

**THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-APARTHEID DEFENCE
POLICY-MAKING**

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DECLARATION

I declare that this report is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Masters in Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.

Agnes Sherly Magano
12 September 2006

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	-	African National Congress
APLA	-	Azanian People's Liberation Army
AU	-	African Union
AVF	-	Afrikaaner Vryheid Front
AWB		Afrikaaner Weerstand Beweging
CCR	-	Centre for Conflict Resolution
COD	-	Council on Defence
CODESA	-	Conference for Democratic South Africa
COSAWR	-	Committee on South African War Resistance
CP	-	Conservative Party
CSO	-	Civil Society Organisation
DHQ	-	Defence Headquarters
DOD	-	Department of Defence
DR	-	Defence Review
DRWG	-	Defence Review Work Group
DU	-	Defence Update
ECC	-	End Conscription Campaign
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GFN-SSR	-	Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform
IFP	-	Inkatha Freedom Party
ISS	-	Institute for Security Studies
ISSUP	-	Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria
JSCD	-	Joint Standing Committee on Defence
KZSPF	-	Kwa-Zulu Special Protection Forces
MK	-	Umkhonto weSizwe
MOD	-	Ministry of Defence
MRG	-	Military Research Group
NGO	-	Non Governmental Organisation
NP	-	National Party
OPDSC	-	SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

PAC	-	Pan Africanist Congress
PWV	-	Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal
SACP	-	South African Communist Party
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SADF	-	South African Defence Force
SANDF	-	South African National Defence Force
SANGOCO	-	South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition
TEC	-	Transitional Executive Council
TBVC	-	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei
UDF	-	United Democratic Front
UN	-	United Nations
WPOD	-	White Paper on Defence

ABSTRACT

The mid-1970s South Africa saw the emergence of movements opposing apartheid policies. The composition of these movements have varied from individuals coming together in pursuit of basic social rights to the more complex formations seeking a complete overhaul of all apartheid machinery which would translate into democracy. These movements or formations together with a host of others became known as civil society in the post-apartheid South Africa.

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of South African civil society in post-apartheid defence policy-making. It sought to achieve this by analysing previous and current trends followed by government in the defence policy-making processes. In particular, it focused on government's engagement of civil society in defence policy-making processes, periodised as (i) the development and adoption of the White Paper on Defence (1996), (ii) Defence Review (1998) and briefly touches on the current policy review known as (iii) the Defence Update (2004).

Case study materials were gathered by means of primary and secondary data collection methods where the former utilised semi-structured interviews with key individuals involved in defence policy-making processes. Much has been published about the first two cases and secondary data was collected from available literature on the subject.

The examination of civil society participation in defence policy shows that South African civil society has made significant progress in penetrating and engaging the government in processes previously perceived as the reserve of the elite. The 1990 to 1998 period experienced unprecedented political fluidity, where civil society made an impact in influencing policy outcomes. However, the findings identified a trend in a review currently being carried out by the Department of Defence (DOD) where there has been a notable reduction of civil society participation, and very little being revealed about it.

The study concludes that civil society is an important player in the democratisation project and the Ministry of Defence needs to ensure that civil society remains a player in policy making by strengthening its involvement in this process.

One of the key recommendations is that both the Ministry and civil society establish parameters for the latter's participation in policy processes, with a view to establishing of a forum comprised of all key actors in the sector i.e. policy makers, academics, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), research institutions etc. to facilitate dialogue on policy issues.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

‘As South Africans negotiated themselves from racially exclusive authoritarianism to a robust – albeit politically volatile – non-racial, constitutional democracy over the decade starting in 1990, the debate about the state’s function and form could not be detached from how South Africans envisaged a future civil society’ (Swilling & Russel, 2002: 6).

1.1 Introduction

The rapid transformation that followed the democratic dispensation of 1994 has yielded numerous challenges to South African civil society organisations. One of these challenges being how the African National Congress (ANC)-led government was to consolidate and maintain its relationship with those organisations that contributed to the struggle against apartheid while at the same time upholding the principles of good governance.

The notion of civil society advancing liberation in South Africa gained popularity at the time of the banning of political parties such as the ANC which resulted in the formation of political organisations operating as democratic fronts to continue where the banned organisations had left off. One of these organisations was the United Democratic Front (UDF) from which many civil society organisations evolved.

These organisations mainly operated at grassroots level and kept pressuring the National Party (NP) to abandon its unpopular apartheid policies. The first democratic elections took place in April 1994 which the ANC won by a majority votes. The Government of National Unity, installed in May 1994 and led by the ANC instituted major policy revisions soon after its establishment (Cawthra, 2000) and defence policy was no exception.

The historic relationship between the ANC-led government and civil society was expected to guarantee the latter’s active participation in decision-making

processes. In particular, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and academic research institutions had expectations of extensive engagement in policy-making processes but the ANC's second term of office (1999 – 2003) has proved that this engagement could not be sustained for a variety of reasons.

Social researchers on the South African democratic transition agree that the mid-1990s witnessed political fluidity with various actors being involved in policy processes. This political fluidity gradually began to disappear during the ANC's second term. Those who argue against extensive civil society participation in governance issues see the above changes as inevitable and necessary to enable elected officials through parliamentary committees to carry forward their constituents' mandates.

South Africa serves as a model for many countries, regionally and globally for the successful manner in which it managed its transformation process. Predicted by many to be potentially explosive, the South African transformation to democracy has proved that dialogue amongst various competing forces can bring desired results. The success of this complex process was as a result of a balanced relationship between the state and civil society. Despite South Africa's success in completing the transition process and its diverse and vibrant civil society, the institutionalisation of democracy at all levels of the state and society remains a central challenge (Zuern, 2003: 119).

The study investigates the role of civil society in defence policy-making, focusing on the post-apartheid period. However, to obtain a better understanding of the transformation of these processes, the study also looks at defence policy-making processes during the apartheid era and those applied at the dawn of democracy during the transition period.

South African defence policy is periodised in three distinct phases and three case studies will be investigated. Case Study 1 focuses on the White Paper on Defence (WPOD) of 1994 to 1996, Case Study 2 is based on the Defence Review (DR) of 1996 to 1998 and Case Study 3 on the Defence Update (DU), initiated in 2004 and ongoing. Much has been written about the successful White Paper and Defence

Review processes. However, it should be noted that the process initiated in 2004 is still in progress and some material relating to the process may not be accessible for public consumption at time of finalising this report hence it is anticipated that information on the Defence Update may be limited.

Furthermore, a comparative analysis of processes followed in the three case studies will be made with a view to establishing how and what changes have occurred and the impact these changes has made on defence policy. It is envisaged that the study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the defence policy-making field. The concluding chapter will identify gaps in the study and make recommendations for future research.

1.2 Background

The collapse of undemocratic governance systems accelerated from the mid- to late 1970s and the fall of the Eastern European communist block followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the South African context these changes came with the demise of apartheid in April 1994. Apart from pressures from various civil society groups within the country, these events were mainly driven by global changes occurring at the time. With many states under military or authoritarian rule, the advent of democracy brought with it a new thinking about security.

Many states, including South Africa, soon found themselves facing varied challenges ranging from applying the principles of good governance to managing transitions democracy and its consolidation. To date, these challenges are still evident in many African countries as these countries continue grappling with normalisation processes and entrenchment of democracy having been exposed to long periods of colonial rule. These new democracies face significant socio-economic and political problems these new democracies are facing and the development of mechanisms of overcoming them.

Within the South African context, a combination of domestic, regional and global events such as the end of apartheid and the end of the Cold War made the transition into democracy a reality. Due to pressures from within and outside the country in the 1990s, the apartheid government was under pressure to abandon discriminatory policies.

1.3 South African civil society in the 1980s

Political society made up of liberation movements, trade unions and grass root organisations with assistance from the international anti-apartheid movement, were the main drivers of the South African transformation. In many ways the dismantling of apartheid was as a result of the spirit of activism that existed both within and outside the borders of this country. The demands made by these organisations such as pressing for transfer of political power and calling for

political accountability and democratic representation dominated the international discourse at the time.

Although originally polarised between the liberals and conservatives, these efforts “made it possible if not necessary for civilians to reassert control over the political and policy process with the apartheid state” (Cawthra, 2000: 53). These prompted both policy-makers and civil society to interrogate security assumptions and scrutinise the roles, functions and posture of a future national defence force.

The banning of liberation movements such as the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) in the early 1960s did not deter pro-democracy groups from their efforts of fighting apartheid policies. As an example, UDF-type organisations continued mushrooming even at the height of apartheid state repressions. Providing a background to the evolution of the UDF, Rantete (1998: 46) comments:

Formed in 1983 as a federal structure to harness hundreds of community, student, women, civic and worker organisations that were proliferating as a result of intense repression focused on intensifying opposition to the tricameral parliament, the black local authorities and rent increases.

The tricameral parliament came as a result of the Theron commission of 1977 which was set up to improve the affairs of Coloured people in South Africa and proposed the creation of a tri-cameral or three-tier parliament to include the participation of Coloured and Indian people. Blacks were not included in these structures as the apartheid government had already set up separate governance systems structures for them in the form of the homelands. These were disbanded when the ANC came into power in 1994.

Reform strategies such as the tricameral parliament and creation of black local authorities were met with resistance as these were merely an extension to apartheid policies. The Black Authorities Act was established in 1982 to ensure dependence of these authorities on central government, which in turn would result

in the cooptation of the township population “for it would depend on the favour of local government officials for a variety of basic subsistence needs, such as access to housing” (Price, 1991: 132).

Also pressing for a change and developing ideas for future democratic South Africa but with focus on security issues was the Military Research Group (MRG). The MRG had its focus on bringing the military under civilian control and ending the state of emergency which had led to the invasion of townships by the South African Defence Force (SADF) troops. Another big demand from these quarters was for the apartheid government to end the compulsory conscription of white males to the army, resulting in the formation of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) in 1983.

The late 1980s saw the return of South Africans who had been forced into exile for their contribution to the struggle against apartheid as preparations for a democratic South Africa were getting off the ground. These individuals who in most cases had joined liberation armies while in exile, and members of the MRG played a crucial role in developing defence policy frameworks for a post-apartheid South Africa. As some MRG members had their origins in the ANC, their influence as non-state actors began to diminish around 1994 when some of them were absorbed into the new government structures.

Pressure exerted resulted in the government’s introduction of a new amendment to the Defence Act (1992), ‘which provided for moral, ethical or religious objection to military service’ (Rauch, 1994: 11). This signaled a victory that was still to come because in August 1993, Kobie Coetzee, the then Minister of Defence, announced the end of conscription.

To a great extent, the transitions mentioned above brought changes to the actors in the South African policy-making processes which in the case of defence were predominantly military. Cawthra (2000: 52) observes that ‘policy-making processes of the apartheid era were significantly militarised’. As the military was highly organised and well resourced, its involvement resulted in power abuses which manifested into antagonism between the military and civilians opposing

apartheid. 'As might be expected, the military came to dominate national security and defence policy-making' (ibid). A brief overview of apartheid policy making is dealt with in Chapter Four.

The enormous powers given to the military by apartheid structures resulted in what one would call the civil-military divide. The concept of civil-military relations in a democracy is premised on the principle that the military is accountable and subordinate to the civilian authority. Post-apartheid defence policy-making is dealt with in detail in Chapters Four and Five.

As democratisation gained momentum in the post-communist era, it became evident that military dominance in state affairs was on the decline. Efforts to consolidate democracy took many forms. In South Africa these efforts did not only begin after the 1994 elections as it is often thought. Planning and preparations for new democratic institutions began in the early 1990s with FW de Klerk's historical announcement of the decision to unbanned anti-apartheid political parties and release from prison most detained political leaders, including Nelson Mandela. This resulted in the initiation of multi-party negotiations, Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which dealt with transformation strategies and resulted in the development of an Interim Constitution adopted in 1993.

At this time of political fluidity the government sought to ensure that as many views as possible were incorporated in policies. This was achieved through broad consultations in almost all areas of public policy including defence policy. In this instance consolidation of democracy among other things meant recasting civil-military relations.

In a normative sense recasting of civil-military relations would begin by bringing the military under civilian control. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) makes provision for the establishment of a civilian Secretary for Defence to oversee this function. The White Paper on Defence complements the Constitution and makes a provision for the establishment of a parliamentary committee on defence to carry out oversight of defence policy.

However, this study argues that parliamentary committees alone are not sufficient in providing legitimacy to policies. Engaging civil society in matters that require national consensus is a key ingredient for peace, stability and reaching consensus on matters of national interest. Progressively, ordinary people are taking up interest on defence matters and the withdrawal of the secrecy which characterised defence policy-making and military operations of the apartheid era have been replaced by principles of democratic governance such as participation, openness and transparency which the Constitution also provides for.

Transparency and consultation in defence issues have often been interpreted to mean civilian control over the military which is often limited to parliamentary committees and the Department of Defence (DOD). It is argued that this undermines other institutions of democracy such as civil society. Structures such as parliament and the DOD, exist because society has placed faith in them to ensure that their societal needs such as education, housing, health care, safety etc. all of which form part of the new human security concept, are provided for. Civil society has the ability to get government to listen and is thus in a better position to carry these forward. Therefore, it is of critical importance that both the government and civil society recognise and embrace this interdependence for the benefit of public policies including defence policy.

The involvement of civil society in policy-making processes was a strategy applied in the early days of democracy by almost all government departments including the newly established Ministry of Defence (MOD). Cawthra (2000) observes that the newly elected government was not up to speed with policy processes and thus lacked capacity in policy-making. The limited policy capacity within the ruling ANC structures led to the task of policy analysis being carried out by members of civil society. This strategy benefited the government in more ways than one. On the one hand, involving and consulting with non-state actors in policy processes legitimised policies thus enhancing the quality of policies. On the other, this gave most new policy-makers an opportunity to acquire skills in policy-making from working closely with members of civil society who in most cases were in possession of technical knowledge.

Whereas the relationship between government policy-makers and civil society was fluid in the early days of democracy, the modern day policy processes have become formalised. The relationship is now dependent on a host of factors such as the extent to which non-state actors can make a positive contribution to policy. Referring to policy processes of the Mbeki era (1999 to date), Schoeman (2003) observes that participation is specialised and mostly of a technical nature, focused on the particular expertise of outsiders in cases where ‘inside’ expertise and capacity are not readily available.

Broad consultations during the period 1994-1998 which sought to legitimise defence policy by soliciting consensus from as many stakeholders as possible seem to be losing popularity in the Mbeki era. This has resulted in a significant reduction of civil society involvement in defence policy processes. The involvement of non-state actors in policy-making is now on a preferential consultation basis as has been the case with the ongoing defence policy update. This minimalist approach to public policy-making is a cause for concern to policy analysts.

In addition, civil society has been experiencing brain-drain due to absorption of its key people into new government structures resulting in an emergence of new political elites. Depending on the level of commitment to bringing about meaningful change, this absorption could be beneficial to civil society. In the course of their mandated activities the new elites can play a significant role in ensuring a continued inclusion of civil society in governance processes. Given the above, civil society also needs to develop strategies that would safeguard its place in policy circles. Kamrava (2000) observes that most post-democratic political elites are simply too pre-occupied with institutional and economic concerns to pay sufficient attention to the popular norms that are beginning to take hold in their country’s new, post-transition political culture or to worry about the larger population’s general dispositions towards democracy.

‘Civil society is viewed as the critical agency for creating public accountability and participatory government’ (Le Pere & Vickers, 2004: 1). The importance of

civil society participation on matters of national interest cannot be over emphasized.

The early 1990s were characterised by negotiation to end apartheid and from a defence point of view this was a defining period of the South African future defence policy framework. During this time the legitimacy of the apartheid era defence policy, in particular SADF operations, was strongly questioned and debated around negotiating tables and even in civil society circles. These concerns were later addressed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa adopted in 1996. The Constitution (Chapter 11) has provided a policy framework for the new defence force that needed to be elaborated on, hence the initiation of processes of developing the White Paper on Defence in 1996 followed by the Defence Review in 1998 and currently the Defence Update, initiated in 2004 and still ongoing. These processes are dealt with in detail in Chapters Four and Five.

