). Despite these efforts, the education system is underperforming (Melber 2018). The sector has poor education outcomes and has not created the skills needed for Namibia's economic diversification. The lack of skilled personnel also affects FDI, even in the mining industry, which is central to the Namibian economy. For example, there is a limited number of skilled Namibians in deep-sea mining, which results in more skilled positions being filled by expatriates (Ministry of Mines and Energy 2020; Almeida Santos 2018, 5).

After independence, emphasis also moved towards providing primary health care for all (Kaapama et al. 2007). The government funds its health expenditure through domestic resources and has planned to allocate over 10 per cent of the national budget to the health sector, even though this is still below the 15 per cent budget target agreed upon in Abuja (Almeida Santos 2018, 7). The initial gains in public health and well-being were wiped out and reversed by the unprecedented rapid progress of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Namibia has one of the highest infection rates in the world, with 19.5 per cent of adults (15-49 year-olds) living with the disease (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002, 239). The first HIV infection was reported in 1986, and by 1996, AIDS became the largest cause of death, claiming the lives of 1 per cent of the population. Thus, life expectancy declined from 61 in 1991 to 45 in 1998 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002, 239).

The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are reflected in the time trend. HDI began to decline from around 1994 and was at an all-time low by the mid-2000s. To counter the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the government rolled out antiretroviral drugs and an extensive campaign for the prevention and control of all sexually transmitted diseases (Hunter 2005). Antiretroviral therapy coverage reached 92 per cent in 2018 due to the efforts of the government and its development partners, which contributed to a significant decline in deaths from AIDS-related infections. It increased life expectancy to 65 years in 2016 (United Nations Development Programme 2019b). Challenges in the health system include a limited number and distribution of qualified staff, limited integration of services, lack of finances, and insufficient community outreach (World Health Organization 2014).

Namibia has made progress in key areas of human development since independence, despite the devastating impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The country is above average for various HDI indicators in the sub-Saharan Africa region (Almeida Santos 2018, 7). However, inequality remains persistent, and an estimated 45 per cent of the population suffers from multidimensional poverty (Intergovernmental Forum 2018). For instance, when the 2018 value of HDI was discounted for inequality, it dropped from 0,65 to 0,42 (United Nations Development Programme 2019b). Thus, the number of Namibians struggling to make a living is growing. The poverty levels are said to have triggered high rates of suicide, gender-based violence, and other forms of aggression (Melber 2014, 156).

7.1.4. The interplay between political accountability mechanisms and development in Namibia

This section aims to analyse the interaction between Namibia's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes since independence in 1990. Colonial rule denied the majority of Namibians fundamental rights and freedoms (Keulder 2010). The government of Namibia, through its 2030 Vision, acknowledges that investing in institution-building, education, and health is a precondition for social and economic transformation (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004). Nevertheless, on average, the country has modestly underperformed expectations in both dimensions of development (ANS and HDI), owing to a declining economy from 2014 and the challenge of HIV/AIDS infections. The high degree of institutionalisation has allowed SWAPO to plan long-term, broad-based development. However, the party's dominance has limited the space for the opposition to compete and thus affects accountability.

7.1.4.1. Vertical political accountability mechanism and development outcomes

The immediate challenge that confronted Namibia in 1990 was to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy and to effectively deploy administrative and political resources for economic and human development (Kaapama et al. 2007). For others, decolonisation instead of democratisation was foremost in SWAPO's agenda (Melber 2003b). Nonetheless, Namibia has built institutions, procedures, and practices rooted in democracy (Kaapama et al. 2007). The country ranks among the most well-governed countries on the continent. The 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranked Namibia 4th in overall governance and 12th in human development in Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2018). Therefore, there is a good foundation for optimising the contribution of mining to Namibia's development, as enshrined in various laws and policies (Intergovernmental Forum 2018).

Even though Namibia is known for being free, when you scratch the surface, you see aspects of control or elements of 'soft authoritarianism' (Anonymous 2015). Some African countries have formal democratic institutions, which are often not respected or genuinely implemented (Gumede 2017). Power-sharing institutions may be present, but an inclusionary culture may decrease and disappear. Therefore, power concentration occurs with the help of or despite formal democratic institutions (Van Cranenburgh 2006). Thus, autocratic tendencies can exist within a formally democratic system (Melber 2015).

SWAPO's history as a liberation movement and its dominance in the Namibian political space is important in understanding the coexistence of 'soft authoritarian' and democratic institutions. The political culture of liberation movements, which includes a set of attitudes and beliefs that govern a political system, can be detrimental to democratic governance and inclusive development (Gumede 2017). Like in the case of Kaunda in Zambia, the culture supports one united party to drive development and nation-building through the centralisation of decisions and policy-making, as well as the abuse of the liberation and independence rhetoric (Melber 2003b). It also encourages secrecy, the dominance of personalities and the fusion of the party and state, where independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party. Criticism within and outside the party is frowned upon, and the party system often has fractured and irrelevant opposition parties (Gumede 2017).

The lines between the ruling party, the government, and the state have been blurred since independence (Bauer 2001; Melber 2003a). SWAPO does not distinguish between the party and the government when listing its achievements (Hunter 2005). Du Pisani (2015) referred to Namibia as a ‘partocracy’, where the ruling party represents the vision of the people. SWAPO and the government emphasise a supra-ethnic and all-inclusive nationalism (Fosse 1997). The ruling party believes it has support from a wide range of society irrespective of race, ethnicity, and economic status and is thus best placed to promote inclusive development (Tonchi and Shifotoka 2005).

The power concentration within the ruling party enabled SWAPO to amend the constitution to permit former president Nujoma to run for a third term and commit troops to the DRC (Van Cranenburgh 2006; I. Cooper 2014). The president decided to deploy members of the Namibian Defence Force to the DRC without prior discussion with the cabinet and parliament (Keulder 2010). Namibian forces were also involved in military conflict with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and turned parts of Namibia’s border into conflict areas that impacted security and tourism. These issues were not debated publicly, and critical voices on these issues were labelled as unpatriotic.

The conflicts had ramifications for Namibia’s development as they led to overspending, while UNITA rebels usually targeted hospitals and schools (Melber 2003b). The backlash to these actions led to the formation of CoD, which still failed to challenge SWAPO's electoral dominance. The harshness of SWAPO towards the newly formed CoD affirms the emergence of autocratic tendencies under SWAPO and trends towards nepotism and patron-client relations (Melber 2003b, 2015).

The dominance of SWAPO not only creates a high degree of power concentration but a lack of horizontal accountability and less room for bargaining and compromise (Van Cranenburgh 2006). Unlike in Zambia, co-optation has also not been necessary because SWAPO has managed to create a parliamentary caucus which broadly reflects the complex ethnic makeup of the country. For example, representatives of various ethnic groups have been featured in SWAPO's national assembly list (I. Cooper 2014). Nevertheless, SWAPO's majority allows for arrogance and a lower degree of accountability as members believe that the party will always be in power (Anonymous 2015).

In an interview, Du Pisani (2015) noted that SWAPO monopolises the central government and mediates access to state resources. Resource access can only happen with the knowledge of the ruling party. Government jobs, through cabinet reshuffles and the creation of posts such as 'Minister without Portfolio', are used to strengthen the ruling party and its leadership (Bauer 2001). Furthermore, the government is the largest employer, meaning the party operates a system of employment opportunities through control over parastatals and other appointed positions (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Parties receive no funding from private sources and rely entirely on a public subsidy paid to parties represented within the National Assembly (I. Cooper 2014). Thus, the cost for the opposition to mount a convincing challenge makes elections substantially unfair (Melber 2014).

Namibia is not usually associated with the resource curse, and corruption in the extractives industry is relatively low. However, the country is associated with extreme poverty, partly due to the diversion of resource revenues to politically-connected elites (Hopwood 2013). Mining and exploration licences are granted at the discretion of the Minister, placing massive power in the hands of a single person (Links 2010). For example, Erkki Nghimtina, a former Minister of Mines and Energy (2005–2010), was found to have acted unlawfully in 2006 when he had discretionarily granted Exclusive Prospecting Licences (EPLs) belonging to an Australian-owned company, to another mining company, Ancash. Ancash had a politically connected individual holding a significant stake at the time (Links 2010, 10).

Even though Namibia does not usually feature in various international campaigns for greater transparency and accountability, such as Publish What You Pay, some aspects of the management of its natural resources are opaque and highly secretive (Hopwood 2013).The distribution of profits between the government and De Beers is still not public information, and many aspects of the relationship between Namdeb and the state are kept secret (Munier 2016a). During the civil war, SWAPO argued that the partnership with De Beers was incompatible with its socialist goals, detrimental to the interests of Namibians and that the diamond industry should be nationalised (Munier 2016b). Since then, the company's significant influence on the Namibian economy and the Kimberley Process Agreement has constrained decision-makers policies (Munier 2016c).

7.1.4.2. Horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms and development outcomes

There is an increasing reliance on civil society and the media to hold the government accountable (M. M. Khan 2009). However, civil society is also weak, as most NGOs depend on external funding and do not participate in broader political debates

(Melber 2018). Structural features also neutralise civil society. No mass-based civil society presence exists, so voters are not independently mobilised. SWAPO generally limits the participation of its members in other organisations, which limits their size and importance (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Since there is no strong opposition party, organisations fear closely aligning with parties to avoid alienating potential supporters. Churches also fear becoming too political to avoid being challenged by SWAPO. Trade unions have influence but do not easily take a strong stand against the government, as key ones are affiliated with the ruling party. Thus, civil society has a muted political presence compared to before independence (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009).

The Namibian Council of Churches was arguably the most influential component of civil society at independence and played a decisive role in the liberation struggle. They have taken a firm stand on land, unemployment and poverty issues (Totemeyer 2007). They have also advocated for a policy of national reconciliation (forgive and forget) to prevent ethnic and racial conflicts that emerged in countries like Angola and Mozambique. Founding President Nujoma promoted a slogan similar to Zambia, 'One Namibia, One Nation' (Totemeyer 2007; Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). A nationalist ideology has been created, and SWAPO changes national days into party celebrations at the taxpayer's expense and using state media.

Parliament is weakened because prospects for opposition to either win elections or negotiate co-optation by the executive are limited (I. Cooper 2014). Parliament also struggles to hold the executive to account because the opposition members are fragmented and outvoted in their committee work (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Nevertheless, opposition parties, though marginal, play an essential role in national politics even if they are not yet a government in waiting. They adopt alternative roles and functions given their context, such as sounding an alarm bell and keeping the ruling party on track (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). The role of traditional leaders in governance is also essential (Zaaruka and Fedderke 2011). They provide stability in communal areas and support during elections, as more than half of the population resides in rural areas (Totemeyer 2007).

Judges generally enjoy relative independence, and enforcement agencies have a high degree of autonomy and a consistent record of pursuing officials suspected of abusing public office (I. Cooper 2014). Opposition parties can also use the judicial institution, as in the 2009 elections, when nine opposition parties sought legal intervention to dispute election results (Melber 2010). However, the independent judiciary has been criticised when it takes unpopular decisions against the government (Melber 2003b). For example, in 2004, some members of SWAPO attacked the High Court over an unpopular ruling in a treason case (Zaaruka and Fedderke 2011).

Corruption in government and parastatals has become a high-profile problem, and several commissions have been established to investigate specific incidents (Hunter 2005; Grynberg, Immanuel and Amupadhi 2023). However, the Anti-Corruption Commission has not managed to tackle large-scale embezzlement of funds by higher levels of government (Melber 2018). The alleged use of political influence, where senior officials have enormous discretionary power over the allocation of licences and rights, is a massive concern in the extractives sector (Hopwood 2013). It is difficult to trace the exact ownership of exploration rights unless a transparent and accountable system dealing with exploration licensing is developed (Hopwood 2013).

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) such as Reporters without Borders consider Namibia to have the freest press in Africa (Almeida Santos 2018, 6). However, SWAPO dominates government-owned media. For instance, the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation reaches the largest audience with more than 80 per cent coverage. There is biased coverage over the long period, and the opposition often does not use their airtime effectively (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009).

The ruling party faces competition in the print media and has, at times, suppressed it. For example, the government boycotted the Namibian newspaper and accused it of being critical of government policies. Consequently, SWAPO and the government stopped advertising in the paper (Van Cranenburgh 2006). Private media has also been criticised by government officials for alleged negative coverage, leaking confidential documents, and having a hostile attitude toward the government executive. Civil society groups widely criticised this attempt to restrict the freedom of the press (Bauer 2001).

High-level government officials have been noted to publicly attack journalists and opposition politicians in response to perceived criticism of the government or ruling party (Bauer 2001). The RDP was denied the right to campaign freely, and registered rallies were banned because they would occur in SWAPO territory, which led to violent clashes between members of both parties (Melber 2010).

