

https://dspace.org/

Leadership and resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 1978-2012

EL-Namrouti, Said Ahmed

2016

https://hdl.handle.net/10539/26256

Elnamrouti, Said Ahmed Yousif (2017) Leadership and resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 1978-2012, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, https://hdl.handle.net/10539/26256

Downloaded from a DSpace repository. https://dspace.org/



Leadership and Resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 1978-2012

Said Ahmed EL- Namrouti

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management
The University of the Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Wits School of Governance
"WSG"
South Africa

April 2016

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work. It is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand/ the Wits School of Governance (WSG), Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university.

Said Ahmed EL-Namrouti

25 April 2016

Acknowledgements

This work has been made possible as a result of the support of many people who deserve a word of thanks for their great support and encouragement to accomplish this degree.

To my supervisor, Dr. Gillian Godsell, big thanks for what you gave and for guiding me all the way.

To my co-supervisor, Dr. Manamela Matshabaphala, thank you for your valuable comments and support.

My thanks also go to Prof. Anne McLennan and Dr. Horacio Zandamela, for supporting me and looking after me, particularly when I and my family and the rest of my people experienced aggressive wars.

Special thanks go to my Mother; your support and wishing "*Doaa*" gave me the power to accomplish my mission.

To my great and beloved wife, Mona, I don't know how to reward and thank you. Your patience, your support and your encouragement was a great motivator for all the success that I have achieved in my life.

Big thanks to my daughters, Asmaa, Hadeel and Heba, and my sons, Yaser, Mohammed, Osama and Ali. I know your suffering while I was a very far away from you, particularly in times of wars and fear. But I also know how much you supported and encouraged me to achieve my PhD.

Thank you my great brothers and sisters for your support and for all that you did for me.

Many thanks for all my colleagues at IUG and my work team at the conference centre for your support and confidence.

Abstract

Leadership in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in turbulent times has been under-theorised. A qualitative case study based on document analysis of 70 documents, 39 interviews and 2 focus groups was the vehicle for examining the role of the leadership at the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG). IUG has operated under complex conditions of occupation and ongoing turbulence from its inception in 1978 to the present. This study examines the period 1978-2012. In this time the university grew from 25 men studying Sharia in a tent to 20,000 students (63.7% female) studying across 11 faculties and 112 different specialisations. The study documents and labels four phases of development of the university. The patterns of leadership uncovered in the study include transformational, transactional, heroic, post-heroic and on some specific occasions authoritarian styles, with transformational being the most important. The way in which the leadership resolved short term crises, as well as their long-term and big-picture focus, shaped the development of the university.

Resilience theory was applied alongside leadership theory to analyse the responses of IUG leadership. Resilience was taken beyond surviving to capitalising on disruption. Twenty three markers of resilience were found which worked independently and interactively to support resilient responses to the challenges IUG faced. These factors were initially developed from the literature, and new factors were added based on this research. The relationship between leadership styles and the promotion of resilience was examined.

The thesis describes a mutual shaping and supporting role between university and society in Gaza, and discusses some of the paradoxes of help and harm coming from players and belief systems external to the university. The paradox of faith which can provide a cohesive, binding set of beliefs to support staff and students, as well as being the source of conflict and harm, is also discussed.

A definition of a university as an educational community functioning beyond place, buildings, external recognition, or physical destruction was developed.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ..... **III**

List of Tables ..... **IX**

List of Figures ..... **X**

List of Pictures ..... **XI**

Glossary of Terms ..... **XII**

Chapter One: Introduction **1**

1.1 Background and Context of the Research 1

1.2 Research Problem 4

1.3 Purpose of the Study 5

1.4 Research Questions 6

1.5 Managing HEIs in Turbulent Times: Beyond Knowledge Production 7

1.6 IUG: Focusing the Study on a Specific Institution 9

1.7 The Role of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence 12

1.8 The Role of Transformational Leadership in Turbulent Environments 13

1.9 The Role of Culture and Ideology in Shaping the University 13

1.10 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience 17

1.11 Structure of the Research: A Road Map 18

Chapter Two: The University of Tents: A Story of a Successful Palestinian University under the Israeli Occupation **19**

2.1 The Context of the Israeli Occupation: Shaping the Life of Palestinians 19

2.1.1 Historical Background 21

2.1.2 Quality of Palestinians' Life under Occupation 22

2.1.3 Effects of Occupation on HE Sector in Gaza Strip: Academic Exclusion 25

2.2 IUG: Leading through Adverse Circumstances 25

2.2.1 First Stage: Creating IUG among Rubble: Challenges, Ambitions and Dreams, 1978-1987 30
2.2.1.1 The Inception of IUG (1978) and the Occupation Authorities Reaction 31
2.2.1.2 Financial Constraints 32
2.2.1.3 The Israeli Authority and Control 33
2.2.1.4 Restrictions on Constructing New Buildings 36
2.2.1.5 Conflict over the Cultural Identity of IUG 38
2.2.1.6 Palestinian Support for IUG during the First Stage 39
2.2.2 The Second Stage: Threatening the Survival of IUG during the First Uprising (1987-1993) 42
2.2.2.1 Working Underground 44
2.2.2.2 Al-Azhar University 46
2.2.3 The Third Stage: Launching a Consolidation Process (1993- 2000) 49
2.2.3.1 Alternatives to the Israeli Non-Recognition 50
2.2.3.2 Constructing Permanent Modern Buildings 52
2.2.3.3 Developing Qualifications and Capacities of the Staff 52
2.2.4 The Fourth Stage: Thriving despite Siege and Wars (2000 – 2012) 54
2.2.4.1 Working under Siege and Check-Points Regime 54
2.2.4.2 Impacts of the Palestinian Political Division 56
2.2.4.3 IUG under Attack 57
2.2.4.4 Thriving of IUG: Moving towards Academic Excellence 60

Chapter Three: Resilience through Turbulent Times:The Role of Leadership and Culture 62
3.1 General Overview and Theoretical Components 63
3.2 HEIs in the Heart of Conflict Environments 65
3.2.1 Introduction 65
3.2.2 The Importance and the Role of HEIs in Societies 66
3.2.3 Universities in Different Contexts: Challenges and Ambitions 69
3.2.4 Universities with Ideological Roots 72
3.3 The Concept of Organisational Leadership 74
3.3.1 Leadership in Different Contexts and Cultures: Leadership in an Islamic Context.. 74
3.3.2 The Leadership of HE in Turbulent Times 78
3.3.3 Leadership Styles: Are Transformational Leaders Effective in Turbulent Times? 78
3.3.4 Classifications of Transformational Leaders: 81

3.3.5 Transformational Leadership: Strength despite Criticisms 82
3.4 Culture and Ideology 102
3.4.1 Approaches and Definitions 83
3.4.2 Features of Ideological Culture: The Islamic Ideological Culture 86
3.4.3 The Potential Contradictory Impacts of Ideology 87
3.4.4 The Relationship and Interface between Culture, Ideology and Leadership 89
3.5 Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in Turbulent Times 91
3.6 The Value of Leadership with Special Abilities for Organisations in Turbulent Environments 92
3.7 Organisational Resilience Theory 94
3.7.1 Introduction and Overview 94
3.7.2 Definitions and Features of Resilience 95
3.7.4 Criticisms of Resilience: Some Ambiguity and Vagueness 97
3.8 Building Capacity for Organisational Resilience Strategy 98
3.8.1 Qualities, Clusters and Dimensions of Capacities for Resilience 99

Chapter Four: Methodology 125
4. Methodology 103
4.1 Research Paradigm/ Qualitative Approach 126
4.2 A Case Study Approach 127
4.2.1 The Choice of IUG as a Case Study 129
4.3 Data Collection 131
4.3.1 Ethical Considerations of the Research 131
4.3.2 A Strategy of Data Collection 132
4.3.2.1 Documentation 110
4.3.2.2 Individual Interviews 135
4.3.2.3 Focus Group Interviews 137
4.3.2.3.1 Language of the Interviews 115
4.3.2.3.2 Interview Questions 116
4.3.2.4 Participant Observation 139
4.3.3 Research Data Base 140
4.4 Data Analysis 141
4.4.1 Applying Inductive Content Analysis 141
4.5 Triangulation of Data 143
4.6 The Researcher 145

Chapter Five: An Initial Analysis of the Emerging Themes 148

5.1 The Main Challenges IUG Experienced and the Responses of the Leadership..148
5.1.1 Facing the Dilemma of the Israeli Non-Recognition 150
5.1.2 Lack of Resources 154
5.1.2.1 Lack of Qualified Staff 154
5.1.2.2 Lack of Facilities (Buildings and Equipment)..... 156
5.1.3 Teaching in Risk, Stress and War Conditions 159
5.1.3.1 Disruption of the Educational Process 160
5.1.3.2 Moving Forward: Offering Off-Campus Classes..... 164
5.1.4 Loss of Authority and Control..... 145
5.1.5 Financial Crisis 147
5.1.6 Political Conflict and Division 149
5.2 The Factors Used by IUG Leadership in Dealing with Hardships and Challenges 152
5.2.1 Partnership between the Board of Trustees and the University Council . 153
5.2.2 Communications and Networks 178
5.2.3 Social Cohesion: Embracing and Protecting the University 182
5.2.4 Spirit of Affiliation and Commitment 164
5.2.5 Retention of Employees 167
5.2.6 Training and Development Programmes..... 170
5.2.7 Recruitment of Employees..... 172
Chapter Six: Diversity of Strategies, Leadership Styles and Resilience at IUG. 195
6.1 Strategies Used by the Leadership 174
6.2 The Characteristics and Styles of IUG Leadership 180
6.3 Resilience at IUG 184
6.3.1 Cognitive Factors 186
6.3.2 Behavioural Factors..... 188
6.3.3 Contextual Factors..... 189
6.4 The Role of Culture and Ideology at IUG 191
6.5 The Strategic Value of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence 196
Chapter Seven: Findings and Conclusions 228
7.1 Discussion of the Findings: Actors and Processes 228
7.1.1 Documenting the History of IUG..... 229
7.1.2 The Role of IUG Leadership in Turbulent Times 233
7.1.2.1 Leading in both a Conflict and a Post-Conflict Zone 209
7.1.2.2 The Exercise of Power..... 211

7.1.3 The Contribution of Culture and Ideology to the Survival and Growth of IUG 212
7.1.4 Mutual Shaping of the University and the Society 214
7.1.5 The Role of External Players 220
7.1.6 The Role of SHRM at IUG 222
7.1.7 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience 223
7.1.8 The Value of a Degree in the Community: the Internal and External Value of IUG Graduates in Gaza 225
7.2 The Main Conclusions of the Study and its Theoretical Implications 227
7.3 Recommendations 234
7.3.1 A Future Approach for IUG 234
7.3.2 Reflections on HEIs in Turbulent Times 237
7.4 Further Research 240

REFERENCE LIST 242

Appendices 271

List of Tables

Table 1: Palestinian HE Institutions **24**

Table 2: Total Number of Students Enrolled at IUG from 1978-2012 ..... **26**

Table 3: The Total Number of Males and Females Enrolled at IUG, 1978-2012 ..... **39**

Table 4: Number of Graduates Students from 1978-2012 ..... **45**

Table 5: Development of IUG Academic Staff Members with Masters and PhD Qualifications from 1978-2012 ..... **47**

Table 6: Characteristics of Leadership Styles **79**

Table 7: Factors, Dimensions, Principles and Clusters of Resilience **99**

Table 8: Seven Clusters of Needs that Contribute to Resilience **101**

Table 9: Types of IUG Documents **111**

Table 10: Cognitive Factors of Resilience at IUG **186**

Table 11: Behavioural Factors of Resilience at IUG **188**

Table 12: Contextual Factors: **189**

List of Figures

Figure 1: Palestine 1946-2010 ..... **1**

Figure 2: Quality of Life Determinants in the Palestinian Context. **22**

Figure 3: Increase in the Number of Students Enrolled at IUG 1978-2012 ..... **28**

Figure 4: The Total Number of Males and Females at IUG from 1978-2012..... **40**

Figure 5: Development of Graduate Students at IUG from 1981- 2012 ..... **45**

Figure 6: Development of IUG Staff Members during 1978-2012 ..... **51**

List of Pictures

Picture 1: IUG Tents Used as Classrooms in Early 1980s **9**

Picture 2: Some IUG Buildings, December 2012 ..... **9**

Picture 3: Buildings of Asbestos Replaced Tents, (Female Campus 1983-1995) **37**

Picture 4: The Israeli Decision to Shut Down IUG in June 1988 (Document 47) **42**

Picture 5: The UNRWA Recognition of IUG Certificates (Document No. 51) **51**

Picture 6: Science and Engineering Labs after Bombing during 2008 War **57**

Glossary of Terms

ALESCO	Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation
B'Tselem	Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights
CSCED	Community Service and Continuing Education Deanship
HC	Human Capital
HE	Higher Education
HEIs	Higher Education Institutions
HR	Human Resources
HRM	Human Resource Management
IIUM	International Islamic University Malaysia
IIUI	International Islamic University Islamabad
IUG	Islamic University of Gaza
KIU	Korean Imperial University
OCU	Oklahoma Christian University
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
QDA	Qualitative Data Analysis
R&D	Research and Development
SHRM	Strategic Human Resource Management
SM	Strategic Management
TCA	Thematic Content Analysis
TQM	Total Quality Management
UCAS	University College for Applied Science
UNESCO	United Nations, Educational, scientific and Cultural Organisation
UK	United Kingdom
UNRWA	United Nations for Relief and Work Agency
UNSA	University of Sarajevo
USA	United States of America


Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Context of the Research

Higher Education in countries openly at war, or which are in conflict or post-conflict zones, faces an environment which is turbulent, changing and challenging (Muthanna and Karaman, 2014; Dobre, 2015). These conflicts have created major obstacles for Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) such as the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG), in Palestine.

Figure 1: Palestine 1946-2010



Source: United Nations (2011).

Palestine is located in the centre of the Middle East region at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe, and links African Arab with Asian Arab countries. The Gaza Strip where IUG is located is one of the most densely populated regions of the world. More than 1.6 million people live in the Gaza Strip which occupies a small thin area that does not exceed 365 km^2 (less than 0.014% of the total area of Palestine which is 27 000 km^2) in the southern coastal lands of historical Palestine (Assaf, 2001; Enshassi, 2000). The pictures in Figure 1 reveal the changes that have occurred throughout the years and the current realities of the Gaza strip.

Giacaman, Abo-Rmeileh, Husseini, Saab, and Boyce (2007) describe the range of violent and traumatic experiences to which the Palestinian nation in the West Bank, the lands of 1948 and the Gaza Strip have been subjected due to six decades of the Israeli occupation, including the destruction of the social world, manipulation of history, decline of education, theft of identity and culture, and destruction of values.

The occupation forces withdrew from the Gaza Strip after signing the Oslo accord in 1993, and relocated themselves around the cities of Gaza which created some calm and stability (Ramahi and Davies, 2002). Later in 2005, the occupation forces withdrew to the borders of the Strip. Consequently, the people of Gaza have some space to manage and improve their lives. Therefore, although some of the literature makes a clear distinction between conflict and post-conflict areas, the Gaza Strip exhibits characteristics of both.

The varied economic, social, political, cultural and educational challenges confronting the Palestinian community have shaped their life, and are seriously damaging their chances for peaceful, inclusive and independent development in the future. Within the last five years alone, three wars have been waged against the Gaza Strip in December 2008, November 2012 and July 2014. This is in addition to the tightening of the siege and closure of the borders over the Gaza Strip.

The effects of the occupation have been both general for the population, and specific to universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Heleta (2015) states that universities are always damaged and affected when a country experiences war conditions. As conflict deepens, academic freedom is threatened or curtailed.

This thesis argues that during the past 34 years, the leadership of IUG, the case under investigation, has been able to defy difficulties and obstacles to ensure the survival of the university. These difficulties include: the Israeli and UNRWA non-recognition of the university since its inception until 1993; lack of resources; restrictions on movement; the shutdown of the university several times (Sullivan, 1994); internal political division; financial crises; and the bombing and destruction of all the engineering and science buildings during the aggression of December 2008 against the Gaza Strip. Each one of these problems put the survival and growth of the university at stake.

An understanding of the particular challenges facing HEIs under hazardous conditions might provide a foundation for understanding how tertiary institutions in conflict and post-conflict societies can survive and continue to provide the critical services that they do at operational, political and economic levels.

Lengnick-Hall, Beck, and Lengnick-Hall (2011:243) argue that in adverse circumstances, "Only resilient, agile and relentlessly dynamic organisations will thrive in these turbulent, surprising, continuously evolving environments". In such turbulence and ongoing conflict, resilience is an imperative. Resilience gives the leadership the ability to deploy different factors and options that help them to act in a rational and timely manner to absorb shocks and overcome difficulties.

The case of IUG represents a pattern of the difficulties and challenges that face the Palestinian universities under occupation and might face any HEI in turbulent times. It also sheds light on the responses of organisational leadership in coping with these hardships. Working under the spears of the Israeli occupation since its inception in 1978 created severe obstacles and challenges. The particular Islamic character of the university offered both hardships and resources. Camillzts and Datta (1991) maintain that if organisations cannot absorb shocks and respond in a resilient manner, they might jeopardise their very existence.

1.2 Research Problem

The problem here is the environment of conflict and wars, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence within which IUG must exist and the leadership must operate. As a result of 64 years of occupation, it is extremely difficult to uncover any aspect of Palestinian life that has not been shaped by the prolonged Israeli occupation (Smith, 2011). Such hardships threaten the morale of the staff, undermine the effectiveness of governance and management, and put the survival and growth of IUG at stake.

HEIs have to operate and survive within the social, political and economic environment in which they are located. Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that many researchers view the context and environment of HE as changing. This issue encourages scholars to determine the best delivery of education amid conflict (Bernardo and Baranovich, 2014).

The researcher noted that most research on leadership and resilience has been conducted in Western contexts and culture, especially the United States. Yet, as Wang, Waldman and Zhang (2012) suggest, it is not clear if there might be different results across different cultures and contexts.Therefore, it is important to research the role of leadership and resilience within the Islamic settings of IUG.

The researcher found no comprehensive study that dealt with the role of organisational resilience in the survival and thriving of higher education institutions in general, and in particular, universities that operate under conditions of occupation, war and serious conflict. The managerial strategies and tactics of organisational leadership to stabilize things that underpin the running of any university in a resilient and timely manner, located in politically fraught countries under prolonged occupation and conflict zones, such as the case of IUG, are also under-studied.

Therefore, the researcher believes that this study may help to address the need for research to fill the gap in theories on the role of the leadership in HE during prolonged violence and instability by categorising the strategies and the factors leadership deployed. This will contribute to insights regarding the survival and growth of a university located in an extreme conflict and occupation zone.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The main purpose of this research is to examine the role of the leadership and the sources and manifestations of organisational resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza between its inception in 1978 and the end of 2012. To accomplish this goal, the study explores the challenges and difficulties IUG experienced through the past 34 years, and the responses of the leadership to these challenges.

The study also explores the styles of leadership at IUG and examines whether these are the appropriate styles to be utilised in HEIs in turbulent times. Further, the study unpacks the factors and strategies used by the leadership to overcome hardships, and the interaction between these factors and its contributions in achieving the survival and thriving of the university. Finally the role of the university in the production and transfer of knowledge, to students, staff and the wider society and in nation-building is examined in both conflict and post-conflict situations.

1.4 Research Questions

The overall question of this study is:

How does leadership foster resilience in a Higher Education Institution in situations of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence?

Two subsidiary questions are designed to answer the overall question:

1. How did the leadership at IUG respond to the challenges 1978-2012?

2. How did leadership and culture interact in building resilience?

1.5 Managing HEIs in Turbulent Times: Beyond Knowledge Production

In both developed and developing countries, the business of HEIs is not only the production and transfer of knowledge. According to Stephens and Graham (2010), in post conflict societies, HEIs play a critical role in supporting nation-building. Stephens and Graham contend that universities play a central role in the reconstruction process of societies. They can impact the public mind-set and act as a major contributor to the re-establishment of the civil society. Universities educate the teachers and qualified graduates of which most post-conflict societies are in dire need. However, conflict and wars undermine this foundation and can destroy education infrastructure (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008).

The approaches of Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) and Stephens and Graham (2010) to the additional business of HE are aligned with the approach of Altbach (1987) who argues that in developing countries, HE constitutes a very important institution, not only because it trains elites and provides the basis for a technological society, but because it is the intellectual institution with the most widespread impact on culture, politics and ideology.

Generally, in both developed and developing countries, HEIs face a variety of challenges. Some of these are: developing quality criteria and enhancing quality assurance; meeting the demands of stakeholders such as the government, labour market and funding agencies; and engaging students with the real world (Muller-Christ, Sterling, van Dam-Mieras, Adombent, Fisher and Rieckmann, 2014). In the case of IUG, the major stakeholder, the Israeli Occupying Authority, was hostile to the existence of the university.

Sporn (2010) believes that managing HEIs is a complex task, and concerns a set of actors and processes in order to succeed, particularly in turbulent environments. HEIs are considered by Sporn (2010) and Enders (2015) as critical because they represent one of the important sectors which enable communities to function and actively contribute to the development and progress of societies.

Establishing and maintaining the smooth functioning of universities in the Palestinian territories under occupation was a problematic and challenging issue. It remained a high priority for the Palestinian community in order to stand against the Israeli Occupying

Authority and to contribute to nation building. Baramki (2010:35) states that "Having a university was crucial if we were to resist the occupation. We would produce well–educated, confident graduates, proud of their Palestinian identity and eager to contribute to the development of their homeland".

According to Sullivan (1994), Palestinian universities played an important role in the political activities and the efforts to create an independent Palestinian state.

1.6 IUG: Focusing the Study on a Specific Institution

The Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) emerged in 1978 as a strong example of a Palestinian university actively engaged with the process of coping with challenges and overcoming barriers imposed by the Israeli occupation forces in the Palestinian land. In the early years, IUG was nothing more than some scattered and sporadic tents (see Picture 1) amid the sand dunes which were not suitable for any kind of HE. Within a short period of time, IUG was able to shift to a modern university that housed more than 20 000 students studying in modern buildings as shown in Picture 2, and offering them a diversity of faculties, degrees and specialisations.

Picture 1: IUG Tents Used as Classrooms in Early 1980s



Source: Public Relation Office of IUG

Picture 2: Some of IUG Buildings, December 2012



Source: Public Relation Office of IUG

Impeding the establishment and the progress of the Palestinian universities has been a consistent policy of the occupation authorities (Mahshi, 1978). In this study, IUG represents a symbol of the suffering of Palestinian universities under the Israeli occupation. IUG, the only university in Gaza until 1991, was chosen as a platform to shed adequate light on the sanctions and obstacles imposed by the Israeli occupation against Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Many Palestinian universities were subject to Israeli oppressive measures such as long closure of universities, humiliation against students and staff members and financial constraints. IUG was, also, subjected to additional Israeli targeting such as the bombing of IUG many times in the wars of 2009, 2012 and 2014. This is in addition to the assassination of many leaders and members of the staff.

Soon after the inception of IUG in 1978, the occupation forces tried to impose their dominance over the university. Some of these attempts were: the intervention in the number of registered students each year; the intervention in the curriculum; restrictions on fund raising and freedom of movement; the prevention of opening new faculties/ departments; and rejecting the construction of new buildings (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009).

Although the occupation cast long shadows on the Palestinian community and its institutions, it was not the only obstacle to hinder academic excellence. There are also different side-effects of the occupation, one of which was the political and ideological disagreement, mainly between secular and religious nationalists in the early 1980s. This led to some occasionally violent clashes between students and caused damage to some offices and equipment. Thus, the educational process was disrupted many times. This political conflict also has its own impacts on the Palestinian community as it increased the tension and instability between the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) and Hamas, and caused tightening the siege over the Gaza Strip. It also played a major role in creating internal and external supporters/opponents for the case of IUG, particularly in financial support.

Farranah (1985) argues that Palestinian universities are a fundamental pillar in maintaining the unity of the community, which the occupation is keen to shred. Despite the fact that Palestinian universities played a crucial role in opposing the occupation, political and

religious divisions appeared strongly in universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seriously threatening the unity of the community.

The story of IUG is a story of the struggle and sacrifice of a Palestinian university against the Israeli occupation assaults and invasion to keep the university surviving and able to move forward with the educational process. This thesis is about the achievements of IUG against the background of Israeli oppression. The IUG story reveals points of both convergence and divergence within the Palestinian community. Successful and positive stories have been achieved at IUG. Nevertheless, negative stories have arisen. Therefore, a detailed and documented story of the university is presented and analysed in chapter 2 in order to give insight into IUG realities and their implications.

1.7 The Role of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence

There have been many approaches to organisational resilience and the associated factors or attributes. For example, Hollnagel (2007, 2009) defines resilience as the intrinsic ability of an organisation to adjust its functioning prior to or following shocks and turbulent events. By doing so, organisations can sustain the required operations even after major events or in the presence of difficulties and challenges. This definition was developed by Hollnagel, Woods and Wreathall (2011) and adopted by Steen and Aven (2011).

Another approach to resilience proposed by Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) and Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) is aligned with Hollnagel's definition of resilience. They define and perceive resilience as thriving because of the ability to capitalise on disturbances and unexpected events and create opportunities from threats. Both perspectives seek to absorb the initial damage, recover and exploit any opportunities to move forward and thrive.

In a similar way, Dinh, Pasman and Mannan (2012) define resilience as the ability to minimize damages and get operations rapidly back to normal after adverse events. In the context of serious conflict and wars, Ungar (2011) describes resilience as a dynamic process that can lead to positive results despite war and adverse circumstances. This thesis primarily understands resilience as the ability of an organisation to absorb shocks or initial damages and recover, which is crucial for the organisation to return to normal operations and move beyond surviving to thriving.

1.8 The Role of Transformational Leadership in Turbulent Environments

Because IUG operates in a turbulent and challenging environment, the focus on leadership styles will be on transformational style of leadership with some insight on transactional style as elaborated in the literature discussed in chapter 3. This is based on the assertion of several key authors in the field (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011; Siewiorek, Saarinen, Lainema, and Lehtinen, 2012; Manktelow and Carlson, 2013) that these two styles are more appropriate than other styles, particularly in changing and challenging environments with priority to transformational leadership over transactional style.

The study investigates whether a transformational style of leadership was deployed at IUG and whether it is appropriate in turbulence and ongoing conflict. It investigates the three characteristics of transformational leadership presented by Bass and Avolio (1990) which are: importance of outcomes; transcending self-interest; and activating higher-order needs. Also, the study explores if there were other styles implemented throughout the different stages of IUG history and its major role within the context of the university.

The researcher adopted the definition of transformational leadership introduced by Yukl (2010), who was inspired and strongly influenced by the work of two key authors in the field of leadership, Burns (1978) and Bass (1990).Transformational leadership is about the ability of leaders' behaviours to influence followers and motivate them to comply with instructions (Yukl, 2010).

1.9 The Role of Culture and Ideology in Shaping the University

Aktas, Cicek and Kiyak (2011), define culture as a set of norms, values, beliefs and attitudes that affect behaviour.

The Middle East region reflects particular historical, religious, social and cultural characteristics. The diversity in this region is related to language, religion, traditions, habits and interests. The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO) declared in the Fourth Islamic Conference in Algeria in 2004 that the diversity of culture among Muslim countries has many advantages: it is one of the important factors of sustainable development; it contributes to globalisation and interaction of civilizations; and it helps in creativity and delivering best services to the community (ISESCO, 2004).

