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Title: Apartheid With a Human Face: Punt Janson and the Origins of Reform in Township Administration, 1972-1976.

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In the late 1970s prominent figures in the South African state made a number of spectacular statements of reform. In 1978 PW Botha warned South Africans to "adapt or die." The following year, Piet Koornhof declared war on the dompas and announced that apartheid was dead. Around the same time, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions recommended substantial revision of South Africa's racial legislation. By the end of the decade, reform had been placed firmly on the South African agenda.

The dramatic appearance of reform in this period has been subjected to much academic scrutiny (1). The nature of reform has been analysed and attempts have been made to explain it, but little historical work has been done on the origins of reform. This was partly a result of political choice. Much of the literature was produced to expose reform. Thus its focus tended to be on the present and future, more than on the past (2). There are other causes for the ahistorical nature of the literature. One is that the public appearance of reform was sudden, and that it followed hard on the heels of the 1976-77 uprising and the Muldergate power struggle within the National Party. Another relates to the issue of sources. Post-1958 official documents are not readily available to academics. Contemporary research must lean heavily on published government documents and on newspaper reports. Neither of these lend themselves to an analysis of historical processes within the state (3).

As a result, the literature on reform is disproportionately weighted towards the period after the Soweto uprising. Several writers acknowledge that reform has roots that go deeper into the past than 1976, but few explore these roots in any detail (4). All we are left with is a few references to the end of the 1960s boom and to the Durban strikes of 1973. What effects, if any, this had on the South African state prior to the late seventies remain unexplored. Reforms prior to this period are not discussed, even when they are as obvious as the reintroduction of 30-year 'home-ownership' in 1975. The paper that follows does not purport to fill this gap in the literature. It does, however, raise the question of reform prior to 1976 and it addresses one facet of it. Namely, the reformist career of Punt Janson as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education from November 1972 to January 1976.

The paper departs from early revisionist work in that it does not see the South African state as the uncomplicated tool of capital. Nor does it accept the liberal view that the apartheid state is a juggernaut over which capital has no control whatsoever. Rather, it regards the state and capital as separate forces, but forces between which there is a tense accommodation (5). As Glaser notes, the state has to compromise with capital for various reasons: state actors need corporate taxes for their political projects and for their personal incomes; they depend on a well functioning economy for the legitimacy on which their position is based; as self defined guardians of the 'national interest' they have to prevent a descent into chaos (6). But this also means that the state must also, on occasion, compromise with the dominated classes. If order is to be maintained, the state has sometimes to abandon political projects in the face of resistance from below. This resistance need not take the form of overt rebellion. To take an example from the paper: after the African population had ignored influx control for

over a decade, the state was forced to modify its grand apartheid plans. The paper also rejects a view of the state as monolithic. There are significant tensions within the state, tensions inside and between different departments and different branches of the state. These tensions are affected by, but not reducible to, class forces. Within the context of these tensions, there is some space for individual actors to have an effect on policy. This space is severely limited, but as I hope to show below, it does exist.

The paper starts by sketching the context to Punt Janson's years career in the Department of Bantu Administration and Education. It draws attention to various pressures acting on apartheid in the early 1970s and to tensions within the ranks of Afrikaner nationalism. I then detail some of Janson's personal history and argue that this history predisposed him towards reformist responses to the pressures on apartheid. I look at the reforms that he initiated and at the conflict between him and a *verkrampte* faction within the Department of Bantu Administration. I show that the *verkrampte* faction was able to obstruct Janson's activities, and ultimately to have him removed from the department. Nevertheless, I conclude that Janson's three years in the department are a significant episode in the origins of reform. I argue that his reformist project received strong support from the administration boards and that his presence facilitated major reforms in township administration. I illustrate this argument with a case study of the Vaal Triangle Administration Board.

II

In the early 1970's the great South African economic boom of the 1960s finally ran out of steam. In the 1971/72 financial year, the growth rate dropped from 7% to 5%; the following year it was down to 3%. At the same time, the consumer price index started to rise. By mid-1973 it had reached a post war high of 7.4%. With the fuel price increases of the following year it soared into double figures (7).

Representatives of manufacturing capital diagnosed the root of the problem as being economic apartheid. Investment during the boom had tended to be capital intensive. White population growth proved unable to meet the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour that this investment produced. By 1971 skilled labour shortages approached 100 000 jobs (8). At the same time, there was widespread black unemployment. Manufacturing capital and its supporters in the United Party and the English Press argued that the economy had expanded as far as it could without making use of skilled black labour (9). They also identified the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act as a major economic obstruction. They blamed the Planning Act for creating artificial shortages of black labour in addition to a generalised uncertainty about the future of investment in the metropolitan areas (10).

As the chorus of criticism grew louder, the state responded. The Geyser Committee on Manpower in 1971 recommended greater training of black workers (11). The Riekert White Paper on Industrial Decentralisation, which incorporated the Geyser Committee proposals, called for some exemptions from the restrictions of the Planning Act. It also recommended the removal of job reservation in the border areas (12). The following year the state amended regulations governing the labour structure of the South African Railways and Harbours so as to provide for the more efficient use of black labour (13). In the 1972 Budget Speech, Nico Diederichs adopted an accommodating stance concerning the Planning Act and the training of black workers: "I wish to emphasise that the Government is always prepared to consider adjustments of labour policy within the basic framework of our society, in order to promote efficiency and productivity." He stressed that the state allowed exemptions from the Planning Act and from job reservation, and he noted that the Industrial Conciliation Act had been amended to provide for the subsidisation of in-service training (14).

Diederichs's speech had hinted that the state was willing to reconsider economic policy. Later in 1972, the Reynders Commission on the Export Trade was more explicit. The Commission noted that there were "restrictions of all kinds on the optimum use of the total labour force of the country. This situation makes for decreased overall labour productivity and increased wages in some labour categories, resulting in higher costs which weaken the competitive ability in the domestic and foreign markets" (15). It recommended that these restrictions be removed:

> The realisation of a satisfactory rate of general economic and export growth demands a better and fuller utilisation of *all* the manpower resources of the country, and calls for some relaxation of the limitations on Bantu labour not only in the Homelands and Border Areas, but also on a selected basis elsewhere in South Africa, particularly where the export performance is at stake...
>
> It serves no purpose to open up job opportunities for Non-Whites if persons qualified to fill them are not available. Perhaps the most important single factor contributing to increased productivity is adequate training. The Commission accepts that, particularly in so far as the Bantu is concerned, there are some important deficiencies in the training (especially technical training) of a properly qualified labour force and that this requires urgent attention (16).

The second recommendation was accepted by Diederichs in his 1973 budget speech. He declared that "the increase in productivity of bantu employees is today of the greatest importance," and that an inter-departmental committee had been established to draw up guidelines for training African workers throughout the country (17). The next day the *Rand Daily Mail* gleefully reported his speech under the headline, "The capitulation of economic apartheid" (18).