Justus Mwafonge, Inland Revenue Commissioner, remarked that SWAPO has delivered to some extent, and that people feel like the party has done something, even if it is not everything (Mwafongwe 2015). Du Pisani's view is that Namibia can do significantly more with the resources available as it is not sustainable to grow the middle class through highly paid public sector jobs. There are good policies, but they are not wholly implemented (Du Pisani 2015). According to Melber (2015), civil liberties have had little consequences for many people's material well-being, and there is growing dissatisfaction with the lack of delivery. The slow level of development is associated with policy failure on the part of the ruling SWAPO, which is synonymous with the government and the state (Melber 2014).

While there is much disagreement about whether SWAPO has delivered development so far, it would be misleading to assume that Namibias have accepted the status quo.

The citizens have become more active politically, and print media and journalists operate independently of the dominant SWAPO party (Melber 2010). The decline from over 80 per cent votes in 2014 to 65 per cent in 2019 is also a substantial electoral blow given SWAPO's track record. Though there is no turnover, the loss of a two-thirds majority would require the ruling party to work with the opposition for constitutional amendments, for example. Should the prospect of cooperating with the opposition be undesirable, the ruling party would be incentivised to improve the current development record to increase its vote share.

7.1.5. Conclusion

The chapter's main goal was to explore how Namibia's democratic regime, one-party dominance and institutionalised party system have impacted resource governance and development since independence in 1990. Namibia has made strides in achieving its long-term development goals, including overcoming the legacy of exclusion and improving access to education and health care (Kaapama et al. 2007). Furthermore, broad-based policies reinforce the perception of effective governance, with Namibia achieving consistently high scores on international indexes (Bauer 2001; Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). The country is embarking on development within a relatively stable socio-political context, with public institutions encouraging some level of civic engagement and participation (Hausmann et al. 2022).

The slow process of resolving inequality has brought into question the promise that liberation from colonialism and apartheid would bring about material gains and improved living standards (Melber 2014). Part of the problem in accelerating development outcomes is the breakdown in accountability mechanisms resulting from SWAPO's electoral dominance. The ruling party has managed to increase its dominance uninterruptedly over the years and has exclusive control of the decision-making process in parliament. The dominance of SWAPO and the executive has discouraged a participatory culture in that the party wins despite genuine electoral competition (Bauer 2001).

The political system is also characterised by minimal devolution, as regional and local authorities have limited powers. The ideas of patriotism, independence, and a policy of reconciliation cement SWAPO's legitimacy and limit the ability of opposition parties to challenge the party (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Financial resources, mainly from diamonds, accessed through exercising political power, also help solidify SWAPO's rule (Keulder 2010; Munier 2016a). Meanwhile, there have been concerns about corruption and abuse of state funds (Melber 2018).

Long-term development is more plausible in a dominant-party system, as the ruling party is likely to be more secure. However, it is also in this context where strong checks and balances, a more effective civil society, and devolution of authority to local government becomes more critical for holding the party and government accountable (Totemeyer 2007). As the main economic and political trends that shaped Namibia's independence continue to shift, SWAPO can only secure its hegemony by restoring growth and promoting inclusive and sustainable development. Furthermore, the timely resolution of the land question is crucial to maintaining peace and belonging and a commitment to democracy (Forrest 1994).

8. Political Accountability and Development in Mozambique (1990 - 2018)

Mozambique is a resource-rich fragile democracy. It is also considered a dominant party democracy since it has had no electoral turnovers since its first multiparty elections in 1994. The perception of the degree of party institutionalisation is 0.56 when averaged between 1990 and 2018. It is lower than Ghana's 0.61 and Namibia's 0.82 but higher than Zambia's 0.37 and the region's average of 0.48. The fragile democratic regime, the dominance of government by a single party, and the uneven institutionalisation of political parties have impacted policymaking. High debt levels, reliance on foreign aid, and mega projects linked to resource extraction are essential factors shaping Mozambique's political economy.

Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), a liberation movement turned political party, has ruled Mozambique since independence. It established a one-party state in 1977, two years after independence, just like Ghana's independence leader, Nkrumah, who called for a one-party state in 1962, and Zambia's Kaunda, who banned all opposition parties in 1968 (Gumede 2017). The opposition party, Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), transformed from a Guerilla army into a political party before the first elections in 1994 (C. Manning 1998).

Unlike in Ghana, the strengths and the bases of the two main parties are not evenly balanced. Furthermore, the political environment has struggled to gradually offer the electorate the opportunity to thoroughly scrutinise the ruling party and experience a turnover (Pitcher, 2012). Though the country operates a proportional representation system for legislative elections, which gives opportunity to opposition parties, the presidential elections matter significantly in that the winner-takes-all (Orre and Ronning 2017).

Gumede (2017) argues that most liberation movements, like Frelimo, fused their parties with the new state to transform their societies. The fusion led to fractured and weak opposition parties, intolerance of dissent, a culture of secrecy, the bridling of civil society, abuses of the liberation and independence rhetoric, ambivalence to democracy and violence. Frelimo's use of the state apparatus and its electoral dominance to weaken opposition groups' ability to challenge its power and control of the state has adversely affected democratic consolidation (Carbone 2003; Nuvunga 2014a). The dominance has led to a failure to institutionalise the two-party system, which has led to the development of a dominant-party system (Pereira 2009).

One key difference between Mozambique and the other case countries is the constant threat of conflict between the two main parties, Frelimo and Renamo. For example, Mozambique's Economic and Social Plans of 2015 and 2016 were characterised by increased defence spending (and debt servicing), which ate up large parts of the state budget, cutting into welfare expenditure (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Democratic governments may not improve development outcomes if the political disorder is not minimised (Hoeffler, Fosu and Bates 2006). Political order requires leaders to use their control over coercion to defend rather than prey upon citizens. Likewise, citizens must forgo using force (Bates 2006a, 31). Furthermore, governments can behave in ways that heighten insecurity if resource endowment provides economic immunity from the costs of state failure (Bates 2006a, 57).

Mozambique modestly underperforms on inclusiveness and overperforms on sustainability but still falls within the 80 per cent confidence ellipse, meaning its performance reasonably fits the regression estimates. The 'bullseye' in Figure 8.1 centres on the country's statistically 'expected' levels of inclusiveness (as measured by health and education) and sustainability (as measured by adjusted net savings). The dot marks Mozambique's actual performance on the two indicators. The country is located in the upper-left quadrant near the solid circle (80 per cent confidence ellipse). It shows that the country slightly fell short of statistical expectations on health and education prevalence by 4 per cent. However, Mozambique modestly exceeded statistical expectations on adjusted net savings by about 9 per cent of GDP.

Figure 8.1.: Mozambique case prediction ellipse



This chapter explores potential explanations for why Mozambique has modestly underperformed expectations on inclusiveness but not sustainability despite the fragile political context; mainly asking why has Mozambique avoided a decline in sustainability since the mid-2000s. Generally, I analyse the interaction between Mozambique's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes since 1992.

Mozambique initially experienced high growth rates from 1993 to the late 2000s and had a substantial reduction of debt in 2002 which allowed the country to free funds for social spending and steadily improve its HDI. However, non-rent GDP declined sharply after 2014 due to a loan corruption scandal which led to an economic crisis and explained the modest underperformance of HDI on average. The country's modest overperformance on sustainability is potentially explained by the discovery of vast natural resources at a later stage. Mozambique had zero resource rents until the mid-2000s, and resource revenues are expected to be significant in 2030 when the gas projects complete their cost recovery. However, the country had noticeable ANS declines in 2011 when coal investments became operational and in 2015 after the loans scandal which coincided with a fall in commodities and export revenues between 2014 and 2016. Though the country has high expectations that its resource wealth will fund healthcare and education, ANS is likely to decline in future as the country has begun to mortgage its resources to arrange cash up-front, which may result in a 'presource curse' (Frynas and Buur 2020).

The evidence provided will include a time-series graph to represent political and economic trends between 1990 and 2018, literature on the political economy of the country and the use of primary sources, such as official documents and personal semi-structured interviews with government officials, representatives of interest groups, and political parties.

The first part focuses on unpacking time trends in the key political and economic variables from the cross-national analysis, clarifying dynamics over the entire period from 1990 through 2018. The second part of the chapter explores how political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation, influencing development outcomes.

8.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms, resource rents and development outcomes

Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The country became a one-party state under Frelimo, formed in 1962 by a fusion of three nationalist movements and various groups (Pereira and Shenga 2005). The country then suffered from deliberate destabilisation and civil war, until 1992, against Renamo, supported by the Rhodesian white supremacist regime, and later the South African apartheid regime (Hanlon 2007; Orre and Ronning 2017).

The country plays a significant role in regional trade as it is responsible for 70 per cent of the transit traffic for the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), offering harbour and transportation facilities to landlocked neighbouring countries (African Development Bank 2011, 7). However, Mozambique is among the poorest countries in the world, with poverty levels above 40 per cent (Heher and De Bonneval 2021, 3). The population is estimated at 32 million (2021), with most people living and working in rural areas.

Mozambique is endowed with arable land, water, energy, mineral resources and offshore natural gas discovered between 2010 and 2013 (Pereira and Luiz 2020). Though the main parties signed a Peace Accord in 1992, the country is still battling with a military insurgency, unrelated to the first civil war, in parts of the gas-rich province of Cabo-Delgado, which has led to thousands of deaths and displaced people (Braathen and Aslak 2001; Pereira and Luiz 2020).

Figure 8.2 represents changes in electoral competition, party institutionalisation, non-rents GDP, resource rents, and development (HDI and ANS) from 1990 to 2018. I use the time trend to provide a structure to the descriptive background and unpack the dynamics and trends in Mozambique over the 28 years.

8.1.1. Trends in political accountability mechanisms

8.1.1.1. Political regime

Mozambique has been presented as a success story of transition from a socialist one-party regime to a modern multi-party democracy after a brutal civil war (Virtanen 2003). However, the mixed record after its first democratic elections earned Mozambique different descriptions of its regime, such as patrimonial, managed, fragile, imposed or limited democracy (Harrison 1996; Braathen and Aslak 2001; Phiri 2012; Pitcher 2012). Much of the limitations of the country's democratic system stem from the country's struggle for independence.

Several anti-colonial political groups formed Frelimo, which initiated the armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in 1964. Mozambique then became independent after about ten years of sporadic warfare and significant political changes in Portugal, including a coup in Lisbon in 1974 that overthrew the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano and collapsed Portuguese colonialism (Pereira and Shenga 2005; Pitcher 2006). The country also experienced a civil war and sabotage from its neighbours soon after independence due to the new government's support of liberation movements in South Africa (African National Congress) and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe African National Union). One million people died during the civil war, and millions

Figure 8.2.: Mozambique time trend graph: 1990 - 2018



were displaced (Hanlon 2007).

The leaders of Frelimo established a socialist one-party state after independence and outlawed political opposition, eliminating political pluralism and religious educational institutions (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999). The party formally denounced customary practices and abolished the role of traditional authorities. On the other hand, Renamo collaborated with traditional authorities and became an outspoken defender of marginalised groups and practices such as traditional leadership and rules, religious beliefs and non-Southern rural communities (Braathen and Aslak 2001; Carbone 2003). Frelimo reversed its policy by formally recognising traditional authorities by 2000, and the authorities were turned into an extended arm of the state, just like during the colonial era (Pitcher 2012; Orre and Ronning 2017). Thus, there is a clash between urban-rural and modern-traditional institutions over local power (Braathen and Aslak 2001).

Mozambique also experienced economic mismanagement, nationalisation and a mass exodus of Portuguese nationals after independence (Carbone 2003; Virtanen 2003). President Samora Machel, who ruled the country after independence, conceded that socialism had failed. The country needed political and economic reforms. The first economic reforms took place from 1983 to 1986 and aimed to promote private sector business and attract investments (Pereira and Luiz 2020). Machel died in a suspicious plane crash in South Africa in 1986, and his successor, Joaquim Chissano, continued reforms and embarked on peace talks with Renamo.

A new constitution was enacted in 1990, providing multi-party politics, a market economy, and free elections (Pereira 2009). The civil war ended in 1992 when Frelimo and Renamo signed a General Peace Accord with the Italian government, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) as guarantors (Braathen and Aslak 2001). Frelimo and Renamo committed to demilitarising politics, peacefully resolving issues, and operating within a democratic framework. The agreement also called for free and fair multiparty elections for parliament and the president (Braathen and Aslak 2001; Nuvunga 2005). The agreement was an elitist deal, signed even though most Mozambicans were against abandoning a single-party regime (Carbone 2003). For Harrison (1996), Mozambique's democracy was imposed and, therefore, undemocratic in that it was undertaken without popular support. Nonetheless, the end of the civil war and single-party socialism also brought hopes of introducing democratic accountability.

