THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' UNDERSTANDING OF CORRUPTION IN DR KENNETH KAUNDA DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

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Abstract

Post-apartheid South Africa has faced numerous new challenges. Amongst these challenges is public sector corruption, which is pervasive and of major concern in the local sphere of government. The purpose of this study was to explore what the understanding of corruption is among local government officials in the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality. An investigation through interviews was conducted to gather the understanding of corruption by the officials. One of the major findings of the research was that corruption was generally comprehended as non-adherence and non-compliance to the set standards, procedures, policies and Acts passed to govern local government from National Government. Furthermore, local government officials were aware of anti-corruption policies but opted for non-compliance and non-adherence. It was also established that small salaries, social class competition and greed were amongst the motivating factors to corruption and that the main barrier to reporting corruption was fear of victimization at the workplace.

Declaration

I, Mohau Relebogile Miracle Sekoto declare that this report is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Management (in the field of Security Management) in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

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Mohau Relebogile Miracle Sekoto

13 November 2014

Dedication

This paper is dedicated to my parents Lemphane and Gobuiwang Sekoto, my late sister Lerato Sekoto, and my younger sister Mahlohonolo Sekoto who gave me courage to pursue this study through thick and thin.

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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Description
AG	Auditor General
COSATU	Congress of the South African Trade Unions
DRKKDM	Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
LED	Local Economic Development
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
MM	Municipal Manager
MMC	Member of Municipal Council
MPAC	Municipal Public Account Committee
NACH	National Anti-Corruption Hotline
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PEC	Provincial Executive Committee
SAMWU	South African Municipal Workers Union
SAPS	South African Police Services
SCM	Supply Chain Management

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCING THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Schacter and Shah (2000) argue that corruption, simply defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, is as old as the history of government itself. They further add that in 350 B.C.E. Aristotle suggested in the politics that to protect the treasury from being defrauded, the whole money should be issued in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various wards (Schacter and Shah, 2000). Wei (1999) defines corruption as the abuse of power by government officials to extract or accept bribes from the private sector for their personal benefit. He further posits that corruption is characterized by secrecy, illegality, variations between different economic activities and that it is not possible to have an exact or precise measurement of corruption, unlike perhaps the measurement of inflation. This view is shared by Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2010) when arguing that “by its nature, corruption is a clandestine activity which takes place away from the glare of publicity and which is difficult to measure empirically” (Blackburn *et al*, 2010, p.5).

Public sector corruption may be broadly defined as the illegal, or unauthorised, profiteering by public officials who exploit their positions in public office to make personal gains. To many observers, this type of behaviour is an inevitable aspect of state intervention, which typically entails some transfer of responsibilities from the government to a bureaucracy in a principal-agent type relationship. Such delegation of authority endows the bureaucracy with administrative discretion that may be used to capture economic rents through side payments or bribes. These rents may be significant and the incentive to seize them may be tempered only mildly by imperfect mechanisms of prevention based on costly and imprecise monitoring, together with inadequate and inappropriate penalties (Blackburn *et al*, 2010).

It should be noted however, that this research focuses on the understanding of corruption within the local government, which in essence is defined similarly to the above definitions of corruption. The only difference being that it focusses on corruption in a particular sphere of government. This type of corruption is best captured by Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) and Lodge (1998). Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) argues that various definitions of corruption are found to be limited and need broadening to include abuse of power and violation of trust and the fact that private gain is not the sole motive for corrupt activities. The National Anti-Corruption Forum in its 1999 conference report defined corruption as “any conduct or behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for themselves or for others” (Guwa-Ngamlana, 2009:1). Lodge (1998) concurs with the above definitions, although he narrows it down to be political corruption. He succinctly comments that political corruption is “the unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends. It might take the form of “misperformance” or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal” (Lodge, 1998, p.158). He further argues that this type of corruption is located within the spheres and institutions of government.

Robinson (1998) posits that corruption is usually prominent in sectors whereby it is easier for government/public officials to extract bribes, this being attributed to lack, poor or weakness in the system of controls and regulations in place. This view is also shared by Klitgaard (1998) when he adds that lack of forceful monitoring mechanisms and weak castigatory measures motivates, and promotes the culture of dishonesty and in the process grinds down the confidence of the public on their state to address corruption. Blackburn *et al* (2010, p.5) argue that “there is evidence that the relationship between corruption and growth is two-way causal: bureaucratic rent-seeking not only influences, but is also influenced by the level of development.” Robinson (1998) concurs and posits that there are two divergent views on this relationship provided for by literature, the one view is that corruption destabilizes economic growth “through the extraction of rents”, the other view sees corruption as the catalyst for the enhancement of social welfare and “improve[s] efficiency by overcoming bureaucratic hurdles” (Robinson, 1998:7). The second view suggests that some government officials may partake in corrupt activities without recognising their actions and aligning their attitudes since they believe what they are doing is for the greater good. This in a way contributes to the gist motivation of this research, moving from the premise that what some officials of Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality (DRKKDM) might consider as non-corrupt might actually turn out to be corruption.

1.2 Background

Klitgaard (1998) succinctly comments that corruption has become an issue of major concern in political and economic spheres across the world in recent years. Public sector corruption has a global effect and is not influenced by political or geographical boundaries. Klitgaard (1998:85) further argues that “corruption is not only in existence, pervasive and persistent in the Third World countries as it is suggested by many Eurocentric scholars and reports of corruption in highly industrialized countries, but it is also persistent, dire and rife in developed countries, although at a different level compared to the Third World countries.” However, it is worth emphasizing that public sector corruption is a global phenomenon that needs different activities to curb it (Klitgaard, 1998, Robinson, 1998). Robinson (1998, p.112) argues that “the establishment of democratic political rule and institutions in various countries can curb corruption through the recognition of transparency, independent media to report on corruption, NGOs etc., which in turn creates an opportunity to closely monitor and scrutinize the actions of politicians and government officials.” It is therefore suggested that non-democratic countries are more prone to corruption as compared to the democratic ones (Robinson, 1998). However, Robinson (1998) recognises the fact that there are cases whereby certain authoritarian regimes are able to contain and control corruption, for example China and some Latin American countries. It can therefore be deduced from arguments by Klitgaard (1998) and Robinson (1998) that the maturity of democracy plays a role, meaning that the more mature the country is in terms of democracy the less prone it is likely to be to corruption.

Johnson (2006) also recognises that corruption is entrenched in countries characterised by low political competition and uneven economic growth. Whereas in countries with a wide range of economic opportunities and structured political competition but not necessarily fitting the characteristics of a developed country, corruption is found to be low. At the centre of corruption in the government sector is incentive. Wei (1999) maintains that in countries where there are low wages for government officials, corruption often becomes an incentive to boost low wages. Lodge (1998) posits that in South Africa corruption has a historical legacy in that the previous apartheid administration deliberately adopted a system which fostered the social and economic fortunes of one ethnic group. Given this status of economic imbalance, it may be expected that those who were left out by the previous government, when coming into power may be involved in corrupt activities in an attempt to address the economic imbalances created in the past.

Transparency International (2012) maintains that the Corruption Index scored countries on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being highly corrupt whilst 100 was very clean. Two-thirds of the 174 listed countries scored below 50, which indicated the seriousness of the corruption problem. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 90 percent of countries scored below 50, the top country being Botswana and at the bottom being Somalia. South Africa ranked 69 with a score of 43 (Transparency International, 2012).

Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) maintains that Auditor-General's reports have more often than not revealed that municipal officials paid themselves unauthorized bonuses that claimed thousands of rands that were meant for service delivery. This mostly happened in districts were most people lacked clean drinking water, proper infrastructure, electricity and proper roads. Those are municipalities wherein corruption is common (Guwa-Ngamlana, 2009). The South African government adopted a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy in 1999 as a result, towards the implementation of the resolutions of the National Anti-Corruption Summit. The strategy was however, reviewed in the 2003/4 financial year and a report revealed that South Africa had made immense progress in fighting corruption but also highlighted that there were still serious challenges at the local level in particular. The report also revealed that corruption had decreased remarkably at the national government, while it increased at the local government. There are three spheres of government, namely, national, provincial and local government. Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality (DRKKDM) forms part of the local government and it is amongst four district municipalities of the North West Province. The North West Province is one of nine provinces of the Republic of South Africa.

Given this background and the corruption situation in the local government, it is therefore important to understand and examine a variety of forms in which corruption manifests itself at the DRKKDM.

1.3 Problem statement

It is not known whether local government officials in the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality are conversant with anti-corruption policies and local government programmes meant to combat corruption. It is also not known about these officials' understanding of corruption in general, local government corruption and how to deal with corruption within their particular District municipality. Lack or poor understanding of corruption by the local government officials could be attributed to the level of corruption in this District municipality. As a result, research needs to be conducted as a point of departure to determine awareness and understanding of what corruption is, how it is carried out so that a strategy can be developed to fight corruption within the DRKKDM.

1.4 Purpose statement

The purpose of this research is divided into two aspects:

1) To explore the level of understanding of local government officials with regard to corruption within the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality.
2) Interpret and analyse the findings and provide recommendations.

1.5 Research questions

1.5.1 How is corruption understood in relation to governance in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality?

- What do local government officials consider/understand to be corruption?
- What do local government officials understand to be governance?
- What do the local government officials believe motivates involvement in corruption?

1.5.2 What is the root of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

- Which departments are corrupt/prone to corruption?
- Why would these departments be more corrupt/prone to corruption?
- Do the officials in these departments understand what corruption is and how it is perpetrated?

1.5.3 How is corruption being dealt with in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

- Is there awareness of policy and structures meant to fight corruption?
- How do local government officials approach/deal with corruption in their district?

1.6 Conclusion

Corruption is viewed to be the abuse of power by governmental official for their personal benefit. Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) further adds that corruption also includes the violation of trust by the public towards government officials. Government sector corruption coincides with political corruption and can further be viewed as "the unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends; in this case corruption takes a form of misuse of government resources for private or personal benefit. It is characterized by secrecy and illegality". This type of corruption is found to be located within spheres and institutions of government (Lodge, 1998:158).

Corruption is usually found in sectors whereby it is easier for government officials to extract bribes. According to Robinson (1998) this is attributed to lack of or weakness in the system of controls and regulation in place. In the same vein, Klitgaard (1998) adds that weak castigatory measures motivate the culture of corrupt activities. There are two divergent views on corruption, the one views corruption as causing instability in the economy, whilst another view sees corruption as the catalyst for improving efficiency by overcoming bureaucratic hurdles. It is on account of these two divergent views that there is a need for the understanding of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality. The second view suggests that government officials might partake in corrupt activities without recognising their actions and with the belief that what they are doing was for the greater good.

Given the above background, the knowledge of anti-corruption policies and local government programmes designed to combat corruption by the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality officials will be explored; interpreted and analysed

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This section explores literature on local government corruption under the umbrella of public sector corruption, the implication being local government corruption and public sector corruption coincide and in essence local government is part and parcel of the public sector. The aim is to understand and interrogate the body of knowledge related to public sector corruption generally, both internationally and locally and then local government corruption in particular.

2.2 Corruption and abuse of local government office

Andvig (1989, p.68) maintains that “a member of a public organization acts in a corrupt way if he directly or indirectly deals with non-member and uses the organization’s resources including his decision making power and special information to acquire payment that is against the rules of the organization or against the law.” From Andvig’s definition we can deduce that corrupt behaviour can be a three legged view. At first the local government official has the authority to deal with the rules and regulations at his/her discretion. Secondly the official has the capability i.e. the power as authorised by his local government official status to can extract value. Thirdly the official must have motivation to abuse the power that comes with the position. Local government sphere is the one form of government that is closest to the people, most basic services are provided for by the local government and councillors are the closest politicians to the people. If the officials are therefore abusing the local governance office, people are bound to be immediately affected. This view is shared by Bardhan (2005, p.84) when he suggests that giving more power to the local government can result in the increase of corruption because it might be easier for the local elite group to capture the local government in terms of corruption. Corruption may be high at the local government level because of frequency of interactions between private sector individuals, the public and local government officials at a more localised level and eventually where personal gains can be achieved. This is due to the absence or ineffectiveness of checks done for example by vigilant national media, auditing of public accounts and adjudicatory systems. Triesman (2000, p.48) concurs by adding that a public official might put a private partner in a position whereby the private partner benefits gains that would otherwise be impossible without state intervention. This is done for the private partner to have more advantages than rivals in the market. The private partner in turn, pays the official part of the gain. According to Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) this is widely practiced in the tender processes within the municipalities across South Africa.

