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Understanding policy implementation at the local government level: the case of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP)

Colleen Orsmond

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Development Planning.

Johannesburg, 2022

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Declaration

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Science in Development Planning to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination to any other University.



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Colleen Orsmond

29th day of November, 2022

Ethics Clearance No.: SOAP138/06/2021

Abstract

A smooth progression from policy design to implementation and successful realisation of the intended outcomes cannot be taken for granted. Instead, the interaction between policy, policy implementers and the context in which it is implemented create outcomes that can diverge significantly from the original policy intent. As a case study for policy implementation at the local government level, examining the implementation of the City of Johannesburg's Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP) revealed a challenging socio-economic, political and institutional context that has frustrated progress. Public and private sectors recognised ICHIP as a comprehensive albeit ambitious strategy. Piecemeal and fragmented delivery, weak leadership and a failure to cement a partnership between the City and private sector actors has meant that while certain outputs have been delivered in small measure, the policy outcome of a robust inner city housing market that works for the poor has not been realised.

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To my supervisor, Margot Rubin, thank you for your guidance and insight, your flexibility on deadlines and for pushing me to do better. I'm grateful that you stuck with me.

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Finally, to the people that I interviewed, thank you for sharing your thoughts and perspectives so generously with me. I enjoyed the interactions very much and hope that our paths cross again as actors working to make the inner city a better place for its residents.

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List of Acronyms

AFHCO	Africa Housing Company
BASA	Banking Association of South Africa
BBB-EE	Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment
BBP	Bad Buildings Programme
BNG	Breaking New Ground
CAPEX	Capital Expenditure
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CoJ	City of Johannesburg
CRU	Community Residential Units
CRUM	Customer Relationship and Urban Management
DED	Department of Economic Development
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
FLISP	Finance Linked Individual Subsidy Programme
GDS	Growth and Development Strategy
GPMA	Gauteng Precinct Management Association
GTAC	Government Technical Advisory Centre
HDA	The Housing Development Agency
ICHIP	Inner City Housing Implementation Plan
ICPS	Inner City Property Scheme
ICTR	Inner City Transformation Roadmap
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IMU	Inclusive Mixed Use
ISP	Institutional Subsidy Programme
JDA	Johannesburg Development Agency
JHC	Johannesburg Housing Company
JICP	Johannesburg Inner City Partnership
JOSHCO	Johannesburg Social Housing Company
JPC	Johannesburg Property Company
JPOMA	Johannesburg Property Owners and Managers Association

JWA	Johannesburg Water Authority
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
ME	Municipal Entities
MES	Mould Empower Serve
MHA	Madulammoho Housing Association
MMC	Member of the Mayoral Committee
NDoHS	National Department of Human Settlements
NDP	National Development Plan
NHFC	National Housing Finance Corporation Ltd
NIMTO	Not In My Political Term
NPM	New Public Management
OPEX	Operational Expenditure
PHPS	Public Housing Programme Support
PPPF	Preferential Procurement Policy Framework
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SERI	Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa
SHI	Social Housing Institution
SHRA	Social Housing Regulatory Authority
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
SPRE	Special Programme for the Relocation of Evictees
TEA	Temporary Emergency Accommodation
TEAP	Temporary Emergency Accommodation Policy
TUHF	Trust for Urban Housing Finance
UDZ	Urban Development Zone

1 Introduction

'The best laid plans of mice and men often go awry'
Robert Burns, "To a Mouse", 1785

1.1 Introduction

A smooth progression from policy design to implementation and realisation of the intended outcomes cannot be taken for granted. Policy-implementation gaps - or differences between policy goals and what is actually realised - are evident at all levels of government today, even more so as the context in which policies are implemented becomes more complex (Makinde, 2005; Ansell, 2017). Brynard (2005:658) noted that implementing public policy is a 'complex political process, rather than a mechanistic administrative one' and this much is evident in the case of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP). As a case study for policy implementation at the local government level, exploring the nature of ICHIP's implementation revealed a challenging and complex socio-economic, political and institutional context that has frustrated progress, resulting in a limited and fragmented delivery.

ICHIP was commissioned by the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) Housing Department in 2015 with the intended outcome of 'making the inner city housing market work better for people with lower incomes' (CoJ Housing Department, 2017a:2). With demand for inner city housing far outstripping supply, particularly at the lowest end of the market, ICHIP aimed to stimulate the supply of affordable rental housing through eleven programmes targeting both public and private sector provision. A range of actors from the public and private sectors interviewed during the course of the research project recognised ICHIP as a comprehensive but ambitious strategy, and it was perhaps in trying to do too much that it erred given the implementing capacity of the City. The holistic approach is fundamental to ICHIP however, in that it recognises that *all* rungs of the housing ladder need to be strong

to ensure a healthy inner city housing ecosystem. But limited resources, weak leadership and a failure to cement a partnership between the City and private sector actors has meant that while certain outputs may have been delivered in small measure, the intended policy outcome of a robust inner city housing market that works for the poor has not been realised.

1.2 Background

The Johannesburg inner city is a place of opportunity, an entry point for many who come to Johannesburg looking for employment. As the primary trade and transport hub of the metropolitan region, it is under constant pressure to provide housing for urban immigrants, but a lack of decent, cheap rental accommodation has created high levels of informality, stressed buildings, overcrowding, and unsafe living conditions. A study of the 2011 census data and sample inner-city precincts by the team that developed ICHIP estimated that the number of households living in the inner city exceeded the supply of housing available by approximately 92'000 units, and that the bulk of demand was for very cheap accommodation. The study also showed a housing market responding to the housing supply shortage: the ICHIP report states that in the six years prior, 50 000 new apartments had been delivered in the Johannesburg inner city. But these were largely in the gap market, so not priced low enough to serve the majority of the residents seeking accommodation. This left the informal market to cater to the very poor using spaces not designed for housing and putting a number of households in precarious, high-risk housing situations. (RebelGroup, 2016)

ICHIP was commissioned in response to a call for an updated housing action plan articulated in the 2013 Inner City Transformation Roadmap (ICTR). It was developed by a multi-disciplinary team who consulted with the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), the Johannesburg Social Housing Company (JOSHCO) and the CoJ Departments of Housing and Development Planning (RebelGroup, 2016). In October 2017, a media statement issued by then-mayor Herman Mashaba announced that City Council had approved a plan to 'tackle the housing

challenge within the inner city' (JICP, 2017: no page number), however the research process revealed that that Council had not, and has still not to this day, approved ICHIP as a housing strategy. This matter of administrative process alongside a number of other factors has significantly impacted its implementation, and are discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this report.

1.3 Problem statement and rationale

ICHIP appeared to be a robust, comprehensive strategy that included detailed project implementation plans, set out administrative requirements, actions, timelines, and budgets. It responded to a clear need for affordable inner city housing, particularly for the very poor, identified in the Inner City Transformation Roadmap. Yet in 2021, four years after the CoJ media statement announcing the Council's approval of the plan, a scan of CoJ reports, presentations and documents revealed only an occasional mention of the word 'ICHIP'. While this does not necessarily mean that implementation has failed or that the policy has been abandoned, it raises the question as to the embeddedness of the strategy and how much has actually happened since the announcement. Understanding the extent to which ICHIP has been implemented and how any outcomes compare to the original intentions offers insight into policy implementation at the local government level in South Africa's largest metropolitan municipality. While the research process revealed that the ICHIP was a strategy rather than a policy of the City of Johannesburg, the parallels that can be drawn between policies and strategies as sets of actions identified to address a certain issue or problem render the ICHIP implementation relevant to policy implementation studies.

1.4 Objectives

This research aimed to identify and understand the reasons behind ICHIP's implementation successes and weaknesses and to relate this understanding to the existing body of literature on the policy-implementation gap. Various theories and models of policy implementation have been developed but a number of scholars contend that the discipline lacks a unifying theory, and that there is a need for

further research in this regard. In considering how the case-and context-specific data obtained from the study of ICHIP's implementation relates to different policy implementation theories or models, this study aims to contribute to the body of knowledge relating to policy-implementation gaps.

1.5 Research questions

Main research question:

To what extent has the City of Johannesburg ICHIP been implemented and what are the reasons for implementation successes or failures?

Sub-questions:

Which aspects of the ICHIP are being or have been implemented according to the ICHIP plan and by which entities?

How successfully are they being implemented as measured against required outputs, timelines and budgets?

Which aspects of the ICHIP are not being implemented – at all or to a limited extent - and for what reasons?

To what do stakeholders and role players in the ICHIP attribute implementation successes or failures?

How do the ICHIP interventions or programmes integrate into existing CoJ housing and development strategies?

1.6 Methods

This research project used a single case study approach to explore the extent to which ICHIP has been implemented and to explain the reasons for its successes, failures and weaknesses. The objective is to generate context-dependent knowledge rather than context-independent rational analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In this sense, the goal of the case study is to generate a deep understanding the 'real-world behaviour' of ICHIP's implementation by examining the contextual and other complex conditions that relate to it (Yin, 2011:5). The study employed a largely

qualitative method comprising a review of CoJ policies, programmes and Council minutes and any media articles and statements relating to ICHIP implementation, followed by semi-structured interviews with key informants and experts. I used purposive sampling to select initial interviewees and then snowball sampling to identify additional participants. Samples of the participant information sheet, consent form and interview guide are provided in Appendix B, C and D respectively.

I interviewed representatives from the CoJ Housing and Planning departments, the CoJ Inner City Office and the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA). Private sector participants represented Social Housing Institutions (SHIs), private landlords, independent consultants and academics. I did not manage to identify and interview any representatives from JOSHCO or the JPC, municipal entities that are mentioned often in this report and are key actors in a number of ICHIP programmes. A number of the interviewees provided perspectives on their involvement and I used their annual business plans to make additional deductions. A full list of the research participants is shown in Figure 1.1 below and a comprehensive list of the interviewees and interview dates is provided in Appendix A.




Figure 1.1: City of Johannesburg and private sector interviewees

The interviews were recorded and transcribed, then coded in two ways: the transcripts were first filtered to identify the extent to which different components of ICHIP have been implemented, and then to identify the interviewees' opinions and perspectives on the reasons behind implementation challenges. I categorised these opinions and perspectives using a conceptual framework based on the '7-C Protocol' described in more detail in chapter 2. Through this process I identified recurring themes and perspectives that informed my assessment of the key reasons for ICHIP's weak and fragmented implementation.

1.7 Outline of the research report

The following chapter of this report reviews policy implementation literature, and the evolution of the theories and analytical frameworks developed over the past 50 years to better understand policy design and implementation. An explanation of the contextual framework used to analyse the research findings concludes chapter 2. The third chapter provides a context for ICHIP implementation in describing the macro-level and micro-level governmental framework in which CoJ operates and the Johannesburg inner city housing landscape past and present. The fourth chapter examines ICHIP's journey from inception through to its current status and assesses how much has been achieved against the original objectives, before considering if and how ICHIP is informing CoJ Housing Strategy. In the fifth chapter I analyse the factors that have shaped implementation and possible reasons why it has not progressed according to the original intentions and timelines of the strategy. The sixth and final chapter synthesises the discussion in chapter 5, relating it back to the policy implementation theories and models reviewed in chapter 2, and providing a few recommendations for consideration.

2 Policy implementation theory: a work in progress

2.1 Introduction

The study of policy implementation is relatively young within the field of social sciences (Kahn, 2016). Harold Laswell first positioned implementation as an important part of policy process in 1956, but it was in 1973 that the subject assumed a higher profile when Pressman and Wildavsky published their seminal book, 'Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland' (Brynard, 2005; Madue 2008; Kahn, 2016). Theories and models of policy implementation have evolved from the rational, scientific approach of classical implementation theory to analytical frameworks that recognise the complex contexts in which policies are delivered and the need for more agile and integrated approaches to policy design and implementation. The proliferation of theories and models on policy implementation demonstrate the varied attempts to understand and predict implementation successes and failures, yet scholars of the discipline contend that it still lacks a unifying theory, and more work is needed in this regard (Mosse, 2004; Brynard, 2005; Madue, 2008; Kahn, 2016).

Public policy can be summarised as a set of decisions and actions taken to address a certain issue or matter of concern; policy implementation is the execution of that policy by public and private sector stakeholders to achieve the policy goals (Kahn, 2016). The concept of the policy implementation gap has emerged from observations of implementation failures or weaknesses that result in 'significant gaps between the planned outputs and outcomes of public policy and what actually occurs' (Ansell *et al*., 2017:467). Understanding how and why these gaps emerge is the subject of policy implementation theory.

This literature review covers the evolution of the key theoretical positions and frameworks associated with policy implementation and how this evolution has been organised into generations by policy implementation scholars. It then

considers policy implementation studies in the context of the Global South and South Africa, particularly in terms of the meaning of the state and its relationship with society and informality. The objective of policy implementation research is to understand implementation processes better, improve them and reduce policy implementation gaps. The analytical frameworks that various scholars have developed to enhance this understanding are reviewed in the third section, before I draw on one of the frameworks, the 7-C Protocol, to describe the conceptual framework applied to this research report.

2.2 The evolution of implementation theory, models and frameworks

The originals: top-down and bottom-up theories

'Classical political scientists assumed that public policies… would be smoothly implemented by efficient public bureaucracies and eventually solve the problems they were meant to solve' (Ansell *et al.*, 2017: 467). This linear, rational and Weberian approach forms the basis of classical implementation theory and the top-down model that underpins it. Top-down policy implementation is therefore a deductive process triggered by a centrally generated decision and implemented by an efficient administration (Matland, 1995). It was Pressman and Wildavsky who first drew attention to the reasons why implementation failed due to weaknesses that emerge throughout the implementation chain (Ansell *et al.*, 2017). These weaknesses include vague objectives, weak political support, insufficient resources and misaligned stakeholders (*ibid.*). In this model, the solution to implementation failure was to improve the public administration function (Linder & Peters, 1987).

Policy implementation scholars identified a number of weaknesses in the top-down model. Firstly, it fails to consider the social, political economic and administrative context in which policy is applied, nor does it acknowledge the impact of local-level administrators' interpretations of and attitudes towards the policy (Makinde, 2005, Hudson *et al.*, 2019). In focussing on only the administrative processes, classical implementation theory ignores the political aspects of policy implementation, regardless of whether the policy and its goals are

political or not (Matland, 1995). It also ignores the impact of the quality of the policy itself and whether it is appropriate to the problem it intends to address (Ansell *et al.*, 2017).

Bottom-up policy implementation on the other hand recognises the importance of local context and local actors for policy design and implementation. Promoted by scholars such as Lipsky (1978, 1980), Berman (1978 and 1980), Hjern and Porter (1981), Hjern (1982), Hull and Hjern (1987), a bottom-up approach demands that policy is determined at the lowest level of the organisation, by the people who will be responsible for implementing it or 'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky,1980 and Yates, 1977 in Linder and Peters, 1987; Matland, 1995). These local-level actors are engaged during the policy formulation process to understand their issues and objectives as well as the networks and coalitions that will determine how the policy will be received when implemented (Matland, 1995). Critics of bottom-up theory say that it confers too much authority on local actors to make decisions about what is important and needed, removing this authority from the officials whom voters elect to make such decisions on their behalf (Linder and Peters, 1987; Matland, 1995). Matland (1995) points out that bottom-up approaches also overestimate the autonomy of the local implementers, because they must still operate within a legal and institutional framework that is determined by central authorities and institutional frames.