The 1990 constitution set up political institutions such as the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), National Electoral Commission (CNE), and Constitutional Court, all of which served to provide guarantees of political rights and competition (Pereira and Shenga 2005). However, the introduction of multiparty politics has increased the power of the Frelimo. The party has maintained its former centralised structures and used its access to donor funds and partnerships to entrench its power (Sumich 2010). There are still blurred lines between the party and the state, high centralisation of power, rampant corruption and weak independence of the legislature, media and judicial systems (Carbone 2003). Though a formal separation of state and party structures was introduced after 1990, the separation is artificial as most state personnel are Frelimo members. Thus the country has adopted political reforms but is not yet a liberal democracy (Carbone 2003).

Three presidents from the Frelimo party have ruled Mozambique since the first democratic elections in 1994. Joaquim Chissano was elected president and stepped down voluntarily after two elected terms. Chissano's predecessors came to power after the death of the incumbent (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). Thus, the voluntary transfer set an important precedent for leadership change in the party, in contrast to the conflict in Zambia after Chiluba attempted to run for a third term (Pitcher, 2012). Armando Guebuza took over from Chissano from 2005 to 2015, and his term was mired with growing authoritarianism and corruption (Sumich 2010). Felipe Nyusi replaced Guebuza in 2015 and is the current president.

Mozambique's revised 2004 Constitution guarantees freedom of the press (Bertelsen 2005). However, the transition to democracy did not accompany other mechanisms found in other democracies, such as asset reporting, conflict of interest regulation and reforms to the justice system (Hanlon 2009). Democracy meant using privileged positions for wealth accumulation (Hanlon 2009). The party has monopolised access to donors and international networks and has centralised wealth and power. It has used its access to extend its reach and is a major arena for channelling demands and interests. It also imposes constraints on other actors to operate independently of the party (Sumich 2010). Although various actors can compete, democracy has limited success in empowering actors outside the party in Mozambique. Major donor programmes to promote good governance and strengthen democracy have resulted in reforms, but these reforms have led the ruling party to grow stronger and entrench itself deeply (Sumich 2010).

8.1.1.2. Electoral competitiveness

Mozambique is a diverse society with divisions along ethnicity, region, rural/urban, class and race. When Frelimo took power after 1992, most central and northern ethnic groups were marginalised due to divisions and struggles during the liberation war. Frelimo also had internal conflicts with an ethnic undertone, which led to the initial transition of the leadership from the Centre/Northern parts to the South (Pereira 2009). Despite the politicisation of ethnic differences, Mozambicans not only vote along ethnic lines but also based on struggle credentials, political opportunities, and leadership. Like in Zambia, no single group dominates or has a numerical majority for any party to rely entirely on one ethnic group. Furthermore, ethnicity has not been used to contest for resources and mobilise voters (Hanlon 2007; Pereira 2009).

Mozambique has held six multiparty legislative elections in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. Frelimo has won all elections, but electoral observers organisations have documented irregularities in almost every election since 1994 (Pitcher 2012). The 1994 elections were primarily funded by the donor community, especially the UN Trust Fund of US$10 million set up in 1993, which was dedicated mainly to financing opposition parties (Braathen and Aslak 2001). The elections, recognised as free and fair, had a high turnout of 85 per cent and focused on consolidating the peace process at the elite level by co-opting the opposition to partake (Braathen and Aslak 2001). The 1994 political campaigns focused on the past. Frelimo emphasised that it had liberated the country and could maintain stability and rebuild it. Meanwhile, Renamo attacked Frelimo for crimes committed during the one-party era and promised to reintroduce the authority of traditional leaders (Pereira and Shenga 2005).

Frelimo won the 1994 elections by a plurality of votes, which resulted in a majority in the National Assembly. The party won 44.3 per cent of the valid votes and 129 of the 250 seats (Pereira and Shenga 2005). Renamo also performed well in the 1994 elections. It came second with 37.87 per cent of the vote and 112 seats and became the main opposition party (Carbone 2003; Hanlon 2007). The other 9 seats were won by the Democratic Union (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011).

The 1999 campaign focused more on government and opposition performance in parliament. Renamo capitalised on the dissatisfaction with economic development and regional inequalities between the rest of the country and the South, which received the bulk of investments (Pereira and Shenga 2005). President Chissano stressed the economic reforms and the average economic growth achieved by the country, which was the fastest on the continent, and acknowledged that this growth had not trickled down to citizens (Pereira and Shenga 2005).

The 1999 elections also had a high turnout, at 75 per cent, with domestic and international observers concluding that the vote reflected the will of the people (Bureau of African Affairs 2004). These elections were also financed by donors, mainly from the EU (Braathen and Aslak 2001).The elections were close enough to scare Frelimo (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Frelimo received 48.5 per cent of the vote, while Renamo-EU, a broad electoral coalition headed by Renamo, received 39.8 per cent and a majority in five of the country's ten provinces. Other parties received 12.7 per cent of the vote. Chissano was reelected with 52.29 per cent of the vote compared to Dhlakama's 47.7 per cent (Pereira 2009).

Frelimo increased its National Assembly majority to 133 out of 250 seats, while Renamo received 116 seats. One other seat went to an independent candidate, and no small parties were represented (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). These elections showed a bipartisan pattern as no other party received the 5 per cent threshold required to get a parliamentary seat (Pereira and Shenga 2005). Until 2004, the parties were required to obtain 5 per cent of the votes to have a seat in parliament, which reduced the chances of smaller parties gaining parliamentary representation (Pitcher 2012).

The 1999 election is notable because Dlakama won almost half the vote, and Renamo-EU did not accept the legitimacy of the presidential results (Orre and Ronning 2017). They filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed (Bureau of African Affairs, 2004). They also demanded a recount, a new election, and that they appoint governors in the five provinces in which they received majorities (Pereira 2009). The president and ruling party rejected all demands, and violence erupted

(Braathen and Aslak 2001).

Before the 1999 legislative elections, Mozambique had held its first local elections in 1998, which Renamo boycotted due to flaws in the registration process and after the ruling party refused to extend municipal status to areas favouring Renamo (Bureau of African Affairs, 2004). Thus, the local elections had a meagre turnout at 14. 6 per cent (Carbone 2003). Renamo also opposed the absence of party representatives at the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and its technical secretariat and the irregular voter registration and demarcation of rural constituencies (Braathen and Aslak 2001) Dhlakama threatened that the party, backed by the opposition, would return to the 'bush' unless it was granted legal authority over the country's five central and northern provinces (Braathen and Aslak 2001).

The significance of these preceding elections is that they laid the groundwork for the later events, including the government agreeing to include opposition representatives in the NEC and its technical secretariat at all election levels from the 1999 elections. In 2000, Renamo organised protests against the allegedly fraudulent 1999 election results, and violence erupted in the North. Over a hundred people died, including 80 who supposedly died in an overcrowded jail (Braathen and Aslak 2001; Carbone 2003).

In the 2004 campaign, supporters of Frelimo harassed and intimidated members of the opposition. Opposition supporters were also arrested and detained on false charges (Pitcher 2012). Frelimo won again with 62 per cent of the vote and 160 seats compared to Renamo-EU's 30 per cent and 90 seats (Pereira 2009; Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). The victory is despite high unemployment, crime and corruption scandals against Frelimo (Pereira and Shenga 2005). Guebuza was elected president with 63.7 per cent of the vote, and Dhlakama received 31.74 per cent. These elections also included minor parties, but the battle was still between the two prominent giants

(Pereira and Shenga 2005).

In the 2009 elections, Frelimo increased its parliamentary seats to 191, and Renamo received 51 seats. The Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) was founded in 2009 and made it to parliament with 8 seats. There were renewed hopes that the MDM would break the two-party nature of Mozambican politics (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011; Orre and Ronning 2017). The 2009 elections were also held amid allegations of political exclusion (African Development Bank 2011). Dhlakama moved his official residence from Maputo to Nampula, in the North, against the rule that all parties must be headquartered in Maputo. The move was alleged to protest against the election results he considered not free and fair (Azevedo-Harman 2015). National riot police surrounded his residence in 2012, where a shooting broke out. In the same year, the military attacked this base, and Dhlakama fled to the bush, where he remained in hiding until 2014 (Azevedo-Harman 2015).

In the 2014 elections, power transferred from Guebuza to his defence minister, Filipe Nyusi, who received 57 per cent of the vote and faced no run-off. Nyusi is the first president since 1994 not to be a former liberation fighter and the first leader to hail from the Northern part of the country (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Meanwhile, Guebuza's legacy was dubbed a political and economic mess because of the increased centralisation of power within the executive and the party's dominance at all government levels. His regime also had shady deals and embezzlement of state funds, but no prosecution was initiated (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Frelimo held on to its majority and won 144 seats, while Renamo received 89 and the MDM 17 seats. It was the first time Frelimo lost control of three provincial assemblies to the opposition (Azevedo-Harman 2015). This election also occurred during political and economic challenges, such as the renewal of armed clashes between Renamo and government forces. Trust had deteriorated between the two parties as

Dhlakama, who won 37 per cent of the vote, had first rejected the official results and ordered his party's MPs to boycott parliament (Azevedo-Harman 2015). The elections were unfair, as they had a pro-Frelimo police force, procedural irregularities, poorly prepared opposition, and unbalanced campaign resources (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Frelimo won the 2019 elections, with over 70 per cent of the vote for the party and the presidential candidate. The 2019 elections were allegedly rigged and denounced by civil society and the international community. However, without consequence, the victory strengthened Frelimo's hold on power and, once more, consolidated its dominance across all levels of government (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022).

The two-party system affects the country's prospects for democratic consolidation. The democratic competition is shaped by patterns of conflict from the past, which reflect a legacy of regional divides developed during the anti-colonial struggle and the civil war. Such divides are also reflected in elections, where the two major parties win a clear geographical pattern of seats (Carbone 2003). Renamo has rejected every election since 1994 but was generally considered to have had strong grounds in the 1999 and 2009 elections (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Nonetheless, the judiciary rejected claims of irregularities, and international observers have found no fraud enough to tilt the scale.

8.1.1.3. Party institutionalisation

Although Frelimo and Renamo have competed as political parties since 1994, both organisations have existed for more than 40 years. However, their starting positions were different, and the party system has undergone a limited and uneven process of institutionalisation, unlike Ghana's two-party system, where the NPP and NDC operate on a relatively level playing field (Carbone 2003). The perception of the degree of party institutionalisation, 0.56, is above the region's average of 0.48 because the main parties in Mozambique have deep-seated historical origins and well-established regional roots, which have led to the stability of electoral competition and relatively low fragmentation of the party system (Virtanen 2003; Lindberg 2007).

Frelimo is a disciplined and institutionalised organisation and has also enjoyed a broad level of legitimacy in Mozambican society for its unchallenged role in the fight against colonialism (Harrison 1996). However, this legitimacy has been eroded by political and social repression and ineffective policies. The party had the experience of governing the country for close to two decades after the independence struggle, so its leadership was tested and experienced in the national government, policymaking, administration, political organisation and mobilisation, as well as diplomatic relations (Carbone 2003). The party also benefits from access to state resources and connections to the business community (Alden 2001; Carbone 2003).

Renamo originates in the period after independence and has a complex history, including dissidents expelled from Frelimo in the early years of independence (Virtanen 2003; Pereira and Shenga 2005). Renamo developed as a military organisation with weakly developed administrative and political wings (C. Manning 1998). The organisation was hurriedly re-organised from a clandestine military movement into a political party in the run-up to the 1994 elections, funded by the UN Trust Fund (C. Manning 1998).The party now receives substantial funding from the state.

Alfonso Dhlakama, the party's former leader, retained personalistic control over the party and its finances until his death in May 2018. Dhlakama has also expelled prominent members of the party, which he viewed as threats, and who later founded new parties. Thus, the political structures of the party were weak; the personnel was inexperienced in administration, its internal procedures were ineffective, and policies were poorly articulated (Carbone 2003). The organisation has understood party building as acquiring material benefits such as offices, houses for party representatives who had to move to Maputo, cars, and patronage resources (C. Manning 1998).

The first wave of new political parties emerged after the multi-party constitution in 1990 and the peace talks between Frelimo and Renamo. Over a hundred parties were formed after the peace agreement and contested the founding elections in 1994 (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). The parties were named ‘unarmed’ to distinguish themselves from the former rebel movement, Renamo (Nuvunga 2005)

The minor parties that emerged are distinguished by the social origins of their leaders rather than their political or ideological differences (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). They are often the factions historically excluded from positions of power and would like to get a share in the state apparatus or parties for personal reasons (Pereira and Shenga 2005). For example, the MDM is a breakaway from Renamo, led by Daviz Simango, until his death in 2021. Unlike the rigid structure of Frelimo and the personalistic element of Renamo, MDM introduced a pattern of family ties over party structures as the party president and head of the parliamentary group were brothers. The family-style management has affected the party’s growth and institutionalisation (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011).

