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Title: The Making of Colonial Zimbabwe: Compromise of the Settler State
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THE MAKING OF COLONIAL ZIMBABWE:

COMPROMISE OF THE SETTLER STATE 1923 - 1929

I cannot quite get over the fact of the huge profits the Trusts make out of the tobacco which we are trying to grow out here by the sweat of our brows, or perhaps I should say the natives' ... The fact of Directors of the Trusts dying multimillionaires ... makes one wonder if they ever think of where all their money comes from and how it is that a few crumbs from their groaning tables are not let fall to enable the growers in Rhodesia, or in other parts of the world for that matter, to make a bare living ... (Minister of Agriculture and Lands, to High Commissioner, 9 March 1929)

Although international capital initially viewed the Referendum result and Southern Rhodesia's assumption of Responsible Government with considerable apprehension, its fears soon evaporated. It became clear that the alignment of domestic interests in 1920 had been a vote against the Chartered Administration rather than one unreservedly in favour of Responsible Government. The unity displayed in the 1920 elections by white farmers determined to bring Company rule to an end, was in tatters by 1922. A clear majority, mainly ranchers and tobacco planters for whom the South African market was essential, voted for Union; the remainder, primarily Mashonaland maize farmers keen to retain local produce markets for themselves, wanted Responsible Government.¹

Not only was the domestic bourgeoisie itself fragedented, but its electoral ties with organised white labour were tenu-

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ous and easily disturbed, making it extremely vulnerable to the deliberate process of penetration instituted by large capital from 1923 onwards. 'Three quarters of ... ~~[the]~~ electors may safely be said to possess no property whatsoever', observed Goldfields' Rhodesian manager,

the taxable population is extremely limited, and the mine and land-owning companies will, I have no doubt, become the chief source of revenue and be heavily dealt with I fear, perhaps to a very serious extent, unless they take vigorous steps to protect their interests ... ~~[At]~~ the coming election ... we must do what we can irrespective of party to return as many sound thinking men as we can.²

And Coghlan, as impatient of white labour's political pretensions as he was wary of its allegedly syndicalist tendencies,³ was only too ready to oblige. The colony, he said, needed a '"best man" Government'.⁴ In practice, this meant an open door to erstwhile opponents who 'have shown by their deeds as well as professions, that they have dropped Union'.⁵ By 1925, 'the General Manager of the British South Africa Company, the Manager of Wankie Collieries, the Manager of Rhodesia Railways and others from the Chambers of Mines' were all backbenchers on the Government side of the Legislative Assembly.⁶

The constitution, moreover, was hedged about with safeguards. Under the Letters Patent and Governor's Instructions of 1 September 1923, the authority of the Legislative Assembly was considerably circumscribed.

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Reserved clauses precluded it from passing laws 'whereby natives may be subject or made liable to any conditions, disabilities, or restrictions, to which persons of European descent are not also subjected or made liable'; from 'any law dealing with railways within the Colony until legislation had been passed adopting with necessary modifications the United Kingdom law dealing with Railway and Canal Commissioners and the Rates Tribunal provided for in the Railways Act, 1921'; and from 'any law altering ... arrangement ... relating to mining revenue or imposing any special taxation on minerals', as well as from any law amending the Constitution.⁷ Nor did the Assembly's legislative authority 'extend to extra-territorial matters'.⁸ Measures affecting the currency and the imposition of differential duties were also proscribed. Even the question of nationality fell outside of its sphere of competence; before 1949 Southern Rhodesian citizenship did not exist.⁹

Grudgingly handed over, 'pared down to the minimum, hemmed in with limitations and loaded with servitudes',¹⁰ the constitution fell well short of Responsible Government. It was, as some contemporaries appreciated, 'the next step towards complete self-government'.¹¹ In the meantime, it was designed to perform three main functions: 'to protect the rights of capital, prevent discriminatory legislation against Africans without Imperial sanction, and stop Southern Rhodesia from passing laws incompatible with the more general Rhodesia (interests of the Imperial connexion'.¹² The settled state form, in other words, was a carefully crafted compromise between local and metropolitan accumulation. As

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the dependent partner, the settler state was obliged to accept constitutional provisions seeking to guard against initiatives which might disturb the orderly accumulation of capital in general. Together, these factors produced a thoroughly conservative successor to the Chartered State, so much so that 'the average [Legislative Assembly] session of the 'twenties resembl[ed] more a well-conducted shareholders' meeting than a national convention'.¹³

Typically, though, most of the shares were held outside of the colony. Southern Rhodesia's mineral rights, railway system, asbestos mines, its only colliery and its daily press were all foreign-owned. The chrome industry was effectively in the grip of one foreign company and a handful of British and South African mining companies produced almost three-quarters of the territory's gold output. By contrast, foreign investment was much less prominent in agriculture. The only exceptions were the largest beef cattle ranches, the citrus industry, and the enormous acreage still held by the corporate survivors of the speculative 1890s.

The social formation inherited by the domestic bourgeoisie in 1923 was further distinguished by a uniquely concentrated pattern of ownership. 'The peculiarity of the Rhodesian economic field', wrote *Round Table* magazine, 'is that it contains practically only one capitalist - the powerful financial group which comprises the B.S.A. Company and its subsidiary companies'.¹⁴ As well as possessing the colony's mineral rights and railway system, both

of which enjoyed Imperial protection through the constitution's reserved clauses, the B.S.A. Company had fingers, occasionally a whole hand, in many pies. In 1925, it held an estimated 70 percent of the shares in Wankie Colliery Company Ltd, and owned the Mazoe Citrus Estates and a huge 2,5 million-acre cattle ranch at Nuanetsi. The Company was also significantly interested in Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd, in the Rhodesian & General Asbestos Corporation, in Goldfields of Rhodesia, and in other mining and exploration companies. And not least, through the foresight of its founder, Cecil Rhodes, and its continued association with Rand mining houses, the Company could invariably rely on a friendly press from the Argus Group, parent of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company which brought out Salisbury's *Rhodesia Herald* and Bulawayo's *Chronicle*.¹⁵ Consequently, by the mid-1920s, the B.S.A. Company itself, 'or through their associate companies ... [was] interested in not less than 60 percent of the traffic which travel[ed] over ... [Rhodesia] railways'.¹⁶

During the next decade, the corporate web described above was immeasurably strengthened by the development of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, especially once an elaborate railway rating system was set in place for the mutual benefit of the inter-linked railway, coal and copper companies. The resulting 'extensive and interlocking interests' were perfectly symbolised in the bulky figure of Sir Edmund Davis.¹⁷ Davis, an Australian who made a fortune from guano deposits off the coast of the Cape Colony, railway construction, and the cynical amalgamation in 1889 of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company with Rhodes and his backers

in order to ensure that a Royal Charter was granted to the B.S.A. Company, eventuall sat on the boards of more than 50 companies. At the time of his death in 1939, he was

Chairman and managing director of the Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd, Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Co. Ltd, Fanti Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd, and of East African Lands and Development Co. Ltd; Chairman of Bechuanaland Exploration Co. Ltd, Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd, Rhodesian & General Asbestos Corporation Ltd, Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Co. Ltd, African Chrome Mines Ltd, African Manganese Co. Ltd, Baluchistan Chrome Co. Ltd; Deputy Chairman of Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd, and Rhokana Corporation Ltd; and a director of the British South Africa Co., Mufulira Copper Mines Ltd, Northern Rhodesia Power Corporation Ltd, Southern Rhodesia Metals Ltd, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd, and of other enterprises.¹⁸

Powerful enough to 'make or break the Rhodesian economy',¹⁹ several times over, Davis often loomed large in the calculations of settler politicians. 'Everybody knows that the economic dictator of this country is Sir Edmund Davis', the House of Assembly was told. 'There may be a case of monarchy; but the King should not sit in an office in London, he should be a Rhodesian'.²⁰

On the few occasions that the settler government was moved to challenge the entrenched position of international capital, it came off worst. Invariably, it emerged from confrontation rumpled, perhaps clutching a new and shiny agreement which on close inspection revealed yet another compromise in big capital's favour. This was clearly the case when attempts to investigate the extent of absentee landlordism and tax unproductive land were emasculated,²¹ and was still more apparent when the government

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mounted a half-hearted assault against Rhodesia Railways. Because Southern Rhodesia's remoteness from world markets made the level of transport costs vitally important, railway rating policies were frequently and loudly disputed by settlers and by those companies excluded from the charmed circle of Chartered associates. For the settlers in particular, the railway companies had come to symbolise monopoly control over both the cost of their day-to-day living and their long-term prospects in the country, and at key moments had constituted an emotive rallying point against continued Chartered rule. 'The disease afflicting Rhodesia', sneered the Reform Committee in 1903, 'takes the form of a fine Imperialism degenerated at length into commercial avarice. The country has been made food for a monopoly, and is strangling to death within the grasp of the Rhodesia Railways Trust. This corporation of capitalists has sapped the resources of settlers and immigrants, drained the meagre profits of growing concerns, bled the funds of better established ones'.²²

Much to the chagrin of many colonists, this same 'corporation of capitalists' survived the ending of Chartered rule unscathed. Spokesmen who before the granting of Responsible Government had lamented the fact that 'in our case, instead of the Government of the country controlling the railways and protecting the public from the railways, the Government of the country was here to protect the railways against the people of the country',²³ afterwards found that they were constitutionally hamstrung in their efforts to reverse the equation. As Coghlan was also determined to foster a climate of business confidence in the fledgling colony, he therefore reacted cautiously at the start of his premiership to renewed protests by farmers and miners over high railway rates. The Government instituted a commission of enquiry into railway affairs, and after some bluster but strictly in accordance with

the constitution, passed the Railway Act of 1926 which set up a special tribunal to oversee the system.²⁴ 'In the place of the present régime, leaving the Railway Companies at liberty (a) to charge what they think proper for railway services and (b) to dissipate in dividends whatever portion of the railway receipts they think fit', explained the Government, 'a statutory control is established by which (a) charges are limited to the measure of the just remuneration of the capital employed and (b) dividends are restricted to the same limit, the balance being accumulated to an amount of £1,500,000, a sum which is kept in the control of an independent commission and applied for purposes of railway improvement'.²⁵

While the new Act undoubtedly strengthened the hand of settler governments, at least by comparison to what had gone before, it soon became apparent tht its successful operation depended too much on the personality of the commission's chairman, never mind the goodwill of the railway companies.²⁶ In addition, by glossing over the railways' financial history and capital structure (whose characteristic lack of liquidity was due in large measure to an excessive ratio of debenture [interest-bearing shares to ordinary capital]),²⁷ the Act did little to assuage popular suspicion that the capital of the companies concerned had been deliberately 'watered' or inflated in the past in order to maximise maintenance and renewal charges on debenture issues. As these annual fixed interest charges had first call on railway earnings, the Railway Act, so it was argued, only came into operation *after* most of the real profits had already been 'swallowed up by debenture interest (the debentures being held by friends of the B.S.A. Co.) so that there will be hidden from the public the colossal profits that are being made'.²⁸ Still other opponents of the Act

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who admittedly mixed innuendo with informed comment when dismissing it as leaving 'the Railway Company in full administrative and financial control of the railways',²⁹ nonetheless identified its fundamental weakness. In attempting to deal with Rhodesia Railways in isolation, the Act simply encouraged the juggling of profits from the railways to other B.S.A. Company concerns. 'By limiting the dividends of the railways, said Sir Hugh Williams, leader of the Reform Party, 'you have merely succeeded in making the railways, which should be used to develop this Colony, a pawn in other games. Profits that might have been made are diverted to promote other interests of this corporation'.³⁰

Two years after the passage of the Railway Act, settler politicians were afforded a rare glimpse of how certain of these interests interacted in practice when Government policy momentarily threatened to disturb the cosy relationship between the railway companies and their friends. At stake was the construction of a branch railway line to open up chrome deposits in the Umvukwes region. As the proposed line would benefit small independent producers to the detriment of the huge Chrome Trust in which the B.S.A. Company was interested, the railway companies refused to cooperate. Their opposition made it quite plain 'that where chrome was concerned the railways were controlled from St. Swithin's Lane', the headquarters of the Trust.³¹ Angry cabinet ministers, denouncing the companies for 'usurping a function which is not theirs', emphasised that railways should 'develop countries as well as ... sell transport'. 'Those functions', said the Minister of Mines and Public Works, 'must be looked at from the public utility point of view, not from that of a C.O.D. merchant'.³² Deadlock ensued, but for once it was shortlived because the Government was able to play off the Trust against another large group, and Rhodesia Railway

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were forced to give way. The victory was nullified, however, when the newcomer was soon afterwards swallowed by the Trust (see below) and with monopolistic conditions restored, rates on the branch line were manipulated to the disadvantage of the remaining small mines.³³

Apart from this brief interlude, international capital was left in unchallenged possession of base mineral mining. In 1923, shortly before surrendering its administrative powers, the Chartered Company tightened its already powerful grip on Southern Rhodesia's coal deposits by making over an exclusive prospecting area of 880 square miles to Wankie Colliery. The grant was to last for 30 years, and practically eliminated the possibility of a rival colliery being started. Not content with rewarding its acumen with an additional 40 000 paid-up Colliery shares, the B.S.A. Company then presided over an imaginative reconstruction of Wankie Colliery Company Ltd. In an exercise designed to hide the real return to capital, shareholders were allotted three shares in a new company of the same name for every two shares previously held, as a result of which issued share capital increased by £313 670 to £881 001. Even so, the Colliery, which increasingly came to occupy a pivotal position in the mining economy of Central Africa, provided its owners with an average annual dividend of almost 14 percent between 1924 and 1938.³⁴

For much of the 1920s, Southern Rhodesia's asbestos production was dominated by the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation, and by the Asbestos Corporation, a subsidiary of the large British asbestos manufacturing and marketing combine, Turner and Newall. Although worked locally as far back as 1908, asbestos was first mined in significant quantities during the First World

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War. Expanding world demand encouraged the B.S.A. Company and its allies, notably the Charterland and General Exploration and Finance Company and the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, to invest heavily in the newly attractive industry, but only after amalgamating their interests in order to prevent over-production. 'We desire to obtain control of the Rhodesia asbestos trade', explained the ubiquitous Edmund Davis, '... and in the course of time, not only build up a large industry but create a name for Rhodesian asbestos in markets all over the world, as it is the only way to make a success of the venture and obtain a satisfactory return on the very large amount of capital which will have to be invested in the concern'.³⁵ Registered in 1917, the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corporation was responsible for almost three-quarters of the colony's output by 1926. Its only serious rival was Turner and Newall's Asbestos Corporation which had buttressed its southern African position by buying up weaker companies during the recession.³⁶

