

**THE ROLE OF PEACE MISSIONS IN SUSTAINING PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

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Supervisor


PROF SIPHAMANDLA ZONDI

February 2022

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge, declare that this dissertation is my own work except as indicated in the references and acknowledgements. It is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other University.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge', followed by the initials 'w.c'. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Date: 28 Feb. 2022

DEDICATION

To the memory of my father, Lukong Wiykiynyuy George

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This has been a journey of a thousand miles and the list of those who supported me through this process is indescribable and unbelievably long. However, I would be remiss not to publicly mention the one person who has seen me through boyhood, youthful exuberance and patiently journeyed with, and encouraged me to this date. I dare say, his faith in me and my abilities is comparable to the faith my late dad (to whose memory I dedicate this study) had in me. When systems and personal preferences of those responsible for my progress did not seamlessly pave the way to this completion, he stepped-in and his mastery of scholarly writing stirred me to this point where I doubted I had any more energy in me to get this far. This person is none other than my supervisor, Prof Zondi Siphamandla – A man blessed with many shades of greatness. My first professional boss, mentor and source of inspiration! Ngiyabonga Professor! Sesifikile ngokugcwele futhi ngiyathembisa, ngeke ngikuphoxe.

ABSTRACT

This study examined efforts aimed at ending conflict and restoring order and political stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, under the auspices of the United Nations peacekeeping mission. As one of the largest and most extensively funded peace operations across the globe, the UN's mission in the DRC represents paradoxes and contradictions of the Liberal Peacebuilding approach, from the size of deployment to the scale of its funding, given the failure to end cycles of conflict in the country. In departing from the dominant socio-economic and ethnographic lenses from which the elusiveness of peace in the country have been examined in many studies, this study focused on the institutional guiding frameworks that have informed the succession of UN peacekeeping missions and mandates over the years. A significant amount of research on UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC have relied on the Liberal Peacebuilding discourse and how it proposes to deliver peaceful and a prosperous nation. This study therefore interrogated the UN missions' performance in implementing the Liberal peace framework. It examined if indeed the location of the UN mission within the Liberal Peacebuilding models may help explain its successes and failures, and whether this approach informs its inability to ensure sustainable peace in the country. Furthermore, the study examined the prospects that the transition to Sustaining peace holds for peace and stability in the DRC. To this end, it sought to understand, whether and how the new Sustaining Peace approach could overcome the pitfalls of the Liberal Peacebuilding model; and its potency to resolve this partly conceptual and partly practical quagmire. This study adopted a descriptive method of analysis based on a case study survey design, using both primary and secondary data, and qualitative analysis. Findings from interviews with the UN and other stakeholders indicate that in contrast to clear academic bifurcations on the meaning of these two frames of action, there is not such clarity within the UN, about the conceptual equivalence of its operational frames. Sustaining peace, the study found, is a muscular conceptual matrix whose operationalisation is not linear. It recommends conceptual harmony between theory and practice among other measures, as panacea for peace in the DRC. This justified the usefulness of this enquiry in ending the elusiveness of peace in the DRC.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CAR	Central African Republic
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CNDP	Congress for the Defense of the People
Covid-19	Coronavirus Pandemic 2019
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DPET	The Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DUF	Directive on the Use of Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ex-FAR	ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda
FARDC	Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo/ Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Interventions Brigade

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisations
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
KII	Key Informant Interview
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	Mouvement du 23 Mars
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MLC	The Congolese Liberation Movement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OMA	The Office of Military Affairs

ONUC	The United Nations Operation in the Congo
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBF	Peace-building Fund
PCCs	Police Contributing Countries
POC	Protection of Civilian
PRA	Popular Resistance Army
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
SAP	Structural Adjustments Programme
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SNC	Sovereign National Council
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOZACOM	Societe Zairoise pour la Commercialisation des Minerais
SSR	Security Sector Reform
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
STAREC	Stabilization and Reconstruction Program
TCCs/PCCs	Troop/Police Contributing Countries
UDPS	Union des Démocrates pour le Progress Social

UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN's peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSSSS	United Nations Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	World War Two

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION.....	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 The DRC and elusive peace despite peace missions	1
1.3 The Sustaining Peace paradigm	5
1.4 The study rationale	6
1.5 Research Problem	7
1.6 Research Questions	9
1.7 Research Aim and Objectives.....	9
1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	10
1.9 Outline of Study	11
CHAPTER TWO.....	14
PEACE MISSIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES	14
2.1 Introduction	14
2.2 Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.....	14
2.3 The Elusiveness of Peace in the DRC	16
2.4 The UN Peacekeeping Mandate and the DRC Context	19
2.5 Theoretical Perspectives: Relevant Theories of Peace and Security	23
2.6 Liberal Peace Theory	24
2.7 Application of Liberal Peace in the DRC	28
2.8 The Limits of the Liberal Peace in the DRC	32
2.9 Conclusion	36

CHAPTER THREE	38
RESEARCH METHOD AND METHODOLOGY	38
3.1 Introduction	38
3.2 Research Approach	39
3.3 Research Design	40
3.4 Data Collection.....	41
3.5 Sampling Method and Sample Population	44
3.6 Data Presentation and Analysis	46
3.7 Limitations to the Study.....	47
3.8 Ethical Considerations	47
3.9 Conclusion	49
CHAPTER FOUR.....	51
THE UNITED NATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	51
4.1 Introduction	51
4.2 A Brief Socio-demographic and Political Background of the DRC	52
4.3 Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): A Brief History	59
4.4 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960.....	73
4.5 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	78
4.6 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	84
4.7 Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Peace-building	87
4.8 The Force Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO	90
4.9 Conclusion	92
CHAPTER FIVE	94
THE UN DPKO AND EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS	94
5.1 Introduction	94
5.2 From the League of Nations to the United Nations: A Brief History	98
5.3 The Charter of the United Nations	100
5.3.1 The UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and the DPKO	105
5.4 Normative Frameworks of UN Peacekeeping Operations.....	107

5.4.1 Human Rights	108
5.4.2 International Humanitarian Law	109
5.4.3 Security Council Mandates	110
5.5 The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.....	110
5.5.1 Doctrines in UN Peacekeeping	112
5.5.2 A Critical Analysis of the Capstone Doctrines.....	116
5.5.3 Comparing Doctrine to Practice	118
5.5.4 Emerging Realities of Peacekeeping	119
5.6 Reviews of UN Peacekeeping Operations	122
5.7 Conclusion	128
CHAPTER SIX	130
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS.....	130
6.1 Introduction	130
6.2 Background Attributes of Survey Participants.....	131
6.2.1 Demographics.....	131
6.2.2 Participants' involvement with the UN in the DRC	134
6.3 Thematic Discussion and Simulation of Survey Report	135
6.3.1 Operational Principles in UN Mission in the DRC	135
6.3.2 Perception on Liberal Peace as a Strategy for Sustainable Peace.....	136
6.3.3 Perception of the aims of the Sustaining Peace Principle.....	138
6.3.4 Perception of Motive behind Liberal Peace Principle.....	139
6.3.5 Performance of UN's Mission in the DRC Guided by Liberal Peace Framework.....	142
6.3.6 The Suitability of Liberal Peace to the Underlying Issues of Conflict in the DRC	144
6.3.7. Suitability of Liberal Peace to Local Context of UN Mission in the DRC	146
6.3.8. The Significance of Liberal Approach as Explanatory Factor in the Elusiveness of Peace	147
6.3.9. Rationale for Policy Transition to Sustaining Peace	149
6.3.10. Suitability of Sustaining Peace (SP) to the realization of the UN mandate in the DRC.....	150

6.3.11. Effectiveness of Liberal Peace approach and Realities of Security in the DRC	151
6.3.12. Principal Consideration for the UN's Adoption of the Sustaining Peace Approach	153
6.3.13. Ideological tenets of the Sustaining Peace serve as Remedy to Liberal Peace agenda.....	154
6.3.14. Factor underlying the adoption of the Sustaining Peace framework.	155
6.3.15. The Sustaining Peace approach and the Appreciation of the Local Peculiarities	157
6.3.16. Sustaining Peace Framework in the DRC Unsuitable for Sustainable Peace in the Country	158
6.3.17. Sustaining Peace has Potentials to Address Regional Dimensions to DRC Conflicts.....	159
6.3.18. Sustaining has the potential to address underlying factors of conflict in the DRC.....	160
6.3.19. The Influence of Sustaining Peace approach on the UN's work in the DRC	161
6.3.20. The UN Mission in the DRC future peacekeeping operations.....	162
6.4 Conclusion	164
CHAPTER SEVEN	165
THEMATIC DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.....	165
7.1 Introduction	165
7.2 Operational versus Conceptual Issues	165
7.3 Liberal Peace as Stabilization	166
7.4 From Liberal to Sustaining Peace in the DRC.....	168
7.5 Rationalizing the Transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace	168
7.6 Building Capable Institutions through Multilayered Engagements	170
7.7. Mission Mandate and Sustaining Peace	171
7.8 Lessons for the Future and the UN Peacekeeping missions.....	173
7.9 Conclusion	173
CHAPTER EIGHT	176
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTION, AND RECOMMENDATION.....	176
8.1 Introduction	176

8.2 Study Contours	177
8.3 Study Contribution to knowledge	182
8.4 Recommendations	183
8.5 Conclusion	184
BIBLIOGRAPHY	185
APPENDIXES	212
Interview Guide	212
Interview Guide French	214
Consent Form (English)	215
Consent Form French	216
Questionnaire.....	217
Questionnaire (French)	218

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

UN peacekeeping in the DRC represents the most organized effort at the international level aimed at ending insecurity and restoring political order. It is one of the world's largest and most well-funded peacekeeping missions. Its operational mandate has evolved over the years, with visible changes in the guiding operational frameworks, moving from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace in response to changing contexts and realities (Cavalcante, 2014; Karlsrud & Oksamytna, 2019). The mission presents some contradictions, from the magnitude of its deployment to the inability to terminate war cycles in the DRC. A significant body of research on the UN mission in the DRC is based on the current Liberal Peacebuilding ideology and what it promises to bring in terms of long-term peace and stability (Eriksen, 2009; Hansen, 2012; Zambakari, 2016).

A general appraisal of the UN mission in the DRC suggests that the prevailing paradigm has not succeeded in achieving sustained peace in the country. Scholarly evaluations of its performance describe it as a failure. This is expected, given its inability to bring about long-term peace, which has remained elusive despite more than two decades since the deployment of MONUC in 2010 (Roodt, 2013; Obala, 2015). The empirical foundation and conceptual framework of the investigations that led to this conclusion varies. Finding out if the UN mission's placement within Liberal Peacebuilding frameworks explain its triumphs and failures is important, as is determining whether this strategy contributes to the country's incapacity to maintain long-term peace. This study examines whether and how the new Sustaining Peace strategy might help the DRC in attaining and maintaining peace while overcoming the limitations of the Liberal Peacebuilding paradigm.

1.2 The DRC and elusive peace despite peace missions

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most challenging peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. It is one which particularly puts to test the viability of its

Liberal Peace doctrine of engagement (Eriksen, 2009; Kreps, 2010). Findlay (2002: 2) identifies the UN's intervention in the DRC from 1960–64 as one of the three peace operations in which the UN's disinclination to use force was overcome on a significant scale, resulting in traumatic experiences for the organization—the other two cases being Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–95, and Somalia in 1993–95. The DRC provides a test case for examining the efficiency of the Liberal Peace philosophy of the UN's peacekeeping operations against the backdrop of the dynamics of the global security agenda for a number of reasons. The situation in the DRC remains tenuous with incessant violence and large-scale human displacement in parts of the country, particularly in the north Kivu regions. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2020), over 5.2 million persons were internally displaced due to the conflict and violence in the DRC as of December 2020.

It is worth noting that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was Africa's first country to host a deployment of UN peacekeeping forces (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000). The first United Nations Operation in the Congo known in French as 'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo' (ONUC) was set up to maintain order following the crisis which ensued after the country's independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. This mission was deployed in response to a request for assistance by the then President Joseph Kasavubu to the United Nations Security Council (see Kaplan, 1967; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; Namikas, 2003). ONUC resulted in the deployment of about 20,000 UN peacekeepers at its peak (United Nations, 2001). While ONUC was active only from 1960 to 1964 (Spijkers, 2015), the mission remains on record as one of the costliest of all peacekeeping operations by the UN, accounting for the death of not less than 250 personnel in addition to international financial resource commitment (Seet & Burnham, 2000: 599). This mission, according to Aksu (2018: 100), also cost the UN an estimated US\$400,130,793 between 1960 and 1964, as well as serious financial problems.

Another aspect to note about the DRC is that it has been at the centre of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era which began in 1991. This fact contributes to an understanding of the bearing that power dynamics had on the nature of international global engagements with national and international security challenges.

This second phase of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the DRC commenced in July 1999, with the establishment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by the Security Council resolution 1279 (Kasperek, 2019). This mission was established in response to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five other regional states, namely, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It was initially aimed at ensuring compliance with agreements on ceasefire and disengagement of forces, as well as to maintain liaison with parties to the Ceasefire Agreement (UN, 2021; Doss, 2015). MONUC has lasted for more than two decades, making it one of the longest-serving UN peacekeeping missions. From it, much can be learnt about the changing dynamics of conflict in the DRC, including the roles played by national and regional actors, as well as non-state armed groups over the years.

The inability of the UN mission to restore peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has taxed the ingenuity of scholars and policymakers (Gibbs, 2000), thereby influencing recurring calls for an end to the UN mission in the country (Samset, 2010). According to a report by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2019), citizens of eastern DRC believe that the UN has failed in its protection of civilian (POC) mandate. This failure has been the cause of demonstrations since November 2019, which have culminated in assaults on UN premises (Maeresera, 2020). At the core of these demonstrations are underlying questions about the relevance of the UN Mission in today's DRC.

Questions about the usefulness of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC have persisted, expressly because the involvement of the United Nations in the Congo since 1999 to present has not yielded expected results of helping to consolidate peace-building efforts, institutionalising political reforms, and bringing about peace and stability (Karlsrud, 2015; Obala, 2015; Stearns, 2017). It should be recalled that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to change the mandate of its mission from MONUC to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in 2010 (Neethling, 2011). This transition also meant a change to what effectively were Liberal Peace-building efforts, progressively advancing its strategies towards a more locally-

driven stabilisation process, an approach which, according to scholars like (Wallis 2018, Paris 2004), has yet to establish lasting or sustainable peace in most places where it has been pursued.

The succession of UN peace operation from MONUC to MONUSCO raises many questions around the overall effectiveness of the UN mission in the DRC. The failure to resolve some of the fundamental issues underlying conflict continues to undermine the gains already made while also constraining efforts at consolidation on peace-building initiatives. This has been attributed to the fact that most negotiations towards peace-building often fail to adequately address the sources of conflict (ECA, 2012; Van der Lijn, 2009).

In the case of the DRC for example, conflicts over land and access to its natural resources are key issues in the regeneration of conflict and most externally-mediated negotiation processes often failed to resolve these fundamental challenges (Doucey, 2016). Muraya and Ahere (2014) observe that access to land in the eastern region of the country and the control of natural resource revenues remain contentious issues 20 years after the UN involvement and peace-led activity in the DRC. Domestic and foreign armed groups continue to control the resource fields, especially the territorial capital of the border between Rutshuru and Bunagana (Lyall, 2017). It would seem that contestations around who controls which critical resources remain the major fault lines among groups, many of whom survive on looting natural resources in the country while also depriving the people of decent livelihoods and subjecting others to brutal killings (Tankama, 2017).

It is apparently, in acknowledgement of the above realities that the UN is embracing a change in orientation in order to aid a bottom-up approach in the new agenda of MONUSCO, hence its shift towards Sustaining Peace (Tull, 2009; Ruggeri, Dorussen & Gizelis, 2017).

1.3 The Sustaining Peace paradigm

The Sustaining Peace paradigm, as noted by Mahmoud and Makoond (2018), has the potential to help strengthen peace-building by prioritizing prevention of a resurgence of conflict and making ongoing peacekeeping interventions firmly rooted, owned by the people, and more effective. They describe Sustaining Peace as entailing efforts at revisiting the starting point of the process of building peace by adopting a new approach that recognizes the imperative of a broad-based and proactive peace agenda. The transition from the Liberal Peace focal priorities to one aimed at Sustaining Peace marks a critical point in UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. This is because it also symbolizes a shift in its underlying ideology. According to Huddleston (2018), this shift might well be attributable to the realization of the limitations of Liberal Peace, which focuses on a top-down approach to peace-building by de-emphasizing the underlying factors and leaving the local population disempowered throughout the peace-building process. A shift in orientation towards Sustaining Peace, it would seem, is an attempt to incorporate the local population as the fulcrum for peace-building within the UN peacekeeping operational framework.

United Nations' peacekeepers have succeeded in addressing most of the symptoms which manifest as violent conflicts in the country. However, they have not achieved much in addressing the underlying causes such as the control of, and the management of natural resources. As a result of this, conflicts among contending groups remain a source of insecurity, and constitute a threat to peace-building efforts in the country. State capacity for resource management and law enforcement also remains fragile. As Nkongolo-Bakenda, et.al (2016) observed, state institutions are weak, under-resourced, and thus incapable of mitigating these challenges. Preliminary observation of the security climate across the DRC suggests that some of the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping operation may stem from its focus on Liberal Peace, which fails to prioritize several fundamental issues underlying conflict. This situation toffers a possible explanation for the tenuous nature of peace in the country.

To help maintain peace and stability in the DRC, regional and international players have mediated ceasefire agreements that have, at best, been partially respected by the very belligerents who signed them. Consequently, the peace agreements have failed to end violence among the various groups or to re-establish a central government authority throughout the DRC (Akwei, 2017). Today, amid the rise to power of Félix Tshisekedi in January 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations in its Global Conflict Tracker opines that “poor governance, [an undisciplined military force] and the proliferation of many armed groups have causally subjected Congolese civilians to widespread abuse, sexual harassment, and major abuses of human rights” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). These factors are responsible for extreme poverty in the country.

In restive areas of the DRC, the African Union (AU), the UN, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have struggled to restore and sustain peace, while insecurity and conflict have continued with major impact on human security and peace prospects. Even with assistance, it seems that the UN has not adequately delivered on its core mission, which is *to re-establish and preserve global peace and security* in the DRC (Murithi, 2016). As Williams (2019) notes, while peacekeeping is the most visible aspect of the UN in Africa and has been transformed with evolving circumstances, in the case of the DRC, it has failed in its efforts to achieve and sustain peace. The difficulty in the task of creating lasting peace in the DRC not only questions the Liberal Peace-building approach to UN efforts there, but also raises questions as to why its application has been contrary to the anticipated outcome. Cavalcante (2014) postulates that the UN operational policy, which is often based on the Liberal Peace-building thesis and defined by the top-down approach, constitutes a part of the limitations to achieving lasting peace.

1.4 The study rationale

This study explores whether the UN’s employment of Liberal Peace-building helps to explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC, and whether and how the new Sustaining Peace agenda, reflected in the increasing tempo of shifting emphasis towards a bottom-

up approach, is bringing a new outcome that offers hope for achieving and Sustaining Peace. Assessing these, the study draws insight from UN past missions and employ a qualitative comparative analysis framework to determine what enablers and inhibitors of sustainable peace are there in the DRC. It also examined the strategic shortcomings of the UN mission in achieving its objectives of stabilization and Sustaining Peace.

This approach enables the researcher to interrogate the conceptual and practical evolution of peacekeeping towards ascertaining their adaptations to changing circumstances and most critically, their role in Sustaining Peace today. Within this context, the study would espouse the Liberal Peace-building approach to assert that in its current form and shape, the approach needs to be nuanced and understood contextually, or at least applied conservatively. This, as the study further expounded, is not so because its relevance has waned, as asserted by Cavalcante (2014) and Karlsrud & Oksamytna (2019), but rather because conflict situations continue to evolve and theories remain static. As a consequence, understanding the genesis and quintessence of Liberal Peace is critical to appreciating its undertones and synergy with emerging concepts such as the UN's new Sustaining Peace agenda or adages such as 'African Solutions to African challenges.'

1.5 Research Problem

A significant body of research on UN peacekeeping missions draws on the existing discourses within the context of Liberal Peace-building and what it proposes to deliver in terms of its likelihood to establish peaceful and prosperous societies. As one of the most extensive and extensively funded peacekeeping operations across the globe, the UN's mission in the DRC represents paradoxes and contradictions from its size of deployment, funding, and its inability to end the cyclical conflict in the DRC. Scholarly verdicts on its performance convey its overall assessment as a failed operation given its inability to deliver lasting peace, which has remained elusive after more than two decades of peacekeeping operation (Clark, 2011; Neethling, 2011; Bayo, 2012; Zeebroek, 2008).

However, not enough has been done to analyse the salient issues which underlie the performance of UN's Liberal Peace doctrine in order to understand the conflation of factors which have shaped dynamics of peace-building in the DRC since 1999. There is a need to understand if indeed the preoccupation of the UN mission with Liberal Peace-building models, have contributed to its inability to ensure sustainable peace in the country, and through what mechanisms it has done so. It has also been noted that a major challenge which bedevilled UN peace operations from 1989 to 1999 has to do with its tendency to rush into overseeing electoral governance without developing efficient and inclusive post-negotiations frameworks and institutions which addresses the basic fault lines among groups (Paris, 2004). In reference to the DRC, Warima Kabua (2019) opined that the traditional conflict management model of peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements, power sharing transitional arrangements, and constitutional reviews enforced by the victor/winner of the post-conflict elections would require some tweak in order for it to work in the DRC.

The foregoing shows that a poorly crafted peace agreement could undermine or compromise any peace process and jeopardise the prospects of peace. Corroborating Zondi and Nyuykonge (2016), Spears (2019) opined that peace agreements are operational documents which if undermined at inception only help worsen the prospect of peace. It is against this backdrop that Cedric De-Coning (2018) contends that the UN's operations need to be adaptive and tailored to address structural causes of conflict in order to avoid criticism around its weak civilian protection framework. From this stream of reasoning, it seems the role of the UN in the DRC remains critical, but how should this be conducted is the moot point.

As has been noted earlier, changes in the context of operation as well as the priorities of the UN are reflected in its engagement in the DRC (Williams, 2019). It is important to understand the pathways through which these changes have affected its objective of achieving and Sustaining Peace as a possible explanation for the lack of progress in the effort at creating lasting peace in the DRC. Interrogating the operational utility of the Liberal Peace doctrine in the DRC context thus opens a vista through which we may understand how the UN's employment of Liberal Peace-building helps to explain the

elusiveness of peace. Furthermore, we are able to understand whether, and how, the new Sustaining Peace agenda offers a new strategic approach towards achieving and Sustaining Peace.

1.6 Research Questions

To address the gaps in the study of peacebuilding described above this study broadly sought to investigate the question: *What explains the elusiveness of peace in the DRC despite the extensive role of the UN peacekeeping mission, and (how) does the new UN Sustaining Peace agenda offer a different and more hopeful path to lasting peace?*

The study also interrogated the following sub-questions:

- i. How has the application of the Liberal Peace doctrine served as a key factor behind the elusiveness of peace in the DRC after over two decades of UN-led peacekeeping operation?
- ii. What are the drivers and ideological tenets of the new Sustaining Peace agenda?
- iii. What are the enablers and inhibitors of new sustainable peace concept and how are these suitable to the strategic realities of the UN-mission in view of its goals of stabilization and Sustaining Peace?
- iv. In what significant ways does the new Sustaining Peace agenda influence the UN's work on the ground in the DRC?
- v. What are the implications of these changes and what lessons can be learnt for achieving and Sustaining Peace in other peacekeeping contexts across Africa?

1.7 Research Aim and Objectives

In line with the main and sub research questions, the study, therefore aimed to *analyse whether the UN's employment of Liberal Peace-building helps to explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC, and whether and how the new Sustaining Peace*

agenda is bringing a new approach on the ground that offers hope for achieving and Sustaining Peace.

The following research objectives were also pursued:

- i. To examine the application of the Liberal Peace doctrine as a key factor behind the elusiveness of peace in the DRC after over two decades of UN-led peacekeeping operation.
- ii. To describe the drivers and ideological tenets of the new Sustaining Peace agenda.
- iii. To discuss the enablers and inhibitors of sustainable peace and appraise the strategic shortcomings of the UN-mission in achieving its goals of stabilization and Sustaining Peace.
- iv. To analyse how the new Sustaining Peace agenda is influencing the UN's work on the ground in the DRC in new and useful ways.
- v. To present implications and lessons for achieving and Sustaining Peace in other peacekeeping contexts across Africa.

As previously stated, the DRC has seen an exceptional number of attempts to end its conflict by regional, international, individual, governmental, and institutional players. These efforts have only resulted in the signing of partially recognised peace accords. Consequently, beyond peace agreements and perpetual instability, this study also seeks to understand the role of peacekeeping in achieving and Sustaining Peace. In the light of this, chapter two of this study reviews preliminary literature on UN peacekeeping and the elusiveness of peace in the DRC. It also uses an analytical framework to analyse what constitutes Sustaining Peace and its theoretical grounding.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope of this study is UN peace mission in the DRC, with particular focus on why peace remains elusive in the DRC, the role of the UN as illustrated in the implementation of its Liberal peace framework, the prospect of the new Sustaining Peace for enduring peace in the DRC in particular, and UN peacekeeping missions in

general. In terms of timeframe, the scope focuses on the years between 2000 and 2019. The study also weighs-in on the debate surrounding how the Sustaining Peace agenda is influencing the UN's work on the ground in the DRC in new and useful ways; and drawing lessons for Sustaining Peace in other contexts across Africa. Since the conflict in the DRC is still ongoing, the research does not assume predictive capacity as regards the ultimate outcome of the measures employed by the UN to secure sustainable peace. In essence, the outcome of the study is not to produce a futurological appraisal of UN's work but at offering insights for the UN in other contexts across Africa. The study did not examine the strategies or effects of efforts outside of the UN peacekeeping missions on the DRC conflict, such as those at the regional or subregional levels.

1.9 Outline of Study

This study is organised into eight chapters.

The introductory chapter, Chapter One, provides a background to the DRC and its history of recent deployments of Peace Operations, while questioning why peace remains elusive. In line with this, the chapter also presents the research problem and delineate the research purpose and questions around understanding why peace remains elusive in the DRC and the role of the UN in attaining and Sustaining Peace. This chapter concludes with outline for the study.

Chapter Two on literature review presents a review of relevant literature on the elusiveness of peace in Africa broadly, and the DRC in particular. It assays the changing nature of UN peacekeeping, its design, mandate, and impact, and appraises literature on sustainable peace, focusing on its evolution, application, and usefulness in the DRC and other contexts across Africa. The chapter also identifies gaps in literature in its attempt to unearth the enablers of elusive peace and the pathways of their interaction as they affect the role of United Nations' peacekeeping in the DRC towards achieving and Sustaining Peace. Filling in the gap provides the basis to explore theoretical perspectives, which this chapter does by further discussing the liberal peace

theory and introducing a conceptual framework of analysis. Chapter Three focuses on the Research Method, presents the procedural scheme of work followed in executing the study. It elucidates the research approach, the method of data collection, method sampling and sample population frame, as well as ethical considerations that define and guide the study.

Chapter Four provides a historical exploration of the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, looks at the historical evolution and context of the UN peace operations in the DRC. It also examines the changing mandates of UN peacekeeping, the conceptual ambiguities between these mandates and the goal of peace in the country, as well as its connections to elusive inclusive political settlements. The historical exploration looks at the politics of deployment as a steppingstone to MONUC's challenges and as lead up to the MONUSCO. Importantly, this chapter contextually demarcates the contours between peacekeeping as a tool for ending hostilities, restoring peace and state building. It also looks into the question of transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace in the global and local DRC contexts.

Chapter Five, presents a discussion of the evolution of peacekeeping policy principles and policy transitions through the UN Department of Peacekeeping—the DPKO.

Chapter Six presents Field Data in tabular and graphic forms, summarising the survey data collated from the field.

Chapter Seven presents a thematic summary of interview data obtained from key informants as part of the data collection process, organized in themes in line with research questions.

Chapter Eight summarises and concludes the study and makes recommendation for policy and future research. It recapitulates the research findings on the elusiveness of peace and UN peace missions in the DRC. The chapter rounds up with discussing contributions to study, lessons learnt from the experience of the UN mission in stabilising and Sustaining Peace in the DRC, recommendation and guidelines for policy consideration, and suggestions on areas of further research.

CHAPTER TWO

PEACE MISSIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 Introduction

Literature on causes of conflicts in Africa and the UN peace missions, as well as their mandates and relevance, is extensive. In the context of this study, such literature is examined with a view to ascertain why peace remains elusive in contexts such as the DRC despite an extended peacekeeping presence. The literature on Liberal Peace and its interaction with the Sustaining Peace debates are reviewed in order to assess how the framework explains the elusiveness of peace in the DRC and the relevance of peacekeeping in the UN Sustaining Peace agenda. The first section of this literature explores scholarship on the elusiveness of peace in the DRC and its causes. The second section examines literature on the evolution of UN peacekeeping mandate and context in the DRC. This section aims to better understand what goes into the design, mandate and operationalization of peacekeeping operations, and how the latter can enable or inhibit the UN's drive to attain and sustain peace. The third section, which is the theoretical framework, looks at new and useful pathways for Sustaining Peace, while appraising the Liberal Peace framework with the view that if it is used in conjunction with a combination of new alternatives to identify enablers and inhibitors of peace, then it stands as a chance to succeed in the DRC.

2.2 Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

There have been questions over the years regarding the strategic commitments of the UN mission in the DRC and the implications of these commitments to lasting peace in the country. These questions have arisen from the changes which have characterized the operational tactics of the mission over time. According to Karlsrud (2015) changes in the character of the UN peace mission in the DRC have been evident in developments from both the operational and political forms. One significant concern associated with such changes is the effect on the traditional principles which govern UN peacekeeping missions, particularly, its emphasis on civilian protection and the preservation and

extension of state authority. The adoption of new frames of action through such measures as the Force Intervention Brigade however signify a break from tradition and indeed the doctrinal identity of neutrality with which the UN missions has been associated over time (Tull, 2018).

Both the British Army and the US Army Manuals offer insightful conceptual explications to peace-enforcement. It is defined in the US Army's field manual of 1994 as "the use military force, or the threat of the use of such force, typically in accordance to international permission" (Oliver, 2003). Whereas, in the British Army's Field Manual of September 1994, it is described as "operations carried out to restore peace between hostile sides who do not all agree to intervention strategies and who may be involved in combat actions (Oliver, 2003).

For some, understanding peace-enforcement lies in identifying the operational boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, an issue which relates precisely with the latitude to employ force (Tull, 2018; Boulden, 2001; Muller, 2015). This position is problematic because the use of force is relatively defined in the UN peace mission mandate from the variable application of its Chapter VII mandate defined sometimes as authorization to use "including the use of force", to the use of "robust force", and as in the case of the MONUSCO, "use of all necessary force" (Karlsrud, 2015: 41). It thus appears that the term peace-enforcement is used in recognition of the increasing relevance of force in the execution of peace mission mandates as against the requirements for a more aloof deployment which the commitments to neutrality demands of the UN mission. Although the lack of clarity in respect of conceptual boundaries of these terms remains an important issue, there are more important concerns in practice, regarding the implications such conceptual vagueness has on the perception of peace missions.

There are also issues arising from the challenge of impartiality in a peace-enforcement environment where the mission is strategically engaged in the conflict where its is a collaborating partner to one party, through the FIB for example, where it is expected to engage in offensives with an identified enemy force—the rebels. Boulden (2001)

describes the practical utility of the concept of peace-enforcement as it had been used in Bosnia and Somalia even at the time it was conceptually a work-in-progress. The exigencies of a more effective operation that fits in between traditional peacekeeping and a more forceful stabilization was for him the motivation for peace-enforcement at the time. Whichever way one chooses to look at the concept of peace-enforcement, it is not without paradoxes, in that, it gambles with the idea that it was possible to deploy aerial bombardments against the enemy's camp while hoping at the sametime to achieve a negotiated alliance with the same bombarded party (Tharoor, 1995).

2.3 The Elusiveness of Peace in the DRC

The elusiveness of peace remains a challenge to the UN which was created to maintain international peace. The causes of this elusiveness are wide and varied; and scholars have offered contending explanations for it. These explanations point to the fact that the causes of conflicts have political and cultural underpinnings (Adebajo, 2002), as well as ethnic dissertations, religion and economic considerations, all of which are factors which left unaddressed, are likely to cause conflict relapse and the elusiveness of peace in some instances. Economic factors, for example, are at the heart of African wars, according to Paul Collier (2000). In the context of the DRC conflict, several writers share this view (Reno, 2000; Collier, 2007; Anyanwu, 2002). According to Collier, a state with surplus resources and a rising number of working-age, unutilized human resources is more prone to have frequent conflicts. This theory is useful in understanding a variety of wars [including the DRC] as well as the failure of peace initiatives. In contrast, the Saharawi people, who were seized by Morocco in 1975 and are endowed with marine and other natural riches, (Jensen, 2013) have not resorted to any form of violence (Porges & Leuprecht, 2016). While not discounting the factor of youth bulge as captured by Collier, the Saharawi illustration casts doubt on the argument that endowment natural resource trigger conflicts. It is important then to find the matrix of factors which come to play in the mix in order to produce the DRC outcome. This highlights one of the gaps which this study seeks to fill in its attempt to unearth the enablers of elusive peace, the pathways of their interaction as they affect the role of United Nations' peacekeeping in the country towards achieving and Sustaining Peace.

Eboe Hutchful and Kwesi Aning (2004) agreed that economic factors and resources are not the causes of African conflicts. They stressed that the proliferation of arms at the end of the cold war, coupled with the absence of an effective DDR mechanism in post-conflict societies, created the time-bomb that were ignited by the US-USSR proxy wars in Africa. While this dissertation accords with the grievance hypothesis, the question remains as to what they are so angry over that they are willing to destroy goods and assassinate comrades. Is it a matter of governance? Is it because resources help a specific set of individuals at the expense of others [such as expatriates, peacekeepers, and mediators]? It is worth noting that some nations have resource shortages and mismanagement, as well as authoritarian governments and poor governance, but they are free of violence. As a result, contentions have been made to the effect that conflict causes should be searched out ahead of time (from effect to cause). The goal of this dissertation is to show that stagnated conflicts can have a variety of causes. Nonetheless, the police countries' economic egoism tempts them not to impose a hard, unrestricted, and enforceable mandatory decision to halt the conflict's degradation.

Similarly, William Reno (2000), writing from the perspective of political economy, claims that the increase of transnational business whose earnings enrich corrupt political leaders causes conflicts. Conflict emerges, according to Reno, when a ruler makes life difficult for his subjects by promoting the search for his spy as a method of escaping murky situations. Thus, the conclusion by Reno (2000) that a lack of competent administration breeds conflict. The collapse of the nation-building state system, according to William Zartman (1995), leads to war. While it is possible to agree that state theory has failed, the key question is what motivates leaders to run the state aground. Or is it foreign developed countries' functional presence and 'indirect' political participation?