Electoral and seat volatility has been low between 1994 and 2004. Still, the formation of MDM by former Renamo supporters and smaller parties has shown Renamo’s increasing fragmentation since 2004 and the struggle to accommodate internal differences. Those who challenged Dlakama were either expelled or left the party (Pitcher 2012). Renamo has also suffered from a succession of splits, such as Raul Domingos, Renamo’s chief negotiator for the peace agreement, who was expelled in 2000 and formed a party (Orre and Ronning 2017).

The party’s local structures remain weak, and the party’s official presence is limited to a flag at a member's house (Carbone 2003). However, unlike some parties in Zambia, Renamo's history as an armed insurgent group before it became a political party gave it historical roots in society. The longevity has provided some organisational stability as the personnel who served during the war continued to serve in the multiparty context (Pitcher 2012).

Frelimo is not immune to internal factionalism, even though the party's complex machine has managed to stay united to fight off pressure from Renamo and donors. The character and role of the factions are kept internal, are challenging to identify, and are usually based on speculation (Sumich 2010; Orre and Ronning 2017). The disagreements are usually speculated to be over policies, regional disputes, factional fights amongst prominent members and growing discontent among party members and former supporters about the country's direction. Though there are personal and political conflicts within Frelimo, the party has never become personalised, such as with Dhlakama's Renamo and Mugabe's ZANU PF. There have been peaceful transfers of power, the party has never split, and defections and expulsions are few (Hanlon 2009).

8.1.2. Trends in economic performance: non-rent GDP and resource rents

8.1.2.1. Non–rent GDP

The post-independence government inherited a country with weak socio-economic infrastructure, high levels of poverty and illiteracy, social and regional inequalities, and a strong dependency on agriculture and migrant labour (Pereira and Shenga 2005; Pereira 2009). The IMF also imposed a harsh second structural adjustment programme in 1990, limiting postwar reconstruction and health and education spending, leading to economic decline (Hanlon 2009).

Mozambique's economy is small and has a low degree of diversification as exports are concentrated in a few commodities, such as aluminium. The economy is also dominated by agriculture, which employs over 70 per cent of the workforce (Heher and De Bonneval 2021). The economy's structure remains narrow, where services account for 46 per cent of GDP, followed by agriculture and industry with 30 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively (African Development Bank 2011).

Mozambique was the fastest-growing non-oil economy in the region from 1993 to 2009 (Phiri 2012). The impressive growth decreased the number of people living below the poverty line from 70 per cent in 1997 to 54 per cent in 2003 (Pitcher 2012). The growth resulted from the large inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) mostly linked to natural resources exploitation, high levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and agricultural production (Gqada 2013). FDI, linked to mega-project construction, is a major foreign exchange source (Virtanen and Ehrenpreis 2007).

Economic growth improved from -5 per cent at the end of the war in 1992 to close to 9 per cent in 1993. The annual growth rate between 1993 and 2000 averaged 8 per cent (Pitcher 2012; Bertelsen 2005, 42). Mozambique was also the first in the region to receive debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 2002, and its debt was substantially reduced. Devastating floods in early 2000 slowed GDP growth, but the economy recovered after 2001 (Orre and Ronning 2017). Growth was affected again due to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 (Phiri 2012).

The incredible growth has been declining over time. For instance, growth reduced to 7.4 per cent in 2014, then 6.3 in 2015 and 3 per cent from 2016 to 2019 (World Bank 2022; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 30). The decline is due to multiple shocks, such as a decline in commodity prices, an insurgency, a drought affecting agricultural production, and fiscal tightening (Orre and Ronning 2017). Furthermore, low human capital and infrastructure investments inhibit economic growth (World Bank 2022, 1).

Despite high average economic growth rates driven by mining, gas exploration and services investments, Mozambique is an aid-dependent country. The aid dependency has encouraged rent-seeking behaviour and curtailed the country's policy-making independence (Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Phiri 2012; Nino and Le Billon 2014). Since the 1992 peace agreements, Mozambique has received significant support from the international donor community. It attracted US$3.5 billion in foreign aid between 2005 and 2012 (Azevedo-Harman 2015, 143). One of the highest recorded aid levels was in 2008, when the total aid was almost US$2 billion (Pereira 2009, 227). Thus, ODA represented an average of around 45 per cent of the state budget or government expenditure since independence in 1975, and the country was the eighth largest aid recipient on the continent in 2015 (Orre and Ronning 2017, 18).

Corruption has been rampant and at the core of the economic and political crisis since 2014. Domestic and foreign state debt increased abruptly from 37 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 77 per cent in 2015 and 109.7 per cent in 2017 (Orre and Ronning 2017, 12). A forensic audit report by Kroll, an international audit firm, investigated the whereabouts of money that three state-owned companies had borrowed at commercial rates. The loans were mainly from two banks, Credit Suisse and Russian VTB, but also involved Mozambican banks (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). There is suspicion that part of the loans ended up in the hands of the political leadership, leading to a big crisis of confidence.

The hidden loan scandal led to the country's suspension from the IMF support programme and traditional donors withholding and withdrawing aid and general budget support (Orre and Ronning 2017). Foreign grants decreased from US$700 million in 2014 to less than US$200 million in 2016. At the same time, FDI dropped by 40 per cent and external loans by 87 per cent. The government declared its debt levels unsustainable in 2016 (Orre and Ronning 2017). Thus, Guebuza's rule from 2005 to 2014 was labelled a period of disastrous governance of the treasury and public assets (Orre and Ronning 2017, 12).

Mozambique has raised concerns about a model of development that relies on foreign aid and FDI with limited linkages to the rest of society. The country's development strategies have focused on using donor aid for development programmes and promoting macroeconomic growth by deploying export revenues in state priorities areas, such as mega projects, to attract FDI (Gqada 2013). The country's population is growing fast, and the formal economy is struggling to create enough employment. Since the largest population is in the Northern provinces, where the opposition parties have a stronghold, this contributes to constant centre-periphery political tensions (Orre and Ronning 2017). Maintaining macroeconomic stability is also challenging as the country is exposed to commodity price fluctuations and challenges with governance and transparency. The country needs to be diversified as it is too focused on capital-intensive projects and low-productivity subsistence agriculture (Harrison 1996; Pereira and Shenga 2005).

8.1.2.2. Resource rents

Mozambique has abundant resources, including gas, coal, titanium, and precious minerals. It has attracted significant FDI since 1996, which resulted in large investments such as the Mozal Aluminum Smelter in Maputo, the Sasol gas plant in Inhambane, and Vale coal mining in Tete (African Development Bank 2011).

Mozambique has high coal, gas and hydropower potential but needs more capacity to fully develop the resources to provide the population with electricity (African Development Bank 2011). It exports over 35 per cent of its total power production to South Africa and Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, the government has indicated that it intends to use resource revenues for national development (Gqada 2013).

Resource rents were zero until the mid-2000s. During the second half of the 2000s, there was a gradual realisation that Mozambique had vast natural resources, including the largest hydropower plant, the Cahora Bassa Dam (Orre and Ronning 2017). In 2010, large reserves, the third largest in Africa, were discovered off the coast of Cabo Delgado. The discovery has generated expectations of enormous investments and increased the stakes. These resources also have the potential to transform Mozambique to become a global Liquified Natural Gas exporter as they are among the largest gas reserves in the world (Orre and Ronning 2017).

Contracts to explore the Rovuma region for gas brought in more than 4 per cent of the GDP between 2005 and 2012 (Azevedo-Harman 2015). In general, the extractives sector represented 10 per cent of the country's exports in 2010 but contributed only 3.3. per cent of total revenues (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013). Resource rents peaked as coal investments became operational in 2011, which increased exports (African Development Bank 2011). In 2012, the government approved 245 mining concessions and exploration licences in Tete province (Maennling, Shah and Thomashausen 2014). By 2013, natural resource extraction accounted for 30 per cent of exports (Orre and Ronning 2017, 15). Commodity prices then fell, and export revenue declined between 2014 and 2016, the same time as the hidden loans scandal (Orre and Ronning 2017). Resource revenues will become significant in 2030 when the gas projects complete their cost recovery (World Bank 2022).

8.1.2.3. Policies and institutions governing rents

Mining

All natural resources within Mozambique are the state's property, but the state may grant rights to private persons under certain conditions through licences (Abrahamson et al. 2013). The fiscal framework for the extractive sector has evolved since the 1990s. It initially sought to establish an investor-friendly environment by offering extensive tax exemptions to early entrants such as the Mozal Aluminium smelter, Sasol gas project and Kenmare Resources PLC. Companies like Kenmare could negotiate significantly favourable terms, including contract secrecy and no corporate taxes (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013; Selemane 2013). The country has since scaled back on the tax exemptions and moved from a project-specific regime to a legislative one. Still, the government lost most of its revenue in negotiations between 2000 and 2002 (Center for Public integrity 2013).

The mining law sets out the legal framework for the exploration of mineral resources and the procedures for the concession of licences. The primary sources of law for mining are the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique of 2004 and the Mining Law (Law 20/2014, of 18 August 2014), which replaced Law No 14/2002 (Orre and Ronning 2017). There is also the Megaprojects Law (Law No. 15/2011 of 10 August) and the Taxation Regime for Mining Activity or Mining Tax Law (Law No. 15/2017 of 28 December). Decrees related to health and safety, environmental regulation and labour have also been set (De Amaral and Mussagy 2020).

The new mining law had several significant changes, including that a percentage of revenue from mining will be allocated to developing communities near mining activities. It also implores the state to consider the interests of Mozambicans, including the fair and transparent relocation of local communities (Couto 2014). The new

Mining Law exudes oil, natural gas, methane gas and natural gas from its scope. The new Petroleum Law governs hydrocarbons. The mining law sets royalties for diamonds at 8 per cent, precious metals and stones at 6 per cent, base minerals and coal at 3 per cent and sand and stones at 1.5 per cent (De Amaral and Mussagy 2020). The corporate income tax is 32 per cent (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013). The state can also collect capital gains tax at 32 per cent if mining companies sell their assets (Selemane 2013).

Several authorities are responsible for regulating Mozambique's mining industry. The Council of Ministers is the highest governmental body responsible for creating primary legislation for the mining sector, granting concessions and mining licences. It includes the president, the prime minister, and cabinet ministers (De Amaral and Mussagy 2020). The Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MIREME) implements policies related to the exploration and production of mineral resources (Couto 2014). The National Directorate of Geology and Mining (DNGM) is responsible for administrative procedures. The new National Institute of Mines (Instituto Nacional de Minas) (INAMI) is a regulatory body established to manage and oversee the mining sector, including developing public policy, regulating and monitoring the implementation of new mining projects (Couto 2014). There is also the Inspectorate-General of Mineral Resources and Energy, which monitors mining activities and carries out inspections.

Mozambique is also a candidate for the Kimberley Process Certification and a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (Center for Public Integrity 2010). The country joined the EITI in 2009 and established institutional arrangements for validation (African Development Bank 2011). The compliance was hailed as a step towards transparency in the country's extractive industry. However, the EITI has limited reach because having receipts does not translate to accountability (Gqada 2013). Funds are diverted during the negotiation of the fiscal regime through bad agreements and illegal practices by the government and companies, which makes it irrelevant in preventing the diversion of public revenue (Ossemane 2013).

Uncertainties remain about the rules and regulations governing the mining sector, but it is expected to develop and mature. Part of the issue is that details of fiscal regimes are stated in individually negotiated contracts, which are often secret and pose challenges to tax collections and accountability. These contracts have been a subject of debate in the Mozambican public space, and there are strong calls for them to be renegotiated (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013).

Petroleum and natural gas

Mozambique is among the global players in the oil and gas sector in Africa due to the discovery of significant natural gas in the Northern Rovuma Basin (Gqada 2013). The legal framework will ensure that the discoveries benefit society if adequately implemented. The primary legislation governing the exploration and development of oil and gas reserves derives from the constitution. The relevant legislation for the industry is the new Petroleum Law (Law No 21/2014, of 18 August 2014), which replaced the 2001 law. This law came about after a long period of institutional and public debate. There are also various Decrees related to Petroleum operations, infrastructures, environmental regulations and impacts, and the Rovuma Basin (Gqada 2013).

