


**UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES  
JOHANNESBURG-REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

---

---



A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

***ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES IN THE DRC  
FROM 1997 TO 2001***

***Alain Matundu Nangongolo***  
***Student Number: 0516192W***

***SUPERVISOR: Prof. Daryl Glaser***

**ACADEMIC YEAR 2007**

*Declaration*

I declare that this is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of art in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before any other degree or examination in any other university

**Matundu Nangongolo Alain date of 15 February 2007**

**Dedication**

To God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, my parents Willy Vangu and Mamie Diazola, my son Jossy Vangu and siblings Bijou Vangu, Huguet Vangu, Junior Vangu, Jerry Vangu and Yanick Vangu, to my grandmother Marie Mulemvo Nkubi for their love and encouragement during my stay in South Africa and the writing of this research report. Without their constant support, the Research Report would not have finished.

## **Acknowledgement**

I am grateful to many academics who have contributed in one way or another the completion of this Research Report, particularly my supervisor, Prof. Daryl Glaser in the Political Studies Department at the University of the Witwatersrand, for his support and wise mentorship.

I also express a profound gratitude to my fellow Christians and friends who directly or indirectly significantly contributed to the achievement of this intellectual work, notably Apostles Gabriel and Lydia Veyi, and the whole Christian Assembly of Heirs of Promises Sanctuary; my dear colleagues Noah Ben Adam, Samy Baka, and Didier Losango.

## Abstract

The thesis pinpoints the responsibility of external powers in the tragic course of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as their influence on the policy making its leaders, from 1997 to 2001. It points out that, given the country's geostrategic position in the heart of Africa and its immense natural resources, foreign governments play the preeminent role in the shaping of its destiny, particularly during the abovementioned five-year period marked by the two Congo Wars.

This role had been blunt in the demise of Mobutu's 32 year-long reckless, kleptocratic regime, as a consequence of the shift, by the United States of America aiming to safeguard its hegemonic interests in Central Africa, of the strategically pivotal pawn from Zaire to Uganda in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Thus, craving a great influence in the continent and sponsored by multinational companies from North America, Belgium, Australia and South Africa, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, along with his ex-subordinate Rwandan Deputy President Paul Kagame, patronized in October 1996 the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), a Congolese rebel group led by Laurent Kabila and committed to oust Field Marshal Mobutu who bit the dust on 17 May 1997.

The superseding AFDL reign will be mainly featured by the takeover of key positions of the state authority by Rwandans and Ugandans (keeping President Kabila in the thrall of his two eastern mentors), the throttling of the democratic process, the conditioning by major powers of any funding of Kinshasa's triennial development programme to the Kabila regime's observance of democracy, human rights and a UN investigation of the mass killing of Hutu Rwandese refugees on the DRC's soil. That international community's stance infuriated the Congolese leader who reconsidered all mining contracts signed with multinationals, developing anti-West discourse, promoted South-South cooperation, and expressed Rwandans and Ugandans from the Congo.

The Western-backed Rwanda and Uganda bounced back by undertaking a military toppling of Laurent Kabila; but they reaped a fiasco because of three factors: intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan siding with Kinshasa; dissention within the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD); and tension between Kigali and Kampala that initiated the creation of a new rebel group: the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The stalemate brought about by this situation and the involvement of the UN, the OAU, the SADC, the US, France and Belgium compelled the warring parties to conclude the Lusaka Agreement, setting up a roadmap for the war end, the inter-Congolese dialogue, a new transitional government, and an electoral process toward the democratic rebirth in the DRC. However, the Lusaka Agreement will be implemented thanks to

the rise of Major General Joseph Kabila, after the assassination of his phantasmagoric father Laurent Kabila, paving the way to the Third Republic.

## *ACRONYMS*

|        |                                                                 |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| ACC    | Anglo-American Corporation                                      |
| AFD    | Alliance of Democratic Forces                                   |
| AFDL   | Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire |
| AGOA   | African Growth and Opportunities Act                            |
| AGI    | Accord Global et Inclusif                                       |
| AU     | African Union                                                   |
| BGC    | Barrick Gold Corporation                                        |
| CENCO  | National Conference Episcopal of the DR Congo                   |
| CIAT   | International Committee in Support of the Transition            |
| CNR    | Conseil National de Resistance                                  |
| CNS    | Sovereign National Conference                                   |
| DDRR   | Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, and Reintegration    |
| DDR    | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration                   |
| DRC    | Democratic Republic of Congo                                    |
| EU     | European Union                                                  |
| FAC    | Congolese Armed Forces                                          |
| FARDC  | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo            |
| FAZ    | Zairian Armed Forces                                            |
| FDLR   | Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda                  |
| FNL    | National Forces of Liberation                                   |
| GSSP   | Special Presidential Security Guard                             |
| HCR-PT | High Council of Republic-Parliament of Transition               |
| ICD    | Inter-Congolese Dialogue                                        |
| ICG    | International Crisis Group                                      |
| IEC    | Independent Electoral Commission                                |
| IPC    | Ituri Pacification Committee                                    |
| JMC    | Joint Military Commission                                       |
| LRA    | Lord's Resistance Army                                          |
| MLC    | Movement for the Liberation of the Congo                        |