Keith Sommerville (2017) attempts to pinpoint the genesis of conflict within the geographical landscape of Africa that colonial empires left behind. He claims that current colonial and state boundaries have resulted in a jumble of individuals who had never before mingled as a group. Sommerville's claim explains various African disputes, including Cameroon's fight with Nigeria over Bakassi and Ethiopia's struggle with Eritrea

over Badne. At the time, the hostilities in Kivu, DRC, had yet to erupt, reaffirming Sommerville's dictum. In the context of this dissertation, his statement is premature and requires more than one or two examples to be supported.

The literature examined above speaks to the cause of conflict in Africa generally, while raising questions about the DRC specifically. Despite its thematic diversity, it is fitting to note that Haile Menkerios contemplates that the lack of a regional focus in negotiations is the persistent cause of failure in the DRC peace process (United Nations, 2009). He also believes that negotiators and the command of the UN-led peacekeeping force place too much emphasis on national and local elements in the war. Menkerios believes that regional elements such as Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups operating out of the DRC are under-appreciated. Autesserre maintains that the lack of government programs to militate against sexual violence has both federal government and rebel forces to pest on the feminine sexuality (Autesserre, 2012). Sexual violence against women has somewhat turned to be an incentive and driver of conflict.

Consequently, persons who exacerbate this practice often want to remain in a conflict-ridden DRC where they can get away with such practices, which an excellent legislative framework and social programs will otherwise crackdown. In 2014, a UN Population Fund nine months-focused study according to Gualazzini recorded over 12,000 cases of gender-based violence and sexual assault on women; with 39% of these directly related to the intractable armed conflict (Gualazzini, 2017). Members of military and paramilitary groups are some of the foremost perpetrators of sexual violence. Thus, sexual abuse in the DRC is now a key challenge for nation-building and social cohesion and it remains one of the problems the UN has to deal with, 20 years after its deployment. Being the largest and most funded UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO's inability to end the conflict is a huge paradox that has sparked a debate as to whether or not peacekeeping is a relevant peace-building instrument. Consequently, it is important to examine literature on UN peacekeeping mandates with emphasis on the DRC context.

2.4 The UN Peacekeeping Mandate and the DRC Context

Whatever perspective one takes on Africa, there is no denying that the continent faces a plethora of "old and new" security issues (Aoi, de Coning, & Thakur, 2007). This explains the prevalence of conflict and several UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Consequently, literature on conflict intractability abounds and impresses on the need for effective mechanisms to be created for resolving such conflicts (Greene & Sentongo, 2019). In its efforts to provide peaceful and safe environments needed for the rebuilding of countries, particularly war-torn countries, the United Nations launched the peacekeeping mission, which has since become a defining feature of conflict resolution across the world (Smidt, 2019). Peacekeeping is considered to include observer missions, which also position UN soldiers between opposing armies, as authorised by Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Duarte Villa & Jenne, 2020).

In its evolution, UN peacekeeping has taken multi-dimensional configurations which it continues to adapt to meet the complex security challenges especially in Africa (Kathman & Benson, 2019). The chronic DRC war, for example, continues to pose significant obstacles to UN peacekeeping troops deployed in the region, thereby raising doubts about the UN's ability to achieve and maintain peace. Some UN peacekeeping missions, such as those in Sierra Leone (1999-2005) and Mozambique, are often viewed as successes (1992-1994). Other operations, such as Rwanda (1993-1996) and Somalia (1993-1996) are regarded as blatant failures (1992-1995). These conflicting outcomes not only motivate research into what causes peacekeeping missions to succeed or fail, but they also call for examination of their contribution to long-term peace. The average of these missions has been five years, but in the instance of the DRC, the UN has been there for 20 years.

In the case of the DRC where the UN mission has been in deployment since 1999, there has been a cocktail of security, humanitarian and health challenges. Bellamy, Williams and Griffith (2010) contend that, the UN's initial mandate was weak and ill-adapted to respond to potential changes in the DRC's security landscape. In this vein, Novosselof, Abdenur, Mandrup, and Pangburn (2019) have argued that the UN's failures

in critical issues such as protection of civilians in the DRC is resultant from unavailable capacities such as the use of force for self-defense and to protect civilians. In agreeing with Bellamy that the weaknesses of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC were linked to the mandate, Severine Autesserre slightly differs from Novosselof, Abdenuref *et al* when he suggests that other mandate related things such as weaknesses in peace agreements and challenges such as unemployment, inequality and poverty which drive continued instability. This is in addition to Karlsrud & Oksamytna (2019) and Cavalcante (2014) assertions that challenges to Sustaining Peace in conflict and post-conflict societies are because of the UN's over dependence on the Liberal Peace framework, with Karlsrud & Oksamytna further contending that a change from this framework to a stabilization strategy is 'likely to be counterproductive'. That no one sees the missed opportunities by successive mandate reviews to capitalize on the opportunities for peace is the gap that this study seeks to fill.

Mark Malan (2000) posits that peacekeeping does not bring peace, but sets the stage for peace, and so, should be seen as a procreator for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping, according to Smith, is not a military role, but soldiers are more likely to respond to emergencies and reverse the disordered state of things because of their discipline, training, and experience. Smith goes on to say that the unsolvable problem will not be solved until UN peacekeeping can perform the military function. Unlike Smith, who fails to see that peacekeeping has evolved in character in the post-Cold War era, Nicky Hitchcock (2004) maintains that peacekeeping has witnessed theoretical and practical modifications adapted to handle intricate humanitarian situations. According to Hitchcock, peacekeeping has evolved beyond a military mission to include humanitarian tasks such as caring for orphaned children and safeguarding the education of minors formerly enlisted into rebel organisations. While Hitchcock's diagnosis reveals that peacekeeping has changed in the post-cold war era, there is hardly any dramatic change in the nature and configuration of peacekeeping other than in name and mandate changes. This justifies the need to understand the role of peacekeeping in driving critical UN agenda such as Sustaining Peace today. These concerns relating to change on the operational strategy of peacekeeping seek to affirm that peacekeeping

has evolved from its traditional character of monitoring ceasefires and instituting buffer zones, to an institution aiming at sustainable peace. Othieno and Samasuwo (2007) contemplate that this shift to contemporary peacekeeping is hybrid and is a replacement of the old constrained UN peace operations.

Looking at the context of the DRC, some studies assess the UN from the success of MONUC (under the guiding approach of Liberal Peace), and MONUSCO (implementing the stabilization strategy) similarly, notwithstanding the mandate deficiencies. The influence of Liberal Peace in the UN and the DRC are manifest in MONUC, the mission which preceded MONUSCO. MONUC's mandate made clear the importance of promoting democracy and achieving peace. It reflects a vital tenet of the Liberal Peace paradigm; and till date, the UN plays a critical role in supporting the government before, during and after elections (to deliver credible elections). The mandates of MONUC and subsequently MONUSCO expressly reflect this notion, stating that they must "assist the organisation and conduct of provincial and local elections via the provision of technical and logistical support" (S/1999/232). Roessler and Prendagast (2006) focusing on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) arm of the UN's mandate, and examining programmatic features such as encouraging rebel groups to disarm, and training the police and Congolese national army say the UN peacekeeping has done well. Woodhouse (2010) opines that interventions such as peacekeeping are often contemplated to be external intervention, but that in the DRC's case, MONUC anchored its peace-building drive on local peace games which preceded the 2006 first post-independence democratic elections. These peace games fostered social cohesion and contributed significantly to the serene atmosphere before and during the internationally certified elections. In the case of the DRC, there is little debate about the UN's and international community's commitment. The DRC has reaped the benefits of the international community's blessings and support, particularly when more assistance or mandate renewal was required (The UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2019).

Consequent to the above, change of mandates can sometimes be unclear and leave more questions than answers. In 2011, even the end of MONUC was not clear until its

transformation to a stabilisation force, MONUSCO. Ray Murphy (2016) contends that the move was urgent and important because MONUC had lost credibility; and its protection of civilian mandate suffered a severe dent after the Kiwanja killings which according to Human Rights Watch (2008) claimed approximately 150 lives in North Kivu. The first mission of MONUC (Resolution 1279) did not include the organisation of elections. The fact that the UNSC's mandates are constantly changing demonstrates not just a lack of a coherent strategy, but also a lack of a plan for stability. MONUC's actions were never clear, and it was never apparent if MONUC's mandate was peacekeeping or peacebuilding. It is probably reasonable to say it wasn't any of them since there was no peace to preserve; it didn't make any peace, let alone build or sustain one (Terrie, 2009). As a result, the confusing application of its peacekeeping mechanisms to the DRC conflict situation is a major issue (Vircoulon, 2010). This is due to the mission's hazy vision and the imprecise delineation of the various stages of the peace process, which has resulted in certain implementation issues with implications for the operational mandate to maintain peace.

Prior assessments by Bellamy, Williams, Griffith, Novosselof, Abdenur, Mandrup, and Pangburn on UN peace operations in the DRC are failure-focused and fall short of articulating ways of sustaining the peace achieved through the DDR efforts. Even Roessler & Prendagast's assessments of the DRC peacekeeping mission are limited and the enculturation approach to peace-building adopted by MONUSCO leaves a gap on why peace remains elusive and the role of peacekeeping in achieving and Sustaining Peace. It is therefore not enough to attribute failures of a peacekeeping mission on its mandate, but suffice to appreciate that an assessment of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission such as the DRC requires the putting into place of measurable indicators for goal achievement and the pursuit of sustainable peace. The lack of these goals would continue to lead to partial assessments and subjective conclusions about why the mission is failing and not why peace remains elusive despite changes in mandate.

Understanding the above-mentioned gap in the literature brings us back to the major objective and question of this study, which is to explain why peace remains elusive in

the DRC despite the large presence of the UN peacekeeping force and the new UN Sustaining Peace agenda, which aims to offer an alternative and more promising pathway to peace. Therefore, investigating this, necessitates the adoption of theories or a theory that would help address the inquiry and contribute to the body of knowledge and research on UN missions in Sustaining Peace. It is important to note that the elusiveness of peace already lends itself to several theorizations that also seek to explain conflict intractability or why peace fails and these broadly include the theories related to complexity, peace and Liberal Peace.

2.5 Theoretical Perspectives: Relevant Theories of Peace and Security

According to Gary Grobman (2005), complexity theory examines uncertainty and non-linearity. Like the incertitude of what systems to put in place to attain and maintain peace, complexity theory suggests that systems are unpredictable and constrained by order (Burnes, 2005). Thus, mindful of the fact that peacekeeping is norm and principle-driven, complexity theory seems like the ideal theory for explaining the Sustaining Peace agenda within the context of this study.

Similarly, Johan Galtung's (1986) peace theory also appeals to the Sustaining Peace agenda and emphasizes on relationship and consensus building within one's conflictual self, community, state, region or civilisation. It argues that humans and society are continually pulling in different directions, and this creates conflict. Peace is therefore not the exclusive preserve or property of one party alone, but the property of the relationships between a collective. Galtung's assertions might be a reasonable explanation for intractability in the DRC. In instances such as the DRC, there is value in stakeholders' introspection about what is more gainful to them: instability or peace (Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007).

Liberal Peace contends that active domestic and international collaboration in pursuit of democracy, an open market-based economic agenda, and functional institutions are architects of peace (Hegre, 2004). This relationship is evident in the DRC where UN peacekeepers collaborate with administrative and local authorities in the pursuit of

democracy, good governance and security sector reform (SSR). Hence, Liberal Peace like the complexity and peace theories also fits well in the context of this study.

Deciding on which theory is relevant for this study comes down to two categories, those who believe that the creation of liberal democratic states guarantees free markets and the rule of law, and those like Galtung who believe conflict is internal, and peace emerges when cooperation steps in (Galtung, 1986). As earlier indicated, twenty years since the UN deployment, peace remains elusive; and with the new sustainable peace agenda, this study is timely. So, finding a theory which helps to achieve and sustain peace is urgent.

Liberal Peace offers explanations for the elusiveness of peace and the Sustaining Peace paradigm. This explanation is evidenced through its conceptualization, operational merits and criticisms. In furtherance of this and arguing that peace is not merely the absence of war and violence (Liebovitch et al, 2019), the complexity and Liberal Peace theories come closest to explaining the elusiveness of peace and the complexity of achieving and Sustaining Peace. However, because Liberal Peace speaks of the socio-economic and political system which generates and sustains peaceful societies, the study adopted the Liberal Peace theory.

The next section discusses the underlying theoretical assumptions of Liberal Peace and provides new theoretical insights for understanding the role of peacekeeping in Sustaining Peace. Liberal Peace assumes that ordinary people have more of an interest and stake in peace, unlike belligerents who benefit from the political economies that support and sustain wars (Diehl, 2016). Hence, peace is achievable if a group of people, however small, and mainly armed groups or would-be elites can be restrained or incentivised to end wars.

2.6 Liberal Peace Theory

Having gained currency in post-Cold War international affairs, the invocation of Liberal Peace has sometimes been ambiguous, and its application in conflict and peace situations has dispelled the contemplation that, it has a linear set of assumptions and

applicable only to post-conflict interventions. Following the end of the Cold-War, with the inking of “An Agenda for Peace” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), post-conflict state-building emerged as a critical component of peace-building. In the aftermath of the Cold-War and even more recently with the war on terror and the cocktail of peace and security challenges in Africa broadly and the world at large, Liberal Peace became a household term used to explain conflict challenges and inspire conflict resolution and peace consolidation efforts (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2017).

In this regard, it is important to understand Liberal Peace’s constituent elements and the underlying assumptions upon which is hinged, including its choice as a suitable theorem to understand peacekeepers’ role in restoring and Sustaining Peace. According to Richmond (2005), the key components of the Liberal Peace doctrine are its premiums on democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets and neo-liberal development. The Liberal Peace framework, Richmond asserts, can be understood to have four strands, namely: ‘victor’s peace’, ‘institutional peace’, ‘constitutional peace’ and ‘civil peace’ (Richmond, 2005). Victors peace is premised on the ‘winner takes it all’ peace architecture where peace rests on hegemonic power like the military and its success rests on the dominant hold on the hegemony.

On the other hand, institutional peace is idealistically anchored on consensus. It is based on the normative and legal agreement of states on “how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behaviour”(Richmond, 2006: 293). Institutional peace traces its origin from the Treaty of Westphalia up until the founding of the United Nations, to the modern-day period of the dominance of liberalism as a political and economic framework promoted by the dominant power in a unipolar world order. Constitutional peace is based on the liberal understanding that peace rests upon democracy and free markets founded on the idea that “individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end” (p. 293). Going further, Richmond notes that constitutional peace gained prominence during the European pre-Medieval times to the end of World War One up until the end of the Cold War.

Civil peace according to Richmond (2006) is an anomaly from the three other strands because it shifts power from the state, international actors to the individual. Civil peace is based on citizen engagement, individual attainment of rights and the ability to defend them, advocacy and vibrant civil societies. Richmond (2006) further notes that the four strands of Liberal Peace, at any one particular time, could 'compliment' or 'contradict' each other. The contradictions of the strands have been the basis of the critique of the Liberal Peace agenda. One important observation, however, is the fact that the four strands of the Liberal Peace by nature of their design and implementation, appoint third parties mostly external actors, as drivers of the peace initiative in conflict-ridden societies. Because of the external drivers of peace Liberal Peace "depends upon intervention, and a balance of consent, conditionality, and coercion" (p.300). Other than the four strands, Liberal Peace can be understood from what Richmond (2006) describes as the 'graduations' of Liberal Peace. Graduations of the Liberal Peace framework are founded upon how the actors enter the conflict, how they interact with the local context, and how that interaction has a bearing on how peace is attained and managed. Graduation can be based on the conservative, orthodox and emancipatory models of peace.

A conservative model is typified by top-down initiatives to peace-building. Most of the time the interventions are coercive, determined by the dominant forces, and in many cases than not, apply violence through "conditionality and dependency creation" (Richmond, 2006: 300). Because this model is based on unilateral hegemony and dominance mostly by state actors, it can be seen through the prism of the victor's understanding of peace. Due to the application of force through external means, peacekeeping within the conservative model is 'militarised as has been the case in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The orthodox model can be described based on the mantra 'I will engage you, but you do as I say anyway'. In this model, external actors are aware of the conflict context and because they aim for local ownership of the peace settlements, they are interested in the local culture but still employ their external approaches and norms into the peace framework. Because of how the process is managed, this peace model is based on

“consensual negotiation” and which always leads to “balanced and multilateral, and still state-centric peace” (Richmond, 2005: 300). This peace model has been advocated by international organisations and has been advanced by UN peacekeeping as a post-cold war model to peace having been implemented in East Timor. This model of peace can be described as bottom-up yet top-down where peace is designed by and with the locals and yet designed and agreed at the state level. Richmond (2006) notes that both the conservative and orthodox peace models are hinged on the superiority of the external actors and still modeled on the norms that global values can be applied in local situations and attain and sustain peace.

An emancipatory peace model deviates from conservative and orthodox graduations of peace because it advocates for local ownership and agreements based on consent. When peace negotiations are based on trust and consent, then there is little or no room for coercion, domination, and violence. Emancipatory model is aligned to civil peace as a product of bottom-up approaches and negotiations to peace. The end game of this model is local ownership; hence the process is participatory, consultative, multiple actors with very minimal state engagement. The different graduation model can be applied all through from the beginning of the conflict to the reconstruction phase shifting from one model to the other depending on the nature of the conflict, the intensity of the conflict, parties involved, and the perceived international community mandate at the time (Richmond, 2006).

If Liberal Peace is premised on rule of law, democracy, human rights and free markets, then it is important to examine if it can be effectively applied in Africa. According to Taylor (2007), the nature of Liberal Peace and what it espouses is not a fit for Africa. Taylor argues that strands and graduations of Liberal Peace rest upon hegemony which is lacking in most if not all post-colonial African states. This has led to a contradiction “that whilst the Liberal Peace might reflect the impulses for a trans-nationalized neo-liberal hegemony, in Africa the very basic foundations of a domestic hegemonic project are mainly absent” (Taylor, 2007, p. 562). The lack of hegemony characterized by weak unstable states with little or no autonomy impairs the attainment of the liberal democracy doctrine upon which Liberal Peace is predicated on. The next section

examines the idea of Liberal Peace in the DRC, it also probes into its relevance to explaining the elusiveness of peace and the adoption by the UN of the Sustaining Peace in the country.

2.7 Application of Liberal Peace in the DRC

The influence of Liberal Peace is visible in different levels of UN peacekeeping efforts. Following the publication of former Secretary General Boutros-bok Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" in 1995, the United Nations began to place a greater emphasis on the promotion of values, norms, and practises which reflect the projection of liberal states, specifically in terms of political (democracy) and socio-economic governance (market economies) (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2013). In 2001, the UNSC invoked aspects of Liberal Peace, particularly concerning the link between market economies, natural resource governance, and the attainment of peace. The UN brought this to bear in its engagement with the conflict in the DRC by drawing a link between weakstate institutions, illegal resource exploitation of natural resources, and the perpetuation of violent conflict in the country. Through its Resolution (SC/7057), the UNSC condemned "the illegal exploitation of natural resources and wealth by various actors in the conflict, and expressed serious concern at those economic activities fuelling the conflict in that country." The emphasis in the resolution, on the connection between state capacity, natural resource governance, and the elusiveness of peace in the DRC reinforced the suitability of the UN's standardized notion of Liberal Peace. This notion, in practice, is hinged on the central premise that peace can be attained through strengthened state institutions, a reformed economic model of natural resource governance and trade, as well as a functional political space based on democratic values (Eriksen, 2009). As a result, the UN's involvement was framed as a top-down "remedy" for the causes and effects of armed conflict, in accordance with formulations based on Liberal Peace theorizations.

The UN Peace-building Fund (PBF) committed \$13.9 million in 2009 to assist the Congolese government in funding its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC). STAREC aims to deal with the challenges to peace in

eastern Congo and to consolidate the benefits of recent peace initiatives and associated military and political interventions, according to Dzinesa and Laker (2011). This program underscored security and reinstatement of state authority; humanitarian and social aid; and economic recovery as vital pillars for maintaining and restoring peace (Dzinesa & Laker, 2011). These sectors highlight features of the Liberal Peace paradigm's major focus, such as security sector reform, promoting governance and the restoration of state power, and protecting peace process achievements. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the PBF efforts in the DRC are disconnected from the basic premises of Liberal Peace.

The impact of Liberal Peace today is evident in the United Nations PBF post-conflict mandate, and its orientation towards Sustaining Peace. Sustaining Peace attempts to focus greater emphasis on recognising and reinforcing what is currently working; to accompanying and supporting advocates for peace; and to assure not just a decreased incidence of violent conflict, but to also mobilise resources to abolish it (Connolly and Powers, 2018).

As a result, while deciding whether or not to deploy peacekeeping missions, policymakers must consider the best approach for not just ending hostilities but also ensuring that the seeds of peace are sown and peace is maintained (Larsdotter, 2019). This strategy revolves around the concepts of "do no harm" and "do some good" (Zartman, 2019: 162).

The "Do no harm" concept is based on the notion that peacekeeping or humanitarian actions in areas of violent conflict or insecure peace should avoid unwittingly increasing the danger or incidence of violence (Buhmann, Jonas, & Fisker, 2019). While "Do some good" is founded on the idea that, in addition to avoiding worsening violent conflict, humanitarian interventions should also play a role in reducing existing levels of potential violence by carefully studying the environment in which typical development endeavours are implemented (Berdal, 2019). It can be implied that by extension, this principle requires that peace operations should sustain the peace.

An understanding of these enablers and inhibitors is a critical step towards explaining why peace remains elusive in the DRC, and how changes in analytical and operational frameworks guide UN peacekeeping operations today. The missing link that remains unsolved in the workings of a top-bottom approach is what Eriksen (2009) sums up as four encumbrances to the success of Liberal Peace mandate. These include the inability of foreign drivers of such peace initiatives to ensure the provision of insufficient resources; the application by donors, of a standardized approach to conflict management which often does not adequately take the local context into account; the disconnect between the interest of local power elites and objectives of the pre-designed pattern of state-building; and the challenge of policy rigidity which arises from the UN's adoption of a standardized and non-negotiable notion of the ideal state.

The DRC context of the operationalisation of Liberal Peace and its inability to deliver lasting peace also highlight the failure of the UN to factors in the array of variables both domestic and external, which exert significant deterministic influences on the mandate deliverables. A brief analytical appraisal of Van der Lijn, (2009), Lise Howard (2008) and Ayodeji (2012) reveals that there is plethora of such enabling variables which contribute to peacekeeping's success. Some of these include:

- i. Local ownership of the peace process
- ii. Presence of well-equipped peacekeepers providing impartial security to ALL disputants and stakeholders especially women, children and other minority groups
- iii. The willingness and sincerity of disputants and stakeholders to observe and enforce ceasefires
- iv. A peacekeeping force that has adequate knowledge and familiar with the conflict drivers.

- v. Peacekeepers receiving enough assistance and cooperation from major external players and parties such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the European Union, to name a few.
- vi. The presence of qualified employees under proper leadership, as well as clear command structures to carry out the mission's objectives (s)
- vii. Clear timelines in operations' deployment
- viii. Broad and long-term vision of the peace operation
- ix. Proper coordination of internal and external mandates of the operation

A closer examination of how these factors have contributed to elusiveness of peace in the DRC, and what implications this has for the understanding peace missions leads us to two conclusions. First, that a peacekeeping operation would make a positive contribution to sustainable peace if these imperatives were operationalized accordingly. And secondly, lessons from earlier peacekeeping operations are undoubtedly crucial for a theoretical explanation of Sustaining Peace through the present and future peacekeeping operations, even if mandates and conflict plots sometimes differ.

One possible explanation often given for the failure of Liberal Peace in the DRC is that as a top-down approach to peace, it treats as trivial many factors within the civil space which provide fuel for the continuation of violent conflict in the DRC. As Stearns, Vlassenroot, Hoffmann, and Carayannis (2017) argue, there is a tendency for international actors to becoming distracted because they tend to focus on activities of local political actors, thus overlooking more fundamental issues which underpin the conflict. Such issues include widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment, endemic corruption, and matters around lack of access land, injustice and poor education among the local population. The need to pay more attention to the more fundamental issues in the local environment is challenge to the traditional top-bottom approach favoured by Liberal Peace. This persuasion is also threatened by the complex social dynamics of the conflict. There is the question for example, on the viability of a focus on local solutions where a convergence of regional forces plays a major role in shaping the

dynamics of local conflict and security. Stearns et al posit that, “there is little evidence that local conflicts are the primary causes of the ongoing violence in the country’s east. Nor is it apparent that grassroots actors have the clout to stand up to brutal militias or the powerful networks that support them” (p. 2). It is imperative therefore, to undertake a nuanced appraisal of the context of conflict in the DRC, as only option towards establishing sustainable peace in the country. The section below examines the limits of Liberal Peace in the DRC.

2.8 The Limits of the Liberal Peace in the DRC

Following from the foregoing, it is imperative to understand the necessity for the transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace. Essentially, what were the enablers and inhibitors of peace, and what are the ingredients necessary for the success of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC which the application of the Liberal Peace framework failed to bring on board? These questions are addressed in this study within the frames of the limitations of Liberal Peace and the prospects of Sustaining Peace as the alternative model of explaining the UN’s changing strategies.

According to Patrick Tom (2018), several studies on peacekeeping operations have been anchored on the ‘Liberal Peace’ paradigm. That this study does so might seem like a reinvigoration of the wheels but the reality is that, the lack of clarity on how to operationalize the UN’s new Sustaining Peace agenda lends itself as a new area of study for which a review of Liberal Peace and its conceptual relevance is broadened. This notwithstanding, from an operational level, Chandler (2010) takes issues with Liberal Peace’s top-down approach. He argues that, by its conception, Liberal Peace is externally driven and thus solutions etched-out elsewhere foment the elusiveness of peace and pose a challenge to attaining peace in climes where they are applied. This view is supported by Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam (2011) who opine that in peace-building Liberal Peace suffers a setback because of its lack of inclusivity and its external driven-solution.

Hagg and Kagwganja (2007) argue that the Liberal Peace model, originally designed for the management of inter-state conflicts had gained increased patronage in the attempt to resolve intra-state wars which were driven essentially by identity politics. The implication of its focus by design is the fact that it often fails to address civilian angles to the injustices including the animosities, memories and images which inflame conflict and perpetuate it. Rather, it produces counterproductive outcomes by downplaying actual peace-building and embracing power sharing initiatives which have come with many hidden costs (p. 23). Critical to its inability to deliver sustained peace is the fact that Liberal Peace breeds a cartel-like structure through its process of seeking through agreements with merchants of war. This position echoes Tull and Mehler (2005) who argue that Liberal Peace constitutes an incentive structure which merchants of violence can evaluate in terms of accruable gains from their violence, they may as such become even more motivated to engage in violence in order to secure further concessions from negotiations. As a consequence, regardless of its potential as a conflict management approach, Liberal Peace option of negotiation with armed groups for power is a potential contributing factor to the “reproduction of insurgent violence” as it accredits armed groups as owners of the state rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict (Tull & Mehler 2005:375). There is a need therefore to reconfigure conflict resolution mechanisms in tune with the nature of fundamental drivers and encompassing the use of traditional justice mechanisms in addressing identity-based conflicts.

To Hameiri, Hughes, and Scarpello (2017), the focus on ‘local’ and the imperative of inclusivity in peace-building have widened the scope of peace research. This is despite warnings from (Hughes, Öjendal, & Schierenbeck, 2015) who assert that literature that propagates the importance of local and inclusivity has been largely developed from the global north. Hence in the case of the DRC, even the invocation or inclusion of locals in peace-building has to be taken with a pinch of salt. It is for this reason that even Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015) warn that there are several, sometimes competing and contradictory variables which need to be considered in policy making. Therefore, even the invocation of local or inclusivity in a policy document may not necessarily mean in

the application that ownership is local despite the inclusion of some locals (however many they are). Consequently, dismissing the relevance of Liberal Peace as a theorem to explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC needs to be considered.

In the DRC context, it may seem that at best, the UN-led peace mission is a hybrid because it is inspired from the West and includes carefully selected or recruited Africans who camouflage inclusivity. The hybrid peace model despite it being a critical set-piece for the success of peacekeeping [in Sierra Leone for example] cannot on its own lead to peace (Paris, 2010). Thus, the nine enablers for attaining and Sustaining Peace listed above are critical guidelines which need to be applicable with a focus on prevention of drivers of conflict and investing in opportunities for peace. In doing this, the socio-economic and political drivers of conflict are better managed and local infrastructures for peace are enhanced to achieve and sustain peace, notwithstanding the complexity of doing so and the delicate balancing act required (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015).

From the above reviews, it can be deduced that the Liberal Peace scarcely provides a tools for understanding why peace remains elusive in contexts such as the DRC. It can also illuminate our inquiry into why scholars have yet to offer alternative explanations for conflict prone communities (Selby, 2013). In the case of the DRC, conflict remains elusive in diverse regions; and measures to achieve and sustain peace have to be community specific and should bear in mind the different cultural, historical, political and day to day economic realities of the people. Not doing so is causally responsible for poor outcomes of the liberal initiatives according to Mac Ginty(2008). Likewise, not understanding the local communities' realities has led to peace solutions framed and anchored in the western liberal lens (Hameiri, 2011). Consequently, to achieve and sustain peace in the DRC, there is a need for a shift from the western liberal top-bottom to bottom-up approach in conflict analysis and Sustaining Peace. This shift needs to be beyond a normative and theoretical framing albeit criticisms that in the case of Africa, what constitutes African Solutions remains fluid. This thought has gained currency in the backdrop of the fact that in instances where attempts at inclusivity as a means to attain peace and sustain peace have been engaged, local elites have led to elevation of superficial elites leading to non-inclusive peace settlements. Overall,Mac Ginty and

Richmond(2013) warn against developing any set of guidelines as prerequisites for successful or failed peace settlements. The focus should therefore not be on whether the proposed guidelines enable or inhibit success but on the extent to which they can lead to durable peace.

As the critique of Liberal Peace has grown, international actors have shifted to focus on understanding the local and advancing local-led and owned peace initiatives as a response and shift from top-down to bottom-up approach. This is the reason why beyond understanding the enablers and inhibitors of peace, this study focuses on the DRC intending to re-imagine a new understanding of how Liberal Peace explains the elusiveness of peace in the DRC and what needs to be done to achieve and sustain peace.

For a new approach to Liberal Peace, therefore, Rampton and Nadarajah(2017) take a radical departure from processes of peace-building and actors involved to reimagining peace-building with a focus on realities of post-conflict states. To re-imagine this, they argue that Liberal Peace today is interwoven with a plethora of processes that negate the strongly held view that, it is externally driven and a trigger of instability. Consequently, one can infer that peace-building today is a function of mixed (hybrid) approaches from both west and African approaches. So, in laying down enablers to sustain peace, this study expands the reach of Liberal Peace. A further note is taken that successful peacekeeping missions such as in Sierra Leone showcased great partnership between an UN-led mission with the involvement of regional actors and driven by local actors. Such a partnership brings external, regional and local actors in conflict and post-conflict states to an equal footing. This is important in reimagining Liberal Peace in contexts such as the DRC because of the causal relationship that exists between the limitations of Liberal Peace and the elusiveness of peace.

In essence, looking at the Liberal Peace theory tenets and assumptions, the criticism of the theory, as well as Sustaining Peace, this study neither dismisses the liberal theory nor agrees with it. That assumption of Liberal Peace fails to fully explain why peace remains elusive in the DRC despite its different models having been tried. This,

however, does not negate its relevance if utilised with a combination of new alternatives to identify enablers and inhibitors of peace.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed relevant literature by providing an appraisal of current issues in the understanding of United Nations peacekeeping mission as it relates to the challenge of elusive peace in the DRC. First, it discussed in general the dominant issues in extant literature on conflicts in Africa as foreground to the DRC conflict, then a brief review of literature on UN peace missions, its mandates, dynamics and import to elusive peace in the context of the study. The aim of this was to shed light on why peace remains elusive in contexts such as the DRC despite an extended peacekeeping presence over the years.

The chapter also explored background to the concept of Liberal Peace and its interaction with the Sustaining Peace debates with a view to understanding how they relate to the question of elusive peace in the DRC. This included discussion the notions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement as planks for, and through which the UN peacekeeping mission has evolved over the years, including the changing application of the principles that undergird the UN's peacekeeping missions mandate in the DRC. These are critical to understanding what goes into the design, mandate implementation, and operational application as UN mission instruments, as well as to determining how effective they perform as means towards attaining and Sustaining Peace.

The chapter also offered some illumination to the theoretical underpinning of the study by reviewing an array of relevant theories, then narrowing it down to critical theory. It noted that the elusiveness of peace lends itself to several theorizations that also seek to explain conflict intractability or why peace fails like the complexity, peace and Liberal Peace theories, and sought to align the divergent theoretical perspectives to contribute to the body of knowledge and research on the UN mission in Sustaining Peace. A take home from this chapter is an understanding of the complex influence of the context and phases through which peace mission has undergone in general, and particularly in the

DRC. It is, therefore, imperative that the goal of attaining sustained peace through peacekeeping is examined in-situ, within the localised context in which events are unfolding as presented in chapters four, five, six and seven. But before delving into these, the chapter that follows presents the research method used in this study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

A suitable research method is a critical requirement for any ambitious research enterprise. As has been explained in the preceding sections, this study examines broadly the role of peace missions in Sustaining Peace, through an analysis of the UN peace mission in the DRC. It critiques the UN's Liberal Peace doctrine used to guide for mission in the country and its significance in the unending quest for peace in the country. Furthermore, it discusses the Sustaining Peace agenda as an alternative paradigm and its prospects for enduring peace. This section lays bare the research method—the strategy with which the study objectives are pursued. These include the research design, the method of data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

Research methodology has been defined in various ways by researchers and methodologists. It is the systematically defined strategies and work plan adopted for conducting a research. It encompasses the plan for collecting, analyzing and interpreting information gathered for a study, and of presenting the research findings or results (Williams, 2007). Cooper and Schindler (2001) define it as the operational framework of inquiry within which an investigation is organized, and through which collected data can be positioned in such a manner that its meaning can be more clearly seen, and facts deduced from the inquiry. Schwardt (2007:195) sees methodology as “a theory of how an inquiry should proceed...[which] involves analysis of the assumptions, principles and procedures, and approach to [the] inquiry”.

The use of an appropriate methodology is critical to the success and reliability of a study because it serves as a procedural guide to scientific validation of a researcher endeavor in addition to helping the researcher understand what types of problems are considered researchable, how problems can be framed for investigation, what type of questions need to be asked, and to determine what appropriate means of collecting data must be chosen, among other imperatives of the research process (Schwardt, 2007; Creswell

and Tashakkori, 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2007). In planning the strategy and procedures for scientific research endeavor, considerations are usually given to a range of factors which may influence the outcome of the study. These include the milieu within which study is being conducted, the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the context within which research is to be carried out, among other factors which considerations are critical to ensure that the study is guided by the imperative of validity and that it achieves its objective of contribution to knowledge. The following section presents an explication of the frames within which this study was organized and conducted, including research approaches and designs, sampling method, data collection techniques, and methods of data analysis.