Hybrids: best of both worlds or a compromise?

The shortcomings of the top-down and bottom-up approaches led to the creation of hybrid models that attempted to address their respective weaknesses; Elmore's forward and backward mapping approach was one such hybrid (Elmore, 1982 and 1985 in Matland 1995). In it, policy is designed in two directions: by mapping outcome criteria to policy objectives (that is, in a top-down manner) but also identifying the behaviour to be changed at the lowest level and working backwards to address it (*ibid*.). This approach thus deals with the policy objectives while also considering the realities and objectives of target groups and policy implementers

(*ibid.*). Linder and Peters (1987) note that Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), advanced this approach to implementation studies by recognising that the complexity of the public policy implementation environment impacts how the policy would be realised at the lower levels. Their model was based on three pillars: the tractability of the problem, the implementation structure and how the statute or policy provided for this as well as other resources to implement, and non-statutory variables (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980).

The New Public Management (NPM) discourse that emerged in the 1990s reinforced classical implementation theories by applying managerialist principles to policy implementation (Ansell *et al*., 2017). This approach used performance management techniques to address administrative weaknesses, and charismatic leadership to influence and motivate local implementors (*ibid.*). It also sought to enlist the targets of policy by offering 'exit and voice' mechanisms to give them a sense of empowerment and agency (Hirschman, 1970 and Sørensen, 1997 in Ansell *et al*., 2017).

Matland's (1995) ambiguity/conflict model, embraced all theoretical approaches, suggesting that the approach to implementation depends on the context and circumstances rather than one's theoretical stance. He noticed that different approaches are appropriate in different situations: top-down in cases where the policy is clear and unambiguous, whereas bottom-up is useful where policy is more uncertain or vague. The model recognises the inherently political nature of policy implementation, particularly in cases where a policy is contested and successful implementation demands significant amounts of bargaining and negotiation between stakeholders. (Matland, 1995)

More recently, scholars have focussed attention on policy design as an integral factor in policy execution. This approach was already evident in the evolutionary and backward mapping models proposed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and Majone and Wildavsky (1978) (Linder and Peters, 1987). These models suggested an iterative, interactive form of policy formulation in which policy emerges from

interactions between policy makers, implementing agents and targets of the policy (*ibid.*). Ansell *et al.* (2017) and Hudson *et al.* (2019) propose a collaborative approach based on consultation and consensus seeking between the policy makers, implementers and targets. They also recognise that policy implementation is an adaptive, iterative process rather than a two-part process of policy design followed by implementation. Ansell *et al.* (2017) stress that this approach necessarily blurs the lines between politics and administration, and demands an attitude of mutual learning, flexibility and experimentation from all parties, noting that such an approach is likely to be resisted by politicians but can be overcome.

Generations of policy implementation research

In tracing the evolution of policy implementation research and thought, some authors make reference to three generations of scholars, however there does not appear to be a consistent interpretation of these generations. Brynard (2005) considers the first generation to be the classical political scientists who assumed that, on proclamation of a policy, it would be executed automatically in machine-like fashion by an efficient administration. The second generation, led by Pressman and Wildavsky, challenged the first-generation view as simplistic, recognising the complexity and political nature of policy and using case studies to demonstrate failed implementation (*ibid.*). The third generation took it a step further by trying to understand policy implementation better by creating analytical frameworks and models in the search for explanatory theories (*ibid.*).

Kahn (2016) on the other hand considers Pressman and Wildavsky the first-generation of policy implementation scholars, as they challenged the 'status quo' thinking of classical political scientists who assumed policy implementation was automatic. The first generation studied policy implementation failures, identifying the complexities, variations and the political nature of implementation, but their work was criticised as atheoretical and too case-specific (*ibid.*). Kahn's second generation moved from the descriptive approach of the first generation to a more analytical one, developing frameworks and models in an attempt to understand

and explain policy implementation successes and failures (*ibid.*). This generation includes scholars like Meter and Horn (1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian (1989), Elmore (1979) and Lipsky (1978, 1980). The third generation tried to bridge the gap between the top-down and bottom-up second-generation theories of the second generation by developing hybrid models (*ibid.*). For Kahn (2016), the onus is on the next generation to develop the grand theory of policy implementation.

Brynard (2005) and Kahn (2016) identify a similar evolution of policy implementation thought: from the classical scientific approach, through the recognition of implementation complexity, to trying to understand that complexity using analytical frameworks and finally finding ways to integrate those frameworks into a unifying theory. I consider Kahn's interpretation to be more consistent with policy implementation literature, but it is perhaps more important to focus on [note] the endpoint reached by both, that policy implementation theory is not yet fully mature and requires further research.

2.3 Policy implementation in the Global South and South Africa

Policy implementation in the Global South must be considered through the lens of how the state behaves in contexts increasingly characterised by informality, poverty and limited state capacity. The interface between the state and civil society, the ability of the state to exercise its power and how it does so is of particular relevance for public policy implementation. Lund (2006) writes about the shadow state and twilight institutions, where 'the state' is interpreted as both a system and an idea, and as the lines between the state and civil society blur, power and authority become more fluid, enabling non-state actors to exercise a form of state authority, both delegated and assumed (*ibid.*). This blurring of the lines between state and non-state is echoed in the blurred lines between informality and formality, legality and illegality that abound in Global South urban contexts.

Bénit-Gbaffou (2018a) reflects on the work of various scholars studying state intervention in city-making in post-colonial countries like India and South Africa.

She unpacks the perspectives of Roy (2009), Te Lintelo (2017), Bénit-Gbaffou (2018), Rubin (2018) and Charlton (2018) on how the state interacts with informality and illegality, often through informal practices of its own (*ibid.*). Their work moves away from the assumption that state actions as they relate to policy are always coordinated and purposeful, and while state interventions may be experienced as cohesive, they often mask a diversity of rationalities, interests and objectives across departments, agencies and levels of government (*ibid.*). The way the state deals with knowledge is both inconsistent and political, in some cases deliberately perpetuating a state of confusion or lack of knowledge to allow more flexibility in its interventions (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018a). Te Lintelo (2017, in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018a) identifies three types of informal state practices that are relevant in policy implementation: street-level bureaucracy, policy short circuits that contradict or by-pass legislation, and tolerance of informal or illegal practices that still deliver outcomes aligned to state objectives. In other cases, policy outcomes may diverge from the intention but are considered 'good enough' for the state, as the practicalities of correcting the outcomes lie beyond its capacity (*ibid.*). Charlton (2018, in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018a), cites the example of RDP housing in South Africa, where the effects of the programme may not have been realised exactly as intended but the delivery of housing in itself has been quite remarkable.

Turning the focus to South Africa, and in apparent contrast to the informal practices of the state discussed by Bénit-Gbaffou *et al.* (2018a), public policy implementation in democratic South Africa has been strongly influenced by the New Public Management (NPM) framework that promotes decentralisation, performance management and accountability in the public sector (Munzhedzi, 2020). Le Gales (2016) identifies this evolution not specifically in a global South context, but in relation to increasingly complex, globalised and differentiated societies where the traditional lines of authority between the state and society are blurred. In this context, performance measurement and indicators are not counter-intuitive in the face of informality, but rather provide a different way for the state to exercise control and steer the actions of society. Le Gales (2016:10) notes that 'measurement and quantification are not neutral' and the choice of measurement

approaches and criteria, generally neoliberal in orientation, can create new inequalities or exacerbate existing ones in societies, reinforcing informality and illegality.

Madue (2008:200) suggests that the new South African government has really struggled to '[match] intention with outcome, and rhetoric with practice' resulting in significant policy implementation gaps, particularly in the area of municipal service delivery. Brynard (2007) and Munzhedzi (2020) note that various reasons have been cited for these gaps, including a lack of political will and commitment to implementing policy; over-ambitious targets in some part due to a lack of reliable data to set realistic and clear policy goals; lack of capacity and skills; poor management of existing resources; ineffective government; corruption and maladministration; and a lack of coordination not only between the political and administrative spheres, but also between government departments (). Von Holdt (2010) contends that there is broad agreement that a functioning bureaucracy is essential for a developmental state to set development goals, develop the policies to achieve them and successfully implement those policies. But in South Africa, the post-Apartheid bureaucracy is debilitated by an internal conflict between a nationalistic desire to establish a modern state and the drive for African sovereignty. This diverts attention away from implementing policy and service delivery as focus is directed to issues of elite class formation, hierarchy based on deference rather than merit, an ambivalence towards authority and skills, and a breakdown in discipline (*ibid.*).

The views above provide some insights into the complexities of policy implementation in the global South and the challenges faced in South Africa in particular. In the following section, I look at how different scholars have interpreted successful policy implementation and approaches to avoid policy implementation gaps.

2.4 Minimising the policy implementation gap

Various scholars have identified factors that they believe are necessary for successful policy implementation, or conversely, minimising policy implementation gaps. If policy implementation gaps are defined as 'significant gaps between the planned outputs and outcomes of public policy and what actually occurs' (Ansell *et al*., 2017:467), then identifying policy implementation gaps requires that the difference between a policy's goals and what is finally realised is measurable (Makinde, 2005). However, what is measured and how it is measured depends to an extent on the theoretical stance of the measurer. Matland (1995:154) suggests that 'the pivotal question is whether attention should be focused on fidelity to the designer's plan or on the general consequences of the implementation actions when determining success'. In this sense the distinction is drawn between implementation outputs and outcomes. Classical or top-down implementation theorists might use a relatively narrow assessment of how well a policy has been executed in terms of process and outputs (fidelity to the plan), whereas bottom-up and hybrid theorists might look at the broader impacts and whether the intention of the policy has been achieved in terms of its outcomes or broader consequences (*ibid.*). Determining the exact intention of a policy can be challenging however, as policy – and particularly statutory policy, is often vague by design (*ibid.*). Mosse (2004:639) proposes that good policy 'legitimises and mobilises political support', and to secure buy-in from a wide range of stakeholders it needs to be broad enough to address a similarly wide range of interests.

Proponents of top-down models like Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) advise that policy goals must be clear and consistent, the number of stakeholders and actors involved must be minimised, as should the extent of change needed or implied by the policy, and the implementing agency should agree in principle with the policy's goals (Matland, 1995). Bottom-up theorists on the other hand shy away from providing specific advice given the inductive nature of the approach, however they do note

the need for flexibility in the policy scope to allow for adaptation to the local context and the values of the local actors (*ibid.*).

Makinde (2005) believes that policy implementation hinges on the interaction of many variables, but four are critical: accurate and consistent communication of policy goals and tasks; sufficient resources including human, material and intangible ones like the authority to implement the policy; a bureaucratic structure that facilitates efficiency, cohesion and coordination between departments; and a positive disposition or attitude towards the policy on the part of the implementers. Makinde (2005:65) also notes that the source of policy implementation gaps may be 'the policy itself, the policy maker or the environment in which the policy has been made'. This highlights that policy implementation gaps are not only attributable to poor execution. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) criticised policy implementation literature at the time for being too focussed on implementation as the only reason for policy failures. They identified that policy failure could be caused by implementation failure, by poor policy design or by policy failure (*ibid.*). Implementation failure occurs when the intended effects are not achieved because of the way in which the policy was implemented, but weak policy design could mean that a policy will not succeed even if the implementation is flawless (*ibid.*). Policy failure is slightly different in that it occurs when the policy is implemented according to plan and achieves its objectives, but creates other negative and unintended consequences in the process (*ibid.*).

Hudson *et al.* (2019) also attribute implementation failures to weaknesses in the policy design process, whether insufficient collaboration and consideration of context, or basing policy goals on inadequate information. They refer to the effects of 'dispersed governance', where policy formulated by national government and applied by local government encounters is inappropriate for the local context, or is resisted by local implementers who distort policy outputs through street level bureaucracy (*ibid.*). Ansell *et al.* (2017) note the importance of collaborative policy design that connects the policy makers to the target groups and implementing agents. This improves policy design by assimilating knowledge from all

stakeholders and enhancing innovation (*ibid.*). It also builds a sense of joint ownership in a policy which improves engagement in and commitment to its implementation (*ibid.*). Such an approach requires a shift from a government to a governance approach, in which the state recognises the importance of non-state actors. Bénit-Gbaffou (2018b:2152) notes that that the power of the governance model lies in the application of state and non-state resources towards achieving policy objectives, and depends on state's 'ability to build and maintain coalitions between state and non-state agents in order to mobilise the resources needed for urban change'.

Policy instrumentation – the programmes, agreements and institutional structures that support policy implementation – is also an important determinant of success. Bénit-Gbaffou (2018b) contends that the choice of policy instrumentation is an inherently political act, and thatpolicy instruments deployed by the state represent their policy objectives more accurately than the intentions stated in policy documents. Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) suggest that analysing choices of policy instrumentation over time can help to identify the evolution of policy intention, particularly where the ideology underlying policy is vague. On the other hand, in cases of ideological vagueness, the process of choosing policy instrumentation can help to identify and confirm the policy objectives (*ibid.*). The use of performance indicators and measurement by the state is also a form of policy instrument associated with a modernising state and neoliberal policies, and is, according to Le Gales (2016) a political as well as policy instrument that provides the state with a new means of governing an increasingly complex, globalised and differentiated society.

Despite the lack of a unifying theory of policy implementation, scholars of the subject offer multiple insights into why policy implementation fails or succeeds. In the following section I describe an approach that assimilates these insights and that underpins the conceptual framework used in this research project.

2.5 Conceptual framework: the 7-C Protocol and ICHIP

The objective of this research project is to establish the extent to which the City of Johannesburg has implemented ICHIP and possible reasons for implementation successes or failures. Despite the range of viewpoints on policy implementation, some authors believe that certain factors or variables are common to most, if not all, theoretical approaches. Brynard (2005) identified six variables to which Munzhedzi (2020) added a seventh. Together these variables constitute the '7-C Protocol' (*ibid.*) and I have used this as a conceptual framework for analysing the ICHIP implementation. While the 7-C Protocol is not claimed as a definitive explanation of policy implementation, based on the literature I reviewed I believe it provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating policy implementation.

Unpacking the 7-C Protocol

The 7-C Protocol comprises seven variables that determine strong or weak policy implementation. They are context, content, commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions, communication and coordination. Both Brynard (2005) and Munzhedzi (2020) emphasise that these factors are interrelated and do not function in isolation.

Context refers to the social, economic, political, legal and institutional environments in which a policy is both developed and implemented (Brynard, 2005; Munzhedzi, 2020).

According to Brynard (2005), content is relevant to policy implementation in two ways. Firstly, the policy typology, classified as distributive, regulatory or redistributive, dictates whether the policy aims to generate public goods, set rules of behaviour or redistribute a finite quantity of public goods between different constituencies (*ibid.*). According to Munzhedzi (2020:95), 'governments function by coercion' so the policy typology determines the amount of coercion that will be needed as well as appropriate methods of applying it. A second consideration

about content is the appropriateness of the policy goals themselves as well as the methods chosen to achieve them (Brynard, 2005).