Islam as the prevalent religion in the region can act, in spite of the diversity of understanding and implementation of its concepts, as a unifying force by creating a common culture in the Middle-Eastern cluster (Kabasakal and Dastmalchian, 2001; Kabasakal and Bodur, 2002). Even within the same Islamic countries there is diversity in understanding Islamic concepts. The Islamic culture is a set of thoughts, values and beliefs that stems from the Quran and from the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohamed which guide the behaviours of leaders and followers (Beekun and Badawi, 1999; Faris and Parry, 2011).

Although the beliefs of followers are based on the same sacred texts, nevertheless, the interpretation by many groups of these concepts are extremely diverse and often in conflict with one another. Within the Muslim community there are two big Islamic sects, Sunnis and Shiites. The majority of Muslims are Sunnis. There are Shiites in Iran and parts of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Pakistan. Both sects have the same faith and beliefs (Sullivan, 2001), nevertheless, disagreements appear in the way they explain some Islamic concepts (Awaa, 2006). These different interpretations create conflict and different extreme ideological organisations some of which adopt violence and have led to bloodshed and oppression. The conflict between these groups resulted in violent clashes and wars such as what happened between Iraq and Iran in mid 1980s and the current conflict in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. This is in addition to some individual criminal attacks against civilians in different regions of the world.

In the Palestinian context, although the majority of Palestinians are Muslim Sunni, the general culture is diverse. Differences are both religious and ideological. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, many different political/ ideological factions exist and adopt different ideologies ranging from Islamic to secular and leftist ideologies. These ideologies are implemented in organisations and institutions, including universities. Some of them are, generally, affected by Islamic culture such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Salafist among some other smaller groups. Other factions adopt secular or leftist ideology such as Fatah, The Popular Front, The Democratic Front among other smaller groups. This diversity offers a challenge to the exchange of ideas and beliefs in a rational manner with respect to democracy, equality and diversity (Marriot, Hooley and Weller, 2011). All these organisations tried to promote their ideology and culture to attract the largest number of people, employees and students. This created not only intense competition but also sometimes violent conflicts.

This diversity of ideologies and political affiliation exists strongly in most of the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While Birzeit, An-Najah and Bethlehem in the West Bank and Al-Azhar in Gaza Strip have affiliation with Fatah, the IUG in Gaza has affiliation with Hamas. There is still conflict and disagreement between Fatah and Hamas about dominance over Al-Aqsa university in Gaza. This diversity of political and ideological views turned sometimes to conflict and caused violent clashes between these groups in many universities such as An-Najah, Birzeit and IUG in the early 1980s and in 2007, as will be discussed in chapter two.

The concentration of this thesis on Islamic culture is because it is the adopted culture at the university. IUG provides for its students an academic environment that adheres to Sunni Islamic principles as well as Palestinian traditions and customs, and aims to contribute in building future generations and developing the society in a framework of these Islamic values (IUG website, 2012). Therefore, it has been created with Islamic cultural Sunni roots and sets out to adopt and instill Islamic principles in the hearts and minds of students, staff and the community as a whole. These principles are based on tolerance, justice, peace and cooperation with others. This Islamic ideological culture comprises a cornerstone which cannot be ignored when discussing or analysing the past, the present and the current reality of IUG.

The political affiliation and the dominance of the Islamic Trend (which was absorbed by Hamas after 1987) over IUG played a role in shaping the general culture of the university. The leadership and many of the staff members embrace these Islamic cultures as they form an important part of their beliefs and practices within and outside the university. Generally, there are certain differences between culture and organisational culture, yet there is also overlap and mutual influence between the two concepts, particularly in the case of IUG as will be clarified in chapter 3. This study examines whether Islamic culture can be a unifying factor despite differences.

1.10 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience

Teixeirra and Werther (2013) argue that leadership and culture are key dimensions to create resilience. They believe that leadership is the organising force that creates a resilient organisation. In a study of schools that operate successfully in South Africa, Christie, Butler, and Potterton (2007:27) argue that "the key features of resilient schools are: Sense of responsibility and agency; Leadership; Centrality of teaching and learning; Safety and organisation; Authority and discipline and Culture of concern". These features which constitute leadership and culture, if adopted and implemented properly, might enable educational institutions, not only schools but also universities, to be more resilient in the face of challenges. Thus, they could enhance their ability to absorb shocks and overcome hardships.

Pianta and Walsh (1998) argue that resilience is a process that needs the interface of all the functions and efforts to work together in integrity toward the same goals of the organisation. In terms of the mutual influence of culture and leadership, Teixeirra and Werther (2013) state that leaders can reshape the culture, and this can lead to a more resilient organisation.

Devanna, Fombrum, Tichy, and Warren, (1982) consider Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) a key process in strategy implementation of an organisation. The decisions and actions of organisational leadership shape the central tenet of that strategy. The challenges and changes of the environment needs SHRM goals and objectives to work with synergy and integrity toward the same strategy of the organisation (Demirbag, Tatoglu, Glaister and Zaim, 2010; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011).

In this regard, Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) believe that building capacities for organisational resilience can be achieved through SHRM by developing capacities of leaders and employees to enable them to absorb events, and ultimately engage in transformational activities to capitalise on events and even thrive. This study examines whether SHRM played any role in the survival of IUG or contributed to building capacity for organisational resilience.

1.11 Structure of the Research: A Road Map

This research is composed of seven chapters. Following chapter 1 of the introduction, chapter 2 presents and analyses the story of IUG. It provides a full perspective of what has happened at IUG during the last three decades. It gives insight into the context in which IUG was established and operated. The chapter also relates the progress IUG was able to achieve in spite of difficulties and hardships. The chapter documents the history of the university through its different stages.

Chapter 3 presents the literature review and the conceptual framework by which leadership and resilience are defined and theorised. This chapter conceptualises the role of universities in societies and the challenges that face HEIs in general, and universities in particular, especially in areas of turbulence and conflict. In addition, this chapter summarises the concepts, styles and the role of leadership in different contexts and cultures. Further important factors such as culture and ideology, and strategic human resource management in turbulent times are discussed. The study examines how these concepts are inter-related and how they interact to promote organisational resilience in order to achieve the objectives and goals of the organisation. Organisational resilience theories are then discussed with specific focus on the qualities and markers of resilience and how to build capacity for organisational resilience strategy.

.

Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in this study. It provides the justification for the methodological approach and the procedures employed in the study. Because the researcher has been employed at IUG from 1983 as an administrator in different departments, a process of self-reflexivity added to the richness of the data, and served as a bulwark against bias.

Chapter 5 presents an initial analysis and discussion of the challenges IUG experienced and the responses of the leadership.

Chapter 6 provides a full analysis and discussion of the role of resilience at IUG. Further it provides the strategies and the styles of leadership deployed at IUG. Further it presents the

markers of resilience. Finally, the chapter introduces the role of culture and ideology at IUG.

Chapter 7 presents the findings and the conclusions of the study. It summarises the main contributions of the study, followed by recommendations for IUG and for HEIs. Some suggestions for further research are then presented. The appendices include the semi-structured interview questions and a list of the documents used in the study.

Chapter Two

2. The University of Tents: A Story of a Successful Palestinian University under Israeli Occupation

Recording the history of IUG in this chapter is the first outcome of this research. The story of the university presented in this chapter has been derived from document analysis, interviews, focus groups discussion and personal observation.

2.1 The Context of the Israeli Occupation: Shaping the Life of Palestinians

Smith (2011:316) states that "the Israeli Palestinian conflict is not as a war between two equal sovereigns, but between a hostile state and a captive population". Due to the profound effects of the prolonged occupation on the Palestinian community as a whole, it is crucial to understand the context of the Palestinian dilemma in general, and its potential impacts on the functioning of IUG in particular.

Describing the Palestinian context, particularly in the Gaza Strip, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Filippo Grandi (2011) stated in his speech, introducing the UN annual report in front of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, that Palestine refugees suffered negative effects of ongoing conflict. In Gaza, unless the blockade is lifted and the economy restarted, it would cease to be a liveable place by 2020 and their survival would be at stake (Grandi, 2011).

2.1.1 Historical Background

In 1948 the catastrophe (*Al-Nakbah*) uprooted and dispossessed an entire nation from its own land in order to establish the Israeli State (Hadawi, 1968; Brand, 1991). Palestinians at that time not only lost all of their own land, but some were ethnically cleansed. Others became refugees in surrounding countries and in their own home space (Kevorkian and Khsheiboun, 2009). Relevant international law, although not officially abrogated, has become meaningless in the solution of this acute and prolonged conflict (de Santisteban, 2002) with no real opportunities to solve this dilemma based on justice and fairness in the near future. Recent war has left the Gaza Strip devastated (Jabareen and Camron, 2010), and therefore, Palestinians require aid support and policy advice (Collier and Hoeffer, 2004) to attain their freedom and dignity.

The Israeli occupation has been able through a colonial, deliberate and well-planned policy to control and usurp the Palestinian territories. In the 1920s, as shown in Figure 1a on p1 the territories inhabited by Jewish settlers were few and fragmented. After the wars in 1948 and in 1967 and beyond, they controlled all of the Palestinian territories (Reuventy, 2003)

and imposed their policies and rules on the Palestinian territories. Consequently, the Palestinian territories became as small and scattered pieces without any meaningful territorial contiguity between them.


2.1.2 Quality of Palestinians' Life under Occupation

All communities in wars and conflicts suffer disastrous and long-lasting effects that undermine their reintegration and overall safety (UNICEF, 2007). Wars and conflicts adversely affect basic services for citizens under conflict and thus make them suffer, sometimes for many years.

The Israeli military measures against the Palestinian community were multi-faceted. These include: displacement of civilians from their homes and land; demolition of thousands of homes; razing and destruction of agricultural land; arresting; injuring and killing thousands of civilians; imposing closures and siege; a checkpoints regime; construction of the separation wall; and the isolation of cities and areas from each other (Hamdan and Defever, 2002). These sanctions also include deportation of citizens abroad and imposing restrictions on the movement of citizens and goods.

Drawing from Giacaman, Mataria*, et al*. (2007), The diagram in Figure 2 summarises the major external and internal impacts of the Israeli occupation on different aspects of Palestinian life. They conclude that the quality of Palestinians' lives has dramatically deteriorated since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1948. This acute and prolonged occupation reflects a loss of national dignity, loss of freedom and mobility of movement, feeling of incapacitation, economic decline and poverty and stressful circumstances.

Figure 2: Quality of Life Determinants in the Palestinian Context



Source: Giacaman, Mataria, Nguyen-Gillham, Abu Safieh, Stefanini and Chatterji, 2007:73.

With regard to economic and financial crises, Hilal (2012:386) believes that "Palestine is an extreme case given the extent to which marginalisation is present for the majority of Palestinians and the very severe limitations that are placed on economic opportunities in the current political environment". The Israeli occupation, combined with their restrictions led to financial and economic crises. The occupation authorities tried to impede and prevent any economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nofal (2006) concludes that, in addition to the extensive destruction of various aspects of community, economic and social life, which led to a decline in the rates of growth, output and trade, high unemployment rates appeared and led to increasing rates of poverty (Batniji, Rabaia, Nguyen–Gillham, Giacaman, Sarraj, Punamaki, Saab, and Boyce, 2009). Poverty has become a part of the Palestinian ascribed identity and increased the complexity of their social and educational life.

In terms of the health status, there were imminent risks and continuous suffering. The Israeli measures and restrictions caused serious damage to the basic health services of the Palestinian population. The report of the World Bank (2004) on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip stated that Israeli attacks during *Intifadt Al-Aqsa* in 2000, intentionally targeted civilians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The report added that the closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have imposed extreme difficulties upon the health system.

B'Tselem (2010) states that many old men and women died while waiting on the roads, and pregnant women were forced to give birth while waiting at the checkpoints. Kevorkian (2003) and B'Tselem (2010) declare that Palestinians suffer from lack of adequate health services because of the Israeli restrictions on importing medicine and equipment. This is in addition to the inability to receive medical care on time because of the checkpoints regime. Continuing the occupation for more than six decades has caused deep psychological and mental health problems. Symptoms of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and somatic conditions were found to be elevated within Palestinian society (Kevorkian, 2003).

Kevorkian and Khsheiboun (2009) say that the Palestinian people have yet to attain their inalienable rights as defined by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the right to self-determination without external interference, the right to national independence and sovereignty, and the right to return to their homes. This study examines the role of IUG in opposing the occupation and in nation-building. Over time, this conflict also created political divisions among Palestinian political groups (Secular, Islamic and leftist). These differences appeared most notably among students in some universities (Birzeit, An-Najah and IUG) and led sometimes to clashes in the 1980s between these groups.

The tension and the political conflict escalated after the signing of the Oslo agreement in September 1993 between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israeli government. The agreement led to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) led by Fatah movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to the ceding of some power and territory by Israel to PNA (Chenoweth, Wehrmeyer, Lipchin, Smith, Gazit, 2007). After the Israeli withdrawal from inside the cities of the Gaza Strip in 2005, free

elections under international supervision were held in 2006 in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem to choose members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas won an overwhelming majority of these elections. This, in turn escalated the violence and internal divisions.

2.1.3 Effects of Occupation on HE Sector in Gaza Strip: Academic Exclusion

Since the early years of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli colonial procedures and restrictions against the HE sector aimed to impede any efforts of Palestinians to establish or develop HEIs (Mahshi, 1978; Alzaroo, 1989) particularly in the Gaza Strip. Alzaroo (1989) argues that the Israeli occupation forces tried to hinder the efforts of universities in the Gaza Strip towards progress and development.

One of the real challenges for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem was to establish and maintain universities under the continuous restrictions of Israeli occupation. Notwithstanding these limitations and difficulties against the education sector, the Palestinian people have demonstrated that education is of great importance to them (Baramki, 2010). Due to the dire need, there was insistence and determination of the Palestinian people to establish their own universities. Under the pressure of the community, the occupation has turned a blind eye to the establishment of universities in the West Bank. Sullivan (1994) believes that the occupation allowed the opening of universities in order to keep an eye on and supervise students and their political activities.

During the period 1973-1977, five universities were established in the West Bank (Awad, 1983) while none were established in the Gaza Strip. The pressure and the intensive efforts continued until the Palestinian community and their leaders in the Gaza Strip succeeded in establishing IUG as the first university in Gaza in November 1978. Thirteen years later, Al-Azhar University was established in Gaza city in close proximity to IUG.

Table 1: Palestinian HE Institutions

No	Name	Supervision	Year of Establishment	Location
1	Palestine Technical University	Government	1930	West Bank
2.	Hebron University	Public	1971	West Bank
3.	Birzeit University	Public	1972	West Bank
4.	Bethlehem University	Public	1973	West Bank
5.	An-Najah National University	Public	1977	West Bank
6.	Islamic University of Gaza	Public	1978	Gaza Strip
7.	Palestine Polytechnic University	Public	1978	West Bank
8.	Al Quds University	Public	1984	West Bank
9.	Al -Azhar University	Public	1991	Gaza Strip
10.	Al- Aqsa University	Government	1991	Gaza Strip

11	The Arab American University	Public	1997	West Bank
12.	Gaza University	Private	2007	Gaza Strip
13.	University College of Applied Sciences	Private	2007	Gaza Strip
14.	University Of Palestine	Private	2008	Gaza Strip
15.	Ummah University for Open Learning	Private	2008	Gaza Strip

Source: Dean of planning and development at IUG 2012

As shown in Table 1, the Palestinian society and its leaders were able to create fifteen universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to serve the national objectives of the community, between 1972 and 208. Some of these are government universities which, financially, are fully supported by the PNA, while public universities are partially supported.

The occupation was not able to prevent the establishment of the Palestinian universities. Nevertheless, they were able to impose restrictive measures to disrupt the smooth functioning of the educational process. According to de Santisteban (2002) the Palestinian universities and institutes were always a target of the Israeli occupation (including such oppresive actions as shutting down, intrusive inspection, besieging, vandalising property and humiliation measures).

2.2 IUG- Leading through Adverse Circumstances

de Santisteban (2002) describes the Palestinian case under occupation as distinctive due to its inherent uncertainty in the pace of transition, educational disruptions and the shortage of adequate resources. The lives of Palestinians have been shaped by conflict, rampant unemployment and instability (Alzaroo and Hunt, 2003). Despite this uncertainty and disruptive measures of the occupation, Palestinians have repeatedly turned to education as a primary means of survival (Nicolai, 2007).

IUG was established in 1978 as the first university in the Gaza Strip. It started with only 25 students (all male) and by 2012 had increased to 20 168. The 25 initial students studied in make-shift tents under two faculties: *Sharia* (Islamic Legislation) and Law, and Arabic Language. By 2012, IUG students studied in eleven faculties. These faculties were: Sharia and Law; Art, Religion Foundation; Education, Science, Commerce; Engineering; Nursing; Information Technology; Medicine; and Health Sciences. The faculties offered Bachelor, General Diploma, Master, and new PhD programmes (Appendix E).

IUG adopted the philosophy of teaching male and female students on two separated campuses (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009) with no differences of the subjects the men students and women students study. This decision was accepted and supported by the leadership which consisted of members from different political parties. In 1979, only 40 women were registered. By the academic year 1981-1982, the number of enrolled women had grown to 269 while the number of men enrolled was 898. Before the shutting down of IUG in 1987-1988, the number grew to 1 656 female and 2 848 male as shown in Table 2 (P. 26) and Table 3 (P. 40).

The increase in student enrolment is not linear. Between 1978-1987, enrolment increased from 25 to 4505 students. After the outbreak of the first *Intifada* (uprising) and the forced shutdown of the university, student enrolment decreased sharply in 1989 to only 358 students.

Table 2: Total Number of Students Enrolled at IUG from 1978-2012


Academic Year	Bachelor Degree	Master	General Diploma	Total
78/79	25	-	-	25
79/80	161	-	-	161
80/81	345	-	-	345
81/82	1,167	-	-	1,167
82/83	1,719	-	-	1,719
83/84	2,906	-	-	2,906
84/85	3,805	-	-	3,805
85/86	3,752	-	-	3,752
86/87	4,051	-	-	4,051

Academic Year	Bachelor Degree	Master	General Diploma	Total
87/88	4,504	-	-	4,504
88/89	358	-	-	358
89/90	1,034	-	-	1,034
90/91	1,100	-	-	1,100
91/92	2,061	-	-	2,061
92/93	2,684	-	-	2,684
93/94	3,573	-	-	3,573
94/95	4,192	14	-	4,206
95/96	5,040	36	-	5,076
96/97	4,849	36	-	4,885
97/98	7,412	81	93	7,586

Academic Year	Bachelor Degree	Master	General Diploma	Total
98/99	8,615	132	145	8,892
99/00	9,647	123	163	9,933
00/01	10,069	160	190	10,419
01/02	11,615	261	257	12,133
02/03	12,975	293	327	13,595
03/04	12,995	376	519	13,890
04/05	15,661	545	631	16,837
05/06	16,995	712	476	18,183
06/07	19,108	806	463	20,377
07/08	19,355	953	488	20,796
08/09	18,946	1,117	332	20,395

Academic Year	Bachelor Degree	Master	General Diploma	Total
09/10	18,859	1025	294	20,178
10/11	18,799	1142	327	20,268
11/12	18,747	1119	302	20,168

Figure 3: Increase in the Number of Students Enrolled at IUG 1978-2012



The university has not experienced the same challenges, or applied the same solutions to problems it faced at different stages of development. To enable a better understanding of various difficulties, and challenges, and solutions, the researcher has divided the phases of the university into four stages. The next section presents and analyses these four stages in detail.

Challenges of the Four Stages:

Stage 1: 1978-1987 - Establishment and Recognition

- Lack of resources, human and material (staff and equipment)
- Working under stress and risk (the non-recognition of IUG for fifteen years, raids and inspection, arrests and departure of staff and Chancellors of IUG)
- Lack of infrastructure (buildings, facilities and communication networks)
- Financial crises (salaries and other needs
- Restrictions on the development of IUG (preventing the launch of new programs, limitation of numbers of registered students)
- Disruption and impeding research and development programs
- Loss of control and authority (restriction of free movement of staff, visa and accommodation issues, and expulsion of staff)

- Disruption of decision making process (interference in decisions, curricula, number of students and opening new departments or Faculties)

Stage 2: 1987-1993 - Threatening the Existence

- Destruction of the educational process (closing IUG for four years, arrest of hundreds of students and staff, storming the university, inspecting and tampering with its furniture and equipment several times)
- Financial crises (significant restrictions on fund-raising and transfer, student fees)
- Full disruption of research and development programs
- Endangered the retention of students and staff of the university
- Significant weakness in communication with the outside world because of the closure of the university
- Threatened commitment of employees (dropping out of the university for more than four years and unavailability of salaries for long months)
- Decline of performance (absenteeism of staff)

Stage 3: 1993-2000 - Reconstruction and Development

- Recognition of IUG (local, regional and international institutions, governments and associations, hiring of IUG graduates).
- Launch of training, research and development programs.
- Launch of a major reconstruction process (new permanent buildings).
- Strengthen the local, national and international network and relationships (leadership and employees, partnership and twinning agreements with many universities and institutions.
- Vertical and Horizontal expansion of IUG (new Faculties, units and departments, programs, increase the number of)
- Decision-making effectiveness (partnership and between the University Council and the Board of Trustees, staff participation in decision-making process)
- Development of laws and regulations and systems of the university
- Social cohesion (serving the community and community support)
- Expanding of IUG (the opening of the University College, diploma programs, Bachelor programs

Stage 4: 2000-2012 - Siege, Closure & Wars

- Performance decline (absenteeism and late access of employees to the university).
- Commitment challenges (significant disturbances on academic programs, lectures, examinations and graduation time of students).

- Working under check-point regime (measures of humiliation, arrests, beatings and shootings)
- Working under social and psychological pressure conditions (employees and their families, students, serious shortage and daily cut of power supply for periods ranging from 8-16 hours every day and huge shortage of fuel).
- Impeding of training, research and development programs.
- Restrictions on free movement of staff (traveling, participation in conferences and research programs).
- Lack of resources, devices and building materials
- Disruption of communication network with the outside world.
- Destruction and huge damage to the construction processes
- Financial crisis (destruction of buildings, equipment and 72laboratories).
- Managing crises (student registration, changing lectures and examinations, funds difficulties).

2.2.1 First Stage: Creating IUG among the Rubble: Challenges, Ambitions and Dreams, 1978-1987

Neither the West Bank nor the Gaza Strip had any universities before 1967. Secondary students in the West Bank studied the Jordanian curriculum, while students in the Gaza Strip followed the Egyptian curriculum (Alzaroo, 1989). Egyptian universities accepted around 1000 students from Gaza per year (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). Admittance was determined by both high academic achievement and access to the necessary financial means. The high numbers of matriculate students with no prospect of tertiary education raised unemployment levels and forced many to look for alternative opportunities in other countries.

Socio-political conditions in the Gaza Strip in the 1970s worsened due to escalations in Israeli harassments and restrictions. Many families lived in poverty and could not afford the high costs associated with studying abroad (Sullivan, 1994). In addition to this, the high numbers of matriculating high school students decreased the chances of being accepted at the Egyptian universities.

After the assassination of the Egyptian editor Dr. Yousef Al-Sibaee in February 1978, diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Palestinians collapsed. As a result of this, Egypt significantly reduced the intake of students from Gaza and imposed restrictions which mean that Gazan students were only able to study specific Human Sciences. They were no longer able to study in the Medicine or Engineering Faculties (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

A respondent clarified the mission and the purpose of IUG:

> *"Needless to say that IUG was founded to fill a gap, meaning that there was no HEI to facilitate and serve Gazan students at that time"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

2.2.1.1 The Inception of IUG (1978) and Occupation Authorities Reaction

The Al-Azhar Institute for Religious Studies had been established in Gaza in 1954 as a part of the Al-Azhar Egyptian Institution. It started as a primary school and developed into a high school. The idea of establishing an institute for HE seemed a natural progression (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

The idea of creating a university was rejected by the occupation authorities who issued a warning against any step taken toward implementing the idea (Al-Ajez, 1996). The dire need of the Palestinian people to have their own first university in Gaza to serve the local population was the main reason behind establishing the IUG. Document 1 shows that the Islamic University of Gaza was formally established in 6/11/1978 as an extension of Al-Azhar Institute for Religious Studies in Gaza which follows Al-Azhar University in Egypt (Sullivan, 1994; AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). The regulations and the rules of teaching many Islamic subjects and separating women and men in classes characterised these institutions.

The leadership of the institution worked hard to override the Israeli objections and finally, in 1979, were awarded permission to issue a one-year Diploma in Sharia and Arabic Language. The Israeli authorities did not recognize the institution as a university and instead called it the Department of HE/Al-Azhar as shown in many messages sent to the university (documents, 5, 7, 8, 22, 25, 33, 34, 41, 42, and 47 in Appendix E). The Palestinian community identified this higher institute as the Islamic University of Gaza as shown in document 1.

Each year, thereafter, the leadership fought to have recognition of subsequent years of study (as shown in document 5) with the fourth year (document 8) added to the academic programmes. The occupation conceded year by year- so that by 1982 IUG was offering a 4 year degree, but the occupation did not formally recognise qualifications or hire IUG graduates until 1993. In the meantime, United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) rejected recognizing IUG degrees or graduates as long as the occupation authorities rejected this.

According to Mahshi (1978), Israeli colonialism procedures and restrictions against the HE sector aimed to prevent any growth or development in the Palestinian HE sector. The Israeli fear was that this would lead to an increased sense of national affiliation and identity and in standing against the occupation (Alzaroo, 1989). The prolonged years of the occupation caused a serious collapse in education standards and created many problems (Ramahi and Davies, 2002). Amongst the difficulties experienced by IUG were financial constraints, measures preventing buildings, restrictions on movement and access to resources (Sullivan, 1994), and political intimidation.

2.2.1.2 Financial Constraints

Universities all over the world face financial challenges (Robertson, 2010; Sevier, 2014). IUG, and other Palestinian universities, are no different (World Bank, 2004). The financial support was very limited in the beginning; there was minimal support from Saudi Arabia and the PLO (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The Israeli authorities never gave any kind of financial support to Palestinian universities, rather, Palestinian universities, including IUG, had to pay value-added and other taxes (Sullivan, 1994). When the IUG leadership managed to secure funds from Palestinian donors abroad and some Saudi businessmen, the Israeli occupation confiscated the money for months at a time. In 1980s IUG sent a series of letters (documents 18, 19, 23, 24, 27 and 28) to various Israeli authorities urging the release of the funds. These letters reflected the inability to pay salaries for staff for months and lack of resources which negatively affected day to day operations and development programmes.

The effects of these financial limitations were far- reaching. The university was not always able to provide salaries for employees or import necessary equipment. Occasionally, Israeli authorities granted permission for delegates to travel abroad for fund -raising and released some of the confiscated money (documents 41 and 42). These allowances provided a little relief to IUG in those hard times.

It is important to clarify that the financial support to IUG from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and later, after 1993, from the Palestinian National authority (PNA) has passed through several stages characterised by continuity sometimes and by stopping

some other times. The political dispute has played a key role in this issue. In 1980s the PLO gave financial support to Palestinian universities including IUG. But in 1991, after the creation of Al-Azhar university and the shift of more than 60 staff members from IUG to the new university, the PLO stopped funding IUG. Three years after the establishment of the PNA in 1993, it created the Palestinian Higher Education Council (HEC), the body responsible for universities. In spite of financial difficulties facing the PNA, the HEC started to give financial support to Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip including IUG. However, after the political division between Hamas and Fatah in 2007 the PNA suspended support to IUG until 2014 when they resumed giving support to IUG once again.