3.2 Research Approach

This research adopted an interpretive approach otherwise known as the hermeneutic approach, as strategy for understanding and explaining the role of peace missions as a mechanism for Sustaining Peace. For Dyer (2010), hermeneutics involves the practice of interpretation and understanding which revolves around understanding and distinguishing what can be justified. Its methodologies are diverse divers so long as they serve to interpret relevant epistemological phenomenon such that they can become intelligible and communicable. The interpretive/ hermeneutic approach offers an alternative to the positivist approach which according to Patton (2002), exposes researchers to the risk of losing the deeper comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon because of its orientation towards disaggregation and generalization.

In contrast to positivism, interpretivism explores all aspects of reality within the subjective epistemology of the phenomenon under investigation (Greene, 1992). This means it allows greater space for the interpretation of data and reality observes in contrast to assuming that the reality speaks for itself. It enables the researcher to intervene guided by theories or conceptual framework in giving meaning to the facts of the phenomenon under study. It supports the systematic analysis of socially meaningful action by enabling direct detailed observation of people in natural settings (Neuman, 1997: 74). Scholz (2015) notes that the approach was originally used to give meaning to

interpreting texts, but over time, gained popularity with its extended use in interpreting a broader array of phenomena. Four strands of the approach are often identified. These include the conservative strand; the critical strands, the radical strand, and the moderate (Bingham, 2010). All of these speak to the inclination of the analyst as well as his reading of the issue being investigated.

In the current study, the choice of a hermeneutic/interpretivist approach was informed by its strength to offer in-situ evaluation of the complex issues involved in the phenomenon under investigation, particularly in the specific context of the DRC peacekeeping mission of the United Nations. The hermeneutic approach lends itself relevant given its ability to bring together elements of social interactions and events that are otherwise not easily amenable to disaggregated variable isolation and calibration that is the norm in the positivist approach. The approach allows the researcher the latitude to draw critical inferences from empirical and anecdotal information in order to achieve a common understanding that is reflective of the perception of actors including refugees, academics, political actors, peacekeepers and members of international organizations working closely with the UN mission in the DRC.

3.3 Research Design

A research design is the outlay of the chosen framework of methods and techniques that a researcher uses to conduct a study. It is the general plan with which a researcher connects his conceived research problems with an achievable method of investigation that enables him to address the research problem by answering the underlying research questions effectively. A survey of methods in recent studies examining subjects which involve complex socio-political and contextual variables point to a growing popularity of the case study method as an approach of choice.

The case study method was chosen for this study because it offers the advantage of a holistic appreciation of the broad range of factors within the limited context of the study, The ability to explore the context in its operative form and without disaggregating the dynamics of social processes is a major strength of the case study approach as the

researcher is able to engage the context in greater detail, and to capture the dynamics of his phenomenon of interest within a more clearly defined thematic breadth to understand the broader array of complex problem area.

This study adopted a descriptive case study survey design. It used both primary and secondary data explored using qualitative styles of analysis. This helped to arrive at both hermeneutic inferential interpretation of obtained information. Survey data derived through questionnaires were subject to hermeneutic analysis to generate thematically organized discussions. The chosen method fit well with the emerging emphasis in a growing number of in-situ, context-based studies of social phenomenon which encourage comprehensive appraisal through qualitative research methods in order to capture contextualized variables including attitudes, habits, belief systems, goals, expectations, lifestyles and culture of a people or community (Bryman, 2012; Mohajan, 2018).

3.4 Data Collection

This study combined both primary and secondary data. Primary data refers, to information that a researcher gathers first hand, obtained specifically for the research at hand, and by the investigator themselves (Rabianski, 2003). On the other hand, secondary data refers to all data obtained from previously conducted studies, bulletins, reports and articles related to the subject-matter.

The primary data was collected using two research instruments, electronic survey questionnaire and semi-structured telephonic interview. The electronic survey questionnaire, a data collection technique where questions are housed in software systems which are transmissible in electronic forms and can be answered by the target individuals on electronic devices such as laptop computers, phones, and short message applications from which respondents are able to input their responses to the questions directly with or without the direct physical presence of the interviewer (OECD, 2016). The technique is highly suitable for executing research under tight safety regulatory conditions such as the one Covid-19. Another advantage is that it is cost-effective and

enabled the researcher to assemble a wide array of experts at little cost in travelling expenses and with a flexible time schedule structure since participants were participating from the comforts of their own locations.

The reliance on electronic survey questionnaire was informed and necessitated by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic which ravaged countries during the course of fieldwork for this study. The attendant regulations by governments, including restrictions on local and international travels as well as the ban on physical social gatherings and social distancing across countries made conventional methods unrealistic and thus provided the impetus for innovation. Under these circumstances, data collection used innovative techniques which were built into digital electronic innovation. This included audio/video conferencing with high profile participants, mail correspondence, and communication via the compatible social media platforms.

Electronic survey instruments were designed for compatibility with the diverse range of smart access devices and inputted along with Informed Consent forms and an agreement section which enables the respondent to proceed with the survey only upon a required affirmative response. Dissemination of the survey instruments followed a purposive cluster sampling in the sense that researcher made prior contact and had interaction with members in most of the organisations concerned. Administrators of organisations' social media platforms were encouraged to disseminate links to the questionnaire instrument among their members using the organisation's social media and other official compatible spaces including emails and Skype, Instagram, WhatsApp. In this way, the credibility of the respondents are assured as confirmed members of the target respondent clusters who have the requisite knowledge about the phenomenon being studied.

Design of instruments for the collection of primary data aimed at obtaining qualitative in-depth feedbacks from surveys and interviews, while also ensuring that participants have the latitude to express their opinion despite the reliance on non-contact based mediums. Dissemination of instruments for the samples targeted relevant segments of population within the sampling frame, with deployment effected specifically among identified

groups including UN peacekeeping personnel past and present, Politician and diplomats working closely with, and familiar with the DRC case study, members of DRC refugee community in the sub-region, officials of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, members of the academic community particularly those in fields of political and international/diplomatic studies, members of civil society and local political actors in the DRC.

Interview questions were designed to accommodate opinion divergence and to elicit measured response by using Likert-scale assessment options where necessary. Interview guide comprised questions drawn from the research objectives and research questions and presented in a semi-structured format. The style of presentation of interviews questions adopted a conversational method while directing the process in line with pre-set interview questions. This enabled researcher to direct the conversation and sieve needed information while ensuring that discussions stay on topic. Interviews were typically conducted on a one-on-one basis with the identified key informant, in line with interview process as elucidated by (Harrell & Bradley, 2009). While interview questions were formulated in open-ended styles designed both to engage and to spur deep responses from respondents, questionnaire queries were presented with the wide latitude of options from which to choose from, including allowance for measured gradient of assessment, and neutrality in response.

When used as a method of data collection, semi-structured interviews allow for the collection and documentation of data that could cover various themes relating to how people think about the research topic, as the ability to further explore responses given by respondents often allows the researcher to probe deeper into respondents' experiences, memories and opinions of the research subject (Rivano Eckerdal & Hagström, 2017). The main advantage of in-depth interviews, according to Boyce & Neale (2006) lies in the fact that they offer far more accurate information than what is accessible by other methods of data collection. To Fox (2006), semi-structured interviews are based on open-ended questions and provide both the interviewer and the interviewee the opportunity to discuss themes covered by the research in a more comprehensive way.

The elite interviews approach allowed the researcher the opportunities to interface with designated specialized personnel from the United Nations, the academia, and former personnel of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the country. The researcher used an interview guide with a set of prepared questions, in sequential order, to engage respondent/discussants. These participants were allowed to familiarize themselves with the focus of the study through preliminary briefings and information sharing.

Although a number of desired participants were provided, the United Nations designated an official at the organisation's headquarters in New York to speak on behalf of the establishment. This reduced the number of personnel covered from the UN but also allowed a wider breadth of discussion and information sharing. The interview segment also covered other segments of respondents outside of the United Nations mission. This included academics, members of the diplomatic community, civil society organisations, and local politician and policy makers. However, many of these respondents preferred completing the questionnaire rather than grant interview sessions.

The questionnaires strand of data collection involved identifying clusters of the respondent categories, and the dissemination of electronic questionnaire forms designed on Google Forms, and disseminated through cluster group admin for wider reach of the survey sampling to specifically identified sample groups. In line with the linguistic diversity across the contexts of the study which cuts across the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, as well as the diverse language orientations of the target respondents, the instruments of data collection were designed in the two principal languages: English and French. These were then merged in excel spread sheets at the end of data collection.

3.5 Sampling Method and Sample Population

Sampling describes the system used in the selection of the total number of study units, that is, the defined size of the study population from which data is collected (Parahoo, 2006). This study adopted purposive sampling method, which is a non-probability

sampling technique. This technique is subjective, allowing the researcher to select his sample size in such a way that matches the study criteria, and the participants needed to generate the necessary data for the study (Creswell J. , 2013). Purposive sampling also allows the researcher to identify and selection segments of the population who are most appropriate, informed, or experienced on the phenomenon under investigation (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011).

The identification of potential subjects for data collection for the study was organized through purposive sampling method. Snowball sampling method was used in identification and selection of respondents. A list of study subject segments was defined. While a target survey sample of 200 was set as minimum, the sample size was expanded to 300 as most respondents presented a delegated representative thereby reducing the overall size of individual sessions. In the end, 280 respondents were obtained within the set timeframe of the survey data capturing period. In view of the covid-19 lockdown, participants were more predisposed to the electronic questionnaire data collection instrument. See chapter 6 for thematic summary of survey report. This study sample and key informant interviews provided a robust feedback from which themes were drawn and explored to illuminate our understanding of the role of peacekeeping mission in the DRC.

Contacts were established through snowball sampling method, with political leaders, and other officials in major locations across the DRC. They also provided contacts relevant groups through which data were sourced. A contact person at the University of Goma facilitated contacts with personnel group administrators for the completion of the electronic questionnaire. These included other officials from units within the University of Goma, the University of Lubumbashi, members of civil society organisations as well as officials of international organisations in the DRC including Peace Direct, Christian Aid, and Save the Children International. In all, 280 responses were obtained in the questionnaire component while 6 interview key informant interviews were conducted.

3.6 Data Presentation and Analysis

The method of data analysis adopted in this study is the qualitative content analysis method. In qualitative research, data analysis is the process by which field data including transcripts, questionnaire entries, interview transcripts, observation notes and other textual and non-textual materials gathered by the researcher, are systematically sorted, searched, arranged, and analyses so that they can be used to arrive at a better understanding of a determined phenomenon (Wong, 2008). Content analysis, as applied to this study, entailed the use of a systematic, arrangement and compression of collected data organized into themes such that the opinions expressed by research participants can be compressed coded and categorized in an orderly manner that is replicable (Stemler, 2001; Weber, 1990). This techniques enhanced the researcher's ability to identify trends and patterns, towards drawing logical and objective inferences from the obtained data (Holsti, 1969: 14). Themes were drawn from the research questions and used as organizing conceptual frames for data analysis.

Data analysis in this study involved combining survey data drawn from questionnaires, with critical analysis of interview reports structured thematically in line with the research objective. Data exploration and presented used qualitative analyses method along with simple graphic summaries, as a way to build a convergence between the qualitative method and survey data. In this study, analysis involved collation and sorting of questionnaire responses. Responses were translated into English forms using questions codes drawn out in the design of language compatible questionnaire and interview guides. Interview Instruments reports in the two principal languages--English and French—were then translated electronically and merged in one whole report for analysis.

Graphic presentation were used where relevant, to highlight notable vital trends in the data in support of patterns and inferences that contribute to the understanding of the phenomena. Qualitative analysis also enables a deeper exploration of data, as well as in creating themes and concepts for further exploration from the data gathered. Thematic analysis ere arranged and presented in line with the research questions and

objectives, with the aim of illuminating the role of UN's peacekeeping in Sustaining Peace in the DRC, as these trends emerge from the data.

3.7 Limitations to the Study

A number of challenges were encountered in the course of carrying out this study. The first and most significant was the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition to the effect of restrictions on international travels, the lull in public official structures, in government and nongovernmental circles as well as general social activities during most part of the year 2020 and 2021 stalled and continued for months to slow down the process of data collection. It also gave rise to several adjustments in initially scheduled processes including planned travels for data gathering KII interviews, permission processing and other essential preliminary activities. In order to get pass these huddles, the research adopted innovative alternatives which although eventually yielded results, were strange to many of contact resource persons initially scheduled on the data collection timeline. Alarm over Covid-19 safety limited the options to electronic contacts and while others insisted on questionnaire format participation.

As measures to mitigate potential effects of these challenges on the study, questionnaire sampling size was increased by a 100 from 200 to 300, and specific groups clusters were targeted through existing official communication including group administrators as contacts persons. Social media conferencing technologies were used in the conduct of interviews with KIIs. Coverage of questionnaire survey were monitored and channelled to specific target groups in order to enhance the representativeness of sample groups. Extensive key informant sessions were conducted with delegated spokesperson for official participants such as the UN, the international association of past and present peacekeepers, as well as other individual participants.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

According to Silverman (2000), researchers investigating issues that pry into the personal experiences and private thoughts of participants requires cautious ethical considerations. As Sanjari et al. (2014) noted, qualitative studies relying on interaction

between researchers and participants pose ethical challenging for the researchers due to their personal involvement at different stages of a research endeavour. This makes the formulation of specific ethical guidelines essential. For this reason, the researcher is obliged to put measure in place to protect the rights, values, desires and needs of informants are safeguarded (Creswell, 2003). Miles & Huberman (1994) identify some of the issues that must be taken into account by researchers prior to, during, or after data collection and analysis. These include:

1. The need to ensure that there is an Informed Consent procedure between researcher and participants. The participants in a research activity must be made to be fully aware of what the research is about and what their involvement entails.
2. Participants must be informed about possible effects including potential hurt or harm to which they may be exposed,
3. The imperative of honest by the researcher and the need to demonstrate trustworthiness in their presentation of collected data,
4. The need to ensure that participants anonymity, privacy, and confidentiality are protected during and after the study,
5. The need for sensitivity, that is, a researcher must be cognizant of participants' response or reaction to the process, so as to apply appropriate measures in the probable event that a participant exhibits exposure, fear from risks or vulnerability to potential harmful effects to self or to the researcher.

In line with the above, the researcher was consciousness of the fact that the subject matter of this research is both social and political, and that it draws its data from the individual perception of members of the public. These include personnel of the peacekeeping mission, members of Congolese refugee community in South Africa, members of the academic community, members of civil society organizations, diplomats, local politicians and political actors. All of these categories of persons were interacted with, in gathering data on the role of United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sustaining Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in line with its qualitative orientation and design. Due ethical precautions were taken in the

interaction/correspondence between the researcher and the individuals or groups which served as participants. The exploration of participants' personal experiences in respect of the phenomenon of interest was guided by all applicable ethical procedures relevant to such studies.

Approvals at all levels, including the University of the Witwatersrand and other third-party institutions such as the United Nations office, and relevant institutions within the DRC, were obtained. Also, on-the-field ethical procedures such as Informed Consent process were administered in the course of executing the study fieldwork, with adequate regards to the protecting of participants confidentiality. At the internal level, research instruments were presented for vetting and certified compliant with extant ethical standards prior to data collection. This involves checks to research instrument and specified methods and documents used such as the consent form, storage of data after completion of research, methods allow by respondents for capture of interviewsessions. Copies of these documents appears as appendixes at the end of the research.

3.9 Conclusion

This section laid out the research methodology fore-grounded in the study. It outlined the research approach as interpretative because its advantage as in enhanced latitude for context-relevant interpretation of the observed phenomenon as derived from collected data, as against positivist disaggregated approaches. The chapter also outlined the study design as qualitative case study design because the nature of our research question required the comprehension and analyses the phenomenon of peace missions, their changing contexts, and the elusiveness of peace in the DRC. The DRC case study was chosen for its richness in context for our research aim, the ampleness of data on it, and accessibility to the researcher who had pre-edtablished profeddional contactsas well as good command of the French language widely spoken in the country.

With regard to data collection, the chapter outlined the research approach, research designs, method of data collection, sample population and sampling technique, as well as method of data presentation. It also laid out limitations that were confronted in the

course of the study and the innovative techniques that were used to overcome there effects. The chapter also explained how the methods were applied in the study and how they assisted in realizing the objectives of the study, including the ethical considerations that guided the study. Also discussed was the significance of social distancing regulations during the Covid-19 pandemic as it concerned the collection of data for the study, and how the use of electronic survey and telephony interview techniques were adopted to ensure an effective but non-contact based data collection as mitigation strategy in compliance with the pandemic regulations.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE UNITED NATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

4.1 Introduction

The nature of intrastate conflicts and the complexity of the intervening social, political, and economic undercurrents of its management have tasked both scholars and security policy actors over the years. Unlike the clear-cut arena of inter-state conflict, conflicts within nations are often a function of a wide range of factors with varying influences and dynamics that require sufficiently nuanced understanding for effective management. In Africa, understanding the trajectories of intra-state conflict are compounded even more by the ensnaring influences of the political and historical evolution of the states, their economic fragility, complex demographic, ethnic, and cultural geographies, among other factors which raise the stakes and confound interventions under conflict circumstances. The logical necessity given these realities, and which is often not prioritized in externally-generated policy inputs such as the Liberal peace frameworks, is that for adopted operational frames to meet its purpose, there must be substantial inputs from the local environment.

Nowhere have these diverse range of factors been shown more manifest as they have in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The decades-long conflict in the DRC illustrates the such hostile convergence of inflaming factors that prompted one author to liken it to the conspiracy of nature, a conflict “so fully encompassing that everything seems to sustain it, whether it intends to, or not” (Rosen, 2013: N.P). Much of the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have arisen from a convergence of three contradictions: its ethnographic history, the management of its resources, and the influence of international quest for its natural resources. It is imperative therefore, to present briefly, a background to the DRC context of conflict and the attendant dynamics of United Nations peacekeeping mission to the country. The aim of the chapter is to engage the array of issues which shape the trajectory of the DRC conflict and the

course of its management, particularly at the level of the United Nation peacekeeping mission to the country.

4.2 A Brief Socio-demographic and Political Background of the DRC


The Democratic Republic of the Congo, also known for short as the DRC, or Congo (Kinshasa), gained its independence from Belgium on the 30th of June 1960. It is located in the Central African region. It lies on the Equator, with one-thirds of its size to the North and two-thirds to the South (Bope, 2011). It has a landmass of about 2.3 million square kilometers and it is the twelfth largest country in the world and second largest country in Africa—only second after Algeria (Froitzheim, Söderbaum & Taylor, 2011). It is comfortably, the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. The country has eleven provincial subdivisions in its administrative structure and has Kinshasa as its capital (Bope, 2011). With its population, the Democratic Republic of the Congo also ranks as the most populous French-speaking country in the world.

The DRC geographically covers a greater part of the Congo River basin spanning an area of about 400,000 square meters (Kabemba, 2001). With its large territorial size, the DRC is equal in size to 5 countries of the European Union, namely Spain, France Germany, Finland and Sweden, all put together (Usanov et al, 2013; 29). In its Central African neighborhood, the DRC shares boundaries with eight different states. It is bounded to the north by two states—the South Sudan and the Central African Republic; to the southeast by Zambia; to the southwest by Angola; to the southeast by Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda; and to the west by its short Atlantic coastline, the Angolan exclave of Cabinda, and also by Congo (Brazzaville).

The DRC also ranks high in terms of population, as one of the largest countries in the sub-region. According to the World Bank's estimate, its population as at 2020 amounted to 89,561,404 million people (World Bank Group, 2021). It is also noted for one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.19%, coupled with a fertility rate of 6.11 births per woman (WPR, 2021). Save for the contradictions which they present to national stability, the country has a rich diversity in terms of demographic mix. The

country is one of the most multi-ethno-linguistically diverse countries, with about 450 different tribes and ethnic groups numbering about 250 (Samuel, 2017). Although there are various indigenous languages and about 700 local languages and dialects are spoken among its population (Kabemba, 2001), four major ones include Kiswahili, Lingala, Tshiluba, and Kikongo which are recognized as national languages in addition to French which is the official language (Usanov et al, 2013). See map below.

Figure 4.1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo



Source: Britannica.com<<https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/Cultural-life>>

The DRC is also known for its vast endowments with an abundance of precious natural resources, which offer huge potential through mining, forestry, and oil resources, for

economic prosperity. Some of the important natural resources found in the DRC are cobalt, copper in which it tops the list of nations with these resources, holding 45 percent of world Cobalt reserves, 21 per cent of global reserve of industrial diamonds, and 12 percent of Tantalum (USGS, 2014). It also has large amounts of Coltan (Columbite-Tantalite), diamonds, silver, petroleum, gold, wood and significant hydroelectric potential—with a hydropower generating capacity to carry the entire electric power requirements of the Great Lakes region and more (Ayodele, 2017).

According to a United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) country report (UNEP, 2011), the DRC bears half of Africa's forest and water resources with about 80 million hectares of arable land. Its river basin contains the highest fish variety of any African river and hosts the largest inland fishery on the continent, with an estimated potential production capacity of 520,000 tonnes per year (p. 24). According to the findings of a United Nations assessment released today, the country is endowed with mineral resource deposits, including vast forests and water resources, as well as an estimated 24 trillion dollars worth of mineral reserves, according to the UNEP report. This positions the country, albeit potentially, as the driving force of Africa's economic development if these vast resources are put to prudent use.

Despite its enormous natural resource wealth, the DRC suffers from the absence of quality institutions which are essential for the management of valuable natural resources and for prevention of the conflicts which such resources tend to generate (Burnly, 2011). Interestingly, despite the massive potentials derivable from its endowments, the DRC became one of the principal case studies in resource curse as its natural resources endowments became top among the factors behind its violence and instability and a web of illegal resource exploration and the mining and trade in precious mineral resources became the key source of funds for the sustenance of armed conflicts (UNEP, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2012; Collier, 2007).

As studies show, history has important implications for mutual coexistence and peace among peoples (Vlassenroot, Mudinga & Hoffmann, 2016). To understand the impact of its colonial history on the predominance of identity, ethnicity and territory in the politics

of the DRC, one must examine the nature of its colonial state apparatus and the character of its institutions towards ethnic groups, as well as the structures it bequeathed to the postcolonial state. As Hoffmann (2021) rightly noted, ethnic stereotypes are usually not mere creation of instant opportunism among leaders and groups. Rather, they emerge from identity categories that are instituted in a society's power structure. More broadly, they are embedded through socialization, into the feelings and way of thinking of the members of individual ethnic groups through these structures, and through the articulation of ethnic territories in political and resource struggles. In the DRC, over 250 customary chiefdoms administer a sizable part of the country through modern and customary laws. In addition to these, there are even greater number of smaller customary units, villages and groupings.

The nature of conflict in the Kalele territory, an area lying directly west of Lake Kivu, which remains a scene of continuing violent conflict that have endured for more over two decades, illustrates the how constructed the ideas of territorialized ethnic identifies can be used by ethnic and political actors as instruments in their struggles for power and natural resources. Similar dynamics play out in Uvira, Walikale, and in the North and South of Kivu where constructed ethno-territoriality continues to plays important roles in the nature of political struggle and the resulting violent conflicts, with actors using ethnic narratives as effective strategies for group mobilization, taking advantage of historically entrenched mutual distrust and fear among the people (Hoffmann, 2021).

Hoffmann (2021) stressed that 'ethno-governmentality emanating from colonial construction of ethnicity and territory continued to shape the nature of conflict in postcolonial DRC, as illustrated particularly, in its Eastern region (Hoffmann, 2021). According to the author, through its form of colonial rule, Belgian colonial authorities instituted the imposition of an "ordered scientific visions of ethnicity, custom, culture, space, territory, and geography, upon ambivalent cultures and spaces" (Hoffmann, 2021: 251) through its 'ethnogovernmentality'. Ethnogovernmentality here connoted "the heterogeneous ensemble of bio-political and territorial rationalities and practices of power concerned with the conduct of ethnic populations" (Hoffmann, 2021: 253). The author notes that while colonial legacies of ethnogovernmentality indicates its failure to

produce the colonially anticipated stability and order, it left ethno-territorial regimes with durable effects on the sense of self and identity in the struggles over politics and space among the peoples of the DRC.

The extent to which the colonial overlords tampered with ethnic and tribal identities, distorting their roots on the African continent and in the central African region in particular, is described in Samuel (2017). The author highlighted how events in Europe including the first and second world wars, influenced enduring disruptions in Africa where colonial masters re-aligned ownership, territories and demographic forms of native people on the continent. For example, Belgium, after defeating German forces during the First World War, resorted to exerting its ownership and control of native areas in the Central African region through the acquisition of territories, relocations of tribes, and redrawing of maps over former German colonial subjects, placing sole emphasis on administrative comfort of the colonizing nations, without regards for their cultural and ethnic ties (Samuel, 2017: 21-23). The German colonies that were directly impacted by these policies were Rwanda and Burundi which despite their historical contiguities, came under the altering policies of Belgium with many of its people shuffled among the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

During the years of border re-drawing that followed the aftermath of the First World War, significant portions of land, including peoples from some provinces of German Rwanda were merged with Congo, bringing into what is known as the province of North Kivu, specifically its territories of Rutshuru, Nyiragongo and Masisi. Some of these policies were adopted, for administrative convenience and as a strategy to address the problems of overpopulation and concentration of workforce in places like Rwanda and Burundi, which contrasted with the Congo which had under-population and shortage of working force (Samuel, 2017).

According to Ngondavi, to achieve this objective, the Belgian colonial administrators enacted the 'Deed of cession of indigenous rights' ('Acte de cession des droits indigènes') on the 13th of November 1939, largely superintended by European administrators. This agreement became adopted at the instrument through which

administrators of the Congo commenced the immigration of people of Rwanda and Burundi into the Congo regions, and the creation of new chiefdoms on lands purchased in Masisi territories for the displaced people. In order to obliterate their native Rwandese and Burundi identities, the immigrants were made to leave documents showing their origins at the entry points of the border posts, in exchange for Congolese citizens identity cards (Ngondavi, 2002).

As studies show, history has important implications for mutual coexistence and peace among peoples. To understand the impact of its colonial history on the predominance of identity, ethnicity and territory in the politics of the DRC, one must examine the nature of its colonial state apparatus and the character of its institutions towards ethnic groups, as well as the structures it bequeathed to the postcolonial state (Vlassenroot, Mudinga & Hoffmann, 2016). As Hoffmann (2021) rightly noted, ethnic stereotypes are usually not mere creation of instant opportunism among leaders and groups. Rather, they emerge from identity categories that are instituted in a society's power structure. More broadly, they are embedded through socialization, into the feelings and way of thinking of the members of individual ethnic groups through these structures, and through the articulation of ethnic territories in political and resource struggles. In the DRC, over 250 customary chiefdoms administer a sizable part of the country through modern and customary laws. In addition to these, there are even greater number of smaller customary units, villages and groupings.

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Adebajo (2006) identified six factors that contributed to the success of peacekeeping missions in an African context. They are: the willingness to disarm and accept constitutionally agreed political process like elections as well as and their outcomes; the capacity to develop an effective strategy for dealing with active and potential spoilers who pose continuous danger and are prepared to deploy violence thereby disrupting the peace process; the elimination of conditions through which economic resources fuel conflict; the willingness of regional actors to cooperate with the peace processes; the discontinuation of foreign military, financial and/or diplomatic support for [factions which threaten the peace in order to aid] the peace processes; and lastly, the capability, disposition and quality of the leadership in the peacekeeping missions (Adebajo, 2006: 266).

There are considerable pointers to the validity of these observations in the case of the DRC when considered alongside its history of ethnic distrust and rivalry, and how these factors may function either to attenuate, or amplify conflict, or the challenges of its management in a developing country context. Tribal tussles for political power antedates a winner-takes-all system of leadership where the ethnic group, tribe or race which

gains power does so at the total exclusion of the other groups (Karbo & Mutisi, 2012). A natural course under such a system is that the power wielding group shuts out other groups from equal access to the dividends of governance, thereby breeding hostility and tension which precedes conflict from the denied group (Venugopalan, 2016). This analogy is illustrated in Rupesinghe and Anderlini's (1998: 32-33) argument that unequal or asymmetric distribution of resources is one of the main factors which trigger armed conflict in ethnically plural societies like the DRC. A convergence of the resource curse and dysfunctional governance challenge in the DRC presents a major challenge to peace that add credence to the thesis by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) on the interplay of natural resources and conflict.

4.3 Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): A Brief History

The pendency of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become so important to discussions on conflict in postcolonial Africa that any such discussions is incomplete without a look at the case of the DRC (Karbo & Mutisi, 2012; Venugopalan, 2016). As a major global and regional security concern, the dynamics of postcolonial crises in the country has been a subject of numerous scholarly literature, drawing attention from scholars and policy experts around the world (see for example: Prunier, 2009; Deibert, 2008; Stearns, 2011; Murhula, 2006;). Expectedly, approaches and perspectives have diverged, with some accounts looking at the complex mosaic of issues and others taking a linear historical approach (de Vries, 2015). It is important therefore to properly situate the conflict within the broad triggers and the context in which it has been precipitated and sustained over time.

The DRC has been associated with incessant civil wars and conflicts since its independence in 1960 (Samuel. 2017). It became conflict-ridden almost immediately after it gained its independence with the first signs of tension appearing in series of crises shortly after the official departure of its Belgian colonizers (Prunier, 2009). The polity would soon degenerate into a succession of civil and interstate unrests in the forms of protests, secessionist uprisings and civil war, leading to what came to be known as 'Africa's first world war' (Weinstein, 2000: 11). This internal and cross-border

war would claim the lives of about five million people in long-drawn hostilities between 1994 and 2003 (Venugopalan, 2016). Conflict in the DRC has a complex history, dating to its colonial past to the present, ethnic and tribal contradictions. It is a theatre in which the interplay between domestic political and militia actors conflates with actors from its external environments involving western, regional and sub-regional actors, locked in the struggle for control and exploitation of its vast resources (CEPAC-DRC, 2007).

The underlying factors of DRC's fragile social structure and its inflammability are described in Dobbins et al (2008) as the borders invented during the scramble for Africa by the European powers. The citizenship resulting from such border creation were not formed from or imbued with any prior identity of nationhood which could draw allegiance from the citizens (Prunier, 2009). Post-independence leaders especially Mobutu Sese Seko recognized this vacuum and moved to engender the creation of a nascent Zairian identity (Hoskyns, 1965). However, the prevalence of sharp ethnic rivalries in the Post-Mobutu era indicates that this effort had little effect as sense of national identity remained weak. Dobbins et al (2008: 108) put the absence of national sense of identity succinctly when they observed that "instead of a Congolese nation, there existed a conglomeration of different groups spread out over an undeveloped region roughly the size of Western Europe".

The nature or ethnic geography of the DRC has been one of the major factors in its internal conflicts (Hoffmann, 2021). Many citizens and groups in the DRC had their traditional homes overlapping into other countries across the borders. One of the results of this is that in terms of leadership, there were no clearly accepted national homogenizing leadership figures capable of shifting citizen's allegiance away from their attachment to ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, or inspiring a unified national front among them in order to build the necessary sense of nationhood to address issues of conflict (Prunier, 2009; Dobbins et al 2008). Another effect of the ethnic geography is seen in the transnational scope of conflicts in the country, with its unending tension amplified by the spill-over effect of its cross-border ethnic mix between the country and its neighbors, resulting in easily inflamed security challenge often extending beyond its national borders (Hoffmann, 2021). This is evident in the involvement of regional states such as

Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Eritrea, Burundi, and the ethnically motivated allegiances and solidarities between pro-government and pro-rebel factions (Prunier, 2009).

The historical causes of the conflict-ridden DRC state is often situated in the structural disorganisation from the colonial times, beginning with European appropriation of the African continent and the redrawing of its cartography. This historical watershed was the partitioning process which shared the continent among European powers, at the instance of the then German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck (Lemarchand, 1964). It noteworthy that the conference had no African presence or an African representative, nor did it include any European representation for the indigenous people of the area. There were also no Europeans commissioned at the conference to ensure that the interests and concerns of native Africans were protected in the proceedings. The conference had on invitation, all the major European States who were considered world players and who had interest in the quest for colonizing Africa. These included Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Turkey, and Russia (Faal, 2009). The Berlin Conference saw Africa shared among the major powers and by 1914, about 90% of the continent had been shared between seven countries, leaving out only Ethiopia and Liberia as independent nations. It also gave the continent boundaries that were drawn up by the colonizing powers at the Berlin Conference with no regard for the continent's natural landmarks or the historic cultural, ethnic or political boundaries indigenous to the African natives themselves (Young, 2015).

While King Leopold II officially agreed to the idea that the Congo will have a free trade area for all European powers, in practice most other European nations and their traders were schemed out in the granting of trade concessions to various corporations in their bid to exploit the region's resources. The import of this is that the area later to become the DRC had been designated a common trade territory, free to colonial exploitation to all European nations since in the colonial era (Venugopalan, 2016). This fact ostensibly, was reflected in the postcolonial era, into the Cold war era, and is still evident in the international scamper for the DRC's resources till date.

While granting concessions to various European corporations to exploit the region's natural resources, King Leopold instituted a brutish rule over the territory, exerting forced labor farming of wild rubber as tax to his colonial government. He also instituted a death sanction or punitive amputation practice against natives adjudged to have performed low i.e. having failed to meet their rubber production quota. The revelation of this abuse and brutality by King Leopold reached the Belgian government it reclaimed the territory into its colonial fold until its independence in 1960. Beyond the imposition of colonial cartographies which bore no input to, nor were mindful of the ethno-territorial, socio-cultural and political peculiarities of the indigenous people, one of the important ways through which the legacies of its colonial history would later shape trajectory of peace and security on the continent is in the imposition of state form, its institutions and the relationship between the various groups vis a vis these institutions. The entrenched patterns of ethno-territorial identity were carried on into the countries post-independence era. In his exposition on the background to the DRC conflict (Venugopalan, 2016).

Before colonialism, Africa was organized into Chiefdoms and Chefferies as a form of native governance (Tull, 2010). These Chiefdoms functioned as ethnically discrete and mutually exclusive territories, each under the rule of a single customary chief who governed his chiefdom through customary law. During colonial rule, European rulers exploited the chiefdoms and chefferies, by using them as proxy instruments to rule indigenous people indirectly, thus empowering these structures as tribes or races, allowing them maintain broader scope of influence in their natural environments (Lemarchand, 1964). They also consolidated the power base of these rulers who notwithstanding, ruled their chiefdoms along the tradition of their traditional customs and political structures, in so long as they ensured self-financing, maintained order, and advanced colonial profit interests and supported their quest for resource exploitation and dispossession (Hoffmann, 2021). These traditional structures were appropriated by colonial governors and new ones were created in their hundreds across regions in the DRC in order to ensure that order was maintained, while the colonial authorities

organized the indigenous populations into forces for production and taxable subjects (Venugopalan, 2016; Kabamba, 2010).