The two corporations, however, shared a common interest in securing a place for southern African asbestos in the world market. The Davis group in particular waged a savage price-cutting war against Canadian producers in the mid-twenties, despite which both African concerns regularly paid high dividends. Their competitive edge was supplied by the low cost of black labour and by the informal vertical integration of their mining and manufacturing interests. And when international competition again intensified at the end of the decade following the introduction of moulded brake linings which lessened demand for the previously most profitable grades of asbestos, informal cooperation was quickly transformed into formal merger. In 1929, Rhodesian and General shareholders were invited to exchange their holdings for shares in/

in Turner and Newall, thus cementing monopoly production in southern Africa to British marketing and manufacturing organisation. By the time the Great Depression caused base mineral prices to fall still further Turner and Newall were powerful enough to insist on an important share of the dwindling world market. An arrangement was reached with the Soviet Union, the only other major producer of asbestos apart from Canada, 'in collaboration with the principal consumers in Europe, with a view to the stabilisation of the market on a basis satisfactory to all concerned'. Russia promised not to dump surplus asbestos on the European market, while Turner and Newall agreed to curtail their Southern Rhodesian operations. By 1931, local asbestos mines were working at two-thirds capacity.³⁷

In the chrome industry, the story was much the same, only more so. Output was effectively determined by one international company whose control on a world scale of production and marketing allowed it to influence prices and make national production decisions without reference to its host countries. Initial development of Southern Rhodesia's various chrome deposits had been in the hands of a number of smallworkers and companies who had found it individually impossible to break into the world market. Davis' Bechuanaland Exploration Company, for example, was told by 'a firm who apparently control about two-thirds of the trade ... that for the next two or probably three years the Companies interested in Rhodesia will not be able to dispose of any large quantity of Chrome Ore owing to contracts having been made from New Caledonia, Turkey and other countries for forward delivery'.³⁹ Realising that they had 'to do away with possible ruinous competition' among themselves, most of the territory's leading chrome producers amalgamated/

TABLE IX: ASBESTOS, CHROME AND COAL PRODUCTION, 1908 - 1932³⁸

YEAR	ASBESTOS		CHROME		COAL	
	Tons	£ Value	Tons	£ Value	Tons	£ Value (inc. coke)
1908	55	550	13 358	37 024	164 114	61 907
1909	272	2 725	25 620	60 420	170 893	77 313
1910	332	3 320	44 002	98 132	180 068	88 223
1911	460	6 396	52 363	116 965	212 529	92 193
1912	-	-	69 261	154 600	216 140	73 268
1913	290	5 224	63 383	141 480	243 328	78 431
1914	487	8 612	48 207	107 612	349 459	115 099
1915	2 010	32 130	60 581	175 792	409 763	123 194
1916	6 157	99 059	88 871	333 170	491 582	131 468
1917	9 562	189 890	72 962	327 347	548 954	179 588
1918	8 574	158 684	31 286	134 857	491 268	164 851
1919	9 800	425 240	35 283	142 541	510 040	189 138
1920	18 823	459 572	60 269	245 378	578 492	252 220
1921	19 529	795 699	50 188	195 360	574 753	256 815
1922	14 249	577 699	93 475	302 880	515 610	225 345
1923	20 364	626 880	96 675	244 582	617 297	252 011
1924	26 141	603 423	172 724	432 482	652 049	265 992
1925	34 349	766 381	135 827	337 317	759 718	324 511
1926	33 344	726 835	181 194	420 334	963 579	399 229
1927	33 176	794 215	218 018	490 653	1 001 724	419 700
1928	39 960	970 327	219 428	471 667	1 206 864	511 819
1929	42 634	1 186 627	293 116	674 937	1 142 900	516 649
1930	37 766	1 070 847	226 671	519 581	1 034 785	476 773
1931	24 042	386 494	89 974	224 186	647 341	304 514
1932	15 766	197 092	17 298	33 732	482 925	223 381

mated their interests in June 1908 to form Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd, and promptly flung thier combined resources into battle against established competitors.⁴⁰ 'In the Chrome proposition', recalled Davis,

we fought the price steadily down from 67s. 6d. to 40s., and then, luckily, the French owners of the New Caledonian proposition were satisfied that we should fight them to a standstill and offered to sell out. We formed a Company to acquire their property with a capital of £190,000 ... Those interested in the Rhodesian chrome proposition found this large amount of capital, most loyal assistance being given by the British South Africa Company, which recognised the absolute necessity of acquiring the Caledonian proposition to safeguard the position of the Rhodesian.⁴¹

Production thereafter grew dramatically, until at the peak of war-time demand in 1916 almost 90 000 tons valued at £333 170 were exported.

During the 1920s it suited the Chrome Trust to expand its Rhodesian activities to the point where the colony accounted for over half of the world's production in 1929. Three years later output slumped to eight percent of the world total because of the Depression and because the Trust's production strategies changed in order to eliminate a regional competitor. For some time past, a rival grouping had been expanding production in southern Africa, and it seems that the Trust utilised the contraction in the world market caused by the Depression, along with its access to chrome production and supplies outside of Africa, to 'shut out' its rival's chrome. By early 1932, enough pressure had been exerted, and the Trust bought up the opposition.⁴²

During/ ...

During this entire exercise, the settler government sat powerless to intervene, beyond denunciations in the Legislative Assembly of those 'who control in Rhodesia every other form of life, who control the chrome, the copper and the asbestos, and will subject those people engaged in those industries to desolation because it suits their market manipulations'.⁴³

Settler experiences in agriculture were equally unhappy. At the time of Responsible Government, capitalist agriculture (almost exclusively white in complexion) comprised a mass of small, undercapitalised farmers around a core of big concerns, either individually or company owned. Smallholding aside,⁴⁴ estates ranged in size from the enormous 'spreads' covering hundreds of thousands of acres owned by a dozen or so land and ranching companies; to the 10 - 20 000-acre plantations of 'older established' farmers; down to the 2 - 4 000-acre farms common 'where capital is limited'.⁴⁵ As a rule, holdings were larger in the dryer and hotter parts of the country, specifically Matabeleland and southern Mashonaland. Altogether, an estimated 2 500 white farmers occupied 31,2 million acres in 1925.⁴⁶ Precisely how these figures were disaggregated structurally is not clear, but in 1950, the first year for which detailed and reliable census returns on this subject are available, over 41 percent of the total area alienated to 'European agriculture' was accounted for by less than three percent of the total number of holdings. Farms between 1 000 and 5 000 acres were most numerous but although they represented 57,30 percent of the total number they only covered slightly over 27 percent of the/

the 'white' countryside. Fully 80 percent were owner-occupied.⁴⁷

Production too was highly concentrated. In 1933, the four biggest cattle owners in the country, 'that is, 1.4 percent of those on the roll of the Stockowners' Association, owned 54 percent of the European cattle herd', while a decade earlier, 17 farmers, representing '8 percent of the members of the Maize Association, [had] contributed 195 000 bags or almost half (45.4%) of the total European [maize] crop'.⁴⁸ Put another way, 139 so-called 'Mealie Kings' out of 1 344 maize growers were responsible for more than half the total production.⁴⁹

In large measure, this reflected the varying degree to which farms and ranches were capitalised. Although most agricultural enterprises in Southern Rhodesia were notoriously undercapitalised, there were important exceptions. These included the B.S.A. Company's own estates, Liebigs, later on the Rhodesia Land, Cattle & Ranching Corporation at Nuanetsi, and perhaps upwards of 150 individuals, most notably D. Black R. D. Gilchrist, O. C. Rawson and J. A. Edmonds. Almost from the start, these producers imported agricultural machinery and artificial fertilisers. The primary stimulus for this development was the shortage of agricultural labour which lasted from the turn of the century until about 1912. 'The rapidity with which Rhodesian farmers are securing machinery is astonishing when the cost is considered', observed the Agricultural Department in 1904. 'Disc ploughs, disc harrows, and the best horse-hoes are found on the majority of farms. Mealie drills are common, mowing machines are coming into general use ... Hay rakes, shredders, bailing presses/

presses, winnowers, seeders, potato-planters, and potato-ploughs are numerous. Windmills and graders are becoming more common'.⁵⁰ A petrol-driven tractor costing £343 was brought out to a large farm near Salisbury, and even traction engines and steam ploughs were imported by those who could afford not to wait for supplies of trained oxen to become available again, or for quarantine restrictions to be lifted in the wake of East Coast Fever.⁵¹ By 1905, the planting, cultivating, reaping and shredding of maize were all mechanised on the B.S.A. Company's Premier Estate, outside Umtali. On the same estate, so readers of the *Rhodesian Agricultural Journal* were informed, fertiliser imported at a cost of £10 - 12 per ton had 'more than doubled the yield of potatoes'.⁵² Thereafter, the rate of mechanisation slackened as the industry's capacity to pay for additional imports was exhausted and the supply of labour slowly improved. Only the biggest producers persisted with the introduction of 'steam and oil ploughing outfits'. 'Costly machinery of this description', noted the Director of Agriculture in 1913, 'must be constantly employed in order to prove remunerative; and is not purchased by the small farmer or the beginner'.⁵³

The same group of large-scale producers were virtually the only ones who practised scientific farming. In particular, they worked at improving yields through the careful selection of seed and the importation of pedigreed livestock. By 1910, Edmonds, for example, whose farm 'Glen Lorne' close to Salisbury bore witness to 'skilled methods of carrying on agricultural work', already provided oat seed 'of good

germination/

germination which commands a ready sale to all parts of the country'.⁵⁴ As the agricultural industry's pace settlers, they were prominently featured in the pages of the *Rhodesia[n] Agricultural Journal*, and were frequent exhibitors on local and South African agricultural shows, even making a clean sweep of the prestigious Rand Show in 1919.⁵⁵

By contrast, the great majority of white farmers were perennially short of money, and possessed only the most rudimentary agricultural knowledge. The Chartered Administration and later settler governments consistently underestimated the amount of capital needed to establish intending settlers on the land. Between 1908 and 1928, callers at the London Head Office of the Company or Rhodesia House were told that all they required was £500 - 1 000. In part, such advice stemmed from cynical appreciation of Southern Rhodesia's limited appeal to people of means. 'The type of settler which is most needed ... is the one most difficult to secure', reported Wilson Fox, 'not only because other Colonies compete for it, but because a first-class man with capital can make a good living at home'. Instead, the Company deliberately set its sights on would-be colonists 'with insufficient capital ... [as] the class which is most promising for Rhodesian purposes', and by 1924 had managed to entice 6 557 men, women and children into its domain. Total capital introduced by these immigrants was £2 338 562.⁵⁶

Settlement schemes supposedly compensated for inadequate capital either by recruiting experienced farmers or by making provision for agricultural training inside Southern Rhodesia itself. To some extent, the first criterion was met in South

Africa,/

Africa, but recruiting campaigns pursued overseas were frequently clouded by the social posturing of politicians.

'What the country needed', declared Godfrey Huggins in the Legislative Assembly, 'were young men who had "fagged at school and have been flogged at school"'.⁵⁷ Disillusioned managers of the B.S.A. Company's central training farms soon found that their charges preferred 'to ride and shoot and have an easy time'. 'The young fellows who come out to learn farming do not as a rule see the necessity of downright strenuous labour', commented Sir Lewis Michell.⁵⁸

Never one to throw good money after bad, the Company closed down the training side of its farms, all of them by 1916,⁵⁹ and simply concentrated on promoting land sales until the Privy Council decision of 1918 caused it to lose interest. After 1923, selection procedure, already less than rigorous, was loosened by settler governments pledged to encourage white settlement in the countryside. Attracted by stories of Central Africa's seemingly boundless agricultural possibilities and subsidised by the Imperial Government's postwar Empire Settlement scheme, hundreds of aspirant farmers and planters descended on the colony. Among them was the Tayler family, whose five-year-old daughter was to become known to later generations as Doris Lessing.⁶⁰ Over 2 000 settlers entered Southern Rhodesia between 1925 and 1928, but due to 'very lax [selection] ... during the cotton and tobacco boom ... many men [who] were allowed to ... take up land were entirely unsuitable'.⁶¹

Several decades of playing fast and loose with land settlement policy created a large and expanding constituency of/

of white farmers who lived from hand to mouth. Indeed, the general character of settler agriculture had changed quite markedly in the process. Whereas in 1910 'the average farmer ... [was] a man of substance, and often of experience and education as well',⁶² by the 1920s the reverse was true. Most immigrant farmers found the process of 'buying their own experience' ruinously expensive,⁶³ and few of them could 'withstand the strain ... [of] an adverse season'. No less than 401 out of 1 185 land title grants issued by the Chartered Administration were relinquished in the period 1913 - 1921.⁶⁴ Average income in 1922, an admittedly 'bad' year, was only £146, and by 1924 hundreds of farmers still on the land were close to financial collapse. Of 2 400 farmers liable for quitrent, 1 525 were in arrears.⁶⁵ In 1927, at the height of the tobacco boom, white farmers earned an annual average income of £214, still well below the £300 p.a. officially deemed necessary to maintain a rural family of three or four in comfort.⁶⁶

When the tobacco market slumped in 1928, farmers' incomes fell accordingly. A chastened Ministry of Agriculture conducted an investigation into the agricultural industry's capitalisation, and belatedly conceded that the settlement policies implemented by previous administrations had invited disaster. According to Departmental calculations,

The farmer's dwelling furnished complete must not cost more than £250; he is allowed two cows and £5 worth of poultry, and his living expenses must not exceed £120. He cannot, however, get out of paying the merchants some big bills; he must, among other things, buy a plough at £42 10s., a disc-harrow at £32 10s.,

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a planter at £25, and a wagon at £110. In all the new settler has spent at the end of the first year a total of £1 225, but even if he is lucky enough to have got in his "estimated revenue" he cannot go on as he finds himself facing the second year's expenditure with a shortage of £300. The lowest estimate of capital, therefore, which will enable this frugal farmer to continue, after the first year, to develop the many virtues he must possess, is placed at £1 500.⁶⁷

As this estimate made no allowance for the purchase or lease of a farm, nor any provision for 'such items of expense as medical services, school fees, erection of dipping tank, cart and mules or car',⁶⁸ it was clear that most settlers on the land had started farming operations with approximately half the amount of capital they actually needed to have a reasonable chance of success.

