


UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Master of Art in International Relations Research Report 2023



The gendered barriers women face in politics: The case study of South Africa.


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Declaration

I declare that except for the reference to other people's works, which have been duly acknowledged, this report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university, neither has it been published by any other person or organisation.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Olivier', is written on a light-colored rectangular background.

_____ (Signature of Candidate)

On this the 7th day of December 2023

Acknowledgements

The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) research grant towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are that of the author and not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF.

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List of Abbreviations

Acled: Armed Conflict and Event Data Project

ANC: African National Congress

ANCWL: African National Congress Women's League

ANCYL: African National Congress Youth League

AU: African Union

BBC: British Broadcasting Commission

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women

CGE: Commission for Gender Equality

DA: Democratic Alliance

DEVAW: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women

DIRCO: Department of International Relations and Cooperation

EFF: Economic Freedom Fighters

GBV: Gender Based Violence

IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union

IPV: Intimate Partner Violence

IR: International Relations

JMC: Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

MK: *Umkhonto We Sizwe*

MP: Member of Parliament

NGA: National General Council

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NGM: National Gender Machinery

NPA: National Prosecuting Authority

OSW: Office on the Status of Women

OHCHR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PACE: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

SAA: South African Airways

SABC: South African Broadcasting Commission

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAHRC: South African Human Rights Commission

SASCO: South African Student Congress

SOE: State Owned Enterprise

SONA: State of the Nation Address

UDF: United Democratic Front

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US: United States

VAWP: Violence Against Women in Politics

WHO: World Health Organization

WNC: Women's National Coalition

Abstract

Women politicians face nefarious and diverse obstacles. Their voices are both needed and lacking in the halls of national decision-making. According to the 2022 Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR) the gap in global female Political Empowerment has consistently remained the largest since the first report was published in 2006. Globally women only have 22% of the Political Empowerment that men have. This research conducts a discourse and content analyses of female political representation in South Africa and whether this translates into better outcomes for gender equality in broader society. It investigates the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage and the role it plays in the political careers of women to reach executive level positions such as becoming a cabinet minister and president. Key findings are gender stereotypes and gender roles found in both social constructs keep women out of political power. Many women politicians also do not champion the gender equality cause in South Africa in support of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“The full participation of women to all levels of decision-making is a basic human right.”

~UN Secretary General Kofi Anan

Aims and Rational

There is no greater empowerment for women than being at the helm of politics and political decision making. This research aims to understand the gender barriers that exist to female participation in the political sphere, specifically at the ministerial and presidential level in South Africa. Through investigating the role of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage in women politicians' careers. Women that succeed in national politics get recommended and appointed to international forums. Heads of state and government attend important conferences where decisions about the world and how it is run are made. The final say goes to the leader of the country, executive political power rests with heads of state and government. Thus, women climbing the ranks and succeeding on the national level is imperative to gain access to international decision-making. Women's voices that speak for women's issues are both lacking and needed in the halls of state power because they are deeply affected by the choices political leadership makes (Tickner 2014, 265). Consequently, investigating the gendered barriers women face in politics is important to the discipline of International Relations.

After reviewing literature on women's political representation in national government (Fukuyama 1998, Tickner 1999, Morrel et al. 2012, Correa 2016, Fritzsche 2011, Hooper 2012, Tripp 2001, Hassim 2014, Gouws 2019 and 2021), this research has identified the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage as important factors in the political careers of women politicians. The social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage are identified as playing a key role to the appointment of women in high national political office. There is not a lot of research that has analysed these two social constructs together to ascertain what the link between them is in the political careers of women politicians. This is why I have chosen to focus on the impact of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage on women's political representation in national government.

Avoiding Conflation

This research does not conflate the variables of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage to all female politicians globally the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage is intricate and does not look the same for all women everywhere. There are important nuances in different countries and even within each country political contexts can differ between regions (Sen 2001). The differences between political contexts are acknowledged, just as political landscapes are different across countries, societies and culture so is the concepts of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage socially constructed. The concepts of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage is labelled as social constructs to give the research nuance. As these are fluid social constructs that change with time and location. This research focusses on concepts of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage specifically in South Africa and can only make findings for this case study.

Different Tiers of Female Political Leadership, Not Conflated, But Connected

International Relations was previously gender blind, this has changed, similarly domestic politics was not previously considered International Relations, International Relations was about relations between states, this has also changed (Hooper 2012, 91). In the past there was a distinct boundary in the discipline of International Relations between the public and the private, where men play their role in the public as heads of states, in government and international politics and women are relegated to the private sphere of the home (Hooper, 2012 91). These private versus public versus international divisions built the discipline of International Relations and rendered it totally blind to gender politics (Hooper 2012, 93). Feminists, however, assert that “the personal is political” and that “gender inequality permeates every level of society” (Hooper 2012, 92). Thus, the study of factors that hinder female participation in politics on the national level is necessary to understand its inner workings and eradicate it on all levels including the international level.

This research does not conflate domestic political participation with international political participation. These are two different tiers of political leadership. However, the argument is that they do have a correlation with each other. Women who do well and rise at a domestic political level gets recommended and ascends to the international political stage. International politics is still characterized by a scarcity of women. However, this has been changing over time, investigating appointments of women as head of international institutions and organizations illuminates this.

Starting in Africa the first and only woman to head the African Union (AU), formerly the Organization of African Unity founded in 1963, was South African politician Minister of Health, and then Minister of Home Affairs Dr. Nkosizana Dlamini Zuma who was elected Chairperson of the African Union in 2012 (Jobson 2012). Her four-year tenure ended in 2016 amid her bid to become the leader of South Africa's ruling party the African National Congress (ANC) and president of South Africa (Maasho, 2016). Another notable South African politician to head an international organization is former Member of Parliament, Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister of Minerals and Energy, and former Deputy President of South Africa, Phumzile Mlambo- Ngcuka (UN Women 2012). Ms. Mlambo- Ngcuka was the United Nations Under Secretary General and Executive Director of UN- Women serving from August 2013 to August 2021 (UN Women 2021). UN Women was first led by the former President of Chile Michelle Bachelette from 2010 to 2013, she is now the UN Human Rights Chief (UN Women 2021). The third and current UN Under Secretary General and Executive director of UN Women is Jordanian native Ms. Sima Bahous among her 35 years of leadership experience on the national, regional and international level she has served in two ministerial posts in Jordan (UN Women 2021).

According to a study done by Trade Experettes, an organization of female trade experts working in international organizations, among 291 leaders, there have been 33 women in top leadership posts in 30 key UN organizations and specialized agencies (Trade Experettes 2021). Of these 30 sampled 15 organizations have never had a female leader and only 5 of the 33 women identified were appointed before 2000 (Trade Experettes 2021). Female global leaders are needed to encourage women to believe that they can achieve success (Trade Experettes 2021). To combat global struggles of Gender Based Violence (GBV), racism and gender inequality women need to be seen in prominent roles (Trade Experettes). Particularly women from developing countries in UN management positions would be the biggest symbol of change (Trade Experettes).

The number of female leaders that has obtained executive positions in international organizations who for the most part act under the UN has drastically increased since 2017 under UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres (Uzendere 2021). In 2020 he appointed 20 women to high-ranking UN posts (Uzendere 2021). Nine of these 20 women were appointed to positions in political or peacekeeping missions (Alouazan 2021). Of these 20 female senior managers, 9

are from Africa, 7 from the Americas and the Caribbean, 3 from Europe, and 1 woman derives from Asia (Alouazan 2021). Among them Moroccan Native Nachdat Rochdi was appointed as UN Deputy Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) and UN Lebanon Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (Alouazan 2021). Before Ms Rochdi embarked on her international career, she held several high-level Moroccan government and ministerial posts (Alouazan 2021).

Other notable women leaders of international organisations include Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Minister of Finance for Nigeria, was elected the first woman and first African to lead the World Trade Organization as its seventh Director General (CBS News 2021). In November 2019, former French Finance Minister and 1st female Chairman of the G-20, Christine Lagarde became the first female president of the European Central Bank since its founding in 1998 (Uzendere 2021). In 2011 Lagarde became the first woman President of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) founded in 1944 (Uzendere 2021). The second woman to become IMF president was Bulgarian national Kristalina Georgieva appointed in September 2019 previously Georgieva was the European Commission Vice President and CEO of the World Bank (Uzendere 2021). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) appointed Audrey Azoulay a French civil servant and politician as this organizations Director General in November 2017, she is the second women to hold this position (Uzendere 2021). The first woman Director General of UNESCO was Irina Bokova a Bulgarian politician, who served from 2009 to 2017 (Uzendere 2021). The European Commission appointed its first female president in December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen the former German Defence Minister is president of the Council (Uzendere 2021). Winnie Byanyima a Ugandan national politician and diplomat in August 2019 became the first women Executive Director of the United Nations AIDS Agency (UNAIDS) since the agency was founded in 1995 (Uzendere 2021).

The United Nations has never had a female Secretary General in the 75 years that the organization has existed (Uzendere 2021). The primary deliberative and policymaking arm of the United Nations the UN General Assembly's President is elected by all the 193 member states and to date it has only had four women presidents in its 73-year history (United Nations 2018). Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garces an Ecuadorian politician and diplomat was elected President in 2018, Haya Rashed Al Khalifa a diplomat of Bahrain was elected in 2006, Angie

Brooks a Liberian statesman and diplomat was elected in 1969 and the first woman to ever hold the position was Indian native politician and diplomat Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit in 1953 (United Nations 2018). It is interesting to note that of the women mentioned by name, apart from the four women that have served as the United Nations General Assembly's President only since 2009 have women been given significant leadership positions as heads of international organizations and institutions. Of the sixteen women listed eight were appointed after 2016.

Many women leaders who have achieved significant global leadership positions were first in high political office in their own countries as politicians, diplomats, Ministers, Deputy President and President. The data affirms that women who succeed in political leadership nationally ascend to the international leadership tier. The study of the unique factors that contribute to or hinder women's political careers and women achieving executive government appointments on a national level is important to illuminate barriers that exist to equal participation of women in global politics. The national level is where political careers start.

Why Should Women Have Global Political Representation?

The Fight for Political Rights

It is a basic human right for all people regardless of gender to be able to participate in politics and democracy equally (United Nations Women 2023). This research is situated within the field of International Relations concerned with the global political representation of women. The international political and social rights that have established the global representation of women as a necessity was arguably accomplished after three historical waves of feminist activism (Fritzsche 2011, 41). The metaphor of 'waves' is used in the West to describe how feminisms have developed historically in that part of the World (Bell et al. 2018, 3). Feminist practices predate the idea of a clear social movement, however present-day Western feminism is understood in relation to previous historical crusades of activism and theorizing (Bell et al. 2018, 4).

The first wave started in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Western feminist activists focused on suffrage, securing voting rights, and property rights (Bell et al. 2018, 4). The second wave occurred in the 1960s during a growing self-consciousness for minority groups, and alongside civil rights and anti-war sentiments (Shruti 2020, 2). Focussing on reproductive rights such as access to contraceptive pills and abortion, rights in the workplace such as equal pay for equal

work and the right to be free from gendered violence (Bell et al. 2018, 4). Gender, race and class were taken into account in the different conditions of oppression women experienced, African American feminists were at the forefront of the second wave (Bell et al. 2018, 4). Focusing on the empowerment of minority groups the second wave concentrated on issues of sexuality (Shruti 2020, 2). Unlike the first two waves of feminist activism the third wave in the 1980's and onward was characterized by more individual focused activism and theorizing (Bell et al. 2018, 5). In the 1990's feminists moved away from the homogenous notion of "universal womanhood", rising from the new post-colonial and neoliberal world order (Shruti 2020, 2).

The 3 waves of feminist activism were not felt equally across the globe (Bell et al. 2018, 4). The wave metaphor is problematic, it homogenizes experiences, over simplifies intricate experiences, and closes debates (Bell et al. 2018, 4). Consisting mostly of developments in particularly North America and Europe (Bell et al. 2018, 4). Where African feminist activism for example is not appropriately recognised or included (Bell et al. 2018, 4). African liberation struggles and individual post- colonial African countries had their own specific forms of feminist activism (Hassim 1991). In South Africa for example feminist activism grew alongside the liberation struggle (Hassim 2014).

International Frameworks and Conventions

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) through different feminist activism, not only those described in the wave metaphor, international frameworks such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was formed and adopted by the UN in 1979 (OHCHR 2022). CEDAW is the first comprehensive legally binding international treaty to promote, fulfil, respect and protect women's human rights (OHCHR 2022). Spelling out the meaning of equality and how gender equality can be accomplished, it is not only a bill of rights for women but an action plan to achieve equality to assure women enjoy those rights (OHCHR 2022). Article 7 of CEDAW stipulates that "states should ensure women are on equal terms with men and take all appropriate measures to remove discrimination against women in political and public life", this article is of particular relevance to this research (OHCHR 2022). In 1995 South Africa ratified CEDAW (DIRCO 2004). It is among 189 countries, out of 193 UN member states, to ratify what is known as the most "important bill of rights treaty for women" (OHCHR 2022).

Following CEDAW is the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) (UN Women 2023). DEVAW is the first internationally recognised framework that addresses violence against women explicitly (UN Women 2023). Articles 1 to 6 of DEVAW outlines what violence against women is along with strategies to combat this both domestically and internationally (UNHCHR 2023). The 1995 Beijing Protocol follows, Beijing outlines 12 critical areas for greater equality and opportunities for girls and boys as well as women and men (UN Women 2023). Providing tangible ways to achieve change in these areas that include things like eradicating poverty, educating and training of women, eradicating violence against women, women's health and women in armed conflict (UN Women 2023). After the Beijing Protocol many African countries adopted quotas to include women in government, quoting the Beijing Platform for Action that lays out guidelines for increasing women's political representation (Tripp 2003, 3). Only 3 African countries had adopted quotas prior to 1995 (Tripp 2003, 3).

Other frameworks such as the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa followed (African Union 2023). Better known as the Maputo Protocol that was adopted in 2003 and went into effect in 2005 (African Union 2023). The Maputo Protocol outlines challenges particularly facing women in Africa (African Union 2023). Such as child marriage, Gender Based Violence (GBV) including sexual abuse and exploitation of women and girls, access to education, women's rights to a peaceful existence, economic empowerment, and political empowerment of women and girls are a few of the areas outlined in the Maputo Protocol (African Union 2023). These are the international political and social rights' Treaty's and Conventions that have established the global representation of women as a necessity. South Africa is a signatory to and champions all these international frameworks (DIRCO 2003).

Along with a constitution that is one of the most comprehensive constitutions in the world where non sexism and non- racism are the cornerstones (Morrell et. al 2012, 16). This would give the expectation of high levels of gender equality in the country (Gouws 2019, 3). Yet equality laws on paper and actual levels of gender equality in South Africa are two completely different things (Morrell et.al. 2012, 16). South Africa's new constitution is acknowledged as one of the most liberal globally, adopted in 1996, it protects the fundamental rights of equality for all people (Morell et al. 2012, 16).

Following the end of apartheid and its punitive institutionalized racial segregation, the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) headed the women's movement (Hassim 2014, 72). Advocating for women's rights, the Women's National Coalition (WNC) was a national women's movement, composed of various different political parties, and gender activists in civil society (Hassim 2014, 72). Motivating government to acknowledge the seriousness of gender equality and rights and make it a cornerstone in the new constitution (Britton 2002, 38). Gender successes included recognizing and making marital rape illegal in 1993 (Morell et al. 2012, 16). The recognition of the right to sexual orientation, introducing new laws to prohibit gender discrimination, fortified sexual and reproductive health rights, very liberal abortion legislation was approved, contraception made free, user fees waved from maternity services, sexual harassment made illegal, and rights to maternity leave authorized (Morell et al. 2012, 16).

Equality laws on paper and actual gender equality not only in South Africa but, globally are two different things because complete gender equality has not been accomplished (Fritzsche 2011, 41). This is clear when investigating the long laundry list of gender inequalities found globally (Sen 2001, 466). The afflicted world we live in is characterized by a deeply unequal distribution of the burden that is adversity between men and women (Sen 2001, 466). In all communities, for people of every nationality and class the burden of hardship falls unequally on the shoulders of women (Sen 2001, 466).

The visible presence of women in politics in numbers identified as descriptive representation also known as symbolic representation is of the utmost importance, though not enough (Gouws 2019, 4). Substantive political representation is the action taken on behalf of the people you are supposed to represent (International Republican Institute 2016, 4). Substantive representation is based on the assumption that women represent other women and this is the ideal (Gouws 2019, 4). Substantive representation gives gender issues equal weight in the political process, placing gender issues on the legislative and policy making agenda (International Republican Institute 2016, 5). Merely having women represented is not enough, feminist activists are needed in politics, women need a political voice that speaks for them and their rights both on the national and international levels (Gouws 2019, 4).

Diversity of Political Barriers Women Face

The portrayal of women in high political office is problematic women are often stereotyped by gender roles and what many theorists refer to as the construction of masculinity in international

relations (Fritzsche 2010, 43). Not only is the portrayal of women in high political office problematic, but women also encounter bigger challenges than men to reach the upper echelons of political appointments (Fritzsche 2010, 43). Ever more increasingly women place themselves forward as political candidates for elections, however their numbers are drastically lagging behind those of men the question is “Why is this the case?” (Masad 2020). Women have faced many issues when they received suffrage and in trying to also be represented in national governments and these challenges have not abated (Masad 2020).

These challenges are diverse and there is no one theory, no finite number of reasons that can account for the gender bias in politics towards women (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Gender discrimination in politics does not happen in a vacuum rather it is a result of broader societal attitudes towards women (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Many factors contribute to gender discrimination in politics such as culture, religion, demographics, electoral systems, political institutions, specific countries own unique history and experience, policy, law, level of economic development, the list is long (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Structural impediments through bigoted laws and institutions continue to limit women’s options to campaign for public office, capacity inequalities between the genders cause the likelihood that women will have less education, contacts and resources required to become effective leaders (United Nations Women 2023).

Financing constraints has been identified as a key issue where the cost of campaigning is prohibitively high for most candidates regardless of gender (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Beyond financial constraints is the many social and cultural obstacles to political participation such as lack of experience due to exclusion, weaker professional networks, and time-consuming family care obligations (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Strengthened by public opinions of a “woman’s role” that tremendously undermine women’s ability to run for public office (Slaughter and Binda 2018). Things like new mothers and the challenges of working mothers have been highlighted (Slaughter and Binda 2018).

Women are more likely to be restricted from after-work educational pursuits or political work that necessitates meetings in evenings and on weekends due to their care responsibilities (Jurgensen 2019). In no country in the world is the amount of time spent by men on unpaid work mainly childrearing, domestic and volunteer work equal to that of women (World Economic Forum 2019, 11). Sharing the burden of childcare and housework can be extremely

unequal in family situations (Sen 2001, 468). Women usually carry the brunt of responsibility for child rearing and housework across cultures which is known as the 'division of labour' though for women it is more the 'accumulation of labour' (Sen 2001, 468). It is customary in many societies that men will 'naturally' work outside the home, whilst women can only do so if they could combine taking part in the economy with numerous inevitable unequally shared household duties (Sen 2001, 468). Women are underrepresented globally in decision making roles and do at least two and a half times more unpaid work than men (United Nations 2022). In South Africa women do a 3rd of household work, this is above the global average of time women spend on unpaid work (Jurgensen 2019). When converted to monetary value this would be approximately 27.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Jurgensen 2019).

A heinous barrier women face in politics is Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP) (Krook 2017). Women are often confronted with violent backlash when attempting to be included in the male dominated realm of politics (Ratcliffe 2019). Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP) has only recently been documented as a major global impediment to women's equal participation in politics (Ratcliffe 2019). For the first time ever in 2019 a database that is updated weekly by the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (Acled) was established to track violence against female politicians (Ratcliffe 2019). To help us understand the threats facing women, this is amid warnings of a rise in attacks (Ratcliffe 2019). VAWP is a common thread that link female politicians together globally regardless of geographic location, race and class (Krook 2017, 72). Evidence in the growing body of reports that has emerged in recent years reveal women politicians, activists, and voters face nefarious obstacles that their male counterparts do not (Krook 2017, 75). Initiated by male and female opposition to women's political participation (Krook 2017, 75). The forms VAWP takes ranges from wartime sexual violence, crackdowns on protests and civilians from state forces, women targeted by mob violence from religious and political groups, and verbal abuse and harassment faced by women politicians (Ratcliffe 2019). VAWP encompasses aggressive acts aimed at women in politics, because they are women, frequently using gendered means of attack (Krook 2017, 78). With the aim of discouraging women's participation in politics in order to preserve traditional gender roles and undermine democratic institutions, it is a blatant violation of women's basic human rights (Krook 2017, 78).

Brief definition of Political Hegemonic Masculinity

Here only a brief description will be given of political hegemonic masculinity, the social construct will be explored more thoroughly in this paper's literature review. This research does not include all manifestations of hegemonic masculinity in society. It goes beyond existing literature and focusses on Stark and Sauer's (2014) definition of political masculinities and hegemonic masculinity in politics. Political masculinity is defined as including masculinities formed, ascribed to and/ or claimed by political actors (Stark and Luyt 2019, 435). These are groups or people who are associated or included in the political arena for example professional politicians, members of political movements, party members, the military and citizens demanding or acquiring political rights (Stark and Luyt 2019, 435).

Hegemonic masculinity in politics claimed by politicians is intimately weaved with dominant notions of masculinity in broader society and deeply rooted in gender norms (Stark and Luyt 2019, 437). Hegemonic masculinity is the governing male culture in society and is identified with oppressive attitudes and actions (Morrel et al. 2012, 1). Hegemonic masculinity is described as the gender practice that validates patriarchy and guarantees the supremacy of men and the inferiority of women (Cockburn 2004, 26). Political hegemonic masculinity is based on the same cultural stereotypes found in broader society. These cultural stereotypes include men viewed as biologically aggressive, violent, and perfect for politics and leadership making decisions built on reason (Fukuyama 1998). Whilst women are irrational, victims and emotional, subordinate to men (Hooper 2012).