Blackburn *et al* (2010) point out that there is a correlation between levels of economic development and levels of corruption. They argue that a country could be located within three regimes. The first being a low income regime which is characterised by high levels of corruption, secondly, a high development regime characterized by low corruption and thirdly an intermediary development regime characterised by varying and dynamic levels of corruption. There is more diversity in the intermediary development regime.

Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2007) also argue that it is widely accepted that there is a relationship between corruption and the deficiency in the political system. They further argue that in an established or matured democratic state which promotes political competition, increasing transparency and accountability, there is a provision for checks and balances on corruption as compared to an undemocratic or less matured democratic state. South Africa being nineteen years a democratic state, is widely accepted as not yet a matured democracy. However, some authors have a different view. Robinson (1998) argues that corruption is on the rise due to democratisation, since democracy provides incentives and opportunities for corrupt activities. He further maintains that many new democracies in Africa are characterised by high and/or increasing levels of corruption and the introduction of democratic systems have proved ineffective in combating corruption.

2.2.1 The impact of local government corruption

The systematic study on the effect of corruption on government's public finance by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) showed that:

a) Corruption tends to increase the size of public investment (the expense of private investment among other things) because many items in public expenditure lend themselves to manipulations by high level officials to get bribes.

b) Secondly, corruption skews the composition of public expenditure away from needed operation and maintenance towards expenditure on new equipment.

c) Thirdly, corruption skews the composition of public expenditure away from needed health and education funds, because these expenditures, relative to other public projects, are less easy for officials to extract rents from.

d) Fourthly, corruption may reduce tax revenue because it comprises the government's ability to collect taxes and tariffs, though the net effect depends on how nominal tax rate and other regulatory burdens were chosen by corruption-prone officials (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, p.148).

Added to the above assertions is that local government corruption also contributes to the reduction in quality of roads, an increase in the rate of power outages and water losses. These being common occurrences in various municipalities across South Africa, communities are violently taking to the streets due to lack or poor service delivery derived from misappropriation of funds. Alexander (2000, p.02) maintains that, since 2004, South Africa has seen a movement of local protests which amounts to a rebellion of the poor. This rebellion has been widespread and intense, sometimes reaching unthinkable proportions. These protests have been about service delivery, unfulfilled promises and against, self-serving and corrupt officials/leaders of municipalities. The rebellion described by residents of Jouberton when they burnt Councillor of Ward 6 for lack of service delivery.

2.3 Motivation for corruption

According to Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) before delving much into the motivations of corruption in the local government, it is important to understand the various forms in which corruption manifests itself at the local government level. Guwa-Ngamlana points out the following:

a) Bribery: bribery involves the promise, offering or giving of a benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of a public official. This benefit may accrue to the public official, another person or entity. A variation of this manifestation occurs where a political party or government is offered, promised or given a benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of the political party or government.

b) Fraud: this involves actions or behaviour by a public official, other person or entity that fool others into providing a benefit that would not normally accrue to the public official, other persons or entity.

c) Embezzlement: involves theft of resources by persons entrusted with the authority and control of such resources.

d) Extortion: involves coercing a person or entity to provide a benefit to a public official, another person or entity in exchange for acting (or failing to act) in a particular manner.

e) Abuse of power: involves a public official using his/her vested authority to improperly benefit another public official, person or entity (or using the vested authority to improperly discriminate against another person, official or entity).

f) Conflict of interest: involves a public official acting or failing to act on a matter where the public official has an interest or another person or entity that stands in a relationship with the public official, i.e. a public official considers tenders for a contract and awards the tender to a company of which his/her partner is the director.

g) Favouritism: involves the provision of services or resources according to personal affiliations of a public official. An example would be a Mayor ensuring that only persons from his/her political organisation are successful in tenders or in employment.

h) Nepotism: involves a public official ensuring that family members are appointed to public service positions or that family members receive contracts (Guwa-Ngamlana, 2009, p.12).

Huther and Shah (2000) view motivation of local government corruption in two fold, selflessness and selfishness, arguing that it is widely accepted that lack of selflessness amongst public officials is what motivates corruption. In other cases selflessness can be a motivating factor in that public officials might be involved in corruption with a belief that they might advance their careers and viewing corruption as insurance in an unstable environment characterised with uncertainties. Officials might also view their corrupt activities as not impacting negatively when they corruptively supplement for their low wages. This adds to the gist of the argument of this research, which seeks to establish the understanding of corruption by the officials of DRKKDM, officials might understand corruption as argued above by Huther and Shah (2000) or otherwise. Martinez-Vazquez, del Granado and Boex (2007) add that a public official might be motivated to participate in corruption because of wage effects and the high offer of the bribe and low possibility of detection and low punishment. Other authors argue that colonial legacy could also be a contributing factor for contemporary corruption in Africa. For example, Lodge (1998) maintains that in South Africa, contemporary corruption could be attributed to the apartheid system which catered solely for one ethnic group. It follows then that some local government officials may argue or be motivated to be involved in corruption as an attempt to address these inequalities, which can lead to “its our time to eat syndrome”, however this cannot be tolerated as a justification for corruption. An individual’s actions are based on the information available to him and on the history of actions taken by people preceding him (Sah, 2007).

2.4 Combating corruption

Around the world corruption is believed to be endemic and it impacts negatively on the economic growth, restrains the provision of public services and increases inequality in societies. The World Bank has identified corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development” (World Bank, 2001). This current state of affairs necessitates the need for law enforcement in the fight against corruption. However, law enforcement is not the only solution to fight corruption. The role of law enforcement is to make sure that corruption is eliminated and hold those found to be involved accountable, however, Schacter and Shah (2000) add that corruption prospers where laws apply selectively, i.e. to some but not to other people, and where enforcement of the law is often utilised as means for advancing private interests rather than securing the public interest. On a similar point, Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001, p. 93) argue that the official’s decision to partake in a corrupt activity depends on the predicted cost of the decision. Two variables matters in this case, first, the magnitude of the penalty and second, the probability of being exposed. However, the decision of the official to be involved in corruption does not necessarily need to be influenced by a high probability of being exposed if the magnitude of the penalty is very minimal. Similarly, the size of the penalty may not be important if the probability of being exposed is minimal.

Martinez-Vazquez *et al* (2007) point out to evidence available in the international fight against corruption. They point out the following initiatives:

i. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation of Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) and the Organisation of America States (OAS) have taken important steps to fight corruption in international transactions (i.e. transnational bribery). One of the most important developments in this area has been the signing of the United Nations Convention against corruption by leaders of nearly 100 countries in December 2003. The document addresses issues such as bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, money laundering, protection of whistle-blowers, and makes explicit the intention of co-operation among countries in combating corruption.

ii. The European Union (EU) has also strengthened anti-corruption steps with the signing of the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving officials of the European Communities in 1997, and the technical cooperation and support for anti-corruption issues provided by institutions such as the European Court of Auditors, the European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, and the European Ombudsman

iii. Bilateral donor agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and Regional Development Banks, such as the Inter-American Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank (AFDB) have also developed their own anti-corruption strategies by funding different types of anti-corruption programs around the world (Martinez-Vazquez *et al*, 2007:8).

2.4.1 Law enforcement

The increased or emphasis on the use of law enforcement to deal with corrupt public officials can contribute to lowering corruption. In their view, Jackson, Muzondidya, Naidoo, Ndletyana and Sithole (2009) locally, the South African government has adopted a number of initiatives and legislation designed to combat corruption:

- In the late 1990's the South African government launched a national anti-corruption campaign. It resulted in the National Anti-Corruption Summit Campaign which was convened in April 1999 and involved NGO's, business, donor countries, organised labour unions, organised religious bodies and the public sector. The summit came up with resolutions related to combating corruption, preventing corruption, building integrity and raising awareness.
- As a follow-up the National Anti-Corruption Forum was created in June 2001 as the formal structure to bring the public, business and civil society sectors together to fight corruption in all aspects of our society.
- The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy was established in 2002 motivated by the need to create a unit to co-ordinate and integrate Government's anti-corruption work at the level of policy and strategy implementation. The National Government has introduced and promoted various pieces of key legislation such as:
    - Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003
    - Protected Disclosures Act No. 26 of 2000
    - Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000
    - Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 12 of 2004
    - Prevention and Combating of Corruption Activities Act No. 12 of 2004
    - Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999
    - Public Service Act: Proclamation 103 [Published in Government Gazette 15791 of 3 June 1994]

Latest developments in relation to the above include a National Anti-corruption Hotline (NACH) and the Presidential Hotline which are both designed to offer a platform for concerned members of the public and whistle-blowers to report any corrupt behaviour by public officials.

Jackson *et al* (2009) further maintain that despite the passage of the Protected Disclosure Act (2000) which was a legal way for whistle-blowers to report on corruption, it remained a challenge because of the reluctance by officials to report and act against corruption, this was due to fear of victimisation as a result of whistle blowing. This victimisation included dismissal, harassment, stigmatisation, and other aspects that might legally amount to unfair labour practice. These officials learnt or have previously seen whistle-blowers suffer from dire consequences as a result of their actions. It therefore becomes a challenge to combat corruption despite the passage of law enforcement in a form of the above mentioned anti-corruption Acts and policies. The continued involvement of senior government officials in cases of mismanagement and unruly behaviour remains a hindrance in combating corruption. Jackson *et al* (2009) further argue that these senior government officials abuse their power by intimidating junior officials when they try to report corruption. They perpetuate this by their continuity to disregard the rules and regulations.

2.4.2 Compensation for local government officials

According to Wei (1999) it is viewed as rather naive to give power to the people, pay them small wages, and expect them not to abuse the power for their personal gains. This implies that local government officials engage in corrupt activities to supplement their low wages. This can be viewed as cause and effect. Wei (1999, p.68) further argues that "paying local government officials well, equally or better than their private counterparts contributed to low levels of corruption. This phenomenon was observed in Singapore where public officials were paid above the best alternatives in the private sector." This view is shared by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) when they add that there is evidence that countries in which public officials were poorly paid tended towards higher corruption as compared to the ones in which public officials were paid well.

The moral character and quality of government officials are certainly another very important determinant of the extent of corruption in a country. The quality of the bureaucrats, in turn, is highly related to how they are recruited, paid, and promoted. In a country where nepotism and patronage are rampant, or government posts are sold explicitly or implicitly, bureaucrats will be less competent and less motivated because success depends on advantages gained by connection or bribing superiors rather than merit, and will be very vulnerable to corruption (Wei, 1999).

2.5 Conclusion

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon in all societies across the world. It is reportedly as old as the history of government itself. Corruption happens if a party to an (implicit) contract breaks it for private gain by doing a side contract with another person. According to Wei (1998) culture also plays role in defining corruption. He argues that there are differences in attitude towards corruption and bribery in various countries. Tanzi (1995) adds that different people have different views with regards to bribes versus gifts, or group loyalty versus self-interest. In this view Osborne (1997) argues that many of these observed differences are not culturally inherent. In some communities bribes might be tolerated, the justification being that civil servants received low salaries which are regarded as unfair. Hence it was deemed important to investigate the understanding of corruption by officials of DRKKDM.

It was also revealed that corruption has many negative effects on growth and economy. For instance, Wei (1999) maintains that there are several ways through which corruption impedes development and economy of countries. The corrupt country experienced slower growth and corruption affects the economy negatively in that it misdirects public funds from the most needed projects to the not so needed projects or away from projects entirely. The fight against corruption should also recognize the need to recruit and promote public officials through merit and pay them salaries that are equal or better than of their private counterparts. Most importantly it is also crucial to ensure that the officials are aware and have the correct knowledge of legislation meant to fight corruption, in this way people of different cultures will be brought on an equal footing in terms of the understanding of corruption.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This paper set out to study and to understand the perception and understanding of corruption at the local sphere of government, by engaging senior management, middle management and non-management officials. The site at which this study took place is the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality (DRKKDM) situated in the North West Province of South Africa. The study adopted qualitative methodology. Data was collected through the use of interviews and literature review to capture the understanding of corruption as a challenge in this district municipality. In this chapter, the research methodology that was followed in this study is delineated. The chapter also highlights, explains and substantiates the chosen research method, the research design, population and sample, data collection as well as analysis techniques.

