

training. While the question of the relationship between education and training will be noted at the end of this section of this Research Report, it is appropriate to expand upon two distinctions between education and training suggested by Peters, as they illuminate certain criteria of the education process. Firstly, the trained person is one who has a limited conception of what he is doing, as training suggests the acquisition of attitudes and responses appropriate to a limited situation where, as noted, a conceptual scheme, developed through education, has a bearing upon and transforms the educated person's perspective of the world.

The second distinction between training and education is that training is instrumental, being aimed at the attainment of a particular goal. Thus training can be regarded as completed when the desired goal is realised. Education, on the other hand, is a life-long process. There are no final goals in education, in fact goals come to be questioned and changed in terms of the cognitive perspective which the educated person develops.

As noted, the educated person possesses 'a relevant body of knowledge.' This knowledge forms the content of his education. In Ethics and Education Peters criticises those who advocate some notion of education that ignores content, and argues that the procedures of any discipline can only be mastered by exploring its established content.

In the various modes of thought such as science, history and philosophy there is a great deal to be known before the peculiar nature of the problem can be grasped. The procedures of a discipline can only be mastered by an exploration of its established content⁶⁰

The modes of thought which are worthwhile in themselves and lead to a desirable state of mind Peters calls 'curriculum activities'.

Having excluded extrinsic aims as extraneous to the notion of education, Peters characterises the education process in terms of criteria which are intrinsic to education. Curriculum activities, in terms of which the agent comes to care about and possess relevant knowledge and skills as well as a conceptual scheme in terms of which knowledge is organised 'beyond the level of disjointed facts', lead to a state of mind desirable in itself. Peters now has to show that the state of mind which derives from curriculum activities is more desirable than that which derives from some other form of intrinsically worthwhile activity.

He rejects attempts to justify anyone who should choose to pursue curriculum activities in terms of 'wants', pointing out that because a person wants something is no justification for regarding what is wanted as worthwhile.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p.54.

Peters turns to the concepts of 'pleasure' and 'pain' in order to support the pursuit of curriculum activities. He begins his argument by suggesting that without the concepts of pleasure and pain the concept of 'reason for action' would be unintelligible.⁶¹ However, he states that attempts to justify any activity in terms of the pleasure that it brings, do not take us very far because where more than one activity brings pleasure, we still do not know which activity is the most worthwhile. The reason for this difficulty is that words like 'pleasure' and 'pain' are very general terms, and to be made more specific need to be related to the particular activity or state which brings them about. If we wish to be able to answer the question as to the value of curriculum activities in comparison to some other pleasurable activity, we need to look at the characteristics of the activities concerned.

What then are the characteristics of curriculum activities that distinguish them from other forms of pleasurable, intrinsically worthwhile activities? Curriculum activities are 'serious' in that they illuminate other areas of life.

Science, history, literary appreciation, philosophy, and other such cultural activities are like games in being disinterested pursuits. They can be, and to a large extent are, pursued for the sake of values intrinsic to them rather than for the sake of extrinsic ends. But their cognitive concerns and far-ranging cognitive content give them a value denied to other more

⁶¹ Ibid. p.150.

circumscribed activities which leads us to call them serious pursuits.⁶²

Peters then turns to an assessment of why curriculum activities, rather than 'less serious' activities, should be pursued. He bases his justification of curriculum activities on a 'transcendental' argument. The 'transcendental' argument used by Peters is based on the assumption that in seriously asking the question 'Why do this rather than that?' the questioner is committed to seeking an answer. Thus in asking the question 'Why curriculum activities rather than some other pleasurable activity?' the questioner is engaged in the pursuit of knowledge of the type which characterises curriculum activities.

It would be irrational for a person who seriously asks himself the question 'Why do this rather than that?' to close his mind arbitrarily to any form of inquiry which might throw light on the question which he is asking.⁶³

Peters's argument is open to criticism on two counts. The first is his characterising of education solely in terms of intrinsic criteria on the grounds that extrinsic factors are extraneous to the notion of education. The second ground for criticism is that the argument which he employs in defence of curriculum activities as being more worthwhile than any other intrinsically motivated activity, is open to question.

⁶² Ibid. p.160.

⁶³ Ibid. p.162.