The new law requires a quota of at least 25 per cent of the country's oil and gas output for the local market and for foreign companies to work with local companies in procuring goods and services (De Amaral and Mussagy 2020). A percentage of the income from petroleum operations must be allocated to local communities where the operations are undertaken and are determined by the state budget law.

The petroleum production tax rates (equivalent to a royalty) are 10 per cent for crude oil and 6 per cent for natural gas. These taxes are reduced by 50 per cent if oil and gas production is for local industry. The standard corporate income tax is 32 per cent for income generated locally and abroad, and the capital gains tax is also 32 per cent (Selemane 2013).

The High Authority for the Extraction Industry supervises petroleum activities but has yet to become operational as its composition and powers have yet to be determined. The institutions that regulate the industry include the Council of Ministers, MIREME, and the National Petroleum Institute (NPI), which oversees and promotes oil and gas activity. The NPI was established through Decree 25/2004, of 20 August (Gqada 2013; Selemane 2013). Mozambique's national oil and gas company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), is required to be a shareholder in any petroleum production and exploration project and represents the state in all operations (Selemane 2013).

Generally, the legal and regulatory framework is considered adequate for economic development, and the macroeconomic policies are sound. However, the government needs a coherent approach to harmonise new laws with existing ones (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). There needs to be coordination between different ministries, qualified people and a capacity in government to monitor the value of exports independently of the companies. The systems to regulate concessions could be more reliable (Selemane 2013). Furthermore, the only condition introduced for local policies within the petroleum law was for the company to be Mozambican-owned, but this established the company's front office and did not promote diversification (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Whether the legislation governing the resource sector will help develop the country depends on the rigour with which they are enforced and the transparency in managing the resources for accountability to occur in corruption cases (Gqada 2013). The petroleum Law requires a portion of revenues to be allocated to mining-affected communities. Still, it is unclear how funds will be channelled to communities and managed, and the implementation is weak due to a lack of formal compliance mechanisms (De Amaral and Mussagy 2020). The country also faces the risk of resource and revenue mismanagement due to poor reporting practices (Orre and Ronning 2017). The lack of sector knowledge and a centralised bureaucratic decision-making structure paralyse many institutions. The most severe problem is the interference of the ruling party and prominent individuals promoting their self-interest (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

8.1.3. Trends in development outcomes: ANS and HDI

Mozambique has registered high levels of growth in the post-war period, but it has yet to be matched by inclusive development (Phiri 2012). The country has launched various initiatives to address poverty levels and improve development outcomes (African Development Bank 2011). The country's long-term goals are expressed in Agenda 2025, which identifies viable options for achieving inclusive and sustainable development (Bertelsen 2005). The document resulted from a consensual debate involving government, political parties, development partners, the private sector and civil society (African Development Bank 2011).

The government also developed the National Development Strategy (2015-2035) to improve the population's living standards through structural transformation. The strategy outlines several pillars, including developing human capital through improving education, health and public institutions (Republic of Mozambique 2014). There are also medium-term government programs that run for five years. The country's strategic plan (2015-2019) recognised the need for sustainable management of the country's environment and natural resources. It developed a set of policies, including the Green Economy Action Plan (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Figure 8.1, the case prediction eclipse, showed that Mozambique was doing better than predicted on ANS between 2014 and 2018. Mozambique experienced sharp fluctuations in ANS between 1999 and 2004, while the rents were zero. The original estimates of ANS might have been a bit 'noisy' as they are from different sources. [1]Overall there is not much of a trend, as the zigs and zags cancel each other out. ANS had a noticeable decline in 2011 when resource rents peaked as coal investments became operational, which increased export revenues (African Development Bank 2011). Another decline in ANS occurred after 2015, when commodity prices fell between 2014 and 2016. The hidden loans scandal also emerged around the same time (Orre and Ronning 2017)

What is concerning is that resource revenues are predicted to become significant in 2030, when the gas projects complete their cost recovery (World Bank, 2022). However, as indicated earlier, the country has mortgaged its resources to arrange cash up-front (Orre and Ronning 2017). Several challenges remain in collecting and monitoring revenues, and the debt obligations and loss of donor support also mean that there will be a lack of investment in productive assets. The country's financial management is substandard, even before the onset of significant revenues (Orre and Ronning 2017).

If the country fails to transform the extracted resources into other forms of capital, it will likely have negative or near zero ANS in the future (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). It is also predicted that fiscal revenue will be lower than expected, and based on the record of politicians in government, there will likely be deals that increase

1. The data for ANS is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, but I also use ANS estimates in the World Bank's 'The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium' report to address the gaps in missing ANS values for Zambia (1990-2008) and Mozambique (1990-2004)(World Bank 2011).

short-term profits at the expense of broad development (Orre and Ronning 2017).

There were impressive leaps in human development during the 1990s and early 2000s (Orre and Ronning 2017). After independence, the government provided free health care and education until structural adjustment policies were implemented (Pitcher 2006; Phiri 2012). After the civil war, the government made significant investments in social development, including health, education, water, and sanitation (Pereira 2009). The post-conflict settlement provided an impetus for growth and stability, and the involvement of international aid partners also increased social spending (Phiri 2012).

Between 1990 and 2018, the country's HDI value increased from 0.22 to 0.45. Life expectancy at birth increased by 14.9 years, and mean years and expected school years increased by 2.7 and 6.0 years, respectively (United Nations Development Programme 2019a, 2). However, malnutrition and diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB were still prevalent (Phiri 2012). In 2005, the adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS was 12 per cent, and 510 000 children were orphaned. HIV prevalence was estimated at 10. 5 per cent in 2015, and life expectancy was 55 years at birth, the fifth lowest in the world, partly explained by the legacy of high HIV infection (Orre and Ronning 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

HIV/AIDS impacts the economy by slowing the rate of human capital accumulation. It reduces the share of the school-age population and impairs the education system's capacity (Bertelsen 2005; Arndt 2006). The reduced human and physical capital accumulation also affected the growth rate in 2012 (Arndt 2006). Thus the demographic, social and economic effects of HIV/AIDS, like in Namibia, have been devastating for Mozambique's development goals (Phiri 2012).

The quality of education, enrolment and completion rates have become a key priority, especially in primary education, as the dropout rate is 68.4 per cent. 18.6 per cent of the 2015 state budget was allocated to education, more than the average public expenditure on education among African countries, which is 15.5 per cent (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 32). Despite the investment efforts, Mozambique's HDI value for 2018 was 0.446, putting the country in the low category of human development at 180 out of 189 countries and territories and below sub-Saharan Africa's average of 0.541 (United Nations Development Programme 2019a, 2)

When the HDI is discounted for inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level, the value falls to 0.309 (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 3). Education and health services are unevenly delivered across the country, which increases spatial inequalities. Most Mozambicans do not have access to formal health, and health indicators are amongst the lowest on the continent (Pereira 2009).

8.1.4. The interplay between political accountability mechanisms and development in Mozambique

This section analyses the interaction between Mozambique's political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes since independence in 1990. The country is struggling to consolidate its democracy and limit the dominance and interference of the ruling party in most aspects of political and economic life (Orre and Ronning 2017). Democratic institutions are not supplying citizens with sufficient socio-economic benefits; the economy grew after the civil war, but the growth is not reflected in the lives of ordinary citizens (Pereira 2009). The governance trajectory makes Mozambique ill-suited to manage the expected massive inflow of revenue from natural gas resources. The high debt compounds the challenges of developing and implementing effective policies to achieve inclusive and sustainable development (Henstridge et al. 2012).

8.1.4.1. Vertical political accountability mechanism and development outcomes

Frelimo has utilised legal and constitutional means to maintain an absolute monopoly over political and administrative power (Braathen and Aslak 2001). The ruling party dominates the staff appointment in most public institutions at the central and local levels, and party loyalists are rewarded with jobs and other privileges. Meanwhile, the active entry of opposition parties into the local state machinery is deliberately blocked, affecting the plurality of voice in policy implementation (Orre and Ronning 2017). The dependence on aid has meant that the government's attention is often focused on donors rather than citizens, weakening government structures and accountability mechanisms. Further, Frelimo strongly influences how development aid and investment are channelled (Orre and Ronning 2017)

Corruption at all levels of government costs the economy millions of dollars, and the country defaulted on its debt in 2016, which has become unsustainable (Orre and Ronning 2017). During the hidden debt scandal, the government did not attempt to collaborate with Kroll in the independent audit, and there was a lack of access to sources of information for the company to clarify facts around the secret borrowing . Former president Guebuza and Minister of Finance Manuel Chang refused to comment, while Nyusi claimed that the government would support implementing the recommendations (Orre and Ronning 2017). Former president Guebuza, ministers and key Frelimo officials and their families have maintained an interest in the extractives industry and have significant business interests (Center for Public Integrity 2010). Meanwhile, contracts in extractive industries have been confidential, making it challenging for civil society to hold companies and the government accountable (Gqada 2013).

Though the country has held six elections since 1994, they have not been accompanied by a steady institutionalisation of democratic values and rules (Braathen and Aslak 2001). Opposition parties are weak, fragmented, poorly organised and financed and cannot present a viable alternative to the ruling party. Opposition parties have largely failed to provide checks and balances on the operations of the ruling party, to prevent the abuse of power and ensure that Frelimo acts in the interest of the public (Pereira and Shenga 2005). Citizens have mainly retracted from politics, or at least the ballot box. However, citizens' tolerance levels get challenged sometimes, and they resort to rioting. The state has contained such reactions with repression and concrete measures, such as fuel subsidies and currency inflation, to lower food imports. Thus, the riots can potentially cause political upset but do not threaten the political system (Bilal 2013).

Frelimo has a hegemonic presence to govern alone and approve amendments to the constitution. Decentralisation has remained a contested issue within Frelimo, so strict control by central authorities has been re-established (Virtanen 2003). In 1997, many powers constitutionally assigned to municipalities and the administrative courts were removed and given to Frelimo-appointed governors (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). The concentration of power in Frelimo, despite Renamo winning a large section of the electorate in repeated elections, was also a significant factor that led to the 2013 armed conflict. Renamo had demanded a share in institutional power, including the right to appoint governors in the provinces where it claims to have won elections (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Instead, Frelimo has opted for a dual local governance system where urban municipalities have local elections. Rural districts are ruled by Frelimo-appointed officials who have the most power (Orre and Ronning 2017). Frelimo's control over the local level is crucial, as most of the country's population is in rural areas (Virtanen 2003).

The electoral administration bodies are not trusted by opposition parties or civil society. As a result, elections are often controversial and tense (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011). Since Frelimo controls the electoral board and state apparatus, elections cannot be used as an accountability mechanism (Pereira 2014). Hence, parties still lack incentives to compromise on policy issues and instead use extreme means to get their point across, which has been harmful to democratisation and reconciliation (Azevedo-Harman 2015). The ceasefire in 2017 between the government and Renamo was a significant political development that allowed the economy to bounce back (Orre and Ronning 2017).

Like in Ghana, a change in leadership often results in changes in policies and plans. In an interview, the Centre for Public Integrity director, Edson Cortez, argued that the same party is in power in Mozambique, but policies change when the leadership changes within the party; a single party's dominance does not imply continuity (Cortez 2014). José Jaime Macuane, a faculty member at Eduardo Mondlane University, who was allegedly shot for being critical of the government, also stated that it is crucial that we problematise the idea of a dominant party when it comes to policy making and power relations. In the case of Frelimo, one faction of the party can implement policies without consulting the other part of the faction. Internal complexities mean that the outcome of a government decision cannot be considered a united coalition decision. Thus, we need to ponder the kind of coalition needed to ensure the implementation of development plans in the context of a neo-patrimonial state (Macuane 2012, 2014).

An official from the Ministry of Planning and Development, also a member of Frelimo, mentioned that short-termism exists within the Frelimo party. He noted that some unknown projects appear in the budget and that political considerations are linked to the planning process (Ministry of Planning and Development Official 2014)

According to Pereira (2014), a Mozambican governance and democratisation expert, Frelimo is dominant in terms of political institutions rather than having a broad societal coalition. Nuvunga (2014b) also noted that unlike in Namibia, Frelimo is dominant with minimal voter support. It maintains its power by controlling the state machinery and the ballot box. However, the party has learned that it can be ousted and sometimes responds to pressure. Thus, the party dominates politics, but it is never sure, but somewhat nervous, as elections can always change things (De Brito 2014).

The peace agenda, through bilateral compromises between Frelimo and Renamo, is at the cost of reforms for inclusive development (Orre and Ronning 2017, 40). The political elites struck formal deals in 1992 and again in 2014 after renewed violence. Nevertheless, these pacts cannot hold if non-Frelimo elites feel excluded from access to resources and structures of the state (Azevedo-Harman 2015). The emphasis on personal relationships and discretion applied by policymakers in setting and enforcing laws will affect exploration and revenue management (Henstridge et al. 2012).