3.2 Research approach

The study focused on exploring the perceptions and understanding of corruption among local government officials in DRKKDM. The purpose was to fully comprehend the motivation, cause and effect, and initiatives adopted to fight corruption or the effectiveness of those initiatives to combat corruption within this district municipality. A qualitative approach was adopted to investigate the phenomenon. Merriam (1998:19) defines qualitative research as “research providing detailed narrative descriptions and explanations of phenomena investigated, with lesser emphasis given to numerical qualifications. Methods used to collect qualitative data include ethnographic practices such as observing and interviewing.”

Neuman (2011) asserts that in qualitative study, sense is derived from the principles of interpretative and/or critical social science. Rather than a language of hypothesis and variables, a language of contexts and cases is spoken of. Much emphasis is put on conducting thorough examination of particular cases that are part of the natural course of social life. Neuman (2006) adds that qualitative research is characterised by the following:

- generating social reality
- cultural meaning

- emphasises on interactive process
- life events
- genuineness is key
- theory and data are focussed
- It is situational specific and the researcher is involved with the subjects.

Neuman however, further argues that, like quantitative research, qualitative research sometimes does embrace numerical format of data and more often it includes words, whether written or spoken, visual images, recordings or physical objects. This view is shared by Badenhorst (2008) when adding that qualitative research relies on data in words format.

The assertions by Neuman (2006, 2011), Badenhorst (2008) and Kothari (2008) justified the approach chosen by the researcher because the researcher had to focus on human action, behaviour, perceptions and attitudes which embodied the respondents' understanding of corruption and this was gathered through written or spoken words during the process of data collection.

Kothari (2008) points out that the difference between qualitative and quantitative paradigms is that in quantitative research, emphasis is on the measurement of numbers or amount. It is therefore pertinent to phenomena that can be articulated in terms of quantity, in other words, data is generated in quantitative format and is then subjected to meticulous quantitative analysis in a rigid way. Qualitative research on the other hand, has to do with qualitative phenomena, for instance, phenomenon that has to do with or that involves quality or kind. For instance, investigations of the reasons for human behaviour i.e., why they act, speak or behave in certain ways. Kothari terms this behavioural research and attitude or opinion research. Behavioural research deals with the discovery of the underlying motives and desires, using in-depth interviews. Attitude or opinion research seeks to find out the feelings of people and their thinking in relation to a particular subject/s. He further adds that both are important aspects of qualitative research. In this study, data was not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis and broadly, the techniques of focus group discussions/interviews and in depth interviews were used.

Neuman (2006) also highlights that the difference between the quantitative and qualitative paradigms is that in quantitative research, researchers are much more concerned with issues pertaining to measurements than qualitative researchers. Quantitative researchers view measurement as a discrete step that preside data collection. Researchers assume a deductive methodology, whereby they introduce special terminology and techniques in comparison with qualitative research. Creswell (2003) argues that in qualitative research, research transpires within natural settings where human behaviour and events take place and emphasis is on subject/participant perceptions and experiences and the way they make sense of their surroundings.

Researchers in quantitative research come up with techniques to produce data in a form of numbers. Researchers' point of departure is deduced from abstract ideas to more specific techniques of data collection. Neuman (2011) concisely comments that in quantitative paradigm, researchers rely on positivist principles and the language of variables and hypothesis is utilised. Emphasis is on testing hypothesis and measuring variables. In this way a hypothesis that has already been thought of or already is in mind is tested to be true or false.

Qualitative research methodology was preferred for this study because theory often constructs meaning moving from observation and open ended questions to more general conclusions through an educative process. Creswell (2007) differentiates qualitative research from quantitative research by defining qualitative research as a positioned activity that establishes the location of the observer in the world. The qualitative approach involves interpretative abstracts that clarify the world. Qualitative researchers break the world down into a string of representations that might include field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos. Creswell (2007) argues that qualitative research forms part and includes an interpretative and naturalistic approach to the world. This therefore means that, qualitative researchers study things in their naturalistic state, in an attempt to understand and grasp phenomena in original meaning people bring to them. Creswell (2007) identifies the following as characteristics of qualitative research:

- natural setting
- collection of data in the field

- researcher as a key instrument to data collection
- meaning of subject/participant
- inductive data analysis
- multiple source of data
- emergent design
- theoretical lenses
- holistic account, and
- interpretative inquiry

The use of qualitative research is validated by Brynard and Hanekom (2006) when adding that qualitative research is research that generates descriptive data as generally captured from the subject/participant's own words from his/her own experience or perception. Brynard and Hanekom further argue that the advantage of qualitative research is that it allows the researcher to relate with the subjects/participants in a personal atmosphere, to see their originality and learn about their daily experiences.

3.2.1 Disadvantages of qualitative approach

Although qualitative research is hailed by different authors as highly descriptive, naturalistic, field work and inductive strategy utilised, other authors discredit and criticize it. For example, Bell and Bryman (2007) argue that qualitative research is not open for statistical analysis but is much narrow since it focusses on individual's interpretation of the world. This view is shared by Yin (1984) when he maintains that there is a lack of objectivity, rigidity and robustness as compared to the quantitative approach. Merriam (2002) also adds that qualitative research lacks objectivity, in that it is subjective by nature and data collected by qualitative research mostly lacks hardness and reliability but is rich and deep.

3.3 Case study

This study adopted qualitative research approach and a case study methodology was therefore applied in order to have a full understanding of the phenomena under study. According to Stake (1995), a case study captures the entire complexity of a single case, meaning a holistic and in-depth investigation is conducted on a single or particular case. He further adds that "case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances" (Stake, 1995, p.01). This approach enabled the researcher to gather the kind of information needed which eventually allowed the researcher to comprehend and fully understand the local government officials' understanding of corruption in DRKKDM. Neuman (2011) concurs by arguing that in a case study, in-depth of knowledge is acquired and insightful and complex explanations or interpretations about a particular case are produced.

3.4 Data collection

The researcher utilised both primary data (interview with participants) and secondary data (existing policies and literature review) in this study. The use of several collection methods was viewed as a way to capture full understanding of phenomena. Data collection was an important part of conducting this research, it also was not simple to choose a data collection method, given the fact that the subject of corruption remains a thorny subject within the local government. O'Leary (2004, p.150) notes that "collecting credible data is a tough task, and it is worth remembering that one method of data collection is not inherently better than another." The methods chosen therefore depended on the research goals.

3.4.1 Primary data

Kothari (2004, p.25) defines primary data as "data … which are collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in character." Interviews were an integral part in the collection of primary data for this research project. Kvale (1996) posits that interviews are a logical method of absorbing and listening to people and a way to collect data from participants through conversations. The interviewer or researcher usually uses open-ended questions. Interviews allow a researcher to gain knowledge and collect data from interviewees. Kvale (1996) views interviews as an interchange of views between two or more people on a topic of mutual interest. He sees the centrality of human interaction for knowledge production and emphasises the social 'situatedness' of research data.

Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) argue that interviews are ways in which participants get involved, talk about their views and share perception and interpretations on various subjects. These are expressed from their own views.

Cohen *et al* (2000, p. 267) point out that “the interview is not simply concerned with collecting data about life: it is part of life itself, its human “embeddedness” is inescapable.” Denzin (2000) also adds that any interaction between two or more people with a specific purpose in mind can be referred to as an interview.

Interviews were conducted with six (6) local government officials. Two (2) were senior managers, two (2) middle managers and two (2) procurement/supply chain officials. Interviews were conducted with key officials who had knowledge of the phenomenon.

According to May (2001) there are four (4) main types of interviews in social science research, the structured interview, the semi-structured interview, the unstructured interview and the group interview. It is advisable for a researcher not to limit himself to the use of only one type; rather a mixture of two or more is advisable.

David and Sutton (2004) maintain that semi-structured interviews are not structured and are mostly used in qualitative research. The researcher had key ideas, questions and issues that were covered during the interviews. And, in this type of interview the sequence of questions can be altered depending on the direction the interview is taking. In other words, there was a guide but there were additional questions that were not anticipated at the initial stage to probe further.

Structured interviews on the other hand are sometimes called standardised interviews. Corbetta (2003, p.269) states that structured interviews are interviews “in which all respondents are asked the same questions with the same wording and in the same sequence”. Gray (2004) adds that the ideal question can be read out in a similar tone of voice so that the interviewer’s tone should not influence the respondents. Bryman (2001) maintains that in structured interviews the aim is for the respondents to be given the same framework of questioning. This therefore means that each interviewee receives precisely the same interview impetus as any other. Questions are mostly specific and fixed, i.e. closed, closed ended, pre-coded or fixed choice. Corbetta (2003) argues that due to the rigid nature of structured interviews, respondents may not understand the question and as a result be unable to answer.

Corbetta (2003) succinctly comments that unstructured interviews are non-directed, non-scheduled, casual and flexible interview methods. Usually the interviewer has minimal training or experience in terms of interviewing or has not prepared sufficiently. In this type of interview the respondent is given room to respond as much as they can and give as much detail as they possibly can. However, Corbetta (2003) adds that, this can create problems because the interviewer may not know which direction to take in the interview. As a result, relevant data that is required for the study might not be acquired.

Focus groups are a form of group interview that capitalises on communication between research participants in order to generate data. Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method. This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other’s' experiences and points of view. The method is particularly useful for exploring people's knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way (Kitzinger, 1995).

Denscombe, (2003) maintains that in deciding if an interview is suitable for one’s research the following must be taken into consideration: if data needed is based on emotions, experiences and feelings, or if data needed is based on private, sensitive and personal matters. Feelings and understanding are not easily expressed in a word or two, hence interview as a research method was chosen in this study. Denscombe (2003) further argues that face-to-face interviews will yield appropriate data if the study covers sensitive or personal issues.

3.4.2 Secondary data

Kothari (2008, p.25) maintains that “secondary data are those that were already collected by someone else and which have already undergone statistical process.” According to Bell and Bryman (2007), secondary sources of data are elucidations of events of a particular period based on primary sources. They further maintain that some documents are primary from one point of view and secondary from another. This study has drawn extensively from existing data, some documents that were consulted include but are not limited to the following:

- Auditor General's report
- Annual reports
- Anti-Corruption Acts

3.4.3 Sampling

Brynard and Hanekom (2006, p. 48) view sampling as "a technique used to select a small group assuming that it is representative of a larger group (population)." This study has adopted a qualitative paradigm, as a result the paradigm dictated that non-random sampling be assumed in this research. The researcher adopted a purposeful sampling method for data to be collected through interviews. Bernard (2000) argues that in purposive sampling, the researcher decides the purpose they want the participants to serve, and must go out to find such participants. Creswell (2007) succinctly comments that purposeful sampling is utilised in qualitative research as the researcher selects participants and sites for the study because they can purposefully contribute comprehensive information that will yield an understanding of the research problem and the central matter of the study. Brynard and Hanekom (2006, p.48) justify purposive sampling by maintaining that "the sample is picked for the study and the researcher might already have knowledge of and about the specific people or events." The researcher intentionally selected the particular six (6) respondents/participants because they were viewed as the custodians of most valuable data and willing to give full cooperation as opposed to other officials. The selection was as follows: three (3) senior managers from three different offices were selected, two (2) junior managers and two (2) officers were selected. The Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality is comprised of four (4) local municipalities. In this case the sample comprised of six (6) officials from the four (4) different municipalities so as to get a holistic view of the phenomena within the District Municipality.

3.5 Data analysis

Neuman (2011, p.507) points out that "in qualitative approaches to research, analysis begins while gathering data, but such analysis tends to be tentative and incomplete. To analyse data means systematically to organise, integrate, and examine, as we do this, we search for patterns and relationships among the specific details. To analyse, we connect particular data to concepts, advance generalisations, and identify broad trends or themes. Analysis allows us to improve understanding, expand theory, and advance.”

According to Denscombe (2007) analysis in the qualitative paradigm is based on four guiding aspects: the first one is that analysis of data and the conclusions drawn from the research should reflect in the data. The analysis according to Denscombe, must be seen from the data collected. The second aspect is that the researcher’s explanation and interpretation of the data should appear from a careful and thorough reading of the data. The third one is that the researcher should by all means avoid introducing biasness and personal judgements stemming from literature reviewed earlier. The fourth aspect is that analysis of data should be an elastic process allowing the researcher to move back and forth comparing empirical data with concepts used.