Regarding the exclusion of all extrinsic aims in characterising education, it has already been accepted that if the purpose of education is to contribute to the quality of life of those involved in the process, and that material conditions comprise a dimension of this quality of life, there are grounds for including economic aims among the aims of education.

Further grounds for accepting extrinsic aims in education are suggested by John White. White observes of those who would justify solely intrinsic aims in education, that their standpoint presupposes a society where basic needs have been met.⁶⁴ In a society where subsistence farming is not producing sufficient food to feed the population, there seems little wrong with the idea that education should aim, in part, at improving and modernising farming methods. Yet in terms of Peters's restricted definition, to speak of a nation employing education in its programme of modernising farming methods would be to misuse the term education. A further criticism of the view that the aims of education are intrinsic, noted by White, is that this standpoint 'only makes sense for those with leisure'.⁶⁵ Although in the light of high unemployment in developed countries the call is sometimes heard for 'educating for leisure' or 'educating for unemployment', until a leisure society emerges the aims of education need to be developed beyond simply those intrinsic to the process itself.

⁶⁴ White, J. op.cit. p.29.

⁶⁵ Ibid. p.18.

Peters's argument in support of curriculum activities as being more worthwhile than other intrinsically worthwhile activities is also open to question. Peters argues that education, like reform, marks out a state of mind which is desirable in itself. Yet it is possible to imagine someone accepting Peters's characterisation of education and yet deciding to opt for something else, for example training, in its place. In other words it would seem possible not to desire something that is desirable in itself. What Peters needs to do to support his argument for intrinsic aims in education, is to show that the desirable state of mind induced through curriculum activities is, like happiness, an end in itself.

Peters's 'transcendental' justification for the pursuit of curriculum activities rather than some other form of intrinsically worthwhile activity, can also be questioned. Peters justifies the pursuit of curriculum activities on the grounds that they enable the questioner to answer the question 'Why this rather than that?' Presupposed in asking the question is a commitment to seeking the answer, i.e. the pursuit of knowledge. It would be irrational not to regard as worthwhile that which enables you to answer your question. While questions Peters's use of the 'transcendental' argument arguing that the questioner

is not "committed to the pursuit of knowledge" in the sense that educationists have in mind. ... The most he is committed to seeking is the specific piece of knowledge which answers his question. Any questioner is committed to the pursuit of knowledge in

this very attenuated sense66

In spite of the criticism levelled at Peters's claim that the aims of education are intrinsic and at his supporting argument, the view that the aims of education are intrinsic has enjoyed popularity since classical times, Aristotle having argued that knowledge should be pursued for its own sake. While the popularity of the view that the aims of education are intrinsic does not in itself justify the viewpoint, it does direct us to seeking reasons for this popularity.

The pursuit of curriculum activities, in the sense that Peters suggests the term, contributes an important dimension to the quality of life of the individual. Firstly and most obviously, there is a very real pleasure to be derived from the pursuit of activities whose ends are not outside themselves. The great number of people who play golf prove this point. Similarly, there is a particular pleasure to be derived from a process through which an individual comes to master areas of knowledge, not for any extrinsic reason, but simply for the pleasure which derives from the process itself.

While it is true that not everyone would regard the pursuit of curriculum activities as their preferred intrinsically worthwhile activity, conceptual schemes of the type developed through curriculum activities, have a direct bearing on the quality of life of the

66 *ibid.* p.10.

individual. It has been noted that in terms of conceptual schemes, knowledge is organised beyond the level of disjointed facts. The conceptual schemes developed by the individual enable him to understand principles and reasons underlying what would otherwise be unconnected phenomena. The knowledge that the individual comes to organise is not confined to that which forms the content of the curriculum. Daily experience and knowledge become part of a broad pattern of interrelated phenomena and the individual's world is thus rendered more comprehensible and meaningful. In the sense that conceptual schemes are carried through into everyday life, increasing the individual's comprehension and enjoyment of his world, they can be regarded as contributing a non-material element to the quality of life of the individual.

