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Major Patterns of Group Interaction in South African Society.

Draft

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This paper should be read and viewed as a working paper whose form, content and argument are by no means final. It is presented in the hope that it will stimulate critical and analytical discussion both of its content and of developments in the whole field of interaction between 'race' groups in South Africa. In what follows an 'overview' approach is adopted and no attempt is made to present microscopic empirical analyses of particular areas. The major concern rather is to deal with what can be considered to be important trends and patterns in the broad field of Black-White interaction.

MAJOR PATTERNS OF GROUP INTERACTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

Although recent historians have stated "the central theme of South African history is interaction between peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, ideologies and social systems, meeting on South African soil", [1] scant attention has been paid to such interaction by social scientists. Instead, most work in such disciplines has been segmentary, and focuses on the internal arrangements or attitudes of one group rather than on the relationships that that group has to other groups or to the wider society. This in itself may be one reflection of the polarities of the society that have influenced the pattern of social research itself. The result however, is that outside of the work of historians, there has been insufficient study of the consequences of interaction between the different groups in the population. Yet, such interaction is one vital key to an understanding of the social structure. [2]

In this paper, an attempt will be made to overview the most important patterns of group interaction across the lines - political, ethnic, economic and class - that so clearly demarcate the major groups in South African society. The primary focus in this exploration of the contact and cleavages between such groups will be the present, with some attempt to indicate emerging trends.

Present patterns of group interaction are the result of historical processes over three centuries of Black-White contact. [3] A central feature of this contact has been the imbalance of power between Black and White, that has resulted in the inequitable

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distribution of land, resources and political rights. It has been argued that race relations are fundamentally power relations.[4] This is to imply that the concept of race is not the correct analytical category to proceed from in an analysis of South African society, or in an explanation of its particular distribution of economic privilege and political power. The existence of physical differences by themselves has not been important in shaping the social structure or interaction between groups, rather what has been important is the system whereby groups have socially evaluated these differences and had the power to impose these evaluations on the social structure.

Such a perspective underlies this paper and suggests that individual prejudice, although an important cultural variable which both reflects and helps to shape the social structure, and thus is not an autonomous element in it, nevertheless does not alone provide us with the key to an understanding of the structure of interaction between the major groups in the society. Prejudice only becomes important in understanding patterns of group interaction when it is associated with the resources or power that enable it to be translated into effective discrimination.[5] All this is to suggest that race relations are social relations and consequently, they present the same analytical problems that are posed in the general analysis of social relationships. Thus, in the study of race and ethnic relations "the objective is to explain how patterns of ethnic differentiation emerge, how they are stabilized and maintained over time, and how they ultimately disintegrate or are transformed".[6]

Such a task involves understanding that in South African society, the socially evaluated factor of race has come to co-

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structure in terms of an alternative theoretical model, namely that of internal colonialism. This model places emphasis on the fact that South Africa has the qualities of an imperial-colonial society, in which the metropolis and colony are geographically and economically unified, while White 'colonialists' maintain extreme social distance from Blacks and act as if they were their imperial masters. This model, particularly as set out by Blauner, emphasises that social and economic structures during the colonization process, are deeply influenced by (i) the circumstances under which initial Black-White contact takes place, (ii) the impact of the colonializing power in transforming the values, orientations and ways of life of the 'colonized' people, (iii) the relationship that members of the colonized group tend to have to administrators and representatives of the dominant power, and (iv) the nature and form of the racism associated with colonization.[8]

While the intracies of the internal colonialism model cannot be explored here it is suggested that the model, and in particular the issues raised by Blauner from such a model, do form an adequate point of departure for an analysis of patterns of group interaction in South African society. While the model denies the contention that two or more economic or social systems are at work in South Africa significantly it focuses attention on how Whites live so closely with Blacks yet, through a complex system of controls, maintain a social distance and domination over them. In short the model emphasises that one of the key features of the social structure of internal colonial societies is the pattern of group interaction and the mechanisms by which this pattern is maintained. Consequently the model serves as a good point of departure in any analysis of group interaction in South Africa.

In this paper three of the specific components of the colonization complex that Blauner sets out are examined. However the first component, which stresses "the enormous fatefulness of the historical factor" in providing the setting and manner in which contact between groups is established, is not touched upon.[9] The examination of the three components presents some difficulty, if one is to do so over the whole broad field of Black-White interaction. To impose some order on this problem it appears best to investigate first interaction in the broad political arena, secondly interaction on the organizational level and finally interaction at the personal or individual level.

incide with and reinforce the lines of economic and political conflict. In other words, the interaction of class and race have produced a system of domination founded upon class-based racism, that has stabilized and maintained existing patterns of power and privilege.

