


THE THIRD UNIVERSAL THEORY OF MU'AMMAR
AL-QATHAFI WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE
NORTH AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN SUBSYSTEMS

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Arts
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
for the Degree of Master of Arts

Johannesburg 1987

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work.
It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts
in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
It has not been submitted before for any degree or
examination in other University.



Ingrid Vaneta Havemann

20th day of August, 1987.

For Howard
and of course,
The Beast

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the Islamist brand of Pan-Arabism which has evolved in Libya under leadership of Mu'ammarr Al-Qathafi and in particular, the impact of his "Third Universal Theory" (the "Green Book") on Libyan regional and foreign policy.

Libya, geographically located as the state bordering Arab East (the Middle East) and Arab West (North Africa), has historically been a peripheral member of both subsystems. The Al-Qathafi regime, in its desire to assimilate Libya more fully into the Arab world, has developed an ideology which negates the existence of the nationstate, wishing to transform Libya into the territorial base of a universalist movement, generated and sustained by Islamism and Arabism, with the ultimate goal of reunifying the Arab nation.

The Third Universal Theory, as the vehicle of this Nasserist ideal, serves as exposition of an eclectic ideology which is derived in part from Islam, Marxist theory and Western humanism. Although the Third Universal Theory has been readily institutionalised in Libya and its outward focus entrenched in the foreign policy structures, it has not found fertile ground for exportation in either subsystem - precisely because of its anachronism, and the perception, by its target areas, of the Third Universal Theory as a thinly veiled disguise for Libyan expansionism.

Libya's successive foreign policy failures, both in the Middle East and in North Africa, have clearly demonstrated the unacceptability of the regime's aggressive Islamism and more so, its lack of understanding of the dynamics of the two subsystems in which it has become actively involved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iv
Chapter	
ONE. THE EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS	1
1. The External Environment	1
i) The Origins of the Study of Regional Subsystems	1
ii) Features of a Subsystem	3
iii) Pattern Variables in Subsystem Interaction	5
2. The Domestic Environment	7
i) Geography	7
ii) Leadership	10
iii) Ideology	15
3. The Interaction Between Environments	16
TWO. FEATURES OF THE NORTH AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN SUBSYSTEMS AND THE LIBYAN DOMESTIC POLITY ...	19
1. The External Environment	19
i) Synopsis	19
ii) North Africa	20
iii) The Middle East	30
2. The Domestic Environment	38
i) History	38
ii) Geography	43
iii) Leadership	47
iv) Ideology	56
3. Islamic Revivalism	60

THREE.	THE THIRD UNIVERSAL THEORY - PANACEA AND PRACTICE	68
1.	The Green Book, Part One : People's Authority	68
	i) The Evolution of the Libyan One-Party State	68
	ii) The Third Universal Theory, Part One : The Solution of the Problem of Democracy : The Authority of the People	74
	iii) People's Authority : The Jamahiriya Experiment	92
2.	The Green Book, Part Two : Socialism ...	95
	i) Libya and Oil : Rags to Riches ...	95
	ii) The Third Universal Theory, Part Two : The Solution of the Economic Problem : Socialism	101
	iii) Libyan Socialism : Participatory Partnership	113
3.	The Social Basis of the Green Book	120
4.	Precise	135
FOUR.	LIBYAN QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP : BLOC FORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA; 1969 - 1985	139
1.	The Nasserist Phase : Arab Union, African Overtures; 1969 - 1973	139
2.	Arab Rebuff, African Substitutes; 1973 - 1977	155
3.	"Greater Libya" : Consultation to Confrontation; 1977 - 1985	162
4.	International Implications	186
FIVE.	CONCLUSION	205
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	239

Chapter One : The External and Domestic Environments

1. The External Environment

i) The Origins of the Study of Regional Subsystems

The post-World War II global system has been characterised by a bipolarity of which the only two actors of significant importance are the United States of America and the Soviet Union. An ideological and power conflict, this schism has become an entrenched feature of the contemporary political structure, dominant to the extent that

" . . . the relationship of other systems to it is that of subordination - in the sense that changes in the major system will have a greater effect on a minor system than the reverse. " (1)

Postwar political analysis was confined to the parameters of the Cold War and the concomitant ideological conflict. Subsystem analysis was conceived as an alternative to the bipolar module : Leonard Binder, who first forwarded the notion of a subsystem, claimed that the bipolar model contained "great power" bias, which could not be effectively used to explain the behaviour of the "less-than-great" countries. (2)

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- (1) Binder, Leonard "The Middle East as A Subordinate International System" In : Falk, Richard A and Mendlowitz, Saul H (eds) Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973; p. 356.
 - (2) Thompson, William R "The Regional Subsystem : A Conceptual Explication and A Propositional Inventory" International Studies Quarterly, Volume 17, Number 1, March 1973; p. 90.

The main objections to the use of the bipolar model were that it oversimplified foreign policy issues and that it did not take account of environmental and developmental factors.

" Bipolar models emphasise the importance of a single, dominant axis of conflict and the tendency for regional actors and issues to be conceptualised in relationship to the underlying bipolar axis of the system. The discontinuities model, on the other hand, stresses the importance of both systemwide and regional factors and emphasises the complex patterns of their interpenetration, leaving room for shifting weights with regard to the question of which type of factor is dominant. " (3)

Recent studies in subsystems have contributed substantially to the foreign policy discipline. A subtlety of analysis has been achieved by working from parameters with limited boundaries, a more limited focus and a more and a more comprehensive analysis of relevant variables and processes. Moreover, it becomes clear that superpower action is of a secondary nature when ruling elites concentrate on their immediate regional environments for foreign policy purposes. Area specialists have thus been provided with an opportunity to integrate their works with those of others and furthermore to gain insight through the comparative analyses of subsystems. (4)

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- (3) Young, Oran R "Political Discontinuities and the International System" In : Falk, Richard A and Mendlowitz, Saul H (eds) Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973; p. 35.
- (4) Thompson, op cit; p. 91. See also Cantori, Louis J and Spiegel, Steven L "The International Relations of Regions" In : Falk, Richard A and Mendlowitz, Saul H (eds) Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973; pp. 3 - 5.

ii) Features of a Subsystem

Subsystems are defined not only in terms of subordination to the dominant bipolar system, but also with regard to their principle features:

" We can thus conclude that a subordinate system consists of one state, or of two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attributes of other states external to the system. " (5)

The characteristics of a political subsystem are that its scope should be delimited, therefore the emphasis is on a geographic region; there should be two or more actors, who, taken together, are objectively recognised by other states as constituting a distinctive community, region or segment of the international system; these members should identify themselves as such; they are inferior to the dominant system in terms of power capabilities; and any changes in the configuration of the dominant system should have a greater effect on the subsystem than the reverse. (6)

The very concept "regional subsystem" indicates that there are

(5) Cantori, Louis J and Spiegel, Steven L "Introduction : The Subordinate System" In : Cantori, Louis J and Spiegel, Steven L (eds) The International Politics of Regions : A Comparative Approach, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970; pp. 6 - 7.

(6) Brecher, Michael "International Relations and Asian Studies : The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia" In : Falk, Richard A and Mendlowitz, Saul H (eds) Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973; p. 378.

several states within regional proximity acting in concerted and/or conflictual fashion. The aspect of regionalism presupposes a need for interaction - being mainly 'identity needs' : common social, traditional, historical, ethnic and cultural experiences.

Although regional subsystems are defined by their territorial parameters, it is a distinctive feature of such areas that there is always a core area and a hostile periphery. (7) The hostile periphery, however, need not necessarily be geographically peripheral (as in the case of South Africa and black Africa). In the Middle Eastern subsystem, the hostile periphery, Israel, is centrally located and an integral part of the subsystem. The periphery serves essentially as a rallying point, intensifying subsystem solidarity and distracting from the internal problems of memberstates. (8)

External recognition of a subsystem results from the cultural, ethnic, and historic solidarity of regionally proximate states; secondarily from a precedent of unified action on core areas, such as Arab attitudes to Israel. Internal recognition stems from historic identification : Arab states in the quest for Pan-Arabism, or the legacy of the Islamic Empire; for Africans the common experience of bondage to metropolises during the colonial period, the inferiority of the African administrative structures and the continent-wide identity crisis precipitated by contact with the western cultures.

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- (7) Zartman, I William "Africa as A Subordinate System in International Relations" In : Falk, Richard A and Mendlowitz, Saul H (eds) Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973; p. 386.
- (8) Clapham, Christopher "Comparative Foreign Policy and Developing States" In : Clapham, Christopher (ed) Foreign Policy Making In Developing States : A Comparative Approach, Saxon House, 1979; p. 166.

The use of the term "subsystem" or "subordinate system" indicates that the units of power in the subsystem will be considerably inferior to those of the dominant bipolar system. Thus, the combined power of the Middle Eastern subsystem, whether economic or military, does not pose a threat to either the USA or the USSR. This then, is why cataclysmic alterations in the structure of the subsystem will have a lesser impact on the bipolar system, than would modifications in the structure of the bipolar system have on the subsystem.

iii) Pattern Variables in Subsystem Interaction

While subsystems are shaped by patterns of congruence, there are always discontinuities which result from the amalgamation of local and regional features. Such discontinuities are generally not of such a disruptive nature that the subsystem will collapse under the strain thereof. The aspects of cohesion outweigh the negative forces, since convergence is normally rooted in the survival of the common identity which had originally necessitated the unity.

Convergence centres around social, economic, political and organisational cohesion. Social cohesion results from 'identification' aspects such as ethnicity, language, religion, culture and common historic roots. The economic factor concerns distribution and complementarity of natural resources such as oil; trade patterns and economic cooperation within the region. Politically, similarity or complementarity of regimes enhances cohesion, provided that ideological

divergence is cross-cutting rather than heterogeneously reinforced. (9)

Organisational cohesion focuses on membership of international organisations. This leads to increased convergence of political and economic policies, for example Arab membership of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement strengthen anti-Israeli policies.

Cohesion is supplemented by the nature of communications in the subsystem, whether by means of transportation (road, sea, air, rail); mass media (radio, television, newspapers); or elite exchange (intraregional education, tourism, diplomatic exchanges). (10)

The structure of relations within the subsystem can occur on three levels of interaction : transnational, intergovernmental and comprehensive interaction. (11)

At the transnational level, interaction is regulated by nongovernmental elites. There is a direct societal exchange between social, economic and political forces in the subsystem; whereas intergovernmental regulation of relations is of a more formal nature because governmental elites execute official policies in specified areas, for example military alliances, treaties or economic cooperation.

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- (9) Korany, Baghat Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour : Toward A Theory of Foreign Policy-Making in the Third World, Geneva, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1976; p. 197.
- (10) Cantori and Spiegel ("Introduction" in Cantori and Spiegel, eds) op cit; p. 13.
- (11) Kaiser, Karl "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems : Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers" World Politics, Volume 21, 1968; p. 90.

The comprehensive regional subsystem is one with an amalgamation of decisionmaking power between governmental and nongovernmental elites. Consequently, there is a greater harmony of action in this type of subsystem. Libya is a member of two overlapping comprehensive systems, where official and societal exchange are on par in the creation of subsystem cohesion.

2. The Domestic Environment

1) Geography

Within the parameters of foreign policy interaction, subjective significance is attributed to operative environmental features such as geography, demography and religion. In Arab subsystems, these are the elements of national capability which determine foreign policy orientation. (12)

Territorial size, location, topography, climate and natural resources are conceptually and empirically the factors which condition decision-making perception. Although territorial size does not necessarily correlate with resources, large countries with balanced distribution of resources are able to support larger populations. The strategic advantage of territorial expanse lies in the dispersion of industry and population. Thus, the USSR's pattern of wide dispersion of

(12) Dawisha, A. I. Egypt in the Arab World : The Elements of Foreign Policy, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1976; p. 78.

industry and population makes the state less vulnerable in attack, as opposed to a densely populated small industrial state such as Japan. Conversely, the disadvantage of large frontiers lies in the inability to mobilise forces on both the frontiers and the interior, without sacrificing the one for the other. Moreover, the larger the territory, the larger the proportional complexity of establishing communications and transport systems; and developing and controlling political organisation. (13)

Location, topography and climate are important in so far as they induce population settlement or migration, economic and trade patterns. Economic or trade patterns are stimulated by access to warm-water ports, trade routes and international markets - landlocked states tend to be less self-sufficient and more insecure in foreign conduct. (14)

The availability and exploitation of natural resources reduce the adverse foreign policy effects of dependence on imported raw materials, external trade and foreign aid. However, industrialisation concomitant with exploitation of natural resources could create an imbalance in developing countries, where industrialisation, while perceived to symbolise ultimate independence from former colonial metropolises, is often funded by those metropolises. (15)

(13) Rosenau, James N "The Study of Foreign Policy" In : Rosenau, James N, Thompson Kenneth W and Boyd, Gavin (eds) *World Politics : An Introduction*, New York, The Free Press, 1976; p. 19.

(14) *Ibid*; p. 20.

(15) Dawisha, *op cit*; p. 84.

Demography is significant in terms of the size of the territory; the structure of the economy and the development of technology; indicating limits and potential in relation to economic productivity and technical skill. (16) The greater the degree of economic development, the greater the proportional range and level of education and technical skill. (17) Thus, a large population in a rapidly modernising state could be mobilised as a reservoir for industrial expansion and military strength. (18)

Ethnic homo/heterogeneity influences not only internal cohesion, but foreign policy orientation too. Internal cohesion would be undermined should nationhood be subordinated to ethnic heterogeneity, and the impact of ethnicity could create the existence of powerful lobbying forces among political exiles, alternatively such as force as the Jewish-American groups which influence American policy bearing toward Israel. (19)

Cultural factors such as norms and traditions, interpretation of a common heritage and religious assimilation sustain the sense of community; and values and memories widely shared enhance the national identity. Thus, the more unified the population (by means of common culture and history), the clearer and more resolute they are about common political, social and economic aims and by extension the more

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- (16) Reynolds, P. A. An Introduction to International Relations, London, Longman Group Limited, 1971; pp. 73 - 75.
- (17) Rosenau ("Study of Foreign Policy" In Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd, eds), op cit; p. 21.
- (18) Dawisha, op cit; p. 79.
- (19) Ibid; p. 77.

determined and effective the implementation of foreign policy :

" The history of a state highly influences the expectations, perceptions and values of the population and in many cases, the diplomatic role of the given state. " (20)

ii) Leadership

Political legitimacy has been denoted as the focal point of controversy in Arab government, where modernisation is spawning a dysfunctional relationship between the political community and the corporate sense of communal solidarity. (21) Stability is coincidental to legitimate leadership :

" . . . the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept the rightness of the ruler's superior power. " (22)

Max Weber traced the triangular relationship between political stability, leadership and the electorate in his categorisation of legitimate authority as being either legal-rational, traditional or charismatic. According to this classification, legal-rational authority would be legitimised by entrenched belief in the legality of normative rules and the concomitant right of those in authority

(20) Qualman, H Limits and Constraints on Foreign Policy in A Dependant State, Part I, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1975; p. 76.

(21) Hudson, Michael C Arab Politics : The Search for Legitimacy, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977; pp. 2 - 4.

(22) Ibid; p. 1.

to issue commands. Traditional authority derives legitimacy from established belief in the sanctity of "immemorial traditions" and charismatic leadership rests on the unquestioning devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him. (23)

Legal-rational authority is typified by the bureaucratic system of government in Western states; traditional authority by traditional religious as in Iran, or the caudillos in Latin America and the hereditary monarchies of the Middle East. Charismatic authority is exemplified in leaders such as Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh and Kwame Nkrumah. (24)

Charismatic authority, therefore, is of a highly personal nature, while legal-rational and traditional authority seem to centre on the office of authority, rather than the person in authority. (25)

Submission to charismatic authority would be contingent on faith in the extraordinary qualities exhibited by the leader - whether such powers exist or not is immaterial. What alone is important, is how the leader is actually perceived by those subject to his charismatic

(23) Weber, Max The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Tr. Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, Talcott; Parsons, Talcott (ed), New York, Macmillan, 1947; p. 328.

(24) La Mond Tullis, F Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries, New York, John Wiley and Sons Incorporated, 1973; p. 80.

(25) Willner, Ann Ruth Charismatic Political Leadership : A Theory, Princeton University, Centre of International Studies, 1968; p.2.

authority. (26)

Charismatic appeal is manifest in the leader's projection of himself as sui generis, in his emotional interaction with the populace. He would be capable of arousing a strong sense of psychological identification - the populace would perceive their fate as being inextricably linked to his successes and victories. (27)

Due to its very nature, charismatic authority must be verified through miracles, victories and guaranteed welfare of society; either with powerful results achieved in the absence of actual power, or by the mobilisation of formerly nascent resources. (28)

Charisma becomes operative, despite its messianism, only when a combination of situational factors, resulting in systemwide societal dislocation affecting large sectors of the population, exist. Cumulative societal disorientation results from a decrease in the legitimacy of the patterns of authority; a concomitant relative decline in the ability of the State to maintain domestic stability; the existence of relatively underdeveloped institutions, incapable of absorbing or assimilating new groups or classes; and rapid environmental and value changes commonly associated with modernisation, leading to increased

(26) Weber (Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Parson ed), op cit; p. 359.

(27) El Fathaly, Omar I and Palmer, Monte Political Development and Social Change in Libya, Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1980, p. 62.

(28) Rustow, Dankwart A A World of Nations : Problems of Political Modernisation, Washington D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1967, p. 165.

demands for economic, political and social participation. (29)

The charismatic leader will facilitate assimilation with the populace by combining into a collective grievance and common political goal the discontent of a divergent group of socially and psychologically uprooted classes, generally by formulating a compelling doctrine that embodies the private dreams and desires of many different people, simultaneously elevating these aspirations into a public and, frequently, millennial vision. (30)

The process of assimilation will be augmented by sharing a common cultural and religious heritage and through establishing a sense of continuity between himself and national mythical or legendary historic figures. (31)

The charismatic leader should be

" . . . as a double-visaged Janus, projecting himself one the one hand as the omniscient repository of ancient wisdom and on the other as the new man of the people, not only leading them toward, but sharing with them, the trials of revolutionary renewal. " (32)

(29) La Mond Tullis, op cit; p. 83.

(30) Willner, op cit; p. 72.

(31) Willner, Ann Ruth and Willner, Dorothy "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders" In: Nordlinger, Eric A (ed) Politics and Society, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970; p. 230.

(32) Ibid; p. 234.

Charismatic legitimacy is directly proportional to popular devotion : if the leader endowed with charismatic qualities is for too long unsuccessful, or if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, his legitimacy will wane. (33) Public expectation and veneration can be regulated by image cultivation - the reinforcement of charismatic characteristics of strength, piety and indispensability to societal welfare ensures continued mobilisation of support. (34)

The most dynamic political leaders are those who are able to absorb "plural possible identifications", investing them with the ability to comprehend and react to social dislocation in terms meaningful to diverse classes of society. Such plural possible identification is contingent on experience of polymorphic family background, either in class, religion or ethnicity; mobility and/or instability of the family unit during childhood; and consequent exposure to diverse environments. (35)

Regime maintenance is best controlled through institutionalisation of ideology in religious, sectarian and bureaucratic dimensions, entrenching charismatic legitimacy in a new system of state purporting to restore historic norms and ambitions.

(33) Weber, Max "Authority and Legitimacy" In : Nordlinger, Eric A (ed) *Politics and Society*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970; p. 42.

(34) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 63.

(35) Willner, op cit; pp. 51 - 52.

iii) Ideology

Ideology, which is the Weltanschauung of the leadership, provides the state with an interpretation of the world and guidelines for reacting to it, usually by attempts at improving or transforming the world. (36)

In the domestic environment, Marx identified the social aspect of ideology as solidarity : during the class struggle, there is an evolution of divergent doctrines and systems into an all-encompassing ideology; which must enforce solidarity, the moral basis of society. From solidarity grows identification, a personal rationalisation of value systems, beliefs and responses to deviation. (37)

Ideology furnishes leadership with the means with which to integrate and mobilise the population in the implementation of policy, and provides a patterned response to systemic social interaction :

" Ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role. It provides a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium. " (38)

Emotional tension is drained by displacement into symbolic enemies - ideology has to offer a value system, legitimate objects of hostility,

(36) Duchacek, Ivo D. Nations and Men : An Introduction to International Politics, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Incorporated, 1971; p. 275.

(37) Apter, David "Ideology and Discontent" In : Apter, David (ed) Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; pp. 19 - 21.

(38) Geertz, Clifford "Ideology as a Cultural System" In : Apter, David (ed) Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; p. 54.

the emotional bridge between what is and what ought to be, solidarity between social groups or classes and elucidation of problems. (39)

Within the foreign policy paradigm, ideology establishes foreign policy goals, the means for the evaluation of criteria and justification of actions, and the perpetuity of bureaucratic process. (40)

Ideology creates a political framework through which reality is perceived, even though it would at times be a distorted vision. Whereas it may serve as a guide for action or may set long-term rational goals, ideology does not provide a blueprint for each unforeseen or unplanned situation. It merely serves as rationalisation and justification of contemporary actions and decisions, by providing a moral and ethical parameter within which the state should operate. Since ideology is composed of several doctrines familiar to diverse segments of the population, leadership adherence to ideology ensures continued mobilisation of mass support in the implementation of policy. (41)

3. The Interaction Between Environments

The conceptual interdependence of domestic and international

(39) Ibid; p. 55.

(40) Holsti, K. J. International Politics : A Framework for Analysis, London, Prentice-Hall, 1974; p. 366.

(41) Duchacek, op cit; pp. 276 - 27

environments derives from the framework of foreign policy analysis, where political interjection transcends the territoriality imposed by state boundaries :

" Foreign policy is composed of actions and reactions which a state undertakes in dealing with other people, institutions or entities outside its own boundaries. " (42)

Although foreign policy outputs are concentrated on effecting patterns of interstate action, the inputs that are generated purely from the domestic polity constrain outputs in terms of national capability and/or national interest.

Any foreign policy act may be viewed as the result of three broad categories of consideration affecting the foreign policy decisionmaker. First, there are the domestic politics within his country; secondly there are the factors of economic and military capabilities; and thirdly, he must consider the international context of any given action. (43)

A state's foreign policy outputs generally aim at manipulating, to its own advantage, the political persuasion of other decisionmaking structures. Each action is designed to elicit reciprocal reaction, thereby producing a cause-effect continuum which involves a

(42) Shembesh, Ali M. The Analysis of Libya's Foreign Policy 1962 - 1973 : A Study of The Impact of Environment and Leadership Factors, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1975; p. 3.

(43) Coplin, William D. Introduction to International Politics : A Theoretical Overview, Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1971; p. 26.

multiplicity of interrelations. (44)

This cause-effect pattern is not exclusive to the parameter of international relations. Its impact is compounded in the domestic environment, where socio-economic and politico-institutional upheaval may either determine or be reflected in foreign policy outputs : (45)

" The institutions organised in response to international inputs may create, in turn, pressure upon their national governments for conducting policy along certain lines. They can influence, in other words, the nature of the output from the polity to the international environment. " (46)

Guided by the revolutionary regime of Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qathafi, Libyan foreign policy has adopted a dynamic regional perspective within the North African and Middle Eastern subsystems. This dimension of regionalism, expressed as a drive for bloc-formation, has become the cornerstone of Libyan foreign policy, centering around the concepts of Arabism, the revival of Islam as an expansionist politico-religious ideology, and an ambition to assume Arab leadership.

(44) Plischke, Elmer "Intellectual Dimensions of Foreign Relations Decisionmaking" In : Merritt, Richard L (ed) Foreign Policy Analysis, D.C. Heath and Company, 1975; p. 64.

(45) Shembesh, op cit; p. 4.

(46) O'Leary, Michael "Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations" In : Rosenau, James N (ed) Linkage Politics, Toronto, The Free Press, 1969; p. 334.

Chapter Two : Features of the North African and Middle Eastern
Subsystems and the Libyan Domestic Polity

1. The External Environment

i) Synopsis

The Libyan polity actively operates within the environmental parameters of two overlapping subsystems, Arab North Africa and the Middle East.

The principal features of a subsystem have been identified as the interaction of geographically proximate states with common ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historic roots.

Geographic proximity per se does not denote the existence of a *subsystem* : the cluster of interacting states, identifying themselves as a distinctive community, must be accorded with international recognition as a political unit. The subsystem, in all dimensions of power, will be inferior to the dominant bipolar structure, whose shifting power configurations have a greater impact on the subsystem, than subsystem realignment will have on the bipolar module.

All subsystems comprise of core and peripheral areas. The peripheral unit might be located at the geographic centre of the subsystem, but remains a hostile polity. The periphery serves as the focal point of subsystem solidarity and as an outlet for domestic political frustration.

Subsystem cohesion is enhanced by ideological convergence, common "identity" bonds, economic interpenetration and trade patterns, organisational membership, and well-developed communications systems. Interaction should be regulated on a comprehensive level through combined non-governmental and intragovernmental channels.

The complexity of interdependence in several dimensions makes it impossible for any political entity to exist or operate in a vacuous condition. Thus the creation of subsystems arises from a need or necessity for combined action or common support of smaller states pursuing related foreign policy goals.

ii) North Africa

Subregionalisation on the African continent is a fairly recent dynamic, for colonialism left a legacy of continual sources of change that disrupt or reorient any steady patterns of action that might have been imposed by the subregional structures. (1)

The African continent, which harbours a wealth of unexplored mineral, agricultural and human resources, remains highly balkanised, poor and weak, erratic in its instability and disunity : differing colonial

(1) Zartman, I William "Africa" In : Rosenau, James N, Thompson, Kenneth W and Boyd, Gavin (eds) World Politics : An Introduction New York, The Free Press, 1976; p. 571.

heritage and racial composition prevail over potentially unifying factors such as common geographic identity. (2)

The structural inability for one state to be vested with continental leadership, has fostered a proliferation of regionally dominant states which use their limited concentration of superior resources as a power base in exerting subsystem penetration or temporary regional paramouncy. (3)

The fragility of regional cohesion is exacerbated by the practice of African states of meeting or opposing each other on specific issues, yet remaining institutionally free to change alliance as they change issues. (4)

The North African subsystem, the Maghrib, consists of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya - the latter at once dominant and peripheral member. *The Maghrib is bordered by Niger, Chad, Sudan and Egypt.*

The "jazirat al maghr'b" (westernmost island, or the place of the setting sun) is so denominated because of its geographic islandisation to the north by the Mediterranean Sea, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean and to the south by the Sahara desert. There is no geographic

(2) Shaw, Timothy M "Africa" In : Feld, Werner J and Boyd, Gavin (eds) Comparative Regional Systems : West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries, New York, Pergamon Press Incorporated, 1980; p. 355.

(3) Zartman (Africa, in Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd, eds), op cit; p. 574.

(4) *ibid*; p. 581.

boundary to the east, allowing Libya mobility in both the Maghribi and Middle Eastern subsystems :

" In fact, throughout history, Libya has tended to serve as link - and buffer - between the two with the eastern portion, Cyrenaica, usually tied more closely to Egypt and the Middle East and the western part, Tripolitania, looking more westward toward the Maghrib. " (5)

The inaccessibility of the Maghrib has been exacerbated by topographic features : there are no navigable rivers, and the few good natural harbours are blocked off from the interior by mountain ranges which effectively isolate the coastal regions from the hinterland. The result is that these natural physical boundaries have served to give the region a distinctiveness vis-à-vis its neighbours throughout the centuries, and one can thus speak meaningfully of a North African history and heritage. (6)

The Maghrib is distinguished from the rest of Africa by its high level of homogeneity. (7) With the departure, in the 1960s, of most Europeans and Jews, the area has been left inhabited by a population racially

(5) Brown, Leon Carl "Introduction" In : Brown, Leon Carl (ed) State and Society in Independent North Africa, Washington D. C. The Middle East Institute, 1966; p. 4.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Grove, A. T. Africa, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978; p. 129.

semitic, not negroid, consisting of Arabs and Arabised Berbers. There is no tribal dichotomy - the indigenous Berbers had been absorbed into the Arabic culture centuries ago. (8)

The assimilation of the Berbers into the Arab culture was facilitated by the lack of any "Pan-Berber" aspirations. There was no one common Berber language, or a usable alphabet or written literary tradition. Rather, the language had been broken down into several "mutually incomprehensible" dialects. (9) As a result, the Berbers did not seem to have regarded themselves as collectively forming a distinctive group, instead, each Berber community was preoccupied with the question of preserving its own local autonomy. (10)

As each new wave of conquerors swept through the Maghrib, the Berbers found it convenient, for literacy and administrative purposes, to adopt the language of the new government. The Arab Islamic conquest, however, demanded more than linguistic adaptation :

" . . . integration into the religion and participation in the traditional-universalistic socio-religious system of Islam has led to a large-scale surrender of identity, with a

(8) Hermassi, Elbaki Leadership and National Development in North Africa : A Comparative Study, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972; pp. 34 - 35.

(9) Abun-Nasr, Jamil M A History of the Maghrib, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971; p. 8.

(10) Grove, op cit; p. 130.

concomitant identification with . . . the
Arabs from the Middle East. " (11)

Arabic became the North African written language; the spoken languages dialectical Arabic and Berber. Thus the Arab penetration of the Maghrib, which started approximately 640 A.D., resulted in cultural and religious cohesion in the subsystem. There are few Christians in the Maghrib, and the Jewish community is settled mainly in Morocco; the Arab population has remained uniform in its adherence to orthodox Sunni Islam.

Cultural development, however, was conditioned by the Maghrib's geographic isolation from the Arab mainland. During the mid-eleventh century, Morocco and much of Spain were conquered by the Almoravid nomads. Muslim Spain, consequently, had a great impact on Maghribi cultural evolution : North African architecture, poetry, music and literature emerged as a distinctive western Islamic subculture. (12)

North Africa, largely escaping the ravages of the Crusades, experienced European occupation, mostly of its coastal cities, from the fourteenth century onwards, when it was increasingly drawn into Iberian affairs.

Colonialism imposed an alien dimension of cultural cohesion on the Maghrib : more than ninety per cent of the population was colonised, from 1830 onwards, by France. Only Libya and part of Morocco escaped

(11) Gallagher, Charles F. "A Note on the Maghrib" In : Zartman, I. William (ed) Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib, London, Pall Mall Press, 1973; p. 6.

(12) Brown (Introduction, in Brown, ed), op cit; p. 7. See also Gallagher (Note on the Maghrib, in Zartman, ed), op cit; p. 7.

French occupation - Libya was for a brief period an Italian colony, while northern Morocco was administered as a Spanish protectorate. (13)

The Maghrib experienced an intense degree of assimilation - the French policy of settler integration with colonised nationals. Whereas colonisation generally entailed the imposition of military occupation, the presence of small cadres of upper-level administrators, merchants, teachers and missionaries; this process was amplified in the North African colonies. A rapid build-up of the settler population was effected by extending the occupation of the Maghrib to French farmers, industrialists, small retail merchants, middle-grade civil servants and even trade unionists. (14) Colonisation started in Algeria in 1830, in Tunisia in 1881 and in Morocco in 1912, and although officially ending in 1962 with Algerian independence, the longstanding and intense dependence on the French metropole has never been fully terminated.

The core Maghrib states shared a common colonial experience and inherited regionally uniform systems of education, administration, law, public finance, agriculture and industry. The middle classes retained French, which was the literacy vehicle under colonial administration in Algérie, Tunisia and Morocco, as a secondary spoken language. (15)

(13) Knapp, Wilfred North West Africa : A Political and Economic Survey, London, Oxford University Press, 1977; pp. 38 - 48.

(14) Brown (Introduction, in Brown, ed), op cit, p. 9.

(15) Gallagher, Charles F. "Language and Identity" In : Brown, Leon Carl (ed) State and Society in Independent North Africa, Washington D.C. The Middle East Institute, 1966; pp. 81 - 82. See also Hermassi, Leadership and National Development, op cit; pp. 35 - 36.