Commitment indicates the willingness of the implementer to carry out the policy tasks (Brynard, 2005). Brynard (2005) notes that while mostly associated with bottom-up theories and the attitudes of the administrative staff to the policy, commitment is also applicable in top-down approaches where it is more commonly referred to as 'disposition'. This translates into political will at all levels of the implementation hierarchy.

Capacity is the ability to deliver policy based on the resources that are available and can be mobilised to support the required outputs (Brynard, 2005.). In the context of public policy implementation, capacity is determined by the structural, functional and cultural ability of the organisation, and it includes tangible resources like budget, materials and staff, and intangible resources like leadership, motivation, commitment and resilience (*ibid.*).

Clients and coalitions are the 'interest groups, opinion leaders and other outside actors who actively support a particular implementation process' (Brynard, 2005:661). The state must be strategic when choosing coalition partners, and invest sufficient time and energy to identify the appropriate partners and build strong relationships with them (*ibid.*).

Effective communication of policy goals and tasks is central to policy implementation, as the implementers need to understand what they have to deliver and the consequences of non-delivery (Brynard, 2005; Munzhedzi, 2020). An evaluation of communication must also include the organisational structures and processes that are put in place to support it (Brynard, 2005).

Finally, coordination refers the degree to which municipal officials are aligned and support one another in executing policy (Munzhedzi, 2020). It is determined by the strength and nature of the relationships between the policy implementation

stakeholders, and influences how resources as well as information flows between them (*ibid.*).

The 7-C Protocol and ICHIP

In applying the 7-C Protocol to ICHIP's implementation, I have analysed how each of the seven factors described above may have affected implementation based on a review of various documents and the perspectives shared in the interviews conducted. Where possible I have applied the analysis at the level of the individual delivery and facilitation programmes, however the granularity of the information provided did not always allow for this. Figure 2.1 below illustrates how the 7-Cs protocol has been applied as a framework to assess ICHIP implementation at a policy and programme level.




Figure 2.1: 7-Cs Protocol as a framework for assessing ICHIP implementation

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed the theories and analytical frameworks developed over the past fifty years to better understand public policy design and implementation and the reasons that policy implementation gaps develop. Despite the numerous

models put forward, scholars of the discipline maintain that it is still lacking a common or unifying theory and that further research is needed. However, it is possible to identify seven factors that contribute to or detract from successful policy design and implementation that are common to most policy implementation models and theories. These have been synthesized into a 7-Cs protocol which underpins the conceptual framework of this research study. But before assessing the research findings, it is useful to understand the Johannesburg inner city housing context that gave rise to ICHIP. This is the subject of the next chapter.

3 Johannesburg Inner City Housing: it's complicated

3.1 Introduction

As the entry point to Johannesburg and the trade and transport hub of the metropolitan region, the inner city is a cosmopolitan and dynamic urban centre. Despite an active private sector housing market, there is still a serious lack of decent, affordable housing, particularly for the very poor. The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) has over the years implemented a range of programmes to try to address this issue, with the Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP) the most recent, having been finalised in 2017. The context within which a public policy is to be implemented is highly relevant for its design and the way in which it is implemented, and ICHIP responded to the Johannesburg inner city housing context at that time.

In this chapter I explore this context by firstly looking at the macro-level housing landscape within which CoJ operates. I then review Johannesburg's inner city housing history with a focus on the various programmes and initiatives that have been implemented since 1994, before assessing the current situation and its key actors. Finally, I describe the high-level governance structure of the municipality and the strategic imperatives that direct its work.

3.2 Framing local government housing policy

The 1996 Constitution places an obligation on the state to ensure access to adequate housing for all its citizens. Adequate housing includes 'adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at reasonable cost' (Yitay, 2011 in Mashiane and Oduko, 2020:99) and suggests a broader interpretation of housing as 'human settlements' rather than simply physical housing structures. The Constitution also requires that the three spheres of government – national, provincial and local – work together in a system of

cooperative governance in which each sphere enjoys a level of autonomy in the areas designated to them. This means that while CoJ is delegated authority to facilitate housing delivery according to its own policies within its area of jurisdiction, it must do so within the legal and regulatory framework established by national and provincial government.

CoJ is also required to pursue the housing policy objectives and principles as set out in the National Housing Act 107 of 1997 and in policies such as the National Housing Code (2009), the Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements or "Breaking New Ground" (BNG) (2004), the National Development Plan 2030 (2012) as well as provincial housing policy (Tissington, 2013). National housing policy identifies inner city regeneration, the needs of the poor, equitable access to housing, densification, and ensuring a range typologies and tenure options as priorities (RSA, 1997; Department of Human Settlements, 2009). It also recognises the need for private sector participation in housing delivery, and to empower individuals and communities to fulfil their own housing needs (*ibid.*). This positions the role of the state as both deliverer and facilitator of housing development.

BNG (2004) signalled an important shift in national housing policy away from increasing housing ownership towards rental housing as a way to meet the demand for housing in the low-income segment (Tissington, 2013). A number of housing policy instruments were established via the National Housing Code to support the delivery of affordable rental housing and social housing by local government. These programmes include the Institutional Subsidy Programme (ISP), the Social Housing Programme and the Community Residential Units (CRU) Programme (*ibid.*).

3.3 Housing in the Johannesburg Inner City

Over the past 50 years the Johannesburg inner city has witnessed massive transformation with periods of dramatic decline and regeneration (Tissington,

2013; Robb, 2018). As Murray (2011, in Robb, 2018:33) states, it went from being the 'finance capital and large-scale corporate enterprise of South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa at large, to becoming the residential home for the urban poor, both formally and informally'. After two decades of so-called 'white flight' in the 1960s and 1970s to the northern suburbs, the inner city became a magnet for poorer South Africans seeking employment opportunities in the economic centre of the country, but overcrowding, poor building management and a deterioration of public services led to an inner city characterised by 'crime and grime, urban decay and anarchy' (Tissington, 2013:31). The late 1990s saw the start of a regeneration narrative that sought to attract investment back to the inner city as a driver of economic development, and the development of housing stock – albeit not necessarily affordable housing – was a consistent element in that narrative (*ibid.*).

Since the late 1990s, the inner city has seen a number of housing strategies and programmes linked to this regeneration narrative that are set out in Figure 3.1 below. These programmes have been driven by CoJ and partnerships between the City, the private sector and community organisations. They have made use of housing and economic development policy instruments like the ISP and Urban Development Zone (UDZ), and to a large extent reflected the strategic goals and development paradigm of the City and its mayor at the time. In the early 2000s for example, the long-term vision of the Joburg 2030 Master Plan of a "World Class African City" focused on investment and economic growth. The Inner City Regeneration Strategy adopted in 2003 mirrored this strongly neoliberal stance with a focus on attracting middle and upper-class residents, gentrification and the eradication of slums (Tissington, 2013). The shift in strategic focus in the Joburg 2040 Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) towards inclusion, sustainability and eradicating poverty was echoed in the inner city regeneration strategy of the 2013 Inner City Transformation Roadmap (ICTR). The ICTR recognised the need for developing new housing stock in a non-exclusionary way, with an emphasis on providing housing for the poor and very poor households resident in the inner city (CoJ, 2013.). However, despite the plethora of programmes, policies and plans, various authors suggest that the 'world class African city' paradigm continues to

dominate city thinking and that little progress has been made towards a more inclusive inner city (*ibid.*; Robb, 2018).




Figure 3.1: Organisations, Programmes and Strategies impacting housing in the Johannesburg inner city, 1992 to 2016 (Source data: Tissington, 2013; Robb, 2018)

ICHIP was created as a response to the ICTR demand for an update of the Inner City Housing Action Plan of 2007 that would provide for a range of housing options and typologies to suite the range of needs and means of inner city households (CoJ, 2013). According to the final ICHIP report, it 'takes into account all sectors of the housing market and the needs of all income groups with an emphasis on the very poor… [and builds] on the extensive work that has already been undertaken and is underway' in the inner city (RebelGroup, 2016:7).

3.4 Inner city housing in Johannesburg today

Despite the rise of the Sandton economic node, the inner city remains the core of Johannesburg and an active commercial, retail and residential centre that 'still functions as a significant economic focus of the city' (CoJ, 2021a:48). The role of the inner city as a trade hub and gateway to Africa contributes to its cosmopolitan nature. Its economic and residential opportunities and its transport infrastructure make it the entry point to Johannesburg for urban migrants from elsewhere in South Africa as well as other African countries (RebelGroup, 2016). A 2017/2018 Quality of Life survey found that over 15 000 migrants enter the city of Johannesburg every month, roughly one third of them from other countries (CoJ, 2021b). The inner city is home to large numbers of non-governmental, faith-based and community-based organisations, significant cultural and heritage assets, educational, artistic and sporting institutions as well as SMME incubators and creative industries (*ibid.*). From a spatial planning perspective, this physical, social and economic infrastructure and the potential to optimise these assets position it as the 'heart of the new compact polycentric city [that] acts as the connector, bridging the historical north-south divide' (CoJ, 2021a:81) and as one of five transformation zones in CoJ's 2040 Spatial Development Framework (SDF).

While the inner city's economic and social importance as well as its potential for development is recognised, rapid growth and urbanisation are straining its urban management systems, placing pressure on infrastructure and creating more demand for service delivery (RebelGroup, 2016). Weak urban management, ageing

and under-maintained infrastructure, and overcrowding have created 'an inner city under stress' (*ibid.*:8).

The lack of affordable housing is recognised as one of the main challenges of the inner city in multiple publications and strategy documents, including the Johannesburg 2040 GDS, the 2040 SDF and the City's Integrated Development Plan (IDP). High poverty levels, a stressed built form, and weak property ownership and management systems all contribute to a vicious property cycle (RebelGroup, 2016). The range of housing supplied does not adequately respond to the demands for welfare and emergency accommodation of economically vulnerable households needing a more flexible rental model. These households often have no option but to rent from unscrupulous landlords and live in very poor conditions that exacerbate their vulnerability (*ibid.*).

Mayson and Charlton (2015) note a complex range of management systems that have emerged across the formal and informal inner city housing markets to respond to the changeability and precariousness of inner city households' circumstances. They suggest that, while some of the management practices and housing conditions expose residents to unacceptable levels of risk, others provide decent accommodation and fill a gap that public housing strategies are failing to fill (*ibid.*). The challenge for municipal housing strategists is therefore to find a balance between intervening in cases of unacceptable risk and assimilating other strategies that – while illegal under the current legal and regulatory framework – are responding adequately to the realities of many city dwellers (*ibid.*).

While the challenges of inner city housing are many, RebelGroup (2016) also identified a number of opportunities. There is large scope for repurposing properties in the inner city and an apparent willingness in the private sector to do so. The private sector is responsive to housing demand in both the formal and informal markets. New funding mechanisms and institutions are opening up the market to investors, particularly to small scale landlords and black entrepreneurs.

And the transport and infrastructure base is significant, even if ageing and undermaintained in certain respects. (*ibid.*)

3.5 Inner city housing demand and supply

Establishing current demand and supply of inner city housing, particularly on the lower end of the rental scale, is frustrated by a lack of recent, reliable and consistent data. The information in this section is derived largely from the ICHIP report prepared by RebelGroup in 2015. The data in that report is based on the 2011 Census findings together with the project team's own fieldwork in a number of inner city areas, and is presented as indicative.

Housing demand

The nature and scale of demand for housing can be inferred from population and household statistics. Between 2001 and 2011, the Johannesburg inner city population grew 23% and household size grew by 6%, both above the national averages (RebelGroup, 2016). This reflects a high rate of urbanisation, but the increasing household size also suggests a housing supply shortage that forces sharing arrangements between households. Indeed, RebelGroup found that in five precincts, flats were oversubscribed by 100% and residential houses by 300%. Table 3.1 below shows an analysis of overcrowding in five inner city precincts based on the number of households versus number of properties registered in the City's rates database. (RebelGroup, 2016)

Area	Households	Units	% Overcrowded
Braamfontein, Hillbrow and IC Core	12 031	7 451	161%
Berea	14 386	5 430	265%
Yeoville	5 196	2 066	252%
Bellevue & Bellevue East	5 532	1 558	355%
Bertrams	6 189	1 000	619%
Total	**43 334**	**17 505**	**248%**

Table 3.1: Overcrowding in five inner city precincts, 2011 (RebelGroup, 2016:40)

Available data indicates that the majority of inner city households (89%) rent, and that most of these households are low- to middle income, earning less than R7000 per month (RebelGroup, 2016). This translates to a housing budget of under R1600 per month, if a guideline of 25% is applied (SERI, 2016). The household income graph in Figure 3.2 below shows that more than 22'000 households earned less than R9600 per annum in 2011, and of those households, 75% reported earning no income at all (RebelGroup, 2016).




Figure 3.2: Inner city households by annual income band, 2011 (RebelGroup, 2016:32)

In 2016, the estimated shortfall of housing just for those households in the inner city considered to be at high or very high risk, was 30,084 units. These households were earning less than R3200 per month and were thus in need of a public sector housing intervention, as the private formal sector was (and is) not able to deliver housing in this rental price bracket. (RebelGroup, 2016)

Housing supply

The range of housing typologies on offer in the inner city is wide, from shared rooms and spaces through to 3-bedroom flats. Subletting and shared living arrangements are common and indicative of both low incomes and the lack of

affordable options. Building management systems are well-established in both formal and informal rental markets and access to services is relatively good but costly. Figure 3.3 below provides an overview of the various sources of housing supply in the inner city as well as their pricing ranges and estimated units provided (where known). While there is no reliable, consolidated information on housing delivery, RebelGroup (2016) estimated based on interviews and various reports that the private sector was delivering between 2000 and 4000 units in the R1500 to R3000 per month rental range, and less than 1000 units in the above-R3000 per month category. Social housing institutions were delivering only 200 communal /shared facilities units for less than R1000 per month, and 500 units in the R1050 to R2100 rental range. Their study found no units being delivered by the public sector for less than R600 per month. This analysis demonstrates the clear need for a strategy and concerted effort to increase the delivery of affordable housing if the supply shortfall is to be addressed. (RebelGroup, 2016)




Figure 3.3: Sources of inner city housing supply (RebelGroup, 2016:42)

The actors

Figure 3.4 below provides an overview of the organisations and institutions in public and private sector that touch or impact inner city housing. While the view is not exhaustive, it gives a sense of the number of actors that have an interest in housing and whose involvement should be taken into consideration in any housing strategy implementation.




