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MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA – PRESS COVERAGE OF JACOB ZUMA

by Sibusiso Nkomo

A research report submitted to the School of Literature, Language and Media in the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Journalism and Media Studies by combination of coursework and research.

Johannesburg, 2016

Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Journalism and Media Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University.

Sibusiso Nkomo
November 2016

Abstract

This research report examines news media representation of political leadership and governance in South Africa between 2007 and 2013, when President Jacob Zuma served his first terms as ANC leader and later as the head of state. The research sought to find out what themes and ideas exist about political leadership in news media more than 20 years since the advent of democracy. Quantitative manifest content analysis is utilised to analyse newspaper articles from the *City Press*, *Mail & Guardian*, the *Sunday Independent* and the *Sunday Times*. The results show that media representation of political leadership is most discussed in opinion articles and editorials and relies on key democratic concepts such as freedom of expression and freedom of the media. The key themes and ideas that emerge include the personalisation of leadership, defining leadership, debate on how to lead, Zuma's own leadership traits versus expectations and it became clear that news media evaluated Zuma as head of state or leader of the nation more often than as president of his party.

Key terms: democracy, news media, representation, political leadership, agenda setting

I dedicate this work to my family for their love of education and progress

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Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

ANCYL – African National Congress Youth League

AU – African Union

CODESA - Convention for a Democratic South Africa

COPE – Congress of the People

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

DA – Democratic Alliance

ESKOM – Electricity Supply Commission

HQ – headquarters

ID – identity document

IDASA - Institute for Democracy in South Africa

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

IIAG – Ibrahim Index of African Governance

KZN – KwaZulu-Natal

JZ – Jacob Zuma

MEC – Member of the Executive Council

M&G – Mail and Guardian

MK – Umkhonto weSizwe

N Cape – Northern Cape

NEC – National Executive Committee

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGC – National General Council

NPA – National Prosecuting Authoring

NUM – National Union of Mineworkers

NUMSA – National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa

PDF – Portable Document Format

SA – South Africa

SABINET – Southern African Bibliographic Information Network

SABC - South African Broadcasting Corporation

SACP – South African Communist Party

SANEF – South African National Editors' Forum

SOE – state owned enterprises

W Cape – Western Cape

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This research report focuses on media representation of political leadership and governance in South Africa from December 2007 to January 2013 when President Jacob Zuma served his first term as leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and later the head of state of the Republic of South Africa (from May 2009). To understand how news media describes political leadership occurs in South Africa, the focus should be on the reporting on political leaders and their intrigues. In the case of South African news media[1], Zuma's time leading his party, the ANC and being president of the country gives us a crucial lens to unearth how political leadership is understood, discussed and engaged in the post-apartheid landscape.

South Africa is a relatively new democracy and news media plays a significant role in setting the agenda for what to expect of political leadership in government. The history of the country, which Cowling and Hamilton (2011) describe as a society shaped by the transition in 1994 from a racialised totalitarian regime to a constitutional democracy and transnational free-market economy shapes media. Consequently, public deliberation is a marked feature of the governmental, civic and public arrangements. In part, this is a consequence of the country's transition to democracy through a negotiated settlement, which agreed on a constitution enshrining individual rights, including freedom of expression (Cowling & Hamilton, 2011).

Because of the transition to democracy, the news media in South Africa has taken seriously the rights granted to it by the interim Constitution of 1993 and later the final 1996 Constitution. They have actively sought to cement normative expectations in a liberal democracy that is to serve as a forum encouraging pluralistic debate about public affairs, to be a guardian against the abuse of power and a mobilising agent encouraging public learning and participation in the political process (Norris, 2000 in Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013).

It is in this context of a vibrant media that seeks to hold those in power accountable that Zuma has been a figure of controversy since the substantive fallout over his

[1] Defined here narrowly and only concerns newspapers but broadly it would include broadcast and online media such as radio, television, websites and social media.

criminal trial in 2005 when he was accused of alleged rape by the daughter of his friend, Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo (most famously known as “Khwezi”). Although the High Court in Johannesburg eventually dismissed the charges, during the trial, Zuma admitted to having unprotected sex with his accuser who was HIV positive and took a shower to avoid contracting the disease. His accuser later had to go into exile due to Zuma’s supporters harassing her. Zuma at the time was head of the National Aids Council, a position traditionally held by the sitting deputy president of the country (Thamm, 2016).

Later in 2005 Zuma was dismissed as deputy president by President Thabo Mbeki, due to corruption charges in relation to the R30 billion government deal for the acquisition of arms for the military, the Strategic Defence Package or more popularly known as the “Arms Deal” scandal. His former financier Schabir Shaik was convicted in 2007 of fraud and corruption related to the Arms Deal and the court proved a corrupt and fraudulent relationship between Shaik and Zuma. Zuma then faced hundreds of charges in a separate trial but the charges were subsequently dropped by the then acting national director of public prosecutions at the time, Mokotedi Mpshe. Later on as president of the country, Zuma has continued to be mired in scandal after scandal over alleged corrupt and questionable relationships with businesspersons including the Gupta family who publish the New Age newspaper and own the broadcaster ANN7.

Added to this were other scandals, including in 2010 when he had a child outside his four marriages to the multimillion non-security upgrades to his private residence at Nkandla and finally the Gupta-linked scandals (see for example, Booysen, 2015; Daniels, 2012; Masondo, 2016; Ntuli, 2010; Rague, 2010; Southall, 2013 and Uting, 2011).

Beyond Zuma’s history, when South Africa became a democracy under the leadership of Nelson Mandela many expectations were created of political leadership. Shaun Johnson, then editor at *The Star*, wrote in a column prior to the landmark 1994 democratic elections that:

> Soon, so very soon, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela's followers will begin to dismantle apartheid and the nameless discrimination that preceded it … He, of all people, feels the gravity of that prospect, and the weight of presidential responsibility about to descend on his shoulders (Johnson, 1994).

Johnson's words give a glimpse of what those in the news media during the transition and in the immediate post-1994 environment saw in the future democratic South Africa. Criteria were already being set out for what leaders had to do and achieve with high expectations from everyone. So leaders after Mandela have had the added burden of meeting the promises of 1994, Mandela's achievements and the ideals of the Constitution.

At the same time, while the Constitution and the democratisation process is used as the basis of journalism work in South Africa, the news media has come to face resistance from politicians according to media academic Glenda Daniels. In her PhD thesis, Daniels (2010) explored the relationship between the media and the governing African National Congress (ANC) and found that news media is subjected to a desire by the ANC for more unity and consensus in a fractured society. Daniels argued that the ANC's default position is that the news media is not loyal and supportive of its programmes and this contradicts the Constitution and the professional code of conduct that encourages holding power to account, exposing abuses and being a watchdog for democracy (Daniels, 2010).

During the 2007 to 2013 period, the continued maligned relationship between elements of the governing ANC, government and the news media reached its peak in 2012 when Brett Murray's *Spear* artwork was unveiled at the Goodman Gallery in Johannesburg (see Freedberg, 2012) showing Zuma in a classic Leninisque pose with his penis hanging out of his trousers, which led to protests organised by the ANC outside the art gallery. The painting was a comment on Zuma's personal infidelities and rape trial. The painting was eventually vandalised live on national television and this particular issue brought into question freedom of expression and what is seen as appropriate by those in powerful positions versus artists, art galleries and journalists (see Van Wyk, 2012 and Pillay, 2012).

Aim and rationale of the study

The aim of this study is to explore the themes and ideas that arise regarding political leadership of South Africa and how the media represented them during the Zuma presidency. Key questions include: how does the news media represent political leadership and governance in South Africa? How is the leader of the country during this period discussed as a political leader and someone responsible for governing South Africa? What does it tell us about the narratives/expectations in the media about political leadership and governance? What are the themes that arise in the print media about leadership and governance in a democratic South Africa and the implications for society?

In the period between 2010 and 2013, I worked as a reporter for Independent Newspapers and spent time in different newsrooms including the *Cape Times*, *Cape Argus* and later the *Sunday Independent* covering local and national politics and social issues, especially in the legislatures and political parties. I was fascinated by how journalists see their role in a democracy and in general about politicians and leadership. I noticed a disconnect in how reporters worked and what the editors decided was important enough to be published and that there was a lens through which politics was understood in a newsroom and this was explained reported and packaged for newspaper readers and which analysis was prioritised. Furthermore regular or guest columnists were chosen based on editors' views (see Serino, 2009). It became clear to me that editors and broadly newspaper owners were influential citizens who were conditioning and influencing large audiences about politics, leadership and how it works.

Another observation I made was that weekly newspapers, especially set the agenda for the news cycle and would break stories that exposed much wrongdoing in political parties, the government and other institutions. Political leaders' reprimands created a tug of war between the media and the ANC specifically, where reporters would ask tough questions but then be costantly shut down or attacked.

This ties in well with the Daniels' (2010) argument that since 1994 various groupings within the ANC have come to understand the relationship of the party with the media

as a combative contest and that the news media is not legitimate and is undermining democracy because it upholds “different values” (Daniels, 2010).

It was in this context that I sought to answer the above research questions and chose to focus on what I deemed the four leading agenda-setting weeklies: *City Press*, *Mail & Guardian*, the *Sunday Independent* and the *Sunday Times*. The main reason for the choice of the four newspapers is their reputation; they are well respected and taken seriously by their detractors and provide much more space for debate through letters, opinion pieces and other forms.

In setting the agenda, these newspapers, set the tone for the rest of media each week on the most important stories and this is explained by the *Sunday Times* being the most read newspaper in the country whilst *City Press* and *Mail and Guardian* have produced major scoops and investigations such as the Nkandla scandal and deep reporting on politics. On the other hand, the *Sunday Independent* is heavily focused on political analysis and it is well respected as a cerebral newspaper.

Additionally, these four newspapers represent the largest print and online media organisations in the country outside of the major broadcasters. Media24 owns *City Press*, *Mail and Guardian* by M&G Media, *Sunday Independent* by Independent Media and the *Sunday Times* by Times Media Group. Additionally, broadcast media, including the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), eTV and Primedia, in South Africa tend to depend on print media for investigative and political stories.

Therefore, this research aims to understand the relationship between news media and democracy; especially the study of media and democratisation and how public leadership and governance is understood but also the type of leadership South Africa is thought to needed to succeed.

Additionally, news media sets a high bar for itself and this is explained in its Press Council preamble on ethics and conduct for South African news media that:

> The media exist to serve society. Their freedom provides for independent scrutiny of the forces that shape society, and is essential to realising the

> promise of democracy. It enables citizens to make informed judgments on the issues of the day, a role whose centrality is recognised in the South African Constitution. The media strive to hold these rights in trust for the country's citizens; and they are subject to the same rights and duties as the individual. Everyone has the duty to defend and further these rights, in recognition of the struggles that created them: the media, the public and government, who all make up the democratic state. The media's work is guided at all times by the public interest, understood to describe information of legitimate interest or importance to citizens. As journalists we commit ourselves to the highest standards, to maintain credibility and keep the trust of the public. This means always striving for truth, avoiding unnecessary harm, reflecting a multiplicity of voices in our coverage of events, showing a special concern for children and other vulnerable groups, exhibiting sensitivity to the cultural customs of their readers and the subjects of their reportage, and acting independently (Press Council of South Africa, 2016).

Added to the media role in democracy, this research would potentially contribute to media representation and political science theories especially around public leadership and governance of elected leaders. Additionally, it will shine more light on the significance of the news media as a political actor in its own right and what it deems important for society. This research also would add clarification on the potential role of news media as a democratising agent, on democratic institution building and how the media is an actor that determines changes and influences citizen political attitudes and behaviour in the democratic transition in South Africa (Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013).

A short biography of Jacob Zuma

According to the ANC's website, President Jacob Zuma was born on 12 April 1942 in Nkandla in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal province. He became an active member of the ANC in the early 1960s through conscientisation by his elder cousin Muntukabongwa Zuma who fought in the Second World War. He later was tutored in politics by ANC luminaries such as Harry Gwala, Steven Dlamini, Moses Mabhida, and John Nkadimeng.

In 1963, the apartheid government arrested and sent him to Robben Island to serve a 10-year sentence. After his release, he went into exile to Swaziland and Mozambique, working closely with Thabo Mbeki to undermine the apartheid government. Later he became a member of the ANC's national executive committee in the 1970s, then chief representative of the ANC in Mozambique and later promoted in the 1980s to head of the intelligence department of the party. On his return from exile, during the lead up to the negotiations towards a democracy, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) he participated in the Groote-Schuur Minute process in 1990, an agreement that outlined important decisions regarding the return of exiles and the release of political prisoners and in 1991 he became deputy to then secretary general, Cyril Ramaphosa. He then became pivotal in the then Natal province when he negotiated a peace agreement between his party and the Inkatha Freedom Party which had participated in a low-level civil war in the province and other parts of the country. In 1994, he became member of the executive council (MEC) for economic affairs and tourism in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government and later elected the national chairperson of the ANC. In 1999, President Mbeki appointed him deputy president of the country and in 2007, he was elected president of the ANC defeating Mbeki. In September 2008, Mbeki was forced to resign the state presidency by the ANC and replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe. In May 2009, Motlanthe gave way to Zuma to assume the deputy presidency of the country following national elections won by the ANC. Zuma was then elected in the National Assembly as president of the country (African National Congress, n.d.).

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Journalists in South Africa, especially since the post-1994 period have always maintained that they are fulfilling a constitutional and sometimes moral role as the public's watchdogs and as the Press Council preamble sets in the previous section, the media exists to serve society. This suggests that the media in serving society is a big player and in exposing wrongdoing, journalism takes on those who are shaping society and in this way contributes towards the democratisation of the country. Additionally, the Press Council argues that through its work, journalism allows citizens in a democratic and constitutional state to make informed judgments on the issues affecting them on an everyday basis (Press Council of South Africa, 2016). Relying on these views and actions of journalism in South Africa and the ideals they espouse, this literature review discusses media representation theories in cultural studies and political science theories on political leadership. These theoretical frameworks are relevant to explain news media views on leadership in a newly transitioned democracy.

The news media in post-apartheid South Africa rely on norms and standards based on long-standing democratic principles and theories to do their work and keep those in power in check - this can be found in the South African Press Code governing print media and other internal company rules and in most editorials.

The use of media representation and political leadership theories in this paper is additionally based on the agenda-setting capability of news media that is derived from political thought and additionally, political theorists have been used because they have thought about leadership and this will help us understand media views. In addition, news media reporting on political leadership, especially the behaviour of persons in political authority, their competitors and these in interaction with other members of society is strongly dependent on an understood approach to politics in a newsroom and to a certain extent, the philosophy of the publication.

Examples of agenda setting can be seen in South Africa, for instance, in how news media writes about tips and leaks from political party factions. This implies that there are close relations between those who speak about power and those in power (e.g. ANC factional fights, DA leadership changes, ANC Mangaung elective conference factions etc.). Because of this access to power, other examples of agenda setting included the instance of news media reporting blow-by-blow the battles for power between Presidents Mbeki and Zuma from 2005 onwards (Brümmer, 2015). Other agenda setting stories included the long investigation into what became the Nkandla scandal and an even more important symbol of agenda setting example was how Zuma came to be identified in his presidency due to what he confessed in a court of law during his rape trial, and this was the Zapiro showerhead image (see Van Wyk 2009).

The showerhead image of President Zuma has become the visual representation of the politician and to paraphrase Stuart Hall the image became a cliché and confirmed that the modern world and culture is saturated by the image in a variety of different forms and this is the representation we have of the leader of the country (Hall, 1997). Zapiro's use of Zuma's image was also malleable and changed with the times, where it started from showerhead and symbolising the rape trial, it then moved to the corruption trial and showing a besieged man to the Zunami and rise to power of an invisible and secretive man to the man who became a chortling president and exclaimed in the National Assembly: "Nkandla, Nkandla, Nkandla" when mocking the opposition over their attacks on him using news media. This confirms what McCombs (2014) describes as the ability of the news media to sway public opinion:

> The pictures in people's minds about the outside world are significantly influenced by the mass media, both what those pictures are about and what those pictures are. The agenda-setting effects of the mass media also have significant implications beyond the pictures created in people's heads. In the original, traditional domain of agenda-setting, the salience of public issues, there is considerable evidence that the shifting salience of issues on the media agenda often are the basis for public opinion about the overall performance in office of a public leader. In turn, the salience of a leader in the news also is linked with whether an individual holds any opinion at all. At the second level

> of agenda-setting, the salience of affective attributes intertwined with the public's cognitive pictures of these leaders represents the convergence of attribute agenda-setting with opinion formation and change. Beyond attitudes and opinions, the pictures of reality created by the mass media have implications for personal behaviours, ranging from college applications to voting on Election Day (McCombs, 2014).

