



**WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCE-BASED CHARACTERIZATION OF GROUP A
STREPTOCOCCI (GAS; *STREPTOCOCCUS PYOGENES*) ISOLATES CAUSING
INVASIVE DISEASE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2019 - 2020**

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Master of Science in Medicine
(Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases)

Submitted by

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DECLARATION

I, Sibusisiwe Thobile Zulu, declare that this dissertation is my own work. Experiments described here were conducted under the supervision of Professor Anne von Gottberg and Dr. Sibongile Walaza at the Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis, National Institute for Communicable Diseases, a division of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Medicine to the Faculty of Health Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to this or any other university.



Sibusisiwe Thobile Zulu

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FOR ME

"I want to thank me for believing in me, I want to thank me for doing all this hard work. I want to thank me for having no days off. I want to thank me for never quitting. I want to thank me for always being a giver and trying to give more than I receive. I want to thank me for trying to do more right than wrong. I want to thank me for being me at all times"- Calvin Cordozar "Snoop dogg" Broadus Jr.

PRESENTATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Invasive group A streptococcus (iGAS) is a major cause of morbidity. Penicillin and erythromycin are recommended for treatment. A 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine is being developed. We describe the molecular epidemiology of iGAS disease in South Africa, 2019 - 2020.

iGAS episodes (cultured from normally sterile sites or from necrotising fasciitis wounds, among all ages) were detected through active, national, laboratory-based surveillance. At the national reference laboratory, isolates were confirmed phenotypically based on colony morphology, β -haemolysis and sensitivity to bacitracin; antimicrobial susceptibility testing was done by disk diffusion and broth microdilution; and isolates were further characterized by whole-genome sequencing. A SNP-based phylogenetic analysis determined genetic clusters.

Of 1487 iGAS cases that were reported, 618 were characterised phenotypically (viable isolates available) and 577 genotypically. Incidence was 1.7 cases/100,000 persons in 2019 and 0.9/100,000 in 2020, with peaks in the extremes of age. All isolates were susceptible to the β -lactam antibiotics. Resistance was detected against tetracycline (10.5%; 65/618), erythromycin (3.6%; 22/618), chloramphenicol (0.2%; 1/618) and levofloxacin (0.2%; 1/618). *tetM* and *mef* genes were present among isolates resistant to tetracycline and erythromycin, respectively. Overall, 56 *emm* types were identified. *emm76* (33/577, 5.7%), *emm92* (30/577, 5.2%) and *emm82* (29/577, 5.0%) were the most prevalent. Globally, *emm1* is the most frequently occurring *emm* type in high-income countries, yet it was only detected in 3.7% of the isolates in the present study. *emm76* and *emm95* types accounted for most of the tetracycline- and erythromycin-resistant isolates, respectively. *emm* types in the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine accounted for 44.6% (244/547) of isolates. Phylogenetically, identical *emm* types clustered together. Among genetic clusters, there was no geographical and temporal aggregation of cases.

iGAS treatment with β -lactams remains appropriate. The 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine offers coverage to less than half of the isolates. No unidentified outbreaks were detected.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

ABCs	Active Bacterial Core surveillance
AMR	Antimicrobial resistance
APSGN	Acute post streptococcal glomerulonephritis
ARF	Acute rheumatic fever
AST	Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
BHI	Brain heart infusion
BLT	Bead-linked transposome
BP	Base pair
CC	Clonal complex
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CLSI	Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute
CNS	Central nervous system
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
CRDM	Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis
CRF	Case report form
DoH	Department of Health
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
ECM	Extracellular matrix
ERM	Erythromycin ribosome methylase
FbaA	Fibronectin binding protein of group A streptococci type A
FbaB	Fibronectin binding protein of group A streptococci type B
Fbp54	Fibronectin binding protein 54
GAPDH	Glyceraldehyde-3- phosphate dehydrogenase
GAS	Group A streptococcus
GBS	Group B streptococcus
GERMS-SA	Group for Enteric, Respiratory and Meningeal Disease Surveillance in South Africa
GTR	Generalized Time Reversible
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPCC	High performance computing cluster

HREC	Human Research Ethics Committee
iGAS	Invasive group A streptococcus
iTOL	Interactive Tree of Life
Lbp	Laminin binding protein
LIS	Laboratory information system
Inu	Lincosamide nucleotidyltransferase
LRTI	Lower respiratory tract infection
LTA	Lipoteichoic acid
MALDI-TOF	Matrix- Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization-Time Of Flight
MEF	Macrolide efflux
MIC	Minimum inhibitory concentration
ML	Maximum-likelihood
MLST	Multilocus sequence typing
Mrp	M related protein
NaOH	Sodium hydroxide
NHLS	National Health Laboratory Services
NICD	National Institute for Communicable Diseases
NMC	Notifiable medical conditions
NML	National Microbiology Laboratory
NPI	Non-pharmaceutical interventions
NT	Non-typable
O ₂	Oxygen
Pbp2x	Penicillin-binding protein 2x
PCR	Polymerase chain reaction
PFBP	<i>S. pyogenes</i> fibronectin binding protein
PFGE	Pulse-field gel electrophoresis
PHAC	Public Health Agency of Canada
PHE	Public Health England
PI	Principal investigator
POCT	Point-of-care test
PrtF1	Protein F1
PrtF2	Protein F2
QC	Quality check

qPCR	Real-time polymerase chain reaction
RADT	Rapid antigen detection test
RHD	Rheumatic heart disease
SAg	Streptococcal antigen gene
SARS-CoV-2	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
Scl1	Streptococcal collagen-like surface protein 1
Scl2	Streptococcal collagen-like surface protein 2
SDA1	Streptodornase D
SfbI	Streptococcal fibronectin binding protein I
SfbII	<i>S. pyogenes</i> fibronectin binding protein II
SfbX	<i>S. pyogenes</i> fibronectin binding protein X
Shr	Streptococcal haemoprotein receptor
SIC	Streptococcal inhibitor of complement
SLO	Streptolysin O
SLS	Streptolysin S
SmeZ	Streptococcal mitogenic exotoxin Z
SMHA	Mueller Hinton with 5% sheep blood agar
SNP	Single nucleotide polymorphism
SOF	Serum opacity factor
Spa	Streptococcal protective agent
Spe	Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin
Ssa	Streptococcal superantigen A
SSTI	Skin and soft tissue infection
ST	Sequence type
STSS	Streptococcal toxic shock syndrome
TAT	Turnaround time
TB1	Tagmentation buffer
TET	Tetracycline
TSB	Tagment stop buffer
TWB	Tagment wash buffer
UK	United Kingdom
UKHSA	United Kingdom Health Security Agency
URTI	Upper respiratory tract infection

US	United States
UTI	Urinary tract infection

1 INTRODUCTION/LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 *Streptococcus pyogenes* (group A streptococcus)

1.1.1 History of *Streptococcus pyogenes* (*S. pyogenes*)

Streptococci were first observed in 1874 by Billbroth in patients presenting with erysipelas and wound infections (1). Five years after this, Pasteur observed the same pathogen in the blood of patients presenting with puerperal sepsis and in 1883, Fehleisen cultured streptococci from erysipelas lesions (1). In 1884, Rosenbach named this organism *Streptococcus pyogenes*, which translates to 'pus-forming chained round-shaped bacteria' (1).

1.1.2 Bacteriology of *S. pyogenes*

Streptococcus pyogenes (*S. pyogenes*) are classified as group A streptococcus (GAS) based on the Lancefield grouping system (2). The Lancefield grouping system was created by Rebecca Lancefield and it classifies catalase-negative Gram-positive cocci based on the antigen of the bacterial cell wall (2). There are currently 20 groups, designated group A-V (excluding I and J) (3). GAS grow in pairs as spherical or ovoid cells or as small to moderate sized chains in clinical specimens (1). When grown on blood agar, GAS appear as white to grey colonies surrounded by zones of complete β -haemolysis (**Figure 1**) (1). The haemolysis is due to the presence of the virulence factor streptolysin S, present in most GAS strains (1). GAS exclusively colonize humans as their host (4).



Figure 1: Growth of *Streptococcus pyogenes* on blood agar showing β -hemolytic colonies and inhibition by bacitracin disc after 24-hour incubation

1.1.3 Pathogenesis of *S. pyogenes*

The primary site of GAS colonization are epithelial surfaces, mainly the throat and skin (5). The throat and skin are the main sites where GAS are maintained and are the main source of GAS transmission (4). Transmission occurs from person-to-person via respiratory droplets from an infected person or through contact with contaminated skin (6).

Colonization by GAS is a precursor for developing disease and various GAS surface structures are involved in host colonization (4,5). The initial attachment of GAS to human host cells and extracellular matrix (ECM) is thought to be a process that occurs in two stages, namely (i) weak/long-range binding followed by (ii) strong high-affinity binding (7). A membrane-bound amphiphilic polymer of glycerol phosphate containing glucose and D-alanine termed lipoteichoic acid (LTA) is hypothesized to play a role in facilitating the first stage of GAS attachment to the host by establishing weak hydrophobic bonds between bacterial cells and host components (7). This weak interaction is a precursor step that allows longer-distance first-attachment events to occur with the assistance of GAS long-surface appendages such as pili (4). This is then followed by the second stage of adherence that involves numerous high affinity binding events between GAS and host components (4). These high affinity

binding events include GAS surface protein-to-host-cell-protein binding or lectin-to-carbohydrate binding events (4). There are numerous GAS surface proteins that enable GAS to interact with multiple host components, thus allowing GAS to establish themselves in various tissue sites in the human host (4). These GAS surface proteins include fibronectin/laminin binding proteins such as PrtF1/Sfbl (Protein F1/Streptococcal fibronectin binding protein I), PrtF2/PFBP (Protein F2/*S. pyogenes* fibronectin binding protein), FbaB (Fibronectin binding protein of group A streptococci type B), SOF/Sfb II (Serum opacity factor/*S. pyogenes* fibronectin binding protein II), SfbX (*S. pyogenes* fibronectin binding protein X), Fbp54 (Fibronectin binding protein 54), FbaA (Fibronectin binding protein of group A streptococci type A), Scl1 (Streptococcal collagen-like surface protein 1), Scl2 (Streptococcal collagen-like surface protein 2), Lbp (laminin binding protein), Shr (Streptococcal hemoprotein receptor) and GAPDH (Glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase) (4,8).

1.1.4 Virulence of *S. pyogenes*

Once GAS has colonized its host, it may cause non-invasive disease or penetrate deeper into epithelial barriers in order to spread into blood vessels and deeper organs, thus causing invasive disease. For GAS to cause disease, it needs to evade the hosts innate immune system (9). GAS have a plethora of surfaced-expressed and secreted virulence factors that help it evade the host immune system (9,10). In addition to their role in host colonization, the surface proteins PrtF1/Sfbl, FbaA, Scl1 and GAPDH assist GAS in evading the host's innate immune system by inhibiting the ability of the host antibodies and phagocytic cells from removing microbes and damaged cells from the host i.e. Inhibiting complement activity at the site of infection (8).

Most GAS strains possess a hyaluronic acid capsule which is an accessory virulence factor (1). The hyaluronic acid capsule shields GAS from phagocytosis by polymorphonuclear leukocytes and macrophages of the human host (1). When cultured on blood agar, GAS strains that produce high amounts of the hyaluronic acid capsule have a mucoid appearance (1).

The M-protein, a surface protein and an important virulence determinant of GAS, was first described in 1927 by Rebecca Lancefield who demonstrated that the immune response was targeted to this antigen (9,11). The M-protein presents itself as a long α -helical coiled coil structure that is anchored in the bacterial membrane and extends from the surface of the cell (**Figure 2**) (9). The M-protein consists of a C-terminal region that is highly conserved and a surface exposed N-terminal region that is hypervariable and associated with serotype identity (4). The serotypes are referred to as *emm* types (4). This feature offers protection through diversity as novel *emm* types (i.e. *emm* types that have not previously colonized the host) evade antibodies raised by the host in response to a previous infection (4,11). The M-protein also protects GAS from opsonization and phagocytosis by polymorphonuclear leukocytes of the host and strains that lack the M-protein have been shown to be avirulent (1). The M-protein has also been shown to induce thrombosis in the host through coagulation activation (12–14). Some M-proteins are capable of binding to human fibrinogen leading to platelet activation which can result in the activation of neutrophils and monocytes, thus accelerating inflammation in the host (14).

In addition to the surface-expressed virulence factors discussed above, GAS produce various secreted virulence factors including two types of hemolysins, namely streptolysin O (SLO) and streptolysin S (SLS) (1). Most GAS strains produce both hemolysins and they are both toxic to numerous host cells and cell fractions (1). SLS is responsible for the β - hemolysis of GAS observed when cultured on blood agar (10). SLS is produced only by GAS strains grown in the presence of serum, serum albumin, α -lipoprotein, ribonucleic acid or detergents (1). Antibodies raised against SLO are used in serology testing as an indicator of a recent streptococcal infection (15).

Some GAS strains produce streptococcal superantigen exotoxins (10). The term ‘superantigen’ was coined to describe the strong primary T cell response these exotoxins illicit (10). The excessive T cell response results in the release of pro-inflammatory cytokines which can lead to toxic shock syndrome (10). These exotoxins were historically known as erythrogenic or scarlet fever toxins because of the red rash they cause in patients presenting with scarlet fever (10). The term streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin (Spe) was later proposed (16). There are currently 14 *S. pyogenes* exotoxins that have been described and they are Spe_A, Spe_C,

Spe_G, Spe_H, Spe_I, Spe_J, Spe_K, Spe_L, Spe_M, Spe_N, Spe_O and Spe_P as well as the streptococcal superantigen SS_A and the streptococcal mitogenic exotoxin Z (Sme_Z) (10). Different GAS strains will encode different combinations of 3 - 6 streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin genes (10).




Figure 2: The M-protein structure of group A streptococcus. Adapted from (17).

1.2 Clinical manifestation of GAS disease

GAS can be asymptotically carried in the throat, which is more common in children aged 5-15 years (18). GAS can cause disease and are responsible for various non-invasive diseases (e.g., pharyngitis, scarlet fever and superficial skin infections) and are also capable of penetrating epithelial barriers and mucous membranes, thus causing more serious invasive disease (e.g., bacteremia, cellulitis, puerperal sepsis, pneumonia, septic shock syndrome, soft-tissue infections and necrotizing fasciitis) (5,18,19). GAS infections that are not treated properly may trigger post-streptococcal autoimmune sequelae, such as acute rheumatic fever (ARF) (20) and acute post streptococcal glomerulonephritis (APSGN) (21). Repeated episodes of ARF may ultimately lead to rheumatic heart disease (RHD) (20,22).

137

138 **1.2.1 Non-invasive GAS disease**

139

140 **1.2.1.1 Pharyngitis**

141

142 Streptococcal pharyngitis is an infection of the pharynx and is the most common
143 illness caused by GAS, with an estimated 600 million cases occurring annually
144 (19,21). Transmission, which occurs from person-to-person via the respiratory route
145 (4), is favored by crowded environments such as military camps and schools (1).
146 GAS causes 20-30% of all pharyngitis cases in children and 5-15% of cases in
147 adults (21). The most vulnerable group are school-aged children aged 5-15 years
148 (21) and peak incidence is seen during the early years of school (1). The most
149 common symptoms of pharyngitis include fever, sore throat, headache, nausea,
150 abdominal pain and malaise (21). Uncomplicated GAS pharyngitis is often self-
151 limiting and symptoms normally resolve within a week (21). Suppurative (e.g., otitis
152 media, sinusitis, bacteremia), non suppurative (e.g., ARF) or toxin mediated (e.g.,
153 streptococcal toxic shock syndrome) complications may arise during or after a GAS
154 pharyngitis episode resulting in more severe disease (21).

155

156 **1.2.1.2 Superficial skin infections**

157

158 GAS can cause various skin infections including impetigo and pyoderma (21).
159 Impetigo is the most common skin infection caused by GAS, with an estimated
160 annual global disease burden of 111 million cases (19). Individuals with impetigo
161 present with reddish sores normally around the nose, mouth, hands and feet (21). A
162 few days following initial appearance of the sores, these sores burst and form honey-
163 colored crusts (21). Transmission occurs through contact with infected skin and most
164 commonly affects young children in low-income countries, residing in crowded areas
165 that experience tropical and subtropical climates (4,21).

166

167

1.2.1.3 Scarlet fever

Scarlet fever manifests as a result of an infection with a GAS strain that produces streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxins (Spe) (1). Scarlet fever is recognized by a distinct rash (scarlatinal rash) (1). At first, the rash appears over the upper part of the chest and spreads lower to the trunk and higher to the neck before moving to the extremities (1). Additional distinct scarlet fever symptoms include (i) scattered petechiae on the body; (ii) covering of the tongue by a white coat with red papillae, giving it a white strawberry tongue appearance and (iii) a beefy red tongue (red strawberry tongue) that appears when the white coat disappears (1).

1.2.2 Invasive GAS disease

It is estimated that globally, approximately 163 000 deaths occur annually as a result of invasive GAS (iGAS) disease (19). Invasive disease caused by GAS includes severe skin and soft tissue infections, pneumonia, meningitis, bacteremia, peritonitis and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome.

1.2.2.1 Severe skin and soft tissue infections and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome

The most common cause of severe skin and soft tissue infections (SSTI) are *Staphylococcus aureus* and GAS (1). Common manifestations of SSTI include erysipelas, cellulitis, necrotizing fasciitis (often polymicrobial) and Fournier's gangrene (1). The most common portal of GAS entry which may result in a SSTI is a break in the host's skin (1). Necrotizing fasciitis, which is the most severe SSTI, is an infection of the deeper subcutaneous tissue and fascia and it is distinguished by broad and rapidly spreading necrosis and gangrene of the skin and underlying structures (1). Even with appropriate treatment, mortality rates for necrotizing fasciitis are extremely high (20%-70%) (1).

Streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS) occurs when an individual is infected with a GAS strain that possesses a streptococcal superantigen exotoxin (10). The exotoxins exert a strong T-cell response which results in the release of pro-

inflammatory cytokines causing the sudden onset of shock and organ failure (1). STSS manifests in three phases namely: (i) fever, chills, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea that is accompanied by low blood pressure within 24-48 hours of initial symptom presentation; (ii) increased heart rate (>100 beats per minute), abnormal breathing and severe pain at the site of infection; and (iii) the sudden onset of shock and organ failure (1).

1.2.3 Post-streptococcal sequelae

1.2.3.1 Acute rheumatic fever/Rheumatic heart disease

Acute rheumatic fever (ARF) is an autoimmune disease that may develop after pharyngitis or a skin infection caused by GAS strains that are rheumatogenic i.e. elicit an autoimmune response (23,24). After an infection with GAS occurs, an immune response is triggered in which neutrophils, macrophages and dendritic cells initiate phagocytosis of the bacteria and present it to the T cells (23). T cells respond by initiating T cell activation which together with B cells produces antibodies (23). In individuals who develop ARF, an autoimmune reaction against various host tissues (heart, brain, joints etc.) is triggered by both the antibodies and T cells through a process termed molecular mimicry as the antibodies and T cell epitopes are shared between the pathogen and those human host tissues (23). Symptoms of ARF include polyarthrits, Sydenham's chorea, skin manifestations (such as erythema marginatum and subcutaneous nodules on skin) and inflammation of the heart valves and myocardium (23). Repeated episodes of ARF may lead to permanent damage of the heart valves, thus resulting in rheumatic heart disease (RHD) (23). A 2005 systematic review estimated that globally, approximately 471 000 cases of ARF occurred annually and most of these cases (336 000; 71%) occurred in children aged 5-14 years (19). Deaths due to ARF or RHD were estimated at 350 000 annually, with the majority of these deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries (19). A South African study reported that during 2006-2007, the incidence of newly diagnosed RHD cases among adults (>14 years old) in an urban community was 23.5 cases /100 000 per annum (25).

1.2.3.2 Acute post-streptococcal glomerulonephritis

Acute post-streptococcal glomerulonephritis (APSGN) is an immune-mediated sequelae of pharyngitis or skin infections caused by GAS (4). APSGN is not caused by a direct GAS infection in the kidneys but rather it is a kidney disease that develops when the host immune system, while combating the GAS infection, mistakenly targets and damages healthy renal tissue (4). Symptoms of APSGN may develop as soon as 10 days after GAS pharyngitis or may take 3- 6 weeks to develop after skin infections (21). The clinical presentation of APSGN includes malaise, fatigue, headache, edema, hypertension, blood in urine and elevated levels of protein in the urine (21). Globally, more than 470 00 cases of APSGN occur annually resulting in approximately 5000 deaths, the majority of which occur in low-income countries (19).

1.3 Diagnosis

It is important to rapidly diagnose GAS disease to initiate appropriate patient management for the prevention of serious complications and to prevent potential outbreaks from occurring (26). Clinical suspicion based on symptom presentation alone is not enough to accurately diagnose a patient with GAS disease as the signs and symptoms of a GAS infection may overlap with the signs and symptoms of other infectious causes (27). Therefore, a laboratory test may be necessary to accurately diagnose a patient with GAS disease.