The invented masculinity that female politicians are measured against is a 'hyper-masculinity' that most men themselves could not attain if they were rated according to the same criteria as women occupying the same political office (Fritzsche 2011, 44). One of the main principles of hegemonic masculinity is the domination of women coupled with marginalized men and masculinities (Smirnova 2018, 2). Men and women who do not subscribe to heteronormative ideals are frequently the targets of physical, sexual, psychological, and symbolic violence given that "harassment begins when [male] power is challenged" (Smirnova 2018, 2-3). Thus, women who are viewed as not belonging in the male realm of politics and challenge male political power experience violence (Krook 2017, 82).

Brief definition of Political Patronage

Again, a very brief description of political patronage is given this social construct will be delved deeper into in the literature review section of this research. Patronage here is used strictly in

political science terms. The Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners (2005) defines patronage as “a negative way of talking about help, especially in the form of a job that is given to people in return for their support”. Patronage refers to the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support (Weingrod 1968, 4). The political party which is a formally organized group is the major unit in this use of the term (Weingrod 1968, 4). Patronage is the power to control appointments to office or the right to privileges (Weingrod 1968, 4).

Patronage and corruption in politics are used together as a ‘you scratch my back I scratch your back’ negative term where reciprocity is fundamental in this relationship (Correa 2016, 11). It implies the use of influence to help or protect another person or group and is identified as political allegiance (Correa 2016, 11). Here political office recruits are selected not on merit, but through patronage (Weingrod 1968, 4). Patronage is the power to make appointments to political positions using favouritism or nepotism to give preferential treatment to allies and supporters (Weingrod 1968, 4). It entails politically facilitated access to public office and distribution of public employment, resources, mass media and political capital (Correa 2016, 12). It is capable of cushioning discrimination, all this to gain political support or the exclusive inclusion in the bureaucracy (Correa 2016, 12). This is also known as the “the old boy network” (Weingrod 1968, 4). I cannot help but notice this gendered term. In South Africa this practice is known as cadre deployment (Khan and Louw 2011). Patronage affects women differently to men because of patriarchal gendered power relations in politics (Gouws 2019).

Post Colonial States and Women in Politics

In post-colonial states as women transitioned from liberation-civil society political movements to trying to be included in newly established governments women politicians have encountered their own unique challenges (Gouws 2021). “There is a particularity of African liberation struggles, weak political institutions, the impact of nationalism and patriarchal cultures in post-colonial contexts” (Gouws 2021, 21). Weak government institutions pose problems for women’s substantive representation (Gouws 2021, 22). Problems of “party loyalty, patronage, clientelism and, in the South African case, state capture, where institutions are repurposed to serve the needs of a corrupt elite”, endanger democracy, women’s substantive representation, and feminist institutionalism (Gouws 2021, 22).

South Africa shares some of the same challenges as many other post-colonial states such as navigating the patriarchal political cultures that have shaped political life (Hassim 2014). National liberation movements in Africa have made an implicit contract with women to support nationalism to overthrow colonial governments and capitalism at the expense of women's autonomy (Hassim 1991, 68). The male political elite give the conditions upon which women can enter the political realm it is argued here that those conditions are not to the benefit of women in general and have a detrimental effect to the levels that women can rise in politics. The conditions women are given for access to politics are to go along with internal party politics that puts gender equality on the back burner (Britton 2002, 46-47). In African liberation movements a concept of 'double militancy' is described where women first work with their political party to gain liberation and access to leadership then work against their party agendas to further gender equality (Britton 2002, 46-47).

In the South African context national liberation movements sacrificed women's autonomy within the movement to overthrow the apartheid government and build South African democracy within the boundaries of nationalism, believing in turn it would end patriarchy (Hassim 2014, 11). Women's emancipation was to be a natural progression of African political liberation (Hassim 1991, 68). The narrative on women in African politics is founded on the immediate political strategic imperatives of national liberation (Hassim 1991, 68). However, the complete promised emancipation of women has not occurred even after liberation has been achieved (Hassim 2014, 90). Other party objectives such as maintaining political power at all costs is paramount, patronage and party politics reigns supreme over notions of equality (Hassim 2014, 90).

Current Global Situation in the National Political Representation of Women

And the Extent to Which Progress Has Been Made

In the year 2022 globally, there was an unprecedented number of women as head of state out of the 193 United Nations (UN) member states (UN Women 2021). As of the 19 September 2022 30 women serve as head of state or government in 28 countries (UN Women 2022). This is the most women serving simultaneously as head of state and/ or government than at any other time in history (UN Women 2022). United Nations Women, however predict gender equality in the highest positions of political power is still far off and will not be achieved for another 130 years (UN Women 2022). Only 21% of government ministers worldwide are

women and only 14 countries in the world have achieved 50% or more women in cabinet (UN Women 2022). The African continent can boast of having had 5 women head of states or government, not including the many acting female heads of state the continent has had (Africa Faith and Justice Network 2021).

Comparative Data Points About Female Political Leadership

According To Who Is the Biggest Gender Gap in Politics, How Is This Measured?

Whilst acknowledging the many strides' women politicians have made there is still an absence of women in high politics, the politics that concern international relations or the politics between states (Fritzsche 2011, 42). Comparative data points over time and per region show that the global gender gap for political empowerment has narrowed the least globally as compared to the other gender equality sub-indexes since the start of the Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR) in 2006 (World Economic Forum 2019). The GGGR measures gender parity between men and women in different spheres of gender equality placed into sub-indexes of Political Empowerment, Health and Survival, Educational Attainment and Economic Opportunity and Participation (World Economic Forum 2006, 3).

The gender gap for Political Empowerment is calculated by variables such as the number of years female heads of state have been in office over the number of years male heads of state have been in office in the last 50 years (World Economic Forum 2006, 22). The ratio of women ministers over the number of male ministers, the ratio of women with seats in parliament as opposed to the male value and the ratio of female legislators, senior officials, and managers as opposed to the number of men holding the same political positions are all contributing factors (World Economic Forum 2006, 22). To achieve 100% Political Empowerment or parity on the Global Gender Gap Index women should have an equal 50/50 share of the political leadership positions available.

The GGGR does not measure the actual levels of the available resources, economically developed countries will always have more education and health opportunities (World Economic Forum 2006, 5). The methodology the GGGR uses does not give us a list of the best places in the world to be a woman, it tries to measure statistically how far countries have come in closing the global gender gap (World Economic Forum 2017). It sets a level playing field regardless of a countries current development status allowing us to see how some of the poorest

countries in the world are managing to make progress towards gender equality by distributing the resources and opportunities that are available equally (World Economic Forum 2017).

Women in the 115 countries covered by the very first edition of the report in 2006, represented over 90% of the world's population, and only had 15% of the Political Empowerment that men had (World Economic Forum 2006, 12). In contrast to the global averages of the just over 50% gender gap closed for Economic Opportunity and Participation and the over 90% gender gaps closed for both Educational Attainment and Health and Survival (World Economic Forum 2006, 12) (See Appendix A). In the 2022 GGGR the global gender gap for the gender sub-indexes of Political Empowerment is 22% closed, the Economic Participation and Opportunity gap is 60.3% closed, the Educational Attainment gap is 94.4% closed and the Health and Survival gender gap is 95.8% closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 5). Over the past 16 years the Political Empowerment gap has consistently remained the largest gender gap in the world (See Appendix A and C).

Data comparisons from the GGGR show improvements and fluctuations in the trajectory of gender parity where different regions and countries advanced at different levels and speeds (World Economic Forum 2021, 20). In 2006 for the Sub-Saharan African region the global gender gap for Political Empowerment stood at about 10% closed, the Middle East and Arab World 4% closed, Eastern Europe 6% closed, North America 10% closed, Latin America and Caribbean 12% closed, Asia 16% closed, and Oceania 19% closed for Political Empowerment (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). All these regions were below the 20% benchmark for Political Empowerment (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). Only Western Europe averaged about 24% of its Political Empowerment gender gap closed (World Economic Forum 2006, 15) (See Appendix B).

The 2006 regional averages that included 115 countries are contrasted to the regional averages of the 2022 GGGR. In the latest 2022 GGGR there are 146 countries covered, 31 countries more than in 2006, and 10 countries less than the previous year the 2021 GGGR which covered 156 countries (World Economic Forum 2022, 8). This affects data comparisons over time and per region. The fact that data is not always complete or available is noted in this research, the data that is available however, can help us analyse aspects of gender equality. As the report grew to include more countries regional classifications also changed. In the 2022 GGGR for Central Asia the Political Empowerment gap stood at 11.8% closed, East Asia and the Pacific

13.3% closed, Europe 39.8% closed, Latin America and the Caribbean 28.7% closed, the Middle East and North Africa 15.1%, North America 33.7% closed, South Asia 26.2% closed, and for Sub Saharan Africa 21.3% closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 18). Europe is still number one for the Political Empowerment gap closed (See Appendix C).

In 2006 when the first report was published for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, South Africa was the then-regional leader in Political Empowerment of women and ranked 8th globally in this sub index (World Economic Forum 2006, 17). In 2006 More than 40% of Cabinet Ministers in South Africa were women and more than a third of the positions in parliament were held by women (World Economic Forum 2006, 17). Due to the 1994 30% women in parliament gender quota instilled by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) (Hassim 2014, 70). This number grew to a 50/ 50 party proportional representation gender quota in 2007, mandated by the ruling ANC the only political party in South Africa with a gender quota (Gender Links 2014). In 2006 South Africa ranked 18th for overall gender parity globally with a score of 71.25% and was the only African country in the top 20 most gender equal countries in the world (World Economic Forum 2006, 15).

Notably in recent Global Gender Gap Reports 2 Sub Saharan African countries Rwanda and Namibia have outranked South Africa in overall gender parity regionally and globally. In 2022 in Sub Saharan Africa Rwanda ranks 1st regionally and 6th globally with an overall gender gap of 81.1% closed, followed by Namibia ranking 2nd regionally and 8th globally with an overall gender gap of 80.7% closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 25). South Africa ranks 3rd regionally and 20th globally with an overall gender gap of 78.2% closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 25) (See Appendix D). South Africa has closed 50.2% of its Political Empowerment gap and is ranked 12th globally for Political Empowerment (World Economic Forum 2022,15). South Africa has 46.7% women in parliament and 48.2% women in ministerial positions (World Economic Forum 2022, 318). Namibia has closed 46.3% of its Political Empowerment gap and is ranked 19th in the world for this sub index (World Economic Forum 2022, 15). Namibia has 44.2% women in parliament and 39.1% of women in ministerial positions (World Economic Forum 2022, 264).

Rwanda has closed 56.3% of its Political Empowerment Gap ranked 7th in the world for this sub index (World Economic Forum 2022, 15). Rwanda is the only country in the world with 61.3% women in parliament, and it has 58.8% women in ministerial positions (World

Economic Forum 2022, 302). Rwanda has consistently been in the top 10 most gender equal countries in the world since its inclusion in the index in 2014 (World Economic Forum 2022, 26). Rwanda is doing exceptionally well in numeric representation of women in parliament and in closing the Political Empowerment gender gap. Making it a country that is an exception to the global trend of Political Empowerment being the largest gender gap as compared to other indicators of gender equality (World Economic Forum 2017).

The 2006 Global Gender Gap Report showed Europe as the world's regional leader in Political Empowerment with about 24% of this gap closed (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). With the five Nordic countries performing consistently well across the board Sweden was ranked number 1, Norway ranked number 2, Finland ranked number 3, and Iceland ranked number 4 in the world for overall gender equality setting the benchmark for comparisons and acting as a model for the rest of the world (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). In Finland, Iceland, Norway and Denmark, women held at least a third of all ministerial and parliamentary positions (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). This trend has continued with the Scandinavian countries dominating the rankings (World Economic Forum 2022, 9). Along with two African countries Rwanda (ranked 6th) and Namibia (ranked 8th) in the top ten countries (World Economic Forum 2022, 9).

No country in the world has achieved complete gender parity, Iceland has been the overall world leader in gender parity for 13 consecutive years (World Economic Forum 2022, 9). The Nordic countries were some of the first countries in the world to achieve the feat of giving women the right to vote (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). They have a long tradition of Political Empowerment of women where women first received the right to vote partially in Sweden in 1862 (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). Women received the right to vote in Norway in 1907, Finland in 1906, in both Iceland and Denmark women received the right to vote in the year 1915 (World Economic Forum 2006, 15). This is why the Nordic countries still dominate the gender parity rankings.

White women in South Africa achieved suffrage in 1930, black people in South Africa only achieved the vote on April 27 1994 (Hassim 2014). All adult South Africans both black men and black women were allowed to vote for the first time in South Africa's first ever democratic elections, it was a hallmark universal suffrage in the history of the country, where all people regardless of race and gender achieved the right to vote (Hassim 2014). This very recent

universal suffrage makes many of South Africa's feats in political gender equality even more remarkable. Women of all races being active in political and gender activism, particularly to end apartheid however, far predates this historic event, the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) specifically was formed in 1918 (Hassim 2014, 8). From suffragettes to feminists' women and men in the world have fought for the political rights of women (Massad 2020). From the very first country to give women the right to vote New Zealand in 1883 and the last country for women to obtain suffrage in the world Saudi Arabia in 2015 (Massad 2020). In 2022 it is estimated that at the current rate of progress it will now take 155 years to close the Political Empowerment gap worldwide (World Economic Forum 2022, 5). "It is unlikely that full gender equality will be realised in our lifetimes or in many of our children's lifetimes" (World Economic Forum 2019). Women need political representation to close the gender gap and to fight for and protect women's rights that is also basic human rights (World Economic Forum 2019).

Main Research Question

How does political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage influence the rise of women to the executive ministerial and presidential level of government in South Africa

Sub Questions

1. How does political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage impact the realisation of gender equality in broader society?
2. How are quotas aimed at increasing women in the executive level of government affected by political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage?

Research Design and Methodology

A post positivist approach is taken as this research seeks to understand the international relations phenomena of the barrier's women in politics face. This approach was chosen because it does not profess universal answers but asks questions about the way the current state of politics in the world promotes certain power relations between men and women (Tickner 2014, 268). This research uses a qualitative and inductive approach to develop existing theories. Qualitative research focuses on meanings behind phenomena, which are investigated and interpreted from the social world in order to illuminate them (Lamont 2015, 31). This research aims to illuminate the phenomenon of unequal gender power relations in politics. Qualitative research is consistent with this research as it is foremost grounded in feminist theory that aims to express female voices and experiences beyond facts and statistics (Bryman 2012, 410). This

research does not argue political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage only affects women politicians. The argument is that due to the structure of power relations between men and women political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage affects women differently than men.

To facilitate the assessment of how the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage can help us understand women's rise and equal participation in politics, feminist critical theory and feminist institutionalism will be utilised. Feminist critical theory is influenced by Marxism and extensively studied by Robert Cox (1986) depiction of global politics in relation to historical structures of power (Tickner and Sjoberg 2014, 209). Feminist critical theory crucially allows for the investigation of ideas and the meaning given to realities of the relation between men and women, the ideas they have about their relationship to one another (Tickner 2014, 266). This research investigates the relationship between male and female politicians and the realities of the meanings of these relationships in politics. Because humans have agency these ideas about gender in institutions, such as government institutions and the political party can change over time and take on different meanings which effects the reality of gender relationships in those institutions (Tickner 2014, 268).

“Feminist institutionalism seeks to include women as actors and to understand the interplay between gender and the functioning of political institutions” (Correa 2016, 1). Feminist institutionalism cannot be divorced from women's participation in politics and women's representation in government (Gouws 2019, 4). It seeks to understand how power is distributed within institutions and also enable change of existing power relations (Holmes 2020, 214). Feminist institutionalism identifies and challenges institutional obstacles that preserve gender inequalities (Holmes 2020, 214). This research argues the existing power relations between men and women in politics in South Africa through the practice of political hegemonic masculinity and patronage/party politics needs to be understood in order for it to be changed.

Data Collection

The timeline for the data analysed starts in 1994 the end of apartheid and South Africa's new democracy. However, the research particularly focuses on the years from 2006 amid raging leadership battles in the ruling ANC and ends in the year 2022. Specifically, South Africa was used in the beginning of search terms entered into the google search engine. The saturation point in search is determined when the article does not directly relate to the social constructs

of political hegemonic masculinity or political patronage, the political careers of women in South Africa, gender equality and the role of female politicians in furthering gender equality in South Africa. The data is coded manually into the categories of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage.

The data will be analysed using the analytical framework constructed in the literature review section of this paper. Through my literature review I will create an analytical framework for the South African case study. By testing whether the same impacts of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage in facilitating or hindering women's political representation at national government level is present in my South African case study. Or whether there are others unique to South Africa that could be explored in further research. Thus, my study has the potential to test the validity of the findings of other studies in different contexts as well as contribute to potential new findings for the field.

The search terms used to source data are Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP), 'patronage in South Africa and women politicians', 'party politics in South Africa', 'cadre deployment in South Africa and women politicians', 'women politicians in South Africa', 'gender discrimination in politics in South Africa', 'women politicians and gender equality in South Africa', 'gender roles/ stereotypes and women politicians', 'feminist institutionalism', 'feminist institutionalism in South Africa'. It is a thematic analysis of data relating to the research topic and themes of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage, critical theory and feminist institutionalism outlined in the analytical framework.

The data collection comprises of various sources including media articles taken from local and international online newspapers and news agencies that comment on the careers of female politicians in high levels of government in South Africa. These media articles include news articles from: Aljazeera, BBC News, Citizen, Conversation, Daily Maverick, Eyewitness News, Guardian, IOL News, Mail and Guardian, Sowetan Live, and Times Live. Documented political speeches are investigated made by both male and female politicians in parliament and elsewhere that refer specifically to the role of women in South African politics and elements of prejudice as well as women politician's role in the gender equality cause. The State Capture Report and Transcripts from the Zondo Commission are utilized, official reports along with journal articles and books on the topic is used.

Case Study Selection

My research design uses a single case study analyses to answer the research question. A case study analysis strengthens the focus of this paper by including practical examples favouring precision over scope. South Africa is an important case study because according to international standards of gender equality law and policy the country is doing well (International Republican Institute 2016). In both descriptive and numerical political gender representation and substantive or legislation and policy making political gender representation (International Republican Institute 2016). South Africa has one of the most liberal constitutions in the world that protects women's rights (Cole 2011, 14). Other African countries have been advised to adopt traits from South Africa's liberal constitution to improve gender equality (Cole 2011, 14).

South Africa subscribes to all the right international policies, conventions and strategic plans to obtain gender equality. Irrespective of this the country does have some of the worst gender inequalities and highest levels of GBV, including rape, in the world (Gouws 2022). South Africa has the highest reported rape statistics in the world, higher even than countries at war, approximately 115 rapes are reported per day (Gouws 2022). South Africa had national elections in 2019 and two female candidates namely Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and Ms. Baleke Mbete were put forward to lead the ruling ANC party and become South Africa's first female President (SABC News 2017). There was certainly a lot of hype about the prospect of the country having its first female President, however this did not materialize. By using this case study, I aim to investigate the factors that hinder or contribute to women's rise to political power. As well as understand how these factors contribute to the discrepancy between increased numbers of women in politics and better gender equality outcomes in society.

Limitations

This research focusses on a specific country it focusses on specific forms of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage practiced in South Africa. I will only be studying the issue of factors that helps us understand women's political careers within a South African context therefore can only make findings for this case study. South Africa has a unique history and society consequently unique forms of political hegemonic masculinity and patronage/party politics has erupted from this which makes generalization difficult. There is difficulty of having access to all inclusive evidence in case studies and duplicating this study may be challenging because it is more unstructured and relies on the researcher's creativity to

find evidence in discourse. However, conducting a study of these concepts specific to a country with a unique national political context is possible. This research is necessary because it investigates a very important problem and one that there are no clear-cut answers for but that will certainly fester and get worse if it is not addressed and the underlying reasons are not investigated.

Conclusion

Chapter one has provided a background of the research topic, situating it in the field of International Relations concerned with the global political representation of women and the social and political rights that necessitates this. In the methodology section motivation for the choice of case study was provided. It has given a brief description of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage that will be delved into deeper in my literature review. The following literature review chapter will construct an analytical framework by identifying reasons given by authors as to how political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage impact negatively or restrict women's political representation at the national level. To establish if these reasons are present in the case study or if there are other reasons identified that impact women's political careers negatively in South Africa. Chapter three establishes context for the South African case study, it provides the background regarding the evolution of women's political representation. Chapter three also provides comparative gender equality statistics to support the study and contrasts this in relation to global standards of gender equality. Chapter four analyses the case study, using data collected from various sources it determines whether the impact of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage are similar to others identified. It illustrates how the South African case study is different. Chapter five is the conclusion to the study, it refers back to my aims and rationale, it summarizes the findings of the South African case study. Then uses these to answer the research questions and makes recommendations as to what still needs research in light of my study.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter provided a contextual background to the research. The research question, rationale and methodology were discussed. Chapter two seeks to identify key discourse on the issue of gender discrimination in politics, political hegemonic masculinity, and political

patronage by reviewing and analysing existing literature on the topics. This literature review links my research with previous studies on the subject matter. Firstly, the review broadly identifies literature that restricts women's political representation at the level of national government in different contexts across the globe. It will then highlight literature that identifies political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage as issues. Providing the reasons given by authors as to how they impact negatively or restrict political representation of women at the national level. These identified reasons will be used to construct an analytical framework for my case study. To establish whether these identified reasons show up in my case study or if there are other new factors that are also prevalent. By using this analytical framework my study can confirm or reject previous understandings of the reasons for gender discrimination in politics and add to existing literature in the field.