The uneven institutionalisation of the two major parties means that Renamo struggles to articulate policy programmes or scrutinise government activities systematically. The opposition party has responded to malpractices by the ruling party by organising protests, as in the 1998 municipal elections and 1999 general results, or threatened to return to the 'bush' (Carbone 2003). Renamo's secretary-general had also threatened to split the country if the party's demands were not addressed in 2014, signalling a willingness to use extra-judicial strategies (Azevedo-Harman 2015).

8.1.4.2. Horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms and development outcomes

The transition to democracy in Mozambique fostered an environment of pluralism. The country saw increased political parties, non-profit organisations such as international and domestic NGOs, trade unions, business associations and political parties (Pitcher 2012). However, Mozambique's parliament is weak and dominated by the executive branch, which proposes and drafts most bills. Many bills are passed unopposed without much interrogation by most Frelimo members (Pereira and Shenga 2005). Renamo is too disorganised to demand accountability, meaning the oversight function of parliament is rarely exercised. Renamo's strategy has been to veto Frelimo's proposals, except when the proposals are related to benefits for the MPs. However, Renamo has also called press conferences to present its intentions and voting decisions (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011).

Renamo has also figured that violence and threats are credible bargaining chips (Azevedo-Harman 2015). In the aftermath of the 2012 violence, where Dhlakama's base was attacked, numerous dialogue sessions were held between Renamo and the government, but formal institutions, especially parliament, hardly played a role. Special representatives from the main parties met, and parliament was hardly consulted about who the envoys would be or to ratify those that the president selected (Azevedo-Harman 2015). Parliament's acceptance of such an occurrence reveals how weakly institutionalised and dependent it is on the executive.

There is a tendency for parallel conflict management by top leadership outside the formal structures and processes (Carbone 2003). Renamo's complaints about electoral processes and outcomes of the 1994, 1998, and 1999 elections were resolved through informal bargaining between Chissano and Dhlakama and, at times, with an appeal to the international community, even though Dhlakama did not sit in parliament (Carbone 2003).

Parliament and the Auditor General can inspect national accounts against corruption and theoretically hold the government accountable. Still, the immunity rules for politicians limit this task to the President of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Council and Auditor General (Orre and Ronning 2017). Those who can check the president and his executive depend on the president for the appointment, and there is a severe lack of human and financial resources, which limits the ability of the judiciary branches to hold the government accountable (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). There are also physical threats to Justices. Notable murders include judge Dinis Silica, prosecutor Marcelino Vilanculos and lawyer Gilles Cistac (Orre and Ronning 2017). An MDM representative noted that Mozambique's judicial system is under too much political influence (Mozambique Democratic Movement Official 2014).

Frelimo's powerful Political Commission and Central Committee, containing prominent members of parliament, is a critical player in holding the party to account and checking the presidential and executive authority (Pitcher 2012). Thus, the government has sometimes been responsive, such as when the boycott of the 1998 local elections led the government to accommodate the opposition's procedural concerns and rewrite and pass the electoral law by consensus in parliament (Bureau of African Affairs 2004).

Various CSOs work in the political and economic space but are primarily concentrated in the capital of Maputo and need stronger links to rural civic movements (Azevedo-Harman 2015). They also lack financial sustainability, which affects their credibility as a bridge between citizens and MPs. However, some CSOs have positively influenced the design of government bills and play an oversight role at different levels of government (Pereira and Shenga 2005; Pereira 2009).

Religious organisations have focused a lot on health care and education. For example, the catholic church has pressured the government concerning its moral obligation to fight poverty and maintain dialogue with Renamo (Orre and Ronning 2017). The church has also played a role in mediating the conflict between the two major parties, drawing on the experience of the peace talks facilitated by the catholic lay community in 1992 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). However, when commenting on the state of public health, a Renamo senior official mentioned that Mozambicans get healed in neighbouring countries, whilst no one ever comes to Mozambique to get healed. This was an apt description of Mozambique's dire state of public health (Renamo Senior Official 2015).

Trade unions had organised frequent protests due to the loss of jobs and benefits when the country embarked on privatisation (Pitcher 2012). Although such checks can curb the behaviour of a single actor like the president, they are insufficient in preventing authoritarian responses to any threats to the party itself (Pitcher 2012). Thus, the role of labour is weak, especially in articulating members' interests, because they are dominated by the ruling party, especially in the context of natural resource exploitation, where labour plays a significant role (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

The media continues to promote public debate on national issues. Public debate and criticism of the government are relatively open in the capital city, but the countryside is more repressive and has less space for critical voices (Orre and Ronning 2017). Government-aligned media have higher coverage than relatively more independent media (Pereira 2009). Radio is a popular medium, and the press is mainly an urban medium. Meanwhile, internet access is relatively low, at 6.4 per cent in 2016 (Orre and Ronning 2017). The online space and social media have revitalised print media. Facebook and WhatsApp discussions have become an essential point of democratic debate and influenced the 2014 electoral campaigns (Azevedo-Harman 2015).

There has been intimidation and violence against journalists by state officials and security forces and abuse of opposition members by the police (Pitcher 2012). For example, Mozambique's prominent independent journalist and political campaigner, Carlos Cardoso, was assassinated in 2000 for investigating financial scandals that pointed to the country's top leadership (Braathen and Aslak 2001; Carbone 2003; Hanlon 2004). Independent media houses have also been targeted through break-ins and detaining of editors and directors, such as the station of Dom Bosco radio which was broken into in 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Mozambique demonstrates a limited capacity to solve constitutional, legal and procedural conflicts, which limits a pluralistic political culture and development (Carbone 2003). Frelimo has operated within the framework of a democratic regime to enhance its interests. Moreover, in cases where the president might have the will for reform, he does not have the power to reinstall democratic accountability. Reforms of the proportional system based on party lists may be necessary to enhance the accountability of members of parliament to the electorate. Furthermore, an overall strategy of decentralisation, including fiscal decentralisation, must be addressed (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

8.1.5. Conclusion

Mozambique has underperformed on social inclusiveness, and though there is no apparent trend in economic sustainability, the recent discovery of natural gas in the context of conflict, corruption, rent-seeking and patronage is likely to pose risks for development and its sustainability (Orre and Ronning 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

The country remains an unconsolidated democracy built upon a fragile economic base, with economic growth alongside high inequalities (Phiri, 2012). The country's stability has historically hinged on external factors such as donor support and geopolitics, which makes it unsustainable until national mechanisms are institutionalised (Braathen and Aslak 2001).

Mozambique's political accountability mechanisms require unconditional acceptance and implementation, especially by the main parties, to function. Concessions from the ruling party that are inclusive, including a stronger focus on decentralisation, will be critical in achieving inclusive and sustainable development (Azevedo-Harman 2015).

9. Comparative Country Analysis

Sub-Saharan Africa has the challenge of using non-renewable resources to initiate long-term development processes that outlive the short-term proceeds of resource extraction. There is still debate about whether observed development outcomes in Africa's resource-rich economies should be attributed to political regimes per se or other practices and institutions. In the statistical analysis (Chapter Four), I found that party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for social inclusiveness, and all political variables do not improve or worsen economic sustainability.

I then conducted case studies to explore other contextual factors not accounted for in the statistical analysis and to provide insights into how the different political accountability mechanisms shape policymaking and implementation, influencing development outcomes. The case studies were selected based on statistical analysis. All four case studies focused on democratic countries with abundant natural resources but with differences in electoral competitiveness and degree of party institutionalisation. The rationale was to represent different political accountability mechanisms and how they play out with respect to development outcomes.

I expected electorally competitive democracies to outperform dominant party democracies on social inclusiveness but not economic sustainability. The pressure to win re-election in competitive party democracies strengthens electoral accountability and the need to provide public goods. However, short tenures present a challenge for long-term development. Meanwhile, dominant party democracies behave like 'secure autocracies' and should have longer time horizons. However, dominant party democracies are less inclusive because elections are a weak accountability mechanism when removing a government through an election is improbable.

I also expected democracies with a high degree of party institutionalisation to outperform democracies with a lower degree of party institutionalisation on inclusiveness and sustainability. Institutionalised parties are better coordinated and can effectively deliver public goods. Institutionalised parties are also established, have stable alliances, and are likely to be enduring. The longevity and predictability can give leaders a long-term perspective on policy making.

This chapter analyses the findings from the case studies. The comparative analysis of the country cases reveals that electoral competitiveness incentivises public officials to embark on policy reforms which improve social inclusiveness in Ghana and Zambia. Furthermore, debt relief is essential as it frees funds for social provision. Party institutionalisation has ambiguous effects, but it matters significantly regarding policy implementation, especially in times of crisis, such as during the HIV epidemic in Namibia. The findings also highlight the significance of sector-level policies and institutions (including mining contracts) in explaining economic sustainability.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part summarises the findings from the country cases, and compares two electorally competitive democracies with differing degrees of party institutionalisation: Ghana and Zambia. It also compares two dominant party democracies with different degrees of party institutionalisation: Namibia and Mozambique. The second part of the chapter highlights insights drawn from the cases and their potential implications. The chapter concludes with several recommendations for case study research.

9.1. Case comparison

9.1.1. Ghana and Zambia

Ghana has experienced several peaceful alternations between its two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and witnessed a stable period of political party development and institutionalisation since its return to democratic rule in 1992 (Abdulai and Crawford 2010; Botchway 2018). Like Ghana, Zambia has had more than one electoral turnover. However, Zambia is considered to have a fragmented party system with frequent fissures and fusions among parties, and thus a low degree of party institutionalisation compared to Ghana.

Ghana modestly overperforms statistical expectations on social inclusiveness. However, it underperforms on economic sustainability. The development outcomes are within the 80 per cent ellipse area, thus reasonably close to the statistical predictions. Therefore, Ghana supports the hypothesis that electorally competitive democracies are more likely to be socially inclusive but not economically sustainable.

As expected, the pressure to win re-elections in Ghana led to a steady increase in HDI for the whole period of democracy but with an acceleration between 2004 and 2008. Meanwhile, ANS turned consistently negative at about the same time. The acceleration in HDI coincides with the first turnover from the NDC to the NPP in 2000. The Kufour government signed up for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 2002, which would forgive a country's debt (Adom and Zogbator 2015). The NPP's initial rule from 2000 to 2008 also introduced extensive health and education reforms, including a universal health insurance scheme in 2003, a grant scheme to cover fees, and a school feeding programme (Carbone 2003). Meanwhile, competitiveness also incentivised political actors to prioritise policies that enhance their political survival in the short term. Excessive budget spending in election years and spending based on over-optimistic revenue projections from oil negatively impacted sustainability (McKay, Pirttila and Tarp 2015).

Even though Ghana conforms to the theoretical assumptions I proposed about electorally competitive democracies, there is awareness of the dangers of being on an unsustainable path and a desire to improve economic sustainability through a novel institutional arrangement. The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) made provisions for transparency and accountability and established the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The PIAC was inaugurated in 2011, when ANS were at their lowest, and was mandated to monitor and evaluate governments' use of petroleum revenues, provide a space for public debate on how revenue is spent and an independent assessment of the management and use of the revenues (Mohan, Asante and Abdulai 2018, 276).

The PIAC is a critical accountability institution composed of civil society representatives and reports to parliament and the citizens. It has successfully produced 16 reports between 2011 and 2020, thoroughly detailing the activities of the petroleum sector (Graham et al. 2019). Thus, civil society and media in Ghana have played a critical role in pushing for the PIAC to continue to guard against revenue misuse. However, the PIAC's findings are often not implemented, it has operated with limited funds, and its functions are limited to report writing (Aryeetey and Ackah 2018). It has therefore improved transparency, but not accountability, and unfortunately, is only limited to the petroleum and gas sector. Still, Ghana has to be commended for strengthening its 'immune system' against the resource curse 'disease' through an innovative institution hailed as a model for bottom-up reform (Koponski, Polus and Tycholiz 2013). Importantly, it was made possible by the country's stable political system and relatively strong civil society (Koponski, Polus and Tycholiz 2013).

Zambia, on the other hand, contradicts the hypothesis that electorally competitive democracies underperform on economic sustainability. The country outperforms expectations on both inclusiveness and sustainability despite the low degree of party institutionalisation and the party system's fragmented nature. Zambia's performance substantially differs from the regression estimates as the outcomes were near the 95 per cent ellipse area.

Zambia managed to increase HDI steadily in the 2000s. However, it avoided a decline in sustainability when copper rents boomed in the same period, about the same time as Ghana, which experienced a decline. In 2000, Zambia was classified as a HIPC and was eligible for debt reduction (Thurlow and Wobst 2004). Like in Ghana, the savings from not having to service debt (and the increased revenue from copper) enabled the government to fund education and health and invest in physical infrastructure.

