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DISCUSSION

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LANGUAGE TEACHING AT SCHOOLS AND FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS

Michael Gardiner

The present situation in language teaching at schools and for secondary school teachers is a most unhappy one. Instead of adopting with relish the position of the self-indulgent pedagogue who deplores the present situation, I am actually glad that the situation is worsening. For far too long now, it has been comfortable for teachers and academics to express concern at declining standards. Such comfort has served to justify feelings of superiority in the reactionary and the ultra-conservative. The situation is rapidly becoming so bad now that the reactionaries and ultra-conservatives are almost obsolete and irrelevant. They have stood in the way of change for so long that they will go down with the rest of the edifice.

In the words of Yeats,

> All things fall and are built again,
> And those that build them again are gay.
>
> (Lapis Lazuli)

We have been shoring up the rotten timbers for too long. We have defended the indefensible, we have justified the unjust: in the words of jazz musicians, we have 'paid our dues' in serving the system. I believe that we have earned our right to say what we know about what we want.

Where are we, and what are we facing?

We are faced with the patent failure of "language" in the schools. After 10 years of instruction, pupils might have learned to manipulate language in some of the current conventions with a fair degree of accuracy, but to what end? - to the successful completion of ritualistic exercises, to a certain level of trainability, to a certain degree of employability. Language teachers continue to flounder in uncertainty, and now applied linguistics (in forms such as psycho- and socio-linguistics) is hurrying to give some point and purpose to language teaching. I hope that applied linguistics can get beyond discovering truisms (such as 'every teacher is a teacher of language') and offer something really meaningful for language teachers to do.

A certain kind of re-orientation in the approach to language has been attempted under the term (a catch-all term, massively encumbered by its radical imprecision), under the term 'Communications'. My impression is that the real energy in this field has remained - and probably should remain - in the world of the machine i.e. a specialised, accurately defined, deliberately intended mode of transmitting signals within an extremely narrow range. The teaching of literature is also in a confused state. Education has succeeded in turning art into a commodity: as Harold Rosenberg has said: 'if art becomes an extension of daily life, it loses itself; it becomes a commodity among commodities, Kitsch.' (1)

So literature in our schools becomes kitsch. If we avoid this, we fall into the trap of failing to perceive what modernism, since before 1905, has been trying to tell us: that pre-modernist literature (in teaching situations this is usually Shakespeare to Hardy) lies on the other side of a really great divide (and our pupils and students know this better than we do) and that unless we approach these works with a keen sense of what they can and cannot mean today, we present them as aesthetic artifacts, despite pandering to banal notions like 'relevance' or 'contemporary interpretation'. What I am saying is that teachers of language in literature need, in Gabriel Josipovici's words, to 'rethink our notion of culture and its relation to books and, in so doing, learn one of the lessons of modernism. (2) We cannot work as if no major cultural changes had occurred.

In emphasising the need to recognise change, I am aware that much attention is being given to the concerns of Technikons, and that Technikons are intended to be and are indeed becoming a major force in our society. When I consider the function of language in bridging the gap between society's needs and education in this context, then I naturally think of the relationship between language and the technically skilled graduates of Technikons. If Technikons focus their attention on a utilitarian notion of language, then they are

likely to move in the direction explored by Dickens in Hard Times, where the point is incisively made that knowledge conceived in strictly utilitarian forms (and expressed in the appropriate mode) has only to do with the narrowest kind of reality, as in Bitzer's definition of a horse:

Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth. Thus (and much more) Bitzer.

Such a view of reality leaves room for no life at all.

The other direction that Technikons would move in if they adopt the utilitarian view of language is towards the situation in Huxley's Brave New World, where workers are conditioned absolutely to take their places in an inflexible system.

If we approve the telling of myths, legends, fables and fairy-tales to our young children, why do we cease to do so to older children and to young adults? Are older people really less concerned about 'the creation of all things, the origin of evil, the salvation of man's soul' (as Elizabeth Cook (3) defines myths, for example) than children are?

All educational institutions have to find their place in the social lives of people, and the language used in such institutions indicates what choices have been made about what they believe human society is and should be. What interests me about the immediate future of Technikons is their increasing multi-racial character. It interests me because I wonder if Technikons are going to continue to assert the primacy of a western, highly-sophisticated technological and capitalist view of society.

Will they take a place in the educational master-plan to ensure white domination?

A utilitarian view of language will put Technikons precisely there. If Technikons intend to train people within what I believe is the real context of South African society, then other kinds of language will have to be spoken, and read and written.

I have used some of the choices facing Technikons as examples of the factors I believe that we need to consider in language teaching at all levels and in all educational situations.

As teachers of language, we need to analyse very precisely where we are and what we want. Our decisions should be acts of our own volition, otherwise we will continue within a system that has failed. If language studies and literature

are not suffusing us and our pupils and students with an increasing sense of what we are and what we want, silence would be preferable to our current chatter.

And that is another lesson of modernism.

Notes

(1) Harold Rosenberg The Tradition of the New, London: Paladin, 1970.

(2) Gabriel Josipovici The Lessons of Modernism, London: Macmillan, 1977.

(3) Elizabeth Cook The Ordinary and the Fabulous, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

ARTICLES

COULD EDUCATIONAL THEORY BE A SCIENCE?

John Sebedi

PREAMBLE

As acute 'crisis of identity' is being experienced within the various circles of social scientists. This, apparently, has been going on for some time now. According to Richard J. Bernstein (1) this painful 'soul searching' among the pundits of the social sciences became particularly acute and frenzied during the boisterous '60s, a period during which society, the 'Establishment', stood with its back against the wall, defending itself and the legitimacy of its institutions with the frantic gestures of a drowning man. The social sciences came under heavy fire as the 'ideological supports' of intolerable social institutions and exploitative economic structures. This was the period during which Existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre, Marcuse and the others, scored devastating points against the 'system', the 'Establishment'. Their philosophical pronouncements soon became jargonised and emulated by almost every university student who felt like a 'dig' at the straight-laced and blasé traditions of society.

Doubts about 'who you are' can be terribly unsettling, to say the least. Such doubts play havoc with the instinctual drive of self-preservation and thus bring about the brittle situation of 'fight for survival'. A set-up which is the least conducive to calm, fruitful and in-depth thinking.

It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that when a great many social scientists found themselves faced with a

situation in which serious and disconcerting challenges were being continually levelled at the epistemological foundations of their disciplines, they funked, floundered and clutched at almost anything to shore up the apparently tottering walls of their intellectual edifice, the sciences of man.

THE CHALLENGE: D.J. O'CONNOR

Many and varied are the challenges brought against the logical and epistemological basis of the social sciences. Because of this, one will be bound to be very selective in one's discussion of the complaints people have against the sciences of man. Perhaps the best methodological approach is to pounce upon one of those people who best exemplifies and embodies, in his writings, almost everything that can be said against the scientific status of the sciences of man. Such a man, to my mind, is Professor D.J. O'Connor, - indeed a consistent and formidable 'gadfly' in the eyes of the defenders of the scientific status of the social sciences.

O'Connor advocates a strong positivist, empirical approach to knowledge. 'Reliable knowledge', as opposed to 'opinion', 'guesses' or 'beliefs', has to be based, solidly, on an empirical foundation. And reliable knowledge, meaning or explanation about 'facts in the universe' can only come from the Formal Sciences, logic and mathematics, and the Natural Sciences.

True, genuine science is a science which stubbornly sets out to explain phenomena, to tell us why things are the way they are. Now, questions about why things are what they are, are, in the final analysis, questions about the CAUSES of things. The specific function of science therefore is to proffer EXPLANATORY theories which map out causal links or connections between phenomena.

Statements made in the formal sciences are Analytic. Such statements, although meaningful on the linguistic level, offer no 'new' information to anybody who knows the language in which they are made: 'a husband is a married man'. There is no causal link here. The connection or link between the two subjects 'husband' and 'married man' is a necessary, logical connection. The natural sciences do not deal with necessary non-causal connections, but with contingent, causal connections. Such connections come through in Synthetic statements: 'Whenever a body is unsupported, it falls down'. There is a contingent, causal connection between a 'body' and 'falling down'.

Science analyses these connections and deduces general laws from them. The idea of laws immediately implies the existence of UNIFORMITIES or regularities in the world of phenomena. Generalisations or universal laws, which play quite a major role in science, cannot be outside the basic

assumption that regularities do exist in nature. As mentioned above, the principal aim of a scientific theory is to offer explanations. And an explanation in the scientific sense is really a DEDUCTION from a general law or laws which have withstood the rigor of what Karl Popper calls the principle of falsifiability or refutation, carried through down right empirical observation in the world of 'facts'.

Therefore any theory which wants to be a claimant to the title 'scientific', must at least satisfy the following criteria: it must have

a) Explanatory power,

b) Falsifiability (i.e. be open to empirical refutation).

If they are not explanatory and refutable, then they cannot be genuine candidates to the title 'scientific'. To be truly 'explanatory' a theory has to link what it hypothesizes about with what people have good reason to accept on empirical grounds; and the 'falsifiability' of such a theory helps it retain that essential and necessary connection with objective facts, observable phenomena (2).

And any statement which purports to be scientific but does not conform to the above 'scientific model' is counterfeit and meaningless. And the majority of statements made within the ranks of the social sciences are counterfeit and meaningless if one uses the 'scientific model of explanation' yardstick. Metaphysical statements and judgements of value statements, the stock in trade of the social sciences, do not have the explanatory power of genuine scientific theories or statements, and lack the latter's openness to 'falsifiability'. They are not open - as empirical statements are - to experimental observation, which is a conditio sine qua non of any genuine scientific inquiry.

Theories of education are by and large a potpourri of pseudo-scientific statements. They theorise about unobservable data like 'motives', 'intentions', 'aims', 'purposes', 'feelings' and so on and so forth and pretend they are proffering scientific explanations about various practices in education, whereas in fact they are simply offering 'rationalisations' at best, or 'ideological bases' at worst. There can be no genuine link between educational theory and educational practice. The former is more often than not a rationalisation of successful practice. Practice precedes theory. And this means that theory in education cannot form an adequate explanatory basis for practice.

'Laws' in the social sciences cannot be as precise and as general as laws in the natural sciences as UNIFORMITIES are

hard to come by in social matters.