The pleasure derived from listening to music supports this claim. Music can simply be listened to and enjoyed as a tune or form of relaxation. However, the individual who is able to relate a piece of music to different works by the same or another composer, who perceives it within the context of the development of music, who is able to relate it to his own experience, be it as listener under different circumstances or as performer, enjoys a heightened awareness and deeper pleasure than the person whose enjoyment is not within so broad a context. An educational process that denied the pupil the opportunity of developing such conceptual schemes would render the child less able to understand and meaningfully enjoy the world around him.

Peters recognises that extrinsic goals can be achieved through an education process the aims of which are

intrinsic. The conceptual schemes developed through curriculum activities would appear a case in point, as these conceptual schemes have relevance to the individual's interpretation of his everyday experience and are not simply restricted to the ordering of the content of a curriculum. Seen within the context of everyday experience (and not simply confined to the education process) it is difficult to regard so important a contributory factor to the quality of life of the individual, as merely an incidental goal of an education process the aims of which are intrinsic. To do so could be seen as being to misinterpret the nature of education.

It is suggested that the development of conceptual schemes, insofar as they contribute towards a greater understanding and appreciation of the individual's world, contribute to the quality of life of the individual. There is, however, a dimension to these conceptual schemes that requires closer attention. A normative dimension is an important element of any conceptual scheme in terms of which knowledge and experience come to be organised, as such organisation involves the attributing of values by the agent. Curriculum activities encourage reflectiveness, a disposition to question given goals and the reasoning underlying these goals. Insofar as education, the aims of which are intrinsic, promotes the disposition to question norms and values, the possibility of conflict with certain implications arising from an economic aim in education becomes possible. The workplace is one possible area of such conflict.

The demands of the workplace are for obedience to authority. An inclination to question rather than simply to obey could, under certain circumstances, not only be conducive to worker dissatisfaction but also to labour unrest and the disruption of production. Yet the quality of the life of all in society requires that economic goals are questioned if these goals are to become a means to achieving a better life for all and not simply an end in themselves. Business often tends to equate its interests with the interests of society at large. It is only through the questioning of economic goals that control over the exploitation of resources, fair wages and good working conditions can be achieved.

By accepting both intrinsic and economic aims as central to education, the notion of education is extended in the sense that certain of the non-material as well as the material elements which contribute to the quality of life of the individual, are recognised within the education process. However, more needs to be said about the normative dimension of the individual's conceptual framework. The importance of reconciling possible conflicts arising from both economic and intrinsic aims being assigned a central position among the aims of education, suggests the development of the ability to make defensible moral decisions as a central aim of education. There would appear to be a place for some form of moral aims among the central aims of education.

III

The reconciliation of conflicting implications that may arise from accepting both economic and intrinsic aims as central aims of education is not the only reason for including a moral aim among the aims of education. In this section of this Research Report the question of a moral aim in education will be examined. It will be suggested that the inclusion of a moral aim as a central aim of education, not only makes possible the reconciling of conflicting implications that may arise from including both economic and intrinsic aims among the central aims of education, but also contributes to a further broadening of the notion of education by directing us to 'a social dimension' of education.

Before arguing the case for a moral aim as a central aim of education, clarification must be sought on what is meant by the term a 'moral aim' in education. Clarification of what is meant by a moral aim presents certain difficulties as there is by no means agreement on what is meant by the word 'morality'. In many areas of knowledge words refer to clearly defined concepts. In mathematics, for example, the term 'greater than' refers to a concept that is clearly defined. The descriptive exactness of words found in mathematics is often lacking in ethics. This Research Report will not attempt so complex an undertaking as that of arguing a particular account of the concept of morality. Two of the approaches that have been adopted to this problem will be noted and the second suggested as a useful starting point to arguing for a place for a moral aim among the central aims of education.

Some have sought to restrict the meaning of the term 'morality' to a code or set of rules, adherence to which defines discourse or behaviour as moral. The scope of the term morality, is thus demarcated by a certain subject matter or content. One of the objections to this view of the concept of morality is that it is too inflexible. Moral rules would be seen as 'given' and a moral life as one lived in accordance with these given values. Obedience would become a central characteristic of the concept of morality and there would be no place for autonomy. A further difficulty associated with this view of morality occurs where the content of moral rules appears contradictory. Under these conditions the agent would have little guidance in assessing their relevance to a situation.

