



HWS 290

MORONEY

HISTORY WORKSHOP

THE WITWATERSRAND: LABOUR, TOWNSHIPS AND PATTERNS OF PROTEST

UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

3-7 FEBRUARY 1978

AUTHOR: Sean Moroney  
(University of the Witwatersrand, SA Institute of Race Relations)

TITLE: The Development of the Compound as a  
Mechanism of Worker Control 1900-1912

NOT TO BE QUOTED, REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

In this paper I wish to describe the development of mine compounds on the Witwatersrand after the South African War and to highlight the central role they came to play in the process of labour extraction. The compound provides a useful focus of the labour system on the Witwatersrand over this period by linking state sponsored mechanisms of labour control (the pass laws, masters and servants act and labour recruiting) with the internal processes of the individual mines (control, discipline and coercion).

### INTRODUCTION

The years following the South African war saw a decided qualitative change in the Witwatersrand's many mine compounds. Symptomatic of the period of more efficient exploitation fostered under the Milner administration, and particularly as a result of the strict controls introduced for Chinese labour from 1904 onwards, the compounds came to resemble more closely the effective institutions of worker control that were to dominate the South African migrant labour system throughout the century. (1)

In the years immediately following the South African war there were dramatic changes in the labour market of Southern Africa. A number of factors, including the growth of alternative, more attractive, work opportunities, (2) induced greater competition for labour within the South African market. Urgent representations were made by mine management for the state to remedy the "labour shortage". The 1903 Transvaal Labour Commission of Inquiry and the subsequent importation of Chinese indentured labour in 1904 were instituted in response. In addition the industry initiated measures to reduce internal competition. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was established to undertake combined labour recruiting and a maximum average wage schedule was agreed upon within the industry to prevent further competition. Because of the stringent profitability constraints within which the mining industry operated and the continued exploitation of low yield mines, labour could not be attracted through increased, more competitive wages. Management devised a range of mechanisms to recruit and retain labour. WNLA and later other recruiting agents waged a concerted campaign to obtain labour from within Southern Africa using a variety of methods. (3)

Due to the nature of the labour market and the often deceptive or coercive manner in which workers were obtained, management, in close collaboration with the state, devised a range of mechanisms to ensure the completion of contracts and prevent desertion. The pass-laws were a crucial component of management's strategy. (4) In conjunction, the Master and Servants Law, prohibited strike action by black workers and thus ensured their continued cheapness. Within the mines widespread violence and coercion was employed to ensure the continued subjugation and productivity of workers. The compound was the social pivot of this system of labour repression.

Prior to the South African War mine compounds developed along rudimentary lines compared with the tight security of those in Kimberley. However, as a result of the changes in the labour market after the war, management paid closer attention to compound security and efficiency. The relative freedom of movement previously enjoyed by workers was drastically reduced as the compounds became virtually "closed". (5) Desertion became increasingly difficult and absenteeism was reduced. In 1903 the Department of Native Affairs reported that "loafing" was "practically stamped out". In June 1903, 5,4 workers per thousand "loafed" as opposed to a rate of 33,7 for the corresponding month in 1899. (6)

### PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Compounds at the turn of the century generally consisted of a rectangular gathering of huts or barracks in which workers lived. The courtyard in the

centre would contain the kitchen, washing facilities (if they existed) and possibly the compound manager's office. Extensions of corrugated iron and wood were often built onto the original brick structures, making the courtyard more cramped. Conditions varied from one mine to another. However some were bad enough to necessitate official action in terms of the rudimentary minimum standards laid down in 1905 by the Coloured Labourers Health Regulation Ordinance. Official action was hardly vigorous and often consisted of informal requests for improvement which allowed for lengthy stalling action on the part of the mines concerned.

Compound rooms or huts accommodated anything between 20 and 50 workers. Usually double decked bunks were built against the walls and were often turned into separate cabins by their occupants nailing strips of wood over the openings to protect themselves and their belongings. As a result of overcrowding in most cases, workers were forced to sleep on earth floors which, because of poor drainage and leaking roofs, became muddy during rain. Heating facilities were seldom provided and workers installed their own Imbanla or fire buckets which usually had no chimneys. Damp conditions combined with poor ventilation and the fumes of the fire buckets contributed towards the high incidence of respiratory disease rates on the mines. Workers would also experience drastic changes in temperature as they emerged from an underground shift and often had no opportunity to dry their clothes. Usually they would have to stand in the heat, wet or cold waiting for their work and meal tickets.