REACTION: MAINSTREAM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

The mainstream social scientists are those who maintain that the social disciplines differ only in degree and not in kind from the natural sciences. They fully accept the positivist, empirical model of scientific inquiry and entertain the belief that it is only a matter of time before the social sciences reach the level of the natural sciences and become fully-fledged sciences. They are social empiricists.

But social empiricists cannot have it both ways. If they fully accept the limits or boundaries of knowledge set down by people like Professor D.J. O'Connor, namely, empirical observation and nothing else, then they must agree that quite a sizable part of the field of their inquiry is immediately shunted off. 'Things' like 'goals and ends', 'aims', 'intentions', 'purposes', etc., are evidently not amenable to empirical observation. But, and here's the rub, these form the very warp and woof of the human sciences. In fact, one could almost say that they are the very elements that set off the social sciences from the natural sciences.

This is how they wriggle out of this apparent dilemma. In their desire for full identification with the empirical method of inquiry as outlined by people like O'Connor and Hempel, these empirical social pundits claim that whatever pertains to the subject-matter of the human, social sciences is reducible to observable, empirical data. Although mental phenomena (or should one use the Kantian term 'noumena'?), are not empirically observable, they correspond to overt phenomena of behaviour open to empirical experimentation as are any data, say, in physics. So the deductive method of explanation employed in the physical sciences can be applied to the whole area of human social phenomena without much ado.

Sociology and, especially, psychology only have to reach the required level of scientific sophistication and, presto, the road to reliable scientific knowledge of the various mental states like 'values', 'intentions' and 'feelings' will be quite open and easily accessible through the observation of overt behaviour. Then the terms usually used to describe mental states would be replaced by terms predicative of overt behaviour. The declared aim is the reduction of non-empirical mental states to empirical data. Hence the term 'REDUCTIONISM' to describe this approach. Sometimes the word 'behaviourism' is used to refer to the above intellectual concern.

In the long history of 'reductionism' or 'behaviourism', names like Auguste Comte, the famous father of the 'science' of sociology, B. Malinowski, the renowned Anthropologist, Emile Durkheim, etc., loom large. 'Reductionism' has a

respectable patronage in the annals of intellectual history.

What, therefore, is the answer of the social scientists to such questions: 'could educational theory be a science?', or 'can the deductive, empirical method of scientific enquiry be applied to the whole gamut of sociological data?'. Admittedly, social scientists, even those that belong to the so called 'mainstream social scientists', are not indivisibly monolithic or homogeneous in their approach. But I think it is safe to say that the majority of them would give a categorical affirmative to the above questions. The variations in their answers would mainly point to the same basic assertion: Social science, educational theory included, is a science on a par with the sciences of nature; social science has the potential to be on the same level with the physical sciences, etc. In other words, they are convinced that there are NO LIMITS to the process of identification between the social sciences and the natural sciences.

THE UNTENABILITY OF THE 'SOCIAL EMPIRICAL' CAPITULATION

So, in order to avoid the charge of 'meaningless-ness' or 'epistemological weakness' placed upon statements made within their various disciplines, some social scientists, as we have seen above, found themselves capitulating and succumbing to the peremptory siren call of 'Either Observability, Or Meaningless-ness'. They opted, in the words of G.E. Moore, for the 'naturalistic fallacy' (3).

But 'reductionism', the naturalistic interpretation of human behaviour is somewhat untenable. Reductionists, in their zeal to emulate the methodological rigor of the empirical sciences, fail to take cognisance of the profound differences that obtain between the 'objects' (subject-matter) of the physical sciences and that of the human, social sciences. And the importance of paying attention to the differences in 'objects' cannot be over-emphasised. Sciences derive their essential specification from their objects. And to a very large degree, even the techniques of inquiry (experiment and investigation) cannot be determined a priori, but are dictated by the nature of the object (subject-matter) of the given science or intellectual discipline. For instance, the 'objects' of astronomy and astro-physics rule out of court the technique or method of 'controlled experimentation', while allowing 'controlled investigation'. What does this mean? If anything, it means that the methods of inquiry employed in physics, for example - 'controlled experimentation' coupled with 'controlled investigation' - cannot be applied holus-bolus to the sciences of Astronomy and Astro-physics. But I have yet to meet somebody who would say that this lack of full applicability of methods relegates these sciences to a pseudo-scientific status.

This should warn us against assuming that the deductive, empirical model of explanation used in the physical sciences can be applied, without much ado, to the whole area of human, social phenomena. Such an assumption is bound to do injustice to the very nature of the subject-matter under inquiry, namely, the 'social'.

The subject-matter of the social sciences is HUMAN ACTION, or behaviour, the complexity of which is attested to by almost everybody, including even the most extreme of sociological empiricists.

Now, one of the basic characteristics of human action is its PURPOSIVE aspect, its goal-directedness, - and this aspect is not open to empirical observation. But, as it might well be expected, reductionists in social disciplines deny this. Purpose - they say - is also open to empirical observation, because the purpose of an action is that which comes as an end result of the external, observable action. For example, the purpose of shoving wood into a coal stove is to make fire, and the end result of that observable action is 'fire', which is as empirically observable as was the action which brought it about.

Here the reductionists confuse what the Scholastics used to call the 'finis operis' (purpose of external act) and the 'finis operantis' (purpose of the acting agent). These two 'fines' (aims, ends, purposes) may coincide, but not necessarily. For example, the 'finis operis' of the external action of 'alms giving' will always be the alleviation of the beggar's plight, whilst the 'finis operantis' may be the praise from the onlookers, or the desire to get rid of the importunate beggar, or the desire to alleviate the beggar's situation. There's no telling which is which by just looking at the external, empirical act of 'alms giving'. The 'finis operantis', that which gives human signification, meaning, to the external action, is not open to empirical observation. And human action cannot be correctly interpreted without taking into account the 'finis operantis'.

This point is so important that it is worth another illustration, albeit banal. The external action of 'pulling a trigger' and shooting someone in the heart, will normally bring about the same result, 'finis operis', namely, someone's death. But the human MEANING of this external action cannot be reached until the 'finis operantis', the purpose of the acting agent is ascertained. The above external action can have several human meanings: 'legal execution', 'revenge', 'manslaughter', 'murder', etc. The external, empirical action derives its 'nature', its specification or meaning from the 'finis operantis'. And this important aspect of human behaviour cannot be arrived at by the methods of empirical, hypothetico-deductive

explanation, or be reduced to physiological states.

It is clear that human action is marked by a basic subjective meaning. By this I mean that it is the acting agent, and nobody else, who attaches 'meaning' to his actions.

Therefore, the normal way through which social scientists arrive at this 'hidden datum' of human action (finis operantis) is not by using the model of empirical scientific explanation as employed in Physics, but by resorting to LANGUAGE, oral or written. They depend largely on linguistic accounts of human behaviour given by the acting agents, - not so much on actual observation of action. Language is therefore an essential social phenomenon (6) and the major tool of inquiry for social scientists. Without understanding the language of the acting agent, there is no way in which the social scientist can arrive at the meaning of the acting agent's action, its interpretation and understanding.

But have we not come full circle? Is this not reductionism in terms of language? After all language does have empirical, observable traits like 'sound', 'marks on paper', 'Morse signals', etc. If the 'finis operantis' renders itself observable in this way, does this not reinforce the reductionist thesis, which says that even the purposive aspect of human actions is open to empirical observation?

Not quite. Observable sounds or marks on a paper are not necessarily 'language'. They can only become language within a specific social context. And this means that to recognise specific sounds or marks as meaningful language already implies that one has transcended the empirical descriptions of these 'sounds' or 'marks'. Sounds or marks in language are not 'natural signs'. They are 'conventional signs'. The important point to be made here is this: a man is not 'speaking' unless he 'intends'. And this latter throws the social scientist back to the subjective meaning of the acting agent, the unobservability of the 'finis operantis'.

But why should 'unobservability' be confused with meaninglessness or even non-existence? After all, not everything in Physics is open to empirical observation. For instance, things like 'electrons' and 'magnetic fields', we are told, are not observable (7). And yet these are real entities capable of causing empirical phenomena. They, though unobservable as mental states, have causal connections with observable phenomena. Perhaps, this explains the status of human mental states, like 'intentions', 'motives' or 'purposes'. They are not open to empirical methods of explanation, but they are there.

ACTION-EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Although uniformities or regularities can be established in the social sciences, these regularities cannot be used, as they are used in the natural sciences, to formulate explanatory generalisations about human behaviour. Human action can only be adequately explained in terms of 'reasons' or 'motives': regularities can only be used in the context of Probabilistic and Statistical generalisations. Such explanations take the form: 'In the majority of situations, when X, then Z'.

Putting flesh to this form, we can say: 'In the majority of situations, when a man gives alms to a beggar, he intends to alleviate his plight'. Evidently, this generalisation is restricted in scope. But it is far from being arbitrary or weakly commonsensical. It is a prediction which can be made with a respectable degree of accuracy. The advances and refinements made in the sciences of sociology and psychology continually increase the margin of accuracy in the predictions we can make of human behaviour in various situations.

Another point. The desire to don the garb of 'scientific theories' should not blind social scientists to the fact that the primary function of theory in the social sciences is not so much to 'explain the world', but to change it. And herein lies the 'Practicality' of the social sciences as contrasted with the explanatory function of theory in the natural sciences. (8) So there is a difference not only in subject-matter, but also in function.

Does this make educational theory and the other social sciences Unscientific? Yes and no. Yes, if one accepts the empirical methods exemplified in the natural sciences as 'normative' paradigm delimiting the possibilities of human knowledge within its own scope. No, if one credits the commonsensical experience of mankind the world over vis-a-vis man's ability to transcend with his 'conscious mind' things empirical or material. Social life would be impossible if the only yard-stick of knowledge, genuine knowledge, were empirical knowledge. The role or function of the social sciences is quite vital to the life of human communities. So, to my mind it is unimportant whether or not the social sciences, including educational theory, deserve the status of 'scientific theories'. Social disciplines are sciences with a difference. To compare them with the natural sciences is, to use the phrase of R. Merton, a 'misplaced masochism' (9).

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(3) G E Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903, p. 6

(4) Michael Lessnoff, The Structure of Social Science, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974, p. 32

(5) Op. cit., p. 38

(6) Op. cit., p. 41

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THE TEACHING OF FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION: A STATEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND OBJECTIVES

Keyan Tomaselli

"... the function of a university is the production of knowledge, and that teaching is only a necessary means to that end. In short, instructors and pupils... compose a company who are all occupied in studying together, some under leading strings and some not".