The siege and closure of the the Gaza Strip increased the unemployment and poverty among the population and affected their ability to pay student fees. As a consequence, IUG was unable to raise the tuition fees for more than 13 years and therefore was unable to pay more than 60% of salaries to the staff since 2012 until the time of writing (2017).

2.2.1.3 Israeli Authority and Control

The occupation has deprived many Palestinians of adequate resources (Batniji, *et al*., 2009). The occupation authorities imposed additional restrictions upon IUG in order to keep it under control and Israeli authority. One of the attempts of the occupation to control IUG was implementing the Egyptian decision 380 for 1955 (Sullivan, 1994) claiming that IUG is not recognised as a university and should be managed under the control of the occupation Department of Higher Education. Sullivan (1994:176) states that "In August 1985, Israel demanded that the university accede to three conditions for the grant or renewal of work permits. These were: acknowledgment of Order 380 which, as amended, would authorize Israeli supervision of university affairs: dissolution of the nursing program which had been established at the university in the previous year; and acceptance of supervision of the university's finances by Israel".

In response, IUG did not commit to this decision arguing that it was against international law and the right of education, and that IUG was the only university serving students in the Gaza Strip. They sent a series of messages to the occupation authorities and international

groups (documents no. 16, 17, 20, 28 and 36) explaining the reason behind rejecting this decision. In a letter sent to the occupation authorities as shown in document 17 the leadership set out the reasons why the decision 380 should not apply to IUG.

In the early years, IUG lacked qualified staff as the Gaza Strip did not have sufficient academics to teach in the faculties of Sharia and Arabic language. Therefore, the leadership requested permission to hire academics from the West Bank and Jordan. The authorities had to grant permission for those academics to stay in Gaza (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). Professor Riad Al-khodary stated that:

> "*The occupation authorities used to threaten those academics by cancelling their permissions and deporting them*" (AL-Khodary, R. individual interview, Feb. 2014).

On certain occasions, the occupation authorities refused to allow IUG to acquire books, scientific journals, or any academic tools from abroad without prior approval (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). In the academic year 1984/1985, the military Israeli director of Arab Affairs sent a message to IUG (document 34) rejecting the admission of 700 students accepted by IUG , and limited the number to 300 students. But the leadership challenged the military order and accepted 899 students as shown in Table 7 (P. 100).

Sanctions increased after the appointment of Dr. Mohammed Saqer as IUG Chancellor in November 1982. In the three years leading up to his final deportation, Dr Saqer was often harassed. He was regularly summoned to the Israeli civil investigation offices for questioning. He also faced difficulties whenever renewing his residents' permit (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The leadership held intensive meetings with the military authorities in order to prevent Dr. Saqer's departure. These meetings failed and in response, the university formed a tri-presidential council to take over the role of the Chancellor, when Dr. Saqer was deported in1984.

Professor Awad-Allah argued that:

> *"The harassment and the fiscal expulsion of Saqer were mostly related to his excellent leadership characteristics such as knowledge efficiency, and high capacities"* (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

In September 1983, seven teachers from the West Bank and Jordan were prevented from continuing their work at IUG (document 13). The leadership strongly condemned the expulsion of the teachers (document 14). Oppressive measures escalated when authorities targeted local teachers. As shown in document 29 a military order issued to IUG preventing six teachers from entering the university, authorities cited security reasons, accusing them of political activism against the occupation.

In August 1984, the leadership sent a message to the military governor of the Gaza Strip requesting permission to open a much-needed faculty of Nursing (document 31). This request was flatly denied (document 34). University leadership challenged the refusal by continuing to make preparations for opening the faculty. In response, Israeli authorities refused to renew the residence permits of 36 members of the academic staff with PhDs, (Sullivan, 1994). IUG leadership stopped all preparations for the new faculty. 36 academics were expelled nonetheless.

> "*At some point in 1985, the occupation had stopped 36 foreign professors who were members of IUG staff from working there by confiscating their permits. To overcome this challenge, the university depended mainly on the local staff and sent students abroad to get higher degrees and then come back to work at the university*" (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

The previous Chancellor confirmed this:

> *"This expulsion of those academics was very dangerous and risky since they were the main core of the university and represented the majority of academic staff"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

During 1978-1987, on religious and national occasions, IUG was exposed to many intrusions and inspections and besieged by Israeli soldiers. The leadership tried to prevent the occupation from storming the university, but to no avail. Also, at military check-points, cars and buses were stopped to inspect students and teachers and to arrest some of them. As a result, many clashes erupted between Israeli soldiers and students. As a consequence of these intrusions, the educational process would be suspended for a few days by a military order, and sometimes by IUG leadership to avoid clashes, and prevent a long duration shut down of the university by the occupation (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

2.2.1.4 Restrictions on Constructing New Buildings

During the 1980s, as a result of growing student numbers, the leadership of the university decided it was necessary to add more classrooms. In February 1982, a letter was sent to the occupation authorities requesting permission to construct a new building (as shown in document 6). In response to these requests, the authorities warned that any construction would result in military action and immediate shut down of the university (document 7).

To provide additional lecture space without new buildings, the buildings of the Al-Azhar Institute high school were used for lectures in the afternoon. The IUG continued to use the current buildings and the Mosque as classrooms. However, both of these were not in good condition. The occupation issued an order which prevented even small repairs. Despite these limitations, IUG used these buildings while covering the windows with plastic and separating lecture rooms with wooden walls (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

The university leadership decided to continue to offer classes even in tents (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). It was as if the university was a camp for the army with tents everywhere as classrooms and offices for the teachers. It was referred to, by many of staff members, students and the community, as the University of Tents (□□□□□ □□□□□□) as a symbol of challenge, patience and sacrifice in spite of all the hard conditions (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

In late 1982, the university tried to obtain approval from the military authorities to build a second floor on the eastern side of the university. The occupation rejected the idea in a letter issued to IUG in October 1982 (document 8:). The university leadership challenged the occupation decision and built stalls (*Baraksat*) to replace tents. These were small rooms about 100 square meters covered with asbestos. The Israeli forces issued a violation note over the buildings to be presented to the military court against the trustees of the university as shown in document 33. The manager of the engineering office was arrested with another two students who participated in constructing these buildings. But the leadership decided to continue the construction process in spite of risk, and therefore many temporary buildings were established. The leadership did not stop challenging the Israeli procrastination in approving the construction of new buildings until they got permission as clarified in document 34: sent to IUG in September 1984. The building process continued until it

became sufficient for the students and staff. In 16/2/1985, the university leadership decided to remove all the tents. They removed most of the tents, but left a few until the mid-1990s as a symbol of their struggle (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

Picture 3: Buildings of Asbestos Replaced Tents, (Female Campus 1983-1995)



Source: Public relation office of IUG

In late 1982, IUG created two campuses, one for males and the other for females as shown in Picture 3. The same staff members taught both male and female students. In addition, some buildings and facilities were scheduled and used by men and women at different times such as the laboratories, the library and the conference centre.

Teaching female and male students on segregated campuses occurs in some Muslim countries. For example, Al-Azhar university in Egypt teaches women on separate campuses. The two biggest and highest-ranked universities in Saudi Arabia, King Saud University, the first university in Saudi (KSU website, 2015) and the King Abdul Aziz University (KAU website, 2014) teach students on two segregated campuses, one for males and the other for females. The Islamic International University Islamabad (IIUI) also teaches on gender-segregated campuses. There is even a debate among some UK universities about segregation of students because of demands of some Muslim students (Redden, 2014; Patel, 2013). In Palestine, although the majority of universities teach on mixed campuses, some of them, particularly in the Gaza Strip offer separate classes for male and female students. This will be discussed in chapter 7 in section 7.1.4 .

2.2.1.5 Conflict Round the Cultural Identity of IUG

There is a diversity of ideologies and political affiliation among the Palestinian political organisations and this diversity, competition and sometimes conflict is clearly demonstrated in most of the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip including IUG.

Since the very early stage of its inception, and in the first declaration as shown in document 1, the Board of Trustees named this new institution the Islamic University of Gaza. Since then, indirect conflict started between rival Palestinian political groups about the identity of the university. The deep roots of the Palestinian political conflict and ideological disagreements started in early 1970s between secular and leftist supporters. Then in the early 1980s, this political conflict also took place between these parties and the Islamic Trend (a body representing the Muslim Brotherhood, which later became Hamas) supporters who decided to create an Islamic bloc to represent students' political affiliation in IUG, Birziet and An-Najah universities.

At IUG, particularly at the inception stage, the main conflict was about the Islamic identity and the ideology of the university which was strongly supported by the Islamic Trend and strongly rejected by secular and leftist trends. This conflict started to escalate gradually in 1980s until it turned to occasional violent clashes between students with support of different political groups among the staff and the community.

The most dangerous consequence of these confrontations was the assassination of the Dean of Student Affairs, Doctor Ismael EL-Khateeb in 1985. This cast a long shadow with deep effects on staff, students and the community. Violent clashes took place and disrupted the educational process as a result of closing the university from time to time during the first stage. The first Palestinian president Yasser Arafat who acted as the Chairman of the PLO

sent a message (document 39) to the rival parties asking them to calm down the situation and to keep the IUG identity in order to serve the community.

2.2.1.6 Palestinian Support for IUG during the First Stage

Due to the good academic reputation of the university among the Palestinian community, student enrolment increased dramatically. In 1987 IUG became the biggest university in Palestine (Alzaroo, 1989) with a total number of 4504 students (Table 3).

Table 3: The Total Number of Males and Females Enrolled at IUG, 1978-2012


Academic Year	Male	Female	Total
78/79	25	--	25
79/80	121	40	161
80/81	295	50	345
81/82	898	269	1,167
82/83	1,168	551	1,719
83/84	1,766	1,140	2,906
84/85	2,253	1,552	3,805

85/86	**2,361**	**1,391**	**3,752**
86/87	**2,534**	**1,517**	**4,051**
87/88	**2,848**	**1,656**	**4,504**
88/89	**275**	**83**	**358**
89/90	**690**	**344**	**1,034**
90/91	**817**	**283**	**1,100**
91/92	**1,547**	**514**	**2,061**
92/93	**2,016**	**668**	**2,684**
93/94	**2,685**	**888**	**3,573**
94/95	**2,739**	**1,453**	**4,192**
95/96	**3,232**	**1,808**	**5,040**

96/97	**4,279**	**2,370**	**6,649**
97/98	**4,395**	**3,017**	**7,412**
98/99	**4,802**	**3,813**	**8,615**
99/00	**4,970**	**4,677**	**9,647**
00/01	**4,834**	**5,235**	**10,069**
01/02	**5,391**	**6,224**	**11,615**
02/03	**5,877**	**7,098**	**12,975**
03/04	**5,495**	**7,500**	**12,995**
04/05	**6,383**	**9,278**	**15,661**
05/06	**6,797**	**10,198**	**16,995**
06/07	**7,555**	**11,553**	**19,108**

07/08	**7,367**	**11,988**	**19,355**
08/09	**7,242**	**11,704**	**18,946**
09/10	**6,963**	**11,896**	**18,859**
10/11	**7,074**	**11,725**	**18,799**
11/12	**6,953**	**11,794**	**18,747**

Figure 4: The Total Number of Males and Females at IUG from 1978-2012



In September 1980, the faculty of Education was opened. Shortly after, the faculty of *Usoul Eldeen* (Religious Foundation) and then a year later, the faculties of Commerce and Science were established. In October 1981, the faculty of Arts absorbed the faculty of Arabic Language. (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

Al-Hindi believes that:

> *"Despite threats, opening these faculties was a strategic decision, where it transfer the confrontation to be not only between the occupation and the leadership of the university, but also with hundreds of students and their families and the entire community"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013).

One key respondent confirmed this saying that:

> *"In the establishment stage, most of the Palestinian nation supported the university as they realized that it was the hope for the youth in Gaza to get the opportunity of HE since it was the only university in the Gaza Strip"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013) .

Most of the individual and the focus group interviews confirmed the positive role of the community in supporting the creation of IUG.

IUG leadership tried to find solutions to the dilemma of non-recognition by obtaining recognition from the Association of Arab Universities (document 3). This opened opportunities for IUG graduates to conduct their postgraduate studies at the Egyptian universities (document 10). To solve the problem of the lack of qualified staff, the leadership implemented two simultaneous strategies: the first was to pressure the authorities to give permission for academics from the West Bank and abroad to stay and teach at IUG (documents 4, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29 and 44).

The second strategy was to rely on IUG graduates by sending them abroad to improve their qualifications. The leadership gave full support to those teachers from IUG, paid half salaries despite the financial crisis and provided them with scholarships. In this way, the leadership would be able to overcome the Israeli restrictions on permits for academics from outside the Gaza Strip.

Summary of the First Stage

Based on the preceding discussion, despite severe obstacles, the leadership was able to launch IUG as the first HEI in the Gaza Strip. The first stage was characterised by the ability of the leadership to open new faculties and departments and thus, attract more students, particularly female students. The leadership also challenged and defied many decisions of the occupation such as constructing new buildings and registering more new students than agreed upon. The leadership exerted great efforts to overcome the dilemma of lack of resources by recruiting qualified staff from abroad and by sending local staff abroad to conduct their postgraduate studies.

The Israeli restrictions disrupted and eliminated the quality of education. The first stage was also characterised by internal political conflict to impose authority and control over the university. The leadership kept IUG surviving and social cohesion played an important role in the process. Garcia-Martinez and Vega-Redondo, (2015) suggest that social cohesion raises the altruism of followers. The leadership emphasised that sacrifices needed to be made for the sake of the organisation, and for graduates.


2.2.2 The Second Stage: Threatening the Survival of IUG during the First Uprising (1987-1993)

During the first *Intifada* (1987-1988) many students actively participated in demonstrations. Military orders were issued to many universities in the West Bank (Birzeit and An-Najah) and IUG in Gaza Strip (Sullivan, 1994).

> *"As students, we were participating in different activities and demonstrate against the occupation who was besieging the university. Many students have been beaten or arrested"* (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

In the years leading up to this *Intifada,* Israeli intimidation was ever-present. Alzaroo (1989) describes the closure of IUG many times in last four years before the *Intifada*, for short periods adding up to a total of 156 days.

Picture 4: The Israeli Decision to Shutting Down IUG in June 1988 (Document 47)



צבא הגנה לישראל

צו בדבר הוראות בישחון,תש"ל-1970

צו לסגירת מקום

בתוקף סמכותי כמפקד צבאי ובהתאם לסעיף 88 (א) (2) לצו בדבר הוראות בשחרן, תש"ל-1970 והואיל ואני סבור כי הדבר דרוש לשם קיום הממשל התקין מסדר הציבורי ולשם בטחון כוחות צה"ל,הנני מצווה בזאת כי:

המכללה האיסלמית אל אזהר, עזה

תיסגר החל מיום חתימתו של צו זה ותשאר סגורה עד שיבוטל צו זה על ידי.

נימוקי הצו:

המכללה האמורה משמשת מרכז לפעילות אלימה, חתרנית ועוינת. במכללה מצויים פעילים שאורגנו הפרות סדר, רה"א שימשה בסיס ליציאה להפרות סדר. בוצעה בה פעילות הסתה ונמצאו בין כותליה חומר הסתה. כמו כן, תלמידים וחברי סגל ההוראה במכללה היו מעורבים בפעילות בנגד מסדר הציבורי ובטחון כוחות צה"ל באזור.

חתשמ"ח

1988

מפקד אזור

צבאי עזה

Translation of Document 47

Military Order Regarding Security System for the Year 1970

According to my authorities as a military leader, and based on the subject (91) A (2) on the security system for the year 1970.

I see that the issue I referred to is necessary to restore security and order and to maintain the security of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), I ordered the following:

Shutting down the Islamic University (Al-Azhar /Gaza) from the date of my signature on this order, and it remain closed until a new decision signed by me to cancel this order.

Reasoning:

The university referred to has became a place of activities, incitement and violence, and included elements participated in the riots, and formed the base of the incitement of riots and chaos, it has been found inside the university leaflets and enticing materials.

The decision includes the staff and students who have been involved in the riots and demonstrations against the security forces.

7.6.1988 Jacob Orr

General military commander of the Gaza Strip

After escalating demonstrations by students of universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the occupation issued a military order in 6th June 1988 as shown in document 47 to shut down the IUG and prevented the staff and students from entering the campus. The university was officially closed until late 1992.

A few months after this order, the occupation authorities expelled Dr. Mohamed Siam the second president of IUG. This is in addition to arresting many staff members and hundreds of students (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The registration of new students stopped completely. Many students tried to travel abroad to continue their education, while others abandoned their education because of the closure, imprisonment, or injury (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

2.2.2.1 Working Underground

IUG leadership realised that the shutting down of the university in the first *Intifada* might be continued for a long time, and that hundreds of students were abandoning their studies. During this stage, the survival of the university was in doubt.

> *"It was a matter of to be or not to be; the strategic goal was whether the university could survive or not"* (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

In order to make it possible for students to continue their studies, the leadership decided to hold classes in houses, Mosques and sports clubs. IUG leadership was inspired by the experience of Birziet university which was the first university in Palestine to offer off-campus classes to their students (Baramki, 2010). Lecturers at IUG continued in their posts, despite non-payment of salaries for several months at a time. Although the university was officially closed, an office was opened to enable students to register, particularly those who were close to graduation. Off-campus classes were started at homes, and public places such as Mosques and sport clubs. This pattern of decentralised classes was supported by many individuals, institutions and the community. However, this model of working underground has not been without problems. Some of the staff members were scared to teach at their homes. Others took the risks and were ready to sacrifice and cope with the consequences of defying the occupation orders.

After the sharp decrease of enrolled students from 4504 to 358 in the academic year 1988-1989, the number started gradually to increase (Table 7, p. 100) until it reached 1034 after one year, and became 2648 in the academic year 1992-1993. IUG graduated 969 students during the closure of the university from 1988-1992 (Table 4, p. 46).

Prof. Zourob, who was one of the pioneer workers at IUG and left IUG to work at Al-Azhar University in 1991, contends that:

> "*The ability of IUG leadership to teach and to graduate students under the most difficult circumstances was a symbol of the determination of the leadership to survive despite the risks and disturbances*" (Zourob, individual interview, Jan. 2014).


Table 4: Number of Graduate Students from 1978-2012

Academic Year	Male	Female	Total
81/82	3	-	3
82/83	68	-	68
83/84	66	28	94
84/85	204	131	335
85/86	329	171	500
86/87	347	228	575
87/88	107	36	143
88/89	127	128	255
89/90	95	98	193
90/91	105	76	181
91/92	124	73	197

Academic Year	Male	Female	Total
92/93	211	69	280
93/94	238	85	323
94/95	259	104	363
95/96	282	147	429
96/97	580	242	822
97/98	655	395	1,050
98/99	868	493	1,361
99/00	844	558	1,402
00/01	807	663	1,470
01/02	774	835	1,609
02/03	762	931	1,693

Academic Year	Male	Female	Total
03/04	734	1,008	1,742
04/05	800	1,254	2,054
05/06	950	1,554	2,504
06/07	1,002	1,800	2,802
07/08	1,068	2,158	3,226
08/09	1,273	2,309	3,582
09/10	1,193	2,226	3,419
10/11	1,389	2,393	3,782
11/12	1,288	2,401	3,689

Figure 5: Development of Graduate Students at IUG from 1981- 2012



UNRWA, although offering job opportunities to graduates from other universities, confirmed in November 1990 that it would not recognise IUG degrees (document 49). The recognition of the UNRWA is of particular importance because it is the responsible body for relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2009) who constitute 65% of the population in the Gaza Strip (Enshassi, 2000). The UNRWA managed hundreds of schools and health care centres which serves, particularly, those refugees.

2.2.2.2 Al-Azhar University

The conflict of interests and political programmes appeared in many universities, which were managed under the authority of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), in the West Bank in the mid 1980s (Sullivan, 1994). Due to the fact that IUG was the only university in the Gaza Strip in the 1980s and was, generally, dominated by the Islamic trend in the late 1980s, the PLO decided to create a neighboring new university (Al-Azhar) dominated and supported by Fatah. As a consequence, one of the serious problems IUG faced during this stage was a number of the staff members leaving to join the new university (Al-Azhar) in 1991. In addition to economic sanctions imposed by the PLO such as withholding its fund aid and obstructing salaries of IUG employees for 8 months, Al-Azhar University appeared to be an alternative to IUG.

One administrator stressed that:

"*Although a big number of the staff left IUG to join Al-Azhar university, we demonstrated the commitment to work extra loads"* (Anaan, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

Although some of the focus group members believed that Al-Azhar was created as an alternative to IUG, other interviews added that the creation of the new university increased the sense of affiliation and commitment among the staff.

Many Fatah affiliated staff members shifted to the new university. The new university tried to impose more pressure on the rest of IUG staff, threatening them with losing their salaries if they did not shift to the new university. The offer was very tempting. Al-Azhar was financially stable and secure since the occupation did not impose tough restriction in its financial funds and transfer of money compared to those restrictions imposed on IUG. The IUG found itself in a very difficult situation as 60 members of the staff (academics and administrators) transferred to Al-Azhar, leaving a serious vacuum.

Table 5: Development of IUG Academic Staff Members with Masters and PhD Qualifications from 1978-2012

Academic year	Doctorate	Master	Total	The proportion of PhD	The proportion of Masters
78 / 79	1	4	5	20%	80%
79 / 80	2	5	7	29%	71%
80 / 81	7	10	17	41%	59%
81 / 82	17	22	39	44%	56%

Academic year	Doctorate	Master	Total	The proportion of PhD	The proportion of Masters
82 / 83	28	29	57	49%	51%
83 / 84	39	49	88	44%	56%
84 / 85	39	46	85	46%	54%
85 / 86	41	65	106	39%	61%
86 / 87	38	65	103	37%	63%
87/ 88	52	72	124	42%	58%
88 / 89	58	77	135	43%	57%
89 / 90	69	81	150	46%	54%
90 / 91	70	85	155	45%	55%
91 / 92	73	85	158	46%	54%
92 / 93	**63**	**63**	**126**	**50%**	**50%**

Academic year	Doctorate	Master	Total	The proportion of PhD	The proportion of Masters
93 / 94	49	56	105	46%	54%
94 / 95	70	52	122	57%	43%
95 / 96	79	47	126	63%	37%
96 / 97	113	72	185	61%	39%
97 / 98	123	90	213	58%	42%
98 / 99	143	102	245	58%	42%
99 / 00	144	81	225	46%	36%
00 / 01	159	78	237	67%	33%
01 / 02	163	79	242	67%	33%
02 / 03	170	91	261	65%	35%
03 / 04	178	109	287	62%	38%

Academic year	Doctorate	Master	Total	The proportion of PhD	The proportion of Masters
04 / 05	195	93	288	68%	32%
05 / 06	203	80	283	72%	28%
06 / 07	204	93	297	69%	31%
07 / 08	221	118	339	65%	35%
08 / 09	225	130	355	63%	37%
09 / 10	232	127	359	65%	35%
10 / 11	246	118	364	68%	32%
11 / 12	292	99	391	72%	28%

Figure 6: Development of IUG Staff Members during 1978-2012




Table 5 and Figure 8 show the sharp decrease in numbers of staff members with Masters and PhD degrees at IUG at the early 1990s. However, the number started to go up gradually as IUG recruited new academics. In addition, numbers of the staff came back to Gaza after obtaining their degrees elsewhere (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

Members from the focus group stressed that:

> *"It was easier said than done to find a way to transfer money; PLO stopped its support and salary was not permitted to be transferred to IUG from any source, so whenever an employee wants to get his or her salary, s/he has to travel to Jordan, since there was no banks in Gaza except Israeli Banks which imposed additional restrictions"* (Focus group1, Jan. 2014).

Summary of the Second Stage

This stage was characterised by two main challenges which seriously threatened the survival of the university. The one was the shutting down of IUG for more than four years and arresting many of its staff members, and the other was shifting a large number of IUG staff to the neighbour university Al-Azhar. IUG leadership dealt with the consequences of these problems which disrupted the manner and the quality of education delivered to students. They were creative when they started teaching underground in decentralised classes with the support of the staff and the community.

2.2.3 The Third Stage: Launching a Consolidation Process (1993- 2000)

In September 1993, the Oslo agreement was signed between the PLO and Israel. This agreement allowed the creation of The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as the responsible body of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Alawda-Magazine, 2013). This political agreement played a dual role in the life of the Palestinians. The Palestinian people split into supporters and opponents of this convention.

On the one hand, the convention created a serious political conflict among Palestinian political parties. But on the other hand, the occupation withdrew from inside the Gaza Strip and Jericho in the West Bank giving space to the PNA to manage the situation in these areas. Members of the leadership agreed that this agreement opened an opportunity to launch a consolidating stage of progress.

> *"After the Oslo agreement we didn't need the Israeli permissions to construct new buildings or opening new Faculties. We were able to move forward faster and easier"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

But members of the focus groups concentrate on the negative political side-effects of the agreement on IUG:

> *"Oslo Agreement in 1993 has deepened the divergence and affected the Palestinian society negatively, but again the university and its guiding principles have reconciled the issues between students themselves and between the university and the society*" (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

The researcher did not find documents referring to this agreement, but based on his own observation he concluded that the signing of the Oslo agreement created a deep rift among the Palestinian community and the academics and students.

Politics played an important role in the fate of the university. In spite of the political effects and factionalistion caused by the Oslo Accord, it gave IUG the opportunity to move toward stability and progress. IUG launched a consolidation stage of recognition, constructing new buildings, opening new faculties and departments, developing the capacities of the staff and strengthening the networks of communication and partnership with universities abroad and the national community.

2.2.3.1 Alternatives to the Israeli Non-Recognition

The issue of not recognizing IUG and hiring its graduates from the two responsible bodies in the Gaza Strip, the occupation authorities and the UNRWA, posed additional problems for the leadership. According to the statistics presented in Table 5 (p. 48), the number of graduated students, until the end of the academic year 1993-1994, reached 3147 with very limited job opportunities abroad or in the private sector in the Gaza Strip.

The leadership held intensive meetings with the occupation authorities to obtain the recognition of IUG and to grant chances to hire its graduates. For this purpose, a series of messages were sent to the occupation (documents 4, 15 18, 28, 30, 35 and 43). Similar efforts were made over the years with the UNRWA, but to no avail. A few months after the signing of the Oslo agreement, the UNRWA accredited the university degrees in October 1993 (document 51). Eight months later, the PNA sent a letter recognising IUG degrees (document 52). This recognition from the two bodies marked a very important stage in the development of IUG. It made it possible for IUG graduates to compete with Gazan colleagues who graduated from other universities in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and abroad for job opportunities offered by both the PNA and the UNRWA.

The IUG was also regionally and internationally recognized (documents 3, 9, 26, 50, 51, 52 and 69) allowing its graduates to compete for job vacancies, scholarships and to join various universities in the world for pursuing their postgraduate studies.

The recognition of IUG from local and international bodies was a real breakthrough in different disciplines. It gave new hope to students and staff. For example, the number of enrolled students in the 1990s increased dramatically. Also, it encouraged donors to contribute to construct new buildings.