If one is not going to proceed to analyze and explain patterns of group interaction in South African society in terms of the facts of race one is then presented with the problem as to what theoretical model of the society to use as a point of departure. For some people the kind of social structure in which group interaction occurs is best depicted in terms of a form of caste theory that sees ethnic divisions in South Africa being reinforced by caste-like barriers that prevent inter-racial association from freely occurring. Other people have argued against this position and in place proposed that South Africa is best depicted as a class society in which most of the factors related to class membership (such as status, income and occupation) are made to correspond closely with differences in official ethnic group membership. Consequently 'classes' have legally superimposed upon them features that give them a 'caste-like' character.[7]

While the caste <u>versus</u> class model of South African society has attracted considerable debate, in large measure this debate has concerned itself with problems of how best to classify the South African social structure. To a considerable extent this debate has not been fruitful for it has focused on taxonomic and ideological problems at the expense of using the models involved as a point of departure in an analysis of the realities of group interaction. At this level the failure of the debate has created a theoretical vacuum, and has led some people to explore the South African social

Black-White Political Interaction

The major feature of Black-White political interaction in South Africa is the political powerlessness of Blacks to have any immediate influence on the course of events. The society has been described as a social oligarchy with all meaningful political power retained in the hands of the White group. Amongst White political leaders, a consciousness has developed that this monopoly of power is, in the long run, untenable and the formula of seperate development has been devised as a means of rationalizing continued Black exclusion from the central political system.

Until the early 1960's, political interaction was marked by White intransigence and rejection, by forcible means if necessary, of the political aspirations of Blacks, particularly as expressed by the Congress movements. Sharpeville and the prohibition of the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress marked an end to this period, whereafter the White government, through its policy of separate development, attempted to channel all Black political aspirations and interaction with Whites through political sub-systems, as represented by the Bantustan governments, the Coloured Persons Representative Council and the South African Indian Council.

The chief intention in this section of the paper, is not to focus on the historical evolution of the policy of seperate development, or on the viability of the Bantustan policy, but rather to examine the forms of political interaction that have begun to emerge through the implementation of this policy and to make some assessment of the significance of these forms in terms of fundamental change.

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The major features of the policy of seperate development however, should be briefly noted. Ideologically, the primary objective of the policy is to assist Black groups to develop along their own lines, in their own areas, to independent nationhood. The clear implication of this is that the White government views itself as a colonial power whose aim is to grant self-determination and independence to the colonies within South Africa. As Dugard has pointed out, the language used in the Statute book, containing phrases such as "confers self-government", is the language of decolonization that indicates that the Government sees itself as a colonial power.[10] In regard to the Indian and Coloured groups, as they have no territorial base outside of White areas, it is widely presumed that the Government's ultimate intention for them is that they should remain in White areas, politically under the White parliament, but with some limited powers of political decision making.

The eight Bantustans, on which the major thrust of this policy is based, cover only some 13 per cent of the total surface area of South Africa. With the exception of two small Bantustans, each of them is fragmented into a series of land areas which are not all contiguous. Thus, for instance, Kwa Zulu is fragmented into over 200 pieces of land and Boputhatswana fragmented into 19 parcels of land. The Transkei is the Bantustan that is closest to having a consolidated area comprising two pieces of land. The fragmentation of the Bantustans will be shown to be a factor that considerably effects the interaction of Bantustan leaders with the Government, as does the question of the amount of land that is to be included in these Bantustans.

The overall picture that emerges, is one of a series of Bantustans that are politically dependent on the central govern-

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ment, mostly geographically fragmented and each economically reliant upon the common economy for finance and for employment of their population. Some indication of the dependence of these Bantustans on 'White' South Africa, is that in every case, the income from migrant workers, the one-third of males aged 15 - 64 domiciled in the Bantustans but working outside of them, exceeds the Gross Domestic Product of the individual homelands, overall exceeding it by some 31 per cent.[11]

Contrary to the expectations of many, there appears to be a grudging acceptance by Africans of government created institutions, particularly amongst those domiciled in the homelands. This can be deduced, for example, from the increased support in successive elections for Chief Kaiser Matanzima, or from Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's decision to accept the leadership of Kwa Zulu. However, caution must be exercised in interpreting the nature of such support. Matanzima's support, for example, is drawn both from a small traditional elite who have a vested interest in the continuance of the system, and from an electorate whose support for him has increased as he more rigorously articulates African demands for more land and greater political and economic power. While Buthelezi, whom opinion polls amongst Africans indicate is the most popular Black leader, has made it clear that he does not subscribe to the policy of separate development, he is involved with it because he sees no way open for meaningful political activity other than to utilize the institutions that the Government has created through this policy.[12]

The application of the Bantustan policy appears to be obtaining its chief support amongst Blacks to the extent that it clarifies some of the major issues in contemporary South Africa. Thus, even Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress,

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argued in 1972, that while Bantustans are dangerous, as they break up the nation, and those who work with the system should be seen as collaborators, an assault should nevertheless not be made on those who use the platform provided by Bantustans to attack apartheid.[13] Within South Africa, the Bantustan policy appears to have stimulated a new political consciousness amongst many Blacks by showing that apartheid policies can be exploited to provide a channel of political confrontation. In this regard, it is significant that none of the Bantustan leaders has accepted the status quo unreservedly, and all the leaders of the major Bantustans have made fundamental criticisms of the policy of seperate development.[14]

One of the chief points of formal political interaction that Blacks have with the Government, concerns the ownership and redistribution of land. At one level, the application of the Group Areas Act and the programme to remove 'Black spots' in White areas, have forced communities into political dealings and confrontation with the Government. At the national level, the question of redistribution of land has become the most immediate and pressing priority on the Bantustan Leaders' agenda for change. Dispute over land has always been a crucial factor shaping Black-White interaction since the first days of contact. Two factors condition White approaches to contact with Bantustan leaders on this issue; first, the determination by Whites to retain the major share of the land (as exemplified in the 1913 Native Land Act); and second, a reluctant willingness to trade some land in the pursuit of a political settlement with Blacks (as exemplified by the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act.)