In 1903, 5022 African workers were officially reported to have died on the Witwatersrand mines and the causes were summarised as follows:(8)

Pneumonia and meningitis	59,90%	Intestinal infections	11,86%
Tuberculosis	5,33%	Scurvy	5,87%
Accidents	4,03%	Other	12,90%

At the turn of the century few compounds had washing facilities but by 1903 most had installed concrete baths in the courtyard in which workers washed themselves and their clothes.(9)

The remarkable variation in conditions from one mine to another appears to have been determined by a mixture of their different profitability rates and arbitrary managerial attitudes. The variations were reflected in death rates which in 1903 ranged from 31,10 per thousand per annum on the Wemmer mine to 135,21 per thousand on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine. By 1905 the death rate for the Langlaagte mine was still as high as 135,68 per thousand.(10) An inspection in 1908 revealed that despite government requests for improvements, conditions on the Randfontein group of mines (11) were as bad as, or worse than, after the war.

Diet also contributed towards the high rate of disease and death. The industry's drive to keep "working costs" as low as possible, determined that the workers' diet was both monotonous and deficient. Scurvy rates grew to alarming proportions after the war. Vegetables were rare as part of a compound diet and the mealie-meal, the staple content, was inferior, being derived from oven dried imported grain and had minimal nutrition.(12)

Medical officers as well as the Department of Native Affairs made recommendations for improvements to the diet and accommodation with varying tones of urgency. The government was loath to introduce and enforce regulations. In addition, those medical officers most aware of the prevailing conditions were usually employed by the mines and therefore found it difficult to press too strongly or openly for improvements, if they were in any way inclined to do so.(13) The most that medical officers achieved were piecemeal improvements and the widespread introduction of "kaffir-beer" as a

nutritious diet supplement from 1903 onwards. Workers did whatever they could themselves to supplement their diet. (14) A black contractor estimated in 1907 that mine workers spent over twenty of the fifty shillings they then earned per month on food purchases. (15) It was clearly to management's benefit for workers to spend a considerable portion of their wages on food. T J Britten, who conducted a study of "Native Wastage" for the Chamber of Mines in 1904 recommended that the mines should provide

Greater facilities to the natives to spend their money by the establishment of a greater number of eating houses and kaffir stores, conducted under the supervision of the mines.

He said all managers agreed with him that if this was done workers would spend longer times on the Witwatersrand on the presumption that they had earning targets which would take longer to reach. (16)

Food, as an extremely scarce commodity in the compounds, became an instrument of coercion in the hands of management. Food stappages were used in some mines to punish "loafers" and "inefficients" who did not go on shift or complete their quota of work. Mines in the Consolidated Gold Fields and J B Robinson groups were noted by Pritchard of the Native Affairs Department in 1909 as being most inclined to use this method. In the case of the J B Robinson mines

At one time the food ration was refused to 'loafers', as they termed them, with the result that, in some cases I am informed 'inefficients' [who possibly may not have been physically able to perform the standard day's work] and actually sick natives have been in the past deprived of food. It is well known that the natives share their food and it should therefore have been obvious to those in authority that punishment of this nature would fall as heavily on good workers as it would on malingerers and loafers who it was specially desired should suffer by it. (17)

On the Geldenhuis Deep Mine workers were given a bonus of "one pound of raw meat" if they drilled an extra 48 inches in one shift. The Manager reported that "the experiment has been found to act as a splendid inducement to Natives to become more efficient, while the native efficiency of this mine has increased during the last few weeks by leaps and bounds." (18)

The physical conditions outlined above constituted the debilitating compound environment in which workers' goals were maintained at a conveniently low level, concerned primarily with day to day survival and the eventual completion of their contracts. The alternative chosen by many was to desert. Those who remained found relief in liquor, which was traded illegally in great quantities and varieties. On those Sundays when shifts did not go down (19) workers would buy meat to cook over outside fires and drink whatever concoctions they could obtain or brew themselves. Sunday revelry sometimes developed into inter-tribal or even inter-compound clashes. Workers also found human contact and sexual release in nearby locations if these were allowed to develop and access was permitted.