Below the theories of media representation are discussed and followed by those from political science to explain political leadership, which is bridged with a discussion on political journalism, the news media as political actors in a democracy and followed on by news media values.

Theories of media representation

Media and power relations

From the 1970s, studies of media representation questioned what the media was offering consumers – that is a selective definition of reality based on the interests of the dominant class. There was an assumption that the media was influential by mapping society and creating themes of reference through which people made sense of society, which deflected wider social conflict and reinforced dominant political norms (Curran 2003, 109).

Therefore, media representation looks at media constructions of society, influence and persuasion about leaders and society in general and these can be found in opinion in print media, television show debates, political writing by political actor and in academic work.

Curran (2003, 232) also argues that a key variable influencing media representation "is the way in which power is organized within a system". As Curran notes: "Another significant influence is the degree to which the prevailing power network coheres. If disagreements develop within it, these are generally reproduced in the media" (Curran 2003). Curran also says that the fourth estate can operate in a way that supposedly exemplifies liberal theory, so for example "tip-offs from rival elite groups can trigger

investigative journalism, their conflicts can generate media debate and a consensus arise from this debate.

For Hall (1997, 6) representation is the way meaning is given to things through depiction via images, therefore it is measuring the gap between what one thinks of as the true meaning of an event or object and how it is presented in the media. For Hall (1997, 7) representation has no real meaning until it has been represented (an image is created or attached to an event or object by the powerful, including the media) and the form changes and representation is a constitution of events as well.). Additionally representation means the use of language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully to others through shared meanings or conceptual maps. Therefore, representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It involves not just images but language and signs (Hall, 1997).

In addition, media representation uses societal ideology and the section below looks at this.

Media representation, ideology and social order

Hall in his *The rediscovery of ideology* in 1982 wrote that representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. "It implies the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping" (Hall, 1982) (see Serino 2009 on *Sunday Times* opinion pages' creation). What Hall, meant was that the media continues to underwrite systematically a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures, that is, the rules of the game – the media determines what society knows in cahoots with those in power because it is reliant on those in power and in turn has to be part of the power structure to stay relevant. (Hall, The rediscovery of ideology: return of the repressed in media studies, 1982, 64)

Therefore, Hall (1982, 87) sees the media as the means of representation:

> to be impartial and independent in their daily operations, they cannot be seen to take directions from the powerful, or…to be bending their accounts of the world… But they must be sensitive to, and can only survive legitimately by

> operating within, the general boundaries or framework of 'what everyone agrees' to be the consensus.

Later, Curran (2003, 211), in agreement with Hall, found that the mass media had assumed the role of the Church in a more secular age. They interpret and make sense of the world to the mass public:

> Like their predecessors, professional communicators amplify systems of representation that legitimise the social system.

Curran (2003, 223) says the priesthood told their congregations that the power structure was divinely sanctioned and the media successors tell the audiences that the government is democratically sanctioned through elections.

For Fürsich (2010), representation has become embedded in the 24-hour cycle of media cable services and social media and have therefore become a culture that has assumed meaning and become knowledge depositories - therefore representation speaks to a sustained image…delivered across media channels and outlets.

Criticism of media representation theories

Analysis of media representation theories shows it has held steadfast in academia and there is little criticism but much agreement. What the area lacks is the understanding that in new democracies such as South Africa legacy issues are important in terms of where you stood in support or against the regime. Some media and journalists organisations during apartheid took an oppositionist stand against the government and supported the Struggle and many were forcibly closed down. Other media houses supported the apartheid status quo and were mouthpieces of that autocratic government. After 1994 and the adoption of 1996 Constitution, a new liberal dispensation arose and called for criticism of those in power and most media houses ran with the freedom of speech they attained with democracy and would say they are doing their duty and feel they must promote the democratic dispensation, including those who used to support the former authoritarian power.

Also for Curran (2003, 211) there is a contradiction in the role of the news media in

that they are seen as rivals to professional politicians:

> both groups have competing claims of legitimacy: they both claim to represent the public and serve the public interest.

For Fourie and Karam (2011) media representation disregards the distinctive attributes and character of media products, the genre of the media product, the intricate connection between the real world and portrayal, the intention of a journalist and the character of perception and media user.

Another criticism is that media representation does not take into account that some journalists could be used by politicians unwittingly, especially when a story is too good to ignore and also journalism training tends to blind new journalists by teaching them to be normative and only later do they learn how they real world works.

Therefore, the real argument against media representation theories is that they can lead to an idea that there is no truth, only constructions of truth, which makes it impossible for media to do its historical job of providing information to people.And we can see that the current 'post-truth environment' is really no better for societies than the mass-mediated era. In the 'post-truth environment', societies and political players are polarised into opposing groups, as seen in the recent United States presidential election and the United Kingdom's Brexit referendum. There is widespread use of social media channels (and in legacy media – radio and television) such as Facebook and Twitter, blogs and websites for conspiracy theories, outright lies, fake news, the use of false equivalence and misinformation by politicians and some journalists to support their positions and assumptions by disregarding established facts (Lewis, 2016).

Political journalism, media as political actors, democracy and news values

According to Nielsen and Kuhn (2014, 1):

> In its self-conception, the popular imaginary, and the social sciences, political journalism in Western European democracies is regarded as a key part of

democratic politics and at the very heart of the journalistic vocation

I argue that South Africa is similar to Western democracies and has for a long time taken ideas from that region and applied them – if you examine the structure of the 1996 Constitution, it has similarities to the post-unity German model, with especially the creation and construction of the Constitutional Court and the strong protections in the Bill of Rights similar to the 1789 post-French Revolution's Declaration of Rights and of the Citizen, especially freedom of expression. Other elements include a Westminster-style Parliament with adjustments such as proportional representation and the direct election of the President by legislature members, similar to how a Prime Minister is chosen in Westminster-style parliaments by commanding the confidence of the majority of MPs. Additionally, civic engagement by non-government actors such as workers' unions and activists can at times resemble the organising that is prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom whether through social media, protests and petitions. This may be due to the long history of colonialism in South Africa and later, apartheid, when the state was an active supporter and beneficiary of the West during the Cold War.

And because of historical influences, political journalism, to Nielsen and Kuhn (2014) even in South Africa is seen as formally independent institution that is part and parcel of representative politics, engaged in criticizing those in positions of power, promoting particular political actors, issues, and views, keeping people at least to some extent informed about public affairs and mobilising citizens for political action but it is also about politics and power, in short, as much about democracy as it is about the media.

To hammer the point home, Gumede (2014) writes that the obvious role of the media in a constitutional democracy such as South Africa is both representative and participatory. It is there to provide information to citizens, not only specialized reporting but also inform people of what is happening, providing criticism, questioning and putting pressure on leaders.

Gumede (2014) adds that the role of media is not only based on accepted democratic norms that South Africa has accepted but also has to go beyond traditional role of informing:

> The media…has [to] contribute to public education and enlightenment by showing quality, diverse cultural, political and social and news programmes to a nation where large swathes never had access to decent education – this would allow opportunities to many to broaden their minds, outlooks and social advancement Gumede (2014).

Also Horwitz (2001) writing about communication and democratic reform in South Africa said media is where democracy most concretely manifests:

> because that arena represents and constitutes the independent political institution wherein citizens can engage in the discussion of the commonweal [th]. (Sanef 1996)

For South African political journalists, their role of criticism, engagement, promotion and keeping people informed through their reporting plays a significant role in how they represent certain political leaders and figures, how certain parties govern - hence my interest in how the media represents political leadership and governance during the Zuma presidency.

Therefore, political journalism, Nielsen and Kuhn (2014) say, is a journalism that generally shares with the majority of politicians, social scientists, and citizens a 'legitimist vision' of electoral politics, accepting the latter's basic legitimacy as indisputable and its importance as a given, and often by implication regarding any outside challenge to this system with considerable scepticism. For Nielsen and Kuhn, it is a form of journalism that is overwhelmingly practised by salaried white-collar professionals working for legacy news media organisations such as newspapers and broadcasters including their online operations – the South African versions are the SABC, eNCA, Independent Media, Media24 and the Times Media Group.

At the outset, in 1994 before the April 27 elections, Mandela told the International Press Institute in Cape Town that a critical, independent press was going to be the lifeblood of democracy:

> The press must be free from state interference. It must have the economic strength to stand up to the blandishments of government officials. It must have sufficient independence from vested interests to be bold and inquiring without

> fear or favour…. it is only such a free press that can temper the appetite of any government to amass power at the expense of the citizen…The African National Congress has nothing to fear from criticism. I can promise you, we will not wilt under close scrutiny. It is our considered view that such criticism can only help us to grow, by calling to attention to those of our actions and omissions which do not measure up to our people's expectations and the democratic values to which we subscribe (Valentine, 1994).

What this reveals, was Mandela's acceptance of Western democratic ideals of what media should do, but the honeymoon did not last long when the ANC was in power. Since that pre-election speech, leaders of the ANC have called media oppositionist and seen them as obstructionist. At a meeting with the South African National Editors Forum in November 1996, Mandela told editors that media ownership and control was not reflective of the population:

> …if senior black journalists – who are in the position to interpret the aspirations of the community –criticize us, then give us the right to criticize them. Freedom of expression is not a monopoly of the press; it is a right of all of us…. We have had strange experiences with some journalists, where you brief them on the true facts – but some are beyond the pale; they say they agree with you and later say the opposite. You can't expect us to be quiet. We will not reply to every criticism. But certain criticism you can't ignore. Where government makes mistakes, you must say so. Where you make mistakes, we should say so… (SANEF, 1996, 7).

Since then Mandela's successors have also been unrelenting in their criticism, from Mbeki in his first *ANC Today* weekly column on the ANC website, saying the mass media did not represent the majority:

> we therefore have to contend with the situation that masquerades as 'public opinion', as reflected in the bulk of our meda, is in fact minority opinion informed by the historic social and political position occupied by this minority (Hamlyn 2008).

In one of the last columns of ANC Today, Zuma wrote in 2008 that the media was politically and ideologically out of sync with society:

> though there are plenty of newspapers and magazines on our newststands, and a multitude of radio and TV stations occupying our airwaves, the overall orientation of South African media is politically conservative. There are few, if any, mainstream media outlets that articulate a progressive left perspective – which is endorsed at each election by the majority of South Africans and represented by the ANC, its allies and the broader democratic movement (quoted in Hamlyn 2008)

So it is clear from what ANC leaders have said about the role of journalism and additionally that the media are political actors and use their news values to inform their actions. There is agreement on what media should be doing but disagreement shows that interpretation is at the heart of the argument.

And due to this disagreement, Louw (2000) wrote that the environment in which media works dictates news values - and their ability to apply them:

> In a dictatorship, for example, news values are ultimately dictated by the authorities. They decide what can and cannot be published and thus they set the news values. There is no way one can exercise an evaluation of news, the selection of news and the publication of news if there is no freedom of expression or freedom of the media because the values are then not open to debate from different standpoints or to assessment by journalists, but are pre-determined by an imposed authority (Louw, 2000).

But news values in a democratic state, Louw says, subscribe to the rule of law, the supremacy of the constitution and enshrined concepts of the freedom of the media and freedom of expression. In such a situation news are decided by journalists and others exercising their freedoms to decide the kind of publication they wish to publish, the subject matter they will deal with and the readers they hope to attract.

Thus in South Africa news media have freedom of choice, of selection and of deciding what set of values they are going to apply to their content, whether that be of news, features and humorous articles, and, of course, what standards of propriety are to be applied.

> I reached the conclusion that in a democracy news values are predicated to freedom of expression and, by extension, to the values applying to freedom of expression and human rights. Thus, the values applying to freedom of expression apply to news values and how they are exercised. Are these foreign values imposed on us? Or are they the values that manifest themselves because of the transformation taking place in South African society and which is focusing attention on other cultural and social values? (Louw, 2000).

I argue that no matter what these changes are, the fact is that South Africa is a country that subscribes to Western liberal democratic values' system and this is shown in how the constitution was investigated, debated and finally written and it is that same supreme law that has been accepted by South African society as a whole and for which many still fight for and with to keep government accountable, whether that is through the courts, protest action or requesting hidden or classified information through the Promotion of Access to Information Act. It is against this background that we operate in this society. Thus, it is my view that news values in a democratic state are inextricably bound up in freedom of expression and freedom of the media .

Therefore, this discussion shows that political journalism and news media in general are seen as political actors not only by media practitioners and academics but also importantly by politicians.

Finally, Wasserman (2010) writes that, with democratisation, the media enjoy greater freedom with an expectation to perform a 'watchdog role', while governments would prefer media to support them in achieving national and developmental goals, as can be seen in what Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have said or written about the media above:

> An important perspective that emerged on media freedom in post-apartheid South Africa, was that the media have now become political players in their own right (Wasserman, 2010).

In a study he conducted with South African journalists he found that the respondents described their watchdog role in a similar fashion to an opposition political party or alternative power centre to the government. On the other hand, interviews with politicians, Wasserman (2010) found that they agreed that the media was 'the opposition' but also described journalists as being embedded with opposition factions within the ruling party or later being hired as spin doctors in government, the state or other political parties.

Due to the news media being a political actor, it is vital to understand what political science has to say political leadership in a democracy and in an environment in which the media depends on and defends a political document, the Constitution, to justify its existence and work, the section below discusses theories of political leadership and governance.

Political science theories on political leadership and governance

This section will look at political leadership and governance as political science concepts and what criteria a leader/leadership has to fulfil theoretically and what conditions are necessary for an institution, country to party to be well governed. These criteria will be used to evaluate the opinion in the research that follows this proposal.

What does political science tell us about political leadership?

According to Paige (1977, 1):

> Political leadership is the behaviour of persons in political authority, their competitors and these in interaction with other members of society…

This, Paige says, means not only the behaviour of the people in the highest authority but also people at intermediate and lower levels. He says we are not only talking

about presidents, monarchs and premiers, but also party provincial chairmen, mayors and village chiefs, headmen and leaders of party cells.

For Paige, we are not only looking at single personalities but also 'collective leadership', which is espoused by the ANC, interaction with followers and it means leadership not only in one type of institutions (e.g. party, legislature or bureaucracy) or process (e.g. policy decision, election or revolution) but across them all.

Paige also places emphasis on how rulers rule, whether through moral suasion and reasoned agreement or via fear and force and whether they are successful or not.

For Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2013, 4) political leadership "is one of the most widely experienced and 'intuitively' understood phenomena". Examples include great power competition, Olympic rivalries, climate change, the right to develop or human rights controversies and others. They say that the 'political leadership' concept is difficult to define because it is dependent on institutional, cultural and historical contexts and situations (echoing Blondel 1987; Wildavsky 2006; Wildasky 1989; Klenke 1996).

If political leadership as a concept is hard to define, then what constitutes its elements, The Oxford English Dictionary (online version) defines leadership as:

> The dignity, office, or position of a leader, especially of a political party; ability to lead; the position of a group of people leading or influencing others within a given context; the group itself; the action or influence necessary for the direction or organisation of effort in a group undertaking.

Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight say, taking into account the dictionary's definition, to lead means goal-setting and motivation and will figure prominently "as essential attributes of the notion of leadership" and there are elements in defining 'political leadership':

- The personality and traits of a leader or leaders, including ethical and cultural character

- The traits and ethical-cultural character of his or her followers
- The societal or organisational context in which the leader-follower interaction occurs
- The agenda of collective problems or tasks which confront the leaders and followers in particular historical situations
- The nature of the leader's interpretive judgment
- The means, material and intangible, that the leaders use to attain their ends
- And the effects or results of leadership, whether real or symbolic, long-lasting or transient.