Predefined Gender Roles and Stereotypes Keep Women Politically Subjugated

Feminists in international relations vehemently argue against predefined gender roles and what it means to be masculine and feminine (Hooper 2012). These gender stereotypes are numerous and centre around women as 'lacking', the 'other' and 'not whole' (Hooper 2012). Gender stereotypes such as men are 'strong', women are 'weak', men are 'violent' whilst women are 'peaceful' and 'nurturing', and men are 'rational', women are 'emotional' and thus men are better suited to decision making, leadership and politics (Hooper 2012, Tickner 1992 and 1999, Fritzsche 2011).

Women as the opposite of men are argued to be biologically wired for peace and nurturing thus women are incapable of handling the tough "manly" world of politics (Fukuyama 1998, 25). However feminist concerns do not revolve around superficial debates about which gender is more "peaceful", feminists have a broad agenda that includes issues of human rights (Tickner 1999, 10). Hooper (2012), Tickner (1992, 1999) and Fritzsche (2011), whose studies are based in the contexts of the global North, critically argue associating women with peace and moral superiority has a long history of keeping women out of political power on the national level. Not only is representation of women in national politics a problem but those who do hold power are frequently faced with doubts about their competence (Fritzsche 2011). Women are more often questioned about their competence based on gender than their male counterparts (Fritzsche 2011). Fritzsche (2011) uses the example of Angela Merkel the first female Chancellor of Germany, in the early years of Merkel's political career her qualifications were distrusted merely because she was female (Fritzsche 2011, 42). Countless times her ability to

do the work was questioned and in the years that followed faultfinders was obsessed exclusively with her gender as opposed to her political performance (Fritzsche 2011, 42).

In Liberia the first female African President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was said to be more like “the mother of the church”, not especially “chic”, using “head wraps to increase her stature” (Anderson et al. 2011, 2512). The focus by the media on such trivialities makes female politicians less appealing to the serious-minded reader or politician (Anderson et al. 2011). The media would have us believe there is nothing more to talk about than fashion or how “unwomanly” a woman in politics is (Laher 2014). References to the fact that President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is “a grandmother” or “a widowed mother-of-four” support claims that most media reports on female politicians are linked to their personal relationships and traditional roles, whereas men are seen as independent of these roles (Anderson et al. 2011, 2513).

Smirnova (2018) does a study on the political hegemonic masculinity of Donald Trump where Trump’s masculinity was seen by his supporters as more qualified, valuable and desirable to a woman. Hegemonic masculinity favours one form of gender, race, sexuality, and class over “others” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 832). In the United States for national politics, that form is “the white, wealthy, Western, Christian, straight male” (Smirnova 2018, 12). To maintain this privileged position, gender descriptions of men who do not fit this form of masculinity are labelled as feminine or flawed (Smirnova 2018, 12). Trump labelled Clinton as a “puppet”, “tool of Wall Street” and a “nasty woman” in presidential candidacy debates (Smirnova 2018, 9-10). This discourse and these dehumanising linguistic strategies diminished Clinton’s qualifications and abilities by punishing her nonconformity to gender roles (Smirnova 2018, 10). Gender roles and stereotypes reign supreme over competence and political gender equality.

Political Masculinities in South Africa

Hegemonic masculinity is the governing male culture in society and is identified with oppressive attitudes and actions (Morrel et al. 2012, 1). Hegemonic masculinity is described as the gender practice that validates patriarchy and guarantees the supremacy of men and the inferiority of women (Cockburn 2004, 26). It is born from practices that allow men’s collective domination over women to persevere (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 840). In certain situations, hegemonic masculinity is described by toxic behaviour including violence (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 840). However, violence and other harmful practices are not

constantly the defining features as hegemony has many compositions (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 840). Various accounts of hegemonic masculinity include 'constructive' characteristics such as men being the 'father', 'protector', and 'provider' (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 840). Political hegemonic masculinity is thus the governing male culture in politics where male leaders are described as the 'father' or 'protector' of the nation and exhibit masculine traits ascribed to 'strong' leaders. As exemplified by one elderly woman's comments about her support for former President Jacob Zuma during his rape trial "We're supporting Zuma because he's like our father, and the country's father" (Hassim 2014, 85).

Different male political leaders in the country exhibit different political masculinities (Robins 2008). Morrell et al. (2012) argues for the concept of hegemonic masculinity where male political elites such as former President Jacob Zuma for example exhibits certain stereotypical masculine traits that dominates culturally. It is important to note hegemonic masculinity is not about dominance in numbers, statistically most men do not fit the stereotypical male profile (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). It is about dynamics of cultural domination where certain gender stereotypes, and masculine traits for example heteronormativity, what is regarded as socially acceptable such as being heterosexual, are viewed as more desirable than others in definitions of a 'real man' (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). In addition to subjugating women, these different competing types of South African political masculinities, silences, and subordinates' other masculinities (Morrell et al. 2012, 13). A criticism of Morrell's analysis is that in discussion of the various competing political hegemonic masculinities only 3 are mentioned namely a "white" masculinity, an "African" rurally based masculinity, and a "black" township masculinity (Morrell et al. 2012, 12). Disregarding other forms of masculinities in South Africa such as Indian, Coloured, and Gay male political hegemonic identities. The Jacob Zuma Rape trial in 2006 is an example of 'ANC political masculinities' being enacted with the politicising of sexuality (Robins 2008, 412).

The Zuma trial provided deep insight into the entrenched "authoritarian culture of patriarchy, misogyny and sexual violence" in South Africa (Robins 2018, 418). The trial was a spectacle of 'Zulu traditional masculinity' as defined by Zuma and his legal team (Robins 2008, 422). Then Deputy President of the ANC Zuma used isiZulu idioms in his court statements associated with deep rural KwaZulu Natal showing he was an authentic Zulu traditionalist, a 'real' Zulu man (Robins 2008, 422). Zuma's behaviour was validated by his legal teams largely unchallenged spectre 'cultural defence' argument that this is how Zulu men are supposed to act

(Robins 2008, 422-423). The Zuma rape trial was set against the backdrop of competing political masculinities and factional battles in the ANC leadership debate between supporters of President Thabo Mbeki and former Deputy President Jacob Zuma (Robins 2016).

Zuma's political hegemonic masculinity is in stark contrast to President Mbeki viewed as the Xhosa modernist engineer of South Africa's liberal constitutional democracy promoting gender equity and same-sex marriage for gay and lesbian couples (Robins 2008). Mbeki was perceived by many to defy 'African Culture' by promoting gender equality and challenging traditional leadership (Robins 2008, 422). Robins (2008) makes the critical argument that the Zuma judgement given by a white judge in the post-apartheid era sought to be seen as sensitive to African culture and traditions (Robins 2008). And made no effort to grapple with the possibility of alternative Zulu masculinities other than the essentialist and decontextualized forms deployed by Zuma's legal counsel (Robins 2008).

The Heinous Barrier of Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP)

A heinous obstacle that restricts women's political representation in politics is Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP) (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). VAWP is a common thread that link female politicians together globally regardless of geographic location, race, and class (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). Using the excuse of traditional gender norms, relatives and party colleagues may sabotage women's political campaigns (Krook 2017). Feminist activists can become targets of online bullying, ridicule, and rape or murder threats from often-anonymous sources, and female citizens may be prohibited from voting or coerced to vote in a particular way by religious or traditional leaders or their own husbands (Krook 2017). These means of intimidation often combine harassment with threats and acts of physical violence up to and including murder (Krook 2017). Restricting the participation of women as women in these ways is aimed at giving a clear message that women as a group should have no part in political life (Krook 2017, 75).

A few examples of the forms VAWP take across countries include verbal and psychological abuse as documented in Zimbabwe during a debate in the Senate chamber, male senator Dino Melaye threatened female senator Remi Tinubu, saying, "I will beat you up . . . impregnate you and nothing will happen" (Krook 2017, 77). In September 2016 a number of women who were demonstrating in Harare as part of the National Electoral Reform Agenda were arrested,

detained, and badly beaten by police officers (Krook 2017, 77). In Pakistan mosques broadcasted warnings to women whilst “baton wielding men” stood at polling stations to stop women from voting in the Lower Dir District of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province where fifty-thousand women were eligible to vote in 2015, yet not one cast a ballot in that year’s election (Krook 2017, 78). In the United Kingdom a culture-based approach to defaming women by questioning sexual identity and morality of politically active women has been taken to harassment of women in particular constituencies (Krook 2017, 78). Such as Naz Shah a Labor MP whose rivals within her own party in her largely Muslim constituency attacked her character (Krook 2017, 78). Defaming her character by circulating doctored photos of her asking “Do you want your daughters to be like her?” (Krook 2017, 78-79). Defamation like this may devastate a women’s reputation in communities where a women’s “honour” is linked with that of her family (Krook 2017, 79).

This violence is grounded in the unequal status of women as opposed to men within all societies and the numerous forms of violence are experienced by and have an impact on the majority of women active in politics (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). VAWP has been primarily hidden just like many other forms of violence experienced by women (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). Acknowledging the problem is hindered by the notion that unless there are physical signs, it is not violence (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). Acknowledgement of VAWP is also hindered by the idea that there are no gender aspects to violence in politics and the fact that most women who experience attacks remain silent (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). Many women are afraid of reporting VAWP as they do not want to appear weak, be perceived as hysterical, not coping, or playing the victim and perpetuate claims that women have no place in political life (Krook and Restrepo 2016, Krook 2017, Krook 2018). Political Hegemonic masculinity in politics is given as a reason for VAWP. Politics has long been regarded as a characteristically masculine space (Krook 2018). At a normative level, the traits frequently used to characterise good leaders such as being competitive, self-confident, and ambitious are also those stereotypically attributed to men (Krook 2018). At a practical level, parliamentary working arrangements namely working hours, debate styles, and even architecture also tend to reflect the assumption that MP’s will be male (Krook 2018). Thus, as women enter politics, they often confront numerous forms of hostility typically rooted in the perceived disconnect between stereotypes of ‘leaders’ and of ‘women’ (Krook 2018).

Does More Women in Politics Really Help Gender Equality?

The question of whether more women in leadership positions will displace traditionally gendered power hierarchies is debatable (Laher 2014). International relations feminists hold the view that women and political power are frequently so far removed from the lived realities of many of the world's women that it is an unproductive sphere for international relations feminists to research (Tickner 2001). Instead, more focus is placed on researching exclusively feminised areas of environmental affairs, human security issues, and development studies (Tickner 2001). This focus away from the traditionally masculine world of politics contributes to the same hierarchies' feminists aim to take apart (Tickner 2001).

Authors agree that political parity with men in numbers is not enough to achieve complete gender equality (Hassim 2014, Gouws 2019, 2021). Whilst still acknowledging that policies to increase political representation of women is important and needed to further the cause of gender equality (Tripp 2003, Hassim 2014, Gouws 2019, 2021). It is important to have feminist activists in government to put women's issues on the legislative agenda and achieve substantive representation (Gouws 2019).

For increased representation of women in government many countries have adopted a quota system including South Africa (Gouws 2019 and 2021). Besides the voluntary political party quota, the other type of quota is a reserved seats quota that only women can run for in an election (Tripp 2003). More than economic development for gender representation quotas matter, because it ensures women are represented (Tripp 2003). Countries where quotas have worked to increase representation of women in government include South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda (Tripp 2003). These countries developed quotas after 1994 and a conflict, Rwanda after their civil war the Rwandan Genocide and South Africa after its liberation struggle (Tripp 2003). Uganda was one of the first countries in the world to adopt quotas in 1989 after its brutal civil war (Tripp 2003). The end of major turmoil and conflict in Africa made countries more pliant to adopt new regulations and include women in political leadership (Tripp 2003).

A criticism of gender quotas is that countries may create quotas for reasons that have nothing to do with broadening the gender equality cause and increasing the welfare of its citizens (Tripp and Kang 2008). Tripp (2003) argues Uganda is a country where introducing quotas created new state patronage systems. Adopting quotas in Uganda did change the political culture to accept women as public figures (Tripp 2003). Women in Uganda have 33% parliamentary

seats, 46% local government positions, and 43% cabinet positions (Tripp 2021). However, many female parliamentarians argue the affirmative action seats have created “a group of legislatures more beholden to the regime than to the cause of women’s emancipation” (Tripp 2003, 7). It is argued many women politicians in high positions of power owe their positions to President Yoweri Museveni, who has led Uganda since 1986 and this has assisted an autocratic regime to hold onto power and receive legitimacy among some sectors in society (Tripp 2021). A similar argument is made for Rwandan President Paul Kagame who has been in power since 1994 (Tripp 2021). Often women representation is used to legitimize male power and guarantee support for male elites (Gouws 2011). A fundamental assumption of quotas is that “women are virtuous and will support other women” (Gouws 2011, 80). This thinking must be changed, we need to understand that women are self-interested individuals just like men exemplified by certain women parliamentarians in the ANCWL (Gouws 2011).

Patronage/Party Politics in Africa and Women’s Movements

Women’s movements in Africa in the 1990’s represent one of the fundamental forces in society that challenges state clientelist practices linked to patronage (Tripp 2001). Writers specifically refer to the disbanded Women’s National Coalition (WNC) movement in South Africa, a movement that cut across race and party lines and had a tremendous effect on gender equality policy (Britton 2002, Hassim 2014, Gouws 2019). The mass mobilization of women before the transition to democracy secured women’s success in constitutional mandates, party politics, and office holding (Britton 2002).

Pressure from women’s movements in African politics along with various UN conventions and resolutions such as CEDAW and Beijing resulted in gender quotas (Tripp 2003). Women political activists in South Africa particularly avoided the inclusion of a feminized ministry that would become the dumping ground for gender issues in the 1990’s (Gouws 2019). Evidence of women in feminized ministries is now found in South Africa and has undone the work of gender activists in the Women’s National Coalition movement (Hassim 2014). The Ministry for Women, Youth and People with Disabilities developed in 2007 during Jacob Zuma’s tenure has only been led by women ministers aligned with Zuma and is seen as a ghettoised Ministry for all issues relating to the disenfranchised (Gouws 2019, 6). It is incorrect however to assume that women in South African politics have only been placed in feminized ministries South Africa’s current and previous Minister of Defence are women (Gouws 2021). The Ministry of Defence is viewed as a very ‘masculine’ Ministry in international politics

where men dominate as the ‘strong’ ‘protectors’ and ‘defenders’ of the nation, women serving in this ministry is rare (Fritzsche 2011).

After African independence certain women were recruited into patronage systems, particularly from women’s wings, leagues and associations linked to the ruling party or regime (Tripp 2001). Some women became patrons in their own right, however independent women’s organizations are opposition to clientelist practices such as corruption tied to the state (Britton 2002, Tripp 2001). Unlike women’s wings of political parties’ women’s organizations do not promote and are not controlled by the interests of one ruling group or party (Tripp 2001). They generally disregard differences that have plagued party life in African countries such as regional affinity, race, religion, and ethnicity (Tripp 2001). Women’s movements challenge the paternal authority of men and the correlation of men/fathers with political leadership on a continent where men have dominated political positions (Tripp 2001). Hassim (2014) and Gouws (2019) both critically argue in South Africa after the disbandment of the WNC there has been a disconnect between feminist activists and women in high levels of politics.

Political Patronage and Feminist Institutionalism

Gender Roles, Gender Stereotypes and Feminist Institutionalism

Political patronage is found in every country in the world. This is not an aberration of exotic African politics and state failure, political patronage is an integral feature of contemporary liberal capitalist democracy across the world in many different forms (Lodge 2015, 229). There are as many variations of political patronage in the world as there are countries, types of societies, types of government and groups of people divided by culture, religion, class etc. (Weingrod 1968, 8). In Mexico for example in the national executive branch the political patronage system takes the form of “*Camarillas*” a political clique that promotes relations of reciprocal loyalties, where “*padrinos*” male political elites control advancement of political careers (Correa 2016, 13). “*Camarillas and padrino*” figures adhere to practices that gives power to politicians within the system based on loyalty in exchange for future expectations such as future cabinet positions, access to media, or financial resources, favours such as discretionary decisions in government’s tenders, preferential access, information, discipline and silence (Correa 2016 13-14). This relationship embodies unequal power relations and foremost these practices guarantee the dominant position of male politicians and the subordination of female politicians (Correa 2016, 14). In the Mexican executive branch professional competence is replaced by loyalty and complicity with superiors/ “*padrinos and*

camarillas”. Gouws (2019, 2021) makes the same argument for Ministerial appointments in South Africa, that loyalty and complicity to male political elites is the criteria through which appointments are made and not competence.

Gouws (2011, 2019 and 2021) critically argues women in South Africa are clients to male patrons who control access to national executive level positions. Clientelism denotes the existence of patronage thus, to guide the direction of the decision-making process for the benefit of special interests, relationships of hierarchy and loyalty are required (Correa 2016, 12). In the African context the patronage system used is described as neopatrimonialism (Tripp 2001, 38). Neopatrimonialism has infused into political institutions and has become one of the most distinguishing features of African independence (Tripp 2001, 38). There are many different arrangements of neopatrimonialism, however it generally denotes a form of personalised rule that is against the rule of law, depends on clientelism and self-enrichment at the expense of the state and the welfare of all citizens (Tripp 2001, 38). Also known as ‘Big Man’ politics, a metaphor with multiple meanings but often connoting corrupt autocratic and totalitarian rule of a country by a single individual (Tripp 2001, 38). The big man is connected to excessive ‘eating’ another metaphor with multiple meanings but mostly denotes personal appropriation of state resources (Tripp 2001, 37).

Weak African state institutions due to corruption pose particular problems for women’s substantive representation (Gouws 2021). Where gender machineries do exist to deal with gender issues often, they lack authority to influence ministries, their mandates are unclear, and they are plagued with focussing on social welfare issues and community development (Gouws 2021). Lacking staff capacity, under resourcing and where they do succeed to influence policy it lacks feminist objectives to emancipate women (Gouws 2021). Problems of patronage, clientelism, party loyalty, and in the South African case, state capture, where institutions are repurposed to oblige the needs of a corrupt political elite, jeopardize electoral processes, women’s substantive representation, as well as feminist institutionalism (Gouws 2021, 22).

Tripp (2001) and Gouws (2019, 2021) does not argue that women are more moral than men or women have a natural distaste for state patronage. Due to the gendered division of labour and the general exclusion of women from politics, women have a different connection to the state, power, and patronage (Tripp 2001, Gouws 2011, 2019, 2021). Patronage flowing across regional affinity, race, religion, and ethnicity has devastating effects for those excluded

particularly women (Tripp 2001, Gouws 2019 and 2021). Political patronage is catastrophic to the development of political institutions and the idea of gaining political office based on merit (Tripp 2001, 38). Many women do not have full access to formal political positions and they also have poor access to the benefits of clientelism through informal networks (Tripp 2001).

Importantly women have a different relationship to state patronage than men through exclusion from numerous political arenas, and political networks called ‘homosocial capital’ which is how men relate to one another in close knit networks built on patronage that exclude women (Gouws 2021, 25). Male dominance is accomplished through various means such as compliant men and women, tradition, culture and institutions (Gouws 2021). Thus, power is distributed and exercised beyond the legislature, such as in state run enterprises and the civil service (Gouws 2021). Neo patrimonialism and patronage networks construct the political culture with the effect of reproducing patriarchy and translates into parliamentary seats particularly in Party Representation (PR) systems where male party bosses make the final candidate list before elections (Gouws 2021).

Correa (2016) in her study of the Mexican national executive branch critically argues gender stereotypes in conjunction with patronage reproduce patriarchal political systems that keep male political elites in power. Women are seen as outsiders, not all networks and politicians have been willing to accept women as insiders in the Mexican national executive branch due to gender stereotypes and gender roles (Correa 2016, 12). Patterns of exclusion which is the root of patronage is founded on socially predefined gender roles (Correa 2016, 12). Informal institutions have permitted elite groups to work in a common place and widely accepted gendered manner (Correa 2016, 21). Gender allocated roles has effects on the relationships women have with their peers, subordinates, and superiors (Correa 2016, 12). For example, certain men may not be willing to work with women because they view women as mothers, daughters and wives, instead of as peers and prospective allies (Correa 2016, 12). Women are either thought of as unprepared for leadership or when they are competent in a leadership position it is frequently scorned because their behaviour challenges prescriptive beliefs of what is desirable behaviour among females (Correa 2016, 12). Stereotypes and Gender misconceptions of what is expected establish the origin of political appointment decisions by those who lead and is the root of patronage, this is a discriminatory approach founded on ‘desired’ qualities (Correa 2016, 12).

Particularly, men do not want women as part of the networks because of broadly held stereotypes, which obstruct “women to share the secrecy, practice codes, expected load of work or even being reciprocal in terms of future expectations, all necessary to belong” (Correa 2016, 14). The gender attitudes and whims of the political male elite can open and close doors, a man that accepts women in politics can open doors and a man that thinks women belong in their homes can close doors (Correa 2016). “Political ideology is made subservient to [male] particularist and personal politics” (Gouws 2021, 25).

Analytical Framework

Authors that specifically write about political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage as issues have identified the following reasons as to how these two concepts impact negatively or restrict political representation of women at the national level. VAWP is identified as restricting political representation of women and is entrenched in political hegemonic masculinity. Gender stereotypes and gender roles found in both social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage that exclude women from the political realm. Clientelism which encompasses the complicity and compliance of female politicians in both political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage for positions of power at the national level of government. Lastly corruption due to political patronage has devastating consequences for women’s substantive representation, as well as feminist institutionalism. These identified reasons are used to construct my analytical framework for my case study. I am going to establish whether these identified reasons show up in my case study. Or if there are other new reasons for gender bias in politics that are also prevalent. By using this method my study can confirm or reject existing research that help us understand the gendered barriers women in politics face as well as add to the existing literature in this field.