Charles Sanders Peirce, 1880

"The notion of experimental art is meaningless. All art is experimental or it isn't art. Art is research..."

Gene Youngblood, 1970

Introduction

South African society is unique. Politically it is complex, socially it is contradictory, economically it is divided by class and artistically it is still in a state of becoming. Televisually, we are a controlled media experiment; cinematically we are ideologically guided, and artistically we are escapist and safe in our landscapes and wildlife, or brutal and superficial in our tortured political sculpture and contorted images. Our heritage and landscape is rich, diverse and powerful. The dramatic light and photographic qualities of our physical environment are stark - the veld, the mountains, the deserts, the canyons, and the bushveld. The social environment is striking and complex - black, brown, white and yellow - but few representative or honest images are relected in the media.

Media America - Implications for South African Film

We are dependent upon Hollywood for cinematic perspectives and Madison Avenue for self-image. We are a part of Africa but isolated from it. Film-makers in South Africa are unable to dissociate themselves from society and study it critically. The consequence is that history and culture are distorted in terms of our umbilical link with Media America and the dominant white South African culture, its preoccupations, its fears, its values and its ideology. Ideology is the lived relationship between people and their world; (1) it prescribes ways of being and ways of seeing

and cannot, therefore, be ignored in a critical analysis. Few film makers in this country are even aware of how their ideology distorts and warps perceptions of the actual scheme of things. In academic circles it is sometimes argued that cinema must have a 'civilising' influence and should be clinically synonymous with the decontextualised images of Eisenstein, Ford and Fellini. Critically, the South African experience does not exist. Our cinema too, is suspicious of local imagery and pretends that it derives its roots from capitalist industries elsewhere. In general, local cinema has reduced itself to syndication: it attempts to touch up the masters, imbibes their techniques long since cliché and convention sterilizes content and cauterizes the richness of local themes. The structural determinants which have propelled the great film makers to the fore are ignored - for example, social upheaval (the Italian neorealists and the Nouvelle Vague); political and social discontent (Third World Cinema in Africa and South America); a normative desire for things as they ought to be (The Russian Formalists) and more recently, the self-criticism in American film generated by the Vietnam war.

In South Africa, this process of syndication manifests itself in "technique". Emphasis on technique results in a quest for continually improved means. This is best seen in documentaries, where the techniques of production lead to carelessly examined ends. (2) The techniques of camera operation, for example, may be considered by the film maker to be of more importance than other objectives - the result may be a visually pleasing film using zooms, pull focusing, tracking shots, opticals and special effects etc., all totally irrelevant and perhaps even obscuring the actual conditions of existence of the people the film is dealing with. The result is 'creative' photography with little evidence of accuracy or relationship. The means, the camera technique becomes the end, the beautiful shot. The significance of events, interactions and relationships, however fundamental, may end up on the screen as trivia, with little connection to anything other than a 'beautiful' composition in the mind of the film maker. Purposes then drop out of sight and an ideologically controlled efficiency becomes the central concern. "What does the audience want?" is the rhetorical question, for this refrain is thought to determine the saleability of a film. Audience wants are generally motivated by ideological considerations which prescribe the boundaries of interpretation. (3) Technique therefore, is itself ideological. Film is both an unconscious and a deliberate technique of manipulation. Content also, is ideologically determined, but a scientific study of both will assist in identifying what is technique, what is content and what is ideology. In the absence of a critical approach to the study of technique and content, ideology unobtrusively continues, unrestricted, unidentified and unconsciously. As one local film maker naively commented

on the films made by the Chamber of Mines for the mine worker compounds: "Our films are totally apolitical - we don't get involved in politics".

Criticism and the Problem of Ideology

To teach uncritically is to abrogate the principles of academia, to ignore the noise factor embodied in technique and to unwittingly perpetuate a State processed reality. The media are the agents of this reality. (4) The designated reality becomes self-sustaining and is efficiently disseminated and accepted by a nation's people. Simultaneously art 'becomes' contentious and political and consequently the butt of social and cultural hostility. (eg. Jans Rautenbach's Die Kandidaat and Katrina and Sven Persson's Land Apart.) The versions of reality reflected in these films differs from that of the socially entrenched status quo. If as Gene Youngblood (5) argues, art is research (and Youngblood offers some impelling arguments derived from thermodynamics, cybernetics and philosophy for this contention), the artist in this climate must be an anarchist, a revolutionary, a creator of new world imperceptibly gaining on reality. (6) To create means to question, to make the receiver more aware of the actual scheme of things, stripped of their opaque reality which is nourished by ideology. The symbiosis between ideology and technique is mutually reinforcing. It is, therefore, necessary to unravel ideology, to unravel technique, to separate ideology from our experiences of life, and to investigate our motivations, our social structures and our social relations. Art is a vehicle for this research; film is a tool to discover reality, and television should be a window on the actual scheme of things; the world is not only a stage as Shakespeare would have it, but a television documentary as well. (7) A study of content cannot be separated from an examination of technique; Eisenstein demonstrated this. (8) So did Andre Bazin (9) and the documentary film makers; as did Kracauer (10) in his commentary on German Expressionism; and as are the electrovideographic artists like the Witneys, Belson and Stehura. (11) Whatever reality being investigated through the medium of art falls into the domain of research. Skills alone are not enough, for skills carry with them their own limitations and inexorably draw the parameters and boundaries of potential. Our language, our frameworks, our paradigms, although in a constant state of flux, inevitably structure our perception and models of reality. The work done by Sol Worth and John Adair (12) among Navajo Indians is a stark empirical verification of this fact. Analysis of such skills, their origin, their function and effects in relation to content is necessary if we are to be able to approach a conceptualisation of reality through film or video - to reveal the real scheme of things, and not the reality within which our language, culture and ideology confines us.

In short, film and television should, ideally, satisfy the needs of people for new experiences, evoke discriminating responses, expand an individual's consciousness and transcend the prejudices of isolated or dominant groups. A broadening of our understanding of reality will correlate with an increased insight into our own and other people's experiences. Art is the communal domain of sociology, anthropology, geography, ethnography, politics and psychology. Film as art should embody the progressive soul of a nation, externalise it and provide mirrors by which a society can discover who and what it is. A society without experimentation is doomed to stagnation and sterility. Film and television are methods of reflection and provide windows through which man tries to make sense of his experiences. (13) A cinema or visual heritage which does not reflect the depth of a nation's soul is reflecting a society which does not understand itself and which is without mirrors.

Teaching Objectives

It is against such a background that an academic degree in the media or communication arts should be evaluated. From this discussion emerge a number of basic objectives which impinge upon a university teaching film and television:

1. The derivation of thought from first principles in the solution of problems (whether creative, technical, or theoretical) should form the basis of an academic course, including those in film and television production.

2. An ability to identify pertinent problems and to suggest normative solutions demands the stimulation of a critical mind which is able to separate form from process and skills from theory. Such a course must, therefore, venture beyond the simple impartation of skills and the mere transmission of knowledge.

3. Distinct from the purely informative transmission of knowledge is the production of knowledge where both staff and student encourage each other. This implies that the teacher must be conceptually and theoretically equipped to actively contribute to the human stock of knowledge. This requires an understanding of research methods, both theoretical and empirical.

4. The student must learn to create, to find without imposing. He must learn to sense rhythm and patterns, lines of tension and strain. He must decipher different kinds of logic operating in the world, the emotional and the sequential. And, the forces which impel and guide that creation must be studied and their significance assessed in a relevant social perspective. Art, creation or social research does not exist in vacuo.

STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THE FILM AND TELEVISION COURSES

As part of the four year degree in Dramatic Art, the student has to complete a three year major from the Arts Faculty on a subject of his choice, for example, Drama and Film, Sociology, English, Afrikaans, Zulu etc. The Dramatic Art course itself covers the theory, history, criticism and practice of the activities offered: drama, radio, film and television. Within these disciplines fall various ancillary courses including design, voice and speech, acting, stage techniques and movement.

This article will concentrate on the practice of film and television production. This activity is inter-related with other areas such as design, props, costume, make-up and so on, which will not be dealt with in detail in this issue.

First Year

The practical course starts off with an introduction to the television studio. (14) The main objective is to interface the student with the technology of production where the results, unlike in film, are immediate. The underlying rationale is that the student, in this "hands on" situation will overcome a seeming innate fear of the technology so that when he comes to handle more 'remote' film equipment, he will do so more confidently. It has been my experience, as well as that of other teachers that urban university students have difficulty in coming to terms with the technology of film. (15) Judging from results so far it is evident that course one students are (a) less reticent to handle cameras and editing facilities; and (b) are producing technically and thematically more complex movies than earlier first year classes which tackled film first. To return to the television component: the hands on production includes camera work, visionmixing, directing, sound, management etc. Students not involved in a technical capacity do front of camera presentations such as interviews, group discussions, newsreading and so on. This activity exposes the student to the demands of television performance as opposed to the more vigorous movements and gestures employed by stage actors. On playback, aspects such as camera operation, cutting, speech, gestures are analysed in detail. Simultaneous with the teaching of production and the manipulation of technology should be some discussion on the semiotics of television, and how composition, programming editing, lighting, framing colour depth etc., affects the message which is actually communicated. Baggaly and Duck (16), for example, have shown that if a speaker is televised in half profile, the shot tends to be decoded in terms of the subject being a more reliable and expert figure than if the same speaker is televised full face.

