


Masters Research Report

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Title: The Bush Administration (2002-2008) and North Korea: Success or Failure?



http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/bush_via_the_daily_mirror.jpg

<http://bajan.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/kimjongil.jpg>



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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The image of North Korea as an enemy in the United States (US) 'war on terror' has driven much of the Bush Administration policy toward North Korea.¹ The continuous negative portrayal of North Korea by Bush has been counterproductive, as his tendency to take a hawkish line toward North Korea in areas of nuclear development and Human Rights has exacerbated the nuclear threat.² By openly stating that he 'loathed' Kim Jong-Il and would like to see the regime 'topple' for example, explain North Korean views that the US presents a clear danger to their states existence and thus the need to maintain and develop nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, rather than compromise.³ In addition, Bush lumped together countries that are more different than alike in proclaiming Iran, Iraq and North Korea as part of the 'Axis of Evil'. This essentially inhibited Bush from pursuing an adequate and specific policy to neutralise the distinctive nature of the North Korean nuclear threat.⁴ The North Korean nuclear situation is distinctive in the sense that, unlike Iran and Iraq, North Korea has a fully functioning nuclear programme that North Korea has on countless occasions vocally reaffirmed as a security tool, very different to Iran's claims of nuclear development as an energy source.⁵ Furthermore, this provocative policy toward North Korea, with the sole purpose of achieving regime change in Pyongyang,⁶ turned a previous threat made by North Korea in 1993 into actually reality when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁷ North Korea remains the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT.⁸

After having declared itself a nuclear power, North Korea conducted a test explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006.⁹ Added to this was the recent rocket launch in April 2009 violating United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1718.¹⁰ The most important clause under UNSCR 1718 condemns any

¹ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 14.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Elliot House, K.E., "The Lessons of North Korea," The Wall Street Journal, D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240913173&clientId=58117, January 2003.

⁵ Patrikarakos, D. and Hasan, M. "How Iran went Nuclear," in New Statesman, Vol. 138, Iss. 4954, June 2009.

⁶ Matray, J.I. "Why the Bush Policy is Failing in North Korea", History News Network, <http://hnn.us/articles/10400.htm>

⁷ Armstrong, K.C. Op Cit. p. 27.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ O'Hanlon, M., "The North Korean Nuclear Threat", in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 51, Iss. 30, April 2005.

¹⁰ Mass, W. "North Korean Missile Launch Creates Crisis", <http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/968>, 7 April 2009.

nuclear or atomic testing by North Korea.¹¹ Such volatility becomes disturbing when demonstrated by a country with enough plutonium for up to eight nuclear weapons, four times what it had three years ago.¹² This statistic clearly illustrates the potential power North Korea could gain as it continues to further its nuclear developments. At the end of the Bush presidency therefore, a lack of genuine engagement failed to put an end to the fifty-year old crisis over Korea.¹³ North Korea continues to date with threats of nuclear and inter-continental ballistic missile tests.¹⁴

This study thus questions the reasons and motives of adopting such a policy that failed to neutralise a nuclear threat that led to the erosion of NPT regime compliance norms-the medium through which Korean Peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers.¹⁵ This discussion in addition will highlight the Bush Administrations pessimism over multilateral approaches to non-proliferation. The importance of such questions raises issues around an unstable and uncertain international security regime as a whole. In this study the international security regime refers to the nuclear security regime aimed at non-proliferation. In this way, the study questions the implications such a failed policy has today regarding the international security regime in which North Korea was able to withdraw from the NPT without having suffered serious consequences and continues today to violate UNSC Resolutions. The study will then suggest various recommendations for the current Obama Administration as the need to neutralise an ever-growing North Korean nuclear threat becomes ever more pressing.

The first chapter of this study will begin with a discussion around the reasons for and implications of a nuclear North Korea. North Korea is a state whose leadership believes that state and regime survival against any threat lies mainly in the development of nuclear weapons.¹⁶ The possibility then of the North Korean leadership giving up on nuclear developments while seeking to protect sovereignty and ensure regime survival is greatly weakened. Furthermore, concerns only increase when looking to the

¹¹ Anonymous, "Solidarity on Sanctions?" in *Business Asia*, Vol. 38, Iss. 20, <http://0-proquest.umi.com.innopac.wits.ac.za/pqdweb?index=8&did=1162624221&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1255872637&clientId=58117>, October 2006.

¹² O'Hanlon, M. *Op Cit.*

¹³ Armstrong, K.C. *Op Cit.* p. 36.

¹⁴ "North Korea Threatens Nuclear Tests", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8024235.stm>, 29 April 2009.

¹⁵ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 467.

¹⁶ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 542-543.

distinctive nature of the North Korean situation. North Korea is not described as a 'rational adversary'¹⁷ or considered a 'rag-tag' Third World regime compared to that of Afghanistan or Libya. North Korea on the other hand is seen as the world's most intransigent and unyielding totalitarian regime. As such, North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from peaceful coexistence and little to lose from confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value on nuclear weaponry.¹⁸

This is what makes the North Korean situation dangerous as this is a country accustomed to subsistence whose main goal is state survival based on nuclear acquisition against all threats. The chapter will look to the instability, suspicion and increasing tension North Korea's nuclear developments have within East Asia and in addition, look toward these implications to international security regimes, particularly the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This chapter ultimately seeks to illustrate the dangers of a nuclear North Korea and the need therefore to neutralize this situation. This chapter attempts therefore to discuss the implications of a nuclear North Korea within the region and toward international regimes.

This chapter furthermore will include a discussion around traditional power politics. Traditional power politics is characterized by impositions that are made by stronger nations onto weaker nations.¹⁹ North Korea however, is representative of a paradoxical phenomenon known as the 'power of the weak'.²⁰ In the North Korean case, North Korea's policy of brinkmanship based on its nuclear program is able to exercise substantial influence and lead a greater power against its will. As North Korean stakes in nuclear issues are directly linked to its own state survival, North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as an important tool to counter any threat to its sovereignty. This chapter will therefore highlight the reasons why an aggressive US foreign policy, to be discussed in chapter two, is not effective in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue as it simply encourages North Korean nuclear brinkmanship to ensure regime survival. North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as a defensive tool against the US offensive policy²¹, instead of surrender to the military strength of the US as advocated under the concept of traditional power politics. This chapter furthermore, will provide with various evidence illustrating the continued development of the North Korean nuclear program and will thus lay the foundation for various suggestions calling for a change in US policy to neutralize this growing threat.

¹⁷ House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3 2003.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 541.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

This chapter will in addition, look to the implications of a nuclear North Korea on international security regimes, particularly the NPT. What is significant to note is that North Korea withdrew from the NPT without having suffered any meaningful sanctions.²² North Korea's success in avoiding meaningful repercussions sets a negative example for other nations and thereby erodes future arms control and proliferation compliance.²³ This is a dangerous prospect as other nations could learn from North Korea and not abide by proposals set by the NPT. Another concern is raised in addition as the erosion of the NPT begins to serve as a medium through which Korean peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for instance.²⁴ There are various arguments moreover stating that the NPT is now under pressure as a result of North Korean non-compliance and withdrawal, making the stakes therefore in keeping the NPT viable very high.²⁵

An important issue which this chapter aims to illustrate furthermore is the reason for North Korea's nuclear developments, based mainly on North Korea's concern with the US military threat.²⁶ North Korea fears that the US is determined to overthrow its government and has thus maintained a policy that ensures a militarily and economically powerful state to counter this threat. An important strategy for North Korea then is to avoid transparency in missile and nuclear issues in order to build a military powerful state or simply creating the perception of North Korea as a military powerful state. North Korea thus continues to resist US demands for inspections unless it receives economic compensations that would then facilitate economic development. This is what is referred to as North Korea's defensive power against the US offensive power.²⁷ North Korea's military insecurity and economic failure therefore have been key factors influencing North Korea's nuclear development in order to maintain state sovereignty. This will then lead to a discussion around the importance of the Juche ideology within North Korean foreign policy. The Juche ideology stresses importance on the principles of independence and sovereignty and explains North Korea's key foreign policy objective therefore to prevent foreign

²² Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007 p. 458.

²³ Alan, Q., "North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact," in Mainstream, Vol. 47, No. 25, June 2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html>.

²⁴ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007.

²⁵ Alan, Q., "North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact," in Mainstream, Vol. 47, No. 25, June 2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html>.

²⁶ Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 200-2001, p. 543.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 543.

intervention.²⁸ The issue then, which this chapter aims to highlight, looks to North Korea's nuclear developments as an issue of security.²⁹ North Korea has always stated that it will negotiate a verifiable end to all nuclear weapons development if the US formally commits to respect North Korean sovereignty.³⁰

The second chapter of this study will then follow from these discussions to outline and explain the reasons for a failed Bush policy that followed a hard-line policy of hawk engagement that simply fueled North Korean insecurities and ultimately prevented North Korea from negotiating a verifiable end to all nuclear developments. This chapter will provide an in depth analysis and critique of the Bush Administration's North Korean policy, determining whether it neutralized or simply aggravated the North Korean nuclear situation. This chapter will provide a discussion that attempts to illustrate the aggressive, hostile and hard-line policy of hawk engagement, adopted by the Bush Administration, which only fueled tensions further as it intensified North Korean insecurities.

The chapter will begin with an analysis of the Clinton Administration's North Korean policy. This analysis will provide with a background and context of US-North Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush Administration. This analysis aims to illustrate the positive policies of engagement adopted by the Clinton Administration that allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the Clinton Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in US-North Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from aggressive policies of brinkmanship.³¹

The Bush Administration however, did not advance and further these policies of engagement. This chapter will therefore provide a discussion on the reasons for a more aggressive and hard-line policy of hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration. The study will then proceed to analyze the implications of this more aggressive, and often hostile, policy.

The US policy toward North Korea upon the election of the Bush Administration saw a reversal from engagement pursued under the Clinton Administration to a hard-line, hawkish approach often described

²⁸ Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 200-2001, pp. 544-545.

²⁹ Bala, A and Solomon, H. *Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis*. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 26.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 19.

as being deliberately provocative.³² This policy had the sole objective of achieving regime change in Pyongyang and therefore adopted a strategy of hawk engagement to build support for action to be taken against North Korea to accelerate the collapse of the Kim regime.³³ This chapter furthermore attempts to illustrate the manner in which the Bush Administrations hard-line policy of hawk engagement failed to support the South Korean policy of engagement and went on therefore to strain both US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations that did not enhance or work toward stability on the peninsula.³⁴ This chapter furthermore ultimately aims to illustrate and explain the vital issue regarding the inability of the Bush Administration to recognize the dynamics of North Korean brinkmanship that responds in a threatening manner to a perceived threat.³⁵ The chapter will therefore move on to provide with important recommendations that should have been adopted by the Administration instead. The Administration for instance should have continued the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration that established a framework for progress that the Bush Administration could have furthered. This is a policy objective that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration and demands important consideration by the Obama Administration. This chapter therefore ultimately aims to reinforce a vital suggestion that genuine engagement provides a better option away from inflexible and uncompromising policies that simply fuel tensions leading to greater a possibility of military conflict over the North Korean nuclear issue or an arms race in East Asia.³⁶ This chapter will refer to the prospect theory to reinforce a key suggestion that illustrates the way in which a more cooperative US that encourages and upholds genuine engagement places North Korea in the domain of gain by offering concrete incentives, North Korea would then subsequently not risk any gain by continuing with coercive strategies of brinkmanship.³⁷

After having analyzed the failure and shortcomings of the Bush Administration in neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat, the final chapter of this study will look to the Obama Administration and the road ahead. This chapter will provide a discussion on the future prospects of US-North Korean relations by analyzing the current Administrations North Korean policy. Although it may be early to analyse the

³² Matray, J.I. "Why the Bush Policy is Failing in North Korea", History News Network, <http://hnn.us/articles/10400.htm>.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 15.

³⁵ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 725.

³⁶ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 16.

³⁷ Suh, J., "Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies/Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to deal with a Nuclear North Korea," in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 63, Iss. 4, November 2004.

current Administrations North Korean policy, it is important to take note of the Administrations response to North Koreas recent nuclear tests and provocative behavior to determine the current weak points of the Administrations strategy; and to suggest therefore important recommendations for an improved US North Korean policy away from the failed Bush Administration policy.

This chapter will begin with an outline of North Korean actions at the end of the Bush Administration term. This outline will provide with a discussion on the traditional strategy of brinkmanship used by North Korea and in addition will provide with a new outlook on the dynamics of North Korean provocative behavior. This outline will then allow for an analysis on the policy response of the Obama Administration; providing an argument that sees certain similarities to the policy response and choice of the Bush Administration; and arguments on the other hand that see certain positive policy departures from the Bush Administration. The chapter will furthermore, in light of the new outlook on the dynamics of North Korea's provocative behavior, away from the traditional strategies of brinkmanship, suggest various recommendations that are needed if the new Administration is to succeed neutralizing the North Korean threat. This chapter will provide with various analyses that lead to a concluding observation that the Obama Administration cannot risk the failure of the previous Administrations contradictory polices of conditionality, nor can the current Administration wait to change and alter policy objectives according to North Korean succession. While maintaining the current policy of conditionality in insisting that North Korea agree to denuclearization before any incentives are given, North Korea will continue building and advancing what they still see as their only option, their nuclear program.³⁸ The Obama Administration should therefore avoid the previous Administrations mistake in fitting threats to policy, instead of policy to threats.³⁹

AIM

This study aims to determine the reasons for the policy choice of the Bush Administration toward North Korea and the reasons for its ultimate failure. The study aims to highlight the implications of this failed policy on the international security regime due to the Administration's pessimism over multilateral approaches to non-proliferation and heavy reliance on policies of appeasement.⁴⁰ Finally, by drawing

³⁸ Ahn, M. "After Kim Jong-Il," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/after-kim-jong-il>, 16 November 2009.

³⁹ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 78.

⁴⁰ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 467.

upon the failures of the Bush Administration, the study aims to provide with possible alternatives and remedies for the Obama Administration.

RATIONALE

The questions and issues raised in this study provide useful insight into the implications of a failed North Korean policy under the Bush Administration, not just within North-East Asia, but toward the international security regime as a whole. Withdrawing from the NPT, without having suffered any serious consequence or retaliation erodes current NPT compliance norms and this very erosion serves as the medium through which Korean Peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers.⁴¹ Thus, Iranian leaders for example, would learn important lessons about the consequences they may or may not face by following a similar path and how the repercussions might be managed.⁴² With the erosion of security regimes therefore, comes an unstable system where compliance to security norms cannot be enforced and thus fails to act as a guarantee for international security and stability, where the potential then of volatility and hostility simply remain and may even increase.

Based on its pessimism over cooperative security arrangements, the Bush Administration was more willing to abide by the regional implications of a nuclear North Korea, rather than engage Pyongyang directly.⁴³ In addition, the ambivalence toward the implications on the international security regime of an eroded NPT further illustrates the Administrations pessimism toward multilateral approaches to non-proliferation and its distaste for the NPT particularly.⁴⁴ In analysing the policy therefore of this Administration and the reasons for its failure, the study provides insight into role of the US as a superpower in the international security regime. In the case of the North Korean nuclear threat, the US as a superpower, failed to neutralise a nuclear threat due to its pessimism toward cooperative security arrangements and multilateral approaches to non-proliferation. Thus, the recent rocket launch by North Korea only deepens international proliferation concerns. Furthermore, experts believe that North Korea can capitalise on the data that can be generated by this space vehicle that can then assist further in the production of more powerful missiles⁴⁵

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 469.

⁴⁴ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 469.

⁴⁵ Kim, S. "Proliferation fears rise following North Koreas rocket launch", <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/04/05/1310401000000AEN20090405000100315F.HTM>, 5 April 2009.

By drawing upon these failures and providing alternatives and recommendations to the new Administration, the study attempts to determine if the role of the US as a superpower, under the Obama administration, will in contrast to Bush, enforce existing multilateral security and opt for cooperative security arrangements that could then bring essential change and progress in this ongoing nuclear situation. In this way then, the study will add to existing literature by analysing the future of the North Korean situation under the new Obama Administration.

In addition, this study will provide important insight into the implications of adopting policies of appeasement. Appeasement can be seen as a more passive approach of pacification, whereby the US would pacify the North Koreans through talk and negotiation, rather than adopt a stronger policy of confrontation. The very reason North Korea has become a nuclear threat is due to a decade of appeasement,⁴⁶ and what Pyongyang illustrates, is a clear picture of the consequences of appeasement.⁴⁷ The Bush Administration policy for example, adopted a policy of engagement and negotiation based on the false expectation that North Korea would eventually denuclearize when in reality Pyongyang used this form of appeasement as a deception strategy to gain more time and pursue its nuclear ambition.⁴⁸ The Obama Administration similarly, seems unwilling to exert strong pressure on Pyongyang as it desires to continue the six-party talks hoping that negotiation would succeed in denuclearising North Korea, this being one of the reasons that informed the failed Bush policy.⁴⁹ By removing North Korea from the US 'terrorism blacklist' in October 2008 for example, the US submitted to the brinkmanship of North Korea.⁵⁰ North Korea adopts a strategy of brinkmanship by using nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool to attain various demands. More recently, with the North Korean rocket launch in April 2009, North Korea has managed to defy the UNSC and will now, most likely simply confront the pleas of Obama and others to return to the multilateral six-party talks, which is exactly where North Korea wants to be.⁵¹ In the six party talks, North Korea will remain in a situation of appeasement, gaining ever-greater material and political benefits in exchange for ever more empty

⁴⁶ Elliot House, K.E. *Op Cit.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Kang, P. "North Korea's Missile Launch-Is Obama Repeating Bush's failed Policy?", <http://worldpolicy.org/wordpress/2009/04/01/peter-kang-north-korea%E2%80%99s-missile-launch%E2%8094is-obama-repeating-bush%E2%80%99s-failed-policy/>, 1 April, 2009.

⁴⁹ Kang, P. "North Korea's Missile Launch-Is Obama Repeating Bush's failed Policy?", <http://worldpolicy.org/wordpress/2009/04/01/peter-kang-north-korea%E2%80%99s-missile-launch%E2%8094is-obama-repeating-bush%E2%80%99s-failed-policy/>, 1 April, 2009

⁵⁰ Kessler, G. "U.S Drops North Korea from Terrorism List", <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101100261.html>, 12 October 2008.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

promises of denuclearisation.⁵² These discussions will thus add to existing literature on such policies of appeasement in a realist situation.

According to Madeline Albright, former US Secretary of State, dialogue and negotiation do not equal appeasement.⁵³ In her view, dialogue allows the US to work toward creating agreement and thus progressing toward an ultimate solution to the North Korean nuclear situation.⁵⁴ However, in reality, North Korea has shown a history of engaging in 'strategic-deception' by signing on to such agreements but purposefully cheating on them to its own advantage.⁵⁵ Therefore, such negotiation becomes worthless and in the end results in a form of appeasement. Dialogue and negotiation sees an agreement created out of a compromise that in the end is not upheld by North Korea. The six party talks provide a clear illustration of this situation. Since they were adopted in 2003, the six-party talks have stumbled around inconclusively as Pyongyang has simply ignored, stalled, renegotiated and violated many agreements.⁵⁶ The only beneficiary in the end, given the nature of appeasement, has been North Korea.⁵⁷ In violation of various agreements, it has not faced any truly punishing sanctions, in addition to gaining the most important resource of all-time, to enhance, conceal and disperse its nuclear program.⁵⁸ The five years grace therefore (from 2003-2007), failed to neutralise a threat that today, given the continuous policies of appeasement, has more opportunity to gain long-term income from its sale of rocket technology to the Middle East and other nations.⁵⁹

The implications therefore around policies of appeasement are important to consider as its failure to neutralise the North Korean threat now allows this nuclear state to support other nuclear ambitious and potentially hostile nations. Such discussions and issues therefore are essential and worth discussing in analysing a potentially dangerous situation threatening international peace and stability

METHODOLOGY

⁵² Bolton, J.R. "Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks", <http://online.wsi.com/articles/SB123897547166291201.htm#mostPopular> mostEmailed

⁵³ Schiff, J. "Lack of dialogue between U.S., North Korea impedes relationship, Albright and ambassadors say", http://www.ur.umich.edu/0203/Mar24_03/06.shtml, 24 March 2003.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Cha, V.D. and Kang, D.C., "The Korea Crisis" in *Foreign Policy*, No. 136, May-Jun., 2003

⁵⁶ Bolton, J.R. "Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks", <http://online.wsi.com/articles/SB123897547166291201.htm#mostPopular> mostEmailed.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Bolton, J.R. "Obama's NK Reaction: More Talks", <http://online.wsi.com/articles/SB123897547166291201.htm#mostPopular> mostEmailed.

⁵⁹ Hyun, K. "North Korea has little to loose, much to gain from rocket launch", <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/04/04/96/04011000000AEN20090404001300315F.HTM>, 2009/04/05.

This study will draw mainly on qualitative analysis that will primarily include the use of journals and press commentaries. In addition, the study will include interviews conducted with Bruce Klinger, Bertil Lintner and Dr. Jim Hoare. The study will furthermore, provide other interviews with senior and key researchers in this field of study. In addition, necessary interviews will be conducted with officials in the North and South Korean and US embassies.

The secondary data collection consists of existing literature on this topic. These include books and journal articles including reports and press commentaries. The University of Witwatersrand library, the South Africa Institute of International Affairs library and the library of the University of Johannesburg will be consulted for the literature and the theoretical application of all works. Furthermore, Internet reports, comments and materials will be used in this study.