This 'capitulation' had ramifications. If African workers were going to be trained to take up skilled jobs in the metropolitan areas, their claim to a permanent place in these "white" areas grew stronger. HJ van Zijl, the Secretary of Bantu Education acknowledged this in a radio interview: "Opgeleide Bantoewerkers sal tydelik permanent (sic) in blanke gebiede bly en die Regering het nie daarteen beswaar nie" (19). By 1973, however, the state had little option but to accept the 'temporary permanence' of urban Africans. Influx control and forced removals notwithstanding, the movement of people from the homelands to the metropolitan areas had not been reversed. The state's own figures attested to this. JF Otto, the chief director of Planning estimated that by the end of the century, 75% of all Africans would be living in the urban areas (20). Faced with such predictions, even Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs under Verwoerd, conceded that the bantustans could never support the entire black population of South Africa (21). MC Botha, the Minister of Bantu Affairs, reluctantly concurred (22). Other prominent Nationalists went even further. Prof Nic Rhoodie told the press that "the African in the White areas was a bona fide urban dweller who preferred the Western life style and had no wish to be nationalised... South Africa would be forced by circumstances to recognise the urban African as a new historical category and as a separate socio-political group" (23). Piet Koornhof, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, announced that workers with Section 10 qualifications would have their right to family life protected in the urban areas, although he withdrew this announcement after a *verkrampte* uproar (24).

III

The Nationalists' commitment to grand apartheid had begun to look wobbly for the first time in a decade. In response, liberal capitalists emerged from the shadows of the sixties boom to mobilise energetically for reforms. The degree to which this mobilisation was co-ordinated is unclear. Nevertheless, over the course of 1972 and 1973, a clear business reform package was discernible from the public announcements of prominent capitalists. Dr FP Jacobs of USCO set out the basic premise of this package at a meeting of the Afrikaanse Sakekamer: "Our approach should be one in which we accept that our economic growth is inseparably bound up with them and that we must therefore create the necessary procedures to satisfy their aspirations, desires and needs in order to promote efficiency and productivity" (25). The rest of the reformist package is now familiar. In addition to the successful mobilisation around training (26), there were calls for an end to petty apartheid (27) and for support for black entrepeneurs (28). In addition, there was the predictable obsession with black homeownership, spearheaded by the building societies. Roy Canning of the Natal Building Society decided that the time had come "to allow private enterprise to invest in African township development and enable the more successful to own their own homes." Lucas Bull, General Manager of the United Building Society and amateur academic, noted that "history has shown that home-ownership is one of the strongest factors in stopping communism" (29).

The United Party adopted the reformist calls of capital wholeheartedly. Their leader, Sir De Villiers Graaf, made urban African policy the centre of his attack on the government in the 1972 no-confidence debate (30). In Johannesburg, the United Party controlled City Council pressed for home-ownership rights for Sowetans. JF Oberholtzer, the United Party Chairman of the Management Committee, approached the Department of Bantu Affairs with echoes of Lucas Bull: "We believe home ownership is the best way to combat communism, for it gives a man new hope and a stake in his country" (31).

By the early 1970s, however, the UP was in the process of disintegration, and the National Party could afford to ignore it. But these years did not treat all South African political actors as harshly as they did the United Party. For bantustan leaders, the early seventies were a period of unprecedented influence. It was in this period that the Nationalists started seriously to float their bantustan policy. In 1972 and 1973 there were close to 150 meetings between bantustan leaders and National Party ministers (32). At these meetings, the Nationalists tried to win the support, or at least the co-operation of bantustan leaders. This they were able to do, but at some cost. The bantustan leaders were aware that co-operation would put them in the role of Vorster's puppets. So they tried to establish their anti-Nationalist credentials by being outspoken in their rejection of apartheid. Gatsha Buthelezi distinguished himself in this respect and rose to national prominence. Richard Turner argued in 1973 that "it is people like Chief Buthelezi who are recognised by the bulk of Africans as their present leaders" (33). Other bantustan leaders were not content to wait in Buthelezi's shadow. They too maintained that they were working for change from inside the system and they tried to extract concessions from Vorster that would support this claim. Vorster, for his part, realised that 'leaders' with credibility would be a greater asset than 'leaders' without credibility. He therefore tolerated an unprecedented degree of public criticism from the bantustan leaders and he even granted some of their more moderate demands (34).

While all this was taking place inside the country, overseas, the sports boycott and the disinvestment movement were gathering strength (35). Apartheid seemed to be under pressure for the first time in a decade, and some of its supporters started to waver. An NGK representative called for the end of migrant labour on the grounds that the "splitting of families for labour purposes was cruel and could never be justified on Christian principles" (36). The Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (IANA) bemoaned the lack of shopping facilities in the urban African townships; its president called for home-ownership in the 'white' areas (37); and its 1973 annual conference learnt about humanism and the urban African:

> the first thing he asks of us is this recognition and acceptance of his dignity as a man, as a human being, and unless it is granted to him as his divine right, the racial harmony which this country must have if it is to survive will elude us (38).

The South African Foundation recognised the need "to eradicate personal indignities that have been inherent in legislation and custom for so long," and it regretted that "the Black elite - professional people, academics, teachers, businessmen and women - had virtually no opportunities to expand their horizons" (39). The Nationalist press gave space for disgruntled Afrikaner academics to call for reforms in Bantu Affairs policy (40). Afrikaner capital also clambered onto the reform bandwagon. SANLAM proudly announced in September 1972 that it had done away with all apartheid within its organisation (41). The president of the AHI, CFJ Human called for a more enlightened labour policy (42). The Afrikaner Sakekamer were told to accept the permanency of urban Africans and to improve conditions in the townships and on the factory floor (43). The ASK and the AHI both called vociforously for the training of African workers (44).

In this context, reformist elements started to show themselves within the National Party. Theo Gerdener, while Minister of the Interior and leader of the Natal Nationalists, warned that long term peace in South Africa would be impossible unless the government closed the wage gap (45). Soon after issuing this warning, Gerdener left the Nationalist Party to form his ill-fated Democratic Party. Other reformists remained in the party. One of these was Piet Koornhof, who developed his *verligte* reputation as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, before his promotion to Minister of Sport in August 1972. Koornhof's *verligte* achievements in the department of Bantu Affairs were not impressive: he arranged that black professionals would be exempt from influx control and he forced his *verkrampte* Minister of Bantu Affairs, MC Botha, to acknowledge the permanency of urban Africans. As would later become his hallmark, he tended to promise a great deal more than he actually delivered (46). Nevertheless, Koornhof established a *verligte* base within the Department of Bantu Affairs. Punt Janson, his successor in the department, built on this base with spectacular effects.

IV

Janson was born into a Dutch speaking home in Dullstroom in 1917. His parents were strict Calvinists, but they were less racist than many of their contemporaries. Janson recalls being beaten by his father for being rude to a black person older than him. During the Great Depression his family fell on hard times and Janson remembered that in this period he grew to hate "the Englishman, not because he was English, but because he was rich." The Janson family split up as his father sought work as a migrant in the Transvaal forestry department. He himself was sent away to an NGK school in Lydenburg. After finishing high shool, Janson managed to put himself through a degree in Theology at the University of Pretoria by moonlighting as an estate agent and a travelling salesman. He then moved to Witbank where he worked as an NGK minister. He turned down a request to stand for the National Party in Witbank in the 1948 general election, but in 1952 he was elected to the Witbank Town Council, where he gained some experience in African township

administration. He finally entered parliamentary politics as the Nationalist MP for Witbank in 1957. In August 1972, Janson emerged from relative obscurity to become Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education (47).

Janson brought elements of his Calvinist past with him into the Bantu Affairs Department. The most striking of these were his unprecedented frankness and his paternalistic humanism. Unlike any of his predecessors, he not only recognised the failures of grand apartheid, but also was prepared to announce them in public. His first major speech as deputy minister contained some extraordinary admissions:

> Bantu will for many years, in our generation, in the time of generations yet to come, be in the White areas...
>
> I want to state quite frankly that there is a housing shortage for Bantu...
>
> These aid centres were established years ago. I agree that they were not functioning properly and I want to state emphatically that even at the moment they are not functioning properly at all (48).