According to Hoffmann (2021) as intermediaries between the colonial government and the native people, the customary chiefs acquired extensive powers in relation to the affairs of their indigenous people, and thus became very instruments of colonial control and dominance. At the same, they became officially legitimized through recognition by the Europeans and their framing as authorities embodying the hitherto diverse native political institutions and systems whose individually varied forms were previously determined by the indigenous people of each locality (Lemarchand, 1964). These chiefdoms became powerful ethnic territories (ibid). With the passing of time and the increasing powers of the colonially consolidated traditional proxy rulers—the chiefs, the pliability expected by the colonial authorities began give way with resistance and disobedience from the traditional rulers as divergence of interests and other influences began to materialize. A number of chiefs began to mount rebellion against the colonial authorities resulting in violent repression by the colonial authorities and the fragmentation of the territorial model. This also ushered in a tradition in which governance around structures of ethnic territories acquired a dynamic process and in which boundaries were determined by political struggles. At the same time, a culture of the use of Violence or threats of it in the leadership began to gain prominence with narratives of racial or tribal superiority increasingly harnessed as tool for the colonial creation of ethnic territories (ibid).

Beyond these foundational issues, accounts of the immediate causes of the postcolonial DRC have been rendered by various authors (see for examples: Karbo & Mutisi, 2012; Venugopalan, 2016; Kabemba, 2001; Prunier, 2009; Usanov, De Ridder, Auping, Lingemann, Espinoza, Ericsson & Liedtke, 2013). The dominant angle is that they situate DRC's conflict in a complex web of triggers factors including ethnicity, cross-border insurgency, conflict over ownership, exploration and control of vast natural resources, pervasive regional ethnic cleavages, internal political governance challenges, as well as foreign interests. All of these conflate into a web of conflict-precipitating factors.

Venugopalan (2016) for example, argued that the events leading to the crises in postcolonial DRC began with the assassination of the first prime minister of the Patrice Lumumba in 1961, as his administration moved to forge among the vast tribes and ethnic groups a new sense national identity and to make a break from subsisting ethnic-based allegiances. Patrice Lumumba has sought to engender a new sense of national citizenship through his leadership. His advantage in that venture was based on the fact that his party, the Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National Congolais) was the only political party which had broad national spread and having national and regional structures at the time of Congolese independence in 1960. This national agenda would be short-lived with his arrest and assassination in 1961. A 2001 parliamentary commission in Belgium which enquired into Lumumba's killing, would later admit to the complicity of certain foreign collaborators, including officials of the Belgian government as being morally responsible for the circumstances leading to Lumumba's assassination, plunging the nascent nation into crisis (*Hébert, 2016*).

The ouster of President Joseph Kasavubu in November 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko who came to power after a coup d'état and would stay in power for 30 years, also pursued a radical programme of African nationalism which saw him changing Congo's name to Zaire in an attempt to rid it of colonial legacies. This programme led to his Zairianisation policy under which he embarked on a nationalization and local redistribution of foreign-owned businesses assets in 1967. This would be followed in 1974 with his radicalization programme in an attempt to address the country's economic problems such as absent social justice, unemployment and high inflation. This period also saw the total nationalization of all Belgian companies and the creation of the state-owned commerce organ *Société Zaïroise pour la Commercialisation des Minerais* (SOZACOM) as tool for centralizing the exploitation and trade in natural resources by the government purportedly "to market the country's mineral resources"(Johnson & Kayser, 2005: 145; Venugopalan, 2016: 2). However, this supposedly altruistic initiative would prove a total failure due to government patronage and corruption, resulting in the destruction of the economy through loss of local and foreign private sector confidence, lending and the will to invest in the economy.

As a way to cushion the adverse of the policy, the Mobutu administration resorted to external borrowing directed mainly at western allies, thereby accumulating huge debts, much of which ended up in illegitimate government dealings and corrupt diversion of funds by government officials and supporters of the administration. The result of this was a rapid wave of capital flight and economic crisis which Mobutu sought to arrest unsuccessfully, by settling the country's debts, securing waivers on bilateral loans obtained from western allies including the United States, France and Belgium, with conditions that he adopts and implements the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustments Programme (SAP), sponsored by the World Bank (WB), all with very minimal effects on the economy due to pervasive corruption under the administration. Against the backdrop of these mismanagements, Usanov et al (2013) opined that:

Overall, Mobutu's thirty-two-year long rule was characterized by a single-party political system, a culture of corruption and economic mismanagement. As a result *le mal Zaïrois* (the Zairian Sickness) became synonymous with the country. The country essentially became a failed state (p. 35).

The economic downturn which followed would have cataclysmic effects on all facets of Congolese national life, including the military which went without pay between 1991 and 1993, causing unpaid army soldiers to pillage Kinshasa the country's capital city marking yet the start of another crisis (Stearns, 2011). With the military overthrow which brought an end to Mobutu's rule came the start of what became known as the First Congo War (Usanov et al 2013). By the month of May, in 1990, pressures upon the administration to bring about a transition to democratic government had peaked with students' protest against the Mobutu government which had reneged on the promise of democratic reforms and transition. In response to this student uprising, soldiers under Mobutu's command responded with violence killing nearly 300 students. Mobutu's insistence on holding on to power and his rejection of the call for democratic reforms following

these events, led to his abandonment by his western allies, and his eventual ouster in 1994 (Namikas, 2003).

As Venugopalan (2016) noted, the fall of Mobutu's government in 1994 was propelled by the country's domestic economic crisis and also fuelled by an external factor—the genocide which was taking place in Rwanda at the time. In 1994, about 800,000 members of the Tutsi ethnic groups and some Moderate Hutus lost their lives in attacks by extremist Hutus and the Hutu army of Rwanda's president, Juvenal Habyarimana. At the end of Habyarimana's government following the take-over of power from the Hutus by the Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Hutus began to flee from Rwanda into the DRC, aided by the porous eastern borders of the country (Froitzheim, Soderbaum and Taylor. 2011).

Although the cross-migration of ethnic groups across the region dates back to times long before colonial rule, and had continued after it, the genocide-triggered migration of the Hutus post 1994 marked a major demographic shock that would redefine inter-ethnic relation among the people. Therefugees, along with hundreds of the militiamen who carried out the 1994 genocide in Rwanda began to setup camps in the border areas. Others, numbering about a million of them, moved into the Kivu regions where they used these camps to organize and launch new attacks against the Rwandan government from within the DRC. This migration would change the ethnic mix and balance within affected regions of the country as the Congolese Tutsi of the hosting regions of Kivu became a minority in the midst of hostile visitors. The predominance of the Hutu ethnic group in some areas resulted into the killing of Congolese members of the Tutsi ethnic group with tacit support from Mobutu, the Zairean military and some Kivu political figures. To further heighten tension, Congolese Tutsi villagers were sidelined in the distribution of foreign aids aimed at helping deal with the humanitarian crisis which arose from the influx and the economy. This effectively internalized the historical ethnic war in Rwanda into the northern and southern Kivu regions of the DRC (Karbo & Mutisi, 2012).

Both Hutu and Tutsis have been involved in the historical migration of people across the region, particularly into the DRC. For example, the Tutsi subgroup of Banyamulange, were one of the migrant groups predominant in the area of South Kivu. Also, the *transplantes who are* mostly Hutus, had settled as migrants in Kivu since the era of colonial coffee plantation when they were used as migrant labour in the European tea and coffee farms. Other groups in the region were consists of the refugees of Tutsi origin who made up the third major group. These were people who had left Rwanda since the Hutu revolt of the early 1960s. For reasons of these divergences and despite the long years of interethnic relations, the emergence of new migrants following the Rwanda genocide awakened renewed sense of ethnic and group solidarity which inflamed old sentiments and acrimony. The Banyarwanda, for example, were categorized as foreign people and therefore barred from asserting or claiming citizenship rights, and this denial was officially sealed with the 1981 Nationality Act (Mathys, 2017).

The question of contested citizenship would further amplify the divides and reinforce the alignment of opposition and violence after a massive influx of Hutu refugees and the terror formation—the *interahamwe moved into the* Democratic Republic of Congo following the Rwandan genocide, streamlining the reference point of division into a Hutu-Tutsi conflict. As such, regardless of any other subsisting notion of identity, mobilization and the formation of tactical group alliances grew in North Kivu where Hutu natives united in aims with the violent *interahamwe* and other groups including *the* the ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR), while similar alliances were also formed along Tutsi solidarity lines including with RPA and Hunde groups (Kabamba, 2010). These factors converging with the historically troubled inter-tribal relations and cross national ethno-political solidarity and alliances combined in expanding the scope of the DRC conflict and the number of parties that were actively involved in the conflict. It was the series of attacks launched by cross-border militia groups, including Congolese rebel group Interahamwe extremists, that resulted in the

invasion of then Zaire, by forces sponsored by Rwanda and Uganda and led by Laurent-Desire Kabila (de Vries, 2015).

Following long years of instability in the country, hopes of a return to peace came in the early 1990s when Tshisekedi Wa Mulumba Etienne, the leader of the Union des Démocrates pour le Progress Social (UDPS) was chosen by the Sovereign National Council (SNC), as Premier Minister of the country which was then known as Zaire at the time. During this time, Mobutu allies led by Kiyungu Wa Kumwanza Gabriel with Mobutu's support, mobilized Katanga natives across the province, against members of Tshisekedi's ethnic group—the Lubas—within Katanga province, in order to weaken Tshisekedi's influence politically. Mobutu thereafter promoted Kyungu Gabriel making him governor of the Katanga province (Samuel, 2017). Such manipulation of ethnicity for political gains was even more deadly in the province of North Kivu than it was in Katanga. As Samuel (2017) notes further, unlike what obtained in Katanga, the case of North Kivu was not centered on native against non-native violence, but between natives against themselves, centering on the granting or withdrawal of citizenship rights to Congolese Hutus and Congolese Tutsis in the province (Ngondavi, 2002).

Between 1998 and 2003, the DRC was in the grip of another crisis that is now called the Second Congo War. This war had Rwandan and Ugandan fighters on one side, pitched against forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo alongside a plethora of other African states on the opposing side, in a war that has been described as having “a clear regional dimension” and an overriding dynamics that was beginning to change with an increasingly obvious economic dimension (Johnson & Kayser, 2005: 158; de Vries, 2015: 2). This is for the fact that the natural resource contest angle had begun to manifest. All parties to the conflict were actively involved in the exploitation and export of Congo's valuable mineral resources and other goods that were available in the territories that they controlled. The presence of armed forces had also spurred local people to mobilize themselves and, as security measures, to organize armed vigilante

groups known as the Mayi-Mayi, for their local protection (de Vries, 2015). A timeline of events is appropriate to summarize the trajectory of conflict and instability in the DRC.

Table 4.1: The Democratic Republic of Congo: A Chronology of Events.

1994	Mobutu agrees to appoint Kengo Wa Dondo as prime minister. Wa Dondo is an advocate of the free-market reforms backed by western and European nations.
1996-97	Much of the eastern part of Zaire is captured by Tutsi rebels while President Mobutu is away on medical treatment abroad.
May 1997	Aided by Rwanda, Tutsi rebels along with other anti-Mobutu rebel groups successfully captures Kinshasa the capital of Zaire, The country is renamed as the Democratic Republic of Congo and rebel leader Laurent-Desire Kabila is installed as president.
August 1998	Rwanda and Uganda backed rebels moves against Kabila, advancing to take over Kinshasa. Troops from Zimbabwe and Namibia are send to repel them, with Angolan also sending troops in support of Mr Kabila. Much of eastern DRC is taken over by the rebels.
July 1999	A ceasefire agreement is signed in Lusaka the capital city of Zambia, by the six African countries that are involved in the Congo war. The Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), the rebels backed by Uganda, and the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), another rebels group supported by Rwanda also sign the agreement by the following month.
2000	The UN Security Council authorises the deployment of a 5,500-strong force to oversee and monitor ceasefire in the DRC, even as fighting continues in the country between rebel groups and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces on

	another side.
January 2001	A bodyguard kills President Laurent Kabila. He is succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila.
February 2001	Joseph Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame meets in Washington DC, and Rwandan, Ugandan troops and their rebels groups agree to pull out of the DRC following a UN plan. Same month, Uganda, Rwanda begins the pullback of its troops from the frontline.
May 2001	Statistics from a US refugee agency puts direct or indirect death toll from the war between august 1998, at 2.5 million people. A UN panel alleges that warring parties were deliberately prolonging conflict in order to continue plundering DRC's gold, timber, diamonds and other valuable resources like the coltan which is used in the manufacture of mobile phones.
July 2002	A peace deal is signed by the Presidents of DRC and that of Rwanda, for Rwanda to withdraw its troops from eastern DRC and for Congo to disarm and arrest perpetrator of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (that is Hutu gunmen from Rwanda hiding in DRC).
Sept 2002	A peace accord is signed between the Presidents of DRC and that of Uganda committing Ugandan to withdraw its troops DRC.
December 2002	Kinshasa government and the major rebel groups sign Peace deal in South Africa with government committing to give rebels and opposition members portfolios in a planned interim government.
June 2003	French soldiers leading a rapid reaction force mandated by the UN arrive in Bunia.
June 2003	A transitional government is named by President Kabila to lead the country until elections scheduled to hold in two years time. He swears in leaders of main opposition and former rebel groups as vice-presidents in the following month—July.

Feb. 2006	A new constitution is enacted and a new national flag is also adopted.
March 2006	Thomas Lubanga of the DRC, a warlord and also the founder of the Congolese Patriots rebel group, becomes first person ever convicted for war crimes face charges at the International Criminal Court in The Hague where he is charged for forcefully recruiting children into war combat.
May 2006	Efforts by the army and troops from the United Nations at disarming irregular forces ahead of the elections result in thousands being displaced in DRC's north-east.
July 2006	DRC holds its first free presidential and parliamentary elections in over four decades.
November 2006	In the October run-off election presidential election, Joseph Kabila is declared winner. The election had general approval from international monitors.
April 2007	The regional Great Lakes Countries Economic Community (CEPGL) is re-launched by governments of the DR Congo, Burundi and Rwanda.
October 2008	A major army base at Rumangabo is captured by rebel forces. The DRC government accuses Rwanda of giving backing to Laurent Nkunda, Tutsi rebel leader. Rwanda denies claim.
November 2008	Increased troop deployment is temporarily approved by the UN Security Council as a measure to bolster UN peacekeeping effort that is already strained in eastern DRC.
July – November 2010	The World Bank and IMF approve an \$8 billion debt relief deal for the DRC. Half of DRC's debt is scrapped by Paris Club of creditor countries in November.
November 2011	DRC holds presidential and parliamentary polls where Mr Kabila wins a second term in office amidst wide criticism and voting result disputations by the opposition.

February 2013	11 African countries meet in Ethiopia and sign accord to help end conflict in the DRC. The rebel group M23, declared a ceasefire prior to peace talks and Bosco Ntaganda, its leader surrenders in the following month.
July 2013	The UN deploys 3,000 troops of its Intervention Brigade to disarm rebels groups in the eastern part of the DRC.
January 2015	Proposed electoral law changes spark protest which sees dozens killed. Opposition alleges changes were strategies by government to allow President Kabila remain in power.
November 2016	Kabila ruling coalition signs a political deal with the opposition to delay presidential polls till 2018. Augustin Matata Ponyo, the prime minister resigns with his cabinet resign, making the way for the composition of a new cabinet which includes figures from the opposition.
December 2017	In the middle of conflict, over 1.7 million people are estimated to have fled their home during the year, as the DRC faced a major humanitarian crisis due to conflict and displacement, according to international aid agencies.
March 2018	Felix Tshisekedi is chosen by the main opposition, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress as its candidate for the presidential poll scheduled for December.
August 2018	Former interior minister, Ramazani Shadary is chosen by the governing People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy as its presidential candidate.
January 2019	Election officials returns opposition candidate, Felix Tshisekedi as the winner in the December presidential poll, spurring protests from Martin Fayulu, the rival opposition candidate.

Source: adapted from BBC Africa News,(2019).

4.4 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) was the first UN operation to the DRC (ONUC). On July 14, 1960, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 143 (1960), which constituted the mission. It was the first time a peacekeeping mission would be deployed with military capacity. It is notable that ONUC remains till date, among the largest operations ever deployed by the UN, both in respect to operational scope and scale. The UN operation during the 60s was described as the “by far the most important instance of peacekeeping during the Cold War” (Gibbs, 2000: 359).

As Gibbs (2000: 362) puts it, the necessity of the ONUC mission from 1960 to 1964, arose from “one of history's least successful cases of de-colonization, which followed the independence of the Congo from Belgium in June 1960”. The condition upon which the Belgium conceded to Congolese independence was faulty from its start, leaving a nascent state characterized by tension and division among its regions and ethnic groups, with over 200 distinct language groups, and a sense of national identity that as far weaker than most other countries which attained independence on the continent about the same time. In addition to the pervasive tension at its independence, there was a dire shortage of educated Congolese who were meaningfully experienced in political administration. Bokamba (1986) noted that “there were no more than thirty Congolese with university degrees” at the time (p. 193).

ONUC was established in response to the first major post-independence crisis which began just four days after the country gained independence on the 30th of June 1960, when an uprising broke out within the army (Boulden, 2017). The United Nations through this resolution, authorized the UN Secretary-General to adopt the necessary measures, in consultation with the DRC government, to provide it with such military support that may be necessary until, through the government's efforts alongside the United Nations technical assistance, it is able to ascertain that its national security forces are able to meet their tasks fully.

In the aftermath of the independence of the Congo, the Belgian commanding officer of the army, Lieutenant General Emile Janssens had refused to commence the process of Africanizing the army's officers' corps. This resulted in disorder and mutinies just four days after the Congo gained its independence. On the 5th of July 1960, troops from Congolese Force Publique in Thysville had carried out a mutiny against Belgian military officers who were the top echelon of the Congolese military. News of the mutiny and the violence with accompanied it, spread quickly across the country, resulting in panic and an exodus of Belgian administrators and technicians from the country. This resulted in a sudden collapse of essential public services (Klinger, 2005).

In a bid to stop the mutiny from gaining entry into the capital city—Leopoldville, Belgian troops were ordered by the ambassador to intervene and its treaty to withdraw all military presence in the country was rescinded with the announcement that it was to reinforce with additional Belgian troops. While the President, Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Patrice Lumumba—the Prime Minister were trying to negotiate a peace arrangement with the mutineers, the Belgian government swiftly deployed troops into the country in the pretext of restoring order and moving to protect over 100 thousand Belgians who remained in the country (Power, 2001).

However, within days of its intervention, with the agreement of Moïse Kapeng Tshombé, the Belgians sent their troops into Katanga taking over the region and establishing secession as a way to secure Belgian mining interests. Tshombe had, with support from the Belgian forces who helped write all his statements, declared Katanga's secession as an independent state on television on 11th July, with himself serving as its Président. The July 12 appeal by the Congolese government was to ensure the withdrawal of the Belgian forces which were perceived to be taking sides with Tshombe from the Katanga region who had aligned with the Belgian government during the crisis. Critics of the Belgian government's role in the crisis world-wide condemned the situation and the use of Mr. Tshombe of the Belgian government and its mining interest, as a puppet to orchestrate disorder in the country (Power, 2001: Mathys, 2017).

Katanga was known for its richness in natural resources and minerals. It contributed more than 60% of the total natural resources output in the DRC and was the major source of the world's diamonds, copper, cobalt and uranium which was a principal resource used in the production of nuclear bombs which was dropped by the United States, on Hiroshima during Second World War (Williams, 2015). Consequently, the interference from Belgium was seen as an act of aggression, a neo-colonial attempt to gain control of the Congo's most vital resources. Both president Kasa-Vubu and the Prime Minister blamed the mutiny on the Belgian government accusing its officers of masterminding the mutiny, accusing it of an attempt to annex the country (Macqueen, 2017).

Indeed, the intervention of Belgian troops to the Congo was in contravention of international law because there was no request for such intervention from the Congolese officials. It was on this basis that the President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Lumumba sought for help from the UN on the 12 of July, prompting the then Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld to convene meeting of the Security Council on the 13th of July urging the council to act "with utmost speed" on the intervention request. Security Council resolution 143 (1960) was adopted, through which the United Nations called for the withdrawal of Belgian Troops from the Congolese territory. The ONUC mission received approval with a vote of 8 in support including the United States of America, and no country voting against it, during the passage at the Security Council. There were three abstaining countries which included France, the Republic of China and the United Kingdom (Morrison, 1997).

Through resolution 141, the Secretary-General was authorized to ensure a return to law and order by facilitating the withdrawal of Belgian troops and helping to firm establish and legitimization of the new postcolonial government, in collaboration with the Congolese government (Lord 1994). The missions mandate was further extended to ensuring the maintenance of the integrity of the Congo's territorial sovereignty by seeing to the eviction of foreign mercenaries who were in support of the secession of the Katanga region of the country. This was reinforced by UN Security Council resolution 161 (1961), which "urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and

evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under UN Command, as well as mercenaries" (UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 161, 1961).

United Nations' troops, made up mostly of military personnel from Africa and Asia arrived at the Congo on the 15th of July 1960, with its initial mandate gradually expanding in response to the worsening scale of violence which saw an insurrection in Katanga, the collapse of the government at the centre, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and presence of mercenaries from foreign countries. Its mandate thus widened to include the protection of the country's territorial integrity, taking measures to prevent the breakout of a civil war, ensuring the removal unauthorized armed forces, and securing the country's independence (Prados, 2006).

A total of about 20,000 officers and men were deployed from about twenty-four countries, under the leadership of Indian, Irish, and Swedish officials. At the peak of hostilities from September 1961 to December 1962, there was a transition in the mandate of the ONUC mission from peacekeeping to a more decisive military enforcement with capacity to carry out military offensive against mercenaries and secessionists in the DRC. It was however phased out gradually as relative normalcy returned by February 1963 with the reintegration of Katanga, transforming into a civilian assistance operation. The mission came to a complete end with its withdrawal on the 30th of June, 1964 (Aksu, 2003).

Archival records from British, United States, and UN primary sources would later show that the ONUC Peacekeeping in the Congo was used, in collaboration with policy makers in the US, to intervene considerable in Congo's internal politics, making it to an extent a tool for the advancement of the US' strategic interests in the country and diminishing its impartiality rating (Gibbs, 2000). Some of the notable alleged failing of the mission were in respect of its handling of situations surrounding the death of Patrice Lumumba whom, many argue could have been better protected by the UN mission. Another criticism concerned the UN's management of the crisis over the secession of Katanga.

Issues regarding the complicity of the UN gave birth to demonstrations by African-Americans in New York and in Belgium. In New York for example, there were protests following the death of Lumumba, during which protesters rampaged into the United Nations building, causing chaos in the General Assembly. A similar incident involving attacks on the UN was reported in the UN's office in Brussels, Belgium (Hebert, 2016). USSR's Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, had, as leader of the country (chairman of the country's Council of Ministers), also criticized the involvement of the United Nations in his address at the UN General Assembly on the 23rd December 1960, highlighting the political bend of the controversial operation in the Congo, blaming this as the cause of Lumumba's death in favor of Lumumba's opponents and calling for a reform of the UN (Macqueen, 2017).

Among its many novelties, the ONUC mission had the legacy of being the first peacekeeping mission of the UN to adopt force as a strategy for implementing the decisions of the UN Security Council, the first to successfully enforce an arms embargo and a no-fly-zone, and till date, the most robust operation of the UN in respect of its scope, means of force and scale of operation (Aksu, 2003). It was on record to have succeeded within the first three years of its operation, in improving Congo's internal security and restoring its unity that was threatened by the secession of Katanga (Lefever & Wynfred, 1966). Despite its initial acceptance, the ONUC mission would in subsequent years, become to most Congolese, an unwelcome interference of foreign powers in their internal affairs (House, 1978). The mission had Force commanders from African and European countries. See table 4.1.

Table 4.2: Commanders of ONUC 1960-1964.

SN	Name	Country of Origin	Period in command
1	Major-General Carl von Horn (transferred from UNTSO)	Sweden	July 1960 – December 1960
2	Lieutenant-General Sean MacEoin	Ireland	January 1961 – March 1962

3	Lieutenant-General Guebre	Kebbebe	Ethiopia	April 1962 – July 1963
4	Major-General Kaldager	Christian	Roy Norway	August 1963 – December 1963
5	Major-General Ironsi	Johnson	Aguiyi- Nigeria	January 1964 – June 1964

Source: Authors Compilation

4.5 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monuc) was established by the United Nations Security Council through its Resolution 1279 passed on the 30th of November 1999, with a mandate to take the people of the Congo, by stages, from a state of civil war, to civilian rule through the organization and conduct democratic elections. It was a response to the chaotic civil conflict which had taken over the country following a complex weave of national and regional conflicts (Barerra, 2015; Lemarchand, 2009).

By the end of the Cold War, there was widespread instability in the Great Lakes region: economic crisis in the Zaire (DRC) with a downturn in GDP since independence, losing about 65%. Similar situations obtained in Ugandawhere the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) led by Yoweri Museveni had seized power by 1986. In Rwanda, there was the mobilization of arms and the launch of attacks against Rwanda's Hutu-led government by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group made up of Tutsi refugees which had set its based in the southern part of Uganda. Rwanda had been under a Hutu-led government since its independence on the 1st of July 1962 (Barrera, 2015).

The Rwandan civil war, and particularly, the genocide which occurred between the 7th April and the 1994, had monumental social and political ripple effects in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese Hutus into the Kivu region in the Eastern part of the DRC following the establishment of Rwanda's new

government led to widespread tension in the Congo. Some of the Hutu migrants had actively participated in the killing of Tutsis during the genocide. It was estimated that about 1.2 million Hutus moved to the Kivu region following civil war in the neighboring country (Lemarchand, 2009).

In 1996, a rebellion had begun in the Kivu region in which forces loyal to Laurent Désiré Kabila were pitched against the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Aided by Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila's forces took Kinshasa, the capital city in 1997, thereafter renaming the country as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). By 1998, another rebellion arose against Kabila's government in the Kivu regions, with rebels taking over large portion of the country within weeks. This resulted from a combination of diverse factors, including ethnic tension arising from the influx the Interahamwe *génocidaires* in the eastern part of the country, fragility occasioned by ethnic conflicts among dozens of communities, in an economy that was already troubled, all combined with a regional alliance against the Kabila government from Rwandan and Ugandan forces, leading to widespread instability and conflict. The immediate trigger of the violence as the policy of the Kabila led government against his former Rwandese and other regional allies. Kabila who, as rebel leader, had benefitted from the support of Rwandese allies, who on their part, sought to dismantle the military base of the Interahamwe in DRC through the alliance, had breached that alliance after assuming power. He had turned against the Rwandese allies, sacking advisers of Rwandan origin, including Jams Kabarebe, his Chief of Staff. This triggered the invasion of DRC by the Rwanda and Uganda controlled rebel group—the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) (Barrera, 2015; Van Reybrouck 2008).

The regional dimension of the crisis would become further complicated with the intervention of Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe in alliance with Kabila's government, offering military support to his government against Rwandese forces. However, rebel forces, under the aegis of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), maintained their control of the country's eastern region with support from Rwanda and Uganda (Barrera, 2015). The extended effect of the Rwandan crisis on the DRC is captured by Lydia Polgreen; (cited in Lemarchand, 2009: 126) who stated that "the

unfinished battles over the Rwandan genocide play out on Congolese soil among armed groups fueled by lucrative mines like the one in Bisie and by other mines controlled by the Hutu militias that carried out the genocide.”

Following this chaotic scenario, the UN Security Council, then led by Koffi Annan, formed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in July 1999, following the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement between the DRC government and five regional governments. The five regional states in the signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement include Angola, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Uganda. It is important to note that while leaders from all six state parties signed the July 10 Lusaka Peace accord, none of the Congolese rebels, including the main rebel group—Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) refused to sign the agreement (ICG, 1999). The situation of the DRC precedent to the establishment of the MONUC was described by its head former head of mission, Ambassador William Swing who noted that:

[T]wo wars in the DRC from 1997 to 2002 produced the following sad legacy at the time of the first peace agreement, the Lusaka accords of July 1999: a country divided under three different belligerent's administrations; armies of six foreign nations occupying bits and pieces of the DRC; wide-scale plunder of the Congo's abundant natural resources; four million dead from war-related causes; 3.2 million internally displaced persons; 2.4 million HIV infected; 500,000 refugees; infrastructure of the country destroyed (William Swing, cited in Plaut, 2007: 580-581).

MONUC was established through the passage of UNSC Resolution 1234 (1999), through which it unanimously called for a cessation of hostility and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It demanded the re-establishment of government's authority as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of the country. It also called for commitment to a ceasefire agreement and a process to disarm all negative forces, that is, non-governmental armed groups (Barrera,

2015). The resolution establishing the mission also emphasized the need to engage all citizen of the Congo in a political dialogue that would be all-inclusive, as a strategy for achieving national reconciliation; conducting a democratic, free and fair election; and organizing for international border (UNSC, 1999). Furthermore, the resolution committed to instituting a Special Envoy for peace in the country spearheaded by the Secretary-General, sought for full cooperation from all parties to the conflict, including prompt response to the mission's requests for assistance from member states and other organizations. Moustapha Niase of Senegal as appointed the special envoy for the peace process to the DRC on April 5, 1999 (Naidoo, 1999).

The MONUC mission came into effect on the 24th of February 2000 following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1291, with over US\$1 billion budgeted to finance it. With this, the mission remains in the history of UN peacekeeping, as the largest and most expensive operation (Plaut, 2007). Although MONUC was initially deployed to observe the implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, and monitors the disengagement of unauthorized armed forces in the DRC. Its scale and assigned tasks however grew over time, with subsequent resolutions of the UN Security Council (Barrera 2015).

By late 1999 for example, the mission had about 500 observers, with a military protection force made up of 5,037 soldiers saddled with the task of monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. By 2005, roughly six years after, MONUC had assumed broader mandate with a force capacity of 16,000 troops, and under Chapter VII mandate of the UNSC, which authorized it to "use all necessary means" including military force as strategy of enforcement in the peacekeeping operation (McLaughlin, 2007). The expansion of its mandate also ensured its capacity for the DDR process, a comprehensive scheme which sought to disarm unauthorized armed groups, demobilize Congolese armed forces, and ensure the reintegration of ex-combatants (Tunda, 2016). Added to this, MONUC also had the task of protecting the civilian population, the supporting state authority and strengthening its organization.

The mission recorded significant success with the conduct of the first democratic elections in 2006, marking the first in the country's 46 years of existence as an independence state since 1960. The July 30 2006 polls also saw the election of a 500-seat National Assembly (Tull 2009). Although the conduct of the election contended with logistic constraints and post-election legal tussles which culminated in a run-off election to the office of the president on the 29th of October, it however produced a president in the person of Joseph Kabila, son of Laurent Desire Kabila. This marked a significant step in the task of restoring peace and stability in the DRC. MONUC recorded further strides with the disarmament of the last three major armed groups operating in the Ituri region three years after the successful transition to democratic governance in 2006. There was also a drastic decrease in the scale of displacement in the country as IDP figures in the DRC fell from over 3 million as of 2002, to about a million IDPs as of early 2007 (Barrera, 2015).

MONUC faced criticisms on account of its inability to protect civilians and to prevent human rights violation by rebel groups and the FARDC. For example, Levine (2010) refers to MONUC's failure during the KIMIA II mission in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu regions, where it could have leveraged better on its partnership in joint operations with the national army. The members of the national army were, on the contrary, alleged to have exploited MONUC's support to legitimize its abuses and excessive use of force on the civilian population with civilians bearing the brunt of violence despite the official ending of the war, with MONUC falling short of fulfilled its mandate of protection (Mobekk, 2009). The effectiveness of the mission also came under scrutiny. Barrera (2015), for example, questioned whether the mandate of the UN mission in the DRC, as elsewhere, had sufficient scope and capability to resolve the local root causes of most of the conflicts in the country. MONUSCO can only help to reduce violence in one way: by reducing structural violence at the national level by assisting in the return of state power. However, as will be discussed further below, MONUSCO can only assist in this effort because the Congolese government bears main responsibility for reform implementation.

The UN began plans for a transition towards stabilization in 2006, commencing with the introduction of the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS) in late 2006. This followed the relative success of the mission in ensuring that some armed groups disarmed and that peace gradually returned to the country. The implementation of the UNSSSS was however delayed due to the relapse into conflict in the Eastern part of the DRC followed by the re-emergence of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) in the North Kivu crisis. The CNDP had launched an offensive on government's military positions in the province of North-Kivu in late October 2008, leading to the collapse of government and the displacement of state forces in the province in a matter of days (Jason, 2012). The group had also captured a major town—Rutshuru, and advanced towards the provincial capital, Goma which was one of the most strategic cities, and also held the largest population in the DRC (Ogbuka, 2015; Paddon and Lacaille 2011).

Indeed, despite the initial optimism in MONUC, Congolese armed groups numbering in their dozens continued to operate, causing instability and displacement in the northern and southern parts of the Kivu region. It is on this account that Andrew (2008) notes that despite the support to the Congolese national army—the FARDC, the CNDP was able to force a peace deal from the government's forces after it surrounded the capital city of Goma in 2008. The peace agreement became formalized on the 23rd of March, 2009. These developments constituted major impediments to the planned move by the UN mission towards stabilization. MONUC remained active on the ground, engaging in military civilian support activities including resolving cases of outstanding conflicts in parts of the country, after the election, and enhancing capacity-building as part of the UNSC's mandate. By the end of 2009, it had dawned on the UNSC that a transition from mainstream peacekeeping to stabilization must occur and the driving vehicle for the next phase of operations must be equipped with a new mandate hence the renaming of the MONUC in 2010.

4.6 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo known in French as '*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*' emerged as a successor mission to MONUC, following the renaming of the earlier mission on the 1st of July 2010, through the United Nations Security Council resolution 1925 of 1999, and resolution 1291 of years 2000. MONUSCO was a product of reforms towards a successful transition from MONUC's declining emphasis on peacekeeping, to one which focused more on stabilization as the UN missions new priorities as the UN looked forward to a possible disengagement from the Congo (Neethling, 2011).

According to Novosseloff et al. (2019) MONUSCO was conceived to serve as a monitoring mission over the peace process which had been set in motion by MONUC. It was empowered to use all necessary means in carrying out its objectives which included among other things, civilian protection, protection of human rights defenders and humanitarian personnel who may come under imminent threats of violence, and also, to support efforts by the DRC's government towards stabilization and consolidation of peace in the country. It became mostly engaged with conflicts in Ituri, Kivu, and Dongo (Jobbings, 2010). The mission's initial capacity commitments comprised, in addition to civilian personnel, members of judicial bodies and correctional components, a maximum military capacity of 19,815 personnel, military observers numbering 760, 391 personnel from the police force, and 1,050 members of other police units (UN, n.d).

Aside from its original operations which revolved around the protection of civilians and the restoration of the government's authority to the Congolese state, the mission has undergone series of expansion in terms of mandate and powers over the years. For example, in February 2013, through the adoption of resolution 2098, the UN Security Council expanded MONUSCO's mandate with the activation of Chapter VII. The import of the resolution was that it authorized the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which was further empowered to neutralize all armed groups 'negative forces' that

threatened the peace, with or without the support of the national army (Aljazeera, 2013). To achieve this objective, an additional troop deployment of 3069 personnel were provided by South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania to augment existing personnel capacity enabling the mission to engage in operations alongside the national army that is as a result of this collaboration, adjudged to be significantly more cohesive in its activities (Vogel, 2014). The mission has been strategic to the success recorded against the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), the rebel army which had emerged as the main opponent of the national government in the volatile Kivu provinces from April 2012 to October 2013 (Barrera, 2015).