Picture 5: The UNRWA Recognition of IUG Certificates (Document No. 51)

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

NATIONS UNIES
OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX POUR LES
REFUGIES DE PALESTINE DANS LE PROCHE-ORIENT

وكالة الأمم المتحدة
لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى

P.O. Box 61
Gaza

UNRWA Field Office, Gaza

Tel: (07) 861195,861196
822327,822740
822660,822843
Fax: (07) 821765
Cables: UNRWA Gaza

UR Educ. 93-873

31 October 1993

Dear Dr. Shubair,

I refer to your meeting with the Commissioner General on 19 October 1993 in my office.

The Commissioner General agreed that the degrees awarded by the Islamic University will be recognized by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East for recruitment purposes.

Please note that this recognition does not mean that candidates from your university will automatically be employed. It means that candidates may apply for posts, however, selection for vacant posts will solely be based on academic merit and professional experience. Please also note that the recognition of the degrees awarded by your university is exclusively for recruitment purpose.

Yours sincerely,

Klaus Worm
Director of UNRWA Operations, Gaza
and UNRWA Representative in Egypt

Dr. Moh'd Eid Shubair
Acting President
The Islamic University of Gaza
P.o. Box 108
Gaza

2.2.3.2 Constructing Permanent Modern Buildings

The recognition from the PNA granted permission for IUG to start the construction of permanent buildings. Temporary buildings of asbestos were replaced by new permanent and modern buildings. The individual interviews with leadership members confirmed this. The previous Chancellor of IUG contended that:

> *"Since the coming of the Palestinian authority, it was the real starting development point of the university. As you know, the occupation was preventing the construction. However, when we turned to the Palestinian authority, we easily took license for permanent buildings"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

This process was confirmed by members of the focus group:

> *"After the coming of the PLO, the university had witnessed a great alteration. For the first time, after been recognized, IUG was able to build fixed buildings"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

The HE Council of the PNA was established in 1996. The council supervised the Palestinian universities in terms of accrediting programmes and fund allocation. IUG became a member of the council and received financial support from the PNA.

> *"The university returned it financial rights from the council of high education, new faculties and majors were opened"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

2.2.3.3 Developing Qualifications and Capacities of the Staff

Ever since the IUG was established, the leadership provided scholarships to staff members to conduct their postgraduate studies on different continents. The International Institution for Helping Arab Students, and the Government of Qatar, granted the IUG three permanent scholarships. Fulbright, DAD, AMIDEAST, the British Council and other institutions provided scholarships for IUG students. After the war of December 2008, some scholarships were guaranteed by the Turkish government and Malaysian NGOs (AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). The current Chancellor stated that:

> *"To motivate and encourage the staff, beside the full scholarship offered from donors, the leadership paid half salary for academic to conduct their post graduate studies"* (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014).

To improve research skills, the university encouraged the staff, particularly in summer vacations, by providing research scholarships and academic exchange to spend a few months abroad. In addition, intensive training programmes targeting academics and administrators were offered on campus.

> *"Developing the human resources is an essential part of the management and the policy of the Islamic University, either by scholarship, the encouragement to attend conferences and courses, perhaps the Islamic University spend a lot of its budget to encourage the faculty members to attend conferences, and this is also considered a human development, also the administrative staff"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

One academic expert in the field of HR stressed that:

> *"Since mid-1990s and beyond, the IUG offered the staff with diversity of scholarships and research programmes"* (Abo AL-Roos, individual interviews, Feb. 2014).

While the PNA was in charge of the Gaza Strip, the IUG had more stability and consistency.

Summary of the Third Stage

The consolidation stage was characterised by achieving important long term objectives allowing IUG to thrive despite difficulties and different political and economic challenges. Some of these achievements were: obtaining the recognition of IUG degrees; raising the capacities and qualifications of the staff; opening the faculty of Engineering; constructing many buildings and increasing the number of students from 2061 by the end of 1992 until it reached 9933 by the end of 1999. Many cooperation and partnership agreements were signed with foreign universities in the consolidation stage (documents 51, 56, 57, 59). However, this stage also had its own problems and deficiencies, particularly the tension among students between Fatah and Hamas supporters as a result of the Oslo agreement.

2.2.4 The Fourth Stage: Thriving despite Siege and Wars (2000 – 2012)

IUG developed rapidly in the third stage until the outbreak of the second uprising (*Intifadat AL-Aqsa*) on Sep 30th 2000. This *Intifada* inaugurated a new stage of IUG history. For the first time, in the academic year 2000-2001 the number of women grew to 5235 and exceeded the number of males at 4834. Thereafter, the number of undergraduate females increased sharply year after year, and by the end of the academic year 2011-2012, it had swelled to 11 794 female (62.9 %) while the number of males was 6953 (37.1%) as shown in Table 3 (p. 40).

2.2.4.1 Working under Siege and Check-Points Regime

Demonstrations and clashes took place again in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the breakout of the second uprising in 2000, with even more violent action, between the Israeli soldiers and the Palestinian people. A few weeks later, the military authorities imposed additional sanctions against the whole community. They divided the Gaza Strip into three separated areas controlled by a tight check point regime.

In normal circumstances, it does not take more than 40 minutes driving to get from the far North to the far South of the Gaza strip. But with this security regime, it might take six hours or more if people or vans have a chance to pass through (AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009).

This created problems for all citizens, and also for students and teachers. Sometimes, they would be confined to university campus, not allowed to go home. Other times, they would not be able to reach the campus. They might have to spend the night on campus, or find other shelter close to the university, staying away from their homes for several days in order to keep up with their classes. The United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA) asserted that the siege around Gaza restricted the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza (OCHA, 2011a).

Despite the blockade, incursions, detentions and humiliating measures against the staff and students, the leadership found ways to keep the educational process moving. For example, IUG provided staff members with housing near the campus. Also, it helped students from the isolated areas to find houses close to the campus and sometimes subsidized prices although IUG was suffering a financial crisis.

> *"In times of closure combined with the restrictions of the check-points regime the university turn into renting some apartments near IUG. Frankly, the university gave the teachers and students half of the rental fees or more sometimes to help them overcoming those difficulties"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

To ease the process, the leadership also rescheduled classes and examinations in order to adapt to the new situation. Offices were opened in the remote and isolated areas in the South of Gaza Strip to facilitate communication with the main campus and between students and their teachers.

> *"Teachers were relocated based on where they needed and where they lived"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

In addition, in the isolated areas, students could attend many lectures at houses, Mosques, sport clubs and schools. Lectures were also circulated via video and email. In a step forward, IUG started to construct a new campus in the south of Gaza Strip to serve students from the isolated areas.

> *"It was clear that these tough conditions will continue for long time. We decided to create a new campus to serve thousands of students in the southern of Gaza Strip"* (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014).

Despite these adverse circumstances, IUG inaugurated the faculty of Informational Technology in September 2004.

Some of the staff members refused, for security reasons, to teach in the isolated areas. In the meantime numbers of students would cancel their registration of some courses so as not to be subjected to humiliation measures at the Israeli check points. But the facilities offered by the leadership such as compensations and accommodation motivated many lecturers to open decentralised classes and teach students in the isolated areas.

IUG was not able to import any devices, equipment or building materials. This hindered the practical lectures and thus affected the quality of teaching.

> *"The leadership did its best to provide the staff with the required facilities even if it had to buy them for expensive prices. The purchasing process would be done in a flexible and non-conventional way to make sure they were available fast enough"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

The purchasing process was accomplished by direct orders to overcome bureaucratic procedures. By doing so, the leadership was able to manage the situation and partially overcome the restraints.

2.2.4.2 Impacts of the Palestinian Political Division

The victory of Hamas in the free elections of 2006 was sweeping. Fatah was not satisfied with the results. Severe political violence took place between the two rivals. This fight caused the current political division which led to serious changes, one of which was Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip while Fatah took over the West Bank. In addition, siege and closure was tightened, imposing additional restriction on travelling and importing materials.

Security forces supported by Fatah stormed IUG in June 2007, partially burning some buildings such as the first floor of the administration building and some parts of the main library. This caused disruption of the educational process for several days. But soon after the clashes had ceased, the leadership started to repair the damage by securing sufficient funds from the Islamic Bank for Development in order to rebuild the damaged places (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).

The leadership inaugurated the School of Medicine in late 2006 which the population of Gaza Strip was in dire need of. By 2008, and in spite of political division, the situation was stable enough to allow IUG to accomplish the construction of most of the planned buildings, laboratories, gardens and other facilities. Two large buildings were built, one to house the faculty of Medicine, and the other for the faculties of Engineering and Science.

The science and engineering building housed 74 different laboratories to serve the students of these faculties. This building served thousands of students from the faculties of Science, Engineering and Information Technology. These facilities also provided important services available to the community such as laboratories for blood analysis and food analysis. This is in addition to laboratories for testing soil and building materials.

2.2.4.3 IUG under Attack

In late December, 2008, the occupation forces waged aggressive attacks against the Gaza Strip. Israeli air craft launched brutal raids causing severe damage to the infrastructure and governmental institutions. The IUG was targeted during this war and the buildings of Science and Engineering Faculties, along with the all 74 laboratories which contained hundreds of pieces of expensive scientific equipment, computers, medical equipment and engineering equipment were completely destroyed as shown in Picture 6.

Picture 6: Science and Engineering Labs after Bombing during 2008 War



Source: Public relations office of IUG

The destruction of IUG buildings was a real shock for the Palestinian community as a whole since IUG was an institution for HE and served more than 20,000 students.

> *"In Jan. 2009, the university's laboratories were gone down to the earth"*
> (Focus group1, Jan 2014).

The war started in the morning of 27 December 2008 while about 20 000 students were attending their classes. There was panic and shouting, but the leadership and many of the staff members were able to evacuate students safely. The war continued for 27 days. On the day the war ended, members of IUG leadership held an urgent meeting. During the first moments, following the ceasefire, the people of Gaza went out to check for damage to their houses and property. Likewise, IUG leaders and many employees, students and a lot of people went out to check IUG campus. Nobody instructed them to do so, but to them, the university was like their second house. They were overwhelmed and shocked by what they saw.

> *"IUG was a great place that meant a lot to them. It was very painful for them to see their university destroyed in such aggressive way and was very hard for them to discuss the severity of the destruction"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

That resulted in a meeting that was spontaneous and not planned in advance; it was held in order to discuss how they could get out of this crisis. This required changing strategy (Rochet, Keramidas, and Bout, 2008) and finding alternative classrooms, securing urgent requirements such as purchasing the needed equipment. Also, they searched for alternative places to compensate the insufficiencies in halls and laboratories.

> *"The first decision made was to stop the suspension of classes as soon as possible (two weeks maximum) and to work out a plan to reschedule classes. The truth is that the staff's affiliation have eased all difficulties. To be honest, there was real belonging"* (Alkhodary, a, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

A committee was established to determine what courses could not be taught due to the lack of critical resources such as practical classes of science and engineering.

Al-Hasanat (2013) states that study began again a week after the war which destroyed the practical facilities, but students were able to finish the school year. After overcoming the initial aftermath of the war, and in spite of the financial crisis IUG faced, the leadership engaged in intensive communications with the Islamic Bank of Development who agreed

to fund rebuilding the engineering and science laboratories and offices in a better way and even larger than before.

After the war and the targeting of its buildings, IUG gained more sympathy and support. For example, international delegations from Arab, African, Asian and European countries visited IUG Many agreements of cooperation and partnership were signed with international universities and institutions (document 66, 67, 68 and 69). IUG was keen to establish good relationships with local community dignitaries and institutions by inviting them to visit IUG and sharing with them the difficulties as well as the ambitions of the university.

The Chairman of the Board of Trustees declared that:

> *"IUG policy is to continue the educational process under all difficult circumstances and that IUG will keep teaching students in spite of siege, wars and destruction"* (AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014).

In this regard, IUG students and staff reactions to the oppressive practices of the occupation on the university campus changed gradually. These practices included incursions, inspections, closure, and bombardment of the university campus. At the beginning, the students would be frightened and run to their houses and suspend their study for a day or so. Later, they would remain on campus and stay in the yards. Eventually, staff and students would remain inside their classrooms and pursue their lessons as these practices became part of their daily lives. With regard to the risky conditions under which the leadership and the staff worked, unfortunately, there are no accurate statistics of the numbers of staff who have been murdered, injured and/or imprisoned. Based on discussions with administration departments at IUG, informal statistics show that, the number of murdered is 63, the number of injures exceed 85, and the number of prisoners is approximately 274.

2.2.4.4 Thriving of IUG: Moving towards Academic Excellence

In 2010, a new phase of construction and development commenced. The IUG leadership launched the Medical City project which consisted of a big hospital, offices, classrooms

and laboratories among many other facilities. This project was fully supported by the Turkish government and expected to be opened in September 2017. In July 2014, IUG celebrated the first 38 medical graduates. Launching this big project under conditions of siege and closure can be taken as a good sign of thriving IUG.

The leadership continued with their strategy of improving the qualifications of the staff by offering many scholarships to the academic staff to conduct their PhDs' in the UK, USA, Turkey, Malaysia, Germany, South Africa and Egypt among many other countries. According to the statistics of the Dean of Foreign Affairs, and Table 5 (p. 48), IUG has 292 full-time academics who hold PhD degrees. More than 130 graduated from American, British and other European universities. More than 40 graduated from Turkish, Malaysian, Indian, Japanese, Korean and Chinese universities. The others graduated from universities in different Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan. This diversity gave more space to additional valuable knowledge and experience that transferred to students and the community.

The leadership tried to give more attention to research and development programmes by inaugurating a deanship for scientific research and another for planning and development. Creating the Total Quality Management unit (TQM) in 2006 has helped the leadership to improve the quality of education and management, in addition to improving the university environment. TQM also aims to improve the skills of the staff by offering a diversity of training programmes for both academic and administrative staff. Some of these courses concentrate on managing crises, managing stress and time, and team work among many others.

In June 2012, IUG received the UNESCO Chair in Astronomy and Astrophysics and Space Sciences (UNESCO, 2012). IUG was the first university in space science in the Arab region to receive this chair (IUG website news, 2012).

IUG has created different centers and units for serving the society such as the Community Service and Continuing Education Deanship (CSCED) which offers specialised programmes and courses that serve all categories of society, as well as engineering and scientific laboratories offering their services and research to companies and individuals. In

1998, the University College for Applied Sciences (UCAS), was opened, offering a Diploma and a B.Sc. This college has attracted more than 10 000 students so far, in addition to employing hundreds of workers.

In 2012, the Irada project opened at IUG with full donation from the Turkish charity foundation, TIKA, serving and employing more than 400 people who have war injuries. Those injured became professionals in the furniture industry, ceramic industry and the software design industry. These units consolidate the social solidarity and cohesion of the Palestinian community with the university.

By the end of the fourth stage, challenges still exist, yet struggle, determination and ambitions of the university are still great.

Chapter Three

3. Resilience through Turbulent Times: The role of Leadership and Culture

This chapter presents the literature review and background to IUG. The following pages discuss the concept of organisational resilience as a theoretical base for the study. To conceptualise the framework of the literature: first, the chapter discusses the role of HE institutions, particularly universities in conflict areas and ongoing turbulence with specific focus on the main challenges that face HEIs in turbulent environments.

Second, the study presents some related concepts and styles of leadership in different contexts and leadership in an Islamic context. The role of leadership in HE in turbulent times with specific focus on the transformational style is then discussed. The importance and the value of leadership human capital are then presented with specific focus on the contribution of HE leadership particularly in turbulent times.

Third, the concepts of culture and ideology are then presented and discussed in detail, with more concentration on potential impact on the university and the society. This is in addition to clarifying the interaction between leadership, culture and ideology in fostering resilience and in coping with shocks and hardships and in the survival and growth of IUG.

Fourth, the chapter clarifies the importance of Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), particularly in turbulent times.

Fifth, the value of the leadership with special capacities (human capital) in turbulent times and its contribution in achieving the survival and growth of organisations are discussed.

Sixth, the literature review presents different concepts and theories of organisational resilience. The discussion focuses on the role of resilience in organisations that operate in turbulent environments and how to build capacity for organisational resilience strategies.

3.1 General Overview and Theoretical Components

Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) play a crucial role in the development and the social reconstruction of communities (Zamini, *et al*., 2011; Bernardo and Branovich, 2014; Heleta, 2015). The threats, shocks and ongoing conflict in different regions of the world are "too ubiquitous to be isolated and too nimble to be contained" (Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009:1). The Palestinian environment has been, and is still characterised by conflict and instability (Alzaroo and Hunt, 2003), uncertainty, and an inability to predict the future (EPACBI, 2015). Because conflict and turbulence have devastating consequences on HEIs in different regions of the world, the reconstruction and development of HE must be a high priority (Maclure and Denov, 2009) if these institutions seek to be the drivers for development and progress of societies.

Although traditionally a clear distinction between literature review and theoretical framework is drawn, because of the nature of thematic issues embedded, the literature review of this chapter is inclusive of the theoretical framework. The next few pages include the theoretical components of the study which comprise the foundation of the theoretical

framework. The theoretical base of this study is in the domain of organisational resilience theory. Organisational resilience provides a specific moment-in-time lens to comprehend the much broader question of the role of leadership in HE in a situation of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence.

The management of HEIs, particularly in conflict and turbulent times, is a complicated mission, and therefore it requires a set of actors and processes (Sporn, 2010) such as leadership with repertoire of human capital and culture in order to promote and foster resilience to ensure the survival and best delivery of education under adverse circumstances. It should integrate concepts such as strategies and processes in order to cope properly with hardships (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013). The success of an organisation relies mainly on its leadership (Mowday, Steers, and Porter, 1979; Koo and Choi, 2000; Kim, Kim, and Kim, 2011).

Some scholars (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010) believe that transformational leadership is an appropriate style in situations of turbulence, conflict and war conditions. Burns (1978) views transformational style as a process whereby leaders take control of the situation by conveying a clear vision of followers' goals, building their awareness and enabling them to reach high levels of motivation and aspiration. Then extraordinary results are expected from those leaders and their followers (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012; Senior, Martin, Thomas, Topakas, West and Yeats, 2012; Vega-Vazques, Cossio and Martin-Ruiz, 2012).

Lepak and Snell (1999) and Huang, Lai and Lin (2011) believe that human capital is essential for organisational success and consider it as a strategic asset of the organisation. They place particular emphasis on the skills and experience of the leadership and employees. Skilled and competent leadership has the ability to cope with difficult challenges and achieve the objectives of the organisation (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar, 2001; Senior, *et al*., 2012). In contrast, incompetent and poorly skilled leadership is a crucial factor that might lead to failure (Douglas and Shaniely, 2000) and catastrophic consequences.

Ouyang, *et al*. (2012) define resilience as the joint ability of infrastructure systems to resist any possible threats, absorb the initial damage, recover and return to normal operations. In other words, resilience is a set of behaviours and processes that improve the ability of an organisation to cope with both expected and unexpected events (Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009), survive, adapt and thrive in the face of disturbances (Martin-Breen and Andries, 2011). By doing so, they can sustain performance under pressure or after calamities (Hollnagel, 2007, Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011; Steen and Aven, 2011). To cope with, and even capitalize on, hardships, the leadership deploys a proactive strategy to prevent some event and/or reactive strategy to deal properly with other events after their occurrence (Reason, 1997).

Another important factor that plays a role in the development and progress of HEIs is culture (Zamini, *et al*., 2011). In the broader meaning, culture can be defined as a set of beliefs and values that affect the member's thoughts and behaviours (Kilmann, 1985; Aktas, *et al*., 2011; Zamini, *et al*., 2011). Culture contributes to achieving the objectives of the organisation (Aktas, *et al*., 2011).

3.2 HEIs in the Heart of Conflict Environments

3.2.1 Introduction

Seitz (2004) stresses that wars and military conflict not only damage the education infrastructure, but also impair education systems. The negative effects of wars on education and the infrastructure have been discussed by many other scholars (de Santisteban, 2002; Novelli and Lobes Cardozo, 2008; Afana, 2009; Smith, 2011).

The study of Kwiek and Maassen (2012) concentrates on the challenges that HEIs might be exposed to such as the changing structure of HE; autonomy and funding; the changing dynamics of public/private HE; policies and demographics. They regard these as turbulences facing the HE sector. Teixeira and Amaral (2007) refer to turbulent times facing HE such as financial crises, competition and lack of resources. They shed light on the strategies used to survive and overcome these challenges. None of these studies

discussed the additional challenges resulting from serious conflict, occupation and war conditions. The management of HE in turbulent times is still under-theorised and lacks coherence.

Muthanna and Karaman (2014) note that many Arab countries are associated with protests and conflict. They added that HEIs have also been subjected to violent incidents and measures considered to maintain inequity. Bernardo and Baranovich (2014:84) found that HEIs in conflict situations "operate in an eclectic mix of facilitator of peace, an inadvertent instigator of conflict as well as a victim of the war itself". These potential multiple roles of education are also discussed by Bush and Saltarelli (2000), who see education as an important factor to increase and/or decrease conflict.

3.2.2 The Importance and the Role of HEIs in Societies

Regardless of the contexts, Bernardo and Baranovich (2014) argue that HEIs are assumed to play a crucial role in the social construction of societies alongside teaching and research. This is aligned with the view of McClellan (2006) who believes that HEIs are responsible for educating and training employees in order to improve their capacities in responding to challenges and difficulties. Nelson Mandela, the former president of South Africa, stated that "education is the most powerful weapon which can be used to change the world" (Aguilar, 2013:1). Therefore, HEIs can play an important role in the progress of societies.

The history of HE demonstrates an evolution of university structure and purpose that directly reflects the dynamic of societies (Stephens and Graham, 2010). Douglass (2010) suggests that the size and quality of HEIs and systems are crucial for the social and economic future of nations and countries. Therefore, beside teaching and research, HEIs can play an important role in the social and economic change of both developed and developing countries.

In line with Douglass' suggestion, Massyrova, Tautenbaeva, Tussupova, Zhalalova, and Bissenbayeva (2015) believe that education is one of the main factors for developing societies and therefore, the management of HE needs to be reformed to meet the need for

progress of communities. Meeting the needs of new generations and creating the basis for progress and prosperity must be a high priority of HE management.

According to Kahveci and Taskin (2013) the management of HEIs should integrate concepts such as strategy, quality and process in order to cope with hardship. These concepts enable universities to respond properly and in a timely manner in the face of difficulties. Kahveci and Taskin (2013) argue that Strategic Management (SM) can adapt to rapidly changing and challenging circumstances, as it provides universities with long term direction, and therefore the process works in line with operational goals and strategic approach for the future of HEIs.

Due to the evolving systems of HE, flexibility is important to meet and to anticipate societal demands (Douglass, 2010). Katharakis and Katharakis (2010:115) assert that "Universities are knowledge organisations; their core objectives are to generate, acquire and transfer knowledge, but also to develop and transfer technology innovation, support and challenge current political establishments, as well as support the economy by becoming the providers of appropriate knowledge and skills". This means that besides the production and transfer of knowledge, universities can play an important role in growth and political change.

According to Bramwell and Wolfe (2008) HEIs in general, and universities in particular, are not only generators of knowledge or qualified graduates, but also contribute to knowledge transfer. First, they generate and attract talent and qualified staff who are builders of society (Florida, 2002; Betts and Lee, 2005). Second, beside the main mission of basic research, universities provide expert staff who can contribute to research and development (R&D) activities of the society (Grossman, Reid, and Morgan, 2001; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2004). Third, universities play an important role in co-operation in international academic research and networks (OECD, 1999; Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell, 2004). Finally, universities can act as good community players that support organisations with innovation and knowledge exchange and train and retain talented people (Wolfe, 2005; Gertler and Vinodrai, 2005; Betts and Lee, 2005).

In a study of the history of universities in Europe (1500-1800), Ruegg (1996) argues that the great three purposes of universities are: learning; virtue; and utility. This means the advancement of knowledge, preparation for the observance of a code of social, moral and religious conduct, and training for high office or the professions. For centuries, universities have been at the forefront of creating and breaking paradigms, and educating the future decision-makers, entrepreneurs, and leaders (Cortese, 2003; Lozano, 2006). In line with this approach, Waas, Verbruggen, and Wright (2010) state that universities have played a historic role in social change and in serving the greater public good, and therefore can be considered as great motivators to achieve the society's future goals of progress and prosperity.

The objectives of universities may also include the promotion of cultural diversity, political democracy and trade (Marginson, 2010). In some universities in the Middle East region there is diversity of cultures but with less democracy combined with some violent clashes. Because the Palestinian community has lived under occupation for more than six decades, politics play an important role in their daily life. Therefore, Palestinian universities, generally, are pillars of diversity of political affiliation as well as pillars of religious thoughts, yet there is often a tense atmosphere, particularly among students from different political parties.

In postmodern economies, and increasingly in developing countries, there is growing dependency on the expansion of knowledge accumulation that will be vital for greater national and global productivity and competitiveness (Douglass, 2010).

The main objective of universities is teaching and research alongside the production and transfer of knowledge. The importance of universities increases in contexts of turbulence and conflict, such as the context of the Gaza Strip where the IUG operates. This is because, in spite of uncertainty and instability, university objectives extend to serve social and political needs (Marginson, 2010). The question to be addressed: which key competencies are most relevant for survival and growth and hence should be developed in future-oriented HE?

3.2.3 Universities in Different Contexts: Challenges and Ambitions

In developed, and increasingly in developing, countries, universities seek to play a central role in nation-building and to contribute to the growth of societies through teaching and research and in educating tomorrow's decision makers (Stephens and Graham, 2010). But challenges and difficulties might undermine the smooth functioning of universities toward achieving these objectives.

Robertson (2010:2) outlines "five key challenges at the heart of the contemporary university which have an impact on quality. These are: access and HE as a positional good; pedagogy and the industrialisation of learning; new sectoral and institutional geographies of universities; the rise of for-profit firms engaged in all aspects of HE governance; and the commercialisation of ideas, knowledge and education".

Sevier (2014) expands the challenges facing HEIs by confirming some challenges presented by Robertson (2010) and by adding, through interviews with many academics, another series of challenges. Some of these key challenges are: financial issues (fees, salaries, costs, and revenues); lack of quality; partnership between colleges and area business; changing demography and pedagogy; pressure to pursue a college completion; responding to changes; reactive rather than a proactive approach to change; leadership management; the role of women in leadership; building strong networks of communications; the value of the degrees in the marketplace; developing curricula; the technology role in reducing the costs of education and increasing the quality of instruction; and decision making effectiveness and realistic objectives.

In spite of these challenges, Maharey (2011) stresses maintaining quality of knowledge, learning and education in the face of change by creating new ways of improving for the benefit of the community. Therefore, successful universities are those which will be able to address these challenges and will have a competitive advantage over others.

The nature of the challenges dictates the mission of universities and the manner of the responses to these challenges. For example, in the turbulent Palestinian environment, beside teaching and research, political issues and opposing the Israeli occupation occupied a great deal of attention among university leadership, staff and students.

Nations and communities that live in the context of war and occupation might be exposed to serious difficulties and challenges in different walks of life especially the education sector, and thus need to pay high priority to how education can contribute and foster the reconstruction process (Maclure and Denov, 2009). In this regard, Seitz (2004) suggests that the educational reconstruction process is a potentially transformational process that can address fundamental social inequities and injustices.