Therefore, civil society in the form of anti-apartheid movements and the anti-militarists played a significant role in the post-apartheid defence policy. Rauch (1994: 12) observes:

The anti-militarisation movement, both at home and in exile, made a significant contribution to the debates about the nature of military and other security forces in a democratic South Africa. Many supporters of the objector movement and the ECC now share a new vision of security in the post-apartheid period which has also been influential in ANC policy formulation.

1.4 Summary of subsequent chapters

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The chapter reviews relevant literature, paying attention to the role and impact of civil society in post-apartheid policy processes. It examines various public policy theories and models with the aim of identifying those applicable to the study. In addition, the Chapter examines how these models have been applied in defence

policy-making. The Chapter serves as a ‘foundation’ for arguments presented in Chapter Four.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

This chapter outlines the research approach applied in the study and how the researcher arrived at the chosen approach. It further looks at data collection and analysis approaches the researcher has applied in the study. A brief discussion on how and why the researcher arrived at the choice of interviewees is also discussed. It highlights limitations to the study and provides a strategy of how these will be overcome.

Chapter Four: Presentation of Findings

This chapter presents data collected from various sources, both primary and secondary. Secondary sources include various people who were involved in the three processes of defence policy-making. The chapter explores defence policy-making processes in the post-apartheid era and focuses on civil society’s role in these processes and if this non-state actor has been able to influence the defence policy. It also looks at processes followed during the various phases of the development of the post-apartheid defence policy, and how the changes in process have shaped the final policy.

Chapter Five: Data Analysis – From theory to practice

In this Chapter civil society participation in policy processes is examined using information collected during interviews and that drawn from relevant documents, with the aim of extracting information on how this non-state actor has influenced policy in the three case studies presented in the Chapter Four. The discussion below is based on responses that emerged during the interviews.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

The Chapter sums up the researcher’s conclusions and recommendations, and also provides suggestions for future research to be carried out.

CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The notion of civil society gained popularity between the 1970s and 1980s and its importance to the democratisation project gained momentum in the early 1990s during which many countries were undergoing governance transitions. The most notable study which supports this statement being the one carried out by Putnam (1993) which concluded that the creation of civil communities contributes to sustainable democracy which in turn yields economic growth.

Twentieth century social researchers such as Edward (2001), Fine (1997) and Diamond (1994) have contributed to existing literature on the subject and various definitions have emerged out of their work. Edward observes that most important has been the recognition that states and markets are but two components of an essential trilogy: society matters, social institutions count, and citizens make a crucial difference to the health of the polity and to economic success.

Within the South African context, little attention was paid to this concept in the years preceding democracy. Apartheid South Africa was dominated by a relationship characterised by a struggle between clusters of civic organisations and the apartheid regime. It is against this backdrop that the researcher will attempt to investigate the role of civil society in post-apartheid defence policy-making processes.

2.2 Theoretical framework

In order to achieve the above objective, it is critical to locate theories, concepts and models within the existing literature. Hanekom (in De Coning et al, 2000: 29) observes:

In public policy-making, theories are utilised to explain the policy-making process. Furthermore, simplification of policy-making is enhanced by using models to present problems in acceptable dimensions, while it appears that the various perspectives on policy-making could also contribute towards greater clarity of the process.

The theoretical framework of this project will be informed by two clusters of theory. On the one hand the project will focus on defence policy as a subset of public policy, paying attention to the role of civil society in the policy process within the South African context. On the other, it will attempt to locate the process within the various models found in public policy literature. Critical stages of civil society involvement in the policy process will also be explored.

This chapter begins by exploring the various definitions offered on the topic under discussion. This is followed by identifying areas in the policy-making process where civil society has been effective. Various viewpoints have emerged in the civil society participation discourse and literature reviewed will not be limited to defence policy but will seek to explore whether these non-state actors have been able to influence other public policies. The aim is to strengthen the argument for the appropriate level of civil society participation in policy processes. The researcher then proceeds by identifying policy models applied in the three case studies being studied and the effectiveness of these approaches.

The last section attempts to identify the most suitable model which will facilitate the ideal levels of civil society engagement in defence policy-making.

2.3 Definition of terms

2.3.1 Civil society

Analyses of the nature of explanations offered in the civil society discourse indicate that there is no universal definition of civil society. However, as will become clear, various authors agree that civil society provide masses with a

platform for open political discussion, facilitate information dissemination and participate in the management of public resources.

The concept of civil society has been interpreted differently and this resulted in the emergence of various definitions of the term. Edward (2001) makes a clear distinction between the analytic and contemporary definitions of the term. He argues that analytic or structural definitions stress the importance of forms: social organisations and networks, the 'third sector', or more broadly, the arena in which citizens come together to advance the interests they hold in common. This definition contains all organisations and associations between the family and the state, with the exception of business.

Edward's second classification of civil society definitions lies with what he terms 'cognitive definitions'. He observes that cognitive definitions stress the importance of norms: social values and attributes such as trust, tolerance and co-operation that are assumed to bring about a society defined as 'civil', a way of being and living in the world that is different from the rationality of either state or market.

Diamond (in Grugel, 2002:94) points out that:

Civil society is understood to be the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from the society in general in that it involves citizens acting in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state officials accountable.

However, Zuern (2000) challenges this by observing that the central difficulty with this definition is that it does not distinguish civil society from society at large.

According to Hutchful (2003: 95) civil society refers to:

The space in which social agglomerations of all kinds (including student and professional associations, unions, churches, business groups, etc) come together to pursue their organisational interests, and in so doing, act on the state and otherwise try to affect (through various forms of advocacy and pressure) the allocation of social values and the overall conduct of power.

However, definitions of civil society are influenced by various contexts. Within the South African context the concept has emerged from various political and social movements and has its roots in the struggle against apartheid. The social, political and economic conditions of the apartheid era were characterised by conflict and antagonism which heightened during the mid 1980s. During this time the banned liberation movements particularly the ANC formed alliances with civil society groups i.e. churches, community based organisations and trade unions to push for political reforms. The formation of alliances and approaches taken in pressurising the apartheid government have innovatively altered and shaped the South African civil society.

Although the various definitions offered on the subject often bring confusion, there is a general consensus that civil society refers to social relationships between non-state actors whose aim is to promote their interests and those of other members of the public, often by challenging unequal power relations between the state and society.

The definition adopted in this study refers to civil society as a sphere where individuals or organisations promote their interests through interactions with the state, providing a channel through which the public participate in policy-making.

In the light of this definition, this study focuses on social formations with a security-based identity and whose interest is on defence and security policy research. These are limited to academic institutions, NGOs and think tanks involved in both the previous and current defence policy-making processes.

However, it is important to distinguish between research oriented NGOs and those that emerge in the implementation of social policies. Through research initiatives, the former together with academics and other experts have a responsibility of stimulating public debate which in some cases have led to policy initiation or review.

2.3.2 Apartheid defined

Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines apartheid as a political system in which members of different races had different political and social rights and lived, travelled, spent their free time, etc. apart from each other.

Another conceptualisation of apartheid is that offered by Van Niekerk (2001) who views apartheid as a value system, a form of government, an ideology, and a policy of racial segregation that formally came into being in South Africa in 1948 under the National Party government. Apartheid's basic principle was that 'race', or the classification of a person as belonging to a particular race grouping, determined the role and function of that person within the state. Under apartheid rule, the Black majority was denied basic democratic rights consequently being excluded from political activities such as voicing their opinions in matters of national interest thus resulting in various forms of resistance that led to the dismantling of apartheid in May 1994. The impact of apartheid on defence policy is dealt with in Chapter Four.

2.3.3 Public policy defined

The development of public policy can be traced back to the enlightenment theory which states that developmental problems can be solved through the 'application of knowledge and rational thinking' (Parsons, 1995: 17).

Dye (1995:3) defines policy as 'whatever governments choose to do or not to do'. These choices require rational thinking and this can only be achieved through the 'acquisition of facts and 'knowledge' about 'problems' so as to formulate 'better

solutions' (Parsons, 1995: 17). However, facts and knowledge about problems and the formulation of better solutions requires opinions of those directly affected.

In his analysis of public participation in policy-making, Landsberg (in Zake, 2006) argues that 'individuals often felt excluded from crucial stages of the setting of policy agenda' as their opinion was 'sought only at the implementation of policies, which they had no say in formulating'. He further observes that although 'the executive remains highly influential in policy formation', it lacks 'capacity to research, formulate and coordinate the entire machinery of government on its own'. He suggests that:

If SA was serious about achieving the developmental state it talked about, it should have the mechanisms to coordinate, manage and facilitate participation.

Therefore the task of identification of problems and provision of solutions should not only be restricted to government policy departments but should be extended to non-state actors who are in a better position to do so due to their closeness to communities. This should not be construed to imply that government should cease carrying out their mandates but should be understood to mean that over and above election mandates, more problems are likely to surface and these are better detected by those who are in close contact with communities.

Hanekom (in De Coning et al, 2000) is amongst those who have contributed to existing definitions of public policy. He refers to public policy as a desired course of action and interaction which is to serve as a guideline in the allocation of resources necessary to realise societal goals and objectives, decided upon by the legislator and made known either in writing or verbally (ibid).

Having looked at the various definitions literature has to offer, the study will adopt a working definition provided by Anderson (2000: 4). He defines policy as 'a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern'. The purposive course of action or 'statement of intent', to borrow from De Coning et al - refers to what the government aims to do

with the identified problem and this is normally communicated to a wider public in a form of a White Paper.

Governments distribute a variety of services through public policies. Public policies deal with a variety of issues ranging from the provision of social services to national security. Van der Walt (2001) classifies public policies into three categories, namely, domestic, foreign and defence. Since the study focuses on defence policy-making, it is imperative to define defence policy as a subset of public policy.

2.3.5 Defence policy defined

According to the South African White Paper on Defence (1996), defence policy should be in harmony with all other aspects of government policy, particularly foreign policy and national security policy. It can be described as that subset of government policy which is concerned with countering military threats; with the orientation, preparation, maintenance and employment of armed forces; and with the procurement of weaponry and military equipment (White Paper, 1996: 1). Since no changes have been effected on the update of the White Paper on Defence, the study will adopt this definition.

Some research institutions such as the Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) have extended this definition to include the strategic defence review. GFN-SSR (2005) describes a Strategic Defence Review as that which forms the foundation of a state's defence policy, outlines the plans and programmes for the modification of Armed Forces necessary to meet emerging requirements. Policy includes the reassessment of the future strategic context and its implications for the national forces.

A paradigm shift has occurred more recently as a result of the consolidation of democracy in many countries. Defence policy makers currently adopt a wider and holistic approach to defence matters with a shift from focusing on military composition and strategy to the inclusion of human security in the defence discourse.

Although the study focuses on defence policy, it should be noted that reference to security policy is inevitable as the former is a subset of national security policy. The South African White Paper on Defence (1996) makes a provision for citizens' full participation in governance processes such as defence policy-making. This approach demonstrates a clear shift from the traditional secrecy in national security issues, which by default have an effect on defence issues. In essence the statement encourages participatory governance through public debates in so doing transforming the traditional security concept characterised by secrecy and by removing the idea of tying this concept solely to the State. This paradigm shift recognises contributions that could be made by non-state actors in the development and implementation of security policy. In this regard the State is no longer viewed as the only actor in the security policy-making.

2.3.6 Policy-making conceptualised

Whenever one speaks about public policy-making there is always the likelihood that the word will be confused with political decision-making. Booysen *et al* (1998: 233) observes that:

Political decision-making and public policy-making are two overlapping and closely-intertwined processes, with decision-making always a subdivision of public policy-making. Governments formulate policies in order to address societal problems. Policy formulation involves the development of pertinent and acceptable proposed courses of action for dealing with public problems.

The overlap described above is neatly captured by Van Nieuwkerk (2006) where he provides a dichotomy of policy stages into pre-decision and decision stages. He observes that the pre-decision stage is made up of two phases, the first one being where public officials decide whether problems or issues will receive their attention. This stage is also known as the agenda-setting stage (see Anderson, 2000, De Coning et al, 2000, Parsons, 1995, Dye, 1995). Phase two of the pre-decision stage is the policy formulation stage and this is where the 'development

of proposed courses of action for dealing with a public issue or problem’ occurs (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006:18).

Van Nieuwkerk further observes that the decision stage is made up of policy formulation, decision and implementation. This is where Booyesen’s (1998) overlap occurs in that policy formulation continues flowing from the pre-decision stage as the first phase of the decision stage. However, Van Nieuwkerk (2006: 18) argues that policy formation stage is different from policy formulation, ‘because it includes the creation, adoption and implementation of policy’. Table (1) below summarises this public policy process.

Figure 1: Public policy process

Policy terminology	Phases in the policy process				
	Pre-decision stage		Decision stage		
	The policy formation stage				
	One: Policy Agenda	Two: Policy Formulation	Three: Policy Decision	Four: Policy Implementation	Five: Policy Evaluation
Definition	Those problems or issues that receive attention of public officials	Development of proposed courses of action for dealing with a public issue or problem	Action by some official body or person to adopt, modify or reject a preferred policy option	Application (administration) of the policy by the state	Attempts to measure and indicate the success of policy measures
Common sense	Getting the government to consider action	What is proposed to be done (about the problem)	Getting government to accept a particular solution (to the problem)	Applying government’s policy (to the problem)	Did the policy work?

Source: Van Nieuwkerk (2006: 18)

Van der Waladt (2001) argues that policy-making is the activity preceding the publication of a goal, whereas a policy statement or a policy is the result of that activity. Policy-making is constructed by a series of activities which together make up a policy process. Public policy analysts (also see Van Nieuwkerk, 2006, De Coning et al, 2000) have identified policy-making processes and a quick scan

of these processes indicate that there is a general consensus in their work that policy process always begins with problem identification and ends with evaluation of policy outcomes.

However, problem identification, or the “statement of the problem”, leads nowhere if clear goals and objectives are not identified and formulated (Roux, 2000: 116). Booysen et al (1998) echoing this opinion, observe that the information drawn from process models is not enough to facilitate in-depth policy analysis. These authors further observe that the lack of detail on process models obscures information about the nature of the actors involved, the relationships between them, and the influences each have on the other.

Policy process models should be used to serve as guidelines as their application is context-driven. Within the South African context, a culture of activism that characterised the country’s politics for almost two decades which resulted in the ANC taking over as a democratic government brought with it an expectation of consultation and public participation in all democratic processes. For this reason, De Coning et al (2000) argues that policy management should allow for participation in all phases of the policy process.

To obtain a better understanding of how these models are applied in public policy, the next section provides a general overview of those relevant to this study. Drawing from De Coning et al (2000) in his contribution to an examination of theories and models for analysing public policy, these are identified as elite, group, institutional and incremental models. These are discussed below.

2.4 Policy models

More often than not policy making is thought of as a clear cut process with a beginning and end, as long as one of the models is applied. Lindblom (In Parsons, 1995: 22) rejects the idea that thinking of policy process in terms of ‘stages’ or ‘functional’ relationships is misleading and proposes a model which takes account of power and interactions between phases and stages. This proposition alludes

policy-makers to the fact that models only provide guidelines and their application are context-driven, thus bringing about various complexities to the policy process.


2.4.1 Elite model

De Coning et al (2000: 33) observes that:

Elite theory is based on the premise that a small, elite group (usually government) is solely responsible for policy decisions.

Notwithstanding the above observation, the early years of South African democracy saw its governing elites being more reliant on the advice of independent policy analysts. Figure 1 adopted from Dye demonstrates this top-down approach.

Figure 2: Elite Model



Source: Henry (1992: 289)

The elite model seems to be relevant for understanding both the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and Defence Update process initiated in 2004. The latter has

often been regarded as having been inclusive but the author would argue otherwise. These arguments are presented in detail in Chapter Five. Although the drafting of the White Paper was delegated to an NGO, the process was limited to the elite i.e. the Minister and his ministry.


2.4.2 Group Model

The group model begins with the proposition that ‘interaction among groups is the central fact of politics’ (Dye, 1995: 23). Conflict is inherent whenever there are contending views and this often results in struggles for the promotion of different interests. However, this could be averted where proper mechanisms for managing this are in place. Dye argues that the task of the political system is to manage group conflict by maintaining equilibrium in the group struggle.

What may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to tip in their favor.... The legislature referees the groups struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalition, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes (Dye, 1995: 24 citing Earl Latham a political scientist).