The Government is not prepared to transfer more land to the

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Bantustans than that provided for in the 1936 Act, while Black leaders are not prepared to negotiate with the Government on the basis of the 1936 Act.[15] Consequently, the scene is set for a confrontation between the Government and Bantustan leaders.

The dynamics of this process of contact and conflict have had several major consequences for Black political activity. In the first place, the conflict has propelled homeland leaders into taking more radical political positions vis-à-vis the Government. Thus, while initially Matanzima was reluctant to criticise the Government and White domination, he now openly attacks both and advocates "the equality of all races in South Africa".[16] Similarly, other Bantustan leaders have used the land issue to launch attacks on government policy, apartheid, the educational system, economic inequalities, discrimination in the economy and other items of concern. In short, political interaction with the White government appears to have made the transparency of the connection between White political power and Black subjugation clearer to Black leaders, with inevitable politicizing and radicalizing consequences. Secondly, government interaction with Bantustan leaders has unified these leaders on critical issues, so that they now believe that group solidarity is an essential precondition for any resistance to White policies and pressures. Thus, in November 1973, six Bantustan leaders met in Umtata to frame a programme of minimum demands that they would make of the Government and to lay the foundation for creating "one Black nation, not weak tribal groupings divided along ethnic lines."[17] This meeting is to result in formal talks being held between the Prime Minister and the eight homeland leaders in March 1974, when the central issue will concern the division of land between Black and White. Thus, the experience of political interaction

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with White government officials has propelled Black leaders into attempting to construct some form of unified opposition to White domination, and in this way, is challenging the old colonial strategy of divide and rule, which is a major motivation behind Bantustan policy. Thirdly, the experience of Black homeland leaders has led them to raise in the public arena, issues that Whites do not want to discuss. These issues fundamentally concern the question of the re-allocation of resources and of the forms of Black-White political contact. In short, the homelands are providing a base for Black leaders to launch a struggle for at least partial re-entry into the sphere of "White" and national politics, and to inject into national discussions, the ideas of redistribution of resources of a sharing of political power in some form of a common society.[18] Such issues, ironically, are precisely the ones the Government wished to keep off the political agenda by its Bantustan policy. Fourthly, political interaction between Black and White leaders in regard to the Bantustans has stimulated the growth of political awareness amongst the Black population living outside of these homelands. Some eight million Africans live in the 'White' areas of South Africa and inevitably have been exposed to a politicization process, for many of them vote in Bantustan elections and look to leaders such as Mangope, Buthelezi and Matanzima to speak of the issues that concern them.

Of particular significance here, is the intervention of the Kwa Zulu government in recent labour disputes in Natal, which has established legitimate association between Black political leaders and Black workers. Thus, political segregation along ethnic lines is acting as a 'collective bond' heightening consciousness of identity and by so doing, stimulating the growth of other Black organizations.

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It seems that the above features are the unintended consequences of the Government's Bantustan policy that will significantly influence Black-White political interaction in the future. This is not to imply that the Government's policy does not at the same time have many intended consequences that work toward retarding significant political change. For instance, the fostering of tribal institutions serves to retard the growth of modern political values; the overall divide and rule strategy creates divisions in the ranks of homeland leaders; the unfulfilled promises contained in the Bantustan programme may well create increasing political apathy among the Black population; and, the growing number of Blacks with some vested interest in the system, helps to stabilize government institutions.

If the issues involved in the politics of interaction between the central government and Bantustans have a range of contradictory consequences for Blacks, they also give rise to contradictions amongst Whites. Schlemmer, for instance, shows that on the basis of a variety of reputable surveys conducted of White opinions on Bantustans, that while roughly 66 per cent of the White electorate consider the idea of independent Bantustans a good one, the idea was supported mainly for intrinsic reasons (separation for separation's sake), and not as a means of ensuring racial peace or stimulating development of the country. More significantly for the immediate future, are the findings that 40 per cent of White voters consider that the Bantustans should never be granted independence and that the greatest support for increased spending on Bantustans comes from those who favour a policy of integration, while many who favour Bantustans feel that the Government is spending too much on them. [19]

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While such findings reveal expressed attitudes, nevertheless these attitudes are rough indicators of the political reality of White self-interest being at odds with the ultimate goals of seperate development. This in itself is reflected in the cautious approach that the Government has taken to the question of the independence of the homelands. The Minister for Bantu Administration and Development has laid down, amongst other things, the conditions that no Bantustan should become independent before it has "reliability in all actions" and "a firm desire for peaceful co-existence". This indicates the Government's dilemma between the desire to fulfill its stated goals and its fear that the consequences of doing so will endanger White domination.

While the Government has been forcing Black political activity into officially sanctioned channels, this political activity can develop a momentum and logic of its own with consequences that cannot necessarily be controlled by Whites. In regard to the Coloured Persons Representation Council and the Indian Council, the control that is exerted over these bodies by White officials is damaging their ability to develop as independent a political momemtum as homeland bodies, although the Coloured Persons Representation Council is exhibiting the first indications that it might well do so.