The French "colons" developed and maintained an impressive economic infrastructure throughout the Maghrib, consisting of roads, railroads, light industry and pockets of modernised farming; but the discriminatory education system imposed on the North Africans did not prepare the indigenous population, in particular the Algerians, for decolonisation and the concomitant exodus of trained French personnel. (16) While the institutional structures of political party and trade union organisations were retained, post-independence constitutional reforms led to the review of the legal systems, the restoration of Arabic as official language and the establishment of traditional monarchies in Morocco and Libya. (17)

African nationalism in Maghrib was characterised by a strong sense of regional solidarity, with overtones of Islamic nationalism, particularly in Morocco. (18) As early as May 1946, the major parties of Tunisia and Morocco (Neo-Destour and Istiqlal) signed the "Maghrib Charter" but given the colonial status of these countries, their cooperation during the next decade until independence was limited to the liberation struggle in the area.

The study of foreign policy in established states assumes the coincidence of three units of interest and identification : territorial (country), popular (nation), and organisational (party government). In

(16) Brown (Introduction, in Brown, ed), op cit; pp. 9 - 10.

(17) Knapp, op cit; p. 6.

(18) Rivlin, Benjamin "Problems and Prospects for North African Unity" In : Brown, Leon Carl (ed) State and Society in Independent North Africa, Washington D.C. The Middle East Institute, 1966; p. 287.

the case of the Maghribi states, these components and their interrelations were not fully developed, nor was their underdevelopment mutually commensurate. Thus Morocco and Tunisia were faced, at independence, with the choice of orienting their foreign policy either towards regional unity and revolution, or towards national independence and internal development. Allal Al-Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal, committed Morocco to the former with the declaration that the Moroccan independence could not be considered complete until such time as the entire Maghrib had been liberated from colonial rule. (19)

In reality, there was little option in the matter - independence could become *de facto* only with the resolution of the Algerian war :

" . . . the leaders of Morocco and Tunisia . . . could not divorce their fate from that of Algeria. Cultural and colonial similarities were reinforced by personal experiences common to the North African nationalists, including . . . the exile of several Tunisian, Moroccan, and Algerian leaders together in Cairo. Furthermore, . . . the continued occupation of both independent states by the French army could never be brought to an end until the Algerian war was over. " (20)

The Moroccan and Tunisian constitutions contained clauses affirming their allegiance to the greater Maghrib, the FLN had committed itself

(19) Zarman, I William *International Relations in the New Africa*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Incorporated, 1966; pp. 1 - 2.

(20) Ibid; p. 3.

to the goal of North African unity and Moroccan emphasis of the "North African entity" resulted in the conclusion of an agreement between Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, to develop cooperation and closer contact on a permanent basis, to serve the common interests of the sister nations of the Maghrib and to draw up a formal treaty of cooperation and alliance. (21)

In 1958, the Istiqlal, Neo-Destour and FLN adopted the Tangiers Convention, which reaffirmed the goal of Maghribi unity and which called for the formation of a North African Federation. Ideological incompatibility, however, particularly after Algerian independence, forestalled the implementation of a federal structure. (22)

The Maghrib Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM), established in 1964 by a conference of the Maghribi Ministers of Economy with the guidance of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has been responsible for a Protocol Agreement governing preferential trade exchanges and the harmonisation of trade policies. (23)

Several joint projects have been implemented under the aegis of the CPCM, inter alia the establishment of the Committee on Post Office and Telecommunications Coordination; the Committee on Tourism, which in turn established the Maghrib Institute for Training in Hotel and Tourist

(21) Zartman, International Relations, op cit; p. 4.

(22) Woronoff, Jon Organising African Unity, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1970; pp. 115 - 117.

(23) Mutharika, B.W.T. Toward Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa, New York, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972; p. 295.

Trade Affairs and which also coordinates advertising and organising the Maghribi tourist festivals; the Esparto Grass Agency, which has commercialised the production of esparto grass and which coordinates the activities of esparto grass exporters; the Industrial Studies Centre which promotes coordinated industrialisation, conducts industrial research, and deals with problems such as the desalinisation of sea water, chemical fertiliser production, manufacture of pharmaceutical products and the advancement of trained skilled labour; committees have been created each to deal with a different aspect of transport development, such as road, railway, air and marine infrastructures. The CPCM, furthermore, coordinates bilateral trade and economic agreements between memberstates. (24)

The Maghribi states maintain their Arabism and Islamism through membership of distinctly Arab regional organisations and Muslim international institutions, such as the League of Arab States; the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; the Arab Monetary Fund; the Arab Union of Railways which was established in 1979 to stimulate and coordinate the development of Arab railway links; the Islamic Development Bank; the Muslim World League; the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which has several subsidiary bodies charged with the coordination of economic, cultural and political programmes. (25)

The Maghrib has, however, played a marginal role in the conflict with Israel. Its geographic islandisation has determined a policy toward

(24) Ibid, pp. 295 - 299.

(25) The Middle East and North Africa, Annual Survey, 1984 - 85, London, Europa Publications Limited, 1984; pp. 179 - 205.

the Palestinian issue which rests on Bourguiba's gradualist approach and on the recognition of the necessity for a solution that would be acceptable in terms of international law and mores - with the notable exception of Libyan congruence with this general Maghribi policy.

" Being part of many worlds, the peoples of the Maghrib cannot but be influenced by cross-pressures and geopolitics . . . To the extent that the Maghrib is precluded from direct confrontation, it must assume the role of a distant brother, emphasising unity of ranks, rationality of approach, and a sensitivity to world opinion. " (26)

iii) The Middle East

It has been argued that the term "Middle East" is no reflection of the reality of the Muslim world; rather, that the use of the term (which originated in the writings of naval historian Mahan), is a barometer of European ethnocentric prejudice. (27) It follows, therefore, that in this international hierarchy topped by the Anglo-Saxons, the concept of the "Middle East" functions both as a cartographic-cultural label and as a politico-cultural label.

" More than a geographic notion, the area became a political concept to Alexander the Great, the Crusaders, and the British and French colonists. Together they distinguished

(26) Hermassi, Elbaki "The Maghrib and the Middle East Conflict", in : Middle East Review, Volume X, Number 4, Summer 1978; p. 38.

(27) Duignan, P and Gann, L.H. The Middle East and North Africa : The Challenge to Western Security; Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1981; p. 28.

it as a region apart from both the West, because it is not rooted in Greco-Roman civilisation, and the rest of the Orient, because of its relative proximity to the great cities of Europe. " (28)

The area defined as the Middle East includes eighteen states : the periphery of Iran, Turkey and Israel; with the core consisting of Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, the Sudan, Jordan, Syria, South Yemen, and the Persian Gulf States.

The Middle Eastern subsystem is defined by its framework of geographic location, cultural affiliation and common historic experience. Geographically, the region stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Maghrib (which nominally participates in core relations), becomes a territorial unit when viewed as the intersection of the world's commercial lanes and as strategic midpoint between East and West.

In the cultural dimension, ethnic heterogeneity is to a small extent ameliorated by the pervasive force of Islam and by ideological commitment to Arab nationalism. The historic conditions of common Arab and Ottoman rule and the period of colonial occupation, imposed an administrative uniformity on the subsystem and contributed to an equable cultural consciousness.

(28) Piscatori, James P and Ramazani, R.K. "The Middle East" In: Feld, Werner J and Boyd, Gavin (eds) Comparative Regional Systems : West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries; New York, Pergamon Press Incorporated, 1980; p. 274.

Despite such indications of uniformity, there is little unity; the Middle Eastern culture has been likened to a mosaic, where people live together, by living apart. (29)

External disputes are exacerbated by ethnic hostility and cultural affiliation which transcend the concept of the nationstate, e.g. Kurdish ethnic borders fall in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union. The secessionist movement for an independent Kurdistan is thus in opposition to five different legitimate governments. (30)

The Middle Eastern subsystem, in the pre-Islamic era, was politically dominated by the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires. Byzantine control extended from the eastern Mediterranean to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Greece and Turkey and the Sassanids ruled Iran and Iraq. The Arab peninsula was regarded as the rural periphery, and since contact was restricted to trade, foreign settlements in the hinterland and occasional forays of conquest; was less affected by the Byzantine, Persian and Syrian cultures.

Societal structure, founded on the economic principle of wealth accumulation and the political organisation of parochial clan authority, was revolutionised by the advent of the Prophet Muhammad. Under the

(29) Hudson, Michael C. "The Middle East" In: Rosenau, James N, Thompson, Kenneth W and Boyd, Gavin (eds) World Politics: An Introduction, New York: The Free Press, 1976; p. 468.

(30) Piscatori and Ramazani, op cit; p. 281.

charismatic leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, society in the Middle East underwent

" . . . a religious and social revolution; he had established a new community of faith in which religious affiliation supplemented - and in some sense transcended - kinship. His was a theocratic government that in its own estimation derived its legitimacy from God. " (31)

Muhammad consolidated the metropolitan areas of Mecca and Medina and then extended his campaign to the rural Arab tribes and clans. The expansionist legacy inherited by his successors, the Rashidun (the orthodox Caliphate), culminated in the establishment of the Arab Empire - which, a century after Muhammad's death, encompassed the area from North Africa to Spain, the former Byzantine Empire, the area to the Pyrenees on the border of France and across the east to the Pamirs in Central Asia.

Administrative control of the Arab Empire - its political and economic interpenetration - was sustained by religious and cultural cohesion. Whereas the Empire was able to impose political and religious control, the Arab-Muslim culture, a relatively underdeveloped oral tradition, was gradually absorbed into the cultures of the conquered nations. By the twelfth century, Arab-Muslim culture was an amalgam of the cultural traditions of the vastly more complex societies the Empire had confronted. (32)

(31) Duignan and Gann, *op cit*; p. 5.

(32) Bill, James A and Leiden, Carl The Middle East : Politics and Power, Boston, Allyn and Bacon Limited, 1974; p. 49.

Although all of Sunni Islam - with the exception of India - had been united under Ottoman rule, the Turkish conquest virtually destroyed the Arab culture and its universal quality was gone. Except for a limited number of theological and philosophical studies, the literary use of Arabic would henceforth be confined to Arabic-speaking communities. (33)

The impact of the Crusades gradually forced the Ottoman Empire to decrease the size of its borders and initiated a slow retreat and a series of territorial cessions to European powers; steadily leading the Empire to internal decline :

" The Ottoman system of government, taxation and land tenure were geared to the needs of an expanding society. Once the frontier began to recede, Ottoman institutions could no longer cope with the country's needs. " (34)

Concomitant with the deterioration of the internal political structure, was a weakened border defense and a growing inability to protect the Empire from European incursion. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was readily partitioned after the First World War. Syria and Lebanon became French mandates; Palestine and Transjordan, British mandates. Turkey became a secular state with the overthrow of the Caliphate in 1922.

Arab regional relations during the inter-War period focused on the settlement of border disputes between independent states, friendship

(33) Duignan and Gann, op cit; p. 14.

(34) Ibid; pp. 15 - 16.

treaties and the emergent problem of the separation of Palestine and Transjordan. However,

" Although from 1920 the reunification of the Arab world under an independent political regime was to be a main objective of Arab nationalism . . . nevertheless the separate development of each territory created in time political loyalties which accentuated the tendencies to disunity already present. " (35)

Post-independence Arab politics was characterised by a distrust of the West, rooted in the Israel/Palestine controversy and fuelled by the particularly Nasserist brand of emerging, often strident nationalism, especially among the Arabic-speaking people, who evolved from resenting to rejecting what was construed to be Western tutelage, in whatever form. (36)

Consequently, post-World War II Middle Eastern politics tended to focus on internal reorganisation and regional relations. The 1948 War of Independence and three subsequent wars against Israel, the exacerbation of the Palestinian problem with the growth of population and militancy of the "refugees", the ongoing civil war in Lebanon and the regional Iran-Iraq war; have resulted in a situation where regional hostilities and changing alliances supercede ideals of Arab nationalism and Arab reunification.

(35) Bullard, Sir Reader The Middle East : A Political and Economic Survey, London, Oxford University Press, 1958; p. 18.

(36) Howard, Harry N "Historical Backgrounds" In : Ismael, Tareq Y (ed) The Middle East in World Politics : A Study in Contemporary International Relations, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1974; p. 17.

Although the main function of the League of Arab States, founded in May 1945, is the responsibility for resolving regional disputes, its failures in the past have been indicative of its impotence and inability when faced with disputes of a serious and violent nature, e.g. the Egypt-Syria hostilities after the breakdown of the United Arab Republic; Egypt-Saudi Arabia conflict during the Yemeni civil war; Egypt-Libya border war of 1977; the ongoing Western Sahara dispute between Algeria and Morocco. The Arab League prescribes for its memberstates a foreign policy orientation of Arab nationalism, neutralism, and non-alignment, but has no power to enforce policy decisions.

" Having admitted its limitation, however, it would be erroneous to suppose that the League is functionally unimportant. It has served in two important ways to integrate the Arab world : first, through the mediation of intra-Arab disputes; and second, through the institutionalisation of functional activities. " (37)

Organisation cooperation has, however, been more successful on non-political levels. The Arab League has, inter alia, established the Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation; organisations for literacy, research, industrial development, broadcasting; a federation of news agencies; post and telecommunications unions; the Arab Labour Organisation; women's and students associations; and professional organisations in the areas of civil aviation, engineering and urban planning.

(37) Hudson (The Middle East, in Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd, eds), op cit; p. 491.

The League of the Islamic World, established in 1970 as a cultural organisation, has founded the Islamic Solidarity Fund (in 1973), designed to meet the needs and requirements for Islamic unity, Islamic causes and the enhancement of the Islamic culture. (38)

Extending its activities into the economic dimension, the Islamic League has established an interest-free Islamic Development Bank, whereby wealthier memberstates pledged aid to the poorer states through a special combined fund from OPEC and the Saudi Development Fund.

The Arab League, at its inception in 1945, had also provided for economic and financial cooperation between memberstates, to be regulated by the Economic and Financial Committee of the League. The Committee, however, has not yet achieved anything other than making general recommendations. (39)

The principle of an Arab Common Market, mooted at the 1953 Conference of Arab Ministers of Finance and National Economy, led to the conclusion of the Convention for Facilitating Trade and Regulating Transit Trade Between States of the Arab League - superseded in 1957 by the Agreement for Economic Unity Among Arab League States. A further agreement stipulated the emergence of the Arab Common Market in 1965. These programmes have yet to come to fruition - the chief donor, Kuwait, has not yet ratified the agreements. (40)

(38) Piscatori and Ramazani, *op cit*; p. 276.

(39) Wionczek, Miguel S *Economic Cooperation in Latin America, Africa and Asia : A Handbook of Documents*, Cambridge, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969; p. 284.

(40) Hudson (The Middle East, in Rosenau, Thompson and Boyd, eds), *loc cit*.

The successful utilisation of the oil market as a key political weapon in the early 1970s, not only served to illustrate the rarity of concerted Arab action, but a psychological restoration of political confidence was instilled in states even as relatively negligible (in the global context) as the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms. (41)

On the whole, though, the Middle Eastern subsystem is characterised by political discord, with few areas of convergence and cooperation.

" If the Middle East is a regional system, it is so metaphorically - that is, it is like a unit with subcomponents in regular interaction. 'Subsystemic' elements, however, portend to be more revealing of how states of the area cooperate with each other, coordinate their interests and politics, and disagree with each other. The Middle East, already burdened with its own mysticisms, hardly needs the added burden of identification with 'an almost mystical wholeness'. " (42)

2. The Domestic Environment

1) History

Libya is regarded as the most "Arab" country in the world - second only to Arabia itself - despite the fact that the Arab conquest of the area occurred fairly late in the Libyan settlement history. (43)

(41) Ismael, Tareq Y. "Oil : The New Diplomacy" In : Ismael, Tareq Y (ed) The Middle East in World Politics : A Study in Contemporary International Relations, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1974; pp. 235 - 237.

(42) Piscatori and Ramazani, op cit; p. 296.

(43) Grove, op cit; p. 135.

The Phoenecians were the first to settle in Tripolitania, in 700 B.C. and the Dorians in Cyrenaica in 631 B.C. The Pentapolis - five cities and ports in Cyrenaica - were established as an integrated part of the Empire of Alexander the Great until 320 B.C. when the Egyptian Ptolemy dynasty seized control of the Pentapolis.

The Second Punic War, and the destruction of Carthage, led to the Roman Empire's absorption of Tripolitania. Ptolemy Apion, at his death in 96 B.C. bequeathed Cyrenaica to Rome. During the following five hundred years, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were governed by Rome as two separate states - Cyrenaica linked to Crete; and Tripolitania as the province of Africa Nova, later to be united by Emperor Augustus with western Africa Vetus. Under Roman occupation, the Fezzan was penetrated and "Libya" experienced its greatest period of peace and prosperity. (44)

Cyrenaican stability was shattered by the Great Jewish Rebellion of 115 A.D.; Tripolitanian civilisation was destroyed, never to fully recover, by Gaiseric the Vandal's conquest of 429 A.D. Although Belisarius recovered Libya for the Byzantine emperor Justinian,

" It remained a shadow of its former self, and was quite unequal to checking the advancing forces of Islam, then mustering in Egypt. " (45)

The Arab conquest of 642 A.D. lasted effectively until 1911, interspersed with brief periods of European intervention. Libya was governed by the

(44) Knapp, *op cit*; p. 179.

(45) *Ibid*; p. 180.

Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs of Damascus until the invasion of Tripoli in the twelfth century by the Norman king Roger of Sicily.

When the Almoravid rulers of Morocco expelled the Normans in 1158, Christian rule in North Africa was ended and Tripolitania was governed, for the next three hundred years, from the west; while Cyrenaica was ruled by the Egyptians and later the Seljuk Turks.

Although Libya was absorbed into the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century, Turkish rule was nominal : Tripolitania was governed until 1711 by janissaries, renegade Greeks, Italians and Mediterranean islanders; the authority of the Sultan was recognised in Cyrenaica only in 1640.

In 1834 the Sanusi sect of mystics - which gradually undercut Ottoman rule - was established. Still practiced in contemporary Cyrenaica, the Sanusi creed calls for a return to the purity and spirituality of Islam under the Prophet Muhammad. Sayyid Mohammed Ali Al-Senussi, its founder, erected fifty zawiya lodges - partly schools, partly centres for meditation and work, functioning too as fortresses. The zawiyas, which served to unify the country, were the byproducts of a weak and unpredictable central authority. Ottoman rule, which was neither progressive nor efficient, was ended with the deposing of the Tyrant Abdul Hamid in 1908.

Italian military occupation of Libya started in 1911 and was completed

by 1914 - in disregard of the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) of 1912, which granted Libya full autonomy and whereby the Sultan forfeited all his rights to the country. Sayyid Mohammed Idris, then the Sanusi leader, became amir of Libya by Italian decree. He left Libya in 1922 not to return until 1944 - the Sanusi clan took little part in the anti-Italian resistance movement.

Consolidation of the Libyan "Fourth Shore" was effected through a series of Italian atrocities, designed to achieve a "Pax Romana" by 1932. The civilian population was subdued after being herded into concentration camps and subjected to a policy of decimation whereby one in each ten villagers was executed; the resistance movement was defeated only

" By executions (shooting in the back or hanging), by sending men to slow death in the salt pans . . . by blocking the desert wells with concrete or poisoning the water to restrict the movement of tribes . . . the guerillas were being bombed with mustard gas at least by the spring of 1930 . . . guerilla leaders being dropped alive from aeroplanes onto their own villages, or being run over by tanks . . . " (46)

Libya was the only Maghribi country in which the events of the Second World War acted as catalyst in the achievement of national independence. At the end of the war, Britain was in occupation of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and the French held Fezzan. In 1947, Italy signed a peace treaty whereby it renounced all claims to former colonies. In

(46) Wright, Jon Libya, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1969; p. 167.

1949 the United Nations General Assembly rejected Italian claims to Tripolitania on the basis of this treaty and simultaneously refused to recognise British and French claims to the other two territories. Furthermore, it rejected the United States claims to the Wheelus Air Base and Soviet claims to the Mediterranean ports.

The General Assembly, instead, stipulated that a united Libya, composed of the three territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, should be granted independence no later than 1952, with a constitution agreed to by a national constituent assembly.

In Libya itself, a power struggle had evolved : the Sanusi clan had been reinstated in Cyrenaica by the British, Fezzan was under control of Saif Al-Nasir and Tripolitania was in turmoil as ten different parties vied for supremacy. The result was that there was no united opposition to Idris, who had British backing - exacerbated by the fear that if Idris, and by implication the British, were antagonised, the country would be handed back to Italian rule. Idris was elected to a hereditary monarchical rule, heading a federal bi-cameral system of government. The UNO assessment of the newly constituted state was that

" Libya is a hopeless country.
Everywhere you go you just find sand." (47)

Libya experienced its greatest period of internal turmoil and unrest during Idris's eighteen year long reign, partially because its short period of colonialism determined an inward-looking nationalism. Italian

(47) Abugassa, Mohamed The Rising of People's Authority : A New and Unique Libyan Experiment, African Studies Association, 1977; p.1.

settlement had been too short-lived to make any significant impact on societal structure, for the European presence was focused on military conquest and left no legacy of dialectic nationalism or liberal metropolitan government. Furthermore, there was little assimilation of the three provinces - a situation encouraged by Idris - since the overthrow of the Italian colonial rule was effected not by concerted Libyan action, but rather by the military forces of other colonial powers.

Under Idris' rule, only one election was held : the obligatory election of March 1957. Thereafter, all political parties were banned :

" From now on, politics were conducted in a constitutional, semi-clandestine way. This helped to create the conditions for Qaddafi's coup in 1969. " (48)

ii) Geography

Within the framework of regionalism, significance is attached to environmental features such as geography, demography and natural resources, particularly since national capability is conditioned by the perceptions of the decisionmaking elite. (49)

Libya is strategically located on the African coast, bordered in the north by the Mediterranean Sea; in the west by Algeria and Tunisia; in the south by Niger and Chad; and in the east by Egypt and the Sudan. It

(48) Cooley, John K. *Libyan Sandstorm*, New York, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982; p. 39.

(49) Dawisha, op cit; p. 78.

is the fourth largest country in both Africa and the Arab world, and the fifteenth largest in the world, extending over an area of some 1,759,540 square kilometers. (50)

As Libya consists mainly of desert, with broad plains and plateaus and only two per cent arable land, (51) the coastal zones of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica support the agricultural sector. In Tripolitania, eight million hectares of its ten million hectares productive land is designated to pasturage; of the four million hectares productive land in Cyrenaica, three and a half million hectares sustain pasturage. Farming is largely subsistent; supplemented by livestock, field crops and trees. (52) The agriculturally productive Mediterranean enclaves are separated by the Gulf of Sirte, which cleaves the coastline to meet the pre-desert of the Sirte Basin, the cradle of Libyan oil reserves, particularly the Cyrenaican zone, where the slightly distorted, coastward dipping, Crustaneous strata have trapped the reservoirs of crude - sulphur-free - oil. (53)

Geological evidence indicates the existence of other mineral deposits and recent speculation about uranium deposits along the Libya-Chad border, has precipitated conflict in that area. (54)

(50) Middle East Review 1985 (Annual Survey), World of Information, Essex, 1984; p. 151.

(51) First, Ruth Libya : The Elusive Revolution, New York, African Publishing Company, 1974, p. 52.

(52) Knapp, op cit; pp. 174 and 204.

(53) Allan, J. A. Libya : The Experience of Oil, London, Croom Helm, 1981, p. 52.

(54) Ibid.

Despite its territorial size, Libya has the smallest population in North Africa and one of the smallest in Africa. Although the annual rate of growth is estimated at three comma seven per cent, (55) the latest census figures (1982) rest at 3,22 million. (56) In 1969, the UNO estimate of the population density was at one person per square kilometer of the total area. The 1982 figures show a slight increase in population density - to one comma eight per square kilometer. (57)

It has been established that ninety per cent of the population live in less than nineteen per cent of the country, being primarily diffused along the Mediterranean coast. (58) The 1959 oil boom heralded increasing urban migration and the two capital cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, now contain more than one quarter of the entire population. (59)

Libya is distinguishable from traditional Arab societies by its lack of a substantial peasantry and its modest agrarian sector. (60) Statistics indicate that the majority of the labour force is engaged in community and social services (191, 200) and in construction

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- (55) Damachi, Ukandi Godwin Leadership Ideology in Africa : Attitudes Toward Socio-Economic Development, New York, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978; p. 87.
- (56) The Middle East and North Africa 1984 - 85 (Annual Survey), op cit; p. 546.
- (57) Ibid.
- (58) Reich, Bernard "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", In : Long, David E and Reich, Bernard (eds) The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980; p. 359.
- (59) Shembesh, op cit: p. 112.
- (60) First, loc cit

programmes (164,300); and only thirdly in agriculture (147,900). (61)

By 1978, unemployment figures had dropped to 1,910 as opposed to 5,310 in 1972. (62)

Ethnically, the population is composed of Arabs, Arabised Berbers, Tuareg, Tabu, Bedouin, and until 1969, foreign Caucasian minorities. The Arab majority is descended from the two great Arabian Peninsula tribes of Beni Halil and Beni Salim, who settled in Libya during the eleventh century. (63)

The relative absence of the problems of assimilation and threats to the national identity, problems suffered acutely in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, is attributable to the small proportion of aliens among the Libyan population. (64) The elements of national solidarity are reinforced by the consanguinity of Islam - in modernising Arab states, politics has always been characterised by strong patterns of religious influence. (65)

At independence, ninety per cent of the population was illiterate. Under the monarchical regime, education was conducted in American-built schools, by revolutionary Nasserite teachers. Al-Qathafi has enforced compulsory education up to the preparatory level, but not

(61) Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1982, Geneva, International Labour Office, 42nd issue, 1982; p. 226.

(62) Ibid; p. 363.

(63) Shembesh, op cit; p. 102.

(64) Knapp, op cit; p. 178.

(65) Bill and Leiden, op cit; p. 57.

until the late 1970s did all female children attend school. By that time, however, the school building and university expansion programmes had caught up with the potential school population. (66) At present, twenty three per cent of the national budget is allocated to education, (67) with technical skills granted the highest priority. Pending the completion of an oil institute and training centres for skilled and semi-skilled workers, students are sent either to Algeria or the Institut Francais du Petrole in Paris, for technical instruction. (68)

iii) Leadership

Internal political stability being directly proportional to leadership legitimacy, the successful constitutional entrenchment of Colonel Al-Qathafi's "Third Universal Theory" is dependent on the perpetuation of his "personalissimo" and the rectification of the societal inequality the Libyan Republic inherited from the monarchy.

In terms of Weber's classification of legitimate leadership, Al-Qathafi displays the characteristics of a charismatic political leader. Foremost, the Libyan Revolution - considered an ongoing process - is identified with Al-Qathafi, not with the Revolutionary Command Council. Similarly, the implementation of many political, social and economic programmes was accomplished not because of a party-political powerbase, but because of popular devotion to the man, and by extension, to his ideals.

(66) Allan, op cit; pp. 161 and 229.

(67) Knapp, op cit; p. 232.

(68) Ibid; p. 233.

Al-Qathafi's assumption of power in 1969 coincided with a period of great political and societal turbulence. Libya was then governed by a federal monarchical system in which political expression or organisation was forbidden by law; opponents to the regime were either incarcerated or deported - all political parties having been disbanded within the first week of King Idris's reign.

The administration operated on a clientele basis, particularly in the more decentralised provincial and municipal structures; positions of authority and power were filled either with the King's relatives or with Cyrenaican tribal nobles - thus preserving key areas to the Sanusi sphere of influence. The result was that the injection of oil revenue distorted the economy in favour of an elite circle of officials and foreign skilled labourers.

Two abortive coups led by Army officers (1964, 1967) alerted the monarchy to the incipient threat contained in the armed forces, the only disciplined and well-structured organisation in Libya. The "divide-and-rule" maxim was extended to the Army: the majority of officers were elected on the basis of their loyalty to the monarch; the Royal Guard was composed of Cyrenaican units (i.e. from the traditional area of Sanusi influence); the rest of the forces were kept widely dispersed. (69)

The disproportion of the dispersion of the oil revenue and the retention of a social infrastructure which effectively disbarred the

(69) El-Rayyes, Riad and Nahas, Dunia Politics in Uniform: A Study of the Military in the Arab World and Israel, Beirut, Lebanon, An-Nahar Press Service, 1972; p. 64.

impoverished population from raising its standard of living, heightened the collective political consciousness. Before the advent of oil, political activity was confined to competition for favourism, advantage and position; but the existence of an economic alternative more lucrative than subsistence farming created a demand for increased participation in a revised political and economic structure. (70)

Thus the prerequisite for the emergence of a messianic or charismatic leader - widespread societal dislocation - had been an entrenched feature of the Libyan polity at the time of Al-Qathafi's coup.

The establishment and entrenchment of Al- charismatic leadership were facilitated by the cognisance that Islam takes of messianism and personalised leadership. In as much as the theory of human fallibility is often propounded by Western political scientists, the consequence of which is that only a god can give laws to man, (71) Islam has ever rested on the concept of theocracy, yet simultaneously accommodates concepts of mysticism such as za'im and baraka :

" Za'im . . . the individual whose person and actions signify the most basic, the most profound reality : the sociological conditions that surround him within his own country. Personification, significance, authenticity - we are dealing with mystical incarnation, a process that is especially well adapted to Arab societies, in which imagination, mysticism and thirst for

(70) Knapp, op cit; pp. 189 - 191.

(71) Rustow, op cit; p. 159.

symbols play an essential role." (72)

The specific qualities associated with a leader imbued with za'im coincide to a great extent with those of a charismatic leader, viz. incarnation (his speaking for the entire nation in terms of ethnic origin, language and aspirations, i.e. plural possible identification); guidance of the community and thereby forging it into an active force; dispensation of justice with due respect for custom and environmental factors. Such an illuminist leader is more readily accepted in a society which has its origins and guidance rooted in a long tradition of prophets and religious leaders. (73)

The Libyan population adheres to Sunni (Orthodox) Islam, and in addition to the obvious reverence for the Prophet Muhammad and his successors, the preponderance of Libyans are members of an order of Sufis, a cult of saints which purports to imbue its followers with spiritual satisfaction and vitality, purified from the rigidity of the law. (74)

The concept of za'im is underscored by that of baraka - a special blessing of divine origin. It is believed that Allah endowed Muhammad and his descendants and the prophets with baraka. Baraka implies that the leader will be able to develop a system of ideas and ideals

(72) Lacouture, Jean The Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World, London, Martin Secker and Warburg Limited, 1971, p. 11.

(73) Ibid, pp. 65 - 66.

(74) First, op cit; p. 38.

which will consolidate his leadership position, in the fashion of Muhammad, who was able to intertwine the divine and the human, the spiritual and the material, in his ideology :

" Muhammad's charisma derived from his role as Prophet of God and publiciser of the Word of God. As a result, his position as a political leader had an extremely solid ideological foundation . . . All of the Prophet's personal, social and political activities carried a deep spiritual significance . . . Members of the Islamic community, by the very fact that they were Muslims, considered Muhammad to be the temporal, social, political and religious leader of the society . . . He was a charismatic personality in the full sense of that term." (75)

Al-Qathafi, who assumed power under circumstances of deep social turmoil, restored the emphasis on religious observance and Islamic principles of equity and humanism - infusing the community with a sense of righteousness :

" His intense piety was particularly well-suited to his aspiring role as a charismatic leader, for the religious traditions of Muslim North Africa are replete with stories of pious ascetics of humble origins called by God to serve great purposes . . . His religious piety thus placed Qadafi's rise within the context of Libyan traditions and facilitated the development of emotional ties with Qadafi and Libya's intensely religious population. Establishing impeccable religious credentials

further lessened his vulnerability to the attack of the Ulema and enhanced his ability to pursue his modernisation values as the fulfillment of Islamic tenets. " (76)

Al-Qathafi created for the Libyans the image of a messianic leader of immutable strength. The immediate restoration of the Shar'iah and its concomitant ban on alcohol, smoking and gambling, the restoration of the alms tax and the introduction of free medical, educational and welfare institutions, were precursors to significant internal structural changes and diplomatic and political actions with a lasting impact on the Libyan polity.

Internal reforms centred, in the early years of the revolutionary regime, around the creation of a national trade union for aggrieved workers, a political party based on the principle of participation, a students' union; and ambitious agrarian and land reforms coupled with an equitable redistribution of land and wealth.