The gold standard for the diagnosis of GAS infection is culture (26). Briefly, an appropriate specimen type is collected from an individual suspected to have GAS disease and the specimen is inoculated on horse blood agar and incubated in aerobic conditions for at least 48 hours (26). Resulting colonies are identified as GAS based on colony morphology, the presence of β -hemolysis, Gram-positive staining, a negative oxidase and catalase test and a sensitivity to bacitracin (5,26,27). Matrix-Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization-Time Of Flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry and latex agglutination can also aid in the detection of GAS (26). One of the limitations of using culture is the long turn-around-times (TAT's) as it may take 2-3 days to obtain a result which is not ideal in emergencies. Another limitation

is that patients may be treated empirically using antibiotics prior to obtaining a specimen for testing and in such cases, obtaining a positive culture result may not be possible.

Serology may also be used for the diagnosis of disease caused by GAS infection. Serology testing is normally utilized when a prior infection with GAS is suspected in a patient that presents with symptoms suggestive of post-streptococcal sequelae, such as ARF and APSGN (15). Serology is the preferred method for diagnosis in such cases as the post-streptococcal sequelae may only be evident long after the initial infection with GAS has cleared, thus yielding a negative culture result (15). Serology may also be utilized to discriminate between carriage and active infection with GAS (28). Streptolysin O and deoxyribonuclease B antigens are one of the main targets of streptococcal serological assays (15). Similar to culture, a limitation of using serology testing to diagnose GAS disease is the long TAT's as it may take up to 4 weeks to mount an immune response that can be detected and this may not be useful for diagnosis in patients who present with acute GAS disease (15).

As mentioned above, the use of culture and serology to diagnose a patient with GAS disease can result in long TAT's and this is why over the past two decades, other techniques have been developed in an effort to shorten TAT's. One such technique is the use of immunochromatographic rapid antigen detection tests (RADTs) that detect the polysaccharide C cell-wall antigen of the bacteria (26). These rapid tests are often used for patients that present with acute pharyngitis in order to determine the etiological agent so to make a decision on the need for antibiotics. RADT's offer the advantage of quick test results and testing can be conducted either within the laboratory or at the physician's office as a point-of-care test (POCT) (27). One of the major short-comings of RADT's is that interpretation of results relies heavily on the user, which may introduce user variability and subjectivity (27). Nucleic acid amplification tests (26,27) including real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) have also been developed for the detection of GAS in specimens by targeting specific conserved regions in GAS such as the *spy* gene (29).

The diagnosis of ARF is made based on fulfilling specific clinical criteria, referred to as the Jones Criteria (**Table 1**) (30). Initially established in 1944 (31), the Jones Criteria has undergone several updates with the latest update in 2015 (30). The

299 Jones Criteria is divided into major and minor manifestations. A patient diagnosed
300 with ARF for the first time should have laboratory results indicating a preceding GAS
301 infection and in addition, present with two major manifestations or one major
302 manifestation accompanied by at least two other minor manifestations (30). Should a
303 patient present only with Sydenham's chorea, they are exempt from fulfilling these
304 criteria as this manifestation may only become evident long after GAS infection and
305 thus a laboratory test result may not yield a positive result (32). For patients with a
306 history of ARF or RHD, diagnosis is based on laboratory results indicating a
307 preceding GAS infection and two or one major manifestations together with two or
308 three minor manifestations (30).

Table 1: The Jones Criteria 2015 used for the diagnosis of acute rheumatic fever.
Adapted from (30).

Criteria	Population	Manifestations
Major	*Low-risk populations	+Carditis (Clinical and/or subclinical)
		Arthritis (Polyarthritis only)
		Chorea
		Erythema marginatum
		Subcutaneous nodules
	Moderate-and high-risk populations	Carditis (Clinical and/or subclinical)
		Arthritis (Monoarthritis, polyarthritis or polyarthralgia)
		Sydenham's chorea
		Erythema marginatum
		Subcutaneous nodules
Minor	*Low-risk populations	§Polyarthralgia
		Fever ($\geq 38.5^{\circ}\text{C}$)
		ESR ≥ 60 mm/hr and/or CRP ≥ 3.0 mg/dL
		Prolonged PR interval, after accounting for age variability (unless carditis is a major criterion)
	Moderate-and high-risk populations	Monoarthralgia
		Fever ($\geq 38^{\circ}\text{C}$)
		ESR ≥ 30 mm in the first hour and/or CRP ≥ 3.0 mg/dL
		Prolonged PR interval, after accounting for age variability (unless carditis is a major criterion)

ESR- Erythrocyte sedimentation rate; CRP- C-reactive protein

Erythema marginatum and subcutaneous nodules rarely occur in isolation as major criteria.

In a single patient, joint manifestations can only be regarded as either a major or a minor criterion

CRP value must be greater than the normal laboratory upper limit

ESR values may change during the course of ARF and therefore, peak ESR values should be used

*Low-risk populations are defined as those with an annual ARF incidence ≤ 2 per 100 000 school-aged children or an annual RHD prevalence of ≤ 1 per 1000 population in all ages

+Subclinical carditis is defined as echocardiographic valvulitis

§ Polyarthralgia is considered a major manifestation only in moderate-to high-risk populations after other causes have been ruled out

1.4 Prevention and treatment of GAS disease

1.4.1 Prevention

Currently, the only available treatment strategy for GAS disease is antibiotics (18). To prevent ARF and RHD, in South Africa there are two strategies that are recommended: primary prevention and secondary continuous prophylaxis (33). As a primary prevention strategy, it is recommended that children aged 3 -15 years presenting with a sore throat are treated with penicillin to prevent ARF (33). In addition, it is recommended that children with a history of ARF should continuously be treated with penicillin as prophylaxis, either intramuscularly once every four weeks or twice daily orally until they reach 21 years old to prevent recurrent ARF (33). Any individual with a history of RHD should receive prophylaxis until they are 35 years old (33).

1.4.2 Treatment

Antimicrobial resistance patterns of GAS to various antibiotics vary globally, but using phenotypic and genotypic techniques, various studies have reported that GAS causing invasive and non-invasive disease continue to be universally susceptible to β -lactams such as penicillin (18,34–40). Penicillin and penicillin-based antibiotics are therefore the first-line agents for the treatment of invasive and non-invasive GAS disease and the prevention of ARF/RHD (18). Macrolides (erythromycin) are used as an alternative for treating patients who are allergic to penicillin (21,41). Some patients may experience gastrointestinal side effects when taking erythromycin and therefore other antibiotics (e.g., clindamycin, azithromycin) have been approved for the treatment of GAS disease (21). Vancomycin or linezolid can also be used to treat patients who are intolerant to penicillin (41).

For severe iGAS disease such as necrotizing fasciitis, meningitis, pneumonia and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS), a combination of clindamycin and penicillin is recommended for treatment (42) as clindamycin has been shown to inhibit protein synthesis at the ribosomal level, thus resulting in the inhibition of the synthesis of GAS virulence factors such as streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxins and the M-protein (39). Although not routinely used to treat GAS disease, particularly in

354 children due to the negative side effects they have on bone and joint development
355 (43) fluoroquinolones such as levofloxacin can be used as an alternative for adult
356 patients who cannot take penicillin and considering the global increase in macrolide
357 resistance (44). Tetracycline antibiotics are not commonly prescribed for the
358 treatment due to the high rate of resistance among GAS (43).

359

360 **1.4.3 Antimicrobial non-susceptibility**

361

362 The antimicrobial resistance rates of GAS to different antibiotics vary globally (45).
363 Globally, GAS remain susceptible to β - lactams. Although clinical resistance to β -
364 lactam antibiotics has never been reported, in 2021 the CDC reported two of the first
365 cases presenting with iGAS disease that exhibited a rare penicillin-binding protein 2x
366 (*pbp2x*) mutation resulting in elevated β -lactam (ampicillin, amoxicillin and
367 cefotaxime) minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC) (46).
368 Various studies have demonstrated a resistance rate to macrolides varying between
369 3% to 5%, with an increase being reported (18,35,37). A 2024 South African study
370 on iGAS and non-iGAS isolates reported a much lower resistance rate of 1% to the
371 macrolides azithromycin and erythromycin (47). Two main mechanisms of macrolide
372 resistance in GAS have been described (48). The first mechanism is the modification
373 of the ribosomal macrolide-binding site, thus preventing the antimicrobial from
374 binding to the ribosome (49). This mechanism of resistance is encoded by the *erm*
375 (erythromycin ribosome methylase) gene family and results in the cross-resistance to
376 all macrolides, lincosamides and streptogramins B, commonly referred to as the
377 MLSB phenotype (48). The second mechanism of macrolide resistance involves the
378 active removal of the antimicrobial from the cytoplasm (48). A membrane-spanning
379 pump (macrolide efflux), encoded by the *mef(A)* and *msr(D)* gene, lowers the
380 intracellular antibiotic concentration by pumping out the antimicrobial, thus reducing
381 its effectiveness (48). This process only results in low to moderate resistance to 14-
382 and 15- membered lactone ring macrolides, termed the M phenotype (48). In
383 addition to the resistance encoded by the *erm* family genes mentioned above, two
384 other mechanisms resulting in resistance to lincosamides (clindamycin) have also
385 been described (45). The two mechanisms are i) drug inactivation which is driven by
386 the *InuB* (lincosamide nucleotidyltransferase) gene and ii) active efflux by an efflux
387 pump encoded by the *Isa* gene (45).
388 Resistance to tetracycline is due to ribosomal protection proteins encoded by the *tet*
389 gene family (41). Resistance of GAS to tetracycline is generally higher than the
390 resistance against macrolides, with a 2011 Tunisian study reporting a tetracycline
391 resistance rate as high as 70% amongst their isolates collected from invasive and

non-invasive sites (50). In GAS, resistance to fluoroquinolones is as a result of point mutations that occur within the quinolone resistance determining region of topoisomerase IV ParC and/or topoisomerase II DNA gyrase GyrA (51).

The over-use of antibiotics may drive antibiotic resistance, which is a big global issue as this may lead to the development of resistant GAS strains (46). The over exposure of commensal flora to antibiotics may also result in long-term dysbiosis (52).

1.4.4 Vaccines

A vaccine is currently not available to prevent GAS disease. As mentioned in section 1.2.3.1, the highest burden of the most severe consequence of GAS disease, ARF and RHD, is seen in low-income countries. This may be an indication that ARF is not treated adequately in these settings due to limited access to healthcare, thus resulting in RHD. A vaccine is therefore the best intervention to reduce the incidence of ARF and RHD.

1.4.4.1 M-protein-based vaccines

Various vaccine formulations are currently in development and the leading vaccine target antigen is the M-protein (53,54). Serology testing has shown that the host immunity response targets the M-protein by producing M-protein type-specific antibodies (55,56). These antibodies have been shown to be opsonic and promote the ingestion and killing of GAS by phagocytic cells (55). The leading vaccine currently in development is the 30-valent M-protein based vaccine that is designed based on the epidemiology and *emm* type prevalence of GAS in high-income countries (53–55). As mentioned in section 1.1.4, the M-protein has a hypervariable N-terminal region (a portion of the *emm* gene) that determines the *emm* type of a strain (4). The 30-valent vaccine is a recombinant vaccine consisting of four different recombinant proteins that contain 7 or 8 N-terminal peptides representing 30 *emm* types (**Figure 3**) (54,57). A streptococcal protective agent 18 (Spa18) that is expressed in many GAS strains is also included in this vaccine formulation (53,54,57). The *emm* types included in the 30-valent vaccine are *emm* types (1, 2, 3,

4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 24, 28, 29, 44, 49, 58, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 92, 114 and 118) that are important causes of invasive disease and pharyngitis in North America and Europe (53–55). *emm* types that have been historically considered to be rheumatogenic (1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 24, 27 and 29) are also included in this vaccine formulation (9,54). The 30-valent vaccine is currently in phase I testing of clinical trials (54). The biggest challenge with development of an M-protein-based vaccine has been the diversity of *emm* types and that distribution and prevalence of these *emm* types vary across geographic regions (58). This is a major limitation particularly for low- and middle-income countries, where populations are at a greater risk for developing ARF and RHD, as the *emm* type distribution and prevalence in these settings may differ from high-income countries (22,58). An animal study conducted using the 30-valent vaccine revealed that there may be cross-protection against some *emm* types that are not included in the vaccine formulation (57). In this animal study, forty *emm* types were tested of which 24 (8, 9, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, 48, 51, 52, 59, 65, 66, 68, 76, 79, 85, 94, 97, 103, 105, 109, 111 and 122) showed >40% bactericidal killing activity in the presence of rabbit anti-sera generated after vaccination (57). A study done in Cape Town, where *emm* types were determined for invasive and non-invasive GAS isolates, reported that the 30-valent vaccine would only potentially offer protection in 23% (54/233) of the typed isolates (59). Five of the most prevalent *emm* types detected in this study (76, 81, 80, 43 and 183) were not part of the vaccine formulation (59). When cross-opsonisation was considered, potential vaccine coverage in these isolates rose to 66% (154/233) (59), which is still much lower than the potential vaccine coverage in high-income countries such as the United States where potential vaccine coverage is >90% (60). In a Kenyan study, the potential vaccine coverage was 28% (99/357) amongst iGAS isolates and this rose to 57% (203/357) when cross-opsonisation was considered (61). In a study conducted in Malian school children presenting with pharyngitis, the potential vaccine coverage was 31.0% (139/449) for vaccine serotypes and 75.1% (337/44) with cross opsonization (62).

Disadvantaged individuals of the aboriginal population in Australia have one of the highest prevalence of RHD and it is believed that the high prevalence of GAS skin infections in this populations is the cause (63). The proposed 30-valent vaccine may not offer adequate protection as the formulation of this vaccine does not take into account the *emm* types that cause skin infections and these *emm* types differ from

the types that cause invasive disease and pharyngitis (63). In addition, GAS skin infections are caused by a greater diversity of *emm* types in comparison to pharyngitis and iGAS disease (63).




Figure 3: The four proteins containing the 30-valent M-protein-based group A streptococcus vaccine. The numbers in the blocks represent the M-protein type and the numbers below each peptide indicate the amino acids of the mature M-protein included in the vaccine protein. Adapted from (57).

Other GAS antigens that may have protective epitopes and are present in most or all GAS strains are being explored (58,64). One such antigen is the M-related protein (Mrp) that is a member of the M-protein family of GAS, which includes Emm (referred to as M-protein throughout this study) and Enn proteins (65). Some isolates express only the M-protein while others express the M-protein, Mrp and/or Enn protein (65). The Mrp is a virulence factor of GAS and has been shown to evoke an immune response in rabbits (58,65). The N-terminal region of the *mrp* gene that codes for this protein is not hypervariable but rather semi-conserved (58). Mrp is present in most GAS clinical isolates that have been studied thus far (58,65). All Mrp sequenced thus far belong to three structurally similar families, which are MrpI, MrpII and MrpIII (58,65). A trivalent Mrp (trMrp) vaccine formulation (**Figure 4**) that includes Mrp representing each of the three families has been tested in rabbits and an immune response against each component of the trivalent vaccine (i.e. each of the individual Mrp proteins) and the recombinant trMrp vaccine protein was observed (58). The trMrp vaccine sera produced by the rabbits in this study displayed bactericidal

activity against isolates of different *emm* types (some not included in the 30-valent M-protein vaccine) of GAS that expressed Mrp from all three families (58). In this study they also explored the possible outcome of a vaccine construct that is a combination of both the 30-valent M-protein and the trMrp vaccine (58). They did this by mixing 30-valent antiserum and the trMrp vaccine antiserum produced by the rabbits and performed bactericidal assays using this serum (58). Bactericidal activity was higher when the 30-valent and trMrp immune sera were mixed than when each serum was tested on its own (58).




Figure 4: The potential trivalent recombinant M-related protein-based vaccine construct. Adapted from (58).

1.4.4.2 Non M-protein- based vaccines

In addition to the M-protein another antigen of interest is J8, which is a 29 amino acid long peptide found in the conserved C-terminal region of the M-protein (66,67). In the vaccine formulation, the J8 peptide is conjugated with diphtheria toxoid and adsorbed onto aluminium hydroxide (66). This vaccine has reached phase I clinical trial testing (MJ8VAX) (66).

1.5 GAS disease surveillance

A study conducted in 2005 estimated that globally from 1 January 1980, there were 1.78 million new cases of severe GAS disease (ARF, RHD, APSGN and iGAS) occurring each year, resulting in approximately 517 000 deaths annually in individuals of all ages (19). The majority of these deaths were as a result of iGAS disease (31.5%, 163 000) and RHD (45.1%, 233 000) (19). There are limited published studies on invasive and non-invasive GAS disease in Africa and as a

result, it is difficult to accurately estimate the true burden of GAS disease in this region (68).

From 2014, high-income countries reported an increase in the annual incidence of invasive and non-invasive GAS disease (69,70). This prompted various countries to re-assess their surveillance systems in order to efficiently monitor the epidemiology of GAS disease (69–71). England, Wales and Northern Ireland noted a steep rise in scarlet fever cases in 2014 (70). In the United Kingdom (UK), scarlet fever is a notifiable medical condition and suspected cases of scarlet fever are notified to the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), formerly known as Public Health England (PHE), by clinicians on the basis of clinical symptoms with or without laboratory confirmation of a GAS infection (70). In addition to conducting syndromic surveillance for scarlet fever, the UKHSA also conducts laboratory-based surveillance of iGAS disease, defined as GAS cultured from a normally sterile site (70). In the United States (US), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducts population and laboratory-based surveillance of iGAS disease through their Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) of emerging infections (60). In this setting, iGAS disease is defined as the isolation of GAS from a typically sterile body site or wound culture, along with the presence of necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (60). In Canada, iGAS disease is a notifiable medical condition (72). The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) conducts routine iGAS disease surveillance and this is done through the Canadian notifiable disease surveillance system (72). A case of iGAS disease in this setting is defined as a laboratory-confirmed iGAS diagnosis from a normally sterile body site, bone or joint fluid excluding the middle ear and superficial wound aspirates (e.g. skin and soft tissue abscesses) (72). The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Canada conducts national, laboratory-based surveillance of invasive streptococcal disease in Canada and GAS is one of the pathogens included in this surveillance (72).

There is a paucity of data on the epidemiology of GAS disease in Africa because of the lack of surveillance systems and as an effort to address this, a number of initiatives have been started. Currently, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) in South Africa reviews ARF reported through the electronic Notifiable Medical Conditions (NMC) system (73). ARF is listed on the NMC system as a category 1 NMC, necessitating immediate reporting by the most rapid means

available upon diagnosis. Subsequently, a written or electronic notification to the Department of Health (DoH) within 24 hours of diagnosis should be submitted by health care providers, private health laboratories or public health laboratories (73). Although useful data is received through this notification system, a 2006 publication reported that there is underreporting of ARF cases by health care professionals and in addition, there is poor administration of the notification system thus resulting in a decline in the number of reported cases in South Africa between 1990 – 2004 (74). In 2019, the NICD also started conducting active, national, laboratory-based surveillance for iGAS disease through the GERMS-SA (Group for Enteric, Respiratory and Meningeal Disease Surveillance in South Africa) network (75). In GERMS-SA, over 200 microbiological labs (public, private, military and mining) across the country report iGAS cases and submit invasive isolates to the Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis (CRDM) at the NICD for further phenotypic and genotypic characterization. The African group A Streptococcal infection registry (*AfroStrep*) was established in 2016 and is a collaborative multicenter study to describe the clinical, microbiology, epidemiological and molecular characteristics of invasive and non-invasive GAS infections across Africa (71). In the *AfroStrep* registry study, active surveillance of GAS pharyngitis is conducted in sentinel primary care centers across Africa and passive surveillance of iGAS disease is conducted by collecting isolates from microbiology laboratories across Africa (71). This study will serve as a platform to gain a better understanding of GAS epidemiology across Africa (71).

1.6 Outbreaks of GAS disease

GAS is capable of causing endemic outbreaks. Scarlet fever outbreaks have been described in the literature, occurring in China (76), Hong Kong (77), Spain (78) and the UK (79). iGAS disease outbreaks have also been reported in the US (80), the UK (81–83), Canada (84) and New Zealand (85). Outbreaks may arise from the transmission of a GAS strain to susceptible individuals, either through a shared source (81,84,86) or, particularly in crowded settings, through person-to-person contact (78,87). Specific GAS clones that are more virulent may also drive GAS outbreaks (82,83,85).