STRUCTURES OF CONTROL

The central authority in the compound was the white manager. Workers understood that he exercised extreme power over their daily working lives. Higher management relied on him to maintain discipline and a continuous pressure on workers to work their shifts. The compound manager, through the tremendous power he exercised, often determined the level of coercion and violence that would prevail throughout the mine. He could choose to provide relatively good accommodation and food as well as protection against violence inflicted by white workers. If he left labour control in the

hands of cruel compound policemen, neglected compound conditions and condoned or encouraged violence, his mine would earn a bad reputation. Some compound managers in fact intervened effectively on behalf of workers who had been cheated of their pay.(20) Mr H M Taberer, at the time an inspector for the Department of Native Affairs, admitted in 1907 that the compound manager, with his force of "police" was the de facto ruler over the workers' lives, having complete control over their freedom of movement through the pass system.(21) Only compound managers could issue special passes for workers to leave the compound if they were not going on shift.

The manager had under his command a group of compound "police" who played a crucial collaborative role in controlling workers. As van Onselen found in Rhodesia, compound "police" on the Witwatersrand, were also selected because of their social distance from the majority of Africans amongst whom they would work.(22) On the Witwatersrand, workers from Natal and Zululand remained a small proportion of the labour force during the period under review.(23) Evidence indicates that Zulus were appointed as compound "police" on many mines. Numerous complaints against their excesses were recorded. Tribal headmen and sons of chiefs of various tribes were also appointed as police on some mines.(24) Some mine managements recognised that the level of antagonism between workers and "police" of different tribes was non-productive and appointed "police" representative of all the tribes in the compound.(25)

However, management also used tribal differences as a means of maintaining division amongst workers. Buckle, Chairman of the 1931 Native Grievances Enquiry listed the following as the three "safeguards" used by management:

- "(1) The personal influence of the compound managers.
- (2) The native respect for European authority as personified in the police.
- (3) The inter-tribal jealousies which have always rendered it possible, in the last resort, to protect Europeans by utilising one tribe against another."(26)

Evidence shows that inter-tribal jealousies were maintained through the compound "police", separate accommodation (usually according to the preference of workers themselves), tribally composed work gangs and through differential access to scarce commodities like food.

Heading the compound "police", and directly under the compound manager was the head induna. He supervised the compound police and fed the manager "with a constant stream of politico-economic intelligence".(27) The "police" wore uniforms and handcuffs and carried sjamboks which they used liberally as they "hustled" workers from the compounds to the mineheads to go on shift. When complaints arose regarding the use of sjamboks, management argued that they were merely meant to be "badges of office" and disclaimed responsibility for their other uses.(28) "Bossboys", another key group of collaborators, controlled workers underground and extended the violence of the compound system. They also used sjamboks to maintain discipline (29) in conjunction with the white miners who also dispersed blows freely.

Workers reacted against the compound and underground collaborators in the limited ways that they were able to. The mining industry of which the collaborators were the agents, "the abrasive edge of managerial practice and policy",(30) suffered as a consequence of the high rate of defensive desertion and labour withdrawal that occurred.(31) Sir Godfrey Lagden, Commissioner of Native Affairs, while on tour of the Cape Colony in 1904 with the S.A.

Native Affairs Commission, wrote a memorandum to his office drawing attention to the fact that potential workers in the Cape refused to be recruited for the Witwatersrand "because they are set upon and hammered by the Zulu police on the mines". (32) I have been unable to find direct evidence of individual retaliatory action by workers against compound police but I am convinced that it occurred (33) Such action would have produced minimal results compared with labour withdrawal. Management was more concerned to prevent labour withdrawal than to protect its own collaborators.

Each mine compound had, as a vital part of its coercive machinery, a detention room, or, as it was known to workers, "stocks" a result of the fact that stocks were used in these rooms until the time of the Milner Administration. (34) In 1903 the acting pass commissioner judged the mine detention room to be:

an absolute essential as being the only means of controlling riotous and quarrelsome natives. It must be remembered that in the majority of cases mines are situated in a very considerable distance from any charge office or gaol, and as it not infrequently happens that a native 'runs amok' it is necessary that he should be promptly dealt with in order to prevent further developments". (35)

The Commissioner claimed that department inspectors were always informed whenever a worker was detained so that such workers were "seldom detained for more than a few hours". However it is clear that the use of detention rooms was hardly controlled as judiciously as the Commissioner tried to make out. Compound police could detain workers as they saw fit and numerous cases emerged where white miners and contractors also made use of the detention room to punish workers under their supervision underground. (36) In 1905 a white contractor, Anderson, on the Croesus mine was found guilty of assaulting

one native Jim Simali by placing handcuffs on his wrists and handcuffing him to an iron staple attached to a wooden plank made fast to the floor and did keep the said Jim Simali in this position for 4 days without food or drink.