Within a few months of coming to power, Al-Qathafi established a reputation as an "international giant-killer" (77) - an image forged by his immediate post-Revolution international negotiations and carefully nurtured since. His swift repatriation of the large Italian community and the confiscation of their sizeable agricultural holdings (and the subsequent conversion of their churches into mosques)

(76) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit. p. 66.

(77) Ibid, p. 65.

were perceived to be long-awaited acts of national liberation : anti-Italian sentiments had not yet abated among the Libyan population. (78)

Simultaneously, the American and British military bases were evacuated; the leases for those bases amicably terminated within two months of the Revolution. Given the strategic importance of Libya's oil resources, its relatively small army, threats to the Revolutionary regime from Sanusi loyalists and the perceived omnipotence of the Western powers, the majority of Libyans had been conditioned to believe that attempted expulsion of these Western forces would result only in foreign military occupation of Libya. The seeming ease with which Al-Qathafi arranged the American and British evacuations acquired the proportions of a miracle : securing his reputation as a man divinely endowed with baraka in the tradition of the Prophet. Thus, it follows that

" If emotionally he is tendered responses appropriate to a demigod, cognitatively he is perceived as a demigod or demon. " (79)

Charismatic legitimacy is directly proportional to popular devotion, which in turn is contingent on perceived assimilation : the "plural possible identification". The chief determinant in the analysis of charismatic leadership is perception : what alone is important to Weber is not what the charismatic leader is, but how he is perceived by those he rules. (80) Charisma is founded on the subjects'

(78) Abugassa, op cit; p. 2. See also LaMond Tullis, op cit; pp. 188 -189.

(79) Willner, Ann Ruth, op cit; p. 7.

(80) Weber (Theor. . . Social and Economic Organisation, Parson, ed); loc cit.

psychological identification with the ruler; identification being the emotional involvement of the subjects with the ruler, whereby they perceive their fate to be inextricably linked to that of the ruler. (81)

Thus, in 1969, when the breakdown of the traditional centre of authority had reached the nadir, identification with Al-Qathafi and the Revolutionary Command Council - exemplary Muslim puritans - became a stable point of reference, providing a means of coping with the strains and ambivalence of rapid societal change.

" Qadafi's emergence as the most powerful individual in Libya could trigger off identification patterns among a preponderance of Libya's population, and particularly among the Libyan masses caught in the cataclysmic changes produced by Libya's rampant oil economy. Qadafi could serve as a symbol of national unity and pride. Moreover, as the identification process becomes more fulfilling, the more intensely the Libyan masses identified with Qadafi, the greater personal stake they would have in his survival and in the success of his programmes. His success would become their successes. His failure would threaten their own sense of security and throw their lives into confusion. Because they would have a personal stake in Qadafi and his programmes, Qadafi would acquire an important tool for controlling and mobilising the Libyan masses symbolically. " (82)

The "identification patterns" which Al-Qathafi trigger off, do not

(81) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 62.

(82) Ibid; pp. 62 - 63.

detract from his stature as a man sui generis, rather they compound the aspects of his psychological assimilation and cross-identification. Al-Qathafi was born during the Second World War, into a nomadic Bedouin tribe. His childhood was characterised by environmental mobility, from which stems his concern for fundamental Muslim values and his awareness of agricultural problems and the acute dislocation of the peasantry as a result of the oil industry.

He was first noted for political activism after expulsion from high school in Sebha, where he formed his first political cell (and from which the membership of the Revolutionary Command Council was drawn). (83) The political cell pattern was repeated at his next school in Musrata, and again with the formation of the "Free Officers Movement" at the Military Academy in Benghazi - a conscious process of broadening the revolutionary base of his cadres. (84)

Al-Qathafi's environmental and social mobility had provided him with another quality associated with charismatic leadership : the ability to communicate with the masses on a one-to-one basis and simultaneously to fit into the prevailing norms of his society. Moreover, his personal lifestyle is characterised by simplicity and in terms of Arab leaders in general, is devoid of ostentation :

" He mingles freely with the masses and extols the virtues of rural society. Dropping all official titles, he has chosen to answer only

(83) Ibid; pp. 43 - 39.

(84) Shembesh, op cit; p. 165. See also El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 39.

to the address of 'brother'. He is, in short, very much a creature of the Libyan milieu. He is also a speaker of exceptional skill, quite adept at communicating with the masses in the local idiom. " (85)

Nonetheless, Al-Qathafi, in the reinforcement of his charisma, had to establish the image of himself as the sole leader of the Revolution - a necessary symbol of focused loyalty, without which the Revolutionary programmes would have collapsed into traditional Libyan patterns of provincial and tribal hostility and competition, if not apathy. As a result, Al-Qathafi placed himself above the government, leaving day-to-day operations in the care of the Revolutionary Command Council.

This image was reinforced by the publication, in the period 1976 - 1979, of his Third Universal Theory, the formulation of an Islamist socialism designed not so much to restore a Muslim code of ethics to Libya and ultimately to Arab politics, as primarily to serve a unifying function in the domestic polity.

iv) Ideology

In the classic definitions, ideology as the Weltanschauung of the leadership, must define interpretation of and reaction to the external environment; internally it must enforce solidarity, and evolve a framework of values for the domestic population. (86)

(85) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 67.

(86) See pp. 15 - 16, supra.

Al-Qathafi defined his approach to ideology in terms of "revolution" (Arabic : "thawra"), not of a coup (Arabic : "inqilab"). He believes that a coup is a casual event determined at the will of an elite group, whereas

" A revolution is the opposite, even if the practical application of the idea partakes of the same appearance as a military coup. A revolution is a vital necessity which grows naturally in the consciousness of the society as a whole . . . [producing] . . . a man of revolution, a man of comprehensive and complete change, a man who is as if born again in a new age." (87)

This assertion of a new, "liberated" national identity, forged at first with the expulsion of foreign forces, was compounded by the nationalisation of all foreign holdings in real estate, banking and the oil industry.

However, the national identity was not promoted as an exclusively domestic entity, rather, it was obfuscated by a foreign policy in anticipation of a united Arab world. Whereas Al-Qathafi's earlier foreign policy objective was the initiation of a universal thrust towards Arab unity, an ambition inspired by Nasser, it has since evolved into the desire for an Arab unity under the Libyan banner. This quest for Arab leadership was in part fuelled by Nasser, who seemed to approve of Al-Qathafi as being his most likely successor. (88)

(87) First, op cit; p. 101.

(88) "The Arab World : Oil, Power, Violence" In : Time Magazine, April 2, 1973; p. 24.

Contrary to predictions that the continued failure of Al-Qathafi's mergers with other Arab states would be detrimental to his stature, these incidents have merely provided him with a forum from which to denounce the lack of commitment to the ideals of Arab unity prevalent among the other Arab leaders.

The "problem of Israel" features less prominently in Libyan ideology than was expected of a radicalist Muslim regime :

" This 'solution' of the problem of Israel forms part of Qaddafi's dream of a greater Arab world, in which the Arab states unite in a nationalist and populist campaign. In practice Libya has played less part in the formation of policy towards Israel than almost any other Arab state (except in its support for Palestinians) and, paradoxically, popular reaction towards Israel has been muted, in contrast to the demonstrations which took place under King Idris in 1967. " (89)

Al-Qathafi has an almost volatile relationship with other Arab states. His exclusion from the Arab attack on Israel in 1973 was a deliberate attempt, on the part of Sadat, to isolate Al-Qathafi; indicative of poor Libyan-Egyptian relations. The Libyan attitude towards the Iranian regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini oscillates; Libya has acted as mediator in the North-South Yemeni dispute for fear of Soviet or Chinese interference in Arab affairs. Al-Qathafi had wavered alternately in support and condemnation of ex-President Numeiry of the Sudan - and similarly reversed his opposition to the Moroccan monarchy by

(89) Knapp, op cit; p. 225.

signing a treaty of union, at Hassan's instigation, with Morocco in 1984.

In Europe, he has allied Libya to the extremist Irish Republican Army, he has had close relations with France, none with Britain following the death of a British policewoman during the siege of the Libyan embassy in London in 1984, there are several trade and investment agreements with the former colonial master, Italy. He opposes the policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union (but uses the latter as an arms supplier) - as an Islamist fundamentalist he condemns the ideologies both of capitalism and Marxism.

On the domestic level, he has firmly entrenched his policies of detribalisation and deprovincialisation; local government has been revolutionised by the institution of the practice of popular participation through a system of popular committees, as designed in his Third Universal Theory. (90)

Al-Quthafi recognised the need for a transition period before his Third Universal Theory would become perfectly practicable, and in Rousseauian tradition, regards himself as the interpreter of the general will, guiding the population along the revolutionary course.

" It must be clear to all of us that the period of transition from our Revolution to a State, inspired by the principles of the Revolution, will necessarily last for about ten years. This transformation process shall be conducted by more than one generation and not by an

(90) El Fathaly, Omar I and Chackerian, Richard "Leadership, Institutionalization and Mass Participation in Libya", in : El Fathaly, Omar I, Palmer, Monte and Chackerian, Richard (eds) Political Development and Bureaucracy in Libya, Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1977; pp. 92 - 97.

individual or by a Council, as some of you and some outsiders suppose. This will not be a period of dictatorship, as our enemy thinks it might be. Nobody shall govern the country in the name of the people; this shall be a period in which the moral and material reconstruction of the new society for which the Great First of September Revolution took place, will be finished. " (91)

3. Islamic Revivalism

Islam, after several centuries of political dormancy, has embarked upon a phase of renewed activism through the re-politicisation of the creed. A distinctly universalist ideology, which does not accept separation of government and religion, the impact of the revivalist phenomenon has not been restricted to Arab states or Arabic-speaking Muslims.

" Indeed, the quest for a new Islamic identity is discernable not only in the Arab sphere, but also in Nigeria, Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia. It is manifest not only in countries where Muslims are numerically dominant, but also among Islamic minorities in India, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and the Western countries. Nor is the Islamic revival limited to particular social and economic classes or occupations. " (92)

(91) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 132.

(92) Dekmejian, R. Hriar "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival : Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives" In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 34, Number 1, Winter 1980; p. 2.

The Islamic political revival, in essence a reaction against the imposition of Western normative structures, was in part generated by the prevailing mood of cynicism and political upheaval after the Arab defeat of 1967. The inability of the Arab leadership to fulfill promises of an Israeli defeat caused a comprehensive crisis of legitimacy in those states, (93) precipitated by political dissent and instability resulting from the disruptive impact of the oil boom.

Societal cleavages were reinforced by the maldistribution of oil revenues, the inability of governments to create viable developmental and mobilisation infrastructures, and a concomitant rise in corruption and elite incompetence. Arab regimes were perceived to fail to achieve a balance between modernising programmes and social justice - a contravention of the Islamic principle of communal sharing of basic resources. (94)

Against this milieu of socio-political dislocation, the ignominious Arab defeat in the Six Day War exacerbated sentiments of fear, insecurity and inferiority; simultaneously discrediting leftwing radicalism and challenging the legitimacy of Arab ruling elites and military regimes. Moreover, the Middle Eastern conflict, quintessentially a parochial problem focusing on the existence of the State of Israel, changed substantially in nature with the Israeli

(93) Tibi, Bassam "The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social and Social Development of the Middle East" In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 37, Number 1, Winter 1983; p. 7.

(94) Dekmejian (Anatomy of Islamic Revival, in MEJ, Winter 1980), op cit; pp. 6 - 8.

conquest of Jerusalem and the partial burning of Al-Aqsa in 1969 : an Arab regional conflict was transformed into a universal Islamic concern. (95)

The Arab inability to regain territories occupied by Israel and the humiliation of yet another military defeat in 1973, were ameliorated to a large extent by the successful utilisation of OPEC's considerable bargaining power. An economic breakthrough for Third World Countries, it was perceived to be a Muslim victory over the former colonial powers; a persuasion occasioned by the fact that OPEC membership, barring Venezuela and Ecuador, is drawn from Muslim states, the majority of them Arabic.

The psychological impact of the oil price hikes should not be underestimated. Rooted in the longstanding association of Islam with wealth, the decline of Muslim power in favour of the Europeans - whose contact with Muslim civilisation had always been characterised by enmity and warfare - induced spiritual torment in Muslims : if God favoured the Faithful with worldly success, why was Europe in ascendancy?

" In the 1970s came the oil boom, and suddenly Muslims could stand up to their Christian nemesis. The long slide downward stopped, as some Muslims again enjoyed the wealth and power that was their due as God's community. The oil boom marked a turning point in Muslim consciousness : more + ... ng else, it

(95) Pipes, Daniel " "This World is Political!" The Islamic Revival of the Seventies", In : Orbis, Volume 24, Number 1, Spring 1980; p. 37.

prepared the way for widespread Islamic political activity . . . the wealth and power conferred by oil has Islamic implications, confirming God's favour and heralding the return to a world more correctly ordered. " (96)

Rejection of modernising leadership engendered by a neo-normative Islamic philosophy, led to an exposition of Islam as an assertive revitalising force, the definitive norm against which all elements of life must be measured. (97)

Islamic revivalism, however, is characterised by a multiplicity of interpretative and normative doctrinal diversities, for Islam has no overarching religious hierarchy (such as the Papacy in Catholicism); consequently, there is no single revolutionary or organisational epicentre for the revivalist groups (98) - the exception being the well-structured clergy of Shi'i Islam. This lack of structural and intellectual focus has resulted in environmental or regional fragmentation : each congregation . . . autonomous, acknowledges only the guidance of its own preferred authority, confirming that there is no one person who speaks for all of Islam, or even most of it. There are many people, who speak for many different segments of the religion. (99)

(96) Ibid; pp. 20 - 21.

(97) Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution : The View of Sayyid Qutb", In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 37, Number 1, Winter 1983; p. 15.

(98) Dekmejian (Anatomy of Islamic Revival, in MEJ, Winter 1980). op cit; p. 2.

(99) Parker, Richard B North Africa : Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, New York, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984; p. 87.

Whereas the methodology is widely divergent, the aims and justification of all revivalist or "Islamist" groups converge in a unique rhetoric : a call for the establishment of Islamic statehood in accordance with Shar'iah law, and the random citation of Qur'anic verses to motivate and validate the Islamist revolution :

" Unencumbered by the traditional, historical, linguistic and philological interpretations of the past, they allow specific verses to address each individual and society in their existential moment . . . The mission of Muslims is not to accommodate the guidance of the Qur'an to prevailing or borrowed social systems; rather, the revelation itself provides a revolutionary ideology that to transform society and liberate per from bondage to human systems. " (100)

The revivalists, perceiving themselves as God's selected umma (community), have as ultimate objective the re-establishment of the rule of righteousness. Their claim to Islamic leadership is founded in the many Qur'anic verses which designate the Believers to be the perfect, ascendant community of faith (101) - in a religion which is determined, sustained and fulfilled by God :

" These teachings make Islam an ideology to be sought after. It is no longer in competition with Arab nationalism, socialism or Communism. It stands in judgment of all 'posited' systems . . . They quote them liberally in an effort to instill Islamic consciousness, calling on fellow Muslims to renounce doubt and the feelings of

(100) Haddad, op cit; p. 17.

(101) Viz : Sura 5:3, Sura 3:110, Sura 21:105, Sura 39:74, Sura 7:128.

subservience, irrelevance and inferiority which appear to be the by-products of European colonialism and repeated Israeli victories . . . Their ideology supersedes that of the two contending systems in the world . . . They have their own superior order which has divine validation. " (102)

Shi'i Islam with its structured clerical organisation and greater emphasis on the role of the clergy, could more readily foster politicisation of the religion. Iranian dissidence found radical expression in Khomeini's revolutionary theory of the governance of the jurist. It is a perception of the law and of politico-religious leadership alien to the traditional Iranian Twelver Shi'i Islam, which considers the Imamate a spiritual establishment divorced totally from the political. Khomeini has designed a doctrine which simultaneously relies on a mythical history of the Imam locked in battle with unrighteous governments - his own fabrication - and an interpretation of that history which authorises him to replace the Imam with the jurist. (103)

The lack of perceptible structural focus in Sunni Islam has given rise to the crystallisation of three classes of revivalist activity : governmental Islam, autonomous movements, and neo-orthodox movements. Governmental Islam is denoted by the use of Islamic symbols and and ideology in Muslim states, as justification of governmental

(102) Haddad, op cit; p. 20.

(103) Bayat, Mangol "The Iranian Revolution of 1978 - 1979 : Fundamentalist or Modern" In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 37, Number 1, Winter 1983; pp. 34 - 41.

policies; but without affecting those policies. This type of action was exemplified by Anwar Al-Sadat, who couched all his major policy decisions - from war against Israel to making peace with Israel - in Islamic terms. Autonomist movements are active in countries where Muslim communities are ruled by non-Muslims - their goal is to gain political control and there is little or no consideration of Islamic statehood; viz. the conflict in areas such as Cyprus, Burma, and Thailand. (104)

Neo-orthodox movements, operating in Muslim states, demand the restoration of the Muslim way of life. These groups are characterised by their devotion to the Shar'iah as the law of the land; the belief that Islam should be regarded not as merely a spiritual doctrine - it must permeate all spheres of life; their adherence to the principles of Muslim solidarity - which do not recognise geographic, linguistic or cultural differences - and hostility to non-Muslims which is expressed in a rejection of Western norms, capitalism, communism, liberalism and even democracy. Libya was the first country to experience rule by a neo-orthodox regime, followed by Iran. Turkey, Egypt, some Persian Gulf states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia have recently experienced unprecedented neo-orthodox revivalist activity. (105)

In Libya, the total state control of religion has resulted in the promulgation of an ideology which consists, behind the facade of

(104) Pipes, op cit; pp. 10 - 11 and pp. 15 - 17.

(105) Ibid; pp. 11 - 15.

revivalism, of elements of economic and technological modernisation and

" . . . a large dose of the so-called Arab-Islamic 'desert' traditionalism. " (106)

Revivalists, whether neo-orthodox, governmental or autonomist, in a like manner to the Arab nationalists before them, have successfully been using Islam as a double-edged sword : serving simultaneously as a weapon against Westernisation, a remedy for societal dislocation, and as an instrument guaranteeing them accession to political power. (107)

(106) Singh, K. R. "North Africa", In : Ayoob, Mohammed (ed) The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, London, Croom Helm, 1987; p. 69.

(107) Bezirgan, Najm A. "Islam and Arab Nationalism", In : The Middle East Review, Volume XI, Number 2, Winter 1978 - 1979; p. 43.

Chapter Three : The Third Universal Theory - Panacea and Practice

1. The Green Book, Part One : People's Authority

i) The Evolution of the Libyan One-Party State

Independent Libya has had limited experience of the multi-party state system - only once had an election been contested by more than one political party.

The Libyan constitution, at independence, provided for a federal bi-cameral system operating on a multi-party basis. The first free elections - the UNO's prerequisite before granting the territory independence - were held in March 1952. The traditional tribal following of King Idris won the elections; a result which was declaimed against by the Tripolitanian National Congress Party (TNCP) as manipulation of the vote.

A mass demonstration organised by the TNCP - which drew its party membership from the educated, urbanised classes - degenerated into rioting. The King responded with drastic measures : the TNCP was dissolved, party leaders incarcerated, political opponents of the monarchy deported, and all political parties outlawed. (1)

There followed for the next decade, a process of consolidation and expansion of the monarch's already considerable power. While there

(1) Knapp, op cit; p. 188.

has never existed a limited constitutional monarchy in the Arab world, for the "Palace group" is maintained and supported by the privileged classes, the landowners, traditionalists and tribal leaders; one of the salient features of such a system of government, is that the powers exercised by the Palace tend always to exceed to those granted under the original constitution. (2)

In Libya, political activity centred around the reinforcement of a traditionalist system wherein power and influence were vested and concentrated in geographic origin and family/tribal relationship; the perpetuation of an administration based on clientele relationships; with the King and his advisers consciously displaying a disregard of growing demands for political participation and the institution of a more equitable political and social dispensation. (3)

" To further prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas, severe measures were taken to curb the influx of workers and technicians from other Arab countries, especially Palestinians and Egyptians, the most passionate supporters of of Nasserism and vocal advocates of the revolution and socialism. Non-Libyans already working in Libya were subjected to stringent controls, and many of them, including large numbers of Egyptian teachers, were forced to leave the country under one pretext or another. " (4)

(2) Sharabi, Hisham Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World (The Middle East and North Africa), Princeton, New Jersey, U. Van Nostrand Company Incorporated, 1966; p. 48.

(3) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; pp. 37 - 38.

(4) Sharabi, op cit; p. 74.

The Revolution of 1969, distinguished by Al-Qathafi as an ongoing process, (5) introduced several changes to the traditionalist, tribal-oriented instruments of government, the most significant being the establishment of an Islamist Republic and the restoration of the right of political organisation. It has been a Revolution characterised by three distinct phases of development designed to politically educate and mobilise the population.

During the first phase, dating from 1 September 1969, the date of the Revolution, to 15 April 1973; in a comprehensive administrative purge, traditionalist leadership was replaced with appointed modernising leaders; the tribal system - source of Libya's social stratification - was legislatively immobilised; and a single political organisation, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was created in June 1971. The existence of other political parties was forbidden and made punishable in May 1972. (6)

Huntington postulates that the largest number of one-party states are produced by social revolutions which occur at a particular stage in the process of modernisation and development. The viability of the one-party system appears to depend on the society being in the early or early-to-middle phase of modernisation, when there is a sharp societal bifurcation between more modern and more backward social forces. (7)

(5) El Fathaly and Chackerian, op cit; p. 92.

(6) Knapp, op cit; p. 198.

(7) Huntington, Samuel P "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One Party Systems" In : Huntington, Samuel P and Moore, Clement H (eds) *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society : The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, New York, London, Basic Books Incorporated Publishers, 1970; p. 12.

Revolutionary one-party systems are characterised by a social dynamism, autocratic and charismatic leadership, disciplined party, highly developed ideology, and stress on propaganda and mass mobilisation. In one-party systems where political authority is vested in a single, autocratic leader, the party, system and man tend to be identified with each other. The party would be perceived as the organisational instrument of the leader; whereas the leader would be perceived as the charismatic embodiment of the party. (8)

The salient feature is identified as the ideology, which tends to be the product of a struggle and/or violence. It singles out a chosen people or constituency, a specific enemy, and an ultimate victory of the chosen constituency after a necessary conflict between these forces. Moreover, in its origins, the one-party system must be intensely anti-capitalist, anti-traditionalist, anti-imperialist, anti-Semitic or anti-something. (9)

Monarchical Libya, at the time of the Revolution, was experiencing deep social turmoil determined by the nascent modernisation process. With a government unable to either control or direct this process, the military class was the only with the education, discipline, resources and inclination to affect a social revolution. Moreover, there had been a long precedent for military coups in the Middle East :

" . . . there has been a growing tendency to accept the theory that military coups are 'the natural course' in contemporary Arab

(8) Ibid; p. 25.

(9) Ibid; p. 13.

history . . . Rule by army officers is regarded as a historic necessity. Nasser also formulated the programmatic basis of the theory which assigned army officers the historic role of the revolutionary avant-garde in the Arab world. " (10)

Whereas the Libyan Free Officers' *modus operandi* initially signalled conformity to this supposition, particularly with the establishment of a one-party state and the strong emphasis on Arab nationalism, the concomitant focus on Islamism would negate the hypothesis of a "natural course" of Nasserist military dictatorship in Libya. In essence, RCC ideology was composed of elements of Nasserism, Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism and Islamic fundamentalism, generated and sustained by a strong personality cult :

" Gadafi, the new Nasser, believed like his mentor that the army would both make revolution and lead it. The Free Officer movement that planned revolution in Libya and the Revolutionary Command Council that has ruled the country since the coup were directly modelled on Egyptian precedents. Like Nasser, Gadafi was determined to develop and transform his country and regenerate and unite the Arab world. But Gadafi's adherence to Islamic fundamentalism and his turning of Libya into a theocracy was a challenge to Nasser's example of reform through a secularised political state. Gadafi stated : 'There

(10) Ba'eri, Eliezer Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Pall Mall, Praeger, 1970; p. 4.

is no contradiction between religious consciousness and political decisions'. " (11)

Although accorded with mass approval and political legitimacy, the RCC was unable to raise the level of political consciousness. Active participation in the ASU seemed to be successful only in areas with established traditions of political organisation or with a history of trade union activity. Furthermore, it suffered from a dearth both of cadres (it was not a spontaneous revolutionary movement, rather, it was instituted by government decree, partially since in anticipation of the merger with Egypt, the RCC wished to reduce the incompatibility of their respective political structures) and of rank-and-file membership (surveys indicated the inculcation by the monarchy of an attitude that political involvement ought to be avoided, at best left in the hands of the "experts"). (12)

Such prevalence of political apathy, coupled with the evident long-term split between Egypt and Libya, precipitated the declaration of a Popular Revolution in April 1973. The abrogation of many laws, the full transfer of power and authority to the RCC and the debilitation of the last vestiges of public opposition, signalled as much the inauguration of the second phase of transformation as the rejection of Egypt's Nasserist-Arabism and the destruction of any domestic or ideological compatibility which might have realigned the course of the two states.

(11) Mazrui, Ali A and Tidy, Michael Nationalism and New States In Africa From About 1935 to the Present, London, Heineman Educational Books Limited, 1984; pp. 54 - 55.

(12) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 98.

The Popular Revolution introduced a system of popular committees elected directly by the people in each local administrative zone; led to the abolition of local administrative structures; and was a direct precursor to the central theme of Al-Qathafi's Third Universal Theory : the concept of democratic self-government by means of direct participation as opposed to political representation. In January 1976, Part One of Al-Qathafi's "Green Book" was published,

" . . . an amplification of his political ideas, including the familiar criticism of political parties and parliamentary assemblies and the necessity for popular participation in government. " (13)

In the three-part treatise of the Third Universal Theory, which Al-Qathafi claims is based on Shar'iah, the nature of political, economic and social structures is examined. In holistic, fundamentalist character, he maintains that no part of life can be disconnected from the Revolution and the Islamic order :

" But this combination of the general and the particular, of political and moral is the distinctive feature of all the manifestos of those modern fundamentalists who regard the creation of an Islamic state within the immediate capability of Muslims. " (14)

ii) The Third Universal Theory, Part One : The Solution of the Problem of Democracy : The Authority of the People

Unification and politicisation of the populace had by the late 1970s

(13) Knapp, op cit; p. 200.

(14) Enayat, Hamid Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982; p. 107.

become a continuum which demanded of the leadership formalised expression of intent and objective. Thus followed, in a series of three slim volumes, Colonel Mu'ammarr Al-Qathafi's "Green Book" - the ideologically design of a structure of political and economic power-sharing. Devoid of any reference to Islam other than in the oblique allusion in the title, (15) it purports to offer the "Third Universal Theory", a middle ground between the two contending theories of capitalism and communism.

Dichotomous, the Green Book would appear, superficially, to reconcile the pragmatic with the Islamist ideal. Political expedience, however, prevails over religious commitment. Primarily, Al-Qathafi repudiates the fundamental character of the Islamic state as a theocracy: he imbues the citizen with supreme legislative, punitive and appellate authority. Yet he pleads for the retention of religion as the political constitution of the state; but it would be a religion free from any attendant body of clergy. Their functions would be obviated by the transfer of all authority to each responsible citizen. Participatory government by the people, moreover, must be conducted under the guardianship of a single "strong" leader.

The inherent defect which renders contemporary instruments of governing dictatorial, contends the Green Book, Part One, is the antecedence of political administration with a power struggle. A particular governing body might triumph, but the people are defeated for the object of democracy, people's rule, is thwarted.

(15) Green is the colour traditionally associated with Islam.

Particularly acute are the power struggles which result in victory either by a fifty one per cent poll of the vote; or the situation whereby one candidate, opposed by several others, is elected. In the first instance, forty nine per cent of the electorate is subjugated to rule by an administration it did not choose. In the latter instance, the winner might collect less votes than the combined poll of the other candidates. (16)

Avowing the immutable worth of democracy as the desired system of state, Al-Qathafi alleges that this concept has been "falsified" in all states other than the Libyan Jamahiriya. Foremost in culpa ranks the Western prototype of pluralist democracy.

" In its wider connotation, this term implies the people's unrestricted right to legislate by a majority vote on all matters of public concern. Thus the 'will of the people' is set forth . . . as something that is free of all external limitations, sovereign unto itself and responsible only to itself. " (17)

In Al-Qathafi's analysis, the system of parliamentary representation is devoid of any of these features. He claims that it constitutes a legal barrier between the people and their exercise of authority. Representation does not safeguard the rights of the people, but usurps their sovereignty: whether representatives are elected from political parties or selected by appointment. This system isolates and ultimately

(16) Al-Qathafi, Muammar: The Green Book, Volumes One - Three, Tripoli, Libya, The Public Establishment for Publishing, Advertising and Distribution, Undated; pp. 5 - 6.

(17) Asad, Muhammad: The Principles of State and Government in Islam, Gibraltar, Dar Al-Andalus Limited, 1980; p. 19.

alienates the representative from his constituents. Rather than act for them, he acts ⁱⁿstead of them. Since this mode of government is maintained and reinforced by skillful administration of propaganda, parliamentary democracy is denounced as a demagogic system which manipulates and exploits the people; specifically when votes may be falsified or bought. The poor are disqualified, by nature, from competing - it is the wealthy, and always the wealthy - who participate, select and win. (18)

The principle of representation is antiquated and obsolete, deriving as it does - according to the Green Book - from the desire of the unsophisticated masses of a feudal era to be represented before their kings, sultans and conquerors. Colonel Al-Qathafi appears, herewith, to be at odds with the concepts of the viceregency and the Bay'ah (the contract of appointment or the Caliph) as contained in the Qur'an and Hadith. An Islamic state governed in accordance with the Shar'iah should vest supreme political authority in a viceregent - typified in the early Islamic state by the Caliphate - who will be assisted in matters of government by an Advisory Council elected or appointed by the people to represent their interests. (19) In fact, there is a strong injunction to all believers to take an oath of fealty to the leader and the Qur'an cautions that obedience to "those in authority from among you" is second only to obedience to God and His Prophet Muhammad. (20) The viceregent does not only represent God and His

(18) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 7 - 10.

(19) Maudoodi, Sayyed Abul Ala Political Theory of Islam, Johannesburg, South Africa, Undated; p. 38.

(20) Gaber, Mohammed H.M. The Early Islamic State with Specific Reference to the Evolution of the Principles of Islamic International Law, 632 - 750 A.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1962; p. 58.

will on earth, he has to represent the people and strive to fulfill their aspirations.

Whereas Montesquieu believed that all power is dangerous and should therefore not only be circumscribed, but subject to a system of checks and balances which would guarantee civil and personal liberties, Al-Qathafi considers the concept of constitutional checks and balances a mockery of the rights of the people. His interpretation of such a precautionary system rests on the assumption that the legal check is on the ruling party and that the power to check and balance is vested in the parliamentary body. Since the parliamentary body is composed in the majority of the members of the ruling party, it signifies to him a non-sequitur whereby the ruling party is subjected to checks and balances by its own members. (21)

Political parties in similar manner as parliaments are deemed to abort democracy and to deny the people their right to political expression : parties consist of peer or pressure groups which vie for political supremacy. Once that power has been achieved, authoritarian rule ensues for one interest group imposes its will and doctrine on other diverse segments of society, in the way that tribal rivalry of old would result in one tribal group superimposing its will over another. (22) This particular stance of Al-Qathafi echoes the exhortations of "pidgin Marxism" that democracy as practiced in the West is

(21) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 15.

(22) Ibid; pp. 11 - 16.

nothing but a particularly refined form of repression, indeed, totalitarianism in disguise. (23)

The inherent antagonism in the pursuit of political party supremacy is considered a destructive practice. In the campaign to gain votes, each party will attempt to discredit the other, its policies and achievements. Consequently, social and economic programmes suffer at the price of allowing unrestrained political activity. (24) The Libyan leader displays disregard for the *modus operandi* of political parties in a pluralist system : that each political aggregation functions as a legitimate channel for articulation of the political aspirations and demands of specific societal strata. In a multiparty system, the range of interests represented by each party will be narrow, each party representing distinct concerns; whereas in a two-party system - or a system such as in the USA, with two parties dominant in the political spectrum - the interests represented are of a wider scope, each party combining and compromising principles, aspirations and interests in such a manner as to promote the smooth functioning of the pluralist system as a whole. (25) Moreover, the very strength of the pluralist democratic system lies in the ability of the people to elect or dismiss representatives, and in the power of political persuasion and debate to safeguard those principles :

" Democracy is based on uncertainty. If the people believe the leadership is in error, they can replace them with other leaders. The

(23) Revel, Jean-Francois The Totalitarian Temptation, Translated by Haggood, David, Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company Incorporated, 1977; p. 124.