The other side of the coin of inadequate capital and inexperience was amateurism and opportunism. Agricultural loans were sometimes misused to 'pay off pressing personal bills' and to support a 'disastrously widespread ... sun-downer habit'.⁶⁹ Private capital, when available, was often frittered away. An early observer of the white farming scene noted money spent on 'greyhounds for coursing buck', while stockyards were left unfenced.⁷⁰ Housing sometimes received disproportionate expenditure to the detriment of productive investment, but most common was the purchase of unsuitable equipment and stock. Farms were bought, crops selected and fields laid out in almost total ignorance of local conditions. Typically, a farmer would

tramp/

tramp his thousand dry acres, shoulder high in majestic grass, or he would trace the gentle slopes of a river valley or vlei and decide perhaps to try cotton? Surely cotton climates differed little enough from this, and the soil looked all right - see the marvellous grass! Or perhaps he would think, 'Jove, what a mealie field this will make, with maize at £1 a bag my fortune will be made!' Perhaps the young farmer would favour the hills and his farm would lie among the rough and rugged little kopjies piled high with lichenised granite boulders and wooded with slender trees. 'Cattle!' he would think, and his imagination sprang to the growing towns of Salisbury and Umtali and he could see his animals loaded into the open trucks and shuttling regularly to the abattoirs in the towns.⁷¹

Farming methods were generally poor, and once established proved difficult to eradicate, not least because of the chronically undercapitalised state of most producers. As early as 1911, the Government Agriculturalist pointed to evidence from 'the older established farms in the Rhodesian maize belt that continuous cropping is tending to reduce the average acre yield'.⁷² While some farmers acted on the warning, the majority were precluded from following suit by the prohibitive price of artificial fertilisers.⁷³ By 1927, the low average maize yield was attributed, among other reasons, to 'dirty [i.e. weed-choked] lands, due probably to the grower planting out a bigger acreage than can be properly worked, [and] planting too close, with the result that the cobs are stunted and in many cases no cobs form'.⁷⁴ 'Poor or starved soil' had become a major problem because of the inability/

inability or reluctance of most farmers to use fertilisers. Even green manuring was economically impossible for most producers. The cultivation of green crops for ploughing under occupied fields which might otherwise carry cash crops. Few planters could postpone short-term returns for long-term viability. During the 1928-9 season, less than one percent of white farmers growing maize used green manure.⁷⁵

But the crude and cost-cutting methods employed by small farmers were not entirely attributable to inexperience and undercapitalisation. In most cases, agricultural practice was determined by an additional consideration. Farming, in the opinion of many, was very much a 'speculative gamble'.⁷⁶ Starting from just before the First World War, Southern Rhodesia's soils were 'mined' or robbed of their value for over a generation by settlers desperately keen to 'get-rich-quick'.⁷⁷ Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, small farmers tended to 'rush' from crop to different crop in search of the riches which had so far eluded them. The tobacco industry in particular was periodically seized with speculative fever. At the time of the first tobacco boom of 1912-14, one favoured region, Marandellas, 'was almost like a mining camp, so full was it of eager young (and old) speculators'.⁷⁸ In the mid-twenties land was again hastily taken up by hundreds of new planters, eager to make their fortunes and easily persuaded, in the words of the novelist Gertrude Page, that 'in Rhodesia, you ... [could] grow lots of things by chiefly looking at niggers'.⁷⁹ These were the so-called 'stoep farmers' who 'cultivated their crops from the veranda of Meikles Hotel, the great social gathering place/

place in Salisbury'.⁸⁰ 'Taken as a whole, concluded the colony's Chief Agriculturalist in 1928

they have not yet got down to solid serious farming ... instances are numerous where, after years spent on the same farm, the owner is no nearer to a settled policy and a solid basis to his business than when he started. There are also many cases where second best methods are thought to be good enough, but in farming there is no greater fallacy than this. The only man who will succeed on the land is the one with a clearly thought out and settled policy ... and above all who brings to every operation of the farm ... a maximum standard of efficiency. Today these conditions are far from being realised. Some farms are over-stocked. Very few farmers grow sufficient of the most suitable food crops for the requirements of their livestock. Winter ploughing is widely neglected, poor ploughing is of common occurrence, planting is often delayed unduly late, and weeds are not adequately controlled ... Many non-successes are unquestionably due to lack of system ... and to dropping one line of activity before it has been fully studied in order to snatch at something newer and apparently more attractive.⁸¹

It was a phenomenon which both imparted an extraordinarily volatile element to the volume of production, and aggravated the highly uneven productivity of commercial agriculture as a whole. Indeed, white farmers seemed destined to share the fate of the biblical swine of Gadarene, until the state was eventually persuaded to provide safety nets for those who successively hurled themselves over the 'cliffs' of cattle, cotton, tobacco and maize.

TABLE/

TABLE X: MAIZE, TOBACCO AND COTTON PRODUCTION, 1920-9⁸²

	MAIZE		TOBACCO (Virginian)		COTTON	
	Production (Bags)	Value £	Production (lbs)	Value £	Production (lbs)	Value £
1920/1	1 220 768	672 000	3 193 000	121 000	-	-
1921/2	662 636	387 000	2 880 000	215 000	-	-
1922/3	1 505 580	364 000	2 541 000	174 000	-	-
1923/4	1 080 084	565 000	3 426 000	154 000	1 691 000	-
1924/5	1 068 904	594 000	1 987 000	216 000	5 888 000	41 000
1925/6	1 393 654	481 000	5 313 000	141 000	8 220 000	77 000
1926/7	1 659 597	697 000	18 631 000	393 000	735 000	76 000
1927/8	1 268 100	808 000	24 491 000	1 731 000	114 000	4 000
1928/9	1 826 345	666 000	6 704 000	779 000	339 000	2 000
1929/30	1 917 252	762 000	5 494 000	271 000	1 906 000	4 000

TABLE XI: MAIZE YIELDS BY SIZE OF PRODUCER, 1921-9⁸³

Size of Maize Producer	No. of Producers	Maize Acreage by size of Producer	Average Maize Acreage per Farm	Yield per Acre (bags)	Average Harvest per Farm (bags)	Total Crop (bags)
301 acres plus						
1921/2	139	74 000	534	4,95	2 648	368 000
1928/9	258	153 000	594	6,52	3 870	998 000
201 to 300 acres						
1921/2	113	30 000	268	3,79	1 016	115 000
1928/9	175	46 000	263	5,53	1 456	255 000
101 to 200 acres						
1921/2	178	28 000	156	2,50	392	70 000
1928/9	398	61 000	153	5,15	789	314 000
100 acres or less						
1921/2	914	37 000	40	1,84	74	68 000
1928/9	1 451	65 000	45	3,99	179	259 000

In the early 1920s, the need to find cattle export markets had become urgent.⁸⁴ A large and fairly indiscriminate wartime demand which had helped cattle owners build up an export trade, gave way in 1921-2 to recession and falling prices. Southern Rhodesian ranches were particularly hard-hit because most of their animals were low-grade. The colony's small domestic market was quite unable to absorb significant numbers, and as the surplus grew, so prices were further depressed. Average export prices received for cattle fell from about £18 per head in 1921 to approximately £5 in 1922 and 1923.⁸⁵

Ranchers initially tried to market their cattle by mobilising domestic capital in co-operative ventures. A canning factory was set up in 1919 at Odzi, near Umtali, but went out of business within three years. To some extent, this was due to the familiar problem of undercapitalisation. Capital raised by subscription had been fully 'absorbed in the erection of the Factory and they had [subsequently] run on capital borrowed from the bank'. A more important reason for failure was the tremendous competition encountered in the post-war meat market. The entire canning industry was depressed by the surplus stocks of canned meats off-loaded by the British and American governments at the end of the First World War. In addition, the big American packing houses were reported as 'selling corned beef to Germany at a low price and giving 12 to 18 months credit, so that they could get rid of their stocks and cut their losses', while even the adjacent South African market was lost to subsidised Australian canners.

A second attempt was made in 1921 when the co-operative Meat Producers' Exchange was established. Although the Exchange included cattle owners throughout southern Africa, two-thirds of its working capital came from Southern Rhodesia. Its professed aim of securing 'fair' prices by limiting supplies and by-passing the middlemen who infested the important Johannesburg market aroused enormous hostility amongst vested interests, and after some brief success the Exchange was aborted through the shadowy actions of the Imperial Cold Storage Company. From the moment that the Exchange established 'close relations' with the Rand Cold Storage Company over the huge 'compound trade' along the Reef, its fate was sealed. Unknown to the Exchange, the R.C.S. Company was itself 'closely connected' to the I.C.S. Company. This fact was manipulated to draw the Exchange into a dependent relationship secured by a series of large and mostly unnecessary loans. The simmering resentment felt by many South African cattle owners at the strongly Rhodesian 'flavour' of the Exchange readily lent itself to a campaign designed to destroy confidence in its management, and when rumours of this kind reached banking ears, the Exchange was obliged to look elsewhere for capital. It did not have to look very far, however. Three of its company members obligingly stepped forward with a £20 000 loan, repayable on call, in return for which they placed their own nominees on the Exchange's board of directors. It only later transpired that two of the companies concerned, the B.S.A. Company and Liebigs, had compelling reasons for coming to terms with the Rand's dominant cold storage interests. Through Rhodes and De Beers, the B.S.A. Company was linked by sentiment and hard cash to the I.C.S. Company, while Liebigs

relied heavily on the Rand as a market for slaughter cattle. The newly-enlarged board of directors lost no time in moving the Exchange away from its past 'co-operative practice'. A new business manager, responsible only to the board which appointed him, promptly borrowed a further £30 000, this time from the R.C.S. Company, his former employer. When ordinary members objected to this and other dubious transactions, the R.C.S. Company stopped distributing meat supplies from the Exchange. Two large mining groups thereupon cancelled their contracts, an action which cost the co-operative almost half their trade. The back of the Meat Producers' Exchange was effectively broken and in May 1923 it was forced into liquidation.⁸⁶

As a result, ranchers turned to the state for help, and ironically enough, an invitation was extended to the I.C.S. Company to come in by the front door. Sensitive to charges that its policy was 'equivalent to handing over Rhodesia, bound hand and foot, to the mercies of interests that ... in other countries are regarded as the enemies of cattle producers',⁸⁷ the settler government tried hard to interest other large companies in proposals to establish a meat freezing industry in the colony, but with no success. Southern Rhodesia's remoteness from the major world meat markets, specifically Britain, and the limited number and generally poor quality of its cattle held little attraction for established American and British meat packing trusts. Vestey's the biggest of the British firms, whose operations embraced South America, Australia, New Zealand and Madagascar, as well as refrigerated steam ships and almost 4 000 retail outlets/

outlets in Britain, 'would not consider working in Africa, much less Rhodesia under any circumstances'. Rhodesia, said Lord Vestey, 'had not the cattle or the country to compete with South America'.⁸⁸ Only Liebig's, largely interested in low-grade cattle for its meat extract works, had found the colony to be a suitable base for its operations, and then only after extracting every imaginable concession from the B.S.A. Company.⁸⁹

With no real choice in the matter, particularly once the South African government imposed weight restrictions on live cattle imports in 1924,⁹⁰ Southern Rhodesia had to content itself with the I.C.S. Company. Although of overwhelming regional importance, the I.C.S. Company was insignificant outside southern Africa. Even so, it was only coaxed into Southern Rhodesia by an agreement, confirmed in 1924, which among other benefits, gave it a ten-year monopoly over the export of frozen and chilled meat. Moreover, the company was guaranteed that if in any year its profits fell below ten percent of its capital, the state would make up the difference to a maximum of £15 000.⁹¹ The agreement worked smoothly at first, but began to break down over the provision calling for the development of exports to overseas markets. These markets, while better-paying than anything in Africa, demanded larger quantities of quality beef at lower prices than the settlers could regularly supply.⁹² For its part, the I.C.S. Company was too small to force its way into major world markets, especially as the period 1925-7 was one of cut-throat competition. This was the era of the so-called 'Meat War', during which the major trusts eliminated smaller competitors and fought over the size of their shipping quotas and/

and market shares.⁹³ The I.C.S. Company's energies anyway were dissipated by efforts to corner the large meat trade generated by Katanga's copper mines, where it was soon embroiled with another regional *eminence grise*, the 'villainous Mr Bongola Smith'. Smith, whose business empire was centred in Brussels, was also largely interested in the cattle trade, and between him and the I.C.S. Company, it was widely regarded as 'a dirty game, and a network of intrigue covering Cape Town, Salisbury, Bulawayo, Livingstone, Elizabethville, Brussels and New York'.⁹⁴ The Southern Rhodesian government, concerned that the I.C.S. Company's intervention in the Congo would lead to price-cutting at the expense of ranchers exporting cattle on the hoof, objected to the colony's freezing works being used for purposes other than the development of overseas trade. After considerable wrangling, in which the I.C.S. Company insisted that it needed financial help if it was to bid competitively on international markets, a fresh agreement was patched together. An export bounty was instituted, and in 1929 the company at last won an Italian contract for 8 000 tons of beef. But the bounty notwithstanding, it still lost money, and the cattle industry remained as far, perhaps further, from establishing itself on lucrative export markets as it had been at the start of the decade.⁹⁵

By this time, the plight of tobacco planters was desperate. Their traumatic experience really began in 1924 when Rhodesian tobacco, painfully recovered from its fall ten years previously, was favourably received at the Wembley Empire Exhibition in London. In the same period the relative profitability/

profitability of tobacco cultivation had been considerably enhanced by the slump in cattle and maize prices precipitated by the recession of 1921-2, and by the related increase in the supply of black labour which facilitated a shift towards this labour-intensive branch of production without inducing significant upward pressure on wages.⁹⁶ Prices and prospects went higher still when in July 1925 Britain increased imperial preference on tobacco by 50 percent, causing Southern Rhodesian growers to turn their backs on the South African market which had previously filled their horizons, and concentrate on meeting what they thought was Britain's huge demand. 'Many of the largest independent manufacturers in Great Britain, as well as representatives of the Imperial Tobacco Company ... [are] all pleased with the quality of Rhodesian tobacco and keen to do business', enthused the *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal* in 1925, '[but] until such time as there is a larger permanent supply, say, seven to eight million pounds annually, of Southern Rhodesian tobacco for sale in England, our tobacco will only be used for blending purposes ... The amount available must be increased and the continuity of supply assured in order to obtain the full benefit which this market offers'.⁹⁷

With prices in 1925 and 1926 far in excess of low production costs, white farmers abandoned cotton and maize growing for the 'leaf of gold':⁹⁸ 'all eyes are turned on tobacco. Every farmer one meets talks about it and very handsome profits have been made or are anticipated being made as a result of this year's crop'.⁹⁹ The industry's expansion was startling. Acreage planted with virginian

leaf/

leaf approximately doubled every year for four years; from 7 500 in 1925 to 13 000 in 1926 to 30 000 in 1927 to an estimated 50 - 60 000 in 1928. The number of planters also increased rapidly, from 189 in 1925 to 763 in 1927. By 1928, the tobacco industry boasted 3 000 curing barns, 500 grading sheds and 700 bulking sheds, accommodating the 24,4 million lbs produced by 50 000 black labourers and 987 planters.¹⁰⁰

The bubble was not long in bursting. 'In retrospect', admitted the industry's chroniclers, 'there is something almost pathetic about a group of ingenuous and isolated farmers sitting in their rustic high-ceilinged boardroom in the village which was Salisbury, blundering confidently into the vortex of international financial and political interest. Visitors told them their tobacco was good; they were learning the art of growing it; there seemed no logical reason why they should not be able to sell it'.¹⁰¹ In fact, a very large proportion of the gigantic crops of 1927 and 1928 was of extremely poor quality. Inexperience in the case of newcomers to the industry was compounded by greed on the part of established planters. 'The tendency to go beyond the reasonable limits of available finance greatly hampers the arrangements for the following season's crop', noted the Government Tobacco Expert in 1927,

and renders more urgent the sale of the crop immediately after it is prepared for marketing. Under the above circumstances there is also an inclination to rush the crop through the barns by harvesting immature leaf, crowding the barn beyond normal capacity, and hastening the curing

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in order to forward the tobacco for sale at the earliest possible opportunity.¹⁰²

As a result, much of the tobacco reaching Britain was discovered to be 'of an undesirable character, being thin and flimsy, almost entirely lacking in silkiness'. 'The tobacco on the whole is very dead', concluded an investigation conducted on behalf of the Southern Rhodesian government, 'and of a very pale lemon colour ... Even the better grades are more or less green tinged and unripe'.¹⁰³ Not surprisingly, it proved virtually unsaleable on the British tobacco market.