In defence Anderson claimed that

This is a common practice on the mines to lock up natives like this - a kind of punishment. We are not allowed to lash them so they are locked up.

Simali had refused to return to work for Anderson on the night shift, as he had already worked an entire day shift. Anderson was fined £20 or one month's imprisonment. (37) Far from controlling the use of the detention rooms, some compound managers abused the institution. In 1909 the Assistant Compound Manager at the Village Deep was found guilty of assaulting a worker and "inflicting various wounds" by thrashing him with a sjambok while he was fastened by handcuffs to a table in a detention room for about 12 hours. (38)

In June 1902 1 000 workers at the Langlaagte mine went on strike, broke out of their compound and marched towards the Village Deep Mine from where they had been recruited. The strike was defused by police action. However one policeman reported the complaints made to him by the workers:

The compound manger ill treats them by having them thrashed in the compound and down the mine with a cat-o-nine tails and thrashed them on the testicles: further that they were not allowed out of the compound for a moment, that they were shut up like dogs. Also that the compound manager gave instructions to the

native police to hit them when they saw fit, stated that they would work and not give any trouble if the compound manager treated them as human beings not dogs and they would not continue to work while he was in charge of the compound and they would kill him if he continued (39)

It is important not to generalise with regard to such patterns of violence. The fact that the Langlaagte strike was partially a result of the disparity of conditions experienced by the workers who had previously worked at Village Deep, indicates that workers themselves recognised the differences. In 1905 the District Controller at Boksburg noted the considerable variations in conditions:

On certain mines, no harsh treatment of any nature whatever will be permitted. On others, I regret to have to state, it is not only passively winked at, but in some cases actively condoned... (40)

The compound structure provided a cover for violence at all levels of the labour extraction process. In the first instance, a worker, if he wished to lay a complaint of assault, and presuming he had a day off shift, would have to obtain a special day pass from the compound manager to proceed to the nearest pass office. The manager could refuse such a pass if he realised the worker's intention, which he would in most cases. Native Affairs inspectors or police investigators would always have to obtain the manager's permission to enter the compound and would probably have to state their purpose. They could easily be misdirected by the manager as Pritchard, the Boksburg Native Affairs District Controller had experienced:

... the Department will always be at the mercy of the Manager and Compound Overseer, as far as our intelligence is concerned... the crux of the reason why our intelligence is defective, is the fact that Compound Overseers do not - and I go further and say dare not, report to the Officers of the Department every occurrence having reference to the conditions of the natives under them... the mere giving away of 'compound secrets' might mean summary dismissal .(41)

In the closed society of the compound, witnesses could be prevailed upon to make themselves unavailable. Pritchard exemplified this in 1905:

On the new Modderfontein Gold Mining Company a very serious case of assault was unearthed in which a native who had been kicked in the ribs, died of the effects. The case was handed over to the Transvaal Town Police, but, notwithstanding their most strenuous endeavours, no prosecution was instituted, owing to the fact that the principal witnesses were - in my opinion - spirited away. (42)

Whatever the decision of a court might be, the complainant would still have to return to his compound and perhaps suffer reprisals, possibly of a more covert nature. A worker had very little to gain by laying a complaint:

... I am of opinion that all cases of ill treatment do not come to the knowledge of our office in the form they should. Witness the case of Rex vs Seames. In this the natives admitted on oath, that they had never complained, or thought of complaining, of what was subsequently found to be wholesale flogging of a most brutal nature.(43)

The compound extended the clandestine nature of the widespread pattern of underground assault. In the same way it protected management from workers taking legal action against other forms of abuse, particularly illegal pay

deductions and extensions of contract time. Compound society was regulated by its own rules and survival necessitated compliance and subjugation.