Assuming that parliamentary committees effectively facilitate state-civil society engagement, the citation above can be understood to view public policy as a reflection of interests expressed by group formations. In addition, it assumes that all parliamentary committees exercise a strong oversight role over policy. However, this is not always the case as seen in the recent African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report which expressed disappointment in the way parliament is downplaying its ‘critical voice and becoming a cheerleader for government’ (Boyle, 2006). Boyle argues that although South Africa has good policies, bad implementation occurs as a result of ‘ineffective public participation in policy-making and Parliament’s diminishing watchdog role’. Figure 2 illustrates this model as follows:

Figure 3: Group Model



Source: Henry (1992: 289)

2.4.3 Incremental model

Lindblom (in Parsons, 1995: 289) asserts that:

The core idea in an incrementalist approach is the belief in skill in solving complex problems.

He makes a clear distinction between two dimensions of incrementalism:

- incrementalism as a political pattern of small step-by-step changes;
- incrementalism as policy analysis.

South African defence policy-making process has gone through various processes since 1994. The first and second policy phases of the White Paper and Defence Review have been regarded by the Minister of Defence (1996) as consultative processes. However, the current (third) phase known as the Defence Update is characterised by reduced public consultation. Although the current phase aims at updating or revising the existing policy, the absence of broad consultations and communication that characterised defence policy processes of 1994 – 1998 have become obvious. Dye (1995) offers four justifications for the application of incrementalism to policy but only three of these are relevant to this section and are summarised as follows:

- Policy-makers do not have the time, information, or money to investigate all the alternatives to existing policy.
- There are heavy investments in existing programmes. Within the South African context commitments made during the procurement of armaments can serve as an example and justifies the choice of an option that would cause the country 'little economic dislocation'.
- Politically expediency i.e. incrementalism is applied to easily obtain a buy-in in new policies and also to avoid conflicts that often arise before policies are passed.

The extent to which incrementalism accurately describes defence policy-making process under review will be discussed in Chapter Five.

2.4.4 Institutional model

The effectiveness of public policies is an outcome of how well public institutions function. Dye (1995: 19) argues:

The relationship between public policy and government institutions is very close. ...a policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented, and enforced by some government institution.

However, Dye warns researchers about the risks of attaching success or failure of public policies to institutional arrangements. He asserts:

Too frequently, enthusiastic reformers have asserted that a particular change in institutional structure would bring about changes in public policy without investigating the true relationship between structure and policy Dye (1995: 21).

2.5 Efficacy of civil society

The role and efficacy of civil society in influencing public policy are context-driven. Van Nieuwkerk (in Le Pere & Vickers, 2004: 67) argues that during the transition,

Civil society articulated its role in terms of opposition and resistance to apartheid oppression but it also assisted with developing and promoting an alternate vision of the future, largely maintaining an ideological symbiosis in the country with liberation movements in exile.

Apart from being instrumental in forcing undemocratic governments to transform, Grugel (2002: 92) observes that 'any explanation of democratisation, consequently, must pay attention to the concept of civil society and to the struggles to extend rights and citizenship throughout society'. Constituents of civil society are seen to be essential to the construction of what are assumed to be the social preconditions for more accountable, public, and representative forms of political power (Khilnani, 2001: 12). Analysing the relationship between civil society and public sector institutions, Uphoff and Krishna (2004: 357) argue that 'countries cannot and will not make good use of financial resources unless their public institutions exhibit characteristics such as accountability, transparency and

responsiveness to the needs and concerns of their publics'. Grugel (2002:93) notes that 'organisations and individuals from within civil society can hold the state accountable, share their experiences, promote their interests and learn values of civility and trust'.

Civil society organisations and capabilities by their existence and effectiveness help to ensure that people's interests, rights and needs are not suppressed and are, instead fulfilled (Uphoff et al, 2004: 359).

Not only has civil society been instrumental in the upliftment of democratic governance but it has and continues to play various roles in the public sphere. Civil society plays a crucial role in bringing societal concerns to the attention of law-makers and quite often these state-civil society interactions have resulted in improvements in political processes.

In his examination of how South African civil society efforts have influenced the mine-ban policy, Naidoo (2004) asserts:

South African civil society played an important role in encouraging the government to take a leading role in adopting both domestic and international landmine treaties and domestic legislation, and then ensuring compliance.

... For example the Defence Secretariat requested the holding of a number of workshops to hear and discuss the contributions of civil society to South Africa's domestic mine-ban legislation. The South African parliament gazetted the 'Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill' on 5 December 2003.

Civil society has also been able to change government policies through court actions. This has largely been in the health sector where the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has on several occasions taken the Minister of Health to court over the government's HIV/Aids medication roll-out strategies. One such example is a court ruling issued by Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson where The Constitutional Court 'denied the government leave to appeal against a high court

order compelling it to provide anti-Aids drugs in state hospitals' (MacLennan, B & Grobler, F, 2002).

Although the above are but a few examples where civil society has been successful in influencing government policies, the varied approaches highlighted above are a clear indication that state-civil society interactions are not as straightforward as one would prefer them to be. These interactions always produce a set of winners and losers.

2.6 Conclusion

The chapter began by providing definitions of various terms offered by literature and adopted those to be used in the study. It assessed public policy processes and identified phases where civil society participation has been effective during the development of the post-apartheid defence policy as problem identification and policy formulation, facilitation of dialogue and implementation.

The chapter also looked at various public policy models and identified elite and group models to explain the 1995 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. It also argued that the current Defence Update process which began in 1994 has seen decision-makers' changing direction in policy-making processes by taking an incremental approach.

Having investigated various theories/models of public policy and located various viewpoints regarding these theories, it is relevant to further investigate how these can explain post-apartheid defence policy-making.

CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Chapter overview

This chapter outlines the research approach applied in the study and how the researcher arrived at the chosen approach. It provides justification for the researcher's choice of interviewees and discusses data collection methods applied. It highlights limitations to the study and provides a strategy of how these will be overcome and followed by a short description of how data is interpreted.

3.2 Research strategy

The study focuses on challenges faced by civil society organisations in the defence policy-making processes. It seeks to clarify the relationship between state and these non-state actors by obtaining opinions from defence sector civil society such as academics, and NGOs with special interest in this sector and the DOD.

Yin (1994) argues that a research strategy is determined by the type of research question being asked. In pursuit of obtaining a clearer understanding of the role of civil society in policy-making, the researcher poses the “how” and “why” questions.

Therefore, choosing a research strategy was influenced by various factors such as those mentioned above as these have direct causal effects on research findings.

3.3 Unit of analysis

Unit of analysis is seen by De Vaus (2001) as an object of the study about which we collect information. This process of collecting information about an object or an issue is usually referred to as a case study. De Vaus further observes that

researchers carry out case studies to build up an understanding about an object such an understanding is informed by the context in which the whole case exists.

A further exploration of what a case study is in relation to what it aims to achieve can be obtained from Yin (1993:1). This experienced researcher on case study design observes that:

Case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.

The above explanations have influenced the decision to adopt the case study method in quest of obtaining the understanding of post-apartheid defence policy making. In this regard the following units of analysis are investigated:

- Transition period (1990 – 1994)
- White Paper on Defence process (1994 – 1996)
- Defence Review process (1996 – 1998)
- Defence Update process (2004 -)

3.4 Purpose of research

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of South African civil society in post-apartheid defence policy-making. It sought to achieve this by analysing previous and current trends followed by government in the defence policy-making processes. In particular, it focused on government’s engagement or the lack thereof of civil society in policy-making processes and how this engagement has influenced existing policies.

3.5 The research problem

A review of South African defence policy-making processes indicates conflicting trends since the demise of apartheid. These are identified and briefly discussed below:

(i) *Consultation is imperative for consensus on national policy*

Although consultation and participation in policy debates are assumed to consume scarce resources, it is argued that this leads to a high degree of consensus on national policies. A positive relationship between civil society and policy-makers benefits policy because:

- civil society presence in political processes subjects government to account to the public,
- its closeness to the general public enables it to communicate government strategies of with societal problems thus facilitating acceptance and ownership of public policies.

Referring to the elaborate 1998 Defence Review process, le Roux (2003: 168) observes:

The broad consultative nature of the South African defence debate made it a slow and time-consuming process. However, it greatly enhanced the quality of the debate and the end product and led to a high degree on national consensus on defence.

South Africa is regarded as having adopted one of the most liberal constitutions ever and it would therefore be an oversight not to explore the Constitution's provisions for openness, transparency and broad participation in political processes such as policy-making (Constitution of the RSA, 1993: Chapter 11). As a way of balancing power, the Constitution provides for a hierarchy of authority

within the defence structures. However, these provisions can be meaningless if civil society participation in policy-making is allowed to dwindle.

(ii) *Limited consultation*

Whereas defence policy-making of the mid-late 1990s was quite inclusive and transparent, this no longer seems to be the case today. It is argued that the reasons for broad consultations applied to both the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review were two-fold. In the first instance, having come from a background of secrecy around defence and security issues, the new government sought to reassert its legitimacy by encouraging public debates. It also sought to acquire an elevated degree of consensus around defence policy from public debates. Secondly, limited state capacity, both structurally and in terms of skills, meant that policy could not be confined only to the government and its various departments but required an inclusion of a range of other policy actors who would provide expert advice and these included civil society.

Current policy makers and implementers are of the opinion that time for broad consultations followed during the formation of defence policies in the early years of democracy has ran out. These are now perceived to be time consuming as delivery of social services should be given priority, hence the principles of Batho Pele. The pressure of being seen to deliver in increasing volumes, and to do this at accelerated speeds, contributed to policy-making beyond the mid-1990s being characterised by the focused action of a core group of policy actors (Booyesen, 2001: 131).

The most recent example of the dwindling consultation in defence policy-making is the current Defence Update process. Major changes in the channels of information and procedures used in the earlier processes in drawing up the Defence Review have been effected. Broad consultations of the earlier defence policies have been kept to a minimum. Communication is filtered and kept within the confines of those with the expertise in defence policy-making, who can also provide a certain level of technical advice to the government rendering the process less transparent.

3.6 Research question

Given the above conflicting trends, a key question is - to what extent should defence policy- making involve, engage and connect with civil society? The argument for civil society participation in defence policy process is a strong one and the research project critically investigated the views of both state and non-state sectors on the issue. Further exploration of the main question was guided by the following sub-questions:

1. What was the role of civil society in influencing defence policy?
 - During the transition period (1990–1994)
 - During the White Paper and Defence Review policy processes (1994–1998)
 - Current process of the Defence Update (2004–2006)
2. What factors prevented such a role from being realised?
3. What would have enabled civil society to play a more effective role?
4. Did the government provide civil society with a platform to shape these policies?
5. Did civil society create such a platform?

3.7 Interviewees

Key interviewees were drawn from the following institutions involved in defence policy processes. These ranged from academics, NGO representatives – including research institutions, DOD representatives, former military personnel and former parliamentarians. All of the key interviewees occupy management positions at their institutions and had been involved in defence policy processes. The selection was based on the assumption that the interviewees have acquired a high level of expertise in their fields thus should be able to provide rich data. The list is attached (Addendum 1).

3.8 Data collection

Due to secrecy the apartheid government exercised around defence issues, defence-related civil society organisations (CSOs) on the subject are in the minority. With the exclusion of the state departments (DOD and Parliament), the composition of these actors was largely made up of a small number of participants with interest in defence from the academia, NGOs, research institutes, churches and the media.

The qualitative data collection was chosen as a preferred method as it has proved to be effective in studies involving a small sample. Qualitative data can be collected in various ways such as interviews, documents, observations, focus groups etc. De Vaus (2001: 10) observes that:

Qualitative research “adopts an interpretive approach to data, studies ‘things’ within their context and considers the subjective meanings that people bring to their situation.

An interpretive approach to data is best achieved when a researcher interacts with the source of information. As with other data collection methods, the qualitative approach has the following advantages which benefited the study:

- a certain level of flexibility, allowing the researcher to re-phase questions where vague responses had been given until some form of meaning is established;
- face to face interviews being part of qualitative data collection methods provided the researcher to observe interviewees’ body language, thus bringing issues the interviewee strongly felt about to the researcher’s attention, without the former knowing it.

3.8.1 Primary data

In order to draw as much information about the phenomenon being studied, the researcher applied various approaches to the interviewing process depending on both parties (interviewee and researcher) preferences. Considering the busy schedules of some interviewees, these approaches included allowing flexibility of receiving responses in whatever form i.e. electronically or through face-to-face interviews. However, it can never be guaranteed that a particular approach will yield better results than the other. In some instances follow up interviews were unavoidable and these were mostly conducted telephonically.

Although the initial plan was to conduct structured interviews, it became evident that applying rigidity to data collection was going to be counter-productive and would increase error in the findings. Therefore an additional strategy was introduced to maximise chances of obtaining rich data. For this reason, structured and semi-structured interviews were used in those instances where interviewees were not opening up.

Whether structured or semi-structured, the research used the same type of questions for each interview, asking open ended questions thereby allowing the interviewee to speak about their experiences on the subject. Follow up questions were used to seek clarity from those interviewees who the researcher felt were not providing sufficient information.

Apart from the reasons given about the sample size, this qualitative approach is still preferred over quantitative particularly when a researcher wishes to eliminate the problem of respondents only responding to those questions they are comfortable with and leaving out the ones they feel have no relevance to them.

While good personal relationships can facilitate easy access to key people when conducting research, these can also be impediments if parameters are not adequately set. Formalisation of the process was important, considering the researcher's acquaintance to key interviewees. To ensure that the process was formal and also to avoid being side-tracked, letters providing information about

the research requesting co-operation on the study were forwarded to interviewees. Ethical considerations were also provided in the letters, detailing protection of their privacy at the dissemination of results. Their anonymity was also guaranteed. Appointments were made well in advance and in instances where respondents could not honour such meetings due to time constraints, email responses were accepted.

Permission to record proceedings was obtained prior to interviews and in all instances but two, discussions were recorded to ensure that information is captured accurately. Two interviewees responded to questions electronically. All recorded material was transcribed by the researcher and this enriched the researcher's understanding of the phenomenon.

3.8.2 Secondary data

Policy processes of both the WPOD and DR have been well documented. As the Director of the institution where the researcher is an employee was highly involved in these processes, and has written quite extensively on the subject, necessary documents are easily accessible. The relationship shared by the researcher with some key interviewees also made it easy to access additional information where necessary. Documents used included minutes of meetings and reports of proceedings during planning stages for a new democratic defence force, documents from parliamentary proceedings, journal articles and book chapters.

3.9 Limitations of research

A key limitation to the study was the sensitive nature of the topic under discussion. This sensitivity therefore renders policy-making in this area complex and it was anticipated that obtaining information was going to be difficult. Complexities around the topic, such as the secretive manner in which defence policy-making was conducted, have resulted in a limited number of people taking interest in it hence a small number of civil society organisations in this field.

Therefore, there was a compelling need to draw key interviewees from the high echelons of the defence policy-making structures. This became a constraint as it means that a small sample had to be drawn, increasing chances of error and researcher biases. The second limitation anticipated was that of difficulties in securing appointments with certain key individuals, which would have aggravated the problem of producing results within a short space of time.

The sensitive nature of the subject could also result in less commitment on the part of non-state interviewees due to fear of exclusion in future processes and this could have a negative impact on the validity of results.

3.10 Mitigating the limitations

As an employee at an academic institution that has from time to time been commissioned to carry out defence and security related research at both national and regional levels, the researcher was in a better position to secure interviews and key documents on the topic. The researcher has also built a good reputation with most key interviewees therefore it was anticipated that her interactions with them was going to be less problematic. Problems were expected in securing appointments as the nature of the identified interviewees' jobs requires them to travel extensively and delays in the finalisation of the report were anticipated.

Another area of concern was the researcher's subjectivity to civil society involvement in defence policy-making and this may prejudice opinions from state actors. To prevent this, the researcher undertook to work with policy analysts of high caliber both within and outside of the state parameters. It should also be noted that she relied on her academic supervisor, who has written quite a number of journal articles on foreign and security policy – which are closely related to the topic under discussion, for guidance and clarity.

Conversely, processes of defence and security policy-making have been well documented and therefore obtaining secondary data was less problematic. These were closely scrutinised for elimination of romanticising this policy process.