Another approach has been attempts to find criteria in terms of which the content or subject matter of discourse or behaviour can be appraised in order to be categorised as moral. Kant, for example, proposed a 'Categorical Imperative' and suggested that any action that did not violate this imperative fell within the scope of moral action. Similarly, Peters has argued for a 'rational morality' based on what he calls 'fundamental principles'⁶⁷ in order to avoid the criticism noted above, levelled at those who would restrict the concept of morality to a certain content.

⁶⁷ Peters, R.S. "Concrete Principles and Rational Passions." In Peters, R.S. ed. Psychology and Ethical Development. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974, p.66.

Peters's approach is open to criticism. His 'fundamental principles' are a priori and depend upon some notion of man as a rational being to support them. Thus even if Peters's principles are accepted, the question could be asked why they should be applied and it remains for him to show that not to do so would be irrational. Secondly, Peters's fundamental principles could allow for differing moral viewpoints within their framework.

In spite of these reservations, Peters's approach to defining the scope of the concept of morality serves as a useful starting point to an attempt to argue a place for a moral aim among the central aims of education. First, however, it is necessary to explain the nature of the fundamental principles proposed by Peters.

By fundamental principles, Peters means procedural principles, a framework or approach particular to matters concerning moral issues. Fundamental principles do not tell the agent what rules or dictates to follow in a particular situation, but offer general guidance about the way in which the agent should go about deciding such matters by indicating criteria of relevance.

Fundamental principles of morality such as fairness and the consideration of interests only give us general criteria of relevance for determining moral issues. They prescribe what sort of considerations are to count as reasons. Within such a framework men have to work out arrangements for organising their

lives together.⁶⁸

Those who see the concept of morality as being linked to fundamental principles which 'give us general criteria of relevance for determining moral issues', have had the objection levelled against them that fundamental principles do not offer guidance to the individual who wants to know 'what he ought to do.' Secondly, it has been argued that fundamental principles are of little use as they always have to be interpreted in terms of 'concrete traditions'.

Peters meets the first criticism by arguing that while fundamental principles do not suggest 'what ought to be done' they do, nevertheless, rule out certain courses of action. Peters questions whether the task of moral theory is in fact to answer the question 'What ought I to do?' or whether it is not rather to guide the agent in questioning the reasons for any action.⁶⁹

While accepting the second criticism, Peters notes that the interpretation of criteria in terms of concrete traditions applies to all rational activities.

In determining what are basic rules and in seeking above this level ways of living which may be improvements on those we may have inherited, we make use of principles. Such principles have to be interpreted in terms of concrete traditions; they cannot prescribe

⁶⁸ Ibid. p.65.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p.64.

precisely what we ought to do, but at least they rule out certain courses of action and sensitise us to features of a situation which are morally relevant.⁷⁰

Peters gives the example of a scientist who accepts some higher order principle such as the principle that one ought to test hypotheses. This higher order principle, Peters notes, does not give concrete guidance for proceeding. Procedures still have to be worked out that are relevant to the 'concrete situation'.⁷¹

As noted above, it is possible to construct an argument for including a moral aim among the central aims of education using Peters's notion of morality as a starting point. In order to construct such an argument, four fundamental principles based on Peters's work will be suggested. These principles not only suggest a means of reconciling conflicting implications that may arise from including both economic and intrinsic aims among the central aims of education, but broaden the notion of education to encompass the 'social dimension' of the life of the individual involved in the education process. The first principle suggested is that of impartiality. Central to any accepted view of morality is that it should not allow for arbitrariness of application or for the agent making an exception of himself. Any deviation from the principle of impartiality should be justified by relevant reasons. As a result of the application of

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p.65.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.64.

the principle of impartiality, what is regarded as moral is seen as being so by a wider circle than simply the agent concerned. It could also be added that this principle, by not allowing for arbitrary exceptions, gives moral values some degree of universal acceptability.

A second fundamental principle is that moral values are somehow carried over into behaviour. The concept of morality thus implies a degree of freedom relevant to the performance of the agent's principles as actions. This principle also draws attention to the question of what motivates moral behaviour. Behaviour, no matter how morally acceptable the outcome, cannot be regarded as moral if it is motivated by selfish or immoral intentions, or because of some form of external pressure brought to bear upon the agent. For an act to be regarded as moral, it is generally accepted that the agent must be inclined to act morally.