Bush and Saltarelli (2000) point out that education can play an important role in fostering a social reconstruction process and aid in eliminating past corrosive social tension among the different groups of the society. If universities seek to become leaders and change drivers of the society, they must ensure that the needs of the present and future generations be considered and such considerations built upon to serve the community goals and objectives (Lozano, Lukman, Lozano, Huisingh, and Lamberechts, 2011). By doing so, they might gain their trust and support.

In terms of strengthening the social cohesion between communities and universities, Harris and Chapman (2002) found that solid and strong links with the society are more likely to gain their support and loyalty, particularly in times of challenge and hardships. Corrall (2008:30) believes that, for the success of universities, the leadership "need to have a top-down, grass-roots and inside-out approach. Need to have clear overall policy and effective liaison at level of individuals". This can be accomplished throughout the entire university system, which includes the following inter-linked elements: Education; Research; Campus operations; Community outreach (Cortese, 2003); Assessment and Reporting (Lozano, 2006). In addition, the dedication, commitment and experience of the teachers and staff are one of the main reasons for success. Without enthusiastic and motivated educators, the chances for success are very limited (Christie, *et al*., 2007). These important factors and their potential impact on IUG are investigated in this study to explore to what extent they contribute to the success of IUG. Hicks and Gidley (2012) argue that if teachers are not able to empower students in relation to their feeling about the future, then they might have failed in their mission to create a new generation of leaders.

In the context of developing countries, universities might be exposed to additional challenges. A good example of a university that has operated under conditions of conflict

and occupation conditions is the Korean Imperial University (KIU). This university has, to some extent, similarities to the challenges and difficulties IUG has experienced. Sohn and Kenney (2007:994) report "The first university was Keijo (Japanese) and Kyungsung (Korean) Imperial University (KIU) located in Seoul, which was founded in 1924, mainly to educate Japanese settlers. The Japanese Imperial Government had little interest in providing HE services to Koreans. At the end of the occupation, Korea had an extremely weak HE system. The situation in 1945 was dire, because many of the skilled technicians and managers were Japanese who were repatriated. At that time, Korea did not have sufficient trained manpower to maintain the existing industrial facilities. There were only 11 Korean doctoral degree holders and approximately 200–300 science graduates (The Korean Federation of Science & Technology Societies, 1980). The Korean universities began as training institutions rather than new knowledge generators. For this reason, universities had little significant role in new knowledge generation for commercialisation. They were not research institutions. The universities trained a large pool of talented scientists and engineers that became the workers upon which Korean firms have propelled themselves into the world's first rank and from whose work Korean living standards have advanced to near developed country status. They were an excellent base for Korean economic development".

KIU experienced a severe lack of resources, particularly qualified staff after the repatriation of the Japanese technicians and managers who had left their jobs at KIU after the end of the Japanese occupation of Korea. In addition, research and development programmes were very weak due to political and economic problems. Consequently, the production and transfer of knowledge at KIU were insignificant. The main focus of the leadership at KIU was to train a large pool of talented scientists and engineers to overcome the difficulties they faced and achieve the objectives of the university.

Some of these challenges KIU faced during the Japanese occupation are similar in part to those IUG has experienced such as working under occupation, lack of resources and qualified staff, and the lack of R&D programmes. The main difference between KIU and IUG is that the Japanese occupation withdrew and therefore KIU was able to manage in a post conflict situation, while IUG still has to manage in a post conflict situation while conflict still exists.

3.2.4 Universities with Ideological Roots

Although most of universities in the world are socially mixed, there are still some universities or institutions today which are ideologically based, and IUG falls into this group. The historical development of many universities around the world confirmed the phenomenon of establishing universities from religious roots, and with an ideological background whether they are Christian, Islamic or Jewish. Ruegg (1992) describes the Christian origins of some universities in Europe in the middle ages.

Over history, the idea of religious roots applies to some universities in the USA and Europe.. For example, in 1789, Georgetown University (GU) was established as the first Catholic and Jesuit university in the USA. By 2014, GU offers a diversity of specialisations for 17 858 students (GU website, 2016). In 1842, the Congregation of the Holy Cross created Notre Dame university which combined teaching and research, and serving the community with Catholic roots (ND website, 2016). These universities have adopted a specific ideological culture to accomplish their vision, mission and objectives.

The University of Sarajevo (UNSA) is the largest and the oldest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was founded in 1531 as an Ottoman Islamic Law College. In 1949, it started teaching modern scientific subjects. Today UNSA teaches 50 000 students, who study Bachelors, Masters and Doctoral degrees in 30 faculties and institutes (UNSA website, 2015). The International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) seeks to restore the dynamic and progressive role of the Muslim Ummah in all branches of knowledge and intellectual discourse (IIUM website, 2017).

In Africa, the University of Timbuktu was founded in Mali as one of the oldest universities in the world (UNESCO website, 2015). It started as an Islamic religious institution. By the 12^{th} century, it was a big centre of Islamic learning and commercial establishment in Africa with 25 000 students in a city with a population of 100 000. Then it grew to one of the most important universities in Africa with three departments and 180 Quranic schools, before it declined again. Another example is the University Zaytouna in Tunisia which was established in 737 as an Islamic institution. The university continued teaching Islamic and Quranic subjects and participated in opposing the French occupation of Tunisia from1881-

1956. By 1951, it had started to offer Bachelors degrees. After independence in 1956, it became a modern university (Zaytouna University website, 2015).

In Palestine, different universities are running with different ideological backgrounds whether these are Christian, Secular or Islamic. For example, Bethlehem University which was established in 1973, is a Catholic co-educational institution that aims to provide quality higher education to the people of Palestine and to enrich the minds of its students with knowledge on the basis of rationality and moral vision, (Bethlehem website, 2016). Also, Bethlehem Bible College is one of the Palestinian HEIs in the West Bank which established in 1979 and aims to encourage spiritual growth. (BETHBC website, 2016). Birzeit, An-Najah and Al-Azhar universities are driven by a secular approach while IUG is driven by an Islamic approach.

3.3 The Concept of Organisational Leadership

Two key authors in the field give different definitions of leadership. Burns (1978:18) writes that "Leadership is exercised when persons mobilize institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers". Another definition is presented by Yukl (2010) who argues that researchers define leadership as a strategy that focuses on the objectives of the organisation and motivates followers to achieve these objectives by influencing their performance and culture. While Burns (1978) places greater emphasis on satisfying the motives of followers, Yukl (2010) combines satisfaction and the motives of followers with culture to enhance achieving the objectives of the organisation.

Burns (1978) presents two main concepts of leadership which are transactional and transformational leadership. The conceptualisation of these two concepts by Burns (1978) provides the foundation of revolution in the conceptualisation of the role and the value of leadership. This concept of leadership focused primarily on what leaders need to do in order to accomplish their objectives and be effective leaders.

3.3.1 Leadership in Different Context and Cultures: Leadership in Islamic Context

Organisations in different contexts have particular external and internal work environments which dictates, to a considerable extent, the appropriate style of leadership to be deployed and the way this leadership responds to problems, threats and opportunities.

In the context of HE, Dimmock and Walker (2000) have criticised the study of leadership for being dominated by Anglo-American intellectual and cultural frameworks, and for under-exploring the influence of various cultures on leadership. Dimmock and Walker argue that many studies on leadership have been conducted, but much of its concentration was on defining the American and Western approach to leadership. What works in a Western environment may or may not work well in different environments or cultures around the world including Islamic ones.

Kabasakal, Dastmalchian, Karacay, and Bayraktar (2012) argue that, although there is a large body of literature that looks at effective leadership prototypes and practices from Western countries, few studies have investigated effective leadership prototypes from the Islamic part of the world, particularly from the Middle Eastern region. In fact, the Middle East leadership styles have not been given adequate attention by scholars. Hofstede (1984); Hallinger and Leithwood (1998); and Fidler (2000) emphasise that it is important to understand the variations in different societies and cultures in order to understand their impacts on leadership. This thesis examines the extent to which Islamic culture, particularly in HEIs, might influnced by/affect leadership styles within Islamic context in turbulent times.

As an example of the differences between Eastern and Western leadership, Faris and Parry (2011) shed light on the leadership in Western communities compared to the leadership in Muslim communities. They argue that the Islamic notion of leadership is very close to notions of leadership in the Western community that exists in the mainstream literature. Differences in the manifestation of leadership are most likely to come from the organisational context or the external context. What often distinguishes Islamic leadership from traditional Western notions of leadership is the close attachment of leadership to religion, especially its moral and human roots. Followers, especially those with strong

religious roots, generally, have a religious obligation to obey their leaders as long as there is no disobedience towards God and the Prophet (Beekun and Badawi,1999).
Many Texts from the holy Quran stress on this, for Example:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا □□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□ " (سورة النساء 59:4)
□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□"

"*O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Muhammad), and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority*" (Quran Surah, An-Nisa' 4:59).

The concept of " , *Altaaea*" obedience in an Islamic setting has its own implications for both followers and leaders to obey orders of the God and the Prophet Mohammad. While followers have to obey their leaders, the leadership have to follow the instructions that are aligned and not contradictary with Islamic principles and rules (Al-Nabulsi, 2008).

In Islam, the concept of obedience (*, Altaaea*) does not contradict the concept of consultation (*, Shurah*) and both are key concepts of Islam (AL-Khaiatt, 2004). Obedience of followers is a must only when it comes with Quranic texts or direct and clear sayings of the prophet Mohamed. But in other daily life issues or work environments, the concept of consultation, which is the backbone of Islamic regulations, should be implemented and after taking a decision followers have to obey the instructions and proceed accordingly (AL-Khaiatt, 2004).

"وَالَّذِينَ اسْتَجَابُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَىٰ بَيْنَهُمْ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنفِقُونَ" (سورة الشورى 38:42)

"*Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on them for Sustenance*" (Quran Surah, Shurah 4:59).

The Quranic text here stresses on the need for consultation that characterised those who respond to the willing of their lord.

Another text clarifies that consultation is a must, and once a decision is taken then leaders and followers have to carry out with trust.

> "فَبِمَا رَحْمَةٍ مِّنَ اللَّهِ لِنتَ لَهُمْ ۖ وَلَوْ كُنتَ فَظًّا غَلِيظَ الْقَلْبِ لَانفَضُّوا مِنْ حَوْلِكَ ۖ فَاعْفُ عَنْهُمْ وَاسْتَغْفِرْ لَهُمْ وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ ۖ فَإِذَا عَزَمْتَ فَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَوَكِّلِينَ" (سورة ال عمران 159:3).
>
> "*So by mercy from Allah (GOD) that you became compassionate towards them. Had you been harsh and mean-hearted, they would have abandoned you. Therefore, you shall pardon them and ask forgiveness for them, and consult them. Once you make a decision, carry out and rely upon Allah. Allah loves those who rely upon Him*" (Quran Surah, Al-Imran 3:159).

Therefore, the concept of obedience is not strict or blind, rather, it comes after consultations and agreement about a specific decision. Ali (2005: 146) clarifies this by arguing that the traditional view of leadership in Islam is that "leadership is a shared influence process. Leaders are not expected to lead or maintain their roles without the agreement of those who are led, and at the same time, decisions made by those leaders were expected to be influenced by input from their followers. The process is dynamic and open-ended and the ultimate aim is to sustain cohesiveness and effectiveness".

The main difference is about the extent to which ideology is involved and influences the way the leadership of an organisation responds to events and challenges they face. In general, ideology seems to be more involved in the Islamic styles of leadership.

In spite of the fact that there is diversity of thoughts and beliefs among Muslims in different countries, generally, Islam has its own special conceptions of leadership. Clarifying this approach, Beekun and Badawi (1999) contend that Muslims base their behaviour as leader or follower upon the word of God that is clearly shown in their holy book, the Qur'an. They believe that the leader plays the role of the servant and the guardian at the same time. Although the servant style of leaders exists in the Western literature (Manktelow and Carlson, 2013), a religious dimension of faith and obedience "□□□□□□" is added in the Islamic contexts. The previous definition might be true for leadership of some organisations that adopt Islamic culture and conceptions, but not for all organisations or leadership. Most of the organisations in the Muslim and the Arab world do

not necessarily adopt or implement these particular concepts. In the case of IUG, the Islamic culture shaped, to a considerable extent, the behaviours of the leadership and therefore their decisions are affected by such culture.

Comparing traditional leadership theories and Muslim notions of leadership reveals that they are not identical in practice. Rather, in general, Faris and Parry (2011) argue that the deeply moral and religious aspects of Muslim leadership seem to make the job of leading and the job of following clearer. The belief, obedience "□□□□□□" and commitment of followers is part of the doctrine of Islam which deserve the reward from God (An-Nady, 199). An important difference might be that, in the Middle East, the leadership is less democratic compared with Western leadership as the concept of consultation (*Shurah*) is not implemented all the time. This might appear sometimes when some leaders exploit the obedience and commitment of followers to achieve their own objectives.

3.3.2 The Leadership of HE in Turbulent Times

In today's conditions of turbulent environments,complex challenges and rapid changes, the ability of leaders to adapt and solve problems becomes even more crucial (Martinuzzi, 2008). This is because the effectiveness and the value of the leadership depends mainly on how well the leadership adapt to changes and challenges of the external environment and how they deal with threats and opportunities (Yukl, 2008). The future challenges and difficulties facing HE might be charcterised by turbulence and uncertainty which requires more involvement and action of the leadership.

Faris and Parry (2011) conclude that many of the leadership challenges are internal to the organisation or imposed from the external context. These challenges might be social, cultural and structural as well as legal, political and economic. These challenges require adaptable leaders who are comfortable and do not panic when operating in a turbulent environment when solutions to problems are not clear (Collins and Driscoll, 2008). Their adaptability might give them a space to organise their human capital and take powerful actions in response to various events. This also requires that organisations operating in

turbulent environments need to transform themselves to cope with challenges, changes and disturbances (Mirkamali, Thani, and Alami, 2011). Mohammadi and Youzbashi (2012) suggest that, in turbulent environments, the leadership of an organisation should use rational thinking from the point of identifying the problem to taking the right and rational actions in response to it.

3.3.3 Leadership Styles: Are Transformational Leaders Effective in Turbulent Times?

The literature provides different styles and classifications of leadership that can be exhibited by leaders in different fields. For example, Manktelow and Carlson (2013) argue that there are ten styles of leadership: Transactional leadership; Autocratic leadership; Bureaucratic leadership; Charismatic leadership; Servant leadership; Democratic leadership; Laissez-faire leadership; Task-oriented leadership; People/relations-oriented leadership; and Transformational leadership. Siewiorek, *et al*. (2012) classify eight types of leadership which include transformational and transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles of leadership in addition to different other styles as shown in Table 6. Both , Manktelow and Carlson (2013) and Siewiorek, *et al*. (2012) stress the importance and the value of transactional and transformational styles.

Table 6: Characteristics of Leadership Styles

1.Transactional leadership • **cost-benefit exchange between leaders and their followers** • **contingent rewards** • **active management by exception**	**1.1 Transformational leadership** • **inspiring and stimulating followers** • **idealized influence** • **inspirational motivation** • **intellectual stimulation** • **individual consideration**
2. Heroic leadership • **omnipotence** • **rightness** • **face-saving** • **co-dependency**	**2.1 Post-heroic leadership** • **empowerment of members** • **risk taking** • **participation** • **development of members**
3. Authoritarian leadership	**3.1 Shared leadership** • **mutual influence – dispersed leadership**

• **high degree of control** • **leader determines all policies, activity steps and work tasks – gives orders** • **no active group participation, leader mostly makes decisions alone**	**role** • **members participate in the decision-making process** • **members fulfil tasks traditionally reserved for a hierarchical leader** • **members offer guidance to others to achieve group goals**
4. Coercive leadership • **leader demands immediate compliance with his orders** • **leader dictates each step taken** • **drive to achieve, initiative, self-control**	**4.1 Democratic leadership** • **leader encourages group decisions, participation and discussion** • **leader builds consensus through participation** • **leader shares leadership to some degree with members** • **leader builds organisational flexibility**

Source: Siewiorek, *et al*. (2012:133-134).

Because the focus of the study is on the style of leadership suitable for an environment that is characterised by changes and challenges, the main focus of the study is on transformational style with some insight into transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles. Table 6 presents useful characterstics of leadership styles which will be examined in the context of IUG. Many scholars argue that in business and management, transformational and transactional styles are the most researched and widely used types of leadership (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011; Siewiorek, *et.al*., 2012; and Manktelow and Carlson, 2013).

Transactional leaders differ from transformational leaders in that they are interested in lower level needs of followers compared to higher level needs in transformational style. Explaining the approach of Burns, Bass and Avolio (1990) argue that transactional leaders encourage followers to perform their missions well to achieve personal gains and for the good of the organisation. In contrast, transformational leaders are interested in followers' performance and in developing their capacities and in treating them humanely. They create and communicate a vision, and empower employees to act beyond expectations (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Vega-Vazques, *et al*., 2012).

Supporting the specific importance and the outcomes of transformational leadership, Yukl (2010) concludes that this style of leadership depends on participation to meet followers' needs and motivates them to reach the maximum of their abilities. This type refers to behaviours that inspire and challenge others to reach goals (Judge, Bono, Illes, and Gerhardt, 2002). It gives leaders the ability to change the goals of their followers according

to the mission they need to accomplish (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). This, in turn supports the ability of the transformational style to be flexible and adaptable in the face of changes and challenges, particularly in adverse conditions.

Warrilow (2010) focuses on the role of transformational leadership theories arguing that they are about a form of collaborative greater good. They build awareness among followers, focusing their minds on group objectives rather than on personal interests and giving consideration to their aspirational needs. Therefore, they can lead the organisation to overcome the changes and challenges in a resilient and timely manner.

Sylvester (2015) found that resilience is correlated with, and a positive low to moderate predictor of, transformational leadership behaviours. Therefore, this study examines the role of transformational leadership in building resilience throughout the four stages of IUG.

3.3.4 Classifications of Transformational Leaders:

According to Burns (1978), Bass and Avolio (1990), Yukl (2010), Craig (2011), Senior, *et al*. (2012) and Siewiorek, *et al*. (2012), transformational leadership has four main categories. First, idealised influence, meaning that the transformational leader has the charisma to influence followers to obey and respect them while understanding their mission. Second, inspirational motivation, meaning that the transformational leader encourages followers to have high expectations, develop team spirit among them with a good understanding of the organisational vision and mission. Third, intellectual stimulation, meaning that the transformational leader motivates followers to be creators and innovators, to share the same values and standards of the leaders and of the organisation. Fourth, individual consideration, meaning that the transformational leader gives great attention to individual needs, with self-esteem and authority.

In addition to these four factors, Siewiorek, *et al*. (2012) adds another factor to the four factors that are shown in Table 6 (P. 80), which is inspiring and stimulating followers, meaning that the transformational leader admires followers and make them satisfied with the job they perform. This style of leadership is characterised by flexible thinking which enables the transformational leader to lead the organisation to achieve their objectives. Faris and Parry (2011) argue that the context determines how that leadership shall be

displayed. There is evidence that the power of organisational leadership has different effects on outcomes in different contexts (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Therefore, transformational leadership should take into consideration the context and environmental changes when they act or plan. Manktelow and Carlson (2013) argue that transformational leaders inspire people with a shared vision of the future, set clear goals and motivate people towards these goals, manage delivery, and communicate well with their teams.

3.3.5 Transformational Leadership: Strength despite Criticisms

Burns (1978) describes transformational leadership as a process that provides a clear vision of followers' goals, presenting a marked passion for the work, and enabling followers to feel recharged and energized. In spite of the strength that transformational style gives leaders, Craig (2011) argues that all leaders suffer from uneven character development and not all of them are perfect in mixing virtues and vices. Although Craig is convinced that transformational leadership is more successful than other styles, and that leaders invoking this style and their organisation can gain extraordinary results, he criticises transformational leadership for giving, sometimes, more attention to stakeholders at the expense of the organisation as a whole. Also, self-interest can play a negative role especially if the transformational leader were to satisfy stakeholders or their own interests at the expense of employees. This in turn will affect negatively the satisfaction, commitment and performance of employees. However, these criticisms are about all leadership styles and not exclusively for transformational leadership.

Reviewing the literature reveals some other criticisms of transformational leadership. One criticism is that, it has some ambiguity (Lee, 2014). Also, it is criticised in that some transformational leaders see themselves as great men, sometimes at the expense of followers (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002; Northhouse, 2013). It is criticised for being elitist, rather than democratic, leadership, and for its ability tobe exploited negatively. In

addition, it is criticised as looking at personality traits and not behaviours that people can learn (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002).

Bass and Avolio (1990) respond to these criticisms by arguing that transformational leaders can be democratic mentors and participants and make people satisfied with the job they perform. The ability of leadership to communicate effectively and share knowledge and information with employees and take their consideration into account can make the difference between successful and failing leaders.

3.4 Culture and Ideology

Every nation, whether in Western or Eastern communities, has its own culture of thoughts, beliefs, values, habits and traditions which affect their lives and the way they act and interact with different situations in their daily life and in their work environment. Aktas, *et al*. (2011) argue that culture has a strong impact on organisational life and therefore it is important to understand the contribution of culture in achieving organisational goals and objectives.

As noted in the introduction of this thesis, IUG is a public educational institution that generally adopts the Islamic culture in the laws, regulations and daily practices. The curriculum comprises many Islamic subjects such as Quran, Islamic Culture and Islamic History, among other Palestinian subjects alongside secular subjects which aimed to raise the commitment and national loyalty of students. Therefore, the occupation tried to intervene to minimise the effects of such subjects by confiscation of Islamic and national books related to the Palestinian cause (Al-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). By having its own curriculum, IUG has inculcated a kind of devotion and commitment to its culture and style. Although Al-Sinwar and Mouteer state that at the early years of its inception the curriculum covered mostly Islamic subjects, currently this is not the case. Islamic subjects are part of a wide diversity of science, art and modern subjects that are proper for a modern university.

3.4.1 Approaches and Definitions

HEIs are one of the important basics of a country's development and universities' organisational culture has an important role to play in this process (Zamini, Zamini and Barzegary, 2011). The importance of culture, which encompasses thoughts, beliefs and attitudes lies in that, it is a strong factor that can motivate followers and contribute to improving organisational outcomes (Christie, *et al*., 2007).

The term 'culture' is different, to some extent, from 'organisational culture', yet they overlap and are affected by each other. According to Tharp (2009), there are many definitions of culture and organisational culture. Generally, according to Tusi, *et al*. (2006), there are two main schools of thought. The first school takes a phenomenological approach and focuses on understanding the concept and defining the meaning of culture (Pettigrew, 1979; Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Hatch, 1993). The second school takes the functionalist approach (Parsons, 1951; Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and focuses on the consequences of culture for individuals, groups and organisations.

Drawing from the functionalist perspective, scholars pay attention to the role and impact of culture on individuals and organisational outcomes (Denison and Mishra, 1995; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). Culture, is a set of beliefs and values that affect member's thoughts and behaviours (Tharp, 2009; Faris and Parry, 2011; Aktas, *et al*., 2011).

In contrast, organisational culture includes the expectations, experiences, philosophy and values of the organisation. Kilmann (1985) defines organisational culture as sharing philosophy, ideology, values, assumptions, beliefs, hopes, behaviours and norms that bind the organisation together. In line with these definitions, O'Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell (1991) define culture as a set of core values shared by organisational leadership and members. This definition was adopted by many authors (Tsui, Zhang, Wang,Xin, and Wu, 2006; Zamini, *et al*., 2011; Aktas, *et al*., 2011) because of its effects on organisational performance and the individual's commitment. Another definition of organisational culture is that of Schein (1992, 2004) who defines organisational culture as a pattern of shared

basic thoughts and assumptions that helps a group and new members to solve problems of external adaptation and internal integration.

The two approaches of O'Reilly, *et al*. (1991) and Schein (1992, 2004) focus on sharing culture at the individual, group and leadership levels. These two approaches have similarities in that culture is described as the shared thoughts and values of organisational members. Therefore, culture and organisational culture are similar and overlap in many aspects such as values, thoughts and beliefs. In some other aspects, organisational culture is different from culture as it includes systems, rules, experience, vision, mission and setting goals.

Culture can be a strategic asset for the organisation, especially when it increases the adaptability of and fit between an organisation and its environment (Peters and Waterman, 1982). In line with the value of culture, Lim (2009) considers culture as an important and fundamental component in an organisation, which can actively contribute to solving organisational problems and can influence organisational outcomes. When employees of an organisation understand the culture of their organisation and when they have the desire to implement the stock of values, experience, behaviours and norms, then, they will be more able to adapt to challenges and solve the problems of the external and internal environment.

Culture has an impact on job satisfaction, job efficiency, employees' commitment and cooperation, in addition to decision-making processes (O'Reilly, *et al*., 1991). Consequently, culture can affect and shape the organisation. This means that culture has its own reciprocal impact on organisational leadership and employees. In a similar way, Yun Seok (2007) describes culture as a predictive factor indicating success of an organisation. Hence, culture can affect the level of commitment, positive/ negative, of employees and their capacity to achieve the objectives of the organisation.

The importance and value of organisational culture lies in that, first: it works as guidance for leadership and employees. It forms a pattern of relations and behaviours that should be followed by members. Second, it offers an intellectual and organisational framework. Zamini, *et al*. (2011) argue that when leadership and employees of an organisation share the same positive beliefs and values, this would strengthen the unity of employees and

might be a facilitator for success. Then, a powerful organisational culture exists for the benefit of both the organisation and employees.

In conclusion, while culture is a set of thoughts, beliefs and values of individuals or groups, organisational culture comprises different factors such as vision, mission setting goals and cooperation. However, the culture of individuals has its own impacts on the way people behave and interact within their organisation. The culture of the IUG influences and is influenced by the culture of individuals in the university, as well as the broader culture in Palestine, and in the Muslim world.

3.4.2 Features of Ideological Culture: The Islamic Ideological Culture

Hofstede (1984) argues that organisational culture is divided into four categories: rational culture; ideological culture; consensual culture and hierarchical culture.

In the Palestinian environment, there is a diversity of cultures. Some of these cultures are based on Islamic concepts while others are not. In addition, among the Islamic ideologies there is a diversity of political and ideological approaches and this creates conflict between some of them.

Erikson (1968:31) defines ideology as "a system of ideas that provides a convincing world image". This system forms the way people see life and events. Khamis (2000) conceptualises ideology as a set of attitudes characterised by the expression of politico-religious beliefs and values relevant to self and identity. Ideology represents a long-standing commitment to politico-religious principles and choices, commitment to religion as faith and practice, and attitudes about political parties. Swidler (1986: 279) defines ideology in general terms as "a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action, which competes with other belief systems for dominance over some form of social activity". Another definition of ideology, presented by Hsiaoa and Cheng (2006) describe ideology as a set of faiths and

thought, or system of concepts which are frequently expressed by people subconsciously or intentionally.

These definitions of ideology are diverse, yet overlapping and have similarities. Erikson's (1968) definition focuses on the ideas that provide people with a world image for different events and situations. This definition aligns with the approaches of Swidler (1986), Khamis (2000) and Hsiaoa and Cheng (2006). These definitions of ideology highlight the important role it can play and the effects it can have on the individual and at organisational level. Therefore, based on the previous definitions, ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs, values and attitudes about faith and destiny and about the world and how to manage life and deal with different events and situations.