A critical analysis will thus be facilitated from all above collected data

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are various policy ideas and theories that will be used to frame the issues and research included in this study.

A. Realism vs. Idealism and Institutional liberalism

Embracing realism as a guiding philosophy, candidate Bush, in his first major foreign policy speech stated that 'a President must be a clear-eyed realist', using force to counter force.⁶⁰ In practice however, the Bush Administrations doctrines and policies form a different worldview to that proposed by classical realism. The North Korean nuclear threat and ongoing nuclear situation is indeed representative of a realist condition, where according to classical realists, placing hope in treaties and international laws and the spread of democracy amounts in the end to 'fruitless' and 'dangerous' dreaming.⁶¹ This however, is the very policy and philosophy adopted by Bush and thus, the reason for its ultimate failure. The Bush Administration chose to adopt an ideational approach that represents a 'core' versus 'periphery' situation. Like-minded and democratic nations establishing rules and norms to govern behaviour fill the core while undemocratic states fill the periphery. The goal of the US policy then, according to this approach, has been the goal to persuade major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate. Support for democracy and opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction illustrate a key example of ideals that the US believes all states should abide by if

⁶⁰ Mazarr, M.J., "George W. Bush, Idealist" in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, May 2003, p. 503.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 504.

peace and stability is to be maintained. The US would then transform these ideals into policies to be locked into institutions. This forms the liberal institutionalist strand, whereby policies on weapons of mass destruction for instance will be governed under international institutions. An interesting paradox emerges however as the idealistic Bush foreign policy is the pursuit of institutionalist and liberal ends in a more aggressive and often unilateral manner, contrary to what liberalism purports. In its pursuit for instance of universal 'democratic peace', democracy is used as a security-tool, by believing a change in ideology radically and naturally changes the nature of the threat. Bush thus, in his idealistic endeavours, tends to measure his counterparts in politics and world affairs by a moral standard.⁶² For example, Bush openly stated "I loath Kim Jong-Il...I've got a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people...it is visceral. Maybe its my religion...but I feel passionate about this."⁶³ These statements are representative of passionate reactions that then further separate Bush's foreign policy thinking from realism that has no space for moral conviction in politics. Another example is evident in Bush's continual call for a US policy that would seek and support the growth of democracy in every nation that ultimately represents a US goal to use democracy to end tyranny.⁶⁴ In yet another move, guided by an ideational predisposition, Bush created the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, an effort to promote human rights in North Korea.⁶⁵ This is a typical example of an idealist approach in which the political ideology of state A seeks to conquer the minds of the government of state B.⁶⁶

The US under Bush has always illustrated a fundamental strategic interest in supporting democratic trends in what it labels unfree or undemocratic nations.⁶⁷ By adopting freedom, justice and human dignity as its foundational pillars that would lead to a growing community of democracies and ensure peace and stability, saw idealism triumph over realism in shaping US foreign policy strategies.⁶⁸ It is important to note however that the US policy, under the Bush Administration represented a specific form of idealism bent toward overseas democratisation, by force if necessary, challenging the prerogative therefore of state sovereignty.⁶⁹ This has been the main fear of North Korea, the collapse of its existence and thus the need to maintain and build its nuclear deterrent to prevent a threat against

⁶² Ibid, p. 515.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Kim, H. "The United States and the Two Koreas: One Hundred Days after President Bush's Re-election (November 2004-February 2005)," in Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, Spring 2007, p. 66.

⁶⁵ Kyung-Ae Park, "North Korea in 2004: From brisk Diplomacy to Impasse" in Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 19.

⁶⁶ Armstrong, K.C. Op Cit. p. 509.

⁶⁷ Mazarr, M.J. Op Cit. p. 511.

⁶⁸ Huntley, W.L. Op Cit. p. 462.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

North Korean sovereignty. Bush policy ideas therefore only exacerbated North Korean fears thereby fuelling the nuclear threat. This theory is then clearly applicable to many issues dealt with in this study and assists in illustrating the reasons for and implications of the Bush Administration's North Korean policy.

B. Appeasement and Brinkmanship

The policy of appeasement is the very reason North Korea has become, and remains a nuclear threat.⁷⁰ By simply adopting and maintaining 'soft policies' of negotiation, North Korea has been able to continue its military brinkmanship by developing nuclear weapons and often simply just threatening the use of them in order to attain a suitable outcome and buy more time in solidifying its nuclear deterrent.⁷¹ In almost all instances, this has worked for North Korea, where it remains in an environment of appeasement, gaining ever-greater material and political benefits in exchange for ever more empty promises of denuclearisation.⁷² Nuclear weapons thus act as North Korea's strongest bargaining tool assisting and furthering North Korea's policy of brinkmanship.

Passive policies of appeasement prevent not only the US, but all members of the six party talks (South Korea, China, Russia and Japan) from taking direct action against North Korea. This policy of appeasement therefore prevents North Korea from the full impact of important initiatives aimed to counter the North Korean nuclear threat. North Korea for instance is yet to feel the full impact of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).⁷³ Formed in 2003, the PSI stands to counter proliferation efforts.⁷⁴ North Korea therefore, in the absence of more direct opposition, is able to continue using its nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool to achieve its demands. Explanations and discussions on policies of appeasement and brinkmanship will therefore assist in supporting the suggestions made in this study

⁷⁰ Elliot House, K.E., The Lessons of North Korea, The Wall Street Journal, D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1240913173&clientId=58117, January 2003.

⁷¹ Klingner, B. "Solutions/Klingner: How should the U.S. handle North Korea?" <http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/03/solutions-klinger-hoe-should-ushandle-nkorea/>, 3 May 2009.

⁷² Kim, S. "Proliferation fears rise following North Korea's rocket launch", <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/04/05/1310401000000AEN20090405000100315F.HTM>, 5 April 2009

⁷³ Bolton, J.R., Salvaging our North Korean Policy, The Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/article.SB120571176083740265.html>, March 17 2008.

⁷⁴ Nikitin, M. "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," Congressional Research Service, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf>, September 2009.

calling for stronger action, away from appeasement, to be taken against North Korea that would restrict and prevent North Korea from continuing to use nuclear weapons as a tool to further its own aims.

C. Prospect theory

A discussion and explanation of prospect theory will support and frame the solutions set out in this study for the prevention of continued policies of appeasement that simply further North Korean brinkmanship. The prospect theory proposes that engagement and the provision of incentives would prevent the crystallization of conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a threatening posture as its only course of action.⁷⁵ Policies of engagement furthermore will facilitate an environment of engagement and cooperation by providing with incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in negotiations as it now has something to either gain or lose. As such, incentives can be turned into 'ammunition' or 'sticks' to be used against North Korea if North Korea disrupts negotiations with any unruly behavior and the chances therefore of North Korea maintaining coercive bargaining is thus greatly lessened. Non-communication, threats and intimidation in contrast, pursued by the US under hard-line policies of hawk engagement, stand only to exacerbate preemptive/preventive situations in which North Korea is most likely to adopt coercive bargaining and aggression based on their vulnerability and insecurity. This is a situation, illustrated by the reasons for North Korean traditional strategies of brinkmanship whereby North Korea finds itself in the domain of loss, explaining North Korea's adoption then of nuclear developments as a defensive deterrent to prevent this loss, mainly a loss of sovereignty.⁷⁶

The prospect theory therefore suggests a policy of engagement instead, that provides various incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; that allows the US furthermore to tactically build a coalition of punishment should North Korea defect. Engagement then, in this manner, facilitates a policy that will ensure progress and at the same time, maintains a security net to respond to North Korean defiance.⁷⁷ Applying this theory to North Korea therefore, preemptive or preventive strike will always be an option for North Korea, which aims to avoid the certainty of loss, given an

⁷⁵ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 44.

⁷⁶ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 68.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

uncompromising and inflexible US policy.⁷⁸ If faced however, with a more cooperative US that encourages and upholds genuine engagement that places North Korea in the domain of gain by offering concrete incentives, North Korea would not risk any gain by continuing with coercive strategies of brinkmanship.⁷⁹


These ideas and theories will provide the framework to explain the methodological implications they have toward the main issues raised in this study.

⁷⁸ Suh, J., "Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies/Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to deal with a Nuclear North Korea," in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 63, Iss. 4, November 2004.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT



<http://theblackcommenter.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/north-korea-nuclear.jpg>

CHAPTER TWO

2.The North Korean Nuclear Threat.

“It is the disposition and will of our people and army...to answer dialogue with dialogue and strength with strength.”(Kim Kwang-chin, Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces)⁸⁰

The North Korean weapons program dates back to the 1980’s, where its nuclear aspirations have always been problematic ever since it joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985.⁸¹ North Korea considers its nuclear program a vital element of national security, against the suspected United States (US) threat and a vital element that ensures the continued existence of the Kim family regime.⁸² In addition, North Korea has learnt that nuclear weapons or even the threat of developing nuclear weapons has become its best bargaining tool.⁸³

This chapter attempts to outline the reasons for and implications of a nuclear North Korea. Nuclear weapon development by North Korea forms an important strategy of national security against the US threat. Secondly, North Korean nuclear developments are considered a vital element that ensures the continued existence of the Kim family regime by providing power to the ruling regime to resist all threats to North Korea’s sovereignty. This will then lead to a discussion on the implications of a nuclear North Korea within the region and toward international regimes. The chapter will look to the instability, suspicion and increasing tension North Korea’s nuclear developments have within East Asia and in addition, look toward these implications to international security regimes, particularly the NPT. Furthermore, the chapter will provide a discussion on North Korea’s strategy of brinkmanship. Nuclear weapons act as North Korea’s most important political bargaining tool used to achieve demands; this exacerbates tensions further as North Korea is able to bluff, threaten and stall with negotiations on a solution to the nuclear issue.⁸⁴ In addition, a discussion on North Korea’s defensive power provides an important analysis on North Korea’s ability to resist US influence. This chapter ultimately seeks to illustrate the dangers of a nuclear North Korea and the need therefore to neutralize this situation.

⁸⁰ Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 7.

⁸¹ Huntley, W.L., “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 457.

⁸² “Six-Party Talks”, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm>.

⁸³ Quanyi, Z. “Warming U.S.-North Korean Relations?”, http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/06/30/warming_us-north_korean_relations/6116/, 30 June 2008.

⁸⁴ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 76.

An important lesson learned from the collapse of the Cold War and failure of socialism was that economic success; and not military strength, served as the most effective means of state survival.⁸⁵ North Korea however did not follow along this path. From the time of President Kim Il-Sung's rule, North Korean efforts were continually directed at reinforcing and strengthening the country's military capabilities as a vital strategy of state survival. This policy was maintained under the rule of Kim Jong-Il, who upheld a war-like atmosphere since attaining leadership of North Korea.⁸⁶ Despite signing on to the NPT in 1985, North Korea had always remained determined to develop a nuclear weapons program.⁸⁷ Between mid-1960-1970, North Korea's nuclear interest mainly focused on studies regarding nuclear fuel refining, conversion and fabrication.⁸⁸ In the 1980's, North Korea then extended interest toward the practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system and thus began constructing a 200 megawatt nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon.⁸⁹ In 1985, US officials presented intelligence of data proving that North Korea was building a secret nuclear reactor. This resulted in international pressure on North Korea who then signed on to the NPT in 1985 but refused however to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁹⁰

It is this situation that has led to various tensions and issues regarding North Korea's nuclear aspirations. Between 1992-1993 for instance, the IAEA was permitted to, after North Korea's eventual acceptance of the safeguard agreement, inspect six of North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities.⁹¹ In March 1993 however, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT stating that the IAEA had violated the principle of 'impartiality' by involving the intelligence of the US in special inspections, unpermitted by North Korea, at the unreported Yongbyon nuclear site. This led North Korea, in 1994, to remove 8 000 fuel rods from its 25 megawatt reactor, without permitting monitoring by IAEA inspectors.⁹² This situation caused a great amount of tension and instability as the US contemplated a military strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities; while dispatching missiles and reinforcements to South Korea in

⁸⁵ Bong-UK, C. North Korea: The Land that Never Changes. Naewoe Press, republic of Korea, 1995, p. 110.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 2.

⁸⁸ House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3 2003.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, pp. 2-3.

⁹² Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, pp. 2-3.

preparation for an imminent full scale conflict.⁹³ This is just one example illustrative of North Korea's nuclear developments that increased the possibility of full scale conflict within the region. Furthermore, tensions increased upon the discovery of plutonium in North Korean nuclear facilities. In 1994, the Department of Energy estimated that 8 kilograms of plutonium could be used for a small nuclear weapon. This raised concern internationally as US estimates reported North Korea to possess 12 kilograms which could result in the formation of one or even two nuclear bombs.⁹⁴ For these reasons therefore concern has always been raised regarding North Korea's nuclear developments.

2.1 The Reasons for North Korea's Nuclear Developments.

An important reason for North Korea's nuclear developments is based on North Korea's concern with the US military threat.⁹⁵ North Korea fears that the US is determined to overthrow its government after having brought down socialism in the former Soviet Union. North Korea therefore has adopted a policy that ensures a militarily and economically powerful state. An important strategy for North Korea then is to avoid transparency in missile and nuclear issues in order to build a military powerful state or simply creating the perception of North Korea as a military powerful state. North Korea thus continues to resist US demands for inspections unless it receives economic compensations that would then facilitate economic development. North Korea thus, in developing and maintaining a nuclear program to ensure state survival against the US threat, is able in addition to use their nuclear program as leverage to attain economic incentives that in addition to military developments, ensures state survival. This is what is referred to as North Korea's defensive power against the US offensive power.⁹⁶ North Korea's military insecurity and economic failure therefore have been key factors influencing North Korea's nuclear development in order to maintain state sovereignty. These points are reaffirmed by the views of Bertil Lintner.⁹⁷ In an interview with Mr. Lintner, the point was stressed that nuclear weapons are considered as North Korea's only 'life insurance.' Mr. Lintner reaffirmed this point by describing his trip to Pyongyang in 2004 whereupon questions were continually asked by top North Korean officials on his views regarding Bush's plans to attack North Korea. Once again this reaffirms the North Korean fear and

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3 2003.

⁹⁵ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 200-2001, p. 543.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 542.

⁹⁷ See Appendix A

insecurity of the US threat, as Mr. Lintner explains, the North Korean fear of not wanting to become “another Iraq.”⁹⁸

This leads to the importance of the Juche ideology within North Korean foreign policy. The Juche ideology stresses importance on the principles of independence and sovereignty and explains North Korea's key foreign policy objective therefore to prevent foreign intervention.⁹⁹ North Korea is the only country that has adopted Juche as the ruling ideology and the policy thus provides North Korea the rationale to exert defensive power over the US, who they consider a threat to their sovereignty. As Chapter two aims to illustrate in the antagonistic policies pursued by both the Clinton and Bush Administration, that tensions were simply fueled as these antagonistic policies simply increased North Korean fears and insecurity causing them to retaliate with greater nuclear threats. Furthermore, negotiations on missile and nuclear issues coincide with the maintenance of the Kim regime, North Korean leadership therefore cannot simply give in to US demands or pressure. As the ‘realizer’ of Juche, Kim Jong-Il has to maintain nuclear developments to ensure state and regime survival.¹⁰⁰ In this way then nuclear weapons are seen as the gold standard of the Kim family regime.¹⁰¹

An example illustrative of North Korea's fear of the US is evident in the events that precede US President Bush's adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004.¹⁰² This Act ultimately infringed on the regime's rule over its citizens and thus impacted on North Korean sovereignty. North Korea thus responded by calling this a ‘declaration of war’ that left them with no option but to reinforce their nuclear deterrent.¹⁰³ This then is a clear example of the manner in which North Korea responds to a US threat to its sovereignty. North Korea adopted a hostile reaction and threatened a nuclear response as resistance to this threat. The issue therefore around North Korea's nuclear developments is an issue of security.¹⁰⁴ North Korea has always stated that it will negotiate a verifiable end to all nuclear weapons development if the US formally commits to respect North Korean sovereignty. In light of these

⁹⁸ Internet Interview with Bertil Lintner, 1 November 2009.

⁹⁹ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations,” in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 200-2001, pp. 544-545.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Quanyi, Z. “Warming U.S.-North Korean Relations?”, http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/06/30/warming_us-north_korean_relations/6116/, 30 June 2008.

¹⁰² Kyung-Ae Park, “North Korea in 2004: From brisk Diplomacy to Impasse” in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 19.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Bala, A and Solomon, H. *Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis*. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 26.

discussions on the reasons for and evidence of North Korea's nuclear aspirations; certain concerns are raised regarding the implications and dangers a nuclear North Korea presents.

North Korea is often described as a rogue state. Many definitions find rogue states to be ruled by a group that control power through coercion, suppressing basic human rights and freedoms.¹⁰⁵ These groups seek to maintain regime dominance and embark on costly military programs, particularly in weapons of mass destruction to protect and ensure regime survival against all threats. This definition however, that associates proliferation with undemocratic states ignores the fact that most nuclear armed countries are democratic. In addition, one cannot look to human rights abuses in authoritarian nations as grounds to classify countries as rogue nations as many democratic states themselves have records of human rights abuses.¹⁰⁶

Questions therefore arise as to why North Korea would be classified as a rogue state while countries like Syria, involved in purchasing weapons of mass destruction are omitted.¹⁰⁷ The answer however remains clear. The US needs the assistance of Syria in resolving issues in the Middle East and this clearly shows a dominance of pragmatism over principle in determining which countries are classified as rogue nations.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, this represents the policy of the US aimed at political mobilization whereby the US would seek support for political action against an alleged threat that would then justify the pursuit of an aggressive and confrontational policy. In the case of the US policy on North Korea, particularly under the Bush administration, the US believed that the only way to end proliferation by North Korea was to achieve regime change, and therefore adopted an aggressive, hard-line policy of hawk engagement.¹⁰⁹ As discussed previously however, the only reason North Korea maintains a nuclear program is as a military deterrent against this US threat to its sovereignty and not as an offensive weapon. By adopting aggressive policies therefore that only fuel these North Korean fears and insecurities it is clearly evident why North Korea would respond with even greater nuclear threats as a deterrent to the US threat. Chapter two aims to further discuss this issue and proceeds to provide with recommendations on the need for engagement and negotiation to lessen North Korean fears and insecurities and thus lessen the chance that North Korea would respond with nuclear brinkmanship.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 732.

¹⁰⁸ Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 200-2001, p. 540.

What is evident with regard to the US policy toward North Korea is the fact that the US always presents the 'worst case scenario' as an indisputable truth.¹¹⁰ In addition, the US, in most cases, distorts intelligence on North Korea and thereby seriously exaggerates the dangers of Pyongyang. This is most evident in the US reports of the dangers of North Korean uranium nuclear developments. This example furthermore illustrates the manner in which the US raised the Uranium issue as a ploy to scare both Japan and South Korea who up until that point both adopted a conciliatory approach to North Korea.¹¹¹ At the time, US intelligence presented clear findings that North Korea did not have the capacity to build a uranium nuclear weapon as North Korea still faced many obstacles in pursuing an enrichment program.¹¹² Furthermore, the US did not publicly release any of the intelligence on North Korea's uranium program and it thus became clear that the US chose to exploit this issue mainly for political purposes.¹¹³ As is clearly evident in the words of General James Clapper, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency in 1994, "We didn't have smoking gun evidence either way. But you build a case for a range of possibilities. In a case like North Korea, you have to apply the most conservative approach, the worst case scenario".¹¹⁴ This is clear evidence of the approach adopted by the US in dealing with the North Korean proliferation issue. An approach that resulted in the US making accusations without any evidence that only further represented their aggressive policy that only fueled tensions further.

Despite this argument however that explains the many exaggerations that are made regarding the North Korean nuclear threat, the threat of North Korea remains a reality where important aspects and developments need to be considered.

2.2 Dangers and Implications of a Nuclear North Korea.

North Korea is a state whose leadership believes that state and regime survival against any threat lies mainly in the development of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁵ The possibility then of the North Korean leadership giving up on nuclear developments while seeking to protect sovereignty and ensure regime survival is greatly weakened. Furthermore, concerns only increase when looking to the distinctive nature of the

¹¹⁰ Harrison, S., "Did North Korea Cheat?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 100.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 101.

¹¹² *Ibid*, p. 102.

¹¹³ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 27.

¹¹⁴ Harrison, S., "Did North Korea Cheat?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 102.

¹¹⁵ Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 542-543.

North Korean situation. North Korea is not described or considered a 'rational adversary'.¹¹⁶ Russia for instance, during the Cuban missile crisis was considered a rational adversary with which the US was able to deal with. In addition, North Korea is not considered a 'rag-tag' Third World regime compared to that of Afghanistan or Libya, North Korea on the other hand is seen as the world's most intransigent and unyielding totalitarian regimes. As such, North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from peaceful coexistence and little to lose from confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value on nuclear weaponry.¹¹⁷ This is what makes the North Korean situation dangerous as this is a country accustomed to subsistence whose main goal is state survival based on nuclear acquisition against all threats. Kim Jong-Il has thus continually confessed North Korea's nuclear capability prompted by his own concerns for security.¹¹⁸ Under the rule of Kim Jong-Il, North Korea has engaged in coercive bargaining that has often resulted in crisis as North Korea continually provokes tension by firing missiles and walking away from treaties.¹¹⁹ Such an adversary therefore becomes a dangerous threat as the very issue of nuclear development that raises concern is the same factor North Korea depends on for state survival.