The introduction of the FIB and other strategic interventions which followed brought high hopes of stabilization in the country. One of these strategic initiatives was the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS), and its later model, the ISSSS. The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) was conceived as a support structure for the implementation of the National Stabilization and Reconstruction Program (STAREC). Its aim was to assist in ensuring that tangible dividends of peace reached the wider public, and to support broader political engagement in the stabilization process. MONUSCO stabilization support unit, in collaboration with the ISSSS Technical Secretariat, played crucial roles in the implementation of international efforts on stabilization in the country. The ISSSS adopted a target-based approach, focusing on thirteen priority zones across 5 provinces in the country's eastern region that were jointly identified alongside stakeholders in STAREC and ISSSS. These provinces include Ituri, Bas-Uele, South Kivu, North Kivu, and Haut-Uele (UN-MONUSCO, 2021).

While MONUSCO has recorded some notable achievements in the DRC, its capacity to deliver sustainable end to the conflict has been in doubt. This is attributed to the complex peculiarities of the conflict. For example, Barrera identifies two levels of causal factors—the primary and the secondary, as causes of conflict in the DRC. To the author, much of the UN engagements, including those driven by the MONUSCO mission, have focused on the secondary issue in the conflict, such as the international dimension, the involvement of foreign armed groups in the DRC, the role of 'blood

minerals', much to the exclusion of the primary causes. The primary causes to the author, are social in nature, and their underlying causes reach far into the historical past of the country's evolution, predating the Congo Wars. These include issues emanating from land struggles, societal fragmentation, cyclical history of violence, and an elite class that is socially opposed to state authority. All of these present complex contextual intricacies to the Congo conflicts that require much more socio-structural initiatives that are outside of the scope of the UN mission's mandate, resources, and stabilization strategy in the country (Barrera, 2015).

The MONUSCO mission has recorded to its credit a number of achievements in the DRC. Its role in successfully reunifying the country has been widely acknowledged. Although there is no agreement among the Congolese population regarding the assessment of performance, with wavering verdicts on issues of legitimacy, credibility, impartiality of the MONUC/MONUSCO mandate over time and diverging across the country, it had enjoyed significant positive appraisal and goodwill on notable national initiatives like the introduction of Radio Okapi in 2001 through which the mission has sensitized the DRC public on its activities and programs (Novosseloff et al, 2019). As part of the overall institution-building agenda, the presence of MONUSCO has also been of strategic importance to building confidence among other actors including local and international organizations working to help stimulate the Congolese economy through the development of critical infrastructure in areas such as telecommunication, airports, and access roads, among others. Its activities have also helped improve the civil space, including enhanced space for democratic politics (Novosseloff et al, 2019).

It is important to note that the MONUSCO engagement in the DRC has suffered legitimacy issues which results from its inability to manage public expectations, prioritizing its key engagements, and enjoy wider buy-in from both sides to the conflict so as to win wider credibility as an impartial organization. The position of the UN mission itself presents a paradox. For example, while opposition figures perceived the mission as partial and pro-government—a factor explaining its lack of acceptance as a neutral among these elements—there is the reality of the mission having to contend with suspicion on either side. Since 2011, there have been calls by officials of the

government for the withdrawal of UN mission from the country. In May of that years for example, the minister for international cooperation declared the government's desire for an "orderly, progressive withdrawal" on the grounds that there was significant normalization of relations between the DRC and its neighboring countries, as well as success in containing rebel forces to a "few isolated zones" (PeaceWomen, 2011: n.p; Nsia-Pepira, 2014: 104).

4.7 Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Peace-building

The elusiveness of peace and the seemingly endless quest has led to modifications in the strategic approaches to the UN peace mission in the DRC, informing what is seen as shifting frameworks of engagement in policy and academic circles (De Coning & Peter, 2019; Karlsrud, 2015; Malone & Wermester, 2000). The implementation of diverse approaches to peace ostensibly, in response to changes security and political environments not only tends to obfuscate the distinctions between the forms of engagement, it also confounds the expectations and in respect to goals, methods and outcomes that should be anticipated from such engagements. More importantly, it has blurred the lines between the various mandate statements which guide the UN mission in the country (Karlsrud, 2015; Tull, 2018). This prompted some actors and analysts to suggest that structures like the Force Intervention Brigade be separated from the MONUSCO as an independent structure in order to ensure clarity in the tasks being confronted and the methods that are distinctly fit for each task, be it peacekeeping, peace-building or peace enforcement (Cammaert, 2007). This appears to have been needed given the UN's engagements in conceptual ambiguity.

While officials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo refer to MONUC operations as stabilisation missions, it is unclear when one phase ends and another begins. The word has evolved to mean military measures to bring a situation (or perhaps a country) under control. The UN has given 'stabilisation' some structure and meaning during the last decade; the UN Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping (Capstone doctrine) defines stabilisation as the time during which a UN peacekeeping operation is deployed (DPO-DFS, 2008). What's fascinating is that, in many respects, stabilisation is the polar

opposite of what UN peacekeeping missions are supposed to achieve, at least in its more militaristic (and NATO-influenced) forms. Stabilization refers to the use of military forces to stabilise a country, generally using all available means to neutralise possible 'conflict spoilers.' However, as the Brahimi Report points out, one of the main principles of peacekeeping missions is that they should only be deployed when there is a peace to uphold (Peter, 2015).

There are several cases of UN peacekeeping operations being sent where there is no sign of peace - Chad, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are all noteworthy examples. However, these missions were not granted peace-enforcement mandates (with the exception of MONUSCO's new mandate), which defined the enemy and required the mission to 'neutralise' it; instead, they were given a broad mandate that allowed them to defend civilians by whatever means necessary (Karlsrud, 2015).

It should be emphasised, however, that there is no correlation between the degree to which a UN peacekeeping operation can use force and whether or not it is designated as a "stabilisation" mission. The UN mission in South Sudan, for example, has a Chapter VII mandate that allows it to "take all necessary means...to carry out its protection mandate," and many other UN peacekeeping missions have Chapter VII mandates that allow them to be 'robust.' (Peter, 2015).

Following the UN's failures to protect civilians in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia in the 1990s, doctrinal revisions evolved that allowed the UN to be "robust" and use force to defend people when necessary. However, there is a significant difference between using force to protect civilians for a short period of time and giving the UN peacekeeping mandates – including a general authorization to use all necessary means and authorising the UN to intervene brigade or not – the UN must be willing and able to carry out its entire mandate. 'This is one Mission with one mission, one Special Representative, and one Force Commander,' was seen as a the recipe for success capable of enabling MONUSCO in accomplishing all of its responsibilities in an integrated way, whether or not those conducting them are in uniform (Wistuba & Cusumano, 2017).

Others, on the other hand, were of a different mind. Some look critically at Security Council's decisions that potentially engage the United Nations in 'peace-enforcement' activities," . Pointing out that such a move might jeopardise the neutrality and impartiality that are so important in UN peacekeeping (Karlsrud, 2015). From this point of view, it is believed that the Organization should always be considered as a 'honest broker,' and while the rationale behind deployments are evident, it was more desirable to have brigades as a stand-alone entity with distinct responsibilities from MONUSCO's other brigades' (Müller, 2015).

There has also been concerns about whether the transition from MONUC to MONUSCO constituted a fresh start or a continuation of the old order in UN participation in the DRC. The Security Council begins its resolution extending MONUSCO's and its FIB's mandate by stating that it is acting "on an extraordinary basis and without setting a precedent or prejudice to the recognised principles of peacekeeping." This is particularly intriguing because, since the first mission, the SC has been steadily refining the notion of peacekeeping. This raised the question of whether the Supreme Court considered itself bound by its precedents if nothing else is clearly stated (Karlsrud, 2015).

Despite its contentious mission, MONUSCO has been successful in carrying it out, not least in the case of M23's surrender. However, this may come at the price of the UN's legitimacy. Given the FIB's success thus far, it has been suggested that aggressive UN operations will become more common in the future. Some have gone even farther, predicting the formation of a new 'UN Special Forces' based on the M23's loss. Following the FIB's relatively successful operations in eastern Congo, which resulted in the defeat of the M23 rebel group, the UN used the situation to issue a warning to other armed organisations, urging them to surrender or face military operations. While some observers regard the Force Intervention Brigade as only one more and unavoidable step in the irreversible trend towards more robust peacekeeping, others see it as a revolution in peacekeeping (Peter, 2015).

4.8 The Force Intervention Brigade under MONUSCO

The authorization of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013, through Resolution 2098 of March 28 that year, marked a significant shift in the modus operandi and temperament of the UN mission to the DRC. It has as such spurred a wave of scholarly attention on the dynamics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as the lessons that such innovations, as signified by the FIB in the MONUSCO mission, portend for peacekeeping missions globally. The idea of the FIB in the DRC first came up at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The ICGLR is an intergovernmental organization formed region in 2008 by African countries of the African Great Lakes (ICGLR, 2010).

The conference under the initiative of Uganda and South Africa, had highlighted and addressed issues surrounding the inability of MONUSCO to bring an end to violent conflict in the Congo's eastern region, noting that continuing instability in the DRC posed a threat security across the region. The solution proposed was the creation of a neutral regional Intervention Brigade to be drawn from countries across the region, with a capacity for offensive use of military force. The proposed brigade was to be saddled with the peace-enforcement tasks consisting of preventing the expansion of, neutralizing and disarming armed groups (Nystrom & Starbuck, 2015).

The idea was adopted by the UN and developed into the MONUSCO mission, following the inability of the regional body to mobilize the personnel and financial resources required to drive the plan (Cammaert, 2017). As Cammaert further noted, although the introduction of the FIB and its authorization to use of force are not entirely a new phenomenon in the history of UN peacekeeping, it was a radical departure from the traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement approaches of the UN, particularly its conventional orientation towards neutrality. It was the first time the UN would grant its peacekeeping operation authority to carry offensives targeted specifically at the use of full military force against threats to state authority and peace.

The FIB also signified a strategic step-back (although not explicitly admitted at the UNSC level) from its combat neutral posture in the theatres of conflict—a principle which scholars have argued as an impediment to peacekeepers use of initiative in dealing effectively with armed rebels and belligerents in the theatres of conflict (Cammaert, 2008; Landsberg, 2002). This is so because, whereas other previous peace-enforcement engagements involving UN peacekeepers had been delegated to mandated forces usually outside of the control of the UN mission, in the case of the Force Intervention Brigade, its operations were put directly under the command of MONUSCO, in the office of the Force Commander (Cammaert 2017).

Confronted by threats to the existential essence of its peacekeeping mandate, and risks associated with the exposure of its personnel as well as the civilian population to armed violence particularly by the M23 among other rebel groups, the idea of the Force Intervention Brigade arose ostensibly from the imperative of self-defense and civilian protection that were mostly dire in the Kivu province of the eastern parts of the DRC (Sheeran & Case, 2014). While the intervention brigade was welcomed for its timely commitments to the imperatives of self-defense and civilian protection taking advantage of the latitude granted in the resolution empowering it, to neutralize rebels groups in executing the mandate, it also drew the ire of critics as indicating a major deviation from the UN's age-long principle of neutrality and minimum use of force as “peacekeepersexecuting this kind of offensive mandates inevitably take an active part in armed conflicts” (Nystrom & Starbuck, 2015: 35).

A number of important questions have arisen from the role of the Force intervention Brigade. It has been noted for example, that the FIB's active participation in the theatre of hostilities indicates that the UN mission has taken a stand in the conflict, for or against certain parties in the divide (Whittle, 2015). This observation is in addition to the fact that the UN's peacekeeping principle emphasizing consent from the host state further proves that its operation is anticipated on working collaboration, in some ways, with a party to the conflict—the state. Considering the historically oscillating trajectory of rebel control of the state over the years, the commitment to work with the incumbent state government (which often is a result of concession with one or more rebel groups) further

calls to question the prospect of peace and nation-building in post-UN DRC. This is likely a challenge that will arise from the quest by various groups to gain control of the state and become legitimized by virtue of such collaborations derived from the UN's commitment to the principle of host state consent as basis for peacekeeping deployment. This is even more compelling as nation-building is seen as a path towards reversing the elusiveness of peace in the country, is expected to draw from an end of hostilities between the various rebel groups on one hand, and between rebel sides of the divide and the UN-backed government on the other hand (Caula, 2019).

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter traced the history of the United Nations peacekeeping in the DRC and examined the socio-contextual factors underlying conflict in the country, as factors which continue to influence the dynamics of UN peace mission to the country. From the foregoing, the fact has been established that the United Nations' peacekeeping mission in the DRC dates back to its independence, and has gone through different phases responding to the changing nature of conflict in the country.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a textbook example of how to manage a long-running war with numerous tragic turns that is putting sub-regional parties and the international community to the test. Any signs of accomplishment are frequently snuffed away, leaving a distinct sense of collective despair. Even when the international community tries to disregard the issue, it continues reappearing with fresh obstacles. Negative occurrences, which are most prevalent in the Eastern DRC, have an impact on both the Great Lakes and the SADC Regions, and ignoring the situation is no longer an option. This conflict is particularly peculiar because, in the absence of a long-term solution, the international community continues to experiment with new concoctions of interventions in the hope of success. The dispute has drawn in a large number of participants, as it always does in such circumstances, and it continues to put the international community's ability to handle crises to the test. Many various actors have been drawn to the core, but they do not appear to be able to affect events on the ground, leaving the Eastern Region, in particular, profoundly

dysfunctional and allowing the battle to stretch on indefinitely. The issue looks to be improving currently.

The formation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) have provided a ray of optimism. But the FIB cannot run in perpetuity, It is clear that government authority is still weak and hardly existent in most places, even as the government at Kinshasa pretends to be in charge of governance. There is no doubt that the FIB has made significant progress since 2013, in terms of regional stabilization, by keeping certain rebels on a leash and others on the run. The issue then becomes how long the FIB can maintain the status quo, considering that rebels in the region have a tendency to retaliate if government troops or peacekeepers start to lose momentum. As a result, the rebels' capacity to recoup will be heavily reliant on the FIB's and the Congolese Forces' (FARDC) ability to preserve the initiative via confinement and, over time, the establishment of institutions that would ensure long-term peace. As the UN mission now appears to be contemplating a winding down process, the structures on the ground must begin to focus on sustainable order and peace.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UN DPKO AND EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The United Nations peacekeeping operation has witnessed many challenges in its over 70 years of existence which have compelled a reassessment of its operational methods and principles. For the Security Council, peacekeeping has been a significant track in a long journey of learning curves in its effort in the management of global peace and security. The theatre of UN peace missions have changed significantly for many reasons: while the demands on the Security Council for UN missions have become more frequent, the theatres of conflict have also become more complex, shifting from the keeping of peace to efforts at achieving it, often in the midst of belligerent state and non-state entities. In addition, unlike its earlier missions, a higher number of peacekeepers deployed by the UN are in locations witnessing large-scale violence, and where there has not been any peace accord, or even in places witnessing a collapse of peace processes (Peter, 2019).

The nature of the Peacekeeping operations have varied across different settings due to peculiar factors of context and circumstances surrounding conflicts in which the UN missions are deployed, some of which provided the impetus for inward reflection and performance evaluation regarding operational frameworks. In 2000 for example, the experience with the implementation of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) when its mandate was threatened by poor planning, poorly equipped and inadequately trained military personnel, lack of effective communication, flawed coordination and control prompted an inquiry into its internal workings (Malone & Thakur, 2001).

In 1995, its experience in Srebrenica which saw the organisation criticized for its role in the events that resulted in the death of thousands of civilians prompted its critical self-evaluation in the UN in 1999, culminating in the publication of the inquiry 'Report of the

Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica [A/54/549]' (see UN, 1999). The role of the UN in averting the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the basis for the International panel set up the then UN Secretary-General, Koffi Annan and headed by former Swedish Prime Minister, Ingmar Carlsson, returning equally critical appraisal of the UN's involvement in the saga which avoidably took the lives of half a million Rwandan people (Lynch, 1999). Events as these have informed the commissioning of high-level international investigations to report on suggestions on ways for improving the UN peacekeeping operation anchored on findings from these critical self-evaluations (UN-DGC, 1999).

At the same time, the nature of security challenges and conflicts are changing, with peacekeeper facing new challenges that continue to motivate for new response approaches to managing them. Because of the realities of active conflicts in Africa, such as those in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), peacekeepers are constantly faced with actual threats, violent extremist insurgents, and cross-border organised criminals operating far beyond the UN's deployment locations. And UN peacekeepers are also being slain at an unprecedented rate: Due to increased involvement of troops in military action engagements, 2017 was the deadliest year for peacekeeping after 1993 (Peter, 2015).

The United Nations initiated a significant assessment of peacekeeping concepts in 2008, resulting in the "Capstone Doctrine" to drive modern operations. The Capstone kept the essential principles of consent, little force, and impartiality but allowed them to be applied as context demands, in complex and multidimensional operations. The Capstone has been critical to peacekeeping, allowing for some of the UN's most innovative initiatives to date. This 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping principles has been repeated in subsequent efforts to evolve peacekeeping, such as the High Level Panel on Peace Operations and Action for Peacekeeping. However, the current mission portfolio is pushing these essential values to their limits. Many of the UN's actions in Darfur, the DRC, and South Sudan are aimed at safeguarding people from state-sponsored violence. While these missions have formal "strategic" approval for their

presence, they have minimal "operational" approval to carry out their tasks. These developments have raised questions on whether the principle's objective is jeopardized by their limited host consent (Hunt, 2019)

In the case of the DRC for example, the United Nations' coordinated military operations with the Congolese army against armed groups have sparked widespread accusations that the UN is siding with one side or the other. Following a significant onslaught by the M-23 armed group in 2012, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was given permission to deploy offensive force against armed groups. In Mali and the Central African Republic, the UN has been asked to use military action to stabilize and extend state authority due to weak or missing governmental capacities in various sections of the country. There has been a persistent appeal for the UN to be more aggressive in its peacekeeping missions, willing to adopt preemptive coercive actions in situations when civilians are at risk. In the light of these demands for a more forceful engagement by peacekeeper, there are the question whether the principle of 'minimal use of force' still applies and if so, what it means for the roles of UN peacekeeping operations in an increasingly demanding environment (Hunt, 2019).

Analyses of events in the Central African Republic (CAR) have also raised questions on whether the United Nations has legitimately become a party to the conflict, particularly bothering on whether it is of any use to keep referring to these operations as 'impartial' if there is no consensus among the major actors and local communities (de Vries, 2015). In line with Hunt's observation, the shift to 'robust' peacekeeping entails a greater emphasis on civilian protection, stability, and state-building, sometimes without clear buy-in from the key conflict parties. This is important because since the start of the civil war in 2011, the UN has shielded 200,000 civilians in South Sudan from violence (Hunt 2019).

According to a UN news release from 2018, the UN Staff Union's Standing Committee for the Security and Independence of the International Civil Service reported that over 71 UN and affiliated workers were murdered in the line of duty in 2017, including 53 peacekeepers and 18 civilians. Two police officers and 15 contractors were also killed.

In the last five years, not less than 310 UN personnel were slain in intentional attacks for the fourth year in a row. The highest casualties figured have been suffered by the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, where it recorded the death of 21 peacekeepers and seven killed among civilians. The announcement also stated that on December 7, 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers were murdered and 43 others were injured in the DRC, in the largest attack on UN soldiers in the Organization's recent history. In the incident, at least five military men from the Democratic Republic of Congo were killed. The number of UN troops murdered in that country was the highest in a single incident since 23 Blue Helmets were slain in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 (UN, 2018).

Civilian fighting casualties have been gradually rising for the previous eight years, as has displacement and brutality against civilians. State security actors are a big threat to civilians in several of these conflicts. In other cases, direct attacks on UN forces have shown how the UN is viewed as a party to the conflict by some belligerents. Peacekeeping teams are increasingly required to function in activities beyond the monitoring of peace accord in these highly hazardous environments. It had been noted that peacekeepers are increasingly under pressure to safeguard people and the peace process since the beginning of the twenty-first century (Zambakari, 2016). When the powers provided to them by the Security Council clearly enable, if not require, them to use appropriate actions against individuals who would disrupt the peace or endanger civilians, peacekeepers have been chastised for remaining inactive in the face of violence (White, 2014).

Given the fact that the United Nations Charter makes no clear mention of peacekeeping, the UN peacekeeping doctrine has developed over time, becoming firmly anchored on the three principles of parties' consent, minimal use of force, and impartiality. In their operational applications however, there have been questions regarding the suitability of these principles in the face of changing times and imperatives, and these questions have informed reviews of the operational frameworks. Towards understanding the nuances of these reviews and their significance for understanding the elusiveness of peace in the DRC, this chapter proceeds with a brief historical background to the United Nations, and the evolution of its peacekeeping

frameworks. It examines the origin and changing philosophical underpinnings of the UN's peacekeeping missions, its logic, goals, and objectives. It discourses issue of human rights, international law, as factors in the design of UN mandates in pursuit of world peace and security and looks into the various policy reviews which have informed and influenced the principles guiding UN peacekeeping particularly at the level of the Department of Peacekeeping operations. Before delving into the crux of peacekeeping principles and reforms, a brief prelude to the United Nations itself is in order.

5.2 From the League of Nations to the United Nations: A Brief History

Culminating from events in Europe since the start of the 20th century, the United Nations was a product of major historical events—World War I which lasted from 1914 to 1918, and World War II, which lasted from 1939 to 1945. Belief in the formation of an international organization as a strategy for promoting long-term peace, and averting a repeat of the atrocities and cruelty of the European wars of 1914-1918, had led to the formation of the League of Nations which preceded the formation of the United Nations. In the case of the United Nations, it was the horrors of the two world wars that spurred efforts by world leaders to create a platform for interrelations of nations on the global landscape in order to foster peace, security, and development. The United Nations became the second multi-purpose international body with a global scope and membership founded in the twentieth century. Following the creation of the UN, the Treaty of Versailles which established the League of Nations in 1919 was dismantled in 1946 (Ayodele, 2017).

Prior to the formation of the UN, the League of Nations had operated from a normative worldview, appealing to the ideal presumably, of the collective quest for peace and security (Steigerwald, 2019; Wilson, 2011). Two important ideals predicated the League of Nations. First, there was the need to engender collective action towards the maintenance of world peace. The league was thus as an organization which could be used to appease parties to a conflict during disagreements. The League's Council took charge of mediating and appeasing parties. In other cases, however, economic penalties followed by military measures may be used. To put it another way, members

are charged with protecting other members from assault. Secondly, there was the ideal to pursue international agenda for peace through the institution of law. The League's treaty stated that one of its goals was to promote international cooperation to achieve international peace and security by accepting obligations not to resort to war, prescribing open, just, and honourable relations between nations, firmly establishing understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and maintaining justice and scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations (Damousi, 2018).

The foundation for peacekeeping as a future area of specialization within the framework of an international organization was laid through the instrumentality of the League of Nations. Although there was a willingness within the newly formed United Nations to dismiss the old League as a failed project and regard the new organisation as something unique, representing a new approach to world peace and security problems, there was some essential continuity of the old League in the new United Nations (Goodrich, 1947). At the inception of the United Nations, the fairly short-lived League of Nations was seen as being of little consequence, or to some, even as some form of a “cul-de-sac, from which the world must take a reverse to allow a fresh and improved organizational form to take shape. Apart from being closely modeled in organisational terms, after the League of Nations, the UN and the League of Nations shares the same organizational ethos, pointing clearly to a thread of continuity in the international security architecture which has ran from the 1920 to the present times (James, 1999).

Although it was in the 1950s and 1960s during the time of Dag Hjalmar Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General, that the term ‘peacekeeping’ came to be used in reference to a specific form of international activity in which an internationally organized team of personnel are used as an impartial, non-combative and non-threatening role towards making disputants create or maintain peace among themselves, or for assisting disputants in producing and implementing a plan for the settlement of their dispute. This notwithstanding, it is important to note that the use of the term does not determine the historical origin of the events or activities known today as peacekeeping as James

promptly points out “the activity in question predates its conceptualization” (James, 1999: 154).

The League of Nations resolution of October 1920, which authorised the creation of an international force to hold a plebiscite in the contested region of Vilna with the goal of resolving the territorial dispute between Poland and Lithuania, is one clear indication of the League's foundational role in what is now known as peacekeeping missions. This was the first time a regional crisis was attempted to be stabilised by sending soldiers from several nations under the auspices of an international organisation. The project was almost ready at the time as the League of Nations' pioneering work in the subject of peacekeeping, albeit it was eventually abandoned for political reasons in March 1921 (Bourneuf, 2016). Although the outbreak of WWII indicate the league's failure to achieve its fundamental purpose of international peacekeeping, its demise did not happen in a vacuum, but resulted from a chain of events, many of which were beyond its control, including opposition to the idea of the League by several of the world's most powerful governments (Adebajo, 2004).

5.3 The Charter of the United Nations

The most important document in the functioning of the United Nations—the UN Charter, was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco. It serves as the framework for all UN operations spelling out the broad objective of the organisation. According to the Charter, the United Nations was founded to "rescue future generations from the scourge of war," and one of its key goals is to keep international peace and security in place (Bodescu, 2005: 43).

One of the most successful projects in UN history has been the deployment and operation of peacekeeping operations (UN). Despite various flaws and shortcomings, the "blue helmets," which were not included in the United Nations Charter at the time, have helped to bring peace and stability to a number of domestic and international military conflicts. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeeping forces in 1988 for their contribution "to reducing tensions where an armistice has been negotiated

but a peace treaty has yet to be established..., the forces have, by their presence, made a decisive contribution towards the initiation of actual peace negotiations" (Saura, 2007: 479). Similar acknowledgement were recorder in September 2005, when the Heads of State and Governments across affirmed the role of the United Nations peacekeeping as a force that has made a decisive contributions to peace through its interventions (Saura, 2007).

Peacekeeping has evolved into one of the most significant tools used by the UN to achieve this purpose, despite the fact that it is not specifically specified in the Charter (Kaya, 2015). It established the principle that the United Nations Security Council is an organisation with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, according to the Charter. The Security Council is empowered to take a variety of actions to fulfill its role, including establishing a United Nations peacekeeping mission. The Charter's Chapters VI, VII, and VIII provide the legal foundation for such action. Chapter VI deals with "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," while Chapter VII covers "Action with Regard to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", Chapter VIII of the Charter also allows regional organisations and agencies to participate in the preservation of international peace and security, as long as their operations are in conformity with the Charter's goals and principles (Oguno & Nnalue, 2020: 1-2).

The United Nations Charter's Chapter VI has long been associated with UN peacekeeping deployments. When implementing a resolution authorising the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, the Security Council, on the other hand, is not required to refer to a particular Chapter of the Charter, and it has never done so. In recent years, when approving the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces into hazardous post-conflict situations when the state is unable to maintain security and public order, the Security Council has started to cite Chapter VII of the Charter. In these circumstances, the Security Council's invocation of Chapter VII can be interpreted as a statement of firm political resolve and a reminder to conflict parties and the wider United Nations membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions, as

well as indicating the legal basis for its action. Linking UN peacekeeping to a single Chapter of the Charter may be misleading in terms of operational planning, training, and mandate execution. When assessing the nature of each peacekeeping operation and the capabilities required to support it, TCCs and PCCs should be guided by the tasks assigned by the Security Council mandate, the concept of operations and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component (White, 2014).

In the aftermath of the UN's sixtieth anniversary, it seems fitting to take a look at how the international body has handled one of the most contentious parts of peacekeeping: UN troops' obligations to follow the standards of international humanitarian law. In effect, despite the overall success of peacekeeping missions, the shocking revelation that a few of the otherwise highly qualified and law-abiding troops had perpetrated grave infringements of the laws of war prompted academics and the UN to consider the Geneva Conventions and other relevant treaties' applicability to these missions (Saura, 2007). The topic seemed to be resolved for good with the Secretary-general's of an internal Bulletin in 1999, 'Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law', although significant legal concerns persist (UN, 1999).

The internal workings of the UN reflect its complex organizational structure. The UN is a political organisation and an intergovernmental organisation made up of 185 sovereign nations, whose powers are controlled by the United Nations Charter. Only Member Nations have the authority to offer proposals, and the Organization may only act in response to choices made by those states collectively. The Security Council is primarily responsible for achieving the Organization's primary goal of preserving international peace and security. The Security Council, like any other entity, does not have the authority to enforce its decisions on Member States. The lone exception is when the Council votes to act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in which case the decisions are binding and enforceable throughout the Member States' borders.

When international peace and security are threatened, Chapter VII of the Charter establishes a collective security framework under which the Security Council is entitled

to adopt a variety of actions. For example, the Council may order whole or partial disruption of commercial connections and means of communication, as well as break diplomatic contacts, if it deems interim measures essential (see Art. 40 of the UN Charter) (see Article 41 of the UN Charter) Furthermore, the Council has the authority to deploy air, sea, or land troops, which should ideally be under the direction of the Military Staff Committee, which is made up of representatives from the Council's five permanent members (UN Charter, Art 42: 45-47). The Charter envisaged a system in which states would make their troops accessible to the Security Council by signing agreements with it. However, no such agreements have been made so far under these Articles.

Significant decisions under Chapter VII need a majority of at least nine votes (out of a total of fifteen); this majority must include the "concurring" votes of the five permanent members. Even though absences and abstentions are not recorded as votes, the Provisional Rules of the Council provide that a negative vote from any of the five permanent members might prohibit the Council from adopting a resolution. During the Cold War, which began almost immediately after the birth of the United Nations and lasted until recently, the Security Council was unable to carry out its functions fully in the manner originally contemplated under Chapter VII due to a lack of agreement among its members, particularly among its permanent members. There was no provision for peacekeeping in the United Nations Charter. Rather, during the Cold War, this idea emerged out of necessity and became the only feasible alternative for addressing issues acceptable to Council members. Chapter VII decisions, which authorise Member States or ad hoc multinational forces to act with military force in extreme crisis situations, have only recently been implemented by the Council.

The first United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, in 1948, best exemplifies the circumstances in which this tool was founded (UN Department of Public Information, cited in Lee, 1995). Palestine was a region managed by the United Kingdom under a League of Nations mandate in 1947. It had a population of around two million people, with two-thirds of Arabs and one-third of Jews. Both sides claimed ownership of the entire region. In April 1947, the British Government referred the issue to the General Assembly after failing to find a solution acceptable to both groups. In

November, the Assembly approved a partition proposal that divided the region into an Arab and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem under international control. The Palestinian Arabs and Arab States, on the other hand, did not embrace the proposal, and violence erupted in Palestine.

Hostilities escalated after Jewish leaders declared the State of Israel. The Security Council eventually called for a cease-fire, which both sides agreed to. Despite the fact that the superpowers recognised the necessity to keep the war contained, neither the US nor the Soviet Union were ready to allow the other to intervene. When it became clear that a third party was required to oversee the execution of the cease-fire, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), a group of unarmed military observers, was established. The first significant UN peacekeeping deployment was born out of this circumstance. India and Pakistan (1949); Lebanon (1958); Yemen (1963); Dominican Republic (1965); Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988); Iran and Iraq (1988); Angola (1989); Central America (1991); Iraq and Kuwait (1991); and Tajikistan (1994) were among the peacekeeping missions that followed the UNTSO and UNEF missions (Lee, 1995).

In each case, the underlying conditions necessitated the use of a neutral third party to contain a conflict by overseeing and insuring the continuation of an existing cease-fire. This third-party duty was provided by a United Nations peacekeeping mission. As a result, previous United Nations peacekeeping operations were made up of unarmed military observers, lightly armed peacekeeping personnel, or a mix of the two. Later, the United Nations added civilian police as a third element to these troops. The multi-faceted operations in Namibia and Cambodia, in particular, demonstrated the interplay of all three components, which included a substantial civilian force to carry out political, humanitarian, and administrative responsibilities.

The United Nations does not have its own military observers or personnel. Normally, Member States provide personnel at the request of the Secretary-General for the term of a mission. They wear their own national garb, but with UN symbols on it. The United Nations has previously sought peacekeeping troops only from Argentina, Bangladesh,

Canada, India, Ghana, Nepal, Pakistan, and the Scandinavian countries. The Secretary-General strives to incorporate forces from nations that are politically and geographically distanced from the conflicts as much as possible. Due to restricted personnel availability and the necessity for specialised training, equipment, and technical competence, this strategy has proven more difficult to implement in recent years. Frequently, the Secretary-General is forced to accept military troops from one country while also providing training and equipment from other nations. The preservation of a unified command has been a key issue because each mission is made up of various country contingents.

5.3.1 The UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and the DPKO

Like other multinational bureaucracies, the UN Secretariat has institutional and policy interests (Dijkstra, 2016). In terms of institutional interests, principal-agent models predict that secretariats would favour broad job sets, which may justify increased expenditures and more positions (Pollack, 2003). "UN bureaucrats are perceived as extravagant globalists who spend first, budget second, and simply pass along the expenses to member nations," according to public perception (Hawkins et al. 2006: 4). The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) noted that "the Secretary-comprehensive General's reports... promote huge mandates with frequently formulaic mandate responsibilities" in peacekeeping (UN, 2015: 60). Secretariats, on the other hand, have policy interests. For self-serving and (due to self-selection or professional socialisation) ideational motives, they want their organisation to flourish (Cortell and Peterson 2006; Gould 2006).

Personal and organisational goals are pursued by international bureaucrats (Ege, 2020). Secretariats are frequently requested by member states to create preferences that are closer to the organization's common purpose than current national government views (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021). Delegation of legislative initiative to the European Commission, for example, was motivated in part by a desire to strengthen a pro-integrationist agenda setter (Pollack, 2003). Similarly, peacekeeping management

has been entrusted to the UN Secretariat, which has a significant interest in maintaining international peace and security, both self-serving and ideational (Sharma 2013; Hall 2016; Littoz-Monnet 2020).

As a result of the interplay of these underlying objectives, new IO activities may be viewed as either expansive or conservative. An IO's portfolio of tasks can be expanded to help it better solve cooperation issues. Secretariats frequently urge for development into new sectors, as seen by IOs that have delved into climate change adaptation, bioethics, or structural adjustment loans (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021). When it comes to relatively uncontroversial multidimensional peacekeeping responsibilities like public information and strategic communications (Oksamytna, 2018), or those that assist safeguard the UN's reputation like environmental management, the Secretariat has played an entrepreneurial role in UN peacekeeping (Maertens, 2019).

The Department of Peace Operations (DPKO) was established in 1992 under Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It was created to support the Secretary-General and the Member States in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. In order to carry out Security Council mandates, the DPO offers political and executive guidance to UN peacekeeping operations across the world, as well as maintaining communication with the Security Council, troop and financial donors, and conflict parties. It recognises the relevance of politics in the peacekeeping process. It recognises that, in the end, the effectiveness of peacekeeping is contingent on active and long-term political processes, or the possibility of a peace process. In the framework of peacekeeping operations, the Department strives to combine the activities of the UN, governments, and non-governmental organisations. DPO also advises and supports other UN political and peacekeeping operations on military, police, mine action, and other pertinent problems (Perry & Smith, 1991).