3.4.3 The Potential Contradictory Impacts of Ideology

Honderich (1995) argues that ideology allows individuals to distance themselves from personal prejudice and serves as a foundation for rational rule. In a study of the impact of war and ideology on Palestinian adolescents from the Gaza Strip and South Lebanon, Khamis (2012) argues that Islamic ideology plays an important role in sustaining the Palestinians' life under the most devastating of circumstances. The findings of Khamis are aligned with the working of Laor, Wolmer, Alon, Siev, Samuel, and Toren (2006), who found that ideology can provide adolescents with a sense of purpose that may serve a protective function, increase their level of personal resources which, in turn, protects them against severe symptom development. Shirali, *et al*. (2012) argue that religious beliefs like believing in fate have affected how people deal with risk and interpret accidents. Haveman and Khaire (2004) found that ideology can have a positive impact on the survival of an organisation. The survival of an organisation requires adaptable and coping abilities of leaders and followers and, ideology might give a sense of unity and faith which, in turn helps in coping with disturbances.

Ungar (2012) believes that organisational resilience can be understood better if it is studied across different cultures and contexts which both have a direct impact on resilience. These two important components shape the environment in which processes related to resilience

occur. The belief in faith and destiny might give the followers the ability to cope with shocks and events in a rational and resilient manner.

Ideological zeal may positively affect the whole organisational life (Haveman and Khaire, 2004). It can put both the leaders and the followers in the right direction to influence the behaviours and performance of the organisation which could help the organisation to cope with challenging events in a resilient manner.

The Middle East region is characterised by the spread and strong impact of ideological culture, some of which is associated with the Islamic religion and adopted by many institutions, groups and individuals of the Muslim communities in the region and in the world. In Palestine, many factions, institutions, groups and individuals adopt the ideological culture based on Islam such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad among other groups. The believers of such culture are convinced that it creates unity and social cohesion among them and gives them the ability to cope with the challenges they face.

Despite the importance of ideology and its impacts on leadership and the organisation as a whole, Khamis (2012) criticises ideology, pointing out that the findings of research in some aspects of ideology (protective and coping functions) have been inconsistent. Some studies (Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, Salo, Komproe, Qouta, El-Masri, and De Jong, 2008) have indicated that ideological commitment to a cause is a protective factor that increases the ability to cope effectively in highly stressful situations.

In contrast, in Lebanon, Aljardali, Kaderi, Levy-Tadjine (2012) argue that some of the Lebanese public sector institutions suffer from religious issues. They added that religious interests that contradict Lebanese University interests often mar the decision-making process. Therefore, they advised that religion and politics must be moved away from teaching. Some previous studies confirmed this approach and found that ideology is a risk factor (Jones, 2002; Kanagaratnam, Raundalen, and Asbjornsen, 2005).

The specific effects of ideological culture, based on religion, remain unclear and some paradoxes exist. Scholars have some possible explanations for these paradoxes. First, some researchers indicate that depressed individuals who experienced negative life events often

turn to religion for the sake of consolation, (Ellison, 1991; Fitchett, Rybarczyk, DeMarco, and Nicholas, 1999). Second, other researchers explain that religiosity offers an external framework of control such as belief in fate which may contribute to depression (Pargament, Smith, Koenig, and Perez, 1998). Third, an important and alternative explanation of ideology claims that it provides followers with a belief perspective which enables them to deal better with crises, war atrocities and shocks (Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, *et al*., 2008).

Ideological culture may be an important component of a group's social capital, especially for those who experience continuous existential threat (Khamis, 2012). Therefore, a clear understanding of the relationship and the interaction between leadership, culture and ideology may help the leadership to take forceful actions in the face of shocks and disturbances and gain support of followers.

3.4.4 The Relationship and Interface between Culture, Ideology and Leadership

Faris and Parry (2011) argue that the role of external context in understanding the relationship between leadership and organisational culture has not been well researched. Their criticisms also focus on the impacts and the importance of culture in understanding leadership styles (Law, 2012) which has not been given adequate attention by researchers (Fidler, 2000; Hofstede, 1984; Schein, 1996).

In spite of these criticisms, some authors highlight the reciprocal relationship between leadership and organisational culture. For example, Ali (2005) emphasises the potential mutual effects of culture and ideology upon leadership and employees. Also, Faris and Parry (2011) found that culture can affect the way leaders think and perform, and therefore, the leadership needs to be resilient to understand and adapt to the changes and the challenges of the environment and take the right decision accordingly.

In line with this, Wang, *et al*. (2012) note that there is evidence to support the importance of culture in shaping leadership behaviours. In contrast, Tsui, *et al*. (2006) give more weight to the effect of leadership upon culture, arguing that the leadership is the main shaper and builder of organisational culture. Once the culture is formed, then, the leadership of the organisation is responsible for managing the assumptions and concepts of that culture and modifies it when required to keep up with the changes the environment

presents (Schein, 1992). Even more, Schein (2004) notes that leadership has a greater impact upon organisational culture in problematic and challenging circumstances. Shaping and sharing the culture is a formidable task and leaders have a central role to play in the process.

Christie, *et al*. (2007) stress that the relationship and culture are key features in achieving resilience and success. Many scholars (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011) believe that transformational leaders are more resilient and have the ability to gain the commitment of followers in order to achieve good results even in turbulent environment. This requires sharing of a common culture.

The concepts of leadership, culture and ideology reflects the complexity of organisational resilience in the context of conflict environment of IUG. The classification and categorisation of the factors and strategies employed by IUG is strongly linked to the premises of this theory and reflects how organisational resilience theory shapes this process through these mediating factors.

3.5 Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in Turbulent Times

SHRM is a provider of employees' capacities and actions to create and deploy policies and practices that contribute to achieving organisational goals and objectives (Devanna, *et al*., 1982; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler, 1997; Wright, 1998; Dessler, 2008). Jackson and Schuler (1995) define SHRM as the means that the organisational leadership use to manage their goal, priorities, and behavioural needs. Hence comes the importance of SHRM, particularly, in turbulent times. On the one hand, SHRM is the builder of leadership and employee capacities that enable them to scan the environment, size the threats and opportunities and respond properly. On the other hand, SHRM is a key partner in strategy implementation that can be developed and adapted in order to fit with organisation strategy (Colbert, 2004).

However, Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel (1996) shed light on a classic problem in the field of SHRM: how to establish and maintain a match between expected external environmental demands and anticipated internal organisational resources (Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005). In response, Werbel and DeMarie (2005), Fernandez (2009) and Demirbag, *et al*. (2010) claim that the contingency approach of SHRM works to fit and align all the functions and policies with the organization strategy. The contingency approach is related to leadership effectiveness and rationality in dealing with external

threats and internal demands (Grimsley, 2010). This means that it should be dependent upon the situation which dictates the choices of action.

In turbulent and conflict environments, Chathotha and Olsen (2007) argue that leaders need to address the environmental volatility and uncertainty dimensions as well as develop resources that support their strategy formulation decisions. The presence of SHRM helps the leadership to recognize the threats and opportunities the environment presents and enhances their ability to cope with challenges and take the right decisions in a resilient and timely manner. Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) argues that achieving the objectives of an organisation especially in a turbulent environment requires developing capacity for organisational resilience through SHRM approach.

3.6 The Value of Leadership with Special Abilities for Organisations in Turbulent Environments

According to Dator (2005:201), there are four generic futures facing all institutions, organisations and societies: continuation of 'growth'; collapse 'from one reason or more various reasons'; discipline 'since growth is not possible and collapse is not desirable, institutions need a set of guiding values in order to survive; and transformation. In a turbulent and conflict-ridden environment such as the Palestinian environment, which is characterised by deep rooted and prolonged occupation and war, organisations are exposed to the threat of collapsing, and they struggle to survive.

When confronted by difficulties and hardships, some leaders bury their heads in the sand until the the storm passes, while other leaders try to keep up to date with all of their skills and constantly remain aware of the need to remain resilient and responsive.

Ulrich and Brockbank (2005) assert that global changes imply that organisations must innovate and improve to survive and thrive. To accomplish these goals, the leadership deploys their human capital to scan the environment to recognize and size up threats and opportunities from this environment (Becker, 1962; Mintzberg, Raisininghani, and Theoret,

1976). Doing this enables the organisation to choose and implement the best strategies to address threats and exploit opportunities. Organisations with a superior repertoire of human capital are in a better position to launch a high volume of complex and forceful actions in response to events and challenges (Offstien, Gnyawali, and Cobb, 2005). These rich repertoires give the leadership more alternatives to deal with disturbances in a rational and timely manner.

To achieve survival and success, organisations need to attract, motivate and retain employees (Fitz-enz, 2010). Those people with rich human capital (HC) especially at the leadership level can actively contribute to lead their organisation to survival when they face adverse conditions. Mattalia (2012) argues that HC acts as the true engine that plays a central role in growth, is considered as a significant determinant of organisational survival, and is essential for organisational success (Becker, 1964; Barney, 1991; Lepak and Snell, 1999; Baum, Locke and Smith, 2001; Yukl, 2008; Franzen and Pointers, 2011; Unger, Rauch, Frese, and Rosenbusch 2011; Huang, *et al*., 2011).

Some organisations operate in a systematic way and routine that does not give individuals or leaders space to deploy their distinctive skills and experience. Offstien, *et al*. (2005) argue that the organisation's human capital, especially of the leadership, improves the organisation's awareness, motivation, and capability to actively compete and achieve its objectives. Becker (1975) concludes that human capital gives the leadership deeper understanding and knowledge of the operations, over others who do not have such experience. Increasing the capacities of leaders and employees at all levels would increase their self-confidence and performance (Kirkhaug, 2010). The capacities of leaders form a key difference between success and failure, particularly in times of challenge and controversy. Organisational leadership plays a crucial role in overcoming existing barriers to any change initiative (Koolhaas, Bartolomucci, Buwalda, de Boer, Flügge, Korte, Meerlo, Murison, Olivier, Palanza, Richter-Levin, Sgoifo, Steimer, Stiedl, van Dijk, Wöhr, and Fuchs, 2011).

3.7 Organisational Resilience Theory

3.7.1 Introduction and Overview

Kirkhaug (2010) argues that organisations more or less consciously respond to internal and external threats of a turbulent environment with the help of two strategies, an anticipation strategy and a resilience strategy. Reason (1997) considers an anticipation strategy to be a proactive one. This strategy enables the organisation to prevent the occurrence of risky situations and to be aware of emerging dangers through centrally preinstalled patterns of action (Wildavsky, 1988).

In contrast, resilience strategy is considered to be a reactive strategy (Reason, 1997). According to Marcus and Nichols (1999), resilience organisation theory is based upon the notion that risky situations cannot always be predicted, or they may appear in new forms, and therefore, organisations cannot take precautions to prevent them. Resilience strategy enables organisations to deal properly with both expected and unexpected events.

Reviewing the literature in the field of organisational resilience theories reveals that there are two different perspectives of organisational resilience. In the first approach, scholars define organisational resilience as the ability to recover from unexpected, stressful and

adverse situations, and to pick up where they left off and get back to normal operations (Horne and Orr, 1998; Balu, 2001; Gittell, Cameron, Lim and Rivas, 2006). In this approach, the ability of an organisation to absorb shocks and recover from them is seen as a coping strategy to achieve survival in the face of disturbances and adverse circumstances. Thus, organisations have to struggle to withstand hazardous conditions that are out of the scope of the organisation.

The second approach is more interested in moving beyond restoration to apply new capabilities in order to take advantage of opportunities or even to create them (Weick, 1988; Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005). In this second approach, organisational resilience is seen as a strategy for survival and thriving because of the ability to capitalize on unexpected challenges. This enables an organisation to benefit from its resources and capabilities, not only to resolve current problems, but also to exploit opportunities and move forward to a bright future (Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011).

3.7.2 Definitions and Features of Resilience

Resilience is the process of and the capacity for successful adaptation, despite extremely challenging circumstances (Masten, Best, and Garmezy, 1990; Rutter, 2007; Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009; Endersby, 2012). Masten and Reed (2005) argue that resilience, in simple terms, is the ability to spring back from, and/or adapt to, different tribulations successfully. These two definitions are about the ability to adapt to challenges and recover from these. Adaptation in these approaches is a key component of resilience.

In contrast, Dinh, *et al*. (2012) refer to resilience as a kind of forward and pro-active defence. They believe that it is very difficult to bounce back and recover from disturbances if it is too late. This definition is more about anticipation strategy, meaning the ability to prevent or predict events and deal properly with them. If the organisation cannot deal with events properly and in a timely manner, then it will be difficult to recover and go back to normal operations. Recovery and risk reduction are major challenges that need to be a high priority (Collier, Hoeffer, and Soderbom, 2006) for the leadership of an organisation.

The first approach of Masten, *et al*. (1990) and Masten and Reed (2005) is an adaptable approach, meaning the ability to absorb shocks after they have occurred (reactive strategy) and recover from these in a rational and timely manner. In contrast, the second definition of

Dinh, *et al*. (2012) is more about an anticipation and a pro-active approach that predicts events and takes actions in advance to prevent the occurrence of such events.

Saurin, *et al*. (2012) conclude that resilience can be defined as the ability of an organisation to respond properly and keep functioning regardless of poor behaviour, poor design and poor circumstances, during both expected and unexpected situations. This implies that the organisation should have a portfolio of alternatives and the resources to withstand difficulties. Then, flourishing despite adversity and promising outcomes might be achieved (Hildon, Montgomery, Blane, Wiggins, and Netuveli, 2010).

Azadeh, Salhi, Arvan and Dolatkhan (2014) assert that in high risk situations the consequences of unexpected hazardous events are sometime unbearable. Therefore, it is crucial to have different alternatives particularly in turbulent environments to enable the organisation to continue working and surviving (Aven, 2011). Thus, resilience appears as one of the important approaches that seeks to improve the ability of the organisation, at all levels, to create robust yet flexible responses. Lyons, Mickelson, Sullivan and Coyne (1998) define resilience as the capability of individuals, to cope successfully in the face of significant adverse circumstances and risky conditions. This gives them breath to keep going and not to break down or surrender when difficulties and hazardous conditions hit their organisation.

Maddi and Khoshaba (2005:6) give a good description of individuals' response to events and shock, they note that "less resilient people show vulnerability under stress. In contrast, it is resilience that leads us to thrive at work and at home. Some people are resilient even in extreme stressful circumstances. They turn disruptive changes and conflict from potential disasters into growth opportunities. This is the heart of resilience. Resilient people resolve conflicts, turn disruptive changes into new directions and learn from the process". This approach introduces a key difference between resilient and non-resilient people. Maddi and Khoshaba (2005) found that employees who responded resiliently to difficulties they experienced had three attributes: commitment, meaning that they were involved with the people and environment around them; control, meaning that they kept involved to influence the outcomes; challenge, meaning that they tried to find out how to grow through stress.

Werner and Smith (2001) identify four factors that distinguish resilient from non-resilient individuals. These factors are problem solving abilities, favourable perceptions, positive reinforcement and strong faith. Furthermore, they suggest that resilience is a capacity that can be developed deliberately. If individuals have such capacities, then they will be more able to challenge, control the situation and feel stronger in confronting adverse conditions. These factors are examined in this study to determine the contribution of each factor, particularly strong faith, in achieving resilience.

Most of these definitions revolve around the following: absorbing shocks and recovering in a timely manner (Haims, 2009; Min, 2012), and at low cost which means measuring the economic value of resilience (Walker, Pearson, Harris, Mäler, Li, Biggs, and Baynes, 2010) and the relative resistance of a system to specific disturbances (Derissen, Quaas, Baumgartner, 2011).

3.7.3 Criticisms of Resilience: Some Ambiguity and Vagueness

Despite the value and the importance of resilience for individuals, groups, communities and organisations, Strunz (2012:115) criticises the concept of resilience for appearing sometimes as vast and fuzzy and having some degree of vagueness. A similar criticism is that the resilience construct is somewhat ambiguous and difficult to pin down (Veronese, Castiglioni, Barola, and Said, 2012). The ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness of the concept of resilience might refer to the definition of resilience due to the fact that resilience is linked to several levels and contexts such as individuals, groups, communities and different kinds of organisations which might makes it more difficult to pinpoint. Resilience is a process rather than being a snapshot and therefore the context and the environment play a role in the ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness that appears sometimes when constructing resilience. However, this does not mean that people/ organisations do not exhibit resilient behaviours. Rather, many scholars stress the effectiveness and the good alternatives resilience provides leadership/individuals and organisations in dealing with problems and capitalising on difficulties and threats (Lengneck-Hall and Beck, 2005; Hollnagel, 2007, 2009; Ungar, *et al*., 2007; Costella, *et al*., 2009; Lengneck-Hall, *et al*., 2011; Ungar, 2011; Dinh, *et al*., 2012; Ouyang, *et al*., 2012; Masten, *et al*., 2012), and encourage them to be resilient in facing the challenges and hardships .

The inability to deal with disturbances properly and resiliently might put the survival of the organisation at risk. Unexpected shocks and hazardous conditions may lead to a real catastrophe if the organisation cannot handle these in a resilient manner (Wood, *et al*., 2012). Resilience gives organisations the ability to innovate robust, yet flexible, processes, to work under pressure, and absorb shocks and cope with hardships.

Ouyang, *et al*. (2012) conclude that organisations experiencing shocks and extreme events pass through three stages: first stage, resistant capacity correlates with initial damage level; second stage, absorptive capacity correlates with maximum impact level; third stage, restorative capacity correlates with recovery time and cost. These stages will be applied to the analysis of IUG through the four stages of its history.

3.8 Building Capacity for Organisational Resilience Strategy

Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011:248) propose a very useful approach for building capacity for organisational resilience saying that "A firm's capacity for developing organisational resilience is achieved through strategically managing human resources to create individual competencies among core employees, that when aggregated at the organisational level, make it possible for organisations to effectively absorb uncertainty, develop situation-specific responses to threats, and ultimately engage in transformational activities so that they can capitalize on disruptive surprises that potentially threaten their survival". The inability to capitalise on events and shocks makes it uncontrollable and might often lead to loss, powerlessness and threaten the survival of any organisation.

Implementing Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in an organisation could help in creating a social atmosphere in which employees have a good feeling about the organisation (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004), and thus enhance their ability to contribute to achieve the goals and objectives of the organisation. It may also provide a sense of participation, open communication, sharing knowledge and accountability, and trusting relationships in the organisation (Collins and Smith, 2006). This social atmosphere within the organisation and the effective management reflects more commitment and enhances the

ability to survive and thrive. Building capacity for resilience increases the capacity of individuals, communities or institutions to survive, adapt and thrive in the face of acute crises and chronic stresses (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011).

This repertoire of resilience markers enables the leadership to deal properly with both expected and unexpected events. It gives them more alternatives in the face of threats and even allows them to exploit them for creating new opportunities.

3.8.1 Qualities, Clusters and Dimensions of Capacities for Resilience

Hollnagel suggests that resilient organisations should exhibit four qualities; first, the ability to respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet flexible manner; second, the ability to monitor what is going on, including its own performance; third, the ability to anticipate risks, events and opportunities; fourth the ability to learn from experience (Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011; Steen and Aven, 2011).

Table 7: Factors, Dimensions, Principles and Clusters of Resilience

Hollnagel (2007)	**Costella, *et al*. (2009)**	**Dinh, *et al*. (2012)**	**Ungar, *et al*. (2007)**
Factors	**Dimensions**	**Principles**	**Seven Cluster**

Hollnagel (2007)	**Costella, *et al*. (2009)**	**Dinh, *et al*. (2012)**	**Ungar, *et al*. (2007)**
Factors	**Dimensions**	**Principles**	**Seven Cluster**
Flexibility	Flexibility	Flexibility	
Monitoring	Awareness	Controllability	
Anticipation	Leadership commitment	Early detection	
Learning	Learning	Minimization of failure	
		Limitation of effects	
		Administrative controls	Experience of social justice
		Five contributions: Design	Experience of a sense of cohesion with others
		Potential detection	Adherence of organisational culture and relations

Hollnagel (2007)	**Costella, *et al*. (2009)**	**Dinh, *et al*. (2012)**	**Ungar, *et al*. (2007)**
Factors	**Dimensions**	**Principles**	**Seven Cluster**
		Emergency response plan	Access to support relations
		Human management	Access to material resources
		Safety management	Development of decided personal identify

Table 7 combines contributions from Hollnagel (2007) Costella, *et al*. (2009) Dinh, *et al*., (2012) and Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, Othman, Kwong, Armstrong, *et al*. (2007) in terms of the qualities and dimensions and contributions of resilience. The four core qualities proposed by Hollnagel (2007) are important for organisations, especially those that operate in unstable contexts. The importance of these qualities are: first, flexibility is a crucial component of resilience which involves balance and gives alternatives for responding to regular and irregular threats and disruptions. Second, awareness is important to monitor what is going on and why and to understand its effects, which in turn, enables leaders to control the situation and tackle the problems. Third, anticipation of risks and opportunities means that leaders should not panic or lose direction. Fourth, learning is an essential component of resilience to learn from self-experiments and experience as well as from others.

The principles of resilience proposed by Costella, *et al*. (2009) match three of the four previous qualities of Hollnagel (2007) as shown in Table 7. These qualities are: leadership commitment; the ability to learn from both incidents and normal work (learning); the ability to increase flexibility (flexibility) and finally; the ability to be aware of system status (awareness). These four qualities of Hollnagel and the four principles of Costella, *et*

al. (2009) explain the concept of resilience and point to some practical ways to assess and improve the level of resilience in an organisation.

The six factors set out by Dinh, *et al*. (2012) are consistent, to a considerable extent, with the four points of Hollnagel (2007) and Costella, *et al*. (2009) and provide a good explanation of those points. The ability of an organisation to be flexible (flexibility), to learn from the experience and mistakes (learning), trying to be alert and to extrapolate the reality and the future (awareness), to redirect their goals and create a commitment of employees reflect a resilient organisation. Such organisations have a greater ability to anticipate events, deal properly with it, minimise the damage and recover quickly, compared to other organisations that do not have such qualities.

In addition, the literature review presents seven common clusters of needs studied in eleven different countries which contribute to resilience as proposed by Ungar, *et al*. (2007), and adopted by Wood, *et al*. (2012) to develop resilience of Lesotho teachers. These seven clusters are presented in Table 8, along with explanatory remarks.

These seven clusters of needs and their explanation, as presented in Table 8, shape some important markers for resilience and introduce a useful contribution to building organisational capacity for resilience. The value of these clusters stem from being focused on certain important elements and their role in achieving resilience. In conclusion, the dimensions, principles and clusters of resilience are important and should be considered by leaders when an organisation is facing disturbances and shocks.

Table 8: Seven Clusters of Needs that Contribute to Resilience

1.	Access to material resources	Availability of financial, medical, educational and basic human needs such as food, clothing and shelter, as well as employment opportunities.
2.	Accesses to supportive	Presence of a supportive relationship network within the family,

	relations	community, school, work colleagues, mentors.
3.	Development of desirable personal identity	Awareness of life purpose, personal strengths and weaknesses, aspirations and beliefs, values, spiritual and religious identification, good self-esteem.
4.	Experience of power and control	Sense of self-reliance and internal locus of control, sense of agency to effect positive change in social/physical environment and to access health promoting resources.
5.	Adherence of cultural traditions	Knowledge of, and ability and opportunity to adhere to cultural practices, values and beliefs.
6.	Experience of social justice	Formation of a meaningful role in a community, which brings with it acceptance and social justice.
7.	Experience of a sense of cohesion with others	Ability to balance interest with responsibility to community and to greater good; feeling of being part of something larger than oneself; engaging appropriately with others, according to cultural and community expectations without losing own sense of identity.

Source: Wood, *et al*. (2012:431). Adapted from Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, Othman, Kwong, Armstrong, *et al*. (2007).

Pianta and Walsh (1998) remind us that it is critical that the efforts to understand resilience do not fall into the trap of single factor explanations for success under conditions of risk Rather, it is a process that needs all the effort and functions to work together toward the same objectives and goals.

Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) believe that organisational resilience can be created by developing a configuration of HR practices that are internally consistent and directed at nurturing cognitive, behavioural, and contextual dimensions of resilience. Cognitive factors contribute to the creation of organisational resilience. An organisation can foster a positive, constructive conceptual orientation through a strong sense of purpose, core values, a genuine vision, and a deliberate use of language (Freeman, Maltz, and Hirschhorn, 2004), sense making and shared mind-set (Weick, 1998). These factors help in solving problems, taking action and enable the organisation to understand the challenges and respond in a flexible manner to move forward.

In terms of a behavioural dimension, Furniss, *et al*. (2011) provide a framework for reasoning about resilience. They claim that there are many important elements that affect resilient behaviours. For example, mode of operations, resources and enabling conditions, vulnerabilities and opportunities. They add that responding to vulnerabilities and opportunities is a central part of resilience particularly when these reactions are outside expectations. Behavioural factors support resilience by taking actions and responses in accordance with threats and opportunities the environment presents.

Contextual factors rely on relationships within and outside an organisation to facilitate effective responses to environmental complexities (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005). This in turn leads to the ability of an organisation to act quickly under emerging conditions that are uncertain and surprising. Consequently, building capacity for organisational resilience requires time, continuous dialogue, deep communication and trust. This study examines the cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors of resilience deployed at IUG.

Chapter Four

4. Methodology

The questions of this research revolve around the role of the leadership in fostering resilience in HEIs in situations of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. These questions are also about the responses of the leadership to the challenges IUG experienced, and the interface between leadership and culture in building resilience. To address these questions the researcher chose a qualitative case study approach to IUG using document analysis, individual interviews, focus groups and participant observation. The chosen methodology has been shaped by the research questions. By choosing this methodology, the researcher seeks to unpack the facts from those who lived it or documented it in real time.

The researcher embarked on the study as interested witness and researcher who sought to provide an interpretive account of the responses and experiences of the leadership. Investigating the case of IUG may help other universities and institutions to benefit from the positive lessons and the achievements IUG was able to accomplish, as well as to avoid its mistakes and deficiencies.

4.1 Research Paradigm/ Qualitative Approach

The main goal of qualitative research is to explain individual actions and behaviours. Many qualitative studies aim to understand social situations from the point of view of those involved in the phenomena under discussion (Green and Thorogood, 2004; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Britten, 2011). A qualitative approach seeks to use data in the form of words and behaviours to understand the meaning and interpretations of human action. Applying a qualitative approach is useful for understanding social life and situations from the point of view of the people involved in the case under investigation.

The focus in qualitative methods is on the meanings that participants attach to their social world (Patton, 2001). Therefore, qualitative researchers must rely on their ability to present a clear description, offer a coherent analysis, and make a strong argument for their interpretation to establish the value of their conclusions (Green and Thorogood, 2004). The qualitative approach enables the researcher to examine the responses and actions of the leadership from the point of view of those who are involved in the process at IUG. Creswell (2003) argues that in a qualitative approach, researchers need to give thick description which implies giving information, explaining meaning, giving examples,analysis and evaluation. Neuman (2011) states that the central aim of qualitative research is to understand the social life of people and to explore how people construct meaning in natural settings.

Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, and Newton (2002) argue that there are some weaknesses surrounding the use of qualitative methods. First, it is difficult to manage the development and the final aims of research. Second, it is not easy to analyse data; and sometimes the data gathering needs more resources than using a quantitative approach. In short, qualitative researchers are subject to the criticism that they sometimes leave their readers with little choice but to trust researchers in that their interpretations of the data are accurate and legitimate. Qualitative research has several strengths. Data assembly is more common and natural. It contributes to the generation of theories. Its focus is on change processes and it is useful tool to help understand people's behaviours (Amaratunga, *et al*., 2002). A qualitative approach offers more understanding of the meanings that participants had constructed about their world and experiences (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Forbus, 2008).