It is important to note in addition that traditional power politics cannot be applied to the North Korean situation. Traditional power politics is characterized by impositions that are made by stronger nations onto weaker nations.¹²⁰ North Korea however, is representative of a paradoxical phenomenon known as the 'power of the weak'.¹²¹ In the North Korean case, North Korea's policy of brinkmanship based on its nuclear program is able to exercise substantial influence and lead a greater power against its will. As North Korean stakes in nuclear issues are directly linked to its own state survival, North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as an important tool to counter any threat to its sovereignty.¹²² Traditional power politics are non-existent therefore as the US does not have the power to use its military strength in this case to exert any impositions or obligations upon North Korea. This would explain the reasons why North Korea is seen as a state that has little to gain from peaceful coexistence and little to lose from confrontation and thus, in light of this, places a great value on nuclear

¹¹⁶House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3 2003.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Cha, V. and Kang, C., "The Korea Crisis," in *Foreign Policy*, No. 136, May-June 2003, p. 21.

¹²⁰ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 541.

¹²¹ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 541.

¹²²*Ibid.* p. 543.

weaponry.¹²³ Chapter two will therefore discuss the reasons why an aggressive and hard-line US policy is not effective in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue as it simply encourages North Korean nuclear brinkmanship to ensure regime survival. North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats as a defensive tool against the US offensive policy¹²⁴, instead of surrender to the military strength of the US as advocated under the concept of traditional power politics.

Another concern raised points to the lack of transparency, knowledge and information regarding North Korea's nuclear development that only fuels suspicion and raises tensions. Furthermore, a serious problem arises as most news of North Korea is often the product of American analysis, the news therefore is mainly a projection of Americans with a strong view on how they thought North Korea would react.¹²⁵ News then was based mainly on assumption that only leads to a great deal of misinterpretation that could simply fuel tensions further. This ultimately makes the situation even more difficult to resolve as the international community is unaware of exactly what it is dealing with and what needs to be done. The issue of the level of plutonium in North Korea for instance, is a serious concern. The plutonium issue continues to raise anxiety as enough plutonium allows for the creation of a nuclear weapon; and it has not yet been determined how much plutonium North Korea has.¹²⁶ The international community is thus left to speculate on whether or not North Korea has, or will be, in the near future, able to create nuclear weapons. As it stands, estimates show North Korea to possess enough plutonium for up to eight nuclear weapons, four times what it had three years ago.¹²⁷ This uncertainty only raises suspicion that creates and maintains an atmosphere of tension. The international community will thus continue to fear the worst from North Korea and will thereby maintain an environment of suspicion, tension and hostility. Another example of this is seen in North Korea's ambiguous Statement in 2002 about possessing weapons more powerful than nuclear weapons.¹²⁸ Due to a lack of evidence, information and knowledge; experts are simply left to assume and suspect that North Korea possesses

¹²³ House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3 2003.

¹²⁴ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 542.

¹²⁵ Bala, A and Solomon, H. *Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis*. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 24.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ O'Hanlon, M., "The North Korean Nuclear Threat", in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Vol. 51, Iss. 30, April 2005.

¹²⁸ Sharma, V. "State Sponsors: North Korea," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9364/>, 28 June 2008.

biological and chemical weapons and this only raises more suspicion and tension regarding the danger of North Korea.¹²⁹

Further concern is raised regarding the series of developments of North Korea's nuclear program. The announcement of the alleged Taepodong I for instance, show a more advanced missile program.¹³⁰ North Korean missiles, created in 1976 for instance, only had a range of 60-106 km, but developed into Nodong and Taepodong missiles that now have a range of up to 6 700 km.¹³¹ The Taepodong II again represented North Korea's continued advancement in nuclear capability as this missile has the potential of reaching the US mainland while Taepodong I can reach South Korea and Japan. Not only did these developments result in a stalemate between North Korea and the US that only increased the already tense relationship; but it advanced the potential of a major security crisis in the region. South Korea for instance began talks with the US to develop long-range missiles and thus extend its missile range while Japan approved the US-Japan defence cooperation guidelines in the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system with the US.¹³² The TMD system raises many concerns and fears within East Asia that TMD deployments could trigger a regional arms race and would thus greatly foster regional instability.¹³³ These developments therefore only increased the possibility of an arms race in East Asia that would increase an already hostile situation.

In addition, concern was raised regarding the sale of nuclear devices from North Korea to other nations.¹³⁴ Given the economic value of missile and nuclear weapons, it is easy to see why North Korea would not give up on these sales that prove indispensable for economic survival.¹³⁵ According to US reports, North Korea has become the largest missile exporter, earning approximately \$ 580 million between 1980-1992.¹³⁶ An estimated forty percent of North Korea's foreign exchange earnings are from

¹²⁹ "North Korea Profile," NTI, http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html, October 2009.

¹³⁰ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 536.

¹³¹ Lintner, B., "North Korea's Missile Trade Helps Fund its Nuclear Program," YaleGlobal, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/north-koreas-missile-trade-helps-fund-its-nuclear-program>, 5 May 2003.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ Medeiros, E. and Saunders, P. "Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security," NTI, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_3a.html, January 2003.

¹³⁴ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 537.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 543.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

weapon sales, mainly through missile exports.¹³⁷ Reports show North Korean sales of ballistic missile technology to Iran and Syria while missile technology has been transferred to Pakistan and Yemen.¹³⁸ These sales only increase tensions around issues on proliferation. The sale of the Nodong I medium-range ballistic missile to Iran for instance has a range of 1350-1500 km and a payload of 1 200 kilograms of explosives that can theoretically hit Israel.¹³⁹ Another major concern is that these sales will be to other rouge nations mainly in the Middle East and Asia and increases the chance therefore that missiles and advanced nuclear devices could end up in the possession of international terrorist groups. Furthermore, an increase in sales only allows for greater development of North Korea's own nuclear program. North Korean nuclear sales to Egypt for instance have played an important role in North Korea's missile development.¹⁴⁰ Where North Korea could only develop missiles with a range of 60-160 km in the 1970's, can today produce missiles that have the potential to strike as far as the US mainland. These developments therefore, linked to the increasing sales of nuclear weapons raises a great amount of concern as North Korea's nuclear proliferation continues to advance.

Concern furthermore is raised regarding the implications and impact a nuclear North Korea has toward the international security regime of the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 after the Bush Administration charged North Korea for undertaking a second uranium-based nuclear program.¹⁴¹ What is significant to note is that North Korea withdrew from the NPT without having suffered any meaningful sanctions.¹⁴² North Korea's success in avoiding meaningful repercussions sets a negative example for other nations and thereby erodes future arms control and proliferation compliance.¹⁴³ This is a dangerous prospect as other nations could learn from North Korea and not abide by proposals set by the

¹³⁷ Lintner, B. "North Korea's Missile Trade Helps Fund Its Nuclear Program Washington ponders how to choke off its exports," Yale Global, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/north-koreas-missile-trade-helps-fund-its-nuclear-program>, 5 May 2003.

¹³⁸ Sharma, V. "State Sponsors: North Korea," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9364/>, 28 June 2008.

¹³⁹ Lintner, B. "North Korea's Missile Trade Helps Fund Its Nuclear Program Washington ponders how to choke off its exports," Yale Global, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/north-koreas-missile-trade-helps-fund-its-nuclear-program>, 5 May 2003.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 457.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 458.

¹⁴³ Alan, Q., "North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact," in *Mainstream*, Vol. 47, No. 25, June 2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html>.

NPT. Another concern is raised in addition as the erosion of the NPT begins to serve as a medium through which Korean peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for instance.¹⁴⁴ There are various arguments moreover stating that the NPT is now under pressure as a result of North Korean non-compliance and withdrawal making the stakes therefore in keeping the NPT viable very high.¹⁴⁵

In light of these discussions therefore, the dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. Not only does North Korea continue advancing its own nuclear program; but it continues to sell devices and technology to other nations that only increases proliferation dangers and increases the possibility of threats to peace and stability within various unstable regions.

2.3 North Korea's policy of Brinkmanship.

Brinkmanship, the most distinctive characteristic of North Korean diplomacy, is a unilateral policy that involves making unconditional demands, bluffing, threatening and stalling which all result in a mixture of provocative and aggressive tactics.¹⁴⁶ This tactic is clearly evident in the words of a North Korean negotiator stating, "If you don't accept our proposal, we will walk out," and "We accept your proposal, but you do X first."¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, there are no limits to North Korean brinkmanship that sees North Korea threatening war if certain demands are not met or policies, such as the imposition of sanctions, are not accepted.¹⁴⁸ North Korea for instance has continually threatened the use of nuclear conflict after sanctions have been imposed or certain demands were not met. In July 2000 for example, North Korea threatened to restart its nuclear program if the US did not compensate for delays in building civilian nuclear power plants.¹⁴⁹ In a more recent incident, in response to UN condemnation for a North Korean

¹⁴⁴ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007

¹⁴⁵ Alan, Q., "North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact," in Mainstream, Vol. 47, No. 25, June 2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html>.

¹⁴⁶ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 76.

¹⁴⁷ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 76.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ "Timeline: North Korea's Nuclear Development," The Associated Press, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/world/asia/10chronocnd.html?_r=1, 9 October 2006.

Rocket launch, North Korea launched a multistage rocket.¹⁵⁰ These examples clearly represent a situation that only increases tensions and instability in an already hostile situation.

Furthermore, this policy is counterproductive as it undermines the development of an effective working relationship between negotiators.¹⁵¹ In this sense, North Korea would not be seen as a rational negotiator as it continues to threaten and bluff and even walk away from talks if conditions are not suitable. Mr. Lintners views again reaffirm these views regarding North Korean brinkmanship. According to Mr. Lintner, North Korea has discovered that its nuclear policy acts as an important diplomatic tool which they can use to extract concessions and aid from South Korea, Japan and the US.¹⁵² This is often referred to as 'nuclear blackmail' as each time that North Korean demands are not met, a nuclear test or any such provocative act will be carried out, after which North Korea usually attains the desired concession.¹⁵³ Chapter Two will however provide with reasons as to why North Korean brinkmanship continues and ways in which this can be avoided if the US adopts policies of negotiation and engagement that will lessen North Korean insecurities that remains the main cause of North Korean brinkmanship. A further danger arises as this policy could cause negotiators to discount the real sources of tension as they could miscalculate a threat, seeing it as a bluff instead and therefore risk possible escalations of the conflict.¹⁵⁴

Linked closely to this policy is the policy of crisis diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is a process that involves a manipulation of threats.¹⁵⁵ For instance, when the US ignored Pyongyang's call for the replacement of reactors in 1992, Pyongyang responded by threatening to withdraw from the NPT and defect from all inspections.¹⁵⁶ This leads to the ideology regarding the 'power of the weak,' whereby weaker powers are able to exert substantial influence in the international system and manipulate and lead the greater power away from its own desired position.¹⁵⁷ The traditional power approach therefore remains inadequate in accounting for North Korea's role and influence over other states, the US particularly.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 77.

¹⁵² Internet Interview with Bertil Lintner, 1 November 2009.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 78.

¹⁵⁵ Bala, A and Solomon, H. Between Nukes and Negotiations: Exploring the North Korean Crisis. SAIIA Reports, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa, 2005, p. 6.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp 6-7.

¹⁵⁷ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 541.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 553.

The US for instance was unable to impose sanctions on North Korea following North Korea's threat in 1993 and thus had to resort to negotiations instead where North Korea attained its long-standing objective of establishing a direct relationship with the US.¹⁵⁹ North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT illustrated the leverage North Korea had by using the potential threat of its nuclear program. The result of this threat saw the formation of negotiations based on North Korean terms.¹⁶⁰ This policy of political blackmail has the danger of creating even more hostility between the two as North Korea does not conform to US interests and in addition; continues to exercise its defensive power against the US.¹⁶¹ This situation therefore only fuels an already unstable and hostile situation in which the creation of a constructive negotiating environment is compromised.

The North Korean nuclear threat thus raises many points of concern. As North Korean nuclear sales increase, the advancement and development of North Korea's nuclear programme continues. Furthermore, growing North Korean nuclear proliferation fuels proliferation ambitions, not only within East Asia, but in many other unstable regions in addition. North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in addition is said to provide motivation for other states to continue, unhindered, in acquiring nuclear weapons.¹⁶² In addition, attempting to bring North Korea back to the NPT without absolving past non-compliance would also present the chance for other NPT parties to break certain rules.¹⁶³ For these reasons therefore, North Korean nuclear activities clearly present a threat and challenge to international peace and security. The lack of transparency, information and knowledge regarding North Korean nuclear developments only increases suspicion as the international community is left to speculation and assumption that only fuels uncertainty and thereby raises tension and hostility. This situation is then compounded by the adoption of policies of brinkmanship by North Korea that again does not allow for a conducive and productive environment to promote constructive negotiation. In light of these discussions therefore, the dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. The need therefore to neutralize this threat is essential in preserving and maintaining global standards of peace and stability. This chapter has explained and illustrated the key reason for North Korean nuclear development as a defensive deterrent based on their insecurity against the US aggressive policy aimed

¹⁵⁹ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 70.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 553.

¹⁶² Alan, Q., "North Korean Brinkmanship and its Global Impact," in Mainstream, Vol. 47, No. 25, June 2009, <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1419.html>.

¹⁶³ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 467.

at regime change in Pyongyang. This insecurity leads North Korea to pursue a policy of brinkmanship and coercive bargaining, by maintaining a nuclear program. Chapter two will therefore proceed to discuss the failure of the Bush Administration in neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat by adopting an aggressive hard-line policy of hawk engagement that simply maintained and increased North Korean fears and insecurities and thus continued their provocative and dangerous strategy of brinkmanship.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 65.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS NORTH KOREAN POLICY



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http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/ED-AH355_bolton_20080414193904.jpg

CHAPTER THREE

3. The Bush Administrations North Korean Policy

“I view the North Korean situation as one that can be resolved peacefully” (President George W. Bush, December 31, 2002)¹⁶⁵

The study will now proceed with an in depth analysis and critique of the Bush Administrations North Korean policy, determining whether it neutralized or simply aggravated the North Korean nuclear situation. The above quotation, stated by President Bush upon his election, gives the impression of a US policy that aims to negotiate, cooperate and engage with North Korea in a peaceful manner. This chapter will however illustrate an aggressive, hostile and hard-line policy of hawk engagement instead, adopted by the Bush Administration, which only fueled tensions further as it intensified North Korean insecurities.

The chapter will begin with an analysis of the Clinton Administrations North Korean policy. This analysis will provide with a background and context of US-North Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush Administration. This analysis aims to illustrate the positive policies of engagement adopted by the Clinton Administration that allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the Clinton Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in US-North Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from aggressive policies of brinkmanship.

The Bush Administration however, did not advance and further these policies of engagement. This chapter will provide a discussion on the reasons for a more aggressive and hard-line policy of hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration. The study will proceed to analyze the implications of this more aggressive, and often hostile, policy.

3.1 The Clinton Administration and North Korea: The 1993 Nuclear Crisis.

A major criticism against American foreign policy regards the United States (US) unwillingness to cooperate with rivals including the tendency of making promises they do not uphold.¹⁶⁶ It is suggested that countries that seek nuclear arms are insecure; adopting policies that isolate and antagonize these

¹⁶⁵ “George W. Bush: Exchange with Reporters in Crawford, Texas,” The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=263>. December 31, 2002.

¹⁶⁶ Sigal, L. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998, p. 3.

countries therefore is counterproductive.¹⁶⁷ What is needed then instead is a policy of ‘diplomatic give-and-take’ that combines reassurance with conditional reciprocity.¹⁶⁸ Such a policy will promise inducements on the condition that potential proliferators accept nuclear restraints that will then increase the chance of non-proliferation¹⁶⁹. The US foreign policy toward North Korea is a case in point that is representative of this criticism.

The Clinton Administration’s policy toward North Korea was initially based on misjudgments that were mainly political.¹⁷⁰ In addressing the North Korean issue, Clinton therefore adopted a posture, and not a policy by adopting a tough stance toward North Korea that allowed for and led to the crisis faced in 1993. When dealing with the North Korean plutonium issue for instance, the Clinton Administration threatened to employ economic sanctions, a policy choice that would only further antagonize North Korea and further fuel North Korean insecurities. The Administration therefore opted for coercive diplomacy, a strategy to compel North Korean compliance to the NPT by threatening economic sanctions. In 1993, the US had accused the North Koreans of conducting a nuclear weapons program where it was alleged that enough plutonium had been extracted for one or two nuclear weapons.¹⁷¹ Tensions escalated further with the dispute and disagreement over the IAEA inspection of the unreported Yongbyon facility.¹⁷² The crisis came to a boiling point when the US had threatened sanctions against North Korea through the United Nations Security Council, seen as an ‘an act of war’ by the North Koreans who then resorted to the policy of brinkmanship and threatened withdrawal from the NPT.¹⁷³ The region was thus placed on the brink of war. This example therefore clearly illustrates the Clinton Administrations hard-line approach in dealing with North Korea. Instead of the Clinton Administration considering resolving the crisis through direct talks with North Korea, focus was placed instead on whether or not China would support the sanctions.¹⁷⁴ This policy therefore simply antagonized the North Koreans who responded typically by adopting a defensive policy of brinkmanship to counter the US offensive policy.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶⁸ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 4.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁷¹ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 18.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷⁴ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 59.

The situation was resolved however with the visit of former President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang. Carter received Kim Jong-Il's pledge to freeze the nuclear program in return for US assistance on North Korea's energy program and a reduction of tensions between both countries.¹⁷⁵ This offer was accepted by the Clinton Administration who then chose to negotiate with North Korea that led to the formulation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.¹⁷⁶ The Clinton Administration therefore chose to adopt the policy of 'diplomatic give-and-take' by promising financial and technical assistance for the North Korean energy program while North Korea promised to freeze nuclear developments. The US agreed to provide North Korea with two Light Water Nuclear Reactors (LWRs) for electricity generation while North Korea agreed to abandon nuclear research reactors and comply with nuclear safeguards.¹⁷⁷ This informed the new policy adopted by the Clinton Administration stating that, "it is always possible to get an agreement when you give enough away."¹⁷⁸ In keeping with this new policy, the Clinton Administration agreed to lift the previous policy to impose sanctions and continued diplomatic meetings.¹⁷⁹ These diplomatic meetings would assist in the policy objective to achieve a full normalization of political and economic relations between the US and North Korea. Furthermore, leading from the Agreed Framework was the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).¹⁸⁰ KEDO, established by The Republic of Korea, the US and Japan, was obligated to supply North Korea with heavy fuel oil to ensure fuel electricity generation while the LWRs were under construction.¹⁸¹

The initial policy of the Clinton Administration therefore, that adopted for a policy of coercive diplomacy, brought the region to the brink of war.¹⁸² This policy ultimately discouraged cooperation and opted instead for a 'crime-and-punishment' approach, opting for sanctions over negotiation in dealing with a 'rogue' state. The US represented their inability to recognize the fact that North Korea adopted a nuclear program in light of insecurities and in an attempt to adopt 'tit-for-tat' nuclear diplomacy. As discussed in chapter one, North Korea adopts a nuclear program to ensure state and regime survival against the antagonistic US threat that can only be secured by economic strength; and thus the need to

¹⁷⁵ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 19

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 1998, p. 7.

¹⁷⁸ Snyder, S. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1999, p. 6.

¹⁷⁹ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 1998, p. 7.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 722.

keep a nuclear program that provides the leverage to achieve various incentives. Countless examples represent situations in which North Korea becomes more unruly in response to an aggressive US policy but in contrast; responds with more concessions when dealing with a more cooperative US attitude. The Clinton Administrations switch to 'give-and-take' diplomacy is a key example representing a decrease in tensions as a more cooperative environment brought North Korea to offer more concessions.¹⁸³

The Clinton Administration thus turned to a policy of engagement despite condemnations from hard-liners that engagement would amount to appeasement that would simply encourage North Korean threat and wayward, deviant behavior.¹⁸⁴ The Clinton Administration realized however that the opposite was in fact true. The Administration recognised that well placed concessions can essentially have a controlling effect on a country that needs the cooperation and assistance of the outside world.¹⁸⁵ The Administration became aware that North Korea responds in a more cooperative manner if the US engages in a non-aggressive manner, as was clearly illustrated by former President Jimmy Carter. This new policy furthermore, was in line with the 'sunshine policy' pursued by South Korea and this greatly facilitated improved relations between the US, South Korea and North Korea. Improved relations were evident in the landmark first inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000.¹⁸⁶ By adopting a strategy that was now consistent to that of its important South Korean ally, the Clinton Administration was able to change the antagonistic US view of North Korea as a rogue state that is irrational and incapable of compromise.¹⁸⁷ This change in policy and attitude led to and facilitated a great amount of progress in US-Korean relations and allowed for various breakthroughs. Inter-Korean relations improved greatly while North Korea adopted a policy of "New Thinking".¹⁸⁸ This policy of "New Thinking" for instance, was aimed at economic recovery and restructuring that demonstrated the DPRK's new willingness to learn from the outside world, instead of remaining completely isolated and closed off.¹⁸⁹ In 2001, for instance, North Korea sent almost 500 students and government officials abroad, to mostly other Asian countries, to study economics, business and technical subjects.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 723.

¹⁸⁴ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 535.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 534.

¹⁸⁷ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 732.

¹⁸⁸ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, pp. 30-31.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

The US policy toward North Korea therefore of engagement pursued by the Clinton Administration saw a policy shift that brought notable success in improving US-North Korean relations in addition to neutralizing North Korean nuclear threats. This success and progress in the normalization of US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat however was compromised upon the election of the Bush Administration when a shift in policy saw engagement replaced by a hard-line policy of hawk engagement.