Since we live in a country that is democratic and people fought to have such a system, then it follows then that political leadership is expected to be democratic. Below I outline democratic political leadership as explored by Teles.

Fundamental role of exercising leadership in a democratic society

In democratic societies, political leaders have an important role in creating alternatives and displaying opportunities to choose between rival strategies for the public realm based on the citizen's preferences, according to Teles (2015). This means that not only are leaders "responsive" to situations and individuals, they are "responsible". In other words, for Teles, there must be three political leadership functions:

- 'Governing' as a way to improve coordination and to provide strategic leadership, therefore leaders must be able to generate policy ideas through negotiation and communicating them through the organisation.
- 'Governance' must be the result of understanding the complexity of relations between different levels and functions of government, relating to private organisations, other public authorities and developing partnerships and networks of policy delivery and deliberation and;
- 'Allegiance' and commitment to supporters but leaders ensure that they keep their formal position without jeopardising their vision for the organisation (Elcock, 2001 adapted by Teles, 2015).

Although Teles (2015) using Elcock (2001) sets out political leadership functions, he does not speak about the media's role is in a democratic society when evaluating leaders but Helms (2012) does.

Political leadership in the new media age

When it comes to evaluating political leadership, Helms (2012) finds that the mass media are of primary importance in assessing the opportunities and constraints that contemporary leaders face but political leaders try to influence the media to their advantage.

For Helms, three media features affect the conditions for good democratic political leadership and how they respond:

- The greater number of different media with strongly differing features – newspapers, online, social media, radio, television and multimedia
- There is an expanded focus of media coverage on people's lives and very little escapes attention, think of the focus on politicians and their families.
- Citizens use different media more intensively and move between them easily, from online to print to radio.

Because of the functional and structural changes to mass media as they relate to the conditions of democratic political leadership, Helms (2012) says an impact assessment can be made by looking at:

- Effectiveness – democratic leadership can be described as effective if it succeeds in identifying and solving social and political problems effectively and with democratic means
- Responsibility – this is an elusive and much-contested concept because being responsible as a politician can mean many things; but it usually relates to the responsible allocation of scarce resources, such as money; and constant responsiveness of leaders to the interests of citizens…between elections
- Authenticity – authentic leadership requires that the political actions of a leader are consistent with his or her convictions and beliefs.

Even though political leadership can be evaluated in a new media age through Helms' criteria, one should also understand that politicians are personalised by the media. McAllister (2007) says "the single most often-noted effect of the changing nature of media coverage of politics is personalisation". McAllister believes personalisation is may be "the" central feature of politics in the 21st century. Personalisation means the systematic focusing of the mass media and the public on the individual top candidates of parties or the incumbent because they have a higher entertainment value and economic potential than any balanced analysis of competing policy agendas (McAllister, 2007).

Although mass media personalises politics, politicians are not innocent and they also utilise media to develop high profiles, often similar to Hollywood celebrities, in order to win voters' trust and support during election campaigns, according to Pakulski (2013). Pakulski writes that leaders then play an increasingly central role in governing elites in their own political grouping - whereby there is a trend towards the growing profile and centrality of leaders through 'personalisation' or 'presidentialisation' of democratic politics and a shift towards 'leader democracy'. This Pakulski (2013) says leads to a political configuration in which leaders play the major role in generating mass trust and electoral mandate-authorisation such as the United States presidential elections.

As much as leaders are personalised and have become central, political leadership is still exercised competitively (Pakulski 2013) – this also involves 'leaders of the opposition' and by small leadership groups. A political party does not only involve its known leaders but also deputies and trusted advisors who form the leadership group. For Pakulski (2013) such leadership group – the 'inner circles', 'courts' and 'core executives' are leader-centred but vary in size and composition. Therefore, the high profile and influence of political leaders should not be conflated with successful 'good' leadership.

Pakulski (2013) says Mandela, for example, was a high profile democratic leader who ensured the 1994 democratic election was won by his party, the ANC by negotiating with the former government and because of that and his force of personality, he ushered in a new era with a lot of power and influence:

> He surrounded himself with an ‘inner circle’, ‘courts’, ‘kitchen cabinets’ and gained very high approval and enormous influence over his government, parliamentary and party colleagues – he became the main agent of social and political change and peaceful revolution (Pakulski 2013).

But a warning from March and Weil (2005) is that there leadership idealism in political science, and they say that:

> it is not at all clear that leadership requires any remarkable talents, or that major differences in the success of organisations reflect differences in the capabilities of their leader, or that history is the product of leaders’ actions (March and Weil, 2005).

For political leader to rule or run a country, they have to govern based on certain prescripts – what works in that country may not be the same as the neighbouring country and there may be influences from outsiders.

In the case of South Africa, the current governing party, the ANC, says it practises collective accountability through its national executive committee to lead society and this is also partly reflected by the structure of the country’s Cabinet. The president in both cases is first among equals and is a member of a group who is officially on the same level as the other members but in fact has more slightly more responsibility or power (Cambridge University Press, 2016)

The ANC through its then deputy president Zuma, in the *City Press*, mainitained that collective leadership is a central pillar of the party’s principles, meaning that there is a culture of openness, comradeship and solidarity between leaders of the organisation. Additionally respect for and acceptance of decisions of the collective, “while each individual member of the collective retains the right to raise and reraise any matter, within constitutional structures, which she/he believes requires review”.

> Leaders should always lead by example, as custodians of the values and best practices of the movement. This should apply in good time and bad – ensuring

> that the interests of the movement come first in everything we do. Especially in difficult times, leaders should be the best examples of principled and disciplined conduct (African National Congress National Executive Committee, 2005).

Ngesi (2014,16) in his research on the rhetorical meaning of collective leadership says this is a normative definition of what constitutes leaders of the ANC, prescribing the rules to be followed by everyone who occupies a leadership position in the party and the ANC president is then expected to embody all the above-mentioned qualities. Ngesi (2014) says that however, it does not prohibit an ANC president from having leeway or taking an initiative provided that this is done in the interest and within the confines of the constitutional structures of the party (Stengel 2010 in Ngesi 2014), which can then be linked to principles of good governance.

Good governance theory

According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation governance is the:

> provision of the political, social and economic goods that any citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that any state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens (Governance, 2014).

The foundation awards the $5 million Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership to African leaders who have developed their countries and left power in the last three years after fulfiling their constitutional mandate. The foundation also publishes the annual Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) that evaluates governance in Africa within four conceptual categories: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. This means that a well governed country would have high levels of the categories used.

To evaluate each country, the IIAG breaks down safety and law by scoring rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security (Governance 2014), The section on participation and human rights looks at participation in free and fair

elections, power to govern to political rights; allowance of freedom of and association, civil liberties and freedom of expression, gender equality and others.

The sustainable economic opportunity category looks at public management, openness and competitiveness of the business environment, good infrastructure and well functioning rural areas and policies. The last category looks at human development that includes social and welfare regime, education provision and quality, health and sanitation (Governance 2014).

The IIAG and other similar statistical instruments rely on the concept of good governance and accordingly, South Africa is ranked fourth with an overall score of 73.3 out of 100 just below Botswana, Cabo Verde and Mauritius respectively.

Over two five-year periods (2005-2009 and 2009-2013), the IIAG found that South Africa's overall governance level has shown improvement in the past five years compared to deterioration in the previous five years. Also there has been an improvement in human development. There has been less deterioration in the safety and rule of law category in the most recent five years in comparison to the previous five-year period (Governance, 2014). But there IIAG says there has been more deterioration in participation and human rights category in the most recent five years in comparison to the previous five-year period. There has also been less improvement in the sustainable economic opportunity category in the most recent five years in comparison to the previous five-year period (Governance 2014).

The conceptual framework that the IIAG uses is based on good governance theory and research by Gisselquist (2012) comparing multilateral, regional and continental institutions of their understanding of good governance found they all revolve around these categories: democracy, representation, human rights, rule of law, efficient and effective public management, transparency and accountability in particular institutions, human development, predictability and openness.

Gisselquist (2012) says those who see good governance agenda as a worthy goal but also as a means through which to impact a variety of other outcomes, particularly economic growth and development. In poorly governed countries, it is argued, corrupt

bureaucrats and politicians baldly hinder development efforts by stealing aid contributions or misdirecting them into unproductive activities. Less obvious but equally pernicious, governments that are not accountable to their citizens and with inefficient bureaucracies and weak institutions are unwilling or unable to formulate and implement pro-growth and pro-poor policies.

But opponents of the good governance agenda, on the other hand, raise strong challenges. Critics, especially in aid-recipient countries, argue that the use of governance criteria in the allocation of foreign aid effectively introduces political conditionalities and imposes Western liberal models of democracy (see Nanda 2006; NEPAD 2007: 3-4). Grindle (2004) points out that the good governance agenda is a poor guide for policy because it is ad hoc, 'unrealistically long', and not attuned (Kuhn 2014) to issues of sequencing and historical development (see also Booth 2011). Along related lines, Andrews (2008: 380) notes that prevailing models of government effectiveness are 'like telling developing countries that the way to develop is to become developed' and that the 'one-way-best model' of governance ignores institutional variation across well-governed states (see Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).

To evaluate media representation of political leadership and governance, this research will have to look at political reporting or at least writing about politics, which falls broadly under political journalism. This type of journalism is most concerced with what leaders do and why they do what they do and in the case of South Africa, playing their part in the democratic dispensation as epitomised by similar traditions in other countries (Botswana, Namibia, the United States and the United Kingdom) with freedom of the press and are similarly ranked by Reporters Without Borders (see https://rsf.org/en/ranking) and and the next section explains the research design and methodology.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This report uses quantitative content analysis to deconstruct newspaper articles from four major national weekend newspapers in South Africa - *City Press*, *Mail and Guardian*, The *Sunday Independent* and the *Sunday Times* and later discusses the manifest themes and ideas.

Prasad (2008) describes content analysis as a scientific study of content of communication, which is a versatile tool for social science and media researchers and has been in use for decades. Considered an unobtrusive method of social research, Bernard Berelson in his *Content analysis in Communication Research (1952)* quoted in Prasad (2008) described content analysis as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. Due to systematisation, content analysis then analyses the form and substance of communication or as Holsti (1968) in Prasad (2008), the technique allows for making inferences to identify specified characteristics of content. Therefore, underlying meanings and ideas are revealed through analysing patterns in elements of the text, such as words or phrases (Yang, 2008, p. 689) and these texts are empirically coded based on a researcher-created coding system in order to make observations about the messages conveyed (Babbie, 1999, 286).

Furthermore, Prasad (2008) added that content analysis conforms to basic principles of scientific method including objectivity, meaning that the analysis is pursued through explicit rules to enable the researcher to obtain the same results from the same documents. The systematisation determines the inclusion or exclusion using consistently applied rules to avoid only including materials, which support the researcher's ideas, and finally, the generalisability of the results can be applied to other similar situations (Prasad, 2008).

The advantages include the ability to deal with large volumes of data, which is a laborious process, but easy to do and it is also requires minimum capital investment. But the limitations of content analysis include inferences being limited to the content

of the text only and also symbols are processes and coded according to the attribution given by the researcher (Prasad, 2008).

Overall Design of the Study

The texts, all electronic, were collected through the SABINET online SA Media database collected by the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.

In order to find material related to the theme of political leadership during Zuma's presidency key search terms were inputted including, "Zuma leadership", "ANC leadership", "Zuma governance", within the following dates – 1 December 2007 and 31 January 2013. This period marks Zuma becoming ANC president for the first time and also the first few years of the of his state presidency. It also covers the lead up to his second ANC win at Mangaung.

Once the search results came up, only articles from the four chosen newspapers, *City Press, Mail and Guardian*, the *Sunday Independent* and the *Sunday Times*, were downloaded in PDF format, grouped according to the newspaper publication, and placed in folders. Only articles covering the first 25 search webpages were chosen due to time constraints resulting in approximately 850 articles being used for analysis. Also further disaggregation took place through removal of cartoons and articles that were not in line with the search terms.

All the articles were catalogued in an Excel sheet according to type with the date, author, SA Media article ID and headline.

Furthermore, each set of articles were read and further disaggregated by relevance and marked for use or not. Those that were marked for use were then read further and highlighted in different colours and notes made in the PDF regarding key terms and argument around political leadership in South Africa.

The marked, highlighted articles were then further coded and filed in an Excel sheet according to date, author, article ID and headline and additionally an evaluation and quotation.

To distinguish the types of articles from each other, an evaluation was made on basic features that are prevalent in South African newspapers. Not all articles were easy to separate; therefore, ‘comment, opinion and column’ articles were all renamed ‘opinion’. ‘News articles’, ‘letters’ and ‘editorials’ were left as separate categories. However, in some instances, news articles that were more analysis-focused were then re-identified as opinion.

A news article, traditionally, has the following features: it is an upside-down pyramid with the most important information at the beginning. Other features are the name of the reporter, title and follows the 5 Ws and H (who, what, when, when, where and how) model and focuses on current events and usually gets the views of all sides. The written piece will tend to smaller in size compared to features and is mostly reportage. On the other hand, opinion includes comment, features, columns are longer and allow the discretion of the writer or editor, and can take positions on any subject (see Figures 1 to 3).

Figure 1: Example of news article on the front page of a newspaper


BusinessDay

NEWS

BUSINESS BRIEFS

CEO pleased with Pick n Pay gains

Pick n Pay's CEO Richard Brasher says he is pleased with the progress that the retailer has made since he took the helm three years ago, but that there is more to be done and he plans to be there to do it. /Page 11

DiamondCorp regains sparkle

DiamondCorp's share price soared on news that the financially troubled company had received expressions of interest to buy all or part of the company. /Page 11

Hanjin crisis to affect Trencor

Trencor on Tuesday said the bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping, one of the world's largest container carriers, would cause the company an expected headline loss per share of between 320c and 330c. /Staff Writer

Thomas Schäfer /File

VW warns state over cutting industry support

Any lessening of state support for the motor industry could have drastic consequences by causing multinational companies to question the need to remain in SA, VWSA MD Thomas Schäfer has warned. Discussions had revealed some senior officials were arguing that resources set aside for the support could be better used. /Page 2

Same same... but different.

Fedhealth GRID: Pay less every month and still get the same great benefits.

PIC releases details of unlisted portfolio

● VBS Mutual, Independent Media among investments of R44.6bn fund

Linda Ensor
Political Writer, Cape Town

The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) has made public its unlisted portfolio on Tuesday for the first time, providing Parliament's standing committee on finance with a list of 250 investments in housing, property, energy, financial services and other sectors.

The portfolio – held in the Isibaya Fund – totalled R44.6bn at the end of March 2016.

Due to its size – the PIC is the biggest investor in the economy, with R1.8-trillion in assets – and

back the R7.5m that he was found to owe on the upgrade of his Nkandla homestead.

PIC chief investment officer Dan Matjila said the PIC and the Isibaya Fund invested in a range of financial institutions and did not have any say over their lending decisions. He also reiterated that the PIC was engaged in talks about acquiring a stake in Barclays Africa when its parent company sold off the subsidiary.

The mandate of the Isibaya Fund, established in 1999, is to invest in projects that have a social impact and to support long-term economic, social and

Figure 2: Example of a feature, column or opinion article



IN-DEPTH

ANALYSIS · FEATURES · OPINION · PERSONALITIES · ENTREPRENEURSHIP · INSIGHT · TRENDS

Ethnic nationalism: Zuma's style of

● *SA needs a national solidarity woven around the Constitution, democratic values, rules and institutions*

William Gumede

Most African countries were flung together by former colonial powers out of diverse ethnic, religious and regional communities, making them among the most diverse nations on earth.

The colonial powers exploited these differences to play off communities against each other and so reinforce their control over subject peoples.

Sadly, in the postcolonial period, many African leaders and governments have sought support from only their own ethnic communities, regions or religious groups, further entrenching divisions inherited from the colonial past.

Apparently President Jacob Zuma is no different. After his return from exile, Zuma, an isiZulu speaker, built his support base in the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal, the party's region with the largest membership.