|          |                                                                            |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MPR      | Popular Movement of the Revolution                                         |
| MONUC    | United Nations Organisation Mission in Congo                               |
| OAU      | Organisation of African Unity                                              |
| OCHA     | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs                        |
| PACMT    | Political Agreement for Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC |
| RCD-Goma | Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma                                         |
| RCD-ML   | Congolese Rally for Democracy- Liberation Movement                         |
| RCD-N    | Congolese Rally for Democracy-National                                     |
| SADC     | Southern African Development Community                                     |
| SPLA     | Sudan People's Liberation Army                                             |
| UDPS     | Union for Democracy and Social Progress                                    |
| UNITA    | National union for the total independence of Angola                        |
| UPC      | Union of the Congolese People                                              |



## **Table of contents**

|                                                                                                      |              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| <b>GENERAL INTRODUCTION</b>                                                                          | <b>1</b>     |
| 1. Aim and Research Question                                                                         | 1            |
| 2. Historical Background                                                                             | 1            |
| 3. Rationale                                                                                         | 2            |
| 4. Research Problem Statement                                                                        | 3            |
| 5. Scope of the Research                                                                             | 4            |
| 6. Methodology                                                                                       | 4            |
| <br><b>CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL CONTEXT BEFORE 17 MAY 1997</b>                                         | <br><b>5</b> |
| 1.0. INTRODUCTION                                                                                    | 5            |
| 1.1. CAUSES OF THE MOBUTU REGIME'S                                                                   | 5            |
| 1.1.1. The Internal Causes of the Mobutu Regime's Collapse                                           | 6            |
| 1.1.1.1. The economic recession                                                                      | 6            |
| 1.1.1.2. The political contestation.                                                                 | 7            |
| 1.1.1.3. The gradual weakening of the national army.                                                 | 7            |
| 1.1.2. The external causes of the Mobutu regime's collapse                                           | 8            |
| 1.1.2.1. The Belgo-Zairian Contention                                                                | 8            |
| 1.1.2.2. The IMF-Zaire Crisis                                                                        | 9            |
| 1.1.2.3. The End of the Cold War                                                                     | 9            |
| 1.1.2.4. The Rise of the Democrat President Bill Clinton                                             | 10           |
| 1.2. HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS FAILED AND PAVED A WAY FOR THE<br>ASCENSION OF LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA | 10           |
| 1.3. THE FIRST CONGO WAR AND EFFORT FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATION                                        | 13           |
| 1.3.1. The beginning of the conspiracy                                                               | 14           |
| 1.3.1.1. The Franco- American Standoff                                                               | 14           |

|                                                                             |           |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1.3.1.2. The Axis of the Conspiracy: The Americano-Ugando-Rwandese Alliance | 15        |
| 1.3.2. The launch of the rebellion                                          | 18        |
| 1.3.2.1. The Official Reasons and the Outset of the Rebellion               | 18        |
| 1.3.2.2. The Creation of the AFDL                                           | 19        |
| 1.3.2.3. The Unwinding of the War                                           | 21        |
| 1.4. CONCLUSION                                                             | 24        |
| <b>CHAPTER TWO: L.D. KABILA IN POWER</b>                                    | <b>25</b> |
| 2.0. INTRODUCTION                                                           | 25        |
| 2.1. THE BACKING OF EXTERNAL FORCES                                         | 25        |
| 2.1.1. The Suppression of the Political Debate                              | 26        |
| 2.1.2. The Monopolization of Power                                          | 26        |
| 2.2. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ALLIES ON THE LAURENT KABILA REGIME               | 27        |
| 2.2.1. The Foreign Dominion in the National Army                            | 27        |
| 2.2.2. The foreign influence over the early government policies             | 27        |
| 2.2.2.1. A Chaotic Politics: From Cronyism to Nationalism                   | 27        |
| 2.2.2.2. A Calamitous Diplomacy                                             | 28        |
| 2.2.3. The Foreign influence over the AFDL-ERA Congo's Economics            | 32        |
| 2.2.3.1. The AFDL-Era Congo and the International divestment                | 32        |
| 2.2.3.2. The AFDL-ERA Congo and the South-South Cooperation                 | 34        |
| 2.3. ALLIED OR ENEMIES?                                                     | 34        |
| 2.3.1. Laurent Kabila's Unshakeable Nationalism                             | 35        |
| 2.3.2. The Western Powers' Double Standard Policy                           | 35        |
| 2.3.3. The Congolese People's Pressures                                     | 36        |