3.2 The Bush Administration and North Korea

The US policy toward North Korea upon the election of the Bush Administration saw a reversal from engagement to a hard-line, hawkish approach often described as being deliberately provocative.¹⁹¹ This policy had the sole objective of achieving regime change in Pyongyang and therefore adopted a strategy of hawk engagement to build support for action to be taken against North Korea to accelerate the collapse of the Kim regime. This Administration began by setting conditions for cooperation that it knew were unacceptable to Pyongyang and then used this to justify US views of North Korea as an unreasonable rogue state.¹⁹² The antagonistic US view of North Korea as an irrational rogue nation therefore returned with the Bush Administrations more hard-line aggressive policy. This showed early signs of the potential tension and strain this policy would have in not fostering and furthering engagement policies established under the Clinton Administration.

What is notable from the inception of the Bush Administration is the divergent and contradictory policy choice toward North Korea resulting from a split in views between two camps in the Bush Administration. While one camp called for a hard-line aggressive policy for North Korea, the other opted for more engagement and negotiation.¹⁹³ In the end however, an aggressive hawkish policy dominated over engagement and cooperation. For instance, while the US in 2001, adopted a comprehensive policy recommending unconditional talks with Pyongyang, a more aggressive policy was chosen instead when Bush, in his State of the Union Address in 2002, grouped North Korea with Iran and Iraq as part of the 'axis of evil'.¹⁹⁴ This represents a clear reversal from the Clinton Administration that immediately caused a great amount of tension and disrupted all previous improvements achieved by the Clinton

¹⁹¹ Matray, J.I. "Why the Bush Policy is Failing in North Korea", History News Network <http://hnn.us/articles/10400.htm>.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 2.

¹⁹⁴ Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 79.

Administration. North Korea responded by viewing the speech as a “little short of declaring war on the DPRK”.¹⁹⁵ North Korea had taken various steps to distance itself from terrorism and it therefore became clear that by linking North Korea to terrorism, President Bush guaranteed a hostile response from Pyongyang, after which it could then justify the need for a hard-line aggressive policy to deal with a hostile North Korea.¹⁹⁶

Not only did Bush divert from the policy of engagement established by the Clinton Administration, but Bush went on in addition, in 2001 to criticize South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’.¹⁹⁷ This greatly strained an improved and strengthened US-South Korean alliance. The failed summit meeting in 2001 between the US and South Korea is representative of this point.¹⁹⁸ This summit clearly highlighted the divisions within the Bush Administration and between the US and South Korea regarding the policy of engagement with North Korea.¹⁹⁹ This lack of consistency in policy objectives between the US and South Korea strains an alliance that is unable then to effectively deal with the North Korean situation in a unified manner. The Clinton Administration adopted a policy of engagement that worked consistently with South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’ facilitating an improved US-South Korean alliance, and an improved inter-Korean alliance. The Bush Administration however, shifted to adopt a more aggressive hard-line policy that only strained US-South Korean relations whereby South Korea constantly opposed US efforts to place sanctions on North Korea or even discuss the use of force.²⁰⁰ Agreement between these two allies is crucial in effectively dealing with North Korea. Strain and inconsistency in the US-South Korean relationship can be seen upon the passing of the Human Rights Act by President Bush in September 2004.²⁰¹ This Act directly attacked the DPRK as a dictatorship by calling for the promotion of freedom and human rights. South Korea responded by criticizing the Act for increasing tension and friction between the US and North Korea. Instead of working together therefore, South Korea and the US pursued different methods in dealing with North Korea that prevented a unified alliance. Furthermore, unlike the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration failed to promote and maintain a healthy relationship between North and South Korea. The Bush Administration failed to recognize the need to maintain a relationship between the two that had been moving away from confrontation toward a

¹⁹⁵ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 31.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁹⁷ Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 79

¹⁹⁸ Harnisch, S., “U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From “Slow Go” to “No Go,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 863.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 13.

²⁰¹ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 15.

policy of engagement pursued by South Korea and supported by the Clinton Administration.²⁰² The Bush Administration therefore, in light of its firm deterrence policy, needed to retain flexibility that would continue to improve inter-Korean relations and thereby enhance stability on the peninsula.²⁰³ The Bush Administrations hard-line policy of hawk engagement however, did not provide support for the South Korean policy of engagement and went on therefore to strain both US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations that did not enhance or work toward stability on the peninsula.

Divergent interests were again evident within KEDO, where South Korea urged the US to adopt a more pacifying and softer stance toward North Korea.²⁰⁴ South Korea went on to assert that closer US-North Korean relations based on policies of engagement would improve South Korea's relations with Pyongyang.²⁰⁵ It can therefore be concluded, that a more aggressive and hostile US policy pursued by the Bush Administration, not only affected US-North Korean relations, but impacted negatively on South Korea's relations with Pyongyang in addition. Where engagement policies of the Clinton Administration fostered a more cooperative environment between the US, South and North Korea; the aggressive policy of the Bush Administration went on to disrupt and strain relations between all parties. Furthermore, given the deep interest of the US's key allies in the Korean peninsula, it was vital and necessary for the US to have a unified policy that had the agreement of all parties involved.²⁰⁶ The Bush Administration's confrontational policy however met with resistance from China, South Korea and even Japan.²⁰⁷

3.1.1 The Bush Administrations Policy of Hawk Engagement

Hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration, held the belief that engagement laid the groundwork needed for punitive action.²⁰⁸ This is a policy best understood when contrasted against the 'sunshine policy' of South Korea. South Korea recognized the fact that North Korean strategies of brinkmanship, that formulated their threatening posture, are based mainly on their insecurity. As such, South Korea chose to adopt a policy of engagement to create an environment that would facilitate

²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

²⁰³ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 1998, p.18.

²⁰⁴ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 550.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 33.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34

²⁰⁸ Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 82.

conciliatory negotiation to lessen North Korean insecurity and in this way prevent North Korea from pursuing a nuclear program thereby lessening the nuclear threat. Various ‘carrots’ or incentives that included economic aid and normalized relations were used to help reduce the tension and give North Korea a stake in the status quo; this would then have a greater influence in getting North Korea to cooperate in negotiations in which it now has something to gain or lose.²⁰⁹ This policy was pursued by the Clinton Administration, represented in the Agreed Framework of 1994, and brought a great amount of improvement in containing the North Korean proliferation threat. The Agreed Framework opened up a path to peace and normal relations between the US and North Korea in addition to improving inter-Korean relations.²¹⁰ Progress however was hampered upon the election of the Bush Administration that reversed these policies of engagement.

The Bush Administrations hard-line policy of hawk engagement, breaks with these policies of engagement in various ways. The Bush Administrations policy of hawk engagement sought to use engagement initially to build a coalition of punishment at a later stage.²¹¹ The US would therefore turn today’s ‘carrots’ into effective ‘sticks’ tomorrow in achieving its ultimate purpose of regime change in Pyongyang or simply to be in a better position to wield effective control over North Korea.²¹² It is important to note however, that the Bush Administration did not proceed with the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration; as such, the Bush Administration did not use the ‘carrots’ set up by the Clinton Administration to be able then to turn them into effective ‘sticks’ later on. The Bush Administration immediately began with an aggressive policy by refusing to provide ‘carrots’ or incentives unless North Korea met certain demands. This showed early signs therefore of a US policy moving away from engagement and ultimately a policy with no objective in continuing with the Agreed Framework.²¹³

Engagement with the US itself was seen as an incentive as the US stipulated that any agreement would have to address issues regarding North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear programme, compliance with the IAEA and addressing human rights concerns.²¹⁴ North Korea was thus presented with a ‘take-it-

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²¹⁰ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 16.

²¹¹ Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 83.

²¹² Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 83.

²¹³ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 27.

²¹⁴ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force*, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, pp. 1-2.

or-leave-it' negotiating position that clearly represented an uncompromising and inflexible policy.²¹⁵ Donald Gregg, a senior US diplomat who served as the CIA Station Chief in Seoul, makes an important point stating that, "Significant progress with North Korea will only be achieved through sustained talk and negotiation. Sporadic meetings with inflexible demands and agendas will not do the job".²¹⁶ It is evident therefore, that this uncompromising and inflexible policy of the Bush Administration would not be effective in dealing with North Korea. In addition, by adopting an uncompromising and inflexible policy, the Bush Administration made it clear that talks and engagement would only effectively occur if North Korea accepted these conditions. This policy then, from the beginning did not establish a productive environment to maintain the progressive engagement policy of the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration was in a better position than Clinton to use the rationale of hawk engagement to turn the 'carrots' into 'sticks' and thereby wield control and influence of North Korean proliferation developments.²¹⁷ The success of Clinton's policy of engagement was based on a policy that provided North Korea with new benefits (food, energy and hard currency).²¹⁸ The Bush Administration was in a prime position then to continue this policy, by continuing to raise the stakes for North Korea with these incentives and then threaten to withdraw these if North Korea did not comply with any agreement as set forth in the Agreed Framework.²¹⁹ The Bush Administration however did not continue with the Clinton Administrations policy of engagement and could therefore not adopt this strategy that could provide the US with substantial influence over North Korea. The Bush Administration instead, began with an aggressive and hostile policy that only drove North Korea back to policies of brinkmanship.

The Bush Administration then did not continue the Clinton Administrations policy of engagement under the Agreed Framework or offer the incentives promised under this framework, but instead, immediately pursued an aggressive and uncompromising policy. This prevented the Administration therefore from pursuing engagement that would turn today's 'carrots' into effective 'sticks' for tomorrow as they did not provide any incentives to give the North Koreans a stake in the status quo. In this way then, the Bush Administrations aggressive policy would not successfully end the North Korean nuclear threat as it pursued a policy that was purely aggressive, and as such, simply encouraged the North Koreans to revert back to policies of brinkmanship, in which North Korea's main stake remained in their nuclear program

²¹⁵ Harnisch, S., "U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 868.

²¹⁶ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 48.

²¹⁷ Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 87.

²¹⁸ Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 87.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

as a defensive deterrent against the aggressive policy of the Bush Administration.²²⁰ A key example representative of this argument can be seen in the crisis that resulted in 2003.

The second nuclear crisis emerged in 2002 when North Korea admitted to a secret uranium enrichment program.²²¹ In addition, North Korea announced that it would restart its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.²²² North Korea withdrew from the NPT, expelled IAEA inspectors and unsealed 8 000 plutonium rods upon announcing that it would restart the processing of spent fuels.²²³ This resulted in a crisis as dangerous as the crisis that emerged in 1993.²²⁴ This crisis however, cannot simply be a result of the actions of North Korea. The 2003 crisis, like the crisis of 1993 resulted from a sustained interaction of threat perceptions of the US aggressive policy and North Korean actions and reactions to these perceptions.²²⁵ In his State of the Union Address in 2002, Bush grouped North Korea, Iran and Iraq as part of an 'axis of evil' that signaled a sudden turnaround in US policy that showed anything but a US objective to normalize relations with Pyongyang.²²⁶ This address by Bush marked the beginning of a more aggressive US policy toward North Korea away from a conciliatory policy of engagement pursued by the Clinton Administration that sought economic and political normalization of US-North Korean relations.²²⁷ In addition, details of a Nuclear Posture review that stated the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes against rogue nations, in which North Korea was included, became public in June 2002.²²⁸ Criticism thus surrounded the North Korean policy of the Bush Administration. The argument questioned the logic of Hawk engagement that sought for negotiations on peace while preparing for war; adopting a policy therefore that outlines the possibility of nuclear strikes is greatly at odds with a policy of engagement with North Korea.²²⁹ It is not surprising therefore to note the reaction of North Korea to this new aggressive US policy that simply fueled North Korean insecurities and fears. For the Bush Administration, expelling the Kim regime before it could further build its nuclear deterrent was the greatest and most

²²⁰ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 70.

²²¹ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 724.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 27.

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

²²⁵ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 725.

²²⁶ Ibid., pp. 726-727.

²²⁷ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 19.

²²⁸ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 727.

²²⁹ Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 85.

urgent priority.²³⁰ By adopting an aggressive and hostile policy to advance this priority however, simply fueled the North Korean threat as it only increased North Korean fears and insecurities.

Prior to this crisis, many commentators have stated that North Korea complied in many ways to the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a view confirmed by both KEDO and CIA Director George Tenet who went as far as providing testimony to Congress in March 2002.²³¹ President Bush's State of the Union Address in 2002 in line with his public disagreement of the 'sunshine policy' in 2001, showed clear signs of a more aggressive and hostile US policy that did not embrace the existing policies of engagement²³² that would ultimately generate fears and counter-reactions by North Korea.²³³ This then is what led to the crisis in 2003. North Korea's anxiety and fear began to increase following President Bush's axis of evil speech that led an official North Korean spokesperson to state that, "(North Korea) would respond ...by starting its nuclear program and resuming its missile tests"²³⁴, and this is precisely what happened eight months later. North Korea's response paralleled its behavior during the 2003 crisis by adopting a policy of brinkmanship to get the hard-line US Administration to negotiate.²³⁵ This example illustrates once more that North Korean anxieties and insecurities against a US aggressive policy only fuels policies of brinkmanship; and simply maintains the North Korean motive to pursue nuclear development to reinforce brinkmanship and ensure a defensive deterrent.

One needs to consider in addition the resemblance this more aggressive policy of hawk engagement has with North Korea's policy of brinkmanship.²³⁶ The study has thus far illustrated an inflexible and uncompromising policy adopted by the Bush Administration that explicitly threatens North Korea while advancing policies that intentionally create a crisis in order to achieve concessions.²³⁷ For this reason, productive engagement and negotiation did not occur between the US and North Korea following the election of the Bush Administration. A key example representative of this point again would be the events that led up to the 2003 crisis. In October 2002, a high level US envoy was sent to North Korea led by

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²³¹ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 728.

²³² Cha, V.D., "Korea's Place in the Axis" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 79.

²³³ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 728.

²³⁴ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 729.

²³⁵ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force*, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 18.

²³⁶ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 732.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 733.

Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly.²³⁸ Kelly ultimately brought an ultimatum to North Korea and not a message of reconciliation as expected by North Korea following the US call for ‘unconditional talks’ in 2001.²³⁹ Instead of negotiation, Kelly immediately began with accusations against North Korea of a secret program of enriching uranium for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons.²⁴⁰ Following this accusation, the US stated that North Korea had therefore violated the 1994 Agreed Framework and then went on to suspend oil shipments to North Korea that marked the end of the Agreed Framework.²⁴¹ North Korea retaliated by stating that the Bush Administrations aggressive policy, following the ‘axis of evil’ speech and the adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review; directly contravened Article three of the Framework that called for US assurance to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.²⁴² What is important to note is that the US had been suspecting secret uranium projects since the late 1990’s, it therefore seemed that the Bush Administration had timed this visit to suit their objective of ending the Agreed Framework.²⁴³ The Bush Administration therefore clearly used this hostile strategy of accusation to end the 1994 Agreement that facilitated engagement and provided North Korea with incentives that Bush was against. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration aimed to stop KEDO from transferring the LWRs to North Korea as this nation, as part of the ‘axis of evil’ could use this technology to threaten the US or assist other terrorist organizations.²⁴⁴ The trip by Kelly therefore, and the approach used, clearly exposed these US objectives in wanting to end a policy of engagement with a rogue nation and opt instead for an aggressive policy of hawk engagement with the ultimate purpose of regime change.

A major criticism was then raised regarding the amount of evidence the US had regarding this accusation. Many now recognize the misrepresented and distorted intelligence data used by the US to justify the invasion of Iraq, and now apply this theory to assess the manner in which the US sought to reverse the previously established US policy of engagement toward North Korea.²⁴⁵ The Bush Administration achieved this by presenting a worst-case scenario as an indisputable truth and distorted intelligence on North Korea by seriously exaggerating the danger the production of North Korean

²³⁸ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 26.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Harrison, S., “Did North Korea Cheat?” in Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 99.

²⁴² Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 27.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Harnisch, S., “U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From “Slow Go” to “No Go,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, pp. 875-876.

²⁴⁵ Harrison, S., “Did North Korea Cheat?” in Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p.99.

uranium based nuclear weapons.²⁴⁶ By failing to approach this issue delicately and distinguish between civilian and military uranium enrichment capabilities, the Bush Administration managed to not only renew tensions, but aggravated what would have already been difficult negotiations to end all North Korean nuclear developments and prevented the potential of future inspections.²⁴⁷ It is important to note in addition that Kelly's accusations were not justified by US intelligence that reported meaningful enrichment North Korean capabilities as an uncertain possibility as North Korea still confronted many obstacles in producing enriched uranium nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration however, chose to exploit this intelligence for its own political purpose, the uranium issue thus "furnished powerful ammunition to render the Agreed Framework a dead letter".²⁴⁸ Hawk engagement had thus dominated and succeeded in ending the Clinton Administrations policy of engagement. In addition, it is stated that the Bush Administration used this as a strategy to move South Korea and China away from conciliatory approaches to North Korea, and adopt a more hard-line approach that would then provide support for the US policy.²⁴⁹ If the US were to apply sanctions for instance, it would need the support of these allies, the Bush Administration hoped therefore to reverse not only the US policy, but the policies of China and South Korea in addition.

At the end therefore, US-North Korean relations returned back to an environment of hostility and tension. With the end of the Agreed Framework came the even greater danger posed by the North Korean plutonium program that now no longer had any check as North Korea was no longer bound by the Agreed Framework.²⁵⁰ The plutonium program; that poses a greater threat than the suspected uranium enrichment program, could have been dealt with effectively under the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration however not only compromised an effective solution to the plutonium program, but raised a new threat that simply went on to compound an already complicated nuclear situation. Furthermore, by opposing and ending the Agreed Framework, the Bush Administration blocked action on the threat of North Korea's reprocessed plutonium that could be used to create a nuclear weapon or transferred to other parties that could present an even greater threat. The Bush Administration could have continued with the engagement policy under the Agreed Framework to continue building trust and reducing North Korea's economic and political insecurities by providing concessions.²⁵¹ This would have

²⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 100.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Harrison, S., "Did North Korea Cheat?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 103.

²⁴⁹ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, pp. 33-34.

²⁵⁰ Harrison, S., "Did North Korea Cheat?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 110.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

allowed the Administration to adopt a more delicate approach in getting North Korea to permit inspections which would have prevented the US from making hostile accusations. The Bush Administration could have embraced the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration to work together with North Korea instead of adopting a policy that resulted in an even greater divide between the US and North Korea. The Bush Administration therefore, following the 2003 crisis, came under intense criticism stating that this Administration gave the impression that it wanted to preserve the North Korean threat.²⁵² These arguments stated that despite progress in US-North Korean relations under the Clinton Administration; the Bush Administration diverted and opted for a more aggressive policy, being aware that it would antagonize North Korea further and then use this to justify the need for an aggressive policy against an antagonistic North Korea.²⁵³ Furthermore, by pursuing and continuing an aggressive policy, the Bush Administration maintained a crisis-driven relationship with North Korea.²⁵⁴ This only adds to the unpredictability that further fuels uncertainty and tensions. Hawk engagement as pursued by the Bush Administration did not allow for the Administration to engage unconditionally with North Korea, and this therefore did not end the dangerous cycle of confrontation, crisis and reluctant engagement that characterizes this crisis-driven relationship.²⁵⁵

Both crises that occurred in 1993 and 2003 respectively, provided the US with an opportunity to engage with North Korea through substantial dialogue.²⁵⁶ Engagement, rather than confrontation, would fit in with Pyongyang's desire and key concern for US security assurances.²⁵⁷ This opportunity was embraced by the Clinton Administration that chose to deal with the 1993 crisis through engagement that resulted in the adoption of the Agreed Framework that facilitated progress toward normalized relations between the US and North Korea. The Bush Administration however, did not respond to the 2003 crisis in this manner. The Bush Administration should have been aware of the dynamics of North Korean brinkmanship that responds in a threatening manner to a perceived threat.²⁵⁸ Instead therefore of having continued with a hard-line aggressive policy, the Administration should have continued the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration that established a framework for progress that the

²⁵² Harnisch, S., "U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 867.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 18.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁵⁷ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 18.

²⁵⁸ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 725.

Bush Administration could have furthered. Critics therefore asserted that President Bush had missed an 'historic moment' to further US-North Korean relations and achieve great success in neutralizing the North Korean threat by following up and leading on from where Clinton had left off.²⁵⁹

The Bush Administration had failed to learn from the lessons of the first nuclear crisis in 1993.²⁶⁰ The Administration had ignored the number of concessions made by North Korea in the period leading up to the second crisis in 2003. North Korea had taken steps toward domestic reform, increased cooperation with Russia and sought to normalize relations with Japan. Family exchanges along with business contacts and cultural programs began between North and South Korea that illustrated progress in inter-Korean relations.²⁶¹ The Bush Administration however failed to enhance and continue this progress by advancing the framework of engagement set up by the Clinton Administration. This policy reversal by the Bush Administration therefore saw North Korea revert back to a previous threatening posture as it reverted back to policies of brinkmanship.

The Bush Administration failed in addition to learn from the lessons of all previous crises that resulted mainly based on North Korean insecurities and fears of a confrontation with the US. The US, to North Korea, represents a long and unbroken nuclear hegemony in East Asia where the US remains the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons in a conflict situation, and in very close proximity to North Korea.²⁶² During the Korean War, the US proposed the possibility of employing nuclear weapons against North Korea.²⁶³ Following from the Korean War, the US introduced ground-based nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1953, which directly violated the armistice agreement which prevented any such weapons acquisition by any party.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, the US and South Korea have held yearly joint exercises of 'Team Spirit' that clearly represented offensive military strategies.²⁶⁵ For these reasons therefore, it is clear to see the root of North Korean insecurities based on their fear of a US confrontation that leads North Korea to continually call for US security assurances.

²⁵⁹ Harnisch, S., "U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 867.