The course then moves onto creative thinking and scripting. Film is a polysemic medium using several sign systems simultaneously, and is, in essence, non-linear in character. It follows an emotional, rhythmic and integrative logic, unlike science, written language or sequential logic. It is generally accepted that this division of emotional integrative logic or art from the mathematical, digital primarily language oriented linear logic has its origin in the hemispherical duality in brain structure. (17) The student is therefore made aware of this and shown how Western culture has been dominant in developing the left side of the brain, which is concerned with sequential reasoning, at the expense of the artistic, affective functions processed by the right hemisphere of the brain. During scripting the student is taught to harness the creative energy of both sides of the brain by means of creative patterning exercises. Once this technique has been mastered, the student must apply it to the derivation of a film script. Over the student's basic idea, which is developed by means of creative patterning, must be imposed the normal conventional linear based treatment, script and breakdown script. Once the script has been vetted for its cinematic viability, the student is allowed to proceed into production. Emphasis is on non-narrative film for the student must learn to discover the immediacy of his surroundings before progressing onto aesthetic manipulation in narrative film. The rushes are viewed by the whole class which is encouraged to criticise both the technical and thematic aspects of the film. Students are then taught the fundamentals of editing, both technical and creative, in relation to both the films they have made and the postulates of the major film theories. (18)

Second Year

The second year commences with an introduction to single system sound shooting and the use of sound in general. The use of sound is only introduced at this stage for both technical and thematic reasons. Film is primarily a visual medium. The student is therefore expected to master the visual component before combining the image track with the sound track. This distinction is fundamental, for the silent film maker, in order to hold his viewer's attention, must have complete control over the medium. Too often, the use of sound at too early a stage in the learning of film making, short-circuits a complete ability to communicate purely visually. The result is that the lazy or incompetent film maker relies on the use of sound to mask the inadequacies of the film or to disguise bad editing. Single system sound shooting involves the filming of actuality subjects such as news, on-the-spot reporting and cinemá vêrité. This area of film making moves the student into the ambit of semiotics and the structure of communication which is dealt with in the theory course. (19)

The second major area of study is structured around group projects which will investigate through film and video, subjects like proxemics, kinesics, gesture or some other form of educational and/or research topic. These exercises confront the student with the problems of ethnographic film as opposed to the problem of aesthetics and art. (20) An example is the filming of aspects of the working life of an ice-cream vendor. This actuality footage is then used in a TV documentary which analyses and evaluates patterns of interaction between the vendor and his clientele. Lessons learnt in this type of exercise are very useful when applied to the broader area of social relationships. Analysis reveals aspects of behaviour and confronts the student with the problem in narrative cinema of recreating and directing such performances for the camera.

Third Year

A detailed introduction to television scripting, which is a far more complex and precise exercise than is a film script, is taught by means of a group project produced in the colour TV studios. This may be either a video documentary or a drama. (21) In the former case the subject tackled is usually of an investigative reporting nature taking an in-depth look at social problems, for example, response to the needs of black education and aspects of domestic workers.

The second teaching area covers double system filming methods, editing techniques using separate magnetic tracks, sound editing and sound studio operations. Teams of two students make a short movie using double system methods. In this course, the emphasis is on the mastering of technique, for this is the first year of specialization and the student will be expected to be primarily concerned with content and directing in the following year. (22)

The theory courses are far more extensive during this year and cover content analysis, cultural indicators, ideology and ethnographic film making. A detailed course is offered on the history of film decor and costume design, the creation of mood, colour, music and effects.

Fourth Year

By this stage the student should have mastered the basic techniques of film and television production and have arrived at the point where he can apply his energies to the exploration of content, an application of process and a specialisation in directing.

Practical projects include film and television productions under the direction of the teaching staff. Crews are drawn from the junior years. The practical is designed to approximate the procedures of professional production and

allows students to learn by observation. It will also, hopefully, alleviate some of the individualistic, obstructive and counter-productive behaviour patterns which have been noted in senior students who, in the past, appeared to be unable or unwilling to work as a team. This project encourages students to integrate their knowledge derived from other courses such as set design, mood evocation and film music into the activity and so gain valuable practical experience.

Individual film projects are usually of an ethnographic nature and are designed to teach the student how to solve theoretical and conceptual problems of content, process and technique and to understand the significance and distortions of any particular film-making style or approach. In production it is an interview film on the last days of a meths drinking tramp. This film sets out to show his response to the society that has rejected him and is invaluable as an ethnographic record of the conditions of existence of the outcasts of an urban industrial society.

The practicals are supplemented by lectures on professional practice, i.e. a comprehensive knowledge of how the film and television industries are structured and how they work. The film course, for example, looks at financing, pre-production, production, post-production, distribution, promotion exhibition etc. This course is designed to give the student a background into the industry he/she will be entering, what the problems are, how they might be solved and how academic knowledge may be employed and utilised in a work environment generally hostile to innovation and change, and very often, graduates in film and television.

During this final year, the student, ideally should come to know as much, if not more, than the lecturer, in his area of specialization. Each student has to write a thesis based on empirical research and it is at this stage that C.S. Peirce's maxim should be operating at its highest potential and represent the normal course of events. Completed projects include a broad study of SABC-TV from 1976 - 78; (23) and the development and production of three video programmes aimed at teaching pre-school children the use and potential of their five senses. (24) Present projects include a sociological study of cinema aimed at black audiences and a film/video project recording the rituals and activities of Sangomas in Soweto.

The Question of Teacher Redundancy

The major aim of the teacher is to make himself redundant to each of his students where the teacher/student relationship is replaced by a student/subject relationship. The teacher in the modern university should reduce emphasis on direct teacher instruction and place more on management and

direction of the student's learning (25) to cause him to continually practice his own judgement and to come to trust it. (26) Against this background, learning becomes more of an individual activity than being a member of a class permits. Students are able to work at their own pace which has been shown to be faster than normal practice in the class-room. Also the cumulatively damaging effect of having fallen behind at some stage of the conventional paced system can be avoided.

The Chimera of a Value Free Dramatic Art

This discussion raises the question of the extent to which the academic should act as an instrument of change. Research into the continuum of knowledge is being utilized by the technostructure who provide the key institutions with better tools for economic exploitation and social manipulation. The existing value systems of decision-makers are reinforced by the key institutions (such as universities) of society and disposes them to a predetermined stance which has no slot for what ought to be at the expense of production and profit maximization. The chimera of a "value free" social science or dramatic art or communications studies is negated by the observation that our choice of problems to study and the phrasing of these problems is influenced by the values we hold and by our position in the social structure. Often the call for objectivity is nothing more than a mask for the use of social science (or art) to support the existing social order. Awareness of subjective values and an explicit statement of these is the only defense against "... a vain ritual or moral neutrality which, because it invites men to ignore the vulnerability of reason to bias, leaves it at the mercy of irrationality". (27) Universities are not screening or sifting devices to eliminate graduates who question the status quo, but should rather provide the student with an insight into the structure of the status quo and the ideology that nourishes it. Given this perspective, the student will identify the nature of his subjectivity and understand the significance of what he is doing.

Conclusion

While the present departmental emphasis on acquisition of skills and technique remains of utmost importance, so too must a generic acceptance of theory be brought about by both students and staff. While skills will be improved and enhanced with practice, mostly when the student has left the university, as far as theory is concerned, the fourth year of study is the student's last chance to entrench and forever internalize his appreciation of theory, the need to solve problems from first principles, and to physically put into practice the art-research equation.

Or as Peirce has expressed it, "...the function of a

university is the production of knowledge...". The extension of the boundaries of knowledge is effected through research and as Youngblood has argued in relation to film, "Art is research...."

NOTES

(1) L Althusser & E Balibar Reading Capital London; NLB (1970).

(2) J Ellul The Technological Society New York; Vintage Books (1964).

(3) The relationship between Ideology and audience wants is dealt with more fully in KG Tomaselli "Ideology and Censorship in South African Film" in Critical Arts, Vol.I, No.1 (1980) pgs 1-15.

(4) See, for example, D McQuail Sociology of Mass Communications New York; Penguin (1972).

(5) G Youngblood Expanded Cinema London; Studio Vista (1970).

(6) See, for example, M McLuhan Understanding Media New York; Abacus (1964) and JJ Lebel "On the Necessity of Violition" in Drama Review, Fall.

(7) Youngblood op.cit. pg 78. Since through television we are in daily contact with the human condition, according to Youngblood, there is no longer any need to represent it through art. (pg 79).

(8) See, for example, S Eisenstein Film Form edited and translated by J Leyda, London; J Dobson (1963).

(9) See, for example, A Bazin What is Cinema? translated by H Gray, Berkeley; University of California Press (1967).

(10) S Kracauer From Caligari to Hitler New Jersey; Princeton University Press (1974).

(11) For a detailed discussion of the work of these film makers see Youngblood op.cit. pgs 207-259.

(12) S Worth & J Adair Through Navajo Eyes; An exploration in the film of communication and anthropology Bloomington; Indiana University Press (1972).

(13) See, for example, J Van Zyl "The Socio-Semiology of Performance" and KG Tomaselli Media and Change Johannesburg; McGraw-Hill (1977) pgs 35-48.

(14) The Department has access to the University's Central TV Services which has a two camera monochrome studio and a multiple camera broadcast quality colour studio.

(15) See Worth & Adair, op.cit. Also see J Terry "Teaching film-making with a Super-8 at MIT" in American Cinematographer Vol.56, No.11 (1975) pgs 1286-1287 & 1299-1300.

(16) J Baggaly & S Duck The Dynamics of Television Hants; Saxon House (1976).

(17) See, for example, RE Ornstein The Psychology of Consciousness New York; Penguin (1977).

(18) The prescribed text for the theory course is LD Gianetti Understanding Movies Englewood Cliffs; Prentice Hall (1976).

(19) J Fiske & J Hartley Reading Television London; Methuen (1978).

(20) Recommended reading is J Collier Visual Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method, Studies in Anthropological Method Series, New York; Holt Rinehart & Wilson (1976).

(21) Prescribed text is G Millerson The Technique of Television Production London; Focal Press (1969).

(22) Prescribed text is M Mikolis & G Hoos Handbook of Super-8 Production New York; UBP (1979).

(23) G Gardon Television in South Africa 1976-1978. Final year thesis, School of Dramatic Art, University of the Witwatersrand.

(24) S Levy Something Else. This package includes a theoretical introduction to the perceptual development of pre-school children and three scripts and videotapes of the three programmes.

(25) CR Carpenter "The Multi-media Approach" in Tickton (ed) To Improve Learning New York (1971).

(26) R Lee "Theories pertaining to Multi-media Educational Systems, with Special Reference to Teletuition" Paper delivered at an educational technology conference, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit.

(27) AW Gouldner "Anti-Minotaur; The Myth of a Value free Sociology" in Social Problems (1962) pgs 199-213.

IS EDUCATION INEVITABLY A POLITICAL MATTER?

Yvonne Bickley

Any answer to this question depends primarily on the particular interpretation given to the words 'education' and 'political matter'.

There is widespread disagreement among philosophers, political scientists and professional politicians as to the nature of politics.