A third fundamental principle arises from the above. If motivating factors outside the agent are to be ignored in judging whether an act is moral, one is then led to ask what in fact motivates people to act morally. It could be suggested that it is conscience or a feeling of guilt that non-performance of an act would bring that motivates moral acts. However, conscience or feelings of guilt concerning the non-performance of some act require some object. The object in question is the concept of 'good'. The motivation for morally acceptable behaviour can be regarded as being some sense of well-being achieved through good acts or alternatively, a feeling of conscience or guilt induced by the non-performance of good acts.

However, not everything that is good in the sense that it promotes happiness, well-being or satisfaction in some form can be regarded as morally valuable, e.g. physical health. The term 'good' in the moral sense, it could be argued, is related to the recognition of the intrinsic worth of persons. What is morally good is that which recognises the inherent worth of persons and which therefore considers the interest of persons simply by virtue of an acceptance of their intrinsic worth. The recognition of the intrinsic worth of persons, carried over into behaviour as the recognition of the interests of others, is suggested as a third fundamental principle of morality.

A fourth principle is suggested by the observation, made above, that a moral agent cannot be motivated by external forces, but that the agent must be inclined to act morally. Not only must the agent be inclined to act morally, but the moral values that motivate the agent must themselves be subject to critical questioning and not simply accepted without question or regarded as constant. When we talk of a moral person we refer to one whose behaviour is not only in accord with moral values, but one who has reflected rationally on those values that are translated into action. This suggests an element of autonomy on the part of the agent in moral matters as a fourth fundamental principle of morality.

At this point a distinction needs to be made between moral autonomy and other forms of personal autonomy. The concept of autonomy was first applied in a

political rather than in an ethical context. Kant, however, applied the term to the individual defining it as 'the property the will has of being a law unto itself.'⁷² Dearden has suggested that the essence of autonomy is forming one's own independent judgements, on the basis of criteria which are themselves made subject to continuous reassessment.⁷³

He argues further that while freedom in the sense of absence of restraints is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the existence of autonomy it is, however, necessary for the exercising of autonomy.

The first distinction between moral autonomy and other forms of personal autonomy, is that moral autonomy is more restricted in nature. Morality, it has been argued, is not only defined but made possible by fundamental principles. These principles serve to set definitive limits on discourse or behaviour. Personal autonomy is not characterised by 'limits' but by the agent's independence. In reality, however, personal autonomy is seldom exercised without restraints and is in reality, if not in principle, a matter of degree. Nevertheless personal autonomy is characterised in terms of independence of word, thought and action, while moral autonomy is a 'restricted' form of autonomy in that the individual exercises his autonomy within the limits set by the concept of morality.

⁷² Dearden, R.F. "Autonomy as an Educational Ideal." In Brown, S.C. ed. Philosophers Discuss Education. London: MacMillan, 1973, p.3.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p.7.

A second distinction between moral and other forms of personal autonomy relates to the motivation of the agent. While personal autonomy can be motivated by self-interest, moral autonomy could not be so motivated.

Thirdly, personal autonomy does not supply the agent with guidance as to which ends to pursue. Personal autonomy is exercised regarding the means by which a desired end is pursued, moral autonomy is an end in itself.

Having demarcated the concept of moral in terms of fundamental principles, it remains to be shown that there is a place for a moral aim among the central aims of education. The first reason for including a moral aim among the central aims of education is that it makes possible the reconciling of conflicting implications that may arise from including both economic and intrinsic aims among the central aims of education.

It has been noted that one possible area in which implications arising from regarding both intrinsic and economic aims as central aims of education could conflict, is the workplace. Training develops in the individual attitudes most likely to facilitate the performance of economic functions; a narrow perspective centred on an occupational role. Questioning is more likely to be confined to the means by which goals can be realised most effectively than to a questioning of the goals themselves.

Education, the aims of which are intrinsic, develops in the individual the disposition to question the goals of the workplace, since individual value schemes, as noted above, form part of the cognitive perspective developed through such an education process.