3.11 Reliability and validity

To achieve reliability, a standard set of questions were designed and the same interviewing method used throughout the data collection process. Open ended questions allowed each interviewee to speak openly about the issue being raised in a question. This was done to build up on themes that emerged and to ensure that similar interpretation of responses was obtained from one interview to the other. In addition, standardised follow up questions were designed and only be used where the researcher needed a better understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. Werbeloff (in Ngwira, 2004: 73) asserts that:

Reliability is necessary for ensuring that the results obtained on a certain occasion, under certain conditions, are reproducible.

Validity of the findings was facilitated through ensuring that each question has a direct link to the main research question. ‘Validity is necessary to ensure that the results of the survey really refer to the construct or trait intended for measurement (ibid).

3.12 Data analysis

The objective of the study sought to investigate the extent to which defence policy making should involve, engage and connect with civil society in order to bring about societal consensus on defence policy. As a point of departure, the study began with a proposition that consultation and participation in policy debates and processes lead to a high degree of consensus on national policies.

Data was analysed comparing models and how this data fitted or did not fit the models. A quick summary of the models identified in Chapter Two is provided below:

- Elite theory is based on the premise that a small, elite group (usually government) is solely responsible for policy decisions (De Coning et al, 2000: 33).

- The group model begins with the proposition that ‘interaction among groups is the central fact of politics’ (Dye, 1995: 23).
- Incremental model postulates that only a limited number of policy alternatives are available in an incremental fashion. The incremental model regards public policy as the continuation of existing government activities with the potential for small, incremental adoptions only (De Coning et al et al (2000: 32).

The researcher drew from interviews and literature review, presented in Chapter Five where she provided evidence of which model adequately explains a particular process.

3.13 Conclusion

This chapter described the researcher’s data collection and analysis approaches. It explored case study design and identified the method relevant for its analysis. Having explained methods used to collect data for the study, the next chapter focuses on the presentation of findings. See Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees.

CHAPTER FOUR - THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-APARTHEID DEFENCE POLICY-MAKING

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data collected from various sources, both primary and secondary. Primary sources include various people who were involved in the three processes of defence policy-making. These are: an academic who was involved in mapping out the new South Africa's defence policy and now an advisor to the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence, members of the DOD's Policy and Planning unit, former Parliamentarians from the ANC and the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), a member of one of the leading NGOs in the defence and security sector who also served as the Director of Strategy of the SANDF. Other primary sources in the form of available documents on the subject, were also interrogated. Therefore, the chapter is based on interviewee responses to questions raised in Chapter Two of this study and information solicited from documents such the minutes of meetings, journal articles and book chapters.

The chapter explores defence policy-making processes in the post-apartheid era and focuses on civil society's role in these processes and the extent to which this non-state actor has been able to influence policy. It also looks at processes followed during the various phases of the development of the post-apartheid defence policy, and how the changes in process have shaped the final policy.

Post-apartheid policy revisions cannot be seen in isolation from the overall transformation of South Africa in the 1990s. To this end the study will begin by providing a brief overview of apartheid defence policy-making. To ensure that the study is manageable, the apartheid period will be limited to the 1975 – 1989 period. 1975 is significant in that this is the period during which 'the national security doctrine of Total Strategy was developed by South African Defence Forces (SADF) ideologues' (Nathan, 1992). An elaboration of the Total Strategy

doctrine is provided in the overview of apartheid defence policy, section 4.2 below.

This is followed by an examination of the transition period, 1990 – 1994. The chapter finally proceeds to an examination of policy processes during the development of the White Paper on Defence, 1994 – 1996, the Defence Review, 1996 – 1998 and the current Defence Update.

4.2 Overview of apartheid defence policy

Apartheid policy making processes, particularly defence and security policy, favoured a minority of its citizens and were aimed at defending the apartheid state. Cawthra (2000: 53) observes:

During the apartheid era defence policy making was significantly militarised, with the State Security Council providing the military, intelligence and defence officers and officials with considerable leverage over the policy and as a result the military, particularly senior defence officers and officials dominated all defence and security activities, thus rendering policy-making a preserve of the elite. Defence policy-making was carried out in a closed and secretive environment in which little public or political consultation took place.

The approach, known as ‘Total Strategy’ developed and modified by the NP government during the period 1975-77 sought to combat a perceived Soviet-orchestrated onslaught on the apartheid value system. Nathan (1992: 13) observes:

The strategy was premised on the claims that South Africa faced a ‘total onslaught’ inspired by Moscow and that “modern warfare is 80% political and only 20% military”. It comprised three main arguments: responsibility for defence lies with society as a whole and not solely with the armed forces; the state should use all the resources at its disposal to

repel the “onslaught”; and certain black material grievances should be urgently addressed so as to undercut the ability of “revolutionaries” to win support.

The value system mentioned above included the oppression of non-White citizens by preventing them from participating in governance processes. It was supported by Total Strategy’s notion of urgently addressing Black material grievances through, over and above oppression, the use of force. This effectively meant that processes were not fully representative, not only in terms of racial representation but also lacked the multiplicity of policy-making actors which democracy requires. These exclusionary governance approaches were met with resistance and became more and more aggressive leading to country-wide unrests which were progressively met by the use of force by the SADF, in its attempt to ‘undercut the ability of revolutionaries’ (Nathan, 1998).

Insurrection increased after the formation of the UDF in August 1983. Price (1991:252) observes:

Under conditions of widespread insurrection, the commitment to heightened repression was folded into a broad and systematically conceived counterrevolutionary security regime.

Between the period 1983 and 1986 the government had already declared two states of emergencies. During the state of emergency, agents of security such as the defence force and the police had become involved in a range of secondary functions to counter actions of civic insurgence in Black townships, in the process acquiring greater power. Some analysts argue that this was widely seen as contributing to the politicization of the military and the militarisation of politics (Le Roux, 2005, Williams, 2003, Cawthra, 2000).

Politicisation of armed forces occurs when the military ceases to act in the spirit of nationalism, therefore adopting the political ideology of the ruling party. Indeed the SADF being an apartheid force subscribed to the NP ideology of racial segregation and identified itself with the political myth that white supremacy

represented the only form of democracy in this country. As a result, the SADF became an important element in defending the apartheid ideology in order to maintain its legitimacy.

However, analysts like Williams (2003: 213) argue that the restriction of the armed forces to their primary role does not always guarantee sound civil-military relations. He observes that while the utilisation of the armed forces in those tasks relating to either military aid to the civil power has resulted in the 'development of a praetorian identity' and military influence over the political process, there have been countries where the involvement of their armed forces in secondary tasks have not witnessed an 'assault on the principle of civil supremacy'. Examples given here are China, Israel and South Africa in the post-1994 period.

Williams concludes that there is no direct link between the deployment of the armed forces in secondary roles and their eventual politicisation. These relationships, he argues, are determined not by abstract principles, but by critical factors such as the legitimacy and authority of elected government, the resilience of civil society and its influence over the formal decision-making process in government, the composition of the armed forces and the corporate identity of the armed forces themselves (Williams, 2003: 213-214). The absence of these factors during the apartheid era resulted in undesirable effects on the image of the SADF but on the positive side gave birth to civil society organisations which later became instrumental in the crafting of the new defence force.

The negative image of the SADF and atrocities committed at the time need to be conceptualised in how the defence force evolved during the apartheid era. This evolution is neatly captured by Rauch (1994:1) as follows:

As opposition to apartheid mounted, troops were deployed against protesting black citizens, and the SADF wrought havoc in the sub-continent, where South Africa's rulers sought to bring the independent, post-colonial governments in neighbouring countries under their control. At home, there was a crisis of conscience in sections of the white community.

As Rauch argued, young whites began to leave the country rather than serve in the military. In exile, they set up the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR) to mobilise support for conscientious objectors in South Africa and to highlight the repressive role of the military. *Resister*, the journal which COSAWR published, became the primary source of information on the militarisation of Southern Africa. The *Resister* articles are now an invaluable record of the period' (ibid).

Cawthra, a former member of COSAWR, comments that the movement succeeded in filling the vacuum created by the ANC's limited capacity in defence transformation and has inspired some liberal and radical academics based in South Africa to start examining security issues.

The task of policy analysis for the ANC thus fell largely to a somewhat odd grouping of military intelligence operatives, anti-conscription activists and a small number of activist-academics, who operated within the broad political framework established by the ANC's military and political leadership (Cawthra 2000: 54).

The above clearly indicates that the NP government security policies lacked legitimacy and authority both from its constituency and anti-apartheid activists. As the government is made up of a set of actors responsible for running its institutions, this lack of legitimacy affects the credibility of its decision making processes rendering policy initiatives undertaken illegitimate.

Such was the case with the NP government whose efforts to gain recognition had undesirable results as it increasingly became aggressive not only to the black population but also towards its neighbouring countries. Williams (2003:213) observes that:

The SADF's influence over government decision-making processes extended to the executive nodes of the state ensemble particularly the State Security Council and the National Security Management System.

This provided the defence force with enormous leverage over policy, in particular its implementation strategies. These included curtailing insurgency through the application of force. SADF's maintenance of the apartheid ideology through the politicisation of the military and the militarisation of politics resulted in ever-increasing military expenditure. Cawthra (2000) observes that by the late 1980s, defence spending had increased to around one-quarter of the state budget and 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The goal of security policy under apartheid was to maintain the system of minority rule against domestic resistance and international pressure. This goal was pursued through extensive use of military and police force. Society became highly militarised as the Defence Force was drawn into all spheres of life and the defence budget imposed an increasingly heavy burden (Draft White Paper on Defence, 1995).

4.3 The Transition (1990 – 1994)

It can be argued that a series of events such as the escalation of political instability inside the country, pressure from the international community, in many ways contributed to the dismantling of apartheid. President F W de Klerk, the NP's leader at the time, surprised his constituents on 2 February 1990 with his announcement to unconditionally release all political prisoners and lifting the ban on the ANC and political organisations such as the SACP and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

Three months later, representatives from the NP government and the ANC met in Cape Town in preparation for constitutional negotiations. Rantete (1998) notes that preparatory work for the preliminary talks was initiated during the Groote Schuur meeting held from 4 to 6 May 1990, where an agreement to establish a working group which would define the parameters for ANC-government negotiations. These agreements included the government's undertaking to review its existing security legislation, to work towards lifting the state of emergency and

the curbing of violence through establishing channels of communication with the ANC (ibid).

4.3.1 Threats to negotiations

The process took off at a slow pace due to the 'government's failure to implement the Groote Schuur agreements' (Rantete, 1998: 162). Political instability and violence went on the increase, compelling the ANC to call for a 'second bilateral meeting on 6 August 1990 which resulted in the NP giving the assurance that it would fulfill its obligation with regard to security legislation and the state of emergency' (ibid).

Although with difficulties, amid violence and hostilities, a Declaration of Intent for CODESA was signed between 20 and 21 December 1990, to kick start the formal negotiations. The negotiations commenced in an environment of complete mistrust given the historical relationship between the liberation movement and the NP government.

The control of the armed and unarmed forces became a focal point given the clashes between ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters which resulted in violence that claimed many lives in areas such as Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal (PWV), Kwa-Zulu and Natal Midlands regions. Suspicions of a 'third force' playing a role in fuelling violence grew within the liberation movement and communities. The media played a major role in exposing this third force for 'in 1991, the *Weekly Mail*, together with *The Guardian* in London, broke the "Inkathagate" scandal, which described how police funds were being secretly channeled to Inkatha to block the ANC' (History of the Mail & Guardian, 1991).

In addition to the above, resistance to change from the right wing movement made up of Afrikaaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB), Conservative Party (CP) and the Afrikaaner Vryheid Front (AVF) also became an obstacle to the negotiation process. Their resistance also became violent as demonstrated with the invasion of the World Trade Centre during the multiparty negotiations in June 1993.

Cawthra (2000) observes that the multi-party negotiations culminated in the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).

4.3.2 Civil society involvement in multi-party negotiations

The TEC comprised of sub-committees and within the security sub-committee, 'the two principal negotiating partners were the SADF and MK and the latter strongly relied on the work and advice of the MRG' (Le Roux, 2006).

Le Roux (2006) observes that during this period the role and influence of civil society was restricted to some NGOs and academics such as the MRG and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). He further negotiating partners were the SADF and MK and the latter strongly relied on the work and advice of the MRG. Motumi (2006) describes the MRG as:

A progressive think tank which set the basis for defence and security policy advice to the then government-in-waiting, the ANC.

Apart from this internationally-based organisation representing civil society during the negotiations, Le Roux (2006) observes that:

NGOs such as the ISS also influenced the debate to a lesser degree through direct participation and the influence of their advocacy and publications on the other participants.

The CODESA negotiation process culminated in the adoption of an Interim Constitution in July 1993, used as a legal framework during the first democratic elections. After intense negotiations a final constitution was crafted and adopted which is today known as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

Chapter 11 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) makes provision for the re-establishment of the defence force calling for the integration of the revolutionary armies such as MK, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), Kwa-Zulu Self-

Protection Forces (KZSPF), the seven defence forces from the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda Ciskei (TBVC) homelands and the SADF into a single defence force - SANDF. Furthermore, the Constitution establishes that the primary objective of the defence force is to defend and protect the country's sovereignty and its territorial integrity while observing the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

Institutions that support this objective have been set up in accordance with the Constitution. For purposes of political stability, the Constitution stipulates that a member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. As the head of the national executive the President has authority over defence matters and should inform the relevant parliamentary committee(s) on any decisions made about the employment of the defence force.

The onset of negotiations, and the realisation by the ANC that it would inherit the existing SADF into which MK would at best be integrated, and possibly assimilated, led to a sudden requirement for new policy options (Cawthra, 2000: 51). This provided civil society with an opportunity, to become active participants in the country's political processes relating to defence policy.

While the ANC had a well established military wing, challenges such as the lack of a policy framework became evident. These included articulating South Africa's new security paradigm in a manner that would not only be acceptable domestically but also internationally. Although a disadvantage to the ANC, this created an opportunity for non-state actors to get involved in policy processes. Cawthra (2006) notes that:

This creates an intellectual framework within which individual could actually inject new ideas and introduce new concepts.

Apart from the tensions in the period leading to the general elections, the years 1990 to 1994 experienced political fluidity as unprecedented measures were taken to include a multiplicity of actors in policy processes. This was done in order to reach a consensus on conflicting issues such as complete MK takeover versus

integration, which the key negotiating parties, the ANC and NP could not agree upon at the time. Thus civil society's role in shaping future policies became evident as capacity limitations particularly within the ANC became obvious. Kenkel (2006: 3) observes:

Policy formulation in this period is characterised by the capacity gap left by the discrediting of the apartheid armed forces' paradigm (and with it their technical know-how) and both practical and theoretical innocence (though coupled with political legitimacy) of the incoming majority government.

This policy vacuum opened a window of opportunity for think tanks on defence policy such as the MRG to 'consciously fill the gap' (Kenkel, 2006). Cawthra (2000: 55) observes that during this period forums became an important feature of the South African policy process as they facilitated the participation of NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). He further observes that in some forums policy-oriented NGOs played a critical role and exploited this window of opportunity to make significant impacts on the shape of future government policy.

Table 1 below highlights deliberations made to CODESA by the ANC's negotiators who among others included members of civil society. These later became guiding principles for defence transformation.

Table 1: Guiding principles for defence transformation

• Integrating into one national defence force the armed formations associated with the parties participating in the negotiations. • Establishing effective and democratic civil control over the military. • Setting up a multi-party paramilitary force to police the elections. • Establishing an agenda for demilitarisation and disarmament of paramilitary groups which were not integrated into the national defence force. • Developing a strategy for peaceful and co-operative security relationship with other Southern African states for participating in the international collective security systems.
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Source: Cawthra (2000:54)

4.4 White Paper on Defence (1994 – 1996)

The South African political transformation which began in 1994 was characterised by various restructuring processes, including restructuring of government institutions such as the executive and relevant parliamentary committees. These were set up within a constitutional framework providing for public participation in public matters from which checks and balances could be made.

To effect efficiency of these new institutions, the government undertook radical policy positions from which defence was no exception. The process began with the initiation of the White Paper on Defence in June 1995. Cawthra observes:

During this period, defence policy was radically challenged and reviewed, both in the negotiating forums and also in civil society. A range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of them newly established, became involved for the first time in defence policy-making and a window of opportunity was opened for academics and other experts who had previously been marginalised from the defence process (Cawthra, 2000: 53).

4.4.1 Policy actors

To start the process, Deputy Minister Ronnie Kasrils tasked Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town and also former member of the MRG to draft the appropriate White Paper (Le Roux, 2003: 157).