This type of honesty remained a feature of Janson's deputy ministership. From 1973 to 1975 the English language press followed him around as he made repeated public statements acknowledging that urban Africans were a South African reality and that traditional National Party policy towards them had been woefully inadequate (49).

Janson's humanism was no less striking than his frankness. He stressed that "die Bantoe menslik behandel moet word", even to the point of receiving the same treatment as whites (50). In parliament he insisted that "Relations are not fostered by legislation; they are fostered by an attitude of the heart and mind." (51). For Janson, the attitude of heart and mind which fostered good race relations was one of approachability, and he tried to set an example for the rest of his department to follow. In a press release, he invited Africans: "If you have problems, come to my office and I will try to find the time to discuss them with you. Your requests will be given all the consideration I can give." (52). This offer was not completely without substance. In his three years of office, Janson showed a remarkable energy for visiting townships, receiving delegations and soliciting advice. He met with or received memoranda from bantustan leaders, the Urban Bantu Councils of Soweto, Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Atteridgeville, NAFCOC, ASSECA and various other organisations (53). He attended conferences on Bantu Affairs policy that were organised by industrialists and he frequently appealed to the UP and even to Helen Suzman for advice on particular issues (54).

Janson had become a junior minister at a time when National Party Bantu Affairs policy was under greater strain than ever before. The urban African population had continued to grow over the previous ten years and it was now clear that the bantustans were incapable of fulfilling their grand apartheid mission. The national growth rate

had dropped to its lowest level since Sharpeville and organised capital insisted that South Africa had expanded as far as it could without removing racial restrictions on industrial production. The international sports boycott and disinvestment campaigns had gathered momentum, and inside the country private capital, the United Party and bantustan leaders were clamouring for reform. Even erstwhile allies of the National Party like the NGK, IANA and Afrikaner capital were making reformist noises. Janson's particular background made him receptive to the reform calls and his receptivity was heightened by the events of his first few months as deputy minister.

On January 9, 1973 2 000 workers at Coronation Brick and Tile demanded a pay increase, triggering off the famous Durban strike wave of 1973. From 1965-71 a total of less than 23 000 African workers went on strike. In the first three months of 1973 60 000 African workers downed tools (56). The Durban strikes are generally accepted as the starting point of both the independent trade union movement and the reforms in labour legislation, but their more general effect on National Party thinking has not been explored (57). The Durban strikes were the first major sign of African dissatisfaction since the crackdown on the ANC and PAC in the early 1960s. Some Nationalists responded to the strikes in an entirely predictable manner. Marais Viljoen, Minister of Labour at the time, told parliament that the strikes were all the work of agitators from the University of Natal Wages Commission (58). But other Nationalists took a more enlightened view of the situation. JB Vorster, himself, told parliament that the strikes contained "a lesson for us all."

> They contain a lesson for hon. members on the opposite side; they also contain a lesson for me and this side of the House... I am looking past all party affiliations and past all employers, and experience tells me this, that employers, whoever they may be, should not only see in their workers a unit producing for them so many hours of service a day; they sould also see them as human beings with souls (59)

Janson took Vorster's sentiments a step further: "I agree with hon. members when they say in a responsible manner that we should take steps to take a firm grip of these strikes, not in the sense that one should intervene by using force and violence, but in the sense that one should seek solutions to the problems (60)."

Janson's quest for the solutions to these problems led him to the conclusion that some reforms to grand apartheid were necessary. A month after he made his statement on the strikes, he told parliament that urban Africans were a reality that would not disappear.

> The way I view my task is that as far as these Bantu are concerned, as long as they are in the White area, for their own benefit, also for the benefit of the Whites who need their labour, we must accept that we have a task, namely that of establishing and developing between those people and the Whites the happiest relations possible; and any person who says that life should be made unpleasant for Bantu in White areas, is playing with the future of both White South Africa and non-White South Africa (61).

Janson sought to modify apartheid so as to make it more durable. He did not contemplate abandoning any basic principles of white domination. On the contrary, he argued at length that his modifications of apartheid were necessary for the preservation of white supremacy (62). Janson might have been a minister of religion, but he was also a minister of the National Party. Thus, he did not propose to abolish apartheid, only to give it a human face.

V

Giving apartheid a human face was, nevertheless, an arduous task. Janson directed himself first to reforming its administration. He repeatedly stressed to officials that they should be accessible to the African public (63). In July 1973 he issued a press statement calling for a 'menslike bedeling' for influx control. He declared

> Die probleem is egter om die tsotsi-element uit te hou. Wat ons nodig het is 'n dokument wat onderskei tussen die wetsgehoorsames en die leegleer-wetsverbreker (64).

Later in 1973, he announced that his department was streamlining the registration process for black workseekers. The plan was to eliminate long waits at pass offices that were the result of bureaucratic inefficiency. He also called on township residents not to tolerate offensive officials and corrupt policemen, but rather to lodge complaints with the relevant authorities (65). By 1974 he had identified a host of petty regulations and administrative practices that had to be scrapped. These included the eviction of widows from houses registered in the name of their late husbands and the expiry of lodgers' certificates every three months (66). At the 1974 National Party Congress he told delegates that the time had come "dat ons op plaaslike vlak moet begin om ons daarvoor te beywer dat onnodige krapperige wetgewing van die wetboek verwyder word" (67).

Janson's reforms were not limited to administration. Having realised that urban Africans were not going to disappear, Janson took a number of measures to stabilise their conditions of life. His years as a dominee and as a town councillor had left him sensitive to the importance of housing. At a meeting with the Vaal Triangle Administration Board he declared: "Slegs waneer bantoes gerieflik gehuisves is, sal hulle gelukkig wees en goeie diens lewer en nie hunker na ander trekpleisters nie." (68) In parliament he was much more emphatic:

> There is a very great housing shortage and this is leading to undesirable conditions. Anyone who denies this is denying a truth. Therefore we must face the fact that something will have to be done to relieve this housing shortage and the other shortages which exist, such as the lack of recreational facilities... It is true that there is a housing shortage and it is true that there is a shortage of schools. This is not in the interests of the Bantu, and for that reason it is not

> in the interests of South Africa either. Consequently we have to do something about it, and a great deal more will have to be done about it in the future... We cannot argue away these facts of a housing shortage and of an alarming increase of crime." (69)
>
> "through environmental causes people can become rapists, robbers and murderers... We have to bend the economy to provide housing for people so that they do not turn into robbers, rapists and murderers (70).

Motivated by these beliefs, Janson placed a moratorium on all removals of urban townships (71). He withdrew the restrictions preventing township residents from extending their houses and he announced that residents would be fully compensated for all alterations that they made (72). He also engineered the reintroduction of 30 year 'home-ownership' in May 1975. Although MC Botha told parliament that the reintroduction of 'home-ownership' was a product of talks between Vorster and the bantustan leaders (73), Janson played the crucial role in this reform. Janson was committed to home ownership as a way of stabilising the urban African population. From his experience in Witbank municipal politics he also believed that full property rights were necessary if the financial base of township administration was to become viable. The budget of white municipalities depended heavily on assessment rates. Black local authorities were deprived of this source of revenue because they had no property to tax. Janson maintained that until this situation was rectified, black local authorities would always be short of funds (74). Moreover, he thought that denying urban Africans formal property rights served no practical function. He later recalled his thinking at the time:

> occupation to me meant ownership. Of course it's legally not correct, but... the practical position was that they had occupied the land and therefore, give them title to it. To me it seemed the best thing (75).