1.7 Molecular epidemiology of GAS

1.7.1 GAS typing

Typing/characterization of GAS isolates is an important part of understanding the epidemiology of GAS disease (20,88). Typing can include using methods to study the morphology of an organism (e.g., capsular wall, surface antigens, pili etc.) which provides insight into why certain strains are more virulent and thus more successful than others (20,88). Similarities between strains may also help elucidate transmission patterns and detect outbreaks and clusters (20). GAS are highly diverse organisms and typing methods such as pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), where the DNA fingerprint of an organism is determined, and multilocus sequence typing (MLST) using 7 housekeeping genes have been utilized to genotype GAS and elaborate on the clonal structure of GAS populations (89–94). Serological methods have also been used to type GAS isolates, mainly by targeting the M-protein of this organism (20). The variants of the M-protein can be identified and typed serologically using the anti-sera of recognized type specific anti-M sera (11).

1.7.1.1 *emm* typing

Although the typing methods mentioned in section 1.7.1 have been useful in the past, they have largely been replaced by the molecular sequence typing of the M-protein, a technique referred to as *emm* typing (20). *emm* typing is the sequence typing of a portion (the hypervariable N-terminal region) of the M-protein (*emm*) gene, which is responsible for coding of the M-protein (20), and is currently the most common technique used to discriminate between different GAS strains. Due to the hypervariability of the N-terminal region, different sequences coding for that region will result in different *emm* types (6). Currently ~243 *emm* types have been described and the prevalence and distribution of circulating *emm* types differ by geographic regions (6,88).

610 **1.7.1.1.1 Prevalence of *emm* types**

611

612 **Table 2** depicts a summary of *emm* studies from different continents conducted
613 between 2011 – 2023. The data presented in the table as well as previous reports on
614 the global distribution of *emm* types (95) illustrates that the distribution of *emm* types
615 differs geographically.

616

617 **Table 2:** Summary of *emm* typing studies published between 2011 - 2023 from six
618 continents

Continent	Country	^a Year	Specimen type	Sample size	Typed isolates	No. of <i>emm</i> types	^b Prevalent <i>emm</i> types	Reference
Africa	South Africa	2014	Non-invasive	157	157	26	48, 89, 4*, 12*, 75*, 1 ^c , 94 ^c , 22, 9	(22)
	Mali	2015	Non-invasive	449	396	70	65, 18, 55*, 42*, 81 ^c , 58 ^c , 25, 109, 11, 169	(62)
	Kenya	2016	Invasive	357	357	88	44, stg866, 65, 18, 11*, 179*, 8 ^c , 90 ^c , 77 ^c , 92 ^c	(61)
	South Africa	2021	Invasive and Non-invasive	54	43	15	92, 6, 25*, 75* 52, 3 ^c , 70 ^c , st3735.0 ^c , st2147.0 ^c	(96)
	The Gambia	2023	Non-invasive	115	107	46	80, 85, 229, <i>emm</i> /stG1750	(97)
Europe	France	2011	Invasive	1542	1542	83	1, 28, 89, 4, 3, 12, 75	(98)
	Sweden	2013	Invasive	584	494	NA	1, 89, 28, 3	(99)
	Iceland	2014	Invasive	288	226	25	1, 28*, 89*, 3, 12	(100)
	Finland	2015	Invasive	1165	1122	72	28, 89, 1, 12, 119, 4*, 77*	(101)
	Norway	2016	Invasive	756	756	52	1, 89, 12, 3, 28, 4, 66, 112	(102)
	Germany	2017	Invasive	719	719	46	1, 28, 89, 2, 12	(103)
	Ireland	2018	Invasive	561	473	33	1, 3, 28, 12, 89, 4, 6	(104)
	Portugal	2019	Invasive	381	381	40	1, 89, 3, 12, 6	(105)
	Spain	2019	Invasive	103	93	14	1, 12, 6, 3*, 75*, 4	(34)
	Spain	2020	Invasive	29	26	11	1,3, 5*, 6*, 44*	(106)
	Spain	2021	Invasive	1893	1893	58	1, 89, 3, 4, 12, 6, 87*, 28*, 75 ^c , 77 ^c	(107)
	Belgium	2023	Invasive	518	122	37	1, 64, 11, 77, 5*, 89*, 101*	(108)
	United Kingdom	2023	Non-invasive	142	142	23	108, 89, 12, 1, 4	(97)
Asia	Lebanon	2011	Non-invasive	103	103	31	1, 22, 28*, 88*, 4, 97, 12, 110 ^c , stC5345.1 ^c , stC6979 ^c	(90)
	China	2020	Non-invasive	297	297	9	12, 1, 75, 89, 3, 6, 225*, 4*, stg485*	(37)
	Japan	2021	Invasive	621	621	34	1, 89, 12, 3, 6, 4, 28, 76, 77	(109)
North America	Alaska	2016	Invasive	516	422	51	1, 82, 49, 12*, 3*, 89, 108, 28, 92, 41	(110)
	Canada	2018	Invasive	3551	3053	65	1, 28, 59, 12, 82, 3, 89, 101, 11, 41	(111)
	USA	2020	Invasive	3895	3864	71	1, 89, 49, 12, 3, 82, 92, 28, 4	(112)
	USA	2022	Invasive	483	194	38	1, 12, 28, 11°, 4°	(113)
South America	Brazil	2014	Non-invasive	91	86	28	12, 1, 4, 22*, 8*	(114)
	Brazil	2015	Invasive and Non-invasive	229	229	48	1, 87, 22*, 12*, 77 ^c , 6 ^c , 89, 33 ^β , 75 ^β , 3 ^β	(115)
Oceania	New Caledonia	2010	Invasive	90	90	31	15, 92, 106, 74, 89*, 109*	(116)
	New Zealand	2014	Invasive	2861	2861	111	1, 49, 81, 75*, 89*, 82, 92, 12, 91, 28	(117)
	Australia	2015	Invasive	128	82	26	81, 197, 113, 101, 44*, 92*	(118)

^a The year that the study was published; ^b Descending order of prevalence; *° °° Similar number of isolates; NA – Not available

1.7.1.1.2 The *emm* cluster system

As mentioned in section 1.7.1.1, *emm* typing relies on a small portion of the M-protein *emm* gene, the hypervariable N-terminal region. A 2014 study by Sanderson-Smith *et al.*, demonstrated that analysis of the complete, and not just a portion, *emm* gene sequence indicated that many *emm* types are highly similar to one another (119). In the above-mentioned study, 1806 isolates representing 175 *emm* types collected from 31 countries were used. The complete *emm* gene was sequenced for these isolates and phylogenetic analysis were conducted. The general organization of the tree obtained from the phylogenetic analysis revealed that most of these isolates belonged to two clades (X and Y) with the exception of isolates that were *emm* type 55, 95, 111, 215, 221 and 222. Clade Y was further divided into two major subclades, Y1 and Y2 (119). Within clades X and subclades Y1 and Y2, isolates were further divided into 48 *emm* clusters (**Table 3**). In 16 (E1 - E6, D1 - D5 and AC1 - AC-5) of the 48 *emm*- clusters, each cluster had isolates that represented a variety of *emm* types (e.g., *emm* cluster E1 had *emm* types 4, 60, 78, 165 and 176; *emm* cluster E2 had *emm* types 13, 27, 50 (50/62), 66, 68, 76, 90, 92, 96, 104, 106, 110, 117, 166 (st1207), 168 (st1389) etc.). This phylogeny indicated that although different *emm* types, *emm* types in the same *emm* cluster were highly similar based on their complete *emm* gene sequence. The remaining 32/48 *emm* clusters had isolates that expressed only one specific *emm* type [e.g. *emm* cluster 5 had isolates that expressed only the M5 (*emm*5) protein and *emm* cluster 14 had isolates that expressed only the M14 (*emm*14) protein]. The 32 *emm* clusters mentioned above indicated that some *emm* types are highly divergent from others, thus not clustering closely to other *emm* types within the phylogenetic tree.

In addition to conducting the phylogenetic analysis to establish the *emm* cluster system, Sanderson-Smith *et al.*, also used a subset of isolates that were a representative *emm* type from each of the dominant *emm* types to assess their binding capability to key host proteins that are known to interact with M-proteins (119). The results indicated that *emm* types within an *emm* cluster displayed homogenous functional profiles (119).

653 **Table3:** The clustering of 173 *emm* types into 48 *emm* clusters based on phylogenetic analysis. Adapted from (119).

<i>emm</i> types	Clade	Sub-clade	<i>emm</i> -cluster
4, 60, 78, 165 (st11014), 176 (st213)	X	N/A	E1
13, 27, 50 (50/62), 66, 68, 76, 90, 92, 96, 104, 106, 110, 117, 166 (st1207), 168 (st1389)	X	N/A	E2
9, 15, 25, 44 (44/61), 49, 58, 79, 82, 87, 103, 107, 113, 118, 144 (stknb1), 180 (st2460), 183 (st2904), 209 (st6735), 219 (st9505), 231 (stNS292)	X	N/A	E3
2, 8, 22, 28, 73, 77, 84, 88, 89, 102, 109, 112, 114, 124, 169 (st1731), 175 (st212), 232 (stNS554)	X	N/A	E4
34, 51, 134 (st2105), 137 (st465), 170 (st1815), 174 (st211), 205 (st5282)	X	N/A	E5
11, 42, 48, 59, 63, 65 (65/69), 67, 75, 81, 85, 94, 99, 139 (st7323), 158 (stxh1), 172 (st2037), 177 (st2147), 182 (st2861UK), 191 (st369)	X	N/A	E6
36, 54, 207 (st6030)	Y	Y1	D1
32, 71, 100, 115, 213 (st7700)	Y	Y1	D2
123, 217 (st809)	Y	Y1	D3
33, 41, 43, 52, 53, 56, 56.2 (st3850), 64, 70, 72, 80, 83, 86, 91, 93, 98, 101, 108, 116, 119, 120, 121, 178 (st22), 186 (st2940), 192 (st3757), 194 (st38), 208 (st62), 223 (stD432), 224 (stD631), 225 (stD633), 230 (stNS1033), 242 (st2926)	Y	Y2	D4
97,157 (stn165), 184 (st2911)	Y	Y2	D5
46, 142 (st818)	Y	Y1	A-C1
30, 197 (st4119)	Y	Y1	A-C2
1, 163 (st412), 227 (stil103), 238 (1-2), 239 (1-4)	Y	Y2	A-C3
12, 39, 193 (st3765), 228 (stil62), 229 (stmd216)	Y	Y2	A-C4
3, 31, 133 (st1692)	Y	Y2	A-C5
164 (st106M), 185 (st2917), 211 (st7406), 236 (sts104) 36,	X	N/A	Single M-protein <i>emm</i> -cluster belonging to clade X
5, 6, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24*, 26, 29, 37, 38 (38/40), 47, 57, 74, 105, 122*, 140 (st7395), 179 (st221), 218 (st854), 233 (stNS90), 234 (stpa57)	Y	Y1 or Y2*	Single M-protein <i>emm</i> -cluster belonging to clade Y
55, 95, 111, 215 (st804), 221 (stCK249), 222 (stCK401)	Outlier	N/A	Single M-protein <i>emm</i> cluster outlier (i.e. not part of clade X or clade Y)

654

655 The asterisks (*) mark indicates *emm* types that cluster into sub-clade Y2. Brackets () represent old nomenclature

656

657 **1.7.1.2 Whole- genome sequencing**

658

659 Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is fast becoming the main technique used to
660 study and describe the molecular characteristics of pathogens, as this method offers
661 greater genomic resolution and the development of bioinformatics tools make it
662 feasible to manage and analyze the large amounts of data generated through this
663 technology (120,121). A study in the United States using whole genome sequencing
664 data to describe the molecular epidemiology of GAS strains causing invasive
665 disease, obtained from one year of population-based surveillance, was the first of its
666 kind (122). From the whole genome sequencing data, strain characteristics including
667 *emm* types, MLST's, predictors of antimicrobial resistance and other key features
668 associated with the virulence and adhesion of iGAS strains were extracted (122).
669 There is a paucity of whole genome sequencing GAS data in Africa and studies
670 focusing on this would be beneficial to gain a better understanding of the GAS
671 population in this setting.

2 STUDY AIM AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 Aim

To describe the epidemiology of iGAS and molecular characteristics of iGAS isolates obtained from active, national, laboratory-based surveillance (GERMS-SA) in South Africa from 01 January 2019 – 31 December 2020

2.2 Objectives

- (i) Describe the demographic and clinical characteristics of cases with iGAS reported through the GERMS-SA surveillance in South Africa from 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020
- (ii) Document the antimicrobial resistance patterns to relevant antimicrobials of iGAS isolates collected through the GERMS-SA surveillance in South Africa from 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020
- (iii) Perform whole genome sequencing on iGAS isolates collected through the GERMS-SA surveillance in South Africa from 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020 in order to:
 - Assess predictors of antimicrobial resistance
 - Describe *emm* type prevalence and determine the potential vaccine coverage of the proposed 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine
 - Determine the presence of the M related protein (Mrp) in all isolates
 - Determine multilocus sequence type (MLST) based genotypes
 - Determine key virulence factors and strain features associated with improved GAS colonization and transmission
 - Determine genetic relatedness of isolates in order to detect clusters and outbreaks

3 METHODS AND MATERIAL

3.1 Ethical approval

GERMS-SA (an active, national, laboratory-based surveillance system) ethics has been obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of the Witwatersrand (Protocol number: M1809107), Johannesburg, South Africa. Project specific ethics was also obtained from the University of Witwatersrand (M210750), Johannesburg, South Africa (**Appendix A**).

3.2 GERMS-SA surveillance and isolate collection

GAS cases were detected through the GERMS-SA (Group for Enteric, Respiratory and Meningeal Disease Surveillance in South Africa) network. The GERMS-SA network was established in 1999 to initially conduct surveillance of invasive disease caused by *Haemophilus influenzae* type b, *Neisseria meningitidis* and *Streptococcus pneumoniae* in South Africa (123). In 2003, surveillance was enhanced at select sentinel sites where dedicated surveillance officers were placed to collect additional clinical and demographic data for each case (124) and in 2019, surveillance of invasive disease caused by *Streptococcus agalactiae* (Group B Streptococcus; GBS) and *Streptococcus pyogenes* (GAS) was added. Presently, GERMS-SA conducts active, national, laboratory-based surveillance in the nine provinces of South Africa, representing 60.6 million persons (<https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15601> Accessed: 12 May 2023). Approximately 200 clinical microbiology laboratories (including public, private, military and mining sectors) across the country are requested to report iGAS cases and submit available laboratory confirmed isolates collected from patients in all age groups to the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis (CRDM) for further phenotypic and genotypic characterization. In addition, routine quarterly retrospective audits of the laboratory information system (LIS) TrakCare [used by the National Health Laboratory Services (NHLS) in the public sector] were done to detect cases that are not recorded on GERMS-SA. These cases were then added to the GERMS-SA database. This study was conducted on iGAS cases recorded between 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020.

3.3 Case definitions

Individuals with iGAS disease were defined as people with GAS identified from any normally sterile site specimen [e.g., cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), blood, pleural fluid, pericardial fluid, joint fluid, tissue etc.] or from a non-sterile (wound) site specimen in a patient presenting with necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (**Appendix B**). The patient clinical presentation is often detailed on the specimen submission forms that are sent together with the specimen to the diagnostic laboratories.

3.4 Patient demographic and clinical data

Isolates received at CRDM were accompanied by a TrakCare or other laboratory report and basic patient demographics (gender and age), date of specimen collection and site of specimen collection were extracted from the report and captured on the GERMS-SA database by the laboratory clerks. For cases identified by audit (representing only the public sector) and not reported to GERMS-SA, these data were extracted directly from TrakCare and also captured on the GERMS-SA database. The place of residence (by province) for each of the cases was extrapolated from the location of the testing laboratory.

From 2020, at 25 sentinel site hospitals across all 9 provinces, surveillance officers tracked all laboratory-confirmed GAS cases and an electronic case report form (CRF) was completed with additional data including race and final outcome of hospitalization (**Appendix C**). The CRF's were captured on the GERMS-SA database.

If the site of specimen collection suggested that the case might not fit the case definition, surveillance officers at enhanced sites were contacted and requested to verify true cases by checking the relevant patient hospital records. For non-enhanced sites, the reason for submission was reviewed on TrakCare to assess if non-sterile site isolates were associated with necrotizing fasciitis. Cases that could not be verified from non-enhanced sites were not included in our study.

If more than one isolates were received from one patient and the isolates were isolated within 21 days of one another, this was considered a single case and only

one isolate was included in the downstream analysis. Multiple isolates from one patient that were isolated more than 21 days apart were considered separate cases and all isolates were included in the downstream analysis. The descriptive analyses for this study included all cases on the GERMS-SA database from 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020. Place of residence, gender, race, age, date of specimen collection, site of infection and final outcome of hospitalization were described for each case. Incidence was stratified by age category (<1 year, 1-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, 15-24 years, 25-44 years, 45-64 years and ≥ 65 years) and calculated as follows: Incidence= (New cases) / (Population x Timeframe). Incidence is expressed as cases per 100 000 persons and was calculated using mid-year population denominators obtained from Stats SA's population projections for 2019 and 2020 (<https://www.statssa.gov.za/>). Cases were stratified by specimen collection date to illustrate the monthly distribution of cases.

3.5 Laboratory testing

3.5.1 Phenotypic

3.5.1.1 Bacterial culture

Upon receipt at CRDM, isolates were sub-cultured on 5% horse blood agar (Diagnostic Media Products, Johannesburg, South Africa) and incubated at 37°C in 5% CO₂ for 18-24hrs, together with a bacitracin (0.04 units) disc (Mast group, Bootle, UK). β -hemolytic pure colonies that appeared with a zone of inhibition around the bacitracin disc were presumptively identified as GAS. β -hemolytic colonies that did not exhibit a zone of inhibition around the bacitracin disc were confirmed as GAS using Matrix-assisted Laser Desorption Ionization-Time of Flight Mass Spectrophotometry (MALDI- TOF MS). Presumptive GAS colonies were cryo-preserved in glycerol skimmed milk at -70°C for further phenotypic and genotypic characterization.

3.5.1.2 Antimicrobial susceptibility testing

3.5.1.2.1 Kirby-Bauer disc diffusion method

Antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) was done on viable isolates. Isolates were initially screened for resistance by the direct Kirby-Bauer disk diffusion method. Preparing the culture for AST by Kirby-Bauer disc diffusion method and preparing the culture to confirm organism identification was done simultaneously. Briefly, a primary culture received on Dorset transport media was sub-cultured on 5% horse blood agar and incubated at 37°C in 5% for 18-24hrs to check for purity. An inoculum was prepared by taking a light sweep of the growth with a sterile swab and placing it in 0.9% normal saline. A 0.5 McFarland standard was used to compare for turbidity of the suspension. The suspension was inoculated on two fresh Mueller Hinton with 5% sheep blood agar (SMHA) plates and using forceps, the following antibiotics were placed on the surface of one of the SMHA: a systematic Gram positive ring (MASTRINGS-S®, Mast Group, UK) containing oxacillin (1µg), chloramphenicol (30µg), tetracycline (30µg), erythromycin (15µg), clindamycin (2µg) and rifampicin (5µg). The penicillin disk is not stable on Mueller Hinton with 5% sheep blood agar and as a result, the oxacillin disk is used instead with the assumption that AST interpretation is identical for the two antibiotics. On the second plate, a disk for ampicillin (10 µg) was placed. The plates were incubated at 37°C in 5% CO₂ for 18-24hrs. Zones of inhibition around each disk were measured (to the nearest mm) after overnight incubation and the isolate was interpreted as "sensitive", "intermediate" or "resistant" using the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) M100 guidelines (125).

3.5.1.2.2 Broth microdilution method

The Kirby-Bauer disc diffusion method was merely used for initial screening, but final AST interpretation was based on the minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) results from the broth microdilution method. All viable GAS isolates were tested for MIC's irrespective of zone diameters. MIC's were determined by broth microdilution using Sensititre® HPB susceptibility plates (TREK Diagnostics Systems, West Sussex,

UK). Briefly, a 0.5 McFarland standard of each isolate was prepared in Mueller-Hinton broth (with TES buffer). A 100µl of the suspension was combined with Mueller-Hinton broth containing TES/lysed horse blood. The mixture was then poured into a sterile trough and 100 µl of the resulting mixture was transferred into each well of the Sensititre® HPB susceptibility plates coated with the following antibiotics: penicillin, ceftriaxone, erythromycin, clindamycin, chloramphenicol, tetracycline, rifampicin, cotrimoxazole, linezolid, vancomycin, ceftaroline, quinupristin-dalfopristin, meropenem, amoxicillin and levofloxacin. MIC breakpoints were interpreted as "sensitive", "intermediate" or "resistant" using the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) M100 guidelines (125). Resistance breakpoints for penicillin, ceftriaxone and ceftaroline are not available in the CLSI guidelines as resistance against these antibiotics has never been clinically observed. For the purpose of this study, elevated MICs against these antibiotics were defined as 0.12µg/ml for penicillin and 0.5 for ceftriaxone and ceftaroline. These are the susceptibility breakpoints for these antibiotics according to the CLSI guidelines. Breakpoints for rifampicin, cotrimoxazole and amoxicillin are not available in the CLSI guidelines and therefore, these antibiotics were excluded from all analysis.