The MRG had a membership whose origins ensured its normative resonance with the new government. The key to its success was that it brought academics and activists together with policymakers and representatives of the ANC and MK allowing ANC preferences to be clearly communicated to the academic members, who then tailored their inputs to these leanings (Kenkel, 2006: 11-12).

Its membership also included current and former ANC/MK underground operatives. Motumi (2006) observes:

Academia was also involved, mainly institutions such as Wits University (P&DM) through Prof Gavin Cawthra, the University of Cape Town (primarily through Prof Annette Seegers); the University of South Africa's Strategic Studies Department (Prof Deon Fourie) and the University of Pretoria's Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSUP) through Prof Mike Hough.

Just like in any policy process, the selection of non-state actors is of critical importance and therefore these have to meet a certain criteria determined by policy makers. Cawthra (2006) argues that:

Whether civil society has access to policy processes is determined by personal relationships and trust. Political alignment and personal relationships allows one access to these processes.

Kenkel (2006) adds that attributes possessed such as specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige and normative commitments such as value judgments and stances taken out of political expediency at specific junctures, determine entry to these processes. Indeed, Nathan's stature as the director of the MRG had already won Deputy Minister Kasrils trust through the MRG's preparatory work carried out during the negotiations and enhanced by his political credibility amongst the anti militarist camp. The organisation's pragmatism at that juncture and its alignment to the ANC's ideology secured itself a leading position in the policy process through Nathan. Cawthra (2006) observes:

What made the MRG work is that the organisation had a history in its contribution to the apartheid struggle. It shared the same values with the ANC and was thus trusted by the incoming government. Without these values it becomes difficult even if an organisation can have excellent research outputs.

However, the MOD went to great lengths after the first draft came out to ensure that as many views as possible were incorporated in the new policy and rejected

those drafts which the Ministry felt were not inclusive enough. Le Roux (2006) argues:

Early in 1995 military staff at DHQ wrote a Draft White Paper and presented this to the Secretariat. As this was a unilateral product (that had not been consulted outside the SANDF) it was summarily rejected and the Secretariat staff set off developing a Green Paper (draft white paper) of their own. Once again, this was a one-sided effort and when this was to be presented to the Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence (JSCD), and it became known that it had not yet been cleared by the Minister of Defence at his Council on Defence (COD), it was withdrawn and declared a "non-paper".

Rejecting the suggestion that the White Paper was mainly driven by an NGO, Modise (2006) notes:

The draft came out as a product of the Ministry which then parliament went through and approved. Parliament was powerful because even though at that time MK was legally disbanded, those who were not absorbed in the system kept a watchful eye on those inside. The vibrant structures such as churches, the Human Rights Commission, the Youth and Women's Leagues kept parliamentarians on their guards. As a result, there were a lot of interactions. Importantly, public hearings created a lot of vibe.

Although the JSCD was 'very active during the White Paper process' the notable limited representation of civil society at the policy formulation stage could not conclusively be regarded as representing a national consensus (Cawthra, 2000: 57). However, the White Paper was adopted in 1996 with multi-party support, and was regarded as representing 'a national consensus on defence policy' (White Paper on Defence: 1).

Table 2: The chronology of the drafting process

21 June 1995 draft of this document was published by the Minister of Defence with an invitation to Parliament and the public to comment thereon.
27 October 1995 draft incorporated comments submitted by political parties, non-governmental organisations, the defence industry, defence analysts, and members of the public and the SANDF.
31 January 1996 draft incorporated proposals from the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), as approved by that committee on 23 January 1996.
30 March 1996 draft incorporated the Minister's decisions regarding proposals of the JSCD and further submissions from the Department of Defence.
22 April 1996 draft incorporated further comments of the JSCD and the Portfolio Committee on Defence, and was presented to Cabinet on 8 May 1996.

Source: <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencwp.htm>

The White Paper presents evidence of how effective civil society contributions can be in the enhancement and legitimisation of policy. MRG members, through their brainstorming sessions were able to come up with ideas to address security challenges prevailing at the time and one of these included the redefinition of security thus aligning it with the principles of the RDP, providing the promotion of the well-being and security of citizens. In one of his journal articles, Nathan (1992) argued that 'security' should no longer be seen as a predominantly military concept, but as having political, social, economic and environmental dimensions. The argument later appeared in the White Paper (1996) with slight modifications.

Furthermore, the key principles underpinning the White Paper can be traced back to MRG's research, particularly in Nathan's 1992 publication titled: "*The Changing of the Guard*". Kenkel (2006) observes that the initial nine principles were first listed by the then in-coming Minister of Defence, Joe Modise in May 1992 and were expanded to 16 in *The Changing of the Guard* and finally incorporated into the 1996 White Paper on Defence with only limited modifications. The principles of 'defence in a democracy' were set up as guidelines to the

transformation process and derived from the Constitution (WPOD, 1996). Addendum 2 presents these principles as outlined in the White Paper.

However, the White Paper as a policy framework lacked clarity on how the policy was to be implemented. In his analysis of the draft White Paper issued by the Minister for parliament and public comment in June 1995, Cawthra (1995) criticised it for sidestepping some of the most pressing challenges facing the SANDF in his own words stating that it was ‘short on detail where it counted’.

The White Paper dealt more successfully with principles for civil-military relations and for the organisational architecture of defence management, which laid a firm basis for the next phase of the policy process, the Defence Review (Cawthra 2000: 59).

4.4.2 Policy process

Contrary to the apartheid defence policy processes which were conducted in a closed environment, the process of writing the post-apartheid defence policy was more inclusive in a sense that it was characterised by a high level of interaction and consultation between the Ministry of Defence and parliament’s (JSCD).

The process was initiated in early 1995 by the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise who tasked the Deputy Minister, Ronnie Kasrils to facilitate the development of a policy document that was politically acceptable to all South African citizens (Cawthra, 2000: 57). As already noted in the previous section, the new government faced capacity problems which resulted in the task of policy formulation being devolved to consultants. Cawthra observes:

In theory, the newly established Secretariat for Defence, headed by the Defence Secretary, Pierre Steyn, should have been responsible for drafting the White Paper, as policy became one of the key functions of the new civil authority.

Compounding capacity problems within the new government structures was the lack of a clear division of labour within the DOD. Le Roux (2006) argues:

There was no real clarity or agreement about the respective roles of the Secretariat and the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) staff.

Whenever this occurs an opportunity is created for non-state actors to get involved in the policy process. These factors, to borrow from Kenkel (2006) ‘opened the otherwise closed policy process to potential participation by members of civil society’ in a policy process which was previously a preserve of the senior army staff during the ‘Total Strategy’ era.

The draft policy document entitled Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa was issued on 21 June 1995 which outlined the process as follows:

Defence policy is no longer the preserve of an elite group of securocrats. On the contrary, the Draft White Paper is an invitation to citizens and their elected representatives to engage in debate on military matters and, to the greatest extent possible, forge a national consensus on defence.

The statement further enabled more civil society actors to express their opinion in the defence policy through their submissions to parliament, signaling government’s commitment to working within the Constitutional framework of being accountable and responsive to the public.

4.5 Defence Review (1996 – 1998)

The White Paper on Defence was approved in May 1996 (SA White Paper on Defence, 1996) and immediately thereafter a new process was instituted. The Defence Review aimed at providing guidance to the Department of Defence and the Defence Secretariat (both established under the Defence Amendment Act of 1995) in relation to the force design of the SANDF, armaments, equipment and human resources. The Act (1995) makes a provision for the establishment of a Defence Secretariat and the appointment of a civilian Secretary for Defence who among other things ‘shall serve as a the principal adviser to the Minister with

regard to defence policy matters as well as any matter which may be investigated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of Parliament’.

4.5.1 Policy actors

The drafting of the Defence Review was driven by the Department of Defence (DOD) under the supervision of Deputy Minister Kasrils. A work group, the Defence Review Work Group (DRWG) was established to draw up a discussion document to be tabled to the JSCD. In the initial stages the process was headed by the Director Strategy of the SANDF, Major General Len le Roux as an acting convenor but was later replaced by Dr Rocky Williams in his capacity as director of policy within the Defence Secretariat. In addition to the senior members of the DOD and the Defence Secretariat, the DRWG membership included ‘three representatives from the JSCD, two civilian ministerial advisors, NGO representatives, members of the academic community, representatives of the defence industry and a representative from the country’s National Part Time Force Council (Le Roux, 2006, Williams, 2003).

This inclusive approach made the process more consultative than that of drafting the White Paper as it covered a wider range of role players. As seen in the preceding section, the drafting of the White Paper was primarily driven by a few influential people who had close ties with policy makers. Contrary to this approach, the DR process was inclusive right from the beginning as the expansion of the DRWG enabled a wide range of non-state actors’ participation in the initial stages of policy development.

South Africa has in the years preceding democracy (1990 – 1994), created a culture of consultation and participation. Apart from the administration of government being dominated by good governance discourse, there is an expectation from the majority of South Africans that accountability, transparency and responsiveness would form part of government’s daily activities. These are necessary ingredients for the effective operationalisation of pledges made by the ANC government before it came into power. As an example, the Freedom

Charter (1955) stipulates that 'the people shall govern'. This pledge was carried further by the ANC in its 1994 election manifesto where it stated that its plan of action will succeed only if it is based on the active participation of all, a tradition which it would carry into government.

In his analysis, Naidoo (2006) notes that the pledges meant that the government have a responsibility to consult and involve civil society in policy formulation and implementation. Drawing from the White Paper, Naidoo further asserts that the defence policy is very clear about civil society engagement in policy processes. Putting this into perspective, the White Paper (1996) stipulates that:

The Minister and the DOD shall consult with interest groups and stakeholders in civil society in the formulation of defence policy, and shall provide the public with adequate information on defence matters (South African White Paper on Defence, 1996: 11).

This emphasis on civil society engagement, consultation and participation in governance is indication that democracy requires voices that would keep checks and balances on government in order to legitimise its actions. Taljaard (2006) contends that this in essence, is the role civil society plays. However, exercising this role is not always as smooth as one would hope it to be. She asserts that:

This role is exercised in a pool of interests where there are different components of civil society. Some of them contradict one another, some of whom are in direct opposition to one another in their agendas with government. Ultimately government acts as referee to look at what civil society is saying and actually picks certain agents in civil society that say what the government ultimately wants to.

The above is an illustration that policy making and in particular approaches to processes do not necessarily occur in a linear fashion as suggested by process models. The contradiction in the selection of actors and their involvement in the above processes clearly indicate that theoretical knowledge acquired from policy studies, particularly processes, can only serve as guidelines when theory is

translated into practice. In this regard the researcher draws on Lindblom's argument cited in Parsons (1995: 22) that thinking of policy process in terms of 'stages' or 'functional' relationships is misleading but should rather be seen as a process that takes into account the power and interactions of actors between phases and stages.

Within the policy community there will always be contending factions whose place in the policy process depends on attributes such as the power of rhetoric and possession of sectoral technical knowledge. This contestation is further exacerbated by the fiscal environment which to a greater extent, often defines whose place is guaranteed in these processes. Dye (1995) argues that what may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to tip in their favour.

Arguments presented above make one to realise that the rules of the game are constantly changed without official acknowledgement and these depend on policy maker preferences. One only needs to look at the policy maker approaches during the development of the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review and it becomes obvious that there is little evidence of clear rules of the game.

The change in the demographics of policy actors during the development of the DR suggests a strong commitment on the part of policy makers to involve a broad spectrum of participants in the process. By virtue of constitutional powers vested in him, Williams, the director of policy within the newly established Defence Secretariat, was committed to involving civil society demonstrating the influence and power policy makers have in the selection of actors and the design of processes to be followed.

4.5.2 Policy process

As stipulated by the White Paper framework, the process aimed at putting plans into place for the operationalisation of this policy. The DRWG established sub-

committees each with specific responsibilities in the review process. These sub-committees were responsible for specific chapters of the Defence Review such as defence posture, tasks and force design, efficiency, management and structure, human resources, the part-time or reserve component, land and the environment, defence acquisition process and the defence legal environment (Le Roux, 2003: 159).

To achieve an acceptable degree of legitimacy of the Defence Review, the workgroup 'embarked on a wide-ranging consultation process with political society, civil society and the state (Williams, 2003: 208). This consultation process below is outlined in Chapter 1 of the Defence Review (1998: 2):

National consultative conferences were held on 12-13 February 1996, 12-13 August 1996 and 16 May 1997. Regional workshops were held in July 1996 and May 1997 in all nine provinces where the Secretariat involved NGOs, the business community, members of the public, the academic community and politicians. These workshops were open to the public and were attended by national and provincial parliamentarians, members of political parties and government departments, and a broad cross-section of the defence establishment and civil society.

At the same time a few academics had been brought in to participate in the working groups set up to run the process. Most of these actors had already been involved in the WP process and remained involved in the new process. Although not always possible, it is important to maintain the same actors in the policy process, particularly processes that aim to achieve results within a short space of time as was the case during both the development of the White Paper and Defence Review. In government results are judged against policy objectives and as a result such judgements can effectively be made once policies have been adopted and implementation is underway. Cawthra (2004: 44) notes:

A flurry of White Papers resulted as the new ministers moved, with varying degrees of urgency, to establish policy framework and justify their departmental budgetary demands. The latter was an important factor in

the decision by the Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, to initiate a White Paper on Defence.

As already noted, the White Paper only provided a broad framework and in ‘some places open to various interpretations, and avoided dealing with key hard issues such as force design’, hence the initiation of the Defence Review process (Cawthra, 2000).

The DR process was divided into two components and ‘consisted of work done in sub-committees, plenary sessions, discussions with and obtaining inputs from departmental governing bodies and sessions with the JSCPD’ (Le Roux, 2006). Although there had been attempts to maintain the same actors as those in the WP process, inconsistencies began to surface due to varied strengths in each of the working groups. Cawthra (2003: 46) notes:

In some working groups (notably that on human resources), NGOs were strongly represented and argued their case vigorously, sometimes with better information and analytic skills at their disposal than the government officials or military officers present. There is certainly a case to be made that this had a direct influence on the policy outcome.

The process has been regarded by various analysts as the most transparent in the history of defence planning. Williams (2003:208) notes:

The breadth and depth of consultation exceeded any similar process in South African and remained possibly the most consultative process on defence policy ever attempted by a modern democracy.

However, not everything in this scenario was positive. It became clear that the availability of constitutional provisions do not always guarantee a smooth policy process and these are, more often than not, subject to various interpretations. Although policy makers at national and provincial level are constitutionally required to facilitate public involvement in their processes, power relations in politics will often determine how processes will play out.

Influenced by the political restructuring and the creation of an enabling environment for civil society participation, the democratic government undertook to reorganise the political environment by introducing various initiatives supportive of public scrutiny. Much to the surprise of many observers, the success of the DWRG in involving civil society in this policy process nearly had adversarial effects on the process itself. Cawthra (2000:61) observes:

Some members of the legislature became concerned that the Ministry was bypassing parliament in its dealing with civil society, and that NGOs were gaining an inordinate influence over the policy process, since they were actually drafting documents.

Attempts on the part of the Ministry at undoing this situation almost proved difficult as this was met with resistance due to NGOs had become 'accustomed to being in the policy loop' (ibid). Perhaps this response should be conceptualised in the South African civil society evolution. The rising protest movement experienced from the mid-1970s extending to the late 1980s resulted in a united opposition albeit with contradictory political ideologies. This incident, however, pointed to an important issue in the policy process, one which had become obscured by the 'abnormal' conditions of the transition: the relationship between government, political society and civil society (Cawthra, 2000:61).

4.5.3 The role and influence of civil society on the Defence Review

The consultative nature of the Defence Review signaled a continued effort of the MOD to bring defence policy public scrutiny to achieve national consensus. Arguments presented in the previous sections of this chapter clearly indicate that civil society access and its effectiveness in influencing policy are dictated by process. Taljaard (2006) asserts:

Essentially process opens or closes doors. If the process is fully transparent and consultative then such a process is likely to determine the scope for civil society.

The scope is influenced and dictated by the relationship civil society shares with the government of the day and the way the former organises itself in its interactions with the latter. Civil society organisations which share a similar ideology with that of the government of the day stand a better chance of engaging with government in policy processes. Le Pere et al (2004: 75) observe:

The government's receptiveness to NGO contributions is perhaps a function of the balance of political forces which would allow voices in civil society or the non-state sector to either be heard or marginalised.