Janson was not able to arrange the provision of full land and housing property rights to township residents. With cautious support from Vorster, however, he was able to pilot 30 year home-ownership through the National Party (76). Once this had been done, he made appeals to employers to provide housing for their workers under the new dispensation (77). In addition, he met with building societies to discuss how they could participate in the home ownership scheme. The building societies lobbied his support for the extension of the 30-year titles into freehold. When it became clear that freehold rights would not be granted, they agreed to provide 30-year home loans to individuals through the administration boards (78).

Janson also addressed himself to the need for general development in the urban townships. Soon after his appointment as deputy minister, he announced the establishment of a joint BAD/private sector township sports facilities fund. Rembrandt and Anglo American made opening contributions of R50 000 and R200 000 respectively and the fund was able to raise enough capital to finance projects like the George Thabe Stadium in Sharpeville (79). In November 1973, he told the Mid Free State Administration Board "[Dit is] egter noodsaaklik

vir die goeie verhoudinge tussen blank en nie-blank dat daar in blanke gebiede geriewe vir Bantoes geskep word waar hulle 'n menswaardige bestaan kan voer." The following month he told the Midlands Administration Board to investigate with local chambers of commerce the feasibility of establishing large shopping centres in the townships under their jurisdiction. By 1975 he was saying "The time is overdue for proper planning of townships which, in accordance with what is provided in modern townships for Whites, could make provision for sports fields, swimming baths and other recreational facilities (80).

Another of Janson's reformist interventions concerned the training of urban African workers. Janson sat on the interdepartmental committee on training whose formation Diederichs noted in his 1973 budget speech. Anglo-American and the FCI, with whom the committee liased, mobilised his support. On the committee he argued for the establishment of training centres in the 'white' areas that would be run by industry with as little interference as possible from the state. This duly happened. On recommendation of the committee, training centres were built and equipped by the Department of Bantu Education, but the training that took place inside them was run by industrialists (81).

As Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Janson was given responsibility for the establishment of the training centres. He approached this task with enthusiasm. While many of his ministerial colleagues reluctantly endorsed urban African training schemes as a necessary response to the country's shortage of skilled labour, Janson saw that they also dovetailed well with his own plans for urban township development. This is clear from his response to Helen Suzman's criticism of the increased service charges which township development produced:

> It was wrong in principle for the government to subsidise basic services. The correct principle was that workers should be paid a living wage and that, as costs rose, the wages should take this into consideration. To me it is only logical that employers should increase wages to compensate for increased costs. It is then up to the employer to see to it that productivity increases. I believe that Mrs Suzman's plea should be directed at employers rather than towards the government (82).

Janson was prepared to accept the removal of job reservation as a logical, if electorally unpopular, consequence of the training schemes. In deference to electoral politics he never explicitly called for the removal of job reservation. Nevertheless, he stressed that training African workers would be counter-productive unless these workers could be guaranteed of skilled jobs at the end of their training: "You can have all the qualifications in the world, but if you do not have the job opportunity that is when the trouble will start" (83).

If providing Africans with work could prevent 'trouble', so too would talking to them. In October 1973 Janson announced his intention to establish elected African councils to work with the Administration Boards. He stressed "that it was important [that] Africans themselves should elect members to the proposed bodies. If

they were selected by the department they could be accused of being Government puppets, and this would destroy much of their potential value" (84). Janson's thoughts on these proposed councils prefigured the Community Councils. In May 1975 he told parliament that the government and homeland leaders had "agreed that consideration be given to joining the existing Bantu urban councils and the councils representing homeland Governments in the urban areas into a new body with more powers and responsibilities." The Star reported on his announcement as follows:

> It is reliably learnt that the increased powers and responsibilities being considered could lift Black control of their own urban affairs on to the level of that of a fully fledged local authority (85).

VI

Janson's reforms created quite a stir in the early 1970s. Numerous individuals and organisations who saw themselves opposed to the Nationalists were outspoken in their support for him. His first speech in parliament was received enthusiastically by the United Party, whose attitude to Janson thereafter was summed up by their MP for Hillbrow, GJ Jacobs:

> We on this side of the House always listen to the hon. Deputy Minister with great interest becasue, he has a perceptivity of mind that is denied many of his colleagues (86).

As early as May 1973, Helen Suzman conceded that Janson was "bringing a new approach to bear on a difficult problem." Once he had been Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs for over a year she was more generous with her praise:

> I want to give [Mr Janson] credit here and now, sir; he is the one man to hold that job who has ever really expressed any concern for the people over whom he has such vast jurisdiction (87).

Alex Boraine was another opposition parliamentarian who was impressed by Janson (88).

Outside parliament, prominent capitalists enthused about Janson, as did the English press (89). In the case of the latter, Janson was at times embarrassed by the degree of support he received. Addressing a National Party meeting in Pretoria he felt constrained to point out that

> I did not ask for that support (from the English press) but I welcome it. But they must remember that I stand and fall by the Nationalist Party and its leader, Mr Vorster (90).

Janson's reaffirmation of his Nationalist credentials was necessary because of political tensions within the National Party. Janson was aware that his reforms had made him unpopular in *verkrampte* circles

secure the loyalty and support or even the co-operation of the thousands of officials upon whom he depended. Some officials responded positively to Janson's reformist posture. Prominent among these were officials in the administration boards whose practical experience had led them to the conclusion that apartheid administration had to be modified (99). But the overwhelming majority of officials within the Department of Bantu Affairs itself, saw no need to change and resented Janson's attempts to force them to do so. They responded to his reforms in a way that would later become characteristic of Bantu Affairs officials: they obstructed them bureaucratically. In doing so, they received the tacit and at times overt support of M.C. Botha.

Janson's housing reforms were among those hardest hit by Botha's interventions and by bureaucratic obstructionism. Botha simply ignored Janson's announcement of an indefinite moratorium on urban removals and continued to authorise the removal of townships that were too close to white areas for his liking (100). Janson's plan for differentiated township housing was almost regulated out of existence by officials within the department (101). A similar fate befell the reintroduction of 30 year leasehold housing. Officials' obstructionism ensured that regulations governing leasehold only appeared a year after the the return of home-ownership was announced in parliament. Moreover, when these regulations finally appeared, they stipulated that home-ownership would only be available to township residents with homeland citizenship certificates (102).

Janson's sport policy also received rough treatment by *verkrampte* bureaucrats. Janson felt that the department should use sport as a way of improving the quality of life of urban township residents. He saw his sports fund playing an important role here. However, the sports officer of the Department of Bantu Affairs had other ideas:

> Sport moet op 'n volksbasis geplaas word. Soos... uitgewys moet elke volk sy eie sport he, bv. die Xhosa sokker, Tswana tennis, Sotho golf ens. wat uiteindelik aan die tuisland geknoop moet wees (103).

Even the training schemes, around which there appeared to be a remarkable degree of consensus within the cabinet, were not immune from bureaucratic obstructionism. When JC Knoetze of the Vaal Triangle Administration Board pointed out that the schemes would be useless if job reservation was maintained, the Bantu Education official liasing with his board denied that this would be the case. He explained his conception of the aims of the training: "[dit is] daarop ingestel om aan die bantoes die basiese opleiding te gee, sodat hy meer nywerheids-orienteerd is... Hy sal nou weet wat 'n bytel is, wat 'n hamer is, ens. as hy gevra word om dit aan te gee" (104).