The DPKO (DPO) is divided into three offices, according to the UN Peacekeeping website:

- a. Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI): OROLSI works with governmental bodies to protect civilians, enhance State authority, re-establish law and order, and stabilise conflict and post-conflict situations, as well as strengthening rule of law components in UN peacekeeping and special political missions. OROLSI specialises on law enforcement, justice, prisons, security sector reform, mine action, and ex-combatant reintegration into civilian life.
- b. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) strives to deploy the most appropriate military assets in support of UN goals, as well as to enhance the performance, efficiency, and effectiveness of military components in UN peacekeeping deployments.
- c. The Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division (DPET) is in charge of creating and disseminating peacekeeping policy and doctrine. In addition, at the request of the department heads, the division is responsible for evaluating how those policies are being implemented, gathering lessons learned and best practises, and using that information to guide the development, coordination, and delivery of standardised training to complete the learning cycle. The DPET is also responsible for establishing and sustaining strategic collaborations with other UN and non-UN organisations.

DPO and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) also share eight regional divisions that cover the Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, and are overseen by three Assistant Secretaries-General. A major contribution of the DPKO has been in respect of data management on UN peacekeeping troops and police personnel contributions from member states. For example, it provides a searchable database available that includes all available statistics on uniformed contributions (troops, military observers and specialists, and police) to UN peacekeeping since 1990, making historical information on uniformed efforts more accessible (Perry & Smith, 2013).

5.4 Normative Frameworks of UN Peacekeeping Operations

International standards, peacekeeping, intra-state disputes, and the United Nations have all been the subject of numerous studies throughout the years (Hirono &

Lanteigne, 2013; Beber, Gilligan, Guardado & Karim, 2017; Karlsrud & Oksamytna, 2019). A review of these and other sources reveals a rise in interest in human rights, humanitarianism, and the weakening of the sovereignty concept, particularly in the 1990s. Many studies have been conducted to see if an international humanitarian intervention norm is evolving under the aegis of the United Nations (Aksu, 2003).

In this respect, post-Cold War studies have focused on changes in international norms, while their broader implications for the UN and the international value system have not been thoroughly examined. As a result, there is a paucity of research on the processes underpinning the triangle interaction between the UN, intra-state disputes, and important players' ideas of governance. The connection between interests and normative preferences, as well as the temporal dimension, are both important aspects. This underpins the idea that the UN's involvement in governance should be viewed as a result of the intricate interaction of interests and norms (Aksu, 2003). The legal foundation for UN peacekeeping operations is provided by the following instruments, according to the: UN internal rules, regulations and guidance; Security Council mandate; Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Directive on the Use of Force (DUF); national law of the host country; Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UN and Troop/Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs); Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) (UNDPKO, 2017).

5.4.1 Human Rights

International human rights law serves as a normative underpinning for UN peacekeeping efforts. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which serves as the cornerstone of international human rights standards, human rights and basic freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everyone. Human rights should be completely observed by UN peacekeeping deployments, which should endeavour to strengthen human rights as part of their mission implementation (UN, 2008).

UN peacekeeping troops, whether military, police, or civilians, must act in accordance with international human rights law and be conscious of how their work affects human rights. Personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations should strive to avoid violating human rights. They must be able to recognise human rights violations or abuses and be ready to react appropriately within their authority and competence. In their contacts with colleagues and local people, UN peacekeeping personnel should respect human rights in both their public and private lives. Where they do misconduct, they should be held responsible.

5.4.2 International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law, sometimes known as the "law of war" or "law of armed conflict," places restrictions on the weapons and tactics that can be used in armed conflicts. International humanitarian law is made up of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as regulations controlling the means and methods of conflict (Henckaerts, 2012). International humanitarian law includes conventions and accords on the protection of cultural property and the environment during armed conflict, as well as the protection of war victims. International humanitarian law protects civilians, victims, and non-combatants in armed situations. It is designed to protect individuals who do not engage in, or no longer participate in, hostilities. It's important for UN peacekeeping missions since they're typically deployed in post-conflict situations where violence may endure or conflict may reemerge. Furthermore, in post-conflict circumstances, significant civilian populations have been targeted by the warring parties, as well as prisoners of war and other vulnerable persons to whom the Geneva Conventions or other humanitarian law would apply in the event of future hostilities (see Bothe, Partsch & Solf, 1982). This makes it imperative that the principles, norms, and standards of international humanitarian law are clearly understood by UN troops, and that they followed these in situations where they apply. The 6 August 1999 Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance of International Humanitarian Law by United Nations Forces (ST/SGB/1999/13) was aimed at clearly laying out these basic principles and standards of international law that may apply to United Nations soldiers.

5.4.3 Security Council Mandates

The UN Security Council authorizes mandates for peacekeeping operations to be deployed. The mandate of the UN Security Council lays forth the responsibilities of a UN peacekeeping deployment. The Security Council's responsibilities change from crisis to crisis, depending on the nature of the conflict and the particular issues it offers. Because UN peacekeeping missions are usually sent to assist in the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement, the kind and substance of the agreement reached by the conflicting parties has an influence on Security Council mandates.

The Security Council's tasks also reflect the larger normative problems that affect the international environment. A number of cross-cutting, theme missions are often assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations based on the following significant Security Council decisions: Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security; Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict; 3 Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 4 Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 5 Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 6 Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The range of responsibility given to UN peacekeeping operations has substantially expanded in response to changing patterns of conflict and to effectively handle emerging threats to international peace and security. Despite the fact that each UN peacekeeping deployment is unique, the Security Council's requirements for mandatory actions are rather similar (Henckaerts, 2012).

5.5 The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission

Peacekeeping was developed by the United Nations as a means of regulating and resolving violent disputes. In a 1990 article, Professor Alan James traced it back to the delimitation committees set up in the early 1920s to redraw a number of European borders after World War I. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO) was the United Nations' first peacekeeping mission (Ghali, 1993). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was a detachment of unarmed military observers assigned to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise a cease-fire mediated by Count Bernadotte during Israel's first conflict with its Arab neighbours. When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 'ordered' a ceasefire a month later, UNTSO stayed in position (Goulding, 1993).

A similar force was deployed in Kashmir a few months after the UNTSO was deployed in June. Following the Anglo-French-Israeli war on Egypt in October 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was sent as the first armed UN force. The Organization's vital role in enforcing the difficult Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements of 1949, as well as UNEF's effectiveness in defusing the Suez crisis, boosted demand for its peacekeeping services. For Goulding (1993), this was the first golden age of UN peacekeeping, which lasted from 1956 to 1974. Following the UNEF catastrophe in 1967, however, it would take a six-year hiatus. During those 18 years, ten of the thirteen peacekeeping operations that were established prior to the late 1980s boom in demand for peacekeeping were established.

The Congo operation, which lasted from 1960 to 1964, is especially important. It is often referred to as a failure, although it achieved its objectives, albeit at a terrible cost, including the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and a serious constitutional and financial crisis at the United Nations (Dorn, 2013). It is still relevant in today's environment for three reasons. It was first used in a nation where governmental institutions were collapsing—the first instance of "painting a country blue," as the Foreign Secretary recently put it. Second, it was the first peacekeeping operation to include a significant civilian contingent. Third, it began as a peacekeeping mission; however, when it became clear that the peacekeeping mode would not allow it to achieve its objectives, the Security Council authorised it to use force on a large scale to end Katanga's secession—the first, and until Somalia, the only, case of a transition from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement mission (Goulding, 1993).

Another major UN adventure was the Near East war of October 1973, which saw the deployment of a UN force (UNDOF) to control an agreed buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces on Syria's Golan Heights, as well as the interposition of a second UN Emergency Force between Egyptian and Israeli armies in an extremely dangerous and complicated military situation (Rudloff & Diehl, 2015). That power still exists, but it goes unseen because it works so well. Following those two wins, the line fell quiet until 1988, when the US and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating, raising hopes for regional conflict resolution and reinvigorating desire for peacekeeping (Goulding, 1993; Davis, 1975).

The UNIFIL was founded in southern Lebanon following a 14-year period of peacekeeping inaction (Makdisi, 2014). The then-Secretary-General and his top advisors questioned the operation's sustainability. Despite this, the US pushed it through the Security Council for urgent, though small, political reasons: President Carter was about to begin the discussions that would lead to the Camp David Accords, and he didn't want the process to be disrupted by Israel's recent invasion of Lebanon (Goulding, 1993). UNIFIL was never able to finish its mandate because all parties concerned were unwilling to cooperate. The 13 Cold War peacekeeping missions supported the slow creation of a set of principles, methods, and practises for peacekeeping, some of which have now been recognised by all parties concerned as a corpus of case law or common practise (Goulding, 1993; 452-3).

5.5.1 Doctrines in UN Peacekeeping

Three important principles guide the UN's peacekeeping mission: consent, impartiality, and non-violence. These are based on the Capstone Doctrine, but their practical applicability remains a controversial.

i. Consent:

UN peacekeeping missions are expected to be deployed with the permission of the conflict's key parties, according to the theory of consent. This sets them apart from law enforcement. The parties must agree to participate in a political process in order for

consent to be granted (Peter, 2015). "In the absence of such consent," the Capstone Doctrine contends, "a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being dragged away from its essential purpose of maintaining the peace" (UN PO, 2008: 22). This is for both normative and practical grounds. Consent is sought in order to make UN peacekeepers' operations and missions more feasible. It's generally achieved by a peace agreement between the conflict's primary players. While peacekeepers are sent to dangerous places, they are not meant to work in the midst of open warfare. These instances demonstrate that consent is lacking in today's activities, owing to the absence of comprehensive peace accords. While the issue of spoilers has always existed in peacekeeping, the new operations go a step further by not requiring the permission of the major parties (Greenhill & Major, 2007; Stedman, 1997).

Missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Somalia are employed to help reinforce the state's authority and defeat one of the conflict's parties. Many missions now have the goal of 'increasing governmental power.' Importantly, the targeted parties possess the political and military might enough to destabilise governments on their own. As a consequence, these organisations may only be regarded as serious combatants. In such missions, the practical reasons why UN soldiers are not designed to perform enforcement operations are overlooked. Its execution, on the other hand, is primarily driven by moral and security concerns. The latter typically tips the balance in favour of the Security Council. Al Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda-affiliated forces in northern Mali, and, to a large degree, the LRA, FDLR, and M23 militias in eastern DRC are not seen as genuine combatants, and their cooperation is not sought. These groups routinely feature on the terrorist lists of Northern nations, making members of the Security Council even less willing to believe their assertions. However, a lack of legitimacy among intervenors does not mean that the local community lacks legitimacy or political agency (Peter, 2021).

ii. Impartiality

According to the Capstone Doctrine, UN peacekeeping missions must carry out their tasks impartially and without favouring one party over another. Furthermore, impartiality

is considered as "critical to sustaining the primary parties' consent and cooperation, but should not be misconstrued with neutrality or inaction" (Malone & Thakur, 2001). It is apparent that agreement to peacekeeping efforts is the cornerstone of impartiality; impartiality is designed to guarantee that all major political stakeholders continue to cooperate so that the operation may carry out its mandate successfully. Furthermore, the Brahimi Report declares unequivocally that "the United Nations does not conduct war," and that when such action is necessary, it is entrusted to coalitions of willing governments with Security Council approval (Zittel, 2002).

In their handling of the conflict's main protagonists, the new peacekeeping operations are far from impartial. In this situation, the absence of approval makes it impossible for these operations to be unbiased, even in theory—the missions must be biased. This can be seen not only in enforcement missions like those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, but also in South Sudan and, more recently, Somalia, where the UN is assisting in the construction of new nations alongside the government and against the interests of other political actors. As a consequence, a one-of-a-kind partial reality emerges. UN peacekeeping operations are not only expected to "side with the government" above the interests of other parties, but they are also staffed by personnel who have vested interests. Many missions, in fact, are made up of soldiers assigned by conflict-affected regional governments. In the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, regional conflicts have long been noted (e.g., the European Union now has regional strategies on all three). However, while planning expeditions to certain regions, the need to assemble a sufficient number of soldiers takes priority over impartiality. As a consequence, it's unclear whether the soldiers in these missions are there to implement the peacekeeping mandate or to protect the immediate interests of the sending nations. As a consequence, their objectivity is called into question (Peter, 2015).

iii. Non-use of Force

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense, which goes back to the first deployments of armed UN forces, is one of the pillars of peacekeeping (Findlay, 2002).

Despite this conceptual constraint, it is widely agreed that peacekeepers may use force strategically with the Security Council's authorization and when acting in self-defense or mission defence. The willingness of the Security Council to authorise UN peacekeepers to use all necessary means to "deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent physical attack, and/or assist national authorities in maintaining law and order" stems from a post-Cold War trend toward more robust mandates (UN PO, 2008: 34).

Since the 1990s, there has been a steady increase in public acceptance of the use of force in peacekeeping. The new regulations, on the other hand, represent a fundamental shift in the use of force, from defensive to aggressive. The UN is employing force not just to defend the peace accord, civilians, or itself—all legitimate grounds for deploying force—but also to safeguard and aid the host country and its administration. The intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo is especially revealing in this regard. Previously, operations might use force to protect their mission, but today the use of force is an integral component of the mandate. The mission's goals must not only be safeguarded but also accomplished through the use of force. The use of force is linked to the lack of legitimacy of the groups attacked, just as it is with the abrogation of consent and impartiality. These organisations operate outside of the regular international framework of collective security, which allows for extraordinary actions to be used (Peter, 2011).

This, however, does not deprive these groups of political influence or legitimacy in the eyes of the wider people, as suggested previously. Of the three essential principles, the Security Council is the least comfortable with abandoning the principle of non-use of force. The Security Council resolution creating an intervention brigade as part of MONUSCO clearly states that it would be constituted "on an exceptional basis, without setting a precedent, or in violation of recognised peacekeeping standards" (UN Security Council, cited in Janik, 2014). Even though the UN mission is actively aiding them, it is clear from prior experiences in other countries that the Security Council prefers to outsource these tasks to regional groupings and interested parties (for example, France in Mali and AMISOM in Somalia).

5.5.2 A Critical Analysis of the Capstone Doctrines

These advancements in peacekeeping practise have been met with scepticism, particularly from nations in the Global South. Guatemala, a nonpermanent Security Council member, voiced concern that the deployment was bordering on a peacekeeping operation while considering the establishment of an intervention brigade as part of MONUSCO in the DRC. Some participating governments, believing that the UN should always be considered as a "honest broker," would prefer that the brigade be a separate entity with distinct responsibilities from MONUSCO's other activity (Peter, 2021).

Argentina's ambassador echoed similar opinion during the same debate. Despite the fact that the document specified explicitly that the brigade would not create a precedent, he asserted that the concept of "enforcing peace rather than maintaining it" required much thought, not simply a week of discussions. The Argentinian envoy also advocated for a more thorough consultation process with troop contributors, so that they are better informed about the new activities (UN News, 2013). He alluded to the potentially troublesome repercussions of divorcing political concerns at the UN Security Council from ground reality.

Similarly, Argentina, Guatemala, Pakistan, and Russia campaigned for a clear reference in the preamble of the MINUSMA mission in Mali to the core principles of peacekeeping—consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force (UN, 2013a). A number of member countries, especially developing countries, were opposed to the chosen path of the peacekeeping operations. While the reality on the ground is changing and the Security Council is becoming more willing to approve forceful operations, the official UN responses to these challenges have failed to acknowledge the extent of the doctrine-practice mismatch. The resolutions creating these missions present their activities as anomalies, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the most recent peacekeeping review process remained deafeningly mute on the scale of these challenges. According to the review's title, the New Horizon process was established to "assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas confronting

UN Peacekeeping today and in the coming years," as well as "reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on possible solutions to better calibrate UN Peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements" (Peter, 2015: 351).

Instead of altering and adapting UN peacekeeping to address new and emerging challenges, the process mainly served to confirm previous review texts. The Secretary-General listed four reform goals in his report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: policy development, capacity development, global field support strategy, and planning and oversight—all of which are quite realistic (UN, 2009).

According to the non-paper that kicked off this peacekeeping review process, the concept of 'robustness' in UN peacekeeping is a political and operational strategy to signal a UN mission's intention to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of spoiler resistance (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). Robustness is a term used to describe defensive rather than offensive aspects of force application. Furthermore, by stating that robustness "is rooted in the guiding principles that are the foundations of UN peacekeeping: non-use of force except in self-defense and defence of the mandate, consent of the main parties, and impartiality in implementation," the non-paper limited the space for future debates about doctrinal implications (Peter, 2015: 361).

Notably, no mention was made of any prospective ideological conflicts or adjustments. During the Security Council's open discussion on 'new trends in UN peacekeeping operations' in June 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that he has instructed the Secretariat to begin work on a review of UN peacekeeping operations. While he avoided arguing the doctrine in favour of focusing on new threats and required capabilities, he did open the possibility of such a debate by criticising the UN's peacekeeping borders (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). The UN Secretariat and the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, chaired by Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, are now undertaking two separate but related studies. This approach gives the UN another opportunity to

discuss areas where its peacekeeping behaviour no longer corresponds to its ideology. Continued rejection of the mismatch might have serious implications for the missions' capacity to achieve their objectives and the change of the areas in which they operate.

5.5.3 Comparing Doctrine to Practice

In the spring of 2013, the United Nations Security Council expanded the scope of its long-running peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and established a new operation in Mali. Both of these operations are taking place in dangerous environments where the UN Security Council and Department of Peacekeeping Operations would typically be unwilling to commit soldiers. More crucially, both missions have far-reaching mandates, underlining and expanding the range of activities in which UN soldiers have lately engaged and supported. The use of an intervention brigade, allusions to unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) in operation mandates, evident linkages between terrorism and organised crime, and support for state power growth in the midst of open conflicts are all changing the face of peacekeeping.

Furthermore, new capabilities such as strategic communication and, more recently, military intelligence have started to be used in peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping deployments by the United Nations are increasingly mirroring Afghan and Iraqi stabilisation initiatives. It conflates the roles of peacekeeping with peace enforcement, generating worries about future developments and implications. UN peacekeeping looks to be shifting away from imposing military solutions via offensive action, and toward assuming and excluding certain political solutions through partnering with (often contentious) governments.

Recent UN peacekeeping operations have been inconsistent with the organization's policy. Intelligent observers and the United Nations have taken note of the situation (Gowan, 2013). Both member states and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat are aware that they are dealing with a slew of new difficulties. The ranking is topped by non-state actors and unusual threats. As a

consequence, in order to address the challenges of the twenty-first century, the UN is working hard to strengthen its capability-driven approach to peacekeeping. While these reform attempts have acknowledged, fought for, and been anchored by the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine's essential principles of UN peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). They've also been anchored by the Brahimi Report's and the Capstone Doctrine's essential principles of UN peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. The changes prominently reference the Capstone principles in what amounts to a collective denial of the gap between theory and practise.

5.5.4 Emerging Realities of Peacekeeping

Following a period of steady growth from the late 1990s to the present, the United Nations' peacekeeping expansion seemed to be slowing at the conclusion of the preceding three decades. Three large-scale operations in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Liberia were progressively winding down, preparing to leave, and changing their focus to peace-building activities (Peter, 2015). Furthermore, the global financial crisis of 2008 acted as a wake-up call for international peacekeeping, placing enormous pressure on any proposals to slash budget or operations.

Following the failures of international stabilisation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is considerable scepticism about large-scale, potentially long-term deployments. Peacekeeping seems to be in short supply. However, this pattern did not last long. The Security Council has not only approved the deployment of 12,000 troops and police to Mali (UNSC, 2013c) and 10,000 troops and police to the Central African Republic (CAR), but it has also approved the deployment of missions on a scale not seen since before the financial crisis. The types of missions that are authorised to carry out new and improved missions have a considerable influence on the nature of UN peacekeeping. After conventional and multifunctional peacekeeping, we are now entering a new era of enforcement peacekeeping (Peter, 2015).

Offensive use of force is used to impose both political solutions and military victories. Enforcement peacekeeping includes things like backing a government's state-building goals and attempting to increase state power in the middle of a battle. This is because non-state actors are the focus of peacekeeping missions that have no international legitimacy due to their atrocious human rights or war crimes records. As a consequence, no comprehensive peace agreements with soldiers are sought before they are deployed, which is in stark contrast to both conventional and multidimensional peacekeeping.

These operations have a striking similarity to the Iraqi and Afghan stabilisation efforts, as explained below. Unlike UN operations, the Afghan mission was authorised by the Security Council but carried out by a US-led coalition of mostly Western states, with only a little UN presence in the form of a special political mission (Cotney, 2003). While the UN's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were far from effective, they are being imitated as it deals with groups that resemble al Qaeda and the Taliban (e.g., Al-Shabaab, M23, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) (Peter, 2015).

Similar operations are being carried out on a smaller scale as part of UN peacekeeping deployments, with the purpose of controlling and limiting these crises, since Western nations' readiness for unilateral or coalition-led interventions has decreased. The next paragraphs depict some of these new activities and imply a seismic change is underway. Two of the most prominent developments in UN peacekeeping are the introduction of targeted combat operations and the move from defensive to aggressive peacekeeping. The UN Security Council has approved the establishment of a "force intervention brigade" under the DRC's current UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) mission organisation. This is the first time the UN has sent a 'offensive' peacekeeping force (UN News, 2013). The brigade was founded with the objective of neutralising and disarming the Tutsi March 23 (M23) militia in eastern DRC, a military euphemism for violent actions. This gang had previously upped its pressure on both Congolese army and UN personnel, even capturing Goma, the regional capital, in November 2012. Despite the fact that M23's recent actions prompted its expansion, the Security Council resolution has a far larger

reach. It orders UN troops to assist Congolese authorities in combatting all armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (LRA). For the first time in UN peacekeeping history, the Security Council compiled a list of adversaries that UN troops must neutralise. The phrasing of the resolution and the kind of responsibilities assigned to UN forces imply that the UN is at odds with the Congolese government, which the UN and other international actors have repeatedly reprimanded for allowing grave war atrocities against civilians (Kok, 2013; Human Right Watch, 2012).

While the Congolese experience has yet to be replicated in other UN peacekeeping missions, it is part of a bigger trend. Unlike the army in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA, does not have an explicitly aggressive mandate. Several Security Council members toyed with the idea, but in the end, the mandate does not clearly enable UN offensive actions. This is due to concerns raised by the Secretary-General regarding UN forces' ability to fight in the desert, as well as developing countries' hesitation to approve such a mission under UN supervision. The UN mission absorbed the AFISMA mission of the Economic Community of West African States when it was established (ECOWAS). AFISMA was previously sanctioned by the Security Council to support the government of Mali, an ECOWAS member, in its struggle against Islamist extremists in northern Mali (Peter, 2015).

The extension of state authority is a mission of both MINUSMA in Mali and MONUSCO in the DRC. In the absence of a larger peace agreement, several governmental agencies are receiving support. Parallel to this, the deployment of regional actors engaged in conflict dynamics has increased in UN peacekeeping missions. Sending peacekeepers to regions where they can be viewed as vehicles for their governments' goals has been frowned upon throughout the history of peacekeeping (Victor, 2010). When regional actors, such as Australia in Timor-Leste (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET) or Nigeria in Sierra Leone (UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL), have been deployed as part of a UN mission, it has been with the consent of all major parties to the conflict and after the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement.

5.6 Reviews of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Until the 1990s, the UN's peacekeeping mission was restricted to small-scale monitoring of peace accords. There were a few triumphs in this age of peacekeeping missions, but far too many big failures. Engagements in Rwanda, Somalia, and the Balkans demonstrated that the UN needed to be more aggressive in supporting nations dealing with war, moving away from passive monitoring roles. These experiences have served as the foundation for a number of studies both inside and outside the UN throughout the years. So, what does this mean for peacekeeping operations on the ground? And how do they affect the people living in war zones on the ground? The following section looks at three major review including the Agenda for Peace, The Brahimi Report, and the Responsibility to Protect.

i. The Peace Agenda (The Agenda for Peace)

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, or simply An Agenda for Peace, is a report written for the United Nations in 1992 by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali responds to a request from the United Nations Security Council for an "analysis and ideas" to improve peacemaking and peacekeeping. In the post-Cold War period, the paper sets out how Boutros-Ghali feels the UN should react to war. The United Nations Security Council convened for the first time in 1992, recognising the limitations of peacekeeping, particularly as such missions grew increasingly regular in the early 1990s (Peou, 2002).

The summit ended with 15 members signing a statement asking then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to draught a report detailing further measures. The chiefs of state noted in their statement that "the absence of war and military conflicts among States does not guarantee global peace and security." Non-military sources of insecurity in economics, social welfare, humanitarian relief, and the environment have become obstacles to peace and security. The settlement of these challenges must be a key priority for the whole UN membership, working via the appropriate institutions" (UN Department of Public Information, 1992: 34).

Many opponents of peacekeeping argued, and prior failures indicated, that peacekeeping alone, as practised at the time, was insufficient to produce long-term peace. An Agenda for Peace, written by Boutros-Ghali and released a few months later, was his response. He outlined a number of alternative preventive diplomacy tactics that the international community may use before or alongside peacekeeping operations. He also advocated distinct definitions for peacemaking and peacekeeping, using Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to legitimise military involvement without the consent of both sides (Doyle, 1998).

Until now, the UN's leadership has been silent on these issues. An Agenda for Peace's most important contribution to our understanding of peace is the introduction of the concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding." According to Boutros-Ghali, "action to discover and support processes that would tend to deepen and solidify peace in order to avoid a return to conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 203). The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has been especially relevant in the academic discipline of peace and conflict studies. Several scholars have adopted it as a paradigm for peace that addresses not just latent forms of physical violence, but also fundamentally violent characteristics of society that might lead to war re-emerging.

Boutros Boutros-seminal Ghali's "An agenda for peace" was written in response to a request from the United Nations Security Council to prepare and circulate a "analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen and make more efficient the United Nations' capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping within the framework and provisions of the Charter" (King & Matthews, 2012). The proclamation took use of a once-in-a-generation opportunity: the end of the Cold War reawakened security council members' determination to uphold "the Purposes and Principles of the Charter [of the United Nations]" and offered up fresh pathways for long-term rebuilding (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992, paras. 1 and 3, respectively).

With ideas for more thorough and active preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, the agenda for peace added a fourth instrument to the international arsenal: post-conflict peacebuilding. Over the past three decades, there has been

significant advancement in the practise and research of peacebuilding. The concept and practical implementation of peacebuilding have developed through time, extended in breadth and deepened in participation. Peacebuilding has been institutionalised within the UN and the greater international community, and peacebuilding initiatives have shown their efficacy in responding to violent conflict and preventing its recurrence (King & Matthews, 2012).

ii. The Brahimi Report

The UN developed new institutions in the 1990s and 2000s, including the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in 2005. Apart from the United Nations, regional actors have adopted a more militant stance against spoils of war. The founding of the African Union (AU) in 2002 was a watershed event for Africa, assuring that African nations would be at the forefront of providing solutions to their own challenges. After a decade of struggling to ensure efficient responses, the UN requested a review of UN peacekeeping in 1999. It resulted in the now-famous Brahimi Report, which helped the UN recognise the growing significance of regional responses to conflicts, the need of strong operations, and the crucial non-military responsibilities played by civilian and police components in long-term recovery and peacebuilding. In 2000, the Brahimi Report (formally the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations) emphasised the need of improving the UN's capabilities to carry out a broad variety of operations. The UN should retain brigade-sized troops, according to one of the report's numerous recommendations.

The UN then deployed sophisticated, integrated, and large-scale operations, suggesting that the report will be used as a major guiding tool for improved, more successful deployment. Despite these modifications, the UN's peacekeeping deployments remain still ineffective. Following the Brahimi Report, peacekeeping missions were deployed with more broad mandates, with a particular emphasis on civilian protection. As a consequence of this method, the funding for peacekeeping increased from US\$5.2 billion in 2007 to US\$7.8 billion in 2014 (Langille, 2016). Even with the new funds, though, peacekeepers were compelled to do more with less to satisfy the standards.

This shows that the Brahimi Report's capacity to handle the constantly changing environment is limited, with varied results. While peacekeeping has become more engaged in settling intrastate conflicts, it is usually unable to satisfy the mission's complex criteria and the reality on the ground. In nations like Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, conflict overflows across national borders, while missions like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo show how new methods of interacting with peacekeeping operations offer challenges for the UN to react effectively.

The panel focused on issues that are critical for UN member states in terms of political participation and budgetary obligations in a highly visible process. However, there was significant scepticism about the UN's ability and political will to implement the measures. Similar concerns have been voiced in earlier reviews, such as the UN Review of Civilian Capacities, demonstrating that many daring suggestions will go unheeded if nations do not demonstrate great leadership in accepting the report, or if the UN has the desire and ability to carry out the directions.

Instead of attempting to manage everything, Oksamytna & Lundgren (2021) opined that the UN should rather be focusing on its core objectives and strengthen engagement with stakeholders who can assist. He condemned the so-called "Christmas tree" kind of UN mandate, which encapsulates all of the UN's hopes and desires, suggesting that it be phased away (pp. 227). It takes a healthy dose of pragmatism and humility to ensure that UN solutions are targeted and effective. Independent assessments have become increasingly appealing tools for the United Nations and its member states. There have been nineteen independent assessments since the start of the practise in 2017. These studies, which included multidimensional peacekeeping operations and field-based special political missions, were ordered by both the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General.

On three levels, policy, management, and operations, difficulties with UN peacekeeping missions may be solved. Policymaking is essentially the responsibility of member nations, notably those on the UN Security Council, especially the five permanent members (P-5). The Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform underscores the

importance of conflict prevention for the United Nations. Annan's attempts to address the root causes of violence in many places and countries, including as oppressive regimes, a lack of democracy, severe human rights abuses, predatory economic policies, and the still-thriving global arms trade, need more cooperation from member states. Before violence erupts, the Security Council must break free from its present reactive mode and confront potential crises holistically and at their source.

The value of clearly stated objectives and goals, as well as matching military and financial resources and defining performance criteria, has long been acknowledged but seldom executed. The council's disagreements are hidden by ambiguous wording, with peacekeepers on the field suffering the price. Another widely held belief is that peacekeepers cannot maintain the peace if there is none to keep. Missions are still being launched in the hopes of everything going as planned.

Another key lesson learned at great expense and with much human suffering in the 1990s was that the need for impartial peacekeeping does not necessarily entail moral equivalence among conflict parties on the ground. Following the precedent of a fundamentally flawed local peace agreement, the Security Council in Sierra Leone first overlooked Sankoh's legacy of atrocities. The crimes perpetrated by his thugs are beyond description, and the operation suffered as a consequence. Member countries with the best resources for training, equipping, and disciplining troops lack the political will, while those with the will lack the military and logistical capability.

The Security Council's track record of making decisions that aren't backed up by the resources required to carry them out was criticised in the Brahimi Report. It is advised that the council waits until the secretary-general confirms that the needed people and equipment have been provided before deciding to commence an operation or change its purpose considerably. More open and democratic decision-making processes by the Security Council may also help to foster a culture of accountability, with member states held responsible for disasters caused by faulty policies. The same goes for UN officials. The Secretariat's administrative faults add to the policy shortcomings.

As US permanent representative Richard Holbrooke and others have pointed out, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is practically the UN's ministry of defence, although on a more or less permanent war posture. Its human, technical, logistical, and financial resources are grossly insufficient to participate in this vast, worldwide, 24-hour endeavour. Many former force commanders, including Australian Gen. John Sanderson (who took part in the largely successful Cambodian operation), have expressed concern about the strategic gap between their needs on the ground and the quality and professionalism of military advice available to UN officials in New York.

iii. Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP)

This is a worldwide political commitment made at the 2005 World Summit by all UN member states to address the UN's four primary concerns: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. At the 2005 World Summit, all UN member states endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP), a global political commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002).

The hypothesis has been regarded as a global and well-established worldwide norm for the last two decades (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2011). The Responsibility to Protect concept is based on the idea that sovereignty entails a duty to protect all people from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations (Bellamy, 2010). Respect for international law's norms and principles, especially those related to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict, underpins the notion. Three pillars support the R2P:

1. State protection duties - According to the first pillar, "each individual state has the duty to safeguard its people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity."
2. International aid and capacity-building — States commit to help one another carry out their protection responsibilities.

3. Pillar III: Prompt and decisive collective action - When a state "manifestly fails" to meet its protection commitments, countries should act as a group to protect the people (Bellamy, 2015).

While countries agree on the Responsibility to Protect, the third pillar's usefulness in practise is still being debated (Welsh, 2019). The Responsibility to Safeguard creates a framework for putting current measures in place to prevent atrocity crimes and protect individuals (such as mediation, early warning systems, economic sanctions, and Chapter VII authorities). In the framework of the Responsibility to Protect, the UN Security Council has exclusive authority to employ force, which is considered a last option. The UN Secretary-General has produced yearly reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009, which build on the instruments that governments, multilateral organisations, civil society, and the corporate sector may employ to prevent atrocity crimes. The Responsibility to Protect has been a source of contention, notably over how different parties have applied the concept in the context of country-specific situations such as Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Kenya (Liu & Zhang, 2014; Orford, 2011)

In 2008, the UN launched a major review of peacekeeping principles, which resulted in the "Capstone Doctrine," which now guides contemporary operations. The Capstone maintained the fundamental ideals of consent, little coercion, and impartiality while enabling them to be used to large, complex undertakings.

5.7 Conclusion

The United Nations' performance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the elusiveness of peace, provide an opportunity to reflect on the organization's work over the decades, including the many ways in which it has successfully adapted to new challenges, and how its efforts affect and are received by the local population in its areas of operations. More than a decade after the Capstone concept was launched, it is vital to reflect critically on the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as their implications for peace and security in difficult terrains.

Despite these revisions, the UN still has concerns about the effectiveness of its peacekeeping deployments. Following the Brahimi Report, peacekeeping missions have been deployed with more broad mandates, with a particular emphasis on civilian protection. As a consequence of this method, the peacekeeping budget increased significantly as previously shown. However, even this increased financing was inadequate to fulfil the demands, as peacekeepers were obliged to do more with less. This shows that the Brahimi Report's capacity to respond to the constantly changing environment is limited, with varied results.

While peacekeeping has become more engaged in settling intrastate conflicts, it is usually unable to satisfy the missions' complex criteria and the reality on the ground. For example, 123 peacekeepers died as a result of mission-related deaths last year. In nations like Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, conflict overflows across national borders, while missions like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo show how new methods of engaging peacekeeping operations offer challenges for the UN to react effectively. It's important to remember that peacekeeping isn't an end in itself. Rather than attempting to achieve everything, the UN should establish defined objectives, communicate them to parties, and focus on its key objectives in order to effectively interact with people who may assist.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary and thematic discussion of field data reports. The section simulates data derived from field survey questionnaires with key informant interview reports in order to bring into focus the perspectives of UN field officials and the perceptions of various categories of participants on the significance of Liberal Peace framework to the elusiveness of peace, as well as the prospects of Sustaining Peace as a strategy for engendering lasting peace in the DRC. The field survey component is vital for the fact that as research has shown, participants' perception in survey data collection processes are often influenced by a wide range of factors associated with the positionality of each respondent (Soedirgo & Glas, 2020). More so, the performance and legitimacy of political processes are best assessed through the perception of populations drawn from the context of the events. Furthermore, such attributes as race, ethnicity, professionalism /expertise, gender and variations in participants' ethical pedestals are potential influences in how they evaluate social phenomenon (Ho, 2010; Virkki-Hatakka, Luoranen & Ikävalko, 2013; Prasad, Marlow & Hattwick, 1998; Kidwell, Stevens & Bethke, 1987).