²⁶⁰ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 728.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 725.

²⁶³ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 20.

²⁶⁴ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 725.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 726.

The Bush Administrations hard-line aggressive policy of hawk engagement therefore certainly did little to lessen these insecurities. It therefore came as no surprise that North Korea responded by reverting back to a threatening posture in pursuing their nuclear deterrent against the US.²⁶⁶ When North Korea admitted for instance, to the secret uranium project, this was a clear strategy of brinkmanship in which North Korea sought to improve its bargaining position in achieving a negotiated settlement with this more aggressive Administration.²⁶⁷ This threatening policy of brinkmanship represents North Korean efforts to bring the US Administration back to the bargaining table, as was done in 1993.²⁶⁸ This behavior by North Korea furthermore, is consistent with the North Korean desire for security assurances, “A security guarantee is what they want. It is the absolute conviction that they are under threat”.²⁶⁹ By adopting a hostile aggressive policy that made the possibility of a US nuclear strike on North Korea probable, President Bush simply maintained and fueled these North Korean insecurities. For North Korea then, no option was left but to revert back to policies of brinkmanship in which their nuclear program acted as the best deterrent to this threat. From 2003 therefore, North Korea strongly emphasized its ‘military-first ideology’. In response to a more aggressive US policy therefore, North Korea abandoned previous assurances made under the Agreed Framework and reverted back to nuclear developments as a need for a ‘powerful deterrent force’.²⁷⁰

Instead of taking note of and recognizing the dynamics of North Korea’s previous negotiating behavior in which North Korea’s threatening posture was simply a strategy to achieve negotiation and allow for a normalization of relations, the US repeated the same mistake that led to the 1993 crisis.²⁷¹ The Bush Administration believed that by demonizing North Korea as an ‘evil rogue state’, it could force North Korea into concessions.²⁷² This Administration therefore adopted a firm policy stressing that “America and the world would not be blackmailed,” the results therefore of this firm, inflexible and uncompromising policy were unsurprising.²⁷³ North Korea became more threatening concluding that the only reliable way to prevent confrontation with the US, and deterring the US from objectives of regime

²⁶⁶ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 20.

²⁶⁷ Harnisch, S., “U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From “Slow Go” to “No Go,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 877.

²⁶⁸ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 18.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁷¹ Bleiker, R. “A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis,” in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 730.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 730.

change in Pyongyang, would be to have and project a nuclear deterrent.²⁷⁴ Engagement and policies of diplomatic negotiation with North Korea was considered by the Bush Administration as mere policies of appeasement. Appeasement can be seen as a more passive approach of pacification, whereby the US would pacify the North Koreans through talk and negotiation, rather than adopt a stronger policy of confrontation.²⁷⁵ The Bush Administration opted therefore, for a more hard-line policy of hawk engagement that was considered more reasonable in attaining the desired objective of regime change in Pyongyang.²⁷⁶ It was this belief essentially that hampered the Bush Administration from taking into account the dynamics of North Korean negotiating behavior. The more hard-line policy of hawk engagement is derived from the traditional power approach. According to this approach, the more economically and militarily powerful state can wield control over and influence the weaker state into compliance. Adopting an approach based on power asymmetries, the traditional power approach explains how any non-compliance by the weaker state will be met with sanctions by the powerful state. In the case of North Korea however, the study has provided with evidence and various examples that illustrate what is referred to as a 'paradoxical phenomenon' of the 'power of the weak'. North Korea, in line with the importance of the Juche ideology aimed to preserve and uphold state sovereignty, discussed in chapter one, maintains its nuclear program as a defensive power against the US offensive policy that threatens North Korean sovereignty. In this way then, the traditional power approach cannot account for a situation in which the weaker power adopts a nuclear program as a defensive strategy to counter the influence of the stronger US offensive power and thereby attain a certain influence over this stronger power. If the US threatens sanctions against North Korean non-compliance, North Korea will not submit but will instead revert to an even greater threatening strategy to ensure a stronger defence.

North Korea therefore has a stronger motivational power as the stakes for North Korea are higher in having to ensure regime and state survival.²⁷⁷ It is this motivational power then that allows for North Korea to hold on to and enhance its nuclear program that acts as its defensive power. As such, North Korea is not pressurized or influenced by an aggressive US policy. North Korea will not yield then, as is proposed by the traditional power approach, to US influence, power or pressure.²⁷⁸ A hard-line policy

²⁷⁴ Carpenter, T., "Bush's North Korea Gambit," Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3283, October 24, 2003.

²⁷⁵ House, K. "The Lesson of North Korea," Wall Street Journal, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002857>, January 3, 2003.

²⁷⁶ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 541.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 541-544.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 555.

would in essence then only fuel and increase the need for a greater North Korean defensive power. Adopting a hard-line policy therefore, with the sole purpose of achieving regime change in Pyongyang proved implausible and questionable then in light of these dynamics in North Korean behavior that existed well before the Bush Administration, which it is clear then that the administration either failed to take note of or simply chose to ignore. Hawk engagement, which pursued both engagement and military action, was clearly spelt out in the Armitage Report stating that “One cannot expect North Korea to take US diplomacy seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United States is prepared to bolster its...military posture.”²⁷⁹ Various criticisms therefore rightly questioned how the Bush Administration expected to pursue engagement while preparing for war at the same time, the very cause of North Korean insecurity that simply maintained a defensive North Korean posture.²⁸⁰ The Bush Administration refused to adopt a policy of engagement alone that it believed would remain vulnerable to North Korean brinkmanship.²⁸¹ The Bush Administration failed then to recognize the empirical pattern in North Korean behavior.²⁸² If lessons were learnt from the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration would have recognized that when the US adopted an aggressive policy to pressure North Korea into concessions, North Korea responded with more hostility. By contrast, when the US adopted a more cooperative attitude that facilitated a move toward normalized relations, North Korea responded with concessions.²⁸³ The 1993 crisis clearly stood as an example of this for the Bush Administration whereby tension had decreased only when the US adopted a ‘give-and-take’ diplomatic strategy that provided North Korea with incentives for giving up the nuclear option by lessening North Korean insecurities.²⁸⁴ The Bush Administration however continued to follow a hard-line policy of hawk engagement that simply fueled tensions further leading to another crisis in 2006 and an escalation in the North Korean nuclear threat that at the end of its term, the Bush Administration failed to neutralize.

Following from the 2003 crisis, the Bush Administration continued with its inflexible and uncompromising hard-line policy. The Administration continued to set conditions for negotiation calling for a settlement to issues in a multilateral setting, even though North Korea, and regional partners

²⁷⁹ Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 86.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 85.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 86.

²⁸² Bleiker, R. “A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis,” in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 723.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 723.

themselves, called for bilateral talks between the US and North Korea.²⁸⁵ In addition, the Administration refused still to provide North Korea with incentives, despite the progress incentives had brought under the Clinton Administration.²⁸⁶ For the Bush Administration, there was a strict refusal to 'reward bad behavior'.²⁸⁷ In keeping with these themes, the US proposed a new denuclearization agreement with North Korea at the six party negotiations.²⁸⁸ These talks would facilitate a multilateral setting for negotiations, sought by the US, to include the participation of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia and North Korea. From the outset however, the six party talks represented a setting in which the US simply reinforced their uncompromising and inflexible policy. From the very first meeting, the Bush Administration adopted an antagonistic attitude by demanding that North Korea first admit to the existence of the alleged uranium enrichment program. Beginning in such a manner would clearly not facilitate an environment that would lessen the tension and hostility and furthermore, the Bush Administrations precondition hampered the potential for effective and constructive negotiation and cooperation from taking place.²⁸⁹

By pursuing multilateral talks, the US had given the idea that it sought to address the North Korean situation diplomatically, it soon became clear however that this 'diplomacy' simply entailed making unilateral demands on North Korea that ultimately disrupted and hampered any effective negotiation and progress.²⁹⁰ For example, in the very first multilateral six party talks, the US had agreed to provide North Korea with renewed energy aid, humanitarian assistance and a security assurance not to attack, *only if* North Korea completely dismantled its nuclear program and agreed in addition to international inspections. This US demand became known as the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the entire North Korean nuclear program.²⁹¹ The Bush Administration therefore, did not provide incentives first, to establish a more co-operative environment to lessen North Korean insecurity as was done by the Clinton Administration in 1993. As such, the Bush Administration had not raised the stakes for North Korea within these multilateral talks by being able to, at a later stage, remove incentives unless North Korea comply.

²⁸⁵ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 22.

²⁸⁶ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 22.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Harrison, S., "Did North Korea Cheat?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No. 1, January-February 2005, p. 100.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 28.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

As discussed previously, the Bush Administration could have in this way, transformed the ‘carrots’ into ‘sticks’ to ensure North Korean compliance. The Bush Administration however, refused to provide any incentives and as such had no ‘ammunition’ to use against North Korea at a later stage. It is not surprising therefore that North Korea maintained its threatening posture, calling for the US to give up its hostile policy and provide a security assurance after which North Korea would then agree to verification.²⁹² This is yet another example of North Korea’s bargaining tactic of North Korean brinkmanship seeking an assurance and incentives for giving up its nuclear option. The Bush Administration should have been aware of these dynamics and responded in a manner therefore that would provide some incentive to allow for North Korea to compromise in turn. The failure of the Bush Administration policy then in achieving this outcome is clearly represented in North Korea’s refusal to participate in the 2004 multilateral six party talks based on what they considered a hostile policy of the US that continues to demand for CVID.²⁹³ Further evidence of a hostile US approach was seen in the adoption of the 2004 Human Rights Act.²⁹⁴ This act essentially banned economic aid to North Korea unless progress was made on human rights; once again therefore, the US placed conditions on incentives and went further by intervening in what North Korea considers a sensitive sovereign issue.²⁹⁵ The Act further antagonized North Korea by providing US\$ 4 million for radio broadcasts into North Korea promoting democracy and a further US\$20 million to groups and programs fostering human rights.²⁹⁶ This Act therefore clearly exposed the US intentions against the communist regime and further exposed in addition the US desire for regime change in Pyongyang.

North Korea continued however to show its willingness to cooperate if the US provided with a security guarantee and therefore still represented the same policy of brinkmanship from the 1990’s.²⁹⁷ The difference now however, was that the stakes for North Korea were higher that led the North Koreans to actually claim the existence of nuclear weapons.²⁹⁸ At this point however, the absence of any nuclear testing resulted in uncertainty and ambiguity. Events in 2006 however, brought the situation once again to a crisis point.

²⁹² Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 28.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

²⁹⁴ Matray, J.I. “Why the Bush Policy is Failing in North Korea”, History News Network, <http://hnn.us/articles/10400.htm>.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Armstrong, K.C. “U.S.-North Korea Relations” in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 35.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

With the re-election of the Bush Administration came the continuation of the hard-line US policy. In President Bush's inaugural speech, focus was given to his new objective of ending tyranny which Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice took further in including North Korea in a list of 'six outposts of tyranny'.²⁹⁹ In addition, US officials provided 'evidence' that alleged North Korean processed uranium sales to Libya. All these actions therefore clearly represent a continuation of an aggressive and hostile policy of the U to North Korea that only went on to escalate tension and instability. It was therefore not surprising that North Koreans responded by declaring a statement that North Korea had "manufactured nukes for self defence to cope with the Bush Administrations undisguised policy to isolate and stifle (North Korea)."³⁰⁰ This led many commentators to state that the policy choice of the Bush Administration therefore, only strengthened and allowed North Korea to expand its nuclear capabilities.³⁰¹ With a lack of cooperation between North Korea and the US and further strained relations, tensions finally mounted to another nuclear crisis when North Korea conducted a missile and test explosion of a nuclear device.³⁰² The six party talks then resumed in 2007, after a stalemate in negotiation between North Korea and the US, whereby Resolution 1718 was adopted to condemn any nuclear or atomic testing by North Korea.³⁰³ Furthermore, the 2007 six party talks saw the adoption of the 'Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement' calling for North Korea to abandon all nuclear developments.³⁰⁴ In keeping with the agreements, North Korea permitted inspections by the IAEA and went on to shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under IAEA supervision. Bush went on in 2008 to remove North Korea from the US list of State sponsors of terrorism.³⁰⁵

Progress however came to a halt when the US expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement had not adequately addressed issues of North Korea's past procurement efforts and its suspected proliferation activities with other 'rogue' states.³⁰⁶ North Korea on the other hand expressed dissatisfaction with the slow rate at which it was receiving aid. Throughout the six party talks furthermore, the US continued to

²⁹⁹ Matray, J.I. "Why the Bush Policy is Failing in North Korea", History News Network, <http://hnn.us/articles/10400.htm>.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² Kim, I. "The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy," http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html, February 2009.

³⁰³ Anonymous, "Solidarity on Sanctions?" in *Business Asia*, Vol. 38, Iss. 20, <http://0-proquest.umi.com.innopac.wits.ac.za/pqdweb?index=8&did=1162624221&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=P ROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1255872637&clientId=58117>, October 2006.

³⁰⁴ Kim, I. "The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy," http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html, February 2009.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

call for CVID while North Korea pushed for ‘freeze for compensation’.³⁰⁷ This inflexibility of both parties, where the US was unwilling to fully accept proposal by all other parties to provide aid to north Korea in the initial ‘freeze’ phase of nuclear dismantlement.³⁰⁸ This ultimately prevented any breakthroughs from being achieved.³⁰⁹ By the end of 2008, the six party talks reached a deadlock over issues regarding the verification of North Korea’s nuclear activities.³¹⁰ These multilateral talks therefore failed to address the North Korean nuclear situation as both the US and North Korea maintained opposing views. Animosity between the US and North Korea increased, seen by Bush calling Kim Jong-Il a ‘tyrant’ during his presidential campaign and North Korea responding by calling Bush a ‘political idiot’.³¹¹ These were clear signs then of a strained US-North Korean relation based on animosity and hostility that would allow for anything but genuine engagement.

In the end, genuine negotiation and cooperation was hampered by the Bush Administrations unrelenting emphasis to address issues of verification, instead of using the multilateral talks as a framework for genuine engagement to lessen the tension in US-North Korean relations and create an environment to facilitate progress. The Bush Administration therefore failed again to grasp the six party talks, which resulted from the 2003 crisis, as an opportunity to engage with the North Koreans. As such, the Bush Administration failed to negotiate and cooperate with all parties to ensure the neutralization of the North Korean nuclear situation. In failing again to adopt a more conciliatory policy to facilitate genuine engagement the Bush Administration only went on to give North Korea more time in the stalled negotiation process to strengthen its nuclear deterrent.³¹² The 2006 stalemate at the six party talks, following North Korea’s missile and nuclear detonation tests was said to represent a clear sign of a failing Bush policy.³¹³ The Bush Administration, once again, constrained with bureaucratic squabbling, failed to build a cohesive multilateral coalition in support for its efforts and in addition failed to genuinely engage with Pyongyang in a series of negotiation based on its unwillingness to adopt a more flexible

³⁰⁷ Kyung-Ae Park, “North Korea in 2004: From brisk Diplomacy to Impasse” in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 18.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Kim, I. “The Six-Party Talks and President Obama’s North Korea Policy,” http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obama_north_korea.html, February 2009.

³¹¹ Kyung-Ae Park, “North Korea in 2004: From brisk Diplomacy to Impasse” in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2005, pp. 18-19.

³¹² *Ibid.*

³¹³ Wit, J., “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 53.

approach.³¹⁴ The Bush Administration needed to adopt a policy of enhanced engagement to articulate a positive vision for the Korean peninsula that would lessen North Korean insecurity and build a common ground with Pyongyang.³¹⁵

3.2 Recommendations on Policy Objectives that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration.

The study has thus far illustrated the ways in which the hard-line policy of hawk engagement adopted and maintained by the Bush Administration has only compounded an already tense, hostile and unstable nuclear situation with North Korea. A discussion will now be given surrounding the need for a policy of engagement, away from any form of confrontation, as the best means for resolving this situation and allowing for engagement to shape an active process of reconciliation.³¹⁶ This is a policy objective that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration and demands important consideration by the Obama Administration. Genuine engagement provides a better option away from inflexible and uncompromising policies that simply fuel tensions leading to greater a possibility and potential for military conflict over North Korea or an arms race in East Asia.³¹⁷

Engagement should always remain the most viable policy option for the US when dealing with North Korea since the traditional power approach, as discussed previously does not apply to the North Korean situation. Since the US cannot use its military power in a coercive way to get North Korea to submit as this only escalated North Korean nuclear defensive developments, engagement would prove more effective.³¹⁸ In this way, an engaged North Korea would be more conducive to stability than a desperate North Korea whose only security option lies in nuclear developments against a hostile coercive US policy.³¹⁹ In looking to the example of the Agreed Framework, then US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, acknowledged that North Korea was abiding by all agreements. It was the US that had fallen behind on its promise of oil shipments and the construction of the LWRs. Based on this, the North Koreans had test fired missiles in 1998 as a reflection of their dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in bilateral negotiation. In addition to negotiation therefore, it is imperative for the US to abide by all

³¹⁴ Wit, J., "Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 53.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 16.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 551.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

promises made which will then build confidence in bilateral negotiation and thereby strengthen engagement to allow for greater progress.³²⁰

Engagement and the provision of incentives furthermore, as proposed under the prospect theory, would prevent the crystallization of conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a threatening posture as its only course of action.³²¹ On this point, it is important to draw vital insight from the preemptive/preventive rationale. Hostile coercive bargaining by North Korea reflects the preemptive/preventive logic. The dynamics of North Korean coercive bargaining represents disruptive acts and unruly behavior by North Korea that are not serious enough to start a war but are dangerous enough to attract attention and result in crisis. Policies of engagement therefore stand to facilitate an environment of engagement and cooperation by providing with incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in these negotiations as it now has something to either gain or lose. As such, incentives can be turned into ‘ammunition’ or ‘sticks’ to be used against North Korea if North Korea disrupts negotiations with any unruly behavior and the chances therefore of North Korea maintaining coercive bargaining in thus greatly lessened.³²² Non-communication, threats and intimidation in contrast, pursued by the US under hard-line policies of hawk engagement, stand only to exacerbate preemptive/preventive situations in which North Korea is most likely to adopt coercive bargaining and aggression based on their vulnerability and insecurity. This situation only pushes North Korea further into the domain of losses, explaining North Korea’s adoption then of nuclear developments as a defensive deterrent to prevent this loss, mainly a loss of sovereignty. The 1998 hostile North Korean acts for instance were met with the Perry recommendations calling for more engagement with North Korea that in addition, sought to provide North Korea with financial aid, humanitarian assistance and political normalization.³²³ The Clinton Administration had therefore taken North Korea out of a situation of loss and placed North Korea instead within the Agreed Framework where it now had a stake in the status quo. This resulted in North Korea refraining from further hostile acts until 2003, when the Bush Administration had switched to adopt a more aggressive hard-line policy that caused North Korea to revert back to coercive bargaining strategies of brinkmanship. The dynamics therefore of engagement to prevent preemptive/preventive actions by North Korea are clear. This logic

³²⁰ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea’s Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 551.

³²¹ Cha, V.D., “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 44.

³²² Ibid., pp. 68-70.

³²³ Ibid., p. 69.

of preemption, prevention and engagement stems from the rational deterrence theory.³²⁴ Engagement, as represented by the policy followed by the Clinton Administration that led to the adoption of the Agreed Framework, carried fewer costs. The Bush Administration however, suffered the costs of North Korean brinkmanship by opting instead for a hard-line policy that of coercion and isolation. The Bush Administration therefore faced a greater North Korean defensive power as it chose to pursue a more offensive policy.³²⁵

The policy of engagement and the provision of incentives furthermore, lays the groundwork for a coalition of punishment at a later stage if North Korea defects.³²⁶ The Bush Administration was never able to achieve a regional consensus to impose sanctions on North Korea. This was based mainly on the basis that the Bush Administration had immediately pursued a coercive strategy against North Korea as regional partners felt the US as proceeding prematurely to a coercive policy. The Bush Administration should have instead, first sought a policy of continued engagement with North Korea, which the regional partners favored, and in this way build a coalition of support for coercive action once non-confrontational methods have been exhausted.³²⁷ Only if non-confrontational methods have been exhausted, should the US turn to aggressive and coercive policies. Engagement creates a process of notifying North Korea that it could be facing its last chance for cooperation and in this way allows for a coalition to be built for punishment should North Korea defect.³²⁸ The Bush Administration therefore wrongly judged the Agreed Framework as an 'open-ended appeasement' policy that rewarded bad behavior. The administration should have instead paid greater importance to the reasoning of former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage that "diplomacy strengthens the ability to build and sustain a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate..."³²⁹ The Bush Administration however, chose immediately to use incentives as sticks without having given North Korea a stake in the status quo. By pursuing a policy of engagement therefore, that provides various incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; the US is able to tactically build a coalition of punishment

³²⁴ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 70.

³²⁵ Kyung-Ae, P., North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, p. 542.

³²⁶ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 71.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 71.