(24) Al-Qathafi, *op cit*; p. 13.

(25) Armstrong, John A. Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union : An Introduction, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1974; p. 52.

opinion of the majority determines the society's direction because no one is totally committed to belief in an unarguable Verity. Thus the ability to convince others is the essential talent of political man in democracy. " (26)

By contrast, Lenin regarded the party not as an overarching institution of interest aggregation, but as a force with which to transform - not mediate - the interests and political culture of society. (27) It may not have been an overt ideological determinant with the RCC, but the institution of the early Libyan one-party state, particularly the establishment of the ASU, would conform to this principle.

The Marxist notion of the class struggle is spurned for reasons corresponding to the rejection of parliamentary assemblies and political parties - however, not without a distinguishing qualification. Class is likened to tribe; and class and tribal coalitions are superior to parties and assemblies since each person belongs either to a class or tribe. This preference is presumably dictated by the inference that class and tribal affiliation are predestined not by choice, whereas political party association is predetermined by conscious choice and level of political sophistication.

Al-Qathafi's rejection of the doctrine of the class struggle stems from Islamic injunctions against considerations of social and economic disparity, (28) but he rejects, simultaneously, the Marxist notion

(26) Revel, op cit; p. 39.

(27) Armstrong, op cit; p. 53.

(28) Enayat, op cit; p. 127.

of a classless society, contained in some measure in Islam :

" Nationalism in all its forms and disguises runs counter to the fundamental Islamic principle of the equality of all men and must, therefore, be emphatically ruled out as a possible basis of Muslim unity. According to Qur'an and Sunnah, that unity must be of an ideological nature, transcending all considerations of race and origin : a brotherhood of people bound together by nothing but their consciousness of a common faith and a common moral outlook. " (29)

Al-Qathafi postulates that any class which defeats a system and thereafter assumes power, in time will assume the very characteristics and nature of the system it replaced. The liquidation of the ruling classes brings to power the working class, which becomes heir to the structural framework of society. Part of that legacy is the gradual transformation of the working class, now supreme, into resemblance of the very ruling class it has ousted. Indeed, a cyclical evolution results, in which new classes are constantly in formation, until such time as a new working class emerges, only to engage itself in the timeless struggle for superiority. (30)

There is no scrutiny of Marx's model of societal transformation in which the thesis (ruling class) and the antithesis (opposing class, the proletariat) clash to produce the synthesis (a new economic,

(29) Asad, op cit; p. 32.

(30) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 19 - 21.

political and social order). (31) Instead, he presents an Orwellian perception of a new class struggle, thereby acknowledging the premise of a clashing thesis and antithesis; but ignoring the result, the synthesis. Cooley has drawn a parallel between the slogans contained in the Green Book and those of George Orwell's futuristic novel "1984" but he does not extend the analogy to Al-Qathafi's perception of the class struggle and Orwell's "Animal Farm". The elements of similarity are clearly discernable, though. (32)

Moreover, in his disregard for the emergence of the synthesis, Al-Qathafi does not heed the possibility of a new structure evolving from cross-class cooperation which could resemble "true" democracy - albeit in the Soviet doctrine a democracy lacking in pluralism :

" In Soviet political literature a national democracy is defined as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of semi-proletarian and non-proletarian working masses and petty bourgeois strata all anxious to see independent progressive development. " (33)

In his equation of the class struggle with parliamentary and pluralist systems, Al-Qathafi neglects to examine Lenin's premise of the party being the vanguard of the working class, which will educate and liberate the people. (34) This vanguard would consist of the most

(31) Dougherty, James E and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippcott Company, 1971; p. 174.

(32) Cf. Cooley, op cit; p. 139.

(33) Ilyanovsky, R. Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974; p. 77.

(34) Burns, Edward McNall Ideas in Conflict : The Political Theories of the Contemporary World, New York, W.W. Norton and Company Incorporated, 1960; p. 159.

class-conscious, devoted and self-sacrificing members of the proletariat, operating on the basis of "democratic centralism" by implementing policies only after wide-ranging consultation, discussion and debate ⁽³⁵⁾ : an approximation of the system that is proposed in the Green Book.

The final stage in the implementation of total dictatorship, according to Al-Qathafi, is the use of plebiscites. These are fraudulent procedures : the people are denied the right even of representation, having to their avail only two words ("yes" or "no"). It is at this point in the discussion that he offers his solution :

" The Green Book announces to the people the happy discovery of the way to direct democracy, in a practical form . . . since this Third Universal Theory provides us with a realistic experiment in direct democracy, the problem of democracy in the world is finally solved. All that the masses need do now is struggle to put an end to all forms of dictatorial rule in the world today, to all forms of what is falsely called democracy . . . " ⁽³⁶⁾

In terms of Al-Qathafi's theory of "people's authority", the only manner in which popular democracy may be achieved, would be through the formation of popular congresses and people's committees. The system operates horizontally with basic popular congresses, popular congresses,

(35) Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op cit; p. 180.

(36) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 26.

administrative people's committees; and in a pyramidal hierarchy of municipality, zone and national level. The highest authority, at national level, is the General People's Congress.

All citizens are members of the Basic Popular Congresses, from which a leadership committee, the secretariat, is elected for each zone. This secretariat constitutes the Popular Congress and from within its ranks the Administrative People's Committee is selected, its function to replace traditional government administration. The People's Committees are responsible to the Basic Popular Congresses, which determine policy and supervise the execution thereof. This system is designed to replace the traditional definition of democracy as the supervision of government by the people, with a new maxim: "Democracy is the supervision of the people by the people". (37)

It is the duty of certain citizens to organise themselves, according to their professional capacity, in trade unions or workers' syndicates, in addition to their membership of Basic Popular Congresses.

The secretaries of Popular Congresses, People's Committees, syndicates and trade unions meet annually or periodically in the General People's Congress. Whatever policies or programmes are discussed at the General People's Congress, are referred back to the Basic Popular Congresses for debate and approval before they are implemented in executive fashion by the Basic Popular Congresses. (38)

(37) Ibid; p. 27.

(38) Ibid; p. 28.

Al-Qathafi's vision of a politically active society in which all citizens are considered equal, and in which political participation is the norm rather than the exception, may in part have been derived from certain Islamic precepts about government. First, political rights may only be extended to members of the Ummah, the community of the faithful (i.e. Muslims). Secondly, the Qur'an has no legal terminology for man as a political "citizen". This is the basis of the concept of equality of all men, for the only criterion of superiority or inferiority can be taqwā, piety - i.e. the heightened level of fear of God that is found in some members of the community. Thirdly, there are the principles of shūrā (consultation) and ijmā (consensus). (39) The shūrā and ijmā were designed to extend the rule of law to all people, and thus to safeguard just and equitable government, conforming to the particular needs of the community. (40)

The central dichotomy in the theory of the "people's authority" is presented by Al-Qathafi's Islamist approach to the law. Constitutions and constitutional legislation are branded totalitarian measures designed to alienate man from his innate sense of morality and his time-honoured practices :

" The natural law of any society is either tradition (custom) or religion. Any other attempt to draft law for any society, outside these two sources, is invalid and illogical." (41)

(39) Enayat, op cit; pp. 127 - 129.

(40) Allan, op cit: p. 263.

(41) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 29.

This is, to some extent, a true reflection of Muslim jurisprudence. Until the advent of the Prophet Muhammad, societal and behavioural patterns were structured around the sunna (common law) of each tribal or urbanised area. Within the framework of the sunna, political, economic and social ethics evolved, through the passage of time assuming the force of law. Islam, under the guidance of the Prophet Muhammad, gradually superceded many customary practices, although never abrogating the sunna in toto. (42)

Al-Qathafi's rejection of "man-made" law is rooted in the Islamic notion of the state as the theocratic organisation of society. In this form of government, God's will as expressed in the Qur'an, is the source of law and societal organisation. Government functions on a representative basis : the state is led by a viceregent who executes the will of God on earth. In this "universal divine nomocracy", it is the law of God which governs, rather than God Himself. Thus it follows that there can be no distinction between secular and religious functions :

" The Islamic nomocracy, however, in contrast to the Respublica Christiana, presented, in its legal theory at least, a real unity between church and state . . . The caliph, as head of Islam, stood in some respects for both pope and emperor, whose chief functions were the universalisation of Islam and the enforcement of the divine law. " (43)

(42) Khadduri, Majid War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956; pp. 20 - 22.

(43) Ibid; p. 18.

There is no attempt, on Al-Qathafi's part, to reconcile this Islamist approach to law with the mainstay of his theory, the absolute sovereignty of the people. This contradiction is extended to the questions of the supervision of the conduct of the society - traditionally by the religious establishment - and the readjustment of society in case of deviance from its law, which traditionally falls within the ambit of the court, or in Islamist tradition, the religious courts.

He premises that in a democratic society no one group could claim the right to supervise the conduct of the members of that society : if democracy is the responsibility of all members of society, it should follow that supervision is the responsibility of all members of society. Self-supervision will result once society has been restructured through Basic People's Congresses and People's Committees. Deviance will similarly be corrected by these congresses and committees. (44) Islamic courts, the Islamic penal system and the role of the Ulema are carefully omitted from this discussion - a precursor, perhaps, of the later confrontation and conflict with the religious establishment.

" In Qadhafi's system, if there is a deviation from the laws of society, such deviation would be the deviation of the whole and is then corrected by the involvement of the whole, which is the democratic procedure and, since no group exists outside the system, the deviations are corrected from within and not from without . . .

(44) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 34 - 36.

Qadhafi seems to consider this the greatest asset of his Doctrine. " (45)

The concept of self-supervision proposed in the Green Book, approximates the premise of the duty of the Muslim believer to conform with Qur'anic law and the jurisprudential concept of the state deemed to exist for the purpose of enforcing the divine law. Should the state fail to fulfill this duty, the believer, however, remains under the obligation to observe the law.

Colonel Al-Qadhafi regards the right of freedom of expression with ambivalence. It is the natural right of each person, including corporate persons, but must be circumscribed within the context of the freedom of the press. He does not believe that any newspaper could represent the views of the public at large; it represents only the opinion of its owners and editors. Similarly, professional and trade journals only represent the particular views of specific peer or pressure groups. The "democratic press", therefore, ought to be run by Popular Committees, which are representative of cross-cutting social strata. (46)

Islam regards the right of freedom of expression as one of the fundamental rights of man and there is no suggestion that the media should be state or centrally controlled. The only Islamic curtailment of the freedom of the press is in the warning that caution must be

(45) Habiby, Raymond "Qadhafi's Thoughts on True Democracy", In : The Middle East Review, Volume X, Number 4, Summer 1978.

(46) Al-Qadhafi, op cit; pp. 37 - 39.

exhibited not to offend against common decency and not to incite against Islamic law or an Islamic government. (47) It is, however, a distinct feature of neo-orthodox revivalists that there is central control of the media and that they suffuse the media with Islamic themes in stories, music and news broadcasts. (48)

Libya, at the time of the Revolution, had only one broadcasting service, which operated for four hours a day. The service was administered and controlled by the government, on a very restrictive budget. Al-Qathafi, whereas continuing the practice of a state-controlled broadcasting service, increased its transmission times and erected several new transmitters which are capable not only of reaching the remote areas of Libya, but the entire Arab world. Three external services have been created the "Voice of the Arab World" which is targeted at the Middle East in general, the "Voice of Friendship and Solidarity" which is situated on Malta, with the ostensible aim of improving and widening the existing ties between these two countries, but which really aims at reaching Arab migrant workers and students all over Europe, and the militant "Voice of the Arab Nation". The latter was created in December 1973 to serve as counterpart to the Egyptian "Voice of the Arabs". Aimed in particular at the Arabs living in "Palestine", its content is highly politicised and strongly worded;

" We have made a conscious decision to hit them
[Other Arabs] hard. The music and the opening
lines are very harsh. We feel that the first 90
seconds are crucial. We want to shock other Arabs

(47) Asad, op cit; p. 83.

(48) Pipes, op cit; p. 14.

out of their felt state of inadequacy - to give them pride in being Arabs. And to do this, we feel that we have to shock them. " (49)

Al-Qathafi had decided from the outset that Libyan broadcasting (television had been introduced in Libya only in 1968, the year preceding the Revolution) would not only forge a coherent nation in Libya, but would compound the impact of the RCC's Arabism throughout the region. Internally, the broadcasting service, now run by a People's Committee, has been charged with the protection of the Revolution and the upholding of its principles. There are five internal services; one directed at the younger audiences, an all-news service, an educational service with heavy emphasis on Arab culture and heritage, an entirely religious service and the main service, which consists of elements of all four the others. Throughout, the government's policy is that broadcasting must serve the function of promulgating nationalism and patriotism among the Libyan population. (50)

The result of state-controlled media, however, is that freedom of expression is substituted with an artificial sense of national unity and consensus, bordering on the xenophobic :

" Censorship and propaganda collaborate to put forth each day a paranoid fictional vision of the nation and the world, so that little or nothing penetrates the society that is unfavourable to those in power or that fails

(49) Gartley, John "Broadcasting in Libya" In : Middle East Review, Volume XII, Number 4, Summer 1980; p. 38.

(50) Ibid; p. 35.

to do homage to the accuracy of their views
and the fruitfulness of their policies. " (51)

At the end of Part One of the Green Book, Al-Qathafi presents his second great anomaly. He draws a distinction between his Theory and its implementation in practice. Theoretically, he claims to have solved the problem of government and the Third Universal Theory contains not only the parameters within which the reconstruction of society on a truly democratic basis may take place, but also an exposition of the economic and socio-ethical issues related to the government process. This doctrine, however, appears to him to remain esoteric hypothesis, for he concludes that realistically, it is the strong who always rule, i.e. the stronger element in society. "All always gain superiority" (52)

The inference has been drawn that this is not merely a justification for a "democratic" society to have a strong - perhaps charismatic - leader, but a justification by Al-Qathafi of his own personalised leadership of the reconstructed Libyan state. (53) Conversely, it could be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the truth lies in the fact that

" . . . all efforts to synthesise Islam and
democracy are bound to founder on the
bedrock of that body of eternal and unchangeable

(51) Revel, op cit; p. 248.

(52) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 40.

(53) Newsweek, January 20, 1986; p. 9.

doctrines which form the quintessence of every religion. Those Muslim thinkers who face this issue boldly . . . come up with the open admission that Islam and democracy are irreconcilable. " (54)

iii) People's Authority : The Jamahiriya Experiment

On March 2, 1977, the third phase of the Libyan Revolution commenced with the establishment of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the "peopledom" of the Libyan republic. (55) This third phase has been characterised by the RCC's demand that the Libyans become revolutionary citizens by becoming fully integrated in the political system, and by Al-Qathafi's expectation that this goal could be achieved by formulating an official revolutionary dogma, contained in the Third Universal Theory.

In perpetuation of the system founded with the ASU, the political structure, now in implementation of the Green Book, remained three-tiered. It operates on a zone level, a municipality level and the national level.

The highest authority in the Jamahiriya, the General People's Congress, meets on an annual basis. It has no legislative powers - only the people collectively are deemed to have the power to legislate. Rather, it has to coordinate the decisions and recommendations of the Basic People's Congresses.

(54) Enayat, op cit; p. 135.

(55) Parker, op cit; p. 74.

The General People's Congress has proved itself to be an excellent sounding board for Al-Qathafi and the RCC, where the success or otherwise of their revolutionary programmes can be effectively measured by the response and comment from the people's representatives.

" At the same time, it has proved an effective channel through which the national leadership can communicate its ideas and objectives to the people. In this sense, while Qaddafi and the members of the RCC have remained the primary decisionmakers, the current political system has produced a level of representation hitherto unknown in Libya. " (56)

The General People's Congress has the power to veto recommendations suggested by any member, including Al-Qathafi. In a rare occasion of disagreement with him, the General People's Congress in 1984 rejected four proposals he had made. These included giving women the right to divorce; compulsory military training for women; closing all elementary schools; and reducing the number of municipalities to equal the number of military districts in the country. A month later, however, Al-Qathafi convinced the General People's Congress to enforce compulsory military training for women. (57)

The General Popular Committee (the equivalent of a cabinet) is elected by a show of hands by the members of the General People's Congress. This is the principal administrative government organ : it heads and supervises the state bureaucracy and the popular committees at branch level.

(56) St. John, Ronald Bruce "Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies", In : Current History, Volume 80, Number 470, December 1981; p. 434.

(57) Ritchie, Michael "Libya" In : Middle East Review (Annual Survey) 1985, Essex, World of Information, 1984; p. 153.

Ideological disparities aside, it has become obvious that

" If one were to allow an analogy between the Libyan institutions and those of the Soviet Union, the general popular committee would correspond to the Soviet cabinet, and the general secretariat would correspond to parallel positions designed to maintain and strengthen the position of the party. The permanent secretariat would be the equivalent of the Politburo. The analogy is only approximate, however, for the Libyan system combines many features of the parliamentary and communist systems as well as making a variety of unique innovations. " (58)

One such significant innovation, a departure even from the system envisaged in the Green Book, was the establishment of "revolutionary committees" by zealous activists. Their activities were subsequently sanctioned and are now encouraged by Al-Qathafi. They were initially to operate informally within the Basic People's Congresses and unions; their mission to counteract the apathy and predominantly parochial focus of the Basic People's Congresses. The Popular Committees were gradually divested of their power and real decisionmaking and supervisory powers were transferred, legislatively, to the revolutionary committees in 1979.

Revolutionary committee members are appointed directly by the central authority and are perceived as the dynamic nucleus in the process of cadre building. (59) They are, inter alia, responsible for influencing

(58) El Fathaly and Palmer, op cit; p. 142.

(59) Africa, Number 167, July 1985; p. 45.

decisionmaking in all organisations considered to be of political importance, such as universities. (60)

The relative ease - and speed - with which the Third Universal Theory has been implemented, has been attributed to diverse factors : to the existence of a small, relatively homogeneous population whose political and economic demands have been satisfactorily met; to the fact that the Green Book's fundamental strength appears to lie in its simplicity; (61) and to the fact that Al-Qathafi, despite his resignation from official politics in 1977 to assume the role of Philosopher of the Revolution, does not appear to have relinquished any significant amount of control of the political process :

" Undoubtedly Libya's present constitutional arrangements are superior to those of the feudal regime of King Id. is, but it is not true that every citizen can now influence government policy . . . all elected representatives must follow the guidelines of the thoughts of the 'Teacher-leader' . . . There is a considerable Gadafi personality cult, based on his charisma, humour and incorruptibility . . . but resting primarily on his unarguable achievements in domestic politics. " (62)

2. The Green Book, Part Two : Socialism

1) Libya and Oil : Rags to Riches

At independence, Libya was distinguished by its lack of an economic

(60) Allan, op cit; p. 300.

(61) Africa, Number 167, loc cit.

(62) Mazrui and Tidy, op cit; p. 267.

infrastructure, and caricatured for its poverty :

" The country was extremely poor . . . the average Libyan was ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed. (The favourite men's outer garment was a British army surplus overcoat, and foreign visitors used to wonder what would happen when the stock was exhausted.) There was no immediate prospect that this situation would change dramatically. The best that could be hoped for was a gradual evolution to a somewhat less desperate level of poverty. " (63)

Prospects for economic development were constrained by not merely the lack of an educated and skilled manpower, but quintessentially by geography. The country consists largely of desert, with few scattered settlements on the coastal strip and in oases, Tripolitania is dominated by its mountain range - factors limiting economic development, not only because of the debilitating costs of the infrastructure needed to link such remote areas, but also because the benefits of economics of scale would be denied to small, isolated enterprises. (64)

Economic activity in the decade following independence remained concentrated in subsistence agriculture. Prime arable land, forcibly taken from local farmers by the Italian colonial administration, was retained by the foreign settlers. The monarchy made no significant attempt to redress the matter. In fact, in a country with no other natural resources, agricultural expansion was given no official

(63) Parker, op cit; p. 77.

(64) Mabro, Robert "The Economy" In : Knapp, Wilfred North West Africa : A Political and Economic Survey, London, Oxford University Press, 1977; p. 201.

priority. What programmes were developed, were at random, isolated and non-extensive.

Hydrogeological constraints compounded the deterrent factor - ninety per cent of Libya has no rainfall, the coastal regions suffer seasonal rainfall deficiency and groundwater resources were either inaccessible or inadequate. (65) Furthermore, the economy had no industrial base with which to generate employment. All industry, until the oil era, was confined to agriculturally related production (e.g. date packing, folk textile), with the notable exception of the construction sector, which survived on the manufacture of building materials. The Libyan economy survived until the discovery of oil, through foreign assistance. (66)

Dramatic change was heralded, towards the end of this first phase of economic development, with enactment of the First Petroleum Law in June 1955. The Law provided for the distribution of concessions, not to a single oil company as was standard practice, but to attract as much competition as possible : an economic blueprint for rapid exploration and development. Not only did the granting of so many reconnaissance permits permanently alter the course of domestic history - it had extensive international repercussions.

This Law served to terminate the monopoly by the "Seven Sisters", the major oil companies, which virtually controlled oil production outside of the United States and the Communist Bloc. The Libyan mode of

(65) Allan, op cit; pp. 27 - 31.

(66) Ibid; p. 76.

concession granting introduced into the oil market the "Independents", companies which did not control sources of crude petroleum outside of the Middle East. The risk factor, exposed only twenty years later, was that these companies were non-diversified, consequently heavily dependent on Libyan oil and extremely vulnerable to Libyan pressure :

" Their existence helped to some extent - though it did not determine or provide an explanation for - the Libyan success in obtaining higher taxes in 1970, the first in a series of significant events which changed the rules of the oil game in favour of OPEC. " (67)

The exploration concessions granted by the end of 1958 covered fifty five per cent of the Libyan territory. In June 1958, the first major discovery was made, the first cargo of petroleum exports leaving Libya in 1961; thus making it the country in which there was the most rapid exploration, development and production of petroleum resources.

By 1958, the government introduced curtailments to its oil policy, now recognised to be too generous. The most significant was the undertaking to spend a fixed minimum amount on exploration over a specified period of time - a principle now enjoying universal application by petroleum producing countries.

Libya joined OPEC in 1962, entering the second phase of its economic evolution. Already a major oil exporter by 1967, the Middle East war boosted its status : by 1969, Libya provided twenty five per cent of

(67) Mabro, op cit; p. 210.

Europe's oil. The closure of the Suez Canal, precipitating a tanker shortage, combined with the elimination of an emergent rival, Nigeria, by its civil war; and the increasing demand for Libyan crude, which is sulphur-free, secured its advantageous position.

Internally, however, the economic structure was not significantly affected. A characteristic of petroleum-based economic development is that sudden large injections of revenue do not improve domestic conditions. Economic growth is not merely restrained by the tendency to retain revenue in elite circles; increased economic activity would neither be the manifestation nor reward of petroleum production.

" In an oil economy, the usual order of things is reversed. Social and economic development does not precede or accompany income growth . . . Usually economic development entails a sequence in which agriculture gives way to industry while industry in a second phase induces the expansion of the services. In the oil economy, development starts in the tertiary sector; and the question is whether this sector can be expected to transmit growth to agriculture and industry. " (68)

The monarchy's policies did not address the fundamental problem; rather, this inverted structure was perpetuated. This distortion was reflected in a continued social and economic imbalance, wherein the transformation of the social and economic infrastructure was of a tangible nature : the construction of roads, rather than agricultural and industrial productivity or capital formation. (69)

(68) Ibid; pp. 216 - 218.

(69) Allan, op cit; p. 62.

The RCC, after 1969, opted for experimental programmes of "Libyanisation" and ad hoc investment programmes for the first few years of its rule. Its first developmental plan, however, did attempt to redress the structural imbalance by increasing agricultural and industrial expenditure, with the long-term aim of transforming Libya from a raw material exporter to an industrial country, specialised in the complete processing of its primary product. (70)

Al-Qathafi's rule has been characterised by an upswing in state intervention in the economy. In conformity with his proposed "Libyanisation" of all sectors, the distribution and marketing of petroleum was nationalised in 1970, along with all commercial banking institutions. The agricultural sector is regarded of first importance and as such priority has been given to reclamation and irrigation schemes, reafforestation and dune stabilisation.

Industrial expansion has, since the Revolution, proceeded rapidly. Since 1969 there has been the successful completion of numerous factories and plants, now fully operative. The heightened level of construction has, furthermore, created a greater demand for building materials. The discovery of iron ore reserves in southern Libya made possible the construction of a steelwork sector, which in turn necessitated a new railroad infrastructure.

Extensive private ownership is not permissible in terms of Al-Qathafi's professed "Islamic" socialism. The whole private sector is to be

(70) Mabro, op cit; p. 217.

abolished; companies, businesses and retail outlets to be controlled either directly by the state or by proxy workers' committees. With the publication of Part Two of the Green Book, Al-Qathafi has initiated a fourth, but radical, phase of Libyan economic reorganisation.

ii) The Third Universal Theory, Part Two : The Solution of the Economic Problem : Socialism

The fundamental principles of the Libyan Revolution were those of "freedom, socialism and unity" - freedom being national liberation from the monarchy and the restoration of the right to participate in the political process; socialism, the eradication of poverty, the redistribution of national wealth and Libyanisation of the economy by means of nationalisation; unity referred to the ideal of Arab unity and the desire for a single Arab homeland undivided by territorial allegiance to the nationstate. (71)

Freedom having been achieved with the establishment of the Jamahiriya, and a measure of socialism approximated with the nationalisation of the petroleum and banking sectors and the redistribution of land in the early 1970s, Al-Qathafi has had to formulate an ideological justification for his programme of socialisation, particularly because

" In contrast to the capitalist choice, the socialist choice has need . . . of a 'utopian' mobilizing ideology. Capitalist economy spreads step by step, automatically, so to speak, once

(71) Al-Qadhdhafi, Mu'amar A Visit to Fezzan, Speech of September 22, 1969; Tripoli, Libyan National Cultural Centre, 1970; pp. 1 - 3.

the necessary conditions are provided. Individuals apply themselves to it one after another when the prospects of profit are sufficiently attractive to them, and their propensity to take advantage of these prospects has overcome any mental obstacles that may have stood in the way. With the socialist, or collectivist, economy it is not like this. Such an economy has to be organized socially, collectively. The advantages that the individual is to obtain from it are not always obvious. In the initial phase they are frequently non-existent . . . Consequently, the mobilization of individuals calls for the combined influence of an ideology and of material incentive. (72)

As with Part One of the Green Book, where Al-Qathafi eclectically selected Islamic precepts about state, government and law and derived his own theory therefrom - a theory which consequently not resembles Islamic jurisprudence, although the influence is discernable - in Part Two of the Green Book he opted for Marxist economic analysis as a derivative basis for his own theory of "scientific socialism".

Part One of the Green Book contains a critique of contemporary systems of government and introduces as an equitable solution the configuration of "true" democracy in the system of people's committees. Part Two of the Green Book, however, presents contours only : Al-Qathafi's exposition of the historic economic problem, the wage system; a discussion of the exploitative nature of ownership, whether private or public; and the

(72) Robinson, Maxime Islam and Capitalism, Translated by Pearce, Brian, London, Allen Lane, 1974; p. 221.

determination of man's essential needs. The solution : limited private ownership and full partnership in the productive enterprise. However, the manner in which it is to be attained is not indicated. As with democracy, socialism would seem to signify to Al-Qathafi a form of participation. In this instance, the traditional Libyan apathy might be counteracted by the economic incentive of profit-sharing.

Al-Qathafi identifies as the historic economic problem the question of work and wages : the relationship between workers and employers, between producers and owners. (73)

Although he acknowledges that trade unionism has served to secure an improved working relationship between workers and employers with the regulation of fixed working hours, minimum wages, overtime payment, prohibition of arbitrary dismissal, and the recognition of the right to strike, these and other approaches to the economic problem, such as the transfer of ownership from "right" to "left" (capitalist to socialist), do not address the real problem. Workers, despite the alleviation of some hardships, remain wage earners. They are trapped in a condition akin to slavery, even if a temporary slavery, which lasts as long as they work for wages from an employer, regardless of whether the latter is an individual or a state. (74)

Possibly the most evident convergence of Al-Qathafi's socialist theory with Marxist doctrine, lies in his rejection of the wage system. Marx

(73) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 43.

(74) Ibid; p. 45.

contended that the capitalist domination by the bourgeoisie of the working class was rooted in wage slavery. The worker, as a result of his inferior bargaining position, owns nothing of worth other than his labour power. This ability is debased into a commodity, which he has to sell and re-sell to employers in order to survive. Thus, what should be the most human activity in which he could engage, work - the fabrication of his world according to his own creative insights and impulses - becomes a profoundly dehumanising force. (75)

Moreover, as workers compete for wages, they compound the polarisation of society; eventually leading to the demand for the abolition of the wage system. This would result in a revolution, bringing about the first stage of socialism: dictatorship of the proletariat, where there would be payment in accordance with need and work performed. (76)

Al-Qathafi maintains that all workers, whether part of the traditional capitalist or socialist systems, share the same fate of wage slavery. The socialist dictum that income generated from public ownership will revert to society, could be valid only if that society were governed in accordance with the democratic popular committee structure as set forth in Part One of the Green Book.

Redress is possible only through the abolition of the wage system and a reversion to the "natural socialism" which characterised man's early existence. Natural socialism - a state of affairs where consumption

(75) Germino, Dante Machiavelli to Marx: Modern Western Political Thought, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1972; p. 361.

(76) Burns, op cit; pp. 151 - 152.

approximately equalled production - was distorted and corrupted by the advent of man's exploitation of man and the desire to own a greater share of the general wealth than dictated by man's need. (77)

Al-Qathafi's envisioned return to the "natural socialist" condition would in Marxist analysis, however, signify a regression not a progressive evolution. This stage, the primitive communist stage, is the first in the evolution of economic history. It is the antecedent of slavery, feudalism and capitalism. In the capitalist stage, the class struggle is at its most acute, ultimately culminating in a revolution from which evolves an advanced form of communism. (78)

Al-Qathafi's analysis of the constituents of economic production reveals the inextricable association of three factors : raw materials, an instrument of production, and a producer. Although these components have remained immutable and interdependent, quantitative and qualitative deviations have been predicated upon technological progress. Qualitatively, primitive tools have been replaced by sophisticated technical equipment; quantitatively, as technology innovates, less workers are required to operate machinery.

In an equitable society, Al-Qathafi envisages that the production of both industry and agriculture would be evenly distributed among the three components - whether in industry among the producers (workers),

(77) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 45 - 47.

(78) Sami G "The Marxist Origins of Qadnafi's Economic Thought" in : The Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 20, Number 3, September 1982; p. 365.

instruments of production (factories and plants), and the resources; or in the case of agriculture, among the farmer, the land and the machinery. (79)

Al-Qathafi's characterisation of the process of production as the interdependence of producer, raw materials and machinery, appears to correspond to some extent with Marx's identification of the productive forces as constant capital, raw materials and instruments of production (premises and instrumental materials), and variable capital, labour power. The point of departure arises in the worth ascribed to each factor. For Al-Qathafi, all three factors are of equal importance - he maintains that without any one factor, the other two are debilitated to the extent that production is impossible. Thus the equal share of production for each. Marx, however, believed that only labour power could create value and it is therefore the only indispensable force :

" The productive forces must include labour power because the centre of their development is a development of labour power. " (80)

Whereas this interpretation led Marx to an examination of the psychological impact of technological innovation on the worker, Al-Qathafi suffices with the factual development. In contrast to Marx, he neglects to analyse the impact of science on the non-skilled and non-professional worker. He believes in a future where every worker will be a skilled, educated professional, without regard for the

(79) Al-Qathafi. op cit; pp. 50 - 51.