The description of data analysis by Neuman (2011) and Denscombe (2007) in simple terms is that analysis of data presents systemic explanations and unbiased interpretation of participants’ feedback. Creswell (2003) concurs that data analysis is indeed an ongoing process that involves clarifying and putting into perspective the raw data and continuous reflection about the data.

Merriam (2002, p.14) concurs that data collection and analysis should be done simultaneously for the researcher to make adjustments along the way, “to redirect the collection process, to test emerging concepts, themes and categories against existing data. One starts with a unit of data (word, phrase, narrative, etc.) and compares it to another unit of data, this is done while at the same time looking for commonalities in terms of patterns across data. The patterns are then given names (codes) distinguished and accustomed as the analysis continued. This process is referred to as coding and usually applied in quantitative research.”

3.6 Validity and reliability

According to Stenbacka (2001, p. 552), “the concept of reliability is even misleading in qualitative research. If a qualitative study is discussed with reliability as a criterion, the consequence is rather that the study is no good.” On the other hand, Patton (2001) maintains that validity and reliability are two important aspects which should be applied by any qualitative researcher while designing a study, which is mainly the analysis and judging of the quality of the study. Healy and Perry (2000) argue that while validity and reliability might be important aspects for checking quality in quantitative research, in qualitative research the terms credibility, neutrality or “confirm-ability”, consistency or dependability and applicability or transferability suffice for the criterion for quality.

Creswell and Miller (2000) add that the validity is dependent upon the researcher’s perception of validity in the study and his/her choice of approach assumed. Davies and Dodd (2002) concur by pointing out that, many researchers have developed their own appropriate terms of validity such as, quality, rigor and trustworthiness. However, other authors hold contrasting but almost similar views, for example Leedy and Ormrod (2001) view validity as the accuracy, meaningfulness and credibility of a study and reliability as the consistency of the results within the study.

The researcher made an effort to be reliable by ensuring consistency. The researcher also captured notes during the interviews as per agreement with the respondents. The responses from respondents were checked against both primary and secondary data. Furthermore, the researcher re-checked and verified the responses with respondents in order to evade any different explanations or interpretation of the data. Although the researcher’s nature of work to a certain extent dealt with corruption within Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality, the researcher ensured openness and objectivity during the research to guard against biasness. Preconceived ideas were not discussed with the respondents during the interviews. Respondents were also encouraged to re-check on their responses during the interview which ensured that there was not be data distortion.

3.7 Significance of the study

This study contributes towards the fight against corruption within the local sphere of government with particular reference to Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality. The exploration of the understanding of corruption by the officials of this municipality led to the understanding of the dynamics of corruption i.e. cause and effect relationship, motivation, knowledge of policies designed to fight corruption. Officials might be involved in corruption without their knowledge, perhaps thinking it is an operational way within the municipality. The findings thereof might also contribute to policy formulation in terms of the fight against corruption.

3.8 Limitations of research

- Amongst the sample, there were senior and junior managers. Due to the nature of their work/workload it was difficult to access some of them. Meetings were arranged a month in advance but were postponed several times. Some interviews were conducted outside the workplace. Interviews were mostly conducted after hours and in informal places were respondents were comfortable and sure that none of their colleagues could see them. In this kind of setting, much detail was divulged. The reason was as mentioned before, corruption being a thorny subject as a result nobody wanted to be seen as an informer.
- Corruption and the local government have become topical issues which made officials nervous to discuss the matter; hence purposive sampling was adopted for this study. However, the participants were assured that the findings were solely for academic purposes. A letter from the University of Witwatersrand was presented in conjunction with an individual letter that requested the interviews. A rapport was developed weeks prior to the actual interviews. Respondents were shown documents that proved that the researcher was indeed a university of the Witwatersrand student and was not a member of any law enforcement agency i.e. letter to request permission/cooperation, student card and proof of registration

3.9 Ethical considerations/issues

Respondents were informed that their identity was not to be revealed if they so desired. To ensure this, reference was only made to unique codes such as Respondent 1 allocated to each participant. To foster compliance with all ethical principles, the research was conducted with openness, free from bias and data collected from respondents was treated with respect and confidentiality.

3.10 Structure of the report

The research report is structured as follows:

- **Chapter One: Introduction:** Introduces the study and background details, the study context and an overview of public sector corruption as a phenomenon. The chapter further highlights challenges posted by corruption on the public sector/ local government, and this provides the problem statement and purpose of the research. It also includes questions driving the research.

- **Chapter Two: Literature Review:** This chapter outlines existing literature reviewed consisting of books, journals and research reports on local government corruption under the umbrella of public sector corruption.
- **Chapter Three: Research Methodology:** This chapter deals with the research paradigm proposed by the researcher, the approach and techniques employed to sample, collect and present data, and how the data collected is analysed in the completion of the research report.
- **Chapter Four: Data Presentation:** This chapter presents the perspectives offered by the sample which is comprised of two (2) senior managers, two (2) middle managers, and two (2) procurement officers to fully capture the perceptions of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality.
- **Chapter Five: Data Analysis:** This chapter analyses data collected during the study and provides a connection with the existing body of knowledge on local government corruption.
- **Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations**: Conclusions are drawn from the data collected only, presented and analysed in conjunction with the existing literature. Recommendations are forwarded to advice at the level of policy making for fighting corruption in the local government.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focusses on the presentation of data collected through interviews. However, it will also briefly present the case review and the area of study. The interviews carried out where semi-structured face-to-face interviews that utilised open-ended questions with the officials of DRKKDM. The findings were interpreted in relation to the research questions and literature review. The researcher interviewed six (6) selected participants who had insight into corruption in DRKKDM. Of these participants, two (2) were senior managers, two (2) were junior managers and two (2) were supply chain/procurement officials. Secondary data was collected through document analysis using books, Auditor General Reports and policy documents.

Interviews were conducted with the following respondents, for the purpose of primary data collection:

Respondent 1: Manager of Finance Department - Senior Manager - Ventersdorp Local Municipality

Respondent 2: Supply Chain Officer -DRKKDM offices

Respondent 3: Chairperson: Municipal Public Accounting Committee - Junior Manager - DRKKDM offices

Respondent 4: Supply Chain Officer - Maquassi Hills Local Municipality

Respondent 5: Human Resources Manager – Junior Manager - Matlosana Local Municipality

Respondent 6: Director Technical Services: Senior Manager - DRKKDM offices

The author attempted to include Municipal Managers as part of the respondents but due to their busy schedules it was not possible to schedule interviews with them. It must also be noted that corruption remains a thorny subject within the local government, as such, most officials are wary of discussing the subject due to fear of victimization.

4.2 Case review

4.2.1 Demographic and geographical background

The DRKKDM consists of four (4) local municipalities i.e. Matlosana, Tlokwe, Maquassi Hills, and Ventersdorp. The area covered by the District Municipality is attached as Appendix A.

4.2.2 Corruption and governance background

According to the Auditor General's (AG) 2010/11 Annual Report, the following audit opinions were raised:

- **Procurement and contract management**: 34 contracts were extended without tabling the reasons for the proposed amendments in the Council of the Municipality as required by Supply Chain Regulation 43. On the same note, the AG 2011/12 Annual Report reported that the Supply Chain Management Unit was understaffed and had officials who lacked relevant skills. As a result, the unit should be staffed such that internal control is in place. The same applied to Human Resource department, which was understaffed and lacked qualified personnel (Auditor General Annual Report 2010/11:98-105).
- **Irregular and fruitless wasteful expenditure was found on opinion 10**: expenditure of R5 141 436 and R27 273 184 in 2011. The AG's report stated that Supply Chain Management procedures were not followed and there were no receipts and invoices to trace those funds. Opinion 11 found fruitless and wasteful expenditure of R3 373 864 in 2010. The office of the Executive Mayor spent R923 937 but could not furnish the Auditor General (AG) with supporting document in relation to that expenditure (Auditor General Annual Report, 2010/11, p.108).

4.2.3 Deviations

Section 62(1) of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) states that, the accounting officer, who is the Municipal Manager (MM) of a municipality, is responsible for managing the financial administration of the municipality, and must for this purpose take all reasonable steps to ensure that:

a) The resources of the municipality are used effectively, efficiently and economically

b) Full and proper records of the financial affairs of the municipality are kept in accordance with any prescribed norms and standards

c) The municipality has and maintains effective, efficient and transparent systems:

  i. of financial and risk management and internal control, and

  ii. of internal control and it operated in accordance with any prescribed norms and standards.

Regardless of the above prescript, according to the AG Annual Report (2011/12, p. 112), there has been non-adherence to legislation. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations was not reviewed and monitored. Funds that were intended for basic services were wrongfully channelled towards the payment of overtime and salaries in general. This deviation had a negative impact on service delivery. Supply Chain Management (SCM) regulations were not complied with in the case whereby the procurement processes of competitive bidding were not followed. According to the procedures, goods and services with a transaction value of more than R200 000 must undergo competitive bidding process that includes at least three (3) companies. It was also found by the audit team that on the database, some municipal officials were recorded as suppliers and inappropriate information was recorded. Amongst the root causes of poor audit outcomes were key vacancies of key positions and/or officials lacking appropriate skills.

4.3 Findings

4.3.1 How is corruption understood in DRKKDM?

Respondent 1 interviewed on 17 September 2013, maintained that corruption is multi-faceted but normally prevails when procedures are not well followed. He pointed out that corruption activities include but are not limited to:

- Bribery of officials to acquire confidential information and award jobs, tenders or jobs to service providers

- Fraud was also a form of corruption, a situation whereby officials accepted fraudulent documents to advance certain companies

He elaborated further by pointing out two examples. The first one being that the MFMA stated clearly the procedures to be followed for the procurement of goods and services, however, human beings (municipal officials) in this case manipulate the system and processes which then results in corruption. Manipulation in this instance takes various form i.e. escalation of prices of tenders, leakage of confidential information to the preferred bidder, etc. The second was that Section 117 of the MFMA stated clearly and prohibited Councillors to be involved in the bidding system for tenders. However, Councillors become indirectly and illegally involved in such processes by their negative influence on the administrators. Respondent 1 maintained that private and covert meetings between councillors and bidders will be held to discuss ways to manipulate tender processes, the administrator is then bribed by the Councillor on behalf of the bidder.

Respondent 2 interviewed on 17 September 2013 argued that corruption has to do with favouritism and appointment of officials who do not meet the minimum requirements. These types of appointees are later utilised to perpetuate corruption in DRKKDM. He further argued that political appointments, nepotism and cronyism were also forms of corruption. The appointment of municipal officials through political, nepotism and cronyism is not only corruption activities on their own, but ensures the continuity and perpetuation of corruption. Officials are strategically recruited in a wrong way in key positions at the finance department with the full knowledge that they do not meet the requirements and as a result, they will be easily manipulated to pursue corrupt activities because they know that their employment was achieved through personal favours. Employment through the above mentioned methods should be viewed as illicit favours, in their nature, illicit favours carry in them the message that ‘rub my back and I will rub yours’. The implication will then be if one is afforded that illicit favour now, they surely and must be prepared to reciprocate the same favour in future. According to Respondent 2, the starting point of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality is in the recruitment processes which are not adhered to and complied with.

Respondent 3 interviewed on 18 September 2013 maintained that corruption is any action contrary to the policies, Acts and procedures set to govern all municipal departments, for instance, appointment of unqualified personnel through cronyism, political appointments and nepotism. Usually posts will be advertised requiring certain qualifications, but instead of appointing an unknown person with skills, a family member or friend who totally lacks skills gets appointed. He further went to point out that, lately more complex mechanisms were applied in relation to these wrongful appointments. If a friend or family member does not meet the requirements of the post, the requirements will then be lowered to their standards in order for them to be qualified. The other means utilised to perpetuate these wrongful appointments were cases whereby people who were not shortlisted by the panel during interviews, ending up being appointed to particular positions. There are financial implications involved because the municipality may end up paying double i.e. pay the salary of the unqualified employee who does not deliver on the job, as well as potentially pay for someone else who actually knows how to do the job.