³²⁹ Ibid., pp. 71-72.

should North Korea defect. Engagement therefore, in this manner, facilitates a policy that will ensure progress and at the same time, maintains a security net to respond to North Korean defiance.³³⁰

This policy of engagement that suggests the provision of incentives in order to raise the stakes for North Korea thereby being able to influence and control North Korean behavior is line with the prospect theory. North Korea's threat perception of the US was considerably high given the aggressive and hard-line policy of hawk engagement pursued by the Bush Administration.³³¹ This threat perception resulted in an increase in North Korean insecurities and fears regarding the threat of the US against North Korean regime and state survival.³³² For this reason, the adoption of an aggressive policy that imposes sanctions or adopts any such confrontational approach should be abandoned as it stands only to escalate the possibility of a preemptive strike by North Korea or the continuation of North Korea's nuclear deterrent and coercive bargaining.³³³ According to this theory, any actor that perceives themselves to be in the domain of loss tends to be risk prone, as is clearly the case with North Korea who always turned to threatening and risky policies of brinkmanship.³³⁴ On the other hand, the actor that perceives themselves to be in the area of gain, as North Korea found themselves to be in upon the adoption of the Agreed Framework, tends to be reluctant of any risk. Applying this theory to North Korea therefore, preemptive or preventive strike will always be an option for North Korea, which aims to avoid the certainty of loss, given an uncompromising and inflexible US policy.³³⁵ If faced however, with a more cooperative US that encourages and upholds genuine engagement that places North Korea in the domain of gain by offering concrete incentives, North Korea would not risk any gain by continuing with coercive strategies of brinkmanship.³³⁶

3.3 Idealism and the Bush Administration

The strongest argument by the US against engagement is based on the Bush Administration's ideational tendencies.³³⁷ The study will now proceed with a discussion on the reasons why the Bush Administration

³³⁰ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 78.

³³¹ Bruet, G. "Prospect Theory and Rogue Regimes," http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/S97PS472_Papers/GUIBERT_DE_BRUET.CHRISTOPHE.ROGUE_REGIMES.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Suh, J., "Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies/Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to deal with a Nuclear North Korea," in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 63, Iss. 4, November 2004.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 70.

chose to follow a hard-line policy of hawk engagement that did not neutralize, but in many instances only fueled the North Korean nuclear threat. As discussed previously, the Bush Administration viewed policies of engagement as appeasement that would not be sufficient in dealing with a 'rogue' nation. The Administration felt that engagement with North Korea would send the wrong message to other rogue nations resulting in a view by these nations of a weak US. Seeking accommodation therefore, in terms of adopting policies of engagement, was considered morally unacceptable. The main criticism against this view states that nations like North Korea should not be viewed as moral deviants that need to be reprimanded, but rather as problems that need to be solved.³³⁸ This is essentially the main weak point of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration chose to follow a policy based on idealism whereby it had followed the Cold War ideological schism of separating free and democratic states from evil rogue nations.³³⁹ The Bush Administration viewed North Korea as a rogue state that disregards human rights, aspiring to possess weapons of mass destruction and therefore remains outside the sphere of 'good,' needing to be controlled and contained.³⁴⁰ There are countless examples to represent these US views of North Korea, for instance, Vice President, Dick Cheney stating "we don't negotiate with evil, we defeat it."³⁴¹

When dealing with North Korea, the Bush Administration made the mistake of applying this familiar policy template of the Cold War to understand the nature of the North Korean threat.³⁴² This was the main weakness then in fitting threats to policies, instead of policies to threats.³⁴³ This was dangerous in addition, as a policy that brought peace in one era could result in conflict in another, and this is exactly what happened in the case of North Korea.³⁴⁴ The Bush Administration had always exposed its views of North Korea as a rogue state that it refused to bargain with, and the US tendency to demonize rogue states only intensified following the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001.³⁴⁵ The result was an increase in hostility and tension in US-North Korean relations that often resulted in crisis. The Bush Administration therefore, in dealing with North Korea, had always exposed the tendency to abide by

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 71.

³³⁹ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 731.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Wit, J., "Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 56.

³⁴² Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 78.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁴⁵ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 731.

moral and ideological convictions in dividing the world between ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ reaffirmed in the word of President Bush making it clear that, “you are either with us or against us.”³⁴⁶

In his Presidential campaign in 1999, Bush stated that US foreign policy “required tough realism in our dealings with China and Russia. It requires firmness with regimes like North Korea and Iraq, regimes that hate our values...”³⁴⁷ This is an example of Bush proposing a policy based on realism seen again in his first major foreign policy speech stating that, “a President must be a clear-eyed realist.”³⁴⁸ In practice however, the Bush Administration followed anything but a policy based on realism.³⁴⁹ In order to illustrate the divergent policy ideals of the Bush Administration from that of realism, it is important to begin with an outline on the key aspects of realism. In the realist school, the world is made up of sovereign states where military power holds great importance.³⁵⁰ Realists furthermore view material strength, and not ideological views, as a key component in a world where the main threat to a nations sovereignty is seen in the military strength of other nations. For realists, placing hope in international institutions and the spreading of democracy amounts in the end to ‘fruitless dreaming,’ morality and ideological predispositions therefore have no meaningful role to play in state policy.³⁵¹ The Bush Administrations foreign policy however diverges from these realist aspects in many ways.

The most glaring example can be seen in the actions taken by the US when dealing with Iraq. The US invasion and occupation was explained by the Bush Administration as a mission to create a democratic government.³⁵² This clearly exposed the US objective to spread the ideal of democracy as President Bush adopted an almost ‘missionary sense of America’s role’. These ideational tendencies and the obvious moral streak runs counter the principles of realism.³⁵³ As discussed previously, in the case of North Korea, the Bush Administration had adopted the Human Rights Act to essentially promote democratic freedoms. Abiding by policies of hawk engagement, the objective is to provide aid that can then act as an investment by spurring the North Korean people to fight against the regime.³⁵⁴ This is clearly evident in the statement by Bush that “We (US) want them to have food. And at the same time, we want them to

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 732.

³⁴⁷ Shrader, N., “From Realism to Liberalism: George W. Bush’s Rhetorical Foreign Policy Transition, 1999-2004,” in *Commonwealth: A Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 28-30.

³⁴⁸ Mazarr, M.J., “George W. Bush, Idealist” in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, May 2003, p. 503.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 504.

³⁵¹ Mazarr, M.J., “George W. Bush, Idealist” in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, May 2003, p. 504.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 506.

³⁵³ Mazarr, M.J., “George W. Bush, Idealist” in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, May 2003, p. 506.

³⁵⁴ Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 84.

have freedom.”³⁵⁵ This again illustrates a US foreign policy based on idealism and moral convictions of spreading democracy as a tool when dealing with ‘rogue nations’.³⁵⁶ The Bush Administration has always referred to the strength of US values as ideals as important components of the country’s strength, diverting from the realist notions of a country’s strength solely determined by military power and capability. In relying on the values and strength of the US ideals, the Bush Administration adopted the view that a change in ideology can radically change the nature of the threat. This however was not achieved in the case of North Korea. The more the Bush Administration isolated North Korea as an evil rogue state as part of an outpost of tyranny as stated by Condoleezza Rice in 2005, the more North Korea responded with greater hostility. Moreover, the US adopted the tendency to group democratic, like-minded nations as part of the periphery while undemocratic, or ‘un-free’ nations made up the core. According to Bush, like-minded democratic nations share common interest that prevents the possibility of conflict, and therefore there is a need to spread democracy to ensure peace among nations.³⁵⁷ This however has little to do with realism where sovereign states do not share common interests or work together to promote peace and stability.

This policy, based on idealism furthermore, represented the tendency of Bush to measure counterparts by a moral standard which once again prevented the US from adopting an approach that would effectively deal with the North Korean situation without exacerbating tensions further.³⁵⁸ In an interview for instance, Bush reacted by stating, “I loathe Kim Jong-Il! Maybe it’s my religion, maybe it’s my-but I feel passionate about this.”³⁵⁹ These moral, passionate views which guide US policy ideals further separate the US policy from realism and go on to exacerbate tensions that are only compounded by an aggressive US policy that creates a divide between democratic and undemocratic nations. This strategy is therefore counterproductive as it did not allow for the US to adopt a policy of genuine engagement as the US strictly abided by views that “we (US) don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it.”³⁶⁰ The Bush Administration, in light of these views, has on countless occasions expressed distaste for engaging North Korea diplomatically and this continues to express the Administration’s deep conviction that North Korea is a rogue state that cannot be ‘rewarded for bad behavior’ and is thus not seen as a

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

³⁵⁶ Mazarr, M.J., “George W. Bush, Idealist” in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, May 2003, p. 511.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ Wit, J., “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 56.

sovereign equal.³⁶¹ Once again, this prevented the Administration from engaging with North Korea effectively as the gap between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ remained where the Administration refused to adjust its uncompromising and inflexible policy in dealing with what it considered a rogue nation. Delivering his second inaugural address, Bush stated that it is “the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”³⁶² While North Korea was not mentioned by name, the mention of tyranny was a tactic reference to North Korea following Rice’s previous statement.³⁶³ As expected this went on to increase North Korean insecurities and anxieties that increased the gap between the US and North Korea, strained progress of the multilateral six party talks straining all potential therefore for genuine engagement and progress. Many observers thus responded by stating that Bush had “declared a holy war of liberty.”³⁶⁴

In closing, the views of Bruce Klingner³⁶⁵ provide an essential and clear summary regarding the Bush Administrations North Korean policy. According to Mr. Klingner, the Bush Administration chose to follow two very different approaches, switching from one ineffective extreme to another.³⁶⁶ During the first six years, the Administration chose to follow an all sticks approach by adopting a more aggressive and often hostile policy that simply went on to fuel North Korean fears and insecurities. North Korea viewed the aggressive and hostile policy pursued by Bush as a strong US offensive aimed to achieve regime change. This stood therefore as a major threat to North Korean sovereignty, the most vital element of North Korean policies guided by the Juche ideology. For North Korea then, the only option was to develop a stronger defensive against this threat to ensure regime and state survival. Following the 2006, and 2009 North Korean missile and rocket launches, this cycle became even clearer. North Korea continued to respond aggressively to a hostile US policy as followed by the Bush Administration that chose to maintain a hard-line policy of hawk engagement. The Bush Administration chose not to maintain and further the policies of engagement of the Clinton Administration that established notable progress and laid a platform for further progress and improvement, and as such, only aggravated what seemed to be moving toward, an improved North Korean situation. According to Mr. Klingner, the Bush Administration

³⁶¹ Huntley, W.L., “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 463.

³⁶² Kim, H. “The United States and the Two Koreas: One Hundred Days after President Bush’s Re-election (November 2004-February 2005),” in Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1, Spring 2007, p. 66.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁶⁵ See Appendix B.

³⁶⁶ Internet Interview with Bruce Klingner, 8 May 2009.

should have followed a more integrated approach instead.³⁶⁷ This integrated approach in Mr. Klingners view, would require the use of all instruments of national power that would allow for a more coordinated strategy in which the Administration would have been able to continue negotiations with North Korea through diplomatic resolution while simultaneously using outside pressure to influence North Korea's negotiating behavior. As was suggested throughout this chapter, the Bush Administration should have used the 'carrots' provided by the Clinton Administration to allow for a policy of engagement and be able then to turn these 'carrots' into 'sticks' to be used against North Korea if North Korea defects. In Mr. Klingners view, this would prove effective as the US would be combining diplomatic and economic instruments in dealing with North Korea.

³⁶⁷ Internet Interview with Bruce Klingner, 8 May 2009.

CHAPTER FOUR:
FUTURE PROSPECTS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND
THE ROAD AHEAD



<http://blog.taragana.com/n/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests.jpg>.

Chapter Four

4. Future Prospects: The Obama Administration and the Road Ahead

“North Korea has a choice: It can continue down the path of confrontation and provocation that has led to less security, less prosperity, and more isolation from the global community...or it can choose to become a full member of the international community, which will give a better life to its people by living up to international obligations and foregoing nuclear weapons.” (President Barack Obama, November 2009)³⁶⁸

The study will now proceed with a discussion on the future prospects of US-North Korean relations by analyzing the current Administrations North Korean policy. Although it may be early to analyse the current Administrations North Korean policy, it is important to take note of the Administrations response to North Koreas recent nuclear tests and provocative behavior to determine the current weak points of the Administrations strategy; and to suggest therefore important recommendations for an improved US North Korean policy away from the failed Bush Administration policy.

This chapter will begin with an outline of North Korean actions at the end of the Bush Administration term. This outline will provide with a discussion on the traditional strategy of brinkmanship used by North Korea and in addition will provide with a new outlook on the dynamics of North Korean provocative behavior. This outline will then allow for an analysis on the policy response of the Obama Administration; providing an argument that sees certain similarities to the policy response and choice of the Bush Administration; and arguments on the other hand that see certain positive policy departures from the Bush Administration. The chapter will furthermore, in light of the new outlook on the dynamics of North Korea’s provocative behavior, away from the traditional strategies of brinkmanship, suggest various recommendations that are needed if the new Administration is to succeed neutralizing the North Korean threat.

4.1 North Korean nuclear developments and actions at the end of the Bush Administration term: A traditional strategy of brinkmanship vs. post-test analyses arguments (April, May, July 2009).

³⁶⁸ “President Obama Offers Tough Talk on North Korea, Iran,” US Fed Service, <http://0-proquest.umi.com.innopac.wits.ac.za/pqdlink?index=0&did=1903214211&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1259577202&clientId=58117>, 18 November 2009.

On April 5, 2009, just months after the election of President Obama, North Korea fired a missile directly over Japan in direct contravention of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718.³⁶⁹ This Resolution forbids any nuclear or ballistic missile testing and development by North Korea. North Korean provocative acts continued just a month later when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test since October 2006.³⁷⁰ Very similar to previous North Korea actions in 2003 and 2006, North Korea expelled monitors of the IAEA and walked out from six party talks following international condemnation of the April test-firings. These provocative acts carry with them serious implications. Not only do they represent the failure of the Bush Administration in having neutralized these hostile and aggressive nuclear threats, but in addition, they represent North Korea's continuing progress and advancement in nuclear developments. The May 2009 nuclear test verified that North Korea had successfully manufactured a nuclear device and in addition, the notable success of the launching of the Taepodong-2 missile in contrast to the failed 2006 launch, represents significant progress in North Korean missile capability.³⁷¹ The successful launches of scud and No-dong missiles in July 2009 furthermore, represent progressing North Korean capabilities of attacking South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles.³⁷² The North Korean nuclear threat then is clearly growing and thus demands serious attention if greater provocative acts by North Korea are to be prevented.

There are many arguments that see these provocative acts as the traditional North Korean strategy of brinkmanship whereby North Korea adopts a threatening posture and engages in provocative acts to get the attention of the US to engage with North Korea and gain concessions. Just as North Korea had done on many occasions before, North Korea engages in provocative acts as it takes the necessary steps to prepare for talks with the US, hence, North Korea is playing the same game it played before with both the Clinton and Bush Administration.³⁷³ North Korean provocative and aggressive acts in April and May 2009 suggest that North Korea has taken note of President Obama's willingness for engagement and has thus used these acts in maintaining strategies of brinkmanship to strengthen its bargaining position. These acts were not surprising given North Korean threats to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 just after Clinton was inaugurated, or the North Korean launch of the Taepodong-1 in 1998 when Kim Dae-jung had just become President of South Korea and initiated his 'sunshine policy' of engagement with North

³⁶⁹ Powell, B. "Why the US Should Talk to North Korea", <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1891390,00.html>.

³⁷⁰ "North Korea conducts nuclear test," BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8066615.stm>, 25 May 2009.

³⁷¹ Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 146.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

Korea. North Korean provocative acts in April and May 2009 therefore represent a repetition of North Korean brinkmanship diplomacy of which Obama has become the latest target. This argument that discusses the North Korean policy of brinkmanship, explains this as a strategy resulting from North Korean insecurity and fears against the US.³⁷⁴

These arguments seem valid given North Korea's continued indication of the threat they perceive from the US and the continued persistence therefore to maintain a military and nuclear deterrent.³⁷⁵ This strategy of brinkmanship, given North Korean insecurities against the US, is evident in North Korea's provocative and threatening actions taken in 1994, 2003 and again in 2006 where North Korea believed this to be the only option available in getting the US to engage in serious dialogue.³⁷⁶ This argument of North Korean brinkmanship as a strategy to engage with the US is used again therefore to explain the reasoning behind North Korean actions in 2009. Prior to the April and May tests North Korea, in January 2009, continued to push for a normalization of diplomatic relations with the US, that it felt should take precedence over denuclearization.³⁷⁷ The new Administration however responded by stating that normalized relations will only be possible with complete and verifiable North Korean denuclearization. The North Koreans however maintained that North Korea's "status as nuclear weapons state will remain unchanged as long as it is exposed to the slightest U.S nuclear threat."³⁷⁸ This would once again reaffirm the argument of North Korean insecurity that drives policies of brinkmanship in adopting a threatening position and engaging in aggressive acts to secure a defensive against the US threat and in addition ensure bilateral engagement with the US to facilitate the normalization of relations.

This point is further evident in a statement by Selig Harrison, Director of the Asian program at the Washington-based Center for International Policy, stating that North Korea's slogan is "denuclearization through normalization, not normalization through denuclearization."³⁷⁹ This argument can then be applied to North Korea's actions in 2009 where it is believed that North Korea maintained the strategy of brinkmanship in order to secure bilateral talks with the US. By launching missiles and conducting nuclear tests, North Korea hoped to put nuclear and missiles issues, its best bargaining chip, on the table for

³⁷⁴ Cha, V.D., "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 125.

³⁷⁵ "North Korea conducts nuclear test," BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8066615.stm>, 25 May 2009.

³⁷⁶ Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 729.

³⁷⁷ Kim, I. "The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy," http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obamga_north_korea.html, February 2009.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁹ Kim, I. "The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy," http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_six_party_obamga_north_korea.html, February 2009.

negotiation, which North Korea believes would strengthen their bargaining position.³⁸⁰ According to North Korean policies of brinkmanship, missile and nuclear developments provide North Korea with greater leverage that enables them to achieve various concessions and incentives, the most important being the normalization of US-North Korean relations. North Korea has persistently sought to attain a new peace mechanism to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement to facilitate a normalization of relations and legally end confrontation with the US. Once again, this points to the insecurity of North Korea of a perceived US threat. In order to secure and ensure talks on this issue then, North Korea will continue with such provocative acts until the US engages with North Korea and adopts a mechanism to facilitate a normalization of relations. This once again does not break with North Korean previous calls in 1993 and 1994 for a peace agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement.³⁸¹

This argument therefore looks to the actions taken by North Korea in 2009 as a traditional North Korean strategy of brinkmanship aimed to bring the US to the bargaining table and achieve the important goal of a normalization of relations with the US given their insecurities. In this way, North Korean nuclear developments and provocative actions are seen as an offensive to the US defensive that North Korea will only submit once it has a new peace agreement with the US. Until that is not achieved then, North Korea will not surrender its best bargaining chip.³⁸²

There is a different argument however, that provides a new outlook regarding the reason for and implication of North Korean provocative and hostile acts that breaks from the explanation around North Korea's traditional policy of brinkmanship given North Korean insecurities and need for bilateral engagement with the US. A discussion on both arguments is essential as an analysis of both arguments regarding North Korean behavior will allow for carefully constructed policy options and recommendations for the Obama Administration when dealing with North Korea.

The latest set of North Korean provocative actions sees North Korea threatening future ballistic missile tests, a retaliation of a 'nuclear war' against any sanctions, a demand for an apology following condemnation against the April testing and a refusal to return to the six party talks.³⁸³ Thus far it has been illustrated how these actions have always been explained as a North Korean tactic of brinkmanship

³⁸⁰ Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 143.

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 144.

³⁸² Reynolds, P. "North Korea a problem for Obama," BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7985336.stm>, 6 April 2009.

³⁸³ Cha, V.D., "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 120.

to get the attention of the US, drawing them into bilateral engagement and negotiation. The North Korean nuclear test in 2006 for instance, was often explained to have been the result of the Bush Administrations reluctance to engage in high-level bilateral talks with the North Koreans. Arguments however now arise against these traditional explanations, explaining instead how these explanations have resulted in an unhelpful dynamic in which the reason and cause for North Korean aggressive and provocative behavior was explained to be a result of US inaction or aggressive postures. As such, the cause and reason for North Korean aggressive behavior was rarely seen or explained by looking to North Korean intentions instead. The advent of the Obama Administration brought this new outlook to light by illustrating that even when the US clearly stated an interest and willingness to engage and negotiate with North Korea, North Korea responded in an aggressive and provocative manner despite the immediate trip of US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to North Korea that further reaffirmed the commitment of the Administration.³⁸⁴

This commitment to engagement continues till date given US plans to send a special US envoy in December to North Korea, again, headed by Stephen Bosworth, for direct talks, despite North Korean provocative acts of further missile testing in October 2009.³⁸⁵ Despite clear US efforts by the new Administration to engage North Korea, these continuing provocative and aggressive acts, it is now argued, can no longer be rationalized as an attempt to engage with the US.³⁸⁶ The clear call for engagement by the Obama Administration had illustrated that arguments can no longer justify North Korean provocative actions to US inaction or lack of commitment to negotiation. Unlike the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration had not entered with an aggressive and hard-line policy, it stated for the outset firm commitment for both unilateral and multilateral negotiation that would result in assistance, diplomatic normalization and the creation of a new Northeast Asian Peace and Security Regime for North Korean denuclearization.³⁸⁷ This is a point that was clearly reaffirm by Obama stating, “the door is open to resolving these issues peacefully, for North Korea to see over time the reduction of sanctions and its increasing integration into the international community...but it will only happen if

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 121.

³⁸⁵ “US experts to visit Pyongyang before envoy: Yonhap,”

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iLjvDfkQqJLVYue8atelg9DgCzw>, November 2009.

³⁸⁶ Cha, V.D., “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 121.

³⁸⁷ Cha, V.D., “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 121.