While Bantustan policies partly have filled the gap created by the crushing of mass African political movements, Black political organizational activity nevertheless still occurs outside of government created channels. A significant feature of such Black activity is that it is founded on a strategy of broadly based Black solidarity that rejects all collaboration with White politics. Thus, such organizations as the B.P.C., the N.I.C., the B.C.P., the S.A.S.O., have emerged to vehemently oppose the "Buthelezi

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strategy" and to stimulate the growth of Black political consciousness.[20] The Government's response to these organizations has been to attempt to harass or destroy them, banning their leadership and their members.[21] This again reflects the Nationalist strategy of forcing all Black-White political interaction into the channels it has created and hopes to control. The inevitable consequence has been a growing political polarization between Black and White.

General Patterns of Interaction

In this section, an attempt will be made to overview some of the general patterns of interaction as they occur in selected social institutions. The first, axiomatic, point to be made is that the patterns of group interaction in these institutions are profoundly affected by the political system in which they are embedded. What this means is that the major institutions in South African society experience a state of tension between the need to co-ordinate and provide an integrative setting for the activities of individuals, and the need to preserve and even re-inforce the cultural diversity and social segmentation on which the society rests.[22] Thus, for instance, the various groups in the population meet in the economy where they have been welded into economic interdependence and co-operation, yet the economy functions to preserve the larger pattern of power distribution and to re-inforce the social cleavages of the society. Similarly, education is torn between the need to teach individuals the knowledge and common skills required in the society and the need to re-inforce the cultural and social cleavages of the society. These tensions in institutional life help to explain the basic patterns of social inequality.

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Every social institution in South Africa reflects these basic patterns of inequality and discrimination contained in the society. Education, thus, is free and compulsory for Whites, but not for Africans, and the State spends approximately fifteen times as much on the education of each White schoolchild as it does on each African child.[23] In the economy, White per capita incomes are, on average, more than thirteen times as high as African ones and White trade unions are legally recognized while Black ones are not.[24] Similarly, the legal system both reflects the pattern of the broader society in its laws and the discrimination contained in them, as well as being used as a tool to entrench inequality by preventing social and political change that does not accord with the ideology of apartheid. Even the institution of religion reflects the structure of inequality and discrimination of apartheid society; for its organizational life has produced marked inequalities and discrepancies of power and income between its personnel of different groups.

In view of the basic inequalities indicated above, the process of group interaction raises certain common problems within institutional life. The first of these is the question of the extent to which Blacks should be either included or excluded from the organizational life of institutions. Within the political system, as already shown, the protagonists of seperate development claim to have an answer to this problem. However, the very implementation of the policy creates new problems of interaction, requiring the establishment of new mechanisms to meet them, as already pointed out. A further example of this problem is provided in the economic system. Here the intention has been to contain the problem of Black participation in the economy by denying Blacks direct access to bargaining situations, offering as a substitute the system of works and liaison committees.

The second major problem that has had to be confronted

within the institutional setting involves, for the participants, a decision as to the degree and type of contact that they should establish across ethnic lines, while for the society the problem is presented in different terms, and becomes one of what should be the permissable bounds of inter-racial association.

The problem confronting the participants is well illustrated in the sphere of work. It is at work that real contact between Black and White is established, albeit of a limited sort. Socially Black and White scarcely meet, but at work they are forced into situations where they have to communicate, collaborate and engage in joint activities. This raises immediate problems for the individuals involved. Hahlo, in one of the few studies of Black-White interaction in the workplace, set in a Johannesburg Bus Company, argues that interaction across the colour line confronts workers with the dilemma of whether to be friendly, impersonal or antagonistic in their day to day relationships.[25] At the lower occupational levels the dilemma was partly resolved by developing a master-servant relationship into a paternalistic joking relationship, whereas at the higher occupational levels a 'sponsor-client' relationship developed that was based on a privileged friendship involving mutual rights and responsibilities which cut across social boundaries. Significantly Hahlo reports that Blacks who entered into sponsor relationships were often beaten up by their fellow workers, while the White 'sponsors' were regarded by their fellow workers as sell-outs. In short, social pressures operate against establishing any relationship at work which is viewed as an anomaly within the societal setting.

For the society the problem of what should be the permissable bounds of inter-racial association is solved mainly in the political sphere via legislation that, for instance, prevents

sexual contact across Black-White boundaries, constrains inter-racial contact in educational institutions, and in the economic sphere prevents Blacks holding supervisory positions over Whites.

The third problem that institutions face regarding group interaction arises from their relationship with the central government. Simply expressed, the problem concerns the degree to which prevailing apartheid patterns should be imposed on those institutions that are not close to the centre of political power. While the segregationist strategy is to generalize apartheid measures across the whole system of institutions and organizations, this strategy is not easily applied to some forms of religious, cultural, educational and economic activity. The dilemma for the government is how to deal with the organisations, such as NUSAS, which have insisted on holding non-racial conferences; those professional societies that remain integrated; and those churches and ecumenical bodies that engage in non-racial activity.