The *verkrampte* opposition to Janson also ensured that many of his more grandiose schemes did not materialise at all during his spell as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education. The influx control legislation was not amended to provide for a "dokument wat onderskei tussen die wetsgehoorsames en die leegleer-wetsverbreker." Janson's ambition "to afford all the children of the Bantu peoples free and compulsory education" (105) was not

realised. He did not see township residents granted full property rights, nor did he preside over the introduction of Community Councils.

Finally, in January 1976 his *verkrampte* opponents succeeded in forcing him out of the department altogether. After refusing several offers of ambassadorships, he was 'promoted' against his will to become Deputy Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions, of Planning and the Environment, and of Statistics. His deputy ministerial portfolio within the Department of Bantu Administration and Education was split into two new portfolios which were given to the less than enlightened Messrs Andries Treurnicht and Ferdie Hartzenberg (106).

VIII

In all, Janson spent three years and three months in the Department of Bantu Administration and Education. After *verkrampte* opposition and obstruction, the net effect of these three years on Bantu affairs policy might appear negligible. The eulogistic approach to Janson in the English Press seems a little out of proportion to what he actually achieved. Nevertheless, we should be wary of dismissing altogether the importance of Janson's three years. Some of Janson's reformist measures actually did materialise. The reintroduction of leasehold in the urban areas, however much it was restricted, was significant. So too was the establishment of industrial training centres for African workers in the urban areas. But if we are to assess the real importance of Janson's term of office we need to look beyond his direct achievements as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education. We must look instead, to the indirect effect that he had on urban township administration.

As I noted above, many senior officials in the administration boards responded positively to Janson. This was unsurprising, because these officials had to deal with the contradictions of grand apartheid policy. All of the administration boards except West Rand Administration Board and the Peninsula Administration Board acted as development agents in designated homelands. The senior officials of the boards, therefore had a clear sense of the state of homeland development and of the incapacity of the homelands to fulfill their grand apartheid mission. Moreover, the same officials had to face the urban administrative problems created by a decade's neglect of township development and a massive housing shortage. Many of them agreed with Janson when he told parliament that "serious situations, sociological abuses and other abuses, may arise if these housing shortages are not tackled with all the energy and enterprise at our command" (107). For them, Janson was someone with rank in the Department of Bantu Administration who understood their predicament and who offered them a way out of it. Janson recalled:

> [From the administration boards I received] not only support, but active support and enthusiasm... you were not preaching heresy, you were only saying common sense things that they had in their own hearts. I wouldn't say anything contradictory to

> their own feelings, their own ideas. It wasn't something that would destroy the Afrikaner ideal or the National Party. It was plain common sense [and] it was accepted as such (108).

Thus, I would argue that even if many of Janson's reforms ran aground on the bureaucratic reefs of the department, unofficially, they were adopted by some of the officials actually engaged in day-to-day administration. A case study of the Vaal Triangle Administration Board (VTAB) illustrates this point (109).

IX

The VTAB was established in 1973. Its chief director, JC Knoetze, was a technocratic administrator who had never joined the National Party. Knoetze's career in Vaal township administration started in 1950. He was the first Manager of the Vanderbijlpark Non-European Affairs Department. When Sebokeng was established in 1965, he became chief director of the Management Board of Sebokeng. He held this post until he became chief director of the VTAB which took over the functions of the board and of the municipal Non-European Affairs Departments.

Knoetze's experience led him to share many of Janson's ideas about Bantu Affairs policy. The township population of the Vaal is overwhelmingly SeSotho speaking. Grand apartheid therefore envisaged the relocation of the bulk of this population to Qwa-Qwa. But the management board and the VTAB had acted as development agents in Qwa-Qwa. So Knoetze knew that the bantustan had neither the housing facilities nor the economic infrastructure to support the population it contained already, quite apart from any additions from the Vaal. As early as August 1973 the VTAB decided that no relocations from the Vaal to Qwa-Qwa could take place (110).

Once the VTAB reached this conclusion, it had to assume responsibility for the Vaal housing shortage. For if residents on the Vaal waiting list could not be housed in Qwa-Qwa they would have to be housed in the Vaal townships. The problem of the housing shortage was given an added urgency by the presence of Evaton - a freehold area - adjacent to Sebokeng. Most of the people on the waiting list had set up shacks in Evaton which was becoming increasingly difficult to administer. An official complained:

> Hierdie gesinne is gedurig aan die uitkyk vir beter huisvesting met die gevolg dat hulle van plek tot plek in Evaton rondswerf en kan daar dus nooit behoorlik rekord van hulle woonadresse gehou word nie. Op die wyse ontduik hulle ook die betaling van hulle maandelikse permitgelde en word hulle daardeur blootgestel aan vervolging (111).

Janson's pronouncements on housing made sense to the VTAB. They seemed to offer some solutions to the problems that the board faced. Equally important, Janson's presence as deputy minister, gave Knoetze the confidence to experiment with 'verligte' changes in housing policy (112). Thus, from 1973 to 1976 the board began to

transform its approach to housing. On Janson's insistence, it accepted that the removals to Sebokeng of Boipatong, Bophelong and Sharpeville could not take place until the housing backlog was overcome (113). In January 1975, noting that the housing shortage was restricting the flow of labour, it requested central government loans to build 2000 houses per annum in Sebokeng (114). When it was informed a year later that no more government loans were available for housing, it sought and found private financing. Over the next two years, banks and building societies invested R10 million in Vaal township housing (115). Employers matched this investment in building homes for their workers. (116). In 1975, the board also reached the conclusion that there "is a crying need for better types of houses, e.g. better types of houses for doctors, chemists, etc". In accordance with this it resolved to set aside 20% of all new stands for the construction of 'better houses' (117). Three months later it started a "Better Homes" scheme with *World* (the predecessor of *The Sowetan*). The board encouraged residents to improve their homes or to build new homes and *World* ran a weekly article on the new/improved homes (118). In addition, it addressed itself to the issue of township development. Knoetze noted that "As the backlog in housing is being overtaken more attention is given the the provision of social services, which are essential for the development of a civilised community" (119).

Janson's impact on the board was not limited to the field of housing. The board took up his lead on industrial training centres eagerly. Knoetze enthused about "the training of black labour, which I regard as the only solution for the constant demand for higher wages for blacks, and which is not only justified from the worker's point of view, but is also in the general interest of the country" (120). He arranged the construction of a training centre in the Vaal and he used the training issue to improve relations between the VTAB and local manufacturing capital (121).

The board also responded to Janson's call for a menslike bedeling for influx control. It began to discriminate between the *wetgehoorsames* and the *leegloer-wetverbrekers* by providing housing for workers who were legally employed in the Vaal Triangle and had families in the urban areas but no permanent residency rights (122). The board adopted a more pragmatic approach to conflicts between influx control and employers' needs. It granted companies influx control exemptions for key workers (123). It allowed employers to transfer workers between urban areas (124) and it turned a blind eye to infringements of the Planning Act (125). Knoetze's discourse on influx control changed completely. By 1977 he was telling the department: "Dit is gemenesaak watter irritasie Artikel 10 van die Bantoe (Stadsgebiede) Konsolidasiewet, 1945 (Wet Nr 25 van 1945) tot gevolg het" (126)

The new approaches to housing and to influx control that the VTAB developed during Janson's deputy ministership would be central to their administrative policy throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus Janson's effect on Vaal township administration long outlived his stay in the Bantu Affairs Department. The VTAB had the reputation of being a particularly reformist administration board. Nevertheless, Janson believes that other administration boards responded to him in the same way as the VTAB did. At this stage there is no research either to confirm or to refute him. But, if he

is correct, the movement towards reform in township administration begins a long time before the Riekert Commission and the statements by PW Botha and Piet Koornhof with which this paper started.