North Korea is taking serious steps around the nuclear issue.”³⁸⁸ This statement in addition, represents an important break from the Bush Administrations policy of hawk engagement that does not commit time to policy, the Obama Administration on the other hand represents a policy that sees engagement as taking time in which greater interaction would be facilitated, allowing for North Korea to slowly open up to reform.³⁸⁹ North Korean objectives furthermore, for aid, assistance and a normalization of relations were presented as attainable in a peaceful manner of engagement, yet North Korea still chose to defect. This new outlook then questions what the reasoning behind North Korean provocative behavior truly is.

The April missile test of the alleged long-range Taepodong-2 with the potential to strike as far as Hawaii and Alaska was more successful than the July 2006 missile test.³⁹⁰ The July 2009 missile testing illustrated the improved accuracy of the North Korean short and medium range missile capability. Finally, the May 2009 nuclear test indicated the existence of a 3-8 kiloton nuclear weapon. These developments are seen by many, not as a North Korean strategy to seek attention and demonstrate its toughness to draw the US into bilateral talk.³⁹¹ Instead, post-test analyses argue that these tests expose North Korean intentions to build a better nuclear weapon and ballistic missile.³⁹² Many traditional arguments, as stated previously, have argued that North Korea seeks a nuclear program to better its bargaining position, provide a defensive and enforce policies of brinkmanship as there are no better options of aid and assistance, there is a lack of commitment or action by the US to engage with North Korea, and various elements, such as an aggressive US policy, that fuel North Korean insecurities. The argument however ignores the fact that these incentives have been offered to North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework and again in the 2005 six party Joint Statement. According to the post-test analyses of North Korean acts in April, May and July 2009 then, what North Korea really wants is to be accepted as a nuclear state by the US.³⁹³ This argument states that North Korea could be aiming, through more provocative acts, to turn the six party talks, which the Obama Administration has pushed for from the outset, into bilateral US-North Korean nuclear arms negotiations. It is suggested that North Korea would

³⁸⁸ “US experts to visit Pyongyang before envoy: Yonhap,”

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iLjvDfkgQqJLVYue8atelg9DgCzw>, November 2009.

³⁸⁹ Cha, V.D., “Korea’s Place in the Axis” in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 3, May-Jun 2003, p. 89.

³⁹⁰ Cha, V.D., “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 122.

³⁹¹ Kirk, D. “Clinton says North Korea missile tests won’t affect talks,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1012/p06s01-woap.html>, 12 October 2009.

³⁹² Cha, V.D., “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 123.

³⁹³ Cha, V.D., “What Do They Really Want?: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 124.

aim for an agreement similar to that accorded to India, whereby North Korea would return to the IAEA safeguards and monitoring while being assured of a civilian nuclear element and in addition would have control over a part of their nuclear and energy weapons program . This argument seems plausible given North Korea's continual call for the construction of the LWRs that were promised back in 1994. Although it is true that North Korea has never tabled these aims, signs of these intentions are evident with North Korea's continued rejection of negotiations on denuclearization, North Korea's continual reference to their de facto nuclear weapons status and their demand that they be treated like India and Pakistan. All these actions should be considered as it offers a new outlook into the possible intention of North Korea which the Obama Administration would need to address.³⁹⁴ Furthermore, North Korea announced in June 2009 that it would begin enriching uranium and build its own LWRs.³⁹⁵ North Korea had therefore taken the step to admit to a uranium-enrichment program. Ultimately then, this argument states North Korean intentions of wanting to be treated like India and Pakistan , nuclear states who possess nuclear weapons outside of the NPT and still maintain normal relations with the US.³⁹⁶

Post-test analyses then proceeds to discuss the issue around North Korean insecurity. According to the 'apologists' or traditional arguments around North Korean insecurity, North Korea's provocative acts were based on insecurities against the US hostile and aggressive policies, Bush's 'axis of evil' or Rice's reference to North Korea as part of the 'outpost of tyranny' for instance.³⁹⁷ Although there are indeed various reasons why North Korea would have cause to fear a militarily and economically stronger and superior US, one cannot disregard the US's countless statements of non-hostile intent toward North Korea. The Obama Administration continues today to enforce this assurance stating that the US is "more than willing to engage in negotiation to get North Korea on a path of peaceful coexistence...and we want to encourage their prosperity."³⁹⁸ North Korea however, dismissed this as empty words, much as it had done with regards to the negative security assurance given by the US in 2005, which North Korea dismissed as a piece of paper with no meaning. In essence, this argument illustrates a further North Korean intention of not wanting a negative security assurance, but rather, a special type of 'regime

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

³⁹⁵ Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 141.

³⁹⁶ Ahn, M. "After Kim Jong-Il," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/after-kim-jong-il>, 16 November 2009.

³⁹⁷ Cha, V.D., "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 125.

³⁹⁸ Cha, V.D., "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 138.

security assurance.³⁹⁹ The argument then gives a clear reason of North Korean insecurity based on the reform dilemma that North Korea faces. The US, even under the Obama Administration continues to call for negotiation and engagement in which aid and assistance would be given upon denuclearization. For North Korea however, there is a realization that if it does indeed give up its nuclear option, and attain aid and assistance, vital for state survival, this could cause a threat to regime survival.⁴⁰⁰ In receiving aid and assistance, North Korea would have to open up, with this comes the entry of influence from the outside world that could result in a decentralization of economic and political power away from the regime and thus threatens regime security.⁴⁰¹ Giving up its nuclear option then does not seem like a viable option for a country embracing the Juche ideology as the ruling ideology that reinforces the principle of sovereignty and self-sufficiency against any foreign intervention that threatens state and regime survival.⁴⁰² The stubborn call of the US therefore for negotiation and engagement for aid and assistance upon denuclearization then does not seem appropriate given North Korea's firm resolve to maintain regime survival that is ultimately tied to nuclear developments.

4.2 The Current Administrations North Korean policy: Weaknesses and Recommendations

In light of the post-test analyses, various suggestions are set forth for the Obama Administration in dealing with a North Korea whereby; provocative acts expose true intentions of attaining a nuclear status. The Obama Administration would need to work toward the implementation of sanctions through UNSCR 1874, passed prior to the May 2009 nuclear testing.⁴⁰³ In addition, the Administration would need to work toward the establishment and institutionalization of a multilateral counterproliferation regime against North Korean nuclear weapons so as to prevent the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear state. The Obama Administration needs to illustrate that such resolutions enforce penalties if violated, thus keeping North Korea in check as North Korea would be aware that the US is prepared to enforce and carry out all penalties if it defects. Currently however, North Korea is aware that the US cannot enforce sanctions without the support of key allies, namely, South Korea and China. In order to attain the support of these allies, the current Administration needs to avoid the mistakes of the Bush Administration that failed to attain the support of allies in adopting a tougher stance with North Korea.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴⁰⁰ Mack, A. "Security and the Korean Peninsula in the 1990's," in Mack, A. (ed.): *Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula*, Allen and Unwin Australia Pty Ltd., Australia 1993, p. 16.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² Kyung-Ae, P., "North Korea's Defensive Power and U.S.-North Korea Relations," in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 545-546.

⁴⁰³ Cha, V.D., "What Do They Really Want?: Obama's North Korea Conundrum," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 127.

The Bush Administration failed to persuade its allies that it was serious about negotiations, given the inflexible and uncompromising policy it adopted when dealing with North Korea, insisting for CVID before negotiation on aid and assistance for instance.⁴⁰⁴ As such, gaining the approval of allies to adopt a tougher position against North Korea became impossible. If negotiations, negotiations as pursued by the US, failed, which they inevitably did, the Bush Administration did not have the support of the allies to pursue a tougher stance toward North Korea.⁴⁰⁵ Post-test analyses argues that the situation is now moving toward a point where there is a greater chance that the US would have to deal with a North Korea with more nuclear weapons aiming for nuclear status. The best way to avoid such a scenario would be to unite the US and its allies around a common policy that could deal with a North Korea that still maintains a threatening posture. In order to secure this unity, the Obama Administration would need to implement engagement policies with North Korea. The allies will not adopt coercive measures until they are certain that all policies of engagement have been adopted to test North Korea's repeated statements for a negotiated settlement. If the US therefore illustrates that engagement has been used and failed, then only can unity and support be given by the allies who can no longer find fault in US engagement practices. The US needs to show firm commitment by not only simply mentioning, but actually implementing genuine bilateral engagement with North Korea, which has continually been called for by all allies.⁴⁰⁶

Various statements made by the Obama Administration however represent a policy of engagement very similar to that of the Bush Administration. Statements such as, "The door is open to resolving these issues peacefully...but it will only happen if North Korea is taking serious steps around the nuclear issue,"⁴⁰⁷ and "we are open to bilateral meeting as part of the six-party process if that will lead to an expeditious resumption of the denuclearization negotiations."⁴⁰⁸ Both these statements once again represent the prospect of engagement based on denuclearization. This is very similar then to the inflexible and uncompromising policy of the Bush Administration that offered the prospect of negotiation and incentives only if North Korea agreed to denuclearization. It was this inflexible and

⁴⁰⁴ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 28.

⁴⁰⁵ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force*, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 4.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁷ "US experts to visit Pyongyang before envoy: Yonhap,"

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iLj> Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009 [vDfkgQqJLVYue8atelg9DgCzw](http://www.washingtonquarterly.com/Content/ViewFullArticle.aspx?ArticleID=1113), November 2009.

⁴⁰⁸ "North Korea makes new threat as Obama arrives in Asia," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5AC0ZE20091113>, 13 November 2009.

uncompromising policy that prevented any genuine engagement between the US and North Korea and that ultimately caused the US to fail in securing the support of allies. The Obama Administrations inflexible policy based on conditionality's is seen again in the statement by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton:

"If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalize relations, replace the peninsula's longstanding armistice agreements with a permanent peace treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needs of the North Korean people," (Clinton, February, 2009)⁴⁰⁹

Statements such as these do not represent a break from the past policy of the Bush Administration. There is very little difference from this to the Bush Administrations offer to provide aid, assistance and a negative security assurance only after North Korea achieved complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program.⁴¹⁰ Further similarities in the US response to North Korean provocative behavior between the Bush and Obama Administration are evident in addition. Similar to the responses of the Bush Administration, President Obama responded to North Korea's May nuclear testing with strong words stating that "the danger posed by North Korea's threatening activities warrants action by the international community."⁴¹¹ If the traditional explanations on the reasons for North Korean provocative behavior are considered again at this point, one could deduce that such a response by the US, stating the possibility of action being taken against North Korea, will only fuel North Korean insecurities further, and provide North Korea with a reason to retaliate against this perceived US threat and thus the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent. A further example of the current Administrations policy that stands only to further antagonize North Korea can be seen in a statement made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Clinton suggested the possibility that North Korea be placed back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the only step taken by the US, under the Bush Administration, to normalize relations with North Korea.⁴¹² This would essentially mean going a step back, instead of moving forward. This would then be similar to the Bush Administrations adoption of a more hard-line policy of hawk engagement over genuine engagement with North Korea set up by the

⁴⁰⁹ Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 145.

⁴¹⁰ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 28.

⁴¹¹ "North Korea conducts nuclear test," BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8066615.stm>, 25 May 2009.

⁴¹² Symonds, P. "Obama moves aggressively against North Korea," World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml>, 10 June 2009.

Clinton Administration that brought notable progress and development. Instead of building on this progress and securing further improvement, the Bush Administration opted for a policy that took the situation back to crisis point.

A further example of a weakness in the current Administrations North Korean policy, which fails to break from the previous, failed policy of the Bush Administration, is evident in the maintenance of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI was launched by the Bush Administration in 2003 as a response to the Administrations aim to prevent the sale and transfer of nuclear materials or technologies from North Korea to other state or non-state actors.⁴¹³ The PSI aimed to prevent this proliferation through preventive interdiction of shipments in question by land, sea or air. North Korea saw this as a coercive initiative that resulted in a great amount of tension and instability. The PSI affected US-South Korean relations as South Korea initially resisted joining the PSI to avoid antagonizing North Korea.⁴¹⁴ The standoff in relations between North Korea and the current Administration is said to be based on choices that the administration makes, which affects North Korean behavior, according to the traditional arguments on North Korean brinkmanship.⁴¹⁵ These choices therefore can be potentially dangerous and unreliable as a policy choice could cause a provocative North Korean response that will only exacerbate tensions further. The PSI is just one such policy choice representative of this argument. The maintenance of the PSI, that caused an increase in tension, illustrates another similarity between the Bush and Obama Administration policies. In looking to the traditional arguments on the reasons for North Korean strategies of brinkmanship that promotes provocative behavior based on North Korean insecurities, President Obama should have recognized that the maintenance of a policy considered by the North Koreans as coercive would do little in allowing for cooperation from North Korea. When South Korea joined the PSI following the May nuclear testing by North Korea for instance, North Korea responded by calling this a 'declaration of war.'⁴¹⁶ North Korea considered the South Korean move to an agreement with the US as South Korean disregarded of North Korea's sovereignty. While North Korea

⁴¹³ Huntley, W.L., "U.S. Policy Toward North Korea In Strategic Context: Tempting Goliaths Fate", in Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2007, p. 468.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Kirk, D. "North Korea and the problem with the PSI," Los Angeles Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/29/opinion/oe-kirk29>, 29 May 2009.

⁴¹⁶ "North Korea renews threat over weapons inspections," Defence Talk, <http://www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-renews-threat-over-weapons-inspections-19575/>, 8 June 2009.

increased military threats, South Korea strengthened their defences.⁴¹⁷ This clearly represents a situation in which the PSI fueled an already tense situation and led only to more instability.

Statements then, by the Secretary of State that the US “will do everything we (US) can to both interdict it and prevent it and shut off their flow of money,” would only antagonize North Korea further and increase overall tension.⁴¹⁸ The increase of friction in North Korean relations with the US is evident in North Korea having described itself as a ‘proud nuclear state’ that threatened to strike the US if provoked as the US tracked one of the North Korean ships.⁴¹⁹ North Korea stated that “It is a great mistake for the US to think that it will not be hurt if it ignores this and ignites the fuse of war on the Korean peninsula,” to which the US responded, “This administration-and our military-is fully prepared for any contingencies.”⁴²⁰ This again therefore is a clear example of the tensions and increase in hostility caused by the continued pursuit of a policy which North Korea considers a grave threat to its sovereignty and generally considers coercive.

Not only is the PSI increasing tension and hostility in US-North Korean relations, but tensions are caused in addition in inter-Korean relations. North Korea’s most recent military threat to South Korea occurred in November 2009 when North Korea stated that South Korea would pay an ‘extensive price’ for firing at a North Korean boat.⁴²¹ This was the first naval conflict in seven years and again illustrates the manner in which the PSI stands only to exacerbate tensions further.⁴²² In line with the PSI furthermore, the current Administration circulated a draft resolution which urges UN members to cut loans, financial assistance and grants to North Korea for all programs linked to military and nuclear programs.⁴²³ This once again represents a link to the previous administrations policy whereby the Bush Administration had frozen \$24 million in North Korean accounts.⁴²⁴ The Obama Administration seeks to expand on these measures which will once again, according to traditional explanations on North Korean brinkmanship, drive North Korea further toward nuclear developments as the only option and deterrent against such

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,” World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml>, 10 June 2009.

⁴¹⁹ “North Korea says to hit back at US if attacked,” Defence Talk, <http://www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-says-to-hit-back-at-us-if-attacked-19986/>, 22 June 2009.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ “North Korea makes new threat as Obama arrives in Asia,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5AC0ZE20091113>, 13 November 2009.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,” World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml>, 10 June 2009.

⁴²⁴ Wit, J., “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 62

developments. Critics view the previous Administrations freezing of North Korean accounts as serious misstep as the Administration was completing the 2005 joint communiqué.⁴²⁵ In a similar argument then, one could deduce that the current administrations pursuit of a policy aiming for the same objective is a serious misstep as it seeks to continue to encourage North Korea to return to the six party talks. It would be counter-productive to pursue a policy that antagonizes North Korea while at the same time seeking to encourage North Korea to negotiate and cooperate.

Linked to the traditional explanations of North Korean provocative behavior as a strategy of brinkmanship based on North Korean insecurity, statements by President Obama stressing the potential of ‘consequences’ if Iran fails to demonstrate peaceful nuclear ambitions will not tame these North Korean insecurities.⁴²⁶ North Korea might conclude that just like the Bush Administration, the current Administration follows a hard-line policy that threatens action if certain conditions are not met. Various arguments therefore state that the current Administration has made the mistake of signaling a more aggressive stance toward North Korea that will only aggravate an already tense situation, much like what the Bush Administration had done.⁴²⁷ Further similarities to the Bush Administration are seen in statements by Obama saying “We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation,” very similar to President Bush’s repeated declarations that the US would not “reward North Korea for bad behavior.”⁴²⁸ The Obama Administration furthermore does not seem to break from the past as it maintains a policy of not wanting to offer North Korea any further incentives, a point reinforced by Obama’s chief strategist stating that “Clinton bought it once, Bush bought it again, and we’re not going to buy it a third time.”⁴²⁹ This strategy however, strictly pursued by the Bush Administration, failed to raise the stakes in negotiation for North Korea, as proposed by the prospect theory discussed in chapter two. The Clinton Administration had illustrated positive progress in containing the North Korean nuclear threat by offering incentives that raised the stake for North Korea in negotiations. North Korea was aware that any defection could cost them various incentives of aid and assistance promised under the Agreed Framework. With US delays however in constructing the LWRs, despite North Korea abiding by the established proposals, North Korea chose to defect and resort once again to provocative behavior.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ “President Obama Offers Tough Talk on North Korea, Iran,” US Fed Service, <http://0-proquest.umi.com.innopac.wits.ac.za/pqdlink?index=0&did=1903214211&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1259577202&clientId=58117>, 18 November 2009.

⁴²⁷ Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,” World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml>, 10 June 2009.

⁴²⁸ Symonds, P. “Obama moves aggressively against North Korea,” World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/kore-j10.shtml>, 10 June 2009

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

This occurred again following the agreement established at the conclusion of the six-party talks in 2007. This agreement broke down once again due to delays in US promises and reluctance to offer genuine incentives from which North Korea can gain from upholding its end of the bargain.⁴³⁰

The Obama Administration should therefore implement a strategy toward North Korea that the Bush Administration failed to adopt. The Obama Administration should not run the risk of being criticized for having an aggressive, uncompromising and inflexible policy similar to that of the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration furthermore should avoid presenting an 'all or nothing' package to North Korea, much like what the Bush Administration had done.⁴³¹ The following suggestions and recommendations would therefore need to be considered.

4.3 Recommendations:

A former Bush Administration official stated that a key factor that led to the failure of the Bush Administration in neutralizing the North Korean threat, was the inability of the Administration to determine at what price North Korea would actually be willing to surrender its nuclear program.⁴³² By adopting a strict policy of hawk engagement, the Administration represented their skepticism in the possibility that engagement would bring success.⁴³³ The Administration chose instead to look to the behavior of North Korea, which they felt did not reflect a deeper and fundamental change in North Korean intentions. As such, the Administration refused to engage with a regime they felt will not reciprocate even when given various incentives.⁴³⁴ This led the Administration therefore to maintain an inflexible and uncompromising policy of conditionality, where cooperation and incentives were possible only if North Korea agreed to complete and verifiable denuclearization, as discussed previously. The Administration failed therefore to recognize the fact that for North Korea, denuclearization would only occur through a normalization of relations, rather than normalization through denuclearization. Engagement then, would have been the best policy choice that would allow for the normalization of relations and the provision of incentives or 'carrots' that would reduce North Korea's threat perception of the US and therefore, North Korean insecurity, moving North Korea away then from its only policy

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 12.

⁴³² Wit, J., "Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea," in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 57.

⁴³³ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 42.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

option of proliferation and instead, toward reform.⁴³⁵ This is a policy option that should then be considered by the Obama Administration.

The Obama Administration should adopt a policy of genuine engagement that offers North Korea concrete incentives in an attempt to normalize political and economic relations.⁴³⁶ The current Administration should therefore avoid the failure of the Bush Administrations inflexible and uncompromising policy where incentives were only offered once North Korea denuclearized. The Obama Administration should instead, in line with the prospect theory, provide North Korea with various incentives or ‘carrots’ that will then give North Korea a stake in the negotiation, placing North Korea in the area of gain, where any provocative action would threaten this position.⁴³⁷ At the same time then, this approach will prevent the preemptive/preventive logic whereby North Korea maintains policies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy to achieve engagement and gain concessions. If the US implements and maintains a genuine policy of engagement and provides with concrete incentives, the reason for North Korean insecurity and the need for strategies of brinkmanship lessen.⁴³⁸ If the US continues however, to maintain an inflexible policy where it prioritizes denuclearization as a condition necessary if benefits are to be given, North Korea will continue to see itself in the area of loss which will simply maintain North Korean insecurity and sense of vulnerability where North Korea would therefore maintain the belief that deterrence against an offensive and uncompromising US is better accomplished through nuclear weapons, rather than negotiation based on conditionality.⁴³⁹ The Obama Administration would therefore need to change these dynamics and raise the stakes for North Korea in negotiation that would have a greater chance of preventing North Korea from defecting.

As discussed previously, North Korea faces the dilemma of being presented with a US deal to give up its nuclear weapons program and then receive large amounts of benefits.⁴⁴⁰ The dilemma North Korea faces however, is giving up its only strongest bargaining chip that provides it with policy leverage. Looking to the past furthermore, North Korea will recognize that throughout all previous agreements,

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Wit, J., “Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 2007, p. 57.

⁴³⁷ Cha, V.D., “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 68.

⁴³⁸ Cha, V.D., “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 68.

⁴³⁹ Abramowitz, M. and Laney, T. Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Report of an Independent Task Force, the Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America, 2003, p. 19.