(80) Cohen, G. A. Karl Marx's Theory of History : A Defence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978; p. 42.

interim. Marx utilised the advent of such qualitative and quantitative changes to illustrate the exacerbation of man's alienation from his only asset, his labour power. When man sells his labour, he loses the right to decide how to use it, or when and where. Technology further restricts his freedom.

" Alienated man is an abstraction because he has lost touch with all human specificity. He has been reduced to performing undifferentiated work on humanly indistinguishable objects among people deprived of their human variety and compassion. There is little that remains of his relations to his activity, product and fellows which enables us to grasp the peculiar qualities of his species. " (81)

Al-Qathafi's apparent lack of sociological concern has been ascribed to the fact that Marx, as a "seasoned social philosopher" provides a factual condition, analyses its consequences, and projects what will happen. Marx perceived the future communist society as a logical and natural extension of existing socio-economic conditions. Al-Qathafi, on the other hand, commits the "naturalistic fallacy" by deducing "ought" from what "is". In this manner, he describes what "is" and then immediately proceeds to prescribe how it "ought" to be. The result of this logic is that whereas Al-Qathafi accepts Marx's fundamental observations and premises, he discards the analysis which accompanies the former. Therefore, what to Marx represents a social theory, represents to Al-Qathafi only "exhortations". (82)

(81) Ollman, Bertell Alienation : Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971; p. 134.

(82) Hajjar (Marxist Origins, in JMAS, September 1982), op cit; pp. 368 - 369.

The basic structure of the socialist system which Al-Qathafi envisages, revolves around the concepts of need and ownership. Limited private ownership could be permissible only in relation to man's needs : a house, an income and a vehicle; but there would be no private ownership of the means of production.

No person has need for more than one house; thus each family would own its own house but would not be allowed to build additional houses for purposes of renting and leasing. Similarly, use of a vehicle would be exclusive to its owner - it may not be hired out. The renting of houses or vehicles, therefore, is perceived as attempts to control others' needs, in order to exploit or enslave them. Income, which would be derived from the worker's share of the production, may not be utilised to pay another person a wage in exchange for production. (83)

Socialist ownership, on the other hand, will be extended to land and that part of the general wealth which exceeds the basic needs of each member of society.

Although land is no one's property, any person may benefit from it by the working, farming or pasturing thereof. Such benefit may be derived purely for the purpose of fulfillment of need, on the condition that the cultivation of the land does not involve the exploitation of other persons. Ownership of land would be extended to those only who satisfy the dual requirements of (a) living on the land while (b) cultivating it. (84) Again, this "regulation" of private ownership represents a

(83) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 53 - 54.

(84) Ibid; p. 55.

regression. This is identifiable as the first stage of possession in terms of John Locke's theory of the evolution of private property rights; a theory which in some respects anticipates Marx's labour theory of value.

Locke reasoned that it was by man's mixing his labour with the natural environment that economic worth was created. With this worth, went title to the property a man has tilled or otherwise appropriated. Property, therefore, is a right antecedent to society : it is a right by nature rather than by convention. (85)

Al-Qathafi's perception of land as being inextricably linked to tending of the land, i.e. of the employed cultivator, might be rooted equally in his tribal upbringing and in the Islamic jurisprudential attitude towards land ownership :

" There is also an Islamic element present in his views toward landownership, namely, the fact that in Islamic theory and practice landownership necessarily implies its development and cultivation to justify its possession, while neglect of the land will forfeit that right of ownership. Thus ownership of land in Islam is inseparably tied to its utilisation and fructification. Similarly, to the tribe that is vested with tribal lands . . . landed property is not vested in any particular individual but in the community as a whole and the members are not landowners but have the right of usufruct only (al-intifa') . . . Thus here again al-Qadhdhafi's views with respect

(85) Germino, op cit: p. 131.

to landownership are very much a product of his tribal and Islamic background. " (86)

The rules of Al-Qathafi's new socialism preclude equally economic activity for the profit-motive, and economic activity for the purpose of saving the surplus. As the purpose of economic activity is the satisfaction of one's material needs, both the profit-motive and the savings-motive result in the depletion of the general wealth to the detriment of the other members of society. Profit-making and saving of the surplus not only result in hoarding - they are acts tantamount to theft and plunder. Since man will be economically active in order to fulfill his need requirements, the motives of profit and savings will be obviated : his need will provide his incentive. The only exception would be that those incapable of working (e.g. lunatics) and those rendering a public service, will be allocated a share of the general wealth commensurate with either their need or in the case of public servants, with their performance. (87)

This view is at variance with not only that of Locke, who believed that hoarding of money (non-perishable surplus as opposed to perishables such as foodstuff produce), was a natural consequence of man's tacit consent to the implementation of the money-exchange system; (88) it would also appear to negate the Islamic jurisprudential concept of income distribution on an equitable basis. In Islam there is no argument with the concept of wage-labour, as long as the wage-worker

(86) Deeb, Marius K and Deeb, Mary Jane Libya Since the Revolution : Aspects of Social and Political Development, New York, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982; p. 118.

(87) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 56 - 63.

(88) Germino, op cit; pp. 131 - 132.

is paid a fair amount for his performance. (89) Furthermore, the only restriction the Qur'an places on private ownership, is the prohibition of usury and the obligation to give alms.

" There is, of course, no special restriction in religious law upon ownership of the means of production . . . Economic activity, the search for profit, trade, and consequently, production for the market, are looked upon with no less favour by Muslim tradition than by the Koran itself. We even find eulogistic formulations about merchants . . . " (90)

In Marxist terminology, Al-Qathafi's view would be expressed as the entitlement of man to the value of his labour, but not to its surplus, which is the value of the labour of others. (91)

Just as Al-Qathafi acknowledged at the outset of his economic theory, the positive contribution made by trade unionism in improving working conditions, so he recognises, at the end of Part Two of the Green Book, the incipient threat to capitalism contained in the organisation of labour. In his opinion, trade unions are capable of overturning the capitalist societies of wage-workers into societies of "partners". (92)

(89) Chapra, M. Umar "The Islamic Welfare State and Its Role in the Economy" In : Ahmad, Khurshid and Ansari, Zafar Ishaq (eds) Islamic Perspectives, Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, The Islamic Foundation, U.K. in Association with Saudi Publishing House, Jeddah, 1979; pp. 206 - 207.
For a discussion of the Islamic treatment of wage-workers, see also Rodinson, op cit; pp. 14 passim.

(90) Rodinson, op cit; p. 16.

(91) Ali, Ausaf The Political Economy of the Islamic State : A Comparative Study, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International 1970; pp. 245 - 246.

(92) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 66.

Furthermore, the demand for higher wages will eventually, under guidance of the Green Book, evolve into the demand for sharing in production.

Labour's partnership in the productive process, however, is not the solution, nor the ultimate object of Al-Qathafi's socialism. Once society has undergone the metamorphosis necessary to produce a fully productive community, profit will automatically disappear and there will no longer be any need for money. (93) In other words, by adopting Marx's basic premise about the evils of capitalist society, and by circumventing the fundamental Marxist proposition of the class struggle and revolution, Al-Qathafi proposes the attainment of the final, advanced stage of communism - the condition in which private property will be eliminated; the divisions between producers and productive forces destroyed; the control of economic production through a rational, all-embracing plan; the distribution of goods organised according to need. (94)

Thus having successfully dispensed with productive activity the result of which is material production, Al-Qathafi examines the quandary of labour power which does not involve a real production-relationship : domestic servants. He distinguishes them from the working class on the basis that they do not engage in production, but rather in service. Thus, it follows that domestic servants could not lay claim to a share

(93) Ibid; pp. 66 - 67.

(94) O'Rourke, James J. The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought : An Analysis of the Treatment of Human Freedom by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Contemporary Soviet Philosophy, Dordrecht, Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974; pp. 27 - 28.

of the general production. Their status, even more so than that of wage-labourers, is a form of slavery from which they must be liberated. The house must be serviced by its occupants, or alternatively, by employees who will be promoted while performing their house jobs and who would therefore enjoy social and material safeguards in a similar manner as any other employee in the public service. (95)

Marx, however, did not consider servants part of an economic class, for a servant is not able to generate surplus value - rather, he identified the relationship as a type of ownership, in which labour power is leased to the master. (96)

Not only has Al-Qathafi, in the economic aspect of the Third Universal Theory, borrowed heavily from Marx; but his vision of the future coincides with that of Marx, both in its pursuit of man's freedom, and in its panacea :

" . . . Qadhafi's new socialist theory, like Marx's communism, is a type of utopia whose realisation is questionable . . . if the experiences of the socialist-bloc states are any indication, the progress will be slow and painful, if not entirely doubtful. " (97)

(iii) Libyan Socialism : Participatory Partnership

The advent of oil precipitated a change in the political structure, and

(95) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 69.

(96) Shaw, William H. Marx's Theory of History, London, Hutchinson and Company, 1978; p. 37.

(97) Hajjar (Marxist Origins, in JMAS, September 1982), op cit; p. 375.

as a result, in the conduct of the economy. The 1969 Revolution ended an era of international laissez-faire, and heralded a national laissez-faire; its aim the evolution from rentier state fully dependent on the petroleum industry, to balanced growth among all sectors. (98)

A great emphasis has been placed on agricultural development. A first Three-Year Development Plan (1972 - 1975) was implemented, its chief objective the achievement of diversification of the economic structure by making the best use of oil revenues to increase the importance of the agricultural and industrial sectors in relation to GNP and employment. (99)

A Five-Year Plan, for the period 1976 - 1980, was launched in January 1976, aiming at self-sufficiency in consumer goods and other materials; increase the level of output in all sectors of the economy so that the annual growth-rate in national income could be attained from non-petroleum sectors; and to promote import-substitution in iron-plates, iron wires, cement, threads and textile products manufactured locally. (100)

The 1976 - 1980 development plan and the concomitant rapid pace of socialisation, however, merely compounded the structural defects inherent in the Libyan economy. Chiefly, the unchecked growth of the

(98) El Fathaly, Omar Ibrahim The Prospects of Public Political Participation in Libyan Local Government, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1975; p. 74.

(99) Elmaihub, Saleh Hafaied Public Investment in a Capital Surplus Country: The Case of Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1977; p. 140.

(100) El-Fathi, Attia Elmahdi Import Demand and Economic Growth in Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1977, pp. 153 - 154.

services sector, a byproduct of the oil industry, has resulted in a disproportionate concentration of labour in the services sector; thereby depleting the already limited labour pool for commodity production. Contrary to Al-Qathafi's desire for a Libya self-sufficient in consumer production, this structural imbalance has stimulated the import of consumer goods. (101)

Development has been severely impaired by the dearth of skilled labour - the economy is heavily reliant on foreign labour, both quantitatively and qualitatively, drawn from neighbouring states. Proposed agricultural rejuvenation has been adversely affected by a pattern of urban migration which is steadily depopulating the rural areas.

Although labour migration to industrial areas will, in the long term, have the positive subsidiary effects of exporting modernisation trends to traditional sectors of the hinterland, and thus weaken the distinctiveness of individual provinces, its immediate impact has been disruptive. (102) Migrants are generally young, unskilled, illiterate ex-farmers; their only asset their willingness to adapt and their ambition to partake of the wealth generated by the petroleum industry. The Libyan government anticipates that vocational training programmes will improve the educational status, skills, productivity and work performance of these migrants. (103)

(101) Ibid; p. 159.

(102) El-Hammali, Abdullah Amir Modernisation Trends in Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1979; p. 50.

(103) Khalfallah, Ramadan Araib Migration, Labor Supply and Regional Development in Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1979; p. 229.

These concerns have almost certainly influenced development programmes, hence the significance ascribed to regional development, diversification of the economic structure and especially to social services - attempted counteraction of the shortage of human resources. (104)

The Transformation Plan, a five-year plan spanning the years 1980 - 1985, was preceded by the enactment of the major tenets of Al-Qathafi's socialism :

" . . . this phase saw the elimination of socio-economic forms considered exploitative. Workplaces were transformed into partnerships or cooperatives, with the workers able to exercise power in important areas of decision-making. In addition, it became illegal for an individual to hire others to work for him while family enterprises were, and still are, permitted to sell, only what they have produced. This series of changes formally altered the character of what were previously private or state enterprises into public or collective enterprises. " (105)

Although Al-Qathafi did not provide a framework for implementation of his economic policies in the Green Book, these policies were intended as general principles for action and implementation. His conception of a precapitalist socialism was to become practice in September 1978, when he directed workers to take over the major private and public enterprises, placing them under supervision of workers' committees. (106)

(104) Adham, Mazen Abdussalam The Role of Money and Banking in The Libyan Development Process, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1979; pp. 81 . 82.

(105) Bing, Adoty "Restructuring the Economy" In : Africa, Number 167, July 1985; p. 47.

(106) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 115.

The wage labour system was abolished, and to ensure that there would be no market exploitation (e.g. the creation of artificial shortages), the government fixes prices with no room for speculation. Furthermore, retail stores and private trade have been replaced with state-administered supermarkets. The only private practice admissible is service-oriented skills, e.g. barbers, carpenters, plumbers and interior decorators. (107)

Workers no longer receive wages - they are allotted a share of the profits of the company, deemed equal to their effort, capacity and efficiency. Whereas their income might fluctuate depending on their contribution to the production effort, it ensures that their gains or losses are commensurate with their labour and their incentive is the fact that they partially control their own destiny by working for themselves. (108)

Although the RCC had already instituted housing measures in the early 1970s, designed to enable every person to own a house; legislation to this effect was enacted only in 1978, enforcing the principles of ownership as suggested in the Green Book. Each family is now entitled to ownership only of the house in which they live. Former tenants of leased apartments and houses in effect found themselves to be the instant owners of the dwellings they occupied, having to pay nominal mortgage bonds to the government; while landlords have been promised compensation through a series of payments over a period of years. (109)

(107) El-Khawas, Mohamed A. "The New Society in Qaddafi's Libya : Can It Endure?" In : Africa Today, Volume 31, Number 3, 1984; p. 30.

(108) Ibid; p. 31.

(109) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 115.

As the goal of self-sufficiency in foodstuff production had almost been reached by 1980, (110) greater emphasis has recently been placed on expansion of the industrial base - hence the mushrooming of manufacturing plants. The Transformation Plan of 1980 - 1985, the first phase of a longterm "2000 Plan", has accommodated this shifting priority from agriculture to industry, with the general objective of improving the structure of the economy and increasing the ability to produce both intermediate and final demand goods. (111)

To safeguard the principles of self-sufficiency, the state has become the sole importing agency in Libya. Private import companies have been nationalised, now functioning as public corporations. (112) Thus, the government decides on the quantity and quality of imports, according to customs registers and, in the final analysis, in the light of society's "real need" for any particular commodity. (113)

The most ambitious project undertaken by the Libyan government, has been the "Great Man-Made River" (GMR), an artificial river which will carry water by concrete pipeline from an aquifer in the southern desert to the Gulf of Sirte (across an area of approximately nineteen hundred kilometers), where there is excellent rich and arable, but parched soil. The construction contract, awarded to a South Korean company, is thought to be the largest single order contract ever to have been awarded in the Middle East, and certainly the largest ever

(110) Mazrui and Tidy, op cit; p. 267.

(111) Africa, Number 167, July 1985, op cit; p. 48.

(112) Unwin, Tim "Economy" In : The Middle East and North Africa, 1984 - 1985 (Annual Survey), London, Europa Publications Limited, 1984; p. 538.

(113) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 119.

undertaken by a private company.

- " If superimposed over Europe, the proposed irrigation network would sprawl from Switzerland to northern Western Germany, with a branch stretching to Britain. It will, its designers hope, turn the barren Mediterranean coast of Libya into a garden as green as the envy of its desert-locked neighbors. " (114)

It is estimated that the GMR will supply the coastal areas with enough water to irrigate another one hundred and eighty thousand hectares - enough for Libya to not only achieve foodstuff self-sufficiency, but to become a net exporter of wheat.

Reduced revenue, however, has forced the government into a series of cutbacks in budgetal allocations. The oil glut has caused a loss in annual income, and a portion of crude oil exports is being used to settle foreign trade debts. Libyan workers are now obliged to cede a month's income per year to the state, in order for the government to meet investment targets without having to seriously deplete reserves. (115)

- " As noted above, the oil glut (and not the U.S. embargo) has seriously affected Libyan oil revenues, which account for 99 per cent of exports. The impact has not been as drastic many ill-wishers had hoped, but the conjunction of lower prices and OPEC quotas, which Libya has often ignored in the past, has sharply reduced the Libyan surplus and forced major economies in development and consumer

(114) Achiron, Marilyn with Lewis, David "Libya's Man-Made River", In : Newsweek, June 10, 1985; p. 47.

(115) Ritchie, op cit; p. 152.

expenditure . . . Libya is still relatively well off by comparison with its neighbors, but that a degree of austerity has been imposed and Qadhdhafi is not as free to indulge his fantasies as he once was. " (116)

3. The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory

Part Three of the Green Book, "The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory", more than anything else, exposes Ai-Qathafi's Weltanschauung as a disparate eclecticism; torn between an egalitarian ideal and an expression of individuality, rooted in Muslim idealism and Nasserism.

The "Social Basis", which purports to analyse group formation and group dynamics, the consideration of minorities (women and blacks), and group interaction (culturally and recreatively); reveals a philosophy derived to some extent from the ideal of a global community unified by Islam.

" The political Islamic Community, which has existed for more than thirteen centuries, differs from any other preceding and succeeding community in one sense : it is an open-end community under one universal God. The significance of this lies in the absence of any racial, territorial, political, or any other exclusivism. The password for any nation to join is the acknowledgement of the one principle : the universality of the One God. This simply means the creation, for the first time in

(116) Parker, op cit; p. 79.

human history, of a universal community based on complete equality, regardless of the considerations of race, colour and ancestry. " (117)

This sense of universalism permeates Al-Qathafi's examination of structured social evolution. He distinguishes four phases of expansion of social relationships : from the basic unit, the family, to the tribe; from the tribe to the nation; and ultimately, from nation to world community. This sense of communal evolution, he claims, is responsible for, and is the basis of the movement of history. (118)

The relationship between an individual and a group being a social relationship, it follows that the rational relationship (nationalism), upon which nationhood is founded, is a social relationship. However, whereas the state is an artificial economic and political system, man's intrinsic allegiance is to his family. The family is his cradle, his social umbrella and his origin. Mankind, therefore, consists of individuals and families, as opposed to states. Man's relationship to the nation is comparable to that of a leaf (man), to the branch (tribe), to the tree (nation). If separated, they lose their value or their life. Thus, should society reach the stage where man existed without a family, it would become a society of tramps, rootless, like artificial plants. (119)

(117) Elkholy, Abdo A. "The Concept of Community in Islam", In : Ahmad, Khurshid and Ansari, Zafar Ishaq (eds) Islamic Perspectives, Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, The Islamic Foundation, United Kingdom, in Association with Publishing House, Jeddah, 1979; p. 172.

(118) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 73.

(119) Ibid; p. 80.

Al-Qathafi's perception of the family unit as the fundamental social organisation, which is functional not merely as a biological unit predetermined by immediate blood-bonds, but as a psychological "cradle" of security and protection, (120) is a reaffirmation of the Islamic concept of the family unit as a social structure emanating nutrition and nurture, perpetuating the cultural heritage which sustains the nation. (121)

The tribe, the procreative extension of the family, is the intermediary stage in the evolution from family to nation. The tribe, as secondary familial unit, conditions the behavioural patterns and provides a social education for its members. (122) Its prime function, therefore, is to extend the "nutrition and nurture" of the basic unit into a wider community. In what Hajjar terms its "socialization" function, (123) tribalism must uphold, as in orthodox Islam,

" . . . the primacy of the collectivity against the individual, of consensus against personal investigation; it must support established authority and set up communal unity as the highest objective of social action. " (124)

Although Al-Qathafi's discussion of the "merits of the tribe" is a precursor to his exegis of nationalism, the former would find

(120) Hajjar, Sami G. "Qadhafi's Social Theory as the Basis of the Third Universal Theory" In : *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, Volume XVII, Numbers 3 - 4, July - October 1982; p. 178.

(121) Abdul-Rauf, Muhammad *The Islamic View of Women and the Family*, New York, New York, Robert Speller and Publishers Incorporated, 1979; pp. 71 - 73.

(122) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 83.

(123) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in July - October 1982), op cit, p. 179.

(124) Sharabi, op cit; p. 16.

applicability only in the Third World; elsewhere tribalism is a negligible element in the national composition. Despite the merits of the tribe, Al-Qathafi considers tribalism inherently destructive and divisive, since tribal allegiance weakens national loyalty and flourishes at its expense. (125) Hence his efforts to diminish the socio-political role of tribes in Libya : an historical condition, compounded at first by the Italian colonial administration's attempts to isolate Libyan society, and then perpetuated by the monarchy since tribalism provided the mainstay of Idris's powerbase. (126)

The nation, as the political umbrella in the manner the tribe functions as social umbrella, is distinct from the state. Nationhood and nationalism are natural social expressions, the culmination of human interaction on a broad scale. Statehood implies the imposition of imperial structures which equally might or might not coincide with the parameters of the national social structures. If not, the creation of an artificial state or empire would give birth to the sense of communal solidarity - nationalism, which is the desire for independence and self-realisation - an emotion more often than not, sustained by religion. (127)

Implicit in Al-Qathafi's understanding of the forces of history and communalism which shape nationalism, although never actually referred to, is an echo of themes of Arab nationalism : the universalism of Islam, the indivisibility of the dual aspects of Islamic universalism

(125) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 85.

(126) Malhauf, Mohamed Farag A Study of Newly Developed Communities In Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1979; p. 7.

(127) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 74, 77 - 78, 86 - 91.

coupled with the yearning for the restoration of the Arab Empire. (128)

Al-Qathafi's exposition of the fragility of superimposed political structures (the state) and the inevitable victory of the social force (nationalism) appear to be a veiled reference not only, in general, to the rebirth of the Arab Empire, but in particular, to the disappearance of the Jewish state - hence the notion of nationalism overcoming the religious impetus in the process of state-formation. (129)

" From the above macro-view of society and the theory of social structures, Qadhafi turns next to what can be considered a micro-analysis of specific social groups. His discussion focuses on the groups of women, minorities and blacks. The analysis is a micro-analysis in the sense that he assumes that the larger natural divisions of society center on the roles of gender (sex), of minority (either social, political or economic), and of race (blacks) . . . His analysis evolves around the themes of observable natural differences, natural rights, and historical tendencies. " (130)

The dominant theme is the discussion of women, derived from woman's natural capacity for motherhood - the basis of the family unit. Al-Qathafi describes, repeatedly, the physiological differentiation between male and female, which, he maintains, determines the psychological disparity between the sexes. Men do not bear children, is the gist,

(128) Dodge, Baynard "The Significance of Religion in Arab Nationalism" In : Proctor, J. Harris (ed) Islam and International Relations, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965; p. 111.

(129) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 88 - 91.

(130) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in JAAS, July - October 1982), op cit; p. 181.

and are therefore not subject to the vital, natural nesting instinct which dominates the female psyche, and renders it "gentle". (131)

It follows, therefore, that men and women are equal in their humanity - sharing the same physical and emotional needs - but there exists a natural condition of "separate but equal". Woman's "separateness" has to be preserved in order to preserve the sanctity of the family unit. She must, therefore, not be allowed to participate in the labour force in traditionally male-oriented work sectors - if she does, her femininity would be destroyed. Furthermore, career-women endanger the very fabric of society: to accommodate their desire to compete in the labour force, they either reject maternity, or their children are forced to suffer the ignominy of day-care.

Al-Qathafi equates nurseries and day-care centres with chicken batteries on poultry farms. Just as chickens from poultry farms even have a synthetic taste, we are expected to infer that children reared in day-care centres would be doomed to an inorganic life due to the uprootment from communal existence. The whole ethos of career-women was an invention by societies driven by materialism; women are thus demeaned into an economic commodity. (132)

Abdul-Rauf is at pains to point out that although men and women are different, Islam does not preclude women from working, undertaking responsibilities (religious, as well as economic), and being rewarded for their labour. His basis for differentiation between man and woman

(131) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 104 - 105.

(132) Ibid; pp. 98 - 105.

is identical to Al-Qathafi's, from physical differences right down to psychological role differentiation. Here too, emphasis is placed on woman's natural priority, maternity, but in one step further than Al-Qathafi, he blames education - traditionally denied to females - for woman's expectation of a viable economic alternative to domesticity. Abdul-Rauf would indulge this challenge to the "historical pattern" only to the limited extent of allowing a woman to pursue a career either when her children are grown-up, or on a restricted part-time basis which would not interfere with school-going children's timetables. (133)

Al-Qathafi's is a view which reflects the entrenched opinion in Libya. The traditional perception of woman as the homemaker appears to prevail over economic considerations in a society suffering a dearth of domestic skilled labour. Thus, while in theory Libyan women enjoy equal rights with men, in practice very few of them exercise their rights. It seems neither society in general, nor women in particular, are yet prepared for such developments. (134)

Social norms and economic considerations have bifurcated Libyans on this issue. The Grand Mufti of Libya has decreed that it is suitable only for poor women to work, on the condition that their chastity is not imperilled. Women from wealthy families are not to work, and restrictions on behavioural patterns and mode of dress were outlined for those who do work. (135)

(133) Abdul-Rauf, op cit; pp. 31 - 33 and 62 - 63.

(134) El-Huni, Ali Mohamed Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation : The Case of Libya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1978; p. 31.

(135) McMorris, David S "Society and Its Environment", in : Nelson, Harold D (ed) Libya : A Country Study, Washington D.D. The American University, 1979; p. 110.

The Libyan government, however, is cognisant of the labour potential of the female population. As such, several labour laws have been promulgated specifically with women in mind, for instance provisions for extremely generous maternity leave and matters related to infant-rearing, the state bears the maternity expenses if the child is born at a hospital, equal pay for equal work, maximum working hours per day and per week, prohibition of night-shifts for women with the exception of the nursing profession, generous pension schemes, and in encouragement of medical welfare (and combatting infant mortality) a bonus during pregnancy which is paid only upon visits to the state clinics. (136)

Women are encouraged to participate in the political process; and although they may enter any profession of their choosing, they have been legislatively disbarred from the areas in which physical endurance or strength are required, such as heavy construction work, road building or employment in iron and steel factories. Instead, women are recruited chiefly for the teaching, nursing, clerical-secretarial and housekeeping services and in some selected industries such as clothing and textile. (137)

Educational opportunity has not been restricted; and as such allows women entr  e into areas previously unthinkable. At the universities in Libya, there are now female students in all faculties, including the traditionally male areas of economics, engineering, medicine and dentistry. (138)

It has been found, however, that labour force participation among married

(136) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 69. See also El-Huni, op cit; pp. 31 - 32.

(137) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 65.

(138) McMorris, op cit; p. 111.

women is still predetermined by traditional patterns of role differentiation. Participants tend to be single, educated, above the twenty five year age bracket; working married women tend to fall into the forty five to fifty year category ⁽¹³⁹⁾ - statistics which lend force to the view that women still give priority to their maternal, domestic role. The male perception too, is predicated upon economic status and level of education : professional and managerial workers have favourable attitudes towards women in decisionmaking or high-level occupational positions. ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

Although younger women seem to have no qualms about working, or being conscripted into the defense force, the older generations - the figures and wielders of authority, disapprove and still adhere to antiquated practices such as polygamy, prohibition of education to female children, and arranged marriages where the price for a "good bride" is determined by her chastity. ⁽¹⁴¹⁾ It would seem that a proportion of educated women, too, still feel strongly linked to the traditional role system. The sentiments of several female participants, all highly educated, at Al-Qathafi's "International Colloquium on the Green Book", are echoed in this contribution from a female delegate :

" In spite of their attitude, women's achievements socially, economically, and culturally have been detrimental to her (sic) nature and role as mother, motivated as they are by the material demands imposed upon her. It should not be forgotten that the mother's

(139) El-Huni, op cit; pp. 102 - 103.

(140) El-Hammali, op cit; p. 138.

(141) Kichener, Julie "Inside Libya Today", in : New African, Number 193, October 1983; p. 11.

role remains woman's basic function." (142)

There are other minorities, in the national context, which can be categorised either as a minority existing within a national framework; or a minority which exists outside of the national framework and therefore develops its own social framework. The latter type, because of its evolution of a sense of community, will eventually constitute a nation. Minorities, furthermore, may be classified on a social basis only and should be accorded the fullest protection of the law with regard to their civil and political rights. (143)

" Suffice it to note . . . that the distinction Qadhafi makes between social rights (natural) and conventional rights (societal in the form of political/economic rights) is a logical extension of his earlier distinction between society and state. The former type of rights tend to assert themselves naturally as when a minority "eventually constitutes a nation", while the latter require political and economic reforms to establish them." (144)

This particular view might also have been a natural outgrowth of Al-Qadhafi's own social background. He has a holistic, "all-inclusive" view of Islam, which would include the People of the Book (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians) in his universalistic concept of the Muslim religion. It is a view derived from the epoch of the Arab Empire, in

(142) Al Bittar, Fahima "Women in the Framework of the Third Universal Theory", In : International Colloquium in Benghazi : The Green Book (1-3 October 1979), Volume II, Tripoli, Libyan Arab Socialist Jamahiriya, Foreign Liaison Office, General Secretariat of the General People's Congress, (Undated); p. 125.

(143) Al-Qadhafi, op cit; p. 107.

(144) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in JAAS, July-October 1982), op cit; p. 183.

which the Empire was considered the dar al-Islam (a Pax Islamica) comprised of Muslim and non-Muslim territories united by Islamic rule. The members of the tolerated religions (People of the Book), were allowed to maintain and preserve their own cultural and religious identities; but were regarded as second-class citizens, Called "dhimmis", they were entitled to the Caliph's protection, but were accorded only partial civil rights. (145)

Al-Qathafi has, however, on occasion stressed that non-Arab Muslims are auxiliaries (mutatawi'un) to the faith, and that in their practice, they distort the Qur'an. The Lebanese Christians too, have been blamed for the ongoing civil war in that country.

" His oscillations could be clearly seen in his attitude toward non-Muslim minorities in the Arab world. For al-Qadhdhafi, brought up in a society that did not encompass religious diversity among its indigenous population, it was difficult for him to conceive of an Arab society that had divisions of a sectarian or religious nature. He admitted that the only Christians he had ever seen or met in the desert where he had been brought up were the Christian colonizers, whether Italian or British. Consequently, coming from such a background it was understandable that his conception of Arab nationalism or Arabism was simply tied to his Islamic identity. " (146)

(145) Khadduri, Majid "The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance". In : Proctor, J. Harris (ed) Islam and International Relations, London, Pall Mall Press, 1965; pp. 25 - 26.

(146) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 103.

In his discussion of education, Al-Qathafi envisages an ideal system based on the principle of freedom of choice : students should be able to select the courses they want to be taught, and must not be subjected to "methodized curricula". (147) The Libyan educational reality, however, does not approximate this ideal. Education, particularly at preparatory and secondary levels, is consciously aimed at projecting specific socialisation and nationalistic behavioural patterns.

The 1970 Laws of Education expounded the following "philosophy and objectives" of teaching : the aims to create a "good citizen" who believes in Islam and is proud of his Arab nationality; the creation of a skilled labour force which will increase production; compulsory education in all geographic areas of Libya, founded on the principles of freedom, social equality and unity. (148)

Perpetuating the trend initiated by a poverty-stricken monarchy which had to rely on textbooks and teachers from Egypt and schools built by the USA, the RCC has continued to stress the universalism of Arabism and Islam. During the monarchical era,

" This was the prevailing theme in all the reading books in the Libyan schools. Everything, even if it was about Libya, was related to Arab nationalism and Arab unity. " (149)

(147) Al-Qathafi, op cit; p. 110.

(148) Gobbi, Bashir Salem. A Study of the Development of Libyan Formal Education, Past, Present and Future, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1976; pp. 54 - 57.

(149) El-Mogherbi, Mohamed Zahi The Socialization of School Children in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1978; p. 34.