What we are faced with is the possibility of conflict between the values of the workplace and those of the individual who enters the workplace with a developed value system. The four fundamental principles suggested above, do not tell such a person what he 'ought to do' in a situation, but suggest criteria of relevance in terms of which the weighing up of the considerations surrounding a particular situation can take place. The reconciling of conflict arising between the values of the workplace and those of an individual who enters the workplace with a developed value scheme, lies in the ability of the individual to differentiate between those considerations morally relevant and those morally irrelevant to the question at hand.

It might, however, be suggested that all humans need in order to reconcile conflicting moral values, is a set of socially acceptable moral rules rather than fundamental principles which give us general criteria of relevance for determining moral issues. While certain shortcomings of restricting the meaning of the term 'morality' to a code or set of rules have been noted, it is worth considering an argument put forward by White. In pointing out that moral conflict is a feature of complex societies in which we live, White suggests that

In particular situations different moral rules may prescribe different courses of action. ... In conflict situations like these the agent cannot simply stick to the rules found in his society, for rules do not tell him what to do. He has to move to a more reflective level. ... Beyond a certain point there are no rules to guide him: he will have to weigh the different courses of action open to him and come down, taking all relevant factors into account, on one side or the other.⁷⁴

Reconciling conflicting implications arising from including both economic and intrinsic aims among the central aims of education, is not the only reason for suggesting a place for a moral aim among the central aims of education. A place for a moral aim among the central aims of education is suggested by a consideration of an important dimension of the quality of life of an individual, viz. a social dimension. By the term 'a social dimension' is meant inter-personal relationships that the individual enters into with those around him. An analysis of the forms or levels of relationships that an individual enters into with those with whom he comes into contact, is beyond the scope of this Research Report. However, everyday experience would suggest that one's relationships with others can be a source of great misery or extreme happiness. Thus, to extend the generalisation, it could be claimed that because humans live out their lives in the company of others, the quality of individuals' lives must to some degree depend upon how they interrelate with their fellow human beings.

⁷⁴ White, J. op.cit. p.93.

In The Object of Morality G.J. Warnock relates the notion of morality to the the social dimension of the individual's quality of life. Warnock suggests that the rationale behind morality is that it should 'contribute in some respects, by way of actions of rational beings, to the amelioration of the human predicament.'⁷⁵ The 'human predicament' is caused by a human 'propensity to act to the disadvantage or detriment of other humans.'⁷⁶ Moral principles create 'those good dispositions whose tendency is directly to countervail the limitation of human sympathies, and whose exercise is essentially ... good for persons other than the agent himself.'⁷⁷

Warnock's view of the object of morality can be linked to the view of morality as fundamental principles, in terms of which the content of discourse or behaviour can be appraised in order to be categorised as moral. The fundamental principles suggested above, such as moral autonomy, impartiality and the recognition of the interests of others based on the acceptance of the inherent worth of persons, define the character of the individual's life and contribute toward the 'amelioration of the human predicament' by counteracting the human 'propensity to act to the disadvantage or detriment of other humans.' In so doing morality, as categorised in terms of these

⁷⁵ Warnock, G.J. The Object of Morality. London: MacMillan, 1967, p.71.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.73.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.79.

fundamental principles, can be seen as contributing to the quality of life of all in society.

It is, however, possible for someone to accept that while the quality of life of all would be enhanced if 'those good dispositions whose tendency is directly to countervail the limitation of human sympathies' were encouraged, it is not the purpose of an education system to encourage people to do so.

This criticism can be countered on two levels. Mary Warnock writes that children

need to learn to modify their selfishness and even their affections, and this is the essence of morality. They spend a great deal of time at school, in constant contact with other people, and so it will necessarily be there that they learn a great part of their duties, responsibilities and powers with regard to other people.⁷⁸

Secondly, it has been accepted that the purpose of education is to improve the quality of life of those who undergo the process and therefore it is to be expected that the education process should recognise so important a dimension of the quality of life of the individual as the social dimension. This would suggest the inclusion of a moral aim among the aims of education.

⁷⁸ Warnock, M. op.cit. p.130.

The notion of education has been extended from the rather restricted view of education implied by the 'Work Committee: Education principles and policy' to include intrinsic and moral aims in addition to an economic aim of education. Another viewpoint on the way the notion of education is extended through the inclusion of a moral aim, is suggested by P.H. Hirst. In the seminal paper 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge' Hirst offers a strong argument in favour of moral knowledge as an indispensable element of a liberal education. Hirst sees the development of the mind through the acquisition of forms of knowledge as the aim of a liberal education. He suggests various forms of knowledge necessary to a curriculum that is to achieve the aim of developing the mind. Such a curriculum characterises liberal education.