When he was fired in 2005 as deputy president by former president Thabo Mbeki for alleged corruption, he wooed isiZulu speakers to secure his reinstatement. In 2007, at the party's Polokwane conference, he used his Zulu background to win the ANC presidency.

He did so again in Mangaung in 2012 in his bid for the country's presidency.

At Polokwane, Zuma portrayed opposition to his bid for power as an "anti-Zulu" conspiracy and cast Mbeki as a member of an educated elite waging a "war" against African traditions, institutions and styles of leadership. During that campaign, some of his supporters wore "100% Zulu" T-shirts, adding to impressions that Zuma was pursuing the politics of ethnic patronage.

Since then, Zuma has claimed that critics of his poor policies and personal indiscretions are opposed to "Zulu" or African "traditions" or "culture".

In response, then City Press editor Mondli Makhanya warned ahead of the Mangaung elective conference that Zuma was unleashing the "spectre of tribalism, the demon that the anti-apartheid struggle successfully exorcised from the body politic".

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi said an ethnic war could result if the ANC leader continued to claim an "anti-Zulu conspiracy" against him.

After the death of Zulu King Cetshwayo in 1883, politics in what became known as Zululand focused on maintaining the larger Zulu community as a recognisable unit, following repeated attempts by colonial and, later, apartheid governments to break it up through divide-and-rule tactics, as well as internal conflict.

During most of the ANC's 100-year history, two distinct strands of Zulu nationalism competed for dominance in the party, especially in what is now KwaZulu-Natal: one conservative and closed off, the other progressive and inclusive of other communities. Conservatives emphasise Zuluness as the defining feature of one's identity, and want the Zulu group to be dominant in the broader African and South African community. Progressives see Zuluness as part of a layered African and South African identity, with the wider Zulu community an equal among others. Zuma's election as ANC president in 2007 and his re-election in 2012 signified the triumph of the conservative wing of Zulu nationalism, and the retreat of the progressives.

Many of Zuma's appointments to senior positions, both in the government and his party – especially those in the security networks – are individuals from KwaZulu-Natal. Critics warn of the danger of the "Zulufication" of the ANC.

Anthony Butler of the University of Cape Town points to the "skewed composition of the Cabinet, the KwaZulu-Natal-dominated ANC parliamentary list, the growing non-representativity of important directors-general and their deputies, and the composition of parastatal boards and managers" during Zuma's presidency.

These appointments, he argues, indicate "a big shift in the context of resources and power towards people of amaZulu descent".

Under Zuma's predecessor, Mbeki, the ANC came close to capturing the state. This phenomenon deepened under Zuma, who has turned the ANC into a "partyarchy" dominated by entrenched leadership factions and networks within regional, ethnic, generational or even class groups.

BETRAYAL

Now, some ANC members are turning purely political differences into "ethnic" differences. In Mangaung, some members said that failing to support Zuma's re-election as party leader would be

United in culture: IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi (second from left), King Goodwill Zwelithini (centre) and President Jacob Zuma next to him

Figure 3: Examples of editorial and letters on the inside of a newspaper



BusinessDay www.bdlive.co.za Wednesday 19 October 2016

OPINION

BusinessDay

NEWS WORTH KNOWING SINCE 1985

Following the money

If there is one thing the disclosures about the Guptas and the banks tell us, it is that SA's banks and its banking regulators are pretty good at noticing anyone who is moving large sums of money in a way that may break the law. Whether the law enforcement agencies that should prosecute the law-breakers can actually do so is far from clear, however.

But in the case of the Guptas, the light of public and political scrutiny is at least being shone on the usually secret probes by banks and their regulators into dealings that may be dodgy.

The country's commercial banks have long had to have stringent "know your customer" measures in place and to monitor and report any unusual or suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), which looks out for money laundering or terror financing and approaches law enforcement agencies if it suspects these.

When the big four banks closed the Gupta family's accounts and the accounts of Gupta-linked businesses earlier in 2016, it put the spotlight on the banks' obligation to monitor and report on suspicious transactions, a role that is required not just by SA's legislation but by international agreements to which the country is a signatory.

Now that Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan has applied to the courts for a declaratory order to support his contention that he cannot possibly intervene with the banks on the Guptas' behalf (or indeed on any client's behalf), we know that the banks' decisions did indeed involve R6.8bn of suspicious transactions.

THE TROUBLE IS THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE ITSELF CANNOT PROSECUTE CASES

There may, of course, be a perfectly innocent explanation for the total of R6.8bn of suspicious transactions in 70 bank accounts belonging to members of the family, their associates and companies. But if there is, the Guptas have yet to provide one.

Instead, they responded to the banks' closure of their accounts with what Gordhan's court papers show was a relentless barrage of letters and communications that claimed that Gupta-controlled Oakbay Resources had done nothing wrong, and tried to put pressure on the finance minister to intervene with the banks.

Now, the writer of the letters, former Oakbay CEO Nazeem Howa, has finally resigned. We are told that to JF Health. It may be frivolous to quip that it would have made anyone sick. But the effect of the Gupta banking saga on SA's political fabric and on its institutions has unfortunately been far from frivolous.

That the banks picked up the R6.8bn of suspicious transactions

THE THIRD UMPIRE

PATRICIA DE LILLE

What on earth persuaded Cape Town's politically experienced mayor to put former SexKhona leader and poo-thrower-in-chief Loyiso Nkohla on the city's payroll? He was thrown out of the ANC — that should have been warning enough.

MCEBO DLAMINI

The former Wits SRC head's lawyer applied for bail following his arrest on a range of charges allegedly committed while he was trying to close down the university, saying he had a test to write. No, it doesn't make sense to us either.

POOH BEAR

The estate of AA Milne, creator of the "bear of very little brain", is worth £275m, making him three times richer than Kim Kardashian. As long suspected, there's an inverse correlation between intelligence and earning power.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Democracy fails whites

While the commentariat has dominated public debate in the past weeks, the criminal element has burned buildings and the contents of libraries and attacked — physically and verbally — those members of society who have elected, and been selected, to preserve peace, order and the sanctity of property.

One question presses particularly hard upon every thoughtful white South African today. What is our position in this nation? Let us face the truth — the bitter truth. We are a minority in the government our fathers framed. As that minority, we now have the onerous privilege of tax paying and the dubious distinction of serving as subjects of an experimental government under second-class members of a discredited organisation that discredits itself more daily — fanatical evangelical fundamentalist preachers and bankrupt political theorists.

That is our exact position. It does no good to subjects that are driven by global research and not parochial culture? History, philosophy, languages and social sciences I can understand, but for the rest I can't see it. Once again, where are the studies to support such an approach?

Perhaps a study of the American and Chinese systems with analogies of how to handle the obviously deep cultural differences would be useful. After all, if we solve this as Africans it could at least be a positive takeaway from all this disruption.

Andy Clay
Woodmead

Opportunistic Ramaphosa

So Cyril Ramaphosa is now reported to have thrown his lot in with Pravin Gordhan. Too little, too late and rather opportunistic coming as it does when President Jacob Zuma is finally going cowardice). These same ministers defended the spending on Nkandla. The ANC Cabinet has proved itself time and again to be untrustworthy, so to now claim the high ground in defence of Gordhan is really ingenuous.

Charles Cadman
Via e-mail

Berning issue of credibility

Berning Ntlemeza's claim that there is no political pressure on him — "I'm just doing my job without fear or favour, or being influenced by any person" — in response to questioning about the Pravin Gordhan matter is a joke. This from a man described by a judge as being a liar and without honour!

Ronald Reynolds
Tamboerskloof

Confidence crisis hits jobs

Much of the business community run businesses on their perception of the economy (Business owners' confidence declines, October 14). This perception is fed by events such as a summons being served on the minister of finance. When business people see Parliament ordering a board of a parastatal to step aside and they refuse, the business community shakes in its boots.

Their confidence down, businesses refuse even to invest in their own businesses. Businesses thus cannot create more jobs. Businesses turn to retrenching staff. The labour minister and her esteemed deputy then accuse businesses of refusing to implement employment equity (even when they are not employing at all).

Cry the beloved country.

Michael Bagnall, MP
Labour spokesman, DA

Initially, the evaluation of the coded articles relied on Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2013); Helms (2012), and McAllister's (2007) literature on political leadership such as:

- Personality and traits of leader
- His followers' character and actions
- Responsibility of a leader
- Effectiveness of leader
- Problem solving
- Leader's interpretive judgment
- Effects of leadership by specific individual or collective

But as the results show below other themes and ideas were found and these included:

- Acceptance of lack of leadership or low level expectations, a lack of decision making, sitting on the fence, a watch and wait approach and political will
- The actions of supporters, allies or enemies in political battles
- Showing leadership in certain areas/leadership of convenience/for personal gain
- How Zuma should exercise his power as president or how he should be as president or what is presidential.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS FROM COUNTING AND FILTERING

Due to the counting involved in content analysis and subsequent filtering into categories, the results below start from the full sample collected to its breakdowns.

First level evaluation: full sample

Figure 4: Sample of published articles (n=820)



Table 1: Total number of published articles by newspaper

	City Press	***Mail and Guardian***	***Sunday Independent***	***Sunday Times***
2007	16	12	15	25
2008	27	72	33	35
2009	25	36	28	34
2010	12	28	48	18
2011	11	28	36	66
2012	38	35	52	76
2013	2	3	4	5

When the sample of collected articles, totalling 820, from SA Media are disaggregated by year of publication, the most active year is 2012. About 201 articles

were published in 2012, followed by 2008 with 167 and then 2011 with 141 and 2009. 2012 was the year when the ANC's Mangaung elective conference took place and President Zuma was re-elected for a second term as leader of the ANC. 2008 is the year that the former president Thabo Mbeki was recalled by the ANC but also a year where Zuma was fully in charge of the ANC after his election in Polokwane in 2007. 2009 is another pivotal year, as Zuma became president of South Africa.

When viewed per newspaper, the *City Press* seems to have published more articles in 2012 on Zuma's leadership, followed by the year 2008 with 27 and lastly 2009 with 25 articles.

The *Mail and Guardian* published most on the topic in 2008 with 72 articles and then followed by 2009 with 36 and 2012 with 35.

The *Sunday Independent* published its most articles in 2012 (52), followed by 2010 with 48 and then 2011 with 36 articles. The *Sunday Times* published the most out of all the newspapers covered here in 2012 with 76 articles, followed by 2011 with 66 articles and 2008 with 35.

All newspapers seem to be pointing to the period 2008 to 2012 as an important time when editors, reporters, politicians as well the public were strongly engaged in a debate or discussion about political leadership.

Figure 5: Total number of newspaper articles by type (n=820)



Table 2: Breakdown of newspaper articles by published newspaper

	City Press	***Mail and Guardian***	***Sunday Independent***	***Sunday Times***
Editorial	12	28	14	27
Letter	20	35	21	7
News analysis	17	24	11	13
News article	48	98	106	135
Opinion	35	33	67	53
Unidentified				1

When disaggregating by text type, the largest numbers of texts found are news articles numbering 387, followed by 188 opinions, 83 letters, 81 editorials, 65 news analysis pieces and one unclassified article.

All four newspapers produced more news articles than any other text type. The second largest amount were opinion pieces. The *Sunday Independent* published the most opinion pieces. The *Sunday Independent* and *Sunday Times* published more letters than anyone else with the *Mail and Guardian* published the most news analysis pieces, at almost double the amount. To get to the point of analysis of relevant articles, a second disaggregation took place, resulting in 179 articles.

Second level evaluation: disaggregated sample

Of the 179 coded articles that are being used for analysis, most came from the *Sunday Times* (54), followed by the *Mail and Guardian* (45), the *Sunday Independent* (41) and the *City Press* (39) (see Table 3). Of the 179 articles chosen for analysis, the most number were opinion (85), followed by news articles (45), editorial (29) and letters (20) (see Table 4) and the pattern is similar by newspaper breakdown.

Table 3: Total number of coded and analysed articles by newspaper and year (n=179)

	City Press	***Mail and Guardian***	***Sunday Independent***	***Sunday Times***	**Total**
2007	7	1	2	5	*15*
2008	6	8	5	5	*24*
2009	10	11	9	8	*38*
2010	4	6	19	10	*39*
2011	3	9	4	11	*27*
2012	9	10	1	13	*33*
2013			1	2	*3*
Sample	39	45	41	54	***179***

Table 4: Total number of coded and analysed articles by newspaper and article type

	City Press	***Mail and Guardian***	***Sunday Independent***	***Sunday Times***	**Total**
News article	4	11	11	19	45
Opinion	22	16	21	26	85
Letter	5	10	5	0	20
Editorial	8	8	4	9	29

Third level evaluation: Frequency of themes to be discussed

After evaluation of the coded articles, discussion heavily emphasises personality and comparison of leader or leadership, followed by a strong focus on the promises and results of the leadership of Zuma, the third most discussed area is how South Africa should be led and finally what leadership really means. Another category (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Main recurring thematic themes in analysis



Breakdown by newspaper shows that in the *City Press*, personality is at the forefront followed by the definition of leadership, how to lead South Africa and the promises and results of Zuma's leadership (Figure 7).

Figure 7: City Press main recurring themes in analysis



The *Mail and Guardian*, also heavily focuses on personality, followed by the promises and results of Zuma's leadership, how to lead South Africa and lastly, what leadership is (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Mail and Guardian main recurring themes in analysis



In the *Sunday Independent*, there was almost an equal number of articles focused on personality and promises and results of Zuma's leadership followed by how to lead the country and lastly, the definitions of leadership (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Sunday Independent recurring themes in analysis



In the *Sunday Times*, more articles focused personality, followed by the promises and results of Zuma's leadership, followed by how to lead SA and discussion of what leadership is (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Sunday Times recurring themes in analysis



The thematic categories for discussion and a timeline of political events

Before discussing the various categories that came up frequently in the findings above, a timeline assessment shows that over time the focus of newspapers changed in the case of the *City Press*, it focused on personality and what Zuma would be expected to bring as president of the ANC. In 2008, the paper had more articles on how the country could be led and what is needed. In 2009, the focus shifted back to personality, and then in 2010 the focus went to defining leadership and in 2011, there was a shift again towards personality and the leadership definition and finally in 2012 most focus was on leadership itself.

The *Mail and Guardian* also focused on personality in 2007 and 2008. In the latter year there was a focus on leadership definition as well. In 2009, there was a shift towards how to lead, leadership definition and personality and in 2010, the focus shifted to the results of Zuma's leadership and personality whilst 2011 focused on how to lead and the results of Zuma's leadership and later, 2012 was focused on personality and results.

In the *Sunday Independent*, December 2007 focused on personality and similarly for 2008. In 2009, the conversation moved to how to lead and reflections on Zuma's leading the country. In 2010, personality came back followed by the results of Zuma's leadership and how to lead. In 2012, the focus was on defining leadership.

The *Sunday Times* also focused on personality in 2007 and 2008. In addition, 2008 also focused on results of leadership by Zuma and how to lead. 2009 to 2012 was focused mainly on personality. 2010 also focused on results and leadership definition, 2011 the results of Zuma's leadership.

The thematic categories discussed in the newspapers then merge into the broader context of the period. To clarify why these categories were the main focus the timeline shows us that the period begins with the ANC elective conference in Polokwane in 2007, which led to Zuma's election as ANC president and then Zuma was recharged with corruption in the same month of December by the National Prosecuting Authority. This was followed in early 2008 by a decision to drop charges

against Zuma by the then acting National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi Mpshe that paved the way for Zuma to be available to be elected president of the country by the National Assembly in May 2009 after the national elections, if his party won a majority of votes. Still in 2008 major xenophobic violence broke out when South Africans attacked foreign African nationals across the country and the state's electricity utility company, Eskom, began blackouts due to low capacity because of a poor government decision in the 1990s that had stopped a process to increase capacity and build new power stations – the blackouts or 'load shedding' in South African parlance lasted throughout Zuma's first term as president and had a big impact on economic stability and exacerbated the already low economic recovery.