No less important was the fact that the dominant manufacturing concerns, interlinked with American interests, found it neither feasible nor desirable to use Empire leaf on so large a scale. Even had Southern Rhodesian tobacco been of a uniformly high quality, no major company was willing to disturb the established tastes of the smoking public. Rhodesian virginian tobacco was quite different from the American leaf used in British manufactured cigarettes, and several attempts at promoting an all-Rhodesian product by appeals to Empire sentiment ended in failure before the Southern Rhodesian government and settlers grudgingly conceded that their best hope lay in the gradual blending of their tobacco with popular brands.¹⁰⁴ 'Appeals to patriotism counted for little where a man's palate was concerned', reported an official from London. 'Preference and price were the real factors'.¹⁰⁵

Still more to the point, the 'great British firms were not prepared to throw into imbalance a nicely and profitably secured adjustment of vested interests'.¹⁰⁶ The world tobacco market had originally been divided by arrangement between

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the Imperial Tobacco Company, which accounted for three-quarters of the British tobacco trade, and the hugely capitalised American Tobacco Company. Their joint operating venture outside of the metropolitan United States and Great Britain was the British American Tobacco Company. In Britain, the I.T.C. had the trading rights of A.T.C. brands; in America, the A.T.C. had the trading rights of I.T.C. brands; and in most other countries, B.A.T. held the 'rights and trademarks of both the older organisations'.¹⁰⁷ An anti-trust judgement by the American Supreme Court in 1911 broke the A.T.C. into smaller components without significantly affecting this division of spoils.¹⁰⁸ Although American tobacco was largely used, the I.T.C. was not averse to strengthening its position within the consortium by nurturing alternative sources of supply. It was, however, determined to do so on its own terms, without alarming its American partners, and certainly not at a pace and on conditions set by colonial planters.

Before 1924, the B.A.T. subsidiary with which settlers were most familiar was the United Tobacco Company, established in Cape Town in 1906. Its involvement in the Rhodesian tobacco trade predated the First World War when the company provided growers with a degree of financial support and their one significant market. But only selected planters were helped and many growers were convinced that the U.T.C. boomed the industry in order to stimulate production, only to break it when successive planters' cooperatives threatened to become too powerful. A contract signed in 1918 between the Rhodesian Tobacco Cooperative Society and the U.T.C. did little to dispel the suspicion and bitterness which ^{had already} enveloped the industry.

Members of the cooperative soon argued that buyers manipulated the classification of tobacco grades so as to 'batter' prices downwards while the company, irritated by the increasingly truculent attitude of the cooperative, did its best to weaken the producers' organisation by favouring one particular group of growers over the rest. Consequently, when the new settler Minister of Agriculture declared in 1924 that 'if a market was opened up in England and the Continent for Rhodesian Tobacco it would immediately put the growers in this country in a position to get out of the hands of that monopoly of the United Tobacco Company which during the last few years has been considered by Tobacco Growers to be a very grievous burden', the cooperative, recently transformed into a limited company in order to gain more control of marketing, needed no further prompting.¹⁰⁹

The Rhodesia Tobacco Warehouse and Export Company, as the cooperative had now become, at once began to develop an overseas export market. Advantage was taken of the Wembley Exhibition to bring samples of Rhodesian tobacco to the attention of British manufacturers, but the very success which attended this first venture infused subsequent business forays and negotiations with a mixture of arrogance and ignorance calculated to confirm the worst suspicions of the industry's controlling interests. Independent buyers at the 1927 sales were 'allowed ... to go back empty handed', and the U.T.C. was only offered tobacco on terms which the Warehouse 'knew ... they would never agree to'.¹¹⁰ Even I.T.C. representatives were treated indifferently.¹¹¹ Instead, the Warehouse

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set up its own selling organisation. Disposal of the entire crop was placed in the hands of merchant bankers, Chalmers Guthrie and Company. This was done in order to eliminate the brokers and dealers who stood between producers and manufacturers, and because the Warehouse was well aware that the shaky financial condition of most of its members precluded the lengthy delay which normally attended payment for tobacco sold by brokers. 'Merchant Houses', noted an observer, 'are usually employed by those requiring more finance than the dealer can provide with the aid of his ordinary banking facilities'.¹¹²

Chalmers Guthrie, however, were not closely associated with the tobacco trade, and had no regular clientele of buyers. Because of arrangements previously made to finance the sale of the crop, they were also unable to offer established brokers their customary commission on sales. Dealers therefore had no financial incentive to place Rhodesian tobacco with manufacturers. Indeed, they had every reason for 'getting supplies from other countries and pushing them against Rhodesian'.¹¹³ By antagonising the British tobacco trade, the Warehouse set the seal on the fate of the Southern Rhodesian industry. Brokers and manufacturing companies unite against Warehouse practices and prices. 'There is no doubt our people after last year's big prices were swollen-headed and expected the manufacturers to be on their knees begging for it', acknowledged the colony's Premier. 'We seem to have a lot of "Mompapas" [fools] at the head and in charge of our tobacco industry'.¹¹⁴

As unsold tobacco bales piled up in British warehouses, Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Agriculture confided in his South African counterpart that 'history has repeated itself with us'. 'A long struggle between the growers and buyers', explained Fletcher,

punctuated by alternative periods of shortages and gluts, high prices and no prices at all, culminating in the tobacco boom two or three years ago, brought about partisans say, deliberately, by the big prices given during the previous seasons, when 3/-, 4/- and even 5/- a lb was given for the best bright leaf, which today can only be sold at an average of 1/3d, with large quantities, and lower grades unsaleable.¹¹⁵

Faced with the imminent collapse of the industry, the settler government hurried to the rescue of the Tobacco Warehouse with over £500 000 to pay off merchant bank loans and to put at least some cash in growers' pockets and the hands of unpaid labourers. Many planters nonetheless faced ruin and by 1930 700 of them had abandoned the industry. Production fell as once more domestic interests lay prostrate before international capital, leaving the I.T.C free to buy 'the best grades ... but at its own prices',¹¹⁶

While the helping hand extended to tobacco growers was economically and politically unavoidable, it was also exceptional. Other supplicants were usually ignored. For example, the state refused to act on the annual resolutions passed by the Rhodesia Agricultural Union calling for a system of controlled production and compulsory marketing

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residing in the dry and crowded Lower Gwelo reserve.¹³¹ Nor was recovery shared by tens of thousands of poor peasants brought to the starting point of proletarianisation by state policies in previous decades, and for whom depression and drought were the final blows. The rate of indigenous African participation in the labour market began to increase rapidly as a result. Whereas the rate had remained static at around 20 percent between 1911 and 1922, it climbed to 23 percent in 1923 and to 35 percent in 1926, by which time Southern Rhodesia was well on the way to becoming a labour surplus economy. This structural change was of considerable importance as it greatly facilitated the rapid emergence of export-orientated settler agriculture in this period.¹³²

At the other end of the scale, a comparatively small number of individuals continued to own huge herds of cattle. Differentiation was less marked in Mashonaland districts where herds ranged in size from ten to fifty head, than in Matabeleland where it was not unknown for *iziduna* to possess herds of up to 2 000 cattle.¹³³ Cattle ownership in Nyamandhlovu 'varied quite a lot', according to the local NC. 'A few of them own several hundred head; others are just beginning to get a herd together'.¹³⁴ In the overcrowded Selukwe reserve, where most people only had one or two beasts, 'one man owned 155 head, and quite a number ... owned forties and fifties', while in Gwanda, two large cattle owners minimised their losses from drought in 1927 by exporting hides directly to Port Elizabeth.¹³⁵ Overall, it seems that ownership of economic herds of cattle, variously/

of maize.¹¹⁷ It even dismissed widespread agitation for government labour recruitment during the cotton and tobacco booms.¹¹⁸ Although special aid was given to smallworkers to tide them over postwar inflation, and the cold storage agreement was negotiated on behalf of ranchers, on the whole the government confined itself to the provision of research services and loans through the agency of a Land Bank established in 1924. It eschewed 'any direct commitment in the field of production, by, for instance, providing price supports, or in that of marketing'.¹¹⁹ Far from directing an unrestricted process of domestic accumulation, the Southern Rhodesian Government, although narrowly responsible to a settler electorate, was itself located within the 'wider sphere of capital's subordination of other classes in "civil society"'.¹²⁰ Encompassing the economic, political, and ideological interests of capital in general, the settler state sought to contain and channel the antagonistic relations and contradictions engendered by the unceasing struggle to secure the many different conditions necessary for the creation and appropriation of surplus value.¹²¹ Through the ideological practice of segregation, the colonial state encapsulated the contradiction between the economic interests of mining and agricultural capitals and the social and political conditions necessary for the undisturbed reproduction of capital. It thus continued to discriminate against African rural areas, frozen in a structurally subordinate position since the passage of the Native Reserves Order in

Council/

Council of 1920, while simultaneously setting in motion policies intended to blunt the most immediate contradictions which had sharpened in the meantime.

The general deterioration of the reserves in the early 1920s, accelerated by the postwar slump in grain and live-stock prices and by severe drought in 1922, sufficiently alarmed the state for 'developmental' policies to be introduced. Although Native Department voices had first called for agricultural training programmes in 1907 and more insistently at the time of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry in 1910-11, they had very largely gone unheeded.¹²² After the war, selected parties of chiefs were invited to inspect agricultural shows,¹²³ and more importantly, industrial training schools which looked to build on 'the native[s] ... simple methods of agriculture and stock raising' were opened at Domboshawa in 1920 and Tjolotjo in 1922,¹²⁴ but it was not until the devastating impact of drought combined with economic recession that the urgency of the situation was appreciated. 'Whichever way the native or the Native Department turned [in 1922]', wrote the C.N.C., 'the economic results of the drought obtruded themselves ... Famine conditions have been experienced in almost every district ... The demand for native stock, already diminishing, practically ceased'.¹²⁵

From 1924, black agricultural demonstrators were trained at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, and in the same year a Native Trust Fund, supported mainly from dipping fees, was established for the improvement of cattle and agriculture generally/

generally. Finally, in 1926 the post of 'Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives' was created. Its first incumbent, E. D. Alvord, was a former missionary of enormous drive and enthusiasm.¹²⁶ As these initiatives coincided with rising commodity prices after 1924, the next five years saw a modest recovery in the reserves. Between 1926 and 1930, the number of carts, wagons and even motor vehicles owned by blacks increased from 1 241 to 2 913. Grade bulls owned by Africans and bought through the Native Department increased in number from 918 in 1925 to 3 737 in 1930.¹²⁷ Cattle found a market of sorts and grain production expanded, especially once white farmers began to concentrate on tobacco growing. Approximately 25 000 bags of maize were sold in the Charter district alone in 1928. 'The majority of local European farmers are dropping the growing of maize and buying their requirements from natives, finding it more convenient and economical to do so', explained the NC.¹²⁸ In 1929, over 700 000 bags of maize were harvested throughout the colony, and the fact that almost 200 000 bags were marketed 'threatened to become a serious problem' for settler farmers in the wake of tobacco's collapse.¹²⁹

The fruits of recovery, though, were unevenly distributed. Evidence accumulated in the mid and late 1920s of overcrowding and overstocking in many reserves. This applied particularly to smaller reserves such as Bushu, Mzingwane, Que Que and Selukwe.¹³⁰ 'When is the whiteman going to leave this country, because the taxation is making it impossible for me and my natives to live', complained one headman residing/

residing in the dry and crowded Lower Gwelo reserve.¹³¹ Nor was recovery shared by tens of thousands of poor peasants brought to the starting point of proletarianisation by state policies in previous decades, and for whom depression and drought were the final blows. The rate of indigenous African participation in the labour market began to increase rapidly as a result. Whereas the rate had remained static at around 20 percent between 1911 and 1922, it climbed to 23 percent in 1923 and to 35 percent in 1926, by which time Southern Rhodesia was well on the way to becoming a labour surplus economy. This structural change was of considerable importance as it greatly facilitated the rapid emergence of export-orientated settler agriculture in this period.¹³²

At the other end of the scale, a comparatively small number of individuals continued to own huge herds of cattle. Differentiation was less marked in Mashonaland districts where herds ranged in size from ten to fifty head, than in Matabeleland where it was not unknown for *iziduna* to possess herds of up to 2 000 cattle.¹³³ Cattle ownership in Nyamandhlovu 'varied quite a lot', according to the local NC. 'A few of them own several hundred head; others are just beginning to get a herd together'.¹³⁴ In the overcrowded Selukwe reserve, where most people only had one or two beasts, 'one man owned 155 head, and quite a number ... owned forties and fifties', while in Gwanda, two large cattle owners minimised their losses from drought in 1927 by exporting hides directly to Port Elizabeth.¹³⁵ Overall, it seems that ownership of economic herds of cattle, variously/ ..