Figure 3.4: Inner city housing actors (created by author; source data CoJ Housing Department, 2021a)

3.6 City of Johannesburg strategic and governance framework

The long-term strategic priorities of the City of Johannesburg are articulated in the 2040 GDS (published in 2011) and are aligned to the 2012 NDP as well as provincial strategies like the Gauteng Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation strategy of 2015 and the Growing Gauteng Together 2030 strategy published in February 2020. The City's IDP provides a 5-year strategic plan and the current IDP for 2021 to 2026 identifies 12 strategic priorities, one of

which is Integrated Human Settlements. These strategic priorities are supported by strategies like the the Joburg City Safety Strategy (approved in 2003 and revised in 2016), the SDF 2040, the Inner City Transformation Roadmap of 2013, and the Joburg Human Settlement Strategy articulated within the 2021 to 2026 IDP. The Human Settlement Strategy recognises the inner city's housing challenges as well as the City's constitutional mandate to ensure access to adequate housing for its residents. It acknowledges ICHIP as part of the Inner City Revitalisation Programme (CoJ, 2021b)

The governance structure of the City provides for the separation of the legislative and executive functions. The City Council is made up of elected councillors who are responsible for policy formulation and overseeing policy implementation. The Council elects an Executive Mayor who provides strategic direction for the City, supported by a Mayoral Committee comprising 10 councillors or Members, each responsible for a portfolio. Section 79 Portfolio Committees are chaired by councillors and have an oversight function that includes monitoring the delivery and outputs of departmental programmes, reviewing CoJ plans and budgets, and holding the Executive accountable for performance against City policies and priorities. Finally, the CoJ administration, led by the City Manager, comprises departments and is staffed by employees responsible for delivering the vision and strategies of the Council. (CoJ, 2021b)

Municipal Entities (MEs) are the City's service delivery agents. They are wholly-owned by the City and governed by service level agreements. There are 13 MEs, however the key ones for this report are the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), responsible for supporting area-based economic development initiatives; the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), which develops and manages all CoJ-owned properties to optimise their social and commercial value for the City; and the Johannesburg Social Housing Company (JOSHCO), which is responsible for providing and managing affordable rental housing for the City. (CoJ, 2021b)

3.7 Conclusion

Under the 1996 Constitution, the City of Johannesburg as the local arm of the State is obliged – alongside its provincial and national counterparts - to ensure its residents have access to adequate housing. The Constitutional interpretation of adequate housing implies more than physical structures, but points to adequacy in terms of location, pricing, infrastructure and services (Yitay, 2011 in Mashiane and Oduko, 2020). In formulating its approach to housing policy and strategy, the City enjoys a level of autonomy but must still work within the national and provincial legislative frameworks and support their policy objectives, which, as they relate to housing, include prioritising the needs of the poor, inner city regeneration and densification (RSA, 1997; Department of Human Settlements, 2009; Tissington, 2013). They also recognise the role of the private sector in housing provision and the agency of individuals to provide for themselves; in this sense the state is a facilitator of housing provision rather than purely a provider.

A number of housing strategies and programmes have been implemented in the Johannesburg inner city since the 1990s as part of various inner city regeneration drives. Despite these programmes and a dynamic private sector housing market, there is still a serious lack of decent, affordable housing in the inner city, particularly for the very poor. This has created a situation in which the most vulnerable households are forced into precarious informal housing situations that further increase their vulnerability. Housing developers and landlords in the formal private sector are unable to provide housing at rental prices accessible to the very poor, so this responsibility falls to the City. An inner city housing situation faced with multiple challenges and involving a large number of actors requires a strategy that embraces complexity and facilitates cooperation between the public and private sectors. The following chapters analyse the extent to which ICHIP has been able to achieve this.

4 Assessing ICHIP's implementation

4.1 Introduction

In February 2017, the City of Johannesburg's (CoJ) Housing Department presented the draft Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP) to the Inner City Partnership Forum and in May of the same year it secured approval for the plan from the CoJ Mayoral Committee. Eight months later on 1 October 2017, the CoJ published a media statement in which Mayor Herman Mashaba announced that 'the City's Council has approved our plan for tackling the housing challenge within the inner city and creating safe, clean and connected communities with access to economic communities' (eNCA, 2017; JICP, 2017). The announcement referred to the need for 30'000 accommodation units to address the housing shortfall in the inner city, the important role of public-private partnerships in the strategic approach, and said that '[t]hrough the Inner City Housing Implementation Plan, we are set to make the inner city housing market work better for the poor' (*ibid.*).

ICHIP was premised on an approach that was contextually appropriate, prioritised the poor, and promoted public-private partnerships. It addresses the key strategic areas of providing temporary emergency accommodation to meet the City's Constitutional Court obligations, delivering a pipeline of subsidised rental housing, enhancing the delivery of affordable rental stock by the private sector, providing emergency services to buildings in critical condition, dealing with 'bad buildings', and reversing the decline in owner-occupied housing through a sectional title rehabilitation programme. ICHIP proposed an institutional arrangement to enable implementation as well as a budget breakdown for the five-year period from 2017/18 to 2021/22. The total projected programme cost was R2,069 billion, comprising approximately R1,9 billion in capital costs, R102 million in operating costs and R58 million in programme management costs. It was foreseen that the CoJ would carry R1,32 billion of the total budget, with the balance coming from

state grants and subsidies as well as the private sector. (RebelGroup, 2016; CoJ Housing Department, 2017b)

Five years after the mayor's media statement in October 2017 the question is asked how much has been achieved. The answer from a diversity of stakeholders has ranged from 'not much' to more qualified responses identifying pockets of activity related to a few of the programmes. The interviews also revealed that ICHIP was in fact never approved by the City Council. Despite this, there is evidence that ICHIP as a strategy is still being used by the CoJ Housing department to inform its strategy. In the following sections I discuss ICHIP's journey from its inception through to its current status. I assess how much has been achieved against the original objectives and possible reasons why. Finally, I consider how ICHIP continues to inform CoJ Housing strategy, even if not in the manner initially intended by its authors.

4.2 The status of ICHIP, and why it matters

On 5 May 2017, the CoJ Housing department submitted a report to the CoJ Mayoral Committee requesting approval for an Inclusive Mixed Use (IMU) Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP) and its associated R2 billion budget (CoJ Housing Department, 2017a). The project was initiated by the Housing department who collaborated with the Development Planning department, the Johannesburg Social Housing Company (JOSHCO) and the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) (*ibid.*). The JDA led the project from an operational perspective, drawing up the terms of reference and hiring consultants RebelGroup to develop the strategy (JDA Official, interview 10 December 2021; Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021). Emanuel Sotomi, Director of the Housing department's Public Housing Programme Support (PHPS) directorate, explained that his directorate had approached the JDA for their assistance because the JDA had a panel of consultants that the Housing department did not, and is also subject to less challenging procurement mechanisms for project budgets of less than R1 million (interview, 22 December 2021; Housing Department Official 1, interview 8 December 2021).

RebelGroup prepared a draft ICHIP report that included an overarching strategy as well as more detailed action and precinct plans. Using RebelGroup's draft report, the Housing department consulted various internal and external stakeholders to check ICHIP's viability before taking it to the Mayoral Committee (Housing Department Official 1, interview 8 December 2021). The minutes from the Mayoral Committee meeting were not available at the time of writing, but Sotomi confirmed that the plan was approved (interview, 22 December 2021). The budget was not approved in full however; instead 'nominal amounts were approved year on year' (Sotomi, personal correspondence 10 March 2022).

In saying that 'the City's Council has approved our plan for tackling the housing challenge within the inner city' (eNCA, 2017; JICP, 2017), the media statement on 1 October 2017 suggested that ICHIP had been approved by the Council as well as the Mayoral Committee. However, every CoJ official that I interviewed including Sotomi stated that ICHIP was not approved by the Council. It had apparently been tabled at a Council meeting on 27 and 28 September 2017, but as the extract of the Council Meeting Minutes in Figure 4.1 below shows, the item was withdrawn by the MMC for Housing, Councillor Ntuli (CoJ, 2017).



37

City of Johannesburg Council 2017-09-27/28 MINUTES

Item 8 INCLUSIVE MIXED USE (IMU) – INNER CITY HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

MMC Ntuli withdrew the item.

WITHDRAWN

(HOUSING)
(E Sotomi)
(Tel. (011) 018-6704)

Figure 4.1: Extract of CoJ Council Minutes, 27/28 September 2017 (CoJ, 2017)

This begs the question why Mayor Mashaba announced in a media statement three days after the Council meeting that ICHIP had been approved. The media statement also referred to the Council approving the release of 12 CoJ-owned properties for

low-cost housing, and this leads me to believe that the media statement conflated the approval on the 12 buildings by Council with Council approval of ICHIP; whether this was deliberate is not clear.

According to Sotomi, Council approval was neither needed nor requested by the Housing department because ICHIP is a strategy not a policy (interview, 22 December 2021). He explained the difference between the two as: 'Policy speaks to how you do things, it's about rules. Strategy is saying we have these instruments, this is how we'd like them to work together' (*ibid.*). This was relevant because ICHIP was not proposing an entirely new set of initiatives, as it included existing Housing programmes in an overall, integrated strategy. Sotomi confirmed that 'it was approved by the Mayoral Committee and that was all that was required of it, however, Mayor Mashaba insisted that it go to the Council' (interview, 22 December 2021).

Any strategy, programme or policy that is put to the Council is subject to a rigorous process that includes approval by the relevant Section 79 Committee, an oversight body responsible for vetting and monitoring programme implementation (Housing Department Official 2, interview 30 November 2021; Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021). Figure 4.2 reflects this process; it shows the header of the Final ICHIP Report that was submitted to the Council on 30 August 2018. The header lists the entities to whom the report has been presented and when, and it is evident that by the end of August 2018, the report had been put before the Mayoral Committee a second time, the Section 79 Housing Committee twice, and the Council three times. Sotomi clarified however that the header in the report in Figure 4.2 indicates that there were three attempts to put ICHIP before Council prior to the one that was withdrawn in September 2018, but they were not successful. To this day, ICHIP has not been approved by the Council.



1

City of Johannesburg Council 2018-08-30

COJ : HOUSING COMMITTEE 2017-10-11 2018-02-05
COJ : COUNCIL 2017-09-27 2017-11-29 2018-02-22
COJ : MAYORAL COMMITTEE 2017-06-07

HOUSING RESUBMISSION

2 **INCLUSIVE MIXED USE (IMU) – INNER CITY HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN**

Figure 4.2: Header section of Final ICHIP Report to Council, 30 August 2018 (CoJ Housing Department, 2018)

No clear reason other than politics was forthcoming from any of the interviewees as to why ICHIP was never approved by the Council. Director of the Inner City Office, Thabo Maisela, recalled that the report had been sent from one committee to the other in an administrative process that was influenced by the political parties involved (interview 10 December 2021), and this process is evident in the report header in Figure 4.2. I consider the nature of the politics further in the following chapter, but it appears that it was not for lack of trying that ICHIP did not get Council approval. The JDA Official confirmed that the JDA was actively involved in helping the Housing department to complete ICHIP and get it approved by Council, but they did not succeed (interview, 10 December 2021).

It does seem that Council approval would have been useful however, particularly in terms of securing the full budget needed to implement the strategy. Sotomi noted that Housing had not wished to put ICHIP to the Council because the only 'new' budget needed for ICHIP related to the TEA delivery programme and this budget could be approved at the level of the Mayoral Committee (interview, 22 December 2021). According to Sotomi, the budgets for the other programmes were already accounted for since they were existing programmes of the respective implementing agents (*ibid.*). This doesn't explain why the full budget was submitted to the Mayoral Committee for approval in May 2017 however, and I have been unable to ascertain the reasons why it was not approved. But as the following section will show, the lack of budget appears to be a key cause of weak

implementation, and a number of the CoJ officials that I interviewed felt that Council approval would have addressed this. Housing official Msizi Khuhlane commented that there was never any money set aside to cover ICHIP's R2 billion projected cost and it had to be funded from the existing Housing budget (interview, 2 December 2021). He believes that Council approval would have given the Housing department the footing to ask for the additional budget (*ibid.*), a view corroborated by Housing Department Official 2, who said that once any strategy has been approved by Council, budget must be allocated to implement it (interview, 30 November 2021). Khuhlane also felt that Council approval would have ensured a higher prioritisation of the strategy within the Mayoral Priorities related to the inner city, which should have unlocked additional funding (interview, 2 December 2021).

Council approval was also important in relation to securing the operational support for ICHIP across the CoJ. The Planning Official interviewed remarked that it is 'difficult to get everyone pulling in the same direction' (interview, 29 November 2021), a view echoed by Housing Department Official 1 who reflected on the challenge of getting departments to work together or getting City officials to deliver anything that falls outside of their job description or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (interview, 8 December 2021). The reality is that within the City, different departments can have KPIs that are diametrically opposed (Klug, interview 15 November 2021), and in this respect, having a policy or programme approved by the Council ensures that the programme's outputs are translated into KPIs for all departments implicated in its execution (Housing Department Official 1, interview 8 December 2021).

But even though ICHIP was not approved by the Council, it is evident that certain elements of it have been implemented to some extent. I examine what has been achieved in each programme in the next section.

4.3 Implementation status of the ICHIP programmes

ICHIP is based on two pillars of implementation: housing delivery and housing facilitation (CoJ Housing Department, 2017a). Each pillar comprises a number of programmes, where the housing delivery programmes focus on increasing the supply of accommodation and the housing facilitation programmes address issues with existing housing or attempt to provide a better platform on which housing delivery can occur (*ibid.*). There are 11 programmes in all: six delivery programmes and five facilitation programmes that are shown in Figure 4.3. Each programme has a responsible department or municipal entity (ME) and an implementing agent or agents.

Delivery Programmes

Programme	Responsibility	Implementing agent
Delivery Programme 1: Temporary Emergency Accommodation (TEA)	JOSHCO	JOSHCO, external service providers e.g. MES
Delivery Programme 2: Municipal Rental Rooms	JOSHCO	JOSHCO
Delivery Programme 3: Private Rental Rooms	JDA	Private sector e.g. Jozi Housing, AFHCO
Delivery Programme 4: Social Housing	JOSHCO; JDA	JOSHCO (muni. SHI); Independent SHIs e.g. JHC, MHA; HDA
Delivery Programme 5: Emerging landlords	JDA	TUHF; HDA
Delivery Programme 6: Ownership	CoJ Housing	CoJ Housing; GPF

Facilitation Programmes

Programme	Responsibility	Implementing agent
Facilitation Programme 1: Relocation of Evictees	CRUM	ICHIP Programme Office Social Dev; EMS; JOSHCO etc.
Facilitation Programme 2: Sectional Title Rehabilitation	JDA	ICHIP Programme Office
Facilitation Programme 3: Bad Buildings	DED (ICPS)	Support: ICHIP Programme Office; Joburg Water
Facilitation Programme 4: Municipal Support	JDA; Housing; Planning	JDA; Ext. service provider; Planning; Joburg Water
Facilitation Programme 5: Information Systems	CRUM Legal & Compliance	Region F inspectors; External service providers

Figure 4.3: ICHIP Delivery and Facilitation Programmes (Adapted from CoJ Housing Department, 2017a)

Before discussing the implementation status of the programmes, it is relevant to consider the institutional arrangements proposed for ICHIP and whether these were realised. The 2016 ICHIP Strategy and Programmes Report noted the need to allocate sufficient human resources to the programme (RebelGroup, 2016). It also recommended that an Inner City Programme Management office be set up, identifying the JDA as suitable for the task given its role as the City's development

facilitation unit (RebelGroup, 2016). The CoJ Inner City Office, located in the Office of the City Manager, would ensure strategic alignment with other Inner City programmes, in particular the Inner City Transformation Roadmap (*ibid.*). Various interviews confirmed however that the Programme Management Office was not set up, and although the JDA was certainly involved in driving some ICHIP programmes, it did not take on the coordinating role as intended (JDA Official, interview 10 December 2021; Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021).