In his view, corruption is a two way stream and there are two parties involved namely, the corruptor and the corruptee. He elaborated by using the following scenario: that there might be a tender to construct a 4 kilometre road and the amount required is R5 million. A ‘preferred’ construction company will be given the tender after all has been approved, but the scope of work will then be reduced, that is, rather than 4 kilometres it then becomes 3.6 kilometres but the awarded amount does not change. The question then arises that there was a study conducted to conclude that the above amount is needed for the initial set scope of work, then how were the processes reversed and altered? Moving forward, the appointment letter of the tender will then indicate 3.6 kilometres. Later on a letter will be drafted to request an additional R1million to complete the 4 kilometre road construction and increase the scope. The total money for the tender becomes R6 million instead of the initial R5 million. It should be noted that the construction company is not involved in the initial processes, it then boils down to officials and Councillors who collude with the construction companies to perpetuate corrupt activities and extract bribes. In this scenario, R1 million will go for the bribe, and in this case the corruptor is an official and the corruptee becomes a chairperson of the particular portfolio committee. In simple terms the corruptor is the briber and the corruptee is the bribee.

The respondent also identified the interference of politicians in the administration as form and part of corruption, they interfere by influencing the tender and recruitment processes. In his view politicians condoned corruption. He added that politicians must deal with oversight and officials must implement, administrators and officials are appointed as experts on their respective positions as a result they must be allowed room to expedite their duties and responsibilities in accordance with municipal policies and procedures. Instead, some politicians dictate to certain officials especially in regards to issues of recruitment and tenders.

Respondent 3 also noted that procurement processes are also not followed. For instance, policy clearly stipulates that procurement of any service above R30 000 must follow a bidding process, however, one can find that services of more than that amount were procured without following the processes and procedures. In this case non-compliance equals to corruption as per Respondent 3. He also added that ignorance by officials is also part of corruption, an official can be glad to receive a bribe not knowing or overlooking the scope of damage that the corrupt activity is likely to bring. Ignorance of the anti-corruption policies, Acts and procedures by officials is also corruption because it then leads them to derail from what is stipulated on the legal frameworks.

Respondent 4 interviewed on 25 September 2013 viewed corruption as when municipal officials are looting state resources by not complying with by-laws and ordinances set out to govern the local government. She further maintained that corruption started from top management and then cascaded down. She said that top management awarded tenders to companies of their cronies as opposed to companies that met the requirement for that specific tender. She explained that top and middle management had influence on corruption in municipalities. According to Respondent 4, this included bid committees in the sense that these committees were responsible for shortlisting companies in terms of scores of companies. She argued that, i~~I~~nterference by politicians with the administration of the municipality should also be viewed as corruption because it is clearly stipulated on the code of conduct that Councillors should not interfere with the administration. Interference then becomes non-compliance and highlights corruption according to Respondent 4.

Respondent 5 interviewed on 25 September 2013 argued that corruption in the municipalities is any conduct that has to do with extortion, bribery, fraud, dishonesty, shady deals and crookedness. For example, the supply chain function is located within the finance department in the municipalities. For a supplier to be awarded a tender there must be a choice of at least three (3) companies in the bidding process of which the lowest quote or proposal in terms of the funds needed for the project must then be chosen in accordance with the procurement procedures. What will normally happen will be that the bidding process will be overlooked and only one supplier will be directly appointed or awarded a tender. According to Respondent 5, failure to follow the guiding principles, Acts and procedures set to govern the municipalities is also corruption, for example, employment in terms of political appointments, cronyism, nepotism and employment of non-qualified personnel in strategic positions which eventually puts a strain on service delivery. Service delivery is then affected because non-qualified personnel do not know what to do to deliver service to the communities. They may have no experience or skills to carry out the necessary daily tasks that allow the municipality to deliver services to the communities.

Respondent 6 interviewed on 30 September 2013 simply viewed corruption as stealing or taking something that does not belong to you without acquiring permission from the owner. She further explained that it included fraud and dishonesty towards officials' responsibilities at the work place given by the local government and rendered for the local communities or municipal areas. In DRKKDM, she maintained that corruption can be viewed as receiving kickbacks from people who received assistance through corrupt means i.e. bribery. Another example she gave is when officials award companies tenders in return for bribes and/or shares in terms of profits in those tenders. Respondent 6 further explained that corruption can also be the illegal selling or stealing of government property.

4.3.1.1 Motivation for corruption

Respondent 1 identified greed as the sole factor that motivated municipal officials to involve themselves in corrupt activities. He argued that officials were being paid their salaries but still engaged in corrupt activities and labelled this to be greed. Officials who were involved in corrupt activities were not indigent individuals but people who were receiving monthly salaries and identified with the working and middle class. Therefore, officials then become greedy and want to acquire more wealth in a wrong way. This wealth was then acquired through corrupt means that see the misuse of municipal funds.

Respondent 2 identified three motivating factors for corruption: greed, social competition and wrong appointments. Greed motivated officials to partake in corrupt activities in the sense that people tend to want more than what they are receiving or supposed to receive which coincides with social competition in society. Municipal officials as friends might be on different bands or salary scales, e.g. Councillor and MEC. The Councillor will then strive to compete with his MEC counterpart or any other municipal official at the higher salary band. The option he or she has to supplement what he or she is currently earning is then to involve him or herself in illicit activities which are forms of corruption in this case. Respondent 2 explained that some municipal officials want to lead lives beyond their salaries and graduate to the upper class in society in the economic context. Wrong appointments are made deliberately (under political appointments, nepotism and cronyism) to manipulate the appointees to implement unlawful instructions. Officials will then be appointed in strategic positions to allow for easy illicit control in future.

Respondent 3 identified four (4) factors that motivated corruption:

- Socio-economic status: whereby officials get into positions expecting to lead luxurious lives (i.e. driving expensive cars, owning big houses and designer accessories) that will allow them to be competitors in the social class competition in society.
- Contract employment: whereby officials, who are employed on a five (5) year contract, try to accumulate as much wealth as possible before their contract lapses. This accumulation of wealth is usually achieved through corruption. Therefore, it means fear of being out of employment after five (5) years motivates them to be involved in corrupt activities to sustain their luxurious lifestyles beyond five (5) years.
- Small salaries: officials and Councillors are motivated to partake in corrupt activities as a way of supplementing their small salaries. For example, salaries of municipal officials are done through grading, if the grading is lower

so will the salaries be. However, the responsibilities and duties remain the same regardless of the grade.

- Greed: other officials were highly paid but still involved in corrupt activities, this has nothing to do with supplementing their salaries but more to do with seeking to have more than they have.

Respondent 4 also identified four (4) factors that motivated the involvement of local government officials in DRKKDM in corruption:

- Small salaries: To a certain extent, officials believe that their salaries are small as a result they ought to supplement their salaries.
- Factionalism: political factions within the municipalities have a tendency of financially assisting their members using the municipal funds.
- Debt: most officials are indebted as a result of leading lives that are not sustainable with salaries that they earn.
- Class competition: this competition was amongst officials and politicians in relation to material and luxurious life styles. Respondent 4 explained that social class in this case was demonstrated by means of what you are wearing or driving; and officials strived to be on the high scale.

Respondent 5 identified motivating factors for involvement in corrupt activities by municipal officials to be:

- Pursuit of wealth: officials strive to be rich and wealthy at the expense of the municipality funds.
- Social class competition: this competition leads officials to acquire and utilise illicit means to outclass their colleagues and lead lives beyond their salaries.
- Small salaries: officials justify the involvement in corruption based on the argument that their salaries were small, as a result, they supplement their small salaries.

According to Respondent 6 corruption is motivated by:

- The appointment of officials who lack experience in their particular fields.
- The appointment of officials who lack relevant qualifications.

- Ignorance by officials: officials do not read anti-corruption Acts, legislation and policies governing the municipalities.
- Political influence: the code of conduct extracted from the National Treasury clearly stipulates that Councillors should not interfere in the administration of the municipalities, however, experience has shown that Councillors disregarded the code of conduct and continue to interfere in the administration of the municipalities.
- Greed: officials earn salaries but still want more and acquire that through corrupt means.

Respondent 6 further mentioned that the appointments of those who lacked relevant qualifications and experience are achieved through cronyism, nepotism and political appointments which are key aspects of corruption. Corruption is then easily perpetuated by these officials because some of them are given powers to make decisions and execute the powerful mandate by having signing powers to the release of those funds. These unqualified appointees also sit in the SCM bid committees which are appointed by the MM as the accounting officer and play a role on key decisions in relation to which companies should be granted tenders. Respondent 6 went on to explain that due to the fact that more often than not these officials solely deal with large amounts of money, in this way they then seem to believe that other officials are blinded, as a result, they connive and enrich themselves through corrupt means.

4.3.1.2 How is governance understood?

Respondent 1 argued that governance or good governance is when there is compliance to the set standards, procedures and Acts. Governance is affected badly in a department and environment where corruption is found to be prevalent. The key word is compliance. If the municipal officials do not comply with the set Acts and procedures it will then result in poor governance and affect services to be delivered to members of the community. He maintained that standards and procedures governing the municipalities were entrenched in the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996 and was surely passed by parliament i.e. MFMA. Given this background, if most of the municipal officials are not compliant to the set standards, procedures and Acts governing the municipality it therefore means there is something wrong that is being done and obviously going against the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996.

In Respondent 2's view, governance has to do with proper implementation of policies for delivering services to community members, for instance the implementation of Integrated Development Plan (IDP). This is a process in which the municipality must be in consultation with the community members regarding their needs. Governance is formed by three layers namely, the politicians, administrators and the community members. He added that corruption is part of governance in DRKKDM in the sense that, administrators who have the responsibility to implement policies in the municipality are influenced negatively by corrupt politicians to carry out their illegal political mandates that are contrary to the MFMA and municipal procedures in general. Refusal to carry out these mandates can result in one being unemployed. At the core of these illegal mandates are political appointments, nepotism and cronyism.

According to Respondent 3 good governance prevails in a place where monitoring and evaluation processes are in place. This evaluation and monitoring needs to be done on a monthly basis as opposed to quarterly because officials are paid monthly. There must be oversight and compliance to local government procedures, Acts and policies. If non-compliance prevails, then there will be poor governance which in turn compromises service delivery because funds intended for service delivery projects will then be misused and misdirected to corrupt activities. Furthermore, putting unqualified officials into positions or appointing qualified officials and then not giving them support also results in poor governance because firstly they will not have necessary skills and knowledge to perform their duties and secondly, such officials are prone to manipulation. The fact that their employment was not achieved procedurally, they will then be lead astray under the idea that they owe something to whoever assisted them with their employment; this in turn leads to corruption which in turn negatively influence governance.

Respondent 4 maintained that governance has to do with the how part or the *modus operandi* in municipalities. There must be guidelines on how recruitment should be done. There must be policies in place on how things should be done including the code of conduct. This approach should apply to all employees including top and middle management. Good governance is therefore compliance to the adopted or set policies and procedures. Corruption can never co-exist with good governance as corruption advocates and carries with it non-compliance as its key pillar whereas good governance coincide with compliance and adherence. Respondent 4 explained that for instance, non-compliance with MFMA Act 56 of 2003 results in corruption and eventually poor governance or non-good governance. In addition, good governance in DRKKDM will only be achieved through non-interference of politicians in the administration side of the municipality. In her view, politicians played a predominant role in ensuring poor governance and corruption by rent seeking and bribery. She pointed out that politicians were solely responsible for the political governance of the municipality whereas, the administration side was the responsibility of administrative officials.

Respondent 5 maintained that governance is “about the people for the people”, meaning that it is about people who uphold compliance with Acts and policies of local government to provide services and goods for the society. It therefore means that if officials are corrupt, then corrupt governance is in place. Corruption and governance co-exist in the sense that corrupt officials are put in local government positions in the municipalities. This status quo is perpetuated by the fact that the perpetrators are not dealt with but are rather redeployed into other departments or to different municipalities, which therefore means that, corrupt officials are not dealt with but are rather let loose and allowed another opportunity elsewhere to repeat their corrupt behaviour.

Respondent 6 understands governance to be the fulfilment of the government mandate by officials by providing services to the municipalities with loyalty and honesty. Further, good governance is characterised by passion and truthfulness in practicing and adopting Batho Pele - “People First” principles during the execution of the tasks given to officials. These mentioned tasks, duties and responsibilities are provided for and in guidance from the local government and municipal Acts, legislation and policies that are set to be followed and executed by all municipal officials.