For some, politics is restricted to activities centering on state authorities. Anthony Skillen (1) observes that this statist conception of politics is not confined to defenders of the status quo in a modern capitalist society, but that it also '...pervades the thinking of those Stalino-Marxists, for whom revolution consists in replacing capitalism with state socialism'. The anarchist, who in condemning the manipulative practices of power-mongering politicians says he is against politics, is also considering politics in this narrow sense.

For others, including Skillen, politics is best seen as a fundamental dimension of human life. In the concluding chapter of The Nature Of Politics, J.D.B. Miller (2) states that politics is concerned with conflict and disagreement and that it is a basic human activity which makes its appearance wherever there are people and rules: 'It may be seen in small compass in a tennis club or a dramatic society and in its widest scope in the manoeuverings of the cold war'. With this in view it is likely that Skillen would agree as he suggests that all the classical questions of political philosophy (questions of obedience, of legitimate authority, of consent, of freedom, of justice, of democracy, of the common interest and so on) apply to schools, factories, families, in fact to any human relations. 'By calling a structure or situation "political" we are stressing the tension and at least potential conflict among the activities and interests that make it up.' (3)

Hollis appears to take an interesting 'middle position' between the narrow statist view of politics and the very broad view suggested by both Miller and Skillen. For him, political questions are those needing public moral decisions about priorities: 'When a decision to be taken affects the future shape of the community it is a political decision'. (4)

Some ways in which these various interpretations 'of what constitutes a political matter' are linked to education will now be considered.

As Peters notes, there is a well-established generalized use of the term 'education', which refers roughly to any process of 'learning', 'instruction' or 'training' that go on at home or at school. (5) For P.S. Wilson this is 'education' in its descriptive sense, and he refers to it as schooling. (6) Schooling is a means to an end: qualifications, jobs, socialization into patterns of acceptable behaviour. If one considers education in this way, then a strong case can be made for education as inevitably a political matter for the following reasons:

1. The state (often through a special department of education) makes political decisions about schooling. This link between the state and schooling has a long history: for Plato schooling had the function of producing future citizens of the ideal state. According to Freire, the Ministry of Education in any society is '...always an eminently political ministry. Politics serves the interests of the dominant class in a class society; it serves the interests of the people in a revolutionary society'. (7)

   Any number of examples of political decisions with regard to schooling could be given: in the United States the desegregation of government schools and the controversial busing of pupils to ensure racially mixed schools; in South Africa the separation not only of educational facilities but also of education departments for the different racial groups; in Britain, according to Hollis, both the Conservatives and the Socialists have a notion of how citizens should behave in a generation's time and they ask education (in the sense of schooling) to make that possible. The perhaps unintended political consequences of schooling are interesting. Rosabeth Moss Ranten suggests that the American child becomes the 'organisation child' through experience management in nursery school. (8)

2. Policy decisions within particular schools involve resolution of conflict over such issues as period allocation for subjects and code of conduct prescribed for pupils and/or staff. This activity is political according to the use of the term to cover a conflict, or potential conflict, situation.

3. Again using the term broadly, what goes on in a particular classroom will be political not only in the sense of being influenced by the needs and demands of the ruling national order and by the policies of the particular school, but also in terms of the relationship

between teacher and student from which may result consensus or conflict.

While it is not being suggested that schooling is only a political matter it does not seem likely that there is a schooling situation which does not have a political dimension to it, and so perhaps schooling is inevitably a political matter.

But what if education is considered in a different way? For Wilson, when education is considered in the evaluative sense, it is something valued intrinsically by those involved in it: 'Its only describable use or purpose, then, is to get people more educated. The only end to which education is the means is more education. The only "needs" which education "satisfies" are "educational needs" ...' (9) and so on. For Peters, education as distinct from training involves '... getting people to make something of themselves within activities that are thought to be worthwhile, in a way which involves an understanding that has some depth and breadth to it... all education is, therefore, moral education, if we are to include the pursuit of good in morals and not just confine it to codes and more general dealings with other men'. (10)

In their discussion of education and the educated man both Wilson and Peters seem to set such a man apart from his society. This is a mistake and a mistake which could lead to a claim that education is not inevitably a political matter. I would agree that education is just as fundamentally a political matter as schooling, and that this is the case whether one considers politics as restricted to activities centred on state authorities or as any conflict situation to which a solution is sought. A man may value his learning for its own sake without the learning experience being just an end in itself. His education (and specifically education, not the narrower schooling, instruction or skills training) contributes to the development of his community and society. For Hollis, education's task is 'to make the best society possible'. (11) What type of community development should take place and what the best society should be like are surely questions which have a political dimension. Is the existing society to be reinforced by its educated men or transformed by them? To return to Peters' worthwhile activities, there is inevitably a political content to these activities in that decisions have to be made about what is to count as worthwhile and who is to be involved in this decision making.

Throughout his writings Freire has stressed the impossibility of education being politically neutral. It is political in that educational issues are a concern of the state, but more importantly it is political in the way that those who are being educated see themselves in relation to

their society. Freire quotes a peasant from Sedengal in Guinea-Bissau who has participated in an adult literacy program: 'We never knew before what we knew. Now we not only know what we knew, but we also know that we are able to know a lot more'. (12) Here is a man who has been initiated into a worthwhile activity, who has developed an interest, but his enthusiasm is not just for literacy for its own sake. It is also for the further possibilities of contributing to the development of his community and country. To categorize his knowledge as the result of schooling is to look at it too narrowly; it is education which has enabled him to look at himself, his classmates and his country in a new way.

Freire would probably agree with Peters' position that no specific type of activity is required for education. He suggests that the activity must be suited to the particular people involved in an educational situation and that the nature of this activity must be worked out by the educator in co-operation with those whom he is to guide. 'If the educator takes refuge in his role as educator of the people without accepting his own need to be educated by the people, then his revolutionary oratory is counteracted by an alienating and reactionary practice'. (13) The young Cuban brigadistas reported that their year of living and working with peasant families while engaged in the literacy program had contributed greatly to their own education. It seems to have been not just the overtly political content of their teaching materials, but also the educational experience of the abject poverty and lack of self-esteem of many of the peasant families which inclined these young educators towards socialism. (14)

A possible 'escape' for anyone wishing to argue that education is not inevitably a political matter might be to say that the relationship between an educated man and his society is a matter of morality rather than politics. I would argue that while there is certainly a moral dimension to politics and while we do use concepts of morality in the critique of political systems, conversely there is a political dimension to morality and thus to moral education. Skillen, a self-consciously political writer, makes the following comments on contemporary British society: 'We imbibe from our official institutions, then, a morality appropriate for capitalists, time-serving careerists, hacks and rank-and-filers, a morality which detaches the focus of action from content, context and consequence (someone should form a British Society for the Social Responsibility of Moralists)'. (15) Hollis, in more neutral terms, in considering the relationship between moral philosophy and political theory observes that '...either there is no conflict between the good of each and of all and it does not matter whether we talk morals or politics; or there is conflict and considerations of community should prevail. In both cases education's task is to make the best society

possible ... Political theory is communal moral philosophy, the only kind of moral philosophy there is'. (16)

Education as schooling and education as the initiation of men into intrinsically worthwhile activities is concerned with man in society and thus with possible conflicts between groups of men. As such it is inevitably both a moral and a political matter.

NOTES

(1) Anthony Skillen Ruling Illusions, The Harvester Press, 1977, pg 24.

(2) JDB Miller The Nature of Politics, Penguin, 1967, pgs 288-294.

(3) Anthony Skillen ibid., pg 43.

(4) Martin Hollis "The Pen and the Purse" in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, vol. 4, no. 2, 1971, pg 167.

(5) RS Peters "Concrete Principles and Rational Passions" in Sizer and Sizer (eds.) Five Essays on Moral Education, pgs 44 - 45.

(6) PS Wilson Interest and Discipline in Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, paperback edition 1974, pg 121.

(7) Paulo Freire Pedagogy in Process, Readers and Writers Publishing Cooperative, 1978, pg 78.

(8) R Moss Kanter "The organization child : experience management in a nursery school" in Schooling and Capitalism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976, pgs 164 - 173.

(9) PS Wilson ibid., pgs 121 - 122.

(10) RS Peters ibid., pg 45.

(11) Martin Hollis ibid., pg 169.

(12) Paulo Freire ibid., pg 164.

(13) Paulo Freire ibid., pg 80.

(14) Jonathan Kozol "A New Look at the Literacy Campaign in Cuba" in Harvard Education Review, 1978.

(15) Anthony Skillen ibid., pg 163.

(16) Martin Hollis ibid., pg 169.

INTERCHANGE

ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION: A CONTAGIOUS DISEASE OR A SUBJECT WORTHY OF PUBLIC DEBATE?

Napier Boyce

The present crisis in the education of all ethnic groups in South Africa has given thinking persons reason to be concerned about the quality of educational provision for Blacks, Coloureds, Indians and Whites.

This raises the issue of accountability in education which is the subject of debate in Great Britain. There are those, however, who regard accountability as just another 'in-word', a fashionable topic only, but to others a 'plague' and a 'contagious disease' which has spread to the U K from the U S A, something to be avoided because of the 'punitive tone' and 'negative forms' associated with it. In America, it has been asserted, accountability has had a 'stultifying effect on education, inhibiting innovation and progress'.

If a debate on accountability in education is to promote desired change in this country, then it is important to ask pertinent questions:

> For WHAT is the educational system, whether provincial or national, accountable?
> To WHOM are the systems, the schools and individual teachers accountable?
> WHAT EVALUATIVE CRITERIA should be used to provide an objective measurement of educational quality?
> HOW is the evaluation to be made?
> WHO is accountable? The schools and individual teachers, the education department which provides the

service or the State?
For WHAT should the schools and their teachers, the education departments be accountable?

Sockett (1) is of the opinion that, if accountability means the obligation to deliver an account of what is being done, then there are two ways in which this could be done, that is, there are two different forms of accountability viz. accountability for results and the maintenance of standards, and, secondly, accountability in terms of professional codes of practice.