Assessing progress on ICHIP's Delivery Programmes

As the name suggests, the delivery programmes aim to increase the supply of housing in the inner city. The objective of the first delivery programme, Temporary Emergency Accommodation (TEA), is to provide appropriate accommodation for inner city evictees. This is not only an obligation placed on the CoJ by the Constitutional Court, it is also an important piece of the housing supply chain in that it enables the release of buildings for redevelopment as affordable housing (RebelGroup, 2016). There was broad consensus among the interviewees that the TEA programme is being delivered albeit at a slow pace (Maisela, interview 10 December 2021). Other opinions are that it is poorly managed (Khuhlane, interview 2 December 2021) and not being realised in the manner intended by ICHIP (Housing Department Official 2, interview 30 November 2021). A 2021 TEA Readiness Report prepared by the Housing department confirms that four new TEA buildings yielding 412 rooms were completed over the past five years (CoJ Housing Department, 2021a). It also notes 12 projects that were presented to the Mayoral Committee for the five-year period are stalled or have been cancelled for various reasons, and a further 11 new projects are earmarked for a combination of TEA, Affordable Rental Accommodation and old age rental units (*ibid.*). The report emphasises that the TEA programme has been and continues to be significantly under-funded: against a budget requirement of R561 720 000 projected by ICHIP for the five-year period of 2017 to 2022, only R173 812 000 was received, a shortfall of R387 908 000 or 69% (*ibid.*).

At the time of the 2021 TEA Readiness Report, more than 10 000 TEA beds were required for evictees based on court eviction notices (CoJ Housing Department, 2021a), implying an urgent need for TEA facilities that is not matched by the pace of delivery or the budget allocation. According to Sotomi, securing buildings for TEA facilities from the JPC is critical, but while Housing works closely with the JPC, it is not an easy relationship and they struggle to access the JPC's asset registers (interview, 22 December 2021). Sotomi suggested that the JPC's orientation towards maximising profit is fundamentally misaligned with the Housing department's developmental objectives, and this is where a large part of the disconnect between the two entities originates (*ibid.*).

The second delivery programme aims to increase the delivery of subsidised municipal rental accommodation for very poor households through the expansion of the existing JOSHCO social housing model (CoJ Housing Department, 2017a). There is some overlap with the TEA programme as three of the 11 buildings listed in the 2021 TEA Readiness Report are earmarked for old age rental accommodation (CoJ Housing Department, 2021b). This is a focus of the Housing department as no new old age facilities had been developed by the City since 1994 (*ibid.*; Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021). One of the buildings currently being used for TEA may be used for old age rental accommodation as well (Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021). Beyond this focus on old age rental accommodation and the conversion of TEA into municipal rentals, there was no other indication of delivery on programme 2.

Delivery programme 3 encourages the private sector to deliver large numbers of cheap rental rooms by providing capital subsidies and incentives that make it financially viable for them to do so (RebelGroup, 2016). Six interviewees were aware of an initiative by National Treasury to develop an incentive model for private developers. The JDA and Andreas Bertoldi of RebelGroup were involved in the initiative, and an email exchange in February 2018 between Anne Steffny on behalf of the Johannesburg Inner City Partnership (JICP) and a JDA official confirmed that 'the incentives discussion this afternoon, with GTAC [Government

Technical Advisory Centre] colleagues comes from one of the programmes in ICHIP, and it specifically tries to explore incentives to increase the affordable / inclusionary housing stock' (Steffny, personal correspondence 5 February 2018). However, according to Bertoldi and Steffny, the model was never approved (interviews 23 November 2021 and 8 December 2021).

The objective of the fourth delivery programme is to increase the delivery of social rental housing, specifically on the lower end of the social housing income range (RebelGroup, 2016). JOSHCO is central to this programme and it continues to deliver social housing rental units as its core business. The most recent business plan (2020/21) available on the JOSHCO website indicates that 297 units were delivered in the 2018/19 financial year, with just over 700 new units planned for the inner city in the three financial years up to 2022/23 (JOSHCO, 2020). This constitutes approximately 30% of the total new social housing units planned by JOSHCO in this period, and reflects a shift in focus towards student accommodation and greenfield developments in the northern and southern suburbs of Johannesburg that promise higher rentals (*ibid.*). ICHIP also proposes to support private Social Housing Institutions (SHIs) to increase their delivery of rental units. The JDA Official recalled a project the JDA worked on with the Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA) and the Housing Development Agency (HDA) to help SHIs acquire land parcels that was 'a bit disastrous' (interview, 10 December 2021). The SHI Manager also indicated that his organisation had secured one building through the building release programme (interview, 14 September). So, although the social housing programme is one where delivery is occurring, JOHSCO's apparent focus on expanding its reach into the more lucrative markets of the northern suburbs and student accommodation and the limited benefits derived by private sector SHIs from ICHIP suggests that it is underperforming in terms of ICHIP's original intentions.

Supporting emerging black landlords to deliver rental accommodation is the focus of the fifth delivery programme (RebelGroup, 2016). The intended support is largely in the form of providing access to City-owned buildings on preferential

terms and to finance (*ibid.*). Very little was reported on this programme in the interviews, with the only indication of any activity coming from the Trust for Urban Housing Finance (TUHF), largely because financing emerging black landlords is their core business (Cox, interview 27 January 2022). This programme has a strong transformation objective, which is supported both by TUHF and by the JPC. In its 2021 Progress Report on the Inner City Property Release Programme to the CoJ Housing Committee, the JPC confirmed 91 properties were awarded in the first two phases of the Inner City Rejuvenation Programme in accordance with its Preferential Procurement Policy Framework (PPPF) (JPC, 2021). Under the PPPF, the JPC awarded 147 properties in total, 'mostly to 100% black, women-owned and managed companies, each with Level 1 BBB-EE accreditation' (*ibid.*:2). Apart from the activities of TUHF and the JPC, I came across no further signs of activity related to this programme.

The sixth and final delivery programme focusses on ownership as an alternative to rental for very low income households in the inner city using FLISP subsidies and BNG medium-density, fully-subsidised housing, as well as a 'Help to Buy' option (RebelGroup, 2016; CoJ Housing Department, 2017b). Sotomi said that his directorate was investigating options to build steel-framed high-rise inner city housing but nothing has been delivered yet as this would need national approval as an RDP project (interview, 22 December 2021). Housing Department Official 2 noted a push within the City away from rental towards ownership in the past five years, and that a rent-to-buy model is being considered at the moment (interview, 30 November 2021; CoJ, 2021b). Separately, Johannesburg Housing Company CEO Elize Stroebel spoke of a survey that the National Department of Human Settlements (NDoHS) sent to SHIs regarding a rent-to-buy model, however the proposal placed all the risk on the SHI with the NDoHS not offering any support and was considered unfeasible (interview, 6 December 2021). The CoJ Housing officials were unaware of this initiative by the NDoHS, and apart from the City's rent-to-buy objective and inner city RDP housing ideas, I discovered no other information on ownership-related programmes during the course of my research.

Implementation of ICHIP Facilitation Programmes

The facilitation programmes aim to create services and platforms to support the delivery of affordable housing in the inner city. The first facilitation programme focusses on processes around relocating evictees to temporary emergency accommodation. Meant as a standalone programme, the Special Programme for the Relocation of Evictees (SPRE) has since been incorporated into the CoJ Temporary Emergency Accommodation Policy (TEAP) that was approved by the City Council on 25 February 2021. The TEAP incorporates the procedural aspects of relocating evictees, including engagement processes and guidelines as well as the conditions of tenure in TEA facilities (CoJ Housing Department, 2021c). Neil Klug, senior lecturer at the Wits University School of Architecture and Planning who worked on the initial SPRE policy finds the TEAP a 'watered-down version of what was originally intended', and believes that by incorporating the SPRE into the TEAP, the City is using emergency accommodation to treat non-emergency situations, as evictions are seldom emergencies (interview, 15 November 2021).

A proposed approach to implementing the second facilitation programme, sectional title rehabilitation, was prepared by the Rebel Group, TUHF and the JDA and presented to the Housing department in a report, but has not proceeded any further. Katherine Cox, Research and Development and Development Impact Manager at TUHF subsidiary TUHF21 confirmed that TUHF had driven the programme, engaging with RebelGroup, the JDA, the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) and other banks (interview, 27 January 2022). Sotomi acknowledged the work done by TUHF and the JDA, confirming the receipt of the report, but the Housing department has not yet been able to present it to the Section 79 Housing Committee for review because the Committee had not sat for 'quite some time' under the previous administration (interview, 22 December 2021).

The targeting and release of 'bad buildings' for rehabilitation is the focus of the third facilitation programme. This is essentially the existing Inner City Property

Scheme (ICPS) that sits in the Department of Economic Development (DED) and is run by the JPC (CoJ Housing Department, 2017b). In the context of ICHIP, the intention is that the buildings are rehabilitated specifically to increase the delivery of affordable rental accommodation or TEA facilities. To that end, the Housing department secured a capacitation grant from the SHRA to identify suitable buildings for conversion into housing which resulted in the four TEA buildings mentioned above (Sotomi, interview 22 December).

That the building targeting and release is happening is not in question, as the 2021 JPC Progress Report mentioned earlier shows. What is questionable is its effectiveness in supporting the delivery of affordable housing. As Mayor, Herman Mashaba gave a lot of impetus to the building targeting and release programme, however Khuhlane noted that the buildings that Mayor Mashaba handed over to the private sector were directed to developments in the higher-income social housing bracket rather than low-cost rental rooms (interview, 2 December 2021). As a City official, Khuhlane recognises this, commenting on Mashaba's relentless targeting of the R3500 to R10 000 income market when the inner city housing crisis was being driven by households earning less than R3500 (interview, 2 December 2021). Although according to the SHI Executive the deals brokered by the JPC are difficult to make work even for social housing institutions. He commented that his SHI had wanted to participate in the programme and had looked at a number of the buildings on offer by the JPC, but they couldn't get it to work financially (interview, 5 January 2021). Private developers face increasing construction costs and rapidly increasing utilities costs levied by CoJ (*ibid.*; Plit, interview 20 December 2021). As the SHI Executive said, 'if you [the City] want to help the poor, you have to come to the party somehow' (*ibid.*).

The fourth facilitation programme comprises four sub-programmes: municipal process facilitation, education and training, urban densification through back yarding regularisation, and emergency service provision to critical buildings (CoJ Housing Department, 2017b). The intention was to make the process of delivering housing and densification easier for developers, landlords and investors (*ibid.*).

Cox spoke of a 'fast track centre' that TUHF delivered together with the JDA and CoJ Development Planning (interview, 27 January 2022). The objective was to provide developers with information and access to City departments to resolve issues, fast track applications and indicate areas where the City was specifically supporting development (*ibid.*) Curiously, there was a very low take-up of the service by developers and it was discontinued (*ibid.*). This initiative responded mainly to the education and training sub-programme, and it has an element of municipal process facilitation too, although the ICHIP report positioned that sub-programme more as a review of by-laws, planning approval processes, zoning and billing backlogs (RebelGroup, 2016). The Planning Official noted that the city has implemented a number of measures to support densification through the regularisation of backyarding (personal correspondence, 8 March 2022). The City's new Land Use Scheme of 2018 introduced subsidiary dwelling units on all residential 1 erven across the city, and extended the rights for subsidiary units to allow for each to be divided into three rentable rooms, each with their own bathroom and kitchen (*ibid.*). The 2019 Nodal Review also encourages formal densification through re-zoning high density zones (*ibid.*). Beyond this, there were no indications of any progress having been made on the other sub-programmes.

The final facilitation programme is the development of an integrated management information system that would assist to log, track and resolve issues with problem buildings in the inner city (RebelGroup, 2016). Sotomi believes that this system is the key programme to get right in the short term (interview, 22 December 2021). He said, 'I think one could say it's the most important one… to collect this information, put it in one place and be able to draw reports from it to plan with it', but while a brief has been submitted to the CoJ Information Technology department, there has been no funding for the project and no progress, although Sotomi indicated that a recent meeting with the Metro Trading Company might remedy this (*ibid.*; personal correspondence 22 March 2022).

4.4 The continued relevance of ICHIP for the City of Johannesburg

The perspectives shared in the interviews paint a picture of a fragmented and uneven implementation of the ICHIP programmes rather than a cohesive, integrated human settlement strategy. But the high-level principles and objectives of ICHIP continue to be referenced in CoJ strategic planning documents. It is mentioned in the draft version of the 2021 - 2026 Integrated Development Plan (IDP) in the context of the human settlements strategy and the inner city revitalisation programme, and it is also described in some detail in the 2040 Spatial Development Framework.

Urban planner Tanya Zack (interview 26 November 2021) believes that, while one probably can't ascribe all of the City's housing interventions and programmes to ICHIP, it could be that ICHIP 'would have helped lay the foundation for what should be done, what shouldn't be done… to help steer projects in a certain way, and maybe just help some to get off the ground more quickly'. In this way ICHIP could be considered a sort of 'toolbox' for the City to use in addressing housing challenges (*ibid.*). This sentiment is supported by Inner City director Thabo Maisela, who said, 'I think it was a very, very brilliant start to what we wanted to achieve, because it gave us a better understanding of what we needed to focus on… in that there are certain aspects of housing that we had completely neglected. And ICHIP had put those on the agenda for us' (interview, 10 December 2021).

A number of City officials interviewed maintain that ICHIP's concepts and programmes continue to inform housing and inner city strategies. Housing Department Official 2 observed that the issues that ICHIP addresses are still very relevant as they haven't been resolved yet (interview, 30 November 2021). The official also confirmed that many of ICHIP's concepts have been integrated into the as-yet unpublished Housing 2040 Strategy, albeit in a more distributed or segmented manner (*ibid.*). The Housing department's 2021/2022 Business Plan has few references to ICHIP-related programmes though, mentioning only budget provision for TEA facilities and a Housing Data Management System to enable

housing data management and performance monitoring as part of the department's turnaround plan (CoJ Housing Department, 2021a), so it will be interesting to see the extent to which the 2040 Strategy incorporates the other programmes.

4.5 Conclusion

When I began investigating the implementation status of ICHIP, a possible scenario was that the report was gathering dust on a shelf in the CoJ Housing Department. This is clearly not the case and by all accounts ICHIP concepts continue to inform CoJ Housing strategy. But decisions made about ICHIP as a strategy in itself have strongly influenced its implementation. The fact that ICHIP was never approved as a housing strategy by the Council has had consequences in terms of funding, human resources and institutional support. Sotomi's assertion that ICHIP did not need Council approval or additional budgets because it worked with existing housing instruments is validated to the extent that the delivery and facilitation programmes where some level of implementation has happened mostly existed prior to ICHIP. But it is also widely considered that they are not happening to the level required to address the inner city housing challenges. The rest of ICHIP's programmes, while they may leverage existing instruments like grants or subsidies, are initiatives requiring an injection of resources, whether budget, people or institutional changes, and these have faltered.