Even where workers did lay a complaint of ill-usage and Native Affairs and police investigations led to a prosecution, the law courts, reflecting standards of settler justice, did not strain their powers to punish assault. Punishment for white miners convicted of assault was always minimal. For example, a Native Affairs Official noted in 1906 that in a particular assault case in which the accused was merely discharged with a warning, the magistrate made remarks in court which made it "appear that he considers flogging of natives by their employers as justifiable under certain circumstances". The District Controller continued:

This may in some way account for the number of assault cases in which I have recently failed to obtain convictions against white men for assaults of natives".(44)

Although individual government officials(45) attempted to act against abuses and even agitate for reforms, policy makers in the Milner administration would consistently refrain from interfering with the mine's internal labour extraction processes and continued until its demise, to tread its collaborative path.(46) This attitude was reflected in the action of what one speculates to be the majority of department inspectors. An African contractor told the 1907 Mining Industry Commission:

The complaints of natives are many, but are not known, and even if they are known they are winked at by the so-called Inspectors who spend much of their time in chatting with the mine officials and neglect the people whom they are supposed to look after. (47)

The manner in which the State supported the compound system is reflected in the following two cases. On 1909, as a result of an increasing incidence of assaults being exposed, the CID Deputy Commissioner wrote to his superiors as follows:

I desire to draw the commissioner's attention to the so called mine police boys employed by the different mine companies. These boys are not in any way legally sanctioned either to arrest or otherwise detain natives ... still they are to be seen going about armed with handcuffs and a badge and making arrests. In the mine compounds there are cells in which the natives are imprisoned and in which they are frequently handcuffed under cruel and unnecessary conditions, and no steps appear to be taken by the Inspector of Mines Department or Native Affairs Department to remedy matters. (48)

The commissioner of police proposed that the compound "police" should be drawn under the control of his department, a proposal which the Native Affairs Department opposed strenuously and successfully. The latter was very loath to interfere with the "individuality and influence" of the compound manager "so essential to a well controlled native compound".(49)

In 1905 Brownlee, Magistrate at Mount Fletcher in the Cape, was sent to Johannesburg as a result of complaints sent by workers to their district magistrates. He took statements from the workers on the New Heriot and Driefontein mines which revealed particularly indiscriminate punishment being meted out by white miners and very little attempt being made by compound overseers to rectify the situation. The reasons for assault ranged from lack of skill on the workers part to plain unprovoked violence. White miners punched, kicked and struck with instruments such as sjamboks, jumpers, stones, hammers, shovels and leather bands. Workers' heads and

groins appear to have been prime targets, although some miners had sufficient foresight to hit them only where they were clothed, so that marks would not give evidence of their action. (50)

Officials of the Transvaal Native Affairs Department became highly indignant at the fact that Brownlee, from another colony, had come to investigate and expose conditions on "their" mines. In their objections they inadvertently gave an indication of their attitudes to assaults on workers:

..... without in any way desiring to justify the assailant I cannot but think that the natives gave considerable provocation by their insolent and insubordinate manner. It should not be overlooked that miners are, as a rule a rough and ready class who give a blow as a means of correction as naturally as a duck takes to water ..... though nothing could excuse anything in the nature of a deliberate flogging. (51)

#### CONCLUSION

Beyond providing for coercive labour extraction and the continued subjugation of workers, compounds during the period under review became effective instruments to quell worker unrest and resistance and to prevent inter-mine organisation. This purpose was most clearly articulated by Buckle, chairman of the 1913 Native Grievances Enquiry. He recommended

that steps ought certainly to be taken to render compounds more easily convertible into places of detention, where the compound has strong, steel cased gates which can be locked from the outside, and one entrance, and high walls with no outer windows, a comparatively few armed men can prevent exit from it and thus isolate a disturbance which might otherwise spread with alarming consequences. (52)

Police and management tactics during strikes that have been documented, indicate that consistently, the first step was to persuade or force workers back to their compound. Promises of reform would be made and assurances given by state officials. However, once back in the compound, workers would be less militant, and promises were never fulfilled.

I hope that I have been able to reflect the development of the compounds on the Witwatersrand in a way which not only describes their environment but which also indicates their vital role in labour extraction. Indeed the former is merely a symptom of the latter. During the century compounds were to become more uniform and sophisticated in their methods and structures. However, their violent and coercive roots were to have a determining influence on patterns of industrial relations.