4.3.2 The root of corruption in DRKKDM

Respondent 1 identified three (3) departments that are corrupt or prone to corruption and argued that this was the case because those departments dealt with tenders and finances which are the root of corruption:

- Finance department which includes Supply Chain: tenders are awarded from this department which deals with a lot of money; this department is influenced negatively and indirectly by the Mayoral office. Councillors collude with bidders and influence the decisions taken by the administrators to favour their preferred companies.
- Office of the Municipal Manager: the municipal manager is responsible for the appointment of employees and final awarding of tenders. In this office, officials are usually bribed to advance certain companies. A company can be awarded a tender even when the adjudicating committee did not endorse that company. The final signature of appointment of tenders is done in this office.
- Office of the Mayor: indirectly and illegally appoints certain companies to render services even if those companies do not comply or meet the requirement. This could be achieved through cronyism and nepotism.

The key word again is compliance. Respondent 1 posits that officials in the above mentioned departments understand corruption and how it is perpetuated. Officials in these departments have knowledge about corruption. There are Acts and a Code of Conduct which prescribed what officials shall do and how they are supposed to work but officials choose ignorance and by so doing increase the level of non-compliance which in turn works totally against the standards and norms set by the Acts. For example, according to MFMA Act 56 of 2003, chapter 11 clearly stipulates that municipal officials must declare gifts (which entail bribes) but officials do not do as per policy requirement.

Respondent 2 also identified three (3) but slightly different departments:

- Finance department which includes supply chain;
- Technical department; and the
- Political office which included all Councillors.

He argued that these departments were inter-linked. The IDP concept was financed through the department of finance and supply chain which is concerned with the development projects of particular areas. Politicians will then head hunt companies of their preference to be part of these projects with the aim of extracting personal gains. A technical department has to do with infrastructural projects which again gives room for bribery and manipulation by politicians. Politicians advise their cronies to bid for tenders and do illicit favours in return for bribery, usually in monetary and or material goods. This is done secretly in that municipal officials reveal confidential tender documents to their cronies, which involve the amounts required and specifics which will eventually provide more advantage to their cronies as opposed to other potential bidders. Section 57 municipal officials: these are municipal directors who are political appointees and their appointments were motivated and endorsed by Councillors. This three legged relationship ensures that illicit favours are carried out smoothly. Councillors easily influence Section 57 officials under the auspices that they are the ones who vouched for their employment.

According to Respondent 2, some of the officials do not have profound knowledge of corruption. For instance, in their view corruption is limited to bribery and they do not see wrong appointments, cronyism, nepotism and political appointments as corruption. Those who have knowledge of what entails corruption, choose to ignore and non-compliance. For instance, corruption that is done through the IDP, whereby people are consulted and needs analysis conducted. Municipal officials will appoint their cronies' companies to fulfil the needs of the communities. This might not be viewed as corruption because the needs of the communities are addressed, however, the fact that tenders were awarded to those companies on a "silver platter"-freely and easy without any struggle or hustle constitutes corruption.

Respondent 3 also identified three (3) departments that are corrupt in DRKKDM:

- Finance department: procurement and tenders are undertaken in this department which includes supply chain.
- Technical department: deals with infrastructural projects that impact on service delivery.
- Corporate department including Human resources: wrongful appointments are processed in this department.

According to the Respondent, officials in these departments are fully aware of their actions. They do have knowledge that some of the activities they involve themselves into are corruption. Policies and procedures are in place and officials are aware of such, but they choose the route of non-compliance and hope that ignorance will be accepted as a proper excuse given the motivating factors highlighted early on this section. For instance, Section 57 employees work five (5) year contracts which are not renewable, as a result they accumulate wealth besides their salaries through corrupt activities.

Respondent 4 identified two (2) departments that are corrupt and/or prone to corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality, namely:

- Technical department: pillar of the municipality because it is where service delivery starts and were infrastructural projects are found and availed to companies. As a result, administrators and politicians come together and team up to award projects to companies belonging to their associates, family members or any company that is prepared to pay a high bribe, whether qualified or not qualified.
- Finance department: this is where tenders are awarded and municipal procurement is taking place. Procurement policies are not complied with and awarding of tenders is done through cronyism, factionalism and nepotism. Interference by politicians in this department makes it highly corrupt and prone to corruption. Re-directions of funds also takes place in the finance department, for example, infrastructural grants intended for eradication of bucket toilet systems and proper roads can be redirected to salaries after the salary account was misused in relation to corruption.

Respondent 4 further argued that poor skills and lack of education in terms of qualifications also played a role in both the above mentioned departments. According to Respondent 4, corruption starts during the recruitment processes which are not complied with. This in turn results in the appointment of non-qualified officials. In terms of awareness, only senior officials have knowledge of what corruption is and the anti-corruption policies, however, arguably all officials are aware of what corruption is all about from the induction process. Respondent 4 further added that municipal officials choose ignorance and non-compliance, for example the induction process may be overlooked depending on who is being employed, usually this becomes the case during wrongful appointments.

Respondent 5 identified the Finance department as the sole corrupt department in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District. He argued that people were wrongly appointed through cronyism, nepotism and political appointment. These recruitment processes were contrary to the set policies and procedures and were adopted deliberately for the politicians to later manipulate people in those positions to partake in corrupt activities. Supply chain procedures are not followed as tenders are awarded to non-qualifying companies that belong to the allies, families or companies that paid high bribes. Officials in this department are fully aware that their actions constitute corruption but choose ignorance and non-compliance.

Respondent 6 identified three (3) departments that are prone to corruption and are already corrupt in DRKKDM:

- Finance department: this department included the Supply Chain Directorate that deals with procurement and the awarding of finances for tenders. The procedure stipulated by the legislations and Acts is not followed e.g. MFMA Act 56 of 2003.
- Technical department: this department dealt with infrastructural projects that are of paramount importance to service delivery. Most municipal projects and tenders are awarded from this department. Nepotism and cronyism come to play again in the awarding processes.
- Corporate department: this department is responsible for recruitment and is where people with irrelevant and lack of qualifications are recruited and placed in strategic municipal positions. Nepotism, cronyism, political appointment and bribery are utilised in this regard. Municipal officials in the Corporate department are aware and have full knowledge of what constitutes corruption because they occasionally attend workshops and they are governed by the legislation, Acts and anti-corruption policies. Furthermore, corruption is an everywhere and everyday subject, on radio, television and newspapers.

4.3.3 How is corruption being dealt with in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality?

Respondent 1 maintained that there are policies and procedures intended to deal with corruption and making municipal officials aware of what corruption is all about. For instance the MFMA Act 56 of 2003 and the municipal code of conduct, especially for supply chain officials. The National Treasury clearly outlined the code of conduct for municipal officials and Councillors. During the induction phase of recruitment, officials are taken through these procedures and policies governing the municipalities.

He further articulated that corruption in local government remains a thorny subject and a difficult issue to deal with. In Supply Chain it was not simple to report corruption, because one is supposed to report any abuse of supply chain procedures and policies to the National Treasury, which will in turn take time to descend to the municipality to conduct investigation. There are some cases that are reported but not many, this was the case because of the political situation in the municipalities. This is a situation whereby intra and inter political fighting prevails; factionalism being at the fore front, officials have a tendency of reporting corruption of the other faction and overlooking what transpired in their own faction. Another reason for lack of reporting of corrupt activities in DRKKDM is fear of victimisation. Officials fear to blow whistles on corruption because it has involved their seniors. Furthermore, if one is found to be reporting corrupt activities they can be harshly dealt with. Their work environment could turn hostile, family members could be threatened and they could lose their jobs. Officials are aware of the Presidential Hotline and Corruption Watchdog, however, due to the above mentioned factors, officials opt for silence.

Respondent 2 argued that there is awareness of the prevailing municipal policies, procedures, code of conduct and units formed to combat corruption. There are units formed in all four local municipalities forming the DRKKDM. Respondent 2 explained that these units were found to be utter failures due to the fact that they were led by politicians who are, to a certain extent, themselves involved in corrupt activities. As a result, most cases would not be dealt with and or corruption would then only be reported against factions.

Respondent 2 also affirmed that officials were aware of the Presidential Hotline and other processes to report corruption. Apparently corruption is being reported to the MEC, Minister of Local government and the Presidential Hotline but there are hardly any follow up action steps against those who are reported. The South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and Congress of South African Trading Unions (COSATU) always advocated for the fight against corruption and voiced their opinions regarding corruption cases in DRKKDM, however, these were later disregarded and labelled to be 'tripartite infightings'. Officials report corrupt activities, only to be viewed as jealous individuals who strive to oust certain individuals in their positions as a way of assuming those positions. In addition, officials opt to be silent when it comes to reporting corruption solely because they fear victimisation, frustration at a work place, mistreatment and loss of their jobs.

Respondent 3 succinctly posited that there are anti-corruption policies and structures in municipalities, namely:

- Municipal Public Account Committee (MPAC). MPAC deals with and investigates corrupt cases in the respective local municipalities. Cases are thoroughly investigated by MPAC and relevant recommendations forwarded to Council. However, the findings and recommendations by MPAC about particular corruption cases are usually blocked by the Council or made to disappear into thin air, which indicates that the officials found to be corrupt might be allies with Council members, as a result, council then chooses to be ignorant in that regard. The MFMA and the code of conduct also outline the procedures and behavioural patterns in relation to anti-corruption which are expected to be upheld by municipal officials.

Respondent 3 further concurred that fear of victimisation also contributes to officials opting to be silent about corruption in the municipalities.

Respondent 4 maintained that there are portfolio committees from various municipal departments that sit twice a month to scrutinise expenditure and discrepancies in those departments. She indicated the MPAC was one of those committees. However, the problem is that officials who are part of these committees are themselves not conversant with financial issues and legislations governing the municipalities and they are not that conversant with anti-corruption policies and Acts regulating the municipalities. For example, the chairperson of MPAC consults with people in finance before compiling his report; which was not supposed to be the case if the chairperson was knowledgeable and conversant with municipal anti-corruption policies and Acts.

According to Respondent 4, officials are aware of anti-corruption policies and Acts, however, they are not that well conversant with those legal frameworks. Organised labour does report corruption to regional managers but nothing is being done about it. For example, South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) reported corruption at the Shop Stewarts regional office bearers and Provincial Executive Committee (PEC). The Respondent argued that she was personally sceptical about the relationship between the members of the PEC and Municipal Managers. She further recalled how she reported corruption through this channel and nothing was done to resolve it. She then explained that the matter was escalated to the media by the whistle blower and a day after, the whistle blower was strongly called to order and told that it is not within his or her parameters and prerogative to report such issues to the media. Furthermore, all he or she must do was to report those issues to the municipality. Respondent 4 said the whistle-blower almost lost her job for reporting corruption.

Respondent 4 also added that corruption is mostly not reported due to fear of victimisation. Once it can be found that one was responsible for reporting corruption, they stand for immediate suspension or even dismissal. However, municipal officials were advised to report to the South African Police Services (SAPS) and Special Investigating Units (SIU) if they were victimised. Reporting to SAPS was not viewed as a solution because some SAPS officials were friends with municipal officials. The Presidential Hotline was also inefficient. In addition, the majority of the officials at the lower level are not aware of corruption and the anti-corrupt activities but the middle and top ones are fully aware and partake in corrupt activities out of their choice of ignorance and non-compliance.

Respondent 5 argued that corruption in the municipalities is not dealt with and can never be dealt with. The reason being how could a corrupt official report another corrupt official and expect the report to be taken seriously thereafter? It therefore becomes useless to report corruption, because the likelihood is that the whistle blower might also be involved in corrupt activities in one way or another; given this background, silence becomes the only option as a form of protecting oneself from corrupt activities surfacing. In addition, fear of victimisation, dismissal and suspension prompt municipal officials to remain silent about corruption around them. It then becomes a case of “if you can’t beat them, join them”. Respondent 5 was emphatic in his explanations that in DRKKDM officials are aware of what corruption is and have knowledge of policies and Acts governing local government but disregard and non-compliance remains their choice.

Respondent 6 maintained that corruption in DRKKDM was being dealt with by taking officials through relevant workshops and courses. The MPAC also contributes towards combating corruption. MPAC deals with corruption cases and forwards recommendations and findings to the Council, the Council in turn takes corrective measures towards those found to be guilty. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and the Public Protector usually visit the Council regarding issues pertaining to corruption. Fear of victimisation continues to make it difficult for officials to blow whistles regarding corruption and pin pointing the corrupt officials.

4.4 Conclusion

To summarise, corruption is non-compliance and non-adherence to set policies, procedures, Acts and norms designed to govern the local government. This coincides with the definition by Blackburn et al (2010, p.08) when maintaining that public sector corruption may be broadly defined as the illegal, or unauthorised, profiteering by public officials who exploit their positions in public office to make personal gains.