It is against the above backdrop that an analysis of the principles driving the United Nations peacekeeping mission with a view to understand their implications on the elusiveness of peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo requires a comprehensive context-based engagement with the various categories of stakeholders including institutional and civil public opinion. As defined in the last chapter on the methodology, perception of trends among institutional actors, local political actors, academia, diplomatic and refugee communities, as well as wider civil society provide a veritable prism from which we may evaluate effectiveness of these principles and their contribution to the peace process in the DRC.

While significant research works carried out on the UN peacekeeping mission have offered projections on liberal and Sustaining Peace principles, and what prospect they hold in establishing peaceful in societies (Clark, 2011; Neethling, 2011), it is important to see how these projections hold relevance in the context of the DRC from the perspective of actual observers of the process. It is important to know how observers on the ground perceive the preoccupation of the UN mission with Liberal Peace-building model, has influenced its effectiveness in ensuring sustainable peace in the country, and whether a transition towards Sustaining Peace is an indication of success or otherwise.

6.2 Background Attributes of Survey Participants

6.2.1 Demographics

A total of 280 respondents participated in the electronic survey of opinion. Table 7.1, X-ray the demographic representation of the respondents with frequency distributions and percentages in reference to gender, age, Role/Job/Career Line, race, nationality, including the years of observation of the subject matter, and experience on the field. Two hundred and eighty questionnaires were administered using Google form. From the table in term of gender, the frequency distribution shows that 170 of the respondents were male representing 60.7 percent of the total sample while 110 of the sample were female making 39.3 percent of the total respondents. This, therefore, implies that more males were engaged in this research work than females.

Age outcomes indicate that respondents fall within the age brackets of 18 years minimum while above 55 years were considered without limitation as long as the respondents are actively participated in within the scope the research work. The frequency revealed the age distribution of the respondents with their percentages to be between 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55 and Above 55, captured as 30 (10.7%), 30 (10.7) 95 (33.9 %), 100 (35.7%), and 25 (8.9%) respectively. The result reveals that larger percentage of the respondents fell within the range of (36-55) which ordinarily are in the middle and top career level office holders in their respective fields.

Career Line of the respondents were captured using five main categories of stakeholders in peace-building career officers to includes; Member of UN/ Peacekeeper (past or present), Civil Society/ International NGO, Local politician/ Policy maker, Academic/ Diplomat, and Refugee Community. The frequency distribution revealed their respective participation as 60 (21.4%), 35 (12.5%), 25 (8.9%), 115 (41.1%) and 45 (16.1%) as the number of respondents from these career offices. The result shows that members of the academic community and diplomats constituted the majority among the respondents in the study, followed by members of United Nations peacekeepers.

Furthermore, the race composition indicates that the respondents self-identified as Black/Africans with 215 (70.8%) of the respondents follow by the White/Caucasia 45(16.1%), Asian 10 (6%), and Australoid 10 (6%). Nationality of the respondents shows that the participants in the survey were domicile in DRC and all other African states with total number of 210 respondents in that category representing 75 percent of the total sample size.

Finally, from the survey, years of observation or experience on the field by the respondents were analyzed using frequency distribution and percentages, with the following outcomes, 0-5 yrs. (45, 16.1%), 6-10 yrs. (25, 8.9%), 11-15 yrs. (45, 16.1%), 16-20yrs. (70, 25%), and Over 21yrs (90, 32%). Itis revealed from the table that the larger percentage of respondents were experienced workers with the minimum of 11years experience from their respective fields of endeavor. This implies that the respondents are well grounded in the purview of the UN peace keeping in the area of the study.

Table 6.1: Summary of Participants' Background

Frequency		Percent
Gender	Categories	
170	Male	60.7
110	Female	39.3
0	Prefer not to say	0.0

280	Total	100.0
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Age	Range	%
30	18-25	10.7
30	26-35	10.7
95	36-45	33.9
100	46-55	35.7
25	Above 55	8.9
280	Total	100.0

Role/Job/Career Line	Categories	%
60	Member of UN/Peacekeeper (past or present)	21.4
35	Civil Society/ International NGO	12.5
25	Local politician/Policy maker	8.9
115	Academic/Diplomat	41.1
45	Refugee Community	16.1
280	Total	100.0

Race	Categories	%
215	African/Black	76.8
45	White/Caucasia	16.1
10	Asian	3.6
10	Australoid	3.6
0	Mixed/ Not sure	0.0

280	Total	100.0
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
Nationality	Categories	%
105	DRC Nationale	37.5
105	Any other African country	37.5
15	Asian	5.4
50	European	17.9
5	Others	1.8
280	Total	100.0

Length of observation on the field	Range in years	%
45	0-5 yrs	16.1
25	6-10 yrs	8.9
45	11-15 yrs	16.1
70	16-20 yrs	25.0
90	Over 21 yrs	32.1
275		98.2

6.2.2 Participants' involvement with the UN in the DRC

Reliability of survey information depends to a great extent on the positioning of respondents in respect to the phenomenon under study. Figure 7.1 shows the form of participants' involvement with the subject of UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. 17.7% of respondents attested on scale 1 as members of the UN peacekeeping contingent (past or present), 29.4% on scale 2 as citizens of the DRC familiar with the UN mission, 13.7 % on scale 3 as members of international organization involved with UN mission, 2% on scale 4 as representatives of the DRC government/policy makers, and 37.3% on scale 5 as members of the academia/ diplomatic community.

Figure 6.1



Source: researcher's own compilation

6.3 Thematic Discussion and Simulation of Survey Report

6.3.1 Operational Principles in UN Mission in the DRC

In respect to situating the UN mission's changing approaches to the conflict management in the DRC within defined theoretical prisms, it is important not only to introduce these theoretical categories to respondents, but also to ascertain their recognition of the practical utility and importance of the concepts. The survey probed into participants' perceptions on the usefulness or otherwise, of operational principles particularly, the Liberal Peace and Sustaining Peace concepts, in the conduct of the UN's peacekeeping missions. In survey question Q8, participants' opinion evaluation adopted a Likert scaling format, ranging on a 5-scale series from "strongly agree" to "agree", as metric of assessment. Report shows that there is considerable consensus

among respondents regarding the relevance of operational philosophies and principles undergirding frameworks of action.

A majority of the participants agree that operational principles and philosophies are important to the execution of peacekeeping mission by the United Nations, in the DRC. There were no significant dissensions on the questions of the importance of undergirding principles. 76.5% consider operational principles as “Very Important” to the direction of UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC. 21.6% rate operational principles as “Important”, while 1.9% consider it as having no major effects. For practitioners however, such conceptual classifications as Liberal Peace and Sustaining Peace which seek to offer defining characterization of trends in the UN objectives in the field of practice appear to hold little significance on the field of engagement, being more useful academic descriptors than operational instruments. For example, while informants acknowledge shifts towards community-engagement priorities in the transition towards peace-building and stabilization with mission operations moving away from emphasis on peacekeeping, field officials account for these shifts not as a change in operational principles but a progression in the execution of intervention objectives.


6.3.2 Perception on Liberal Peace as a Strategy for Sustainable Peace

Beyond the broad conceptual appreciation of the relevance of the Liberal Peace and the Sustaining Peace frames of analysis, to our understanding of the elusiveness of peace in the DRC, it is important to explore how these concepts are viewed individually, in relation to their essential attributes. The survey therefore sought to understand participants’ perception of the core attribute of the Liberal Peace principle as a prism for understanding the driving philosophy of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Q9 presented a Likert-scaled series of perception evaluation following a 5-option. Processed report indicates that a majority of the respondents perceived the Liberal Peace principle as an institution-centered/top-down approach followed by the UN mission in the DRC, and aimed attaining peace through support for institutions building, free market economy and democratization of the political space in the DRC.

While field survey suggested that this understanding of Liberal Peace is prevalent among a majority of the respondents as indicated in the near-consensual affirmative result of the survey, an official source faulted the classification of the UN mission along strict lines of distinct philosophical leanings. The leading figure, a member of the UN peacekeepers veteran community pointed out that “the UN does not promote any particular political or economic philosophy, but responds flexibly to the demands of the contexts as the mission executes the mandate of its operation” (KII Interview, October 15, 2021).

The above suggests that popular perspectives in unofficial circles do not necessarily represent the official position at the institutional level. In fact, there might be significant divergence in institutional perspectives on the underlying frameworks of the UN mission in the DRC, when compared with informal perspectives held by a variety of participants on the subject matter. The difference in perspective is indicated in the bar chart in figure 6.2 (see below). A cumulative 84.6% affirm the institution-centered, top-bottom reform objective as the goal of the Liberal Peace framework while 9.6% object to this view. 5.8% report “Undecided”.

Figure 6.2: Perception of Liberal Peace Approach




Source: Researcher’s own compilation

6.3.3 Perception of the aims of the Sustaining Peace Principle

Survey assessed participants' perception in respect of the Sustaining Peace principle as potentially, a community-centered bottom-up approach to peace. Presented with the question, a cumulative of 94.4% of respondents affirm that the new Sustaining Peace prioritizes community-centered / bottom-up approach as adopted by the United Nations in the DRC, in its resolve to attain peace through the propagation of people-driven, all-inclusive peace process. On a five-scale assessment from point 1 (Strongly agree) to point 5 (Strongly disagree). Null entries were made for point 5 (Strongly Disagree). See figure 6.3 below.

Figure 6.3: Perception of Sustaining Peace Framework



Source: Researcher's own compilation

It is important to point out that Sustaining Peace for UN field officials is understood as stabilization, and while this entails a more positive assessment of the situation of peace in the context of operation in the DRC, it does not preclude strategies characterized as Liberal Peace in academic literature. Essentially therefore, shifts in the temperament of UN mission operations in the DRC reflect progress in the path towards peace-building that emphasises more roles for community members.

6.3.4 Perception of Motive behind Liberal Peace Principle

Against the backdrop of competing theoretical narratives on the underlying motives behind peacekeeping missions (Bayo, 2011), the view that peacekeeping missions serve to sustain a particular global political and economic order in the interest of the post-industrialized capitalist world remains recurrent on public discourse (Pugh, 2014). It is important to establish prevalent understandings among participants in the DRC context of the UN operations. In view of this imperative, the survey evaluated participants' perception on the motive behind the UN's Liberal Peace principle in its operation in the DRC. As shown in Table 6.2 below, on a 5-point Scale from 1 to 5.

Scale 1 projects it as a result of "the UN's appraisal of the socio-economic and political context of the conflict in the DRC" scored a total frequency of 26.8%. Scale 2 which projects it as a result of "the UN's global approach and worldview towards conflict management" scored 37.5%. Scale 3 which projects it as a result of "the demands of North-South political economy in a globalized world" scored 1.8%. Scale 4 presents it as "a combination of all the above" and scored 30.4%, while scale 5 which projects it as a function of "none of the above" scored 3.6%.

From the above, it can be inferred that while respondents acknowledge the divergent considerations which drive the Liberal Peace content of the UN's peacekeeping mission, a significant number of participants perceive the body as one which has a standard philosophical template in its approach to peacekeeping interventions across nations. See Table 6.2.


Table 6.2: Perception of Motive behind Liberal Peace Principle

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	1	75	26.8	26.8
	2	105	37.4	64.3
	3	5	1.8	66.1
	4	85	30.4	96.4
	5	10	3.6	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

This is graphically represented below in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4; Motive for the adoption of Liberal Peace



Source: Researcher's own compilation

In an interview session, the UN-designated key informant provides further insight on the question of motive and the guiding frameworks of UN mission engagement in the DRC. According to the spokesperson, changes in the operational strategies of the UN mission in the DRC often arise more as a function of mission reassessment of engagement priorities informed by progression in mandate execution rather than an indicator of a switch in principle or philosophical frameworks. The spokesperson sees the concept of

Liberal Peace as a one that is more useful to academic discourse than to the officials on the ground executing UN mandates. The UN mission has progressed over the years in line with exigencies of the operational environment, transitioning from a peacekeeping focus to an emphasis on stabilization, as dictated by changes and stages in mission environment and priorities and the needs of the host country.

This perspective challenges the emphasis in academic circles, on the theoretical classification of the philosophies and principles undergirding UN mandates along the lines of linear politico-ideological commitments. Officials including veterans of the UN mission contest the applicability of the Liberal Peace concept which projects it as a framework of state-building that rests on the notion that “peace is necessarily the outcome of liberal democracy, market-based economic reforms and the formation of institutions associated with modern states” (Zambakari, 2016; 18), more so, as “key paradigms that have framed peacebuilding thought and practice come from structural and liberal traditions” (McCandless, 2021: 2). This understanding of Liberal Peace links it closely with the promotion of principles widely associated with western conception of state formation and developmental state, and conceptual typologies such as structural peacebuilding, integrated peacebuilding, Liberal Peacebuilding, hybridity, or transformative forms (McCandless, 2019), find expression as versions of peace processes across different operational landscapes.

In respect of the mission in the DRC however, while affirming the academic utility of these concepts, members of the peacekeepers’ community express doubts that the UN to the DRC is officially guided by any such ideological commitments. They argue that the language of the field of practice is rarely amenable to such hard-cast academic categorizations, and note that the UN does not organize its operations in pursuit of such academically defined ideological objectives because they reflect global ideological political divides that are open to controversies which may threaten the unifying neutrality of global security objectives envisaged by the UNSC. In this wise, the conceptions of mission priorities are rather conditioned by the need to engender stability and ensure a reduction in the incidence of conflict in the DRC, and other context of peacekeeping interventions.

6.3.5 Performance of UN's Mission in the DRC Guided by Liberal Peace Framework.


The study survey in Q12, probed into participants' perception on the performance of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC guided by Liberal Peace approach. Table 6.3 presents findings from opinion sampling. Table 6.3 shows participants response to a Likert-scaled question from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating "Highly effective", to 5 indicating "Highly ineffective". From the responses, it is shown that participants' opinions diverge on the performance of the Liberal Peace framework. Considered as a dichotomous perspective, a cumulative total of 51.8% (Highly Effective at 16.1% and Effective at 35.7%) report a positive performance evaluation of the Liberal Peace (institution-centered bottom-up approach) framework. On the other hand, a cumulative total of 46.5% perceive the Liberal Peace framework as being ineffective or unsuitable in the DRC. 1.8% represents neutral opinion on the question. This is further graphically represented in Figure 6.5 below.

Table 6.3: Performance of UN's Mission in the DRC Guided by Liberal Peace Framework.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	45	16.1	16.1	16.1
	2	100	35.7	35.7	51.8
	3	5	1.8	1.8	53.6
	4	115	41.1	41.1	94.6
	5	15	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.5: of UN's Mission in the DRC Guided by Liberal Peace Framework.



Source: Researcher's own compilation

In contrast to the survey participants' assessment on the performance of liberal peace orientation in the UN mission in the DRC, specialized informants within the UN operational circles argue that the performance of the UN mission can only be understood within the frames of its wider mandate since its main mission was to restore peace and institute a state apparatus that would be capable of governance in the absence of external support. In this respect, they argue, the UN mission in the DRC has achieved significant success hence its shifting priorities from mainstream peacekeeping to stabilization and community engagement. This shift in priority they note, informed the shift from MONUC to MONUSCO in 2010, as well as its support for, and collaboration with the Congolese government over the years, on a number of transition support initiatives aimed at preventing conflict and promoting peace-building activities in the country. Some of these instruments being supported by the UN mission include the National Stabilization and Reconstruction Program (STAREC), and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) which was designed to support its implementation (Interview with UN spokesperson, August 10).

In assessing the mission's performance in relation to the attainment of lasting peace, there is a consensus among UN officials that the responsibility for ensuring lasting

peace rested on the people of the DRC and that the mandate of the UN was limited to ensuring that their government reclaimed its authority and regained the capacity to govern. On the other hand, unofficial sources, particularly non-specialized participants tend to see the responsibility for peace as one which depended more on the international community. Harmonizing this divergence of expectations between goals anticipated by the wider public and those held by officials involved with the UN suggests that there is inadequate understanding among the public, about the scope of objectives pursued by the UN peace mission even as it works towards a likely disengagement in the DRC in the nearest future. This communication is important to measuring the success of the mission and in understanding its relationship with the challenge of elusive peace in the country.

6.3.6 The Suitability of Liberal Peace to the Underlying Issues of Conflict in the DRC

The study explored the suitability of the Liberal Peace framework as an operational principle for addressing the underlying causes of conflict including the ethnographic and economic factors which underlie conflict in the DRC. This is critical to reversing the state of elusive peace, especially taking into account the layered precipitations of conflict in the country (Berrera, 2015, Novosseloff et al 2019). Report show wide divergence of opinion. This speaks to the significance of standpoints in the formation of opinion among respondents. 50% reported in the affirmation, as indicated in figure 6.6.


Table 6.4: Suitability of Liberal Peace to the Underlying Issues of Conflict in the DRC

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	45	16.1	16.1

	2	105	37.5	53.6
	3	10	3.6	57.2
	4	100	35.7	92.9
	5	20	7.1	100.0
Total		280	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.6.



Source: Researcher's own compilation

In contrast to the acknowledgment, and the divergence of assessment by the diverse population sample of participants in the survey on the relevance of Liberal Peace, there is a noticeable difference in the assessment of performance among UN officials and peacekeepers. While non-UN officials including academics and government officials among other key informants, share the view that the UN mission in the DRC may not perform beyond its current level in the stabilization mandate of MONUSCO, having reached its maximum potential, UN peacekeepers and field officials' believe it has the capacity to engender a more socially-embedded peace-building process.

6.3.7. Suitability of Liberal Peace to Local Context of UN Mission in the DRC


In determining the significance of the UN's Liberal Peace operational principle to the question of elusive peace in the DRC, it is essential to ascertain the import of the framework in terms of its appropriateness as a strategic tool of engagement in the peacekeeping mission. The survey explored the perception of participants regarding the suitability of mandate to performance appraisal under the Liberal Peace framework. Given the decade-long experimentation with its institution-centered, top-down approach, to what extent is the illusiveness of peace seen as an approach resolving the local conditions which drive the DRC? There is significant understanding that the UN mission to the DRC driven by the Liberal Peace principles, is suited to the mandate of the mission with nearly 70% affirming its suitability.

Table 6.5. Suitability of Liberal Peace to the DRC Context

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	45	16.07	16.07
	2	155	55.30	71.37
	3	15	5.31	76.68
	4	60	21.42	98.10
	5	5	1.90	100.0
Total		280	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.7. Graphic illustration of perception on the suitability of the Liberal Peace principle in the DRC.



Source: Researcher's own compilation

This perception is affirmed by key informants including practitioners and scholars in the field who argue that while the UN mission is not necessarily guided by one adopted ideological guide, its priorities progress from peacekeeping through institution-building to one which increasingly engages the communities as ultimate stakeholders in the peace process.

6.3.8. The Significance of Liberal Approach as Explanatory Factor in the Elusiveness of Peace

Following from the preceding question, it is important to understand the extent to which participants perceive elusiveness of peace as being a function of operational approach adopted by the UN. The study survey examined participants' perception of the significance of Liberal Peace as an explanatory factor in the elusiveness of peace in the DRC. The aim is to understand if, the emphasis on state-centered institution-based approach to peace adopted by the UN peacekeeping mission is seen as playing any role in the continuing conflict in the country. Table 6.6 presents findings from opinion sampling, showing participants' response to a Likert-scaled question. From the responses, it is shown that participants significantly attribute the framework of UN mission engagement as having significant effects on the elusiveness of peace in the


country. It is important to note again that this differs significantly from practitioners' points of view, common particularly with UN peacekeepers and officials.

Table 6.6.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	45	16.1	16.1	16.1
	2	160	57.1	57.1	73.2
	3	15	5.4	5.4	78.6
	5	60	21.4	21.4	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.8



Source: Researcher's own compilation


6.3.9. Rationale for Policy Transition to Sustaining Peace

The objective here was to determine what participants consider as the major underlying motive for shifts in the mode of UN peacekeeping mission engagement in the DRC. The transition from MONUC to MONUSCO was significant in that it marked a change in UN's assessment of the situation in the country with regards to its operation and informed of the organization's awareness of the need for transition towards stabilization as against its emphasis on peacekeeping. It is important to see how this change is understood by the wider range of participants and observers in the DRC. Table 6.7 is a summary of field survey report on motives behind changing strategic priorities of the UN mission. Figure 6.9 presents a graphic representation of the summary.

Table 6.7					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	60	21.4	21.4	21.4
	2	65	23.2	23.2	44.6
	3	30	10.7	10.7	55.4
	4	45	16.1	16.1	71.4
	5	80	28.6	28.6	100
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.9



Source: Researcher's own compilation


6.3.10. Suitability of Sustaining Peace (SP) to the realization of the UN mandate in the DRC

In view of the acclaimed performance of the UN mission, informing the transition towards post- stabilization plans in the DRC, the study explored perception among participants on the utility of Sustaining Peace framework for realizing the objective of lasting peace in the DRC. Summary of survey are presented by the researcher's own compilation as follows:

Table 6.8					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	160	57.1	57.1	57.1

2	85	30.4	30.4	87.5
3	20	7.1	7.1	94.6
4	10	3.6	3.6	98.2
5	5	1.8	1.8	100.0
Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.10



Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.11. Effectiveness of Liberal Peace approach and Realities of Security in the DRC


Survey interrogated participants' perception regarding the validity of success claims associated with the Liberal Peace approach over the years, and the current realities on the state of security in the DRC. A summary of survey report is presented below. There is greater percentage of participants with a positive appraisal of the Liberal Peace contents in the UN's mission in the DRC. See table 7.9.

Table 6.9 Perceived effectiveness versus Actual State of Security in the DRC

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	100	35.7	35.7	35.7
	2	90	32.1	32.1	67.9
	4	85	30.4	30.4	98.2
	5	5	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

The table above is the researcher's own compilation, as well as Figure 6.11 below, which presents a graphic illustration of perception of the appraisals of actual and perceived effectiveness of the Liberal Peace framework in the DRC.

Figure 6.11



From the foregoing, it can be noted that there is a positive appraisal on the performance of Liberal Peace in respect of the current state of security in the DRC. While this corroborates the persuasion within official UN circles where it is suggested that the transition from conventional peacekeeping to stabilization and reintegration are indications of progress in the peacekeeping phase, it draws attention to the question of mandate definition and communication which seems to underpin perception of the UN mission as a failed mission in current public discourse on the elusiveness of peace in the country.


6.3.12. Principal Consideration for the UN's Adoption of the Sustaining Peace Approach

The study sought to establish what aspects of the United Nation's mission in the DRC informed the adoption of Sustaining Peace framework of engagement. Report indicates that various factors constituted important considerations in the switch to Sustaining Peace. The most important from the survey is the exigencies of the local political environment. This buttresses the assertions in UN official circles that operational developments determine the direction of policies rather than the subscription to a given philosophy or principle. Table 6.10 summarizes the perception from participants. Figure 6.12 illustrates graphically.

Table 6.10					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	95	33.9	33.9	33.9
	2	35	12.5	12.5	46.4
	3	75	26.8	26.8	73.2
	4	70	25.0	25.0	98.2
	5	5	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.12



Source: Researcher's own compilation


6.3.13. Ideological tenets of the Sustaining Peace serve as Remedy to Liberal Peace agenda.

Shifts in the operational tactics of the UN mission in the DRC and the increased attention to community engagement presupposes a response within the mission coordination to the need for adjustments warranted by realities of the mission in relation to ensuring enduring peace. The survey sought to assess the extent to which Sustaining Peace is perceived as capable of addressing the failings of Liberal Peace. Table 6.11 summarizes findings. This is illustrated in Figure 6.13.

Table 6.11

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	70	25.0	25.0
	2	155	55.4	80.4
	3	30	10.7	91.1
	4	25	8.9	100.0
	5	0	0.0	100
Total		280	100.0	

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.13

Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.14. Factor underlying the adoption of the Sustaining Peace framework.

Sustaining Peace ensures the transfer of both the ownership and control of the peace-building processes to the community by engendering a sense of stakeholder-ship among members of the community and the government, particularly at the local level. However, the pace of such transfer process to the public may be influenced by a range


of factors which has implications for community buy-in. Survey probed to establish participants on the compelling factor for the adoption of the Sustaining Peace framework. Table 6.12 presents a summary of the participants' feedback. Figure 6.14 illustrates graphically.

Table 6.12:

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	55	19.6	19.6
	2	80	28.6	48.3
	3	90	32.1	80.4
	4	55	19.6	100
	5	0	0	100
Total		280	100.0	100

Source: Researcher's own compilation

Figure 6.14.




Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.15. The Sustaining Peace approach and the Appreciation of the Local Peculiarities

There is a logical assumption that the ultimate goal of the UN mission in the DRC is to achieve lasting peace, and that policy transitions as indicated by shifts towards community engagement are intended to achieve this objective, it is important to see how the adoption of the Sustaining Peace framework is viewed among participants, as a step in the direction towards lasting peace. The survey explored the attitude of participants in terms of their perception of Sustaining Peace as a strategic move towards addressing the elusiveness of peace. Table 6.13 presents response analysis and Figure 6.15 illustrates graphically as compiled by the researcher.

Table 6.13					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	40	14.3	14.3	14.3
	2	215	76.8	76.8	91.1
	3	10	3.6	3.6	94.6
	4	15	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.15.




6.3.16. Sustaining Peace Framework in the DRC Unsuitable for Sustainable Peace in the Country

Both local and international confidence and trust in mission policy are crucial to success. At the local level in particular, popular buy-in is critical to community mobilization (Gorur, 2019). In the same vein, the prospects of policy failure will be influenced by public despondency and lack of confidence (Tanner, 2010). The survey sought to determine the significance attached by participants to the adoption of the Sustaining Peace framework. The summary report from their responses is presented in Table 6.14 and represented graphically in Figure 6.16 (Researcher's own compilation).

Table 6.14

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	5	1.8	1.8	1.8
	2	45	16.1	16.1	17.9
	3	35	12.5	12.5	30.4
	4	180	64.3	64.3	94.6
	5	15	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.16




6.3.17. Sustaining Peace has Potentials to Address Regional Dimensions to DRC Conflicts

Questions on the effectiveness of the UN mission and its inability to deliver lasting peace so have centered significantly on the complex dimensions of the DRC conflict, particularly given its regional interstate dimensions (Lemarchand, 2009; Naidoo, 1999; Tunda, 2016). It goes without saying therefore, that success in the DRC will be little significant if it does not come with stability across its regional dimensions. This survey explored participants perception of the potential to resolve this regional dimensions through the promotion of the community-based Sustaining Peace framework. The summary report from their responses is presented in Table 6.15 and represented graphically in Figure 6.17

Table 6.15					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	95	33.9	33.9	33.9
	2	145	51.8	51.8	85.7
	3	15	5.4	5.4	91.1
	4	25	8.9	8.9	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.17




Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.18. Sustaining has the potential to address underlying factors of conflict in the DRC.

Given the importance of factors outside of the formal frames of peacekeeping intervention frameworks to the success of the peace process in the DRC, including such concerns as historically altered ethno-geographic cartographies, and the conflicting claims to natural ownership and rights to access of natural resources, it is important to understand perceptions regarding the prospects of the Sustaining Peace framework ameliorating these deep-seated conflict precipitations, being itself a community-oriented approach. Below, Table 6.16 summarizes feedbacks from survey and Figure 6.18 illustrates graphically.

Table 6.16

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	100	35.7	35.7	35.7
	2	145	51.8	51.8	87.5
	3	15	5.4	5.4	92.9
	4	20	7.1	7.1	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.18


Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.19. The Influence of Sustaining Peace approach on the UN's work in the DRC

This segment of the opinion sampling sought to determine the extent to which participants perceive the shift towards community-centered, bottom-up approach indicated by the Sustaining Peace framework, has brought in new and significantly positive influences to bear on the UN's peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Below, Table 6.17 summarizes feedbacks from survey and Figure 6.19 illustrates graphically.

Table 6.17

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	80	28.6	28.6	28.6
	2	170	60.7	60.7	89.3
	3	20	7.1	7.1	96.4
	4	10	3.6	3.6	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.19

Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.3.20. The UN Mission in the DRC future peacekeeping operations


The quest for lasting peace in the DRC in over two decades of UN peacekeeping mission presents potentially, a significant case in point that may be used as an insight both in pedagogy, and in policy analysis on the dynamics of peacekeeping missions across the globe, particularly in a historically and socio-politically complex developing country scenario as those of African and most developing country contexts. Survey

explored participants' perception of the importance of the long quest for peace in the DRC through the United Nation peacekeeping operation, to directing future peacekeeping operations in an African or developing country context. Table 7.18 summarizes feedbacks on the importance of the UN peacekeeping as a pacesetter for future peacekeeping missions and missions in situations similar to the DRC.

Table 6.18. UN mission in the DRC as a positive guide to future peacekeeping operations.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	130	46.4	46.4	46.4
	2	100	35.7	35.7	82.1
	3	10	3.6	3.6	85.7
	4	30	10.7	10.7	96.4
	5	10	3.6	3.6	100.0
	Total	280	100.0	100.0	

Figure 6.20



Source: Researcher's own compilation

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has offered a detailed summation of the data collected through online surveys (See copy in appendix). Specifically, the survey, targeted former and current UN personnel and in particular, those who worked in the DRC UN peacekeeping mission. Knowledge of the participants on the current context varied but more nuanced was the collectively appreciation that the DRC had become a laboratory for the UN to test several approaches to achieving and consolidating peace. Some of such approaches included moving from peacekeeping to a peace support operation, and from peace support operation to stabilization mission; and today, sustaining peace was emerging as a new operational approach and model which unlike others was departing from the liberal peace models. Of interest is the realization that knowledge of liberal peace was disaggregated and largely different from what its proponents in scholarship perceived it to be. As such it must be pointed out that, while the study sought to sample views of different constituents, including refugees and Congolese nationals living in the country, the quick appreciation that their views would best fit for the analytic frame of the country's current context propelled the researcher to to distribute questions whose findings are reported to professionals who amongst others included university professors and UN personnel only. As such, of 280 respondents only 105 (37.5%) were Congolese nationals. The views represented in this chapter are therefore of scholastic and policy relevance because they offer theoretically critical and operationally practical appreciations of the UN's DRC mission but more so, the application of new doctrines. Observable new knowledge from this survey include but not limited the the following; 1.) Empirically, the local population do not share similar visions as the mandate of the UN as they are eager to experience a peaceful, stable and prosperous nation; and 2.) Given that several of the respondents have worked in several other missions or even resigned the DRC mission, the views expressed in this chapter and expantiated in the next go beyond the DRC.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THEMATIC DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

7.1 Introduction

This section presents a thematic summary of interview data obtained from key informants as part of the data collection process. The section is organized in themes in line with collated highlights drawn from participants responses to structured interview guide administered during the interview sessions. An attempt is made to simulate official information with the more widely available survey perspectives on the subject.

7.2 Operational versus Conceptual Issues

One important observation cutting across the sessions with key informants was the evident conceptual gap between the theory (academia) and the field (practice). Such conceptual incongruities are not entirely new in the arena of theory and practice, and they have been noted to have important effects that could make all the difference in research outcomes as they tend to create artificial divides even where none exists. Under such circumstances, they might obstruct the much-needed synergy between the realms of theory on one hand, and practice on the other (Weick, 2003; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). Given the effect that conceptual gaps may have in our understanding and communication of the social world, the importance of clarity at this level of theorizing practice cannot be overemphasized.

It is in recognition of this importance that Weick (2003) explored the different ways through which attempts could be made by scholars to reconcile theory with practice and submitted that “understanding is a major source of trouble” in the worlds of theory and practice, “understanding is a major source of trouble” (p. 2). In the case of the DRC in particular, it was noted that practitioners viewed change as progression of mission rather than a switch from one policy framework to another, whereas it was identified as some sort of a shift in strategy in academic literature (Ortiz-Ayala, 2021; MacGinty, 2008). Many practitioners particularly with the UN mission systems demonstrated little

awareness of the significance of such commonly used theoretical descriptors as ‘Liberal Peace’ or ‘Sustaining Peace’.

In some instances, certain terminologies are avoided or used cautiously for political reasons, because some terms carry political connotations which they sometimes convey motives that are different from those intended in its usage by the UN mission. Notable in this respect is the NATO origin and association of “Liberal Peace”. It is seen in principle, as a reflection of the Cold War ideological divides which is at variance with the diversity which arguably, characterizes the current United Nations system. A spokesperson for peacekeepers noted for example that the word “Liberal” should be avoided as it evokes within the international system, a sense of

7.3 Liberal Peace as Stabilization

Equally remarkable is the observation among official circles within the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC that its Liberal Peace strategy was purely driven by stabilization imperatives. A spokesperson for the UN headquarters clarifies that:

“I think that what you mean by Liberal Peace is really the word ‘stabilization’ from the DRC...Ahhh...I mean, probably not from an academic point of view. But because, I am bureaucrat and I like to take short-cuts” (Interview, August 15, 2021).

In progressing from peacekeeping to peace-building, it reflects, they argue, on the progress recorded on the ground with respect to the reduction of violence and protection of the civilian population. Stabilization for the peacekeepers therefore, entails the use of force in the restoration of order and the restoration of state authority. Explaining further, the spokesperson pointed out that;

Indeed, MONUC was created 20 years ago, and it is now MONUSCO 20 years later. In 2006, there was a shift from MONUC to MONUSCO, and the shift was that the ‘S’ was added because there was a feeling that we were not in a typical peacekeeping

phase anymore, or at least that is not what the [host] government necessarily wanted, based on the situation on the ground, you don't require the categorization of a peacekeeping mission. but we were moving and we needed to show that we were moving to a situation of more of a stabilization so we were...the peacekeeping operation was moving in a way that was going to be more of stabilization, not necessarily in the definition of Afghanistan but more in the definition of peace-building. And peacekeeping doesn't do peace-building but there is this little gap between peacekeeping and peace-building that could be filled. Some people thought that stabilization was the better approach. You call it 'Liberal Peace', some other people can call rule of law (Interview, August 15, 2021).