Therefore, power relations determine civil society access to policy processes and depending on its strength, this access will translate in it influencing policy. However, 'a strong and symbiotic relationship and appropriately organised interventions' will benefit policy (ibid). Once access has been achieved, the responsibility of ensuring that civil society maximises its influence on policy lies with those representing the various sectors civil society claims to speak on behalf of. While this situation is regarded as ideal, government's pre-determined agenda can be an impediment.

Civil society rarely sets the agenda and in cases where it has been successful in doing so, this has been as a result of other factors such as civil society's alignment to government's strategic thinking about an issue, irrespective of whether this alignment is deliberate or by coincidence. Assessing how receptive the government is to the NGO sector in policy making, Le Pere et al (2004) cautions:

Influence is essentially based on how government feels it can best use NGOs to assist its own strategic thinking.

4.5.4 The relationship between parliament and civil society

By virtue of being entrusted by the public, there is an inherent expectation that parliamentarians should promote and ensure that public opinion is filtered into the political system. Members of parliament, as representatives of the people, have as

one of their principal functions the formulation of public policy (Molomo, 1998: 209). Molomo further observes that ‘in most democratic states, policy is initiated at grassroots level through interactions between various members of the public and political parties’.

While the above remains relatively true for South Africa, the country’s electoral system has had a different effect on civil society – state interactions due to the proportional representation system. This system enables party members to be placed in parliament based on the percentage of votes a party has secured during elections. What this effectively means is that a party that gets lesser votes will naturally get lesser seats in parliament.

When this happens, civil society is compelled to develop alternative ways of approaching societal problems other than the traditional dependency on party policy statements made during election campaigns. This creates an enabling environment for civil society to develop its own autonomy. Cilliers (in Le Pere et al, 2004) argues that:

Independence - a degree of detachment both from government and from immediate partisan political debate – should be one of the cardinal virtues of NGOs.

Apart from civil society effectiveness being determined by its own strength, this effectiveness also depends on how strong parliament is. Arguing against claims that parliamentarians’ enthusiasm began waning during the Review, Modise (2006) remarked:

The JSCD was a vehicle parliament used to agree or disagree with policies and to interfere with decisions.

For Modise (2006), the methodological contradictions of the White Paper and Defence Review processes should not be used as a measure to assess parliament’s effectiveness in ensuring that constituents’ interests are carried forward but the

assessment should investigate how parliament facilitates debates on public submissions and how these are strengthened while the process is in progress.

However, the Defence Review has been commended for its consultative approach any defence policy making has ever undergone. Whether this is this argument holds or not, the process resulted in the ownership and legitimisation of both the White Paper and Defence Review.

4.6 Defence Update (2004 to date)

4.6.1 Background to the initiation of the Defence Update process

It is clear from the above that defence policy developed in the early years of democracy was characterised by open debates and conducted in a consultative manner. On the contrary, the Defence Update process initiated in 2004 has been characterised by the marginalization of non-state actors.

After ten years of democracy the government undertook a process of reviewing all public policies in order to identify gaps and initiate changes where necessary. Defence was no exception to this policy review process. Netshitenzhe and Chikane (2003: 3) note:

The Review attempts to evaluate the extent to which government has achieved its objectives in the past decade.

Apart from being a self-assessment tool, the ten year review process was also guided by political developments which had begun creating a paradigm shift on the strategic environment. These developments, dictated by the Western agenda, include among others the post-9/11 and the war on terror agendas and to some extent, the political developments in the region.

The above reality, coupled with expectations from regional and international organisations such as the African Union (AU), Southern African Development

Community (SADC) and the United Nations (UN) that South Africa should play an active role in these forums, most importantly by ensuring that peace and stability are restored and maintained in the continent. As a signatory on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) which “provides a legal framework for SADC’s security integration, clarifying defence cooperation and interaction” (Shelton, 2005: 4), South Africa has committed itself to “provide the necessary support for the OPDSC’s stated objectives” (ibid). The operationalisation of these commitments could not take place in the absence of some form of resource allocation.

Where good governance practices are in place, effective resource allocation cannot be viewed in isolation from sound policies, hence a decision was taken by the DOD to review the Defence Review, initiated in 2004 and still ongoing at the time of producing this research report. The process, known as the Defence Update, aims at aligning South Africa’s strategic environment by revisiting the Defence Review (1998) while considering the White Paper (1996) provisions in terms of the SANDF’s role.

As noted above, the White Paper outlines the primary role of the SANDF as the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, stipulating further that ‘SANDF would be responsible for executing a range of additional secondary functions ... identified as being regional security co-operation, international peace support operations, co-operation with the South African Police Services in the maintenance and restoration of law and order ...’ (Williams, 2003: 209).

However, the changed strategic environment both domestically and continentally has had a knock-on effect on the SANDF’s primary role, rendering this role less important as South Africa’s roles in regional security cooperation and peace keeping increase. Shelton (2005:1) observes:

While the SANDF continues to play a critical role as ultimate guarantor of South Africa’s new democracy, altered domestic, regional and continental circumstances require an updating and refocusing of defence policy.

Despite the comprehensiveness of the White Paper and the Defence Review, the relevance of SANDF's primary role has over the last five years or so been under the spotlight, sparking a few debates on the issue. The armaments package, based on the SANDF's primary function of defending the country against external military aggression, also came under severe criticism. As an example, Taljaard (2006) commenting on the minimalist approach applied to the process contends that:

Political stakeholders have a stake in the list of actors being narrow if it blows open, some of the tensions that were already inherent in the White Paper, where peace keeping was already a priority and which the force design failed to follow logically... The arms procurement is not in my mind a peacekeeping procurement. We are buying fighting equipment.

Taljaard (2006) further argues that

Where government is losing a golden opportunity is to go all out to build societal consensus on peace keeping and peace enforcement in Africa. Because if they were to open up the process, much more even if the process is controversial as it may be, they could try and build the societal consensus which will never exist about the first defence review.

Analyses carried out to assess threats facing South Africa confirmed that the country was not facing an immediate conventional military threat, and therefore arms packages purchased could not address the White Paper's provisions of human security and existing realities of peace support operations. In this regard Shelton (2004: 6) observes:

The absence of a conventional military threat to South Africa, now or in the long-term would confirm the availability of SANDF personnel for collateral deployment in specific areas. Where and how the SADF can contribute to addressing human security needs could be clearly identified in an updated Defence Review.

4.6.2 The process – beginning of the end of civil society engagement?

In 2000, Cawthra predicted:

The need to legitimise policy through public consultation is not likely to be as pressing in future, the links between civil society and government—which depend to a large extent on personalities who share histories in the struggle against apartheid—are gradually weakening, and as capacity in government grows it will be less reliant on academics and expert-based NGOs (Cawthra, 2000: 65).

A similar argument is made by Taljaard (2006), who argues that having learnt from the arms deal experience, “the system is adjusting and is doing a different methodology in its second effort”. This methodology according to Taljaard has involved the narrowing down of the list of actors, and this presents a problem for democracy.

For Motumi (2006), the change in process was inevitable and should be viewed against the backdrop of the previous processes. He argues:

The defence establishment took the minimalist approach on the basis that the initial White Paper and Defence Review processes had been extensive and comprehensive, with involvement of all facets of society, including parliament and hearings in all regions.

Arguments presented above raises one’s curiosity as to the direction which our democracy is taking, particularly when the White Paper acknowledges accountability, responsiveness and openness in government as constitutional tenets (White Paper, 1996: 2). Le Roux (2006) one of the key actors in the previous Defence Review process observes that there has been very little consultation with civil society on this process. He argues:

In the two or more years that the DOD has been busy with this update they have not once opened it up to civil society. The Portfolio Committee on

Defence did call for public submission on the issues that needed to be considered and held one public hearing session. The DOD has to date not responded to civil society on any of these issues. It is in fact unclear as to what the DOD is revising/updating.

The intensive consultations of the first wave of policy making in a democratic South Africa have been reduced to a minimum, thus rendering the Defence Update process as elite-driven.

Not much has been said about this process – safe to say that only a few civil society organisations were invited to submit their comments on the draft and were subsequently invited to make presentations to parliament. Naidoo (2006) observes that ‘the lack of financial resources and insufficient time set aside for the amendment of the defence policy’ have compelled the DOD to apply reductionism. He further observes that:

Getting civil society input in the White Paper and Defence Review processes was much greater than now (referring to the Defence Update process).

4.7 Conclusion

As can be seen from the arguments presented in the preceding sections of this chapter, policy processes of the early years of democracy were undoubtedly inclusive. The inclusive nature of these processes allowed a variety of actors to make inputs to the defence debate which was notoriously known to have been a closed terrain. The interactions during policy processes facilitated a relationship of trust between the state and non-state actors, in the process legitimising policy. Not only have these processes legitimised policy but have provided the MOD and DOD which were mostly regarded as the enemy with an opportunity to prove their credibility through the establishment of sound civil-military relations.

CHAPTER FIVE - FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

5.1 Chapter overview

Chapter Two of this study identified relevant policy models and processes, matching them with those applied to defence policy. These were identified as group and elite models, with the two being applied interchangeably at various defence policy processes i.e. group model during the transition period, elite model during the development of the WPOD, reversing back to group and elite models during the DR and DU respectively.

This chapter seeks to locate their application within the three cases presented in Chapter Four. The journey in pursuit of clarity on complex policy processes seeks to obtain a better understanding of the policy-making actors and processes, and how these shape policy. This Chapter examines these models and processes in relation to information collected during interviews and that drawn from relevant documents. It examines policy-making during the transition period before focusing on the subsequent White Paper on Defence, Defence Review and Defence Update.

5.2 Transition to democracy

South Africa's transition to democracy began with the opening up of the political system to other groups outside of the apartheid's authoritarian regime. At the heart of this argument is a demonstration of how forums outside the state can assist in making the "political discourse legitimate and credible in a period of change" (Rantete, 1998: xv). Cawthra (2003:32) observes that the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation organisations and the freeing of political prisoners set in train the period known as the 'talks about talks' (herein referred to as the CODESA negotiations) during which the ANC re-established itself as an open political organisation.

The legitimisation of the political discourse during this period of change is located within civil society involvement in the democratisation project. Information obtained from various sources during the study clearly indicates that inputs from organs of civil society were influential in mapping out the post-apartheid defence policy.

Various interpretations of the CODESA negotiations have emerged, on the one hand from those applauding the inclusive approach taken by the negotiating parties and on the other, criticisms of this approach being elitist. Cawthra (2000) argues that the participation of NGOs did not signal the ‘massification’ of the policy process as those involved were themselves elite groups.

In order for one to obtain a better understanding of South African civil society it is important to locate explanations in how this non-state actor evolved. It is argued here that during the transition period, what is now called civil society then was a combination of political societies (composed of anti-apartheid political movements) and social movements. The latter had its focus on, among other things, social security issues such as human rights, education, job losses, “third force elements in the security forces” (Cawthra, 2003). The partnership resulted in the two working together in various political activities to influence policy reforms through public mobilisation, advocacy and education to increase public awareness of political issues. As a result of these activities the “National Peace Accord was signed by the major parties to the negotiations in September 1991” (ibid).

5.2.1 Determinants of civil society involvement in the CODESA talks

As can be seen from the above, the period was characterised by a culture of activism – some form of unity on the part of the oppressed – built upon trust and shared values which came out of sharing of ideas through consultation and participation of diverse groups. The NP’s banning of the ANC and the culture described above produced a rich social capital within the country and as such the researcher dismisses the characterisation of the CODESA negotiations as an elite pact. Rather these should be seen in the context of various groups (political and

social) aiming at influencing processes which later were to determine South Africa's path to democracy.

Arguments presented in the previous chapter (notably from Modise, 2006 and Cawthra, 2000) regarding the ANC's policy capacity constraints discount the elite pact notion as they suggest that the ANC often had to rely on organs of civil society to overcome these constraints. Drawing from Kenkel's (2006) analysis of the influence of policy academics on policy formulation, the researcher argues that 'policymaker uncertainty' opened up the negotiation process to other groups, extending the process beyond what would normally be 'the policy elites'.

The introduction of more players in this process challenges Kenkel's (2006) arguments on policy makers' selection of actors in policy development. According to Kenkel, at the initial stages of policy development, policymakers are confronted with many different sources of advice from within civil society. These sources are then narrowed to a manageable scale based on a set of attributes and faculties they possess (Kenkel, 2006: 3). It is argued that approaches differ depending on what policy makers want to achieve. In this instance the aim was clearly to legitimise policy and it was therefore imperative to bring in as many sources as possible to reach public consensus.

However, Bond (2000) contends that the 1990s saw policies being developed by elites. In his analysis of the development of South Africa's macro-economic policy during the early 1990s, Bond argues that a compromise occurred inside the Democratic Movement policy-making elite as views hardened during 1992-93. This argument provides an example of how a minimalist approach to policy can result in less favourable decisions being taken due to pressures from a minority group.

5.2.3 The application of Group Model

As a result of the context described above interaction among the various groups became "the central fact of politics" during the period under review (Dye, 1995).

In order to obtain buy-in from the various groups who not only differed in composition but ideologically as well, it became imperative for the TEC to legitimise processes by allowing the involvement of a wide spectrum of actors in, first and foremost, the drafting and adoption of the Interim Constitution of 1993. As a result of the integration of ideas from ordinary citizens through lobbying and persuasion, civil and political societies (the liberals and conservatives alike), a consensus was reached by contending groups albeit with compromises.

Building consensus on issues of national interest such as establishing a democratic government, reconstruction and development requires clear definitions of these concepts and accurate definitions can be obtained from citizens - through civil society structures, as these are able to articulate public problems effectively. As Mukamunana et al (2005) observe:

Civil society, in a democratic government, is a channel through which citizens participate in making and implementing public decisions; in identifying, prioritising and resolving public problems.

De Coning et al (2000) observes that “group model assumes that policy-makers are sensitive to the demands of the interest groups” which indeed was the case at the time given the relationship between the ANC (as the chief CODESA negotiator) and organs of civil society found in the CODESA negotiating forums.

5.3 White Paper on Defence: Elite Pact?

In many ways policy problems South Africa faced under the apartheid regime were identified before the development of the country’s democratic Constitution and basic approaches to dealing with these were spelt out in its various provisions. In the context of this study such a provision is that of the establishment of the DOD and the Defence Secretariat whose mandate was to develop a policy framework suitable to the new democratic context.

Policy-makers are required to be cognisant of which issues should be regarded as public opinion and which should be classified as individual issues before determining which one deserves to reach the agenda stage. Parsons (1995: 110) notes

In a democracy one could argue that public policy is a function of public opinion... and the fact that opinion is measured and is treated with such attention by policy-makers give weight to the argument that the policy agenda is set by interplay of public opinion and public power.

5.3.1 Aspects of the White Paper where civil society has been influential

Organs of civil society become influential in policy processes if their debates make it to the policy maker's agenda and their inputs feature in the final policy document. Policy makers receive various problems from the public and only serious and well articulated ones receive attention and make it to agenda-setting stage.

In his analysis of agenda setting within the post-apartheid system of integrated governance, Van Nieuwkerk (2006) observes that often senior departmental officials lobby or recommend for an issue or problem to be placed on the policy agenda and at times by the President or his senior colleagues in Parliament or the ruling party. However, the period under review serves as a classical case that policy processes evolve all the time and are context-driven and what direction these will take is determined by what government needs to achieve.

Meyer et al (2000:101) drawing from Hogwood & Dunn (1984, 67 – 68) make the following generalisations about factors influencing agenda-setting which the researcher has contextualised to suit the study:

- Firstly, the problem must reach crisis proportions and can no longer be ignored by government. Problems identified by CSOs mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter were enormous. Problems such as bringing defence under civilian control, getting the troops out of the

townships, ending the state of emergency, integrating revolutionary armies with the SADF and TBVC homeland armies, including ending the wars in the regions were all very important and could not be ignored.