In the late nineteenth century the payment-by-results scheme was the main way in which a teacher was made accountable. No one in his right mind would suggest a return to this system and yet even today the good school or teacher in the mind of the public is the school or teacher with the best results; in other words, high schools and their teachers are predominantly accountable through external examinations. The recent American experience of accountability should serve as a warning. According to Sockett (2), in some American states:

> Education administrators become auditors. Thus the teacher is not accountable to citizens as parents or employers, or to his professional colleagues. He is certainly not accountable to non-taxpaying infants. Children and parents become customers. The central focus of the system is on 'results obtained for resources used'. Children go to school and are taught what they are taught for public purposes.
>
> The teacher is accountable <u>for</u> the achievement of prespecified performances by the children he teaches, performances which embody the desired objectives. Such a purpose is defined in contract. The teacher is contracting to perform a service, according to agreed upon terms, within an establishment time-period and with a stipulated use of resources and performance-standards.
>
> Considerable publicity is given to best results, just as companies publish the results of their year's trading. Between the results and the provision of resources for the school a firm link is established. Improved test scores may merit bonus payment for teachers, or increased provision for the school.

To whom should the schools and education departments be accountable? Administrators and politicians have a responsibility to the public, the parents and their children for the quality of education provided, as in commerce and industry companies are accountable to shareholders.

There has been considerable debate about to whom teachers ought to be accountable. It has been argued that teachers ought to be accountable to pupils and their parents as part of the community, the teachers' employers, the providers of resources, to professional peers and to other educational institutions e.g. secondary schools and universities.

What should be the hierarchy of accountability between these groups?
Who constitutes the final authority: the public or a teacher's professional peers?

HOW should the quality of education be evaluated and WHO should be responsible for the evaluation? Who will decide what are acceptable ways of checking on the qualities and character of schooling? How is the performance of professional persons to be assessed?

There are two ways in which the public's right to know about standards in schools can be secured. The first is by external monitoring conducted by the government's education departments through agents such as inspectors of education; the second involves schools and teachers engaging in a process of self-monitoring.

In 1975 the Department of Education and Science in England established the Assessment of Performance Unit, (APU for short), as an instrument to monitor educational standards in schools. Kay (3) in stating the case for this form of external monitoring is obviously aware of the deep-rooted suspicions of forms of assessment imposed from the outside, two reasons being the restrictive effect on teachers who are subject to the demands of external syllabuses and narrow spectrum of attainment skills assessed. Kay allays the fears of teachers by giving the assurance that the APU will avoid assessing too narrow a spectrum of attainment skills.

Six areas of pupil performance have been identified by the APU, the sum of which in Kay's opinion form a wholly satisfactory description of the curriculum: verbal communication through reading, writing, listening and speaking: mathematical communication through numbers, graphs, models and diagrams; scientific observation, the selection, evaluation and use of evidence, testing of hypotheses and use of experiment; ethical, the pupil's understanding of himself, his development as a responsible person, his sensitivity to other people and his moral attitude towards his environment; aesthetic, the pupil's appreciation of form, colour, texture and sound, his affective response to his environment, his respect for quality, his ability to use his imagination and feeling in creative work; physical, the pupil's developing muscular control, his ability to use his body efficiently and expressively.

These key forms of development have been criticised by Simon (3) as 'six mystic measures' which are so ill-defined that it is uncertain what is to be measured. The attempt to measure the 'personal and social development' of a child has aroused the most opposition because it is feared that this will lead to the assessment of the religious and political outlook of children. According to a recent report in the Times Educational Supplement, however, the APU intends to abandon its plans to test pupils' personal, social, aesthetic and physical development because of difficulties experienced in measuring achievements in these areas. Many educationists have dissociated themselves from plans of the DES to exercise centralised control over the curriculum and introduce tests of children's beliefs. The National Union of Teachers has also opposed the APU, not only as being impractical, but because it considers the whole concept as 'educationally unsound and politically undesirable'. Simon regards the DES plans as an effort towards 'enhanced managerial control under the convenience flag of accountability'.

Edgar Stones of Liverpool (5) is equally critical:

> Even the most sophisticated measurer is prone to basic conceptual errors that transform the foundations of his psychometric edifice from bedrock into sand. Less sophisticated measurers are likely to compound error by the psychometric naivety of their practices.

Goldstein (6) argues that the:

> ...objective measurement movement in education is misguided and offers over-simple solutions to complex problems. The advocacy of objective measurement tends to lead to mystification. It takes the discussion of the curriculum and its evaluation out of the main educational forum and hands it over to technicians who can manipulate the mathematical equations.

Galton (7) also urges a more cautious approach to monitoring and warns against over-reliance on standardised tests.

Holt (8) points out that although:

> ...a heightened awareness of what we must account for, to whom and why is to be welcomed, the introduction of delivery systems based on production functions for schools, the aggregation of norm-referenced test data and other technocratic devices would justify Sir Alec Clegg's fears.

Clegg once asserted that:

> ...if you want to kill stone dead the best work, there is no better way of doing it than to introduce the

plague of accountability.

What then are the alternatives?

In South Africa we have no alternatives to external monitoring and bureaucratic controls. The only form of accountability to which teachers have become accustomed is a rather crude model which requires teachers to be accountable to some persons or authorities other than teachers for his professional actions. To be accountable in this sense means that somebody other than the teacher must be satisfied about teachers' professional actions.

Even in England, as Saville (9) has pointed out, the attitude of many teachers to a type of external monitoring is little more than:

> Inspectoral interference operating on a similar authoritarianism .... In the perception of many teachers inspection implies threat and threat produces styles of teaching which are not necessarily the individual's natural style. Institutionally, it strengthens barriers and dampens the desire or need to innovate.

John Elliott (10) believes that:

> ...genuine accountability is established by the obligation to self-monitor performance.

This implies that an institution should engage in a process of self-evaluation. Simons (11) in her account of The Evaluative School has described in some detail the process of self-evaluation, which, she points out, is based on internal motivation.

> So often, externally imposed demands set up a defensive reaction leading to the production of what is sought or required without actually affecting the professional practice of the school. Such responses, too, are often short-lived, disappearing when the external stimulus fades. Internal motivation on the other hand, is likely to prevail over external threats to teacher and school autonomy and to produce a quality control which is genuinely professional.

Stenhouse (12) has supported this view:

> It is difficult to see how teaching can be improved or how curricular proposals can be evaluated without self-monitoring on the part of teachers.

South African schools and their teachers have become so accustomed to bureaucratic control that one wonders whether

they would be able to develop the capacity to self-monitor their performances. The initiative must be taken by teachers to develop an acceptable way of measuring the performance of schools and teachers. The method of self-evaluation may be less complicated than a research worker would wish but, as Kay (13) points out, it would have to be more sophisticated than 'the customary reliance on a warm inside feeling'.

Elliott (14) argues the case for a system of school self-evaluation on three grounds: social, economic and professional accountability. Schools are socially accountable in the sense that society delegates to them the task of preparing children for socially valued roles and tasks. Schools might be described as economically accountable if they are under an obligation to demonstrate to those responsible for allocating resources at central or provincial government levels that they are giving value for money. Schools are professionally accountable if they are under an obligation to demonstrate to the teaching profession that their policies protect and foster educational values.

Elliott (15) asserts:

> ...it is possible to produce a form of public accountability which respects the professional autonomy of teachers and the right to dialogue with the public about their responsibilities.

Can the teaching profession be held accountable if it does not have the autonomy to be responsible?

Elliott also points out that the concepts of accountability, responsibility and autonomy are connected. To be accountable in the sense of being answerable for one's actions, one has to have the freedom to be responsible for one's actions. One can only be responsible to the extent that one is not compelled to choose a line of action. Responsibility implies that a person was free to choose: to act autonomously.

> The point of any genuine accountability procedure is to establish dialogue between the teaching profession and the public .... In as much as teachers view themselves as responsible professionals they will welcome dialogue about their activities and see the provision of self-reports based on self-monitoring as a means of bringing about such dialogue. The generation of self-reporting and self-monitoring procedures in schools is the test of the extent to which teachers can genuinely claim to be professionals. (16)

Bailey (17) is of opinion that if the:

> ...professional competence of teachers is to be assessed in some programme of accountability then the assessment should be that of professional peers, themselves aware of that body of reflective theory in which different approaches and practices might seek appropriate justification.

Holt (8) has reminded us that the notion of being accountable is not new to education.

> What is new, however, is the desire to give a name to a set of approaches and attitudes which, at root, must reflect a professional conscience.

Ultimately, as Nisbet has said:

> Accountability is an attitude of mind, not an administrative technique.

NOTES

(1) Hugh Sockett "Accountability: The Contemporary Issues" in Hugh Sockett (ed) Accountability in the English Educational System, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980.

(2) Sockett (ed) op cit.

(3) BW Kay "Monitoring Pupils' Performances" in Trends in Education, June 1975.

(4) Joan Simon "What and Who is the APU?" in Forum, Vol 22 No 1, Autumn 1979.

(5) Edgar Stones "The World of APU" in Forum, Vol 22 No 1, Autumn 1979.

(6) Harvey Goldstein "The Mystification of Assessment" in Forum, Vol 22 No 1, Autumn 1979.

(7) Maurice Galton "A Constructive Response to the APU" in Forum Vol 22 No 1, Autumn 1979.

(8) Maurice Holt "Accountability in Education", a review article in Journal of Curriculum Studies Vol 12 No 1, Jan-March 1980.

(9) Chris Saville "Teacher Accountability and Teacher Evaluation" in Cambridge Journal of Education, Vol 7 No 2, 1977.

(10) John Elliott "Who Should Monitor Performance in Schools?" in Sockett (ed) op cit.

(11) Helen Simons The Evaluative School

(12) L Stenhouse An Introduction to Curriculum Research and Development, Heinemann, 1975.

(13) BW Kay "The Assessment of Performance Unit: Its Task and Rationale" in Education 3-13, Vol 4 No 2, 1976.

(14) John Elliott "The Case for School Self-evaluation" in Forum, Vol 22 No 1, Autumn 1979.

(15) John Elliott "Accountability, Progressive Education and School-based Evaluation" in Education 3-13, Vol 7 No 1, Spring 1979.

(16) John Elliott in Sockett (ed) op cit.

(17) Charles Bailey "The Autonomous Teacher" in Sockett (ed) op cit.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE IDEA OF A PROFESSION

Wally Morrow

As 'accountability systems' have been debated and implemented in schooling in the USA and UK there are powerful political and theoretical reasons why it would be a bad thing for an 'accountability system' to be introduced in South Africa. I shall try to say why I think this.