4.2 A Case Study Approach

A qualitative case study is empirical research that primarily uses contextually rich data from bounded real-world settings to investigate a focused phenomenon (Barratt, Choi, and

Li, 2010). Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003) agree that a case study approach is a plan or approach for achieving research that contains an investigation of specific modern phenomena by taking multiple sources of evidence (Jack and Baxter, 2008) in real life environments. These approaches seek to examine a specific phenomenon by using multiple sources of data.

Qualitative case studies exhibit three special features. First, they are particularistic, meaning that they have a specific focus on a particular situation, event, or phenomenon. Second, they are descriptive, meaning that they provide a rich description of the phenomenon under-study. Third, they are heuristic, meaning that they serve to illuminate the reader's understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Merriam, 2001).

A case study is a research strategy used in order to describe the case under investigation. Through a case study approach, questions such as who, why, where, how and what can be answered (Saunders, *et al*., 2003; Yin, 2003). These questions help researchers to clarify the actions of the real word and give a thick description of the phenomenon. A case study approach is about describing, documenting or explaining a particular case as an example of a person, practice or organisation. Overall, the case study approach can assist the researcher to understand the environment of the organisation (Saunders, *et al*., 2003; Yin, 2003), and how leadership responds or adapts to the challenges and the opportunities it present.

There are two key approaches that guide case study methodology; one proposed by Robert Stake (1995) and the second by Robert Yin (2003). Both scholars seek to ensure that the topic of interest is well explored, and that the essence of the phenomenon is revealed, but the methods that they each employ are different and worthy of discussion.

According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when: first, the focus of the study is to answer how and why questions; second, the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study; third, the researcher wants to cover contextual conditions because they seem relevant to the phenomenon under study; or fourth, the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.

Stake (1995) uses three terms to describe case studies; intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. If the researcher is interested in a unique situation, according to Stake they should conduct an intrinsic case study. This simply means that the researcher has an intrinsic interest in the subject and that they are aware that the results have limited transferability. If the intent is to gain insight and understanding of a particular situation or phenomenon, then Stake suggests that the researcher use an instrumental case study to gain understanding. Stake also uses the term collective case study when more than one case is being examined. Therefore, this researcher believes that the instrumental approach of Stake (1995) is more appropriate to gain more understanding of the case of IUG. This is because the study seeks to explain how IUG was able to operate in conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence.

4.2.1 The Choice of IUG as a Case Study

The overall intent of the study guides the selection of the case that helps the researcher achieve his objectives. Yin (1994) argues that historical issues can be described by using the case study approach. Choosing IUG as a case study was not a random choice for this research, rather, it reflects the difficulties and challenges most of the Palestinian universities has been subjected to. IUG represents a pattern of a HEI that was established and is still operating under the difficult circumstances of the Israeli occupation. Like all Palestinian universities, IUG has been subject to the general problems of Gaza and the West Bank. In addition, it has been a particular focus of animosity, through non-recognition of IUG degrees and graduates for 15 years, and bombing from the Israeli occupation during the wars of 2009, 2012 and 2014.

Thus, the selection of IUG, the first and the biggest university in Gaza, as a case study was based on the premise that it offers a useful manifestation of the phenomenon. In spite of the severe challenges and difficulties, IUG has survived in the last 34 years and was able to grow in many different aspects. Therefore, all stages of success and failure of IUG may provide similar organisations with replicable lessons that can guide the future leadership of IUG as well as the leadership of other HEIs, particularly those working in conditions of prolonged conflict and war.

In summary, the study seeks to derive insights (both theoretical and operational) pertaining to institutional survival and thriving in turbulent and obstructive environments using IUG as a platform from which to derive these insights; thus making the instrumental nature of the study evident.

4.3 Data Collection

Barratt, *et al*. (2010) say that, in qualitative research methods, there are several data sources: interviews (either structured, semi-structured or unstructured); observations; and archival sources of data such as documents and reports. This study used different sources of data in the form of documents, individual interviews and focus group interviews in addition to the participant observation of the researcher.

The use of multiple sources is encouraged to promote an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study. This diversity of data gives more weight, strength and validity to the analysis process and the outcomes of this research.

4.3.1 Ethical Considerations of the Research

Undertaking a study in an area where hostilities are ongoing, poses particular ethical constraints. As the findings from this study will be in the public arena, care had to be taken to ensure no adverse consequences for respondents, from the occupying authorities or anyone else. Although confidentiality of information was granted to all interviewees, no classified or secret information, whether it was made available to the researcher during interviews or in documents, was used. The interview questions focused, exclusively, on managerial concepts. In addition, anonymity was offered to interviewees but all interviewees expressed their willingness to have their names used in this study.

The researcher obtained informed consent from the interviewees. Before starting the interviews, the nature and the goals of this research were clarified to all participants and they were given the right to withdraw from interviewing any time. Also, recording the interviews was only with the permission and the acceptance of interviewees.

4.3.2 A Strategy of Data Collection

The focus of this study was on the past and current realities of IUG as experienced and interpreted by the leadership and the staff of the university. The researcher adopted a strategy of diversifying the sources of data. The process started with collecting 70 different documents that covered the history of IUG and included the diversity of challenges and responses IUG experienced. Then, the process of collecting data from interviewees started with conducting 5 individual interviews with key employees with more than 25 years of experience at IUG. The aim of conducting these interviews first was to draw a road map of the data that needed to be collected and the areas to be focussed on during the questions and the discussion.

Once the data needed was clearly understood, the researcher began classify IUG documents, such as the correspondence between the occupation authorities and IUG leadership, reports of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and the University Council, and partnership agreements between IUG and different institutions and universities. The researcher realised that the process of collecting data would be more efficient if he engaged directly in collecting the data. This gave the researcher more insight into the value of the information that flowed through the interviews and gave guidance in the analysis process.

Further data were obtained through participant observation, as the researcher continued in his position as the manager of the IUG conference centre for the duration of the research. Because the researcher has been employed at IUG from 1983 as an administrator in different departments, a process of self-reflexivity added to the richness of the data. Some tables and figures were used to clarify the development of IUG in terms of enrolment of students, graduates, and qualifications of staff members over the past 34 years of IUG's history.

The strategy of using different sources of data gave more trustworthiness, validity and reliability to the collected information. It also helped in clarifying points of agreement as well as points of disagreement between the different sources of data. Document analysis provided the basis of the information. It worked as a reference to support or challenge the data collected from other sources. The data collected through individual interviews needed an in-depth discussion and clarification. This was achieved through the two focus groups.

Self-reflexivity and participant observation presented the view and the experience of the researcher who lived through these events, and therefore, helped the researcher to ensure more validity and reliability of the information that flowed through the individual and group interviews. The combination of these different sources consolidated the trustworthiness of the findings of the research.

4.3.2.1 Documentation

Wesley (2010:3) argues that document analysis is a valid research strategy with considerable merit as a methodology and that the evidence embedded in the text is objectively identifiable .

Holliday (2007: 7) suggests that "most qualitative research involves making sense of the often "messy reality" of social life. Doing so requires the qualitative document analyst to make dozens of difficult and subjective decisions throughout the research process – choices about which similarities and differences constitute real "patterns" in the text; to what degree certain parallels constitute genuine "themes"; which titles should be used to identify these themes; which passages constitute solid "evidence"; how much discrepant evidence must exist to refute a particular set of findings; and many others. There are no inherently right or wrong answers to such questions. There are only stronger or weaker justifications of these choices. As a result, a qualitative document analyst must be explicit in identifying and defending the various decisions they made throughout the research process".

Therefore, the researcher, through document analysis, tried to answer these questions and examine to what extent the results of document analysis fit or differed from those that emerged through the interviews. When researchers analyse documents, they need to keep in mind the key questions of who, what, where, when and how to help the researcher to prove the focus of the document and analyse the body of the document and answer the research questions.

According to Bilville and Willson (2012), researchers should take into account and consider some important steps when analysing documents. These are: type of document; why the document was created; is the information in the document primary or secondary

information; is the information valuable and has no bias of information; the era of the document; compare documents from the same type and same era; examine the originality of the document; and familiarity with the handwriting of the time and place from which the document originates. The researcher took into consideration these steps. The researcher used 70 original documents that covered 6 different types of documents. These documents covered different stages of IUG history and contained valuable information. This in turn helps the researcher to best analyse the documents in a valid and reliable manner.

Table 9: Types of IUG Documents

No.	Types of Documents	Document Numbers
1.	Military Orders and Decisions Sent to IUG	5, 7, 8, 13, 22, 25, 33, 34, 41, 42, 45, 47
2.	Responses of the Leadership Sent to the Occupation Authorities	4, 6, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29,30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 43, 44, 46
3.	Correspondence with Universities and Academic Unions	2, 3, 9, 10, 26, 49, 51, 52, 53
4.	Partnership and Twin-ship Agreements	50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69
5.	Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Trustees and the University Council	1, 16, 18, 48
6.	Legislations, Proclamations and leaflets	11, 12, 17, 39, 40, 64, 65, 70

Document analysis comprised a very important primary data tool of this research. It provided valuable and realistic information in real time. Most of the documents (36 documents) are correspondences with the occupation which are direct and formal letters. In addition, 24 documents are correspondences with universities and partnership agreements as shown in Table 9.

Table 9 clarified that there was diversity of documents to be analysed in this study in order to cover the main subjects under investigation. The researcher believed that the chosen sample of documents served the research purposes and objectives. While some important documents were included in chapter two, a table of all documents is included in Appendix F.

4.3.2.2 Individual Interviews

The individual interviews conducted for this study were designed to explore the values, beliefs and reactions of IUG leadership in dealing with challenges. Interviews sought to unpack the factors and strategies that enabled IUG to survive and achieve its objectives. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (2002: 86) believe that the interview is "an opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience". Polkinghorne (2005) argues that interview aims to generate deeply contextual, nuanced and authentic accounts of participant's outer and inner worlds.

Semi-structured interviews assist researchers to find out any new data that was not mentioned in the questions (Saunders, *et al*. (2003*)*. Semi-structured interviews also allow individual respondents some room and freedom to add new information Therefore, semi-structured questions through the interviews of IUG staff and others allowed the researcher to follow up in depth some aspects that emerged from the answers of interviewees.

A total of 39 interviews were conducted, 27 initial interviews and a further 12 once preliminary results had been obtained. To maximise diversity and to enrich the data collected, the researcher selected the interviewees, for both individuals and focus groups, very carefully. These interviews were conducted with people with different points of view

from inside and outside the university. Individual interviews were conducted with 22 members of IUG leadership and staff members as follows: The Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the secretary general of the board; The current chancellor of the university and two previous chancellors of IUG; Five members of the University Council; Ten employees from different academic and administration levels, Two administrators who retired from IUG a few years ago.

Additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with four academics who had left IUG to join Al-Azhar University in 1992. These were in addition to interviewing the General Manager of HE in the Gaza Strip. These five interviews from outside the university gave more reliability and trustworthiness to the data collection as they provided different sources and different points of view. All the individual interviews with IUG staff were conducted at their offices during work hours. The researcher chose the sample very carefully to cover all the stages IUG has been through.The researcher was keen to create diversity when choosing the sample for the interviews both for the individuals and the focus groups. The chosen sample represents staff with different points of view from different segments and multiple levels from the university (leaders, academics and administrators, both male and female) and from outside the university, some of whom previously worked at the university and some who retired several years ago. Appendix C provided name of interviewees, date of employment and their position.

Some individuals in this sample have worked at IUG since its establishment and have lived and witnessed its events. Others started working at the university in the 1990s, a period in which the university had launched the consolidation stage. What distinguishes the selected samples is the experience they have which ranges from 17-30 years.

The researcher realised the importance of interviewing some members who have managerial background and experience which helps them in judging and evaluating the events and responses from a managerial point of view. Thus, choosing some interviewees from the Department of Business Administration in the Faculty of Commerce served the idea and the goals of this research study.

Through the interviews the researcher used a mixed strategy of recording the interviews and writing important notes that emerged through the discussion. This strategy helped the researcher to concentrate more on the main questions and follow up the points that flowed through the interviews. Each interview lasted approximately 60-90 minutes.

For more trustworthiness and reliability, at the end of the analysis and evaluation process, and after drawing the preliminary results, the researcher decided to conduct a further 12 individual interviews with some of the university staff who were not at the leadership level, but from the academic and administrative area. These interviews were conducted randomly and without pre-selection of candidates and held quickly. The main focus was on a single question about the most important factors that have helped the university to achieve survival and growth under the conditions of the disorder and hardships. The main objective of these random interviews was to check the main results of the study and to achieve more confidence, transparency and credibility of this research and thus test the strength of the expected result.

4.3.2.3 Focus Group Interviews

In addition to conducting individual interviews, the researcher conducted two focus group interviews. Focus group interviews allow deep discussion using individual interaction, and capitalise on communication between research participants, in order to generate data (Kitzinger, 1995).

According to de Boer (2010) focus groups consist of groups of people brought together to discuss opinions, issues, and concerns about something, are among the most well-known qualitative research methods and have been in use for many years. Focus group interviews provide participants with the best opportunity to express their views and experiences.

The researcher conducted two focus groups, one conducted after five interviews with key employees, and the other after conducting all the individual interviews. They provided an opportunity for more interaction and brainstorming to clarify information that might agree or disagree with the data from individual interviews and compare it with the data from documents. The focus groups also gave an opportunity for new data to emerge.

These two focus group interviews were conducted with leadership and staff members of IUG. Fifteen persons participated in these two groups: seven persons participated in the first focus group; and eight participated in the second one. Six of them participated also in the individual interviews. This helped the researcher to ask questions based on the results of the individual interviews. For this purpose, the researcher asked questions different from those he asked in the individual interviews. This helped the researcher to clarify, confirm and follow up some aspects that were not clear from the individual interviews. The focus group discussions lasted approximately 140 minutes each.

The participants of the groups were chosen very carefully with different views, and to cover all different stages of IUG, the past and the current realities of the university. Some of the participants have a good background in the management field as they are staff members at the Faculty of Commerce at IUG. This helped the researcher to unpack their experience and information from a management point of view.

4.3.2.3.1 Language of Interviews

Although the English language is the language of this research, the environment in which this research was carried out is an Arabic region and the mother language of all the interviewees is the Arabic language.

Therefore, the language used in the individual and focus group interviews was the Arabic language for many reasons. First, many of the interviewees are not good speakers of English which makes it difficult for them to answer the interview questions. Second, the flow of information would be much easier for the interviewees when individuals answer the questions in their own language. Third, Arabic language facilitated the flow of discussion through the interviews. Fourth, and finally, answering the questions in Arabic reflects their real expressions more easily when answering the interview questions in their mother language which in turn give more credibility to the information. After reducing the data to themes the researcher started the translation process into English.

4.3.2.3.2 Interview Questions

The challenges and difficulties IUG experienced through its different stages have shaped the responses of the leadership in dealing with these events. Therefore, interview questions mainly focused on these challenges and events. The interview questions revolved around the responses of IUG leadership and examined whether these responses contributed to the survival and growth of IUG.

Additional follow up questions were asked to answer the research questions and to help the researcher to unpack the factors, capacities and strategies used by the leadership in dealing with different events in order to achieve the survival and growth of IUG.

4.3.2.4 Participant Observation

Marshal and Rossman (1989:79) define participant observation as "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study". Participant observation is about watching behaviours and events in their natural settings. The process of observation can be direct by watching events or indirect by watching results.

Kawulich (2005) describes participant observation as the process enabling researchers to understand the real activities and behaviours of people under study as well as understanding the events in their natural settings (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). They add that it is a research methodology that helps in understanding the phenomena under study in an objective way and can increase validity in spite of its limitations. In this regard, DeMunck and Sobo (1998) clarify that one of the disadvantages of participant observation is that sometimes the issue of bias might increase the subjectivity of the researcher. When observation is added to additional sources of data such as document analysis and interviews, it can strengthen validity through thick description. Participant observation was conducted deliberately from the beginning of the research project from 2011 to the end.

4.3.3 Research Database

As the case study of IUG includes different sources of data, it was important to create a data base in order to keep the data and to help readers follow the source of any information. Yin (1994) supports creating a case study data base in an endeavour to increase the reliability and credibility of the case under discussion. A data base provides a series of evidence from initial research questions to the conclusions of the study. This implies empirical materials to be organised and categorised to be available when required.

For the purpose of the data base of the IUG case study, computerised audio files of the individual interviews and the focus group discussions were created. In addition, an A4 book for all the documents used in this research was also provided. The availability of these sources of data is of specific importance to the researcher and readers. It enables the researcher to clarify some issues and unpack further information.

4.4 Data Analysis

Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) is a methodology in the social sciences for studying the content of communications of people. Schamber (2000) argues that content analysis helps the researcher to interpret interview responses (or other qualitative data) in a way that does not compromise the original expression of the subject. Neuendorf (2002) suggests examining themes, categorising and coding them and then seeing what similarities and differences emerge from the data.

When using TCA, the aim is to build a model to describe the phenomenon in a conceptual form or to test a theory on the ground. Inductive content analysis is used according to Schamber (2000), in cases where there are no previous studies dealing with the phenomenon or when it is fragmented.

In inductive content analysis, concepts and coding categories are derived directly and inductively from the raw data (Schamber, 2000; Moretti, van Vliet, Bensing, Deledda, Mazzi, Rimondini, Zemmermann, and Fletcher, 2011). When applying an inductive approach, researchers avoid using preconceived categories, allowing the categories and names for categories to 'flow from the data' instead. They immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge (Moretti, *et al*., 2011).

4.4.1 Applying Inductive Content Analysis

The researcher applied inductive content analysis in analysing the 70 documents, the in-depth 27 individual interviews, and the two focus group discussions. The inductive content approach was used because no previous studies dealt with the case of IUG or similar cases in similar conditions. Therefore, applying the inductive approach was to help the researcher

in answering the research questions by allowing the flow of data and new insight and categories to emerge.

The first step was analysing the 70 documents. After categorising and organising documents based on Table 6 (p. 80), the researcher started analysing them the same way using inductive content analysis. The researcher wrote down each point or theme emerging from the data and categorised the differences and similarities of documents from same subject. Analysing the documents was crucial for checking the data flowing from interviews. The researcher evaluated to what extent these documents supported or otherwise conflicted with the results from the individual and focus group interviews. Finally, the researcher collected all the results and read them carefully for another evaluation, then unpacked the conclusion and recommendations from these results.

The second step was analysing the 27 interviews. The researcher summarised the data while maintaining the presence of the evidence. Summarising the data means reducing each interview to a few paragraphs and then reducing each to a point and theme form. Summarising the data was done by way of vertical analysis of every interview separately. Then, the researcher translated it to the English language and organised it to be ready for analysis. This led to a first level of coding involving assigning descriptive labels (open codes) to text passage.

Using an inductive content approach means that the researcher looks at events and themes that flow through the interviews one by one (vertical analysis). Then, after categorising and coding these themes from all the interviews, the researcher started looking at the similarities and differences (comparison) of these themes from all interviews (horizontal analysis). This was the second level of coding involved clustering similar codes and assigning inferential labels or pattern codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Finally, the researcher evaluated the themes and unpacked the results and developed conclusions.

The third step was analysing the two focus group interviews in the same way as the individual interviews were analysed. Later the researcher compared the two groups and conducted horizontal analysis between them and unpacked the similarities and differences

between them. The researcher evaluated the results of the individual and group interviews and clarified points of agreements and disagreement among them.

4.5 Triangulation of Data

One of the main criticisms of qualitative research is the validity and reliability of the results (McKinnon, 1988). The integration and analysis of the data collected is important for the validity of the research (Wesley, 2010). This process often involves collecting different types of data to facilitate and strengthen this integration.

There are some factors that affect the validity and reliability of the case study approach. McKinnon (1988) highlights five important factors that can undermine the validity and reliability of a case study. First, observer-caused effects can cause respondents to change their behaviour in interviews. Second, interviewer bias can affect the registering, interpreting and coding of responses and events during the interview. Third, since data gathering through the interview method is restricted to the time frame of the interview, there are limits to the quality and quantity of data that can be obtained. Fourth, in recognising the complexities and limitations of human thought processes, it is acknowledged that statements made by respondents cannot always be taken at face value. Respondents can consciously seek to mislead or deceive the researcher, and even if respondents provide honest and accurate responses, their statements can still be affected by natural human tendencies and weaknesses. Fifth, the interview method relies heavily on the integrity and intellectual honesty of the researcher, as the experience cannot be replicated and tested.

The notion of interviewer bias does not simply refer to the way which questions might be asked and how answers are responded to. Rather, interviewer bias refers to the whole process, including the drawing of conclusions (David and Sutton, 2004). The interviewer should be wary of selectivity which leads to overconfidence in some data, especially when

trying to confirm a key finding, and should take into account the fact that information from some sources may be unreliable (Hair, Wolfinbarger, Ortinau and Bush, 2008).

One of the most commonly used techniques for improving the credibility (validity and reliability) of qualitative research is through triangulation: "a validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study" (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 126). Although triangulation may also include multiple methods of data analysis beside multiple sources of data collection, the focus here is on triangulation of data collection.

The triangulation of data means using more than one source of data (Brannen, 1992). The researcher collected the data from different sources. This triangulation provides increased reliability of the data and stronger substantiation of construct and proposition (Barratt, *et al*., 2010**;** Choi and Hong, 2002). Therefore, using triangulation or multiple sources of data can facilitate and help researchers to clarify their theoretical propositions and the basis of their results. This can offer a better understanding of the links between theory and empirical findings and develop new theory (Ostlund, Kidd, Wengstro, and Row-Dewar, 2011). Also, triangulation gives more reliability and validity of the data collected, and limits the potential bias of the researcher and some interviewees. In addition, it helps to achieve the research objectives in the various stages of the study, and to answer the research questions, evaluate them and draw conclusions from them.

Triangulation is important in confirming and clarifying the emerging findings. This enabled the researcher to build credibility and trustworthiness of the information collected and analysed. Also, triangulation helped to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and problems that come from one source of data.

In summary, triangulation provided a double check for the results and consequently increased the validity and reliability of the results. This was another way to increase the credibility, validity and reliability of the research by getting feedback and input from others with both analysis and interpretation. The interest of the researcher in producing a valuable and trustworthy academic project was crucial for the reputation of the researcher and for the benefit of IUG's future as well as for similar organisations.

4.6 The Researcher

The long experience of the researcher as an administrator at IUG since late 1983 allowed him to live through some of the difficulties and challenges the university experienced and the responses of the leadership in coping with them. The researcher participated in and was an eye witness to the turbulent life of the university. The researcher was involved in many different events through the four stages of IUG history. For example, the researcher was involved when the leadership challenged the occupation orders and started constructing temporary buildings under risk and dangerous conditions. It was a real struggle for participants and was combined with stress and fear. Also, the researcher witnessed the violent clashes that took place from time to time between different groups of students. This left the researcher with a lot of sorrow and sadness over how brothers and colleagues who study at the same classes could fight each other in such a hurtful and violent manner. Teaching in public places and providing off-campus classes in the second uprising was seen by the researcher as a national duty to grant the basic right of education for all generations, and therefore the researcher participated in finding private and public places for teaching such as homes and sports clubs. While conducting this research, the war of 2014 took place two days after the researcher returned back home from working on his PhD at Wits University in Johannesburg,. Two weeks after the ceasefire, IUG persevered in holding graduation ceremonies for more than two thousand graduates to give them some hope about the future. The researcher was the organiser of this joyful occasion, yet full of tears as 48 graduates have been killed in this war. IUG celebrated those graduates as well.

The researcher lived the changes IUG experienced from the tiny roots of religion subjects to a modern university that combined science with Islamic culture. The researcher believes that the modernity of the university and the rationality of the leadership should be maintained in order to face the future challenges.

Participant observation can increase validity (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002) and access. The researcher was granted full access to IUG documents and staff, and conducted this research within a context of trust. However, because of the researcher's deep connection to IUG, and his position as an employee there, the chances of bias were particularly high. The researcher realized that this is an academic project that seeks to document the history of the university in an honest and transparent way which requires objectivity. In addition, for the future of IUG and new generations, it is important to present the facts as they happened in the real world in order to unpack the replicable lessons of both success and failure. In this regard, the long experience of the researcher at IUG matured the approach of the researcher and enabled him to see points of strength as well as points of weakness of the leadership. It is also important for the researcher to have a good academic reputation and gain the trust and confidence of academic colleagues at IUG and other universities and readers in Palestine and elsewhere.

Therefore, to help the researcher in his struggle to be impartial and to avoid personal bias as well as avoiding interviewee bias, the steps taken to address this problem and minimise potential bias were triangulation, reflexivity, and conducting an additional 12 interviews after the first results had been analysed. The researcher began the research with document analysis. Documents offer a specific moment-in-time lens for the facts as they occurred in the real world. The discussion with the focus groups provided deeper understanding of the initial findings from documents and individual interviews. Interviewing employees with long experience and with different political affiliation, whether in the individual or the focus group interviews, provided different perspectives on the issues under discussion. In addition, the self-reflexivity and participant observation helped in clarifying different issues raised through the interviews. The researcher has the obligation and commitment to be dispassionate, objective and academic. The researcher took some additional practical steps to avoid potential bias. The first step is trying to avoid generalisation when introducing information or making judgements. The second step is providing evidence to support the arguments and statements provided in the report. The third step is self-awareness meaning avoiding personal assumptions without providing strong evidence, as well as sharing personal experience and views with the reader.

In addition, the researcher used some proven academic strategies for promoting validity and reliability of the research. The first was rich and thick description that provided good description to conceptualise the study and convince the readers about the data and the results of the study (Taylor and Gibbs, 2010). The second was member checking where the researcher took the data and interpretations to the interviewees and checked if they were plausible (Polkinghorne, 2005). In addition, the 12 random interviews were conducted after analysing all the data and writing the first draft of this thesis in order to give more credibility and trustworthiness for the findings of this research. These interviews were conducted without any prior arrangements with interviewees, rather, the researcher visited them at their offices and asked them about the most important reason behind the survival and thriving of the university. The outcomes of these interviews stressed the importance of keeping IUG a resilient and a modern university

The specific importance of this research is to provide IUG and similar organisations with beneficial lessons stemming from a reliable and transparent diagnosis of the challenges and the responses of the leadership in dealing with situations of conflict and post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. If the study were thoroughly biased and only described the positive ways in which the leadership of IUG had responded to threats and challenges, this bias would harm not only the reputation of the researcher, but also the value of this research for the future of IUG in particular and for other Palestinian or foreign institutions that might learn from the lessons and experience of IUG in general.

The researcher hopes to play a positive role in building more awareness and understanding of the challenges IUG might be exposed to in the future and the best way to overcome these. This implies clarifying points of success as well as points of failure or deficiencies. Translating this report into the Arabic language may contribute to achieving these goals as the translated version will be available to the whole staff, students and the community.

Chapter Five

5.0 An Initial Analysis of the Emerging Themes

The concept of organisational resilience provides the conceptual framework of this research. It offers the specific moment-in-time lens which the researcher used to comprehend the broader question of the role of leadership in HE in a situation of conflict, post conflict and ongoing turbulence.

This chapter considers the specific importance of leadership in promoting resilience and ensuring the survival of IUG through turbulent times. Then, the chapter explores and categorises the different factors used by the leadership in dealing with the challenges and shocks IUG has been through in the different stages of its history.