|                                                                               |           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>CHAPTER THREE: L.D. KABILA AND THE SECOND WAR IN THE DRC</b>               | <b>38</b> |
| 3.0. INTRODUCTION                                                             | 38        |
| 3.1. ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT                                                  | 38        |
| 3.1.1. Axing of Rwandans from leading positions in the DRC                    | 38        |
| 3.1.2. Hearty relations between the DRC and the States Blacklisted by America | 39        |
| 3. 2. THE SECOND CONGO WAR: REBELLION OR AGGRESSION?                          | 39        |
| 3.2.1. Internal causes leading to rebellion                                   | 40        |
| 3.2.2. External causes leading to aggression                                  | 41        |
| 3.3. IMPLICATION OF EXTERNAL FORCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR | 41        |
| 3.3.1. International Community and the Second Congo War                       | 42        |
| 3.3.2. Responsibility of powers hostile to the Kabila Regime                  | 43        |
| 3.3.2.1. Rwanda                                                               | 43        |
| 3.3.2.2. Uganda                                                               | 47        |
| 3.3.2.3. Burundi                                                              | 49        |
| 3.3.3. Responsibility of the powers allied to the Kabila Regime               | 49        |
| 3.3.3.1. Zimbabwe                                                             | 50        |
| 3.3.3.2. Angola                                                               | 52        |
| 3.3.3.3. Namibia                                                              | 53        |
| 3.3.3.4. Sudan                                                                | 54        |
| 3.3.3.5. Chad                                                                 | 55        |
| 3.3.4. Role of the Neutral Powers                                             | 56        |
| 3.3.4.1. Engaged Neutral Powers                                               | 57        |
| 3.3.4.2. Noncommittal Neutral Powers                                          | 57        |
| 3.3.5. Course of the war                                                      | 58        |
| 3.4. CONCLUSION                                                               | 59        |

|                                                                                                   |           |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>CHAPTER FOUR: ROAD TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION</b>                                             | <b>60</b> |
| 4.0. INTRODUCTION                                                                                 | 60        |
| 4.1.THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRC<br>CRISIS                                | 60        |
| 4.1.1. The United Nations’ Intervention                                                           | 60        |
| 4.1.2. The Troika’s Congo War Policies                                                            | 61        |
| 4.1.3. The Organization of African Unity                                                          | 64        |
| 4.2. Search of peace and ceasefire agreement                                                      | 65        |
| 4.2.1. The Sirte Summit                                                                           | 65        |
| 4.2.2. The Lusaka Summit                                                                          | 66        |
| 4.3. THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT                                                                         | 67        |
| 4.3.1. Successes of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement                                                | 67        |
| 4.3.1.1. Affirmation of the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the DRC                      | 67        |
| 4.3.1.2. Recognition of the Imperative to Resolve the Internal Congolese Crisis                   | 67        |
| 4.3.1.3. Commission of the Restoration of Security in the Great Lakes Subregion<br>by Signatories | 68        |
| 4.3.1.4. Commission of the Neutralization of “Negative Forces” by Signatories                     | 68        |
| 4.3.2. Misfires of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement                                                 | 69        |
| 4.3.2.1. The Agreement’s Shortness                                                                | 69        |
| 4.3.2.2. The Agreement’s Juridical Incoherence                                                    | 70        |
| 4.3.2.3. The Trap against the Kabila Regime                                                       | 70        |
| 4. 4. THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS                                                            | 71        |
| 4.5. THE KABILA ASSASSINATION                                                                     | 72        |
| 4.5.1. The Assassination as It Allegedly Happened                                                 | 72        |
| 4.5.2. The Palace Revolution Theory                                                               | 74        |
| 4.5.3. The Americano-Angolan Conjuraton hypothesis                                                | 75        |

|                                                       |           |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 4.6. JOSEPH KABILA AND THE NEW POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES | 76        |
| GENERAL CONCLUSION                                    | 78        |
| <b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>                                   | <b>80</b> |