851

852 **3.5.1.2.3 E-test method**

853

854 In an effort to resolve discrepancies between the broth microdilution MIC results and
855 genotypic antimicrobial resistance predictions, these discrepant isolates were tested
856 using the gradient E-test method® (BioMérieux). Briefly, a 0.5 McFarland suspension
857 of each isolate was sub-cultured on SMHA. The required antimicrobial E-test strip
858 (containing two-fold dilutions of a predefined antibiotic on an impervious plastic strip)
859 was applied to the agar surface. The antibiotic diffuses into the agar and after
860 overnight incubation creates an elliptical zone of inhibition along the length of the
861 strip. MIC interpretation was based on the CLSI guidelines (125).

862

863 **3.5.2 Genotypic**

864

865 **3.5.2.1 Preparation of DNA extracts for whole genome sequencing**

866

867 **3.5.2.1.1 Pre-lysis**

868

869 Isolates were retrieved from -70°C storage and a sub-culture of each isolate was
870 prepared on 5% horse blood agar and incubated at 37°C in 5% CO₂ for 18-24hr. A
871 sweep of the β-hemolytic colonies were suspended in Brain Heart Infusion (BHI)
872 broth (Diagnostic Media Products, Johannesburg, South Africa) and incubated at
873 37°C in 5% CO₂ for 18-24hr. Roughly 1.2-1.3 ml of the broth was poured into a
874 sterile 1.5ml Eppendorf tube and centrifuged (Hettich® Rotofix 32) for 2-3 minutes at
875 13 000 rpm to collect the bacterial cells at the bottom of the tube. The supernatant
876 was discarded and the remaining bacterial pellet was re-suspended in 200µl of
877 10mg/ml of freshly prepared lysozyme (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO, USA), followed
878 by a 30 to 60-minute incubation at 37°C.

879

880

3.5.2.1.2 DNA extraction

Genomic GAS DNA for short-read whole genome sequencing was extracted manually using the QIAamp® DNA Mini kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany) following the manufacturer's instructions. After the 30-60-minute incubation, 50µl of AL lysis buffer and 20µl of proteinase K was added into each sample tube and incubated at 56°C for 1 hour. 150 µl AL lysis buffer was again added into each sample tube and incubated for 10 minutes at room temperature. 250µl of 100% molecular grade ethanol was added into each sample and 700µl of this mix was transferred to spin column. Each sample was spun in a centrifuge (Hettich ® Rotofix 32) at 8000rpm for 1 minute. The collection tubes were discarded and the spin column was transferred to a new collection tube. 500µl of buffer AW1 was added into each sample tube which was spun at 8000rpm for 1 minute. The collection tubes were again discarded and the columns were transferred to a new collection tube. 500µl of buffer AW2 was added into each sample tube followed by another spin at 14 000 rpm for 3 minutes. The column tubes were discarded and the columns were transferred to a sterile 1.5 ml Eppendorf tube. 60µl of pre-warmed (56°C) elution buffer was added into each sample tube and left to incubate at room temperature for 5 minutes. Each tube was spun at 12 000rpm for 2 minutes and 60µl of eluted DNA was retained.

3.5.2.1.3 DNA quantification

Following manufacturer's instructions, the Qubit® 2.0 fluorometer (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) and the Qubit™ dsDNA BR assay kit (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) were used to quantify DNA concentrations. Briefly, 199µl of BR buffer and 1µl of BR reagent was mixed to prepare a cocktail mixture. 195µl of the cocktail was mixed with 5µl genomic DNA and incubated for a minimum of 2 minutes at room temperature. The DNA concentration of each sample was quantified using the Qubit® 2.0 fluorometer. All DNA samples with a concentration ≥ 1 ng/µL were sent for whole genome sequencing, whereas DNA samples with a concentration < 1 ng/µL were re-extracted. 55µl of the extracted genomic DNA was used for DNA library preparation, which was followed by whole genome sequencing.

3.5.2.2 Whole-genome sequencing

3.5.2.2.1 DNA library preparation

All DNA samples with a concentration between 1 - 4ng/μL were processed as is, whereas DNA samples with a concentration >4ng/μL were brought to a starting concentration of 4ng/μL by dilution with distilled water.

Using the Illumina Nextera DNA Flex Library preparation kit (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States) following manufacturer's instructions, each DNA sample was fragmented and tagged in order to produce adapter-ligated DNA fragments. Briefly, 7.5 μl of each DNA sample was pipetted into individual wells in a MicroAmp® 96-well PCR plate (Bio-Rad, Hercules, California, United States) and mixed with a 5μl cocktail of the bead-linked transposome (BLT) complex and tagmentation buffer (TB1). The plate was then incubated in a thermal cycler at 55°C for 15 minutes.

Next, the adapter-tagged DNA fragments underwent a washing process. Briefly, the tagmentation reaction was halted by adding 2.5μl of Tagment Stop Buffer (TSB) into each well and the plate was incubated in a thermal cycler at 37°C for 15 minutes.

The plate was then placed on a magnetic stand until the solution was clear and the supernatant was removed by pipette and discarded. 25μl of Tagment Wash Buffer (TWB) was then added into each well to wash and the supernatant was again pipetted and discarded. This washing step was repeated twice.

Subsequently, the tagmented DNA fragments were amplified using a limited-cycle PCR (8 cycles) program in order to attach Illumina sequencing adapters and also create a dual indexed library for each sample. Sample purification beads were used to purify the amplified libraries (Illumina, Inc.). After the purification step, the concentration of the DNA libraries was measured using the Qubit® 4 fluorometer with the Qubit dsDNA high sensitivity assay kit. Additionally, the size of the library preparations was confirmed using the Agilent 4200 TapeStation system (Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, California, United States).

To ensure, the quality of the DNA library preparation, a gBlock® gene fragment that also undergone Nextera DNA flex library preparation was added into the DNA library pool.

3.5.2.2.2 Next-generation sequencing

Tris-Cl (pH 8.5) containing 0.1% Tween 20 was utilized to normalize DNA libraries to a concentration of 2nM. Subsequently, the DNA library samples were pooled and denatured using 0.2N sodium hydroxide (NaOH) to create single strands before loading onto the reagent cartridge. To ensure the quality of the Illumina sequencing runs, a PhiX control V3 (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States) which is an adapter-ligated library, was used. Whole-genome sequencing was carried out on the Illumina MiSeq® (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States), Illumina NextSeq® 550 (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States) or Illumina NextSeq 1000/2000 (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States) instrument. For sequencing done on the Illumina MiSeq, a 600-cycle MiSeq Reagent v3 Kit (Illumina, Inc., San Diego, United States) was used to generate paired-end reads (2 x 300 base pair) with 100X coverage. The NextSeq™ 550 v2 300 cycles kit and NextSeq 1000/2000 kit (300 Cycles) was used for sequencing runs that were done on the Illumina NextSeq® instruments to generate paired-end reads (2 X 150 base pair) with 100X coverage.

3.6 Genome analysis

3.6.1 Bioinformatics analysis

The resulting sequences were processed using a validated CDC (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention) GAS bioinformatics pipeline (122) in order to: quality check (QC) the raw reads; trim the raw reads; obtain whole genome assemblies; identify *emm* subtypes; identify multilocus sequence types (MLST); determine the presence of the *mrp* gene; determine the presence of genes commonly associated with antimicrobial resistance; and to determine strain features that are important for virulence. The CDC GAS bioinformatics pipeline used in the present study was installed and set up in a high performance computing cluster (HPCC) belonging to the University of the Witwatersrand. The original bioinformatics scripts and associated databases are available on GitHub at <https://github.com/BenJamesMetcalf> (created by Dr. Benjamin Metcalf from the CDC). The nextflow implementation (used in the current study) of the original

pipeline is also available on GitHub <https://github.com/shaze/GS> (nextflow implementation by Prof. Scott Hazelhurst from the University of Witwatersrand).

3.6.1.1 Quality check (QC), trimming and assembly

The tools used for QC, trimming and assembly are incorporated into the CDC GAS pipeline.

To check the quality of the raw reads, the pipeline used FastQC and MultiQC. Genome size (~1.8MB) and GC content (~38%) and the number of contigs (<500) were taken into consideration when evaluating the quality of the sequences. The raw reads were trimmed using Cutadapt v1.6 (126). Cutadapt removed low quality bases at the end of the read using the '-q 20 option', removed the adapters using the '-b' option and also filtered out reads that were less than 50 bases in length using the '—minimum length' option (126). VelvetOptimiser v1.2.10 was used to carry out *de novo* assembly (126).

3.6.1.2 Identification of *emm* subtypes/types,

The CDC *emm* subtype database is incorporated into the CDC GAS pipeline to screen for *emm* subtypes (122).

The database (https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/infectious_diseases/biotech/tsemml/) consists of defined 180 base pair (bp) sequences representing different *emm* subtypes. As mentioned above, the pipeline utilizes *de novo* assembly and queries sequences in the M-type specific region (*emm* gene) against sequences in the CDC *emm* subtype database (122). Queries that obtained a perfect 180/180 match to an existing sequence on the database were assigned that same *emm* subtype. The integer part of the *emm* subtype represents the *emm* type e.g. *emm* subtype 18.21 is *emm* type 18. In the present study, *emm* types are reported. Sequences that did not obtain a perfect 180/180 match to existing *emm* subtypes, but showed high similarities to an existing *emm* subtype were reported as 'novel *emm* subtypes' and are to be submitted to the CDC database curator for quality checks and *emm* subtype assignment.

In instances where the pipeline could not confidently call for *emm* subtype, which may be due to the read quality at the specific region, the isolates were re-extracted and sequencing was repeated on the fresh extract. If the problem persisted, these isolates were designated NT (non-typable) by WGS for *emm* subtype/type as per discussions with the CDC. Targeted PCR or Sanger sequencing were not explored to resolve this.

An isolate was considered covered by the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine if the isolate belonged to one of the 30 *emm* types (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 24, 28, 29, 44, 49, 58, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 92, 114 and 118) included in the vaccine formulation.

Cross-protection by the 30-valent vaccine was considered if the isolate belonged to one of the 24 *emm* types (8, 9, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, 48, 51, 52, 59, 65, 66, 68, 76, 79, 85, 94, 97, 103, 105, 109, 111 and 122) shown to be cross-opsonized (>40% bactericidal killing activity) in previous animal studies (57).

emm types were assigned to *emm* clusters based on the Sanderson-smith *et al.*, 2014 publication (119).

3.6.1.3 Detection of M related protein (Mrp)

Presence of the Mrp was screened for by the CDC GAS pipeline by detecting the presence of the *mrp* gene. An isolate was considered to be covered by the theoretical Mrp based vaccine candidate if the *mrp* gene was detected.

3.6.1.4 Identification of multilocus sequence types (MLST)

The sequence type (ST) of each isolate was determined by the allelic profile of seven housekeeping genes (*gki*, *gtr*, *murl*, *mutS*, *recP*, *xpt*, and *yqiL*). The short read typing tool SRST2 (127) and the PubMLST database, both incorporated into the CDC GAS pipeline, were used to assign ST's. This was done by extracting the sequences of the 7 housekeeping genes and comparing them to previously described ST's on the GAS MLST web server (<http://pubmlst.org/spyogenes/>). Newly identified allelic profiles were submitted to the MLST GAS database curator for approval and ST assignment. Sequencing was repeated for isolates that could not

be assigned an ST by the pipeline as a result of poor quality during base-calling on one of the 7 housekeeping genes. If the problem persisted, these isolates were designated NT for sequence type. PHYLOViZ v2.0 was used to determine the genetic relatedness among isolates based on ST and construct a minimum spanning tree (128).

3.6.1.5 Detection of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) determinants

Common streptococcal antimicrobial resistance determinants were screened for by the CDC GAS pipeline. A CDC in-house sequence database that detects 21 targets (122), the ResFinder sequence database that detects 1913 targets (129) and the ARG-ANNOT sequence database that detects 1653 targets (130) are incorporated into the pipeline for this. For this study, the four common antimicrobial resistance genes analysed were *erm* (presence predicts macrolide and clindamycin resistance); *mef* (presence predicts resistance to macrolides); *tet* (presence predicts resistance to tetracycline) and mutations in the *parC/gyrA* region (predicts differing levels of resistance to fluoroquinolones).

A *pbp2x* typing scheme which detects substitutions within the transpeptidase region of *pbp2x* is incorporated into the pipeline (122,126). In order to extract the *pbp2x* sequence fragments from the samples paired-end sequence files, a query file containing representative fragments of the *pbp2x* gene was passed through the *lo_trac* gene program (126). The *pbp2x* gene fragments were extracted and blasted against a CDC in-house database (126). An existing allele number was assigned to the sequence should there be a perfect match (percent identity= 100%, alignment length= query length) to the CDC in-house reference database. A new allele was designated 'New' and will be shared with the CDC for quality checks and assignment. *pbp2x* sequences that could not be extracted due to poor quality at the region were designated 'Not determined' (126).

The genomic antimicrobial resistance prediction results were compared to the phenotypic antibiotic susceptibility patterns. For samples with discordant results, due to time constraints, only phenotypic testing was repeated for available antimicrobials.

3.6.1.6 Detection of strain features important for virulence

The CDC GAS pipeline screened for the presence/absence of genes encoding features important for virulence: the hyaluronic acid capsule (*hasA*); *enn* protein (*enn*); four fibronectin-binding domain repeat proteins [Fibronectin-binding protein of group A streptococci type A (*fbaA*), Protein F2/*S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein (*prtF2*), *S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein I(*sfb1*), Serum opacity factor/*S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein II(*sof*)]; R28 protein (*spr28*); streptodornase 1 (*sda1*); two mutations in the regulatory protein RocA; fourteen exotoxin genes (*speA*, *speC*, *speG*, *speH*, *speI*, *speJ*, *speK*, *speL*, *speM*, *speN*, *speO*, *speP*, *ssa* and *smeZ*); streptococcal inhibitor of complement (*sic*) and an upregulated *nga* operon that encodes NADase and streptolysin O (*pnga3*).

3.6.2 Phylogenetic analysis

Sequences with >500 contigs were excluded to ensure that only high quality assemblies were included (n=577) to construct the phylogenetic trees. kSNPv3 (<http://ksnp.sourceforge.net/>) was used to perform a single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) analysis. kSNP, an alignment-free tool that does not require a reference genome, is used to detect SNPs and construct phylogenies of complete microbial genome sequences based on k-mer analysis (131). In the present study, assemblies were used to generate a core SNPs matrix and the detected SNPs were then used to construct the phylogenies. A k-mer length of 19 was used and 100% of the genomes were required to possess a nucleotide at a given SNP in order for the SNP to be considered a core. Phylogenetic trees were constructed by the RAXML (132) tool using 100 bootstrap, with the maximum-likelihood (ML) method based upon the general time-reversible (GTR) substitution model and gamma distribution. Phylogenetic trees along with the metadata were visualized using the Interactive Tree of Life (iTOL) online (<https://itol.embl.de/>) software (iTOLv6) (133). The phylogenetic analysis determined genetic clusters.

1108 3.7 Data analysis

1109

1110 Descriptive statistics were used to summarize patients' characteristics: province,
1111 gender, race, age, hospitalization final outcome and site of infection. Percentages
1112 were used for quantitative data. This was all performed using formulas on Microsoft
1113 Excel.

1114 The proportion of *emm95* isolates resistant to tetracycline were compared to the
1115 proportion of *emm95* isolates resistant to erythromycin using the Two-sample
1116 proportion test on Stata v18.0

4 RESULTS

4.1 Invasive Group A streptococcal disease in South Africa 2019 – 2020

From 1 January 2019 - 31 December 2020, 1487 iGAS disease cases were recorded (**Figure 5**) through our active, national, laboratory-based surveillance, GERMS-SA.

Of the 1487 cases, isolates were not received for 847 (57.0%) cases. Cases detected through routine quarterly retrospective audits of the laboratory information system (LIS) TrakCare accounted for 838 (98.9%) of the cases without isolates. These cases are not expected to have associated isolates. Nine cases (9/847; 1.1%) were recorded as 'missing' on the GERMS-SA database as the sending laboratories communicated at a later stage that an isolate was obtained and should have been sent but was unfortunately not. These isolates could no longer be located on their side.

At the NICD's CRDM, 640/1487 (43.0%) isolates were received for confirmation and further phenotypic and genotypic characterization. Of the 640 isolates, 622 (97.2%) were viable on culture and presumptively identified as GAS by phenotypic methods and 18 (2.8%) isolates were non-viable when attempts were made to culture them for further characterization. Whole genome-sequencing was done on 596 (95.8%) of the 622 viable isolates. Twenty-six (4.2%) isolates were not sequenced due to time constraints. Only specimens that passed the quality check (577/596; 97.0%) were included in the downstream genome analysis.




Figure 5: Invasive group A streptococcal disease cases recorded in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (N=1487)

4.2 Demographic and clinical characteristics of cases presenting with invasive GAS disease

Patient characteristics are illustrated in **Table 4**. Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Western Cape and the Eastern Cape recorded 94.0% (1398/1487) of the total cases. The Western Cape reported 45.7% (679/1487) of the total cases. Where gender was known, 53.6% (785/1464) of iGAS disease occurred in males. For cases where age was known (n=1408), the median age was 36 years and age ranged from 0 – 94 years. Thirty-four percent (499/1408) of cases occurred in individuals aged 25 - 44 years old, 22.8% (339/1408) of the cases were reported in individuals 45 – 64 years old and young children aged 0 – 4 years old accounted for 12.9% (193/1408) of the cases. **Figure 6** illustrates that in both 2019 and 2020, in individuals where age was known, the incidence of iGAS disease was highest in infants aged <1 years old (4.4 cases/100,000 persons in 2019 and 2.1 cases/100,000 persons in 2020) and the elderly aged ≥65 years old (3.0 cases/100,000 persons in 2019 and 1.9 cases/100,000 persons in 2020). Race data was available for only 105 cases and black individuals accounted for 73.3% (77/105) of these cases. Black individuals in Gauteng (36.4%; 28/77) made up most of these cases, followed by black individuals in Kwa-Zulu Natal (16.9%; 14/77), Eastern Cape (16.9%; 14/77) and the Western Cape (16.9%; 13/77). Coloured individuals accounted for 21.9% (23/105) of the cases and most of these cases were recorded in the Western Cape (52.2%; 12/23) and the Eastern Cape (43.5%; 10/23). Where final in-hospital outcome data was available, 76.4% (107/140) of patients recovered from iGAS disease, 20.7% (29/140) of the cases died and 0.3% (4/140) of patients refused hospital treatment and thus final outcome was unknown.

Table 4: Demographic and clinical characteristics of case patients presenting with invasive group A streptococcus disease in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (N=1487)

Characteristic	2019 (n=971)		2020 (n=516)		Total (N=1487)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Province						
Gauteng	198	20.4	96	18.6	294	19.8
Kwa-Zulu Natal	162	16.7	49	9.5	211	14.2
Western Cape	415	42.7	264	51.2	679	45.7
Mpumalanga	11	1.1	11	2.1	22	1.5
Limpopo	10	1.0	5	1.0	15	1.0
Northern Cape	7	0.7	7	1.4	14	0.9
Free State	22	2.3	11	2.1	33	2.2
North West	2	0.2	3	0.6	5	0.3
Eastern Cape	144	14.8	70	13.6	214	14.4
Gender						
Male	490	50.5	295	57.2	785	52.8
Female	462	47.6	217	42.1	679	45.7
Unknown	19	2.0	4	0.8	23	1.5
^aRace						
Black	3	0.3	74	14.3	77	5.2
White	0	0	3	0.6	3	0.2
Coloured	1	0.1	22	4.3	23	1.5
Asian	0	0	2	0.4	2	0.1
Unknown	967	99.6	415	80.4	1382	92.9
Age category (years)						
<1	50	5.1	25	4.8	75	5.0
1-4	90	9.3	28	5.4	118	7.9
5-9	33	3.4	10	1.9	43	2.9
10-14	20	2.1	10	1.9	30	2.0
15-24	81	8.3	49	9.5	130	8.7
25-44	328	33.8	171	33.1	499	33.6
45-64	233	24.0	106	20.5	339	22.8
≥65	104	10.7	70	13.6	174	11.7
Unknown	32	3.3	47	9.1	79	5.3
^b Final in-hospital outcome						
Died	1	0.1	28	5.4	29	2.0
Recovered	3	0.2	104	20.2	107	7.2
Refused hospital treatment	0	0	4	0.8	4	0.3
Unknown	967	99.6	380	73.6	1347	90.6

^aData on race was available for only 4 cases that occurred in 2019 and 101 cases that occurred in 2020.

^bData on final in-hospital outcome was available for only 4 cases that occurred in 2019 and 136 cases that occurred in 2020.