It manifested itself in various departments. For instance, the appointment of officials who do not meet the minimum requirements opens gates for all other forms of corruption i.e. nepotism, cronyism and illicit favours. These appointees are subject to future manipulation. The other form of corruption which was viewed to be dire was the involvement of politicians in the administration of the municipality which is not permissible in accordance with set Acts, procedures and rules governing the local government. Greed, social competition, contract employment, small salaries and wrongful appointment of officials were noted as key motivational factors to corruption. Non-adherence and non-compliance to those set policies, Acts, norms and procedures was also viewed to represent poor governance, which therefore means that the reverse represented governance or good governance.

Corruption in DRKKDM was mostly located in the finance department, technical department and the political office which included office of the Mayor and other politicians. These departments and offices were seen to be the root of corruption in DRKKDM. It was difficult for officials to deal with corruption as individuals due to fear of victimisation.

Officials were partaking in corrupt activities with a full knowledge of what they were doing and chose ignorance and non-compliance. There are policies in place designed to combat corruption, officials are introduced and taken to various and relevant anti-corruption workshops, however, non-compliance and disregard prevailed. Officials were also concerned about confidentiality of whistle-blowers and indicated that the Presidential Hotline never assisted as several cases were forwarded through this medium but nothing happened to deal with the reported cases. The motivating factors appeared to be constant in the sense that they cannot be viewed as issues that can be easily erased or eradicated.

CHAPTER FIVE: THEMES AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

The researcher analysed data and organised the information into themes that developed from the literature review and the collected primary data. The themes were guided by the interview/research questions. These themes allowed the researcher to establish the understanding of corruption by the officials in DRKKDM.

5.2 Themes and analysis

5.2.1 Understanding corruption in DRKKDM

The themes that emanated from interviews include:

a) Any action contrary to set standards, procedures, Acts and policies for local government

In a nutshell, all respondents argued that corruption existed because of failure to adhere to set standards, procedures, Acts and policies. The respondents also viewed bribery and fraud to be key forms of corruption in DRKKDM. This coincided with a view by Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) when arguing that corruption was any conduct or behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in public office which violates their duties as public officials and which is aimed at obtaining undue gratification of any kind for themselves or for others.

However, the understanding of Respondent 2 was narrowed down to wrongful appointment of non-qualified officials through nepotism, cronyism and political appointments. His understanding was solely based on deviations from employment and recruitment processes and procedures. Other respondents did embody this understanding, but their point of departure was that any action considered and taken against these procedures, Acts and policies constituted corruption. Respondent 3 clearly stated that corruption was any action contrary to the set policies, Acts and procedures set to govern the local government or municipalities. The understanding by all respondents is similar to the three legged view of corruption as explained by Andvig (1989) that the local government official has the authority to deal with the rules and regulations at his/her discretion. Secondly the official has the capability i.e. the power as authorised by his local government official status to can extract value.

Thirdly the official must have motivation to abuse the power that comes with the position. From the research done , it is clear that the officials understand corruption and have the authority to deal with the regulations at their own discretion as well as the authority and power to extract additional value should they so choose to.

b) Any conduct within the municipality that included extortion, bribery, fraud, dishonesty and illegality

Respondents 5 and 6 further introduced different concepts and twists to the understanding of corruption respectively. Respondent 5 added that corruption in the municipality is any conduct that had to do with extortion, bribery, fraud, dishonesty, illegal deals and crookedness. Respondent 6 simply argued that corruption was the stealing of something or taking it without prior consent or permission from the owner. She also highlighted that fraud goes hand-in-glove with dishonesty. Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) concurs by arguing that extortion involves forcing a person or company to provide a benefit to a public official in return for acting in a particular illicit manner. Bribery involves the promise or a benefit given to the official and that wrongfully affects the actions and decisions of the official; in the context of theft and embezzlement, the property is taken by someone to whom it was entrusted.

The arguments by both Respondent 5 and 6 are embodied in Wei (1999) when commenting that corruption is the abuse of power by government officials to extract or accept bribes from the private sector for their personal benefit. Wei (1999) further posits that corruption is characterized by secrecy and illegality. Respondent 3 also added that corruption was a two way stream and that there is more than one party involved, namely, the corruptor and the 'corruptee'. The corruptor being the briber and the 'corruptee' being the 'bribee'. Responses from all respondents highlighted the interference of politicians as another form of corruption in DRKKDM. Respondent 1 succinctly commented that Section 117 of the MFMA Act 53 of 2003 stated clearly and prohibited Councillors from being involved in the bidding system of tenders. However, Councillors where found to be illegally and indirectly involved in the awarding of tenders.

Generally, the respondents' understanding was aligned towards corruption within the tender processes with the exclusion of Respondent 2, who maintained that in DRKKDM corruption started in the recruitment processes and understood corruption mostly under that basis. Corruption in the tender processes was in line with the interference by politicians in the administration of the municipality. It was argued by the respondents that politicians indirectly influenced which companies could be awarded tenders. The process of awarding tenders was done through cronyism, nepotism and bribery which are key pillars of corruption. Respondents 5 and 3 argued that according to policy, for a supplier to be awarded a tender there must be a choice of at least three (3) companies in the bidding process, of which the lowest in terms of calculated cost, will then be chosen and then awarded a tender.

5.2.1.1 Motivation for corruption

Generally, respondents identified greed, social class competition, political influence/interference, wrongful appointments and small salaries as the motivating factors for the involvement of officials in corruption. These were motivations found in this theme that emanated from their interviews.

a) Greed

The respondents argued that officials were earning salaries but because they wanted to lead lives beyond their salaries, they then tended to want more than they had which then amounted to greed. More is then acquired through corrupt means. Respondent 1 argued that officials who were involved in corruption were not indigent individuals but were people who were earning monthly salaries and who could be considered to be in the working and middle classes. This view is shared by Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) who maintains that the Auditor-General's reports have more often than not revealed that municipal officials paid themselves unauthorized bonuses that claimed thousands of Rands that were meant for service delivery. Guwa-Ngamlana further explains that, this mostly happened in districts were most people lacked clean drinking water, proper infrastructure, electricity and proper roads and those are municipalities wherein corruption is common.

b) Social class competition

To a certain extent this coincided with greed, only in this case it was found that officials get into positions with the expectation that they will lead luxurious lives. Those at the low salary bands strive to compete with those who are earning high salaries. This class competition was not confined within the municipal offices only but was pressure from the society at large. To a certain extent this can be viewed in the same light as what Lodge (1998) described as a historical legacy of apartheid in South Africa. Lodge (1998) posits that South Africa corruption has a historical legacy in that the previous apartheid administration deliberately adopted a system which fostered the social and economic fortunes of one ethnic group. Given this status of economic imbalance, it may be expected that those who were left out by the previous government, when coming into power may be involved in corrupt activities in an attempt to address the economic imbalances created in the past.

c) Political interference

According to the respondents, policy stated clearly that Councillors should not interfere with administration work, but it was found to be the case in DRKKDM. Interference in the recruitment and tender processes by politicians perpetuated corruption.

d) Wrongful appointments

These are achieved through nepotism, cronyism, political appointment and bribery. People who lacked appropriate qualifications, skills and experience were appointed. Guwa-Ngamlana (2009) shares the view that nepotism involved a public official ensuring that their family members or relatives are employed or receive tenders. Respondent 2 argued that such people were recruited into strategic positions for them to be easily manipulated in future. He further introduced the concept of illicit favours, this in his view was a situation whereby one could be afforded that favour by being appointed although they were not qualified, and then expected to reciprocate that favour in future by overlooking corruption.

Respondent 3 also highlighted that through cronyism, nepotism and political deployment, when a person did not meet the requirements for a certain position, the requirements would be lowered to the level of the preferred candidate to be accommodated. On a similar note, Respondent 6 posited that such appointees were given powers to sign for powerful mandates, as a result corruption was perpetuated. Triesman (2000) concurs by adding that a public official might put a private partner in a position whereby the private partner benefits gains that would otherwise be impossible without state intervention. This is done for the private partner to have more advantages than rivals in the market. The private partner in turn, pays the official part of the gain

e) Small salaries

The respondents argued that small salaries motivated officials to partake in corrupt activities. This is with the exception of Respondent 1 who argued that municipal officials were not indigent individuals. All other respondents maintained that officials underwent this motivating factor as a way of supplementing their salaries. Huther and Shah (2000) added that public officials might view corrupt activities as not impacting negatively and supplement for their low wages.

Interestingly, Respondent 3 identified contract employment as a motivating factor for the involvement in corruption. He made reference to Section 57 employees (Directors) that they were employed on a five-year contract which was usually non-renewable. As a result, officials strove to accumulate as much as possible during their term of employment. This accumulation was achieved through corrupt means.

5.2.1.2 Understanding governance in DRKKDM

In general, the Respondents argued that governance was made up of set procedures, policies, Acts and ordinances that must be adhered to and failure to do so highlighted and resulted in poor governance. The key issue highlighted in relation to governance throughout the interviews was compliance. Compliance to the set standards, procedures, policies and Acts intended to govern the local government represented the understanding of what constituted governance in respondents' views. Failure to comply resulted in poor governance and gave room for corruption. In the same light, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, p. 98) argued that corruption skewed and misdirected funds from the needed project and service and redirected it to the pockets of the corrupt officials; that in turn resulted in poor governance Respondent 4 added that corruption cannot co-exist with good governance because corruption carried with it non-compliance as its key pillar. Respondent 5 had a different view, he argued that in DRKKDM corruption and governance indeed co-existed because corrupt officials were recruited into key and strategic positions. Respondent 2 maintained that corruption was part of governance in DRKKDM in the sense that wrongful appointments and political interference with the administration was the norm.

5.2.2 The root of corruption DRKKDM

All the respondents concurred that there were three (3) main departments that were prone to corruption and/or already corrupt in DRKKDM. These were identified as:

- Finance department: this department included supply chain directorate and it was where the procurement took place within the municipalities. Tenders were also awarded through this department.
- Technical department: it was argued that this department was the heart of the municipality. Infrastructural projects that had direct impact on service delivery were found in this department. Tenders that amounted to a lot of money were awarded through the technical department.
- Corporate department: wrongful appointments of unqualified, unskilled and inexperienced personnel are processed in this department. It should also be noted that these appointments are achieved through nepotism, cronyism, bribery and political appointments.

Respondent 1 identified the Office of the Municipal Manager (MM) and the Office of the Mayor as being part of the corrupt departments. According to him, these offices are responsible for the final awarding of tenders and are prone to be bribed to advance certain companies. A company could be awarded a tender even when the adjudicating committee never endorsed that company. The final signature for award was done by the MM as the accounting officer. The Mayor’s office indirectly played a role in the appointment of certain companies to render services even when those companies were not compliant with or did not meet the requirements. These were usually done and achieved through cronyism, nepotism and bribery. Respondent 2 also identified the Political Office which included all Councillors as corrupt and prone to corruption. In his view, the persistent interference of politicians in the administration of the municipality represented dire corruption.

5.2.3 Dealing with corruption

Two themes emanated from the interviews. The first one being that officials chose ignorance and non-compliance to set procedures, norms and policies. The second being fear of victimisation as the cause of not reporting corruption.

a) Officials chose ignorance and non-compliance

All the respondents maintained that there was awareness of anti-corruption policies, Acts and procedures. However, officials chose to disregard, claim ignorance and/or be non-compliant. Those arguments coincide with argument forwarded by Huther and Shah (2000, p.124) when they argued that In other cases public officials might be involved in corruption with a belief that they might advance their careers and viewing corruption as insurance in an unstable environment characterised with uncertainties. In a similar vein, (Robinson, 1998:15) maintains that there is a view that sees corruption as the catalyst for the enhancement of social welfare and improves efficiency by disabling bureaucratic obstacles. This view suggests that some government officials may partake in corrupt activities without recognising their actions and aligning their attitudes since they believe what they are doing is for the greater good.