The chronic and acute crisis in South African schooling is not like a flat tyre, or even simply like a badly-adjusted tappet, it is more like the main bearing seizing up. To think that 'accountability' could mitigate such a crisis raises the ghost of the boy with his finger in the dyke. But it is not simply that 'accountability systems' such as have been implemented elsewhere would be futile in South Africa (1) but also that talking about 'accountability systems', as it tends to divert attention from more urgent issues, is irresponsible. The point I am making here is similar to the point made by Professor Noruwana at the Curriculum and Community conference in July. Much of what was spoken about at that conference was not merely irrelevant but also irresponsible in the light of the crisis in South African schooling.

Schooling systems operate within the framework of political structures and 'accountability systems' reflect those structures and are quite likely to reinforce them. If we are concerned about the crisis of South African schooling then anything short of an argument about the political structures of which it is so clearly the product is merely to fiddle while Rome burns.

But still, it might be objected, surely the teaching profession should take seriously the idea that they should be accountable? I agree with this view, but then I need immediately to go on to say that to spell out what this view amounts to would be to describe a whole tradition of thought. Correspondingly, to defend this view would involve defending that whole tradition. These are clearly not possibilities in a single paper.

In general terms my argument is as follows: Words are embedded in traditions, and their meaning (or life) and implications (including the practices with which they are so inextricably intertwined) are part of those traditions. It

is, of course, possible to take hold of a word like 'accountability' and, as it were, to transplant it from one tradition to another. But in this process the word is transformed - it becomes a very different beast. Of course, the extent to which this is the case depends upon the extent to which the two traditions differ. My view is that if we imported 'accountability' into South African schooling we would find that the dominant tradition would turn it into a beast which would swallow up any vestiges there might remain of the idea of a teaching profession.

The remainder of this paper will be in the nature of elucidatory footnotes and an illuminating illustration, with a view to giving slightly more substance to the general argument outlined above. What I shall be attempting to do is to show that Professor Boyce is right when he says 'In South Africa we have no alternatives to external monitoring and bureaucratic controls', and 'South African schools and their teachers have become so accustomed to bureaucratic control that one wonders whether they would be able to develop the capacity to self-monitor their performances?' And not only is he right in these statements but from them the conclusion must be drawn that 'accountability' would be a dangerous beast to release on South African schooling. To talk of it as 'a contagious disease' is altogether too mild.

Let me start the ball rolling with a general remark about the 'acountability debate'. 'Accountability' is closely related to 'responsibility'. They both belong in the same kinds of sentence-frame, both require a double object. If someone is responsible, he is responsible to someone for something. Similarly, 'accountable' fits into the following sentence-frame:

K is accountable to L for M

Much of the 'accountability debate' in the USA has been about what substitutions should be made in this frame. For instance, should K be 'the individual teacher', 'the school', 'the provincial (or local) schooling system', 'the national schooling system', 'the teaching profession', etc? Should L be 'the public', 'the parents', 'the pupils', 'the employing authorities', 'the providers of resources', 'the state', 'professional peers', etc? Should M be 'the welfare of the pupils, 'supplying the economy with trained manpower', 'preparing little citizens for the state', 'the education of the rising generation', etc? Any 'accountability system' is an embodiment of choices of these three kinds. But it is clear that such choices are embedded in deeper-lying theoretical structures. Now, the problem is that much of the 'accountability debate' has been conducted in a kind of theoretical vacuum, indeed one can gain the impression that many of the participants in the debate deliberately use 'accountability' as a device to short-circuit fundamental

theoretical issues (2). I am not saying that the way to proceed is first to sort out answers to such questions as what education is, what the relations are between general compulsory schooling and education, what the relations are between a schooling system and the politico-economic structures which provide its context, etc, and then to design 'accountability systems' which reflect those answers. I am not making a procedural recommendation. What I am saying is that any suggested substitutions in the frame above are reflections of deeper-lying theoretical commitments, and that arguments about which substitutions should be made are misconstrued unless they are seen as fundamental theoretical arguments.

There is another way in which 'accountability' and 'responsibility' are similar, and here we move more clearly towards an articulation of the tradition in which accountability is linked to the idea of a profession. A person can be held neither accountable nor responsible for something which is not under his control. This simple formulation obscures a multitude of problems but I won't start investigating them here as I might never get back to the main issue. Centrally it is a person's own actions which are under his control. I need to say 'centrally' here because, of course, my actions and non-actions can have consequences for which, in some circumstances I can be held accountable or responsible. A more formal (but no less vague) way of making this same point would be to say that a necessary presupposition of my being held accountable or responsible for X is that X is something which could have been under my control. I have to say 'could have' here because I can be held accountable for X even where X occurred through my inadvertence or lack of care. In such a case, to say that I was nevertheless accountable or responsible for X is to imply that I should have had control of X. And, of course, 'I should have' can have no purchase unless 'I could have' has. It is to be noted that this consideration draws a general logical boundary around the possible substitutions for M in the sentence-frame previously mentioned.

But now let us note a difference between 'accountability' and 'responsibility', in order both to free ourselves of 'responsibility', which has its own riddles, and to try to catch further glimpses of the tradition which forges a link between accountability and the idea of a profession.

One might say that one difference between 'accountable' and 'responsible' is that the former is, in a sense, stronger than the latter. 'Accountability' is more firmly rooted in the notions of justification (3) and obligation. My being responsible for something does not place me under an obligation to justify what I do. By contrast, if I am accountable for something then I am obliged to provide a

justification for what I do in relation to it. Sockett says that 'To say that an agent is accountable for his actions to another is not merely to say that he is able to deliver an ACCOUNT, but to assert that he is obliged to do so'. (4) I am not sure whether to 'deliver an account' is the same as to 'provide a justification'. The former might be simply to explain, as opposed to to justify, what one has done. Indeed there are etymological grounds for linking 'accountability' to the idea of 'delivering an account' but then, I think, one needs to go on to say that it is a particular kind of account which one is obliged to deliver if one is accountable. Namely, that kind of account which shows why you considered it right to do what you did. And I think such an account is a justification.

As I get deeper into an articulation of the tradition in which there is a logical relation between accountabiltiy and the idea of a profession the issues become increasingly complex and, correspondingly, the argument becomes increasingly attenuated.

It is important, in the light of some of the way the 'accountability debate' has proceeded, that the action and the justification provided for it by the agent are inextricably logically linked (5). One objection which can be levelled against some 'accountability systems' - particularly those which seek to make teachers/schools accountable for the results they achieve - is that they implicitly assume that an action and its justification are separable. They then impose on teachers a mode of justification which thoroughly distorts what they do. This sleight of hand is a common ingredient of the 'objective testing movement'. What a teacher is doing, in his professional activities as a teacher, is not a question that can be answered by simple empirical observation. A proper description of a professional activity necessarily carries a heavy theoretical load.

To try to gather some of these considerations together we can re-emphasize the close relationships, in this tradition, between accountability, autonomy and the idea of a profession, and note how all of these depend on a particular theory of authority and the social and political organisations erected on this foundation.

To have said that a person can be held accountable only for something that was within his control, and that to be held accountable is to be under an obligation to provide a justification for what one does, is already to have taken a major step towards showing that accountability and autonomy go together. In the South African context autonomy is a little-understood notion. There is a deeply-rooted conviction that links autonomy with anarchy, and sees anomic and autonomous behaviour as two faces of the same aberration

or deviance (6). This conviction stands in stark opposition to the tradition in which autonomy and the idea of a profession are inextricably intermingled. Bailey gives an account of autonomy in terms of 'self-government' and says that:

> ... an autonomous teacher is not anomic, not ungoverned. To claim to be autonomous is to claim to be governed in a special kind of way. An autonomous teacher does not ignore the wishes and interests of others - parents, pupils, governments, employers - but such a teacher does reserve the right to consider such wishes and interests in the light of appropriate criteria. The wants and wishes cannot be simply taken as given starting points. (7)

Related to this is the idea that for an autonomous teacher (or person) authority and the rule of law are never ultimate - that is, they are never taken as 'given starting points' not themselves open to question. This does not imply that the autonomous teacher is opposed to authority or the rule of law but it does imply that he reserves the right to judge them in the light of criteria which do not have their source in them. A person acting autonomously is not acting under the dictates, constraints, or control of others, but that does not mean that he is disobedient or insubordinate.

A person acting autonomously is not acting in conformity to a code of rules nor is he merely following a script. To associate autonomy with anarchy is like thinking that unless he is being obedient to some or other moral rule a person cannot be acting morally. The idea that morality consists in a code of rules is incoherent. For instance, were that the case we would have no way of knowing which rules are moral rules. Similarly, to fail to distinguish between autonomy and wild assertions of personal will is like thinking that a person cannot be talking sense unless he is following a script (8). What, apart from a script or his own naked will could be guiding him? Of course, we are so intimately familiar with spontaneous speech that this latter example strikes us as absurd, that the parallel example from morality does not strike us as absurd is a reflection of our failure to understand the idea of moral autonomy. There are many who think that in morality the only alternative to obedience to a rule is immorality.

Something else emerges from these examples which is pertinent to elucidating the notion of autonomy. A person speaking spontaneously is using a language which is not, and logically could not be, of his own invention. The possibility of spontaneous speech depends upon the existence of a language, in an account of which interpersonal agreement has an essential role. Similarly, a person acting morally is acting

in the light of moral principles which are not, and could not be, of his own invention. An autonomous person is one who is not dependent on a code of rules or others to tell him what it is right to do. He is like a person speaking spontaneously rather than like an actor, even a gifted and imaginative actor, interpreting a script.

All of this is part of the tradition in which authority is never regarded as ultimate or final and, as a consequence, the tradition which opposes the growth of centralized authority. And it is in this tradition that we find the idea of a profession. In this tradition the professions are not part of the central state apparatus. Members of the professions, in this tradition, are not civil servants (they are not seen as employees of the state even if the state, ultimately, pays their salaries), and their professional standing is not dependent on the whims of politicians or their employers (9). The professionals are themselves sources of authority, independent of the authority of the state. The professionals have the general role of contributing to, and maintaining, the quality of life in the society as a whole and, in this tradition, they cannot perform this role adequately unless they have the autonomy to do so.

But this kind of dispersal of authority contains within it the seeds of potential conflict between the various authoritative organs of the society. And here we arrive at the link between accountability and the idea of a profession. Each profession is obliged to justify its ideals, purposes and principles to the society at large.