⁴⁴⁰ Michishita, N., “Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 149.

while North Korea abided by key points of the agreement, the US had delayed on the provision of important incentives as part of the agreement. The delay in the provision of the LWRs for instance, promised under the Agreed Framework, as disused previously. In light of this, North Korea would be hesitant to give up its only strongest bargaining tool having no guarantee that the US would abide by all agreements. The Obama Administration would do well therefore to set up policy objectives that are implemented and achieved.

The Clinton Administration, in turning to a policy of genuine engagement that provided North Korea with incentives represented that North Korea is indeed willing to end the production, testing and export of ballistic missiles if it can get the right price.⁴⁴¹ This provides with a positive sign then that the policy of engagement and the provision of incentives does indeed provide with the potential of substantial progress. The Clinton Administrations policy of engagement that resulted in the adoption of the Agreed Framework demonstrated a pattern in North Korean behavior that the Obama Administration should consider. When the US adopted an aggressive and hostile policy, North Korea responded with more coercive diplomacy but in contrast, responded with a more cooperative attitude when it received concessions.⁴⁴² This would be in keeping with the traditional explanations on the reasons for North Korea's provocative and threatening acts. This policy alternative would therefore be essential for the current administration to consider.

If however, one looks to the post-test analyses that explain North Korea's provocative actions as a sign of North Korea's true intentions of seeking to maintain their nuclear program and gain the status of a nuclear state, then an alternative policy option is suggested, that seeks to work alongside and not parallel to the first policy option. This policy option suggests that the Obama Administration pursue a policy whereby it provides North Korea with 'carrots' thereby raising the stakes for North Korea by placing it in an area of gain. If however, post-test analyses proves correct, the Obama Administration would need a policy to address the chance of potential North Korean hostility. Again, the argument for engagement is used to address this issue. Genuine engagement that provides incentives for North Korea will allow the US to build a coalition for punishment at a later stage if North Korea continues with provocative behavior.⁴⁴³ As discussed previously, the Bush Administration had failed to secure the

⁴⁴¹ Harnisch, S., "U.S.-North Korean Relations Under the Bush Administration: From "Slow Go" to "No Go," in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2002, p. 879.

⁴⁴² Bleiker, R. "A Rouge Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis," in International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, July 2003, p. 723.

⁴⁴³ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 71.

support of key allies to pursue a stronger policy against North Korea when North Korea carried out provocative acts. If the current Administration however, clearly indicates a policy that implements genuine engagement and provides with concrete incentives, if North Korea still defects, the current Administration would be in a better position to show that engagement had failed, and stricter policies are needed. This is a point that is furthered by former Deputy of State, Richard Armitage stating that “diplomacy strengthens the ability to build and sustain a coalition if North Korea does not cooperate.”

⁴⁴⁴ In addition, if north Korea does defect and continue with provocative behavior, by having provided with ‘carrots’ that raise the stakes for North Korea, the current Administration would be in a better position to turn these ‘carrots’ into ‘sticks’ and punish any future provocative behavior. Engagement therefore, in all instances, will allow the current administration to prevent the crystallization of conditions that promote North Korean strategies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy.⁴⁴⁵ This argument supports both the traditional argument of the reasons for North Korean provocative behavior and in addition supports the post-test analyses on North Korean provocative acts. This suggestion provides a policy option that lessens North Korea insecurity and thus has a greater potential of moving North Korea away from its current preemptive/preventive logic where coercive diplomacy and brinkmanship is the only option as there is no better alternative. At the same time, this suggestion recognizes the fact that North Korea may not be willing to fully give up its nuclear option and thus maintains a strategy that will allow for an alternative policy should North Korea defect. Many arguments find that North Korea will continue to play the same game, using the tool of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy, the difference is how the current Administration plays the game.⁴⁴⁶ The policy suggestion given provides a double sided sword that allows for robust and genuine engagement that will facilitate engagement and at the same time, lays the groundwork for the US to acquire defensive tools to use against North Korea, should North Korea defect.⁴⁴⁷

4.4 Looking to the Future

An important issue regarding succession in North Korea has arisen resulting from Kim Jong-Il’s deteriorating health.⁴⁴⁸ This issue has important implications that the current administration would need to face. Given the highly institutionalized totalitarian governing system, the new leadership is most likely

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 72.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 44.

⁴⁴⁶ Michishita, N., “Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, p. 149.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 147.

to inherit and maintain this system and its policies. The most likely successor is said to be Kim Jong-Il's third son, Kim Jong-un. It is important to note that the ability of the new leadership to adopt new policies is limited to the resources available, and for North Korea, these resources continue to be the nuclear and ballistic missiles that remain the only internationally competitive policy tools that North Korea has. The chance therefore of a change in North Korean policies with a change in leadership is unlikely. The Obama Administration should therefore avoid the mistake of the previous Administration that prioritized regime change as a solution to the North Korean problem. The North Korean regime cannot be treated as temporary, and as such, US policy cannot change upon North Korean regime change.⁴⁴⁹

There is however a chance for the new leader not to adopt the historical negative 'baggage' of Kim-Jong Il, and if in addition, this new leader manages to fulfill the minimum necessary demands of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, illustrating a new decency in the conduct of both external and internal policies, there would then be a greater chance for progress through cooperation and engagement.⁴⁵⁰

The current Administration should not however wait for this to happen given the fact that the 26-year old, Kim Jong-un is not domestically established and is thus more likely to rely on the military support and past policies of his father's regime.⁴⁵¹ Some positive aspects are however put forth regarding Kim Jong-un's education that occurred abroad. This is said to present the possibility explained before, that this new leader could be more open to negotiation with the international community. It is suggested that Obama Administration is currently following a 'wait-and-see' approach in dealing with North Korea given these questions and issues around succession. The US, it seems, is waiting then to adjust its diplomatic strategies accordingly, pending the issue of North Korean succession. This is evident in the Administrations current contradictory approach in which it commits to the strategy not to reward North Korean provocative behavior while stating that it will not abandon diplomacy. Diplomacy, as discussed previously, would require a genuine form of engagement that would provide North Korea with concrete incentives, thereby raising the stakes for North Korea and lessening North Korean strategies of brinkmanship that promoted provocation. An example of this contradiction is seen in the US statement

⁴⁴⁹ Berman, I. "Obama Needs To Rethink Pyongyang," American Foreign Policy Council, http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/791, 26 October 2009

⁴⁵⁰ Michishita, N., "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 2009, pp. 147-148.

⁴⁵¹ Ahn, M. "After Kim Jong-Il," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/after-kim-jong-il>, 16 November 2009.

to send a US envoy to North Korea, which when accepted by North Korea, the US switched and insisted instead that North Korea return to the six party talks first.⁴⁵²

The Obama Administration cannot risk the failure of the previous Administrations contradictory policies of conditionality, nor can the current Administration wait to change and alter policy objectives according to North Korean succession. While maintaining the current policy of conditionality in insisting that North Korea agree to denuclearization before any incentives are given, North Korea will continue building and advancing what they still see as their only option, their nuclear program.⁴⁵³ The Obama Administration should therefore avoid the previous Administrations mistake in fitting threats to policy, instead of policy to threats.⁴⁵⁴ This is an important point to consider given the views of Bruce Klingner.⁴⁵⁵ Mr. Klingner explains that one should not perhaps be asking the question of whether the US failed but rather, did North Korea never intend to give up their nuclear program?⁴⁵⁶ If this is indeed the case, the Obama Administration would do well to avoid the mistake of fitting policy to threats, but should rather look to the true intentions of North Korea in their nuclear program and adopt a policy to deal with this situation. In Mr. Klingners view, the common denominator to all the different US approaches, is North Korea's refusal to abide by its commitments.⁴⁵⁷ In order for the Obama Administration then to bring notable progress that previous administrations could not, all suggestions and recommendations provided would need to be considered. Jim Hoare⁴⁵⁸ suggests and reaffirms the views that a more conciliatory approach is needed where engagement would prove the best option.⁴⁵⁹ War or any form of intervention in Mr. Hoare's views carries too many dangers for surrounding countries.⁴⁶⁰

Another important suggestion for an alternative policy looks to the formation of close cooperation with key allies in the region. Given North Korea's continual deception and lack of commitment to agreed upon policies, a closer US alliance, pursued by the Obama administration could stand as a useful policy alternative. Closer US alliance with China for instance is important for two reasons. Firstly, as a close ally to North Korea, China could become a useful partner to the US in its relations with North Korea while

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Cha, V.D., "Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula," in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, p. 78.

⁴⁵⁵ See Appendix B

⁴⁵⁶ Internet Interview with Bruce Klingner, 8 May 2009.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ See Appendix C.

⁴⁵⁹ Internet Interview with Jim Hoare, 19 January 2010.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

secondly; the US can simultaneously improve relations with China in forming a closer alliance.⁴⁶¹ China is said to fear the emergence of an unfriendly regime in unified Korea and if the Obama administrations efforts to build regional cohesion and close US-Sino cooperation are to prove successful, the US will need to clarify and build relations with China in order to tame Chinese fears by clarifying US intentions and providing reassurance thereby allowing in this way for more effective progress toward regional cohesion.⁴⁶²

Although China does indeed have a great interest on superpower status, China may be more willing to settle for a status quo over any instability to the point of accepting a unified Korea led by South Korea and the US, having invested so heavily in North Korea. The Obama administration would therefore need to form closer dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula and principles of a united Korea. By forming a closer allegiance with China, North Korea would be more convinced of a mobilized coercive front against North Korean nuclear programs. Furthermore, a more mobilized and cooperative US-China alliance would demonstrate to North Korea more mobilized coercive measures that would be more effective in preventing the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea could become increasingly aware that taking the path toward denuclearization could provide them with new opportunities in the form of expanded economic and political benefits coming from a closer US-China alliance.⁴⁶³ North Korea would be more willing to denuclearize if it sees greater potential benefits to come from denuclearization.

This chapter has provided discussions on the reasons for North Korean nuclear developments and implications of this threat and has proceeded to provide with policy options available to the current Administration to address these threats and avoid the mistakes of the past. Only genuine engagement that follows from, rather than precedes the normalization of relations, will bring greater possibilities for a resolution.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶¹ Hwang Doo-hyong, "Obama urged to set up dialogue with China over N. Korea contingency plans, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/06/16/39/0301000000AEN20100616000300315F.HTML>, June 15 2010.

⁴⁶² Hwang Doo-hyong, "Obama urged to set up dialogue with China over N. Korea contingency plans, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/06/16/39/0301000000AEN20100616000300315F.HTML>, June 15 2010.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ Armstrong, K.C. "U.S.-North Korea Relations" in *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2004, p. 14.

CHAPTER FIVE;

CONCLUSION



<http://www.zcommunications.org/FCKFiles/image/may08zmoimages/Wuerker-Madman-ZMag0508.gif>

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study intended to analyse the Bush Administration's North Korean policy, ultimately aiming to determine whether this policy proved a success or failure in neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat.

The first chapter of this study began with a discussion and look at the North Korean nuclear threat. The purpose of this chapter attempted to state the existing and growing dangers of the North Korean nuclear program and thus outline the implication of these dangers. This chapter has firstly provided with a discussion on the reasons why North Korea possesses and continues to develop nuclear weapons. The main reasons stated looked to nuclear weapons development as a vital element to ensure the continued existence of the Kim family regime, mainly against the perceived US threat to North Korean sovereignty. This chapter has provided with various reasons and evidence of North Korean fears and concerns, particularly during the term of the Bush Administration, regarding the determination of the US to achieve regime change in Pyongyang.

The chapter therefore went on to discuss the important North Korean strategy of brinkmanship whereby North Korea avoided transparency in missile and nuclear development as they sought to build a military powerful state. Nuclear weapons therefore served as an important tool whereby North Korea could simply create the perception of being a military powerful state in order to prevent threats to its sovereignty or to achieve various concessions. In addition, in developing and maintaining a nuclear program to ensure state survival against the US threat, the strategy of brinkmanship illustrated the manner in which North Korea was able to use their nuclear program as leverage to attain economic incentives that in addition to military developments, ensures state survival. This is what is referred to as North Korea's defensive power against the US offensive power. The strategy of brinkmanship in addition has illustrated the ways in which North Korean provocation has simply increased tension and suspicion within East Asia and will continue as long as North Korea perceives a threat to its sovereignty.

This chapter has in addition looked to the growing capabilities of the North Korean nuclear program that therefore demands immediate attention from the US today. Not only is North Korea successfully developing and advancing nuclear capabilities, but North Korea is said to be the largest exporter of missile technologies. The implications of these developments prove dangerous as sales are made to other rogue nations and possibly other non-state actors under no monitoring system. Proliferation dangers and increases in the possibility of threats to peace and stability within various unstable regions

escalate furthermore when looking to the implications of the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT. This chapter has looked to these implications explaining the manner in which North Korean withdrawal could threaten the erosion of NPT compliance norms which thus begins to serve as a medium through which Korean peninsula developments drive other proliferation dangers, Iranian ambitions for instance.

The lack of transparency, information and knowledge regarding North Korean nuclear developments only increases suspicion as the international community is left to speculation and assumption that only fuels uncertainty and thereby raises tension and hostility. This situation is then compounded by the adoption of policies of brinkmanship by North Korea that again does not allow for a conducive and productive environment to promote constructive negotiation. In light of these discussions therefore, the dangers and implications of a nuclear North Korea are clear. The need therefore to neutralize this threat is essential in preserving and maintaining global standards of peace and stability. This chapter has thus explained and illustrated the key reason for North Korean nuclear development as a defensive deterrent based on their insecurity against the US aggressive policy aimed at regime change in Pyongyang. This insecurity leads North Korea to pursue a policy of brinkmanship and coercive bargaining, by maintaining a nuclear program.

After having established the context of the North Korean situation, the study proceeded to analyse the US policy toward this threat and issue. Chapter three began with an analysis on the Clinton Administration's North Korean policy in order to provide with a background and context of US-North Korean relations prior to the arrival of the Bush Administration. The analysis of the Clinton Administration made the main point that positive policies of engagement adopted by this Administration allowed for and facilitated an improvement in US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The engagement policies adopted by the Clinton Administration culminated into the Agreed Framework that promised further improvements in US-North Korean relations and showed clear signs of improved North Korean behavior, away from aggressive policies of brinkmanship. The Clinton Administration turned to a policy of engagement despite condemnations from hard-liners that engagement would amount to appeasement that would simply encourage North Korean threat and wayward, deviant behavior. The Administration recognised that well placed concessions can essentially have a controlling effect on a country that needs the cooperation and assistance of the outside world. The chapter then went on to discuss how this success and progress in the normalization of US-North Korean relations and the containment of the North Korean nuclear threat

became compromised upon the election of the Bush Administration when a shift in policy saw engagement replaced by a hard-line policy of hawk engagement.

This chapter used the policy of hawk engagement pursued by the Bush Administration to illustrate the reversal away from policies of engagement to more hard-line policies with the sole objective of achieving regime change in Pyongyang. In pursuing a more hard-line policy, the Bush Administration presented engagement as an incentive to be gained by North Korea only if North Korea agreed to complete disarmament. This chapter therefore illustrated this Administration's North Korean policy that did not further the Clinton Administration's policy of engagement and cooperation, but instead provided a 'take-it-or-leave-it' policy by refusing to provide 'carrots' or incentives unless North Korea met certain demands. The analysis of this policy then illustrated how and why North Korea returned back to traditional strategies of brinkmanship as this more hostile US policy only fueled North Korean fears and insecurities. The hostile policy of hawk engagement that refused to 'award bad behavior' failed to provide North Korea with a stake in negotiations. As such, North Korea's main stake remained once again in the development and maintenance of their nuclear program. The Bush Administration should have been aware of the dynamics of North Korean brinkmanship that responds in a threatening manner to a perceived threat. Instead therefore of having continued with a hard-line aggressive policy, the Administration should have continued the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration that established a framework for progress that the Bush Administration could have furthered. This firm, inflexible and uncompromising US policy was met therefore by a more threatening and provocative North Korea that simply went on to strengthen nuclear capabilities.

In having analysed the implications of such a policy, the chapter then went on to suggest various recommendations on the path that should have been taken instead. The prospect theory was used to illustrate a policy objective that should have been adopted by the Bush Administration. Engagement and the provision of incentives, as proposed under the prospect theory, would prevent the crystallization of conditions under which North Korea calculates aggression and a threatening posture as its only course of action. The chapter states the important point that the provision of incentives places North Korea in an area of gain where North Korea now has a stake in the negotiation process and would therefore be less likely to defect and risk losing this stake. The policy of engagement and the provision of incentives furthermore, lays the groundwork for a coalition of punishment at a later stage if North Korea defects. The Bush Administration however, chose immediately to use incentives as sticks without having given North Korea a stake in the status quo. By pursuing a policy of engagement therefore, that provides

various incentives to North Korea thereby raising North Korean stakes in the status quo; the US is able to tactically build a coalition of punishment should North Korea defect. Engagement therefore, in this manner, facilitates a policy that will ensure progress and at the same time, maintain a security net to respond to North Korean defiance.

The final chapter of this study then went on to discuss the road ahead and the future prospects for the Obama Administration. The chapter began with an outline of North Korean provocative acts that were carried out just before and after the election of the Obama Administration. These provocative acts were analysed in two ways. Firstly, these provocative acts were seen to be in line with the traditional North Korean strategy of brinkmanship, aimed to get the attention of the new Administration and ensure negotiation. The second analysis however, considered a new approach regarding the reason for and implication of North Korean provocative and hostile acts. Post-test analyses of North Korean acts in April, May and July 2009 was used to represent a new dynamic in considering the true intentions of North Korea. It has been suggested that what North Korea really wants is to be accepted as a nuclear state by the US. This argument states that North Korea could be aiming, through more provocative acts, to turn the six party talks, which the Obama Administration has pushed for from the outset, into bilateral US-North Korean nuclear arms negotiations. In looking to both the traditional North Korean strategy of brinkmanship and the new dynamic of North Korean intentions under post-test analyses, various suggestions are given on approaches to be taken by this Administration in dealing with North Korea, in either setting.

It has been suggested that the Obama Administration adopt a policy of genuine engagement that offers North Korea concrete incentives in an attempt to normalize political and economic relations. The current Administration should therefore avoid the failure of the Bush Administrations inflexible and uncompromising policy where incentives were only offered once North Korea denuclearized. The Obama Administration should instead, in line with the prospect theory, provide North Korea with various incentives or 'carrots' that will then give North Korea a stake in the negotiation, placing North Korea in the area of gain, where any provocative action would threaten this position. This would therefore lead North Korea away from traditional strategies of brinkmanship. If however, one looks to the post-test analyses that explain North Korea's provocative actions as a sign of North Korea's true intentions of seeking to maintain their nuclear program and gain the status of a nuclear state, then an alternative policy option is suggested, that seeks to work alongside and not parallel to the first policy option. This policy option suggests that the Obama Administration pursue a policy whereby it provides

North Korea with 'carrots' thereby raising the stakes for North Korea by placing it in an area of gain. If however, post-test analyses proves correct, the Obama Administration would need a policy to address the chance of potential North Korean hostility. Again, the argument for engagement is used to address this issue. Genuine engagement that provides incentives for North Korea will allow the US to build a coalition for punishment at a later stage if North Korea continues with provocative behavior. As discussed previously, the Bush Administration had failed to secure the support of key allies to pursue a stronger policy against North Korea when North Korea carried out provocative acts. If the current Administration however, clearly indicates a policy that implements genuine engagement and provides with concrete incentives, if North Korea still defects, the current Administration would be in a better position to show that engagement had failed, and stricter policies are needed. In addition, if North Korea does defect and continue with provocative behavior, by having provided with 'carrots' that raise the stakes for North Korea, the current Administration would be in a better position to turn these 'carrots' into 'sticks' and punish any future provocative behavior. Engagement therefore, in all instances, will allow the current administration to prevent the crystallization of conditions that promote North Korean strategies of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy. This argument supports both the traditional argument of the reasons for North Korean provocative behavior and in addition supports the post-test analyses on North Korean provocative acts.

This chapter has made the important point that the current Administration should avoid the previous Administrations mistake in fitting threats to policy, instead of policy to threats. Many arguments find that North Korea will continue to play the same game, using the tool of brinkmanship and coercive diplomacy, the difference will be how the current Administration plays the game. The policy suggestion given provides a double sided sword that allows for robust and genuine engagement that will facilitate engagement and at the same time, lays the groundwork for the US to acquire defensive tools to use against North Korea, should North Korea defect.

APPENDIX

A.

Bertil Lintner: A Swedish journalist whose main specialty and focus is based on North Korea and Laos. Bertil Lintner was a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media Services. Bertil Lintner has written numerous articles and books that include “Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan.” This book is an expose on North Korea that traces the origins of the Kim family’s ideologies and investigates North Korean missile and nuclear developments. Bertil Lintner is one of the very few journalists to have visited North Korea and as such, is able to ‘demystify rather than demonize’ North Korea by allowing a look behind the walls of secrecy and many misperceptions that surround North Korea. In 2004, Bertil Lintner received an award for excellence in reporting about North Korea from the Society of Publishers in Asia.

Source: Asia Pacific Media Services Limited, <http://www.asiapacificms.com/books/>.

Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HF03Ae01.html, June 3 2006.

B.

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- [Responding to North Korea's Missile Gauntlet](#) Published: Monday, April 06, 2009
- [Pyongyang Defiant](#) Published: Monday, March 23, 2009
- [North Korea's Missile Gambit](#) Published: Wednesday, February 18, 2009
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