ously defined between six and twelve head per family, was slowly becoming concentrated in fewer hands. Evidence for this process is impressionistic, however, because of the way in which official statistics were averaged out for the whole country, neither distinguishing between heavily pastoral districts and the rest, nor specifying the wide variation in herd sizes occasionally mentioned in official correspondence. The underlying tendency is only glimpsed after the Great Depression when investigations began to uncover people who owned no cattle at all.¹³⁶

Those who could turn the vagaries of reserve geography to good account also flourished in the latter half of the 1920s. Market gardeners supplying the towns were particularly successful. Having utilised the slump at the start of the decade to oust Indian competitors,¹³⁷ they were well entrenched by the end of the 1920s. In 1927, Umtali's markets were filled with 'large quantities of pumpkins and other vegetables, tomatoes, sugar-cane, bananas and ... [even] strawberries and rhubarb' grown by 'natives [living] ... near the town'.¹³⁸ On the opposite side of the country, produce grown under irrigation and sold in Bulawayo, helped to buy the '8 four-wheeled and 170 two-wheeled vehicles, including a motor car and a motor lorry' owned by 'Mzingwane Natives' in 1929.¹³⁹ Richer cultivators living in more distant locales not only grew comparatively big acreages of maize, but turned to crops like wheat and potatoes which could better withstand the cost of transport to market.¹⁴⁰ In most instances, their success was bought at the expense

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of poorer neighbours. Until halted either by the intervention of the local NC, or, as happened more often, by the direct action of angry neighbours, rich peasants and emergent farmers yearly augmented the agricultural and grazing lands consumed by their ploughs and herds. Solomon Ndawa, a blacksmith who farmed about 500 acres in Wedza reserve, was in 'some trouble' by 1925 for 'encroaching on land held by others'.¹⁴¹ Ndawana Sinyanga, who ploughed 19 acres and grazed 30 cattle in Chindamora reserve, simply took the land he needed over the protests of neighbours who claimed that although fallow, it belonged to them. Now, lamented Sinyanga, 'I am surrounded. They ploughed there all around me but they have not cultivated their fields. They did this out of spite to prevent me from enlarging my land'.¹⁴²

It was here, amongst the Sinyangas and others of his class, that the impact of the state's agricultural advice was clustered. Instead of 'raising the level of agriculture throughout the Reserve',¹⁴³ agricultural demonstrators often formed class alliances with the rural élite. As most demonstrators were the sons of chiefs and headmen, or of messengers and mission-educated 'advanced natives', alliances of this nature were frequently self-contained and self-sustaining. 'Many of our pupils [at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo] are sent by Native Commissioners, particularly the sons of messengers and chiefs', observed the Director of Native Development. 'This, as it were, opens up the vision of a class of Government employee who will be the pick of the natives of the country/

country'.¹⁴⁴ Mondoro reserve's agricultural demonstrator was the son of the local chief, while in Chiota the first person to cooperate with the demonstrator was Willie Samuriwo, himself a chief's son and later ruler of the district.¹⁴⁵ In Makoni, headman Gandanzara had wheat grown for him by the agricultural demonstrator, and in Wedza, a group of 'largely Anglican "progressive" farmers ... took full advantage of the Demonstration programme' from the moment it reached them. By 1932, they were producing 'some of the best crops grown in Rhodesia, and were able to turn over their maize direct to the Control Board classified as Grade A with an advance of 5/- per bag while other natives in the area had difficulty in selling for 3/- per bag in trade from local traders. The maize from the plot owners was so good that it was loaded on trucks at Marandellas for direct export'.¹⁴⁶ Agricultural demonstrators, remarked the assistant NC for Goromonzi, by imbuing 'a few natives with the idea of money-making', were effectively becoming 'the farm managers of a few enterprising and money-seeking plot owners'.¹⁴⁷

If, for reasons of kinship and class, the first port of call by agricultural demonstrators tended to be of one particular sort, it was frequently also their last. All too often they were unwelcome anywhere else. The overwhelming majority of rural dwellers turned their backs on agricultural demonstration. They did so for two reasons. Because the fixed priority of the 'poor' peasantry, that is most cultivators, was the production of sufficient food to satis-

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fy their subsistence requirements, 'innovations in crops and techniques ... [Could] be highly hazardous as they diverted labour and/or land from the production of means of subsistence, leaving no margin to meet a possible risk of starvation should something go wrong with their commercial crops or should a bad harvest occur before the full effects of land-saving innovations had materialised'.¹⁴⁸ And in Southern Rhodesia, where there was 'about one chance in five that a year will bring subnormal rainfall', the environmental constraints were considerable.¹⁴⁹ Rural responsiveness to agricultural innovation was therefore partly governed by collective assessment of potential benefits weighed against known costs.

Within this context, and to the extent permitted by the worsening financial position of most people, African agricultural practices had nonetheless changed fairly noticeably since the turn of the century. Invariably, rich peasants, somewhat cushioned from risk by accumulated wealth, acted as pathbreakers, but they were followed, albeit slowly and hesitatingly, by growing numbers of ordinary people. An expanding circle of cultivators practised seed selection, upgraded their stock and abandoned hoes in favour of ploughs. As early as 1910, it was reported from Matabeleland that 'improvement in the strain of the mealies grown is very noticeable',¹⁵⁰ and by 1917 the 'small hard mealie [previously] cultivated by the natives ... [was] gradually disappearing' from many areas.¹⁵¹ Less common because much more expensive were efforts to upgrade cattle, but even so, the collapse/

collapse of cattle prices in 1921-2 caused 'scrub' bulls to be castrated on a greater scale, and by 1926 an 'increasing desire ... to improve cattle' was evident.¹⁵² Although ploughs were too expensive for most peasant households, they were much coveted and still more widely employed. While some marginal growers purchased ploughs by pledging future crops and cattle to traders,¹⁵³ many more hired their use. Between 1921 and 1933, when 'possibly half the land utilised for cultivation ... was ploughed', the number of ploughs approximately quadrupled to 66 798.¹⁵⁴

In the second half of the 1920s, however, most poor peasants were unpersuaded of the need to modify either their crops or methods of cultivation in ways not of their own choosing. 'The natives are a conservative people', wrote the NC for Mrewa, 'slow to change their methods, methods which they know will at least give them a certain return in almost any season',¹⁵⁵ especially as in 'some districts the present extensive methods suffice to supply the needs of the cultivators'.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, although output per acre declined during the decade, output per family remained constant, as land was brought under the plough more quickly than the population was growing.¹⁵⁷ There was thus little reason to respond to Native Department complaints that ploughs were largely used as labour-saving devices which actually contributed to poor farming practices. Consequently, it was only in those districts where overcrowding was already a serious problem that agricultural demonstrators were given a hearing, but even then the numbers involved were extremely small.

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Only 157 people cooperated with agricultural demonstrators in Selukwe reserve in 1928.¹⁵⁸

Apart from peasant cost-benefit calculations of the kind specified above, many rural blacks also shunned the state's demonstration programme because they were deeply suspicious of the motives behind it. With the memory of past reductions in fertile land holdings still extremely fresh and sore, Africans had good reason to withhold their cooperation. 'There is a feeling of scepticism among some natives as to the motives underlying these demonstrations of farming methods, and a doubt that they are a genuine attempt to induce natives to use the reserves to better advantage', reported Salisbury's NC. 'Rather do they see them to be an attempt to test the agricultural potentialities of the reserves with a view to their being exploited for the benefit of the white population of the country'.¹⁵⁹ Earlier government afforestation schemes had occasionally foundered on similar perceptions: 'in one district, blue gums were destroyed after a rumour circulated to the effect that if they reached a certain height, white men would seize the land on which they were growing'.¹⁶⁰ A rumour spread in 1927 that officials 'wanted people to learn more about agriculture so that later a tax could be imposed on ploughs',¹⁶¹ and even in Selukwe where conditions most favoured agricultural demonstration, many people were convinced that it was 'some scheme of the Government to take their land away from them'.¹⁶² 'Is this not being done so that we will all only be allowed to cultivate one acre?',

Alvord/

Alvord was asked after a lecture in 1929.¹⁶³

Interconnected with the state's 'developmental' agricultural policies were moves to contain the revolution being wrought by capitalism on the fabric of African society. Emerging class antagonisms and aspirations were delayed and blurred by the gradual formulation and patchy implementation of policies to prop up the disintegrating social cohesion of the Ndebele and Shona peoples. By defining and supporting 'traditional' rulers, and by modifying and consolidating African customary law, the settler state aimed at disorganising the dominated classes through confining their sphere of incorporation to a reconstituted "tribal system".

An important turning-point in official thinking coincided with the onset of economic recession at the start of the 1920s. Up until that point, the voracious demand of the mines and settler farms for labour had obliged the state to employ every means at its disposal to break down the integrity of Ndebele and Shona socio-economic and political organisation. Repeated attempts were made to wrench labour from its non-capitalist nexus; structurally by war and then by land theft; fiscally by taxation; and juridicially by the contract, compound and pass systems. At the same time, the state tried to recast and regulate the social functioning of everyday life after images and patterns more amenable to the rule of capital. Directly through legislation, and indirectly through the teachings of the dozen or so Christian missions dotted about the countryside, the cultural hegemony

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of colonialism was asserted over indigenous practices. Ndebele and Shona cultures were decried as worthless by government and church working in tandem.¹⁶⁴ Their relationship at this time was non-antagonistic, occasionally even close, because Christianity's fragmented gospel

included such tangibles as Lancashire cotton, cash crops, redbrick houses, Western medicine, tombstones, books and money. The intangibles pertained not only to Christianity's transcendent God, but also to individualism, formal schooling, the nuclear family, middle-class values and virtues, skilled trades and ambition. All had religious meaning. Christian conversion aimed at a cultural, as well as a religious conversion. As missionaries were fond of saying, the converted "set themselves apart"; they "declared for a completely changed life"¹⁶⁵

Marriage, for example, was speedily brought within the ambit of the colonial state, where it was stripped of practices which government officials and missionaries found objectionable. Polygamous marriages were penalised by the Tax Ordinance of 1901; and the Shona custom of female child betrothal, *kuzwarira*, was outlawed, and the size of 'lobola', *rovoro*, payments restricted by the Native Marriage Ordinance of the same year.¹⁶⁶ By 1902, Shona marriage, in the sense of uniting families as much as individuals through the mediated exchange of labour power and cattle, already lay outside colonial law.

Initially, the state contemplated the consequences of intervention with equanimity. Churches began making the converts denied them so long as indigenous society had retained

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its 'pristine vigour',¹⁶⁷ and efforts by women and young men to throw off forms of customary oppression were hailed as evidence of the impending demise of chiefly authority. 'Chiefs and elders of families complain that they no longer control their following as they did in the past, and that the young people are breaking away gradually from the old tribal system of control', reported the CNC. for Mashonaland in 1912. 'Contact with civilisation is the cause of this, and though chiefs and others complain, no steps should be taken to prevent this gradual evolution. The increased powers granted to Native Commissioners have materially assisted in breaking up these tribal methods of control, and I am glad to say the results so far have been satisfactory'.¹⁶⁸

As dissolution proceeded apace, however, so a note of alarm crept into official reports. 'The progress of the transition from barbarism to civilisation continues in those districts where frequent contact with civilising agencies obtains', noted one report. 'Native Commissioners report a growing tendency towards individualism ... In the more remote reserves the social conditions of the natives are more healthy; they have not yet felt the combined influences of the various civilising agencies which produce in the evolution of the native character results not always satisfactory',¹⁶⁹ Among the 'unhealthy symptoms' mentioned by the C.N.C. were several which grew during the First World War and matured in its aftermath. The vacuum created by the breakdown of 'traditional' authority was increasingly filled by forces and classes profoundly disturbing to the colonial state. Even surface tranquillity was occasionally recognised for what it was. 'Regarded as a whole', wrote Bulawayo's/

wayo's NC in 1914, '... the Natives have evinced as full a measure of loyalty as we have the right to expect. This loyalty is of a passive nature and would not, perhaps, stand any considerable strain. The chief reason for the discernible lack of enthusiastic loyalty is afforded by the land question'.¹⁷⁰

'The Germans are fools to fight the white people', one official was told. 'They will lose their country and cattle and the white man will make them work'.¹⁷¹ Millenarianism, specifically Watch Tower, amongst Nyasa migrants, appeared but was quickly suppressed in 1917,¹⁷² only to be followed by 'signs ... that [natives] ... have begun to realise that they constitute a considerable political, social and economic factor in the development of the country'.¹⁷³ By the early 1920s, according to district reports, there was 'unquestionably a risk of the trained and educated native giving a ready ear to the cry of "Africa for the African"'.¹⁷⁴

When confronted with these stirrings of popular discontent and consciousness, the state fumbled for an appropriate response. In part, this reflected the diversity of social forces released by the uneven process of dissolution. Far from launching attacks against fixed and timeless African social and economic structures, the state, as discussed in chapter two, had operated in a context where the advance of commodity relations was already tending to dissolve the old order. Combined with capitalism's own uneven development, this enabled middle and rich peasants to escape comparatively unscathed, even as blows rained down on the poor and on peoples north of the Zambesi. Consequently 'modernising' farmers and migrants, Christians and animists, as well as rich and poor, young and old, all contested place and position in the

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space vacated by the ebbing class power of precolonial rulers.