The current curricula have seen little change in that respect : ideological precepts of Arab and Islamic history, the notions of the "Arab Homeland" and the Palestinian cause dominate, with new features of anti-imperialism and socialism. An innovation has been the introduction of an economic syllabus dealing with the importance of agriculture and industry. Although the revolutionary regime has attempted to foster a sense of social solidarity and collectivity by establishing educational themes of social responsibility which stress altruistic and collective behaviour; yet the traditional conception of gender role differentiation has not been eroded. (150)

Al-Qathafi's vision of curricula-free educational systems is certainly light-years ahead of current practice, where appointees from the Ministry of Learning and Education devise and write the curricula; teachers are obliged to teach from prescribed texts and are not allowed to use any other, unapproved, sources for supplement. (151)

Compounding these issues, is the general axiom that schooling should accommodate the child's growing awareness of the political and social system; encourage his/her sense of belonging in this system; and his/her right to participate in its processes. Transitional Libya suffers from a typical bifurcation of values :

" In the educational systems of the developing countries, however, youngsters are introduced to new ideas that are secular and often contrary to the traditional ideas they have

(150) Ibid; pp. 98 - 102.

(151) Gobbi, op cit; p. 58.

been imbued with in the home. Thus, the schools tend to counteract rather than reinforce the family socializing function in changing societies. " (152)

The title "Melodies and Art" for the penultimate section of the Green Book is a misnomer. Al-Qathafi deals with culture and cultural development purely in terms of spoken language, and not as expressed in the arts.

The use of a variety of languages across the globe, Al-Qathafi hypothesises, has restricted mankind's cultural evolution to a stasis. This being "backward" has been determined by the relationship between culture (the transmission of language and creed from one generation to another). The cultural union of humanity, however, will not be attained merely by imposition of one specific language - culture cannot be learned, it must be inherited. (153) Inevitably, but after the passing of many epochs, all men will speak the same language and express the same sentiments. Only then, will the ideal of "civilisation" be attained.

This expression of Al-Qathafi's historicism - the inevitable movement of history towards some predetermined goal - best exposes his idealism and unattainable utopian vision of a future which culminates in the "cultural oneness of the human race". (154)

Sportsmanship is enshrined in the Green Book along with prayer :

(152) El-Mogherbi, op cit; p. 2.

(153) Al-Qathafi, op cit; pp. 113 - 115.

(154) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in JAAS, July - October, 1982), op cit; p. 185.

either it is practiced in private, or it is expressed publicly, collectively. It should not be allowed to degenerate into passivity, where few perform and most spectate. In the same manner as no one person or group has the right to dominate the political dimension, no individual or team should be allowed to monopolise sport, while the people as a whole pay the costs of such a monopoly for the benefit of that one person or that team. (155)

Membership of sporting clubs encourages elitism, deprives the people of the initiative and instills a general apathy. Spectators are people who have no control over the direction of their lives, alienated from their innate dignity and individualism. They are trivial, visionless cowards : they are like pupils who occupy school desks because they are not only uneducated, but illiterate. (156)

Hajjar regards this particular passage of the Green Book illuminating for its symbolism :

" One cannot help having the impression that Qadhafi is making a plea for all to join, not only in sports, but in his revolution which calls for mass participation in the areas of politics and economics - to join in taking charge of their own destiny. It is a call for action as opposed to the role of spectator . . . Given this symbolism, it is no surprise that Qadhafi ends his Green Book with an analysis of sports activity. " (157)

(155) Al-Qadhafi, op cit; pp. 115 - 116.

(156) Ibid; p. 119.

(157) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in JAAS, July - October 1982), loc cit.

either it is practiced in private, or it is expressed publicly, collectively. It should not be allowed to degenerate into passivity, where few perform and most spectate. In the same manner as no one person or group has the right to dominate the political dimension, no individual or team should be allowed to monopolise sport, while the people as a whole pay the costs of such a monopoly for the benefit of that one person or that team. (155)

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(155) Al-Qadhafi, op cit; pp. 115 - 116.

(156) Ibid; p. 119.

(157) Hajjar (Qadhafi's Social Theory, in JAAS, July - October 1982), loc cit.

4. Precise

The Third Universal Theory, as an extension of the original Nasserist creed of the 1969 Revolution ("Freedom, Socialism, Unity"), strives to broaden the ideological base of political freedom. In essence, the Third Universal Theory could be considered a call for social justice. Al-Qadhafi's conception of such social justice, however, is not all-encompassing; rather, it is consciously circumscribed by his understanding of egalitarianism :

" Justice, therefore, is not identical to equality, although the latter, as Qadhafi correctly argues, is essential to the former. " (158)

The concept of liberty is, in his definition, a political and social factor; equality is an economic precept. Structurally, thus, Al-Qadhafi postulates that merit and need are not mutually exclusive in the distributive process; freedom and equality are immutably inextricable in the politico-economic process. Liberty, however, must not be confused with privilege, i.e. the protection and promotion of civil and political rights. (159)

The successful practical adaptation of these premises appears dubious. The political process in the Jamahiriya is dominated by Revolutionary Committees; consensus election of leadership bodies has fostered a situation wherein known elite favourites are elected, and conversely,

(158) Hajjar, Sami G and Swaine, R. Kieron "Social Justice : The Philosophical Justification of Qadhafi's Construction", In : Africa Today, Volume 31, Number 3, 1984; p. 10.

(159) Ibid; p. 15.

critics of the regime are not nominated (either because of fear of risk to the elected, or risk to the electors). (160) Furthermore, neither Al-Qathafi's recent Marxist orientation nor his social modernisation dicta have met widely with approval :

" His support among traditional elements of the masses suffered from the hostility of the ulema and his effort to mobilise women (as a surrogate proletariat?) . . . Thus, while a new revolutionary community in embryo may have been in formation, it had clearly not been consolidated by the 1980s. " (161)

Al-Qathafi, like Nasser, is deeply suspicious of partisan politics - in Al-Qathafi's view the cause of Arab disunity (162) - and regards the military as the vanguard of both the revolution and the people. Once the military had initiated the Revolution, Al-Qathafi sought to consolidate the Libyan political community through manipulation of the country's Islamism. Subsequent to the publication of the Green Book (in which Islam receives no mention, since Al-Qathafi did not want to exclude or alienate non-Muslims from his proposed system), (163) Al-Qathafi appropriated to himself the right to interpret and elucidate Islam. Disbarring the ulema from discussing political matters (traditionally their inalienable right), he has also proclaimed the

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- (160) Hinnebusch, Raymond A "Libya : Personalistic Leadership of A Populist Revolution", In : Zartman, I. William et al, Political Elites in Arab North Africa : Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, New York, New York, Longman Incorporated, 1982; p. 200.
- (161) Hinnebusch, Raymond A "Charisma, Revolution and State Formation : Qaddafi and Libya", In : Third World Quarterly, Volume 6, Number 1, January 1984; p. 71.
- (162) Ibid; pp. 190 - 192.
- (163) Mitchell, Edward "Islam in Colonel Qaddafi's Thought", In : The World Today, Volume 38, Numbers 7 - 8, July - August 1982; pp. 322 - 323.

Hadith - the essence of the Shari'ah - unreliable. The Qur'an alone is to be considered revelation; its function is not a detailed social prescription, but a source of personal ethics and general moral principles. The Green Book, instead, embodies, according to Al-Qathafi, a more authentic application of the spirit of the Qur'an and Sunna. (164)

Al-Qathafi has, according to his speeches, based his Third Universal Theory on the fundamental maxim that all history is the product of religion and nationalism. Since, for Al-Qathafi, all true religion is Islam, and nationalism is the will of God, it follows that all Muslims follow the truth and that they are, thus, always right and their opponents wrong. (165) The sophistry of this belief, when fused with the sophistry of the Green Book's stages of development of the nation, has enabled Al-Qathafi to "universalise" the Libyan community by transforming its national identity into a "transnational" identity - that of Muslim Arabs.

Within this context, Al-Qathafi believes that the Jamahiriya has been entrusted with a prophetic and revolutionary role in the Arab world. This sense of messianism is derived from Al-Qathafi's passionate commitment to Nasserism : a glorification of Arab history and culture, the belief in the existence of an Arab nation which has been temporarily divided by colonial borders, and the reascendancy of this Arab nation after so many years of European domination. The Jamahiriya, as the country most absorbed with the ideal of Arab reunification, is,

(164) Hinnebusch (Charisma, Revolution and State Formation, In: Third World Quarterly, January 1984), op cit; p. 70.

(165) Mitchell, op cit; p. 322.

therefore, portrayed as the vanguard of the Arab nation and the custodian of Arab nationalism. Given its strategic location as the country bridging Maghrib and Meshriq, Al-Qathafi envisages Libya as the political bridge unifying the Arab subsystems - simultaneously ending Libya's historic lack of active participation in Arab affairs.

In identifying the cause of Arab disunity as parochialism - placing more priority on the nationstate interests than on Arab reunification - Al-Qathafi delineated for Libya three target areas of foreign policy action, designed to erode territoriality and to stimulate Pan-Arabism. These spheres of action were to be, respectively, the Meshriq and its unification under leadership of Nasser; the Maghrib, to be unified as "Greater Libya"; and the Sahel, predominantly Muslim, with Arab minorities, to be unified as an Islamic federation : the three areas to be linked to one another by Libya. Al-Qathafi furthermore envisaged that Libya, in consideration of its status as "vanguard of the Arab nation" and given its wealth and resources, would be the territorial base from which the Arab nationalist, Islamist resurgence would be directed. The Nasserist conception of "freedom and unity" has, therefore, been adopted in Libya not only as the goal of national unification and community building, but as a universalistic, if somewhat anachronistic, ideal : the reconstitution of the Greater Arabia; whereas the twin components of leadership - power and charisma - when combined with religious authority, express an Islamic archetype which Al-Qathafi seeks to embody in his role as the guide of the Revolution, (166) both at home and abroad.

(166) Roumani, Jacques "From Republic to Jamahiriya : Libya's Search for Political Community". In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 37, Number 2, Spring 1983; p. 166.

Chapter Four : Libyan Quest for Leadership : Bloc Formation in
the Middle East and North Africa; 1969 - 1985

1. The Nasserist Phase : Arab Union, African Overtures; 1969 - 1973

Post-independence, pre-revolutionary Libya appeared to lack the qualities which could imbue it with political initiative or dominance in either the Maghrib or the Mashriq. Al-Qathafi's avowed Nasserism, coupled with the Republic's recently-acquired wealth, however, permanently altered Libyan regional foreign policy.

It was transformed from a passive stance with little or no commitment to Pan-Arabism and its concomitant anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism into a militant posture, with active support not only for the Palestinian cause, but for a host of disruptive, destabilising forces in both subsystems.

The determinant of Al-Qathafi's regional perspective, Arab nationalism, was conceptualised from the first as a Nasserist drive for Arab union. It was an orientation conditioned by Al-Qathafi's adherence to an ideological ambition - and a perception of Nasser - rooted in the euphoric era of Egypt's seizure of the Suez and thereafter, of Arab leadership : deliberately amnesiac of the futility of Nasser's Pan-Arabism, as incontrovertably revealed after the Arab defeat of 1967.

Accepting the premise that perception and decision-making are conditioned by irrational affinity to certain objects, events and concepts, Al-Qathafi's perception of Arab union, within the context of mainstream

Arab nationalism, both converges with and deviates from the norm. The convergence lies in his vision of a Greater Arabia, a restoration of the ancient Islamic Empire, and in his psychological equation of nationalism with anti-imperialism; the latter a common perception among ex-colonies.

The divergence lies in the fact that the "Arab nation" has not been authoritatively defined. Although the foundation of Pan-Arabism is the belief in the national identity of the Arab people, the focal point of reference has always tended to be the individual nationstate. The result has been a dichotomy wherein the goal of Arab unity is served only when the national interest is not at risk; (1) whereas

" Libya's historical divisions into Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, and consequently the lack of a clearly defined Libyan identity, pushed al-Qadhafi to go beyond his own borders, to seek a wider identity in Arab Unity. " (2)

Al-Qadhafi's preoccupation with politics Egyptian and Middle Eastern, was largely determined by the Libyan environment. A country created by UNO unification of three distinct areas, subjected to non-democratic rule for eighteen years, the orientation of political opposition defined and conditioned by broadcasts from Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs"; Libya came into its own only after 1969. As a result, the RCC's regional approach was in many ways anachronistic : rather than offer new

(1) Ismael, Tareq Y. "Domestic Sources of Middle Eastern Foreign Policy", In : Ismael, Tareq Y. (ed) *The Middle East In World Politics : A Study in Contemporary International Relations*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1974; pp. 198 - 214.

(2) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 127.

solutions, it tended to resemble the early Nasserist and extreme leftist Arab nationalist policies of the pre-1967 era. (3)

Specifically, Al-Qadhafi believed that the Arab defeat of 1967 was a manifestation of Arab discord and parochialism : a preoccupation with domestic affairs, detrimental to the cause of Arab union. Total Arab union was, for him, the precondition to Arab strength. Such union, furthermore, could be achieved only through the foundation of unity on Islam and the eradication of the State of Israel, the last in the series of Western imperialist creations in the Middle East. He considered anything that contributed to these causes, just and right, anything opposing or hindering them, would have to be circumvented or eliminated. (4)

The new regime's ideological policy orientation was characterised by the immediate post-revolutionary anti-imperialist posture. During the period September 1969 to May 1971, this radicalism was reflected, domestically, in the abolition of monarchical administrative structures, the deportation of the Italian community, the confiscation of Italian land, the acquisition of new concessions from the oil companies, the nationalisation first of banking institutions and then of the oil industry in 1970 - 1971, and the expulsion and evacuation of the foreign military bases - the first steps in a revolutionary programme of nationalisation and Libyanisation. (5)

(3) Van Rensburg, A. P. J. Africa's Men of Destiny, De Jager-Haum Publishers, 1981; pp. 196 - 197.

(4) Cooley, op cit; p. 101.

(5) Hajjar, Sami G "The Jamahiriya Experiment in Libya : Qadhafi and Rousseau", In : Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 18, Number 2, June 1980; p. 184.

The profundity of Al-Qathafi's commitment to the Nasserist ideology manifested itself in his first act as head of state. Only days after the coup, he offered Nasser his country for immediate merger with Egypt. It was a revelation not merely, as Heikal suggests, of Al-Qathafi's political naivety, but a shrewd appraisal of the geopolitical constraints which contributed to making a myth of Nasser's Pan-Arabism :

" He emphasized that he had been following everything that had been happening in the Arab world, and he knew that Nasser was looking for a second front with Israel. 'But,' said Ghadaffi, 'he is forgetting depth. We have hundreds of miles of Mediterranean coastline; we have the airfields; we have the money; we have everything! Tell President Nasser we made this revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world's resources to be used for the battle.' " (6)

This initial absolute equation and identification of Libya with Egypt was overridden, in later years, by Al-Qathafi's eclectic pragmatism and religiosity. His militance, however, during the early years, was stimulated by the impetus of subsystemic disruption.

Regionally, at the time of the Libyan coup, revolutionary upheaval dominated both the North African and Middle Eastern subsystems. The Libyan Revolution was closely preceded by a "progressive" military coup in the Sudan, and followed by another "progressive" coup, in Syria.

These events moulded the new Libyan elite's perception of Arab unity

(6) Heikal, Mohamed The Road to Ramadan, St. James's Place, London, Collins, 1975; p. 70.

and their commitment to the anti-Zionist cause. Within its first month in office, the RCC established a committee responsible for fundraising in support of Palestinian liberation groups, in a measure designed to counteract the hostility of the Jordanians and Lebanese towards the Palestinian guerillas.

Al-Qathafi's first attempt at bloc formation - a strategy he regards as mitigating Arab apathy - was the agreement, in the Tripoli Charter of December 1969, to establish a tripartite federation of the core "progressive" states; Egypt, Libya and the Sudan.

It was agreed to coordinate foreign policies, and to exchange assistance and expertise in domestic matters; but no legislative actions were taken until after Nasser's death. The "union", shortlived as it was, was to a large extent an expediency for all parties concerned :

" . . . 'Abd al-Nasir who desperately needed allies in the Arab world, and had just learned in Rabat once again that these were not to be found in the Maghrib or the Arab East, was delighted to have found two disciples so close to home. These, in turn, were equally delighted to be in their hero's company and expected to derive no mean boost to their questionable legitimacy at home by being associated with 'Abd al-Nasir. " (7)

Following the negotiation of the federation agreement, Al-Qathafi's next initiative was the convention of a five-nation summit in Tripoli

(7) Bechtold, Peter K. "New Attempts at Arab Cooperation : The Federation of Arab Republics, 1971 - ?" In : The Middle East Journal, Volume XXVII, Spring, 1973; p. 153.

in May 1970. Attended by Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Libya, the convention was held in response to Al-Qathafi's call for concerted action, military and economic, against Israel. At a further convention of early August 1970, again in Tripoli, a proposal was adopted which made specific demands on those represented (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Sudan) with regard to the supply of troops and financing in the struggle against Israel.

This attempt at building a united Arab front, however, was obviated later that same month when Egypt and Jordan accepted cease-fire negotiations with Israel. A further contributory factor to the demise of the united front, was the deterioration in Libya's relationship with Jordan. What did emerge, stimulated by Libyan initiative, was a renewed leadership rôle for Egypt, of a nucleus of "progressive" states. (8)

In late 1970, when Jordan acted against the Palestinian guerilla groups operating from its territory, Al-Qathafi officially terminated Libyan economic aid to Jordan; aid which was part of the programme of financial assistance to states bordering Israel. After Libyan-Jordanian negotiations over the dispute had reached a deadlock, Libya severed its diplomatic ties with Jordan in September 1970.

Nevertheless, union with Egypt remained a constant preoccupation for Al-Qathafi, and it appeared to commend itself to his colleagues for "obvious practical reasons". (9)

(8) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; pp. 130 - 131.

(9) Knapp, op cit; p. 223.

The obvious practical reasons - complementarity of resources, manpower and education - were obfuscated by ideological motives. Al-Qathafi remained inspired by the vision of union with Egypt, and partnership with his mentor, Nasser, being the first step in the reestablishment of Arabia, the ultimate defeat of Israel, and the inevitable restoration of Arab grandeur as a chosen Muslim people. (10)

The imminent implementation of such a union, however, was forestalled by Nasser's preoccupation with the War of Attrition and the clashes between Jordan and the Palestinian groups it hosted. A primary consideration, too, on the part of Nasser, was his concern that the new regimes in Libya and the Sudan consolidate their power before possibly embroiling Egypt in their internal affairs.

Nasser's death, and Numeiry's series of domestic leadership legitimacy crises, called for a reevaluation of the motives behind the Tripoli Charter and their validity in terms of the new Egyptian leadership.

Not only did Nasser's death bring to a close a particular epoch of post-independence inter-Arab relations; it generated in Al-Qathafi a quest for Arab leadership. It was not merely a desire, as leader of the country bridging Maghrib and Mashriq, to unite Arab East with Arab West. It was a profound response to Nasser's belief in a heroic regional role, awaiting its rightful player :

" For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I do not

(10) Ibid.

know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it. " (11)

Whereas Al-Qathafi might have been merely inspired by this belief, his personal relationship with Nasser, who once told him that Al-Qathafi reminded him of himself at that age, (12) confirmed his aspirations. Henceforth, his commitment to Arabism would be derived from his own ambition to surpass the era of Egyptian leadership. He thus considers himself a leader without a country; Egypt, a country without a leader. (13)

" To be the new Nasser is his obsession - to succeed where Nasser failed. " (14)

The most characteristic feature of the early foreign policy of the revolutionary regime in Libya, was its dualism. On the one hand, there was the quest for Arab unity through bloc formation, and on the other, an emulation of Egyptian policies. Other than the breakdown of relations with Jordan, Al-Qathafi's Arab relations during his first three years in power, exhibited a commitment to and attempts at constructive action; in contrast to the active destabilisation policies of the post-1973 war era. (15)

(11) Nasser, Gamal Abdul Egypt's Liberation : The Philosophy of the Revolution, Washington D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1955, pp. 87 - 88.

(12) "The Arab World : Oil, Power, Violence", In : Time Magazine, April 2, 1973, op cit; p. 17.

(13) Hermassi (The Maghrib and the Middle East Conflict, In Middle East Review, Summer 1978), op cit; p. 38.

(14) Time Magazine, April 2, 1973, loc cit.

(15) Aliboni, Roberto "Panarabismus und Internationalismus in der Aussenpolitik Muammer al-Khadafis", In : Europa Archiv, 37. Jahr, Folge 13, 10 July 1982; pp. 405 - 406.

In order to lend legitimacy and credence to bloc formation, Egypt would, of necessity have had to be an active partner in any attempted merger. Al-Qathafi, mindful of the disparate political systems of Libya and Egypt, and in concern for the political void which had emerged in Libya - the result not only of his purge of the tribal and religious leadership, but also of the development of the new modernising infrastructure - created the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1971. Closely modelled on the Nasserite system in Egypt, the ASU was expected to provide the dual bridging function of creating a more compatible political system, simultaneously linking Libya with Egypt and the RCC with the domestic population.

Despite their personal mistrust of each other, Al-Qathafi and Sadat pursued the principles enunciated in the Tripoli Charter, with Numeiry of the Sudan; each for different reasons. Al-Qathafi, because of his pursuit of the legacy of Nasser's Arab leadership; Sadat, for the present to indicate continuity in Egyptian regional policies; and Numeiry, to posit his radicalism and Arabism in contrast to the "reactionary" regime he had ousted. (16)

When Numeiry had to back off due to Sudanese internal turmoil, Hafaz Assad, the new Syrian head of state, became the third partner in the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR). In the hope that Numeiry would not be long distracted by his domestic problems, the constituent document of the FAR contained a clause enabling other like-minded Arab states to enter into membership at later times. The FAR officially came into

(16) Reichtold, op cit; pp. 159 - 161.

being on January 1, 1972; nine months after the announcement of its formation.

The FAR was doomed, perhaps, from inception. There appeared to be little agreement or understanding of each other's motives. Al-Qathafi, in particular, as the more zealous partner, displayed a sense of myopia with regard to the Sudanese problem. He accused Numeiry, upon the latter's withdrawal from the FAR, of betrayal of the Arab nationalist cause. Al-Qathafi's exuberant pursuit of union was shortsighted not only of Numeiry's legitimacy predicament in terms of political opposition to the new regime, but also of the very real problem of the resentment of the large non-Arab population in the Sudan towards the proposed union. (17) Furthermore, both Sadat and Assad had serious reservations about absolute union with Libya. Rather, they would have preferred a diluted version of Arab union, with no more than a loose federation.

The federal document provided Sadat with presidency, and Cairo would be the capital of the tripartite state. There was to be a federal government, legislative assembly and federal judiciary. Provision was made that each memberstate would have not merely the right, but the express duty, to intervene and "reestablish order" in each other's domestic affairs in the event of internal upheaval. (18)

(17) Alexander, Nathan "The Foreign Policy of Libya : Inflexibility Amid Change", In : Orbis, Volume 24, Number 4, Winter 1981; p. 833; fn. 23.

(18) Cooley, op cit; p. 104.

Despite the formation of some federal institutions, the FAR never developed beyond the stage of paper existence. Within a year, it was superseded by the Benghazi Declaration of August 1972, which announced the proposed merger of Libya and Egypt. (19)

It was agreed that a union, conditional upon the outcome of popular referenda in each country, would take effect by September 1973. Sadat would be the head of state, to be named - prophetically - the United Arab Republic, as was the failed Egyptian-Syrian merger of 1958 - 1961.

Within six months, it became apparent that this bloc, too, would never materialise. Libyan-Egyptian relations during that period steadily deteriorated - the alienation of the two leaders partly due to Sadat's increasingly closer alignment with Syria; partly because of Al-Qathafi's overestimation of Egyptian commitment to the proposed merger.

As Sadat clandestinely immersed himself in the newly formed Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian axis in preparation for the Yom Kippur onslaught against Israel, unification with Libya was left little room in Egyptian foreign policy. Al-Qathafi, ignorant of the impending war, nonetheless sensed Sadat's preoccupation with matters other than the desired merger. Attempting to force Sadat's hand, Al-Qathafi engineered a march of some thirty thousand Libyans from the border to Cairo, where they were to hand a petition to Sadat, demanding immediate unification. (20)

(19) Mussen, William A, Jr "Government and Politics", In : Nelson, Harold D (ed) Libya : A Country Study, Washington D.C. The American University, 1979; p. 217.

(20) Ibid.

The marchers did not reach Cairo, where Egyptians feared they would ransack bars and casinos in a religious demonstration. The incident, rather than precipitate a merger, antagonised the Egyptian public to the extent that Sadat had to cancel the pre-union referendum.

Indications are that the merger, had it proceeded, would have been severely jeopardised by non-political incompatibilities, for cultural differences merely compounded the inherent political divergences. The Egyptian public on the one hand, was deeply suspicious of the level of puritan religiosity prevalent in Libya; whereas the Libyans, on the other hand, resented the high-handed superiority of the Egyptians. (21) Moreover, Sadat was seeking, with his Syrian and Saudi allies, to diminish Libyan influence and to contain and isolate Al-Qathafi's particular brand of Arabism (22) especially in view of the declaration of the Popular Revolution in Libya.

Instituted in April 1973, the Popular Revolution, in Maoist fashion, was designed to create a mass uprising against routinised elements in the state. A more sinister aspect of this cultural revolution, in the light of Al-Qathafi's earlier involvement in destabilisation of the region, was the establishment of a People's Militia; its objective to arm the people so that they could carry out the more missionary dimension of Libyan Islamism. It was an act interpreted by Al-Qathafi's neighbours as a very real para-military threat to their leadership.

(21) Fisher, W. B. "Libya (The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) : Physical and Social Geography", In : The Middle East and North Africa 1984 - 85, London, Europa Publishers Limited, 1984, p. 534.

(22) Vatikiotis, P. J. Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East, London and Sydney, Croom Helm, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984; p. 91.

Arguably Al-Qathafi's greatest setback - second only to the impact of Nasser's death - was the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. His FAR allies, rather than make use of Libya's considerable financial and military strategic resources, did not even inform him of the impending war. Instead, they collaborated with Saudi Arabia, a country, despite its custodianship of Mecca, which falls into the Nasserist category of undesirables : monarchical and traditional :

" Moreover, the war had increased, in the eyes of the people and rulers of the Arab world, the prestige of Sadat and Asad, and even that of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Al-Qadhdhafi had been left out in the cold, and could hardly claim, with any credibility, that he had played any role in that war. His desire to be treated on par with Sadat and Asad had been thwarted, as their newly acquired charisma put al-Qadhdhafi in a position inferior to theirs. " (23)

These events proved to be a watershed in Libyan regional and foreign politics. Revolutionary Libya, disillusioned with - and disbarred from - Arab leadership in the Mashriq, would increasingly look to its west for fulfillment of its goal of bloc formation. The regime would, furthermore, extend its support for Palestinians to other terrorist groups and move closer to the Soviet Union, a country and ideology formerly rejected out of hand.

Libyan westward focus, however, predates the October War. Although Al-Qathafi had withdrawn Libya from the Maghrib's Permanent Consultative

(23) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 133.

Committee, he retained a subsidiary interest in the area, as evidenced by his overtures for bloc formation, at the time when FAR negotiations were stalling, to Malta (at the time of Malta's dispute with Britain over the use of the military bases) and a year later to Tunisia :

" In December 1972, in a speech in Tunis, he proposed the union of Libya and Tunisia, much to the surprise of his audience, not least President Bourguiba, who immediately rejected the idea . . . " (24)

Al-Qathafi had by then embarked upon a two-pronged programme of anti-Zionism. In the first instance, support of Palestinian liberation movements was stepped up. This included, inter alia, the establishment of training camps in Libya; (25) training centres for non-Palestinian volunteers were established, such as the "First Nasserite Volunteers Center" in July 1972; (26) Libyan volunteers were sent to Lebanon to join Palestinian forces; (27) and sanctuary was provided for the terrorists responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre. (28)

Secondly, the anti-Israel campaign involved a new, pro-African orientation.

" Mindful of Israel's activities in the African continent, Libya has exerted great efforts towards weakening the Israeli influence in Africa. Having the financial ability and, more significant,

(24) Fisher, loc cit.

(25) "The Libyan Problem", In : Department of State Bulletin, Volume 83, Number 2079, October 1983, Washington D.C. United States Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication; p. 77.

(26) Alexander, op cit; p. 831.

(27) Mussen, op cit; p. 220.

(28) Department of State Bulletin, Volume 83, Number 2079, October 1983, op cit; p. 71.

new ideological perceptions, the new leaders began to alter the picture. Their primary aim was to win the support of those African countries against Israel. Within this frame of reference, the Libyan leaders had decided to spend generously in every direction and form. " (29)

Al-Qathafi's tactics were simple. In order for Libya to oust Israeli influence and substitute it with Arab influence, diplomatic relations would be established, magnanimous aid would be distributed, and finally, recipient countries (e.g. Uganda, Chad, People's Republic of Congo, Niger, Mali) would be persuaded, as a reciprocal gesture, to sever all links with Israel. (30)

Al-Qathafi certainly derived secondary, ulterior, benefits from these policies. Not only would he be perceived, regionally, to take an active stance on the anti-Israel issue; but he would be perceived, internally, as pursuing a multi-faceted foreign policy. Thus,

" Even the shift from the pre-eminently Arab orientation in the early and mid-1970s to an African orientation . . . did not show a real change of course either on an ideological level or on the political plane. It was undoubtedly a tactical adjustment necessitated by the difficult isolation which was imposed on Libya by the Arab countries. Moreover, the Libyans needed to ensure the supply of some raw materials and to keep tabs on situations which could become dangerous for Libyan national security. " (31)

(29) Shembesh, op cit; p. 212.

(30) Ibid; p. 213.

(31) Amoretti, B. Scarcia "Libyan Loneliness in Facing the World : The Challenge of Islam?" In : Dawisha, Adeed (ed) Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; p. 60.

Libya, in regarding itself as "taqaddumi" (progressive), declared its willingness to support coups and revolutions against traditionalist and/or monarchical regimes. (32) Al-Qathafi, however, was selective, particularly during the early years of his regime, about which coups to support.

He gave moral and verbal support - at the least - to attempted coups directed against King Hassan of Morocco in July 1971 and August 1972. On the other hand, he thwarted an attempted communist coup in the Sudan in July 1971. (33) The longstanding feud with Chad was initiated in 1970 with the establishment of training camps in Libya for dissident Chadian tribes. Similarly, as with the Aozou Strip of Chad, Libyan atlases reflect portions of Niger's Toummo Region as falling within the Libyan borders. Here too, the border dispute has taken on another dimension, with Al-Qathafi providing training facilities for the Niger dissidents, and using ethnic divisions to gain a foothold with the Tuareg of Niger. (34)

Al-Qathafi's early forays into Africa, where not premeditated to be anti-Israeli, were expansionist and disruptive; yet his opportunism obscured his long-term consistency. (35) In his pursuit of the Nasserist conception of three spheres of concern, the Arab circle, the African continent, and the global Islamic circle, Al-Qathafi has maintained

(32) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 132.

(33) Ibid.

(34) Department of State Bulletin, Volume 83, Number 2079, October 1983; opcit; pp. 73 and 75.

(35) Zartman, I. William and Kluge, A. G. "Heroic Politics : The Foreign Policy of Libya", In : Korany, Baghat and Desouki, Ali E. Hilla (eds) The Foreign Policies of Arab States, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1984; p. 183.

" . . . both an adherence to and a unique
elaboration of Nasserism. " (36)

2. Arab Rebuff, African Substitutes; 1973 - 1977

The Libyan foreign policy orientation of extreme Nasserism was eclipsed - but not abrogated - by Al-Qathafi's isolation in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. In response to Libya's isolation from the "progressive" Arab East, Al-Qathafi redirected his foreign policy to accommodate a greater shift towards the Arab West.

Libya had, by 1973, demarcated three distinct spheres of interest. Initially, the prime target was the unification of the "progressive" Mashriq, hence his attempted bloc formations with Egypt and Syria. Of secondary import was the Maghrib, his early relations with his neighbours - particularly after his unification proposals were rejected - often of an aggressive nature. Libya's focus on Black Africa was an extension of its North African policy, but revolving not so much around territorial expansionism, as in North Africa, or diplomatic diversification, as around the desire to isolate Israel.