Conversely, the problem for many organisations is how to respond to the demands and constraints of separate development. The dilemma for TUCSA is whether to be representative of all workers or representative of White workers; and for employers it is the degree of rigidity with which segregationist practices in the work place should be imposed.

The growing political polarisation between Black and White, has its consequences and implications for the general patterns of interaction. For example, in labour relations, one significant Black response to exclusion has been the emergence of a movement aimed at an umbrella Black union informed by the ethos of Black consciousness. Similarly in Christian churches Black caucuses have emerged aimed at securing effective Black intervention in Church affairs.

Contact at the Personal Level.

Central to the ideology of apartheid lies the hypothesis that contact between people and different racial and ethnic origins leads to friction, which in turn is followed by overt conflict and the growth of racial antipathies. This hypothesis has found expression continuously in White South African political and social life and has been used extensively in justifying segregation at both the National and local levels, as well as at the level of personal relationships.

The few academic studies in South Africa concerned with Black-White interaction at the personal level, do not lend much support to the 'contact-friction' hypothesis. Van den Berghe ([26]) for instance found in an attitudinal study, that people who claim to have had much contact with Africans are less anti-African than those who claim to have had less contact. No evidence though is given by Van den Berghe to prove that his subjects did have the contact with Africans that they claim to have had, or that their favourable attitudes found expression in overt behaviour. More important in this regard than attitude studies, are the limited number of studies of actual behaviour at points of contact, such as those carried out by Russell and by Watson. These studies also do not suggest that there is any inevitability of contact leading to friction.

Russell studied a residential area in Durban where, prior to the application of the Group Areas Act, Coloured, Indian and White citizens held freehold property and lived side by side.[27] The findings of this study are particularly interesting in that they showed that despite all the pressures of the wider community to keep friendly relations to a minimum, contact led to interaction and interaction led to friendly relationships being established between Black and White.

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Any spiralling of this sequence, in terms of breaking down prejudice or developing any embryonic community organizations, was inhibited by constant reinforcement of the strict norms for segregation in the community. Consequently, in the relationships established, there was a carry-over into the neighbourhood of White superiority over Black, which revealed itself in an arrogance on the part of Whites that they could make demands and that their demands would be met. In this way the relationships reflected the wider pattern of race relations, in which the Black was the server, the helper, the loser, while it was the White who gained from the relationship and was politically powerful enough to dictate its course. Watson also found, in the area of Cape Town that had both Coloured and White residents, that contrary to apartheid dogmas, relations between residents were generally cordial.[28] However, here too the general structure and prejudices of White society were reflected in the relationships.

These and other findings suggest that the conventional White view of ruthless struggle at points of contact is not accurate. This is particularly significant in view of the fact that the Whites in the neighbourhoods studied by Russell and Watson, on the whole, were either poorer, older or of lower status than most other Whites and thus belonged to groups who could be expected to be highly prejudiced and not well disposed to establishing any relationship with Blacks outside of the dominant master-servant one.

This points to the fact that in situations of contact, it is the <u>conditions</u> under which contact occurs that are crucial in determining its outcome. Simple contact in itself does not lessen prejudice or intergroup hostility, indeed at times it may exacerbate it by raising the level of awareness of heterogeneity and thereby producing 'perceptual points for alarm'. Allport points out that it is only when two

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groups that are in contact (i) possess equal status in the situation, (ii) seek common goals, (iii) are co-operatively dependent on each other, and (iv) interact with the positive support of authorities, laws and customs, that it is likely that they will share values and beliefs and develop harmonious relations.[29] However, even then the acceptance generated by contact is typically limited to the particular situation which created it. In short, the simple contact-friction hypothesis cannot easily be accepted.

In the South African context, the structure of the wider society ensures that there are strong boundary-maintaining mechanisms between groups that make it difficult for most, if not all, of these preconditions for successful contact at the group and personal level to exist. When Black and White have contact, the great imbalance of power and differential access to political and economic resources of the parties immediately underpins whatever relationship exists, while laws and community norms set a framework for the relationship itself, which emphasizes whatever differences there are between the individuals involved. Thus from the start, contact between Black and White is predisposed to a variety of severe structural strains which serve to maintain the political and social identity of those engaged in contact at the individual level, and thereby help stabilize the socio-political order.

The effects of this are that, in general, Black and White are contiguous yet utterly remote. The bulk of their contact occurs within a framework of a master-servant relationship that is at times either mitigated by an element of paternalism or harshened by capricious racist conduct from Whites. Despite this, a cautious note of optimism can be introduced. The work of Watson and of Russell, as well as that by Hahlo, can lead one to infer that with the removal of existing racist programmes, individuals would be likely to develop a conscious-

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ness of class, rather than of colour. If correct, this could mean that were a non-segregationist state to be established, individuals would be quick to recognize and act upon the interests that unite them.

However, the system of segregation has been entrenched and White political attention has become focussed on the two immediate problems of how to maintain the system and how to forestall any significant changes in it. Characteristically, this has immediately involved the attempt to legitimate the structure of the society in the eyes of its members, so that they embrace the White conception of what is regarded as proper and appropriate behaviour vis-à-vis one another and do not attempt to alter this conception.