But as economic recession and depression, at the beginning and the end of the decade, aggravated existing antagonisms and tensions between generations and between some social categories, so self-defence prompted others to coalesce, thus providing the state with building blocks for the construction of conservation. In particular, middle and rich peasants, increasingly Christian and 'modernising', almost by definition male and middle-aged or elderly, and frequently including economically reconstituted chiefs and headmen within their ranks, found themselves threatened by certain currents coursing through Ndebele and Shona society. To take one key example, labour migration had long been 'part of the terrain of struggle of partially formed classes',¹⁷⁵ where elders attempted to maintain control over the labour of young men.¹⁷⁶ Loss of authority could be catastrophic for senior generations. As early as 1909, it was reported from the Matopos that whites were 'steadily clearing natives off their land, the given reasons being that the majority of youths and young men are attracted to mines and elsewhere by higher wages, leaving but few middle-aged and old persons available for the landowners's requirements'.¹⁷⁷ And by 1928, deputations of 'the older generation were unanimous in deploring the desertion of their sons to the Union and asked for Government assistance to have them sent back. Besides losing touch they complain of the lack of financial assistance in their old age'.¹⁷⁸

After some hesitation, the state decided to support 'chiefs and elders and fathers and men against sons and daughters and women'.¹⁷⁹ Its first measures were cautious and pragmatic.¹⁸⁰

Segregationary/

Segregationary discourse, although rising in volume, lacked coherence, and the Native Department itself was split between supporters of progressive individualism and advocates of restored communalism. Contradictory policies therefore ran side by side. For instance, not long after the state began to shore up 'traditionalism', the Native Wills Act specifically recognised the right of Christian blacks to make provision for the guardianship of their children outside the realm of customary law.¹⁸¹ Increasingly, though, the advocates of reconstituted 'traditionalism' and 'tribalism' outpaced their rivals. The state had earlier backed off from the 'lobola' provisions of the 1901 Marriage Ordinance, and retreated still further in 1929 when unregistered customary marriages were recognised as valid.¹⁸² Adultery had been made a criminal offence for blacks in 1916, and in 1927 the Native Affairs Act bolstered the waning authority of chiefs and headmen by insisting that their lawful orders be obeyed. 'Insolence and contemptuous behaviour towards ... [them was made] a criminal offence punishable by a maximum fine of £20 or six months imprisonment in lieu of payment'.¹⁸³ The Act also established an Appeal Court whose subsequent public reports initiated the consolidation of 'native law and custom'.¹⁸⁴

The tribal system under construction during the 1920s was designed to channel popular hopes and grievances into outlets very largely controlled by the state itself. It bore only passing resemblance to pre-colonial forms. To start with, the 'tribalism' condoned and supported by the state was geographically circumscribed. Although many NCs encouraged 'Africans to move into the reserves ... [as] a means by which to slow down the break-up of the tribal system/

system',¹⁸⁵ in most cases it involved movement away from areas lived in for generations. The ambiguity of 'traditionalism' in such settings was manifest. Indeed, later protagonists contended that 'the African tribes in Rhodesia today are in no way identifiable with tribes which existed prior to the conquest of Rhodesia ... but are essentially administrative units created by administrative action'.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the specified duties of chiefs, who anyway only held office 'contingent upon good behaviour',¹⁸⁷ were clearly biased towards countering the political and social threat posed by 'detribalisation'. Ranked as constables in designated areas, they were not only obliged to help in the collection of tax, but were also held responsible for the good conduct of their followers. They were required to arrest law-breakers and report subversive rumours. And not least, the authority supposedly returned to them was actually quite different from the powers rulers had exercised before the 1890s. Whereas in the past, chiefly authority had been limited by the need to retain popular approval, as well as by custom and spiritual sanctions,

this system of checks and balances was severely modified by the introduction of European administration, which buttressed the chief's residual powers. No longer could the people escape from the jurisdiction of an unpopular ruler by the simple expedient of moving away; such movement required the NC's authority and in most instances he would tend to support the chief.

Political legitimacy so narrowly defined could accommodate neither the independent initiative of the Ndebele National Home Movement (later the Matabele Home Society) for a restored kingship/

ship in a consolidated 'national home', nor meet the modestly incorporationist requests of the tiny black petty-bourgeoisie voiced through the Rhodesia Native Association and the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association. Led by Nyamanda Khumalo, elected successor to Lobengula in 1896, and advised by members of South Africa's African National Congress, the National Home Movement took advantage of influential audiences gathered at postwar conventions in Versailles and London to petition Britain's King George V. 'In pursuance of the fact that the right of conquest ... is now repudiated by the civilised world', the petition requested Britain to assume direct responsibility for 'native administration', and to 'hand back the so-called unalienated land to the family of the late King Lobengula in trust for the tribe according to Bantu custom, and the right of Chieftainship therein to be restored and acknowledged'. The Imperial authorities rejected the petition out of hand, as did the new High Commissioner, Prince Arthur of Connaught, in 1921. Nyamanda's cause was subsequently taken up by his nephews, Lobengula's grandsons, Albert and Rhodes. On their return from school and exile in the Cape, the two brothers spent several years demanding 'king's cattle' from *iziduna* rewarded by the Administration for loyalty during the risings. They also collected funds for the purchase of land, until the Native Department caught up with them at the start of the 1930s. As before, the state refused to entertain the idea of a paramount chief. Rhodes Lobengula was eventually induced to leave for the Cape in 1934, and Albert, pathetically, became a messenger-interpreter in the Bulawayo offices of the Native Department.¹⁸⁸

Founded in 1924, the Rhodesia Native Association primarily expressed the aspirations of 'advanced' farmers in Mashonaland. Of all inter-war black organisations and groupings, the R.N.A. was the most moderate. It self-consciously distanced itself from more radical rivals and tried hard to cultivate a special relationship with the government. 'We do not want Kadalie [Of the I.C.U.] to speak for us', said one member in 1928, 'we can speak to our Government'.¹⁸⁹ Although the Native Department accepted the R.N.A.'s *bona fides*, especially after 1927 when the conservatism of its leadership tilted towards obsequiousness, it nonetheless frequently rebuffed the association's approaches. In 1922 a request to exempt registered black voters, of whom there were only 23, from the pass laws, was turned down.¹⁹⁰ In 1924 the R.N.A. was forbidden to operate in the reserves.¹⁹¹ And in 1928, the Native Department ignored the R.N.A.'s stated objection to the custom enforced throughout the colony of blacks removing their hats in the presence of whites.¹⁹²

The similarly constituted, if briefly more radical, Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association received even shorter shrift from the government.¹⁹³ Matabeleland based, the R.B.V.A. drew its support from progressive farmers and teachers. South African blacks, including its founder Abraham Twala and chairman Garner Sojini, figured prominently in its ranks. Convinced that the centre of political gravity had passed from London to Salisbury with the granting of Responsible Government, Twala advocated cooperation with settler politicians in return for concessions and privileges for 'civilised Bantu'.¹⁹⁴ At its inaugural congress in January 1923, the Association called for the 'modification' of the pass laws, a lowering of franchise qualifications, and educational

improvements/

improvements.¹⁹⁵ When these resolutions failed to elicit any response from the state, the R.B.V.A. attempted to add weight to its representations by broadening its base. During 1924 and the first months of 1925, Martha Ngano, a Mfengu Apostolic Faith Mission teacher who had become R.B.V.A. Secretary, busily extended the Association's activities into the countryside around Bulawayo. Popular grievances such as dipping fees and dog licence began to find a place on the R.B.V.A.'s list of demands.¹⁹⁶ NCs were condemned for suppressing African 'rights and interests', but the only lasting success secured by Ngano's campaign to widen support for the R.B.V.A. was to confirm the state in its attitude of measured antagonism. 'Natives should be tactfully informed', Coghlan instructed the C.N.C., 'that the Government's desire is that they should make their representations direct to their officials and not to trust themselves to political agitators'.¹⁹⁷

Unsympathetic towards the aspirations of the colony's black élite, the state was unrelentingly hostile to other more dramatic challenges which it faced from millenarianism and trade unionism in the late 1920s. The threat posed to capital and state by the Watch Tower movement's vision of millenarian upheaval passed through two distinct phases. The first largely coincided with the prophecy of Watch Tower's founder, Charles Russell, that the Second Coming would happen in 1923, especially as it was also a period of continuing economic recession and 'uncertainty about changes in the settler political structure'.¹⁹⁸ Carried southwards by Nyasa labour migrants, Watch Tower had found its most responsive audiences in Southern Rhodesia's biggest mine compounds. Congregations totalling about 200 members and perhaps several thousand/

thousand more or less interested followers were established at Shamva, Wankie, the Globe and Phoenix and the Cam and Motor Miners applauded preachers who attacked the pass laws and promised an end to taxation, and at Wankie, workers were assured that the last would be first: 'The white people will leave on 1 January. The first to go will be Mr Thomson [the colliery manager], with the Doctor and Mr Derby, and you Mr Kidd [the compound manager]. All of you [management] shall go and your authority ... shall pass to the society'.¹⁹⁹

Fearful that Watch Tower members were 'using religion as a cloak to some extent for the purposes of a Labour Organisation which ... will sooner or later lead to trouble',²⁰⁰ the colliery management pressed for action by the state. A leading preacher was deported in November 1923, but by then the movement's popularity had already peaked. During 1924, 'the millenarian tide rapidly receded'.²⁰¹ An improving economic climate, sporadic state harassment and the failure of Old Testament figures Moses and Aaron to appear as prophesied in the main colliery compound, all contributed to Watch Tower's ebbing fortunes. But most damaging in the long run was the narrowness of the movement's appeal.²⁰² Despite the occasional invocation of wider horizons, Watch Tower's message was typically confined to the compound's 'labour aristocracy', most of whom were mission-educated Nyasas. While complaints that 'the white people did not want the people to become clerks in the offices because they were afraid of the natives getting up in the world', accorded perfectly with the grievances of a literate and semi-educated minority, they left the plight of the vast majority of workers untouched.²⁰³ Believing that they were 'better informed and that other natives ... [could] acquire not follow their ideas on religion',²⁰⁴ Watch Tower members

a reputation for sobriety and respectfulness as much appreciated by mine managements more sophisticated than Wankie's, as their leadership and behaviour was resented by ordinary workers after 1924.²⁰⁵ By the end of the decade, Watch Tower's compound constituency had dwindled to a few dozen adherents.

The second phase of Watch Tower activity was very different from the first.²⁰⁶ It was also more formidable. In parts of the Mashonaland countryside, Watch Tower gained an enthusiastic following through its predictions of the imminent overthrow of white oppression, and through its efforts to 'restructure demoralised rural society'. Beginning in 1925, Watch Tower emissaries from north of the Zambesi made hundreds of converts in the Urungwe Sipolilo and Lomagundi districts. Villagers were warned that only those baptised into the movement would escape the whirlwind coming in November 1926. Everyone else, especially whites, would be blown away. Another prophesy in May 1929 promised the faithful that they alone would be rendered bullet-proof during a great conflagration due to start inside the year. 'In about six months', so people in the Urungwe area were informed,

a flight of aeroplanes will come from America - sent by a person who lives under the water there - manned by black people, who will make an aerial reconnaissance of the whole country. These negroes will recognise their own people and will then return to America. Shortly after this they will return and bring war in their train. The white people will then be driven out of the country and the natives will be freed from all taxes and European control.

Alternatively, 'the millenium would be brought by a trinity of saints, Reyi, John Chilembwe [Leader of the 1915 Nyasaland

Rising/

Rising⁷ and Mariya', who would give believers

a potent to drink from a cup. This will send the recipient to sleep for seven days. When they awake they will be white and have ⁷massed wealth. They will not need to work ... All people will be on an equal footing financially and socially. Those who have not dipped ⁷Baptised will die or turn into animals.²⁰⁷

Prophecies and visions such as these held enormous appeal for a considerable segment of Shona society. The people most receptive to Watch Tower's message were precisely those elements who posed the greatest threat to the resuscitated 'tribalism supported by the state and its black allies. In the first place, it tended to be a movement of the rural poor. The late 1920s were years of mounting rural distress. This applied particularly to districts like Urungwe and Lomagundi distant from major markets, and which were further afflicted by an expanding zone of tsetse fly infestation. 'The kraals in the area were mostly miserable affairs', reported a para-military patrol in 1929, 'inhabited mainly by old men and crowds of women. There were, of course, no cattle, sheep or goats, and the only domestic animals seen were a few dogs, which appeared to be "fly-struck", and a miscellaneous collection of chickens'.²⁰⁸ Still more specifically, the Lomagundi area was shaken by the boom and collapse of the tobacco industry. Its inhabitants had watched white settlers occupy land throughout the district in 1925 and 1926, only to see most of them depart again after a few years. But the whirlwind which removed the majority of farmers from the land also left hundreds of unpaid and jobless labourers in

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its wake. Some found employment in Bulawayo and Matabeleland; others returned to their villages where they swelled the ranks of the poor and dissatisfied.²⁰⁹

Secondly, Watch Tower appealed to younger men and women. Your men resented the comparative wealth of elders whose economic and social power was increasingly dependent on the state, while women objected to the submissive strictures of a revitalised patriarchy. Both were readily accommodated by a movement which neither recognised chiefly authority nor required its members to 'salute ... their elders'. Instead, Watch Tower offered a vision of an alternative society in which wealth, including that of whites, would be shared out amongst the faithful. Conflict and tension would disappear, as baptism made it 'impossible for the "dipped" person ever again to bewitch or to be bewitched'. It was a dream which even attracted numbers of elderly men, presumably those outdistanced by the Christian élite, and for whom paradise was appropriately symbolised by the promise that 'great wealth will accrue to believers through the sale of their produce to the American blacks; for eggs one pound will be paid, for a fowl one pound and for a goat two pounds'.

None of these visions of the future commended themselves to the settler state. From the start, the Native Department harassed Watch Tower members. NCs were instructed to arrest any foreign blacks 'behaving suspiciously in rural areas ... and to punish any indigenous Africans who harboured them'.²¹⁰ In 1926, 15 preachers were deported. When Watch Tower flared up again in 1928, government officials were advised to 'forget about the law'. Intimidation became rife once Native Department messengers were told, 'Look, you just beat those fellows up, and chase them back across the

border/

border'.²¹¹ Preachers who had avoided earlier sweeps were identified by spies, and they too were deported. Para-military police patrolled Lomagundi district in 1929, and after the unit withdrew, a 'general policy of promoting discipline ... [through] strict compliance with all the laws affecting Natives' was enforced.²¹² In the face of these persistent attacks, Watch Tower quickly lost momentum, and by the early 1930s had surrendered its apocalyptic vision to the 'more subdued millenarian message' of the Shona Zionist and Vapostori movements.²¹³

The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, established in the colony in 1927, proved rather more resilient to attacks by the state. Following an approach from Southern Rhodesian workers, organiser Robert Sambo was despatched northwards by the leader of the South African I.C.U., Clements Kadalie. For five months, Sambo operated clandestinely in and around Bulawayo. By the time he was arrested and deported, the state had lost its opportunity. As early as March 1927 the union claimed 155 members and its ideas were spreading rapidly.²¹⁴ 'The time is now come', declared Sambo, 'when all natives should be united with one body in the name of Africa ... So I ask you this day to join the movement and we fight for our Africa. Take away the word'.²¹⁵

Although briefly shaken by Sambo's deportation, the I.C.U. survived. Under local leadership, notably Masotsha Ndhlovu, Job Dumbutshena and Charles Mzingeli, it rooted itself successfully in the Bulawayo Location. Meetings advertised by large posters regularly drew crowds of up to 400 people on Saturday and Sunday afternoons.²¹⁶ A branch was established in Salisbury in 1929, and over the next two years a further eleven branches were formed. By

1932 the union had 4 910 members.²¹⁷ Grievances articulated by the I.C.U. covered a spectrum extending from the petty bourgeoisie through the rural areas to the urban working class. Consequently, the content and tone of its demands and speeches varied considerably. On occasion, the I.C.U. sounded almost benign. For example, one of the first resolutions approved by the Union at the annual conference in April 1931 merely asked the government to adopt Cape franchise qualifications.²¹⁸ 'When sifted of all hyperbole, their aims appeared to differ very little from those of the many other Native Associations which exist in this country', concluded Bulawayo's Superintendent of Natives.