While a lack of budget and human resources can clearly be blamed for weak implementation, there are many factors at play particularly in a complex environment like the Johannesburg inner city. In the following chapter I consider how factors such as context, political will and the relationship between the public and private sectors have influenced ICHIP implementation.

5 ICHIP implementation through a 7-C Protocol lens

5.1 Introduction

Having assessed the extent to which the various ICHIP programmes have been implemented to date, this chapter focusses on the factors that have shaped implementation and possible reasons why it has not progressed according to the original intentions and timelines of the strategy. Key themes that emerged during the interviews include the lack of political support for ICHIP, the impact of the institutional structure and culture of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) as an organisation, the relationship between CoJ and private sector housing actors, capacity constraints and the scope and complexity of ICHIP in general.

The literature review traced the evolution of policy implementation theory from the classical Weberian top-down approach to more nuanced interpretations of complex policy implementation mechanisms and environments. The range of policy implementation theory remains broad and while many scholars contend that the discipline lacks a unifying theory, some believe there are certain explanatory variables that are consistently relevant across most theoretical positions (Brynard, 2005; Munzhedzi, 2020). Brynard (2005) identified six such variables, being context, content, commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions, and communication. Munzhedzi (2020) added a seventh, coordination. Munzhedzi (2020) called this grouping of variables the '7-C Protocol' and I have used this as a conceptual framework for analysing possible reasons for the weak ICHIP implementation described in the previous chapter.

The following sections categorise the information provided by the interviewees and City documents according to the seven variables, noting that in many cases the allocation is not clear-cut. Rather, there is a lot of overlap and interplay between the variables. The analysis shows that a number of diverse factors have shaped and

continue to shape the delivery of ICHIP's delivery and facilitation programmes in a dynamic process of interaction between the variables and the strategic outcomes.

5.2 Context: between a rock and a hard place

Context is the environment in which a policy is implemented, and commonly refers to the social, economic, political and legal setting (Brynard, 2005). The institutional context is particularly relevant for policy implementation because it shapes the working relations between stakeholders and directs the flow of resources (*ibid.*). The social, economic, legal and political context in which the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) operates is not an easy one, particularly in the inner city. High in-migration combined with slow economic growth and rising unemployment creates an increasingly poor and indigent population, many of whom are unable to access formal rental housing and so rely on the informal housing market which heightens their vulnerability (CoJ Housing Department, 2021b).

Private sector landlords supplying the bulk of affordable rental accommodation in the city face financial pressure from increasing vacancies as tenants are unable to pay their rent, rising construction costs and escalating municipal utilities costs that make it impossible to deliver housing at the affordability levels needed in the inner city (Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021; Steffny, interview 8 December 2021; Plit, interview 20 December 2021; SHI Executive, interview 5 January 2022). At the same time the municipality is under fiscal pressure, and with rates and utilities being a major source of revenue, they are unlikely to reduce them in the foreseeable future (Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021). Andreas Bertoldi of RebelGroup commented, 'utilities costs are killing the inner city rental market…[but] the city isn't going to respond to that because it's its cash cow' (interview, 23 November 2021). The fact that the CoJ Rates department works to financial KPIs makes it very difficult for the Housing department to, for example, convince them to lower rates or utility fees for low-income inner city residents. This institutional structure and culture promotes a silo-approach to work that

makes interdepartmental cooperation challenging (Klug, interview 15 November 2021; Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021).

The institutional context is also impacted by the political regime, where changing administrations and new mayors trying to make their mark result in changing priorities and a constant turnover of top officials. This is disruptive to programme implementation as it renders City officials nervous to implement something approved by the previous regime (Steffny, interview 8 December 2021). Political positioning and changing administrations appear to be possible reasons why ICHIP was not approved by Council (Maisela, interview 10 December 2021; Sotomi, interview 22 December 2021).

As a strategy, ICHIP aimed to deliver housing in an extremely challenging socio-economic context by an institution operating under severe fiscal constraints and characterised by a highly fractious operational and political framework. Such an environment is hardly conducive to effective implementation.

5.3 Content: nice in theory but too ambitious

Content in policy implementation is relevant in two ways. Firstly, the policy typology, whether distributive, regulatory or redistributive, determines the what the policy aims to do, be it generating public goods, setting rules of behaviour or redistributing a finite quantity of public goods between different constituencies (Brynard, 2005). Munzhedzi (2020:95) notes that 'governments function by coercion' so the policy typology determines the amount of coercion that will be needed as well as appropriate methods of applying it. The second consideration is whether the policy goals themselves are appropriate, or 'the right ones', and then if the methods chosen to achieve them are appropriate (Brynard, 2005).

The typology of ICHIP could be considered both distributive and redistributive. From an outcome perspective, it is distributive because it aims to generate new public goods in the form of affordable housing. But in terms of process or means, it

is redistributive because the CoJ must distribute finite resources between a multitude of competing demands, both within the housing space and across all City operations. There is simply not enough to go around and this is why the resources of the private sector are so critical to the success of the strategy.

Given the dire need for rental accommodation in the Johannesburg inner city (estimated at 30'000 units at the time ICHIP was developed), the goals and approach of the strategy: to deliver affordable housing units through a holistic, integrated approach that leverages the capacity of the private and public sector, were considered sound by the majority of the interviewees. The strategy recognised that the City is not able to provide the full spectrum of affordable housing and needs to facilitate private sector provision (Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021). It also recognised the interconnectedness of the different segments of the housing ladder, and that all rungs of the ladder need to operate for the whole system to work. For example, the problem of TEA facilities is that they effectively become permanent housing for evictees because there is nowhere else for them to go, so more cheap rental housing - the next rung on the housing ladder - needs to be generated.

The scope and scale of ICHIP, while necessary to address the full spectrum of affordable housing, is also considered by some to be its downfall. By its authors' own admission, 'the programmes are unwieldy and complicated to understand' (RebelGroup, 2016:156), and it is too broad and ambitious for the CoJ's implementation capacity (Planning Official, interview 29 November 2021; JDA Official, interview 10 December 2021; Cox, interview 27 January 2021). The JDA Official suggested this was a gap in understanding on the part of the team that developed ICHIP, in that they hadn't fully grasped the internal structure and dynamics of the Housing department, the resources they had available to them and what they could realistically manage (interview, 10 December 2021). While the JDA Official acknowledged the rationale and need for the eleven programmes, bringing together all of the actors needed to deliver on them was 'just really, really challenging' (*ibid.*). But she also noted that, despite ICHIP being almost too broad

to implement, it still did not address three of the CoJ's housing-related priorities at the time: hostel redevelopment, student accommodation and homelessness, which may have counted against it at the political level (*ibid.*).

The fact that ICHIP's ideas and programmes continue to inform the CoJ housing strategy is a testament to their validity, however according to a number of interviewees the breadth and complexity of the programmes is probably too ambitious for the context, most notably the capacity of the City to implement. Yet despite its broad scope, critical omissions like hostel redevelopment, student housing and homelessness may have lost ICHIP the political support it needed to ensure its success. This political support is the subject of the next section.

5.4 Commitment: individual agency and political champions

Commitment refers to the willingness of the implementer to carry out the policy tasks (Brynard, 2005). Brynard (2005) notes that while mostly associated with bottom-up theories as it relates to the agency of the administrative staff, commitment is also applicable in top-down approaches where it is more commonly referred to as 'disposition'. This translates into political will and is applicable at all levels of the implementation hierarchy.

In the area of commitment, or the willingness to implement the strategy, two key factors stood out from the interviews. Firstly, the majority of those interviewed, and particularly the CoJ officials, believed that ICHIP does not have a political champion. They also agreed that without a political champion, a policy or strategy has little chance of succeeding. The natural candidate to champion a Housing strategy would be the MMC for Housing, but the JDA Official recalls how, at the time ICHIP was being developed, the Housing MMC – who was passionate about hostel redevelopment - said 'it's a great plan, it'll never work, and I'm not willing to be the political champion' (interview, 10 December 2021). So although ICHIP had been commissioned by Housing department officials who recognised the need for it, it lacked the political backing to secure the Council approval that, as discussed in

the previous chapter, would have facilitated the allocation of resources needed to support implementation. Political backing is also needed beyond Council approval to ensure that organisational resources continue to be directed towards the programme. As the Planning Official noted, 'it really doesn't matter that the thing was approved, because if it doesn't get any budget, nothing's ever going to happen with it' (interview, 29 November 2021).

The Planning Official also raised the challenge of 'NIMTOism' in local government: the 'not in my political term' phenomenon (interview, 29 November 2021). He referred to 'projects that aren't politically attractive, like building a sewage plant ... [or] upgrading a highway that's going to collapse but that doesn't get seen. It's quite hard to get those things in, and a lot of that stuff is relevant in the inner city' (*ibid.*). Housing Department Official 3 agreed, saying, 'Do you know what kills us? Quick wins. A politician comes in and we've got this programme but they say "what are the quick wins, do the quick wins" and the programme's then forgotten because everyone's clapping at the wins' (interview, 22 December 2021). So even though the inner city is consistently included in the list of mayoral priorities (Khuhlane, interview 2 December 2021), this hasn't necessarily translated into the level of political support needed to drive a complex and longer-term programme focussed on affordable housing.

The second aspect that was clear from the interviews is the importance of individual personalities and agency in driving implementation. A number of individuals were consistently mentioned in various interviews as having been instrumental in driving either the development of ICHIP as a strategy and navigating it as far as the Mayoral Committee, or facilitating implementation of certain programmes. Nicolette Pingo from the JDA is one of them, as well as Simon Mayson, a Housing department assistant director who has since left the CoJ. What emerged as critical is the ability to navigate the institutional framework to access resources, like budget – something that Mayson was highly skilled at, or to get the right people together who have the authority to take decisions and make things happen, a particular strength of Pingo (Zack, interview 26 November 2021;

Planning Official, interview 29 November 2021). The Planning Official spoke of the importance of levers in the administration: tools like budgets, plans, policies 'that can make change actually happen' (interview, 29 November 2021). He noted that access to levers is not correlated with seniority, giving the example of a junior planning official who wields considerable change-making ability through his task of approving inner city rezoning applications. Indeed, senior officials may have access to few real levers and thus be limited in terms of the amount of change they can bring about (*ibid.*). The Planning Official suggested that this could be the case in the Inner City Office; despite being staffed by senior officials, they are a coordinating function without any real tools or levers to work with, so their ability to actually deliver is limited (*ibid.*).

While individual agency can drive implementation very effectively, it also means that implementation can be overly-dependent on specific people. This does seem to be the case with ICHIP, as the key drivers mentioned have all left or moved to different departments, and by all accounts the programmes and initiatives that they were driving have ground to a halt. This returns us to the need for a political champion and strong organisational commitment to drive implementation and reduce dependence on a few motivated individuals. A lack in this area has clearly limited ICHIP's implementation.

5.5 Capacity: levers and leadership

Capacity is the ability to deliver policy and refers to the resources that are available or can be mobilised to support the necessary outputs (Brynard, 2005). In the context of public policy implementation, capacity is generated by the structural, functional and cultural ability of the organisation. It includes tangible resources like budget, materials and staff, and intangible resources like leadership, motivation, commitment and resilience (*ibid.*). Capacity constraints have clearly limited the roll out of ICHIP. This is evident in the minimal financial and human resources that have been dedicated to the programme, but it has also suffered from a lack of the intangible resources such as leadership and motivation.

I discussed the lack of a dedicated budget for ICHIP in the previous chapter. Sotomi indicated that the assumption was made that budgets existed in the departments or MOEs to whom the various ICHIP programmes were designated (interview, 22 December 2022), however it appears that it could not be assumed that they would agree to allocate their budget to ICHIP. As an example, JOSHCO was supposed to take responsibility for the TEA programme, and while they have assisted with a few buildings, they apparently declined full responsibility for the programme as they are prioritising social housing and student accommodation (Housing Department Official 2, interview 30 November 2021).

The availability of people to coordinate implementation and actually deliver on tasks is critical, and has been lacking in the case of ICHIP. Sotomi, whose directorate is responsible for ICHIP, commented that he has only recently been able to start building his team; before that he was on his own with two colleagues for five years, and had to second people from other departments to help with specific functions (interview, 22 December 2021). The Inner City Office is also understaffed, with only two senior-level positions and no junior support staff to actually do the work (Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021; Planning Official, interview 29 November 2021). Sotomi also spoke of the need for building stock and data on inner city housing activity (interview, 22 December 2021). Both are tangible resources that rely on budget, but budget alone is not enough. The availability of buildings depends on the cooperation of the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), and creating a central housing database requires the will and cooperation of various CoJ departments as well private sector actors.

This coordination and motivation of stakeholders is essential for a project with the breadth and complexity of ICHIP. Leadership is critical in this regard, and it was evident from the interviews that leadership has been lacking not only in the Housing department but also from the City as a whole. At the Housing department level, official Thabo Maisela noted that the department has been without an Executive Director for quite some time (interview, 10 December). The Housing department's 2021/22 Business Plan also identifies leadership as a weakness,

noting that the continuous changes in the department's leadership result in 'a lack of continuity [and] constant change of implementation strategies in a short space of time' (CoJ Housing, 2021a:12). Bertoldi felt that the lack of leadership in the Housing department rendered it 'paralysed' (interview, 29 November 2021). He also believes that there is a deficit in the leadership needed at a broader city level to promote a culture of innovation and partnership with the private sector that would address a range of issues, not only the housing challenges of the inner city (*ibid.*).

Poor capacity therefore emerges as a key factor in the weak implementation of ICHIP to date, and while the lack of resources like budget and people has had a predictably negative impact on delivery, a shortage of more intangible resources like leadership, cooperation and motivation appears to have had an equally debilitating effect.

5.6 Clients and coalitions, cynicism and distrust

Brynard (2005:661) points to the importance of finding and partnering with 'interest groups, opinion leaders and other outside actors who actively support a particular implementation process' when implementing policy. These are the clients and coalitions that constitute the fifth variable. They can significantly influence implementation, and while there may be many actors that have an interest in a certain policy or strategy, not all of them will have the same level of interest nor wield equal influence on its outcome (*ibid.*). The choice of coalition partners is strategic, and care and time should be invested in both identifying the appropriate partners and building relationships with them.

Bertoldi, lead developer of the ICHIP strategy, stressed that he 'fundamentally believe[s] that unless the private sector is actively involved, you won't solve the [housing] crisis' (interview, 23 November 2021). A strong partnership between the public and private sector is critical to ICHIP but the relationship between CoJ and

the private sector housing actors is poor, characterised by high levels of distrust and cynicism.

Bertoldi believes that the City is either unwilling or unable to establish the relationships or set up the institutional structures needed to support partnerships with the private sector (interview 23 November 2021). He suggested that there is a 'strong ideological undercurrent' in the City against private sector involvement in housing provision (*ibid.*). Anne Steffny, as a director of the Johannesburg Inner City Partnership (JICP) and Gauteng Precinct Management Association has extensive experience in brokering partnerships between the public and private sector. She believes this ideological undercurrent derives from the context of a 'powerful nanny state that thinks it must deliver everything' (interview, 8 December 2021). Both Bertoldi and Steffny also perceived a level of reluctance on the part of CoJ to work with 'white capital' and a private sector that is only interested in making profit (interview, 23 November 2021; ibid).