The collection of additional data using the case report form (CRF) was only implemented in 2020, hence the improvement of data collection compared to 2019.




Figure 6: Incidence of invasive group A streptococcus disease by age-category, South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019 – 2020 (N=1408).
 “All” bar also includes all individuals including where age was not known (N=1487)

Table 5 illustrates that blood (51.9%, 770/1487) was the most common specimen type where iGAS was detected. Other body sites where iGAS was detected included joint/joint fluid (11.0%, 163/1487), bone (4.2%, 62/1487) and pleural fluid (4.0%, 59/1487). Fine needle aspirate/biopsy/tissue specimens collected from various body sites accounted for 18.1% (267/1487) of the cases.

Table 5: Site of specimen collection in patients presenting with invasive group A streptococcus disease in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (N=1487)

Site of infection	n	%
Blood	770	51.8
^a Fine needle aspirate/ ^b Biopsy/ ^c Tissue	267	18.0
Joint/Joint fluid	163	11.0
Bone	62	4.2
Pleural fluid	59	4.0
^d Necrotic wound/tissue (necrotizing fasciitis)	40	2.7
Central nervous system	34	2.3
Peritoneum/Ascitic fluid	31	2.1
Lung	18	1.2
Endocervical	12	0.8
Lymph node	11	0.7
^e Deep-seated abscess	10	0.7
^f Septic wound	5	0.3
Product of conception	2	0.1
^g Sterile cavity	2	0.1
Pericardial fluid/Heart	1	0.1

^aAnatomical site: Neck= 3; Unknown=14

^bAnatomical site: Unknown=8

^cAnatomical site: Abdomen=2; Back=1; Breast=8; Chest=1; Foot=1; Lower limb=22; Upper limb=18; Groin=2; Kidney=1; Neck=1; Ocular=1; Penis=2; Scrotum=1; Shoulder=1; Upper respiratory tract=2; Unknown=178

^dAnatomical site: Fournier's gangrene=1; Breast=1; Buttock=1; Cutaneous=2; Face=1; Lower limb=10; Ocular=1; Penis=1; Unknown=13; Upper limb=9


^eAnatomical site: Breast=1; Lower limb=1; Neck=1; Unknown=7

^fAnatomical site: Lower limb= 1 Unknown=4

^gAnatomical site: Unknown=1

4.3 Distribution of invasive GAS disease cases

In 2019, more iGAS disease cases were reported (65.3%, 971/1487) in comparison to 2020 (34.7%, 516/1487) (**Table 4, Figure 7**). Six provinces (excluding Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and North West) reported fewer cases in 2020 than what was reported in 2019 (data not shown). The biggest decline in the number of cases was seen in the Western Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape which reported 151, 113, 102 and 74 fewer cases, respectively, than the preceding year. **Figure 7** illustrates the number of iGAS cases reported for each month in 2019 and 2020. The highest number of cases were reported in January 2019 (117 cases), March 2019 (108 cases), May 2019 (103) and August 2019 (100 cases). The least number of cases were reported in December 2020 (22 cases). There was a sharp decline in the number of cases reported from October 2019 in comparison to the preceding months of that year. The number of cases remained relatively stable throughout 2020. Most cases (866 cases; 444 in autumn and 422 in winter) occurred in the winter and autumn months (March – August).



Jan- January; Feb- February; Mar- March; Apr- April; Jun- June; Jul- July; Aug- August; Sep- September; Oct- October; Nov- November; Dec- December

Figure 7: Distribution of invasive group A streptococcus cases by month in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (N=1487)

4.4 Antimicrobial susceptibility

4.4.1 Phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility patterns

Phenotypic antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) results were available for 618/622 (99.4%) of the viable isolates. One isolate could not be located when the samples were retrieved from storage for testing. Penicillin and ceftriaxone results were pending for three isolates and thus these isolates were excluded. The AST results are presented in **Table 6**. Based on the CLSI susceptibility breakpoints, all of the study isolates tested phenotypically susceptible to penicillin, ceftaroline, ceftriaxone, clindamycin, linezolid, vancomycin and quinupristin-dalfopristin. The highest phenotypic resistance was seen against tetracycline (10.5%, 65/618) followed by erythromycin (3.6%, 22/618). Only one (0.2%) isolate was resistant to chloramphenicol and another one (0.2%) was resistant to levofloxacin. Eight isolates displayed resistance against two antibiotics as follows: one isolate displayed resistance against both erythromycin and chloramphenicol and seven isolates displayed resistance against erythromycin and tetracycline.

Table 6: Antimicrobial susceptibility patterns of invasive group A streptococcus isolates based on phenotypic minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC), South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (n=618)

Antimicrobial agent	Number of isolates (%)		
	Sensitive	Intermediate	Resistant
Penicillin	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Ceftaroline	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Ceftriaxone	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Erythromycin	596 (96.4)	0 (0.0)	22 (3.6)
Clindamycin	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Chloramphenicol	617 (99.8)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.2)
Tetracycline	548 (88.7)	5 (0.8)	65 (10.5)
Linezolid	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Vancomycin	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Quinupristin-dalfopristin	618 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Levofloxacin	617 (99.8)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.2)

4.4.2 Major antimicrobial resistance determinants

Of the 622 viable isolates received at CRDM, only 577 (92.8%) isolates were included in the downstream genome analysis. The 45 (7.2%) isolates that were excluded from this analysis were due to the whole genome-sequencing data not being available as a result of time constraints (26 isolates) or the resulting sequences not passing quality checks (19 isolates). The four isolates excluded in the phenotypic AST results in section 4.4.1 were also excluded from the current analysis as they fell into one of the two exclusion criteria mentioned above.

Four common antimicrobial resistance (AMR) genes/mutations (*erm*, *mef*, *tet* and mutations in the *parC_gyrA* region) were analysed in this study and the results are presented in **Figure 8** and **Table 7**. Amongst the 577 isolates that were screened for

these AMR genes, the most frequently detected resistance determinant was the *tet* family gene which was detected in 59 (10.2%) isolates, followed by the *mef* gene detected in 14 (2.4%) isolates and finally the *erm* family gene which was detected in 6 (1.0%) isolates. Mutations in the *parC* region were detected in 7 (1.2%) isolates and no isolates carried mutations in the *gyrA* region. More than one AMR determinant was detected in seven isolates as follows: both the *erm* and *tet* genes were detected in three isolates, both the *mef* and *tet* genes were detected in three isolates and the *mef* gene and a mutation in the *parC* region was detected in one isolate. The *tet* family genes detected in the study isolates were *tetM* (n=54), *tetO* (n=2), a combination of *tetL*: *tetM* (n=2) and unassigned *tet* (n=1). The *erm* family genes detected included *ermTR* (n=4), *ermT* (n=1) and unassigned *erm* (n=1). The most common mutation in the *parC* region was the *parC*-S6A substitution (n=4). No isolates carried mutations in both the *parC_gyrA* region.




Figure 8: Group A streptococcus invasive isolates positive for the ERM, MEF, TET targets or mutations in the *parC_gyrA* targets associated with macrolide, tetracycline and fluoroquinolone resistance. South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (n=577)

1277

1278 There were some discordant results between the phenotypic and genotypic testing
1279 and therefore, the isolates (excluding those with discrepant fluoroquinolone results
1280 as the laboratory had a shortage of the levofloxacin gradient diffusion strips at the
1281 time) were tested using the E-test and re-tested using the Kirby- Bauer disc diffusion
1282 method. The repeat results correlated with the initial phenotypic results, but repeat
1283 sequencing is still pending. We have presented the current discrepancies while
1284 awaiting final resolution. The results are presented in **Table 7**. The *erm* gene was
1285 detected in one isolate that was phenotypically sensitive to erythromycin and
1286 clindamycin. The *erm/mef* gene was not detected in two isolates that tested
1287 phenotypically resistant to erythromycin. The *tet* gene was detected in two isolates
1288 that were phenotypically sensitive to tetracycline whereas this gene was not detected
1289 in four isolates that displayed resistance to tetracycline. Mutations in the *parC* region
1290 were seen in seven isolates (MIC range: 1 - 2 µg.ml) that all displayed sensitivity to
1291 levofloxacin: five isolates had an amino acid alteration in site 6, which included S6F
1292 (n=1) and S6A (n=4); one isolate had an alteration as site 10 (D10N) and another
1293 isolate had an amino acid alteration at site 5 (D5N). One isolate was resistant to
1294 levofloxacin but no mutation in the *parC_gyrA* region was detected.

1295

Table 7: Common antimicrobial resistance determinants associated with macrolide, tetracycline and fluoroquinolone resistance detected among invasive group A streptococcus isolates in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (n=577)

AMR determinant	Antibiotic								
	Erythromycin			Tetracycline			Levofloxacin		
	S	I	R	S	I	R	S	I	R
	(n=556)	(n=0)	(n=21)	(n=516)	(n=4)	(n=57)	(n=576)	(n=0)	(n=1)
Macrolides									
<i>erm</i>	1	0	0						
<i>ermT</i>	0	0	1						
<i>ermTR</i>	0	0	4						
<i>Mef</i>	0	0	14						
None	555	0	2						
Tetracycline									
<i>Tet</i>				0	0	1			
<i>TetM</i>				2	4	48			
<i>TetO</i>				0	0	2			
<i>TetL:TetM</i>				0	0	2			
None				514	0	4			
Fluoroquinolones									
<i>ParC-S6f</i>							1	0	0
<i>ParC-D10N</i>							1	0	0
<i>ParC-S6A</i>							4	0	0
<i>ParC-D5N</i>							1	0	0
None							569	0	1

Bold writing indicates discrepancy between phenotypic and genotypic results

S=Sensitive; I=Intermediate; R=Resistant

1302 Although all isolates tested phenotypically susceptible to the β -lactam antibiotics
1303 penicillin, ceftriaxone and ceftaroline, various pbp2x sequence types were detected
1304 amongst these isolates (**Table 8**). The most common pbpx sequence type detected
1305 in 501/577 (86.8%) isolates was the wild type pbp2x-1, followed by pbp2x-8 detected
1306 in 19 (3.3%) isolates and pbp2x-10 detected in 14 (2.4%) isolates. Five isolates that
1307 were sequence type pbp2x-1 phenotypically displayed elevated MICs to penicillin
1308 and ceftriaxone. All five isolates had an MIC of 0.12 μ g/ml for penicillin. One isolate
1309 had an MIC of 0.12 μ g/ml for penicillin and an MIC of 0.5 μ g/ml for ceftriaxone. These
1310 MIC's were at the cusp of susceptibility for penicillin and ceftriaxone. One isolate
1311 that was pbp2x-10 also phenotypically displayed an MIC of 0.12 μ g/ml for penicillin.
1312 Twenty-two isolates (3.8%) represented unassigned (potentially new) pbp2x
1313 sequence types that require submission to the CDC for further quality checks and
1314 sequence type assignment. The MIC ranges of these isolates for penicillin and
1315 ceftriaxone were 0.006 - 0.023 μ g/ml and 0.015 – 0.06 μ g/ml, respectively. All the
1316 isolates had an MIC of 0.03 μ g/ml for ceftaroline.
1317 The pbp2x sequence type could not be determined for 10 isolates (1.7%) due to
1318 unsatisfactory sequence quality in the pbp2x region. The MIC ranges of these
1319 isolates for penicillin and ceftriaxone were 0.004 -0.015 μ g/ml and 0.03 – 0.06 μ g/ml,
1320 respective. All the isolates had an MIC of 0.03 μ g/ml for ceftaroline.

Table 8: PBP2x sequence types detected among invasive group A streptococcus isolates in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (n=577)

PBP2x type	No. of isolates (%)	^a MIC range (µg/ml)	^b MIC50 (µg/ml)	PBP2x substitution
1	501 (86.8)	0.004 – 0.12	0.015	Wild type
8	19 (3.3)	0.008 – 1.015	0.008	I502V, P676S
10	14 (2.4)	0.008 - 0.12	0.015	M593T
9	6 (1.0)	0.004 – 0.015	0.008	S562T, P676S
13	2 (0.3)	0.008 – 0.015	-	D353A
2	2 (0.3)	0.008 – 0.015	-	D353A, P676S
3	1 (0.2)	0.015	-	S562T
*NEW	22 (3.8)	0.006 – 0.023	0.008	-
°Not determined	10 (1.7)	0.004 – 0.015	0.015	-

Boldface indicates pbp2x substitutions previously reported by the CDC to be associated with elevated MIC values in comparison to their baseline wild-type MICs (134)

^aMIC range against penicillin

^bMIC50 against penicillin

*NEW – Unassigned pbp2x sequence types to be submitted to the CDC

°Not determined – Unassigned pbp2x sequence types due to unsatisfactory sequence quality at the pbp2x region


4.5 Potential coverage of a combined 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine and theoretical Mrp protein vaccine

From the 577 invasive isolates that were typed in this study, 70 *emm* subtypes were identified and from this, 56 *emm* types were assigned (**Figure 9A**). For 30 isolates, the *emm* subtype could not be determined as the sequences were not a perfect 180/180 match to any of the existing *emm* subtypes in the CDC database. Instead, the pipeline assigned these isolates an *emm* subtype it closely resembled with an asterisk (e.g. 58.3*). This meant that the isolate in question was similar to *emm* subtype 58.3* but not identical and thus may represent a novel *emm* subtype as no other hits were found. In this document, these isolates are referred to as potentially novel *emm* subtype/type and were not included when calculating the potential vaccine coverage as the *emm* subtype must be known in order to assign an *emm* type. The sequences for these 30 isolates will be submitted to the CDC for further quality checks and *emm* subtype assignment. Six isolates did not type even when


the sequencing was repeated for these isolates. After investigations and discussions with the CDC, we were advised to report these isolates as non-typable.

The number of isolates within each *emm* type ranged from 1 – 33 isolates. The 10 most common *emm* types detected in this study were (in descending order): *emm76* (33/577, 5.7%), *emm92* (30/577, 5.2%), *emm82* (29/577, 5.0%), *emm44* (27/577, 4.7%), *emm49* (26/577, 4.5%), *emm80* (22/577, 3.8%), *emm53* (22/577, 3.8%), *emm1* (22/577, 3.8%), *emm183* (21/577, 3.6%) and *emm65* (21/577, 3.6%). These *emm* types accounted for 43.8% (253/577) of the isolate collection. Two isolates belonged to *emm/stG1750*, a sequence type that has been previously isolated from a group G streptococcal isolate, but in this case the isolates were *S. pyogenes* as they were positive for the group A carbohydrate (97,116). Only 24 *emm* types in this study collection (*emm92*, *emm44*, *emm82*, *emm49*, *emm1*, *emm11*, *emm4*, *emm81*, *emm77*, *emm3*, *emm12*, *emm87*, *emm18*, *emm94*, *emm22*, *emm73*, *emm2*, *emm6*, *emm78*, *emm28*, *emm75*, *emm83*, *emm114* and *emm89*) which accounted for 244 isolates are included in the experimental 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine. This implies that the 30-valent vaccine would theoretically cover 44.6% (244/547) of the isolates in this study. An additional 108 isolates in this study are *emm* types that have displayed cross-protection in animal studies, which further implies that potential coverage by the 30-valent vaccine could increase to 64.4% (352/547). As depicted in **Figure 9B**, Mrp only was detected in 323/577 (56.0%) isolates, a 30-valent vaccine *emm* type only was detected in 42/577 (7.3%) isolates and 205/577 (35.5%) isolates had both Mrp and a 30-valent vaccine *emm* type identified. Neither Mrp nor a 30-valent vaccine *emm* type was detected in 7/577 (1.2%) isolates. A theoretical vaccine that targets both components (M + Mrp) would theoretically cover 98.8% (570/577) of the isolates in this collection.

A



B



1373

1374

1375

1376 **Figure 9: A.** The *emm* type distribution among 577 invasive group A streptococcus
1377 isolates collected through GERMS-SA, 2019 - 2020

1378 NT: Non-typable

1379 Blue bar indicates NT isolates where 4/6 carried MRP only

1380

1381 **B.** The distribution of the M and M-related protein amongst 577 invasive group A
1382 streptococcus isolates collected through GERMS-SA, 2019 - 2020

1383

Table 9 illustrates the distribution of study isolate *emm* types into *emm* clusters. Thirty-six isolates are not included in the table as these isolates did not *emm* subtype (novel *emm* subtypes and NT's). The isolates in this study collection belonged to 15 different *emm* clusters (E1, E2, E3, E4, E6, A-C3, A-C4, A-C5, D4, D5, *emm*6, *emm*18, *emm*74, *emm*95 and *emm*111) and >75% (428/541) of the isolates clustered into 5 *emm* clusters (E2, E3, E4, E6 and D4). Five *emm* types (*emm*6, *emm*18, *emm*74, *emm*95 and *emm*111) belonged to single M-protein *emm* clusters and two isolates (two *st*G1750 isolates) did not belong to any of the previously described 16 *emm* clusters since these *emm* type were not part of the 173 *emm* types that were tested to create the *emm* cluster system (119).

Table 9: The clustering of 541 invasive group A streptococcus isolates into *emm* clusters. South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020

Clade	<i>emm</i> cluster	<i>emm</i> type (No. of isolates)	No. of isolates (%)
X	E1	4 (11), 78 (5)	16 (3.0)
X	E2	68 (3), 76 (33), 90 (4), 92 (30)	70 (12.9)
X	E3	15 (1), 25 (15), 44 (27), 49 (26), 58 (4), 82 (29), 87 (7), 103 (8), 118 (3), 183 (21)	141 (26.1)
X	E4	2 (4), 8 (15), 22 (4), 28 (2), 73 (4), 77 (9), 89 (1), 102 (7), 114 (2), 124 (8), 169 (2)	58 (10.7)
X	E6	11 (16), 48 (2), 63 (2), 65 (21), 75 (2), 81 (12), 85 (2), 94 (4), 158 (3), 177 (2)	66 (12.2)
Y	A-C3	1 (22)	22 (4.1)
Y	A-C4	12 (7), 39 (4)	11 (2.0)
Y	A-C5	3 (7)	7 (1.3)
Y	D4	33 (18), 43 (9), 53 (22), 70 (1), 80 (22), 83 (2), 116 (16), 192 (3)	93 (17.2)
Y	D5	184 (13)	13 (2.4)
Y	Single M-protein <i>emm</i> cluster	6 (4), 18 (7), 74 (12)	23 (4.3)
Outlier	Single M-protein <i>emm</i> cluster outlier	95 (17), 111 (2)	19 (3.5)
N/A	Not assigned	Stg1750 (2)	2 (0.4)

In blood specimens, 53 of the 56 *emm* types were detected. The three *emm* types that were not detected in blood specimens seem to be rare *emm* types as each of these *emm* types were detected in only two other specimen types. Eleven *emm* types were unique to blood specimens i.e. only detected in blood specimens and not any other specimen type. The distribution of *emm* types by site of specimen collection is presented in **Figure 10**. Only 20 of the most prevalent *emm* types that accounted for >10 isolates are illustrated (n = 398). The specimen types where the most *emm* types were isolated were blood, joint/joint fluid, tissue/fine needle aspirate, bone and pleural fluid where 20, 18, 15, 11 and 10 *emm* types were isolated respectively. *emm* types did not appear to aggregate by specimen type i.e. *emm* types were not restricted to certain specimen types.




Figure 10: *emm* type distribution among invasive group A streptococcus isolates stratified by site of specimen collection. South Africa, GERMS, 2019-2020 (n = 398). Each bar represents the site of specimen collection and is colored based on *emm* type

Of the 63 isolates that tested phenotypically resistant to tetracycline, an *emm* type was available for only 57 isolates. Six isolates were excluded because they were part of the isolates that failed quality checks (**Figure 5**; 2 isolates) and isolates that were not sequenced due to time constraints (**Figure 5**; 4 isolates). The 57 isolates belonged to 14 *emm* types and 2 isolates were non-typable (**Figure 11**). *emm76* was the most dominant *emm* type amongst the tetracycline-resistant isolates (52.6%; 30/57). There were no erythromycin-resistant *emm76* isolates. Twenty-two isolates tested phenotypically resistant to erythromycin but an *emm* type was available for only 21 isolates as 1 isolate was excluded due to poor sequence quality. The 21 isolates belonged to 6 *emm* types with *emm95* isolates accounting for most of the erythromycin-resistant isolates (52.4%; 11/21). The difference in the proportion of *emm95* isolates that were resistant to tetracycline and *emm95* isolates resistant to erythromycin was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$)




Figure 11: *emm* type distribution among invasive group A streptococcus isolates resistant to tetracycline and erythromycin. South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019-2020 (n = 78). Each bar represents an antibiotic and is colored based on *emm* type

4.6 Strain diversity assessed by MLST

A total of 90 sequence types (ST's) were assigned for 577 isolates (**Figure 12**). New ST's were assigned to 142 isolates for the first time after the submission of unique allelic profiles of the 7 housekeeping genes to PubMLST. The 10 most common ST's (in descending order) were ST378 (34/577, 5.9%), ST82 (29/577, 5.0%), ST371 (26/577, 4.5%), ST1142 (23/577, 4.0%), ST11 (22/577, 3.8%), ST1439 (21/577, 3.6%), ST28 (21/577, 3.6%), ST400 (18/577, 3.1%), ST3 (17/577, 2.9%), ST1325 (16/577, 2.8%) which accounted for 39.3% (227/577) of the study isolates. Seventeen isolates could not be assigned an ST as an allele for the housekeeping gene *yqiL* could not be determined for these isolates, thus resulting in an incomplete profile. Sixteen of these isolates were *emm11* and one isolate was *emm82*. The relationships of the ST's are illustrated in the minimum spanning tree below (**figure 12**) and the 17 isolates that could not be assigned an ST were excluded. Based on the distance labels observed on the diagram below, the ST's were highly diverse from one another. Based on our knowledge at the time of this analysis, clonal complexes (CC) for this pathogen have not been described.