Specifically this has involved, and continues to involve, a process of formalization of behaviour. In this, the law is being used at an increasing pace as an instrument of domination to promote an extensive system of punishments and rewards to reinforce the social order that governs the framework of interpersonal relations. In an analysis of Statutes, it has been shown that since 1909, some 200 laws have been passed that seek to regulate relations between the races or which are applicable to the behaviour of specific racial groups.[30] The number of these laws has progressively multiplied over the years. In the pre-Nationalist period of 1908-1948, 49 such laws were passed, then in the twelve-year period 1948-1960, 53 such laws were passed, and the ten-year period of 1961-1971, 98 such laws have been passed. The pace of the attempt to formalize intergroup behaviour thus has been escalating over the time that crude baaskap has declined. This legislative attempt to formalize behaviour, as Kuper has argued, has extended the number of situations in which racial classifications form a mandatory guide to conduct and has led to such classifications

/increasingly..

increasingly being woven into the perceptions of individuals so that they are led to apply social definitions to a widening range of situations.[31]

The consequences of this formalization of behaviour are difficult to determine. In one sense, race relations, in Adam's words, "appear to have assumed the form of a relatively smoothly functioning, correct business relationship despite increased institutionalized separation"?[32] Opinion surveys have reported recently that Blacks have experienced an improvement in their relationships with Whites. A survey in 1973 in Soweto, thus concluded, "The feeling is that more communication is taking place, that the White man is more approachable than before. General courtesy and manners have improved and slowly discrimination is becoming less."[33] However, the same survey reports that only one-third of those interviewed believed race relations to be improving, a smaller number, one-quarter, thought they were deteriorating, while the remainder saw no real change either way. It would appear that the formalization of race relations has introduced some surface changes in their day-to-day manifestations ([34]) which are often appreciated by Blacks, while the roots of Black discontent with their position, remain unchanged. This in itself was illustrated in the survey cited above. While the survey was being conducted, the shooting of eleven Black miners at West Driefontein Mine in Carltonville took place. In one day, the proportion of those who thought race relations to be improving, dropped from 33 to 23 per cent, while those who thought they were deteriorating, increased from 23 to 33 per cent. It could be concluded from this that any feelings on the part of Blacks of improvements in race relations occurring, are fragilely super-imposed upon political and economic realities of their daily lives.

/If increased....

If increased formalization of situations in which inter-ethnic contact occurs has produced a superficial improvement in race relations, it is possible that it has done so by removing most elements of ambiguity from situations of personal contact, through providing individuals with a clear definition of their rôle and of prescribed behaviour. In this way the likelihood of Blacks experiencing capricious treatment at the hands of Whites is lessened and consequently race relations are seen as being 'improved'. It is impossible to know whether this process is at work but it appears that it may well be. The impact that the State has had on such agencies of socialization as schools and the mass media enables it to influence considerably the political socialization of individuals and to imbue them with an official definition of their identity and group membership. Such a definition carries with it clear implications for how individuals should behave in inter-ethnic contacts and what behaviour they should expect from others. It may, therefore, lower the expectations of many Blacks of what is considered appropriate behaviour from Whites and condition them to the behaviour that is experienced. Furthermore, the interaction of legislation and socialization work toward ensuring that alternative patterns of race relations are not presented and only limited types of political information are available to Blacks. This may well incalcate feelings of inevitability about existing patterns of inter-ethnic contact, and even of identification with such patterns, amongst sections of the Black population. It can be argued that these and other factors continue to help rigidify and stabilize situations of inter-ethnic contact, and in this way to 'improve' race relations by giving them a surface calm.

/Associated...

Associated with the formal regulation of contact between ethnic groups has been a segregationist attack on many potential growth points for personal contact and co-operation between members of different groups. Thus, where active co-operation was once possible between Black and White in such fields as social work, art and drama, now most voluntary organisations have been compelled to segregate their activities and committees on ethnic lines. Social Work agencies, for instance, are no longer registered by the State, or allowed to appeal to the public for money, unless they impose segregation upon themselves. Simarlarly, an attack has been made on many individuals who have attempted to establish personal contacts with Blacks outside of the framework set by community norms. Several such people have experienced harassment from government agents and fellow Whites, having had their cars burned, telephoned threats on their lives or being officially punished in some way. All such developments serve to channel personal contact and voluntary organisational activities away from those areas where inter-ethnic contact is seen as challenging the status quo, and so weaken any impulse to engage in contact outside of officially sanctioned channels.