Private sector landlords seem to perceive that CoJ does not want to engage with them. When asked about working with CoJ, their responses reflect a high level of frustration. Speaking about a workshop with the Housing Department to discuss a TEA proposal, the SHI Executive said, 'I remember the social housing guys like ourselves being strongly opposed to it. But of course, they went with it anyhow, because the City officials seem to know better' (interview, 5 January 2022). Developer and landlord Renney Plit said, 'You go see the Mayor, you see the MMC for Finance, you make representations at Council meetings, and they sit and they listen and they just do what they want anyway, without any apparent consideration for the discussions or representations' (interview, 20 December 2021). JPOMA, the Johannesburg Property Owners and Managers Association, was established in 2003 in response to a request from the CoJ to talk to a 'unified voice' from the inner city landlords, managing agents and property owners (Plit, interview 20 December 2021). But the SHI Executive noted that the relationship between JPOMA and the City has deteriorated to the point that JPOMA has adopted

a ‘policy by litigation’ approach, because taking the CoJ to court seems to be the only way for them to get a response (SHI Executive, interview 5 January 2022).

The breakdown in trust between the City and the private sector is an issue across the board, not just in housing (Bertoldi, interview 23 November 2021), but Bertoldi noted that the City needs the private sector’s skills and knowledge to help deliver housing in particular (interview, 8 December 2021). Housing Department Official 3 agreed, noting that CoJ needs information from the private sector about their inner city activities to be able to plan effectively, but conceded that ‘it will be exceedingly difficult because no-one trusts us to give us the information’ (interview, 22 December 2021).

This cynicism on the part of private sector developers and landlords was broadly evident in the interviews, and as arguably the most important coalition for the CoJ in the context of ICHIP, the relationship with the private sector needs to be addressed to achieve ICHIP’s objectives. However, it was also evident that the private sector actors are willing to partner with CoJ if they perceive an intent on its part to enable and incentivise their participation. Plit summed this up by saying: ‘at the end of the day, the power is in their hands, not in ours. We accept that. But if we work together, I do believe we could turn things around pretty quickly’ (interview, 20 December 2021).

5.7 Communication: the sound of one hand clapping

Communication refers to how effectively the goals and tasks of a policy are communicated and the structures and processes that are put in place to support that communication (Munzhedzi, 2020). Munzhedzi (2020) notes that ‘there cannot be good implementation when municipal employees do not know what is expected from them [or] the consequences for missing such targets’. The Planning Official commented that he had not heard ICHIP being spoken about in the CoJ (interview, 29 November 2021), and my impression speaking to a variety of CoJ officials was that people were aware of ICHIP but not overly familiar with it. There

are various reasons why this could be so. One is that ICHIP has not been approved as a single strategy by the Council; instead, its programmes are being implemented in a dispersed manner without the ICHIP label. It could also be related to a lack of political backing. The Planning Official commented that the Corridors of Freedom suffered such a fate when Mashaba became mayor; he was not in favour of that strategic focus and it went from widely spoken about in CoJ corridors to hardly mentioned at all (interview, 29 November 2021).

The 7-C protocol refers to the importance of structures and processes put in place to support effective communication, and it appears that in the case of ICHIP this is lacking. The ICHIP report stressed the importance of developing a robust communication strategy to ensure all stakeholders were kept well informed, particularly given the complexity of the strategy and wide distribution of the programmes across different implementing agents (RebelGroup, 2016). The report allocated the communication function to the Inner City Housing Programme Office, but this office was never set up, and the fact that both the Housing department and the Inner City Office lack human resources to coordinate ICHIP could explain - at least in part – the dearth of communication about it.

Communication beyond CoJ corridors is equally important given the intended role of the private sector in ICHIP. The relationship between the CoJ and private sector actors points to an absence of effective communication, with the sentiments from the private sector suggesting that the CoJ's failure to listen to them is possibly more problematic than a failure to share information. The fast-track centre mentioned in the previous chapter that the Trust for Urban Housing Finance, TUHF, delivered together with CoJ was strongly focussed on sharing information with private developers, yet there was little take-up of the service (Cox, interview 27 January 2022).

In summary, communication about ICHIP in terms of its objectives and what needs to be done to achieve those objectives appears to be limited. This could be due to its low political support and the lack of resources to support an effective

communication strategy. It could also be that in its current disaggregated form, it is difficult to communicate about ICHIP itself. But this does not negate the need for effective communication about those programmes that are implemented, because the coordination needed between stakeholders to achieve their objectives demands it.

5.8 Coordination: the whole is less than the sum of its parts

Alignment and mutual assistance between municipal officials are critical to successful execution of policy (Munzhedzi, 2020). This is the essence of the final variable, coordination. It refers to the strength and nature of the relationships between the policy implementation stakeholders, and how that influences the flow of resources as well as information between them (*ibid.*).

The complexity and scope of ICHIP demands a high level of cooperation between the departments and MOEs involved in implementing it, but fragmentation at the functional and cultural level in the CoJ is debilitating. Bertoldi pointed out that ICHIP's institutional framework recognised the full burden of implementation couldn't sit on the Housing department's shoulders, and so distributed responsibility for the programmes to different entities based on their competencies and capacity (interview, 23 November 2021). But there was still a need for a strong coordinating function, earmarked for the ICHIP Programme Management Office, which in its absence fell to the Housing department (*ibid.*). A number of the interviewees commented on how difficult it is to get the different entities in the City to cooperate and align on their priorities and budgets. The JDA Official remarked that 'every ICHIP programme had its own set of internal politics' (interview, 10 December 2021) and believed that the Housing department was not able to get the Finance and Economic Development departments to agree to debt-write offs on buildings (interview, 23 November 2021). Sotomi confirmed that it has been challenging for the Housing department (interview, 22 December 2021) pointing out that, apart from being understaffed which limits their capacity, as a 'Housing' rather than 'Human Settlements' department, their authority over the

aspects beyond housing that comprise human settlements, like roads and water infrastructure is reduced (interview, 22 December 2021). Instead, the Housing department must negotiate with delivery agents like the Johannesburg Roads Agency or Johannesburg Water and the JPC, to deliver on its projects (*ibid.*). This implies that relationships need to be good if any progress is to be made, and while Sotomi did not talk about the Housing department's relationship with the water and roads agencies, it is evident that their relationship with the JPC is strained and has had a marked impact on their ability to deliver on ICHIP programmes.

5.9 Conclusion

In mapping the perspectives of the interviewees to the 7-C protocol's explanatory variables (content, content, commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions, communication and coordination), a number of key factors emerge as impacting ICHIP's implementation. These factors influence and reinforce each other, creating a web of forces acting on the implementation environment, often in a negative way. The socio-economic context in which ICHIP is operating is challenging in many respects, and the institutional nature of the CoJ, in particular the fragmented way of working, divergent KPIs and political dynamics, makes implementation even more challenging. As a strategy, ICHIP's content is appropriate to the problem it aims to address, but perhaps less appropriate to the institutional context in that it requires an organisational capacity and cohesiveness not currently evident in the CoJ.

The lack of Council approval and institutional backing for ICHIP has meant that it has not received the commitment it needs at a political, budgetary or operational level. The agency of individual officials has been instrumental in progressing some of the programmes, however that progress stalled as they left the CoJ or moved to different departments. As many interviewees noted, ICHIP lacks and needs a political sponsor to enable robust implementation sustained by adequate resource provision. It also lacks strong leadership, particularly in the area of driving partnerships with the private sector. To supply rental housing at the very low end

of the market, the private sector will need some form of incentive or support to lower the cost of provision, and this is where the City will need to rally its own resources in a coordinated way to provide this support. Communication about ICHIP and its programmes is important to ensure a common understanding of its intended outputs and outcomes, and also to strengthen relationships and the sense of mutual purpose between stakeholders.

As many interviewees noted, ICHIP's conceptual and programmatic approach is sound, and the fact that it continues to inform the City's Housing strategy and activities attests to that. But while it might be good news that ICHIP has not been discarded, the fact that it is being adopted and implemented in a fragmented way means that the value derived from the broad and integrated nature of the strategy might not be realised. The holistic approach has created a complexity that has hampered implementation, but it is also a foundational concept of ICHIP that recognises that all of the components of the inner city housing 'ecosystem' need to function properly if the City's inner city housing challenges are to be addressed.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The objective of this research report was to use the case study of the City of Johannesburg's Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP) to explore and understand policy implementation at the local government level. In responding to the main research question: to what extent has ICHIP been implemented and what are the reasons for implementation success or failures, a number of consistencies with the literature on policy implementation gaps have emerged. The first is to acknowledge the observation of Hudson *et al.* (2019) that policies are rarely complete failures as they can usually boast small successes, so 'weak implementation' is invariably a better description than 'failed implementation'.

A document review along with interviews with a range of COJ officials, private sector landlords and urban planning experts revealed that the implementation of ICHIP, an apparently sound and comprehensive housing strategy, has been limited. ICHIP sought to integrate existing and new housing programmes into a holistic housing strategy that would address bottlenecks and deficiencies across the full spectrum of the inner city housing supply chain. But it failed to get the institutional backing needed to deliver a strategy of its scope and complexity, resulting in a fragmented and diminished implementation. And even though the concepts of ICHIP are being applied in various City of Johannesburg (COJ) Housing strategies and programmes, the real value of ICHIP in creating a robust inner city housing ecosystem has been lost in the fragmentation.

Before discussing the reasons for ICHIP's weak implementation and how they relate to policy implementation theory, I respond briefly to the first part of the research question: to what extent has the ICHIP been implemented?

6.2 ICHIP implementation: something is happening, but not necessarily ICHIP

ICHIP comprises eleven programmes: six to boost housing delivery in the inner city, and five to facilitate that delivery. Five years after it was first announced to the public, four of ICHIP's six delivery programmes have seen some form of delivery. These are the temporary emergency accommodation (TEA), municipal rentals, social housing, and emerging landlords programmes. Some activity has been observed on the remaining two programmes, private rental units and ownership: National Treasury investigated an incentive scheme for the former, and the City's 2021-2026 Integrated Development Plan commits to putting a rent-to-own scheme in place within two years (CoJ, 2021b). But to date there has been no discernible delivery on these programmes.

As far as the facilitation programmes are concerned, there has been some activity in four of the five. The first programme, the Special Programme for Relocation of Evictees (SPRE) that was being developed at the same time as ICHIP was recently incorporated into the City's new Temporary Emergency Accommodation Policy (TEAP), albeit in 'a watered-down format' (Klug, interview 15 November 2021). The Bad Buildings programme has been running in one form or another for many years, but the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) by its own admission has not delivered on its inner city regeneration targets (JPC, 2019). Some progress has been made in terms of municipal facilitation in updates to the CoJ Land Use Scheme to regularise backyarding and promote densification, and an attempt was made by TUHF and the JDA to improve access to information for private developers. Work has been done on the Sectional Title Rehabilitation programme by TUHF with the JDA and RebelGroup, but this has stalled at the City level. The fifth facilitation programme, and one that Housing official and de facto owner of ICHIP Emanuel Sotomi considers the most important, the development of an information management system, has not progressed due to lack of budget.

Even though there has been some level of delivery on eight of the eleven programmes, with the exception of the sectional title rehabilitation programme and the fast-track centre, most of the programmes were already running prior to ICHIP. Their pace of delivery has not increased noticeably since the COJ Mayoral Committee approved ICHIP in 2017, so the question must be asked how much of the delivery can really be attributed to ICHIP. This is not to say that ICHIP has added no value, as a number of the interviewees indicated that it has and continues to inform general housing strategy. This responds to the research sub-question as to how the ICHIP programmes integrate into existing COJ housing and development strategies, although the COJ Housing 2040 Strategy, yet to be published, will reveal the true extent of the ICHIP's influence.

6.3 Discussion: Where ICHIP implementation meets theory

The second part of the research question seeks to understand the reasons for ICHIP's implementation successes and failures. According to some authors, certain variables influencing policy implementation are identifiable in some form in most policy implementation theories and frameworks (Brynard, 2005; Munzhedzi, 2020). Seven variables: context, content, commitment, capacity, clients and coalitions, communication and coordination, proved a useful conceptual framework for analysing ICHIP's implementation. Mapping the information gained from documents and interviews against these variables revealed several themes that have defined ICHIP's weak and fragmented implementation.

Firstly, the ICHIP as a strategy is considered a good piece of work by most if not all of the interviewees. It is based on sound principles, is practical and appropriate to the problem it is trying to solve. Under different circumstances, it might have worked exceptionally well. But while the principles may be sound, it appears that the process of designing the strategy was flawed in a couple of respects. I asked Andreas Bertoldi, RebelGroup project lead, what he would do differently if he was asked to design ICHIP again. His response was emphatic: he would turn the process on its head and create the institutional framework first, the coalition of

public and private sector actors involved in the implementation who could then develop the strategy together (interview, 23 November 2021).

Such an approach to policy design speaks to a number of principles raised in policy implementation literature. It aligns to the position of bottom-up theorists who maintain that engaging the actors who will be responsible for implementing policy enables a better understanding of each party's objectives, concerns and constraints (Linder and Peters, 1987; Matland, 1995). It also supports the collaborative and iterative design process promoted by Ansell *et al.* (2017) and Hudson *et al.* (2019) that they say necessarily blurs the lines between politics and administration, and requires an openness to mutual learning, flexibility and experimentation. Blurred lines – between politics and administration, formality and informality, public and private sector – typify Global South contexts and this suggests that the approach to ICHIP's design and implementation cannot follow the classical top-down approach. Even less so because such approaches are premised on highly capacitated administrations that work efficiently and effectively to deliver policy.

The COJ Housing department has faced numerous institutional barriers to implementing ICHIP. Apart from lacking physical resources like budget and staff, it has missed the intangible resources that oil the wheels of implementation, like mutual support and cooperation between municipal departments, strong leadership and, most importantly, a political champion. The poor cooperation between departments can be attributed to an institutional culture created in part by a performance management system inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) approach and embedded by municipal legislation. Key performance indicators (KPIs) relating to COJ's developmental and economic objectives create incompatibilities between departmental goals, further frustrating the different entities' ability to work together. This points to the work of Le Gales (2016), who writes about the use of performance measurement as a policy instrument that, despite suggesting a level of objectivity, is inevitably political. As Bénit-Gbaffou (2018b) proposes, the choice of policy instrument – and in this case I would say municipal KPIs – is a more accurate indicator of intent than policy or strategy

documents. The JPC working to maximise the value of the City's building stock versus the Housing department needing buildings at a low price to develop rental housing for the inner city's poorest residents is a clear example of an operational impasse created by conflicting KPIs and organisational priorities.