These forms of knowledge are not 'collections of information, but the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which are publically specifiable and gained through learning. ... Each form of knowledge ... involves the development of creative imagination, judgment, thinking, ... in ways that are peculiar to itself as a way of understanding experience.⁷⁹ One of these forms of knowledge, necessary if a liberal education is to realise the aim of developing the mind, is moral knowledge. Thus for Hirst, moral knowledge is a requirement of a liberal education and to exclude it would be to restrict what he regards to be the nature of education.

⁷⁹ Hirst, P.H. "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge." In Dearden, R.F. Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R.S. ed. Education and the Development of Reason. London: RKP, 1972, p.399.

In moving beyond the restricted notion of education implied by the report of the 'Work Committee', aims additional to an economic aim in education have been proposed. It is not being suggested that the three central aims of education form a hierarchy of aims, but rather that they are complementary. Economic considerations, as much as value concepts, contribute towards an individual's conceptual scheme. The quality of life of an individual involves both economic and social dimensions. Insofar as the purpose of education is improving the quality of life of the individual involved in the process, the notion of education requires to be extended, in order to accommodate broader aims than simply that of meeting the economic needs of society.

CONCLUSION

Central to the argument developed in this Research Report is the belief that the purpose of the education process is enhancing the quality of life of the individual. If this premise is accepted then clearly there are shortcomings in the report of the 'Work Committee: Education principles and policy.' It has been argued that underlying the report of the 'Work Committee' is the assumption that the central aim of education is meeting the economic needs of society. While grounds have been recognised for accepting an economic aim among the central aims of education, to regard an economic aim as the central aim of education is to ignore all but the economic dimension of the quality of life of the individual undergoing the education process. By ignoring the other dimensions the report of the 'Work Committee' can be regarded as reflecting a restricted view of the nature of education.

Two further central aims have been proposed in an attempt to highlight the inadequacy of restricting the aims of education to meeting the economic needs of society, and to broaden the notion of education beyond that implied in the report of the 'Work Committee'. These aims reflect a recognition of dimensions additional to the economic dimension to the quality of life of the individual undergoing the education process. As noted in the Introduction to this Research Report, part of the mandate of the Human Sciences Research Council was to recommend 'guiding principles for a feasible education policy ...'. In view of the argument developed for broader aims of education it is

difficult to regard the report of the 'Work Committee' as meeting the terms of the Cabinet request. Further central aims ought to have been recognized. Insofar as the recommendations of the 'Work Committee: Education principles and policy' were to offer guiding principles for the other sub-committees of the Human Sciences Research Council Investigation into Education, the entire enterprise can be argued to be based on a notion of education which is restricted and inadequate.

APPENDIX I

PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROVISION OF EDUCATION IN THE RSA

1. Equal opportunities for education, including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State.
2. Education shall afford positive recognition of what is common as well as what is diverse in the religious and cultural way of life and the languages of the inhabitants.
3. Education shall give positive recognition to the freedom of choice of the individual, parents and organisations in society.
4. The provision of education shall be directed in an educationally responsible manner to meet the needs of the individual as well as those of society and economic development, and shall, inter alia, take into consideration the manpower needs of the country.
5. Education shall endeavour to achieve a positive relationship between the formal, non-formal and informal aspects of education in the school, society and family.
6. The provision of formal education shall be a responsibility of the State provided that the individual, parents and organized society shall have a shared responsibility, choice and voice in this matter.

7. The private sector and the State shall have a shared responsibility for the provision of non-formal education.
8. Provision shall be made for the establishment and state subsidisation of private education within the system of providing education.
9. In the provision of education the processes of centralization and de-centralization shall be reconciled organizationally and functionally.
10. The professional status of the teacher and lecturer shall be recognized.
11. Effective provision of education shall be based on continuing research.

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Name of thesis The 'Report of the work committee: education principles and policy': a Critique of its assumptions about the aims of education 1986

PUBLISHER:

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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