Respondents 6, 4 and 3 made mention of MPAC, which played an important role in an attempt to combat corruption. However, Respondent 3 did not believe in the efficiency of the MPAC, he argued that it was led by the very same politicians who interfered with administration. Respondent 4 reiterated that although there was awareness of existing means to combat corruption e.g. Presidential Hotline, Corruption Watchdog, MPAC, etc., not many officials were conversant with those means. Respondent 6 posited that corruption was being dealt with in DRKKDM in the sense that officials were introduced to various anti-corruption courses and workshops. Respondent 3 added that MPAC indeed investigated corruption cases, established the findings and made proper recommendations to the Council. However, certain cases where blocked by Council and disappeared as if nothing happened. That in his view was an indication of collusion between Council members and officials implicated in corruption cases.

b) Fear of victimisation

According to the respondents, officials did not report corruption in DRKKDM due to fear of victimisation. Respondent 2 argued that one stands to be accused of jealousy and plotting to oust officials from their positions should they be dismissed due to the reported corruption. Respondent 1 added that this victimisation included frustration at the work place, suspension and even discharge. Fear of being out of employment was the sole reason officials opted to remain silent in relation to corruption in DRKKDM. This is supported by Jackson et al (2009) when arguing that despite the passage of the Protected Disclosure Act (2000) which was a legal way for whistle-blowers to report on corruption, it remained a challenge because of the reluctance by officials–, this was due to fear of victimisation as a result of whistle blowing. This victimisation included dismissal, harassment, stigmatisation, and other aspects that might legally amount to unfair labour practice. Respondent 1 also added that in DRKKDM corruption was reported in a selective or 'factional' manner. That was a situation whereby officials reported corrupt activities of their opposed factions and remained silent about their own faction.

5.3 Conclusion

In summary, bad governance and corruption coincided because corruption existed in situations whereby set norms, standards, policies, Acts and procedures were not complied with. These were contained in the Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003. The finance, technical and corporate departments (including the political cluster) were seen as the departments that gave room for corruption to enter into DRKKDM. Failure to adhere to set standards, procedures, Acts and policies gave room for corruption in various ways e.g. wrongful appointments, cronyism and nepotism. Corruption was also extended to include extortion, bribery, fraud, dishonesty, shady deals and crookedness.

This lack of compliance represented poor or bad governance. There are various motivating factors to corruption but greed, social class competition and small salaries seem to be at the upper hand. Wei (1999) argued that it was rather naïve to give power to the people, pay them small wage, and expect them not to abuse that power for their personal benefit. Officials were aware of their involvement in corruption, they had clear knowledge of what entailed corruption but chose ignorance and non-compliance. This view was also shared by Robinson (1998) and Klitgaard (1998) when they maintained that lack of forceful monitoring mechanisms and weak castigatory measures motivates, and promotes the culture of dishonesty and that corruption is usually prominent in sectors whereby it is easier for government officials to extract bribes, this being attributed to the lack of, poor or weaknesses in the system of controls and regulation that are in place. Officials were also aware of channels to report corruption but were wary to utilise them due to fear of being victimised. Furthermore, others who attempted to report corruption through the Presidential Hotline maintained that they lost confidence due to its ineffectiveness to respond timeously or total lack of response.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summarised version of the study. Conclusions and recommendations from the analysis of data are presented. The conclusions are tied back to answering the research question and the sub-questions. The recommendations are aimed at outlining gaps identified by the study and suggesting ways to address them.

6.2 Summary of the Findings

This study was aimed at establishing the understanding of corruption by local government officials within the DRKKDM as one of the district municipalities in the North West Province affected by corruption. The study reviewed literature in relation to what constituted corruption and launched an inquiry to establish if there was a same level of understanding of corruption by local government officials within the DRKKDM. Based on six (6) semi-structured interviews conducted, the research pursued to answer the broad research question: “What is the understanding of corruption by local government officials within Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality?” The study established that the DRKKDM officials’ understanding of corruption coincided with the literature reviewed and even more.

The research then analysed the data and arranged it into themes that were derived from the literature reviewed and the primary data collected.

6.3 Study Conclusions

This sub-section of the paper presents generic positions made with regards to the research questions and the findings of the study. It then gives direct responses to the raised research questions.

6.3.1 How is corruption understood in relation to governance in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

In conclusion, it was argued that corruption and governance were inter-linked and related. In a nutshell, the findings presented corruption as ignorance, non-compliance and non-adherence to set norms, standards, procedures, Acts and policies intended to govern the local government or municipalities. In such an atmosphere, room for bad governance is created. The implication is then that good governance prevails in a situation whereby the set norms, standards, procedures, Acts and policies are recognised and complied with. According to the respondents, corruption and governance co-existed in DRKKDM. On the other hand, good governance and corruption are not co-existent, given the argument above that non-adherence and non-compliance are key pillars of corruption and are in contravention with accountability, transparency, ethical and responsible behaviour as the key principles of good governance.

There were various motivating factors for corruption, namely, greed, social class competition, political influence/interference, wrongful appointments, small salaries and contract employment. Huther and Shah (2000) concur with the small salaries as a key motivating factor, they have argued that selflessness can be a motivating factor in that public officials might be involved in corruption with a belief that they might advance their careers and viewing corruption as an insurance in an unstable environment. Wei (1999) also concurs that small salaries can be a motivator for corruption. He adds that "it is viewed rather as naive to give power to the people, pay them small wage, and expect them not to abuse the power for their personal gains" (Wei, 1999:59). This was vastly viewed as justification for the involvement of DRKKDM officials in corruption. Social class competition and greed were arguably part of human nature.

6.3.2 What is the root of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

The study has concluded that corruption in DRKKDM was prominent in the following departments: finance, technical, corporate, office of the Mayor and office of the MM. These departments were involved with tenders and projects and therefore were perceived to be corrupt or more prone to corruption. The politicians influenced the administrators and vice versa. The Corporate department enabled a platform for corruption in the sense that unqualified personnel were appointed in key positions by processes from this department.

Officials in these department were aware, had knowledge and understood what constituted corruption. However, they chose ignorance, non-adherence and non-compliance to the set norms, standards, Acts, procedures and policies as directives on how they should conduct themselves and governing the local government.

6.3.3 How is corruption being dealt within the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

Evidence gathered indicated that although the municipality attempted to deal with corruption by introducing their officials to anti-corruption through courses and workshops however, corruption remained persistent. Most and if not all municipal officials were aware of the policies and structures meant to fight corruption. In the same light, the set norms, standards, Acts, procedures and policies were not known by all. In a nutshell, officials had awareness of the above mentioned aspects that governed the local government and had knowledge of structures meant to fight corruption, but they were not much conversant with all of these.

The persistence of corruption in DRKKDM was caused by the approach the officials adopted in dealing with it. Officials were afraid to report corruption due to fear of victimisation, which highlighted frustration at the workplace, suspension and even discharge. Structures meant to fight corruption were found to be inefficient, e.g. the Presidential Hotline and MPAC. Most of the respondents argued that the Presidential Hotline never corresponded with those who have reported and MPAC was blocked by members of Council who were allegedly in collusion with those implicated in corruption.

6.4 Recommendations

This study has established that officials in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality understood corruption and were aware of the anti-corruption structures and legislation, however, they chose ignorance, non-adherence and non-compliance. It is therefore recommended that:

- Castigatory methods be reviewed and strengthened. Instead of re-deployment of the culprits, officials who are found guilty of corruption that involves funds should be incarcerated or allowed to work to pay for the funds they have misused or stolen. Government must be seen to be doing something in this regard, in this way ignorance, non-compliance and disregard of the Acts meant for local government will be minimised or eliminated.

- The recommendations by the Auditor General should be implemented instead of being ignored. This also talks to weak castigatory methods currently in place or adopted.
- It is also recommended that an anti-corruption and apolitical structure be established. This structure should not be based in the municipality as to allow and ensure anonymity and protection of the whistle-blowers or officials who wish to report corruption.
- The tender processes found in the technical and finance departments should be centralised and the processes should be managed from a nodal point/national office.
- Employment and appointment of officials should be done at a national level or at least the national government should oversee the process to avoid cronyism, nepotism, political appointments and appointment of unqualified personnel which were identified as key forms and motivational factors to corruption in DRKKDM. This structure should also be apolitical.
- There must be much emphasis on corruption educational workshops. These workshops must teach officials about non-compliance, irregular expenditure, maladministration, etc. this will eliminate the ignorant behaviour by the officials.
- A compulsory course that deals with corruption and governance within the local government should be developed to put all local government officials on an equal footing.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Demographic and geographic background

The DRKKDM consists of four (4) local municipalities i.e. Matlosana, Tlokwe, Maquassi Hills, and Ventersdorp. The area covered by the District Municipality appears on the map below (kaundadistrict.gov.za, 2013).



According to the Local Government Handbook (2013) the municipal information of Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality is as follows:

Municipal Information

Area: 14, 642km²

Description: Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality in the North West province is located 65km south-west of Johannesburg and borders the Gauteng province on its south-west. The municipality consists of four local municipalities: the cities of Tlokwe

(Potchefstroom), Matlosana, the towns of Maquassi Hills and Ventersdorp. It is a region with a rich, diverse natural and cultural heritage and potential for sustained economic growth. The region is home to some of the most prominent gold mines in the world and one of the oldest meteor impact sites in the world. The district is serviced by a number of primary roads, with the N12 Treasure Corridor forming the main development axis in the district and serving as a potential concentration point for future industrial, commercial and tourism development.

Cities/Towns: Hartbeesfontein, Klerksdorp, Leeudoringstad, Makwassie, Orkney, Potchefstroom, Stilfontein, Ventersdorp, Witpoort, Wolmaransstad.

Main Economic Sectors: First largest - mining (22%), second largest - trade, finance and business services, third largest - manufacturing, construction, government services and agriculture.

Demographic Information

Population: 695 933

Households: 208 047

Population Growth: 1.49% p.a

Unemployment Rate: 29.70%

Political Management

Composition of Council: ANC 12, DA 4

Mayor: Ms Boitumelo Moloi

Other Members of Council: K Ndincede (Chief Whip), M Zephe (Speaker), WM Matinyane (Member of Mayoral Committee (MMC): Corporate Services), OM Mogale (MMC: Budget and Treasury), NM Koloti (MMC: Economic Development and Tourism), MF Dlamini (MMC: Roads, Public Transport, Community Safety and Disaster Risk Management), K Ndincede (MMC: Municipal Health Services), R Martins (MMC: Infrastructure Development), TK Lehloo (MMC: Rural Development and Special Projects), M Mataboge (MMC: Sports, Arts and Culture)

Administrative Management

Municipal Manager: Mr SK Sebolai (Acting)

Chief Financial Officer: Mr Mollie Daffue (Acting)

Communications Officer: Ms Wendy Sokupha

Local Economic Development (LED) Officer: Mr Melvin Rampedi

Other Senior Management: Richard Lesar (Acting Director: Disaster Risk Management), Setshego Abrams (Acting Director: Corporate Services), Nokukhanya Xaba (Acting Director: Health and Social Services), T Rampedi (Acting Director: District Economic Development and Tourism), Timothy Tshukudu (Acting Director: Infrastructure and Development), R Lesar (Acting Director: Roads, Public Transport, Community Safety and Disaster Risk Management (Local Government Handbook, 2013: 151-156).

APPENDIX B: Interview Questions

Questionnaire

Question 1: How is corruption understood in relation to governance in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

- Sub question: What do local government officials consider/understand to be corruption?
- Sub question: What do local government officials understand to be governance?
- Sub question: What do the local government officials believe motivates the involvement in corruption?

Question 2: What is the root of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

- Sub question: Which departments are corrupt/prone to corruption?
- Sub question: Why would these departments be corrupt/more prone to corruption?
- Sub question: Do the officials in these departments understand what corruption is and how it is perpetrated?

Question 3: How is corruption being dealt with in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District?

- Sub question: Is there awareness of policy and structures meant to fight corruption?
- Sub question: How do local government officials approach/deal with corruption in their district?

APPENDIX C: Interview Request Letter

The Local Government Officials' Understanding of Corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a final year Master's Degree student in the field of Management at the University of Witwatersrand and am conducting a study on 'the local government official's understanding of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality'. I would appreciate if you could afford me some of your valuable time to answer some question regarding the understanding of corruption in Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality and to solicit constructive ideas and possible solutions to the scourge of corruption.

Interviews focus on all echelons of management (i.e. senior, middle, junior management and frontline staff). Please be assured that the information furnished by respondents will remain confidential and will not be divulged to any party. In addition the information collected from respondents will be used exclusively for the purposes of this study and will not be provided to third parties.

Regards,

Mohau Sekoto

Student number (581056)

Mobile phone: 082 315 4135