1452 Thirty ST's (ST378, ST82, ST371, ST1142, ST11, ST28, ST1439, ST400, ST3,
1453 ST1325, ST333, ST1337, ST624, ST176, ST624, ST715, ST26, ST227, ST129,
1454 ST120, ST1340, ST544, ST721, ST228, ST1434, ST1330, ST39, ST36, ST1433 and
1455 ST1327) with >5 isolates each were used to assess whether a given ST was
1456 represented by a single *emm* type. **Figure 13** illustrates that for isolates with a
1457 known *emm* type, the majority of the 30 ST's were generally represented by a single
1458 *emm* type: ST378/*emm*76, ST82/*emm*92, ST371/*emm*49, ST1142/*emm*44,
1459 ST11/*emm*53, ST28/*emm*1, ST1439/*emm*183, ST400/*emm*95, ST3/*emm*33,
1460 ST1325/*emm*184, ST333/*emm*8, ST176/*emm*2, ST624/*emm*81, ST715/*emm*80,
1461 ST227/*emm*116, ST120/*emm*74, ST1340/*emm*25, ST544/*emm*124, ST74/*emm*43,
1462 ST338/*emm*68, ST1330/*emm*103, ST62/*emm*87, ST39/*emm*4, ST36/*emm*12,
1463 ST1433/*emm*102 and ST1327/*emm*18). Both ST1337 and ST26 isolates were all
1464 *emm*82 and both ST129 and ST1434 isolates were all *emm*65. No other ST's
1465 besides these two shared *emm* types. In contrast, based on the 30 most prevalent
1466 *emm* types, only 15 *emm* types were represented by a single ST whereas 14 *emm*
1467 types were represented by more than one ST (data not shown). Of the *emm* types
1468 represented by only 2 ST's, the allelic profiles of the 2 ST's differed by only one
1469 housekeeping gene. The most diverse *emm* type based on ST was *emm*77 which
1470 was represented by 5 (ST63, ST482, ST399, ST1400 and ST1401) different ST's.




Figure 13: Distribution of multilocus sequence types and *emm* types among invasive group A streptococcus isolates collected in South Africa. GERMS-SA, 2019 - 2020 (n=435). Each bar represents a sequence type and is colored according to *emm* types that share that sequence type.

4.7 Virulence genes identified among invasive group A Streptococci

Group A streptococci genes that are commonly associated with virulence features are presented in **Table 10**. The prevalence of these features ranged from 1.7% (10/577) for the *rocA* null mutations to 97.6% (563/577) for the streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin G (*speG*) gene. The *rocA* null mutations [previously associated with *emm18* (*rocAM18*) isolates and *emm3* (*rocAM3*) isolates] were predicted in 10 isolates that were *emm3* (n=7), *emm25* (n=1), *emm48* (n=1) and *emm158* (n=1). The *sic* gene (responsible for streptococcal inhibitor of complement) was only detected in two *emm* types (*emm1* and *emm12*) and it was detected in all the isolates of these *emm* types. Ninety-five percent (549/577) of the study isolates were predicted to produce a hyaluronic acid capsule due to the presence of the *hasA* gene. The gene targets of four fibronectin-binding proteins [fibronectin-binding protein of group A streptococci type A (*fbaA*), Protein F2/*S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein (*prtF2*), Serum opacity factor/*S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein II(*sof*)] and *S. pyogenes* Fn-binding protein I(*sfb1*)] were detected in >60.0% of the study isolates.

Eleven streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin genes were detected in the study isolates and they (in descending order of prevalence) were *speG* (97.6%; 563/577); *smeZ* (83.9%; 484/577); *speJ* (42.5%; 245/577); *speC* (40.6; 234/577); *speH* (26.7%; 154/577); *speA* (22.9%; 132/577); *ssa* (22.0%; 127/577); *speM* (19.9%; 115/577); *speI* (18.0%; 104/577); *speK* (12.7%; 73/577) and *speL* (10.7%; 62/577). The 3 exotoxin genes *speN*, *speO* and *speP* were not detected in the present study. *speG* was detected in all *emm* types with the exception of *emm63* isolates. The most exotoxin genes detected (7; *speA*, *speC*, *speG*, *speJ*, *speL*, *speM* and *smeZ*) occurred in one *emm92* isolate and one *emm81* isolate had only one exotoxin gene (*speG*) detected. One specimen had no exotoxin genes that were detected and this isolate was *emm* non-typable.

Table 10: The prevalence of virulence related features among invasive group A streptococcus isolates, South Africa. GERMS-SA, 2019 - 2020 (n=577)

Virulence feature	^a Number of isolates (%)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin G (SPE_G)	563 (97.6)
Fibronectin-binding protein of group A streptococci type A (FBAA)	549 (95.1)
Hyaluronic acid capsule	549 (95.1)
ENN	529 (91.7)
MRP	528 (91.5)
Streptococcal mitogenic exotoxin (SME_Z)	484 (83.9)
<i>S. pyogenes</i> fibronectin-binding protein (PRTF2)	448 (77.6)
Serum opacity factor- (SOF)	353 (61.2)
<i>S. pyogenes</i> fibronectin-binding protein I (SFB1)	347 (60.1)
NADase D300G substitution	324 (56.2)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin J (SPE_J)	245 (42.5)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin C (SPE_C)	234 (40.6)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin H (SPE_H)	154 (26.7)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin A (SPE_A)	132 (22.9)
Streptococcal superantigen A (SS_A)	127 (22.0)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin M (SPE_M)	115 (19.9)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin L (SPE_L)	104 (18.0)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin K (SPE_K)	73 (12.7)
Streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin I (SPE_I)	62 (10.7)
Pnga 3-Clade 3 up-regulated promoter of the nga operon	60 (10.4)
Streptodornase D1 (Virulence associated DNase)	34 (5.9)
Streptococcal inhibitor of complement (SIC)	29 (5.0)
R28 protein	10 (1.7)
<i>rocA</i> null mutation	10 (1.7)

^aNumber of isolates where the virulence strain feature is detected.

Table 11 illustrates the streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin gene profiles detected in 577 iGAS isolates. Seventy-two distinct exotoxin gene profiles with unique combinations of superantigen genes (SAg) were identified. The 72 SAg profiles contained 1- 7 genes per profile. Five SAg profiles (SAg6, SAg31, SAg65, SAg70 and SAg72) contained only 1 or 2 exotoxin genes. SAg70 was made up of only 1 (*speG*) exotoxin gene and this profile was detected in only one *emm81* isolate. The most prevalent SAg profile was SAg1 (C: G: Z), detected in *emm11*, *emm48*, *emm65*, *emm89*, *emm95*, *stG1750* and as well as one 'novel' isolates. To observe whether *emm* types possessed a specific SAg profile, *emm* types with >20 isolates

were considered. Eighty- percent (24/30) of *emm92* isolates displayed a SAg5 (C: G: J: Z) profile and 75.8% (25/33) of *emm76* isolates displayed a SAg8 (G: J: K: S: Z) profile. More than half (63.0%; 17/27) of *emm44* isolates were a SAg11 (A: G: H: J) profile whilst no other *emm* types displayed this profile. All *emm49* isolates (100%; 26/26) were SAg7 (G: H: I: L: M). More than half (59.1%; 13/22) of *emm80* isolates were SAg10 (G: H: Z). The SAg2 (C: G: L: M: Z) profile was dominated by *emm53* isolates and these isolates represented 95.2% (21/22) of the total *emm53* isolates in this study. Seventy-one percent (15/21) of *emm65* isolates displayed a SAg6 (G: Z) profile. *emm82*, *emm1* and *emm183* isolates did not possess a specific SAg profile but instead, a majority of these isolates displayed two SAg profiles.

1529 **Table 11:** Streptococcal antigen gene (SAg) profiles by *emm* type among 577
1530 invasive group A streptococcus isolates collected in South Africa, GERMS-SA, 2019
1531 - 2020

SAg profile no.	Presence of SAg	<i>emm</i> type (no. of isolates)	No. of isolates (%)
1	C:G:Z	11 (12); 48 (2); 65 (5); 89 (1); 95 (15); stG1750 (1); novel (18)	54 (9.4)
2	C:G:L:M:Z	11 (1); 53 (21); 75 (1); 158 (3); 184 (8); novel (1); NT (2)	37 (6.4)
3	A:G:J:Z	1 (10); 80 (13); 116 (3); 183 (9)	35 (6.1)
4	G:J:Z	4 (2); 18 (1); 25 (2); 70 (1); 75 (1); 76 (1); 80 (6); 124 (7); 183 (11); novel (1)	33 (5.7)
5	C:G:J:Z	25 (1); 28 (2); 85 (2); 92 (24); 124 (1); novel (1); NT (1)	32 (5.5)
6	G:Z	65 (15); 68 (3); 73 (1); 77 (6); 114 (2); 118 (2); 183 (1)	30 (5.2)
7	G:H:I:L:M	49 (26)	26 (4.5)
8	G:J:K:S:Z	76 (25)	25 (4.3)
9	G:H:J	44 (5); 81 (3); 103 (1)	19 (3.3)
10	G:H:Z	25 (1); 82 (13); 94 (4)	18 (3.1)
11	A:G:H:J	44 (17)	17 (2.9)
12	G:H:S:Z	33 (15); NT (1)	16 (2.8)
13	C:G:H:I:Z	12 (5); 82 (10)	15 (2.6)
14	G:K:S:Z	8 (10); 76 (3); 177 (2)	15 (2.6)
15	A:C:G:J:Z	1 (12); 92 (2)	14 (2.4)
16	G:H:J:Z	25 (10); 65 (1); 82 (1); 103 (2)	14 (2.4)
17	A:C:G:Z	11 (3); 74 (5); 92 (1); 15 (1); novel (2)	12 (2.1)
18	A:G:J:S:Z	116 (10); 18 (1)	11 (1.9)
19	G:J:S:Z	18 (5); 87 (1); 111 (2); 116 (2)	10 (1.7)
20	C:G:K:Z	43 (9)	9 (1.6)
21	A:G:Z	73 (2); 78 (5); novel (1)	8 (1.4)
22	C:S:Z	4 (7)	7 (1.2)
23	G:H:I:Z	12 (1); 25 (1); 73 (1); 82 (4)	7 (1.2)
24	A:C:G:K:Z	3 (1); 6 (4); 74 (1)	6 (1.0)
25	A:G:M:Z	74 (6)	6 (1.0)
26	C:G:J:S:Z	87 (6)	6 (1.0)
27	C:G:S:Z	22 (4); 95 (1); novel (1)	6 (1.0)
28	A:C:G:L:M:Z	184 (5)	5 (0.9)
29	C:G:L:M	2 (4); 53 (1)	5 (0.9)
30	G:H:I:J:L:M	102 (5)	5 (0.9)
31	G:J	81 (4); novel (1)	5 (0.9)
32	G:L:M:S:Z	39 (4); novel (1)	5 (0.9)
33	A:G:K:S:Z	8 (5)	4 (0.7)
34	G:H:J:L:M	44 (4)	4 (0.7)
35	G:M:Z	90 (4)	4 (0.7)
36	A:C:G:H:I:Z	12 (1); stG1750 (1); novel (1)	3 (0.5)
37	C:G:H:Z	58 (2); 103 (1)	3 (0.5)

SAg profile no.	Presence of SAg	emm type (no. of isolates)	No. of isolates (%)
38	C:G:J	81 (1); 92 (2)	3 (0.5)
39	C:G:J:K:S:Z	76 (3)	3 (0.5)
40	G:L:M:Z	77 (1); 83 (1); novel (1)	3 (0.5)
41	A:C:G:K	3 (2)	2 (0.3)
42	A:G:S	3 (2)	2 (0.3)
43	C:G:H:J:Z	103 (2)	2 (0.3)
44	G:H:I:J:L:M:Z	102 (2)	2 (0.3)
45	G:H:I:J:Z	118 (1); 192 (1)	2 (0.3)
46	G:H:S	33 (2)	2 (0.3)
47	G:J:K:S	76 (1); NT (1)	2 (0.3)
48	G:J:L:M:S:Z	116 (1); 192 (1)	2 (0.3)
49	G:J:L:M:Z	80 (2)	2 (0.3)
50	G:K:Z	58 (2)	2 (0.3)
51	G:S:Z	95 (1); 165 (1)	2 (0.3)
52	K:S:Z	4 (2)	2 (0.3)
53	L:M:Z	77 (2)	2 (0.3)
54	A:C:G:J:L:M:Z	92 (1)	1 (0.2)
55	A:C:G:K:S	3 (1)	1 (0.2)
56	A:C:G:S	3 (1)	1 (0.2)
57	A:G:H:I:Z	103 (1)	1 (0.2)
58	A:G:H:J:Z	103 (1)	1 (0.2)
59	A:G:S:Z	169 (1)	1 (0.2)
60	C:G:H:J	81 (1)	1 (0.2)
61	C:G:H:J:L:M	44 (1)	1 (0.2)
62	C:G:H:S:Z	33 (1)	1 (0.2)
63	C:G:J:L:M:Z	192 (1)	1 (0.2)
64	C:H:I	63 (1)	1 (0.2)
65	C:M	63 (1)	1 (0.2)
66	G:H:J:S	81 (1)	1 (0.2)
67	G:H:L:M:Z	82 (1)	1 (0.2)
68	G:J:K:Z	80 (1)	1 (0.2)
69	G:L:M	83 (1)	1 (0.2)
70	G	81 (1)	1 (0.2)
71	C:G:L:M:S:Z	novel (1)	1 (0.2)
72	G:H	81 (1)	1 (0.2)

1532

1533

4.8 Phylogeny



A maximum-likelihood tree based on SNP's (single nucleotide polymorphism) in the core genome of 577 iGAS isolates in this study is depicted in **Figure 14**. The rings of the phylogenetic tree are coloured based on year, province and *emm* type.

Based on the organization of the isolates within the phylogenetic tree, isolates of different *emm* types appeared genetically distinct from one another. We identified genetic clusters as isolates of the same *emm* type grouped closely to one another within the tree. Although this was the general pattern, there were some exceptions where isolates of the same *emm* type formed more than one cluster. *emm82*, *emm77*, *emm80* and *emm58* isolates formed two distinct clusters, whereas *emm4* isolates formed three distinct clusters. Of the three *emm118* isolates in this study, 2 isolates clustered together and one isolate was an outlier and of the four *emm73* isolates detected in this study, 3 isolates clustered together whereas one isolate was an outlier. No geographical and temporal aggregation of isolates sharing the same *emm* type was observed.

As mentioned in section 4.5, there were 30 isolates that were not a perfect match to existing *emm* subtypes in the CDC database, but on the phylogenetic tree, these isolates clustered with other isolates of a known *emm* subtype. Of the 30 isolates, 27 clustered with other isolates of known *emm* subtypes/types as follows: 13 isolates that were almost identical to *emm* subtype 58.2 according to the pipeline clustered with other *emm58* isolates; 5 isolates that were almost identical to *emm* subtype 68.4 according to the pipeline clustered with other *emm64* isolates and finally, in at least one isolate, similarities to *emm* subtypes 53.0, 95.0, 83.1, 74.0, 81.0, 85.0, 124.0, 18.7 and 184.0 were detected by the pipeline and these isolates clustered with isolates that were *emm53*, *emm95*, *emm83*, *emm74*, *emm81*, *emm85*, *emm124*, *emm18* and *emm184*, respectively.

1561

Tree scale: 0.1



1568

1569 **Figure 14:** A core gene maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of 577 invasive group
1570 A streptococcus isolates recovered through GERMS-SA between 2019 – 2020. Inner
1571 colour ring going outwards are as follows: Year, Province and *emm* type

5 DISCUSSION

In this study, we aimed to describe the epidemiology and contribute genomic data of *S. pyogenes* isolates causing invasive disease in South Africa, a middle-income country where data of this nature is currently lacking, by whole-genome sequencing of isolates collected in our active, national laboratory-based surveillance. A total of 1487 cases of iGAS disease were detected between 2019 – 2020 and the isolates were a diverse collection.

5.1 Demographic and clinical characteristics

The number of iGAS cases reported in 2019 were relatively stable between January – September. There was a sharp decline in the cases reported in October and the cases remained relatively low until 31 December 2019. The reason for this decline is not clear. Cases slightly increased in January 2020, declined again in April and remained relatively stable until 31 December 2020. From 26 March 2020 – 30 April 2020, level 5 lock down was implemented in South Africa in response to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Various non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) including but not limited to mask wearing, hand sanitization and social distancing were implemented to curb the transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (135). The lockdown levels varied between level 1 and level 5 throughout 2020, but most of the NPI's remained in place during the different levels. These NPIs may have indirectly affected the transmission of other pathogens that are mainly transmitted via the respiratory route, such as *Streptococcus pyogenes*. Studies conducted in Australia (non-invasive), China (non-invasive) and the US (invasive) reported a decrease in GAS disease following the COVID-19 pandemic (136–138). Health-seeking behavior may have also been affected causing individuals to be more reluctant to leave their homes for medical facilities in fear that they would contract SARS-CoV-2 and develop COVID-19. The restrictions may have also affected the availability of staff as some healthcare and laboratory institutions implemented shift work for social distancing and some staff members may have been isolating due to contracting SARS-CoV-2 or under quarantine following coming into contact with a case. Having less staff on

duty may have interrupted the normal work-flow thus negatively impacting the isolation of iGAS, the collection of iGAS isolates and the reporting of these cases. Most iGAS cases in the present study occurred in the colder months. We only have two years of data and the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 also makes it difficult to reach a final conclusion regarding the seasonality of iGAS disease in this setting. Previous studies have reported observing a seasonality of iGAS diseases, with most of the cases occurring in the winter months (98,100,101,104). It is not clear why iGAS disease is more prevalent in the colder months but it has been hypothesized that pathogens that are mainly transmitted via the respiratory route are more prevalent in colder months as a result of behavioral changes during that time (139). In the colder months, individuals are more likely to remain indoors resulting in indoor crowding with poor ventilation in an effort to preserve heat, which in turn promotes transmission (139). The inhalation of chilly air may also dry the mucosal membrane, thus resulting in epithelial damage which would make it easier for respiratory pathogens to colonize their host (140). However, some studies have reported not observing any seasonality at all for iGAS disease (116,141) while one study in Cape Town reported that iGAS disease was more common in the summer months and non-invasive disease was more common in the winter months (59).

The four most populated provinces in South Africa (Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Western Cape and Eastern Cape) reported 94.0% (1398/1487) of the total cases. These provinces do not make up 94% of the total population in South Africa and it is therefore unlikely that the population size is the only reason why these provinces reported most of the iGAS cases. This may be attributed to the availability of resources in these settings such as better access to healthcare with good specimen collection practices and better equipped laboratories for testing.

iGAS disease cases are usually highest in the very young (<1 year) due to (but not limited to) an immature immune system and in the elderly (>65 years) as a result of (but not limited to) their waning immunity (99–101,105,108). Although most cases in the present study occurred in middle-aged individuals, the incidence of invasive GAS disease was highest in infants aged <1 years old and in the elderly aged ≥65 years old. This suggests that the greatest burden is seen in very young and elderly and these two groups are at a greater risk of developing iGAS disease and when

vaccines become available, these individuals should be considered as some of the first groups to be targeted by the intervention.

Other studies on iGAS conducted in Norway, Germany, Ireland, Brussels, USA, Spain and South Africa (59,102–104,108,113,142) reported that males accounted for most (53% - 63%) of the iGAS cases. This is similar to what was observed in the current study as a slightly higher proportion of cases were reported in males (52.8%; 785/1487) and it is not clear why this is so. Amongst the cases that occurred in males, 69.3% (544/785) of the cases occurred in adult males who were ≥ 25 years old [53% (360/679) for women] and thus a possible explanation for why cases were higher amongst males could be due to behavioral differences observed between males and females. Adult males may be disproportionately exposed to circumstances that are known to be risk factors for GAS disease such as homelessness (143) and the use of drugs or alcohol (144,145). In addition, it has been noted that males tend to delay seeking medical help when they are ill due to social beliefs such as ‘masculinity’ (146) and as a result may be less likely to deal with possible iGAS precursors (such as superficial skin infections and pharyngitis) and only present when illness has progressed and is more severe.