Gaps in the Literature

An African perspective on gender inequality in politics is an area I would like to contribute to. Research exists on the broader topic. My research employs a discourse and content analysis specifically on feminist institutionalism as it relates to both political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage and the link this has to appointments of female politicians to high levels of political office. My own research on this topic is informed and influenced by the critical reading of the above literature. This locates my research in relation to previous studies to compile an assessment of the role political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage plays in the appointment of women to national political office. This is to further close the gap relating

to prevailing understandings of the disjuncture between international frameworks for gender equality, promoting full female political participation, not only numerically but substantively, and the adverse lived realities of women politicians and the female constituents they are supposed to represent.

“As long as women are bound by poverty and as long as they are looked down upon, human rights will lack substance.” - Nelson Mandela

CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY

South Africa: Establishing Context

South Africa in a Gendered Nutshell

As in much of world history a woman's role in South African society too is thought of in the sexist and often constrained discourses of domesticity, motherhood and passivity where women are created as the objects and possessions of men (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 9). Father's 'give away' their daughters at marriage, women are viewed as sexual objects, whistled at, ogled, and harassed (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 9). Marriage and motherhood should be the ultimate ambition of any woman, ironically making her dependent on the male, to clothe, comfort and feed her (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 9). A woman's domain is that of the private home, where violence, oppression and patriarchy are concealed behind the curtain of comfortable domesticity (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 9). This is true through most of the country's history where women were viewed as legal minors, irrespective of their race (Hassim 2014, 10). Especially if the woman was married her husband had vast marital powers (Hassim 2014, 10). In African customary marriages women were treated completely as minors regardless if their marriages had ended and polygamous marriage had no legal protection for women (Hassim 2014, 10).

So entrenched was the dominance of men in private and public life that patriarchy was seen as the only non-racial institution in South Africa as all women were affected by it (Hassim 2014, 10). A major part of the democratic process in South Africa was to make women equal citizens with all the rights of personhood and dignity attached (Hassim 2014, 8). The inclusion of a gender equality clause in the constitution is largely owed to the gruelling efforts of the ANCWL (Hassim 2014, 8). However, the ANCWL is not the origin of the women's movement neither is its political hegemony to be seen as being the dominant idea of feminism in South African society or that it has always included members from all classes and races (Hassim 2014, 8). Feminist activism in South Africa started long before the formation of the ANCWL (Hassim 2014, 8):

"For example, African, Coloured and Indian women rebelled against the imposition of regulations that limited their mobility and their right to live in towns, and African women resisted the imposition of restrictions on traditional activities such as beer brewing. White women had begun to question their lack of political rights by the early years of the twentieth century. Indian women living in indenture took up a range of issues relating to conditions of work and their status. And working-class women of all races, newly employed in the factories of an industrialising economy, were becoming active organisers in the trade union movement. Their political demands and campaigns sometimes overlapped, but not always, and the organisational forms and modes of mobilisation often differed" (Hassim 2014, 8).

The Beginning of a Movement

Pass laws that had previously only applied to men can arguably be viewed as the origins of a national women's political movement in South Africa in 1912 (Wells 1993). Pass laws guaranteed that African women no matter what her class, took low paying and labour-intensive jobs as domestic workers in urban mining areas (Wells 1993). Pass laws-controlled employment choice, exposing women to the full force of a racist and sexist apartheid police force (Wells 1993). Women on their own initiative organized themselves, as men in the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), renamed the ANC in 1923 were unwilling to take up the anti-pass cause for women (Hassim 2014, 15). Black women composed and signed petitions given to provincial governments, and marched against pass laws (Wells 1993). "Their arguments against passes referenced equality, but also articulated a demand to end sexual abuse by police [...] and so a movement was born" (Hassim 2014, 15).

Regardless of women's public political activism they were not seen as autonomous equal political agents their status was that of auxiliary members in the ANC without any voting rights (Hassim 2014, 13). Not that this stopped women from intervening in all types of public debates, such as Charlotte Maxeke, the first black woman in South Africa to graduate with a Bachelor of Science Degree from the Wilberforce University in Ohio in 1901 and became president of the first national organisation for black women in South Africa, a supporting movement of the ANC (Hassim 2013, 13). She played a role in founding the Commercial Workers Union in 1920 and successfully argued women must be full members of that organization with equal pay for equal work (Hassim 2014, 17). The league composed of wives and 'other distinguished African ladies' whose duties were to provide suitable shelter and entertainment for delegates to the Congress (Hassim 2014, 18). Women were only acknowledged as members of the ANC in 1943, 31 years after its formation and given voting and deliberation rights at all levels (Hassim 2014, 20). Due to efforts from the league's second president Dr A.B. Xuma's (ANC President 1940–9) American wife Maddie Xuma, who was a social worker and league leader from 1943 to 1948 (Hassim 2014, 20). She raised funds for the party in the US and created the Zenzele self-help movement, fundraising was a big part of the ANCWL role (Hassim 2014, 20). She played a major role in changing the ANC from an elitist organization by eradicating special status given to chiefs and creating a mass-based movement with working branch structures (Hassim 2014, 20). Women in the ANC now had voting rights and could take part in deliberations at all levels of the movement (Hassim 2014, 20). However, the organization was structured like a political family with its incumbent patriarchal hierarchy, the exclusively

male National Executive Committee (NEC) was the patriarchal, paternal head of the political family and the ANC Youth League the militant wing needing guidance from the parents (Hassim 2014, 20). The ANC Women's League was defined by a maternal lesser role, "acting on behalf of their husbands and children", and could not make autonomous decisions without permission from the NEC (Hassim 2014, 20-21).

Other Early Women's Activist Movements

In 1911 an exclusively white suffrage movement emerged, famous writer Olive Schreiner was a founding member, it was early on devoted to the right to vote for all women, however this notion fell through due to racism (Hassim 2014, 19). In 1930 white women received the right to vote, opening debate about denial of citizenship for black men in the ANC and the entrenched white stereotype that black men were not civilised to receive the vote (Hassim 2019, 19). Discourse focused on the emasculation of black men, by undermining their competence to provide for their families, black women's right to vote was barely mentioned (Hassim 2014, 19). By the 1940's women from all races were involved in politics to an extent (Hassim 2014, 18). Indian women in Natal began to mobilise through the passive resistance campaign inspired by Ghandhi against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 dubbed the "Ghetto Act" (Hassim 2014, 18). The Ghetto Act banned Indians from owning property in certain areas and gave them limited voting rights to elect white representatives to parliament (Hassim 2014, 18). Indian women activists such as Dr Kesavaloo Goonam organised Indian women by language and connected African and Indian struggles against white domination whilst broaching issues of women's equality (Hassim 2014, 18). All the while women in the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) much like in the ANC did not have equality (Hassim 2014, 18).

White women through urbanisation and paid labour generated new women political actors for example Mary Fitz Gerald who formed a trade union targeting working white women such as waitresses and laundry workers in 1918 (Hassim 2014, 18). Trade Unions firstly propelled by white women became the space where women of all races were most militant and where class solidarity superseded racial differences (Hassim 2014, 18). Women of all races on the factory floor by the late 1930's demanded rights such as equal pay for equal work, maternity leave, housing and an end to abuse (Hassim 2014, 18). Black women also organised workers in sectors like domestic service (Hassim 2014, 18). Radical working-class white women later joined the Communist Party and Trade Unions that became the cornerstone for the Federation of South African Women formed in 1953, a non-racial women's movement (Hassim 2014, 18). The

Communist Party played a key role in the essential gender equality focussed issues taken up by the federation (Hassim 2014, 24). In the 1940's the Communist Party had very successful campaigns for the provision of affordable food with slogans such as "Today we fight for food, tomorrow for the vote and for freedom for all" (Hassim 2014, 24).

The first Non-Racial Women's Activist Coalition

In 1949 Ida Mtwana an ANCYL member took over the ANCWL leadership, the self-help middle class leadership style of Xuma was replaced by focus on working class women's issues in townships such as restricted movement and economic limits forced on them by the new apartheid state (Hassim 2014, 21). The ANC who only had black African members in the ANC and ANCWL at that time due to racism experienced from other groups by Africans was against a non-racial women's movements (Hassim 2014, 22). The ANC did not want the ANCWL melted into a non-racial women's movement and to organise outside of its national liberation structure for fear of losing members, financial resources and support (Hassim 2014, 22). However, in 1953 this did materialize and the Federation of South African Women was started in a meeting attended by members of the ANCWL, Communist Party and Trade Unions, with women political activist long wanting a women's movement that went beyond race and class (Hassim 2014, 22). The Women's Charter outlining the political role of women was adopted at its first meeting focussing on women's oppression yet still entrenched in the apartheid struggle (Hassim 2014, 22). It proclaimed that unless the evils of discrimination and prejudice against women were rooted out and women given full and equal equality in law and practice men cannot hope to be liberated (Hassim 2014, 22).

The Charter revealed the conflict between women's emancipation and mobilising women for national liberation (Hassim 2014, 22). However, national liberation won in this tussle as a matter of practicality as most Federation members were ANCWL members that had massive influence in the Federation (Hassim 2014, 22). The Federation took part in many campaigns arranged by the 'Congress Alliance', formed by each 'racial' group Africans, Indians, Coloureds and Whites, organised in their own structures which then worked together in the so-called Congress Alliance (Hassim 2014, 22). The iconic August 9th 1956 protest march to the Union Buildings, now commemorated as South Africa's National Women's Day was one such event in a militant campaign against pass laws launched in 1955 (Hassim 2014, 24). This march where a petition was handed to J.G Strijdom's government, with the famous photograph of four women of different races outside the locked Union Building holding a petition of 20 000

individual signatures (Hassim 2014, 24). By 1963, the organization was moribund, due to slow acquiescence of male leaderships views on women's roles and the mounting suppression after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, and the banning of anti-apartheid liberation movements that consequently moved into exile (Hassim 2014, 27).

Exile

Exile brought forth numerous gendered issues such as child care in foreign African countries, many children were separated from their mothers and placed in the care of female run ANC nurseries (Hassim 2014, 30). Women in the armed MK branch were prohibited from getting pregnant and as a matter of policy had IUDs inserted in Angola that left some women infertile (Hassim 2014, 30). Botched illegal abortions on teenage girls was also a major issue that led to the passing of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act in 1996 as soon as the ANC took power in South Africa (Hassim 2014, 30). The maternal role of women was harped on in the movement, yet motherhood left many women limited with childcare responsibility while male cadres were free to continue their revolutionary work and get new partners and have more children (Hassim 2014, 31).

Violence against women was a major problem and this extended to children, even women were violent towards children left in their care (Hassim 2014, 34). The Women's Section as the League was now known, after the disbanding of all ANC structures in exile, carried out urgent social welfare work on these issues and were responsible for the day to day needs of women in exile (Hassim 2014, 54). As late as 1987 the Women's Section argued for a code of conduct against women abuse and child battery (Hassim 2014, 34). There was a rise in women in the armed struggle *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (MK) after the 1976 Soweto Uprisings that saw the predominantly male centre of the exiled movement MK get 20% of its army from young women (Hassim 2014, 38). This grew feminist consciousness and challenged traditional gender roles (Hassim 2014, 38). In MK's severe authoritarian hierarchical structure the battle for women as equal citizens and the rhetorical commitment to equality was most experienced (Hassim 2014, 38).

During this time many women received tertiary education in Europe and Africa, they experienced participation in international politics and gained power in external ANC structures (Britton 2002, 35). In the exile period from 1960 to 1990 there was a disconnect between women in exile and the campaigns and debates of the women's grassroots movements inside

the country, due to lack of intelligence and communication (Hassim 2014, 48). More militant feminist women in MK and the Women's Section had their own power struggles between younger and older women and the articulation of gender equality within the movement (Hassim 2014, 53). All the while women were underrepresented in the NEC showcasing a shallow commitment to women's equality and ongoing conflict between women's emancipation coming second to national liberation against apartheid and white capitalism (Hassim 2014, 55). Despite enormous progress gender roles still dominated the 'family' model of the ANC and gender equality policy was owed to the efforts of a few women and not to a broader understanding of this necessity by members or leadership (Hassim 2014, 57).

The 1990 Malibongwe Conference in Amsterdam two weeks before the unbanning of the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress and South African Communist Party was a landmark (Hassim 2014, 58). Where women in exile and from within South Africa came together for the 1st time to discuss how post-apartheid South Africa would look, the future democratic constitution and issues of healthcare, violence and customary law (Hassim 2014, 58). Here an equality clause for the new constitution was discussed outlining the duty of the state to protect women's rights and guarantee race and gender equality (Hassim 2014, 58). To protect women against discriminatory cultural practices and acknowledge reproductive rights (Hassim 2014, 58). On the 2 February 1990 the National Party lifted the bans on prohibited organisations and the political landscape was transformed overnight (Hassim 2014, 59).

The Women's National Coalition (WNC)

What the unbanning meant for autonomous internal women's organizations was unknown and immediately debates began about the consequences of the unbanning (Hassim 2014, 60). The Women's Section returned to being called the ANC Women's League, the focus on making the ANCWL the primary mobilisation force for women was not universally agreed to by women's organizations inside the country (Hassim 2014, 60). The ANCWL held a meeting in May 1990 in Lusaka to discuss the issue with 70 women from internal women's organizations and the option of them joining the ANCWL (Hassim 2014, 60). Despite Malibongwe placing women's emancipation as a prime concern in post-apartheid South Africa the league opted for recruiting women into the ANC and then the ANCWL as the first order of business (Hassim 2014, 60). During the exile years women's organisations had been created in various parts of the country (Hassim 2014, 60). These organisations were rooted in grassroots community politics and became the core of the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Hassim 2014, 60). These

organisations were independent of the ANC with strong women leaders, less hierarchical structures and were characterised by anti-apartheid activism and fighting patriarchy (Hassim 2014, 60). The exiled movement returned to a transformed political landscape, where the most significant women's bodies were the Port Elizabeth Women's Congress, Natal Women's Organization, the Federation of Transvaal and the United Women's Organization in the Western Cape (Hassim 2014, 60). There were some common political affinities with the ANC, but these women's organizations were not ANC auxiliary movements (Hassim 2014, 60). There was conflict between having an independent women's movement and the national liberation movement (Hassim 2014, 60). The more militant returning female cadres Mavivi Manyaka, Balake Kgotshitsele Mbete and Frene Gwala placed emphasis on the necessity of focussing on women's liberation (Hassim 2014, 60).

Like women men want power and some women worried if the ANCWL would have the same power as the United Women's Congress (Hassim 2014, 60). A question of who would be in charge emerged where some internal women activists felt the exiled women automatically believed they were in charge (Hassim 2014, 60). In April 1991 in the league's first national conference after unbanning in Kimberley many women were comfortable with the maternal, supporting motherly role of the league, others argued for the emancipation of women from all forms of discrimination to achieve freedom (Hassim 2014, 66). In that conference Gertrude Shoppe, the previous Women Section Leader was elected President and UDF member Albertina Sisulu was elected vice President both were sympathetic to younger feminist cadres (Hassim 2014, 64-66). However, Shoppe as leader again invoked motherhood and the protection of children's lives as a common denominator uniting all women from every race and class yet still arguing for women's emancipation (Hassim 2014, 66). This continued claim to "motherhood" and "wifehood" as platforms of action results in a lack of substantive representation (Gouws 2019, 4).

Leadership debates overshadowed discussion of more profound organisational issues such as the leagues accountability to grassroots organisations in achieving gender goals beyond rhetoric, and how to articulate women's issues and become more influential in the ANC (Hassim 2014, 66). This leadership debate at the Kimberley Conference emerged between the bid for Winnie Mandela as league president, Mandela president of the powerful Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal-region and wife of ANC President Nelson Mandela had a unique symbolic profile of 'mother of the nation' (Hassim 2014, 66). As the wife of the President the majority

of feminists did not vote for her as they did not want the league to become a ‘wives club’ (Hassim 2014, 66). At that stage she was also on trial for assault and kidnapping suspected in the death of Stompie Seipi and disappearance of Lolo Sono (Hassim 2014, 66). Her bid was viewed as a ploy to become more powerful in the broader ANC and consequently she lost this round but was elected as league President in 1993 (Hassim 2014, 69). By 1995 she was viewed as an inapt authoritarian league President, squandering the hard work put into establishing the league as an autonomous organisation using the league for personal attacks against the ANC, regardless she was re-elected in 1997 (Hassim 2014, 68).

After the 48th ANC National Congress held in Durban in July 1991 the argument that national liberation does not secure women’s political representation in government was proven true (Hassim 2014, 70). This was where a new ANC constitution was adopted after the unbanning and opened a space for women to gain representation (Hassim 2014, 70). The 30% quota for women on the NEC was denied in a heated debate that left the ANCWL apologising for disrupting the conference and league members feeling betrayed (Hassim 2014, 70). The ANCWL realised the importance of a women’s movement outside the ANC to secure gender equality in law and practice as well as inclusion in political representation (Hassim 2014, 70). Learning from other African countries experience where national liberation did not automatically equate gender equality (Britton 2002, 38). Even if gender equality placed women at odds with party objectives (Britton 2002, 38). It was viewed as imperative for gender equality to be cemented in the new constitution (Britton 2002, 38). In 1991 the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) was formed it was the route “through which women mobilized for action during the transition period” (Britton 2002, 38). Developed by women from political parties who were excluded from the democratic negotiation processes (Britton 2002, 38). The WNC was representative of all South African women, women from all races, classes, political parties and later trade unions, professional and religious bodies, and advocacy and welfare organizations (Britton 2002, 38). The WNC came to include over 90 women’s organizations (Britton 2002, 38). The ANC contributed many founders, however the WNC maintained that all political parties had leaders in the movement (Britton 2002, 38).

The ANCWL played a part in the inclusion of gender equality in the new democratic constitution of 1994, they campaigned for the Women’s Charter (Hassim 2014, 70). The NWC as a whole gets credit for being the major driving force of equality through the Women’s Charter (Britton 2002, 38). The Women’s Charter can be seen as a comprehensive bill of rights

for women, an equality clause in the constitution protects the idea that gender equality surpasses cultural rights (Hassim 2014, 70). The aims of the WNC to have a national women's movement that included all women in its national agenda did fall short (Britton 2002, 38). There was underrepresentation of non-elite rural women in the Charter, women in polygamous marriages are deprived and needed equality most (Britton 2002, 39). The underrepresentation and tension between elite urban women and non-elite rural women, as well as tensions in class issues in the representation of women's issues would come to shape the political landscape of post-apartheid South Africa (Hassim 2014). The WNC was pivotal in moulding the formal institutions of democracy (Hassim 2014, 70). The WNC was a milestone despite shortcomings, it was remarkable that women from different walks of life could work together respectfully to regain power (Britton 2002, 39). Despite major cultural differences, ideological differences and a history of violence, tension, and hatred (Britton 2002, 39).

Feminists versus the League

Thanks to the successful campaigns of the WNC and the inclusion of the gender equality clause in the constitution the quota issue was reviewed just before the April 1994 elections (Hassim 2014, 73). This time women received a 30% gender quota in both national and provincial lists (Hassim 2014, 73). Consequently, the new parliament received nearly 30% women among Members of Parliament (MP's), bolstering the gender equality image of South Africa in the world (Hassim 2014, 73). A number of female MP's Pregs Govender, Lydia Kompe, Ellen Kuzwayo, Mittah Seperepere and Frene Ginwala were resolute to use their new positions in the legislature to progress gender equality (Hassim 2014, 73). Due to the WNC partnership these feminists had allies in other political parties too, many gender activists however came from internal women's organisations and did not have powerful positions in the ANCWL (Hassim 2014, 73). Many worked independently of the league structures and they formed the ANC women's caucus in parliament strategizing how to manoeuvre vital pieces of gender equality legislation onto the party's itinerary (Hassim 2014, 73).

The Caucus played a vital role to successfully shape the multi-party Joint Monitoring Committee on the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women (JMC) responsible for monitoring all state departments (Hassim 2014, 73). Feminists purposefully avoided a Women's Ministry there was enough proof in other countries particularly Africa that women's issues become ghettoised in a ministry that becomes the place where gender issues are discarded (Gouws 2019, 81). Instead, a comprehensive Gender Machinery comparable to that

of the global West was created that included an Office of the Status of Women in the Office of the President, a Women's Empowerment Unit in the Office of the Speaker, a multi-party gender caucus in parliament, gender desks in all national and provincial level civil service departments and the autonomous Commission for Gender Equality (Gouws 2019, 40-41).

Unfortunately, the comprehension and path of the JMC was reliant on the ability and vision of a small band of people led by Pregs Govendor (Hassim 2014, 73). She did crucial work in the WNC and Workers College, where trade unionists trained rather than the league, as such the JMC alone publicly opposed the scandalous arms deal (Hassim 2014, 73). Feminists' beliefs were in conflict with President Mbeki's Aids denialism and weapons corruption scandal that occurred during his tenure (Gouws 2019, 5). Due to her criticism of Mbeki, Govendor was forced to resign (Gouws 2019, 5).

"When Pregs Govendor resigned from parliament. The league continued to control the agenda for equality in parliament, but without any real sense of direction" (Gouws 2019, 5).

This can be marked as the beginning of the end for feminists in parliament (Hassim 2014, 73). After the first five years numerous feminists left parliament, replaced by compliant women with no commitment to feminism (Gouws 2019, 5). A downhill spiral of failure from the ANCWL to take stands on even the most uncontroversial gender issues ensued (Hassim 2014). Feminists in the state are plagued to contend with the "Women's League Syndrome", after liberation movements become government women's participation is anticipated as passive and not focussed on gender equality issues (Gouws 2019, 5). The supporting women's leagues of liberation parties frequently are conservative promoting gender issues in a limited agenda as not to alienate the men who control the party (Gouws 2019, 5).