The lack of a political champion for ICHIP has undeniably weakened its implementation. A strong political champion may have ensured Council approval of ICHIP, which would have improved its implementation prospects, not least because of the budgetary and operational support it would have unlocked. But as a number of CoJ officials indicated, even Council approval is not enough to ensure implementation. Sustained political support as well as administrative savvy is needed to secure budget allocations and the cooperation of stakeholders. Weak leadership at both the Housing department and City level was identified as a problem, particularly as it relates to a willingness to partner with the private sector. If this reluctance is indeed ideologically-based as some interviewees suggested, then political leadership is even more important if attitudes towards the private sector are to change.

6.4 Recommendations: Leadership and Partnership

ICHIP is a broad and complex housing plan. Even in a less challenging socio-economic, political and institutional context it might still be considered ambitious. Addressing the Johannesburg inner city's housing challenges will require the political will, resources and cooperation of all actors in the public and private sector alike. ICHIP provides a strategy to guide such an effort, but it requires a higher level of commitment from the upper echelons of the City to realise its potential gains. In this respect, strong leadership is needed in two respects: firstly, to create more alignment within CoJ in terms of KPIs that prioritise the inner city housing problem; this should extend to ensuring that sufficient resources are allocated to enable implementation as well as sound programme management. Secondly, it is needed to shift attitudes towards public-private partnerships to

create the will and motivation to actively exploit the skills and resources residing in the private sector.

Bertoldi's suggested approach of starting with the institutional framework, the coalition of stakeholders who would develop the strategy together, could deliver multiple benefits. Firstly, it would embed a deeper understanding of COJ's institutional, political and capacity constraints that might limit implementation, and it would also afford City officials better insight into the challenges faced by private developers and landlords. Secondly, it would signal a paradigm shift from government to governance, demonstrating a real commitment from COJ to co-produce an inner city housing strategy with the private sector. Thirdly, it would give the City a platform to engage proactively and positively with aspects of the informal housing market that are helping to deliver decent affordable housing (Mayson and Charlton, 2015). Finally, it might spark the regeneration of the relationship between COJ and private sector housing actors that is so critical to housing delivery and meeting ICHIP's objectives. And while it might seem too late for ICHIP, given the continuing relevance of its principles and programmes, it would be worthwhile to find a way to develop such a framework and could well provide the injection of energy and resources that the strategy clearly needs.

6.5 Conclusion: An ICHIP 'toolbox' is not good enough

The Housing department's objective in ICHIP was to 'make the inner city housing market work better for people with lower incomes'. Given the comprehensiveness of ICHIP as a strategy and the promise it held for addressing the inner city affordable housing backlog, it is disappointing that its implementation to date has been so weak and fragmented. Small consolation can be taken from the fact that, firstly, some ICHIP programmes are being delivered, even if not under the banner of ICHIP and not at the scale needed to meet the demand for housing. Secondly, it appears that the principles of ICHIP continue to inform COJ Housing strategy. It would be necessary to scrutinise the Housing 2040 Strategy to confirm this, and this offers an opportunity for further analysis once the strategy is released. But

that strategy would no doubt face the same challenges that have bedevilled ICHIP's progress unless it has the necessary political and institutional support to drive its implementation. Part of ICHIP's value lies in its holistic approach to meeting housing supply and in recognising that each rung of the housing ladder needs to be strong for the whole system to work. In this sense, using ICHIP as a 'toolbox' to inform individual programmes here and there might help to deliver housing outputs, but it will have missed the opportunity to realise the outcomes envisaged in ICHIP.

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Appendix A: Personal Communications List

Bertoldi, Andreas	**Managing Partner, RebelGroup South Africa,** Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 23 November 2021.
Cox, Katherine	**Research & Development and Development Impact Manager, TUHF21**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 27 January 2022.
Housing Department Official 1	**Ex-City of Johannesburg Housing Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 8 December 2021.
Housing Department Official 2	**City of Johannesburg Housing Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 30 November 2021.
Housing Department Official 3	**City of Johannesburg Housing Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 22 December 2021.
JDA Official	**Ex-Johannesburg Development Agency**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 10 December 2021.
Khuhlane, Msizi	**Assistant Director: Intergovernmental Relations, Policy and Research, City of Johannesburg Housing Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 2 December 2021
Klug, Neil	**Senior lecturer, Wits School of Architecture & Planning**, Johannesburg. Interviewed at Wits University on 15 November 2021.

Maisela, Thabo	**Director, Inner City Office; Special Advisor to the Mayor on Inner City Regeneration**. Interviewed via Zoom on 10 December 2021
Planning Official	**City of Johannesburg Planning Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 29 November 2021; personal correspondence on 8 March 2022.
Plit, Renney	**Chairman, Plitvest (Pty) Ltd**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 20 December 2021.
SHI Executive	**Chief Financial Officer, Social Housing Institution**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 5 January 2022.
SHI Manager	**Manager, Social Housing Institution**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 14 September 2021.
Sotomi, Emanuel	**Director: Public Housing Programme Support, City of Johannesburg Housing Department**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 22 December; personal correspondence on 10 March and 22 March 2022.
Steffny, Anne	**Director, Johannesburg Inner City Partnership (NPC); Director, Gauteng Precinct Management Association (NPC)**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 8 December 2021; personal correspondence, 8 December 2021.
Stroebel, Elize	**Chief Executive Officer, Johannesburg Housing Company**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Microsoft Teams on 6 December 2021.
Zack, Tanya	**Urban Planner**, Johannesburg. Interviewed via Zoom on 26 November 2021.

Appendix B: Participant Information Sheets

i. City of Johannesburg departments and agencies

ii. Strategic Partners

iii. Consultants and academics

UNIVERSITY OF THE
WITWATERSRAND,
JOHANNESBURG

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Colleen Orsmond and I am a Masters student in Development Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. As part of my studies, I have to undertake a research project which I am doing under the supervision of Professor Margot Rubin. The objective of my research is to understand the implementation of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Programme (ICHIP) to date. The research is framed within the broader topic of policy implementation and I will be looking into instances of both strong and weaker implementation.

The **City of Johannesburg [department / agency name]** is identified in the ICHIP institutional and functional framework and I would like to request an interview with you as a representative of **[department/agency]** in order to understand its role in the implementation of ICHIP. I estimate that the interview will take around 45 minutes and will take place either in person or remotely via Microsoft Teams at a time that suits you. With your permission, I would also like to audio record the interview using a digital device. This recording will be stored in a password-protected file on my personal laptop and only I as the researcher will have access to this recording.

There will be no personal costs to you if you participate in this project. You will not receive any direct benefits from participation but there are no disadvantages or penalties if you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study. You may withdraw at any time and you may choose to not answer specific questions. If at any point you would like to stop the interview you will be welcome to do so. I will use a pseudonym (false name) to represent your participation in my final research report to ensure your anonymity and the interview will be completely confidential should you so request.

This study will be written up as a research report which will be publicly available through the university library and may contribute to other academic publications such as journal articles and book chapters. If you wish to receive a summary of the report, I would be happy to send it to you. The information you give to me and all other data collected from this research project will be securely stored on my personal laptop computer as password protected files and will not be shared with anyone else.

If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical), telephone +27(0) 11 717 1408, email hrecnon-medical@wits.ac.za. If you have any other questions about this research either during the interview or afterwards, feel free to contact me or Professor Rubin at the contact details listed below.

Yours sincerely,
Colleen Orsmond

Researcher: Colleen Orsmond, 9112791D@students.wits.ac.za
Supervisor: Prof. Margot Rubin, margot.rubin@wits.ac.za, 011 717 7637

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Colleen Orsmond and I am a Masters student in Development Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. As part of my studies, I have to undertake a research project which I am doing under the supervision of Professor Margot Rubin. The objective of my research is to understand the implementation of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Programme (ICHIP) to date. The research is framed within the broader topic of policy implementation and I will be looking into instances of both strong and weaker implementation.

[Organisation] is identified as a strategic partner in the ICHIP institutional and functional framework and I would like to request an interview with you as a representative of **[Organisation]** in order to understand its role in the implementation of ICHIP. I estimate that the interview will take around 45 minutes and will take place either in person or remotely via Microsoft Teams at a time that suits you. With your permission, I would also like to audio record the interview using a digital device. This recording will be stored in a password-protected file on my personal laptop and only I as the researcher will have access to this recording.

There will be no personal costs to you if you participate in this project. You will not receive any direct benefits from participation but there are no disadvantages or penalties if you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study. You may withdraw at any time and you may choose to not answer specific questions. If at any point you would like to stop the interview you will be welcome to do so. I will use a pseudonym (false name) to represent your participation in my final research report to ensure your anonymity and the interview will be completely confidential should you so request.

This study will be written up as a research report which will be publicly available through the university library and may contribute to other academic publications

such as journal articles and book chapters. If you wish to receive a summary of the report, I would be happy to send it to you. The information you give to me and all other data collected from this research project will be securely stored on my personal laptop computer as password protected files and will not be shared with anyone else.

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Yours sincerely,
Colleen Orsmond

Researcher: Colleen Orsmond, 9112791D@students.wits.ac.za
Supervisor: Prof. Margot Rubin, margot.rubin@wits.ac.za, 011 717 7637

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Colleen Orsmond and I am a Masters student in Development Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. As part of my studies, I have to undertake a research project which I am doing under the supervision of Professor Margot Rubin. The objective of my research is to understand the implementation of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Programme (ICHIP) to date. The research is framed within the broader topic of policy implementation and I will be looking into instances of both strong and weaker implementation.

As **professional in the field of urban planning and development**, I am interested to hear your views on ICHIP and would like to request an interview with you. I estimate that the interview will take around 45 minutes and will take place either in person or remotely via Microsoft Teams at a time that suits you. With your permission, I would also like to audio record the interview using a digital device. This recording will be stored in a password-protected file on my personal laptop and only I as the researcher will have access to this recording.

There will be no personal costs to you if you participate in this project. You will not receive any direct benefits from participation but there are no disadvantages or penalties if you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study. You may withdraw at any time and you may choose to not answer specific questions. If at any point you would like to stop the interview you will be welcome to do so. I will use a pseudonym (false name) to represent your participation in my final research report to ensure your anonymity and the interview will be completely confidential should you so request.

This study will be written up as a research report which will be publicly available through the university library and may contribute to other academic publications such as journal articles and book chapters. If you wish to receive a summary of the

report, I would be happy to send it to you. The information you give to me and all other data collected from this research project will be securely stored on my personal laptop computer as password protected files and will not be shared with anyone else.

If you have any concerns or complaints regarding the ethical procedures of this study, you are welcome to contact the University Human Research Ethics Committee (Non-Medical), telephone +27(0) 11 717 1408, email hrecnon-medical@wits.ac.za. If you have any other questions about this research either during the interview or afterwards, feel free to contact me or Professor Rubin at the contact details listed below.

Yours sincerely,
Colleen Orsmond

Researcher: Colleen Orsmond, 9112791D@students.wits.ac.za
Supervisor: Prof. Margot Rubin, margot.rubin@wits.ac.za, 011 717 7637

Appendix C: Consent Form



Project title: **Understanding policy implementation at the local government level: the case of the Johannesburg Inner City Housing Implementation Plan (ICHIP)**

Researcher: Colleen Orsmond

I, ……., agree to participate in this research project. The research has been explained to me and I understand what my participation will involve. I agree to the following:

(Please check the relevant box below)

I request that my participation remain anonymous	☐ Yes	☐ No
I agree that the researcher may quote me in her research report and assign information and opinions provided by me, while maintaining my anonymity if requested above	☐ Yes	☐ No
I agree that the interview may be audio recorded	☐ Yes	☐ No
I agree that the researcher may contact me after the interview to clarify points made by me or ask further questions, under the same conditions of anonymity as in the initial interview	☐ Yes	☐ No

…… (Signature)

…… (Name of participant)

…… (Date)

…… (Signature)

Colleen Orsmond (Researcher)

…… (Date)

Appendix D: Sample Interview Schedule

City of Johannesburg Departments and Agencies:

1. What are your thoughts on the housing situation in the Johannesburg Inner City?
2. Are you aware of ICHIP? If yes, when did you become aware of it?
3. What in your opinion drove the development of ICHIP?
4. How do you understand the objectives and strategy behind ICHIP?
5. Is your department involved in the implementation of ICHIP? If yes:
    - 5.1. Which programmes are you implementing?
    - 5.2. In each case, is your department responsible for the programme implementation or contributing to its implementation in cooperation with another CoJ department?
    - 5.3. Which other CoJ departments or agencies, other public sector or private sector organisations are you working with on the programme?
    - 5.4. When did your department begin implementing the programme/s?
    - 5.5. Do you feel that your department has the resources (e.g. people, time, equipment, knowledge, budget) to implement the project? If not, what is lacking?
    - 5.6. Who would you say is championing or sponsoring the programme (at a political level)?
    - 5.7. Are you implementing the programme/s according to defined outputs, targets and timelines? Do you feel these are clear and understood by your team?
    - 5.8. Has the programme faced any challenges? If so, what were they and how did you address them?
    - 5.9. In general, how do you feel the implementation is progressing?
6. Is your department involved in implementing any housing-related projects that are not part of ICHIP?
7. In general, what are your thoughts about ICHIP as a housing strategy?

Private sector "strategic partners":

1. What are your thoughts about the housing situation in the Johannesburg Inner City?
2. Was your organisation involved in developing ICHIP? If so, in what way?
   2.1. If not, are you aware of ICHIP?
3. What in your opinion drove the development of ICHIP?
4. How do you understand the objectives and strategy behind ICHIP?
5. Is your company or organisation involved in the implementation of ICHIP? If yes:
   5.1. Which programmes are you implementing?
   5.2. In each case, who is responsible for the programme implementation? Which CoJ departments or agencies, other public sector or private sector organisations are you working with on the programme?
   5.3. When did you begin your involvement in implementing the programme/s?
   5.4. Do you feel that you have sufficient resources (e.g. people, time, equipment, knowledge, budget) to implement the project? If not, what is lacking?
   5.5. Who would you say is championing or sponsoring the programme (at a political level)?
   5.6. Are you implementing the programme/s according to defined outputs, targets and timelines? Do you feel these are clear and understood by your team?
   5.7. Has the programme faced any challenges? If so, what were they and how did you address them?
   5.8. In general, how do you feel the implementation is progressing?
6. If your organisation is not involved, what is the reason?
7. In general, what are your thoughts about ICHIP as a housing strategy? Would you suggest any changes to it?
8. Is your company/organisation involved in implementing any housing-related projects that are not part of ICHIP?

Consultants and academics:

1. What are your thoughts about the housing situation in the Johannesburg Inner City?
2. Were you involved in the development of ICHIP? If so, how?
3. If not, are you aware of ICHIP?
4. What in your opinion drove the development of ICHIP?
5. How do you understand the objectives and strategy behind ICHIP?
6. Do you have a sense of how the implantation of ICHIP is progressing? Have you been monitoring it in any way?
7. Are you aware of any other inner city housing programmes being implanted by the City of Johannesburg?
8. Do you know the extent to which ICHIP (or its component programmes) has been implemented to date? Have you been involved in the implementation of any of the programmes?
9. In general, what are your thoughts about:
   9.1. ICHIP as a housing strategy? Would you suggest any changes to it?
   9.2. The role of the City of Johannesburg in terms of inner city housing?