Data on race was poorly collected in this study. Of the cases where race was known, cases were more prevalent amongst black (73.3%; 77/105) and coloured (21.9%; 23/105) individuals. This is expected as black individuals accounted for 81% of the total South African population in 2019 (<https://www.statssa.gov.za> Accessed: 04 March 2024) and 2020 (<https://www.statssa.gov.za> Accessed: 04 March 2024) whilst coloured individuals accounted for 9% of the total South African population during the same time-period. This (together with how poorly race data was collected) makes it difficult to establish whether our results accurately indicate that these groups are disproportionately affected by iGAS as this may be a reflection of the dynamics of our population. In South Africa, black and coloured individuals come from a historically disadvantaged socio-economic background, which is linked to various GAS disease risk factors including (i) limited access to good health-care; (ii) poor living conditions (e.g. poor ventilation, limited resources for cleaning and washing); (iii) overcrowding in households; and (iv) environmental air pollutants (e.g. burning of fossil fuels for heat and cooking) (147–149). Studies in Canada and Australia have published data illustrating that disadvantaged individuals in their population report higher rates of

iGAS disease (111,141,150). This highlights the importance of accurately collecting race data.

Slightly over half (51.8%) of the iGAS cases in the present study were isolated from blood specimens. Research conducted in Brussels, Spain and India has indicated a comparable prevalence in blood specimens ranging from 44% to 55% whereas, other studies in Germany, Australia and the USA have reported an even higher (>90%) prevalence of GAS isolated from blood specimens (103,106,108,113,118,141,142,151). This suggests that bacteremia may be the most common clinical presentation among patients with iGAS disease. However, it is important to note that this may be a reflection of specimen collection practices as blood may be the easier specimen to collect.

Where in-hospital final outcome was known, mortality was recorded in 20.7% of the cases. This mortality rate is slightly higher than the mortality rates reported in similar studies conducted in Iceland, Finland, Norway, Brussels and Australia, which recorded mortality rates ranging between 5-19% (100–102,108,118,141). It is important to note that due to how poorly this variable was collected, the mortality rate may be underestimated in our population. Where these data were available, the information was collected from hospital records. Home deaths would have been missed as government death registries were not reviewed and would have been very important for patients that died of iGAS prior to presenting at hospital for investigation of their illness. Three of the studies (100,102,118) mentioned above describe that severe iGAS disease (sepsis/streptococcal toxic shock syndrome and necrotizing fasciitis) was associated with significantly higher mortality rates in their population. In the present study, 2.7% of the isolates analysed were collected from necrotic wound/tissue and although 51.8% of isolates were obtained from blood, data on whether this was associated with underlying necrotizing fasciitis or progressed to more severe disease such as sepsis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome are not available. A Kenyan study reported a mortality rate (12.2%; 45/369) lower than our mortality rate (61). Other negative outcomes due to iGAS disease including surgical intervention (drainage of abscess, debridement, amputation etc.) have been described (100,108,118,152). These data were not collected in the present study.

5.2 Antimicrobial susceptibility

Similar to what has been reported globally (90,98,102,104,105,107,112,114,153), all the isolates that were tested in this study tested phenotypically susceptible to all three β -lactam antibiotics (penicillin, ceftaroline and ceftriaxone). Therefore, first-line treatment with these antibiotics remains appropriate in our setting. Mutations in the *pbp2x* region that may result in elevated MIC's against β -lactam antibiotics were first reported in 2020 during a GAS outbreak investigation in the US (46). In the course of the investigation, two near-identical invasive isolates collected from two patients shared an identical mutation in the *pbp2x* region, resulting in the *pbp2x* T553K substitution. This mutation resulted in elevated β -lactam MIC's. For both cases, patient interviews and medical record review revealed that these patients had a long and repeated history of antibiotic, including β -lactam, use which may have created a favorable environment for mutants to emerge. Since then, GAS isolates with reduced β -lactam susceptibility have been reported in other studies conducted in the US, Japan and Iceland (134,154–156). Although these mutations resulted in slightly elevated MIC's compared to the wild-type MIC's (i.e. decreased β -lactam susceptibility) the elevated MIC's remained below the susceptible clinical breakpoints. In the present study, 86.8% (501/577) of the isolates that were screened for mutations in the *pbp2x* region were the wild-type *pbp2x* –1 (*pbp2x* sequence type 1) i.e. no mutations associated with elevated MIC's were detected. Interestingly, 5 of these isolates displayed elevated MIC's against penicillin (0.12 μ g/ml; all 5 isolates) and ceftriaxone (0.5 μ g/ml; 1 isolate). This is contrary to what has been previously reported (134) as one does not expect to observe elevated MIC's in isolates that do not have a mutation in the *pbp2x* region. This could be the result of the inherent inaccuracy in phenotypic testing or an isolate mix-up and repeating the phenotypic and genotypic testing of these isolates may resolve the discordance. This discordance highlights that all isolates that display a higher MIC than what is commonly observed in our setting should be re-tested. Only one sequence type (*pbp2x*-10) previously associated with elevated MIC's in invasive isolates in the US (134) was detected in our study isolates. Sequence type *pbp2x*-10, with one amino acid substitution (M593T), was detected in 14 isolates, but only 1 of the 14 isolates displayed an elevated MIC against penicillin. Although the mutation was present in the other 13 isolates, this mutation does not always confer reduced

susceptibility on phenotypic testing (134). Globally, mutations in the *pbp2x* region resulting in reduced β -lactam susceptibility are rare (157) but ongoing surveillance is important for monitoring this emerging resistance.

The highest resistance rate (10.5%, 65/618) was seen against tetracycline. Previous studies in France, Norway, Ireland, Portugal, Brussels, New Caledonia and Spain have reported similar resistance rates in iGAS isolates ranging between 7–15% (98,102,104,105,108,116,142). A study in the US reported a slightly higher resistance rate of 17% in invasive isolates whereas studies conducted in Brazil and Lebanon reported even higher (>20%) resistance rates against tetracycline in non-invasive isolates (38,89,114). As a result of the high resistance rate against tetracycline, this antibiotic is not routinely used to treat infections caused by GAS and in addition, this antibiotic has also been reported to have negative effects on bone and teeth in children under 8 years of age, and in fetuses of mothers exposed to tetracycline antenatally (43). Although not routinely administered, the susceptibility and resistance patterns of GAS to tetracycline remain epidemiologically important to monitor any changes that may occur (41). The most common *tet* family gene detected in the present study was *tetM*, which was present in 48 isolates that were phenotypically resistant to tetracycline. Three studies conducted in France, Spain and in China have also reported a dominance of this gene among isolates resistant to tetracycline (41,98,158), suggesting that resistance to tetracycline may be predominantly driven by the *tetM* gene. Phenotypic and genotypic results were discordant for six isolates in the present study as the *tetM* gene was present in 2 isolates that were phenotypically susceptible and a *tet* family gene was not detected in 4 isolates that were phenotypically resistant to tetracycline. The phenotypic testing was repeated for these isolates and the results remained the same. Due to time constraints, the genotypic testing could not be repeated. It is thus not clear whether the discordant results are a lab error occurring in the genotyping workflow or the discordance may in fact represent a true difference in the sensitivity of the two methods. It may also be that although the *tet* gene is present, the genes may not be expressed in the isolates that are phenotypically susceptible, a phenomenon that has been described in other pathogens (159). Repeating the phenotypic and genotypic testing at the same time from the same culture may possibly resolve the discordance. A discordance between phenotypic and genotypic testing for tetracycline resistance has been previously reported in invasive and non-invasive

isolates by a group in China (158). This study reported that 7 isolates that were phenotypically susceptible carried the *tetM* gene and that 3 isolates that were phenotypically resistant to tetracycline did not carry a *tet* gene, resulting in a discordance rate for tetracycline (7.1%; 10/140) that was higher than the one obtained in the present study (1.0%; 6/577). The Chinese group did not provide a hypothesis for why the discordance between the phenotypic and genotypic results existed.

The resistance rate against erythromycin in the present study was 3.6% and this is comparable to previously published data (102,104,105,108) that reported resistance rates ranging 3-5% in invasive isolates. Studies from Finland (101), Spain (142) and the US (38) have reported even higher resistance rates in iGAS isolates which were 8.7%, 8.9% and 14.5%, respectively. Surprisingly, no resistance against clindamycin was detected in the present study, whereas clindamycin resistance rates between 3-4% in invasive isolates have been reported elsewhere (102,108,142). Studies that have reported even higher resistance rates against clindamycin include a Finland study (101) that reported a resistance rate of 9.2% for invasive isolates collected in 2013; a US study (38) that reported a resistance rate of 14.6% in invasive isolates collected 2011-2017 and finally a publication from Greece that reported that 18.8% of their invasive and non-invasive isolates were resistant to clindamycin (45).

Clindamycin is recommended for the treatment of severe invasive disease (such as necrotizing fasciitis and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome) and considering that no isolates with clindamycin resistance were recorded in our study, this suggests that treatment of severe iGAS disease with this antibiotic remains ideal in our setting. It is important though to note that in our study, phenotypic inducible clindamycin resistance, which occurs in the presence of an inducing agent (160), was not tested for. The genomic data may assist in detecting isolates that are inducibly resistant to clindamycin as they should carry the *erm* gene even if they appear phenotypically susceptible to macrolides and clindamycin (38). Various studies (38,39,142,161) have tested for inducible clindamycin resistance, which highlights the importance of screening for this type of resistance. Inducible clindamycin resistance that is not detected could have public health implications as clindamycin resistance in patients may only develop during therapy, thus resulting in treatment failures (162). AMR predictions indicated that the *mef* gene seems to be driving macrolide resistance in our setting as this was the most commonly detected AMR determinant in isolates

resistant to erythromycin. This is contrary to other studies that have reported that the *erm* gene is most commonly detected AMR determinant in isolates that are resistant to macrolides (41,43,112,114,122,158). The presence of the *erm* gene may result in the cross-resistance to all macrolides, lincosamides and streptogramins B, while the presence of the *mef* gene may result in resistance against certain macrolides only (163) and thus this may explain why the prevalence of the *erm* gene did not dominate in our setting as no phenotypic resistance was seen against lincosamides (clindamycin). There was some discordance between the genotypic and phenotypic results (discordance rate of 0.5%; 3/577) even after repeating the phenotypic testing. The genotypic testing was not repeated due to time constraints. One isolate was phenotypically susceptible to both erythromycin and clindamycin while carrying the *erm* gene. This isolate may be inducibly resistant to clindamycin, hence the presence of the *erm* gene but further testing is needed to confirm this. A CDC publication reported a similar instance where one isolate was susceptible to erythromycin and clindamycin but carried the *ermT* gene (122). In the CDC study, inducible resistance to clindamycin was phenotypically screened for but not detected for the isolate. Another study conducted in China (158) reported that 4.3% (6/140) of their isolates carried the *ermB* gene but were phenotypically susceptible to erythromycin and clindamycin. These results suggest that the discordance may be due to differences in the sensitivity of the phenotypic and genotypic tests. In the present study, two isolates that were phenotypically resistant to erythromycin lacked both the *erm* or *mef* gene. The CDC publication mentioned above (122) also reported a similar discordant result where 2 of their isolates that were phenotypically resistant to erythromycin lacked erythromycin resistance determinants (122). A Chinese study reported a similar discordance and hypothesized that the observed discordance may be a result of an alternative mechanism of resistance or there may potentially be a mutation in the 23S rRNA (158).

Resistance to levofloxacin in our study was low (0.2%; 1/618) compared to the resistance rates reported in Germany (1.3%; invasive isolates), China (1.7%; invasive isolates), Greece (2.0%; invasive and non-invasive isolates) and Lebanon (5.0%; non-invasive isolates) (39,45,89,164). A study in China and Brazil did not detect any resistance to levofloxacin among their non-invasive isolates (37,114). Although the resistance rate against fluoroquinolones is low, this antibiotic is not commonly prescribed, especially to children, due to the negative effects it has on

bone and joint development (43). In South Africa, fluoroquinolones may be used to treat multi-drug resistant tuberculosis. In the present study, 7 isolates that were phenotypically susceptible to levofloxacin carried mutations in the *parC* region. Although these isolates were phenotypically susceptible to levofloxacin, the MICs for two isolates were slightly elevated and were at the cusp of susceptibility with an MIC of 2µg/ml. Not all mutations in this region lead to the phenotypic resistance of fluoroquinolones and mutations that occur in the *parC* may only lead to low-level resistance, whereas high-level resistance occurs when mutations occur in both the *parC* and *gyrA* region (165). One isolate was phenotypically resistant to levofloxacin but no mutations in the *parC/gyrA* region were detected. The phenotypic testing could not be repeated for this specimen as the laboratory did not have stock of the antibiotic and thus it is not clear whether this discrepancy is a laboratory error. Another possible explanation for the discordance is that resistance to levofloxacin in this isolate may be driven by a different resistance mechanism that was not screened for in this study. A study in China reported that they detected the *pmrA* gene, which is a drug efflux gene that confers resistance to fluoroquinolones through drug efflux.

5.3 *emm* type prevalence and the estimated vaccine coverage

Studies have shown that sporadic increases in the prevalence of GAS disease have been linked to the upsurge of specific *emm* types (166–169). This highlights the importance of monitoring the circulation of *emm* types. The most frequently detected *emm* types in the present study differ from those previously reported in high-income countries (**Table 2**). In studies conducted on the African continent (the Gambia, Kenya and two South African studies) between 2014 and 2023 using invasive and non-invasive isolates, the *emm* types detected in each of these studies differed to the *emm* types in present study, with the exception of one overlapping *emm* type per country i.e. *emm*80 was also detected in the Gambia, *emm*44 in Kenya and *emm*2 and *emm*92 in each of the South African studies (22,61,96,97). This difference may be because most of the isolates in the studies mentioned above were obtained from non-invasive GAS disease. Globally, *emm*1 is the most prevalent *emm* type isolated in high-income countries whereas in the present study, it was detected in only 3.7% of the isolates. The most prevalent *emm* type in the present study was *emm*76,

which was also the most commonly detected *emm* type amongst invasive isolates collected in a study conducted in Cape Town (59). This *emm* type is not included in the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine, but is among the 24 *emm* types shown to be cross-opsonized (>40% bactericidal killing activity) in animal studies (57). Only 5 of the 10 most common *emm* types in the present study are included in the vaccine formulation. The 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine offers coverage to less than half (44.6%) of the isolates in the present study, consistent with results from studies conducted in other low-income countries and disadvantaged populations [Kenya (invasive isolates), Mali (non-invasive isolates), Australia (non-invasive isolates), South Africa (invasive and non-invasive isolates) and India (invasive isolates)] (59,61–63,96,151), which reported a potential vaccine coverage ranging 22 - 47% in their setting. Although the percent of isolates in the present study potentially covered by the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine increases to 64.4% (352/547) when cross opsonization data was considered, this still was much lower than what has been reported (>90%) in studies from the US and Europe (107,112). The study in Cape Town reported a potential coverage of 58% and 60% among invasive and non-invasive isolates respectively when cross-protection was considered and also highlighted that the *emm* types causing invasive disease and those causing non-invasive disease were similar (59). It is not completely understood why cross-protection occurs, but the hypothesis that has been proposed is that it may be due to vaccine and non-vaccine *emm* types belonging to the same *emm* cluster, thus having high-sequence identity across the full length of the M-protein and therefore being similarly protected (119). A majority (27/40) of the M-proteins that were tested for cross-opsonization in animal studies cluster in *emm* clusters that have at least one *emm* type included in the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine (57,119). Although cross-opsonic antibodies acting against non-vaccine *emm* types have been demonstrated in animal studies, clinical significance is not clear as it has not been determined whether the same will occur in human subjects (57). An Australian study demonstrated that potential coverage by the 30 valent M-protein-based vaccine was higher in cases of pharyngitis (66.7%) in comparison with cases of cutaneous (skin and soft tissue infections) infections (25.2%). This is not unexpected as *emm* types that are common causes of pharyngitis in the US and Europe were considered in the formulation of the 30-valent M-protein-based vaccine (57). Streptococcal pharyngitis is a precursor for ARF/RHD, which are responsible for most of the morbidity related

to GAS diseases. By reducing the incidence of strep throat, vaccination can significantly lower the risk of post-streptococcal complications. Therefore, data from low-income countries where streptococcal pharyngitis and ARF/RHD are common are essential to inform vaccine composition and deployment strategies for these vaccines. The Australian study mentioned above also highlights the importance of considering *emm* types that cause soft skin and tissue infections as these *emm* types seem to be an important cause of ARF in Australia, which has one of the highest burdens of ARF globally (63).

While iGAS can be severe, its overall burden may not justify a vaccine program solely aimed at reducing iGAS cases.

The majority of GAS isolates express the M related protein (Mrp) (58,65). Mrp was detected in most (91.5%; 528/577) of the isolates in the present study and therefore this provides support for the concept of formulating a vaccine that targets both the M protein and the M related protein.

The expansion of highly resistant *emm* types may play a role in driving resistance to specific antibiotics (38). A study in the US found that the majority (>90%) of *emm92* isolates in their collection were non-susceptible to erythromycin and clindamycin (38). Another study in Spain also showed an association between *emm22* isolates with tetracycline resistance, *emm28* isolates with clindamycin resistance and both *emm4* and *emm12* isolates with erythromycin resistance (142). In the present study, resistance to tetracycline was most commonly seen in *emm76* isolates and resistance to erythromycin was most commonly seen in *emm95* isolates. These two *emm* types are not included in the 30-valent vaccine. Fortunately, resistance to erythromycin was not detected in any of the *emm76* isolates which would have caused public health concern considering that *emm76* is the most dominant *emm* type in this study and that macrolides are used for treatment in penicillin hypersensitive individuals. However, resistance to erythromycin has been reported in *emm76* isolates as a study in Japan conducted on GAS isolates from streptococcal toxic shock syndrome cases reported that *emm76* isolates accounted for 4.0% of erythromycin-resistant isolates and 19.9% of clindamycin-resistant isolates (109). This is concerning as *emm76* GAS can be spread geographically. This is why it remains important to monitor antimicrobial resistance in relation to *emm* type and to assess any changes that may occur when vaccines are introduced.

In 2020 enhanced surveillance sites started collecting additional clinical data but this was unfortunately poorly collected and therefore, site of specimen collection was used *in lieu* of clinical manifestation in this study to investigate whether certain *emm* types aggregated by site of specimen collection. In the present study, there was no apparent pattern in how *emm* types aggregated based on specimen type. Our result is similar to a study that was conducted in a pediatric population in France, which also reported that a significant correlation between *emm* type and clinical manifestation was not found (170). However, other studies have demonstrated an association between clinical manifestation and *emm* type. A study in Spain reported that *emm1* isolates were significantly associated with more severe clinical manifestations such as necrotizing fasciitis and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome (STSS), whereas *emm3* and *emm4* isolates were associated with the less severe scarlet fever (107). This is similar to what was reported in a study conducted in London where they observed that *emm3* isolates were associated with scarlet fever (171). Another study in Norway reported that *emm2* isolates were significantly associated with necrotizing fasciitis and *emm12* isolates were associated with arthritis/osteomyelitis (102). Inferring associations between *emm* types and clinical manifestation/site of specimen collection is difficult to do and this is due to the high diversity of circulating *emm* types at any given time, especially in low-income countries which have been reported to have a higher diversity of *emm* types (95). In addition, isolate numbers in the present study were too low for some sites for us to see an association. In the present study, *emm* types were more diverse in blood specimens and 11 *emm* types were unique to blood specimens. This suggests that collecting only blood specimens for iGAS disease surveillance may be sufficient in our setting as it still provides a representative picture of strains that are circulating in the population.

We were able to assign 547 isolates to an *emm* cluster based on the *emm* cluster classification scheme (119). Due to the high diversity of *emm* types represented in this study, 15/48 described *emm* clusters were represented in this isolate collection. A Kenyan study, which also reported a high diversity of *emm* types (80 *emm* types), assigned 24 *emm* clusters to their study isolates (61).