Many women MPs are members of the ANCWL and are placed on election lists under its patronage (Gouws 2019, 5). The ANCWL plays a gatekeeping role in making sure ANC women are appointed to oversight bodies, parastatal institutions, government bodies and parliamentary committees (Hassim 2014, 75). The Commission for gender Equality (CGE) was one such casualty of developing patronage politics (Hassim 2014, 75). Created to be an autonomous instrument for accountability and given vast powers by the constitution it ultimately became moribund (Hassim 2014, 75). Steering clear of controversial gender issues such as providing healthcare to women with HIV/AIDS and running campaigns against sexual

violence, both agendas exposed massive problems during Mbeki's reign (Hassim 2014, 75). Limited resources, institutional opposition and mostly the reluctance of leadership to oppose the ruling party weakened the effectiveness of the National Gender Machinery (Hassim 2014, 75).

Mbeki continually articulated the need for women's representation in government and appointed a few well-placed women in positions of power in his cabinet through the politics of quotas (Hassim 2014, 77). Catapulting these women into positions of power influence and wealth, without addressing the structural basis of gender inequality (Hassim 2014, 77). Unemployment and poverty disproportionately affect women, intensified by poor economic growth and profound inherited problems of South Africa's economic structures (Hassim 2014, 77). The elite-Mbeki faction annoyed many ordinary ANC members and set back the gender equality and feminist cause associated with a pro poor agenda and not an economic redistribution of wealth agenda (Hassim 2014, 77). Setting the basis of strong support for next ANC and South African President Jacob Zuma (Hassim 2014, 77). Even after Mbeki fired Zuma as Deputy President of South Africa amidst corruption and rape charges and replaced him with Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka in 2006 Zuma had unyielding support (Hassim 2014, 77).

The 30% gender quota that increased to a 50% gender quota at the 2007 Polokwane conference was supported by Mbeki and was a triumph for women in the ANCWL who campaigned for this (Hassim 2014, 79). Yet Mbeki's strong argument that his successor should be a woman was doomed by his fall from favour in the ANC (Hassim 2014, 79). When space opened up in 2006 for the ANCWL to nominate a woman for president they seemingly did not even consider it, supporting Mbeki's opposition and settling for minor government positions (Hassim 2014, 79).

Zuma vowed to return the ANC to the ordinary people in branches, his campaign was launched on rhetoric of achieving economic redistribution (Hassim 2014, 79). This struck a core with women in ANC branches, women being the biggest shock absorbers of economic failures, and was thus supported by large numbers of women (Hassim 2014, 77). Zuma's 'pro economic redistribution' stance trumped his traditional social conservatism, and his "problematic relationships with women", Zuma is a polygamist (Hassim 2014, 78).

The state party fusion that began under Mbeki (1999 to 2008), heightened with Zuma (2009 to 2018), and is alive and well with South Africa's current President Cyril Ramaphosa (Gouws 2019,7). Factionalism tied to the male political elite or party leaders who hold the power of appointment defines South African politics, influencing nominations for positions at all levels regional, provincial and national (Gouws 2019,7). Women in government institutions in South Africa are beholden to male leaders and political party agendas instead of the citizens of the country (Gouws 2019, 7). South Africa has a proportional representation electoral system where the number of seats a party receives in the legislature is calculated by the number of votes a party receives in elections (Gouws 2019, 4). With a closed list system seats are allocated from the top of the list if women are at the top of the list or every second name is a woman, they receive more seats (Gouws 2019, 4). The 50/50 ANC party gender quota entails that for every male member on a party list a female member must also be represented (Gouws 2019, 4). The problem is party lists are compiled by male leaders who invariably place women allied to them on party lists and not feminists (Gouws 2019, 4). No other party has a gender quota, the official opposition the Democratic Alliance (DA) makes the argument women must receive appointments based on merit (Gouws 2019, 4). Merit defined by male standards, disregarding care duties related to family and children that often limit women's political participation (Gouws 2019, 4).

Political Patronage Is Gendered and It Does Benefit Men

Patronage mostly benefits men and those women who are clients to their male patrons (Tripp 2001). The National Gender Machinery (NGM) driven by femocrats (feminists in the state) was dismantled by the Zuma regime and replaced with a feminised Ministry for Women, Youth and People with Disabilities, negotiated by the ANC Women's League during the 2007 elective conference of the ANC (Gouws 2019, 6). All four preceding Ministers of Women since 2009 were loyal to Jacob Zuma (Gouws 2019, 6). Ensuring compliant women politicians in this weakened institution during his emptying out of state coffers, severe corruption now known as state capture (Gouws 2019, 6). Women are not substantively represented in feminist institutions in South Africa as Gouws (2021) argues there are issues of party loyalty, clientelism and unique to South Africa state capture. In state capture institutions are repurposed to aid the needs of a corrupt elite (Gouws 2021, 22). As with the repurposing of the National Gender Machinery into the Ministry for Women. This endangers the electoral process, women's substantive representation and feminist institutionalism (Gouws 2021, 22). Women are not included in male patronage networks or are made compliant in order to be included (Gouws 2012, 22).

Thus, they become beholden to the charity of men who repurpose the goals of the state for their own benefit severely damaging feminist institutionalism as well as women's substantive representation (Gouws 2021, 23).

South Africa has approximately 30.75 million women, 51.1% of the population is female (South African Government 2023). The latest published statistics sourced, Statistics South Africa (2016) Non-financial census of municipalities report, show that women employed as mayors, managers and councillors are still in the minority. In 2016 nationally 277 of South Africa's 278 municipalities had a sitting mayor, 106 or 38% of whom were women. Limpopo had the highest representation, with 18 of its 30 municipalities or 60% were headed by a female mayor (Statistics South Africa 2016). The province with the lowest representation of female mayors was the Western Cape 8 of 30 municipalities, or 27% (Statistics South Africa 2016). Mayors, senior managers, and ward councillors are appointed when the post becomes vacant, or they are elected every five years in municipal elections (Statistics South Africa 2016). Women held 40% of senior public-sector management posts in 2014 (Statistics South Africa 2016). A third of officials holding municipal management posts in 2015 were women this is 612 of 11 014 posts (Statistics South Africa 2016). A clear gender disparity exists if this figure is disaggregated by rank (Statistics South Africa 2016). Women were less represented in directorship posts in all provinces compared with lower management, with the exception of the Free State (Statistics South Africa 2016). Nationally, only 26% of directors, 413 of 1 567 posts were women, compared with 34% of lower management, 3 199 of 9 447 posts (Statistics South Africa 2016).

Cadre deployment is a major issue of contention in South Africa, it is a global phenomenon where jobs in the public sector are distributed by the ruling party or parties (Zulu et al. 2022, 3). In Africa this has caused poor quality and performance of government institutions (Zulu et al. 2022, 3). In South Africa cadre deployment has been catastrophic where the ANC as the ruling party with control of many municipalities has appointed public servants based on party affiliation instead of competence and qualifications (Zulu et al. 2022, 3). Employing ANC cadres to executive management positions in municipalities through political patronage and the severe corruption related to this practice has seen the dysfunctionality and collapse of several municipalities (Zulu et al. 2022, 3).

Cadre deployment does not only apply to the ruling ANC all political parties in South Africa practice it (Zulu et al. 2022, 3). This practice is based on elite male patronage networks and disadvantages women who are not included in these networks as men dominate politics at branch level (Gouws 2021, 35). As the statistics show women are disproportionately underrepresented in municipalities and only 24% of heads of state-owned enterprises are women (Statistics South Africa 2017). In the legislature the National Assembly comprises 46% women representatives, and the National Council of Provinces 36%, men dominate politics at every level (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2021).

Gender Equality in South Africa Versus International Standards

Educational Attainment

South Africa has achieved gender parity in Educational Attainment with gender parity at every level of schooling primary, secondary and tertiary level (World Economic Forum 2022, 318). It is among 28 countries with full gender parity in this sub index where the opportunity for schooling at every level is distributed equally among the genders (World Economic Forum 2022, 12). As opposed to the country with the biggest Educational Attainment gap, Afghanistan with only 48.2% of this gap closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 15). Afghanistan is known to be the only government in the world where girls were actively excluded from schooling (Sen 2001, 467).

Economic Participation and Opportunity Gender Gap

Professional inequality exists in employment as well as promotion, in work and occupation women frequently encounter bigger disadvantages than men (Sen 2001, 467). Women encounter challenges to get to senior roles due to discrimination or do not get employed in high-reward segments of the economy (World Economic Forum 2019, 11). The Economic Participation and Opportunity gap is calculated by the ratio of men to women participating or employed in the economy, the ratio of wages equal pay for equal work between men and women, and the ratio of women as opposed to men in high level positions of employment (World Economic Forum 2006, 6). South Africa has closed 64.9% of this gender gap and is ranked 92nd in the world for this sub index (World Economic Forum 2022, 318). South Africa is ranked 87th for women employed in legislative and high-ranking managerial positions with this gap 46. 2% closed (World Economic Forum 2022, 318).

Worldwide women looking for work and are available for work have a harder time finding work than men (World Economic Forum 2022). The average global female unemployment rate is 6.4% according to latest data from the World Bank (World Bank 2022). Nearly half 47% of all working age women in South Africa are unemployed, this is massively higher than the global average (Statistics South Africa 2022). As opposed to 35,6% of unemployed men in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 2022). South Africa has higher rates of unemployment for both male and females as compared to other countries (Statistics South Africa 2022).

According to the Trade Union United Association of South Africa (UASA) South African women earn 23 to 35% less than men, yet 38% of South African households are female headed and rely solely on a woman's income for survival (Van Biljon 2022). Despite comprehensive legislation to prevent discrimination in the workplace South Africa has a gender wage gap bigger than the global average (Van Biljon 2022). Globally on average for every US dollar that a man earns in the world a woman earns 33cents or 33% less (United Nations 2022). To put this into perspective Rwanda has a gender pay gap of only 12.8%, women in Rwanda earn 88cents for every US dollar a man earns (World Economic Forum 2022). Men are valued more than women, this is clear when it comes to remuneration women earn less than men in every country in the world even when employed in the exact same position with the same level of experience and qualifications (World Economic Forum 2019, 11). In 2022 the global gender wage gap was estimated to close in 257 years (United Nations 2022). The time it will take to close the gender wage gap is staggering.

Health and Survival Gender Gap

Calculated by comparing factors such as access to healthcare and mortality rates between the genders (World Economic Forum 2006). South Africa has closed 97.9% of its health and survival gender gap and is ranked 32nd in the world for this sub index (World Economic Forum 2022, 318). Related to Health and Survival is the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, South Africa has a disproportionately higher rate of women infected with HIV in all age groups than men (Green 2020). According to the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) in 2019, “7.6 million people were living with HIV in South Africa – 4.8 million women, 2.5 million men and 300 000 children” (Green 2020). The epidemic is extremely gendered, the bulk of people with HIV are black women who carry the unequal burden of the illness and caring for the sick (Morrell et. el. 2012, 14).

Men have a higher mortality rate composing more than half of the estimated 74 000 HIV-related deaths in 2019 (Green 2020). One study found that the high HIV infection rate of women and lower HIV death rates of women is due to women testing more for HIV and taking antiretroviral treatment (Cairns 2018). This is strongly linked to harmful gender norms and GBV (Cairns 2018). Research shows concepts of toxic masculinity is related to the HIV pandemic in South Africa (Morrell et. el. 2012, 14). Women who have experienced Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) with larger uneven power relations in their relationships have a higher risk of being infected with HIV (Morrell et. el. 2012, 14). Whereas male perpetrators of violence have a higher risk of being HIV infected (Morrell et. el. 2012, 14).

Gender inequality and GBV are not the same thing and should not be conflated, they are related as GBV is a form of gender inequality. A heinous example of the adversity women face is seen in the concept of Gender Based Violence (GBV) (World Bank 2019). Gender Based Violence is described as “harmful acts directed at an individual based on their gender”, based in gender inequality, the abuse of power and damaging norms (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2022). GBV is a global pandemic cutting across race, culture, and class (World Bank 2019). GBV includes many different forms of violence such as domestic violence, rape, human trafficking, child marriage, intimate partner femicide, female genital mutilation, female infanticide, psychological/ verbal abuse, and many other forms of violence particularly inflicted on women and girls (World Bank 2019).

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates “over 1 in 3 (30%) of women worldwide have been subjected to either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime” (World Health Organization 2022). It is estimated more than 1 in 4 women globally aged 15 and older have experienced IPV specifically (World Bank 2022). These global averages are estimated to be much higher due to the challenges facing women in being candid about experiences of GBV (World Bank 2022). According to Statistics South Africa 1 in 5 women aged 15 and above have experienced IPV, 21% of the female population in South Africa (Maluleke 2018). Other studies place this figure much higher, a recent Lancet Psychiatry report published in June 2022 estimates this figure at a shocking 1 in 3, 30% or even up to 50% of women in South Africa experience IPV (Brits 2022).

When comparing South African standards of gender equality and law to international standards South Africa does have some of the worst rates of gender inequality and highest rates of GBV

in the world. The most pervasive threat women face is the threat to their very existence and their most basic human right, their right to life (United Nations Women 2022). Femicide is defined as an intentional killing with a gender-related motivation spurred on by “stereotyped gender roles, discrimination towards women and girls, unequal power relations between women and men, or harmful social norms” (United Nations Women 2022). Horrifyingly South Africa is 4th in the top 5 countries with the highest femicide (Head 2019). Daily 3 women are killed by their intimate partner in South Africa and sexual homicides described as rare in other parts of the world are a common occurrence (Moleko 2019, 18).

The South African figure is 5 times higher than the global average of 2.6 victims per 100, 000 women (Head 2019). Atrociously Honduras has the dishonour of being ranked first with a femicide rate of 32.7 victims per 100, 000 women, more than double that of South Africa (Head 2019). IPV is the most lethal type of GBV and most women are killed by their male intimate partner (Sibanda-Moyo et. al. 2017, 30).

South Africa has statistics for IPV matching, and some sources (Moleko 2019, Brits 2022) argue severely exceeding global standards. South Africa has the highest rape statistics in the world, higher even than countries at war (Gouws 2022). South Africa has a rape rate of 132.4 incidents per 100 000 people, according to a survey conducted in 2009 by the South African Medical Research Council, South Africa has one of the highest rates of rape in the world (Gouws 2022). However, the South African government has stated that in recent years this statistic has dropped (Clifford 2021). Regardless of a drop in statistics South Africa does still have one of the highest reported rape rates in the world (Gouws 2022). In the 2019/2020 period, there were 42,289 rapes reported as well as 7,749 sexual assaults reported (Gouws 2022). This converts into approximately 115 rapes per day (Gouws 2022). It is notoriously difficult to compare rape statistics between countries (Clifford 2021). South Africa has a very broad definition of rape, not all countries measure or define rape in the same way making international comparisons of rape statistics impossible (Clifford 2021). Regardless, the numbers in South Africa are still very high and these are only rapes reported to the police.

South Africa has high female unemployment, a vast gender wage gap, high levels of female HIV infection, and high rates of GBV. This severe gender inequality and GBV in a country that is a global leader in policy and law for women’s rights (Morrel et al. 2012, 16). The underlying reasons for these confounding statistics are found in the lack of political will to

champion the pursuit of gender equality that many female South African politicians exhibit (Gouws 2021). It is also due to weak feminist institutions, that have been made weaker by the Jacob Zuma state capture years (Gouws 2021).

Conclusion

This section of the research report has established context for the research by providing the background regarding the evolution of women's political representation in South Africa. This is a long and intricate history where we cannot only speak of the abandonment of the feminist cause by the ANCWL in recent years. This section of the research provided comparative data points with the score for South Africa compared to international standards of gender equality. Regardless of high levels of political representation of women in the South African government and gender equality laws on par with global standards. South Africa does have some of the worst gender inequalities and highest levels of GBV. Due to a lack of political will from women politicians who descriptively represent women in government but substantively do not champion the gender equality cause. Feminists in the South African state that promote gender equality are lacking, the few who remain have had their voices stifled. This paper argues this is because of the complicity of women in political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage for executive level positions. This argument is analysed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY ANALYSES

This section of the research uses data from various sources to determine whether the impact of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage are similar to others identified. Using the analytical framework constructed in the literature review section that identified the reasons

given by authors as to how political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage negatively impact and restrict the political representation of women at the national level. These themes are gender stereotypes and gender roles found in both social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage that exclude women from the political realm. VAWP is identified as restricting political representation of women and is entrenched in political hegemonic masculinity. Clientelism which encompasses the complicity and compliance of female politicians in both political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage for positions of power at the national level of government. Lastly corruption due to political patronage has devastating consequences for women's substantive representation, as well as feminist institutionalism. These identified themes are used to construct my analytical framework for my case study. The sections of this chapter align with these identified themes as my analytical framework to establish the similarities and differences or nuances of the South African case study. In order to show whether the factors identified are present in my case study, thereby confirming or refuting their validity in the context of my study.

Predefined Gender Roles and Stereotypes in South Africa

Similar to the global context as described by Hooper (2012), Tickner (1992 and 1999), and Fritzsche (2011), gender roles and stereotypes are present in South Africa and frame women as the opposite of men 'weak', 'emotional,' and 'irrational' thus not suited to leadership, decision-making, and politics. This keeps women politicians in South Africa politically subjugated the same way that authors have argued it keeps women politicians out of power in the global North. Women are more often questioned about their competence based on gender than their male counterparts (Fritzsche 2011). Exemplified by this quote when Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma was vying for the Presidential Candidacy in 2017, the traditional leader King Mpendulo Zwelonke Sigcawu of the Xhosa tribe questioned her competence based on her gender. And said of the outgoing AU Chairperson that as a "sensitive" woman the countries problems will overwhelm her as it had overwhelmed men seen as naturally more capable leaders (Feni 2017):

"South Africa is not yet ready to be led by a woman president. Women are sensitive by nature. The country's problems have overwhelmed leaders who are men, how much more for a woman?" (Feni 2017).

The construction of masculinity on the national level of politics in the global North coincides with the construction of masculinity in South African politics. Globally notions of masculinity are built on gender roles and stereotypes. Where women are viewed as incapable of handling

the tough “manly” world of politics (Fukuyama 1998, 25). Similar to when Angela Merkel’s ability to be the Vice Chancellor of Germany and her credentials were questioned by critics early on in her career (Fritzsche 2011, 42). Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma too was judged on her gender as opposed to her political performance.

The media is a big culprit in perpetrating gender stereotypes by focusing on trivialities such as a female politician’s appearance, looks and stylishness taking away women’s credibility as effective political actors focussing on gender instead of political performance (Anderson et al. 2011, Laher 2014). As exemplified by the media’s portrayal of Dr Nkosizana Dlamini Zuma during the early years of her career as Minister of Health back when she was demeaned and portrayed as a nanny and domestic worker labelled “maternally frumpy” (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 13). This was done to undermine Dr Nkosizana Dlamini Zuma’s authority and competence as a black female politician and medical doctor, most shockingly this also occurred in a pornographic magazine (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 13). The emasculation of women emerges when women politicians act beyond the constraints of ‘natural feminine innocence’ when they liberate themselves from the limits imposed by masculine discourses of female subjectivity (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 14). A female politician having and exercising political will is not permitted (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 13).

Women politicians in South Africa have long been seen as belonging in the confines of the home doing tasks suited to a woman and the media is complicit in sexist and racist gender stereotyping (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 13). This research argues these specific derogatory media portrayals of a domestic worker and nanny can now be classified as a form of VAWP perpetrated against Dr Dlamini Zuma. This is described as *symbolic violence* which captures abuse and aggression at the level of portrayals that seek to deny women’s competence as political actors (Krook 2017, 80). Under the guise of humour as it was aimed at demeaning her dignity as a black female politician exercising political power. Sexist humour that expresses antagonistic attitudes towards women is masked by “benign amusement” thus classifying sexism as a ‘joke’ avoids the social disapproval usually given when there is blatant discrimination (Krook 2018, 67).

Discourse about Dr Nkosizana Dlamini Zuma during her presidential bid in 2017, was similar to discourse in the media about former Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf where she was constantly referred to as “a grandmother” or “a widowed mother-of-four” (Anderson et al.

2011, 2513). In 2017 Dr Dlamini Zuma too had to contend with focus on her personal relationships instead of her political achievements. A difference is that the focus was on her relationship to former President Jacob Zuma as his ex-wife. Media reports on female politicians are linked to their personal relationships and traditional roles, whereas men are seen as independent of these roles (Anderson et al. 2011, 2513). Dr Dlamini Zuma in 2017 was dismissed as merely “Zuma’s ex-wife”, and this is a defining characteristic of her defeat against her rival Ramaphosa (Essa 2017). As one article states Dr Dlamini Zuma was described by Political analysts, media and the public as “Zuma’s preferred candidate”, “the ace up Zuma’s sleeve”, her political campaign is “Zuma’s campaign for his former wife to become president” (Hartley 2018). In another article she was described by Political Analyst Susan Booysen as Jacob Zuma and companies ‘get out of jail free card’ (Booyesen 2017). As yet no evidence links Dr Dlamini Zuma to any of Jacob Zuma’s corrupt activities to justify reasonable critique of her involvement in corruption. Her stance on Zuma is speculative as her support base is the Jacob Zuma faction and she did not publicly condemn Jacob Zuma either (Du Plessis 2017). In a politically savvy move avoiding the topic of her ex-husband all together (Du Plessis 2017). The inherent gender bias of mere proximity to scandal without any proof of wrongdoing being enough to ruin Dr Dlamini Zuma’s presidential bid is striking.

A Male President at All Costs

There is a clear gender bias where male politicians in the centre of scandal are constantly elected and re-elected as ANC party president and subsequently President of the country in South Africa’s dominant party democracy. This is true for Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa. All three Presidents were elected for two consecutive terms as the ruling ANC party president amid scandal and a devastating political track record.