This perception aligns with Karlsrud (2015) who traces the origin and relevance of stabilisation to UN peace operations, to the establishment of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. This origin explains its ideological association with NATO and its liberal inclinations. For the UN, stabilization refers to the deployment of peacekeeping force with its emphasis on military engagements in the theatre of conflict. It concerns the use of military means as strategy for neutralizing potential spoilers and to ensure stabilization in the context of conflict, using all necessary means (Stedman, 1997). Transition towards the Sustaining Peace analytical frame of action in the DRC could therefore be situated in-situ, as a progression towards peace-building, evidenced in its increased emphasis on community engagement and multilayered approach to peace. The motivation for shifts in the temperaments of its operations is captured in the explanation offered for its changing operational strategies, as presented here:

It [stabilization] is basically on how you can, you know, in places (which is not the case throughout the DRC, or was not back in the days in the DRC), where there is a situation which do not require a peacekeeping mission or the threat no longer requires a peacekeeping mission because it does not pose a threat to

international peace and security, such as for instance the Kassai, then stabilization/ peace-building/Liberal Peace would make sense (Interview, August 15, 2021)

7.4 From Liberal to Sustaining Peace in the DRC

Since the end of the Cold war, the Liberal Peace approach to conflict management has no doubt maintained its dominance on the international conflict management arena. However, despite this dominance, its operationalisation has been marked by problems in terms of its approach to peace and the outcomes in terms of sustainability. Its use as the common operational frame in the management of peacekeeping missions has provided one of the common planks on which the approach is often examined and criticized.

This chapter examined the operational utility of the theoretical debates on Liberal and Sustainable Peace principles in the DRC by looking into the mechanisms of operations of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) in both general terms, and from the lens of the local contexts of the DRC. It highlights contextual peculiarities and understandings on the DPKO in relation to the UN mission in the DRC. The chapter also looked at the challenges and opportunities of the African solution to African problems agenda of the African Union and in relations to how its strategy so far, has performed towards ensuring sustainable peace in the DRC. It evaluates options available to the DPKO in the mission to the DRC in the light of often advanced Western Approaches to Peace.

7.5 Rationalizing the Transition from Liberal Peace to Sustaining Peace

In its broader application, the idea of Liberal Peace, held as its selling point, the globalized assumption that institution building, political democratization and market liberalisation provide a reliable pathway towards enduring and self-Sustaining Peace are (Paris 2004; Richmond 2006). Yet it faces significant challenges, not from rival opposing ideas, but from within. According to Ikenberry (2010), in a critique of the Liberal international order, the author noted that the global liberal order was in crisis, not

arising from the contestation of its dominance from among its co-contending approaches or even an attempt to overturn it, but arising from the its inability to govern itself. As a guiding principle in an international institution such as the United Nations however, it has been to even more criticism (Zambakari, 2016; Eriksen, 2009; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Chandler, 2011).

The United Nations peacekeeping mission has evolved over the years, into a complex, global undertaking guided mostly by the exigencies of crisis which inspired it, but leashed little by any rigid rules. Its operations continue to be directed more by a largely non-codified set of principles that are mostly shaped by the perception of the field officers—men and women who constitute its force across different theatres of operations launched around the globe since its inception in 1948 (DPO-DFS, 2008). The predominant tendency in academic analyses on the United Nations' peacekeeping missions is to rely on policy frameworks, statements and declarations made in line with globally accepted ideals of global governance, and weighed against preferred deliverables vis-a-vis the performance of the UN's institutional mandates guiding such interventions (Karlstrud, 2015; De Waaal, 2009; Tull, 2009; Joshi, 2013).

Apostles of sovereignty draw attention to the intrusive strategies of Liberal Peace in highlighting its instrumentality in an unequal international political arena. Bargués (2020) argue that Liberal Peace foists an invasive system of top-down order of peace agenda that is advanced through a forced re-interpretation of established practice that guide the conduct of international interventions in countries affected by conflict. This is unlike Sustaining Peace approach towards peace-building—an approach which advances a longer-term goal, promotes a bottom-up approach, and assigns secondary roles to external practitioners, and recognizes and accepts risks that may arise from its failure.

When viewed against specific operation contexts over time however, deeper patterns may emerge suggesting that there are more complex undercurrents and more contingency underpinnings between declared ideals and realistic deliverables. While the short term objective of the UN mission in the DRC has oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the evaluation of the mission's long term goals have focused

on issues of democratization, institutional development and an enabling environment for unhindered trade and economic development (see for example: Herbst & Greg, 2018; Duursma & Gledhill, 2019).

As Gowan (2008) noted, the United Nations has peacekeeping mission has been confronted with series of paradigmatic crisis in recent years. These have stemmed majorly from some of the fundamental assumptions which drive its mandates for conflict management through peace missions, particularly about how best to drive a transitions from the state of war to one of peace. Its experience, from engagements in Afghanistan, to elusive peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo, after over two decades, all combine to cast doubt on its efficiency, and the credibility of its core values and principles of engagement. It is important to examine the changing tenor and temperaments of Liberal Peace principle in the operation context of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

7.6 Building Capable Institutions through Multilayered Engagements

Another notable attribute of the UN mission in the DRC is its focus, from in its transition from MONUC to MONUSCO, to prioritize the establishment of locally grounded institutions capable of multilevel, state-driven conflict management. The stabilization structures as anchored on the collaboration between the government of the DRC and the UN peacekeeping mission. The intention was to engender a local community and domestic ownership of its processes. A UN spokesperson noted that:

Stabilization was not just an invention of the UN but a program invented by the peacekeeping mission to support the government's program Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme (STAREC) Eastern DRC in particular, in order to ensure host-government ownership. It recognized that only the national government can engender sustainable peace. Stabilization was focused on STAREC'S national, local, community/grass root level, as its national anchorage, since it was piloted by Kinshasa. Stabilization

was initially known as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) programme and it needed to hinge its peace process on local and national engagement (Interview, September 17, 2021).

7.7. Mission Mandate and Sustaining Peace

Debates regarding the successes of the UN mission to the DRC, or the arguable lack of it (often captioned as ‘elusive peace’ is one that must be situated within the frames of proper understanding of the mandate of the mission to the DRC as well as the operation and institutional contexts of the mission. This is important to ensure that expectations and the associated assessment of performance are weighed against the proper frames of institutional mandates, capacities and possibilities. For one thing, domestic government occupies a strategic position in the execution of UN mandates, particularly through its consent validation requirement. One important angle is to understand the role of the Congolese government in the drive to ensure sustained peace in the country. The UN spokesperson noted in this regards that:

In order to sustain peace, you need to make sure that the Congolese fully own the process. Anything that has the word ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable’, it has to be with the host government. The agencies cannot sustain peace, the UN cannot sustain peace. The only way for peace to be sustainable to pave the way to development is because you have the government fully owning the process. for it the government to own the process. The fact that stabilization was created in support of STAREC, which was not a perfect program, neither is stabilization, but at least you have this hook to the national program which is critical to sustainability (Interview, September 17, 2021).

One of the structures that had been developed to ensure that the UN operation functions in synergy with the aims of the host government was the STAREC program.

This program was also and piloted by Kinshasa, because it was a national program with a view to work in the east and that was necessary. But as the year moved by, we realized that if you really want peace to be sustainable, you need both the community level and the national level. I don't believe, you know, as some people think that if you have the community engagement only, that peace would be sustainable, because the community engagement is critical but it cannot be sustainable if the people in power in Kinshasa are not also associated with the process, and vice versa. In terms of performance assessment, the UN spokesperson maintained that:

A lot of progress has been made in that regards, and this stabilization which was initially the ISSSS program, grew into ensuring that the community were being engaged, notably, in peace processes. The ongoing FRPI process in Ituri was the work of two years of engagement with the local population, civil society, and community leadership, in search to find champions of the peace process to sustain. There were also the issue of NGO who were mostly unreliable as tools for Sustaining Peace as they focused on inter-community dialogue and had other more important interest in accessing funding after which they often fizzled out with time for lack of funding. So they proved unreliable as tools for Sustaining Peace-building.

The FRPI was designed to assist community engagement including women leaders, council of wise men, those who can talk to the youth. It sought to work with local associations who had the means and skills. It sought to ensure the national governments acknowledgement of what was happening at the local level and to enable it act promptly towards achieving an end to impunity, ensuring that the demobilized were re-integrated into their communities, and to ensure that national policies took the peculiarities of local processes into account for sustainability. The coordinator of the National Implementation, the regional Agreement for Peace Security and Cooperation for the Great Lake region, with a National oversight mechanism which was led by someone who had the president's ears, Regional oversight mechanism also led by emissaries linking

the DDR program. For MONUSCO, Sustaining Peace is all about getting all sectors of the society to accept responsibility for peace.

7.8 Lessons for the Future and the UN Peacekeeping missions

The operation of the UN mission in the DRC offers important lessons for UN missions in general. The lessons that this provided for UN mission anywhere, including MINUSTAH in Haiti and elsewhere. The UN has been in the Congo for decades drawing lessons that are important to the future of peace keeping operations. One key take away is the need to develop an integrated approach to the core commitments of the mission, including the protection of civilian people, the organization of civil and political affairs, and the implementation of stabilization priorities across all three levels: local, provincial, and national, and in some rare cases, the regional level such as was warranted by the situation in South Kivu with the regional dimension to the conflict.

7.9 Conclusion

Following from the preceding section, this chapter presented an interpretive analysis of inferential and interpretation data drawing from findings in the survey report and interview data. The interpretive method of data analysis was adopted to harmonise operational and wider social perspectives between the more formal professional, academic and UN official understanding, and those derived from a wider array of the larger public.

The foregoing section equally undertook a digest of field report with the UN's operational principles. It is obvious that while on the one hand, the UN's efforts to restore peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is dynamic and influenced primarily by local and operational realities that inform shifting priorities, as well as focusing first on peacekeeping through peace enforcement and progressing to stabilisation and state-building, on the other hand, wider social expectations among the affected publics remain conditioned by a perception of the UN as an organisation.

The lessons from wars and peace processes are as different as the consequences of the DRC conflicts on various people, no matter where one looks. However, it is evident that in these circumstances, the peace process must be incorporated into the political structure in order to create long-term peace. Furthermore, it must be understood that resolving wars is a costly enterprise that requires the mobilisation of enormous quantities of social capital in peacebuilding processes. As a result, competent peacekeeping administration is required, with a balance struck between peace operations, community commitments, and the preservation of public legitimacy, which includes conflict parties, local civilians, international NGOs, and foreign governments, among others.

The UN's delayed peace efforts in the DRC highlight the significance of re-strategizing for the best possible results. It has to start prioritising effective, achievable initiatives with clearly defined objectives and responsibilities that can be monitored more accurately.

Policymakers should devote greater resources to establishing successful peace procedures that address both the causes and symptoms of armed conflicts, as shown by the above. Indeed, the benefits of deploying a specific peacekeeping mission should be judged in light of the possibilities for a successful peace process. Building successful peace processes requires not just persons, but also a thorough grasp of the dynamics of the conflict and what is required to resolve it. The DRC peace process made it evident that stronger entrance and departure tactics are required. It is widely assumed that determining when and where to deploy peacekeeping forces, as well as when and where they should depart, is a vital but under-debated subject from which we may learn, particularly in relation to the DRC war. In terms of entrance methods, greater attention should be given to the problem of consent: whose permission is required, whose consent is desired but not required, and what should be done if and when the aggressor and legitimate organisations are in disagreement. When there are disagreements about how and when to cease operations, as well as how to gauge performance, having these standards in place will assist to explain how to continue.

Despite widespread criticism, peace operations remain the international society's primary instrument for conflict resolution, and empirical data shows they have helped to the reduction of violence in a number of war-torn areas. Peacekeeping missions, on the other hand, have not been without setbacks. This illustrates why change is required so that peacekeeping operations can meet the needs of society. As a result, politicians and analysts should work together to ensure that peace operations have clear operational instructions, unambiguous mandates, and adequate resources to achieve the stated goals. The success stories that arise would contribute to a declining trend in the frequency and size of conflicts, lower the human and economic costs of violence, and therefore open the way to more dynamic and sustainable development, as the DRC instance suggests.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTION, AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1 Introduction

This central question of this study was to understand the problem relevance of the UN application of Liberal Peace as the principle of engagement in the DRC, and how this explains the elusive peace in the country. Against the backdrop of the promises of Liberal Peacebuilding as a framework for establishing peace and prosperity in conflict-ridden societies, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided a veritable compass for the examination of the performance of the liberal peace framework or for the dissecting its inhibiting or propelling factors. Not only from the scale of international convergence in terms of resource and personnel commitments, but also for the complex nuances which bestraddle the UN operations in the country from internal ethnic and historical dimensions to the regional economic and strategic considerations which come into play. The paradoxes which present themselves to analysis in the DRC conflict make it a great learning curve for future understanding and road-mapping of the nature of peacekeeping in complex terrains. Against the backdrop of perceived failure of the UN peacekeeping mission to bring about lasting peace, the rhetoric of elusiveness has become the defining tag on the UN peacekeeping mission prompting interest in understanding the underlying factors and possible options for enhanced performance.

The study also committed to examining what promises the Sustaining peace alternatives offers in the DRC context, given the notable shift in the orientation of the mission particularly since 2010 following the transition from MONUC to MONUSCO. To put this into useful context, the approach embraced in interrogating the operational utility of the Liberal Peace doctrine as well as the promises of Sustaining Peace in the DRC context, that is, whether, and how, the new Sustaining Peace agenda offers a new strategic approach towards achieving and Sustaining Peace in the country, drawing on

official sources through interview on one hand, and surveyed a wider purview of information through opinion sampling.

The research aim was to analyse whether the UN's employment of Liberal Peace-building helps to explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC, and whether and how the new Sustaining Peace agenda is bringing a new approach on the ground that offers hope for achieving and Sustaining Peace. In order to achieve this, the study set out to investigate the underlying factors that *explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC despite the extensive role of the UN peacekeeping mission, and how/if the new UN Sustaining Peace agenda offer a different and more hopeful path to lasting peace. It therefore investigated* whether/how the application of the Liberal Peace doctrine served as a key factor behind the elusiveness of peace in the DRC after over two decades of UN-led peacekeeping operation; sought to expain what factors constitute drivers and ideological tenets of the new Sustaining Peace agenda; identify the enablers and inhibitors of new sustainable peace concept and how are these suitable to the strategic realities of the UN-mission in view of its goals of stabilization and Sustaining Peace; examine if/In what significant ways the new Sustaining Peace agenda have influenced the UN's work on the ground in the DRC; examine the implications of these changes and what lessons can be learnt for achieving and sustaining peace in other peacekeeping contexts across Africa.

8.2 Study Contours

The conflict in the DRC no doubt presents such a complex scenario with far too wide interplay of forces for any linear analysis. In order to journey through its complexity, one must identify the focal areas of interest among the many questions that influence the perception of success or failure in the politically dynamic theatre of conflict in the DRC. This leads the inquiry into asking a number of questions, namely; is there first of all, any agreed framework for measuring performance? Is there a properly spelt-out mandate upon which the scope of its deliverables or performance can be assessed or evaluated? How are the efforts of the UN perceived among the ordinary populace,

including citizens of the DRC who now live as refugees in neighboring countries? How do official actors perceive the performance of the mission in the face of efforts at transiting to a Sustaining Peace model of intervention which takes the local population as the custodian of their peace? Are there similarities of what form of divergences can be identified in the perception of official informants and more anonymous informants? Then what instrumentalities have been employed in the pursuit of these objectives? What are the possible effects of these adopted measures in the long and short runs? For example, what does the introduction of the Force Intervention Brigade portend for post-peacekeeping social relations in the country? And what are the implications of the FIB structure for security against the backdrop of elite complicity in the ongoing crisis, particularly in the light of the entrenched culture of the illegal exploitation of the Congo's natural resources.

In view of the above, the study engaged in a comprehensive discussion of the broad range of issues touching on the elusiveness of peace and the prospects of Sustaining Peace as an alternative in the UN peacekeeping mission. It established that the conception of Liberal Peace and Sustaining Peace in theory as well as the polarization of these theoretical approaches to peace processes do not operationally represent tactics strictly adopted by the UN. Rather, they at best provide academic concepts in the classification of its approaches.

It can be summed up that the application of the Liberal Peace doctrine is constrained by the frames of its operational regulations as provided in the UN resolutions, and the limits of the missions' mandates such that while it can serve as a force to check the scale of violence and bring it to the barest minimum, it lacks the capacity to deliver sustainable peace. It must be noted that the UN mission recognizes this fundamental fact that building sustainable peace in the DRC rests in the people of the DRC, working with the governments at all levels and stratum of society. While the mandate may hold no solution unilaterally to the quest for sustained peace, it does not explain the elusiveness of peace in the DRC.

The principles guiding UN peace mission—MONUSCO's approach to are founded on the exigencies of the local terrain, particularly the context of the conflict, regulatory processes as well as the needs of the government of the host country. The shift towards stabilization in the MONUSCO has been demonstrated to be informed by progress in the peacekeeping operation in the DRC. Its inhibitors on the other hand may include the complex ethnic and economic dimensions to the conflict. It can be submitted that the bottom-up approach to peace in which community engagement is prioritized alongside the centrality of governments at all levels, offers new and novel insights that force is an inadequate instrument for security the peace, not least sustaining it. Overall, the case of the DRC teaches that sustained peace can come only from within. Foreign actors are rarely equipped, nor can they be equipped to institute peace unless the desire and effort towards sustained peace comes from the people.

The foregoing are inferences drawn from the summary of this study from chapter one to nine. Chapter one laid out the task dealt with in the study by presenting the background and research problem. Chapter two set the conceptual and theoretical groundwork of the study by examining the question of elusiveness of peace presenting an introductory foregrounding on the meaning and operational connotations of the concept of Liberal and Sustaining peace. It illuminated the imperative of harmony between theory as an instrument of policy communication to the academic community and a means of sharpening operational strategies in such a crucial and complex peacekeeping context as the DRC as regards the workings of Liberal Peace and the significance of Sustaining Peace in the country. Chapter Three engaged the appraisal of relevant frameworks in the UN's operations including Liberal Peace and Sustaining peace, but viewed from a critical and complexity perspectives, in an attempt to understand the elusiveness of peace in the DRC despite the extensive role of the UN peacekeeping mission, also examining (how) if at all, the Sustaining Peace framework offered a different, and more hopeful path. Chapter Four focused on the historical exploration of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the country since independence.

Chapter Five focused on the organisational structure for UN peacekeeping mission, generally, but with attention at the DPKO. It examined the traditions that have characterised the planning and executions of the UN peacekeeping mission through the lens of major reviews, as a reflection of the strategies towards arresting the elusive peace in the country. Chapter Six laid out the research strategy and approach, justifying the choice of an interpretative technique as vital to context-relevant analysis, as well as justifying the choice of the DRC as case study due to its robust and historically prolonged nature. Chapter Seven presented the summary and thematic discussion of field data reports, highlighting major inferences drawn from a simulates of survey and interview data. Chapter Eight presents a discussion of findings and points out some key issues. Some of these include:

1. observations about conceptual gaps between the theory (academia) and the field (practice) in the framing of both the goals, nature and performance of UN missions.
2. Equally remarkable is the observation among official circles within the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC that its Liberal Peace strategy was purely driven by stabilization imperatives, rather than a continuous engagement with peace enforcement
3. Also significant is the role of history in the framing of concepts and terms for communicating and assessing the effectiveness of UN operations. Terminologies such as Liberal Peace which have established meanings in academic discourses are avoided or used cautiously for political reasons, because some terms carry political connotations and may convey motives that are different from those intended in its usage by the UN mission. a good example of this is the link between liberal peace and NATO and Cold war history.
4. There is also the need for greater synergy between scholars and policy centres to reconcile theory with practice such that a more productive collaborations may be achieved,

5. Equally noteworthy is the criteria for measuring progress. For the UN, it would seem, metrics for performance assessment are entirely mandate-dependent while public appraisal relies on cessation of conflict and an end to violence. It is important to work out a common understanding of effectiveness and the criteria for measuring it.

6. Following from the above, stabilization for the peacekeepers therefore, entails the use of force in the restoration of order and the restoration of state authority, so that the host state can take up the responsibility of securing lives within and around its borders.

8. From the study, it is also apparent that the practical utility of the theoretical debates on Liberal and Sustainable Peace principles remain limited as the case of the DRC shows, because there is lack of sufficient synergy between the UN as a mechanism of planning and implementation through the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), and the intellectual community on the other hand,

10. It is important to understand the practical workings of the concept of Liberal Peace in the DRC as it is being used in the literature—institution building, political democratization, and market liberalisation as pathways to enduring and self-sustaining peace and the emphasis on local drivers as panacea for sustainable peace in the DRC.

11. Another notable attribute of the UN mission in the DRC is its changing focus and tactics following its transition from MONUC to MONUSCO when it began to prioritize the establishment of locally grounded institutions capable of multilevel, state-driven conflict management.

12. It is clear also that enduring peace in the DRC required effective collaboration between the government of the DRC, the communities, and the UN peacekeeping mission.

13. In general, debates regarding the successes of the UN mission to the DRC, or the arguable lack of it (often captioned as 'elusive peace' is one that must be situated within the frames of proper understanding of the mandate of the mission to the DRC as well as the operation and institutional contexts of the mission.

14. One other important lesson is the need to develop an integrated field-relevant approach for understanding the core commitments of the mission, in the theatres of conflict like the DRC.

15. As data from the survey suggests, there is a major gap in understanding between the populace and the peacekeepers regarding the scope of mandates and the parameters for measuring their success and effectiveness.

8.3 Study Contribution to knowledge

An important contributions to knowledge from this study is the missing link between theory and practice in the implementations of UN mandates, its assessment in academic literature, and its appraisal of mission mandates and successes. This study brings to the fore, the need for greater synergy between the academia and the policy and field practitioners as critical to the realisation of sustainable peace.

At the empirical level, the local population do not share similar exactly visions as the mandate of the UN as they are eager to experience a peaceful, stable and prosperous nation. On the other hand, the UN mandate which seeks to bring about the basis level of order to enable state control is adjudged by officials as having delivered in line with its mandate. It can be argued that the common reference to an elusive peace in the DRC does not ring equally both within and outside the UN for this reason.

At the theoretical level, scholarly the dichotomy between operational and academic lenses of assessment are best reflected in the gap between the framing of Liberal Peace in the literature and as stabilisation in the field of implementation of the MONUSCO mandate in the DRC. This study contributes to knowledge by opening up this important angle for further academic inquiry.

8.4 Recommendations

This study recommends as follows:

1. Further grounded research to close the conceptual gaps between the theory (academia) and the field (practice) in the framing of both the goals, nature and performance of UN missions.
2. There is a need for clearer communication of UN mission mandates so as to harmonize public expectations and mission operations in the context of peacekeeping missions.
3. There is equally, a need to develop base metrics for measuring progress in the execution of UN mission mandates, so that performance assessment at the academic level may be more reflective of mandate-dependent self-appraisal within the UN system.
4. As, the ultimate drivers of sustainable peace, the UN must embark on public sensitization towards reorienting the perception of the public of its messianic capacity and the expectation resulting from this, which shifts attention from the society itself and the midwife of peace and stability in the DRC.
5. The research community must interface more purposefully with their practitioners counterparts, for a better understanding of the scope of mandates, their strengths and potentials as one of many agents among many chain of stakeholders in the quest for sustainable peace. This can be achieved by developing an integrated field-relevant approach for studying UN peacekeeping mandates and commitments in the theatres of conflict like the DRC.
6. All stakeholder must endeavour to conscientise the populace to improve understanding between the people of the DRC and the UN mission regarding the scope of mandates and the parameters for measuring their success and effectiveness.

8.5 Conclusion

It is recognised that there is the imperative of reform as it was agreed in the past that MONUC was too big and expensive, in the same way, there are conscious effort to review MONUSCO operation with a view to making changes the MONUSCO mission. over the years, the DRC mission has gone through reconfiguration, seeing it through reforms aimed at making it more mobile, and tailored priorities to be in tune with the situation on the ground.

It was also admitted that the mission is presently in the process of introducing some changes possibly in its name in the coming year, and to also enable it work with greater flexibility so that it can better adapt to changing situations. The aim as insider KII's hint, it to ensure that the national government is in a position to manage the population independently, so as to take charge of the roles of governance fully. Success for the UN mission is not to maintain the government of the DRC but to support to such a stage where it is able to manage its security issues, especially at the state where such issues are such that they no longer pose a challenge to international peace and security requiring peacekeeping. MONUSCO's success would not be that it has achieved absolute peace but that it has brought the country to the level that can be managed by the national government, having helped it build the capacity to manage them internally. It is also deduced that a certain benchmark to be agreed with the government will determine when and how MONUSCO should withdraw in a way that it does not have to return, hence it is ensuring the government can manage any emerging challenges. Its goal would be to leave in a way that there is no relapse into conflict since the mission cannot return to intervene like it did in Haiti, because the Congo is difficult to reach. This is why the mission has placed a priority on empowering the government of the country at all levels.

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APPENDIXES

Ethical Clearance

UNIVERSITY OF THE
WITWATERSRAND
JOHANNESBURG



Research Office

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (NON-MEDICAL)

R14/49 Nyuykonge

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

PROTOCOL NUMBER: H21/05/38

PROJECT TITLE

The Role of Peace Missions in Sustaining Peace: The Case
of the Democratic of the Republic of Congo (DRC)

INVESTIGATOR(S)

Mr C Nyuykonge

SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT

Wits School of Governance/

DATE CONSIDERED

21 May 2021

DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE

Approved
Risk Level: Medium

EXPIRY DATE

16 September 2024

DATE

17 September 2021

CHAIRPERSON

(Professor J Knight)

cc: Supervisor : Professor S Zondi

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATOR(S)

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Secretary at Room 10004, 10th Floor, Senate House, University. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Non-Medical)

I/We fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the abovementioned research and I/we guarantee to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure to be contemplated from the research procedure as approved I/we undertake to submit an amendment of the protocol to the Committee. **I agree to completion of a regular progress report. For Minimal and Low studies, this is due annually on 31 December. For Medium and High Risk studies, this is due twice annually on 30 June and 31 December.**

Signature

Date

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER ON ALL ENQUIRIES

Interview Guide

Interview Guide

United Nations Peacekeeping Mission Field Personnel

1. How do you understand the Liberal Peace and Sustaining Peace frameworks of the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
2. What in your opinion, was the rationale for the UN's employment of liberal peacebuilding as the basis for its peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
3. To what extent, in your opinion, was the above achieved in the years during which liberal peace doctrine was adopted before shifting to sustaining peace?
4. Why in your opinion, has peace remained elusive in the DRC despite the years of operation peacekeeping operation?
5. How effectively has the adoption of liberal peace doctrine served in the mission to restore peace in the DRC?
6. Some have argued that the application of the liberal peace doctrine is an important factor behind the elusiveness of peace in the DRC despite over two decades of UN-led peacekeeping operation. What is your take on this?
7. In your view, how effectively did the liberal peace doctrine respond to and accommodate issues at the base of conflict in the DRC, including resource struggles and control?
8. What in your opinion, are the reasons for the ideological shift from liberal peace to sustaining peace as driving frameworks for the UN's operation in the DRC?
9. What are the drivers and ideological tenets of the new sustaining peace agenda?
10. What different prospects for peace does the new sustaining peace framework offer?
11. How does the new sustaining peace agenda improve upon, or relate with the processes founded on the liberal peace doctrine?
12. What are the enablers and inhibitors of sustainable peace that may affect the goals of stabilization and sustaining peace as set by the UN mission?
13. How is the new sustaining peace agenda influencing the UN's work on the ground in the DRC in new and radical ways different from the liberal peace doctrine?
14. What implications does the UN operation in the DRC have for the future of peacekeeping missions in Africa?

Interview Guide French

Guide d'entretien

Personnel de terrain de la Mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies

1. Comment comprenez-vous les cadres de paix libérale et de paix durable de la mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo ?
2. À votre avis, quelle était la justification de l'utilisation par l'ONU de la consolidation de la paix libérale comme base de son opération de maintien de la paix en République démocratique du Congo ?
3. Dans quelle mesure, à votre avis, ce qui précède a-t-il été réalisé au cours des années au cours desquelles la doctrine libérale de la paix a été adoptée avant de passer au maintien de la paix ?
4. Pourquoi à votre avis, la paix est-elle restée insaisissable en RDC malgré les années d'opération de maintien de la paix ?
5. Dans quelle mesure l'adoption d'une doctrine de paix libérale a-t-elle servi à la mission de restaurer la paix en RDC ?
6. Certains ont fait valoir que l'application de la doctrine de paix libérale est un facteur important derrière le caractère insaisissable de la paix en RDC malgré plus de deux décennies d'opération de maintien de la paix dirigée par l'ONU. Quelle est votre opinion à ce sujet ?
7. À votre avis, avec quelle efficacité la doctrine de paix libérale a-t-elle répondu et pris en compte les problèmes à la base du conflit en RDC, y compris les luttes et le contrôle des ressources ?
8. Selon vous, quelles sont les raisons du passage idéologique de la paix libérale à la paix durable en tant que cadres moteurs de l'opération de l'ONU en RDC ?
9. Quels sont les moteurs et les principes idéologiques du nouveau programme de paix durable ?
10. Quelles différentes perspectives de paix le nouveau cadre de paix durable offre-t-il ?
11. Comment le nouveau programme de maintien de la paix s'améliore-t-il ou s'articule-t-il avec les processus fondés sur la doctrine de paix libérale ?
12. Quels sont les catalyseurs et les inhibiteurs d'une paix durable qui peuvent affecter les objectifs de stabilisation et de maintien de la paix définis par la mission des Nations Unies ?
13. En quoi le nouveau programme de maintien de la paix influence-t-il le travail de l'ONU sur le terrain en RDC de manières nouvelles et radicales différentes de la doctrine de paix libérale ?
14. Quelles implications l'opération de l'ONU en RDC a-t-elle pour l'avenir des missions de maintien de la paix en Afrique ?

Consent Form (English)

CONSENT FORM

Title of project:

THE ROLE OF PEACE MISSIONS IN SUSTAINING PEACE: THE CASE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Name of researcher: Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge

I,, agree to participate in this research project. The research has
been explained to me and I understand what my participation will involve. I agree to the following:

(Please circle the relevant options below).

I agree that my participation will remain anonymous YES () NO ()

I agree that the researcher may use anonymous quotes in his / her research report YES () NO ()

I agree that the interview may be audio recorded YES () NO ()

I agree that the information I provide may be used in an anonymized format after this project has ended, for academic purposes by other researchers, subject to their own ethics clearance being obtained. YES () NO ()

Participant's signature:

Participant's Name:

Date:

Researcher's signature:

Researcher's name: Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge.

Date:

Consent Form French

FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT

Titre du projet :

LE ROLE DES MISSIONS DE PAIX DANS LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : LE CAS DE LA
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (RDC)

Nom du chercheur : Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge

Je,....., accepte de participer à ce projet de recherche.

La recherche m'a été expliquée et je comprends ce qu'implique ma participation. J'accepte ce qui suit :

(Veuillez encrer les options pertinentes ci-dessous).

J'accepte que ma participation reste anonyme

OUI (), NON ().

J'accepte que le chercheur utilise des citations anonymes dans son rapport de recherche

OUI (), NON ().

J'accepte que l'interview soit enregistrée en audio

OUI (), NON ().

J'accepte que les informations que je fournis puissent être utilisées dans un format anonymisé après la fin de ce projet, à des fins académiques par d'autres chercheurs, sous réserve de l'obtention de leur propre autorisation éthique.

OUI (), NON ().

Signature des participants :

Nom du participant :

Date:

Signature du chercheur :

Nom du chercheur : Wiykiynyuy Charles Nyuykonge.

Date:

Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE

THE ROLE OF PEACE MISSIONS IN SUSTAINING PEACE: THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC).

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Nyuykonge Charles and I am a PhD student at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, registered on student number 0611658J. As part of my studies, I have to undertake a research project, and I am carrying out this investigation under the supervision of Prof. Prof. Siphamandla Zondi. The study is titled: "The Role of Peace Missions in Sustaining Peace: the Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)", and it is aimed at examining whether, and how, if the UN's adoption of Liberal Peace-building as driving framework of its peacekeeping engagement in the DRC, helps to explain the elusiveness of peace in the country. It will also examine whether/how the new Sustaining Peace agenda offers hope for achieving and sustaining peace.

As part of this project, I would like to invite you to take part in answering this questionnaire. There will be no personal costs or benefits to you if you for participating in this project. You may withdraw at any time or choose not to answer any question if you do not want to. Your responses will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you experience any distress or discomfort at any point in this process, we will stop the interview or resume another time. If you require some support or counseling services as a result of the interview, these are available free of charge, 24/7, at LifeLine Johannesburg. Counselling appointments can be booked over the phone via: 011 728 1331. You may also call 0861 322 322, toll free. I shall assist in facilitating access to these services if necessary.

Section One: Bio Data

1. Gender:

- a. Male ();
- b. Female ();
- c. Not disclosed ().

2. Age

- a. Between 18-25 ()
- b. Between 26-35 ()
- c. Between 36-45 ()
- d. Between 46-55 ()
- e. Above 55 ().

3. Role/Job/ Career Line:

Questionnaire (French)

QUESTIONNAIRE LE ROLE DES MISSIONS DE PAIX DANS LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : LE CAS DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (RDC).

Cher Monsieur / Madame,

Je m'appelle Nyuykonge Charles et je suis doctorant à l'Université de Witwatersrand, Afrique du Sud, inscrit sous le numéro d'étudiant 0611658J. Dans le cadre de mes études, je dois entreprendre un projet de recherche, et je mène cette enquête sous la supervision du Prof. Prof. Siphamandla Zondi. L'étude est intitulée : « Le rôle des missions de paix dans le maintien de la paix : le cas de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) », et elle vise à examiner si, et comment, si l'adoption par l'ONU de la consolidation de la paix libérale comme moteur cadre de son engagement de maintien de la paix en RDC, contribue à expliquer le caractère insaisissable de la paix dans le pays. Il examinera également si/comment le nouveau programme pour le maintien de la paix offre l'espoir d'atteindre et de maintenir la paix.

Dans le cadre de ce projet, je vous invite à participer en répondant à ce questionnaire. Il n'y aura pas de coûts ou d'avantages personnels pour vous si vous participez à ce projet. Vous pouvez vous retirer à tout moment ou choisir de ne répondre à aucune question si vous ne le souhaitez pas. Vos réponses seront totalement confidentielles et anonymes.

Si vous ressentez de la détresse ou de l'inconfort à un moment quelconque de ce processus, nous arrêterons l'entretien ou reprendrons une autre fois. Si vous avez besoin de services de soutien ou de conseil à la suite de l'entretien, ceux-ci sont disponibles gratuitement, 24 heures sur 24, 7 jours sur 7, chez LifeLine Johannesburg. Les rendez-vous de conseil peuvent être pris par téléphone au : 011 728 1331. Vous pouvez également appeler le 0861 322 322, sans frais. J'aiderai à faciliter l'accès à ces services si nécessaire.

Section 1 : données biologiques

1. Sexe :

- a. Homme ()
- b. Femelle ()
- c. Non communiqué ()

2. Âge

- a. Entre 18-25 ()
- b. Entre 26-35 ()
- c. Entre 36-45 ()
- d. Entre 46-55 ()
- e. Au-dessus de 55 ()

3. Rôle/Emploi/Ligne de carrière :

- a. Membre de l'ONU/ Peacekeeper ()
- b. Société civile/organisations internationales ()
- c. Politicien/décideur local ()
- d. Académique/ Diplomate ()
- e. Communauté de réfugiés ()