Later in September of 2008, following Mbeki's forced resignation as president of the country through a 'recall' by his party, half the Cabinet resigned and the then defence minister and former national chairman of the ANC, Mosiuoa Lekota and former Gauteng premier Mbhazima Shilowa, allies of Mbeki, formed a breakaway party from the ANC, the Congress of the People (COPE) and contested in the national elections of 2009 and won almost a tenth of the vote spooking the ANC, whose share of the vote declined.

In the same period, the Great Recession started and sent the economy of South Africa into the doldrums with growth at approximately -1.7% at the end of 2009 (Statistics South Africa, 2010). On a more positive note, South Africa hosted the Soccer World Cup in 2010, which saw a recovery in the economy and in 2011; Zuma saw his presidential approval ratings become positive with the Afrobarometer public opinion survey showing that almost 68% of South Africans approved of his performance as president of the country (Lekalake, 2015).

But the positivity was not to last when between 10 August and 20 September 2012, a mining strike broke out in Marikana, near Rustenburg in the platinum belt of the North West province over demands for substantially higher wages at the platinum mine of Lonmin. Violence then broke out amongst miners resulting in about eight people, including security guards and other miners killed by strikers on 11 August and subsequently a massacre of 41 people occurred on 16 August, after failed negotiations between police and miners to stop protesting with weapons resulting in a

confrontation. The miners were gunned down by the police on live television – this was the single most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre.

Finally, the now infamous 2012 ended with the ANC's elective conference in Mangaung that resulted in President Zuma being re-elected as president of the party after defeating his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe in an uneven contest. Motlanthe, who had been president for a short period after the ouster of Mbeki in 2008, was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa, who controversially was a board member at Lonmin during the Marikana Massacre. Ramaphosa is a former unionist leader of the NUM and businessman and attorney who has had a respectable political reputation and is a former secretary general of the ANC, chief negotiator in the CODESA talks of the early 1990s that led to democracy and also led the Constitutional Assembly that created the Constitution and the new structure of the state and government.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter discusses the four thematic areas found during the evaluation of the data in the previous chapter. The four major findings include: personalisation of political leadership; what political leadership should be doing; how to lead; and how President Zuma led between 2007 and 2013.

What the results show is that discussion of leadership is fraught with assumptions and a lack of clarity. Discussants grasp for norms and ideals of how leadership should be, that is the rules of leading and how a leader should act. These norms then tend to be personality-driven, reflecting the views of those inside the ANC, government, the opposition parties, parliament, political analysts, reporters and editors. They also reflect the evaluation of personalities of previous leaders in South Africa and elsewhere in the world.

These norms then also tend to link to the idea of democracy as envisaged in the constitutional structure of power in the country but also these norms link to what the governing party, the ANC thinks of leadership and additionally, how the struggle for democracy was conducted during apartheid. In the three strands of the constitutional state, the ANC and the conduct of the struggle for democracy, there is and was an underlying idea that leaders have to have moral suasion. They have to get support through elections by ordinary citizens or members of parties and have to be accountable at all times and an idea emerged of collective responsibility, not only of the overall leader but also those in other positions, whether as president with cabinet ministers in the case of government or in the United Democratic Front multiple committees and programmes or in the ANC collective leadership structure, the national executive committee. Moreover, in the case of President Zuma, his most important quality is being leader of the ANC and secondly leader of society as president of the country, which is discussed further in the section on his stewardship. This led to the idea that there are expectations and this emerged in the assessment drawing from all the material that is discussed below and most writing on leaders talk about what people want from incoming new leaders, such as when Zuma took over as

president. These expectations also lead norms to the discussion on democracy and news media that is, the leader has to be held accountable.

The normative ideas of leadership are then muddled in newspapers in that the evaluation shows that it is hard for commentators and writers to articulate leadership on its own. Therefore, it is easier for the writers to compare current and preceding leaders by highlighting key areas of difference between them. In addition, the key to the discussion is the person who leads and his leadership at a specific time. In the case of the Zuma period, the evaluation by writers would tend to look at who had coalesced around him or opposed him.

Furthermore, few writers have their own view but rely on comparison and come up with criteria for leadership from that comparison. In the case of the Zuma period, there are pre-existing themes through which leadership is evaluated, especially key moments such as solving the ANC and Inkatha conflict in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1990s, his scandals and decisions in the presidency.

Therefore, the discussion of leadership in South African print media is implicit and has signposts, for example, “he does not do this…” points to norms and what they are and therefore “a leader has to be…”

Personalization of leadership

As discussed in the theory section, McAllister (2007) determines personalisation as ‘the’ central feature of politics, where the coverage of politics focuses on the personality of leaders because they have a higher entertainment value and economic potential than any balanced analysis of competing policy agendas. But Pakulski (2013) found that even though the media personalises politics, politicians are not innocent in this regard because they use the access to the media to develop their profiles.

Therefore, personalisation in newspapers has a far higher entertainment value and helps sell copies, instead of focusing on the nitty gritty of policy. But it also allows the newspapers under assessment to set the news agenda and bring to the ordinary

person human relations in power. Because of the entertainment value of political personalities and all that happens in political office, ordinary people can be engaged much more easily and may even look forward to the 'next episode'.

On the other hand, personalisation of politics and public policy causes a lack of focus on the hard work and complexity of governing and gives less information on the processes needed to lead effectively. A major critique of weekend newspapers is that we find out how politicians are behaving but have no idea when they get time to do their actual work of governing or opposing. It is much more easy to report or comment on a politician who is scandalous and to make that a morality tale.

Moreover, when legislation is introduced and processed through Parliament, news media tends to only focus on the disagreements and personality-driven contests. This may leave an ordinary person without clarity on why legislation is defective or necessary and how it works. In this case there is selective picking of information.

Beyond legislation is, personalisation depends strongly on the extent of leadership problems that a president faces such a Jacob Zuma. These problems then also tended to then be discussed as an aspect of Zuma's personality rather than as issues of the ANC collective leadership group. To clarify this means structural issues and problems in governing or not being accountable whether by a minister or the president are represented in the news media as matters about the personality of the leader. Additionally, Zuma's leadership particularly is also discussed as if the ANC does not exist and Zuma is focused on from a national level, his presidency of the country but this blurs the full picture because a leader like Zuma could only have emerged from the ANC because of the processes of that organisation. Since the state of the organisation is not made a core part of the explanation, the discussions quickly became about Zuma instead of the party and the collective leadership group's failures.

It is thus important to evaluate the personalisation of leadership because it could clarify what is valued by journalists and commentators, and what they think leadership ought to look like and also it may show whether they reflect what society wants but also whether journalism influences society in turn on the 'look' a leader must have. It can also give us a window into politicians and public policy officials'

views of leadership, especially those who write to editors or are quoted in newspapers. It may also open a window into the relationships between the media and politicians as well and who is more valued as entertainment than another.

Therefore, this section focuses on the type of personality a leader has to have in party politics and government in South Africa, as set out by journalists and commentators but also the extent to which the personality of the politician overdetermines the discussion.

The assessment shows that writers focus on normative personality traits and this corroborated by other research. Felton (2016) in her thesis, evaluating IDASA and Afrobarometer public opinion perceptions survey data of South African presidents from 1997 to 2015 found that there is a heavy focus on the personality of leaders amongst adult citizens of the country. Felton found that over time in South Africa, personal traits became more important and stronger during the Zuma presidency in the evaluation of the president by the public during the 1997-2015 period (Felton, 2016) and this may be driven by the news media.

In addition, it would seem the template that most writers have in mind is that of Nelson Mandela with the emphasis on rationality, morality, commitment and transparency. Furthermore, a leader must show concern and interest physically by listening closely and not being afraid of ordinary people.

Also, writers in all the newspapers seem to have similar views and sometimes mirror each other. These views tend to come from, specifically, the editors and regular columnists, but a few letters also show similar views; this may be a function of editors choosing to publish what is similar to their own personal views. When it comes to reporters, a similar approach is taken, where reporters will emphasise the editorial position of their newspaper based on choice of interviewee or whom they quote.

A 2007 article sets the tone for how the discussion of personalisation of leadership took place during the period covered. ‘Oriang (2007) wrote that any leader who takes over power will be judged based on their personal and public history. She added that their mistakes and irresponsible actions in the past would haunt that leader when in

power. When discussing the possibility of Zuma becoming president, ‘Oriang (2007) emphasised that the personal actions of a leader should not be the same as an ordinary person, implying that an ordinary person can make mistakes and not be judged as harshly by society but leaders are different:

> There should be a difference between Zuma and your typical villager. At the time of the incident that has come to define him, he was deputy president of the ANC. He once headed the Aids council. The judgment in the circles that I move in was instant, unanimous and far short of complimentary: "My God, if this is the face of Africa's leadership, where shall we hide?" Some things know no boundaries. A Zuma presidency would not necessarily be the worst thing to hit Africa. Our continent has had its share of psychopaths and mass killers occupying the state house. His confession is child's play in comparison. And he probably has leadership skills that have not received as much coverage abroad as his peccadilloes. Popularity does not excuse irresponsible behaviour, 'Oriang (2007).

Taking a slightly different view to ‘Oriang, UCT sociology professor, Xolela Mangcu agreed that private and public morality matters, but what you do in private should not affect the public and as a leader you should be careful who you surround yourself with (Mangcu X. , 2007):

> The Zuma affair raises an interesting question about the relationship between the private and public morality of elected officials. My own view is that while a leader's private morality may compromise his ability to lead, a leader's public morality may not always be reduced to his private morality. An example of a leader whose private morality affected his public duties was the 19th century US president Martin Van Buren. Van Buren was known to disappear from work for weeks on end on account of his drinking. But equally there are those leaders - Franklin Roosevelt, John F Kennedy, Francois Mitterand, Bill Clinton whose questionable relationships never detracted from their public achievements, Mangcu said.

But Monare (2010), a former *Sunday Independent* editor, says a leader must not equate the public institution of his office (The Presidency) and his person (private life) because if he does anything negative it will insult the self-respect of the country. Monare means that the president has a representational aspect – he embodies the government and represents the coutry, so his personal actions and misadventures bring disrepute to the office, not just to himself:

> ... the crux of the concern is when such actions negatively affect the dignity of the office of the president and, by extension, the country. When cartoonists start transforming the tower of the Union Buildings into an erect penis, it is clear that the office - and not necessarily the incumbent – has been dented. When jokers start changing the name of the Union Buildings into Union Babies, the stature of that office is badly smashed. When some satirists start talking about Zuma delivering the Sex of the Nation next week, then we must really worry about the status and reputation of the presidency. The biggest mistake Zuma is making is to confuse the office with the person holding it. We are talking about the institution that resembles the dignity of the nation. The office that embodies the decorum, the grandeur, the self-respect of South Africa (Monare, 2010).

Taking the 'Oriang, Mangcu and Monare views further, editor Tabane (2008) and academic Gobodo-Madikizela (2009) say a leader must have moral authority, a conscience, commitment, respect and the ability to build up tolerance in his society. Furthermore, Carter (2008) speaks of a principled centre and high morals:

> The essence of Nelson Mandela's leadership was moral authority and a keen consciousness of the potential for violence and destructiveness in our society. Mandela recognised his role in building a culture of tolerance. In contrast, under Jacob Zuma's leadership, political intolerance in our society seems to have deepened. In speeches delivered to crowds outside his court appearances, in statements by leaders of the ANC alliance partners and in the behaviour of Zuma's disciples, the message conveyed under Zuma's leadership has been one of intolerance and a spirit of protest that has permeated many sectors of civil society, rupturing the sense of responsible citizenship among some ANC

> members entrusted with authority in institutions such as schools. At a time when we need leaders who will be moral role models for the next generation of leaders, one wonders what the future holds when our president's strength of popularity is not matched by the strength of his reputation for moral stature", said Gobodo-Madikizela (2009).

Concurring, Habib (2010), a political analyst and academic, emphatically says that personal problems have no place in leadership:

> The revelations of President Jacob Zuma's extramarital affairs have helped distract the nation from the more serious business at hand - his ability to govern… instead of debating the merits of the government's policies, or even the nation's woes, the citizens are focused on the president's sexual escapades...with all these nagging questions gnawing at his mind and conscience, how does Zuma manage to do the challenging job of running a country? asked Habib (2010).

Habib's question brings up Mkhabela's understanding that a South African leader must lead by force of example and have stature (Mkhabela, 2010):

> Given his well-publicised personal problems and his troubled start as president, it is hard to believe that perceptions of him [Zuma] as a leader by his ministers - some of whom wept when their former boss was toppled - are as honourable as one would wish. At the heart of continued controversies around him, his family, his leadership in government and the ANC is his ability to lead by force of example. It appears his stature as a force for example evaporated quicker than mist in the face of a powerful sun when he took over the reins. His undertaking to lead Madiba style - subtext to eschew the much maligned Thabo Mbeki's style of centralising power - held the promise for a greater term in office. But the promise seems to have ended at being consultative has become a subject of his inauguration. His foremost attribute has become a sophisticated way to suggest indecisiveness, (Mkhabela, 2010).

While the past is important in how debates take place about the personality of leaders, other commentators laid out the personality traits similar to Mkhabela (2010) that they deemed important. Therefore, the personality characteristics that a leader requires include showing warmth and closeness to ordinary party members and also to care about their personal concerns (Motshekga, 2007). Close to this view of ANC NEC member and government minister, Angie Motshekga, is that of the former premier of KwaZulu-Natal [Zweli] Mkhize (2009), who says that an individual leader should have humility and be consultative so that the party's leadership collective can support that individual leader and enhance his best qualities:

> Zuma was elected to deputise and strengthen Mbeki's leadership collective because of his excellent human relations, listening skills and capacity to unify. It was felt that, inevitably, Zuma's leadership would be needed to refocus attention on the vision of the ANC to build a compassionate and caring society once the transformation agenda was in place after Mbeki. Any perceived weaknesses are outweighed by his [Zuma] mature leadership style and the stability and spirit of friendship the country will enjoy under it. His strength is his humility and welcoming style that inspires a willingness to contribute to positive achievement for the good of our country, said Mkhize (2009).

Writing along the same lines as Mkhize is Mangcu, saying that a leader must always be aware of his organisation's collective psyche and give ideas to steer it forward. In contrast, Mangcu (2012) says the ANC under Zuma is going through a leaderless period of drift and realignment similar to the 1950s under James Moroka because of a lack of ideas and therefore a lack of consciousness of the soul of the party to steer it into the future.

In opposition to Mangcu's argument of a leader being aware of what the political party members want, Richard Calland admires Zuma's strengths and writes that a political leader must go beyond intellect, and must be instinctive, savvy and be unencumbered to make decisions (Calland, 2008):

> There is more than a touch of Ronald Reagan - or even, dare one say it, George W Bush - in Jacob Zuma. Apparently happily unencumbered by the

> need to demonstrate a towering intellectual faculty, he is an archetypal instinctive politician - streetwise, savvy and not to be underestimated. His greatest political strength is simply: he is not Thabo Mbeki, (Calland, 2008).

Additional to having good instincts as a leader, a *Mail and Guardian* editorial from October 2008 asked that leaders seek consensus, acknowledge their errors but also be able to apologise for their mistakes. Mac Maharaj, Mandela's former transport minister and later Zuma's presidential spokesman agreed with the view of the *Mail and Guardian* and said his boss was a respectful good listener who was unafraid to acknowledge his past mistakes (Maharaj, 2009):

> For all his [Zuma] faults, including his deep social conservatism and weak grasp of policy, Zuma is a consensus politician who is quite different temperamentally from Mbeki the divider and polariser. He does not suffer, for example, from Mbeki's racial hang-ups. And in sharp contrast to Mbeki he has shown that he can acknowledge error and apologise (Call for Mr Cool, 2008).

Ndlangisa (2009) spells out a further criterion for a leader, that they should have a vision, message or belief system that will be implemented. At the same time Ndlangisa (2009) compares Zuma with Mandela and Mbeki, saying that Mandela projected himself as the president of reconciliation, Mbeki styled himself as a man of transformation and empowerment of previously, disadvantaged people:

> It is difficult to tell from Zuma's state of the nation address what his broad vision is. It could very well be that he is telling us that he prefers a more pragmatic approach to governance and leadership - the sort of style that grapples with issues as they arise rather than one that follows hard and fast rules, (Ndlangisa, 2009).