5.4 Strain diversity by MLST

The study isolates were a diverse collection as 90 ST's were assigned to 560 isolates. The ST's in this study were largely different from ST's reported in other studies. A study conducted in Malaysia detected 27 ST's in their isolate collection and only 7 ST's (ST28, ST36, ST549, ST89, ST101, ST55 and ST5) matched ST's detected in the present study (172). A Romanian study reported detecting 23 different ST's, of which only ST378, ST28 and ST150 were also detected in the present study (91). Fifty-seven ST's were assigned to isolates collected in the Gambia and only 10 ST's (ST401, ST715, ST1219, ST229, ST268, ST721, ST120, ST258, ST129 and ST227) were also detected in the present study (97). A Chinese study reported 22 ST's in their collection, with 8 ST's (ST36, ST28, ST150, ST382, ST46, ST176, ST378 and ST63) also being detected in our study isolates. These differing results further emphasize that based on MLST, circulating GAS strains are diverse. In the present study, the 30 most prevalent ST's were largely represented by a single *emm* type which suggest that when the ST is known, the *emm* type can be predicted as previously reported (112). Isolates of different *emm* types also shared identical or nearly identical ST's further emphasizing the concordance between *emm* type and strain genetic similarities that have been reported in other studies done in the US, Romania and China (91,112,122,158). It was very difficult to group ST's into clonal complexes (CC), defined by a founder ST and all other ST's that share four or more alleles with the founder ST (173), due to the diversity of ST's in our collection. This may explain why publications shy away from reporting CC's in their isolate collections.

5.5 Virulence related strain features

The 24 virulence related genes that were screened for amongst the study isolates were detected in varying ranges. One of the most important virulence related strain features, which are thought to play an important role in the pathogenesis of scarlet fever, are the streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxins (spe). In the present study, *speG* and *smeZ* genes were the most common spe's, detected in 97.6% and 84.0% of the isolates, respectively. These genes are believed to be chromosomally encoded, hence their dominance in GAS isolates. Studies in Germany (invasive isolates),

Ireland (invasive isolates), the United States (invasive isolates), Australia (invasive and non-invasive isolates), India (invasive isolates), Denmark (invasive isolates) and Brazil (non-invasive isolates) have also reported a dominant prevalence of the *speG* and *smeZ* genes amongst their isolates (103,104,112,151,174–176). Although believed to also be chromosomally encoded, the *speJ* gene was detected in only 42.6% of the isolates in the present study, consistent with other studies conducted in Australia (invasive and non-invasive isolates), the US (invasive isolates), Germany (invasive isolates) and data from 12 European countries (invasive isolates) which reported a *speJ* detection rate of 31% to 51% in their isolate collection (103,112,174,177). A Russian study reported an even lower prevalence (24%) of the *speJ* gene among their isolate collection (178). The rest of the *spe* genes (*speC*, *speH*, *speA*, *ssa*, *speM*, *speL*, *speK* and *speI*) encoding the other streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxins were detected in varying ranges (10.7% to 42.5%) in the present study isolates. These *spe* genes are believed to be associated with bacteriophages and this is evident by their fluctuation in GAS isolates (174). None of the isolates in the present study were predicted to produce the exotoxins Spe_N, Spe_O and Spe_P as the genes that code for these exotoxins were not detected in this study. At the time of data analysis of this study, we could not find any studies that had reported the detection of these genes (*speN*, *speO* and *speP*). The presence of *spe* genes has been associated with specific underlying conditions. A German study reported that the presence of *speH*, *speJ* and *speK* was associated with chronic skin lesion whereas the presence of *speG* was associated with diabetes (103). We unfortunately do not have data on underlying conditions in our study population and thus we were unable to assess this association. An association between the presence of specific *spe* genes and clinical manifestation has also been reported by an Irish group that published data highlighting that the frequency of *speH* and *SpeI* was highest in cases of septic arthritis (104). On the other hand, a Chinese study reported that the presence of *spe* genes in their invasive and non-invasive isolates was not associated with clinical manifestation (43).

Different strains encode different combinations of *spe* genes commonly referred to as streptococcal superantigen (SAg) profiles (43). Streptococcal superantigen gene (SAg) profiles were diverse in the present study, with 70 different SAg profiles assigned to 577 isolates. Of the 9 *emm* types that were used to assess whether *emm* types exhibited a preference for specific antigen profiles, three *emm* types

(*emm*92, *emm*49 and *emm*53) showed a preference ($\geq 80\%$ isolates) for specific antigen profiles. In the present study, 45.5% (10/22) of *emm*1 isolates were SAg3 (A: G: J: Z), a profile reported in 93.1% (27/29) of *emm*1 isolates in an Australian study working on invasive and non-invasive isolates (174), 100% (43/43) of invasive *emm*1 isolates collected in the Netherlands (179) and 69.3% (311/449) of invasive *emm*1 isolates in a Spanish study (142). An Indian study (151) reported that 25% (1/4) of their invasive *emm*49 isolates had the same antigen profile (G: H: I: L: M) as 100% of the *emm*49 isolates in the present study. In addition to demonstrating that specific SAg profiles were associated with specific *emm* types, a Spanish study also demonstrated that isolates that were a specific *emm* type and exhibited a specific SAg profile, also showed an association with specific clinical manifestations (142). An example is their *emm* 1 isolates with SAg profile A: G: J: Z which were associated with the severe invasive diseases necrotizing fasciitis, pneumonia and streptococcal toxic shock syndrome. It is difficult to compare antigen profiles globally for two reasons: (i) there does not seem to be a standardized method or system on how to assign a SAg profiles. This is seen by how studies may randomly assign an arbitrary value (e.g. profile 1, profile 2, profile 3 etc.) to the combinations of streptococcal pyrogenic exotoxin genes detected in their studies (151, 174) and (ii) *emm* type distribution differs geographically and thus so would SAg profiles.

One isolate in our collection was *emm* non-typable and no exotoxin genes were detected in this isolate. This isolate was positive for the group A carbohydrate which indicates that it is GAS. In addition, other GAS features (enn protein, fibronectin binding proteins and a hyaluronic acid capsule) were also detected, further providing support that this isolate is a GAS isolate.

5.6 Strain relatedness

Historically, identifying potential outbreaks relied on linking cases epidemiologically (time and place) as well as determining whether the isolates shared the same subtypes or sequence types through conventional molecular typing (121). Traditional bacterial typing methods may not be able to adequately discriminate between strains of the same lineage, thus making it difficult to accurately detect clusters and outbreaks (121). In contrast to conventional typing methods, whole genome sequencing exhibits superior discriminatory power when differentiating isolates

belonging to the same lineage and thus may offer valuable insight in outbreak investigations and uncovering hidden patterns of disease clusters in communities (180). In the present study, using whole genome sequence data to assess the phylogenetic relationship among circulating strains allowed us to identify the general genetic clustering of isolates by *emm* type. This suggests that isolates within the same *emm* type are genetically similar and share a common lineage. Our results are concordant with other studies which have also reported the clustering of isolates by *emm* type (121,180,181). In addition, our results suggest that there were no undetected iGAS disease outbreaks that occurred in this population during the surveyed time period as we did not observe any isolates within the same *emm* type aggregating by time and place.

To our knowledge, there is no published South African data on the usage of whole genome sequencing (WGS) to determine the genomic structure of iGAS and non-invasive GAS strains circulating in the population. The use of this method is more common in high-income countries which have shown how WGS data can be used to study relatedness among different strains, in order to detect outbreaks that may have gone undetected and to elucidate transmission dynamics. An Australian study published in 2016 used WGS in conjunction with epidemiology data to investigate whether transmission of GAS was predominantly occurring within households or across the community (182). By generating a phylogeny using WGS data, the investigators were able to discriminate between circulating strains of the same sequence types and they found that these strains were in fact genetically similar beyond just sharing an ST, thus suggesting that transmission was occurring at both the household and community level. A study in the UK identified a new emergent *emm89* clade which was linked to the increase in *emm89* iGAS isolates observed in the population (166). Using WGS data, phylogenetic analysis revealed two distinct clades of *emm89* isolates and that isolates clustering in the new clade, although sharing an *emm* type, were genetically distinct from other *emm89* isolates as a result of changes in the core genome. These studies highlight the importance and usefulness of WGS data in investigating differences beyond strain similarities based on *emm* type or ST to explain sudden surges in GAS disease.

5.7 Limitations

The whole-genome sequence based approach allowed strain characterization of surface structures and virulence related features which is lacking in our setting, but there are some limitations to our study.

We only examined iGAS disease in our setting and did not include non-invasive (cutaneous and pharyngitis) disease and so our results reflect the severe acute disease of GAS, but we have missed understanding the strains that may be associated with ARF/RHD, which are important outcomes of GAS disease especially in low-income settings like ours. Although incidence was highest in the extremes of age, not looking at pharyngitis, which is more common in 5-15 year olds, is a limitation as this group is the main transmitter of respiratory GAS disease. In addition, the genomic data of non-invasive infections is important to assess whether strain molecular characteristics are different or if there are features that are exclusive to invasive isolates.

We were unable to make a conclusion regarding the seasonality of iGAS disease in our setting due to the short time period assessed and the interruption caused by the COVID 19 pandemic. Continued surveillance is required.

iGAS disease is not notifiable in South Africa and therefore we may be missing some desirable data such as epidemiological links amongst cases, which is particularly important for detecting outbreaks/clusters. In the present study, cases are not actively followed up to investigate potential secondary cases. In addition, secondary cases may have presented with non-invasive disease and were thus not eligible for enrolment in the surveillance.

Participation of laboratories is voluntary and this means that laboratories that do not have the time or resources to keep track of iGAS isolates may not prioritize submitting these isolates for further phenotypic and genotypic characterization.

The surveillance of iGAS disease is new and thus was initially slow and incomplete, resulting in the lack of substantial patient clinical information such as underlying conditions. We were therefore unable to assess potential risk factors that are associated with an increased probability of developing iGAS disease. This is important in order to identify individuals at greater risk for developing iGAS disease so that they can be prioritized for vaccination when it becomes available. Data on clinical manifestation were also poorly collected which has limited our ability to

investigate the most common clinical manifestation amongst patients presenting with iGAS disease and in addition, if certain *emm* types are associated with more severe invasive infections. The knowledge of which *emm* types commonly result in more severe invasive infections may be important for vaccine development. Final in-hospital outcome of iGAS disease may be underestimated due to poor data collection of this variable in our study and other negative outcomes were also not captured. This means that the burden of morbidity and mortality of iGAS in our setting is still not completely understood.

Resistance to various antibiotics that are important were screened for in this study and the low resistance rate against these antibiotics is encouraging. However, inducible clindamycin resistance was not tested for and therefore phenotypic resistance against this antibiotic may be underestimated. It is important to note that for the present study, elevated MIC's against β -lactam antibiotics were defined as MIC values at the susceptibility breakpoint of these antibiotics as defined by CLSI. According to the CDC however, they have over the years collected baseline MIC data for wild-type isolates and used this data to define what constitutes an elevated MIC. iGAS disease surveillance is new in our setting and thus limited MIC data is available to determine our own MIC baseline. We cannot be certain whether all M related proteins (Mrp) detected in these isolates belongs to one of the three Mrp families that have been sequenced and targeted in the theoretical vaccine formulation. Thus, the potential vaccine coverage of a theoretical vaccine that targets both M and Mrp may be overestimated. We only performed genomic characterization of strain virulence and toxin production, phenotype testing for these features was not done to confirm whether these features are also phenotypically expressed. Finally, we did not receive isolates of all the reported cases and thus our genomic results are based on a subset of strains circulating in our setting.

2170

2171 **5.8 Conclusion**

2172

2173 Globally, iGAS disease has been reported as a major cause of morbidity and
2174 mortality. In our setting, the very young and elderly are at a greater risk of developing
2175 iGAS disease. The resistance rate against important antibiotics was low and no
2176 resistance was observed against β -lactam antibiotics. The dominant *emm* types in
2177 this study are different from *emm* types reported in high-income countries, and this is
2178 highlighted by the fact that *emm1* is the most prevalent *emm* type in high income
2179 settings whereas this *emm* type was detected in less than 4% of our study isolates.
2180 The potential vaccine coverage (for iGAS) of the 30-valent M-protein based vaccine
2181 may not be sufficient in our setting and more data from African countries is needed
2182 so that African data can be considered and contribute to discussions regarding
2183 vaccine formulations. Data on the genomic surveillance of GAS is currently lacking,
2184 especially in low-middle-income settings. This work provides data and methods that
2185 could serve as the baseline for continued surveillance in an effort to control invasive
2186 disease caused by GAS.

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7 Appendices

7.1 Ethic clearance certificate (Appendix A)



R14/49 Ms. Sibusisiwe Zulu

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (MEDICAL)

CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE NO. M210750

NAME: Ms. Sibusisiwe Zulu
(Principal Investigator)
DEPARTMENT: School of Pathology
Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
National Institute for Communicable Diseases
Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis

PROJECT TITLE: Whole-genome sequence based characterization of Group A streptococci (GAS; Streptococcus pyogenes) isolates causing invasive disease in South Africa, 2019-2020

DATE CONSIDERED: Ad hoc

DECISION: Approved unconditionally

CONDITIONS: Sub-study under M1809107

SUPERVISOR: Prof A. von Gottberg and Dr S. Walaza

APPROVED BY: 
Dr CB Penny, Chairperson, HREC (Medical)

DATE OF APPROVAL: 03/08/2021

This clearance certificate is valid for 5 years from date of approval. Extension may be applied for.

DECLARATION OF INVESTIGATORS

To be completed in duplicate and **ONE COPY** returned to the Research Office Secretary on the Third Floor, Faculty of Health Sciences, Phillip Tobias Building, 29 Princess of Wales Terrace, Parktown, 2193, University of the Witwatersrand. I/we fully understand the conditions under which I am/we are authorized to carry out the above-mentioned research and I/we undertake to ensure compliance with these conditions. Should any departure be contemplated, from the research protocol as approved, I/we undertake to resubmit the application to the Committee. **I agree to submit a yearly progress report.** The date for annual re-certification will be one year after the date of convened meeting where the study was initially reviewed. In this case, the study was initially reviewed in **July** and will therefore be due in the month of **July** each year. Unreported changes to the application may invalidate the clearance given by the HREC (Medical).

Principal Investigator Signature

Date

PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES

7.2 NICD GERMS-SA case definitions for isolate submission (Appendix B)

NICD GERMS-SA case definitions for isolate submission to Reference Laboratories for 2022

GERMS-SA laboratory surveillance: **ALL** laboratories, please submit the following bacterial or fungal pathogens to the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) on Dorset transport medium with a TrakCareLab/ private laboratory report. Alternatively, send specimen tube/blood culture bottle if uncertain of identification and/or no isolate cultured (please contact NICD reference lab before sending).

Pathogen	Specimen	Lab tests	NICD Centre
<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i> <i>Haemophilus</i> spp. <i>Neisseria meningitidis</i> Group A streptococcus (<i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i>) Group B streptococcus (<i>Streptococcus agalactiae</i>)	All normally-sterile site specimens, e.g. CSF, blood, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, pericardial fluid, joint fluid, tissue, etc. In addition to above for <i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i> include non-sterile body site (wound) specimen obtained from a patient with necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome	Culture positive OR Consistent Gram stain OR Latex positive For GAS and GBS culture and /PCR positive	CRDM 011 555 0315
<i>Vibrio cholerae</i> †† <i>Salmonella</i> Typhi <i>Salmonella enterica</i> serotype Paratyphi (A, B and C) Nontyphoidal <i>Salmonella</i> spp. <i>Shigella</i> spp. <i>Listeria</i> spp. <i>Campylobacter</i> spp. Diarrhoeagenic <i>E. coli</i> (from rectal swab/stool only)	Any specimen	Culture positive	CED 011 555 0333
<i>Cryptococcus</i> spp. (no need to send isolates or specimens)	Any specimen - enhanced surveillance laboratories need to inform the Surveillance Officers about cases (all year)	Culture positive OR CrAg test positive OR CSF India ink positive	CHARM – MRL 011 555 0384

††*Vibrio cholerae* isolates from human and non-human (environmental) specimens. CRDM = Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis, CED = Centre for Enteric Diseases, CHARM-Centre for Healthcare-Associated Infections, Antimicrobial Resistance and Mycoses, MRL = Mycology Reference Laboratory

To order a new batch of Dorset transport media, please call Siyanda Dlamini at telephone: 071 307 3262/ 062 605 5318

Level 1 GERMS-SA Surveillance

For other surveillance questions please call 011 386 6234/6012

Version 19 for 2022

7.3 Case report form (Appendix C)

LABORATORY CASE REPORT FORM																													
Lab Specimen No: 																													
Hospital Name: _____						Laboratory Name: _____																							
Lab Contact Person: _____						Lab Telephone No: _____																							
PATIENT																													
Surname: _____						First Name/s: _____																							
Sex: Male: ☐ Female: ☐						Date of Brth: 																							
Ward: _____						Age: _____ Age Unit: Days: ☐ Months: ☐ Years: ☐																							
Hospital Number: 						Admission Date: 																							
Province (Residence): _____						Town (Residence): _____																							
DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME																													
Clinical Diagnosis: Meningitis: ☐ LRTI: ☐ Bacteraemia or fungaemia: ☐																													
Dysentery: ☐ Diarrhoea: ☐ Other: ☐ Specify: _____																													
Outcome: Recovered: ☐ Died: ☐ Unknown: ☐																													
SPECIMEN																													
Collection Date: 																													
Gram Stain: _____						India Ink: Pos: ☐ Neg: ☐ Not done: ☐																							
Latex Antigen / CrAg LFA: - <i>Cryptococcus</i> : Pos: ☐ Neg: ☐ Not done: ☐																													
-Bacterial: Pos: ☐ Specify: _____ Neg: ☐ Not done: ☐																													
Was the organism cultured? Yes: ☐ No: ☐																													
<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;"><i>Haemophilus influenzae</i> ☐</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><i>Neisseria meningitidis</i> ☐</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i> ☐</td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>Salmonella</i> Typhi ☐</td> <td><i>Shigella</i> species ☐</td> <td>Non-typhoidal <i>Salmonella</i> species ☐</td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>Campylobacter</i> species ☐</td> <td><i>Vibrio cholerae</i> ☐</td> <td>Diarrhoeagenic <i>E. coli</i> ☐</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Enterohaemorrhagic <i>E. coli</i> ☐</td> <td><i>Cryptococcus</i> species ☐</td> <td><i>Candida</i> species (BC only) ☐</td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>Candida auris</i> (any site) ☐</td> <td><i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i> (GAS) ☐</td> <td><i>Streptococcus agalactiae</i> (GBS) ☐</td> </tr> <tr> <td><i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i> ☐</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>												<i>Haemophilus influenzae</i> ☐	<i>Neisseria meningitidis</i> ☐	<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i> ☐	<i>Salmonella</i> Typhi ☐	<i>Shigella</i> species ☐	Non-typhoidal <i>Salmonella</i> species ☐	<i>Campylobacter</i> species ☐	<i>Vibrio cholerae</i> ☐	Diarrhoeagenic <i>E. coli</i> ☐	Enterohaemorrhagic <i>E. coli</i> ☐	<i>Cryptococcus</i> species ☐	<i>Candida</i> species (BC only) ☐	<i>Candida auris</i> (any site) ☐	<i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i> (GAS) ☐	<i>Streptococcus agalactiae</i> (GBS) ☐	<i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i> ☐		
<i>Haemophilus influenzae</i> ☐	<i>Neisseria meningitidis</i> ☐	<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i> ☐																											
<i>Salmonella</i> Typhi ☐	<i>Shigella</i> species ☐	Non-typhoidal <i>Salmonella</i> species ☐																											
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<i>Candida auris</i> (any site) ☐	<i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i> (GAS) ☐	<i>Streptococcus agalactiae</i> (GBS) ☐																											
<i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i> ☐																													
Specimen type: Blood culture: ☐ CSF: ☐ Other site: ☐ Specify: _____																													
Was >1 organism type isolated from the specimen? Yes: ☐ No: ☐																													
If yes, specify organism/s: _____																													
PREVIOUS ISOLATES																													
Were any of the above organisms isolated from the patient previously? Yes: ☐ No: ☐																													
If yes, specify organism/s: _____																													
Date of Previous Isolate: 						Lab Specimen No: 																							

7.4 Turnitin report (Appendix D)



Centre for Respiratory Diseases and Meningitis

Modderfontein Road, Sandringham, 2131

Tel: +27 (0)11 386 6410 Fax: +27 (0)11 555 0437 Email: sibongilew@nicd.ac.za

University of the Witwatersrand
Faculty of Health Sciences, Postgraduate Office Parktown, 2193
Johannesburg, South Africa

To whom it may concern

RE: Turnitin report for Sibusisiwe Zulu (1304805) MScMed dissertation

Sibusisiwe Zulu is a part-time student doing her MScMed (Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases) at University of the Witwatersrand. The overall similarity index score (19%) in the Turnitin plagiarism report was due to the following reasons:

- The review of literature included in the research may include some data and or quotes from existing research papers or content that is made available by experts in the field. Sources of the information have been integrated and cited accordingly.
- The report flagged methods/techniques from previous student manuscripts. These methods were conducted as per the manufacturer's instructions
- The report flagged data such as abbreviations and full names of commonly used terms in the field, names and abbreviations of features associated with *Streptococcus pyogenes*, gene and protein names, names of methods/techniques, institution and organisation names, as well as equipment names and reagents names, countries etc.

Kind regards,

Dr Sibongile Walaza

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