Given that the formalization of patterns of inter-ethnic contact has helped stabilize the existing system, it has at the same time introduced new conflicts amongst Whites about how far to carry this formalization and how best to legitimize it in the eyes of Blacks. These conflicts are particularly manifested in the debate over so-called 'petty' apartheid. In 1961 Verwoerd stated that "When separation had been carried far enough, discrimination must be eliminated".[35] The distinction between these two concepts has been used, particularly by Afrikaner intellectuals, to question the necessity of continuing practices "which are no longer necessary in the bigger framework of separate development"

/and which...

and which "endanger human relationships" and "the whole scheme of things to come".[36] Thus, recently, such cities as Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria have taken steps to remove some forms of customary segregation in public amenities under their supervision or control (in terms of the Seperate Amenities Act of 1953), by removing signs and regulations imposing segregation in such places as parks, libraries, zoos and museums (although not in the toilets or restaurants of these places). These acts have brought warnings from the Prime Minister that the process should not be carried too far, and have also re-opened the intricate debate amongst Whites on "petty apartheid". The debate encapsulates the major political positions of White South Africans. In Nationalist ranks, the dialogue is over whether small integration leads to an integrated society, as some Verkramptes argue, or whether it is necessary to sacrifice some segregationist practices to preserve the stability of the society. Outside of the Nationalist ranks, the argument tends to be between those who see apartheid as incompatible with capitalist development, and thus encourage any removal of segregationist practices, and those who see any abolition of petty apartheid as adaptive modifications to forestall long run structural change. How Blacks view this debate and any changes in segregationist practice is not known, but it is doubtful whether it modifies their position in any basic way.

Of more significance than the debate over "petty" apartheid is the change that has occurred in the Government's sports policy, mainly as a result of international pressures. The new policy is based on a conception of South Africa as a 'multi-national' country, rather than a multi-racial one. This distinction is a political one that underlines the Nationalists' conception of the country

/as being....

as being composed of several nations. As applied to sport, 'multi-nationalism' permits each 'nation' to participate seperately in international or 'open' sporting events, while continuing to impose apartheid at the local level.[37] In terms of this policy it then becomes possible for South African 'nations' to each play against international teams that themselves could be multi-racial. However, in international events, South Africa never itself becomes represented as a single nation by one team.

This complex new policy, which is aimed at enabling South Africa to continue to take part in international sporting events on an apartheid basis, has opened up a division in Black sporting bodies between those who believe a policy of gradualism and compromise will eventually bring about integrated sport, and those who hold to a policy of non-racialism and thus non-co-operation with the practice of 'multi-national' sport. Non-racial sporting bodies continue to act as an irritant to the Government, through rejecting its sports policy in both the national and international arena, and thus contributing to the maintenance of international pressure on official sporting policy. This pressure is of significance, for it is difficult not to conclude that the Government has been forced to make the limited concessions embodied in 'multi-nationalism' due to the threat of isolation and expulsion of South Africa from certain international sporting events. In line with this new sports policy, the Government continues to take stringent action to prevent multi-racial sport being played at the local and club level, recently instituting action against the non-racial Aurora cricket team under a new proclamation that appears to especially extend the Group Areas Act to prevent such sport taking place.[38]

/Two implications...

Two implications of the changes in official sporting policy are important. First, the changes demonstrate that Whites are prepared to alter some, but not all, of their patterns of inter-racial behaviour under pressure when they see it to be in their interests to do so. Whatever the views of the White electorate, it appears that the majority of White sportsmen are therefore now prepared to play 'mixed' sport. Secondly, the power of lower participants in the society to affect national decisionmaking has been demonstrated and it is likely that their power (re-inforced in this instance by international connections) will be used to wrest further concessions from the Government in the sporting arena. In this regard, it is interesting to note that after years of attempting to belittle and ignore the views of Mr. Hassan Howa, the chief Black exponent of non-racialism in sport and President of the South African Cricket Board of Control, the Government and White sporting organizations now find it necessary to meet and negotiate with him. However, the extent to which events in the sporting world will act as a stimulus to other Black voluntary organizations to adopt pressure tactics, remains to be seen. But it is probable that the important fact that lower participants have exercised their power and affected national decision making will have a 'demonstration effect' on other Black organizations.

In sum, patterns of inter-ethnic behaviour and contact have been stabilized and rigidified with the growing application of apartheid. Any surface calm that this has brought about, fundamentally rests on the coercive powers of the State to formalize behaviour and to police it in situations of inter-ethnic contact.

/Nevertheless....

Nevertheless, the political economy has been receptive to modifications that attempt to ensure it will not be destroyed by its own rigidity. Consequently, these modifications have been greatest in the personal areas of contact and least in the more intimate ones.

However, any changes in inter-racial situations that have recently taken place, do not speak to the major grievances of Blacks. Edelstein, for instance, in a recent survey indicates that these grievances amongst Africans in Johannesburg, in order of their importance, were inadequacy of political rights, influx control and inadequate and unequal income; and for Coloureds, were unequal pay for equal work, job reservation and inadequate educational opportunities.[39] It is probably true to say that the same types and ordering of grievances would be expressed by the Black population at large.

None of the changes sketched out above appear to effect the basic issue in these grievances, the pattern of the distribution of power and wealth. And meanwhile, as Whites make a cautious series of adaptations, there is growing evidence that younger Blacks no longer see personal relationships with Whites as a significant area of concern.

Conclusion.

Three dominant themes have emerged from this exercise in political sociology. In the first place, the minimal political and social contact between Black and White has been a major factor in the polarization of the society along power and race lines. Secondly, there has been systematic suppression of those organizations attempting to bring about change outside of the framework of seperate development ideology, whether they be multi-racial, White or Black organizations; this has deeply affected patterns of interaction and has, in turn, re-inforced the process of polarization. Thirdly, there has been a formalization of the mechanisms that govern social and political interaction; the new mechanisms that are being established are often pragmatic responses to crises that have occurred in the society. Thus, for instance, the non-recognition of African Trade Unions has necessitated, after a series of strikes, government promotion of a system of liaison and works committees.