NOTES

1. Compounds in the gold mining industry have been discussed by other writers including Van Onselen, C. Chibaro; "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs Vol. 27, October 1973; Pearson, P. "Authority and Control in a South African Goldmine Compound" African Studies Institute, Wits. Mimeo. This apper confirms the observations made by these writers. However an attempt is made to place the development of the compounds within a particular historical context - a period during which pressure for production increased and the compound became consciously included as a managerial mechanism to extract most production for least expense.
2. See Moroney Industrial Conflict in a Labour Repressive Economy: Black Labour on the Transvaal Gold Mines 1901-1912 Honours Dissertation Wits 1976 pp. 1-2.
3. Ibid., pp.19-31.
4. See Johnstone, Class Race and Gold pp. 35-39.
5. The fact that the compounds were not completely closed was due largely, van Onselen claims, to opposition from trade and commerce, which sector thrived on the custom of mine workers who bought food on a large scale to supplement their diets. Correspondence to the Department of Native Affairs from representatives of trade and commerce, confirms this claim. See SNA 2/251/01. Letter from the Association of Chambers of Commerce of S.A.; also SNA 2/300/01.
6. Secretary for Native Affairs 23/1761/03. Report of the Chief Inspector. "loafing" was a term applied by management to a labour pattern symptomatic of the Witwatersrand's work environment. Long shifts, bad health, mistreatment, the effects of liquor and poor motivation caused a considerable number of a mine's work complement to absent themselves from the daily shift. "Loafing" or absenteeism can be viewed as a short term worker strategy in protest against conditions or merely to ensure recuperation and ultimate survival.
7. Fergusson, Central, Robinson, North Randfontein, South Randfontein, Forges and Stubbs.
8. These figures do not reflect the numerous workers who died on the way to or at home of diseases or injuries contracted or received while on Witwatersrand mines. There is evidence that this incalculable death rate was substantial. Figures taken from Coelho Report SNA 40/12/03 p.19.
9. SNA 9/1200/02. Report by inspector Pietersen on compounds, 23 July 1902; See Coelho Report, SNA 50/2912/03 and Report on the compounds for further details of compount conditions of the Randfontein group of mines, SNA 76/1616/03, October 1908.
10. SNA 40/2255/C2. Comparative Death Rates on Various Mines, 1903; SNA 56/1303/05. Report by Dr Turner.
11. Fergusson, Central, Robinson, North Randfontein, South Randfontein, Forges and Stubbs.
12. In 1903 Dr Sanson, the District Health Officer, instigated an enquiry into the quality of meal used on the mines. Samples of the meal

were examined by a government analyst and many were found to be unfit for human consumption containing moulds, weevils and other insects. SNA 28/2788/03. Sansom to Windham.

13. In March 1902, Wybergh, the Government Mining Engineer, wrote to Dr Turner, a government doctor, about the high rate of preventable illness in the mines and commented on the compromising situation of mine medical officers: "... so long as they are paid by the mining companies they dare not press their opinions where expensive alterations or improvements are required. They are simply at the mercy of their employers, and would in very many cases undoubtedly be discussed if they made themselves unpleasant. Of course there are honourable exceptions... but you must be aware of cases in which medical reports have been suppressed or amended even when made by very responsible men." SNA 7/609/02, 21 March 1902.
14. The Chamber of Mines supported the introduction of "kaffirbeer" because "the privilege thus granted would render the natives more contented and inclined to prolong their stay on the Rand". SNA 14/1858/02.
15. Makhothe in evidence before the 1907 Mining Industry Commission. Minutes of evidence p.1449. Such food purchases would often benefit the mining companies themselves as they owned mine stores.
16. Herman Ekstein Archives 138:395 T Britten, Report on the wastage of Native Labour on the mines of the Witwatersrand District 1904.
17. SNA 90/1825/09. Memorandum by Pritchard on the position of the Native labour supply as at 31 March 1909 p.21.
18. Ibid. Pritchard quoting Hallimond p.22.
19. When shifts did not go down on Sundays workers were not paid for the day, nor were they provided with mine rations as a general rule.
20. SNA 61/3868/05. Smith, District Controller Krugersdorp to Windham, Secretary for Native Affairs.
21. Mining Industry Commission, 1907 Minutes of evidence p.1315. The central position of the compound manager from worker's view is reflected in the names given to mines. A large proportion were named after compound managers, their attributes or characteristics:  
  
eg. Henry Nourse Deep - Madonnel (McDonald)  
Van Ryn West - Thomas  
Robinson Deep - David  
Primrose in Sinqangau - Fierce Temper  
Bonanza - Spensile - Spencer  
  
SNA 8/858/02. "Revised list of Kaffir Names on Mines", 14 October 1907.
22. Van Onselen, C. "The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry 1900-1935" African Affairs vol. 27, 1973 p.403.
23. In 1903 for example, Zulu tribesmen constituted only 1,02% of the total African work force on the mines. SNA 27/771/03 Report of WNLA Board of management 2 April 1903. Zulus also appear to have monopolised positions in the State's black police force.
24. Chiefs played a corresponding collaborative role in the recruiting process. The cooption of tribal authority in the labour extraction system is an important theme. For further details regarding chiefs

as collaborators see Moroney, S. Op Cit p.28.