Thirdly, Libya would be extensively involved in what is considered the global Islamic community. This aspect of Libyan foreign policy, too, contained a deliberate dualism in which Arab Muslims, specifically the Palestinians, played a dominant role. Non-Arab Muslim communities, including revivalists and secessionists, were considered secondary priorities.

(36) Ibid; p. 177.

Although Libya was forced into the periphery of the Mashriq, its dualist foreign policy - the centralism of Egypt on the one hand, the desire for bloc formation on the other - was not compromised. Bloc formation would be redirected towards the west, while relations with Sadat would continue to cloud Al-Qathafi's perspective of the Arab East.

Al-Qathafi's immediate response to his blatant isolation from the Mashriq, was to enter into union with Tunisia, in January 1974. This unexpected merger, however, lasted but one day before President Bourguiba - under duress from Algeria - reneged on the unification plans.

In retaliation for this slight, Al-Qathafi announced, in a major speech speech one month later, that Libya would arm and train guerilla fighters to overthrow the leadership of Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. These were statements which, he claimed, while paying lip service to Arab unity, in practice obstructed any and all moves in that direction. (37)

Al-Qathafi's withdrawal from Libyan politics, to devote himself to the formulation of the Third Universal Theory, coincided with a greater emphasis on Islamism in Libyan regional policy. Libyan involvement in Chad and Niger, first on a basis of subversion, then by direct military occupation, constituted the first concretization of Al-Qathafi's ambition to establish a Pan-Islamic African federation. (38)

" . . . about Qadhdhafi's designs on Saharan Africa. The common wisdom is that he is trying

(37) Van Rensburg, op cit; pp. 202 - 203.

(38) St. John (Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies, in : Current History, Volume 80, Number 470, December 1981), op cit; p. 428.

to build a Muslim empire there, exploiting the internal weaknesses of regimes such as those of Chad and Upper Volta and suborning local leaders through gifts of money and arms. " (39)

The Sahel, with its preponderantly Muslim population, presented a natural alternative to the Mashriq. Since Al-Qathafi holds that all Muslims are spiritually united by the Qur'an, their physical separation the result of artificial boundaries imposed by colonialists and upheld by reactionary regimes; it follows that his egalitarian, Islamist ideology would counteract nationalism and facilitate the abrogation of nationstate divisions. Thus, Libya embarked upon a series of adventurist and opportunist policies in that region, including, inter alia, the annexation of the Aozou Strip of Chad in 1973; a border dispute with Niger which resulted in the downfall of the Diouri administration and which culminated in the eventual Libyan annexation, in 1976, of parts of Niger. (40)

The Sahel, however, falls within the Algerian sphere of influence. Endeavouring to both mollify and neutralise that country, Libya entered into a Mutual Defence Pact with Algeria in 1975. The Pact has remained nothing but a gesture of expedience, since relations with Algeria have been clouded not only by Al-Qathafi's Sahelian designs but by a border dispute involving an area of oil-rich land. (41)

(39) Parker, op cit; pp. 71 - 72.

(40) Ogunbadejo, Oye "Qaddafi's North African Design", In : International Security, Volume 8, Number 1, Summer 1983; p. 160.

(41) "Libya : Still a Threat to Western Interests?", In : Conflict Studies, Number 160, Gutteridge, William (ed), London, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984; p. 15.

Al-Qathafi's establishment of the Islamic Legion, a military force composed of Libyans and recruits from Muslim African countries, which he has not hesitated to use - acting in concert with his Bureau for the Export of Revolution - to intervene in the domestic affairs of his neighbours, in particular Chad, reflected the militant aspect of his Pan-Islamist drive. On a more subtle basis, Al-Qathafi had been spreading his version of Islam in a deliberate and organised manner throughout Africa.

Islamic centres comprised of schools, mosques and even clinics, had been erected in several African countries by the Libyans - often linked to foreign aid or technical cooperation with the government in question. Al-Qathafi has not hesitated to use financial incentive in his Islamist programme, even at the highest level, viz. the successful conversion to Islam - at Al-Qathafi's instigation - by the heads of state of Gabon, the Central African Republic, Uganda and Benin. In each case, the convert and his country were "rewarded" with treaties of economic cooperation with Libya. (42)

To some extent, Libyan proselytising in Africa was precipitated by its alienation from the Arab community to its east - a condition of purdah which induced Al-Qathafi into a careful reconsideration of his almost exclusively Arabist Weltanschauung.

With the Revolution, Al-Qathafi had not only committed Libya to a Nasserist policy of Arab reunification, but in couching his ideology in

(42) Oded, Arye "The Islamic Factor in Afro-Arab Relations", In : The Middle East Review, Volume XVIII, Number 3, Spring 1986; p. 21.

strong Islamist terminology, he relied on the notion that Arabism could not be separated from Islam. When Libya entered a new internal revolutionary phase, coinciding with its alienation from the Mashriq, Al-Qathafi needed to redefine not only the state of the nation, but its ideological aspirations in terms of a new regional focus.

The Third Universal Theory was conceived not only as an internal mechanism with which to mobilise support for his revolutionary programmes. It was designed with the non-Islamic world in mind, as a universalist ideology which, while possibly derived from Islam, embraced the fundamental concepts of humanism and naturalism as essential factors in the development of human society. Thus, a whole new market could become accessible to Libyan influence, both in Al-Qathafi's revolution-mongering in the non-Islamic world, and by consolidating his Theory in terms of Islamism in Muslim countries. Moreover, despite the absence of any reference to Islam in the Green Book,

" . . . in the foreign policy field, the emphasis on humanism, which is much more readily understood universally than Islam itself, helps Islam to be projected on the global plane as the highest historical achievement of humanity and the essential matrix of all the history of humanity. " (43)

This apparant reconstruction of the Libyan foreign policy orientation, however, could not guarantee a greater palatability for Al-Qathafi's contrivances in North Africa.

(43) Amoretti, op cit; p. 61.

Libyan relations with Tunisia, in decline after Bourguiba's rejection of the 1974 unification proposals, were subjected to more strain when Tunisia supported the partitioning of the Western Sahara territory between Morocco and Mauritania in 1975; Libya being a staunch backer of POLISARIO. At the same time, the Sudan had been moving closer to the West and further away from its official policy of socialism. In view of a possible loss of grassroots socialist support in those two countries, Al-Qathafi actively supported a coup against each regime.

Following the failure of these coups, he expelled the sizeable Sudanese and Tunisian workforce from Libya ⁽⁴⁴⁾ - a workforce recruited upon his deportation of some two hundred and fifty thousand Egyptian migrants after his humiliation by Sadat. In real terms, Al-Qathafi hereby not only alienated Numeiry and Bourguiba, but created a labour pool vacuum, and lost his most effective conduit with which to export the Third Universal Theory into North Africa. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

Thus, Al-Qathafi's hopes of destabilising Egypt by weaning away its diplomatic and trading partners, were dashed. Not only had Sadat isolated Libya from the Mashriq; but Al-Qathafi himself, through his aggressive pursuit of regionalism, alienated Libya from the Maghrib and Sahel.

Al-Qathafi's abortive campaign to the west, however, was compensated for by Sadat's growing estrangement from the Mashriq - the result of

(44) Muesen, op cit; p. 223 and Conflict Studies, Number 160, op cit; p. 16.

(45) Sarhane, Ghazi "Diplomacy Libyan Style", In : AfricaAsia, Number 6, June 1984; p. 38.

his series of negotiations with Israel which culminated in the Camp David Accord.

As Al-Qathafi envisaged, Libyan-Egyptian regional and foreign policy evolved along parallel lines - but towards opposite goals. The failure of the nascent merger of 1973 and Al-Qathafi's non-role in the October war signified the beginning of a new era of Libyan-Egyptian relations; not an end to it.

For some time, during the period 1974 to mid-1977, the relationship was characterised by verbal hostility. The so-called "war of the waves" was launched by Al-Qathafi's public critique of the manner in which Sadat conducted the war with Israel, an exposition of the shortcomings of Sadat's aims and a condemnation of the entire effort as

" . . . merely a nationalistic attempt
to regain lost territory. " (46)

Within the next eighteen months, Al-Qathafi was not only implicated in three attempted coups in Egypt, but he publicly called on the Egyptian people to overthrow Sadat's regime. Sadat's response was to cast aspersions on the Libyan leader's sanity and to enter into a mutual cooperation agreement with Sudan and Saudi Arabia - clearly an anti-Libyan pact.

At the time, Libya appeared to move into the Soviet sphere; replacing Egypt not just as an arms-buyer, but as a possible site for Soviet

(46) Mussen, op cit; p. 218.

military bases in the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, Sadat steered his country towards the West, at first with the Kissinger "shuttle-diplomacy" phase during which the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements were negotiated and finally with the repudiation of the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

In view of Al-Qathafi's consideration that Libya and Egypt must either unite or embark upon a collision course, the border war of 1977 - although lasting only a few weeks, coming so soon in the wake of the declaration of the Jamahiriya and the concomitant massive sweep of socialist reforms in Libya - assumed significant ideological proportions.

"... the closer the Libyan ties with the Soviet Union became, the more legitimate appeared Sadat's claim in the eyes of the United States that Egypt was the bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East and Africa." (47)

Recognising the utility of its anti-Sadat crusade, Libya, in September 1977, made appeasing advances to Egypt. Briefly, good-neighbourliness governed their relations, only to be finally destroyed by Sadat's peace treaty with Israel. Once again, an Egyptian leader effectively unhinged the fulcrum of inter-Arab relations; in the process offering the Libyan leader a shot at Arab leadership.

3. "Greater Libya" : Consultation to Confrontation; 1977 - 1985

Libya would, during this period, strive to regain some Arab esteem in its

(47) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 135.

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efforts to consolidate Mashriq unity on the issue of Camp David. Notwithstanding his apparent moderation in Arab affairs, Al-Qathafi would also implement his Green Book domestically and on a regional scale, forcefully translate his Third Universal Theory into the design of a "Greater Libya" - a federation of all North African states with some vestige of an Islamic populace, even if only a small minority.

Libya's elusive goal of neutralising Sadat was achieved in 1977, with the creation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (SCF) in Tripoli. The SCF was composed of those states who not only opposed Sadat's unilateral peace with Israel, but who believed that the only solution to the Middle Eastern conflict lay in confronting Israel. SCF signatories included Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO. Iraq attended the convention of these states, but refused to sign the constituent document because of a longstanding feud with Syria. The Tripoli Declaration was issued, compelling the signatories, inter alia, to freeze their relations with Egypt - who responded by severing its relations with them instead.

After the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, a further SCF meeting was held, at which Sadat was denounced for surrendering Palestinian Arab rights to Israel in an action interpreted as placing Egyptian territorial concerns ahead of those of the Arab nation in toto. Later that year, Al-Qathafi convened a special "Arab People's Court" of the SCF, which

" . . . conducted what amounted to a kangaroo court where Sadat was convicted of being a

traitor to the Arab nation. " (48)

Libya, to some extent, achieved a leadership role in Arab affairs during this period by establishing a permanent congress of parties and organisations from all Arab states that opposed the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations; another vehicle Al-Qathafi used, on the popular level, for enhancing his status and influence in the region. A major shortcoming of his initiatives, including the SCF, however, was the failure to incorporate the major Arab powers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Morocco in these measures.

In an Arab Summit Conference convened in Baghdad in November 1978, the Arab League - of which only three memberstates, Sudan, 'Uman, Somalia, supported the Egyptian peace negotiations - suspended Egypt's membership of the organisation and moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. (49)

The wholesale involvement of the Arab League in the matter of Egypt's peace with Israel provided Al-Qathafi with a greater, and more legitimate forum in his anti-Sadat manoeuvres - which he believed would grant him Arab leadership. It meant, however, a considerable ideological adjustment to Libyan foreign policy in the region. First, Al-Qathafi had to seek reconciliation with some of the Arab states he had affronted in the past. He chose to improve relations with a spectrum of states as ideologically diverse as Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait,

(48) Mussen, op cit; p. 219.

(49) Ibid.

Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the two Yemens by visiting each in an extended tour during June 1979.

Furthermore, Libya had to modify its stance on the Israeli problem. Libya had consistently rejected the concept of a peaceful settlement with Israel; believing the only solution to be the elimination of the Jewish state altogether. Since the Arab League had no objection to a settled peace, only to Sadat's independent unilateral negotiations which were perceived to deny the national rights of the Palestinian people and their "inalienable" right to establish an independent sovereign state; Al-Qathafi's own ambitions forced him to abandon Libya's policy of "rejectionism". (50)

The apparent moderation of Libya's Middle Eastern policy, in the wake of Al-Qathafi's return to the Arab fold, was not reciprocated in his relations with the Maghrib. To the contrary, his unsuccessful courtship of North Africa during his Arab exile, led him to embark upon his most controversial venture yet : his full participation in the Chadian civil war. It was, he claimed, at the behest of FROLINAT's Islamist leader, Goukouni Oueddei. In reality, his Bureau for the Export of the Revolution recognised an ideal opportunity to induce a union with Chad, in pursuit of the Greater Muslim Federation in the region.

Al-Qathafi's involvement in Chad, the first explicit and public

(50) Deab and Deeb, op cit; p. 137.

invasion on such a scale of a North African state by a neighbour, was precipitated by repeated failures elsewhere in the region to find a partner either in federation or union.

At first, Libya approached Algeria and Tunisia in mid-1978 with a view to a union, even though relations with Algeria had been strained for some time. Tunisia rejected political unification, opting instead for closer economic cooperation. Al-Qathafi, however, persisted and in an attempt to redress the political imbalance of "progressive" Libya and Algeria as against "moderate" Tunisia; inviting Morocco and Mauritania to join the union. None of these states would be persuaded and Libya had to suffice with increased bilateral commercial development and aid to Tunisia. (51)

Al-Qathafi's unification overtures to Algeria did not relieve their strained relationship. In fact, by the end of that year the situation reached its nadir, despite their superficial affinities. Both states adhered to revolutionary Arabism, imposed state control over their economies, shared the same OPEC policies and supported the POLISARIO cause.

The divergence lay in the threat that Libya's export of its revolution posed to Algeria. Algeria had consistently opposed Libya's attempted mergers with its neighbours, not only because Al-Qathafi encroached on traditionally Algerian spheres of influence, but also because it did not wish to be surrounded - perhaps islandised - by a large unitary

(51) Mussen, op cit; p. 223.

state instead of its present dominance over a couple of relatively weak states. Moreover, Al-Qathafi has never hesitated, in the Soviet model of corruption of opportunity, to promote his own interests while exploiting local opportunities and unrest, (52) in this case, most pointedly with POLISARIO's liberation struggle.

Since the inception of the Western Sahara dispute (upon Spain's granting independence to Spanish Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania each annexed part of the territory and are now locked in combat with POLISARIO), both Libya and Algeria supported POLISARIO, even though Libya had always rejected the creation of smaller states as being contrary to the principle of Arab unity. In his support for POLISARIO - which did not preclude him from withholding recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) for as long as possible - Al-Qathafi managed somehow to retain good relations with Mauritania, one of his economic aid recipients; while enhancing his destabilisation of Morocco. The latter was achieved through Al-Qathafi's support of Algeria, when Morocco threatened to pursue POLISARIO guerillas into Algeria, where they had been harboured.

Simultaneously, Al-Qathafi's support for POLISARIO was designed to unsettle Algeria. As Algerian regional dominance to the east waned in terms of Libya's military success in Chad, Al-Qathafi's patronage of POLISARIO to Algeria's west increasingly raised the spectre of a Libyan-led Muslim Federation. Thus Algeria was forced to increase

(52) "Libya's Foreign and Defense Policy", in : Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 46, Jerusalem, Media Analysis Center, 25 June 1980; p. 4.

its financial backing of POLISARIO; vying for its previously unchallenged position. By November 1980, Al-Qathafi had been using Chad as an entry point for his army into Algeria, favourable relations already secured with Algerian Muslim fundamentalists sympathetic towards his Third Universal Theory, and Libya having virtually entirely taken over POLISARIO. As the Algerian leadership realised only too well of POLISARIO,

" . . . the organization constitutes the representative of the Western Sahara tribes in Algeria, Mali and Niger -- a standing that makes the organization a springboard for the Sahara bloc plan under Qadhafi's leadership. " (53)

To this extent, observers believe that Al-Qathafi not only wants to be the new Nasser, but an Afro-Arab Castro who has the resources to supply, train and support guerillas; while commanding a strategic coastline, with air and naval bases capable of monitoring any military movement in the Mediterranean. Certainly, to the distress of several neighboring states, in particular Algeria, Al-Qathafi had been fomenting Islamist fundamentalist insurrection in Senegal, stepped up training of the nomadic Tuareg who have access virtually to the heart of the continent and had established twenty training centres exclusively for rebels from Benin, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Zaire, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Egypt. (54)

(53) "Qadhafi's Foreign and Defense Policy (Part III)", in : Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 74, Jerusalem, Media Analysis Center, 20 January 1981; p. 2.

(54) Libya's Foreign and Defense Policy (In Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 46, 25 June 1980), op cit; pp. 3 - 4.

Fears that Al-Qathafi intends to establish, by military force, a Libyan-led North African federation, have been lent credence by the successful implementation of several campaigns : to his east, the alienation of Egypt; to his west, the steady destabilisation of Algeria and Morocco and the takeover of POLISARIO; but most ominously, the extent to which Al-Qathafi appears to control the Chadian civil war to his south.

Libya's initial Chadian policy, under the Al-Qathafi regime, was dualist : on the one hand, there was the politico-religious ploy which sought President Francois Tombalbaye's conversion to Islam, coupled with offers of large sums of money to compensate for the loss of the Aozou Strip; and on the other hand, the subversive activity of establishing training camps for dissident Toubou and Tuareg tribesmen.

The latter stage of Al-Qathafi's actual military involvement, stems from his skillful exploitation of the rivalry between the two leaders of the northern Muslim rebels, Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habre, who were unable to find agreement on the issue of the annexure of the Aozou Strip, which in effect meant that their patron was depriving them of their own land. Since Habre refused to accept the Libyan seizure of Chadian territory and Goukouni, generally regarded as the weaker party, was unable to consolidate the rebels under his leadership; Goukouni's only means to power was to enter into a clientele relationship with Libya during the late 1970s. (55)

(55) Department of State Bulletin, Volume 83, Number 2079, October 1983, op cit; p. 73.

This relationship enabled Goukouni in 1978 to invade southern Chad in an attempt to overthrow the new regime of Felix Malloum. Although Malloum was able to stem the campaign, the destabilising effect of the invasion resulted in his downfall, and in the establishment, by the Lagos Accords, of the Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT), a transitional government headed by Goukouni.

GUNT was neither a solution to an already protracted war, nor a body willing or able to cease hostilities and impose cohesion on the country. Each member of GUNT, leader each of a different faction, continued to promote his own interests and advance; the most active Habre, who operated an army from Sudanese bases with Egyptian support. With the French unable to crystallise a clear policy and wavering in their support; first for one, then for another faction, Goukouni was left with no option other than turn to Libya. Under the guise of a Mutual Defense Pact, signed with Al-Qathafi in June 1980, Goukouni formalised the aid he had been receiving from Libya, and provided the legal framework for the intervention to follow.

" Goukouni went to Tripoli in November 1980 to request more aid from Qaddafi. Libyan military forces, including the Islamic Legion and armored units, with logistical support from foreign mercenaries, entered Chad later that month and reached N'Djamena in December. Qaddafi's ability to accomplish this substantial overland effort provoked some surprise among French and U. S. officials. " (56)

(56) Yost, David S. "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge", In : Orbis, Volume 26, Number 4, Winter 1983; p. 971.

The announcement in January 1981 of a merger between Chad and Libya met with such international protest that the two governments, within days, had to refute their joint communique on the issue as a "mistranslated misinterpretation".

At the end of 1981, Goukouni, under French pressure, requested the withdrawal of the Libyan troops, who were to be replaced with an OAU peacekeeping force. The measure of the extent of French pressure lies in the fact that Goukouni and Al-Qathafi had originally agreed that the Libyan forces would withdraw, at Goukouni's request, only when he felt that his leadership was secure; at the time of the Libyan withdrawal, his hold on the transitional government was at best shaky. (57)

Since Al-Qathafi coveted the Chairmanship of the OAU for 1982 and would be able to use his occupation of Chad as an example of goodneighbourly "humanitarian peacekeeping" - and since he left enough arms behind to ensure the continuation of the war; in a withdrawal which the French had estimated would last two months, he also left behind a power vacuum designed to stimulate the war and therefore to guarantee his return.

The OAU forces were unable to sustain GUN and proved ineffectual in containing Habre's military threat. By mid-1982, it had become clear that Goukouni would be unseated, but his request for Libya's return

(57) Buijtenhuijs, R. "Het 'groene' imperialisme van Kadhafi : Libië en Tsjaad", in : Internationale Spectator, Volume XXXVI, Number 7, July 1982; p. 475.

to Chad was refused. Although Al-Qathafi never offered an explanation for his refusal, other than claiming "neutrality", it was obvious that his chances of hosting the OAU Summit would be severely jeopardised by another invasion of Chad. In the event, Goukouni was ousted in June 1982 by Habre, who assumed leadership of GUNT; Al-Qathafi lost the Summit, being unable, on two occasions, to gather a quorum of Heads of State.

Although, outwardly, Al-Qathafi maintained his neutral posture throughout 1982, he was occupied, covertly, in Chad :

" Qadhafi intended the 1983 phase of the Chadian war to appear as purely indigenous. For a year he recruited, trained, organized and armed Chadian dissidents under Goukouni's nominal leadership. " (58)

At Habre's request, a combined French, American and Zairian force attacked and defeated the rebels; an action leading to Al-Qathafi's decision to intervene again, militarily - this time extensively from both the north and the south. By 1985, the Chadian civil war had lost much of its national character, Goukouni and Habre mere figureheads, with Libya and France fighting the battles and neither side clearly winning. This, despite their joint agreement, in 1984, each to withdraw all their troops.

Throughout the conflict, Al-Qathafi has maintained that Chad is a "vital space" and "strategic glacis" for Libya's future. With Libyan experts concerned that their oil reserves will not last another decade, and Chad being considered not only oil rich, but uranium rich (particularly

(58) Department of State Bulletin, Volume 83, Number 2079, October 1983; loc cit.

in the Aozou Strip); the Chadian scenario provided a perfect receptacle for the two leading principles underlying Al-Qathafi's foreign policy : Nasserism and radical Islamism.

" First, the principle of Nasserism, meaning the political-military union under Libyan hegemony in the African arena as a first step towards similar union in the Arab arena. In this connection, Qadhafi also aspires to offset his growing isolation in the Arab sphere by means of victories in the African arena. The second principle is that of "Radical Islam", namely the imposition of Islam through cooperation with other ideologies having common interests - such as the USSR - and through the shunting aside of other ideologies having conflicting interests, such as that of the West. " (59)

These two principal Libyan foreign policy objectives have converged in Chad in such a manner as to obfuscate the differences - if any - between them. Al-Qathafi's multinational Islamic Legion, having served its apprenticeship, is now considered the nucleus of the army of his desired Muslim federal state. To this extent, he has had published maps of the envisaged "Greater Libya", which is to be comprised, inter alia, of Libya, Chad, Niger, Tunisia and Algeria.

In this regard, Al-Qathafi justifies his annexation of the Aozou Strip, small parts of Niger and eastern Algeria, as maintenance of the OAU's principle of honouring colonial boundaries. Since these are all

(59) "Qadhafi's Foreign and Defense Policy", In : Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 72, Jerusalem, Media Analysis Center, 6 January 1981; p. 2.

portions of land which were granted, inter alia, to the Italian colonial administration, but significantly, in treaties that were never ratified, Al-Qathafi's claims are made all the more spurious. (60)

The danger of a Libyan victory in Chad, lies not in the merger of the two countries to produce a large Muslim state; but in the opportunities such a merger would offer Al-Qathafi to extend his destabilising and expansionist policies into the heart of Central and West Africa, while simultaneously placing him in the geographic position to weaken Egypt from the direction of the source of the Nile, its "soft belly". (61)

In true Nasserist fashion, Al-Qathafi with his interventionism not only endangered his chances of leadership of the OAU, but acted as catalyst in the ever-shifting bloc alliances within the organisation, causing turbulence over a period of three years and twice failing to convene the OAU Summit - all among unprecedented international interest in the OAU Summits.

" The Organization of African Unity (OAU) suffered the worst setback in its 20-year history on 26 November 1982 when, for the second time in the space of four months, the annual summit scheduled to take place in Tripoli failed for lack of a quorum . . . Technically, the cause of the breakdown of the OAU in August 1982 was the dispute over the admission of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SADR); and the second breakdown in November the dispute over the

(60) Buijtenhuijs, op cit; p. 413.

(61) Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 72, 6 January 1981, op cit; pp. 2 - 4.

seating of the Chad delegation. " (62)

In reality, the OAU and by implication its Chairman, Al-Qathafi, failed to establish consensus due to lack of perception of priority. For the first time in its history, the OAU collapsed because its memberstates were concerned more with Africa's pressing economic needs than with preserving the traditionally delicate balance between radical and moderate states. Al-Qathafi's intransigence - his insistence, in August 1982 on granting the SADR the right to be seated, and his persistence in denying Habre legitimacy as the Chadian delegate, trying to seat Goukouni in November - was as much the result of his regional ambitions, as of his inadequate understanding of African problems at the time.

However, Al-Qathafi's actions were not entirely decisive in the breakdown of the Summit. The OAU should be apportioned equal blame. The 1982 Summit demonstrated clearly that the organisation is in many ways an anachronism, as Nyerere pointed out, it was established to protect the Heads of State, not the people. (63) In the final analysis, it is likely that Al-Qathafi - unawares and therefore unable to prevent any of it - was caught in the death-throes of an organisation manifestly unable to reconstitute itself, its Charter and its constitutional priorities, in terms of a post-independence, underdeveloped continent.

Although ascribed top priority in the quest for the "Greater Libya" -

(62) Cervenka, Zdenek and Legum, Colin "The OAU in 1982 : A Severe Setback for African Unity", In : Legum, Colin (ed) Africa Contemporary Record : Annual Survey and Documents 1982 - 1983, Volume XV, New York and London, Africana Publishing Company, 1984; p. A42.

(63) Ibid, p. A55.

to the extent that Al-Qathafi virtually sabotaged his own OAU Summit in the attempt to legitimise his puppet rebel leader - Chad was not a Libyan foreign policy preoccupation. Employing more acceptable diplomatic measures, Al-Qathafi sought expansion through a merger with Syria in 1980, and in line with his policy of destabilisation and, ultimately, isolation of Egypt, moved closer to Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY).

The Libyan-Syrian merger, however, has remained unconsummated on the political level, whereas on less controversial levels, it has resulted in increased Libyan economic and military aid to Syria. (64) True political union has been forestalled for two reasons: their conflicting interests in the Horn of Africa, where Libya supports the Ethiopian government but Syria the Eritrean rebels; and more importantly, by disagreement about the system of government administration. Assad, who derives his power base from the Ba'ath Party, has been refusing to accede to Al-Qathafi's prerequisite for political union: the implementation of the Green Book, with its concomitant compulsory dismantling of political parties and the institution of popular committees. (65)

The Horn of Africa has experienced extensive Libyan involvement, at first supporting the Eritrean rebels, even after the military coup in Ethiopia in 1974. However, as his relationship with Sadat deteriorated and Al-Qathafi embarked upon his present policy of destabilisation of

(64) Deeb and Deeb, op cit; p. 137.

(65) Qadhafi's Foreign and Defense Policy (Part III), (In Weekly Media Abstract, Report Number 74, 20 January 1981), op cit; p. 5.

Egypt, an alliance with Ethiopia presented the opportunity to implement such strategies not only against Egypt, but also the Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, he not only shifted alliance to become the second state to support the Ethiopian government against the Eritreans (the only other is the PDRY); but acted as intermediary in Ethiopia's purchase of arms from the USSR, to the extent that he ferried the arms from Benghazi to Addis Ababa during the Ogaden war. Moreover, Al-Qathafi entered into a security pact, the Red Sea Alliance, with Ethiopia and the PDRY in August 1981, (66) ostensibly to counter USA influence in the region, but at the same time adding a further complication to his relationship with Assad, a staunch Eritrean supporter.

Having had no success with his campaigns for bloc formation in either North Africa or the Middle East (after being rebuffed by Mauritania and the SADR in 1981), Al-Qathafi embarked upon a novel, unique approach at the end of 1981; an approach which downplayed to a large extent his demand for implementation of the Third Universal Theory in federation memberstates :

" . . . in which union was to be achieved in stages - with the initial emphasis on unifying internal and foreign policies through joint meetings of Cabinets and Parliaments. Algeria and Syria were to be Libya's first two partners in such a process . . . Plans were announced in July [1982] for a joint meeting of the Tunisian and Libyan Cabinets

(66) Makinda, Samuel "Shifting Alliances in the Horn of Africa", In : Survival, Volume XXVII, Number 1, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, January/February 1985; pp. 14 - 15.

and of the South Yemeni and Libyan Cabinets. At a joint meeting of the Algerian and Libyan Cabinets in April [1982] a series of measures was agreed, for example, the coordination of development plans and formation of joint companies. Officials from Libya and Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and South Yemen meet frequently; but none, other than Tripoli, views union as anything but a long way off. " (67)

Within twelve months of this breakthrough in Arab relations, Al-Qathafi seemed to negate his previous efforts in a series of actions incurring him the wrath of the Arab world : by supporting dissident splinter factions in the PLO against Yasir Arafat; by supporting Iran, a non-Arab state, against Iraq in the Gulf War; by condemning Saudi Arabian King Fahd's peace plan and the Fez Summit (relations with Saudi Arabia already at an ebb because of his criticism of the AWAC affair); by denouncing the Arab world for not resisting the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and by castigating King Hussein of Jordan for accompanying King Hassan of Morocco and President Mubarak of Egypt to Washington. As a result, he was largely excluded from Algeria's proposed plans for Maghrib unity; but his stance on Lebanon and the PLO seemed to be vindicated by the next year, at which time the Arab states joined him in condemnation of the Lebanon invasion, relations with the major Arab states thus being restored; and by which time the Libyan-backed PLO dissidents gained control enough of the movement for Arafat to be

(67) "Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya : Economic Hardship Fails to Dampen Revolutionary Ardour", In : Legum, Colin (ed) Africa Contemporary Record : Annual Survey and Documents 1982 - 1983, Volume XV, New York and London, Africana Publishing Company, 1984; p. 850.

forced to flee Lebanon. (68)

Libya's greatest volte face yet, in his relationship with Morocco and as direct consequence thereof, with the SADR, was the Oudja Treaty of union of states with Morocco in August 1984. An about-turn not by Al-Qathafi's design, but by King Hassan's, the treaty astonished not only Morocco's closest allies, the USA, France and Saudi Arabia, and its greatest regional rival, Algeria; but Al-Qathafi, King Hassan reported, was "dumbfounded" by the proposal. Morocco's allies feared that the union would enhance Al-Qathafi's stature in the Maghrib, since his isolation in the region - the result of his involvement in Chad and his destabilisation of the Sudan and Algeria - might very well be ended; Algeria, probably concerned that the union was a countermeasure to its Treaty of Maghrib Unity of 1983 of which the other two signatories were Tunisia and Mauritania (the latter one of Hassan's opponents in the SADR dispute), and likely to have been perturbed about the possibility of Hassan turning a blind eye should Libya use Morocco as a springboard into Algeria; denounced the union as a potential cause of destruction and discord. (69)

Ratified within a month with massive approval in both countries, the treaty of union does not anticipate true political union. Rather, it is a loose association or formal diplomatic alliance, in which each state

(68) "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya : Slow Economic Recovery, Few Revolutionary Successes," In : Legum, Colin (ed) Africa Contemporary Record : Annual Survey and Documents 1983 - 1984, Volume XVI, New York and London, Africana Publishing Company, 1985; pp. B40 - B41.