Zambia had positive sustainability values when resource rents increased sharply in the 2000s. Thus, the country deviates from the expectation that competitiveness promotes shorter horizons, adversely affecting sustainability. Unlike in Ghana, where the NDC and NPP have ruled for a maximum of two terms, the MMD government ruled Zambia for four terms (about 20 years), from 1991 to 2011, and did not face serious opposition that challenged its dominance, especially between 1996 and 2001. The regime sequenced its economic reforms to correspond to domestic political interests (Rakner 2003). A fundamental reform, implemented at the end of the MDD's second electoral term, included the privatisation of the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines between 1997 and 2000 (ZCCM) (Rakner 2003).

As Zambia was desperate for new investments, the World Bank and IMF advised the country to develop an investor-friendly regulatory regime to attract investments.

The privatisation of the ZCCM was rapid and comprehensive, increasing production and profit for mining companies (Fraser and Lungu 2007). The privatisation process culminated in secret Development Agreements (DAs) between private mining companies and the government, which stabilised the fiscal and environmental regulations, including exemptions from certain taxes and laws on environmental pollution (Fraser and Larmer 2010).

Despite the unexpected surge in world copper prices soon after privatisation, the government could not collect much of the share of revenues from resources to spend on social services and instead relied on donor aid, which ironically increased after the market reforms (Fraser and Lungu 2007). The country still invested in education expenditure, including teachers' wages and salaries, which counts positively towards ANS (Hamilton and Clemens 1999). The first alternation in 2011, with the PF taking over, also resulted in salary increases for civil servants and increased social service spending. The expenditure was financed mainly by loans, especially between 2012 and 2015 (Siachiwena 2017). Zambia's democracy has allowed civil society to call for the renegotiation of the agreements relentlessly. Some DAs, which remained a secret for a long time, have now been published online (Fraser and Lungu 2007).

9.1.2. Namibia and Mozambique

Namibia has had no electoral turnovers, and SWAPO has won all elections since the country's first democratic elections. Namibia's political parties are relatively stable, and the ruling party, SWAPO, has long-standing constituencies. Amongst the four cases, the country ranks highest on the perception of the degree of party institutionalisation at 0.82. Mozambique has had no electoral turnovers since its first multiparty elections in 1994. However, Mozambique's party system has undergone a limited and uneven process of institutionalisation, with the perception of the degree of party institutionalisation at 0.56.

According to cross-national estimates, Namibia's development record modestly underperforms on indicators of inclusiveness and sustainability. The actual development outcomes are within the 80 per cent ellipse and, thus, reasonably close to the predictions. Namibia supports the hypothesis that dominant-party democracies are less socially inclusive but contradicts the theory that they should have longer time horizons. The country underperforms on both development outcomes despite a relatively high degree of institutionalisation.

Namibia's HDI declined from around 1994 to 2010, and ANS began to drop sharply from about 2015. Namibia's underperformance in HDI is linked to the HIV epidemic, which became the largest cause of death by 1996. The epidemic reduced life expectancy, thus negatively affecting HDI. SWAPO's institutionalisation came in handy as the party implemented policies to curb the deaths from AIDS-related infections, including the rollout of antiretroviral drugs, whose coverage reached 92 per cent in 2018 (United Nations Development Programme 2019b).

ANS began to drop in about 2015. SWAPO's electoral dominance prevents the opposition from holding the government accountable for diverting resource revenues to politically-connected elites by allocating mining licences (Hopwood 2013). The Minerals Act explicitly addresses the preservation of secrecy but not transparency of licensing processes (Links 2010, 10). Unlike in Ghana, where a novel institution has been created to promote transparency and accountability, and in Zambia, where civil society has managed to get secret contracts published for public scrutiny, Namibia lives up to the expectations of the dominant party system, specifically liberation movements. In this case, a culture of secrecy is encouraged, and independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party (Gumede 2017).

Corruption is a high-profile problem, and several commissions have been established to investigate specific incidents with little implementation power (Hunter 2005). Despite good governance indicators, civil society is relatively weak. High-level government officials have been noted to publicly attack journalists and opposition politicians in response to perceived criticism of the government or ruling party (Bauer 2001). Thus, unlike in Zambia, civil society finds it difficult to trace the exact ownership of exploration rights, and the fight for the transparent and accountable management of Namibia's resources continues (Hopwood 2013).

Mozambique also moderately underperforms expectations on social inclusiveness but overperforms on sustainability. The actual development outcomes are also within the 80 per cent ellipse and, thus, reasonably close to the predictions. The country supports the hypothesis that dominant-party democracies are likely less inclusive but should have longer time horizons.

Mozambique experienced high growth rates from 1993 to the late 2000s. Like Ghana and Zambia, it had a substantial debt reduction in 2002, allowing the country to free funds for social spending and steadily improve its HDI. However, non-rent GDP declined sharply after 2014 due to a loan corruption scandal which led to an economic crisis and explained the modest underperformance of HDI for the 2014 – 2018 average. Concerning economic sustainability, Mozambique had zero resource rents until the mid-2000s, and resource revenues are expected to be significant in 2030 when the gas projects complete their cost recovery. However, the country had noticeable ANS declines in 2011 when coal investments became operational and in 2015 after the loans scandal coincided with a fall in commodities and export revenues between 2014 and 2016.

Mozambique's history of conflict meant that the country initially sought to establish an investor-friendly environment by offering extensive tax exemptions to mining companies, like in Zambia. Companies like Kenmare negotiated favourable terms, including contract secrecy and no corporate taxes (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013; Selemane 2013). Without capturing sufficient rents, the government has used its access to donor funds and partnerships to entrench its power and fund its development programmes (Gqada 2013; Sumich 2010).

The country has since scaled back on the tax exemptions and moved from a project-specific regime to a legislative one. Still, the government lost most of its revenue in negotiations between 2000 and 2002 (Center for Public integrity 2013). Furthermore, like in Zambia, contract confidentiality has made it challenging for civil society to hold companies and the government accountable and poses challenges for tax collection (Gqada 2013). These contracts have been a subject of debate in the Mozambican public space, and there have been strong calls for them to be renegotiated (Brynildsen and Nombora 2013). Nevertheless, like in Namibia, civil society operates in a confined space and lacks financial sustainability.

The moderate overperformance in sustainability will likely be short-lived, given the predicted revenue boom in 2030 (Frynas and Buur 2020). The country has mortgaged its resources to arrange cash up-front, and conflict continues in the gas-rich region of Cabo Delgado (Orre and Ronning 2017).

9.2. Case study insights and implications

I draw several insights for understanding social inclusiveness and economic sustainability from the case study findings.

First, contrary to the statistical findings, electoral competition does help with social inclusiveness. The risk of being removed from office incentivises incumbents to provide public goods and increase social welfare should they wish to maximise their chances of being reelected (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017). The findings from the

Ghana and Zambia cases, two electorally competitive democracies performing well on social inclusiveness, confirm the theory that electoral competition encourages governments to use resources for the collective good rather than personal benefits (Humphreys and Bates 2005).

There are limits to electoral competition, including a lack of information amongst voters about leaders' performance, and voting may be identity-based, which may encourage clientelistic distributions (Carbone and Pellegeta 2017). Thus, governments may focus revenue spending on targeted programmes such as the creation and distribution of jobs or investments in infrastructure. Moreover, even when elected leaders decide to increase social spending, it may not translate to better outputs (education enrolments) and outcomes (literacy and infant mortality rates). Worryingly, the fiscal expansion occurring in the run-up to elections brings macroeconomic instability at the expense of future savings (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014; World Bank 2018).

The limitations of electoral competition imply that there may be a tradeoff between social inclusiveness and economic sustainability. Furthermore, though there is no deterministic correlation between electoral competitiveness and development outcomes, the literature on the resource curse should pay attention to questions of institutional design and their impact on development and as alternative measures to institutional quality and performance.

Second, the burden of disease must be considered in accounts of social inclusiveness. Outside of the resource curse literature, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) found that health improvement has no significant effect on income growth. However, Southern African countries like Namibia and Mozambique highlight the significant impact of notable communicable diseases on development, such as the HIV epidemic, which reduces life expectancy. In such cases, the degree of party institutionalisation becomes critical. Institutionalised parties are well-positioned to contribute to sector reforms and policy implementation, whether in power or opposition.

Third, the debt burden on public finances undermines the government's ability to channel funds into social development projects. Ironically much of the debt crisis in resource-rich economies resulted from public 'spending sprees' supported by commodity booms and external debt as public officials relied on future export earnings. However, spending is not reduced in times of declining prices because it would have political repercussions, especially in competitive contexts. Instead, governments take up more loans to increase social spending and support populist spending (Onyekwena 2019). Thus, while improving HDI indicators through increased social spending is possible, how the social provision is financed is just as important because it may still place countries on an 'unsustainable' path.

Fourth, sectoral policies play a significant role in achieving economic sustainability. Economic sustainability requires policies that effectively maximise rent produced by mining companies, the recovery of the rent by government agencies that are not only willing but able to do so, and the reinvestment of rents into productive assets, such as health care and education (Lange 2003b; Laporte and Quatrebarbes 2015). Findings from Zambia and Mozambique, countries with different political configurations, show that mining agreements have served to limit the rent captured by the state. Still, the adverse effects of the extraction are potentially hidden by education expenditure (which contributes positively to ANS) financed not only by rents in times of booms but external aid and loans. Thus, the sustainability of natural capital should not be separated from questions about who owns, controls or manages the resource (Redclift 2005). Furthermore, linked to the previous point three, the findings imply that public debt may need to be accounted for in economic sustainability measures. Unsustainable debt (even if used to fund social services) can harm future generations.

Fifth, the impact of political accountability mechanisms on economic sustainability may depend on sectoral institutions which promote transparency and accountability, including the transparency of mining contracts. Transparency is often missing in dominant party democracies of Mozambique and Namibia, as well as Zambia during the MMD's rule, considered a 'predominant party system' at the time (Burnell 2001). In the case of Ghana, the creation of a novel accountability institution like that PIAC shows that electorally competitive democracies may have the ability to self-correct through reforms when they are on an unsustainable path. Nonetheless, transparency is not accountability; thus, monitoring and evaluating compliance is critical.

Sixth, the capacity and space for horizontal and social accountability mechanisms must be improved. Though political systems are not homogenous units, the capacity to tolerate differences is essential for the democratic system to function (Virtanen 2003). The four democracies provide a space, at different degrees, for policy interests to be articulated by various actors with varying degrees of power and incentives (Oduro, Awal and Ashon 2014). However, excessive powers of the president and executive exist in all cases, with the president influencing key institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary, thus limiting parliamentary oversight. Parliaments play a weak supervisory role across the board because of excessive partisanship and the influence of the executive (Bebbington et al. 2018). Opposition parties are also generally weak and confronted by power struggles, factionalism and defections.

In all cases, financial and capacity issues constrain civil society's role, as most organisations rely on external donors. They also face massive obstacles, including official intimidation and repression, especially in dominant party democracies. Thus, the cases show that horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms evolve late in the sequence and build on progress made in vertical accountability mechanisms (Mechkova, Luhrmann and Lindberg 2019). Therefore, it is critical to continuously improve vertical/electoral accountability to protect and reinforce other accountability mechanisms that can counter the excessive power of executives (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020).

Seventh, political stability is a crucial variable. Incidences of violence during elections have been recorded in most cases, such as in Zambia's 2016 elections, which saw the police service apply a controversial Public Order Act to deny opposition from holding rallies. However, Mozambique is different in that it exhibits a constant threat of conflict (between the two main parties, Frelimo and Renamo) stemming from the history of anti-colonial struggle and civil war. The Mozambique case highlights how the political changes since 1990 have left the region with diverse institutional arrangements and how some institutions remain fragile and imperfect (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Thus, political stability, often found in mature democracies, is essential for development (Heo and Hahm 2015). Without stability, much of the budget will be used for defence spending, cutting into welfare expenditure (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Eighth, deep structural and historical factors impact development outcomes. The provision of and access to public goods has a regional dimension in all cases, with variations in educational and health attainments resulting from colonial legacies. Furthermore, inequality remains persistent in dominant-party democracies, like Namibia and Mozambique, with enormous disparity along urban-rural, gender and racial lines. Ethnic/tribal considerations exist as parties have geographical bases or strongholds, though no ethnic group dominates to win elections. Thus, inclusiveness and sustainability are more than scientific concepts but require political action (Robinson 2004). Governments can choose to use their power to enable better allocation of resources and address historical injustices.