They desire better educational facilities, better wages for skilled men, better facilities for bringing their grievances to the notice of the Government, and that the residential quarter of the Town Location should be divided so that there should be an exclusive quarter for the educated people, who should not be expected to live in proximity to the barbarians; in fact they recognise, and desire us to recognise, class distinctions amongst their own people. Masotsha in his speech emphasised that they did not seek to attain their ends by violence ...²¹⁹

At other times, though, organisers were far less conciliatory. 'There is no difference between a person born in Rhodesia than a Slave', so an audience was bluntly told in 1930.²²⁰ Workers were chided for strike breaking, and the need for organisation and unity stressed. 'When the white people were striking, you went to work and helped the Company, and yet the Company do not pay you any more money. I don't blame the Railway Company for that, I blame you', said one speaker. 'We must organise'.²²¹ Yet informing both extremes was a similar set of assumptions. Perceiving the diversity of their following to be a source of strength rather than weakness/

weakness, the I.C.U.'s leadership tried to hold the Union's broad constituency together through appeals to political and economic egalitarianism and to the British sense of 'fair play'.²²² 'As people of Africa we find that we are all in one class', declared Masotsha. 'We are all suffering people and we are all paid less because we are black ... We are Christians and want to live a respectable life and give our children a good education ... You must speak for yourselves. If we feel that we are oppressed and that the Government won't hear our cries, we will appeal to the Imperial Government. Britain says "Justice and freedom to every nation"'.²²

For all their threatened fury and occasional thunder, however, the most serious challenge to capital accumulation in this period was spearheaded not by Watch Tower or the I.C.U., but grew directly out of changed conditions in the gold mining industry. In 1925 the postwar premium on the price of gold was removed, and from that point Southern Rhodesia's gold output fell steadily. The most important reason for this was as mines were worked deeper in the 1920s, the cost per ounce tended to rise, either through a falling-off in the value of the deposit with depth, or because it became more expensive to mine the deeper levels. When the mines applied their time-honoured solution to rising costs of maximising output and cutting expenditure on labour, they provoked widespread strike action by black workers. For the first time since the reconstruction of the industry, black miners enjoyed a relatively strong bargaining position. The assistance given to African cash-cropping in Nyasaland at this time and the expansion of other sectors in the Southern Rhodesian economy all made the supply of labour tight and occasionally scarce.²²⁴

Between December 1925 and October 1928, there were at least

ten/

ten strikes on various mines as workers resisted cuts and fought for increases. Settler complacency was particularly rattled by the strike at Shamva, a large gold mine some 70 miles north-east of Salisbury.²²⁵ Management efforts to minimise costs by cutting back on hospitalisation benefits were strongly opposed by workers already resentful of dangerous working conditions in the open-cast mine. An additional grievance for many workers was the credit system. As the captive clientele of mine stores, labourers were offered credit against future wages because 'it keeps them always in debt and makes them work'. 'We never see our money', complained the miners.

From 12 to 17 September 1927, Shamva's 3 500 black miners, mostly long-service migrants from Nyasaland, struck work for higher wages. Pickets were detailed by workers with experience of the Rand, and the mine manager confronted by what he later described as 'insolent ... natives, the majority being armed with sticks and knobkerries. A large number of them also carried their registration certificates and tickets on the end of sticks, and shouted - "Look at the small pay"'. Subsequent attempts by the C.N.C., newly arrived from Salisbury, to persuade strikers to return to work were shouted down. 'We are all called baboons, and they might as well get baboons to do our work', yelled one miner. 'We are asking for more money'.

The state then systematically set about smashing the strike. Police and Territorial Army reinforcements were rushed to the mine. Miners' weapons were confiscated and the compounds sealed off. Workers were treated to bayonet displays and to the sight of a machine gun. 'Here ... we have troubles with White People', wrote one agitated worker, 'they wanted to kill us all because we stopped

to/

to work'. 'They sent 200 soldiers here', added the writer with understandable exaggeration,

and we still got 100 camped in our compound, to see us working. They think we will stop again. They wrote a letter to Bwana Kashon [i.e. Nyasaland Government] to have permission to kill us all, and he said, "All right - kill them all", and he would send his soldiers to bury us in the graves.

On 17 September the strike collapsed, and 28 suspected ring-leaders were arrested, tried and deported. Similar strikes on lesser mines were much more easily contained, but beyond victimising identifiable leaders and trying to ensure that wages generally did not rise, there was little that mining capital and the state could do. Without wage reductions, the industry's output declined accordingly, until by 1929 the amount of gold produced was smaller than in 1907.

1. Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 232-4.
2. H.Mss.FY4/1/1, 'Memorandum re the new political situation in Southern Rhodesia', by J. G. Macdonald, 20 July 1923.
3. H.Mss. CH8/2/2/7, Coghlan to Chaplin, 3 Mar 1920; Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 244-6. See also D. J. Murray, *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1970), 210-11.
4. As cited in Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', 244.
5. Ibid.
6. Murray, *Governmental System*, 207, 125.
7. Palley, *Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 236-7.
8. Murray, *Governmental System*, 3.
9. Ibid, 4; Palley, *Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 224-5.
10. Wallis, *One Man's Hand*, 200.
11. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates*, 25 May 1922, col 771.
12. Gann and M. Gelfand, *Huggins of Rhodesia* (London, 1964), 62.
13. Ibid, 68.
14. *Round Table*, December 1932.
15. Paragraph based on S881/277/947, 'Principal shareholders: Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd', 15 Dec 1925 ; A3/17/10, Edmund Davis to Secretary, BSAC, London, 11 Feb 1915; Phimister, 'The structure and development of the Southern Rhodesian base mineral industry, 1907 - Great Depression', *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 1975, 9; S881/1353, 'Rhodesian/

- 'Rhodesian ranching developments', 15 July 1926; E. Potter, *The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers* (London, 1975), 38-9; and W. D. Gale, *The Rhodesian Press* (Salisbury, 1962), 129. See also, Lee, 'Politics and pressure groups', appendix III, 'The Rhodesian press'.
16. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 14 Mar 1935, col 91.
 17. Murray, *Governmental System*, 138.
 18. *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 23 Feb 1939. See also Galbraith *Crown and Charter*, 48-86.
 19. Murray, *Governmental System*, 138.
 20. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 21 Mar 1930, col 144.
 21. See *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 30 May 1924, col 8, and related debates in subsequent years.
 22. *The Reform Movement in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1903), 47-8.
 23. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates*, 26 May 1921, col 1190.
 24. *Report by Brigadier-General F. D. Hammond ... on the Railway System of Southern Rhodesia*, 1926, 3 vols. For Coghlan's threat of 'war to the knife between the Government and the Railways', see H.Mss. NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 13 Dec 1924. See also H. C. Hummel, 'Sir Charles Coghlan: the premiership, 1923 - 1927', *Historical Association of Zimbabwe Local Series 35* (Salisbury, 1979), 14-16.
 25. H.Mss. NE1/1/1, 'Rhodesian Railways Bill. Explanatory Memorandum', n.d.

26. E. G. Gibbons, 'The background to the Rhodesian Railway Act 1926', University of Rhodesia, unpub. M.A., 1975, 60-6.
27. See H.Mss. LE3/1/1, 'Hammond Report', Downie to Moffat, 11 Jan 1926.
28. *New Rhodesia*, 26 Nov 1932. For wider discussion, see Phimister, 'Towards a history of Zimbabwe's Rhodesia Railways'.
29. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 5 June 1929, col 1636.
30. Ibid, 24 Mar 1937, col 542.
31. H.Mss. NE1/1/2, Downie to Newton, 25 Nov 1928.
32. H.Mss. LE3/1/1, 'For discussion at Cabinet Meeting', Minister of Mines and Public Works, to the Hon. The Premier, 11 Jan 1929.
33. Phimister, 'Towards a history of Zimbabwe's Rhodesia Railways'.
34. Paragraph based on A3/17/12/1, B.S.A. Company, London, to Wankie Colliery Company, 26 Apr 1923; S881/277/947, 'Principal shareholders: Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd', 15 Dec 1925; ZCB2/2/1, 'Capital history of the Wankie Colliery Company Ltd from 1899 to 1948', 29 Mar 1949; *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 25 May 1938, col 1167 onwards. The colliery also signed a price fixing agreement in 1923 with the railways and mines, in both of which the B.S.A. Company was more or less interested; see C. H. Thompson and H. W. Woodruff, *Economic Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, 1954), 115.
35. A3/17/18, Chairman, Charterland and General Exploration
and/

- and Finance Company Ltd to H. U. Moffat, 27 Mar 1917.
36. A. E. Hadley, *Willoughby's Consolidated Co. Ltd: 1894 - 1944* (London, n.d.), 17; *Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works, on Mines, for the year 1926*, 3.
 37. Paragraph, including direct quotation, drawn from *Rhodesian Mining Journal*, Dec 1931, 707-09; H.Mss. LE3/1/1, E. Davis to H. U. Moffat, 21 Jan 1925; and *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 24 Apr 1930, col 1281. See also S254, E. Davis to J. W. Downie, 8 June 1931.
 38. Table compiled from *Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Reports*, various years; and N. H. Wilson, *The Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1933).
 39. M3/3/9/1, Secretary, Bechuanaland Exploration Company, to Secretary, B.S.A. Company, 1 June 1906.
 40. A3/17/10, E. Davis to Secretary, B.S.A. Company, 11 Feb 1915.
 41. A3/17/8.
 42. For further discussion, see Phimister, 'The structure and development of the Southern Rhodesian base mineral industry'.
 43. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 17 Apr 1931, col 737.
 44. Usually defined as 500 acres or less, they never accounted for more than one percent of the area alienated to whites.
 45. S881/1482/4, 'Southern Rhodesia - 1930. Mr Christopher Turner's notes of his tour'.
 46. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 186.

47. *Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia*, 21 Mar 1952.
48. P. Mosley, 'The settler economies: studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900 - 1963', Cambridge University, unpub. PhD, 1980, 237.
49. Tawse Jolly, *Real Rhodesia*, 147.
50. *Report of the Department of Agriculture for the year ended 31 Mar 1904*, 33.
51. Ibid; G. L. Guy and R. H. Orchard, 'Rhodesia's first petrol driven tractor: Ivel agricultural motor No. 140'. *Rhodesiana*, July 1969.
52. *Rhodesian Agricultural Journal*, Jan 1905.
53. *Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1913*, 2.
54. *Rhodesian Agricultural Journal*, Oct 1908; *ibid*, April 1910.
55. *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 10 Sept 1919.
56. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on B.S.A.C., *Memorandum by Mr H. Wilson Fox upon Land Settlement in Rhodesia* (London, 1913), 63; *Official Year Book of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia*, No. 1, 1924 (Salisbury, 1924) 245-8. After June 1920, the amount of capital required by intending settlers was increased to £2 000. In practice, this stipulation was ignored. Ranchers were advised that they would need considerably more capital than the amounts specified for mixed farming.
57. As cited in Gann and Gelfand, *Huggins*, 70.
58. A1/5/9, 'Report by Sir Lewis Mitchell on his tour in Rhodesia', 25 Aug 1909.

59. R. Hodder-Williams, 'The British South Africa Company in Marandellas: some extra-institutional constraints on government', *Rhodesian History*, 1971, 2, 61. See also R. Reynolds, 'The British South Africa Company's central settlement farm, Marandellas, 1907 - 1910: from the papers of H. K. Scorrer', *Rhodesiana*, July 1964.
60. D. Lessing, *A Small Personal Voice* (New York, 1975), 90. See especially M. C. Steele, '"Children of Violence" and Rhodesia: A study of Doris Lessing as historical observer', *Central Africa Historical Association Local Series No. 29* (Salisbury, 1974).
61. S881/1482/4. For detailed discussion of the various land settlement schemes, see Machingaidze, 'Development of settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia', chapter two.
62. *Report of the Director of Agriculture for 1910*, 1.
63. S881/1482/4.
64. *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates*, 12 May 1925, cols 368-9.
65. *Ibid*, 30 July 1924, col 1296; S480/114, 'Advances to Farmers', 18 Dec 1924; *Official Year Book ... 1924*, 325.
66. S881/1482/4; *Southern Rhodesia, Handbook for the Use of Prospective Settlers on the Land* (Salisbury, 1930), 81.
67. S981/1, Minister of Agriculture and Lands, to Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 15 Nov 1928.
68. *Ibid*.
69. S881/1482/4. 'Women as well as men are addicted', reported Turner. '3 or 4 whiskies at 1/- each are consumed daily. 30/- per week on whisky is out of all proportion to their income/

income'.

70. Hutchinson, *Cape to the Zambesi*, 89.
71. Rose Innes, *Writing in the Dust*, 12.
72. *Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1911*, 31.
73. See, variously, Thomas, *Agricultural and Pastoral Prospects*, 273; and S881/1482/4.
74. *Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for the year 1927*, 1. 'Many new growers ... seem to think the closer they plant the heavier the yield will be', commented the report.
75. S1180/51(15), 'Maize Growing in Southern Rhodesia'.
See also *Report of the Acting Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for the year 1929*, 30, quoting the Executive Committee of the Maize Association that 'there was no occasion for the Department of Agriculture further to demonstrate the advantages of green manuring, for farmers were already convinced of this, and their only difficulty was the financial one of throwing large areas out of maize and into green manure crops'.
76. *Report of the Director of Agriculture for the year 1920*, 5.
77. *Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for the year 1927*, 41.
78. Tawse Jolly, *Real Rhodesia*, 155.
79. G. Page, *Jill's Rhodesian Philosophy* (London, 1910), 5.
80. Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 98.
81. *Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for the year 1928*, 14.