Furthermore, a leader, despite being charismatic, should be seen physically leading from the front, always on top of issues and always involved, according to Mofokeng (2009) and Sefara (2009). This means a leader may not hide and not comment on issues that affect the country and his party.

For Mataboge (2011), citizens must know the leader's positions and know them to be rational by telling citizens. A leader should also not be indecisive, irrational and paranoid (Mataboge 2011).

Several warnings are also mentioned about how a president conducts himself in office and personally. For Pakkies (2008), in a letter to the editor, writes that a leader should not manipulate emotions and expectations:

> Zuma will have difficulty maintaining unity in the ANC. He got into power by manipulating the emotions and expectations of the people, portraying himself as a victim of the "political conspiracy (Pakkies, 2008).

Others also said that leading government does not require charm, but needs management skills and vision period (Mtolo 2010, Morudu 2010, Wonci 2010):

> Unlike his predecessors, Zuma is not a visionary leader. We seem to expect too much from him. A good underground operative, a schemer, a populist and a charmer, but not a statesman, strategist, unifier or a skilled manager like Mbeki. Leading government requires managerial skills more than charm and the ability to sing revolutionary songs. Government is complex.... Mandela was a charmer, a bulldozer and a campaigner, Walter Sisulu, a strategist and Govan Mbeki a theoretician... Zuma is out of touch with himself. Populists rely on promises (Mtolo, 2010).

Taking it further, former *Mail and Guardian* editor, Nic Dawes in an opinion article in 2008 wrote that a leader needs to avoid cults of personality and in an editorial in March of that year spoke about leaders avoiding being "everything to everyone" interpreting a letter by former president Thabo Mbeki to Zuma (It's easier to do the right thing, 2011):

> He [Mbeki] goes on to ask Zuma if he can recall a moment when the movement, in the thrall of such a "noxious phenomenon ... ceased to think, iscontent to act in the manner of the anointed 'personality', such as the late Kim Il-Sung, determined for the people of North Korea!" The implicit

> comparison between Zuma and the North Korean dictator is strengthened when, after a page outlining how the ANC's leadership tradition has avoided hero-worship, Mbeki says: "I find it strange in the extreme that today cadres of our movement attach the label of a 'cult of personality' to me, and indeed publicly declare a determination 'to kill' to defend your own cause, the personal interests of 'the personality', Jacob Zuma." He then demands that Zuma "take all necessary measures" to stop party members from blaming their former president for everything they feel is wrong with the party and the country. Zuma, he says, must remind party members that the ANC's post-1994 legacy is based on "collective decisions" and that he must prevent them from "abandoning their democratic obligations by falsely, and dishonestly pretending that, the goals of the national democratic revolution have been frustrated it they have been, by one individual Thabo Mbeki" (What Mbeki really said, 2008).

Expectations of how you act as a leader also require personal depth, eloquence and transparency (Letsoalo 2010; Tabane, Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 2012):

> The point of this regurgitation of history is that Mbeki governed and imposed his style and beliefs on the party for most of the two terms he served. By the time he left, we knew exactly what he thought of the major issues of the day, which is why he generated a substantial layer of critics who specialised in analysing his presidency. By contrast, Zuma is past the halfway stage of his first term and we still do not know where he really stands on any major issues. We have to make do with hints and actions that, now and then, allow us a glimpse of the man behind the grin and the dance, (Tabane, Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 2012).

At the end of the day, what is significant is that the type of personality that South African journalists and commentators value is a leader they can love, be proud of, one who is respectful, compassionate, politically astute and grounded in the manner of Nelson Mandela (Makhanya 2007, Seepe 2009):

That Sunday happened long before we discovered the ogre that is Jacob Zuma, the ogre who this week might become the president of the ANC and, in 2009, the president of the republic. At that time Zuma seemed an affable, reasonable guy who we could all relate to. He was so different from Mbeki, who believed he had all the answers to all the questions all the time, and treated the other 45 million South Africans with contempt. Zuma reminded us of our happier nascent years - the time when we had a leader who loved us and who we could love back. He led the singing at rallies and political funerals. He listened when people spoke. He spoke back with respect. He possessed that quintessential quality of leaders: empathy... two Zumas: There was the charming, politically astute and grounded leader - and then there was the bumbling servant of the Shaik family.... But Zuma is what he is – ethically retarded and prone to bad judgment, says Makhanya (2007).

The definition of leadership

This section aims to clarify what the news media thinks is leadership, how it is shown or its actions and what it requires. In order to make it clear that the definition of leadership maybe fuzzy for commentators, the Mail and Guardian's Tabane in 2011 warned that South Africans do not know the type of leader they want and if citizens do not know, journalists will also struggle. He says the problem of defining what South Africans want lays in the worry over personalities and ideology in the political system and that there is really no difference amongst leaders since they come from the same tradition:

> When people in the ANC and outside say they do not want President Jacob Zuma to return for a second term and instead want a Tokyo Sexwale or a Kgalema Motlanthe, what is that they really want? Is it the quiet, dignified figure of Motlanthe they are smitten with or do they really believe that, politically and ideologically, he stands to offer something substantially different? What do Sexwale or Motlanthe stand for that Zuma does not already represent? (Tabane, *Mail and Guardian*, 2011).

Similarly, to Tabane, Moya (2012) wrote that leadership is the courage to have convictions and vision at the risk of being unpopular. But he cautioned that in South Africa, there is no definition of leadership, and anything can pass as 'leadership' and anyone can pretend to be a 'leader':

> Leadership requires that we make less of brick-and-mortar projects than we currently do. They will lead us nowhere. The apartheid state created some of the best infrastructure, universities and, frankly, some of the best amenities in the developing world. But who among us will say that Hendrik Verwoerd or any of his successors were great leaders? Another thing about leadership is courage to have one's convictions even at the risk of being unpopular or going against the grain. The late ANC president, Oliver Tambo, may have never built a single school in his hometown, but, his courage and vision made him an outstanding leader. Leaders must lead. They must have the courage of their

> convictions. They must provide us with a vision of what might happen or where they might take us if we follow them. If they don't they are just office holders, (Moya, 2012)

Clarifying the views of Tabane and Moya, similarly Ndletyana (2010) has argued there are criteria for leadership even if people are not sure and said that South Africans do not want philosopher-presidents (Mbeki) nor populists (Zuma) but a combination in the form of Mandela's transformative leadership, that is, the combination of intellectual curiosity, empathy and instincts:

> The populist Zuma affirmed ANC's rank and file. The intellectual Mbeki had made [them] feel stupid with his erudite speeches and even seemed uncomfortable just addressing them. He was impatient with the singing, short on slogans and vacated the podium as soon as he finished his speech. The populist Zuma preferred slogans and singing to long speeches. Crowds love him and clamour for even more singing and dancing. Zuma affirms the ordinary folks, making them feel worthy when others had taken their illiteracy and simplicity as reasons to down upon them. In Zuma, ordinary folks saw themselves and celebrated: 'Finally, someone who gets us!' But, charismatic leaders are not necessarily populist. Nelson Mandela used his messianic stature to appeal to the better angels in us. His was transformative leadership. What benefit will Zuma's charisma be to South Africa? It is not clear yet where Zuma's presidency will lead us. At present, the signals are mixed, confirming and defying populist expectations all at once. Zuma seeks to reconfigure institutions to satisfy personal wants. The government is steered by mood swings: today it seeks to impress, tomorrow it just snubs. South Africa wants neither philosopher-presidents nor populists. South Africa yearns for leadership that combines both. Mandela was a perfect template: a combination of intellectual curiosity with empathy and instincts, (Ndletyana, 2010).

While Mandela's leadership was transformative according to Ndletyana (2010), Du Preez (2010) argued for a simpler type, that of a chief executive, in the style of business.

Investopedia defines a chief executive officer as the highest ranking executive in an organisation, much like the president heads the government and executive of the country. And their primary responsibilities include making major decisions, managing overall operations and resources and acting as the main point of communications between the board of directors and corporate operations (think the Cabinet and civil service heads for the president). But chief executives, also set the tone and the vision for the organisation and similarly, in the case of the country, this is the job of the president (Investopedia, 2016).

In addition, to being a chief executive, Makhanya said in 2010 that a president must lead and take clear positions, make decisions and charts a way forward for the country:

> South Africans are demanding much more than his [Zuma's] affability. They want a president who leads and who is not afraid to take clear positions on issues. There is an increasing sense across classes and political affiliations that the current president is not that person. That he is not a decision maker and certainly not somebody who can chart a path. South Africa functions despite him rather than because of him. The way he has run the Presidency is exactly the same way he has run the ANC: by letting the factions and sub-factions fight it out until a winner emerges. (Makhanya, In the Presidency as in the ANC, a leader who just watches and waits, 2010)

Using comparison, Mulholland (2012), said that great leaders exercise moral and effective leadership by inspiring, comforting and encouraging their people, led by example, have courage, commitment, honesty, dedication and awareness of the need for support from those they lead. He adds that great leadership leads to great results such as what Mandela, Roosevelt, Nehru and Churchill achieved when they were at the helm and led to progress in their countries through industry, commerce, politics and government:

> Zurna's role in South Africa sinks into insignificance. He is no Mandela, who gathered together in his fatherly embrace South Africans of all races and religions, imbuing them with hope for a peaceful and prosperous nation. He is

> no Roosevelt who lifted not only his own country but the entire world out of a sickening depression, telling them to be not afraid as they had ‘nothing.to fear but fear itself’. He is no Winston Churchill who [defied] Adolf Hitler at the nadir of Britain's wartime fortunes. This is what great leaders do. They inspire, comfort and encourage their people. They also lead by example and who can claim that the moral examples established by Zuma are those which the people should follow? Does Zuma belong in this pantheon? (Mulholland, 2012).

Beyond the criteria espoused by a number of commentators, focused on the Mandela type of leadership, others give more benchmarks. De Lille (2008) emphasises moral responsibility and encouraging tolerance, grasping at more Mandela-type criteria especially when a leader is seen as allowing violent rhetoric for political expediency. Patricia De Lille, at the time was the leader of the Independent Democrats and criticised Zuma for allowing his supporters to say whatever they liked including ‘intolerance and war’ but then shifting his mind later. She said failure to reprimand followers:

> is nothing more than hypocrisy and poor leadership. These contradictions in leadership, where leaders condemn and then condone, where we speak out and then keep quiet are dangerous in a society with a culture of violence. We need to be building and encouraging tolerance. As leaders we have a moral responsibility to remind our supporters to be tolerant of those who have different political affiliations to our own - as is their democratic right, (De Lille P. , 2008).

Alongside De Lille’s views, Hlophe (2010) said the leader also shows leadership by acting against wrongdoers, thus showing they are in charge. In the case of the ANC under Zuma, Hlophe found that anybody in the ANC could do what he or she wanted because the centre of power was not holding and this cast doubt on whether, the current leader, Zuma had any ability to lead.

> The ‘free for all’ pronouncements by tripartite leaders created the salient perception that Zuma owed his position to certain political figures within the alliance. Thus, while Malema may not be ‘shaken’, he should consider two

> points. First, Bantu Holomisa's case presents a relevant precedent for him. Second, his political behaviour has inadvertently built and consolidated a power bloc within the ANC against him. This bloc calls on Zuma to 'show leadership' on this matter, which is, to 'deal with Malema'. And when Zuma acts against Malema, he will be consolidating his leadership and stature, (Hlophe, 2010).

Beyond punishing transgressors using moral might, Mangcu argued that some other tools leaders should have in their shed include emotional intelligence, ethical-moral commitment, political willingness and institutional resources (Mangcu X. , How can we rescue ourselves from this mess?, 2011).

For Mazi (2012), the most important thing is, simply, that a president does his job as required and expected by being consistent with policy as set out at the beginning of their term, such as for example creating jobs as promised. But Mzelemu (2009) wrote it cannot just be that simple, leaders have to have idealism and understand complex issues if they are to lead. In another comparison, Mzelemu says Zuma "is a loud nothing" who represents mediocre leadership while Obama is the ideal, as he understands the complex issues that afflict his nation. In addition to idealism Maseti (2011), felt that leadership requires dynamism, intellectual, ideological and political zest to confront challenges. Similar criticism by De Lille and Hlophe is aimed at Zuma:

> ...the style of the current leadership collective is characteristic of zig-zagging. Such a situation needs a wholesale rescue plan and it is incumbent upon the ANC members to correct it even if it means electing young and fresh leaders to take it over. South Africa needs a dynamic leadership that will have the necessary intellectual, ideological and political zest to confront the global challenges of poverty and huge socio-economic inequalities, (Maseti, 2011).

Furthermore, for Sipuka (2012) leadership is toxic if it leaves South Africa or the organisation (the ANC) in anarchy, mired in scandals, on auto-pilot and not dealing with serious challenges on top of a bad image, mediocrity and institutionalising kleptocracy while being led by Zuma:

> According to Whicker (1996), a toxic leader abuses the leader-follower relationship by leaving the group or organisation in a worse-off condition than when he/she joined it. President Zuma found both the ANC and government in much better positions than he will leave them. They say, a leader is as good as his people, surely we are no nation of fools, we deserve much better! (Sipuka, 2012).

Therefore, the solution to issues of toxic leadership and not doing one's job is to face crises head on and seek solutions, according to Lindiwe Mazibuko, the DA's parliamentary leader at the time:

> President Jacob Zuma has failed to demonstrate economic leadership in the midst of a global recession, and this is hindering job creation. For leaders this is the time to lead and to present clear, bold and decisive plans to reverse the threat of decline. To alter the negative trend of his presidency, Mr Zuma must make a final decision about what his government's economic policy is, (Mazibuko, Dithering Zuma must make a choice, 2012).

Significantly, Mazibuko wrote that successful leaders are accountable in office and tend to synthesise transformative objectives with transactional skills through their power of vision, communication and emotional intelligence:

> There was, I saw, an unbroken thread within the wider context of what presidential leadership should look like. The coin of presidential leadership is the notion of accountability, the belief that the buck stops at my door. While transformative leaders inspire followers to transcend self-interest for the sake of a higher purpose, transactional leaders motivate followers by appealing to their self-interest. Most successful leaders in office tend to synthesise transformative objectives with transactional skills. Yet Zuma does not possess either skill set. Lacking the soft power of vision, communications and emotional intelligence, his responses to the Marikana tragedy and Nkandla were disgraceful, (Mazibuko, SA deserves much better, 2012).

How to lead

Beyond the definition of leadership and the personality needed to lead, the success of a leader is understood through whether they know how to lead or not. This section seeks to lay out the criteria necessary to lead, who leads and other qualities such as decision making in general and the style of leading.

For leaders to run an organization or country, they have to be, simply inspiring, repectable, reflective and up to the job and implement their programme, according to Monare in 2009. Monare was criticizing president Zuma, saying that ordinary people would never see him as leading if he focused on his self-pity, conspiracies, indecision and populism (Monare, The time for leadership is now, Mr Zuma, 2009):

> ANC president Jacob Zuma must stop the self-pity, the conspiratorial bunkum, the indecisive "ums" and "ahs" and his populist bull. He must stop singing, cut out the disproportionate laughter and display some inspiring leadership. That is, if he is serious about becoming a respectable head of state. So, if he believes he deserves...honours and responsibilities, Zuma - for a moment...just for a moment - must show them [South Africans] that he is up for the job. He needs to reflect, ponder a little about what South Africans - not just Luthuli House ideologues - want. They want leadership and not some endless we-must-debate crap. He must be bold enough to tell his friends and supporters to go and jump and be able to embrace his opponents and have tea with his enemies.

What Monare (2009) sets out is what most commentators and journalists think is required – if you deem yourself a leader, then you must show certain actions or ideas and then we will believe you know how to lead.

For Ndlangisa in 2007, leading meant having clear policies that will solve problems and gaining or seeking supporters along the way to implement your programme (Ndlangisa, What the Zumafesto holds, 2007). But you can only do that with the help and support of the collective within your organization or cabinet, according to Oliphant (2007). Additionally, when you are new leader you must bring renewal but

keep in mind your predecessors successes and failures, said Malusi Gigaba, then deputy minister of Home Affairs:

> Zuma represents a new experience in leadership. He must introduce freshness in leading the ANC, the tripartite alliance and South Africa. He must do things anew, while not departing from how his predecessors have led the ANC and held its banner aloft (Gigaba, 2008).