- Secondly, the policy problem must achieve particularity. Cawthra (2000) observes that a conjunction of circumstances, internationally, regionally and domestically (the end of the Cold War, the independence of Namibia, moves towards settlement of civil war in Angola and Mozambique, and the suspension of armed struggle in South Africa) made it possible if not necessary for civilians to reassert control over the political and policy process with the apartheid state. This resulted in the multiparty negotiations which required the participation of organisations with popular legitimacy and anti-apartheid credentials thus creating new space for policy work.
- Thirdly, policy problems must have emotive aspects which attract media attention. Security concerns of the late 1980s not only reflected gross human rights abuses but also the brutal killings carried out by security agents. Although these were already raised by various CSOs, they were further sensitised by the media – bringing these issues to the attention of international community opposing apartheid policies.
- Fourthly, these issues raise questions about power relationships in societies. Well resourced CSOs stand a better chance of interacting with policy makers than their under-resourced counterparts. This is due to the fact that the former is able to conduct in-depth research, using seasoned researchers with less monetary concerns. In their dissemination of their findings these CSOs are able to attract high profile people to their seminars thus reaching their intended targets with ease. This has been the case for the organisations already mentioned in this study. Unfortunately, the opposite reality exists for the latter and a strategy that could be applied in such cases is to align themselves with the better-off counterparts to enhance their effectiveness.

However, it is important to distinguish participation from consultation. Within the policy-making context, the latter can be understood to refer to the process of soliciting public opinion after a draft policy has been issued while the former is a process of involving relevant stakeholders in the actual development of policy. Due to 'the urgency of establishing a policy framework that would legitimise the ministry's budgetary demands', the White Paper was developed within a closed environment with only a few experts and elites formulating this policy document. The broader civil society community (churches, interest groups etc.) were only consulted after the draft policy was issued for public comment. Nevertheless, those organs of civil society who were given the opportunity to be part of this policy process played a critical role in steering the policy agenda and determining the policy content.

The distinction between public participation in public policy and civil society participation is usually blurry and there is a tendency to use these terms interchangeably. Public participation is the direct involvement of citizens in the search for information about decisions related to public issues and how they are made (Booyesen et al, 2001: 240). Civil society participation on the other hand involves non-state actors whose aim is to promote their interests and those of other members of the public, often by challenging unequal power relations between the state and society.

The two definitions dispel any propositions that tie the involvement of civil society in policy processes with resource constraints. If properly managed, the importance of civil society involvement in policy processes outweighs that of public participation. Booyesen et al observes that one of the fallacies about public participation is that the mere act of participation satisfies people and makes them believe that justice has been done, thus leaving power relationships unchanged. These authors, citing DeSario and Langton (1987:3), observe that the past three or four decades have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of technical knowledge and skills. Viewed from the developing country's perspective, this 'increased specialisation' provides an opportunity for policy-makers to draw expert advice from these technocrats thus yielding effective and efficient policies.

5.3.2 Technical knowledge as a key to policy process

The period under review experienced unprecedented approaches to defence policy-making, with non-state actors taking a lead in identifying policy issues. Compelled by capacity shortages and moves towards open, transparent and accountable governance, the new government took off by setting theories aside, placing pragmatism at a centre stage by allowing ‘outsiders’ to steer the direction of an otherwise closed policy process. Kenkel (2006: 13) argues:

Nathan’s involvement in the drafting process presents a unique case of extremely strong influence, as he was involved not only in the drafting of the document, but also in that his advice carried considerable weight with Kasrils, who bore the ultimate responsibility for the (civilian) oversight of the document’s content. Instances in which a consensus could not be reached were referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.

The approach taken by government at the time became a demonstration that ‘lobbying and policy advocacy – shaping the public policy agenda – do not always originate from inside the state’ (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006: 112).

Thus for policy outcomes to be effective, policy formulation which according to process models is carried out during analysis, requires to be executed by those in possession of knowledge of specific areas and technocratic skills. Depending on context, this however should not be construed as an application of a minimalist approach but should be seen as an alternative to solving complex problems. A minimalist approach in this study refers to the restriction and exclusion of other policy actors in policy-making.

As noted in Chapter Four, the drafting of the White Paper was outsourced to an NGO and it is argued here that the basis of this decision was, in addition to the political context described above, capacity problems within the newly established civilian components of the DOD. The DOD is made up of the civilian Defence Secretariat and the SANDF.

Cawthra (2000: 57) observes:

In theory, the newly established Secretariat for Defence, headed by the Defence Secretary, Pierre Steyn, should have been responsible for drafting the White Paper, as policy became one of the key functions of the new civil authority. In practice, however, there was little capacity in the Secretariat and responsibility for drafting the White Paper was devolved to consultants.

While this could be seen as confinement of policy-making to elites, an erosion of participatory culture which the majority of South Africans wanted and still want to be identified with, evidence points out that this approach was inevitable given the speed at which solutions to problems had to be derived. This assessment argues that although the liberal democratic theory of public policy requires ‘active decision-making’, circumstances often compel liberals to apply methods contradictory to their ideologies. Such was the case during the drafting of the WPOD which in many ways resembled an elitist approach; policy constraints discussed below challenges De Coning et al’s elaboration of the model in which he asserts:

...The elite/mass model contends that a policy-making and policy-executing elite is able to act in an environment characterised by apathy and information distortion, and thereby to govern a largely passive mass of people (De Coning et al, 2000: 34).

As will be demonstrated in the section that follows, South African society, particularly in the period under review were anything but apathetic, instead it showed enthusiasm in all forms of politics – from gender activism to security issues.

5.3.3 White Paper policy constraints

Political transformations often result in departures of key people who served under the outgoing regime and South Africa was not immune to this challenge. This departure brought about policy-maker “uncertainty” thereby creating a “policy vacuum” which was consciously filled by “academics and other experts who had previously been marginalised from the defence process” (Kenkel, 2006: 9; Cawthra, 2000: 53). As already noted in Chapter Four, some policy ground work and analysis of the SADF had already been carried out in exile by COSAWR. It is therefore argued the policy constraints discussed above influenced the decision to devolve the drafting to consultants before finally appointing Laurie Nathan as the principal drafter.

In addition, this study dispels any assumption that the WPOD was developed by elites, as this assumption fails to recognise strides taken by civil society representatives in CODESA substructures and the oversight role played by members of parliament after the release of the first draft of this policy document. With reference to the role of parliamentarians during defence policy development, Modise (2006) observes:

To a large extent our experiences as members of civil society before we became the government later on had a bearing on how as politicians we were pushing for decisions.

Given the inherent complexities associated with policy-making, the statement asserts that the choice of a model to be applied in policy processes should be guided by what the political system needs to achieve. In this instance the political system needed to legitimise defence policy without compromising the values established during the struggle against apartheid.

Notwithstanding the above observation, the early years of South African democracy saw its governing elites being more reliant on the advice of independent policy analysts.

5.4 Defence Review: Group Model

Contrary to the drafting of the White Paper, the Defence Review process was largely driven by civil servants in the newly established Secretariat for Defence. Cawthra (2000) argues that “the Defence Secretariat maintained close links with civil society” thus creating an atmosphere for a wider engagement of civil society. Chapter Four suggests that the process was sub-divided into Working Groups which were initially restricted to the JSCD but was later expanded to include a few academics and interest groups.

The above is an illustration that policy making and in particular approaches to processes do not necessarily occur in a linear fashion as suggested by process models. The contradiction in the selection of actors and their involvement in the above processes clearly indicate that theoretical knowledge acquired from policy studies, particularly processes, can only serve as guidelines when theory is translated into practice. In this regard the researcher draws on Lindblom’s argument cited in Parsons (1995: 22) that thinking of policy process in terms of ‘stages’ or ‘functional’ relationships is misleading but should rather be seen as a process that takes the power and interactions of actors between phases and stages into account .

The Defence Review, as the second phase of the defence policy was truly inclusive. The major role players in this process of change were the South African Parliament represented by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), Cabinet, the Defence Ministry, the Department of Defence (consisting of the Defence Secretariat and the Defence Force) and Civil Society Organisations concerned with defence and security (Le Roux, 2003:154). In this regard the various parties involved in this process all were aiming at influencing policy in one way or the other.

5.4.1 Application of Group model

Group theory begins with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central fact of politics (Dye, 1995: 23). Conflict is inherent whenever there are contending views and this often results in struggles for the promotion of different interests. However, this could be averted where proper mechanisms for managing this are in place. Dye argues that the task of the political system is to manage group conflict by maintaining equilibrium in the group struggle.

The expansion of the DRWG by engaging non-state actors serves as an example that policy process does not always go in linear stages as public policy literature suggests. The preceding section argued that the choice of a particular model over the others needs to be contextualised and analysed against policy objectives. The WPOD, as a policy framework made a provision for the roles of the SANDF and as these are issues of national interest, there was a need to unpack these roles and it became imperative to apply the principles of participatory democracy (i.e. consultation, engagement and obtaining a buy-in from the majority of citizens) in so doing.

National interest is usually triggered by various issues and in countries with high social welfare expectations, resource allocations will trigger debates and such will have to be negotiated and re-negotiated until a national consensus on the issue is reached. Such was the case during the drafting of the Defence Review. A balance had to be struck between the purchasing of armaments versus prioritisation of the RDP.

Defence policy and execution of defence tasks will broadly affect society either in a positive or negative way, thus will stimulate a great deal of interest group activity. It is against this backdrop that the study makes a strong argument for the involvement of the public.

5.5 Implementation of the White Paper and Defence Review

Civil society in a democratic government is a channel through which citizens participate in making and implementing public decisions; in identifying, prioritising and resolving public problems, and in allocating and managing public resources (Mukamunana et al, 2005: 667). Central to this argument is that policy-makers, in their efforts of legitimizing policies, should recognise the importance of transparency and participation in policy processes. Civil society also plays a watchdog role in the implementation of policies.

Policy implementation is a crucial phase in a policy process as this is where policies are transformed into practice, hence the importance of stakeholder buy-in when reaching this stage of policy formulation. However, translation of policies into tangible outcomes is subject to various interpretations and more often than not, this occurs because of the biases policy-makers and implementers may have about government priorities. This has been the case with the implementation of the WPOD and the DR, upon which the government based its decision to purchase arms packages.

The controversy around the type of equipment the Cabinet approved from which the 'Guns or Butter' debate stemmed, is a classical example of how power and the different agendas civil society bring to the policy-making process, can influence and alter national priorities. These debates were sparked by the defence force's requests for new equipment which the public was not in favour of. As Cawthra (1998) asserts, many argued that the money would be better spent on the RDP, while the defence ministry insisted that new purchases were vital to prevent 'block obsolescence', and to protect South Africa's sovereignty and economic interests. However, the public was defeated in this debate because the decision to purchase armaments to the value of R30 billion was made and approved by parliament. This has been widely seen as contradictory with the White Paper (1996) which makes a provision for alignment of defence expenditure with the RDP priorities.

At the adoption of the White Paper, the government acknowledged the 'compelling need to reallocate state resources to the RDP and further stated that any cuts to the defence budget had to be rational and well planned'. To this end, a provision has been made in this policy document that 'the SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently' (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 3-4).

However, reductionism approach applied at implementation phase nearly compromised the legitimacy of this policy. It transpired during the interviews that some of the procurement decisions were made with little involvement of parliament, let alone civil society. Consultation throughout policy process on matters of national interest can not be over-emphasised as this presents government with an opportunity to explain to the public what it is doing and why is it doing what it is doing. As a result of the lack of consultation when arms procurement decisions were made, the public felt (and still do) that this exercise was a waste of money which could have been allocated to worthy causes.

Kaul (1997) observes that policy implementation calls for consensus-building, participation of key stakeholders, conflict resolution, compromise, contingency planning, and adaptation. Implementation of public sector policies involves delivering services to the public and therefore 'members of the public must also be adequately informed to enable them to provide input into the policy process and to assess government's implementation of policies' (Ball et al, 2004:75). The process is likely to be accompanied by changed roles which in certain instances has resulted in tensions among stakeholders, beneficiaries and implementers and therefore requires effective management.

5.6 Limits to the role civil society in policy-making

5.6.1 Weak parliamentary structures

As noted in previous policy processes discussed in Chapter Four and partly in this chapter, parliament exercised vigorous oversight roles in ensuring that defence policy represented the wishes of the majority of South African voters. However, there has been a reversal of processes, a ‘closed meeting’ so to speak, and this is highly controversial as it contravenes the Constitution which is very clear on the rules of parliament particularly in relation to transparency.

‘Parliament is the ultimate institution in which public policy is debated and ratified by the representatives of the people’ (Taljaard & Venter, 2001: 51). In its interactions with the Executive, it is therefore of utmost importance that parliament has sufficient capabilities to hold the latter accountable.

The strength of parliament cannot be over-emphasised in policy processes as this is a vehicle through which civil society interacts with government. Parliamentary structures that only serve as rubber stamps to Executive decisions weaken civil society and the results thereof have a spill-over effect on democracy.

Criticisms such as those that arose in the APRM report which point to the government’s bad enforcement of policies, are a sign of the weakening parliamentary structures. The role of parliament in a democratic society is to ensure that citizens’ views are taken into account by facilitating public participation before decisions are taken. Therefore, weak parliamentary structures often result in the suppression of civil society in policy processes consequently compromising the legitimacy of political processes. Booysen (1998) argues that policy is one of the major factors that structure the outcomes on which governments are judged.

5.6.2 Executive power

As much as the Executive is accountable to and has the responsibility for executing the laws of parliament, but where parliament is weak and incapable of exercising its oversight role the results have had an opposite effect. A strong Executive is also a necessary requirement for strengthening democracy because unlike parliament which represents constituencies, the Executive represents all citizens and therefore is responsible for ensuring that

5.7 Defence Update and Elite model

For purposes of clarity the study adopts De Coning et al's definition of the elite model outlined below:

The elite model is based on the assumption that a small, elite group (usually government) is solely responsible for policy decisions and this group governs an ill-informed public (the masses) (2000: 33).

Dye also observes that elitism reduces public officials and administrators as merely executors of decisions made by the elite. Policies flow downward from elites to masses; they do not arise from mass demands (Dye, 1995: 26).

Contrary to processes discussed in the preceding sections, the Defence Update process initiated in 2004 has been met with criticism for its lack of detail in consulting non-state actors. Motumi (2006) observes that the defence establishment took the minimalist approach on the basis that the initial White Paper and Defence Review processes had been extensive and comprehensive. To this end, all analysts interviewed concurred with this statement further acknowledging that the Portfolio Committee on Defence has called only one public hearing session on the issue and some further reiterating that two years down the line, the DOD is yet to respond to civil society on issues it raised.

The evolution of politics requires governments to continually adjust their policies to fit new realities. The Defence Update as the name suggests, aims at realigning the defence policy, in this instance the Defence Review, with South Africa's new strategic environment. This strategic environment is contextualised within the 9/11 events, South Africa's security commitments internationally (UN), continentally (AU) and regionally (SADC).

These are complex issues but do they warrant the minimalist approach when strategies to deal with them are developed? It is argued here that interactions with organisations mentioned above should be guided by policy frameworks agreed to by South African citizens and development of these frameworks should not be confined to the government and its institutions such as parliament. These processes should continue to be broadened to organs of civil society as had been the case when the Constitution, White Paper and the Defence Review were developed and adopted. South African defence policy making as a progressive process, has gone through various models since 1994. The initial phase, the White Paper can be argued to have been more consultative in comparison to the Update initiated in 2004. Of significant note is the absence of broad consultations that characterised defence policy processes of 1994 – 1998.

Theoretically, these justifications are relevant but in democratic states they may prove to be difficult to put into practice. As incrementalism may at times be inevitable, any effort to apply this approach to policy process that will achieve the basic principles of good governance such as transparency, legitimacy, ownership, efficiency has to include participation of non state actors enabled by a culture of inclusive and accessibility which the majority in this country desire.

Policy-makers make a mistake of assuming that consultations are not necessary in cases where existing policies are amended. Due to the consultative nature of the WP and DR processes, the new defence policy received 'multi-party support' from parliament and the public (Cawthra, 2000). As a result of the minimalist approach taken on the Defence Update process, there is a chance that changes introduced to the policy will receive less support.

Parsons (1995: 288) asserts that policy evolves through complex and reciprocal relations among all the bureaucrats, elected functionaries, representatives of interest groups, and other participants. However, this should not be construed to mean that there is a balance of power in pluralism. As already demonstrated in the White Paper case study, dominance and bias determine policy outcomes.