Thabo Mbeki’s political track record includes the controversial 1999 30-billion-rand arms deal during his tenure (Evans 2014). Laden with corruption scandals, and heavily criticised for its wastefulness in a country where many live in severe poverty (BBC 2018). Mbeki’s economic policies disenfranchised the poor, his AIDS denialism policies led to the state not providing lifesaving treatment, and he did not address the scourge of sexual violence in the country (Hassim 2014). A 2008 Harvard study has estimated the lives lost due to Thabo Mbeki’s Aids denialism policies at 365,000 people from 2000 to 2005 (Dugger 2008). 330, 000 South Africans died for lack of treatment (Dugger 2008). And 35,000 babies perished because they were infected with HIV due to Mbeki’s government failing to widely administer drugs to help

prevent pregnant women from infecting their babies (Dugger 2008). Together amounting to 3.8 million years of life lost (Dugger 2008).

Jacob Zuma was elected ANC party president in 2007 amid rape and corruption allegations (Hassim 2014). Jacob Zuma was charged with rape and acquitted of the charge in 2006 in a controversial trial that exemplifies the pivotal role of political hegemonic masculinity in South African political life (Robins 2008). Zuma was also charged with corruption relating to the 1999 arms deal in 2005 accused of accepting bribes (BBC 2018). In 2009 weeks before he became President of South Africa these charges were dropped due to his strong faction in the ANC and legal technicalities. Regardless of this and other scandals dogging the Jacob Zuma presidency he was re-elected for a second term as ANC party president in 2014 (BBC 2018). In 2017 two months after he resigned as President of South Africa the corruption charges were reinstated (BBC 2018). Jacob Zuma now faces 16 counts of corruption, racketeering, fraud and money laundering, he stands accused of accepting 783 illegal payments in total (BBC 2018).

Cyril Ramaphosa is accused of using his political influence and position in government to spur the brutal response from state police to miners protesting for a basic wage at the Lonmin Platinum Mines in the North West Province (Myeni 2022). Known as the Marikana Massacre on the 16th of August 2012 where Forty-Four people died and more than seventy were injured (Myeni 2022). Ramaphosa was a shareholder and a non-executive director at the time and a day before the massacre he sent emails to other Lonmin Platinum shareholders and the minister of security where he referred to the protestors as “dastard criminals” and asked law enforcement to take “concomitant action” (Myeni 2022). A class action civil lawsuit is currently underway to hold the president personally liable and enforce monetary compensation in the amount of 66 million US dollars, over a billion rand (Myeni 2022). Ramaphosa is also accused of corruption due to the theft of an alleged amount of 4 million US dollars from his Phala Phala Namibian game farm that was hidden away in furniture this money was undeclared and untaxed (Chothia 2022). Ramaphosa has failed to effectively deal with the country’s extreme electricity crisis (Masaubi 2023). Among other failures Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa have not dealt with corruption, widespread poverty, massive unemployment and the scourge of gender-based violence in the country effectively (Gouws 2019).

This evidence showcases a glaring double standard of how political scandal and a bad political track record/political performance does not deter male presidential candidates from becoming

President in South Africa. So much so that all three previously mentioned ANC presidents were elected for two consecutive terms in office even after bad governance. Whereas Dr Nkosizana Dlamini Zuma as a former female presidential candidate in South Africa was not judged on her political performance or track record. The defining characteristics of her political defeat was her questioned competence based on her gender, gender roles, gender stereotypes and speculative relationship with her former ex-husband. Women politicians are viewed as weak and easily influenced, their identities are connected to their personal relationships, making them less viable presidential candidates than men (Anderson et al. 2011, 2511). A male politician's marital status is rarely talked about and is seen as separate from his competence as a political actor (Anderson et al. 2011, 2511).

Dr Dlamini Zuma's political achievements and thus her political agency outside of her gender and ex-husband was taken away. She was reduced to her marital status overshadowing her competence as a political leader. Accomplishments such as Dr Dlamini Zuma a gender activist for women's rights particularly in medicine, campaigning for basic healthcare for women and children as well as for women's reproductive rights when she was Minister of Health (Du Plessis 2017). As Chair of the AU, she appointed "the first Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, Bineta Diop, and helped spearhead an international campaign against child marriage in Africa" (Du Plessis 2017). Under her leadership Agenda 2063 was composed, a 50-year plan for development on the African continent (Du Plessis 2017). Unfortunately, all this is overshadowed by her previous marriage to former disgraced President Jacob Zuma, a marriage which ended in 1998 (Du Plessis 2017).

The media discourse and comments surrounding Dr Dlamini Zuma's bid for Presidency illustrate that the factors of gender roles and gender stereotypes inhibiting women from breaking the presidential glass ceiling and obtaining the top executive level government position is present in the South African case study. Gender stereotypes and gender roles which ultimately amounts to women being viewed as intruders in the male realm of politics and subservient to men. Gender roles and stereotypes take precedence over competence and political gender equality.

Political Hegemonic Masculinity, Gender Roles and Gender Stereotypes in Women Reaching the Glass Ceiling of President

Analysing the evidence through the social construct of political hegemonic masculinity rooted in gender roles and gender stereotypes shows that these factors are present in the South African case study and are similar to others identified. Each of the three male presidents Mbeki, Zuma, and Ramaphosa all have unique political hegemonic masculinities. The battle for dominance in the ANC shows diverse political masculinities in South Africa that are structured at least along race and class lines that foremost excludes women in the top leadership position (Morrell et al. 2012, 8).

Thabo Mbeki and his brand of political hegemonic masculinity is described as elitist, cold, aloof and dictatorial (Morrell et al. 2012, Hassim 2014). Thabo Mbeki was framed as the Xhosa modernist, promoting gender equity and same-sex marriage for gay and lesbian couples perceived by many to defy 'African Culture' (Robins 2008, 422). Versus Jacob Zuma's political hegemonic masculinity described as a Zulu traditionalist masculinity (Robins 2008), a warm humble man of the people, pro poor development and economic transformation (Morrell et al. 2012, Hassim 2014).

Versus Cyril Ramaphosa's political masculinity, once a trade unionist he is now a billionaire businessman, a representation of black capital in South Africa, with a share in almost every sector (BBC News 2019). The ANC was desperately trying to save face with a fed-up constituency, and the rest of world who are constantly seeing negative headlines about the country and its leadership (Essa 2017). The ANC promoted President Ramaphosa as the leader that will champion gender equality, save South Africa's image in the world, end corruption, restore investor confidence and bring about economic prosperity (BBC News 2019). President Ramaphosa was painted as South Africa's miraculous saviour, a savvy businessman and the opposite of Jacob Zuma now viewed as corrupt and disgraced (Essa 2017).

Numerically most men in South Africa do not subscribe to these masculinities (Robins 2008). It is important to note that hegemonic masculinity is about cultural domination of stereotypical or idealistic male traits seen as more desirable than others that importantly excludes women (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 832). In 2017 Dr Dlamini Zuma was up against the political hegemonic masculinity brand of current President Cyril Ramaphosa. Ramaphosa supporters saw his masculinity as more qualified, valuable, and desirable to a woman. Similar to the United States for national politics, the ideal form of political hegemonic masculinity is "the white, wealthy, Western, Christian, straight male" as exemplified by Donald Trump in 2017

(Smirnova 2018, 12). Political hegemonic masculinity in South Africa is entrenched in gender stereotypes of male competence in leadership and politics, competence that women are viewed as lacking (Smirnova 2018). It is also entrenched in the undesirability of women in politics (Hooper 2012). This provides insight as to why male politicians with devastating political track records, particularly with regards to gender equality who promote policies that disadvantage women most are constantly elected and re-elected as ANC President.

VAWP In South Africa

Violence Against Women in Politics (VAWP) is a backlash to women intruding into the predominantly masculine realm of politics and is entrenched in political hegemonic masculinity. VAWP is derived from broader toxic and noxious views on women and oppressive cultural practices in society (Krook 2016). Where women and femininity are not wanted and violently opposed and oppressed, as politics and leadership are viewed as not a woman's place (Krook and Restrepo 2016). Many societies across the globe have long associated men with the "public sphere" of politics and the economy and women with the "private sphere" of home and family (Krook 2017, 74). Women are thus often regarded as trespassers in the "male" space of politics, giving rise to various forms of hostility toward female leaders (Krook 2017, 74). Hostility to women and negative attitudes towards women increases the likelihood of men engaging in VAWP (Krook 2018, 80).

Through analysing the validity of VAWP in the South African context based on evidence from various sources. This section of the chapter argues VAWP is present as a barrier to women's political representation and political voice in South Africa. There are different forms of VAWP present and documented in South Africa. Such as verbal abuse, physical violence, and murder due to VAWP. Examples include two separate criminal cases of female Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) members who were physically assaulted by their male EFF counterparts (Peter 2018).

In 2018 EFF North West deputy chairperson Bunga Ntsangane appeared in court after the party's junior staff member Maggie Klaas claimed Ntsangane assaulted and threatened to have her genitals "cut off" during an altercation in his office in November 2017 (Peter 2018). EFF Limpopo secretary Jossey Buthane is also before the courts after a party member Mogau Komane from Sekhukhune region alleged that Buthane assaulted her at the regional meeting in December 2016 (Peter 2018). Statements from the victims made to *City Press* details the

incidents. Mogau Komane describes how Jossey Buthane tore open her dress publicly revealing her breast and left her body bruised (Peter 2018).

What is further disturbing about these cases of VAWP is the lack of support the victims have received from their own party. There was no trauma counselling and no support for the victims, the abuse was not addressed by national EFF leadership, the victims were not even acknowledged or offered an apology. Instead, one of the victims, Maggie Klaas, has been slapped with disciplinary charges, bribed by the party to withdraw the case, and forced to work in the same hostile environment as the perpetrator resulting in further trauma. This is a norm all over the world where often there are no repercussions for perpetrators of VAWP and victims are forced to work in the same conditions as before (Krook 2017).

A failure to recognise the gendered aspects of VAWP is the crux of this global problem (Krook and Restrepo 2016). Acknowledgement of VAWP is thwarted by the idea that there are no gender aspects to violence in politics and the fact that most women who experience attacks remain silent (Krook and Restrepo 2016). Most women are scared of reporting VAWP because they do not want to be perceived as weak, hysterical, unable to cope, or play the victim and propagate claims that women have no place in political life (Krook and Restrepo 2016). There is a deathly silence when it comes to acknowledging VAWP and evidence suggests this occurs across political parties in South Africa.

The ANCWL has been accused of ignoring VAWP against their own members namely the rape of Nomboniso Gasa on Robben Island, and the abuse of the committed league veteran Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini by her husband who is himself a senior ANC figure (Hassim 2014, 76). Internationally there is a ‘conspiracy of silence’ around VAWP which has permitted impunity and prevented broad recognition from politicians that the issue exists (Krook 2018, 68). Across the globe victim blaming is common in cases of VAWP (Krook 2018, 67). This response from assault accused EFF Limpopo secretary Jossey Buthane is the epitome of victim blaming: “Politically, she is the one who abuses men by taking advantage of Women’s Month” (Peter 2018).

Physical violence involving bodily injuries inflicted on female political actors or their family members includes domestic abuse, beating, abduction, and even assassination (Krook 2017, 80). Women politicians are robbed of their most fundamental human right, their right to life, because they are women engaged in politics. Women politicians in South Africa have been

subject to this most heinous form of VAWP, South African women have been murdered for their role in politics. An article by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) describes one such heinous crime in 2022.

“Nokhutula Mabaso was a South African leader in the eKhenana Commune and Abahlali base Mjondolo [a movement in Durban]. Among her achievements, she prevented the illegal eviction of residents in mostly women-headed shack dwellings in her community. In May, Mabaso was assassinated at her home aged 39” (Makonyola 2022).

Nokhutula Mabaso was murdered because she was a woman active in politics, fighting the injustice of illegal evictions in her community. These occurrences of VAWP share the same common thread as international occurrences of VAWP. The aspect of the victim’s gender identities to their work as women in politics (Makonyola 2022). The fact that the violence perpetrated on them were as a result of them being politically active as women (Makonyola 2022). The gendered purpose of VAWP, to exclude women from their rightful participation in politics and in its implementation, is grounded in gendered inequalities, social norms, and stereotypes to target women in specific and harmful ways (Krook 2018). Just as in other countries occurrences of VAWP in South Africa presents across physical, sexual, psychological, and economic forms of violence.

Krook (2016, 2017 and 2018) argues this violence is grounded in the unequal status of women as opposed to men within all societies. Political hegemonic masculinity in politics is given as a reason for VAWP. Politics has long been regarded as a characteristically masculine space (Krook 2018). Thus, as women enter politics, they often confront numerous forms of hostility typically rooted in the perceived disconnect between stereotypes of ‘leaders’ and of ‘women’ (Krook 2018, 68). An increase of women entering politics has resulted in an increase in violent attacks against them aimed at curbing female participation in politics (Krook and Restrepo 2016). VAWP violates women’s human rights as outlined in article 7 of CEDAW where women’s political rights particularly the right to participate in political life in all forms has been ratified in international law.

Sexual Harassment in South Africa

VAWP is present in various forms in the South African case study and stifles the substantive participation of women in politics. Extremely prevalent in Africa is sexual harassment, where 40% of African female parliamentarians surveyed in 2016 by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) revealed they had been sexually harassed at some point during their career (Inter Parliamentary Union 2022). “In South Africa in 2006, sexual-harassment allegations led Mbulelo Goniwe, the chief whip of the ruling African National Congress, to be expelled from

his party” (Krook 2017, 80). *Sexual violence* is defined as sexual acts and attempts at sexual acts by coercion, including unwelcome sexual comments or advances this includes sexual harassment, where sexual favours as a condition of employment or promotion are demanded (Krook 2017, 80).

This is not the only form of harassment, other forms include hostile and misogynistic attitudes like sexist jokes, comments and insults (Krook 2018, 67). Thus, there is an argument by scholars for a broader term to be used such as ‘gender-based harassment’ or ‘sex-based harassment’ which does not only require sexual favours but includes creating a hostile work environment through sexist insults (Krook 2018, 67). Sexual harassment is not only an expression of sexual desire, it is driven by a yearning for social status “[...] or a feeling of power gained by pressuring, provoking, frightening, intimidating, or demeaning another person who has little recourse for self-defence or retaliation” (Krook 2018, 67). These dynamics are exacerbated by other forms of inequality such as age, race, and disability where the need to defend one’s status in the existing form of gender hierarchy is the main motivation (Krook 2018, 67). Both men and women can thus engage in gender-based harassment although the likelihood of men to engage in this form of VAWP is much higher (Krook 2018, 67).

The form of VAWP most reported on in the South African media is gender-based harassment during parliamentary proceedings. This is on par with global trends as the pioneering 2016 IPU survey of women parliamentarians worldwide revealed. 82% of female parliamentarians globally has been subject to psychological violence, whether it was sexist remarks, threats or harassment (Inter Parliamentary Union 2022). Expressed either verbally, online or in traditional media psychological abuse numbers are alarmingly high around the world, 67% of those surveyed in Africa and 68% in Europe have experienced it (Inter Parliamentary Union 2022). In South Africa it takes the noticeable form of derogatory, humiliating or discriminating comments, or public ridicule.

There is a culture of violence and sexism in the ruling party, members of the ANCWL are no stranger to violence from the apartheid state and male members of the party dating back to the apartheid era and struggle (Hassim 2014, 31). Former ANCWL president Angie Motshekga commented on the sexism within the ANC during the 2010 “Gender Press Briefing” (Pillay 2010). Describing unacceptable sexist jokes “I have not heard members of the ANC insult other male politicians the way they insult women in the ANC” (Pillay 2010). Women are politically

subjugated and sexually objectified in a way that male politicians are not (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 12). Evidence of gender-based harassment is found in other political parties in South Africa as well.

Sexist Stereotyping and Misogynistic Hate- Speech

Evidence of psychological abuse and sexism includes former African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) President and now EFF Leader, Julius Malema calling then Independent Democrats (ID) leader, Patricia De Lille too “ugly” to be married and not “well mannered” unlike “beautiful and well-mannered women in the ANC” (Mail and Guardian 2010). In 2014 Human Settlements Minister Lindiwe Sisulu was derogatively labelled a “Barbie doll” by the EFF’s Julius Malema (Davis 2017). In 2011, then ANCYL President, Julius Malema refused to take part in a television debate against Lindiwe Mazibuko then DA parliamentary leader calling her a “tea girl” which is akin to calling Ms. Mazibuko a domestic worker (MultiMedia LIVE 2011). Malema said Mazibuko is “a nobody” and he would “not debate with the service of the Madam” (MultiMedia LIVE 2011). Malema explicitly stated “[...] her role must remain there in the kitchen [...] making the tea for the madam” (MultiMedia LIVE 2011). These statements have derogatory racial undertones. Because most domestic workers are poor black uneducated women (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 13).

When the DA and its former leader Helen Zille won the Western Cape Province Malema said “[s]he, the racist little girl, must remember that Zuma is her boss” (Mazibuko 2012). His colleague former ANCYL spokesperson Floyd Shivambu said of Zille’s cabinet appointments: “She has appointed a set of boyfriends and concubines who sleep around so that she can continue to sleep around” (Mazibuko 2012). In 2017 the EFF tweeted derogatory sexist comments about Nomvula Mokonyane then Minister of Water and Sanitation, the EFF said that she had a younger lover and had given tenders from her ministry to this lover (Maune 2017). Slandering women’s political choices and appointments by stating it is a means to procure sex from men and be promiscuous is sexist hate- speak. A male politician is never demeaned in this way, sexual promiscuity is a sign of status and being ‘macho’. As shown in the political hegemonic masculinity Jacob Zuma endorsed, that is patriarchal, traditional, heterosexist, covertly violent and esteems the idea of male sexual entitlement through polygamy and noticeable success with women (Morrell et al. 2012, 15).

More evidence of VAWP as a means to demean female politicians is found in EFF leader Julius Malema's verbal abuse of former Speaker of the House Baleka Mbete at the 2017 State of the Nation Address (SONA). Malema called Mbete "irrational", "impatient" and "partisan" saying she was not made a presidential candidate because of these traits (Citizen 2017). He shouted that she is a "used", "abused", and "dumped woman" (Citizen 2017). "Used", "abused", and "dumped" by former President Jacob Zuma (Citizen 2017). Stereotyping women politicians as male political puppets, solely carrying out male political ambitions, is a direct assault on their gender making them objects to be controlled, used, abused, and discarded by men (Media Monitoring Africa 1999, 1). Christine Qunta a lawyer and former board member of the South African National Broadcaster (SABC) condemned Malema's rant on twitter calling it "disgusting abuse of Baleka" saying feminists in the EFF and outside the EFF are "morally bankrupt" because rights and dignity cannot be reserved for those women that are favoured alone, particularly in a country with so much GBV (Maune 2017).

Further abusive behaviour in parliament includes DA National Spokesperson and MP Phumzile Van Damme being called a "*straat meid*" at the 2017 SONA by ANC MP Mervyn Dicks (Shange 2017). One may argue over the literal translation of "street/straat meid", though it is commonly used to refer to a sex worker/ prostitute or wild woman (Davis 2017). Van Damme later stated this label of her was "despicable" and that it is also a term reserved for black women, and is therefore not only deeply sexist, but also racist. It must be noted that the DA did not take any action against the verbal abuse of Van Damme in parliament (Shange 2017). Minister of Small Business Development Lindiwe Zulu was also previously called a "*street meid*" by Julius Malema (Pillay 2014). This was shortly after former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe called Zulu a "little street walker" (prostitute) (Pillay 2014). When she was international relations advisor to Jacob Zuma and queried Zimbabwe's readiness to have free and fair elections, Mugabe told Zuma to "make her shut up" (Pillay 2014). These incidents too were brushed off (Pillay 2014). There is a culture of sexist abuse in the South African Parliament, an institution that superficially promised itself to the empowerment of women (Davis 2017).

Former President Jacob Zuma has derogatively referred to Ms Mazibuko as "Ntombazana", isiZulu for "young girl" (Mazibuko 2012). Zuma referred to Cheryllyn Dudley, an opposition colleague, the former Chief Whip of the African Christian Democratic Party as "my dear" (Mazibuko 2012). "The President spoke to female opposition members as an elderly man

would speak to a child” (Mazibuko 2012). Women are often referred to condescendingly by male parliamentarians in South Africa and little notice is taken of this either by parliament or the media (Mazibuko 2012). This is an example of ‘ambivalent sexism’, where equal opportunity values coexist with negative sentiments toward women (Krook 2018, 67). Sexist humour flourishes in ambivalent sexism where antagonistic attitudes toward women is masked by harmless amusement (Krook 2018, 67). Those who rank high on the use and enjoyment of sexist humour have a higher probability to harass sexually and/or sexually assault women (Krook 2018, 67). Disguising sexist remarks and behaviours as a ‘joke’ is more socially acceptable than blatant sexism making this behaviour difficult to challenge (Krook 2018, 67).

The prominent male politicians named here through their perpetration of gender-based harassment attempt to validate an African masculinity that is race-specific, backward-looking, and predicated on the notion of male superiority (Morrell et al. 2012, 11). Enforcing gender stereotypes and negative attitudes towards women (Morrell et al. 2012, 11). Political alliances with women require acts of support for equality (Morrell et al. 2012, 15). However, Zuma and Malema represent gender equity as being connected to white middle-class aspirations, deterioration of male economic development and modernity that is against traditional African values (Morrell et al. 2012, 15). This coincides with the argument that gender-based harassment is a means to secure positions of power in the social hierarchy (Krook 2018). Political hegemonic masculinity uses VAWP to curb the intrusion of women in the quintessential male realm of politics where women are viewed as a threat to male power (Krook 2018). The political hegemonic masculinity exhibited by Malema, Zuma and others is laden with noxious masculine practices and negative views on women that spur on VAWP.