X

Janson's transfer out of the department was a setback for reform. After his departure, Botha, Treurnicht and Hartzenberg tried to return Bantu Affairs policy to its pre-Janson days. But their reign was to be shortlived. The Soweto uprising, provoked in part by Treurnicht's reactionary zeal, marked the demise of the *verkramptes*. First in the National Party and later in the Department of Bantu Affairs, reformers gained control. By 1979 MC Botha was out of politics, Piet Koornhof was Minister of Plural Relations and Development (Bantu Affairs) and Janson was Minister of Education and Training (Bantu Education). In the aftermath of Soweto, the National Party made the decision that Janson had reached earlier - that reform was the only way of avoiding conflict.

Paradoxically, however, the new reform programme contained a built-in recipe for conflict. The state called for large scale township development to overcome thirty years of neglect, but it was unable to pay for any of this development. Thus, township residents had to meet the full cost of infrastructural development that took place during a period of rampant inflation in the building industry. In 1974, Janson had forseen this contradiction when he called for employers to pay living wages to support township upgrading. The reformist state in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, regarded wages as the private domain of capital. Manufacturers, for their part, wanted a stable workforce, but they did not want to pay for its stabilisation. Thus wages did not keep pace with rocketing township rent and service charges. The contradiction sharpened in the early eighties as recession set in. By September 1984 it was uncontainable.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Abbreviations

EPH	*Eastern Province Herald*
CT	*Cape Times*
RDM	*Rand Daily Mail*
SE	*Sunday Express*
ST	*Sunday Times*
S.A.	Sebokeng Archives
U.W.	Church of the Province Library, University of the Witwatersrand

1. See for example, J. Saul and S. Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, New York: Monthly Review, 1986. D. Hindson "The Role of the Labour Bureaux in the South African State's Urban Policy, with particular reference to the Reikert Commission Reccomendations" University of the Witwatersrand African Studies Seminar Paper, 12 May 1980. D. O'Meara, "'Muldergate', the politics of Afrikaner Nationalism and the Crisis of the Capitalist State in South Africa" University of Dar es Salaam seminar paper, November 1980. S. Greenberg, *Legitimating the Illigitimate: State, Markets and Resistance in South Africa*, New York, 1987. "Focus on Riekert" *South African Labour Bulletin (SALB)* 5, no 4, 1979. G. Moss, "Total Strategy" in *Work in Progress* 11, 1980.
2. See for example, Moss, "Total Strategy", *SALB* "Focus on Riekert" and O'Meara, "Muldergate".
3. Nor do they lend themselves to an understanding of how different branches or the state interact in practice. A similar point is made by Hindson. See "The Role of the Labour Bureaux," p. 3.
4. See for example, Saul and Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, D. Posel, "The Language of Domination, 1978-83" and S. Greenberg, "Ideological Struggles within the South African State," both in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds) *The Politics of Class Race and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa*, London: Longmans, 1987.
5. D. Glaser, "Manufacturing Capital and the Apartheid State: the Case of Industrial Decentralisation." Paper presented to the African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 17 August 1987, pp. 1-3 and 30-31.
6. Ibid.
7. A. Dickman, "Investment - the implications for economic growth and living standards" in *Optima* 27 (1) no. 3, 1977, pp. 41-44. Saul and Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, pp. 71-2, 78. See also "The Capitulation of Economic Apartheid" in *RDM* 31 March 1973.
8. Saul and Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, pp. 71-2.
9. Glaser, "Manufacturing Capital and the Apartheid State"
10. Glaser, "Manufacturing Capital and the Apartheid State" pp. 8-10. The Planning Act was passed in 1967. It set a 5:2 limit on the black:white worker ratio in industries in metropolitan areas. It also prohibited all future industrial

expansion or development in metropolitan areas. See also De Villiers Graaf's no confidence address in Hansard, 31 Jan 1973, pp. 16-41; "Worker Explosion on way" *RDM* 7 July 1972.

11. See "Big Improvement in Non-White Training Urged" EPH 10 February 1972..
12. Glaser, "Manufacturing Capital and the Apartheid State," p. 9.
13. See remarks in Republic of South Africa: HJJR Reynders, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa. 1972. Copy housed in the Government Publications Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, (hereafter Reynders Commission) p. 395. See also S.A. 5/4/2 vol. 2, document 1. Suid Afrikaanse Spoorwee Afdelingsbestuurder, Johannesburg aan Hoofdirekteur Bantoesakeadministrasieraad. Feb 10, 1975. and document 3. J.C. Knoetze aan die Afdelingsbestuurder SAS Johannesburg. 25 Feb 1975.
14. Hansard, March 29, 1972, pp. 4374-76.
15. Reynders Commission pp. 6393-4, para. 41.
16. Reynders Commission pp. 394-5, paras. 45 and 49.
17. Hansard, March 28 1973, pp. 3533-3534.
18. "The Capitulation of Economic Apartheid" in *RDM* 31 March 1973.
19. "Nuwe Nywerhede Lok Bantoes" *Transvaler*, 9 April 1973.
20. "22-m Urban Africans by A.D. 2000." Star 22 February 1972.
21. See "Die Vader van Groot Apartheid Gesels" *Rapport* 7 May 1972 and "Race Policy Debate" *CT*, 8 May 1972.
22. Hansard February 3, 1972, pp. 305-6.
23. *RDM* May 18, 1972. "SA will have to recognise urban African."
24. See "About time Say Most" *RDM* 3 February 1972 and "Die Bantoe en sy Gesin" *Burger* 4 February 1972.
25. "SA must accept Blacks - steel boss" *RDM* Jun 18, 1973.
26. See for example, "Big Improvement in Non-White Training Urged" *EPH* 10 February 1972, "Labour is key in SA" *RDM* 17 February 1972, "Toyota Chief pleads for African Training" *RDM* 29 March 1972, "It can't Always be White" *RDM* 9 June 1972, "Worker Explosion on way" *RDM* 7 July 1972, "Better jobs for Blacks" *RDM* 3 November 1972, "Bigger use of skilled labour urged" *EPH* 3 April 1974.
27. See for example, "Anglo's Wilson wants new deal for Blacks" *RDM* 2 September 1972, "Nat Press Chief urges new deal" *RDM* 29 September 1972, "Trust Bank boss hits at petty apartheid" *Star* 15 November 1972.
28. See for example, "Aid Black Entrepeneurs" *Star* 15 March 1975, "Bank to help businessmen" *RDM* Extra 25 August 1973.
29. *RDM* Jun 22, 1974. "Home-owning `helps fight communism.'" See also, "Let Blacks buy homes" *RDM* 11 Nov 1972, "Black Homes Call backed by building societies" *RDM* 13 November 1972 and "Black Home rights call by ASSOCOM" *EPH* 17 October 1974.
30. Hansard, January 31 1972, pp. 16-41.
31. "City will fight for black rights" *Star* 23 August 1972. See also "Govt's mad ideology will make slums" *ST* 22 March 1970 and "City fears cash Crisis over Soweto housing" *Star* 27 April 1971.
32. Hansard 7 February 1974, pp. 325-27..
33. Quoted by G. Mare and G. Hamilton in *An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of 'Loyal Resistance'* Johannesburg: Ravan, 1988, p. 38.