But one of Zuma's most vociferous critics, Paul Hoffman, an advocate, says it is key to lead with accountability, responsibility and reason. Otherwise, if this is not done, there is the risk of turning a country into a kleptocracy (Hoffman, 2009):

> A Zuma presidency would be "a dream shattered ... as South Africa turned into yet another post-colonial kleptocracy, another footprint of despair in the path of destruction away from the promises of uhuru. The core issues involve accountability. Zuma cannot pretend to be a mere deployee of his party: he is first and foremost an individual who is in a position in which he is obliged to comport himself responsibly, reasonably and in a manner responsive to the needs of the people. He cannot possibly properly run the complex, long-overdue criminal trial in which his personal liberty is at stake, a trial that will keep him in Pietermaritzburg for months if not years, and discharge the responsibilities of head of state and head of the national executive in Cape Town and Pretoria at the same time (Hoffman, 2009).

In a *Mail and Guardian* editorial in 2009, the newspaper's view is that Zuma is a breath of fresh air and praises some of his traits. The editorial finds that it is good to be a leader that is consultative, consensus-seeking that listens but warns, afterwards it is also important to make decisions and have them accepted (Ubaba must lead, 2009):

> Jacob Zuma's consultative and consensus-seeking style, very much in evidence since he moved into the Union Buildings, is a welcome change. But an appreciation of the importance of consultation and conciliation should not mean that the president becomes paralysed between alternatives - his leftist allies, for example, and his grand vizier, Trevor Manuel. A president has to

> listen, and when he is done listening he must be decisive and accountable (Ubaba must lead, 2009).

In an article evaluating the first 100 days of the Zuma presidency, reporters Mmanaledi Mataboge and Glynnis Underhill spoke to various opposition party leaders about the milestone and the conclusion was that leading means placing substance over style and being the main decision-maker but also being accommodating (Mataboge & Underhill, 2009).

Also leading means having good problem-solving skills, judgment and effectiveness but not for personal gain, according to Nic Dawes, then editor of the *Mail and Guardian*:

> It works like this: take a president anxious to consolidate his position ahead of a vote that will be decided by factional warfare, add an array of state security bodies packed with ANC deployeess whose first loyalty is not to the Constitution, or even the party, but to factional barons, then stir in large dollops of cash" (Dawes, Conspiracy stuck on repeat, 2011). On top of what Dawes outlines, ordinary people should sense that there is credibility, competence, principle and commitment in a leader when leading to build the confidence of citizens with a shared common cause (Smith, 2012).

In addition, Weekend Argus Saturday editor, Chiara Carter said leaders need to be comfortable with tough expectations from citizens and what they believe a president ought to be like (Carter, Under the microscope: Zuma's first 100 days as ANC leader, 2008):

> He faces tough expectations, not least because South Africans and the ANC tend to want a morality play - a noble movement, a miracle nation winning through and an iconic leader at home and on the world stage. Zuma's indisputable charm did not shield him from his own gaffes and these being seized on by his critics as a sign that the man who might well be the country's next president lacks a principled centre and instead plays at being all things to all people. Part of the motivation for the Polokwane coup was to effect a

> return to collective leadership in the party and they are keen to see a mechanism that will ensure that the ANC speaks with a collective voice (Carter, Under the microscope: Zuma's first 100 days as ANC leader, 2008)

And a very good trick, as a leader, is to appoint politically sophisticated and media savvy spokespeople who can engage with the media and put the leader's views out there. This was contained in an editorial (Mac makes a comeback, 2011) in the *Mail and Guardian* in 2011, focusing of Zuma's appointment of Mac Maharaj (a former minister in Mandela's cabinet) as his presidential spokesman:

> If Zuma's motive in appointing Maharaj is also to reach out to the South African public, we approve. The heart of criticism against the president has been that he has failed to give leadership as he protects his political future by balancing interests within the alliance. The appointment also takes place in the context of increasingly acrimonious relations between the media and the government. In contrast with certain recent appointees, Maharaj is politically sophisticated and media savvy - and we hope that he will seek to bridge this widening gap (Mac makes a comeback, 2011).

Pointedly, this section shows that what Monare says is universal in the news media, that a leader leads by being inspiring, respectable, reflective and implements his programme.

Evaluating Zuma's stewardship

The period between the ANC's elective conferences in Polokwane in 2007 and Mangaung in 2012 is key to understanding President Jacob Zuma's leadership in his early years as leader of the ANC and the country, and how he may be evaluated by history after he has left power. It would not be fair to speak of what the press believes about political leadership and the normative criteria they set out, without giving a report on Zuma himself as a leader of this country and the governing party using the very same news media.

After Zuma's election to the presidency, what kept journalists and commentators awake at night was whether he would meet the most basic expectations of his position. Also his history would play a central role in his evaluation. Therefore, this section looks at the expectations of Zuma's presidency, his promises, results and evaluations by the media.

Sipho Seepe, a political analyst in a debate in 2009 (in the *City Press*) with the then DA leader, Helen Zille said that Zuma faced heavy expectations and started his presidency on a difficult footing (Seepe, The sky did not fall, 2009). Seepe argued that disparate groupings who supported him and had him elected ANC president wanted different things from him when in power but he viewed this as a positive thing. Seepe said Zuma's critics expected anarchy but they were proven wrong. This is similar thinking from Kribbs Naidu, also in 2009, who said that Zuma would make a great president if he received support (Naidu K. , 2009):

> Opposition leader Helen Zille has described Zuma as disarming and charming, a person difficult not to like. President Zuma displayed a remarkable shrewdness. He responded to the interests of his disparate constituencies and kept the alliance together while asserting the ANC as the strategic centre and leadership of the alliance. In doing so he displayed a mark of leadership by being humble enough to accept that others may hold a different view from his. But while his presidency has opened and democratised public debate, Zuma, as head of state and leader of the ANC, should address the vulgarity and

> insults that are polluting this space. The pollution comes largely from the alliance partners. But far from the mayhem predicted by prophets of doom, our democracy remains intact and vibrant (Seepe, The sky did not fall, 2009).

Another focus on expectations came from a 2009 editorial in the *Sunday Independent* saying that the expectations were created by the ANC and its leadership through promises, during the election campaign, ranging from increasing the pace of service delivery, fighting corruption, improving social services and reducing crime (Will Zuma fulfil voters' expectations?, 2009):

> These are expectations that Zuma created during his successful election campaign. The electorate absorbed these as promises and now they have become the key performance indicators of his job description - his contract with the people of South Africa. The big question is: Will he deliver? Zuma has a tough balancing act to perform. He has to find capable people while satisfying his critically important constituencies within the ANC/COSATU/SACP tripartite alliance. It will not be easy. However, he must be guided by one thing and one thing only - the interests of 46 million South Africans. And precisely because he has so much to prove, Zuma might turn out to be a great president for South Africa. We will wait and see (Will Zuma fulfil voters' expectations?, 2009).

Moreover, journalist Edwin Naidu said Zuma was expected to be an action man and a headmaster who delivers. “Zuma will have to show he is not all talk but action because some ministers in the extended government he formed will inevitably fail,” (Naidu E. , 2009). Also Marcia Klein, a *Sunday Times* journalist, in an article published in 2008 prior to Zuma becoming president of South Africa, wrote that Zuma had promised to be a collective decision maker and tackle poverty, the economy and create an accountable government (Klein, 2008).

With such expectations, Zuma’s promises came to the fore in an interview with Moshoeshoe Monare, then Independent Newspapers’ group political editor, with the president. Monare wrote that Zuma promised to have a different presidential style by

delegating and strengthening the deputy president's role (Monare, Out with the loafers, in with women premiers - Zuma, 2009):

> Speaking to Independent Newspapers after charges against him [Zuma] were dropped, he spoke confidently and frankly about the shape, form and content of his presidency. Zuma promised drastic changes in the presidency, both in style and substance, saying his diary would 'indicate that now it is a different person here'. 'You should appreciate that I was in government.... There were things then, when I was there (that) I was not happy with. So I already have ideas. 'I'm sure I know the loafers a great deal, so I will be able to deal with (them), but I also know people who work, and work hard.' Zuma said although he would keep some staffers for continuity and institutional memory, he would hire people who pushed his agenda. 'There should be a balance...of people who must carry the kind of culture that I want to bring into government. I want to remove the slow movement in government,' he said. Zuma said he would not be a control freak, but would delegate and strengthen the office of the deputy president. While Thabo Mbeki was criticised for reducing his deputy presidents to ceremonial junior ministers, for Zuma a deputy president's role depends on 'the style of the president'. 'Does the president give his deputy an opportunity...to stretch himself or herself fully in the tasks? Are there specific tasks that are identified to be done by the deputy president? If you don't do that, the deputy president disappears. 'So the deputy president needs to play a greater role...There is a lot that cannot be done by one man; you actually have to delegate,' he said. Zuma reiterated that he would not appoint people simply because they had supported him in the succession battle. 'I believe in the collective leadership...it will not just be me saying, "This individual is good', he said (Monare, Out with the loafers, in with women premiers - Zuma, 2009).

Also, journalist Deon de Lange, writing for the *Sunday Independent*, said that Zuma had promised to be decisive and not allow opposition (De Lange, 2009).

> ANC MPs and members of provincial legislatures (MPLs) elected this year will have to shape up or ship out - no matter what friendships get ruined in the process - Jacob Zuma, the party leader, told delegates at its national list

> conference in Kempton Park yesterday. Zuma warned that underperforming public representatives would not last long before being replaced by ‘people who can do the job’. ‘I don't think we should tolerate comrades who do not deliver simply because we elected them. We will take action ... People don't say: 'So-and-so has failed,' they say: 'the, ANC has failed',’ he said to applause from about 400 delegates'. He threatened ‘comradely but firm’ action against those who did not ‘work tirelessly to deliver services to our people’. Zuma also appealed to candidates to view their nomination as a service to citizens and not simply as a job (De Lange, 2009).

So how did Zuma perform? The mostly negative evaluations and some positive aspects, paint a complex and nuanced picture of a man who knew how to use power when he wanted to but also someone who could become mysterious. Lindiwe Mazibuko, the leader of the official opposition in the National Assembly in 2012 said, simply, Zuma was a bad leader who had failed South Africa (Mazibuko, Time to govern without re-election pressure, 2012). Moreover, *Mail and Guardian* journalists, Michelle Pietersen and Matuma Letsoalo quoted Julius Malema, the then expelled ANC Youth League leader, as saying Zuma was a limited leader who could not think (Pietersen & Letsoalo, 2012):

> South Africa is suffering a crisis of leadership. In these difficult days, we want the president to give the nation hope to overcome despair. Yet he has failed to match the power of his office with a sense of purpose. The president has fulfilled his statutory responsibility to present the presidency's budget, but his speech lacked leadership and vision. The president has failed to demonstrate leadership in the worst-ever global recession. The failure of leadership is causing havoc on the "frontline" of the economy - where real people live. In times past, citizens looked to the president to propose bold solutions to big problems. Their faith has been shaken and the president must restore it by showing leadership. If the president seeks to define a vision, he will need to reacquaint himself with the foundational bedrock of the republic: The Constitution and its Bill of Rights. The president has time and time again failed the constitutional test of accountability on which our entire system of government is built. I would like to ask the president: does doing what is right

> simply because it is right play any role in the matrix of the government anymore? Does the presidency strive to create a culture of accountability in which public officials are the servants and the people the masters? The president presides over a sinister, secret "state within the state", at the apex of which he stands. His problem is that he constantly has to reshuffle the security services like a deck of cards to stay on top. The president's indecision extends to international relations and foreign policy. Our president must be the first head of state in history to fly to the United Nations in New York with three jets - and not one foreign policy brief among them. He is unable to drive policy that runs counter to the interests of the disparate factions that brought him to power. He will never be able to stamp his authority on his government because these factions do not share a common purpose (Mazibuko, Time to govern without re-election pressure, 2012).

Although Mazibuko was disillusioned in 2012, in 2009, the political analyst William Gumede saw the future repeating the past. Gumede (2009) said Zuma had adopted Mbeki's vices when he attained power – he would become an autocrat in power and his history would come back to haunt the country:

> Zuma successfully portrayed himself as "poor" identifying his personal marginalisation by former president Thabo Mbeki with the marginalisation of the poverty-stricken masses. He successfully distanced himself from the failures of the ANC government in the minds of poor voters, blaming them on Mbeki. Throughout the election campaign, his strategists portrayed his camp, which now dominates the ANC, as an almost different party. They projected Zuma and the new leadership as more pro-poor and democratic - and paradoxically less corrupt - suggesting they will offer effective government. To capture the top office, he has assembled a disparate coalition by promising every group what it wants to hear. Often the pledges are contradictory and some of his supporters are heading for disappointment; His initial response to these pressures is not encouraging. Not yet, formally in power, he has copied many vices of the Mbeki era from which he has distanced himself (Gumede, 2009).

Thabedi (2010) in a letter to the *Mail and Guardian*, describes Zuma as a feudalist and fully fledged capitalist, thereby disappointing on some on his promises to supporters (especially the socialists) who brought him to power.

> Every member of his family over 18, and his wives and girlfriends, are in business. Zuma is a polygamist and a playboy, practices that are anti-communist. Rather, he is our South African tsar (Thabedi, 2010).

Other negative aspects include Zuma appointing 'lackeys' to key positions of power and shutting down debate, according to an unnamed critic from the Gauteng ANC (Letsoalo & Molele, Gauteng executive sharply critical of Zuma, 2012). Besides, Sefara says these supporters are blindly loyal and eager to defend the president no matter how foolish he makes them look (Sefara, 'Heroes' at the dinner table, 2010). On the other hand, Ngalwa (2010) says Zuma underestimated the task of governance and taking leadership responsibility (Ngalwa, Zuma: is the centre holding?, 2010):

> After all the hurdles for Jacob Zuma to become president had been cleared, there was an implicit national consensus to give him a chance. Even the venomous opposition was charmed. The media were captivated by his newfound presidential demeanour, a cartoonist even shelved the satiric shower. The tone of his inauguration speech was warm and reassuringly reconciliatory, especially coming from a man whose road to the presidency had been rocky. He confounded the prophets of doom, mostly in his own party. A small section of his organisation did everything in its power to stop him - citing the paucity of probity and dearth of intellect as a basis to reject him. Zuma and his supporters - or those who fought in is trenches - underestimated the mammoth task of governance and responsibility of leadership (Ngalwa, Zuma: is the centre holding?, 2010).

Also, an editorial by the *Sunday Independent* took issue with Zuma's actions and described him as muddling along with no clear purpose, when it came to policy surrounding government-owned companies due to:

> …a lack of decisive leadership on his [Zuma] part now seems to be putting the chances of greater efficiency to risk. No clearer example of this can be found than in the fraught arena of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). What is needed is a sense of clear purpose, united behind the goal of a proper framework harnessing SOEs. Instead, there is more confusion - layered on the muddle that has dragged on for years ...treating a symptom without dealing with the cause: the lack of political leadership from the centre (Zuma's clear vision needed, 2010).

Tellingly, by 2010, an editorial by the *Sunday Independent* showed growing disappointment and came to the conclusion that Zuma did not care about public opinion after all. Zuma had only hit the right notes at the beginning of his presidency because that is what is done by any newly elected leader (Not another Jansen moment please, Mr Prez, 2010):

> The occasion was his inauguration [May 10] at the Union Buildings where the world watched and nodded. The renewal Zuma spoke of related to his approach and content of his leadership. His was a return to reconciliation. The following day, he announced a cabinet that was difficult to find fault with. As the script goes, he did many other good things to silence those who thought the country was about to fall apart on his watch. No sooner had Zuma's critics started eating humble pie did he start showing signs he cared little about public opinion by appointing questionable characters to his administration (Not another Jansen moment please, Mr Prez, 2010).