To conclude, the case studies highlight that a combination of mechanisms may be necessary to provide the basis for inclusive and sustainable development, given that many accountability mechanisms exist in democratic regimes. Still, political accountability mechanisms remain crucial, and economic reforms will not suffice if they are not linked to the political dynamics of the four countries.

In all cases, political actors decide at what pace the government should extract resources and how the proceeds should be used. Such decisions have a long-lasting impact and can affect citizens in the immediate and long term (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Thus, shaping the executive's management of resources through vertical accountability mechanisms is a crucial step in achieving inclusive and sustainable development. After all, democratic institutions can produce an adequate institutional/legal framework. Still, implementing regulations can fall short of expectations due to a lack of capacity and political considerations related to reelection and remaining in power (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

9.2.0.1. Conclusion

This chapter summarised the findings from the country cases by comparing two electorally competitive democracies and two dominant party democracies with different degrees of party institutionalisation. It also discussed insights drawn from the cases and their potential implications.

The findings from the case studies tell us a measured story of optimism. Though the configurations of political institutions in resource-rich African countries vary widely, democracies create procedures for citizens to choose and remove leaders. However, elections are only an essential requirement for democracies and can sometimes not lead to a turnover. Furthermore, parties which participate in elections may not be institutionalised. Still, countries can perform on some aspects of development, given the incentives in their context, and we find that electoral competition and party institutionalisation are crucial for social inclusiveness. At the same time, economic sustainability requires a nuanced understanding of sectoral policies and institutions.

There is room to be optimistic about the payoffs from vertical political accountability mechanisms, given the creation of the PIAC in Ghana. Still, such horizontal accountability mechanisms are not independent sources of constraint but are guaranteed by robust competition in elections (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell 2020). Furthermore, the findings also show that vertical political accountability mechanisms, including democracy, may guarantee the presence of horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms but not their strength or effectiveness. The extent to which accountability institutions like the PIAC are successful will depend on addressing executive power concentration, improving state capacity, and parliament's and civil society's oversight abilities.

Case studies have also highlighted structural explanations for development in resource-rich countries, including the formative role of colonial history, which created the conditions for the emergence of political parties of different shapes and ideological approaches (Du Pisani and Lindeke 2009). Furthermore, multiple actors and factors are involved in the development process. International economic factors and relationships influence domestic policymaking and implementation, including commodity price changes and external donors (Soubbotina 2004; Sneddon, Howarth and Norgaard 2006).

Concerning case study research, we must investigate to what extent dominance and a culture of secrecy in countries like Namibia and Mozambique limit access to information for researchers, as some cases like Ghana and Zambia are more widely studied and have more resources. During my field research, it was relatively easy to secure interviews with opposition party officials from electorally competitive democracies (Ghana and Zambia). In contrast, officials in dominant party democracies (Namibia and Mozambique) were less willing to be interviewed, and when they agreed to do so, they often preferred to remain anonymous. This observation further cements the need to study the political and institutional differences in resource-rich democracies.

Finally, in-depth comparative case study research, which accounts for historical processes, may require more than one researcher. Nonetheless, the comparison of the cases, though variable oriented, remains useful in addressing the gaps in debates about development based on the extraction of resources, including studying resource-rich democracies in Africa, which have been overlooked.

10. Conclusion

The problem that informed this study is the region's dependence on the proceeds of resource exports, which we cannot assume will translate into consistent and reliable revenues to support present and future development goals. Thus, governments are faced with the challenge of 'sustaining the unsustainable', that is, using resource revenues to improve welfare broadly throughout society and invest in forms of production that can outlive the depletion of natural assets.

Scholars agree that political institutions matter for development. However, there is disagreement on which political institutions account for the wide variations in development outcomes. This study aimed to clarify whether observed development outcomes should be attributed to political regimes per se or other accountability mechanisms. Specifically, do democracies perform better or worse on average than non-democracies? Do electorally competitive democracies perform better or worse than dominant-party (but still multi-party) democracies? Do more institutionalised party systems perform better or worse than less institutionalised party systems? In general, how do different political accountability mechanisms affect performance on various dimensions of development?

The main shortcomings of existing literature included the overemphasis on measures of institutional quality and performance, such as corruption and the rule of law, which ignores the political conditions under which such institutions are formed and operate, such as regime types. Second, studies have overlooked the existence of resource-rich democracies in Africa and have emphasised authoritarian regimes to provide evidence for a resource curse. Third, studies have primarily based their findings on cross-national evidence without considering contextual factors. Finally, studies which focus on development or sustainable development as an outcome have not considered the inclusivity aspect and tend to use economic growth (GDP growth or GDP per capita) as a measure of development.

I took two approaches to address the gaps. First, I built a framework for analysing how political accountability mechanisms affect development outcomes. The framework consisted of political regimes, electoral competition, and party institutionalisation – political mechanisms often ignored when focusing on institutional quality. Second, I employed a two-dimensional measure of development, encompassing economic sustainability and social inclusiveness, a move away from only using conventional indicators such as GDP growth. To account for the limitations of the cross-national analysis and a focus on authoritarian regimes, I conducted case study research focusing on resource-rich African democracies.

I argued that democracies are more likely to outperform autocracies on social inclusiveness since they require broader constituencies and would thus be responsive to popular preferences. However, democracies have 'intermediate' time horizons, while autocracies can have either very short or very long time horizons depending on how secure their hold on power is. I also expected competitive party democracies to outperform dominant party democracies on social inclusiveness because the risk of being removed from office may incentivise incumbents to provide public goods. Meanwhile, dominant party democracies behave like 'secure autocracies' and should have longer time horizons. Finally, I argued that democracies with a high degree of party institutionalisation would outperform democracies with a lower degree of party institutionalisation on inclusiveness and sustainability. Institutionalised parties are better coordinated and are likely to be enduring, and can thus effectively deliver public goods and have a long-term perspective on policy making.

I tested the hypotheses using 'nested' analysis, a mixed methods approach combining cross-national statistical analysis and case studies of four resource-rich democracies in Africa. The findings are generally mixed. The cross-national results show that party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for social inclusiveness but not sustainability. All other political variables do not improve or worsen economic sustainability.

The case study findings show that electorally competitive democracies (Ghana and Zambia) perform better on social inclusiveness. The pressure to win re-election encourages public goods provision. Furthermore, sector-level policies can similarly affect economic sustainability in countries with different political configurations (Zambia and Mozambique). At the same time, some democracies with highly institutionalised party systems underperform on both development outcomes due to the burden of disease and corruption (Namibia). Meanwhile, horizontal and social accountability mechanisms are relatively more effective in electorally competitive democracies with a higher degree of party institutionalisation, like Ghana.

My arguments and empirical results add to (and bridge) two extensive and evolving literature. First, I contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of politics and institutions. Previous findings on the effect of regime types on economic performance are mixed and focus on growth as a measure of economic performance (e.g. Barro 1996; Acemoglu et al. 2019). In my cross-national analysis, regime type and electoral competition do not reveal statistically significant effects on development. Party institutionalisation is the only political predictor for social inclusiveness but not economic sustainability. However, through case study analysis, I found support for the positive role of democracy and electoral competitiveness for social inclusiveness in Ghana and Zambia.

Second, I contribute to the work on the effects of natural resources on development. A vast literature has detailed how natural resources shape various economic outcomes, including economic growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1995; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). This research has been challenged by several scholars who find no evidence for the impact of natural resources on development (e.g. Haber and Menaldo 2011) and those who find that the effect is conditional on several factors (e.g. Collier and Venables 2009). In the cross-national analysis, I find that natural resource rents are not positively associated with more inclusive and sustainable development patterns compared to the non-rent sectors. In the case studies, I find evidence for increased social spending in times of commodity booms in Ghana and Zambia, but governments also use income from other sources such as loans. Furthermore, sectoral policies influence the extent to which governments can sufficiently capture and productively allocate rent in Zambia and Mozambique.

The combination of Large-N analysis and case studies of resource-rich economies is a significant contribution. It highlights contextual factors not accounted for in many cross-national studies. The mixed method approach helps identify variables that may explain development outcomes outside political institutions, such as public debt and contractual agreements. Moving away from using only conventional indicators of economic performance, such as GDP growth, to focusing on the inclusivity and sustainability aspects of development is another significant contribution. It highlights the potential tradeoffs between two desirable development goals. Development may be inclusive but not necessarily sustainable, and vice versa. Yet, both are critical if governments are to achieve development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

The findings have implications for how governments harness their inherently unsustainable resource wealth to achieve sustainable and inclusive development. However, a precise specification of the pathways linking political accountability mechanisms and development outcomes may require further examination. Future research should clarify the interactions between different levels of accountability mechanisms (macro vs sectoral). Specifically, studies should investigate the role of sectoral policies, institutions, actors and the context within which they evolve. For example, the policy regime that develops can be influenced by the heads of ministries of resources, who tend to have discretionary power. Second, the temporal effects of resource extraction have yet to be adequately analysed. Countries begin mining at different times, which may impact policy development and implementation. Third, experiential measures, which consider citizens' perceptions of development, may improve our understanding of how revenues generated from natural resources contribute to inclusive development. Third, a measure of economic sustainability may need to account for the level of public debt. Unsustainable debt can harm future generations. Finally, the impact of external factors and foreign interests, which may reinforce structural constraints and limit room for the government to manoeuvre its policies, warrant further investigation. External actors like China drive global booms and busts and substantially invest in Africa's resource sector, impacting the region's development trajectory. Nonetheless, while important, these factors were beyond the scope of this thesis.

A. Appendices

A.1. Two dimensions of development, including Liberia

A.2. Calculating ANS adjusted for diamonds

I adjust ANS for diamonds because they are not included in the World Bank database, and some of the cases, like Namibia, are diamond-rich. The diamond rent estimate is from the Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW) paper, “Where Did Africa’s Resource Curse Go?”, which calculates the diamond estimates using information from various sources (Alence, 2015). I apply the World Bank methodology to calculate ANS adjusted for diamonds. I subtract diamond depletion as a % of GDP from ANS as a percentage of GDP. I calculate the diamond depletion assuming 0.2 (20%) of production revenue is "rent". In other words, for every diamond (1$) sold, the rent is 20 cents, using the 0.64 (64%) average depreciation factor. Therefore, Diamond depletion (% of GDP) = 100 * (diamond revenue / GDP) * 0.2 * 0.64. Most countries have no diamonds, so their ANS is unchanged by the adjustment. But for those with diamonds, like Namibia, a rough estimate is better than nothing.

Figure A.1.: Two dimensions of development: economic sustainability and social inclusiveness, including Liberia



A.3. Calculating HDI

The UNDP calculates the HDI ndex through a two-step process. The first is that minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are set to transform the indicators expressed in different units to be between 0 and 1. The life expectancy years are set at 20 as a minimum and 85 as the maximum aspirational target. Expected years of schooling are set at 0 as aminimum and 18 as a maximum. Mean years of schooling are set at 0 minimum and 15 years maximum. Missing values are estimated using cross-country regressions. Equatorial Guinea was the only country whose expected years of schooling were estimated using regressions (UNDP, 2019).

A.4. Degree of party institutionalisation indicators

The Varieties of Democracy project (VDEM) developed a country-level index measure of party institutionalisation as the first global index, covering 110 countries from 1900 to 2018 (Bizzaro et al., 2020). VDEM poses questions that investigate the proportion of parties with features that resemble an institutionalised party at a country level. The assessment captures the scope of party institutionalisation in a country, the proportion of parties that reach a threshold of minimal institutionalisation and the depth of institutionalisation (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2019, p. 1211). The indicators to measure these are as follows:

1. Party organisations: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organisations?
2. Party branches: How many parties have permanent local party branches?
3. Distinct party platforms: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms

(manifestos) publicised and relatively different from one another?

4. Legislative party cohesion: Is it normal for legislature members to vote with other party members on important bills?

5. Party linkages: What is the primary or most common form of linkage to their constituents among the major parties?

The first three indicators focus on party routinisation, and the last two focus on value infusion. PI is aggregated by adding standardised versions of the indicators and then normalising the measure on a 0-1 scale. The components are correlated reasonably (about 0.6 and up) with the index itself, though some of the correlations among the components are somewhat weaker (around 0.2). A principal-components analysis of the five component measures shows that all the components load with the same sign on PC1, and PC1 accounts for roughly more than double the amount of variance that PC2 accounts for. The additive index allows for partial substitutability where a high value may partly compensate for a low value on another indicator (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2019, p. 1211).

I also use the VDEM 0-4 scale for the indicators, where 0 = no parties, 1 = fewer than half of the parties, 2 = about half of the parties, 3 = more than half of the parties, 4 = all parties. I take an average of the scores for each country (in each year) to get a number between 0 and 4, then divide that number by 4 to get a 'min-max' indicator on a zero-one scale.

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