34. These included the removal of influx control restrictions on professionals, and the granting of urban rights to the families of Section 10(1)a workers. See Hansard 2 February 1972, pp. 276-84, and "Die Bantoe en sy Gesin" *Burger* 4 February 1972. The Nationalists also gave credit to the bantustan leaders for, many of the more substantial reforms that I discuss later in this paper. See for example the remarks of MC Botha on the reintroduction of 30 year home ownership in Hansard May 1, 1975, pp. 5230-34.
35. R. Archer and A. Boullion, *The South African Game, Sport and Racism*, London: Zed, 1982, ch. 9.
36. "About time Say Most" *RDM* 3 February 1972.
37. "Plea to Government: Give Africans ownership rights" *Race Relations News* December 1972, *CT* 14 November 1973.
38. U.W. A1934/B2.3.2 ERBAAB Uitvoerende Komitee Sakelys 1973. Box 21. Agenda, Meeting of Sep 4, 1973, pp. 79-83.
39. *RDM* Nov 9, 1973.
40. See for example, "Te Min te laat gedoen" *Transvaler* 10 September 1973, "Bantoes is in 1936 net beskou as 'n bron van arbeid" Vaderland 26 September 1973, "Swartes is vir blankes duister" Vaderland 2 April 1974, "Maak Soweto 'n Swart Stadstaat" 2 June 1971, "Ken ons Swartman werklik" *Transvaler* 23 August 1974.
41. "Sanlam puts end to petty apartheid" *SE* 2 September 1972.
42. "Better African Labour Policy urged" *RDM* 16 March 1972.
43. "SA must accept blacks - steel boss" *RDM* 18 June 1973.
44. See "Big Improvement in Non-White Training Urged" *EPH* 10 February 1972, "Better African Labour Policy urged" *RDM* 16 March 1972 and "Nat Press Chief urges new deal" *RDM* 29 September 1972.
45. See De Villiers Graaf's comment on this in Hansard January 31, 1972, pp. 16-20.
46. The most spectacular of his hollow promises was the announcement that all workers with Section 10 rights to be in the urban areas could bring their families to live with them. This statement was later 'clarified' to affect only workers with Section 10(1)a rights. See Hansard 2 February 1972, pp. 276-84 and "Die Bantoe en sy Gesin" *Burger* 4 February 1972.
47. The information about Janson's personal history is taken from my interview with him on 5 February 1988 (hereafter, Janson Interview), pp. 6-7, 16-17.
48. Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890 and Hansard, 31 Jan 1973, pp. 16-41.
49. "Helen Suzman welcomes new approach" *RDM* 22 May 1973, "Nywerhede is in hul skik met plan vir stads-bantoe" Vaderland 3 August 1973, *Daily Dispatch* 19 September 1973, "Janson offers a new deal for urban Africans" *RDM* 23 October 1973, The *Star* editiorial 24 October 1973, Argus 15 November 1973, *CT* 22 November 1973, "Punt tells of a new era from the past" *RDM* 10 February 1974, "Atteridgeville Council asks to see Janson" *Pretoria News* 15 October 1974, "Uplift black people or face unrest" *Pretoria News* 12 November 1974, "Bid to cut red tape" *RDM* 9 December 1974
50. See S.A. 5/4/7 document 48. Onderhoud met sy Edele Adjunk Minister TNH Janson op Jul 24, 1973, Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890 and Hansard 6 August 1974, p. 185. See also "Nywerhede is in hul skik met plan vir stads-bantoe" Vaderland 3 August 1973 and "Blacks have a right" Star 5 April 1974,

51. Hansard 6 August 1974, p. 185
52. *RDM* 26 September 1973, "Janson hammers hamhanded officials" *Friend* 24 October 1974, "Consult Blacks daily" *Star* 1 November 1974
53. *RDM* 30 October 1973
54. Hansard 4 March 1975, pp. 1845-52, Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890. See also "Ondersoek na bantoeraad?" *Transvaler* 15 February 1973, *RDM* 26 September 1973, *RDM* 30 October 1973, "Janson will consider rent protests" *RDM* 30 August 1974, "Atteridgeville Council asks to see Janson" *Pretoria News* 15 October 1974,
56. The information on the Durban Strikes is taken from S. Friedman, *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-1984*, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987, ch. 2.
57. Friedman is possible the exception here. He does note a number of reformist statements that were made in response to the strikes. However, he does not pursue them, because his major concern is with the development of the independent labour movement. See *Building Tomorrow Today*, pp. 50-52.
58. Hansard May 2, 1973, pp. 5546-7.
59. Hansard Feb 9, 1973, p. 346.
60. Hansard Apr 5, 1973, p. 4197.
61. Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890.
62. See below, p. 14.
63. S.A. 5/4/7 document 48. Onderhoud met sy Edele Adjunk Minister TNH Janson op Jul 24, 1973, Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890; Hansard, 31 Jan 1973, pp. 16-41., Hansard 6 August 1974, p. 185. See also "Nywerhede is in hul skik met plan vir stads-bantoe" Vaderland 3 August 1973. "Blacks have a right" *Star* 5 April 1974, *RDM* 26 September 1973, "Janson hammers hamhanded officials" *Friend* 24 October 1974, "Consult Blacks daily" *Star* 1 November 1974.
64. S.A. 5/15/4 document 93. "Punt Janson vra 'n mensliker bedeling" Vaderland 30 Julie 1973.
65. *Daily Dispatch* 20 November 1973.
66. "Janson hammers hamhanded officials" *Friend* 24 October 1974.
67. "Sakegeriewe vir swartes ondersoek" *Beeld* 7 November 1974
68. S.A. 5/4/7 document 48. Onderhoud met sy Edele Adjunk Minister TNH Janson op Jul 24, 1973.
69. Hansard 11 April 1975, pp. 3297-99
70. Hansard 2 May 1975, pp. 5305-5306. See also Hansard 18 September 1974, pp. 3215-16.
71. S.A. 5/4/7 document 48. Onderhoud met sy Edele Adjunk Minister TNH Janson op Jul 24, 1973.
72. S.A. 5/4/2 document. 92. J.C. Knoetze aan Hoof Bantoesakekommissaris, Johannesburg. 5 March 1974. See also "Pay out to urban Africans" *Star* 2 April 1974..
73. See Hansard 1 May 1975, pp. 5230-34.
74. Information about Punt Janson's views on housing taken from Janson Interview, pp. 7-13. See also his flexible response to calls for the reintroduction of home ownership prior to 1975 in *RDM* 4 September 1973.
75. Janson Interview, p. 12.
76. See Janson Interview, pp. 7-13.
77. Hansard 18 September 1974, pp. 3215-16, Hansard 2 May 1975, pp. 5305-5306. See also "Black builders for townships call by Janson" *EPH* 28 October 1975