Nevertheless, Monare, also in 2010, said that in actuality Zuma knew how to use power and made important decisions with far-reaching negative consequences (Monare, Criticism of Zuma is evidence of democracy, not conspiracy, 2010):

> Is Kodwa [presidential spokesman] suggesting that one has to flirt with Zuma before one is allowed to comment on him? Zuma is not attractive anyway. If some editors don't like Zuma, so what? And why should they? He was elected to govern - not to be pitied and hugged. Zuma contested power and won it, by a popular vote last year. It was not a beauty pageant. Why should he and his

> aides be frightened by columnist or, commentators? He is not a victim. He doesn't deserve pity. He is one of the most powerful men in the world, leading Africa's biggest economy and representing the continent on world forums. His decisions and actions could shake the whole continent. Zuma also played' the role of the victim when there were attempts to prosecute him and when Thabo Mbeki ejected him from government. Miraculously, his fortunes changed - Mbeki was ousted and Zuma became president of the ANC and the country. That's someone who knows how and when to use power. Zuma is not a moron. He and Kodwa must now stop this bull about Zuma being persecuted. But the danger with this argument is that he and his boss – and some of his colleagues - might actually believe in this conspiracy theory nonsense, become vindictive and hunt "enemies of the state". The previous administration used similar reasoning. Does Kodwa expect the media to ignore a major scandal about the president days before the state of the nation address? Does he expect the media not to analyse the substance of the blandest and most boring speech of 20l0? Maybe he should direct his frustration to his principal - an intriguing, colourful subject of gossip and trivia (Monare, Criticism of Zuma is evidence of democracy, not conspiracy, 2010).

Tied to Monare's view that Zuma knew how to use power, columnist and broadcaster, Redi Tlhabi said in 2011, Zuma led when it was convenient to protect himself and account to the public when he had no choice (Tlhabi, 2011) whilst Times Media editor, Phylicia Oppelt in 2012 described Zuma as being expedient in how he created Malema's profile, had him go after critics and enemies and then discarded him when his creation turned on him (Oppelt, 2012). Tied to Tlhabi's view is that Zuma was decisive and not pleasing everyone when he fired then key supporter and national police commissioner, Bheki Cele after accepting the Public Protector's remedial action. But he also dropped the "lets-please-everyone approach to wield power the way he saw fit (Rossouw & Tabane, 2011).

And in terms of how Zuma actually ran the country and his party, Sefara said the president was a spymaster who watched closely those around him and isolated his critics (Sefara, Zuma's cabinet reshuffle shows his political genius, 2010). Zwelinzima Vavi, then Cosatu general secretary and later an ex-supporter of Zuma was quoted by

journalist Carien du Plessis saying that the president had presided over a predatory state (Du Plessis, 2011) full of "hyenas", "tenderpreneurs", "ultra-leftists", and a "paralysis of leadership". In a 2011 letter to the *Sunday Independent*, Sefu Sekgala, a regular commentator said Zuma had run the country like an intern with a pendulum leadership style (Sekgala, 2011) whilst political scientist Mzukisi Qobo, simply saw it as Zuma's presidency damaging South Africa's institutions (Qobo, 2011) and a *Sunday Times* editorial described it as Zuma killing institutions for his own enrichment agenda (A trickle of justice against the tide, 2011). Njabulo Ndebele, the writer and former University of Cape Town vice-chancellor, said Zuma's conduct showed he had disdain for the Constitution through allowing the erosion of institutions and allowing corruption to flourish (Ndebele, 2012):

> One reason South Africa is deprived of credible political leadership is that the very process of selecting political leadership is not designed to reward excellence. Leadership succession is determined through the dictatorship of the party over society. It is for the reason that the wall of mystery surrounding leadership within the ANC should be assailed to allow for a more open discussion on South Africa's leadership options and the possible directions the country should take beyond Jacob Zuma's presidency. The first is that the character of political leadership has a powerful impact on the nature of the country's institutions and the quality of its future - politically, morally and economically. There is little doubt that for the foreseeable future the ANC will continue to dominate the South African political landscape and act as a party that produces presidents for the nation - however flawed these may be. The consequences of morally and intellectually defective leadership could be extremely damaging and difficult to reverse. Zuma became president simply because his faction had its way. His slate was more popular to those who either falsely saw in him an image of a messiah, or an avenue through which they could access power and plunder state resources. Zuma's rise to power was very much facilitated by a deadly cocktail of political manoeuvring and illegality, including the use of illegally obtained spy tapes to get him off the hook and to pave the way for his rise to the Union Buildings. He came to power with no credibility to stand on. As such, the office of the president lacked decorum (Qobo, 2011).

Additionally, Zuma was accused, in a *Mail and Guardian* editorial, that he made decisions without following ethics and rules (Measure of performance, 2011):

> South African Cabinet ministers are almost never fired for incompetence or ethical lapses - Zuma's October reshuffle had more to do with politics than probity. So, if he does get rid of the minister of expensive hotel suites, it will set a welcome and praiseworthy precedent. So if Zuma really wants to demonstrate his performance monitoring bona fides he should rid himself of his turbulent Police Commissioner, Bheki Cele, the public works minister, Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, who is also up to her neck in a scandal over the procurement of buildings… (Measure of performance, 2011).

Although most evaluations of Zuma are negative, there were some commentators who had positive things to say.

On policy areas, Obed Bapela the deputy minister of the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation (in the Presidency) wrote in the *City Press* that Zuma had shown a steadfast hand on areas such as HIV/AIDS, infrastructure and planning (Bapela, 2012):

> To change our path on HIV, it took strong and decisive leadership. A country once derided for its HIV policies is now acknowledged as a world leader. This is thanks to the decisive leadership of President Zuma. Neither of these plans [the NDP, NGP] would have become a reality without the steadfast leadership of President Zuma. At their core both visions are about creating jobs, building infrastructure to stimulate economic growth and providing opportunities for all (Bapela, 2012).

For Karima Brown, a seasoned journalist and commentator, Zuma showed he was not afraid to admit his mistakes and also understood governing to be a process and made decisions accordingly (Brown K. , 2010) when reshuffled his cabinet:

> Last Sunday’s Cabinet reshuffle is the most explicit articulation of the character of the Jacob Zuma presidency - and of the Zuma view of the country's future - before or since the ruling party's Polokwane watershed. Zuma has shown us parts of his vision and his way of working since Polokwane. This past Sunday, he gave us the whole enchilada. Possibly the most important message the president gave the country was that he - unlike his predecessor - had no problem admitting his mistakes, or recognising that the construction of a government was a process, not an event - a work in progress requiring constant refinement. We saw this with his dismissal of ministers historically close to him (Brown K. , 2010).

Likewise, Brown in an evaluation in 2013, said Zuma had succeeded in holding the ANC’s national executive committee together under his lead and shaping it (Brown K. , 2013). A similar recognition was made by Zweli Mkhize, then KwaZulu-Natal premier and ANC provincial chairman, that the president achieved ANC membership growth, good relations in alliance and NDP (Shoba, 2012):

> Yes, individual leaders play a role shaping the party's identity, but the ANC trumps individual profile. Zuma is firmly in charge of his party with the added bonus of state power. Zuma's support in the ANC is also not confined to one ideological school wing. He has support among nationalists and the left. For all Zuma's flaws, it is under his leadership that the NEC broadly reflects a cross section of leaders from various orientations. This allows Zuma to reconstitute the ANC's centre that has come under threat in the factional battles in the party. While many see speedy action as a sound leadership quality, in the ANC, it is a leader's ability to wait and have patience that yields the most dividends (Brown K. , 2013).

Finally, Zuma’s stewardship of the country and his party, has had more to do with expectations in the news media that were not fulfilled and his reputation suffered but there were some commentators who saw a president who was a smart operator, who was able to keep his party’s support through many damaging scandals who did not conform to the ideas prevalent in society. On whether he is a successful leader, most in the news media would say he failed and only with posterity we will see a clearer

view after Zuma leaves office. This goes some way to understand what was reported, who wrote opinion pieces in that time and some observations on key media actors are in the next section.

Observations on the reporting and opinion by key writers

Overall reporting focused on major events such as the political parties' conferences or major state speeches such as the opening of Parliament. A lot of the opinions in the newspapers seem to emanate from critics and followers within the party, government sources but an interpretation is that the reporters speak to people they are most comfortable with and "are their allies", who feed them information all the time in return for their perspective to come through in the media.

The *City Press* tended to focus on alliance dynamics and ANC internal movements and fights among factions and individuals in the NEC and government and what they were doing. It was taken as a fait accompli that Zuma was not a good leader and instead the debates were amongst letter writers and columnists and criticising each other.

On the other hand, the *Mail and Guardian* did not really focus very specifically on the leadership of Zuma, but on those around Zuma, court cases, information wars and propaganda. There was focus on ethics in how Zuma operated and the party he leads. In 2011/12 the focus moved strongly towards Malema and his acolytes. Strong use was made of unnamed sources but those who could have assumed to be close to powerbrokers or those directly involved such as Zuma, implying that *Mail and Guardian* journalists have their ears close to power. In most articles, there is emphasis on the politics of the ANC and state and there are moments when policy is mentioned but not drilled into much, the assumption was that the reader already knew. Some journalists seem surprised that politicians including Zuma would play games to have an edge in power (there is a false sense of innocence in being part of the media – "oh but how could they do this and that" – as if talking to politicians to get the latest salacious treat is not part of a game itself). In a July 2011 opinion piece "A national conversation driven by fear" by Rapule Tabane, he implicitly admits media is in the "great game" of pushing its own agenda when it comes to evaluating leaders. (Tabane, *Mail and Guardian*, 2011).

There was also a lot of coverage of those who oppose Zuma within the ANC and what they were doing, saying and much of their criticism. The newspaper also allowed pro-Zuma proxies and the opposition to debate within the pages of the paper but more emphasis was on those who were against Zuma prior to Mangaung. Zuma is also covered (Twala, 2012) many times talking about organisational unity and discipline with the Malema expulsion his biggest win yet. In addition, there is an emphasis on Zuma's numbers game, charm and state resources to keep his team in place (Tabane, Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, 2012).

Furthermore, there is less emphasis on Zuma's leadership during various key periods (see the following work on court cases Davies-Laubscher, 2014; Khuluse, 2011 and Utting, 2011. On the Spear controversy (Egglestone, 2014). The relationship between media and ANC leaders (Daniels, 2012), the Arms Deal (Rague, 2010) and (Camerer, 2009) and control of the ANC (Southall, Zuma: party leadership as electoral liability, 2014)).

In the *Sunday Independent*, writers seem to have taken nuanced views of Zuma, arguing for and against. There was focus on followers of Zuma and what they wanted and whether Zuma had delivered or not. The *Sunday Independent* writers were fair to Zuma when he ascended the presidency and their analysis started from looking at what Zuma faced, his promises and what he did to get them done. There was doubt in some columnists' minds but they tried to be balanced reflecting the views of people within the ANC, tripartite alliance and in government. Zuma, earlier in his presidency was interviewed and his voice was allowed to come through (even via his spokespersons, advisors and supporters). However, critics were also given ample space to air their grievances.

In the case of the *Sunday Times*, more focus was on Zuma on a personal level in its reporting and what he had been up to with more critical but nuanced opinion in the columns. Also there was a focus on his supporters and followers who would write in through opinion pieces or letters defending Zuma.

Regular columnists from the *Sunday Times* such as Mondli Makhanya, Redi Thlabi, Phylicia Oppelt, and Stephen Mulholland were Zuma's fiercest critics. Other critics

included opposition politicians such as Lindiwe Mazibuko and Helen Zille. But Zuma's key defenders were Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande, former presidential spokesman, Mac Maharaj and COSATU president Sdumo Dlamini. In their opinion pieces, there was emphasis on not individualising leadership and focusing on collective leadership in the ANC. The key point was that there is almost no room for individual leadership – more cadre than leader. This also brought out the confusion amongst defenders on how the main leader leads but also cannot lead without the collective. Additionally, Zuma's defenders would debate critics over Zuma's leadership with the former emphasising that they "know Zuma better than you – this is what you don't know about him".

Critics then tended to have low expectations and that the man had proven to be a bad leader as expected. In this case, over time, critics showed themselves to have never given Zuma a chance or they had a low bar for him in the first place. Zuma critics also received a lot of space in *Sunday Times* columns and in news article quotations – with a heavy emphasis on the negative.

Finally, there was a tendency in the *Sunday Times* to write about an "unknown quantity" [Zuma] by comparison to what is supposed to be established leadership template [Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe, Obama, Churchill and others] in the world.

CONCLUSION

The emergent themes and ideas in the media representation of political leadership in South Africa show that the press in South Africa tends to represent political leadership and governance through a focus on the incumbent in leadership positions such as the presidency. This representation is further developed through focusing on the personality of the man or woman in charge, their history is important in how analysis takes place and their actions are paramount. There is also more focus on comparison to predecessors and other world leaders. In the case of Jacob Zuma, the focus went deeper into the past, from past ANC leaders to his predecessors such as Mandela and Mbeki and surprisingly even comparison to other international leaders such as Winston Churchill to Ronald Reagan who led their countries in vastly different circumstances.

Therefore, media representation of leadership and how to lead is also dependent on normative positions that journalists and commentators see as key to leading the country or political party and the news media defines these norms or grasps at them by discussing how the incumbent leader is doing and whether he uses good or bad examples from the past or not. A key finding in the research above was that the press had low expectations of Zuma's leadership in the first place, and there were pockets that thought to give him a chance but that quickly evaporated and the focus shifted to criticism of what he was not doing and some key writers felt he was a failed individual in the first place and had gone on to prove them right. But other commentators and supporters of Zuma felt he did some things correctly but these were the minority voices in the press. Also many key writers had their own notions of leadership, against which Zuma was measured and they advanced it into public discussion and that influenced the overall assessment of Zuma.

But what became clearer later, was that the press did not have a specific definition of political leadership but the discussion was driven by an agreement that the best template so far of good leadership with results came from the Mandela period in the 1990s. Additionally, there was much less discussion on how a leader leads the country or his organization and this discussion tended to go towards the traits needed to lead.

Therefore, the narratives in the press revolve around individual leaders and how they affect the system whether of party or state, implying that a leader can have a lot of power to shape the future of the country.

Likewise, what emerges is that the discussion of leadership is fraught with assumptions and a lack of clarity. These norms then also tend to link to the idea of democracy as envisaged in the constitutional structure of power in the country but also these rules link to what the governing party, the ANC thinks of leadership and additionally and how the struggle for democracy was conducted during apartheid from a moral perspective.

Finally, in the case of President Zuma, news media discussed the president as if he was only a state president of the country, an individual who lacked morality and vision and did everything outside of his political party, the ANC, implying that the party was innocent in wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this is mistaken because organisations mould leaders and they create cultures and this allows certain leaders to emerge, just as Zuma did in 2007 in Polokwane as ANC president. Another missing part was that news media discussion omitted that ANC organisational culture does not articulate a vision for the party, it is the collective leadership who do and this is explained by how Zuma always articulated himself as being a servant of the ANC and said he was doing what the bidding of the collective as the overall leader. But, of course that was also a way to absolve himself and political theory tells us that the main leader even in a collective does create a vision for their party and country regardless of whether it is successful or not and makes decisions without the collective.

Eventually, in the words of Mondli Makhanya, the editor of City Press, the type of leader that South African news media value is a leader they can love, be proud of, one who is respectful, compassionate, politically astute and grounded and in many ways we are still hung up on the great Nelson Mandela, who was open about his flaws.

Makhanya's views further confirm my observation, whilst practising as a journalist that editors and broadly newspaper owners are very influential and actively seek to condition and influence politicians and ordinary folk alike on what is politics,

leadership and how it all works. In addition, Hall (1982, 64) said that news media does what it does to continue to underwrite systematically a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures, that is, the rules of the game. The media determines what society knows in cahoots with those in power because it is reliant on those in power and in turn has to be part of the power structure to stay relevant and that is how media representation of political leadership takes place (Hall, 1982).

Therefore, the news media in South Africa in some way stuck to the classic definition of political leadership and assessed Zuma on his dignity, office, his position as leader, especially of the country; his ability to lead; his personality; his followers and supporters; and his direction of the government and party (Oxford English Dictionary (2016) ; Masciulli, Molchanov and Knight (2013)).

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