82. Table compiled from S1180/51(5), Maize Inquiry Committee, 28 Nov 1930; Weinmann, *Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1924 - 1950* (Salisbury, 1975), appendix; and Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 92.
83. Table reproduced from S1180/51(15), Maize Growing in Southern Rhodesia. See also *Report of the Economic Development Committee*, 1939.
84. For wider discussion of what follows, see Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies: beef cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890 - 1938', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 3.
85. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', 107.
86. For the canning factory, see *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal* 1915, 12, 487-8; *Rhodesia Advertiser*, 10 Feb 1916; G1/5/2/3, 'Canning Factory', and attached correspondence; and *Independent*, 27 August 1920. See also Weinmann, *Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia ... 1890 - 1923*, 113-14. For the Meat Producers' Exchange, see *Independent*, 2 Sept 1921, 10 Mar 1922, 16 Feb 1923, 22 June 1923; *Meeting of the Representatives of the Cattle Industry of the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, Swaziland, Bechuanaland and South-West Protectorates, Johannesburg, 24 March 1921* (Johannesburg, 1921); *Second and Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry in respect of the Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia, dealing with its Investigations in the Union of South Africa, 1923, 1924*; and *The Times*, 16 June 1923.
87. *Bulawayo Chronicle*, 15 Sept 1923.
88. S1193/M5, O. C. Rawson, Rhodesia Ranching Co. Ltd to Chairman, Rhodesia Cattle Commission, 1 Feb 1924. For discussion/

- discussion of Vestey's operations, see L2/1/201, 'Notes of interview with Mr William Vestey of Vestey Bros.', 12 Mar 1913; *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates*, 25 June 1923, cols 281-3. See also R. Perren, *The Meat Trade in Britain, 1840 - 1914* (London, 1978), and S. G. Hanson, *Argentine Meat and the British Market* (Stanford, 1938).
89. L2/1/134/4, 'The Liebig's Extract of Meat Company's Properties', 17 Nov 1913: 'The Liebig Company seem to have been allowed to take to a preposterous degree the best parts of the country ... [they] have had extreme liberty in their choice and have ... run most erratic boundary lines to embrace the better spots and to exclude less desirable portions ... The extraordinary configuration of the blocks must exert a harmful influence on the development of the district and is calculated to prove a serious hindrance to future ranching enterprise in that neighbourhood. Access in many directions is interfered with; almost all available surface water is taken in'. See also Phimister, 'Meat and monopolies', 405-6.
 90. See chapter five,
 91. 'Agreement with Imperial Cold Storage', *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*, 1924, 21, 633-6.
 92. H.Mss. NE1/1/4, Newton to Fletcher, 3 Apr 1929.
 93. Hanson, *Argentine Meat*, chapter nine; P. Smith, *Politics and Beef in Argentina* (New York, 1969) chapter five.
 94. Sir Charles Rey, '"Monarch of all I survey": Bechuanaland Diaries 1929 - 1937', ed. by Q. N. Parsons, unpub. 1977.
 95. H.Mss. LE3/1/1, 'Memorandum summarising discussion with the/

- the Directors of the Rhodesia Export and Cold Storage Company', 30 Oct 1928; T. Haddon to Minister of Agriculture, 20 Mar 1930, and attached correspondence.
96. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', 110. Tobacco required 10 x as much labour as an equivalent acreage of maize; see Steele, 'The African agricultural labour supply crisis, 1924 - 1928', unpub. 1973; and V. M. Wadsworth, 'Native labour in Agriculture', *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*, 1950, 47.
 97. *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal*, 1925, 22, 40.
 98. Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 96-7.
 99. H.Mss. NE1/1/6, Leggate to Newton, 18 June 1926.
 100. Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 98; S1180/4(14), Imperial Economic Committee, Tobacco Enquiry, 9 May 1928, Summary of Discussion on the Marketing of Southern Rhodesian Tobacco.
 101. Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 102.
 102. *Report of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, for the year 1927*, 41.
 103. S881/663/3379, 'Report as the result of a visit of Mr O. Siemssen and Mr A. V. Maunder', 9 Aug 1928.
 104. H.Mss. NE1/1/7, Downie to Moffat, 19 June 1928; S1180/4(8), H. Hopkins to Minister for Mines and Public Works, 5 Sept 1928, and attached reports. See also Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 100-108.
 105. S1180/4(8)(2), H. Hopkins, Report No. 14, 4 Jan 1929.
 106. Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 101.
 107. W. T. Davies, *Fifty Years of Progress: an account of the African organisation of the Imperial Tobacco Company*

1907 - 1957 (London, n.d.), 9 - 10.

108. M. Corina, *Trust in Tobacco: The Anglo-American Struggle for Power* (London, 1975), chapters 7 and 8.
109. Paragraph, including direct quotation, based on S1180/4(1) 'Copy of telegram from the United Tobacco Company, Cape Town, to the Hon. Leggate, Minister of Agriculture, Salisbury', and attached correspondence. See also S1193/T3, Leggate to Downie, 3 Nov 1926; and Clements and Harben, *Leaf of Gold*, 66-96.
110. H.Mss. NE1/1/2, Downie to Newton, 24 Oct 1927.
111. H.Mss, NE7/1/1, Moffat to Newton, 12 Dec 1927.
112. H.Mss. NE1/1/7, Downie to Moffat, 19 June 1928.
113. Ibid.
114. H.Mss. NE7/1/1, Moffat to Newton, 5 Dec 1927.
115. S1180/7(19A), Fletcher to Kemp, 13 Dec 1929.
116. Ibid.
117. Murray, *Governmental System*, 70-1.
118. Steele, 'The African agricultural labour supply crisis'.
119. Murray, *Governmental System*, 60-1.
120. B. Bozzoli, *The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa 1890 - 1933* (London, 1981), 18.
121. B. Jessop, 'Recent theories of the capitalist state', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1977, 1,
122. E. Punt, 'The development of African agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to the interwar years', University of Natal, unpub. M.A., 1979, 62; *Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11* (Salisbury, 1911), 15.

123. B. K. Long, *Drummond Chaplin* (London, 1941), 226-7. See also N9/1/22, NC Bulawayo, report for 1919.
124. *Report by H. S. Keigwin, Esquire, Native Commissioner, on the suggested Industrial Development of Natives* (Salisbury, 1920); and *Southern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates*, 24 July 1923, col 575 onwards.
125. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1922*, 1. Drought relief cost the state £50 000; see G. Passmor *The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1972), 18.
126. Zachrisson, *An African Area in Change*, 190; Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 202.
127. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', 192.
128. S235/506, NC Charter, report for 1928.
129. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1929*, 4.
130. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies', ; and Steele, 'The foundations of a "native policy": Southern Rhodesia, 1923 - 1933', Simon Fraser University, unpub. PhD, 1972, 411-12.
131. S96, Morris Carter Commission 1925, evidence of T. O. Beattie.
132. Arrighi, 'Development of capitalism', 112-13.
133. ZAH1/1/1, Morris Carter Commission 1925, evidence of R. C. Nesbitt; ZAH1/1/2, evidence of W. E. Farrer.
134. ZAH1/1/2, evidence of S. W. Greer.
135. S96, evidence of S. J. Wane; S235/505, NC Gwanda, report for 1927.
136. Steele, 'The economic function of African-owned cattle in Southern/

- Southern Rhodesia, 1914 - 1943', unpub. 1977, 7.
137. See for example, N9/1/25, NC Umtali, report for 1922.
 138. S235/505, NC Umtali, report for 1927.
 139. S235/507 NC Mzingwane, report for 1929.
 140. S235/504, NC Insiza, report for 1926; *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1926*, 2.
 141. S96, evidence of H. M Meade.
 142. ZAH1/1/1, evidence of N. Sinyanga. See also ZAH1/1/4, evidence of W. A. Devine; evidence of B. Garandi and J. Gusha; S235/507, NC Mazoe, report for 1927.
 143. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1932*, 5.
 144. *Report of the Director of Native Development, 1921*, 18; as cited in van Onselen, 'Rôle of collaborators', 417.
 145. S235/508, NC Hartley, report for 1930; AOH/3, Oral History Programme, National Archives, W. Samuriwo, interviewed 10 Feb 1977.
 146. Ranger, 'Poverty and prophetism: religious movements in the Makoni district, 1929 - 1940', unpub. 1981, 7.
 147. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1932*, 5.
 148. Arrighi, 'Development of Capitalism in Rhodesia', 194. See especially J. Tosh, 'The cash-crop revolution in Tropical Africa: an agricultural reappraisal', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, 314.
 149. Beach, 'Shona economy', 43.
 150. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, for the year 1910*, 7.
 151. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1917*, 8.

152. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1926*, 3.
153. S235/506, NC Mazoe, report for 1928.
154. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 361-2.
155. S235/503, NC Mrewa, report for 1925.
156. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1927*, 3.
157. Yudelman, *Africans on the Land*, 237-8.
158. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1928*, 18. See especially Mosley, 'The settler economies', 125-39.
159. S235/505, NC Salisbury, report for 1927.
160. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 366.
161. Ibid, 376.
162. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 219.
163. S235/507, NC Mrewa, report for 1929.
164. See for example, W. R. Peaden, 'Missionary Attitudes to Shona Culture 1890 - 1923, *Central Africa Historical Association Local Series 27* (Salisbury, 1970).
165. K. Fields, 'Christian missionaries as anticolonial militants', *Theory and Society*, 1982, 11, 96.
166. Zachrisson, 'An area in change', 303-04.
167. Amongst many others, see Bhebe, *Christianity and Traditional Religion*, chapter 5.
168. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, for the year 1912*, 1.
169. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1915*, 2.
170. N9/1/17, NC Bulawayo, report for 1914.

171. N9/1/18, NC Salisbury, report for 1915.
172. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 197.
173. *Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1919*, 1.
174. N9/1/25, NC Mazoe, report for 1922. See especially N9/1/26, S.O.N Umtali, report for 1923.
175. F. Cooper, 'Peasants, capitalists and historians: a review article', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1981, 7, 2, 295.
176. See Martin, 'Beyond the peasant to proletarian debate', unpub. 1982.
177. NB6/1/10, NC Matopo, report for 1910.
178. S235/506, NC Gwanda, report for 1928. See also, for example, S235/505, NC Melsetter, report for 1927; and Vambe, *An Ill-Fated people*, 197-205.
179. Ranger, 'Poverty and prophetism: religious movements in the Makoni district, 1929 - 1940', unpub. 1981, 8.
180. This interpretation follows Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 519.
181. Ibid, 140.
182. See variously, J. F. Holleman, *Shona Customary Law* (Cape Town, 1952); R. D. Leslie, 'The recognition of tribal law in Southern Rhodesia', University of Cape Town, unpub. M.A., 1963; H. Child, *The History and Extent of Recognition of Tribal Law in Rhodesia* (Salisbury, 1966); and E. V. Mittlebeeler, *African Custom and Western Law* (New York, 1976).
183. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 77.
184. Ibid, 137.

185. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 145.
186. as cited in G. K. Garbett, 'The Rhodesian chief's dilemma: government officer or tribal leader?', *Race*, 1966, 2, 118.
187. What follows, including direct quotations, comes from Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', chapter two.
188. Paragraph, including direct quotations, based on Ranger, *African Voice*, 69-87, 186-190; and Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 182-7. See also Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 151-3, 226-7.
189. as cited in Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 163.
190. N3/21/5, CNC to Secretary, Department of Administrator, 20 Feb 1922. For blacks on the Voters Roll, see N3/3/9, CNC to Secretary, Department of Administration, 3 Nov 1921.
191. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 163.
192. S235/506, NC Victoria, report for 1928. For further discussion of the R.N.A, see Ranger, *African Voice*, 104-8; J. R. Hooker, 'Welfare associations and other instruments of accommodation in the Rhodesias between the World Wars', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1966, 9, 1; and Peadar, 'The contribution of Epworth Mission settlement to African development', in Ranger and J. Weller (eds) *Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa* (London, 1975), 147-8.
193. Unless otherwise stated, the following section on the R.B.V.A. is drawn from Ranger, *African Voice*, 90-104.
194. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 161.
195. N3/21/6, 'Memorandum on formation of Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association', n.d., and attached correspondence.

196. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 161.
197. S138/22, Coghlan to CNC, 4 Feb 1925.
198. van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 206.
199. Ibid, 205.
200. Ranger, *African Voice*, 146.
201. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 199.
202. This interpretation follows van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 206-209.
203. Ibid.
204. Ranger, *African Voice*, 144.
205. van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 208-209.
206. Unless otherwise indicated, the following three paragraphs including direct quotations, are drawn from Ranger, *African Voice*, 202-15.
207. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 201.
208. *Outpost*, 1929, 7, 3, 6. See also J. Ford, *The Rôle of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology* (Oxford, 1971), 300-01.
209. C. T. Taylor, 'Lomagundi', *Rhodesiana*, 1964, 10; and Phimister and van Onselen, 'The political economy of tribal animosity', 16-17.
210. Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 200.
211. Oral/H03, Oral History Programme, National Archives, H. R. G. Howman, interviewed 10 Aug 1971.
212. *Outpost*, 1929, 7, 3; S235/508, NC Lomagundi, report for 1930.
213. Ranger, *African Voice*, 222.
214. *Workers Herald*, 18 Mar 1927.
215. S1671/2265, 'Robert Sambo - Organising Secretary of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union - Southern

- Rhodesia', n.d. and extracts from correspondence.
216. R. Gray, *The Two Nations* (London, 1960), 165; and Steele, 'Foundations of a "native policy"', 169.
 217. Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination*, 227.
 218. N206/1/C5/3, I.L.O. Archives, Geneva, 'First Conference of the Independent Industrial & Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, 3-6 April 1931'.
 219. S138/41, S.o.N. Bulawayo, to CNC Salisbury, 31 Oct 1928.
 220. S138/267, F. Pritchard, detective, to Chief Superintendent C.I.D., Bulawayo, 13 July 1930.
 221. as cited in Hooker, 'The African worker in Southern Rhodesia: black aspirations in a white economy 1927-36', *Race*, 1964, 6, 2, 144.
 222. See especially H. Bradford, 'The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in the South African countryside: notes on ideology', unpub. 1981.
 223. S138/22, J. D. Watt, detective, to Chief Superintendent, C.I.D., Bulawayo, 5 Aug 1929.
 224. Phimister, 'History of mining', 125-9, 137-9.
 225. For the evidence on which the following paragraphs are based, see Phimister, 'An emerging African proletariat: the Shamva mine strike of 1927', in Phimister and van Onselen, *Studies in the History of African Mine Labour*.