25. Native Grievances Enquiry Report 1913-14 UC 34 p.19.
26. Ibid. p.64.
27. Ibid. p.16
28. Ibid. p.19.
29. Ibid. p.19.
30. Van Onselen, C. Chibaro p.141.
31. For a more detailed description of these strategies of worker protest see Moroney, S. "Mine Worker Protest on the Witwatersrand 1901-1912" South African Labour Bulletin vol. 3 No. 5, March-April 1977. pp.11-15.
32. SNA 39/2936/04. Lagden to Windham. This strong reaction was confirmed by reports submitted by 18 Cape Chiefs who were taken on a tour of the Reef's compounds in 1903, in an attempt to promote recruiting in their home areas. Almost without exception they cited the rough treatment by compound police, usually named as being Zulu, as one of the Chief complaints of the workers they had interviewed and a retarding factor in recruiting.
33. Van Onselen's study of the Ninevité organisation shows that collaborators were singled out "for singularly unmerciful attention". The Ninevites had penetrated many of the Witwatersrand compounds and there was a likelihood that their methods of dealing with collaborators were emulated by workers. Van Onselen, C. "South Africa's Lumpenproletarian Army: 'Umkosi waNtaba'. - 'The Regiment of the Hills', 1890-1920" Conference on Southern African Labour History University of the Witwatersrand, Institute of African Studies April 1976 p.16.
34. These rooms were referred to rather euphemistically as "isolation rooms" by management in compound plans etc. Although stocks were taken out after the war, they were replaced by handcuffs attached to a pole on the ground.
35. SNA 39/3069/03 Memorandum on the unpopularity among Cape Colony Natives of Service on the Rand p.5.
36. SNA 53/701/05. Complaints of Native labourers from Mqanduli, Driefontein mine 9 March 1905.
37. SNA 57/2147/05 Court transcript: van den Berg vs Anderson 13 May 1905.
38. SNA 89/1261/09 Press clipping entitled "Savage Brutality".
39. SNA 11/1308/02. Report of Trooper Brickhill 26 September 1902.
40. SNA 61/3868/05. Boksburg Controller to Windham 15 December 1905.
41. SNA 61/3868/05 Boksburg District Controller. 15 December 1905.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. SNA 68/2579/06. Kimberley to Pritchard 10 August 1906. The controller reported that his office had processed 18 ill-treatment cases over

8 months. In nine cases the assailant was warned, in three fines ranging from £2-£5 were imposed, in four the assailant was acquitted and three cases were dismissed because of insufficient or conflicting evidence. For details of the substantial number of cases in which workers laid charges for assault see Moroney S. op cit pp. 102-105. In 1905, 118 cases of "ill usage" were reported to pass offices.

45. Jeeves points out that "during 1902 and early 1903 the departmental inspectors who were supposed to act in some sense as the 'protectors' of Africans on the mines, investigated thirteen cases of alleged assault upon black mine workers by their white overseers and twenty-eight complaints concerning wage irregularities. In the same period well over 3000 Africans were disciplined for breach of contract and for other "offences" against their employers". Jeeves A. "The Control of Migration Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner". Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 2 no. 1. October 1975. So although I quote officials who were more inclined to take action, their conscientiousness was rare. The absence of related correspondence from most other "controllers" indicates their lack of activity in this area.
46. For a brief survey of state-management collaboration over this period see Moroney, S. Industrial Conflict pp.32-39.
47. Mining Industry Commission, 1907 Minutes of Evidence, 29 October 1907 J N Nakholtz p.1442.
48. SNA 89/1361/09. Mavrogardate to Commissioner, Transvaal Police 23 April 1909.
49. SNA 89/1361/09. Pritchard to Windham September 1909.
50. SNA 53/701/05; SNA 53/699/05. Brownlee to Windham 7, 9th March 1905. also SNA 93/40/09 Record of assaults committed upon and hardships suffered by natives on mines and works, during November 1909.
51. SNA 53/701/05 Pietersen to Windham, 12th March 1905.
52. Native Grievances Enquiry Report 1913-1914 par. 501. p.67.