VAWP As Part of Parliaments Masculinised Organisational Culture

Parliament as a male dominated workplace, as with other male dominated workspaces, has an organisational culture where men who demonstrate hyper masculine characteristics are rewarded, this in turn allows for harassment in politics to not be reported or taken seriously (Krook 2018, 68). Political hegemonic masculinity is described as hyper masculinity or the most ideal unrealistic stereotypical form of masculinity that most men themselves cannot obtain (Fritzche 2011). Predictively these dynamics create an environment prone to gender-based harassment, both within and across gender categories (Krook 2018, 68). Gender-based harassment is normalized in politics, this is a ‘warped and degrading culture’ in politics and parliament that has permitted abuse of women to be ‘accepted and normalized’ (Krook 2018,

67). Parliament is a space where political hegemonic masculinities are most clearly enacted (Stark and Luyt 2019, 435). Thus, policies to combat gender-based harassment are less likely to be robust if any frameworks exist at all (Krook 2018, 67). Resulting in the lack of reporting by targets of gender-based harassment and allegations rarely being taken seriously (Krook 2018, 67).

The South African case study has a lot in common with other parliaments across the world when it comes to gender-based harassment, as analyzed by Krook in her study of gender-based harassment in Westminster (2018), and the IPU Issues Brief on harassment across European Parliaments (2016). VAWP is not “normal politics” and sexism and misogyny in the political world is not simply the “cost of doing business” as some female politicians, male politicians and broader society have been inclined to treat VAWP (Krook 2017, 74). South Africa is a pioneer in gender equality rhetoric, however regardless of equality rhetoric verbal abuse and harassment of female politicians is rife and ignored (Davis 2017). It is difficult to imagine a place of employment where a male employee can get away with publicly calling a female employee a “whore” (Davis 2017). The root of the problem is the practice of psychological/verbal abuse towards female politicians as the norm and not being acknowledged and remedied (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). Due to institutional masculine cultural practices in parliament (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). This is a similarity of VAWP in South Africa that is shared across parliaments in the world.

The consequences of VAWP are the same the world over where abusive words strip women politicians of their agency and power in the halls of national decision-making (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). VAWP is designed to silence women during parliamentary debates, violating their freedom of expression (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). This has dire consequence for gender equality and for democracy itself, diminishing policy effectiveness, distorting political channels, and disintegrating political transparency and accountability (Krook 2018, 65). VAWP as a strategy to silence and subordinate women in politics is harmful to parliamentary proceedings and to the cause of democracy (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). This has negative consequences for the quality and effectiveness of parliamentary work and public policies (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11). Parliamentary activities suffer from the violation of the freedom of expression of female parliamentarians by silencing women’s voices in the halls of national decision making (Inter Parliamentary Union 2018, 11).

Does More Women in Politics Really Help Gender Equality?

The evidence in this research confirms more women in political power has not helped substantive gender equality in South Africa. Similar to Uganda and Rwanda where women have high substantive representation and low descriptive representation (Tripp and Kang 2008, Tripp 2003, 2021). Countries are criticised for creating quotas for reasons that have nothing to do with broadening the gender equality cause and increasing the welfare of its citizens (Tripp and Kang 2008). In many instances women representation is used to legitimize male power and guarantee support for male elites (Gouws 2011).

Feminist institutionalism, getting feminists into political institutions and understanding gendered norms in institutions, is embedded in female participation in government and politics (Gouws 2021, 24). Many women that do get appointed to high levels of government and politics who participate in political institutions in South Africa are not femocrats (Gouws 2021, 24). Femocrats are feminists in the state, the lack of femocrats has devastating consequences for feminist institutionalism in South Africa and substantive gender equality in broader society (Gouws 2021, 24).

The ANCWL clings to gender roles and stereotypes of ‘motherhood’ and ‘wifehood’ in support of political patronage as platforms of gender equality action (Gouws 2019, 6). This however is in direct conflict to realising gender equality as ‘motherhood’ and ‘wifehood’ is entrenched in unequal gender power relations with men as protectors and providers (Gouws 2019, 6). Not to alienate their core constituencies the ANCWL vocally rejects feminism, former ANCWL president, Angie Motshekga, publicly denied that the ANCWL was a “feminist organisation” that was “hostile” to male leaders (Gouws 2019, 6). The discourse around ‘motherhood’ is connected to a nationalist view of women as ‘mothers of the nation’ reproducing for the nation subservient to men (Gouws 2019, 6). This unwillingness from the ANCWL to represent women’s issues with a feminist approach has led to a lack of substantive representation (Gouws 2019, 6).

Known as the ‘Women’s League Syndrome’ in Africa with its conventional influence of preserving the idea that a woman’s first duty to the nation is being wives and mothers using these gender roles to mobilize support for ruling regimes (Gouws 2021, 28). This is seen in many African liberation struggles where inclusion of women in politics has been negotiated to

the neglect of women's rights (Hassim 1991, 68). In Zambia for example the United National Independent Party (UNIP) Women's Brigade has alienated women and discouraged participation because its policy content has trapped women in the roles of caregivers and mothers instead of challenging gender hierarchies (Gouws 2021, 28). Frequently women's leagues promote very conservative gender politics that impede struggles for gender equality (Gouws 2021, 28). And the ANCWL is no exception whilst being very influential in making sure ANCWL members get into powerful positions in government (Gouws 2021, 28). This dates back to the apartheid era and concessions made to the exclusion of gender equality to allow women into politics during the liberation struggle (Hassim 2014, 11).

Quotas on the African continent has certainly helped in getting women into positions of political power, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa are all examples of greater substantive representation through quotas (Gouws 2021, 24). However, when it comes to substantive representation and the difference in public opinion between men and women on policy making, where women are expected to prioritize gender equality issues on the agenda, particularly client-patron relations inhibit this (Gouws 2021, 24). Many women politicians are beholden to male political leaders or President who hold the power of appointment to Cabinet (Gouws 2021, 24). Critical gender issues are not effectively addressed in exchange for favour within the male led party and to get appointed to high political office as Hassim (2014) and Gouws (2011, 2019, 2021) argues.

The ANCWL role is vital to make women compliant in government, using important Gendered Institutions and Women's Political Representation in Africa to recreate a conservative, anti-transformative, and nationalist gendered political narrative on the ruling party's behalf (Gouws 2021, 38). In heinous cases of gender-based violence the ANCWL main platform of action is palliative care by demonstrating outside courtrooms and calling for the mass incarceration of perpetrators (Gouws 2019). Without addressing the underlying structural socio-economic reasons and cultural reasons for these heinous crimes (Gouws 2019). At the same time protecting and fiercely defending male political elites who are perpetrators of GBV (Gouws 2019).

Clientelism in Political Hegemonic Masculinity and Political Patronage

Clientelism helps us understand the disconnect between substantive gender representation and substantive gender representation in politics. Clientelism encompasses the complicity and

compliance of female politicians in both political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage. Clientelism is a major factor in the appointment of female politicians to the executive Ministerial level of political office. Political women elites strike patriarchal bargains making them clients to male political elites (Gouws 2021). A strategy that affords them positions of power and status in exchange for their compliance and complicity in male dominated political spheres (Gouws 2021). Patriarchal bargains in South African political patronage encompass the complicity and compliance of female politicians in both hegemonic political masculinity and political patronage. Patriarchal bargains in South African political patronage encompass supporting the reigning hegemonic masculinity within political parties for political favour (Morrell et. al. 2012). This is where political patronage and political hegemonic masculinity is linked.

Many women politicians are not only victims but active participants of their own subjugation and must be called out and held accountable for this (Snodgrass 2017). The ANCWL is constantly on the wrong side of critical gender issues particularly sexual violence as exemplified by the Zuma rape trail (Snodgrass 2017). Where the accusations against him were viewed as a Mbeki faction plot (Robins 2008). The ANCWL a supposed fortress for women's rights did not rebuke then ANCYL president Julius Malema when he said Zuma's rape accuser enjoyed the sex (Mazibuko 2012).

Former President Jacob Zuma then President of the 'Moral Regeneration Campaign' and 'The South African National AIDS Commission' (SANAC) outraged gender activists with his testimony (Robins 2008, 419). Particularly his statement that he had sexual intercourse with his HIV positive accuser, the media gave the pseudonym of Kwezi, without a condom and then took a shower to decrease infection risk (Robins 2008, 419). In a country where HIV and violence against women are pandemics what was most shocking was the deafening silence from women in the ANCWL (Hassim 2014, 82). Who have long regarded themselves as the "only legitimate voice of the women in South Africa" (Hassim 2014, 8).

The ANCWL refuses to take positions that would potentially put them at odds with male leadership (Hassim 2014, 76). The ANCWL supported Jacob Zuma during his rape trail and remained silent on threats made against 'Kwezi', they remained silent on Zuma supporters outside the courtroom intimidating both the accuser and anti-rape activists (Hassim 2014, 85). All this in a country dubbed "the rape capital of the world" (Maluleke 2018, 4). Even when

Zuma supporters were intimidating rape activists, threatening Kwezi and burning her effigies outside the courtroom, some wearing ‘100% Zulu Boy’ t-shirts (Robins 2008, 418). Others with placates reading ‘Burn the Bitch’, and notably women with placates reading ‘Zuma, rape me’ (Hassim 2014, 82).

Conflict between the ANCWL, gender activists, and women’s organizations that work with GBV was rife due to Zuma’s rape trail and his constant philandering (Gouws 2021, 33). The ANCWL defence of Zuma at his rape trail is a form of complicity with patriarchy in defence of the nation (Hassim 2014, 85). Although the ANCWL were key in the “normative secular, universalist framework of the 1996 Constitution”, this is willingly traded away for political survival (Hassim 2014, 85). Survival that is dependent on the empty idea of representation in the state, and the Proportional Representation (PR) system used in South Africa (Hassim 2014, 85). The ANCWL leaders are most secure when they have the favour of the party (Hassim 2014, 85). The incredible support of Zuma’s political hegemonic masculinity during his rape trail is linked to the tremendous political patronage possibilities for his supporters were he to become president (Robins 2008). Supporting Zuma for political expedience comes at the price of a more vigorous debate about treating women as full political subjects (Hassim 2014, 85). Both male and female politicians have strengthened the notion of women as passive imitators of male ambitions or agendas (Hassim 2014, 85).

In a proper display of hegemonic masculinity many of Zuma’s supporters are women and women within the ANCWL are some of his most fervent supporters (Morrell et al. 2012, 15). Hegemony is different from other arrangements of power, it convinces people to participate in their own oppression and it entails consent of both the oppressors and the oppressed (Smirnova 2018, 1). As feminist critical theory that falls under the umbrella of critical theory in international relations argues (Hobden and Jones 2014, 123). Without the consent of those the system subordinates, in this case women politicians, the hierarchy of power and the dynamics of the power relations between men and women would not work (Hobden and Jones 2014, 123). There is an acceptance of patriarchal norms to gain what power women politicians can, despite it disadvantaging them most (Snodgrass 2017). This consent and outright support of women in their own subjugation is what is most disturbing.

Further complicity of the ANCWL in patriarchy is seen in the 2015 ANC marched to the Union Buildings with the slogan “Hands off our president”, in honour of Zuma, instead of demanding

government intervention for women, they chose to protect a disgraced president amid corruption allegations (Gouws 2019, 6). This march under Bathabile Dlamini's chairpersonship, exemplifies the ANCWL's complicity and collusion with men in the party (Gouws 2021, 33). Further solidarity with Zuma's political hegemonic masculinity in support of political patronage is seen in Lulu Xingwana. The second Minister of Women who found a lesbian photographic exhibition that her department funded, in August 2009 South Africa's women's month as part of the celebrations, to be pornographic (Hassim 2014, 84). Zuma articulated homophobic views after his rape acquittal and elevates motherhood as the only 'normal' way of realising womanhood (Morrel et. al. 2012). The ANCWL is complicit in this narrative of 'motherhood' and 'wifehood' as the only way to be a 'real' woman (Morrel et. al. 2012).

The ANCWL is complicit in their silence against VAWP and for not supporting the gender equality cause in broader society (Mazibuko 2012). In an incident involving Mduduzi Manana the country's former deputy Minister of basic education who was forced to resign after allegedly assaulting two women at a nightclub shows (Snodgrass 2017). Former ANCWL President Bathabile Dlamini leapt to his defence saying that other political leaders had done worse and this was a "political tool" and "attack" on Mduduzi (Snodgrass 2017). These are astounding statements for the former Minister of Women, former ANCWL President and former ANCWL Chairperson to make as a woman heading an organization and Ministry that is supposed to champion gender equality.

Dlamini still ardently supports Jacob Zuma, showcased in a passionate letter in defence of the former president, stating the warrant out against him for corruption in 2020 was "a travesty of justice" and calling it "a day of shame" (Citizen 2020). A fundamental assumption of quotas is that "women are virtuous and will support other women" (Gouws 2011, 80). This thinking must be changed, we need to understand that women are self-interested individuals who want political power just like men, and many women politicians bargain with patriarchy trading gender equality to acquire this (Gouws 2011).

Gender Roles/ Stereotypes in Political Patronage and Feminist Institutionalism

The South African political patronage system similar to others is laden with gender stereotypes and this has detrimental effects on feminist institutionalism with the institutionalisation of gender norms (Gouws 2021). Similar to patronage in Mexico the system is masculinised

involving decision-making, networking, and working spaces operating under continuing gender stereotypes and socially defined roles (Correa 2016, 14). It is through this masculinised system where patronage ultimately constrains women in their advancement into high-level positions (Correa 2016, 14).

Importantly patronage relationship personifies unequal power relations and foremost these practices guarantee the dominant position of male politicians and the subordination of female politicians (Correa 2016, 14). Women have a different relationship to state patronage than men through exclusion from numerous political arenas, and political networks called ‘homosocial capital’ which is how men relate to one another in close knit networks built on patronage that exclude women (Gouws 2021, 25). Political patronage is catastrophic to the development of political institutions and the idea of gaining political office based on merit (Tripp 2001, 38). Male dominance is accomplished through various means such as compliant men and women, tradition, culture and institutions (Gouws 2021). The apparently neutral political institutional structures and policies that is protocol for how men and women behave, becomes norms of institutions that is deeply gendered (Gouws 2021, 23-24). When women are allowed into male dominated networks of patronage through political appointment it is on the terms of the male political elite in turn women become beholden to the male political elite (Gouws 2021).

Moreover, women may benefit more from “heterosocial capital” that includes men whilst men benefit from homosocial capital because of authoritarian and paternalistic views about male stereotypes and traits, such as men are successful, and have authority and privilege, male competence and traits that women are not seen as possessing (Gouws 2021, 25). These stereotypical views on male and female traits do not only keep women out of power, but protects men, reproducing male dominance (Gouws 2021, 25). “The accumulation of homosocial capital produces predictability because without it some men may never get into positions of political power” (Gouws 2021, 25). Making women dependant on the goodwill of male political elites for political appointment (Gouws 2019).

The argument here is not that women are more moral than men or women have a natural distaste for state patronage. Women do control their own networks of patronage, importantly the argument here is that women have a different relationship to political patronage than men because they are excluded from male dominated patronage networks (Gouws 2021, 24). Women have a different connection to the state, power, and patronage that is predominantly

controlled by male political elites who hold the power of appointment (Gouws 2021, 24). Due to the gendered division of labour and the general exclusion of women from politics as the below evidence showcases.

Patronage Under Mbeki

Patronage has always been a feature of South African politics and was a major part of the reign of President Thabo Mbeki, however many of his supporters ‘jumped ship’ when his political demise was near and served in Zuma’s Cabinet (Gouws 2019,7). The blurred lines between state and party in the ANC undermines the separation of power this practice started under Mbeki and spiralled under Zuma (Gouws 2019, 7). Under Mbeki women politicians who went against his conservative party views was given the boot and replaced with more compliant women loyal to party objectives (Gouws 2019, 5). Thabo Mbeki had conflict with feminists within the ANC who were not clients to his brand of politics (Hassim 2014, 74 and 83). Due to his economic policies that disenfranchised poor women, the weapons scandal that occurred during his tenure and his ‘Aids denialism’ policies of which women were the most adversely affected (Hassim 2014, 74).

Pregs Govender a feminist within the state was a casualty of patronage politics, she resigned from parliament in 2002 disillusioned with South Africa’s new democracy (Hassim 2014, 75). After she vocally questioned Thabo Mbeki’s commitment to the gender equality cause in a report where her feminist parliamentary caucus broke its silence on the non-provision of HIV antiretroviral treatment (Gouws 2019, 5). Many feminists exited parliament after the first five years due to patronage and the disappointment it caused in obtaining substantive gender equality (Gouws 2019, 5). Healthy debates were replaced by cabinet party loyalty with the centralization of power in the presidency (Gouws 2021, 30). This added to feminist activists’ departure from parliament which led to a decline in substantive representation (Gouws 2021, 30). Feminist politicians were replaced by women loyal to Mbeki who thought of themselves as professionals without a feminist commitment (Gouws 2019, 5). Women’s voices became stifled and their capacity to intervene restricted as they now had to tow the party line (Gouws 2021, 30).

Patronage Under Zuma

A South African Nuance State Capture

Feminist institutionalism dramatically eroded under Jacob Zuma's Presidency he has taken neo patrimonialism to the extreme (Gouws 2019). Tripp (2001) argues in the broader African context the patronage system used is described as neopatrimonialism (Tripp 2001, 38). Neopatrimonialism generally denotes a form of personalised rule that is against the rule of law, depends on clientelism and self-enrichment at the expense of the state and the welfare of all citizens also known as 'Big Man' politics (Tripp 2001, 38). Neo patrimonialism and patronage networks construct the political culture in South Africa with the effect of reproducing patriarchy (Gouws 2021). This translates into parliamentary seats particularly in Party Representation (PR) systems in South Africa where male party bosses make the final candidate list before elections (Gouws 2021).

Jacob Zuma epitomizes the "Big Man" in South African Politics through his use of clientelism where complicit and compliant loyal women and men were rewarded with appointment to high political office (Gouws 2021). The term *State Capture* was coined to describe the severe form of corruption experienced under Zuma (Gouws 2019, 7). State capture is a complete overall of state institutions, repurposing them to change the architecture and policy intent of state institutions in order to loot it making the shadow state more powerful than the legitimate state (Gouws 2021, 7).

The shadow state is the network of corruption that ties people together, the interdependence between the formal state and the shadow state comes from rent seeking elites (Gouws 2021, 32). Through this interdependency unelected individuals such as the wealthy Gupta family gain access to decision-making (Gouws 2021, 33). This system of patronage with mechanisms such as tax evasion, tender rigging, and defrauding social grants has added to the failure of constitutional state institutions and is important to sustain the shadow state (Gouws 2021, 32). In the process of state capture parastatal organizations such as South African Airways (SAA), the electricity provider ESKOM, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) were particularly exposed to crony politics (Gouws 2021, 32). Goods and services in exchange for electoral support in these patronage networks headed by Jacob Zuma has worn away the process and integrity of elections (Gouws 2021, 33). Zuma's severe corruption and political patronage system has devastating consequences for substantive gender representation and feminist institutionalism. The severity of the corruption in *state capture* is a key difference in the South African case study in contrast to other countries, both on the African continent and globally and makes the South African case study unique.

Feminist institutionalism are spaces in the state where women can include women's interests and hardships, what state capture does to the feminist project is calamitous (Gouws 2021, 40). The shadow state functions next to the legitimate state and feminist institutionalism occurs in the legitimate state according to formal rules (Gouws 2021, 40). Thus, women are omitted from spaces of power in the shadow state where many important decisions are taken and if they are included it is on the terms of the male elite (Gouws 2021, 40).

State capture's inhibiting role in the career of a female politician, which suffered dire consequences for not adhering to political patronage is found in the story of Mabel Petronella Mentor, a former ANC MP whose story is documented in the State Capture Report (Bezuidenhout 2018). Mentor describes how she, like others, was taken to the Gupta residence at Saxonwold where the Gupta's offered her the job of Minister of Public Enterprises (Zondo Commission 2018, 32). She was offered this post under the condition she drop the South African Airways (SAA) flight route to India and give it to the Gupta's (Zondo Commission 2018, 69). All this while President Zuma was in another room, emerging minutes later not in the least upset that she declined the offer saying to her something in isiZulu like "It's OK ntombazana [girl]...take care of yourself" (Madonsela 2016, 89). Because she refused the corrupt offer and chose not to play by the rules of Zuma's political patronage and state capture, she was never made a Minister (Bezuidenhout 2018). The "little girl" did not comply with Zuma's 'Big Man' politics and she paid dearly for her obstinance. Mentor drifted into political obscurity later making her claims on Facebook about the incident with Zuma her political career was frustrated and ruined (Bezuidenhout 2018).

The dismantling of the National Gender Machinery (NGM) and revamping this state institution into the Ministry of Women as part of Zuma's state capture agenda was the fatal blow to feminist institutionalism in South Africa (Gouws 2019). "Feminist institutions are very vulnerable to repurposing, because they are institutionalised through the goodwill of male-dominated governments" (Gouws 2019, 8). The creation of a Ministry of Women repurposed the national gender machinery (Gouws 2021, 33). Its original purpose was to allow women access to different sites and levels of power in government through its scattered design (Gouws 2021, 33). The ghettoization of women's issues in the Women's Ministry and the dumping together of women, children and people with disabilities made feminists worse fears come true (Gouws 2021, 33). It eliminated the idea of women's agency and empowerment, instead makes

women seem dependant on male protection paradoxically often their own abusers whilst the ANCWL discourse around GBV and intimate partner femicide is just as problematic (Gouws 2019, 6).

There is a lack of comprehension about the urgency of tackling GBV, reproductive health, and poverty (Gouws 2021, 33). The neglect of women's issues and gender equality is a lack of 'political will' from women political elite clients to engage in issues placed on the agenda by women committed to gender equality (Gouws 2021, 39). This explains why numerous proposals introduced and mobilized for by civil society and women's organizations do not make it onto the political agenda of the repurposed state (Gouws 2021, 39). There is no logic of appropriateness or relationship between structure and agency in the repurposed state (Gouws 2021, 39). The repurposing of the NGM and other Ministries translated into state resources being readily available for looting acquiescent with the state capture process (Gouws 2021, 33).