All these developments must be seen as arising from the interplay between, on the one hand, the Government's attempt to control social change that does not accord with the apartheid ideology, and, on the other hand, its need to meet new circumstances which threaten apartheid practices. This it does through pragmatic adjustments. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that these pragmatic adjustments do not significantly affect the basic issues, on which the Government is not prepared to negotiate. This is illustrated by a recent editorial in a Nationalist Party organ that stated: "There are certain matters which cannot be negotiated - on which no nation (volk) and no community can negotiate .... In South Africa this concerns specifically the maintenance of an own (eie) identity. This means that any direction or any tendency

/which can....

which can lead to an abdication of own (<u>eie</u>) political rights is unacceptable".[40].

These "certain matters" could, for example, be taken to include the entrenchment of the industrial and social colour bar, the question of corporate bargaining rights for Blacks, the issue of defence forces for the homelands and it certainly includes the franchise within a common political system. The greater the determination of the White power structure not to bargain on such issues, the less likelihood there is of relatively peaceful change.

The dynamics of this process have helped to dispel those false assumptions that ascribe the power of change to some inanimate force, or some inevitable logic that will break down the system.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (Eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa, Volume 1. (Oxford, 1969), p.v.

2. For purposes of this paper, interaction is defined "as any process in which the action of one entity causes an action by, or change in, another entity". H.P. Fairchild, Dictionary of Sociology, (New York, 1964).

3. The term "Black" is used in this paper to refer to Africans, Indians and Coloured people.

4. For example, William J. Wilson, Power, Racism and Privilege, (London, 1973).

5. Herbert Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations, (New York, 1967), p. 111.

6. Ernest A.T. Barth and Donald L. Noel, Conceptual Frameworks for the Analysis of Race Relations, Social Forces, 50(2), March 1972, p. 345.

7. On the problems involved in applying the concept of caste outside of Indian society, see L. Dumont, Caste Racism and Stratification in A. Béteille Social Inequality, (Harmondsworth, 1969). Simons and others also, attack the application of the concept to South African society; See H.J. Simons, Preface to G. Watson, Passing for White. (London, 1970), p. x

8. Robert Blauner, Internal Colonialism and the Ghetto Revolt, Social Problems, 16(4), Spring 1969, 395.

9. Ibid., 395.

10. John Dugard, The United Nations, Decolonization and International Terrorism, mimeo. talk to Arts Students' symposium, University of Cape Town.

11. Johan Maree, Bantustan Economics, Third World, 2(6), June 1973, p. 27.

12. G. Buthelezi, 'Kwa Zulu Development'. Address to Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, June 1972, published in B.S. Biko (Ed) Black Viewpoint (Durban, 1972), 49-56.

13. See statement in Third World, op. cit, p. 18.

14. See previous years issues of Annual Survey of Race Relations.

15. For a penetrating summary of the land position, see the article by Patrick Laurence, A Summit on the Land Issue, Rand Daily Mail, 28/2/74.

16. Third World, op. cit.

17. Rand Daily Mail, 8/11/73.

/2....

18. Gatsha Buthelezi said at the conference "I'm sure sons and daughters of Africa, that none of the proponents of the policy of separate development ever thought we would use it as a platform of solidarity." Star, 9/11/73.

19. Reported in L. Schlemmer, White Attitudes to the Bantustans, Third World, op. cit, p. 41-2.

20. B.P.C. = Black People's Convention, N.I.C. = Natal Indian Congress B.C.P. = Black Community Programs, S.A.S.O. = South African Students Organization.

21. See Annual Survey of Race Relations, 1972, and 1973 issues on this.

22. This argument is made in regard to education by H.F. Dickie-Clark. The Dilemma of Education in Plural Societies, in H. Adam (Ed) South Africa: Sociological Perspectives (Oxford, 1971), Chapter

23. Peter Randall, A Taste of Power, (Johannesburg: 1973) p.

24. Ibid. p.

25. M.G. Mahlo, A European-African Worker Relationship in South Africa, Race 11(1), July 1969, 13-34

26. P. Van den Berghe, Race Attitudes in Durban, South Africa, Jnl. Soc Psychol., 57 , 1962, 55-72

27. E. Russell, A Study of a South African Interracial Neighbourhood, Monograph No. 3, Institute for Social Research, Durban, 1961.

28. G. Watson, op.cit.

29. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, (New York, 1954) Chapter 16.

30. Quoted in Peter Randall (Ed) Towards Social Change, (Johannesburg: 1971)

31. Leo Kuper,

32. Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, (California, p. 81.

33. Report of Quadrand Survey in Soweto in Sunday Times 6/1/74.

34. See Adam op. cit, p. 81 and

35. Quoted by Dirk Richard, Petty Apartheid - the Tip of the Iceberg in N. Rhodesia (Ed.), South African Dialogue, (Johannesburg, p. 104.

36. Dirk Richard, op. cit, p.105

37. An outdated but good overview of the sports policy is J. Kane-Berman, Multi-nationalism versus Non-racialism, S.A.I.R.R., mimeographed paper RR 55/72.