78. See Janson Interview, p. 11. Janson recalled that the building societies refused to give blanket approval to this procedure. Nevertheless, in the case of the Vaal Triangle Administration Board, building societies made available substantial amounts of capital for 30-year homeownership schemes. (See section IX below). Janson recalled that he was only lobbied by the building societies *after* the reintroduction of 30 year home-ownership. He maintains that his role in the reintroduction was not influenced by pressure from the building societies.
79. *RDM* 27 July 1973, "Punt tells of a new era from the past" *RDM* 10 February 1974.
80. *Burger* 27 November 1973, *EPH* 22 December 1973, "Black builders for townships call by Janson" *EPH* 28 October 1975.
81. See Janson Interview, pp. 4-6. See also S.A. 10/13/3. document 6. Raad: Uittreksel van die Agenda 17 Augustus 1973. S.A. 10/13/3 p.19. Vakkundige opleiding van Bantoes, 8 November 1973.
82. "Employers duty on black rents" *Star* 24 September 1974.
83. "Uplift black people or face unrest" *Pretoria News* 12 November 1974.
84. "Janson offers a new deal for urban Africans" *RDM* 23 October 1973.
85. Hansard 2 May 1975, pp. 5305-5306 and "Blacks may get more power" *Star* 5 May 1975.
86. Hansard 30 August 1974, pp. 1893, 1916. See also Hansard 12 February 1973, pp. 464-65.
87. Hansard 19 February 1974, pp. 1232-38. See also"Helen Suzman welcomes new approach" *RDM* 22 May 1973.
88. Hansard 6 May 1975, p. 5499.
89. See for example "Nywerhede is in hul skik met plan vir stads-bantoe" Vaderland 3 August 1973 and "Harsh work of sincere men" *RDM* 24 July 1974.
90. "Blacks have a right" *Star* 5 April 1974.
91. See Janson Interview, p. 16.
92. Hansard May 18, 1973, pp. 6883-6890.
93. "Sakegeriewe vir swartes ondersoek" *Beeld* 7 November 1974
94. "Blacks have a right" *Star* 5 April 1974.
95. *Daily Dispatch* 19 September 1973
96. "Sakegeriewe vir swartes ondersoek" *Beeld* 7 November 1974
97. See for example "Blacks have a right" *Star* 5 April 1974. At this meeting Janson ended speculation that he was going to join Theo Gerdener's Democratic Party.
98. Hansard 30 August 1974, pp. 1893, 1916. See also Hansard 2 May 1975, pp. 5305-5306.
99. Debbie Posel has pointed out to me that an important difference between these officials and the officials in the central department was their employment history. The administration boards were staffed primarily with people who had worked in municipal Non European Affairs Departments. In many cases this involved being accountable to United Party controlled town councils. The departmental officials, on the other hand, tended to come up through the ranks in the department, where their promotion often depended on their *verkrampte* credentials.
100. See for example S.A. 5/4/11 vol. 3, document A. Verskuiwing: Bophelong, Boipatong en Sharpeville. Dec 10, 1976.

101. S.A. 5/4/2 document 120. E.A. Johns aan Hoof Bantoesake-kommissaris, Johannesburg. Jul 4, 1974.
102. U.W. A1934/B1.1 ERBAAB Agendas 1976. Box 9. Agenda, Meeting of Jun 24, 1976, pp. 33-36. See also *RDM* Oct 30, 1975. "Black leaders challenge that home condition."
103. S.A. 5/6 document 22. Samesprekings gehou te Sebokeng in verband met nuwe Sport Beleid. Jun 25, 1973.
104. S.A. 10/13/3 document19. Vakkundige opleiding van Bantoes, 8 November 1973.
105. Hansard May 6, 1975, document 5472.
106. See Janson Interview, pp. 14-15, 18. Hansard 1976, vol. 1, p. vi. It seems that the Cabinet decided that Janson, the energetic paternalist and humanist, would be better placed serving the social welfare needs of white voters than those of unenfranchised Africans. The latter could be catered for adequately by *verkramptes* like Botha, Treurnicht and Hartzenberg.
107. Hansard 18 September 1974, pp. 3215-16.
108. Janson Interview, p. 11.
109. The VTAB was generally regarded as the most successful of all administration boards. Because of this, it might be argued that the VTAB provides a misleading case study. Janson, however, maintains that he received strong support from most of the administration boards. In any event, I am unable to use another board as a case study because the VTAB's are the only administration board documents through which I have worked. See Janson Interview, p. 11.
110. S.A. 5/4/2. Uittreksel uit die Agenda. Raadsvergadering 16 Augustus 1973. See also S.A. 5/4/9 document 12. Nota: Evaton Bantoes. Jan 10, 1972. and S.A. 5/4/2 document 179. Uittreksel uit die agenda, Uitvoerende Komitee. Jan 8, 1975.
111. S.A. 5/4/2 document 179. Uittreksel uit die agenda, Uitvoerende Komitee. Jan 8, 1975.
112. Interview with JC Knoetze, 1 February 1988, Sebokeng (hereafter Knoetze Interview), p. 9.
113. S.A. 5/4/7 document 48. Onderhoud met sy Edele Adjunk Minister TNH Janson op Jul 24, 1973.
114. S.A. 5/4/2 document 179. Uittreksel uit die agenda, Uitvoerende Komitee. Jan 8, 1975.
115. See S.A. 5/4/2 vol. 2, document 10. Vergadering: Behuising en Verbeterde behuising. Feb 24, 1975; S.A. 8/17/3 document 17. Uittreksel uit die agenda: Uitvoerende Komitee. 27 Oktober 1976
116. See S.A. 5/4/2 vol. 2, document 10. Vergadering: Behuising en Verbeterde behuising. Feb 24, 1975; S.A. 8/17/3 document 17. Uittreksel uit die agenda: Uitvoerende Komitee. 27 Oktober 1976; S.A. 8/17/3 document 41. Uittreksel uit die agenda: Uitvoerende Komitee. 23 Februarie 1977; S.A. 8/17/1 (vol 4). Uittreksel uit die agenda: Uitvoerende Komitee. 28.6.78.
117. S.A. 5/4/2 vol. 2, document 10. Vergadering: Behuising en Verbeterde behuising. Feb 24, 1975; S.A. 5/4/2 document 179. Uittreksel uit die agenda, Uitvoerende Komitee. Jan 8, 1975.
118. See S.A. 5/4 document 37. J.C. Knoetze to The Manager, World Printing and Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd. 18 July 1975 and S.A. 5/4 document 50. Hoof Bantoesakekommissaris Witwatersrand aan Hoofdirekteur. 1 Maart 1976.
119. S.A. 1/23 document 1. Employment and Housing of Bantoe in the Vaal Triangle Area. Mar 29, 1977.

120. S.A. 10/13/5 document96. J.C. Knoetze to Collin Sutton, 12 February 1975.
121. Interview Knoetze, pp. 8-9. See also S.A. 10/13/5 vol.2 p. 15. Rita Marais aan die Voorsitter, Vaal Driehoek Bantoe Administrasieraad, 23 Januarie 1976.
122. See S.A. 5/15/4 document 67. W.J. Kriel to Bantu Affairs Commissioner Evaton. 2 January 1973 and S.A. 5/4/9 document 12. Nota: Evaton Bantoes. Jan 10, 1972.
123. See S.A. 5/4/2 document 103. J.C. Steenkamp aan die Direkteur Behuising, Vaaldriehoekse Bantoesake-administrasieraad. 1 April 1974 and S.A. 5/4/2 document114. J.C. Knoetze aan die Afdelingsbestuurder: Personeeldienste, USCO. 21 June 1974.
124. S.A. 10/13/3 document 12. Stewarts and Lloyds Memorandum, 26 September 1973. See also S.A. 10/4/5 Opsomming van Samesprekings wat gehou was te Jubilee Sentrum, Johannesburg op 18 Augustus 1976.
125. See S.A. 10/4/5 document 4. Opsomming van die besprekings by die kwartaalikse vergadering insake arbeidsaangeleenthede gehou te Sebokeng op 30 November 1976. See also S.A. 10/4/5 Opsomming van Samesprekings wat gehou was te Jubilee Sentrum, Johannesburg op 18 Augustus 1976.
126. S.A. 9/1/9 document 3. Voorgestelde komentaar van die Vaal Driehoekse Bantoesake Administrasieraad insake die opdrag van die kabinetskomitee betreffende Bantoe in blanke gebiede. 22 Desember 1977.