All 4 Ministers of Women in the Presidency or 'Ministers of Women' since 2009 under the Zuma regime, have all been loyal to Jacob Zuma. They are viewed as compliant with the demands of the Zuma regime (Gouws 2021, 33). They have disintegrated the gender equality agenda effectively aiding Zuma in looting the state (Gouws 2019, 7). Weakening the state institutions of the NGM through their complacency, compliance, and loyalty to Zuma, allowing the severe corruption to go on unchecked (Gouws 2019, 7). Appointments to the Ministry of Women and many other Government Ministry's with compliant women, who compose Jacob Zuma's patronage networks or the Zuma faction illustrates the 'Big Man' politics of Jacob Zuma (Gouws 2021, 33).

The 1st Minister of Women under Zuma was Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya (South African Government 2010), the second Lulu Xingwana was tasked with establishing a Council on GBV due to escalating sexual violence against women, this was demanded by civil society in 2013, Xingwana did not manage this, and neither did her successor, Susan Shabangu (Gouws 2021, 33-34). Bathabile Dlamini former president of the ANCWL and the fourth Minister of Women in the Presidency was kept as a Minister after serious allegations of incompetence as Minister of Social Development and being called a 'disgrace' by civil society (Davis 2018). Dlamini failed to find a service provider to deliver social grants to approximately 17 million South Africans who depend on these grants for survival (Gouws 2019, 7). She was culpable in the

Life Esidimeni tragedy where 143 mentally disabled patients died when they were subsequently moved from government-funded institutions to non-governmental organisation that were unfit to deal with the patients' needs (Gouws 2019, 7). Gouws (2019) describes Dlamini, a Jacob Zuma allies', retention being due to her powerful position as ANCWL Chairperson and the ANC keeping a power balance between the Ramaphosa and Zuma factions.

A South African Nuance: Factionalism

Factionalism rooted in patronage is at the core of ANC appointments to political office (Gouws 2019, 7). Factionalism between male political elite camps in the ruling party that capture women politicians for their own objectives is another way in which the South African case study differs from others. The factionalism within the political patronage system of the ANC is most clearly seen during election time and in presidential leadership contests the ruling party is rife with factionalism and internal party politics (Hassim 2017, 78). For most of the ANC's history this has essentially meant the support of one male candidate over another to be party president, virtually ignoring qualified female politicians (Hassim 2014, 78). Factionalism in support of male leadership in the ANC is where the concept of political patronage and political hegemonic masculinity are linked. Factionalism equates to a political hegemonic masculinity contest, in support of one male leader and his form of political hegemonic masculinity over another to be ANC party president (Morrell et al. 2012, 18).

An article of Lindiwe Sisulu's possible candidacy as ANC President in 2022, describes the still rampant political patronage and factionalism in the party as the title reads. "Woman president? Like Dlamini-Zuma, Lindiwe Sisulu must wrestle with patriarchy seeking to capture her for the benefit of its factions" (Zondi 2022). Sisulu's bid for candidacy in an open letter was not seen as her own ambition to lead, or a political cause in itself, or a feminist challenge to the patriarchal culture in the ANC and general South African politics (Zondi 2022). Instead like Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka's bid for ANC president back in 2007 seen as Mbeki faction candidacy, during the factional battles between the Mbeki and Zuma camps (Hassim 2014). And Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's bid to become ANC president in 2017, seen as a Jacob Zuma faction candidacy during the factional battles between the Zuma and Ramaphosa camps (Zondi 2022). Lindiwe Sisulu too was seen as a Jacob Zuma factional candidacy maintaining the patriarchal traditions of female subservience in ANC politics (Zondi 2022). Her gender a bargaining chip on behalf of male led factions (Zondi 2022). Internal ANC battles that are

supposed to be battles for ideas are instead battles of male personalities to the exclusion of women (Zondi 2022).

Women gain appointment to executive Ministerial political office through patronage and their support of the reigning political hegemonic masculinity. One headline about women being appointed to high political office reads “Fierce Loyalty Reaps Big Rewards” (De Wet and Whittles 2017). The article describes four women appointed by Jacob Zuma, namely Ayanda Dlodlo as Minister of Communications or effectively government propaganda, she was arrested for corruption when she was director of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the charges were later dropped (De Wet and Whittles 2017). Tokozile Xasa appointed as Minister of Tourism, Hlengiwe Mkhise Minister of Home Affairs and Mmamoloko Kubayi appointed as Minister of Energy (De Wet and Whittles 2017). All four exhibited ardent loyalty to Zuma and aggressively defended him among corruption allegations (De Wet and Whittles 2017).

The ANC gives precedence to political connections over values of impartiality, fairness, accountability as well as the effective use of resources, patron–client relations decide governance with little transparency to measure policymaking (Gouws 2021, 37). Cabinet selections were made first and foremost based on loyalty to the president, Zuma’s men and women (Gouws 2021, 37). Cadres those loyal to the president are deployed to state structures such as provincial government, to guard their own interests in the president’s patronage networks, ensuring access to power and preventing opposition parties from gaining position (Gouws 2021, 37).

Zuma rewarded loyalty with appointing allies to his cabinet, he had one of the biggest cabinets globally with 35 ministers and 34 deputy ministers when he began his second term increasing overtime to 72 combined (Gouws 2021, 37). Zuma demanded absolute loyalty and if he did not get this from his minister’s cabinet was reshuffled, in his 9-year term Zuma reshuffled his cabinet 11 times to include loyalists (Gouws 2021, 39). There were many women in Zuma’s cabinet, however many of them were compliant with his demands such as Batabhile Dlamini, Faith Muthambi (former Minister of Public Service and Administration and former Minister of Communications of South Africa), and Nomvula Mokonyane (former Minister of Environmental Affairs and Minister of Communications) (Gouws 2021, 39). Zuma’s power as president is in the executive level of national government, that is where he needed compliance

and this subordinated the legislature to the executive eroding the separation of powers (Gouws 2021, 39).

Female politicians who protect their executive political handlers, shielding them from prosecution and uncomfortable questions orchestrate succession contests (Gouws 2019, 7). This has far-reaching negative consequences for the fiscus, government and the gender equality cause, with privileges for those who are in favour with the ANC president (then Zuma), particularly when they protected him over time (Gouws 2019, 7). Under these conditions women can only survive in parliament by joining a male headed faction which curbs their ability to promote gender equality issues and makes female politicians as self-interested as male politicians (Gouws 2019, 7). Female politicians' positions on party lists during elections depend on male politicians, they have the same vested interests in their career advancement as male politicians (Gouws 2021, 32).

Whatever process is followed by women in the ruling ANC they are connected to compliant women who do not challenge the profoundly flawed processes instead who benefit from homosocial capital resulting from patronage politics (Gouws 2021, 35). Whether through party lists compiled by male leaders, the deployment of loyal cadres, notorious slate politics, which are predetermined lists of candidates and members who fight the most fiercely to be on slates (Gouws 2021, 35). In the ANC slates are a list of candidates vying for top party leadership positions nominated by particular factions, thus it is driven by factionalism grounded in self-interest, having nothing to do with serving the welfare of citizens instead it is all about career ambitions and the spoils of patronage (Gouws 2021, 35).

Even election from the branches of the ANCWL makes women beholden to the League (Gouws 2021, 35). The rife factionalism in the ANC influences nominations during elections on regional, provincial, and national levels (Gouws 2019, 7). In 2010 a damning investigation requested by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC about widely disputed candidate processes found deep-seated factionalism, tribalism, regionalism, gatekeeping and the extensive buying of membership and votes (Gouws 2021, 35). Whilst this investigation was in relation to local government elections, the same problems exist with national and provincial government elections, only on a grander scale (Gouws 2021, 35).

Conclusion

The South African case study is similar to political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage identified in other countries in the ways that it negatively impacts and restricts women's political careers through gender stereotypes/gender roles, clientelism, complicity and compliance. Gender Stereotypes particularly produce the political subjugation of women in both social constructs. Women politicians in South Africa have the added burden of VAWP especially psychological abuse through gender-based harassment. Rooted in political hegemonic masculinity and gender stereotypes that is designed to disintegrate their competence as politicians. This research has found important differences and nuances. State Capture is a nuance to the South African context this severe corruption is detrimental to substantive gender equality and feminist institutionalism. Factionalism in the ruling party equating to patronage in support of one form of political hegemonic masculinity over another is another nuance to the South African context. Factionalism inhibits women from becoming President and dictates appointments of women to the Ministerial level of government. Those women that do comply with political patronage and support the political hegemonic masculinity of the day reach the upper echelons of party and government. Whilst feminist women who go against the grain of clientelism in political patronage and supporting political hegemonic masculinity have difficulty reaching the upper echelons of government in the national executive level.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The aim and rational of this research are to investigate the gendered political barriers women face in reaching the executive ministerial and presidential level of government in South Africa. There is no greater empowerment for women than being at the helm of politics and political decision making. Women need substantive political representation as they face severe adversity

and are deeply affected by the decisions political leaders make. Women who succeed at the national level of government gain access to international decision-making. The study of the unique factors that contributes to or hinders women's political careers and women achieving executive government appointments on a national level is important to illuminate barriers that exist to equal participation of women in global politics.

The theoretical framework of feminist institutionalism that falls under feminist critical theory was utilised. Feminist critical theory attempts to challenge the dominant order by investigating and analysing and where conceivable help oppose social processes to lead to emancipatory change. Feminist institutionalism aims to include women as political actors to understand the relationship between gender and the operation of political institutions. This research set out to analyse the relationships and political hierarchies between men and women politicians in order to challenge it and where possible facilitate change. The research analysed the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage in the South African context. In order to understand the gender barriers to female political participation on the national level as well as add to existing research.

Findings

All the themes identified by authors in the analytical framework constructed in the literature review are present in the South African case study along with two nuanced themes specific to the South African context. The findings of this research are similar to the findings of studies in my literature review. Gender stereotypes and gender roles, VAWP, clientelism, and corruption is all present in the South African context. These themes identified by authors in political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage are barriers to female participation in politics and influence the appointment of women to executive ministerial and presidential levels of government. They negatively impact and restrict the political representation of women at the national level. Two nuanced themes specific to the South African case was also found state capture and factionalism in the ruling ANC. Both have a devastating impact on particularly feminist women obtaining appointment to the executive level of national government.

Political hegemonic masculinity is founded on gender stereotypes and gender roles that frame women as 'weak', 'emotional,' and 'irrational' thus not suited to leadership, decision-making, and politics. These stereotypes are similar globally and keeps women out of political power by establishing women as incompetent leaders based on their gender. The media propagates

discrimination and gender bias evidenced in media discourse about Dr Dlamini Zuma. Similar to media discourse in studies done on Angela Merkel where her qualifications and competence was questioned based on her gender, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf where her appearance and personal relationships was the focus. Media discourse about Dlamini Zuma's 2017 presidential bid revolved around her personal relationship with former disgraced president Jacob Zuma as his ex-wife.

Gender roles and gender stereotypes of women as wives and mothers are the defining characteristic of female politicians not qualifications and political performance making women less viable presidential candidates than men. Political hegemonic masculinity is enshrined in gender roles and gender stereotypes that importantly exclude women. Men are viewed as more qualified, valuable and desirable to a woman in politics. The support of political hegemonic masculinity in the ANC has resulted in male politicians with devastating political track records continuously being elected and re-elected as president in South Africa to the exclusion of qualified women.

VAWP rooted in political hegemonic masculinity is similar to others identified originating from broader toxic and noxious views on women as well as oppressive cultural practices. Globally men are associated with the public sphere of politics and women with the private sphere of the home. VAWP is a backlash to women trespassing in the male political space. Similar to VAWP globally there is a failure to recognise the gendered aspects of VAWP and a code of silence around VAWP that is the crux of this global problem. VAWP manifests in different forms in South Africa psychological abuse, physical violence, sexual violence and gender-based harassment are all present. Parliament is a male dominated workplace with an organisational culture where hyper masculinity is rewarded and VAWP is normalized in a prejudiced and degrading political culture. Similar to parliaments across the globe in South Africa derogatory, sexist, and racist remarks are rife and ignored. Gender-based harassment in parliament is how women's voices are stifled, political participation curbed, and women deterred from participating fully in democracy on the national level of government. Gender-based harassment is a means to secure positions of power in the social hierarchy. Political hegemonic masculinity uses VAWP to curb the intrusion of women in the quintessential male realm of politics where women are viewed as a threat to male power.

Women politicians in South Africa are clients to male political elites who hold the power of appointment to the executive Ministerial level of government. They make patriarchal bargains with male political elites and support the reigning hegemonic masculinity within political parties for political favour. This is where political patronage and political hegemonic masculinity is linked. Many women who get appointed as Ministers are those women who adhere to political patronage and support the reigning hegemonic masculinity of the day, complicit and compliant women instead of femocrats as argued by Gouws (2011, 2019, 2021) and Hassim (2014). The quota system in South Africa as in Rwanda and Uganda uses female representation to legitimize male power and guarantee support for male elites and has nothing to do with gender equality. Political expedience comes at the price of a more vigorous debate about treating women as full political subjects. The ANCWL is complicit and compliant in both political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage in South Africa for political expedience.

The ANCWL maintains gender roles and stereotypes of ‘motherhood’ and ‘wifeness’ in support of political patronage as platforms of gender equality action. This is in direct conflict with gender equality as ‘motherhood’ and ‘wifeness’ is entrenched in unequal gender power relations with men as ‘protectors’ and ‘providers. The ANCWL refuses to represent women’s issues with a feminist approach resulting in an absence of substantive representation. Similar to other African regimes where including women was done to the neglect of women’s rights. Trapping women in the roles of caregivers and mothers instead of challenging gender hierarchies. Women politicians are perpetuated as the auxiliary to male politicians through the ‘Women’s League Syndrome.

Gender roles and Gender stereotypes in political patronage are the same as gender roles and gender stereotypes in political hegemonic masculinity. Based on authoritarian and paternalistic views about male stereotypes and traits, such as men are successful, and have authority and privilege, male competence and traits that women are not seen as possessing as Correa (2016) and Gouws (2021) argues. Producing homosocial capital that keep women out of power, protects men and reproduces male dominance. Women are excluded from male dominated networks of patronage, making them dependant on the goodwill of men for political appointment.

Mbeki distorted the lines between state and party and undermined the separation of powers forcing many feminists to leave parliament disillusioned with the emergence of patronage in South Africa's new democracy. Mbeki replaced femocrats with career politicians without a feminist agenda (Gouws 2019, Hassim 2014). Jacob Zuma completely disintegrated the separation of powers between state and party through the nuanced severe corruption known as *state capture* in the South African context that is a complete overhaul of state institutions for the purpose of self-enrichment (Gouws 2019, 2021). Feminist institutionalism in South Africa suffered dire consequences due to the NGM being repurposed to the Ministry of Women undoing years of work by feminists and making this state institution moribund and readily available for looting. Zuma appointed loyal and compliant women ministers to the Ministry of Women as well as to many other ministries. Acquiescent women to the state capture process reached the national executive level. Most importantly Cabinet appointments are based on loyalty to the President over values of competence, fairness and impartiality.

Factionalism in the ruling ANC is the second nuance particular to the South African context as Gouws (2019, 2021) and Hassim (2014) argues. Women can only survive in the South African parliament by joining a male headed faction. This limits their ability to support gender equality, the assumption that women are virtuous and will support other women is wrong. Women are self-interested individuals who want political power just like men. Many women politicians acquire political power through joining a male headed faction engaging in patronage supporting one political hegemonic masculinity over another. Factionalism within the political patronage system of the ANC is rife at election time and in presidential leadership contests the ruling party is bursting with factionalism and internal party politics (Hassim 2014). Factionalism is where the construct of political patronage and political hegemonic masculinity are connected. Factionalism is a political hegemonic masculinity contest, in support of one male leader and his form of political hegemonic masculinity over another to be ANC party president (Morrell et al. 2012, 18). Female politicians derive privileges from being in favour with the ANC president. Regardless of how a woman reaches the Ministerial level of government in South Africa it is connected to compliance and not challenging the profoundly flawed processes.

How does political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage influence the rise of women to the executive ministerial and presidential level of government in South Africa?

Due to the gendered nature of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage in the ANC rooted in gender roles and gender stereotypes women are automatically excluded as viable presidential candidates. Women reach the ministerial level of government through

joining a male headed faction in support of one form of hegemonic masculinity over another and participating in political patronage. This means perpetuating the status quo of patriarchy and women as beholden to the male political elite for positions on party lists in South Africa's Proportional Representation system. Women are reliant on the goodwill of the male political elite for appointment to the Ministerial level of government. Political Patronage requires reciprocity where loyalty and compliance from women political elite to the male political elite is rewarded with political office.

How does political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage impact the realisation of gender equality in broader society?

Political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage has a negative impact on the realisation of gender equality in broader society by curtailing substantive gender equality. Factionalism in support of political hegemonic masculinity is grounded in self-interest, having nothing to do with serving the welfare of citizens instead it is all about career ambitions and the spoils of patronage. Women political elite clients have a lack of political will to endorse women's issues and gender equality for doing so costs them the political favour of the male political elite. Supporting the male political elite for political expedience comes at the price of a more vigorous debate about treating women as full political subjects. The nationalist narrative of motherhood and wifehood perpetuated by the ANCWL and their anti-feminist conservative gender politics inhibits substantive gender equality. Resulting in problematic narratives around gender equality issues such as GBV. In heinous cases of gender-based violence the ANCWL main platform of action is palliative care by demonstrating outside courtrooms and calling for the mass incarceration of perpetrators (Gouws 2019). Without addressing the underlying structural socio-economic reasons and cultural reasons for these heinous crimes (Gouws 2019). At the same time protecting and fiercely defending male political elites who are perpetrators of GBV (Gouws 2019).

How are quotas aimed at increasing women in the executive level of government affected by political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage?

The 50/50 gender quota system of the ruling ANC has succeeded in greater representation of women in the South African government. Women represented in politics is important. However, the support of hegemonic masculinity and political patronage has resulted in the expedition to ministerial office of complicit and compliant women that go along with male

political elite party objectives. Women are subscriptively represented due to client-patron ties that constrain placing gender equality issues on the agenda and prohibit substantive representation on policy making with a feminist objective. Femocrats are needed and lacking in the executive level of government in South Africa.

Limitations

This research focusses on a specific country it focusses on specific forms of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage practiced in South Africa. I have only analysed the issue of factors that helps us understand women's political careers within a South African context therefore can only make findings for this case study. South Africa has a unique history and society consequently unique forms of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage has erupted from this which makes generalization difficult. This research has focused heavily on the ruling ANC as the only political party that can appoint a president and cabinet ministers in South Africa's dominant party democracy. However, conducting a study utilizing the social constructs of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage specific to a country with a unique national political context is possible.

Recommendations

In light of my study there is a need to better understand the connection between political patronage and political hegemonic masculinity. As well as its influence on the political careers of women politicians in post- colonial states like South Africa. New adjusted analytical models are needed for theories of feminist institutionalism to be applied to post- colonial African countries with unique history laden with complexities. Related to loyalties developed during liberation struggles by liberation movements and maintained post liberation. Context and history are important and must be taken into consideration to understand how power is clustered by some at the cost of others with intense gendered effects. Other post- colonial African countries have their own unique forms of political hegemonic masculinity and political patronage. This requires further investigation in order to understand and facilitate change to the barriers women face in reaching the upper echelons of national government and achieving substantive political representation. Without understanding political social processes and social constructs, entrenched in gender stereotypes and gender norms, substantive representation will only be an ideal.

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
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Appendix A

Global Gender Gap Report Global trends

The following figures provide an overview of global and regional trends revealed by the Gender Gap Index 2006. All scores were weighted by population to produce the global and regional averages. Figure 2 provides a global overview of the gender gap. It shows that although the world as a whole is close to eliminating the gap between women and men in their outcomes on education and health, only a little over 50% of the gap on economic participation and opportunity has been closed. Furthermore, taken together, women in the 115 countries covered, representing over 5 billion of the world's population, have only 15% of the political empowerment endowed to men according to the methodology employed by the Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum 2006, 12).

Figure 2: Global trends (115 countries)




Source: Gender Gap Index 2006; scores are weighted by population.

Appendix B

Global Gender Gap Report 2006 Political Empowerment Regional Performance

Figure 7: Regional performance on the Political Empowerment Subindex




Source: Gender Gap Index 2006; details of regional classifications in Appendix B.

Appendix C

Global Gender Gap Report 2022 Political Empowerment Regional Performance

FIGURE 1.6

Regional performance 2022, by subindex

Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Rank		Score
	Regional	Global	
Rwanda	1	6	0.811
Namibia	2	8	0.807
South Africa	3	20	0.782
Burundi	4	24	0.777
Mozambique	5	34	0.752
Cape Verde	6	45	0.736
Madagascar	7	48	0.735
Zimbabwe	8	50	0.734
Kenya	9	57	0.729
Eswatini	10	58	0.728
Uganda	11	61	0.724
Zambia	12	62	0.723
Tanzania	13	64	0.719
Botswana	14	66	0.719
Ethiopia	15	74	0.710
Liberia	16	78	0.709
Lesotho	17	87	0.700
Togo	18	91	0.697
Cameroon	19	97	0.692
Mauritius	20	105	0.679
Ghana	21	108	0.672
Sierra Leone	22	109	0.672
Senegal	23	112	0.668
Burkina Faso	24	115	0.659
Guinea	25	118	0.647
Gambia, The	26	121	0.641
Nigeria	27	123	0.639
Angola	28	125	0.638
Niger	29	128	0.635
Malawi	30	132	0.632
Côte d'Ivoire	31	133	0.632
Comoros	32	134	0.631
Benin	33	138	0.612
Mali	34	141	0.601
Chad	35	142	0.579
Congo, Democratic Rep.	36	144	0.575

Appendix D

Sub Saharan Africa Regional Rankings