5.7.1 Public institutions, public policy and the institutional model

The effectiveness of public policy is an outcome of how well public institutions function. It is in this context that the following argument on the institutional model will be based. However, it should be noted that the discussion does not suggest any link between structure and policy but is based on how structure have an effect on policy process. The model, drawing from the summary offered by De Coning et al (2000: 36) is premised on the argument:

As public policy is legitimised by government, and only government policies apply to all members of society, the structure of governmental institutions can have an important bearing on policy results.

The above citation not only suggests a link between public policy and institutions but can also be argued in relation to the effect of government institutions in determining policy processes to be followed in policy-making. Parliament is one such institution and has a responsibility to ensure that the public expresses its opinion, through parliamentary presentations before policies are adopted. However, this requires a strong parliament capable of exercising an oversight role and this has been identified as lacking in the current composition of parliamentarians.

The departure of experienced people from senior positions such as portfolio committees and their replacement with inexperienced junior members has been identified to be contributing to these weak parliamentary structures. Robinson (2006) reports that of the ANC's 274 MPs, only 49 of these have remained in

parliament since 1994. The author further observes that nine of the 27 portfolio committee chairpersons have been in parliament since 1994.

This is a gloomy picture particularly if the portfolio committees are supposed to be ‘the engine room of the National Assembly’ the level at which ‘most policies are thrashed out’ (ibid).

5.7.2 Defence Update – restructuring of processes?

Providing groups with access to policy making processes enhance the quality of policies as this provides policy makers with a broad range of views to be investigated before policy propositions can be tabled before decision makers. During the apartheid era group formations formalised themselves by forming forums each dealing with specific issues. Forums facilitated debates within civil society which later became demands put on the apartheid government. Such strategies were applied by anti-apartheid movements such as the UDF whose focus was on civic issues and MRG who in the late 1980s had begun developing future South African security policy frameworks. In an interview with one of the key interviewees to this study, it came out that the ten key principles underpinning the WP could be traced back to the workings of MRG and such ideas were generated through brainstorming.

5.7.3 Public participation versus consultation

What began as participatory governance seems to be taking a different approach. The defence update was initiated in 2004, the year which South Africa celebrated ten years of its democracy. Within the defence and security civil society circles celebrations included far-reaching changes in the domains of policy and decision making. These changes had an effect on processes and actors participating in the processes in order to effect improved policy outcomes. Participation and consultation which formed the basis for creating policy legitimacy are now seen as slowing down the transformation pace.

The distinction between public participation in public policy and civil society participation is usually blurry and there is a tendency to use these terms interchangeably. Public participation is the direct involvement of citizens in the search for information about decisions related to public issues and how they are made (Booyesen et al, 2001: 240). Civil society participation on the other hand involves non-state actors whose aim is to promote their interests and those of other members of the public, often by challenging unequal power relations between the state and society.

The two definitions dispel any propositions that tie the involvement of civil society in policy processes with resource constraints. If properly managed, the importance of civil society involvement in policy processes outweighs that of public participation. Booyesen et al observes that one of the fallacies about public participation is that the mere act of participation satisfies people and makes them believe that justice has been done, thus leaving power relationships unchanged. These authors, citing DeSario and Langton (1987:3), observe that the past three or four decades have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of technical knowledge and skills. Viewed from the developing country's perspective, this 'increased specialisation' provides an opportunity for policy-makers to draw expert advice from these technocrats thus yielding effective and efficient policies.

5.8 Conclusion

While policy studies often places emphasis on models and theories, the application of these depend on a variety of variables and interpretations and should therefore be studied and analysed within this context.

The examination of civil society participation in defence policy shows that South African civil society has made significant progress in penetrating and engaging the government in processes previously perceived as the reserve of the elite. The 1990 to 1998 period experienced unprecedented political fluidity, with civil society playing a critical role at crucial policy stages such as analysis and agenda setting (during both the transition and the white paper processes) and participation

in the various DRWGs where it also made an impact in influencing policy outcomes. Unfortunately the same cannot be said about the current Defence Update. The process is taking place within a cocooned environment with very little being revealed about it.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Within the policy community there will always be contending factions whose place in the policy process depends on attributes such as the power of rhetoric and possession of sectoral technical knowledge. This contestation is further exacerbated by the fiscal environment which to a greater extent, often defines whose place is guaranteed in these processes.

6.1 Summary of key findings

It is clear from the discussions that defence policy-making processes have varied considerably since the unbanning of political organisations on 2 February 1990. The transition period saw unprecedented moves by the ANC (as a principal negotiator) towards ensuring civil society presence and engagement in political processes. The culture of activism and consultation which characterised the struggle against apartheid was carried through to the CODESA talks in which defence sector members of civil society were active participants in shaping the future defence policy. Whether the outcome of these talks was as a result of elite pacting or civil society was a real player in this process, is debatable. Of significance out of this process was the development and adoption of the Interim Constitution, a policy framework for governing the country until a democratically elected government was put in place. The final Constitution was adopted in 1996.

Whereas policy processes of the Constitution were characterised by an involvement of a multiplicity of actors, the WPOD (1994 – 1996) was developed within a restrained environment. A policy vacuum created by the departure of the apartheid civil servants with policy expertise and the urgency to develop legitimate policies resulted in the confinement of policy formulation to a new generation of policy elites.

The approach to developing the DR (1996 - 1998) was more accommodating to civil society participation and engagement, with success stories recorded in the

some chapters of this policy document. Civil society has been instrumental in shaping the human resources policy of the defence forces among others. However, analysis of the process provided a clear indication of how power relations shape policies. An example of how dominance in a policy process can influence policy outcomes is that of how civil society arguments on SANDF's primary versus secondary functions were shelved in favour of the military calls for new equipment.

Although the civil society arguments were based on threat analysis, it is argued that military dominance during the development of the Force Design Chapter resulted in the decision to purchase new armaments for the defence force. This decision raised a lot of questions as it was and still is seen as government contravention of its own socio-economic policies. For discussion on how this approach came into place and justifications provided for the procurement of weapons, see Pretorius (2006).

Notwithstanding the above observations where participation was the order of the day in the previous policy processes, policy-makers in the current DU which began in 2004 have taken a minimalist approach. Some of the reasons provided are that the WPOD and DR processes have been extensive and comprehensive and therefore updating certain sections of the policy does not require such elaborate processes.

The study noted that policy-making approaches in the three cases have varied substantially. Elite model offers a better understanding of the development of the WPOD, whereas group model was applied to the DR process and incrementalism is applied to the current DU process.

The broad participation of the WPOD and DR came about as a result of various factors which have been discussed in the introductory chapter and then in detail in Chapters Four and Five of this document. These reasons are summarised as follows:

- **Changes in the strategic environment**

Global changes occurring at the time required a new thinking about the security architecture resulting in various actors entering the defence policy domain, something one could have not experienced in apartheid South Africa.

- **Vibrancy of civil society**

The culture of activism during apartheid impacted on policy processes in terms of exchanging viewpoints, consultation and acceptance of a popular viewpoint.

- **Legitimisation of policies**

New policy-makers did not want to repeat the same mistakes of the apartheid government and therefore sought to legitimise policies through dialogue and participation to obtain buy-in on issues of national interest.

As a result of the consultative nature of these processes, the following benefits, adopted from Le Roux (2003) were noted:

- The open consultative way in which the review process was undertaken in South Africa led to a large degree of national consensus on defence. This has the benefit that it gives legitimacy and credibility to the defence force, and, therefore, also enhances popular support for and the image of defence.
- Participation of civil society in the defence debate greatly enhanced the quality of South African defence policy. The expertise within academic institutions and NGOs was used to complement that of the military leading to a fresh look at defence matters.

6.2 From presence to engagement

Civil society is an important player and should be involved and engaged in the formulation of defence policy, since defence issues are no longer the preserve of a chosen minority. Debates on these issues require analytical inputs and contributions from civil society, in terms of setting the direction, defining the roles and functions of defence forces and any other contributions aiming at aligning defence policy with national socio-economic policies.

As was evident during the ‘Guns or Butter’ debates of the late 1990s when the ‘relationship between defence spending, the defence industry and economic growth’ came under public scrutiny, civil society was instrumental in challenging the viability of some of the decisions made on the acquisition of arms. The major issue at the time, which until now is still not resolved is how ‘a developing country such as South Africa could predicate its force design and its budget on the primary function’ (Williams, 2003: 12).

Civil society needs to revise its strategies if it were to re-book itself a place in policy processes. As one of the interviewees pointed out:

Civil society itself has a responsibility to engage with government. It cannot be expected that government (the defence establishment in this case) must approach civil society, when the same civil society is confining itself to a corner and does not engage the state and become part of policy formulation. The responsibility therefore also lies with civil society too.

The above statement challenges civil society to come up with new strategies of ensuring that their voices are heard. Most of them, notably those research oriented, are already doing that by producing research outputs which in some instances have been found to be useful to government. In addition, a collective effort from these research institutes will benefit future policies. This can be achieved if (a) these non-state actors cease to compete for government’s attention in antagonistic ways and (b) policy-makers begin to seriously engage civil society and incorporate their inputs final policy documents.

The changing circumstances require that defence policy be reviewed from time to time. Defence policy-makers should consider a process where concepts of defence policy are reviewed on a short-term basis e.g. every three to five years. These reviews should not only be confined to policy-makers and government analysts but should also involve non-state actors.

6.3 Defence Update – what lessons can be drawn from this process?

However, evidence from the findings suggests that there has been a change in approach regarding the current process of reviewing the defence policy. The DOD and the Defence Secretariat have taken a minimalist approach citing that the incremental nature of the process does not require the broad consultations that characterised the previous policy processes. Not much information on the process could be obtained from both primary and secondary sources, except to say an advertisement was placed in a newspaper and only one session of public hearings was held in Parliament. This unfortunately has resulted in speculations which may compromise credibility of the policy. Some of these have been whether the minimalist approach could be as a result of the arms procurement debate, which became a vicious experience for the entire political system and exposed the lack of efficiency within the existing parliamentary structures.

As the above are speculations, it was argued that should they be accurate, policy-makers would be making a judgement error as they would be denying themselves an opportunity to reclaim societal confidence - something which the government needs to achieve particularly after the heated debates about the approved expenditure on arms. It was also argued that had policy-makers opened up the process, even if it was going to open up controversial issues such as the one discussed above, possibilities of achieving a high societal consensus on the updated policy would be greater than that of the Defence Review.

The speculations became evident during one of the interviews when one of the key people in the previous policy processes suggested a lack of clarity on what the DOD was updating in the current Defence Update. Such speculations also feature

in various media reports. The recent analysis of the SANDF's new strategic environment offered by Stead and Mills (2006), the former being a military officer and the latter, a well-known researcher on policy issues, is a clear indication that the current Update is not only a mystery to ordinary members of the public but also to stakeholders. This provides evidence of how policy-makers have kept this process closed.

The evolving nature of politics brings with it changes in government structures. With each election comes new people (with varied strengths and capabilities) installed in government positions. Contrary to the crucial role parliament played in the previous defence policy processes, concerns have been expressed in the media and during interviews about this seemingly dwindling role. In this regard the study also concluded that civil society's access to policy processes depends on the strength of parliament. In addition, some of the interviewees revealed that due to resource constraints (time and financial) government would rather avoid the lengthy consulting processes, provided the latter does not complain.

Therefore it was argued that in the absence of a clear role of parliament, civil society needs to constructively engage government to remain in the loop. However, resource constraints appear to be an excuse to obscure possible policy disagreements within the decision-making structures. Policy process becomes weak when decision-makers are divided.

From a public policy point of view an example of the effects of such divisions can be drawn from the controversy South Africa experienced recently in Toronto, Canada over its HIV/Aids policy. Responses to the Health Ministry's perceived lack of commitment to the fight against HIV/Aids received global coverage and some of the newspapers reported on the possibility of 'a task team involving the Presidency, the Health Department and Government Communication and Information System' being set up to address this (Webb, 2006).

In addition, the reactions around Minister Tshabala-Msimang's response to the pandemic serve as an illustration of how the lack of communication of government policy implementation strategies can lead to disastrous outcomes.

This was even highlighted by a government official during an interview with *The Star* newspaper where he stated:

The cabinet's view is that our responsibility is to find a better way of communicating the strategy so that we are not seen to be over-emphasising one aspect and not highlighting the overall comprehensive strategy we are adopting (ibid).

Could it be that the MOD, DOD and Defence Secretariat are undergoing a similar crisis where ideology clashes have begun to overshadow reality?

Perhaps a response to the question posed above should be sought from Williams' observation:

A crucial tension lies at the heart of South African defence planning and this concerns the extent to which defence planners are realistically designing armed forces for the existing and likely challenges which they may face in future (Williams, 2003: 221).

6.4 Recommendations

6.4.1 Civil society-state relations – way forward

In democratic states, the public as consumers of public goods have a right to demand that its priorities are communicated to and considered by decision-makers before decisions are made about which and how public goods will be distributed. Democracy demands the inclusion of non-state actors in the formulation of public policies (including defence policy) because ultimately the society is the beneficiary of these policies.

The 'Guns or Butter' debate has not gone away. If anything, it has increased. Future defence policy processes should include communication, consultation and engagement if policies are to be regarded as credible. Should the government

continue engaging with civil society and vice versa, something which this study strongly recommends, it would need to realise the importance of constructive engagement and discard the notion of engaging civil society only when it wants to legitimise its policies.

Future defence policy reviews should guide the type of equipment the defence force requires and the decision should be aligned with functions of the SANDF. If South Africa is going to be involved in more peace missions, peace-building or peace-keeping then the type of equipment should reflect this.

The defence strategic environment is not static and changes within it occur all the time without notifications. Today's events are characterised by interconnectedness and changes occurring in one country have an effect on another country's inhabitants. As an example, the effects of 9/11 have had an impact on the global security strategic environment prompting policy-makers to rethink their security assumptions. As a result of these events, it is recommended that South Africa's leadership must take a decision to subject defence policy to regular reviews for example, every four or five years. The success of these reviews will depend on the availability of analytical and research skills both within the policy department and in civil society, and also on sound relationships facilitated by efficient two-way communication between interest groups and stakeholders.

Providing groups with access to policy making processes enhances the quality of policies as this provides policy makers with a broad range of views to be investigated before policy propositions can be tabled before decision makers. It is further proposed that parameters for civil society participation in policy processes be developed, with a view of establishing of a forum comprised of all key actors in the sector, from which government could draw expertise and advice from time to time.

6.4.2 Recommendations for future research

The findings and conclusions indicate that civil society currently plays an extremely limited role in shaping defence policy in this country. It is recommended that future research focuses on:

- Investigating factors that limit civil society's participation in defence policy-making.
- Establishing whether or not government assists in creating an enabling environment for civil society to actively participate in these policy processes.
- Establishing effective communication, consultation and engagement strategies with all stakeholders and interest groups.
- The need to re-invigorate the JSCD with a sense of purpose.

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Addendum 1: List of interviewees

Interviewees	Date	Sector & Designation	WPOD	DR	DU
Cawthra, G. Prof	March 2006	Academia Chair: Defence and Security Management, Graduate School of Public Development, University of the Witwatersrand	x	x	x
Taljaard, R. Ms	July 2006	Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Public Development, University of the Witwatersrand Former Democratic Alliance (DA) MP		x	x
Modise, T. Ms	July 2006	Government Speaker: North West Legislature Former ANC MP: Joint Standing Committee of Defence	x	x	x
Motumi, T. Mr	June 2006	Deputy Director General: Policy & Planning, Department of Defence	x	x	x
Naidoo, S. Mr	July 2006	Deputy Director: Research & Analysis			x
Le Roux, L. Maj. Gen (Rtd)	April 2006	NGO Head of Defence Sector Prog: Institute for Security Studies	x	x	x

Addendum 2: Principles of defence in a democracy

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs for South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.
- South Africa shall adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party.
- The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
- South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
- South Africa's force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defence policy which derives from an analysis of the external and internal security environment, which takes account of the social and economic imperatives of the RDP, and which is approved by Parliament.
- The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.
- The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall be determined by the Constitution and the Defence Act.
- The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary approval and safeguards.
- The SANDF shall be subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.
- The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law. It shall respect human rights and the democratic political process.
- Defence policy and military activities shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, insofar as this does not endanger the lives of military personnel or jeopardize the success of military operations.
- The SANDF shall not further or prejudice party political interests.
- The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution.
- The composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes will be introduced.
- The SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training.