(69) Ritchie, op cit; p. 149.

retains its own institutions, providing for consultation and cooperation, with a special proviso stating that aggression against one signatory would be considered aggression against the other. (70)

Clearly, Morocco is the chief beneficiary of the treaty. Not only will Hassan undoubtedly derive economic benefits, as have all Al-Qathafi's partners in the past, but Libya has renounced its support for the SADR, calling for the dispute to be settled "in an Arab context". This suggestion has been welcomed not only by Morocco, who stands only to lose if the matter remains in the hands of the OAU, but also by a number of African states who would be happy to rid the OAU of a problem which has virtually paralysed, and almost destroyed, it. (71) Furthermore, the hint of the mutual defense pact in the treaty would ensure for each signatory that the other's armed forces would be at its disposal; in the case of Morocco, potentially against POLISARIO, for Libya, in aid of its border dispute, now close to a military clash, with Algeria.

As for Libya, Al-Qathafi's ambition to convert the Moroccan kingdom into an Islamist state in terms of the Third Universal Theory, will have to be suspended; not only because of the union, or because Hassan is a staunch opposer of Iran, which Al-Qathafi has been supporting, but because Hassan has recently been clamping down on fundamentalist Islamism. In July 1984, forty Islamists were tried for treason (attempting to establish an Islamist Republic) : sixteen were condemned to death, the others received harsh prison sentences. (72) Coming a month before the signing of the Oudja

(70) Morrison, Godfrey "The Kingdom of Morocco", In : Africa Report, Volume 29, Number 26, November-December 1984; p. 15.

(71) Ibid.

(72) Ibid, p. 16.

Treaty, it was perhaps intended as a strong deterrent signal to Libya's Bureau for the Export of the Revolution.

Having no definite, positive gain to show from the merger, other than the oblique reference to mutual defense in the event of aggression, Libya has, nonetheless, not been unable to justify the merger. It has been presented to the world in terms consistent with Libya's long-term objectives :

" Unity becomes a necessity, regardless of who is in power in any country - monarchy or socialists. Regimes can be changed, but the people will remain.

From this context, we strive by all means to unite the Arab world and thus this federation with Morocco. It has a new element in that it is the first time in Arab history that we are seeking Arab and African unity - a federation between Arabs and Africans. And our belief comes from the charter of the OAU. We believe in African unity, and in the complementarity between Arab and African nations. " (73)

As a further boon to his revered Maghribi stature, Al-Qathafi's relationship with Tunisia was resolved amicably with the reinstatement of full diplomatic ties and the resumption of the joint economic projects which were abandoned in 1983, when relations were severed as a result of Al-Qathafi's backing of Tunisian rebels. These projects included the formation of a joint investment bank; a loan to Tunisia of twenty million

(73) Novicki, Margaret A. "Interview : Ali Treki : Foreign Minister, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", In : Africa Report, Volume 29, Number 6, November-December 1984; p. 19.

dollars to upgrade the road network near the Libyan border; and further Libyan financing (of forty million dollars) for a high-tension electricity network which would link southern Tunisia with Libya's national electricity grid. Furthermore, cooperation was to be extended into the areas of education, culture, information, manpower and vocational training; and a joint security commission (for the border area) was to be established. (74)

By the end of 1985, however, it appeared that Al-Qathafi's newfound positive Maghribi relations had deteriorated once again, to reach the same level of volatility as his Middle Eastern relations. Libya walked out of the Islamic Conference Organisation when Egypt was readmitted; continued to support various factions in the PLO; remained highly critical of the Saudi Arabian Middle Eastern peace initiative and tried to smuggle armed gunmen into Mecca on the pretext of making the pilgrimage; and has oscillated in support first of the Muslim opposition, then of the Christian-led government in the Lebanese conflict. In the Gulf War, however, Libya had small success - it has been joined by Syria, support of Iran.

In the Maghrib, relations with Al-Qathafi's newfound ally, Morocco, remained cordial, while a new ally was found in the Sudan, where Numeiry had been ousted in a military coup. To Al-Qathafi's delight, this country, which shares the Nile border with Egypt, entered into a military agreement with Libya, renouncing Numeiry's defense pact with Egypt, further offended Mubarak by cancelling an official visit to Egypt at the

(74) Ritchie, op cit; p. 151.

last minute and going to Libya instead, and, importantly, announced that it would abrogate all agreements with Egypt entered into by Numeiry. (75)

In a shock move in August 1985, Al-Qathafi expelled the entire Tunisian, Egyptian, Malian and Niger labour forces from Libya. Although Libya has suffered some economic setbacks, observers believe that the expulsions, aimed primarily at the Tunisian and Egyptian migrant labourers, have been too selective to have been conditioned by economic cutbacks. (76)

The expulsions followed in the wake of Egypt's refusal to acquiesce to Libyan demands to renounce the Camp David Accords and enter into union with Libya; in reward for which Libya pledged to replace in full all American aid to Egypt. Al-Qathafi, in addition to expelling all its migrants, unilaterally broke off the trading and economic projects with Tunisia - reinstituted only ten months earlier - justifying these measures, economically crippling to the migrant national states, on two levels.

First, he justified these moves as being essentially, and manifestly, anti-American : as long as migrants take their salaries home, they are sustaining pro-American, thus pro-Camp David governments. Furthermore, Tunisia had been moving closer, diplomatically, to Algeria, which has, in a strange reversal of roles, been occupying Libyan land in a new

(75) The Economist, July 20, 1985; p. 50.

(76) Fawat, Ibrahim "Libya : Economic Crisis, Political Expulsions", In : AfricaAsia, Number 22, October 1985; p. 32.

border dispute over a Libyan strip of gas-rich land. (77)

Secondly, the migrant workers, prior to their expulsion, had refused to comply with Al-Qathafi's demand that they adopt Libyan citizenship; his hope being that having thousands of dual citizens in Libya, he would be able to manipulate his way into unification with their countries of origin and, simultaneously, export his Third Universal Theory to their relatively poor countries via their financially beneficial experience in Libya. Thus, the refusal to adopt Libyan citizenship has been interpreted as a rejection of his aspirations for regional leadership. In so far as this matter has affected his allies, Morocco and the Sudan - Morocco, which not only mediated, initially, the peace talks between Egypt and Israel, but which hosts the American Sixth Fleet - they stand only to benefit, since their citizens will be called upon to fill the newly-created labour vacuum. (78)

Should Al-Qathafi be able to maintain his current good relations with Morocco and the Sudan, and reach some compromise in Chad, it is feasible that he would be in a position to approach his elusive goal of the "Greater Libya" on a less volatile, although more time consuming, long-term basis; perhaps in like manner as had successfully initiated with Arab states in 1981-1982, Morocco having already agreed to the establishment of a joint legislature.

Libya's relations with the Mashriq appear to mirror its Maghribi

(77) Sbati, Ali "Gaddafi's Expulsion Order", In : Concord Weekly, 29 August 1985; p. 21.

(78) Fawat, op cit; p. 33.

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(77) Sbai, Ali "Gaddafi's Expulsion Order", In : Concord Weekly, 29 August 1985; p. 21.

(78) Fawat, op cit; p. 33.

position : isolation by the majority of the region, close relations with only one radical state, Syria (in the case of the Maghrib, the Sudan) and an unanticipated rapprochement from one of the conservative mainstays, Saudi Arabia (as with Morocco, in the Maghrib).

Saudi Arabia agreed, in 1984, to support Al-Qathafi's Islamic Call Society, an institution geared towards winning converts to Islam and strengthening existing Muslim societies, mainly in Africa. Induced by an ulterior motive, Saudi Arabia initiated this thaw in their relations seeking a quid pro quo. The Saudis, who support Iraq in the Gulf War, have been subjected to a series of clandestine hostilities emanating from Iran, which aims at destabilising the entire Gulf area.

" The Saudis are now seeking to turn Gadhafy's friendship with the Ayatollah Khomeiny to get him to act as an interlocuter to persuade the Iranians to stop their hostile clandestine activities against themselves and the other Gulf States, and to establish suitable terms to end the war with Iraq . . . to seek Libya's intervention with the Iranians to guarantee that they would not allow the war with Iraq to spill over into either Saudi Arabia or the other Gulf countries. Gadhafy apparently agreed to use his good offices for this purpose. " (79)

Nonetheless, the reconciliation with Saudi Arabia has not improved Libya's status as a maverick in the Mashriq and it would appear that there could be no short-term prospect of Al-Qathafi's readmission to

(79) Legum, Colin "Saudis Move to Support Gadhafy's Efforts to Spread Islam in Africa", In : Legum, Colin (ed) Third World Reports, Number CV.2. February 24, 1984; p. 2.

the Arab fold unless he would compromise on fundamental principles such as the split in the PLO, his support for Iran in the destabilisation of the Gulf area, and negotiated settlement with Israel - all of which he considers non-negotiables.

4. International Implications

Arab nationalism - with its concomitant desire for Arab reunification - being the central thesis in Al-Qathafi's ideology, it not only conditioned Libyan subsystemic interaction, but determined Libya's international relations.

Within the context of the bipolar international system, Al-Qathafi maintains, on a rhetorical level, Libyan neutralism : the rejection of and refusal to commit Libya to either of the superpower ideologies. The realistic application of Libya's non-alignment illustrates the typical Third World distortion of that concept. Characterised by a deeprooted resentment of the West in general, and of the USA in particular; Third World neutrality signifies a ready willingness to collaborate, although within defined parameters, with the Soviet Union.

Al-Qathafi's resentment of the Western world derives from his rejection of its ethos : the primary philosophical, religious and political body of precepts of this civilisation; frequently expressed in emotively charged opposition to the United States and its protege, Israel, the enemy of the reunited Arabia Al-Qathafi seeks. (80)

(80) Haley, P. Edward Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969, New York, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984; p. 10.

American fears, during the early years of Al-Qathafi's regime, that the determination to steer Libya on a non-aligned course, would assume the same distortion as the Nasserist model of non-alignment, whereby a country would become increasingly enveloped by the Soviet Union as a result of acceptance of Soviet arms supplies and politico-economic advisers (particularly where the recipient country had initiated the relationship); led the United States not only to invest extensively in Libya on a commercial basis, but twice to forewarn Al-Qathafi of attempts to unseat him. These American decisions were partly motivated, in addition, by the fact that Al-Qathafi's neutrality took the form not only of expulsion of the British and U.S. military forces, but of the denial of landing rights and port facilities to the Soviet Union. (81) Thus, the Americans, perceiving Al-Qathafi as a virulently anti-communist patriot; and in seeking to keep the Soviets a foothold into the Mediterranean, protected Al-Qathafi from being red, during the uneasy first years of the Revolution, that he would remain in power. (82)

Although Al-Qathafi has, since a 1974 treaty, been an enthusiastic military client of the Soviets, and an inimical critic of the United States, his fundamental commitment to his Islamist "Third Way" has endured and has never really been ideologically compromised :

" In fact, however, as the Soviets themselves have undoubtedly gathered, Qadhdhafi's growing reliance on Eastern-bloc arms supplies and trade relations throughout the 1970's would make him

(81) Cooley, op cit; p. 241.

(82) Ibid; pp. 83 and 96 - 100.

no more amenable to their direction than his continuing dependence upon American and European oil companies and markets made him willing to accommodate Western political interests. " (83)

The Middle Eastern subsystem, with its peripheral members, has been a relatively new area of strategic concern to both superpowers - dating approximately from the Cold War period. (84) Their common cause in this arena, infrequently mutually cooperative, has been characterised by tendentious aggression - aimed not at the subsystem itself, but exhibited in their virtually identical policies of containment each of the other's potential vantage. In this respect, the Soviet relationship with both Maghrib and Mashriq exemplifies its predilection for "corruption of opportunity", often to the benefit of its long-term goals.

" For all of its rhetorical emphasis on a comprehensive approach to Middle East peace-making, historically the Soviet Union has not allocated important material or political resources to the search for a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Instead, throughout the 30 years of its active Middle East involvement, Moscow has sought to advance its interests and undercut those of its principal Western adversaries through careful cultivation of bilateral political, economic, and especially arms supply relationships with

(33) Anderson, Lisa "Qadhafi and the Kremlin", In : Problems of Communism, Volume XXXIV, Number 5, September - October 1985; p. 29.

(84) Atherton, Alfred L. Jr. "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View", In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 39, Number 4, Autumn 1985, p. 688.

key states in the region. " (85)

The Libyan Republic's early relations with the Soviet Union were characterised by, some observers believe, dichotomy. (86) In reality, Al-Qathafi was merely manifesting his sense of tactical expediency : on the one hand, while purchasing arms from the Soviets as early as 1970, praising the USSR for its support of the Arab (Palestinian) cause; on the other hand, condemning the Marxist state ideology as atheist, irreconcilable with Islam and denouncing Soviet friendship treaties with states such as Egypt and Iraq as contrary to Arab nationalism. The Soviet Union, at the time still securely ensconced in Egypt, branded Al-Qathafi an extremist who confirmed official Soviet policy that Islam is a doctrine incompatible with their "scientific world outlook." (87)

Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet Union in 1972 and his ensuing rapprochement with the United States in the aftermath of the 1973 War, proved a double-edged sword. Whereas Al-Qathafi welcomed the expulsion of the Soviets from the region, he disapproved of the emergent Egypto-American axis, perceiving from his rejectionist stance a substitute of one superpower for another with the similar objective of negotiated settlement of the Palestinian issue.

(85) Napper, Larry C. "The Arab Autumn of 1984 : A Case Study of Soviet Middle East Diplomacy". In : The Middle East Journal, Volume 39, Number 4, Autumn 1985; p. 733.

(86) St. John, Ronald Bruce "The Soviet Penetration of Libya", In : The World Today, Volume 38, Number 4, April 1982; p. 133.

(87) Dawisha, Karen and Carrere D'Encause, Helene "Islam in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union : A Double-Edged Sword?", In : Dawisha, Adeed (ed) Islam in Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1983; p. 168.

The Soviet Union, divested of its Middle Eastern-North African proxy and perturbed about increasing American influence in Arab-Israeli affairs, recognised in Libya a potential strategic substitute for Egypt, (88) foreseeing that Al-Qathafi's antipathy for the West would surely alienate him from the Atlantic Community. The fact that Libya displayed an equal aversion to the Soviet Union, was irrelevant :

" The Soviets, however, rarely allow their objectives in a country or region to be thwarted by the existence of a regime with principles unfriendly to their own. " (89)

Moscow initiated the thaw in Soviet-Libyan relations early in 1974, by having Major Jalloud, Al-Qathafi's deputy and confidant, invited to several Eastern-bloc countries, ostensibly to consolidate oil deals, but not without a Moscow stop-over which resulted in the largest and longest-running series of arms sales agreements ever entered into by the Soviet Union. (90)

The exchange - superficially, oil for arms - resulted in a mutually beneficial relationship. Whereas Al-Qathafi's gains would number access to arms denied him by the West, an offset of his growing international isolation in the wake of the Cairo-Washington detente by cooperation with the Soviet bloc, and a tactical alliance for Libyan protection in the event of the USA stationing forces in Egypt; the Soviet Union

(88) Phillips, James A. "Moscow's Thriving Libyan Connection", in : The Heritage Foundation Background, Number 362, June 26, 1984; p. 5.

(89) Cooley, op cit; p. 245.

(90) Phillips, loc cit.

acquired more than just a new diplomatic ally sharing its hostility for the United States. On the military front, Moscow hoped to have the same access to Libyan naval and air bases as it had in Egypt and to replace its former strategic intelligence position on the Suez with Libyan proximity to NATO bases in the Mediterranean. Economically, it would earn hard currency whilst having ready access not only to oil supplies should Soviet reserves run low, but also to Libyan gas and non-ferrous metals.

To a certain extent, Libya gained most from this unlikely partnership. It did not lose any West European trading partners; gained East European markets for commercial as well as military trade; concluded treaties of friendship with several Eastern-bloc states; (91) was made an honorary member of the Communist bloc at the UNO; (92) found itself, in the Soviet Union, an ally in support of revolutionary movements; (93) yet has neither abrogated its independence nor allowed Moscow to dictate to it.

Achievement of such a status quo, which has never compromised Libya's ideological and diplomatic self-determination, was due to Al-Qathafi's refusal to become reliant solely on the Soviet Union and its satellite

(91) Tzschaschel, Joachim "Die Aussenpolitik Libyens : Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheitslage im arabisch-islamischen Raum", In : Europa Archiv, 40. Jahr, 17. Folge, September 10, 1985; p. 530.

(92) Ogubandejo, Oye "Qaddafi and Africa's International Relations", In : Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 24, Number 1, March 1986; p. 56.

(93) Ramet, Pedro "Soviet-Libyan Relations Under Qaddafi", In : Survey : A Journal of East and West Studies, Volume 29, Number 1(124), Spring 1985; p. 110.

states. Although the Soviet Union, often through its "subcontractors" East Germany and Czechoslovakia, remains Libya's major arms market, spare parts and maintenance are imported from Rumania, Yugoslavia and North Korea. Alternative systems are obtained from India, a manufacturer of MIG fighters; (94) West Germany has been augmenting the Libyan naval force; and Italy and especially France, have remained Libya's most important arms traders - second only to the USSR. (95)

In terms of its original long-term vision with regard to Libya, the Soviet Union has found itself locked in the role of magnanimous acquiescent and supplier, with little of material substance to show as quid pro quo from Libya. Economic and commercial interchange aside, Libya has made no significant concessions in its long-term policies in order to accommodate its relationship with Moscow. From the outset, despite their divergent doctrines, their regional objectives converged in the compatible (almost identical) goals of adulterating American-Western influence in both subsystems, preferably replacing such influence altogether; debilitating pro-Western regimes in the region; and obstructing any American-sponsored settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute - thus requiring no Libyan policy revisions.

Al-Qathafi's only counterpoise has been a joint NATO-surveillance venture. Libyan concern about NATO forces stationed in or around the Mediterranean dates back to the early RCC regime. In an effort to neutralise the Mediterranean Sea, the RCC induced Malta in 1971, by means of substantial financial reward, to dilute the status of NATO

(94) Couley, op cit; p. 249.

(95) Ibid; p. 250.

facilities in Malta. Although the Maltese did not accede to the suggestion that the facilities be withheld in toto, they did curtail NATO operations by instituting a short-term lease, with a specific proviso that the bases would never be used in air attacks against any Arab state. (96)

The massive infusion of Soviet technological expertise into Libya since the mid-1970s, has concretized in the construction of an extensive military infrastructure - including the modification of airbases and docking facilities to conform to Soviet needs and specifications, despite Al-Qathafi's consistent refusal to allow the Soviet Union to use Libyan military bases, refuelling facilities and port facilities, or to build their own on Libyan territory. Furthermore, in contrast to the Nasser-Sadat and South Yemeni case histories, Al-Qathafi has carefully controlled and contained the possible influence of the Soviet military advisers in the Libyan forces. (97) Relaxation of these circumscriptions has shrewdly been sanctioned in two instances only.

" Although Libya has refused to permit the Soviets to establish their own bases on Libyan soil, it has permitted the Soviets to fly Libyan Tu-22 and MIG-25 aircraft from Libyan air bases to monitor NATO naval activity and military bases. Libya also gave the Soviets access to airfields and refuelling facilities during Soviet airlifts to Angola and Mozambique. " (98)

(96) Alexander, op cit; pp. 67 - 828.

(97) Ibid; p. 830.

(98) Phillips, op cit; p. 7.

United States-Libyan relations have displayed even less consistency than Soviet-Libyan relations. Precisely because of Soviet-Libyan hostility during the pre-1973 period, given the special entente which then existed between Egypt and the Soviet Union, the American administration at this time tolerated Al-Qathafi's anti-Western posture to the extent that it did not hesitate to protect his regime.

By 1973, as Egypt moved closer to the United States, with Al-Qathafi actively engaged in destabilisation of the Sadat regime, an embargo on American arms shipments was imposed on Libya - hence the diversification of the Libyan arms trade.

The Carter administration inherited, and perpetuated, the policy established during the Ford era, that Libya was merely a nuisance, not a threat to international security. As such, the arms embargo was honoured and Al-Qathafi largely ignored - due partially to the Carter administration's reluctance to pursue an "active" African policy. As a result, the United States, until the Reagan era, refrained from any involvement in North Africa :

" . . . Interestingly, some American presidents usually take the view that where the U.S. European allies have had colonial, and close post-independence, links with certain African countries, the allies should be able to hold the Western front against any likely communist or anti-West penetration when these new states are deeply engulfed in major crises. Thus, in this case, President Carter saw the Chad affair as, essentially, that of France, just the same way that President Johnson took the view that

the Nigerian civil war fell squarely within
Britain's sphere of influence . . . " (99)

Capitalising on Carter's perceived passivity, Libya's Foreign Liaison Bureau embarked, in 1978, upon a programme of "people-to-people visits" with sympathetic Americans. The project was designed to win influence enough to reconstitute on the one hand Libyan-American relations, and on the other hand, to have the arms embargo repealed. Quite in keeping with traditional Arab psychological parameters, it was assumed that because immediate blood relatives exercise greater influence over a ruler, then

" It was therefore quite natural for Qaddafi's aides - Qaddafi himself seems never to have gotten personally involved - to assume that winning the friendship of the brother of the President of the United States would be a major coup - one that would certainly influence U.S. policies and that just might help to reverse the whole unfavorable trend of Libyan-American relations. " (100)

Thus originated the intricate "Billygate" scandal, whereby Libyan diplomatic aides hoped that bribing Carter's brother would ensure delivery to Libya of two Boeing aircraft on order (a business deal which the State Department was trying to stop).

Although indications are that neither President Carter nor Colonel

(99) Ogubandejo (Qaddafi's North African Design, in International Security, Volume 8, Number 1, Summer 1983), op cit; p. 164, fn. 35.

(100) Cooley, op cit; p. 252.

Al-Qathafi was aware of the Libyan recruitment of Billy Carter until the scandal broke publicly; the White House, once his special relationship with Libya had been identified, did not hesitate to call on Billy Carter to request Libyan aid during the Iranian hostage crisis. The measure of both the White House's and Billy Carter's ignorance about Libya was fully revealed in this action, which involved several White House officials.

While the Carters and administration officials were clandestinely evolving their fragile new relationship with the Libyan government, American public opinion about Libya was rapidly deteriorating following the burning of the USA embassy in Tripoli at the time of these negotiations. When Al-Qathafi pledged that the embassy would be repaired and compensated for damage, and also informed Carter that he had been mediating with Khomeini about the release of the hostages, the United States indicated that long-term relations with Libya might be on the cards.

Al-Qathafi, however, had no channel of communications with the Khomeini regime - not even an Iranian embassy in Tripoli. Furthermore, the Iranians held him personally responsible for the disappearance and/or death of the Imam Musa Sadr (a high-ranking, Iranian-born leader of the southern Lebanese Muslims) while on an official visit to Libya. Thus, in as much as Al-Qathafi found it difficult to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, it was virtually impossible to do so with Iran. (101)

(101) Ibid; p. 261.

The accession of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency, dashed any hopes Al-Qathafi could conceivably have fostered for a reconciliation with the United States. Whereas previous administrations had felt that punitive measures against Libya, such as sanctions, could not be implemented because of the damage to American oil companies but more importantly, because their European allies would refuse to cooperate in such measures,

" Throwing out this approach the Reagan administration ordered State and Defense to treat Qaddafi as a menace and a Soviet puppet who should be stopped and, if possible, overthrown." (102)

One of the first steps the new administration took, was to challenge Al-Qathafi's sovereignty in the Gulf of Sirte. In 1973, Al-Qathafi, in contravention of accepted international law, announced that the entire Gulf of Sirte was Libyan territory - as opposed to the accepted limit of three to twelve miles of territorial waters.

The United States Sixth Fleet was dispatched, in 1981, for manoeuvres in the Mediterranean, in an area barely short of the imaginary line drawn by Libya in 1973. Al-Qathafi responded by authorising his air force to make several "intruder" flights over the area each day, which resulted, after some mock skirmishes, in two Libyan fighterplanes (which had fired missiles at American planes) being shot down. (103)

(102) Haley, op cit; p. 247.

(103) Phillips, op cit; p. 9.

Following the Gulf of Sirte incident, Reagan decided to discard completely the Carter administration's policy which, in order to avoid pushing Al-Qathafi into the Soviet camp, emphasised the preservation of economic relationships and the limitation of military provocation. (104)

" This shift was significant, not only because it was almost unprecedented for the United States to settle its political differences with other countries by openly espousing military confrontation, economic embargo, subversion, sabotage and assassination, but also because the means chosen were so plainly inadequate for the ends. If the new administration sought to demonstrate its power to punish Libya and thereby 'demonstrate that it pays to be an American friend', the 1981 campaign was a disastrous failure. " (105)

The Gulf of Sirte incident was followed closely by several setbacks in the region for the White House : Sadat's assassination, which had a direct bearing on Numeiry's already unsteady grip on the Sudan; increased POLISARIO activity against Morocco; the Greek resolution that American airbases in Greece may not be used for military attacks on Arab states in general, and Libya in particular; furthermore the American anti-Al-Qathafi campaign launched during the next months actually boosted Al-Qathafi's popular support, both inside and outside Libya. (106)

(104) Wright, Claudia "Libya and the West : Headlong into Confrontation?", In : International Affairs, Volume 58, Number 1, Winter 1981 - 1982; p. 23.

(105) Ibid; p. 18.

(106) Ibid; pp. 18 and 29.

The Gulf of Sirte confrontation was part of a new American policy devised by the Reagan administration, consisting of seven key elements designed to destabilise Libya through the weakening and isolation of Al-Qathafi. These programmes were set in motion with the closure of the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in the United States and the recall of all American citizens in Libya; and followed by a major propaganda campaign portraying Al-Qathafi as unstable, dangerous, the sponsor of international terrorism and subversion; increased aid to Libyan opponents such as Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan; military showcasing, e.g. placing the Sixth Fleet in proximity to the Gulf of Sirte, supporting Al-Qathafi's opponents in the Chadian civil war and participating with Egypt, the Sudan and Oman in the "Operation Brightstar" strategic air power display; prohibition on importation of Libyan oil and exportation of high technology equipment to Libya (particularly equipment related to the oil industry); the consideration - never, apparently, implemented - of engineering a USA-backed coup in Libya; and finally, the coordination of U.S. policy with governments willing, at the time, to oppose Libya, e.g. France and Nigeria. (107)

The shortcomings of these policies were evidenced in, regionally, unprecedented Arab support and sympathy for Libya. Al-Qathafi was perceived as a victim - that the Reagan administration was obsessed with him and that it consequently built him into a far more important figure than he or his country actually merited. (108)

(107) Haley, op cit; pp. 248 - 249.

(108) Ibid; p. 267.

Internationally, the prevailing European view was that while Al-Qathafi might have exhibited anti-Western policies, he did not represent the international danger which Reagan maintained he did, specifically in view of his ostracism from both mainstream Mashriq and Maghrib. Moreover, Europe was motivated strongly against Al-Qathafi's international isolation both because of its economic investments in Libya and for fear of stimulating closer Libyan-Soviet ties.

Domestically, at a time when opposition to and dissatisfaction with governmental socio-economic projects had reached a significant pitch, support for the Al-Qathafi regime and its programmes was dramatically revitalised by America's actions. (109)

European fears were not without cause. Following the Gulf of Sirte incident and the ensuing intensification of the American anti-Libya campaign, Al-Qathafi did in fact move closer to the Soviet Union. Although a rumoured friendship treaty did not materialise, Libya's military pact with Ethiopia and South Yemen has provided Moscow with two proxies through which to protect Al-Qathafi, whilst averting the wrath of the West for doing so. (110)

American interference, in 1981-1982, in a patently African matter, the OAU Summit debacle, when Washington attempted to induce a break-up of the OAU (an event long anticipated in conservative circles), (111)

(109) St. John (The Soviet Penetration of Libya, in The World Today, Volume 38, Number 4, April 1982), op cit; pp. 137 - 138.

(110) Phillips, op cit; p. 9.

(111) Cervanka and Legum, op cit; pp. A43 and A51.

provided Al-Qathafi with the final impetus for reneging on his avowed ideological incompatibility with Moscow.

Tangibly, he reacted by initiating a large-scale programme of military aid to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua; more subtly, he seriously compromised his position on Afghanistan. Whereas the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had always been a bone of contention between Tripoli and Moscow, just as was the Soviet support for a negotiated Middle Eastern settlement, a compromise was reached to coordinate policies.

Al-Qathafi now publicly supported Moscow's move for a Soviet puppet regime in a to-be-constituted Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and agreed in a joint communique that a settled peace in the Middle East could only be negotiated once Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders. In a quid pro quo, Moscow denounced Washington's aggression against Libya and agreed to replenish Al-Qathafi's diminished military supplies, the result of his Chadian invasion. (112)

The full extent of Al-Qathafi's renewed affinity with the USSR was revealed in his fundamental, ideological volte-face in 1983, framed in terms of a continuing evolution of Nasserism :

" If circumstances demand it I would not hesitate to conclude a friendship treaty with Moscow . . . It is true that I have criticized Arab states which tie themselves to the Soviet Union, but I admit that my criticisms were not based on concrete personal experience.

(112) Haley, op cit; pp. 314 - 315.

Since the death of (Egyptian President) Nasser, whose spiritual heirs we are, and the betrayal by Sadat, Libya sees herself as the guarantor of Arab/Soviet friendship in all areas : political, military and ideological. " (113)

The USA, by using Al-Qathafi's military trade with the Soviet Union as a starting point for its aggressive Libyan policy, aiming to combat a fictional Soviet dominance of the region, appears to have actually brought about a situation it claimed had already existed, and in so doing, destroyed any possibility of any future rapprochement with Libya.

France, on the other hand, whilst recognising the need to contain and curb Al-Qathafi's expansionism and subversion - with much better cause than America (i.e. Chad) - employed much the same policy, but with a different approach, which enabled the two states to resume good relations after their period of conflict.

First, France entered the Chadian, and regional, fray by denouncing intervention in the internal matters of sovereign states. Its military presence in Chad was justified in terms of regional security and protection of French nationals. Secondly, once a withdrawal agreement had been reached with Al-Qathafi, France renewed its relations with Libya in such a manner that Libya, its involvement in and withdrawal

(113) "The Soviet-Libyan Connection (Part Five in a Series)", in : Contemporary Mideast Backgrounder, Number 200, Jerusalem, Media Analysis Center, 31 December 1984; p. 2.

from Chad, were accorded with legitimate contribution to African affairs and in principle, would enable Libya to maintain and perpetuate such a role, notably through the aegis of the OAU. Thirdly, and of most import, France did at no stage confront the motif of Libya's ties with the Soviet Union. Instead, by establishing normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Libya, France contrived to dilute the Soviet influence in Libya. (114)

The differing French and American approaches were thus of style, not substance. The French, with nuance, succeeded in establishing a positive relationship from which perhaps they could insinuate themselves to such a degree as to influence Libyan policy in favour of Francophone states in the region.

The Americans, regarding the Libyan withdrawal from Chad as a tactical retreat, understood the fact that fundamental Libyan policy remained unchanged as an implacable sign of Al-Qathafi's commitment to the Soviet bloc. As such, the American military action of early 1986, designed perhaps not so much to punish the Libyan regime as to eliminate its leader, becomes intelligible within the parameters of American preconceptions :

" So total was the administration's opposition that it was difficult to imagine how normal relations might be restored until Qaddafi was overthrown or killed. " (115)

(114) Haley, op cit; pp. 297 - 298.

(115) Ibid; p. 298.

What the United States failed - or refused - to concede, was that Libya had become its own creation : a small, relatively unimportant Third World country irretrievably entwined in the superpower web, clustered with a global power not by ideological design, but as a result of regional and international power shifts and rivalry.

The Soviet Union, however, recognises precisely what it has been saddled with : a regional ally with convergent subsystemic objectives; more of a burden than a blessing, for Al-Qathafi, although recently espousing his affinity with Moscow, is not - and is not likely ever to be - even a Soviet satellite.

Anything but a puppet, Al-Qathafi has been a constant source of discomfort for the Soviet Union : "unreliable" in his independence from its direction, an embarrassment. (116) Thrust into superpower politics, Al-Qathafi has not demurred to use even the Soviet Union to advance his own cause.

(116) Anderson (Qadhafi and the Kremlin, in Problems of Communism, Volume XXXIV, Number 5, September-October 1985), op cit; p. 44.

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Name of thesis The Third Universal Theory Of Mu'ammr Al-qathafi With Specific Reference To The North African And Middle Eastern Subsystems. 1987

PUBLISHER:

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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