This tradition, thus, yields roughly the following substitutions in the sentence-frame previously mentioned: A profession is accountable to society for the articulation and maintenance of its ideals and principles. Of course, if a profession is to do this then the individual members of the profession need to be accountable to the profession as such. A member of a profession is accountable to his professional associates for his professional actions and activities, he is obliged to justify his actions and activities in the light of the ideals and principles which are constitutive of his profession.

That the dominant tradition in South Africa is constitutionally opposed to this kind of an account of a profession is glaringly obvious; what is not as obvious is that this opposition is rooted in a different theory of authority, and thus a different theory of the appropriate forms of social and political organisations. Teachers need no reminding of the extent to which their activities have increasingly been subject to the control and regulation of 'higher' authorities. The very notion of 'higher authority' is part and parcel of the theory of authority which spawns

hierarchical organisations and powerful central institutions. In terms of this theory of authority, which is a central feature of the dominant tradition in South Africa, the alternative to tight control from the centre is confusion, chaos and anarchy. In other words such a theory of authority has no logical space for the idea of autonomy, and, correspondingly, no logical space for the idea of a profession. For the dominant tradition in South Africa a member of a profession is simply another employee, albeit an employee with 'higher' status because the tasks he is employed to perform touch the interests of the central authority very closely.

In this tradition, as autonomy can find no foothold, accountability loses its connection with autonomy and thus becomes something very different. It becomes merely satisfying others, in terms of their definition of one's task, that one is performing one's task satisfactorily. This degenerate notion of accountability is likely to be the only one that could take root in South Africa, and were it to flourish it is likely that it would simply increase the already massive power of central institutions (which, in practice, in South Africa, are accountable only to 'higher' authorities or to themselves) to control teachers' activities. The status of teachers as civil servants would become entrenched, and, because of the tighter control central institutions would be able to have over teachers and schools, schools would become even more obviously nothing other than parts of the ideological state apparatus. These are not mere speculations, they are attempts to spell out what kind of beast 'accountability' would become were we to transplant it into the dominant tradition in South Africa, a tradition which is deeply hostile to the idea of an independent profession.

To this it might be replied that the teaching profession (at least the 'white' bit of it) has already taken steps to establish a professional body which can provide a bulwark against the corrosion of its status as a profession. This hope is illusory. The South African Teachers' Council is inextricably enmeshed in the very tradition which is so hostile to the very idea of a profession (10). I shall conclude by showing why I think this to be the case.

For a start, and very obviously, a racially exclusive body cannot qualify as a professional council. A professional council should have as its chief aim to articulate and maintain the ideals and principles constitutive of the profession and so to build a defence of the profession against those who are hostile towards it. The tag 'white' is not a minor aberration, possibly to be removed at some future date, but it shows the SATC to be entangled in the very bureaucratic structures from which teachers need to be independent if their claim to be a profession is to be

anything more than comforting eyewash.

Secondly the SATC 'Code of Conduct', which is the main instrument for the achievement of the Council's chief objects, contains a fatal ambiguity about the question of what a profession is. Here are two glaring examples:

In the Preamble to the Code teachers are required ' ... to pledge themselves to obey the laws of the country ... ', it doesn't add 'whatever they might be', nevertheless the general implication is clear. The authority of teachers, such as it is, is 'lower down' in the hierarchy than is the authority of those who make the laws of the country. In pledging themselves to be obedient servants to those who currently make the laws of the country, whoever they might happen to be, teachers abandon a central feature of their professional autonomy.

The Council seems unable to have made up its mind about whether teachers are going to be seen primarily as employees or primarily as members of a profession:

> 6.1 (A teacher) is loyal to his employers by serving them to the best of his ability, obeying all their lawful instructions and regulations, and by conducting professional business through the proper channels only.

Who is to decide which 'instructions and regulations' are 'lawful'? And who defines what the 'proper channels' are?

> 8.2 (A teacher shall not) disobey, disregard or make wilful default in carrying out a lawful order given to him in his capacity as a teacher by a person or body having authority to give such an order, or by word or conduct make himself guilty of insubordination.

The punitive tone of such clauses is quite shocking in a document purporting to articulate the nature of professional responsibilities. One might seriously wonder whether their author had his basic training in the Defence Force. But, quite apart from their tone, clauses such as these make it quite plain that teachers can't be trusted to do what is right unless someone tells them what to do.

In short - there are powerful reasons of both a political and theoretical kind why an 'accountability system' is something to be avoided in South Africa. That is, it would be a bad thing to start talking about 'accountability' in South Africa if we think that there is something valuable about the idea of teaching as a profession.

NOTES

(1) It is significant that 'accountability systems' have been introduced in countries where there is an over-supply of qualified teachers. In South Africa we have, at present, only about 20% of the qualified teachers we need to staff a conventional schooling system founded on a 1:30 teacher/pupil ratio.

(2) That 'accountability systems' have tended to appeal to those who are immersed in the theoretical naivety of 'practicism' becomes clear from a glance at the responses to 'accountability systems' which have been implemented in the USA. By and large such systems have sought to make teachers/schools accountable to others (like school governors, school boards or 'the public') for the results they achieve. When such results are measured in terms of 'behavioral objectives' (after all, how else can we measure results objectively?) it is little wonder that 'accountability systems' have had a 'stultifying effect on education, inhibiting innovation and progress'. It is not too cynical to echo the opinion of one American commentator that 'educational technicians', nurtured in the ideology of Behaviorism, and having failed to 'revolutionise' educational practice by influencing teachers and teacher-trainers directly, are now turning their attention and skills to designing 'accountability systems' for clients who, if not blatantly hostile towards teachers and the schooling system, are at least considerably less sophisticated in their understanding of what the schooling system is about.

(3) If one refuses to recognise a distinction between justification and rationalization, or if one insists on calling justification 'mere rhetoric', then one is standing outside of the tradition I am trying to articulate. For such a person what I go on to say will become increasingly unintelligible, or will increasingly seem simply wrong.

(4) Hugh Sockett "Accountability: The Contemporary Issues" in Hugh Sockett (ed) Accountability in the English Educational System, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980, pg 10.

(5) Here we catch a glimpse of one reason why theoretical studies are so important in teacher-preparation, if one thinks of teaching as a profession.

(6) Talk about 'internal motivation', 'self-monitoring' and 'accountability is an attitude of mind' are perilously close to 'the customary reliance on a warm inside feeling' justifiably rejected by Kay. Autonomous action

is not an arbitrary assertion of will. The difficulties here, and those which arise subsequently in relation to authority, are entangled in subjective-objective dichotomies inherited from Positivism. A particular conception of objectivity is promoted to the model or standard for objectivity in general (see my deliberately polemical remarks in note 2) and then anything which does not meet this standard is dubbed 'subjective' (and hence is rejected as unreliable, etc.)

(7) Charles Bailey "The Autonomous Teacher" in Sockett (ed) op cit, pg 99. Bailey's general argument is that education is a moral enterprise directed towards helping people to become autonomous. He contends that one who is not himself in some measure autonomous is in no position to help others to become autonomous. A main support for this position is an argument invented by Kant: to see morality as possible without personal autonomy is incoherent. This argument would be a central pillar of the defence of the tradition I am trying to describe.

(8) There are clear implications here for the idea of academic autonomy. Many South African graduates seem to be capable of little else than to echo the words of their masters, and the idea that the quality of an academic paper can be measured in terms of the length of its bibliography is never far below the surface in South Africa.

(9) As I was writing this an article by Brian Bamford was published in The Star (12 August 1980.) In it he warns against interference with our judicial system, which has built into its structure a strong and independent Supreme Court. (Judges, as opposed to magistrates, are not civil servants; their salaries, conditions of employment, promotion and transfer are not under the direct control of the state, etc.) Bamford reports that 'A strong body of opinion, with influence in high places, believes that the Supreme Court is too independent, or, to put it another way, if its present independence were assailed, directly or indirectly, that would be no great matter'. He locates the idea of an independent judiciary in the very tradition I am trying to describe: 'The point is that if one were asked what was the real key to a modern democracy, there could be several reasonable answers, but high on anyone's list would be a strong and independent judiciary'.

(10) Professor Boyce is right to emphasize the extent to which tight bureaucratic control insidiously induces in its victims an inability to conceive of acting

autonomously and accountably independently of those controls. It has been said that many slaves were incapable of seeing their emancipation as a benefit, or of grasping the opportunities it presented to them.

NOTICES

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Human Sciences Research Council's investigation into education is of interest to all educationists. This journal would be pleased to publish articles and commentaries on that investigation and we encourage readers to submit material as soon as possible.

We intend to publish three issues of Volume 5 in 1981, and the deadline for Number 1 is 15th February 1981.

Two further address slips have been included in this issue for completion by those who wish to receive this journal and who have not yet sent us an address.

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Contributions should not ordinarily exceed 3000 words in length, and should be typewritten on one side of A4 paper, double spaced, with ample margins. Two complete copies should be submitted. Proofs will not be sent to authors for correction unless this is explicitly requested.

There is to be no separate 'Bibliography'. References should be kept to a minimum. All notes (which includes 'footnotes' and references) are to be numbered consecutively in the text (in Arabic numerals, in parentheses, on the line of the text), and should be listed at the end of the article, as 'Notes'. Titles of papers or chapters cited are to be enclosed in double quotation marks; titles of books are to be underlined. Examples:

Notes

(1) Carole Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

(2) PF Strawson "Freedom and Resentment" in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1974, pgs 15-23.

(3) L Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in BJ Cosin (ed) Education, Structure and Society, Harmodsworth: Penguin, 1977, see pg 81.

Substantial quotations (more than about 3 lines) should be indented, shorter quotations should be enclosed in single quotation marks. Omissions from a quotation should be indicated by three dots.

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

52 The Present Situation in Language Teaching — Michael Gardiner

ARTICLES

56 Could Educational Theory be a Science? — John Sebedi

65 The Teaching of Film and Television Production: A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives — Keyan Tomaselli

76 Is Education Inevitably a Political Matter? — Yvonne Bickley

INTERCHANGE

82 Accountability in Education: A Contagious Disease or a Subject Worthy of Public Debate? — Napier Boyce

90 Accountability and the Idea of a Profession — Wally Morrow

NOTICES

101