5.1 The Main Challenges IUG Experienced and the Responses of the Leadership

The occupation measures have affected every aspect of Palestinian life and caused serious damage to the education infrastructure (de Santisteban, 2002; Seitz,2004; Giacaman, *et al*., 2007; Chenoweth, *et al*., 2007; Smith, 2011).

The challenges that IUG faced were at three levels: The first level existed at the level of individual staff members. The staff faced different challenges and restriction, not the least of which was working under stress, risk and war conditions. This includes the risk of being arrested, injured or killed. In addition, they had to cope with the denial of salaries for long months, and severe restrictions on freedom and mobility of movement and travelling. All these obstacles produced psychological and social stress.

The second level existed at the leadership of the university. The leadership found itself working in a turbulent environment and very complicated internal and external conditions.. Some of these were traditional challenges that might face any emerging institution, while the turbulent Palestinian environment posed additional challenges. These challenges are diverse and sometimes unpredictable and cannot be prevented.

The third level existed in the system and includes structural and environmental aspects that influence and constrain the organisation. These include lack of resources, human and material, and lack of facilities and technology. This is in addition to external factors such as siege and closure and wars that require the system to adapt to all the challenges.

Some of the challenges are similar to those challenges facing any emerging university in any context (Kwiek and Maassen, 2012; Sevier, 2014). However, the turbulent environments of IUG posed additional challenges and barriers that needed responses from the leadership. The challenges IUG faced through the four stages, and the leadership's responses to them were diverse yet overlapping. Some problems occur across all stages but each stage also has some unique difficulties. Sometimes the same challenge elicited different responses in different stages. Some of these challenges were predictable, while many others were not.

The diversity of sources of data collection (documents, individual interviews, focus groups and observations) gave different evidence and deep understanding of these challenges and responses. The documents from IUG revealed the challenges and restrictions the leadership experienced, and how the leadership dealt with them. The main topic of these documents and date of issue are included in Appendix F.

The individual interviews clarified the severe difficulties of establishing a university under occupation. Prof. Mohamed Shoubair, who acted as the Chancellor of IUG from 1992 to 2008 said that:

> *"Actually, the Israeli occupation has put many obstacles to prevent the establishment of IUG. At the beginning many youth had refrained from joining the university, for they said that there is no recognition. Therefore, they did not want to waste their time, money and efforts, and they went to work inside the occupied territories to earn their living as this certificate will not be a great deal in the future as it is not recognised. Yet, these obstacles had been resisted by the university."*
> (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Due to the context in which IUG operated , the mission of IUG was not limited to education and research, but included raising the awareness of the people about their

national rights and opposing and resisting the occupation. Opposing the occupation was one of the main reasons behind the severe difficulties and the disruption of the educational process at IUG.

5.1.1 Facing the Dilemma of the Israeli Non-Recognition

Organisational leadership, staff members, students and many leaders from the community consider the Israeli non-recognition of IUG as a collective punishment for the population (Al-Ajez 1996).

The leadership realised the consequences of this dilemma. At the local level, the leadership issued different communications, visited and exchanged messages with the occupation. The evidence from many documents revealed the concerns of the leadership from not recognising the university. In a series of letters addressed to the occupying authorities (documents 4, 12, 13, 25, 26, 32, 37 and 38), the leadership requested the occupation to recognize IUG and to allow hiring of its graduates. These documents cited the basic right to education for the Palestinian community which is guaranteed by international law (Sullivan, 1994) and the right to establish and manage their own universities (EPACBI, 2015). In addition, documents also listed the consequences of not recognizing IUG degrees and the negative impacts on students, staff and the community. This series of documents provided examples of intense engagement with the occupation in order to overcome this problem.

The general view of the individual interviews and the focus groups stressed the risks of not recognising IUG. This jeopardised the survival of IUG and put the future of thousands of students, graduates and staff at risk. The Israeli occupation affected both the work life of the graduates and the intentions of pursuing any postgraduate studies after graduation.

Commenting on the negative effects of this dilemma, Professor Al-Hooly, a respondent from the academic staff relates an experience from 1990:

> *"I graduated as a valedictorian Master's degree from the Jordanian University. Although I got the highest marks in the job interview, I was*

> *not allowed to be hired as a teacher at schools in Gaza, since my bachelor degree was from IUG"* (Focus group1, Jan. 2014).

The issue of not recognizing IUG was summed up by a staff member who graduated from IUG in 1987 and works now as a PhD lecturer at the Faculty of Commerce, he reported that:

> *"There were two important issues hindered by the occupation like refusing to approve the IUG degrees, and to give the graduates their rights in public work. This had instigated a lot of institutions like UNRWA to not recognize IUG degrees"* (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

In addition, the participant observation of the researcher showed that this issue affected the number of enrolled students as they were worried about their careers, particularly in the early years of IUG inception.

The leadership tried to solve this problem in different ways. The previous Chancellor of IUG confirmed that:

> *"We work in different direction and at different levels to find a solution and obtain the admission of IUG, and therefore we conduct intensive communications with the occupation authorities as well as with the UNRWA. This is in addition to community leaders to enforce the occupation and the UNRWA to recognize IUG certificates and give its graduates equal opportunities for job vacations"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The issue of non-recognition was unbearable because it did not come only from the occupation authorities, but also from the UNRWA. Document 49 shows that the UNRWA refused to recognise or hire IUG graduates. The UNRWA required the recognition of the hosting government (Egypt and later the Israeli occupation) as a pre-condition to hire IUG graduates. Although the United Nations was supposed to be neutral in the conflict between the Israel occupation and Palestinians, UNRWA followed the lead of the occupation, and therefore, refused to recognise IUG degrees. It was very hard to understand why the UNRWA should follow suit.

The leadership tried to engage the occupation to admit IUG and its graduates. The leadership believed that the recognition of IUG would strengthen the support of the community, and hundreds of new students would join the university. The determination and struggle of the leadership played an important role in gaining the support of students and the community. In spite of this dilemma, IUG became the largest university in Palestine in terms of the total number of enrolled students, even before their degrees were recognised.

The Chairman of the Board of Trustees Jamal AL-khodary concludes that:

> *"Despite the difficulties and the effects of the non-recognition, our determination to keep going and teach our kids was stronger than the willing of the occupation. We were not disappointed nor we gave up, we worked hard and we gained recognition from different countries and academic unions"* (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014).

The leadership was determined to carry on and overcome these obstacles. The leadership worked on an international level to find alternatives to local recognition. Since the 1980s and beyond, they have issued various communications and messages and sent many delegations to Arab, Muslim and foreign countries requesting them to recognise IUG degrees to overcome the Israeli non-recognition (document 4, 15, 28, 48).

The evidence from documents and interviews revealed that while the leadership failed to obtain recognition from the occupation authorities and the UNRWA for 15 years, they succeeded in achieving it from the Union of Arabic Universities in November 1980 (document 2), the Union of Islamic Universities in April 1984, the Union of Mediterranean Universities in 1998, and membership of the World Association of Universities in 2004. This strategy was one of bypassing the occupation and finding suitable alternatives elsewhere.

After the international recognition, local recognition followed, once the Oslo accords were signed in 1993. Document 51 showed that IUG received recognition from the UNRWA in October 1993, and in June 1994, IUG received a similar recognition from the PNA few months after its creation as shown in document 52. The Oslo accord played a crucial role in obtaining the recognition and hiring of IUG graduates. This was considered by the leadership, staff, students and the community as a breakthrough and the best alternative to the Israeli non-recognition.

As a result of the recognition, more partnership agreements were signed with European, Asian, African and American universities as was clarified in chapter two. In the meantime, the leadership tried to find job opportunities for its graduates, especially in the Arabic Gulf countries. Achieving recognition from these important bodies opened further opportunities for IUG staff to conduct their postgraduate studies abroad with fewer restrictions, apart from those imposed by the occupation authorities.

In conclusion, the individual interviews demonstrated on different occasions a spirit of patience, struggle and calmness under the pressure of this dilemma. Nevertheless, in some other occasions university leaders took quick and forceful actions such as opening the faculty of Nursing, but they have to cope with the consequences of deporting 36 academics. The focus group concentrated more on the deep impacts of the dilemma of non-recognition which continued for 15 years. The leadership was unable to solve this dilemma until 1993 leaving hundreds of graduates with very limited job opportunities inside the Gaza Strip. The document analysis clarified how the leadership tried to engage with the occupation authorities to obtain the recognition but failed. Simultaneously, they bypassed the occupation authorities by obtaining recognition from different unions abroad. Despite political conflict, the leadership exploited the Oslo Accord in a resilient and rational manner obtaining recognition from both the PNA and the UNRWA.

5.1.2 Lack of Resources

The availability of resources can enhance the outcomes of an organisation (Zhou-Ling, 2009; Fitz-enz, 2009) and helps them in coping with threats (Andrews, 1995).

5.1.2.1 Lack of Qualified Staff

A strong, qualified academic and administrative staff is a strength and a competitive advantage in any university (Gertler and Vinodrai, 2005; Mamman, Kamoche, and Bakuwa, 2012). This factor directly affects the quality of the administration and the satisfaction of the students. In addition, it can effectively contribute to scientific research. Table 5 (p. 48) in chapter two, shows to what extent there was a lack of qualified staff, particularly, in the inception stage, and how it developed through the different stages of IUG history.

Any emerging university might lack qualified staff either because of financial problems or lack of competitive advantage (Teixeira and Amaral, 2007). Universities operating in turbulent environments, such as the case of IUG, seem to suffer from more complicated problems. For instance, IUG suffered from the occupation's attempts to control the university by imposing certain policies, such as preventing the staff from getting a residency, and thus preventing the university from recruiting qualified staff from other countries. The more skilled and competent the organisation's leadership and employees, the more likely the organisation will meet its strategic goals and objectives (Hitt, *et al*., 2001). This is why the lack of a qualified staff was the main problem that IUG faced in its first years. When a university lacks qualified staff, then the goals to be achieved will be very difficult.

Document analysis revealed to what extent the issue of qualified staff concerned the leadership. Different messages (documents 14, 20, 28, 29 and 44) were sent to the occupation authorities requesting permission to hire qualified staff from the West Bank and from abroad.

Individual interviews shed light on the lack of qualified staff and the strategies used by the leadership to address it. The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Prof. Majed Al-Farra reported that:

> *"Most of the staff members, in the inception stage, were bachelor degree holders. Therefore, it was necessary for the leadership to find alternatives, and thus the leadership started to think and collaborate with universities in Jordan to recruit professors to work at the university. In addition, they decided to send academic staff to conduct their postgraduate studies abroad"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

This empowerment and development of staff members' qualifications played a crucial role in overcoming the Israeli restrictions. Christie, *et al*. (2007) found that the experience of the teachers and staff is one of the main reasons for success, and such capacities improve the outcomes of the organisation (Phillpot, *et al*., 2011). The leadership therefore tried to overcome this problem by hiring qualified staff from the West Bank, Jordan and Egypt, however this required permission from the occupation authorities.

The policy of the occupation was to put the leadership under threat and pressure all the time. The occupation authorities cancelled the residence of seven academics from the staff in September 1983 (document 13). Also, they deported 36 academics in October 1985 (document 30). They expelled prof. Mohamed Saqer, the Chancellor of IUG in 1984 and the vice Chancellor Mohamed Siyam in 1988, and 23 of the academic and administrators were deported to Marj Al-Zohoor in South Lebanon in December 1992 (AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009).

One respondent (a professor in chemistry), who left IUG to join Al-Azhar University in 1991 was proud of this response by leadership saying that:

> *"Students who are sent by the university to complete their HE have returned from abroad after they achieved their master and PhD degrees; and thus were eligible to work in the university. It also attracted a number of Palestinian professionals who are working*

abroad to work in the university" (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

The strategy of relying on the local staff was key: by sending them everywhere possible for postgraduate studies to avoid the Israeli restrictions. By supplying scholarships, despite financial crises, the leadership was able to send staff and students abroad to different universities. The leadership exploited the closure of IUG in the first uprising in 1987 to send more academics abroad to pursue their postgraduate studies. The other strategy was recruiting Palestinian professionals who worked abroad (in the UK Germany and USA), particularly those who have the Gaza identity. These strategies helped IUG to fill the gaps and released, to some extent, the leadership from the Israeli pressure.. At the same time, IUG continued recruiting qualified staff from the West Bank, Jordanian and Egyptian universities.

These strategies enabled IUG to have a diverse and well qualified academic staff complement. Literature emphasises the importance of diversity of the workforce and how it can lead to positive outcomes (Mamman, *et al*., 2012). The former Chancellor commented on this matter by saying:

> *"As I pointed out, the main goal was sending the academics of the university abroad to benefit from various experiences. I assume that we were in the founding phase, so cultural variety and diversity of certificates benefited the building of advanced Faculties (engineering, information technology, medicine, and other specific departments). We believe that this diversity offers different experiences, and this was reflected on the level of the academic quality"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

IUG leadership was able to overcome the problem of insufficient qualified staff by sending them abroad to obtain their postgrduate studies.

5.1.2.2 Lack of Facilities (Buildings and Equipment)

The document evidence showed that this issue was of great importance for the leadership in order to provide students and the staff with good quality of education. Much correspondence was sent to different Israeli authorities as shown in documents 6, 21, 28 and 32. These documents stressed the dire need for buildings and equipment, and that IUG had the right to provide a suitable and comfortable educational process for its students and staff. The Israeli authority rejected these demands and sent different messages to the leadership as shown in documents 7, 33 and 34 threatening them if they constructed any buildings without military approval. These documents demonstrate two opposite strategies, on the one hand, the documents of the university revealed that the leadership tried to engage with the occupation authorities, but when this did not work they decided to challenge and defy their orders. The documents sent to IUG showed that the occupation tried to impose their authority and control and exercise their power against IUG.

Some interviews and a focus group revealed that there was debate among the leadership about the timing to challenge the occupation and start the building process. Some of the staff were scared of the consequences and the anger of the occupation. The support of volunteer students and staff enabled the leadership to construct temporary buildings - the so called *Baraksat* which looked like prefabs.

> *"The occupation prevented the establishment of permanent buildings for the Islamic University, and it's hard to imagine that the university first consisted of tents then of the so-called Baraksat (temporary buildings) approved by the occupation to be set up under great pressure by the community"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The operation of constructing the buildings started in secret at nights over weekends, but a day later, the occupation destroyed what had been built. The IUG started to re-build it again with the help of staff, students and the community. Social cohesion played its role in the process of challenging the occupation. A respondent explained that:

> *"The occupation prevented the establishment of permanent buildings for the Islamic University, and it's hard to imagine that the university*

> *first consisted of tents then of the so-called Baraksat (temporary buildings) approved by the occupation to be set up under great pressure by the community"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Another respondent elaborated further that:

> "*The university started building temporary classrooms, but the occupation demolished them. And, soon we rebuilt it again and again till we had some temporary buildings. The university faced many difficulties in promoting its projects to have them funded by donors*" (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014).

The focus groups shed light on the dangers of constructing building without Israeli permission.

> *"The leadership took the risk of being arrested or deported if they build without permission. However, the process was classified and few members knew about it in advance"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

During the first and the second stage, the leadership tried to find temporary solutions to this critical problem. This situation continued until the third stage in 1993 when the PNA came to power and took control of the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Soon after, IUG leadership launched a consolidation process in different domains. One of the most important things was launching a campaign to raise funds for constructing permanent buildings.

The Chairman of the Board of Trustees confirmed that:

> *"One of the key responsibilities of IUG leadership is to ensure that all the facilities are provided to student and staff, especially comfortable buildings. We exert huge efforts to find donors to construct permanent buildings and as you see we succeed to do so"* (AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014).

This statement confirmed that building a modern university with a comfortable environment was always a high priority of the leadership. The interviews and the observation undertaken provided strong evidence that the leadership was able to construct most of the new buildings based on a structural chart prepared for IUG by the faculty of Engineering. However, there were still challenges and direct risks surrounding IUG. This was made very clear when the Israeli fighters bombed the main buildings of IUG in the war of December 2008.

Al-Ajez who is one of the pioneer workers at IUG concluded that:

> *"When buildings got demolished we built tents in the morning. When a teacher was absent, his colleague filled his place without complaining or asking for compensation, and all that is an evidence for loyalty and affiliation to the university"* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

The determination to keep IUG functioning was the aim of both the leadership and staff even under tents. The members of IUG fulfilled their tasks and the team work spirit made them work very hard under extreme conditions. The leadership deployed different strategies to solve this problem; one strategy was being flexible to engage and convince the Israeli authorities to give the required permissions for buildings. The second strategy was perseverance and insistence to challenge the occupation orders and constructing temporary buildings. However, the price was high and some members of the leadership were arrested and the pressure from the occupation against IUG increased.

5.1.3 Teaching in Risk, Stress and War Conditions

The occupation's attempts to control IUG made the job of higher learning harder and more dangerous because the leadership worked under the direct threat of the occupation and its security measures against IUG and its staff and students. The literature review provides evidence that conflict and wars undermine the functioning of the education system and also destroy education infrastructure (Seitz, 2004; Novelli

and Lopes Cardozo, 2008), in addition to putting people under stress and affecting their mental health (Miller and Rasmussen, 2010).

Dolatkhan (2014) asserts that in high risk situations, the consequences of unexpected hazardous events are sometimes unbearable. IUG was exposed to both expected and unexpected disturbances forcing the university to work in stressful and risky conditions.

5.1.3.1 Disruption of the Educational Process

As an institution building itself under the occupation, IUG was subjected to many disruptions that caused a temporary interruption to its activities. For instance, the Israeli occupation often shut down the university (Sullivan, 1994) and arrested some teachers and students. Individual interviews focused on the occupation's attempts to disrupt the teaching process. One respondent said:

> *"The Israeli troops stormed the university many time in the 1980s and arrested many students to prevent political activities. Even more, they shut down the university many times in advance or after political events and demonstrations had taken place"* (Al-Rantisi, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Opposing the occupation and raising the awareness of staff and students were important steps in to challenging the Israeli orders against the university and the community as a whole. But sometimes not opposing orders, in order to absorb the anger of the occupation was also important.

Some respondents noted that the leadership had to shut down the university or evacuate students and staff to prevent the occupation's troops from storming the university and arresting some students or staff members.

> *"We had to shut down the university many times for several days as an act of protection and defense for our students after the Israeli soldiers would break into the campus and arrest a number of students"* (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

The evidence from documents showed also that the Israeli targeting of IUG did not stop. Many documents provide strong evidence about the Israeli attempts to disrupt the educational process at IUG since the early years of inception. For instance, documents 7, 8, 22, 25, 33, 34 and 47 are messages sent from the military authorities to IUG leadership. These documents detailed the restrictions and difficulties IUG was exposed to by the occupation and how the occupation tried to intervene in the policies and practices of the university. For example, the military governor asked IUG in document 22 issued in December 1983 to provide them with the agenda and the minutes of their meetings. The leadership sometimes sent very short reports to the military governor to absorb the occupation's anger. They sent many different letters to the Israeli authorities to convince them to remove the restrictions on IUG. Most of the time, though, the leadership challenged these obstacles and ignored such requests of the occupation.

Documents number 16 and 17 sent to the Israeli military governor in October, 1983 stressed the right of IUG to perform their policies and practices for the interest of the students and community away from the Israeli pressure. In addition, documents number 18 and 21 which were sent to the Israeli general coordinator in October and December, 1983 rejected the restrictions imposed by the occupation to disrupt the educational process. These documents, among many others, reflected the spirit of challenge, defiance and exercise of power

The general view of many respondents is summed up by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees:

> "*The Israeli disruptions didn't stop; they tried whatever they can to impede any progress of IUG. They deport chancellors and academics; they imposed restrictions on travelling and accommodation of staff; they prevent buildings; they block our funds and so on, but we kept*

> *going as our main goal is to continue the educational process"*(AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014).

All these measures negatively affected the smooth operation of teaching and disrupted the functioning of IUG. Nevertheless, these disruptions did not stop IUG from providing services to students, staff and the community. There was a perception that the leadership was able to carry on and create innovative solutions to overcome closure. This issue was confirmed by many respondents even those who left IUG to join Al-Azhar university in 1991:

> *"At the beginning of Intifadat AL-Aqsa in 2000, The Gaza Strip was being dismembered, and as a result, students couldn't reach school. Therefore, the university founded a communication center for the students in the south of Gaza Strip. The university succeeded in using this center as an alternative so that the students can go on with their education. We held lectures at homes, Mosques and clubs"* (Zourob, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

IUG leadership was the pioneer of universities in the Gaza Strip, finding alternative solutions in order to keep the educational process moving forward. This communication centre played a strategic role in facilitating the distribution of lectures and examinations via networks between the main campus in Gaza and the centre in the South. The leadership created opportunities out of threats and hardships. This is one of the ways in which IUG adapted to hazardous conditions, finding alternatives and working under all the circumstances. The initial results were not so promising because the siege continued for many years, but nevertheless, the educational process kept going.

The observation of the researcher showed that there was huge panic and shock among students and the staff when the war and bombing started suddenly, because thousands of students were in their classes. In such moments of extreme risks, students look for guidance, support and immediate protection (Mutch, 2015). There were a number of respondents who thought that it would be very difficult for IUG to return normal operations after the destruction of its main buildings.

This issue was outlined by one respondent who said that:

> *"When we returned to the university after the destruction of two main buildings in the war of Dec. 2008, we couldn't help to see the scattered debris. Class rooms weren't ready, and students' mentality was damaged because they lost either someone or something. All that made us feel that we couldn't act as if the semester was finished. Hence, we made some examinations just to sense the students desire to overcome the ordeal which actually was surprising even to the top management, and I was the academic deputy that time. We even doubted that we could start the examinations after two or three weeks, but we found ourselves astonished as after four or five days we started running examinations successfully with extra care for the students who suffered during the three weeks of war"* (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

Despite the damage the war left, and despite the feelings of shock and disappointment, the insistence on the strategy of keeping the educational process moving was crucial for the leadership, meaning that the university did not give up and did not break or shatter even if most of the buildings were bombed. This experience made it clear that the university was something beyond buildings: an educational community that continued to function, and even function well, after infrastructure was destroyed. Steps taken in order to successfully complete the semester and keep moving were self-reinforcing, and gave more power, control and authority to the leadership in dealing with shocks.

The day after the war ended, the leadership started to find alternatives to continue the educational process. After cleaning the mess, they opened new rooms as laboratories with the little equipment that was not damaged; they co-operated with other universities such as Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa to use their labs. Although Al-Azhar had been set up in opposition to IUG, in this crisis and similar occasions, particularly those related to opposing the occupation, they were prepared to help. The co-operation between IUG and these universities enabled the leadership to overcome the

lack of resources and facilities required for the educational process. The leadership also moved quickly to buy whatever equipment they could. The leadership was on the ground to determine the policy and the required steps, to supervise the process of construction and to give orders and instructions.

The Chairman of the Board of Trustees as many other respondents explained that:

> *"We did our best to overcome this shock, the mess was huge and the damage was unimaginable. But soon we consulted with many different members of the staff. Challenging the occupation and the willing to survive was stronger than the destruction and we gain all the support to rebuild what the occupier destroyed"* (AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014).

The participation of the staff in this decision empowered the staff and motivated them.Thus, the intellectual stimulation of the leadership which characterises transformational leadership (motivate followers to be creators and innovators, to share the same values and standards of the leaders and of the organisation) made the staff ready to sacrifice and fulfill their mission. The researcher observed that not only in spite of, but perhaps because of, the severe damage of this war, the sense of unity and cohesion among the staff and with the community increased. IUG gained the support and funds to rebuild the destroyed building from the Islamic Bank-Jeddah in Saudi Arabia who used to give support to Palestinian universities and institutions.

5.1.3.2 Moving Forward: Offering Off-Campus Classes

Most of the Palestinian universities were subjected to a variety of Israeli assaults and invasion such as shutting down universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Sometimes, this required exceptional responses and measures such as working underground while facing dangers. For instance, in the first uprising in 1987, The occupation authorities issued military orders and closed the Palestinian universities (An-Najah, Birzeit, Bethlehem and Hebron in the West Bank and IUG in the Gaza Strip). IUG was closed for four years by military order as shown in document 47. The shutting down of IUG as a HEI was a decision the occupation seemed likely to make.

The number of IUG students downsized dramatically from 4504 to only 358 as shown in Table 2 (P. 26) and Table 3 (P. 40). Thus, the situation during the first uprising foreshadowed such a decision which was a serious challenge to the existence of the university.

Although the military order to shut down IUG was disappointing and affected students, staff and the community, nevertheless, it was a great motivator to challenge the occupation and teach underground. Birziet university was the pioneer to do so in the West Bank and later IUG followed suit in the Gaza Strip. The leadership decided to continue the educational by offering off-campus classes, exploiting all the options and alternatives they had. The individual interviews and the focus group gave different explanations. Some of the interviewees stress the importance of challenging the occupation and saving the career of the students by teaching underground, while others focused on the risk and the price of rejecting the military orders and open off-campus classes.

> *"The IUG leadership convinced many of the faculty members to teach in their homes, Mosques, sport clubs and in all available places to save students career"* (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

Confirming this reality, Professor Jawad Wady, Al-Azhar's previous Chancellor, who was one of the pioneer staff at IUG, and left for Al-Azhar University in 1991, expressed the difficulties and risks of teaching underground:

> *"It was scary and dangerous to teach students at our homes at that hard times, some of our colleagues reject the idea while many others was ready to sacrifice"* (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

This intellectual stimulation and empowerment of followers worked well. At that time, the self-reflection of the researcher indicated that although some academics refused to teach underground as they were scared of being arrested or punished, others took risks and were ready to struggle and sacrifice. Some of them have been arrested for teaching underground.

Members of the focus group discussion said:

> *"We dealt correctly with closure; we were the pioneers in Gaza to do so, but we acknowledged that the price was high"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

The flexibility and the open-mindedness and calmness under pressure enabled the leadership to find alternatives and solutions to restarting the educational process. Respondents from the focus group were convinced that:

> *"Teaching underground or in public places was a strategy used in two occasions; once in the first uprising in 1987 and the other in the second uprising in 2000. In the two occasions the aim was to prevent the collapse of the educational process and to save the careers and the futures of thousands of students"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

The self-reflection of the researcher points to the threats of working underground on the staff and leadership as well as students. This situation repeated itself after the breakout of the second uprising in 2000 and the isolation of the cities of Gaza Strip from each other. The suffering of the staff and students at the checkpoints they had to cross to reach campuses was almost unbearable and cast risks on their personal safety.

In spite of risk and dangers, the leadership decided to keep going with the educational process. From their previous experience and with the support of the community, the leadership started teaching again at informal venues for more than two years until they were able to construct a new campus to serve students in the isolated areas.

5.1.4 Loss of Authority and Control

Under the Israeli occupation, it was very difficult and challenging for Palestinians to formulate their own education system, improve the quality standards and direct it to meet economic and social demands (Ramahi and Davies, 2002).

Document analysis showed the attempts of the occupation to control IUG, and how the leadership used different strategies in dealing with this dilemma. Many messages issued to IUG from the Israeli authorities reveal the extent to which they tried to impose their control and authority over IUG. For example, document 8 issued to IUG

in October, 1982 gives evidence how the Israeli authorities limited the number of new students to only 200. In addition, they rejected hiring qualified staff and the expansion of the members of the Board of Trustees. They tried to intervene in simple things pertaining to the running of IUG such as preventing opening a new gate (document 45) a few days after the first uprising broke out in December 1987.

The leadership realised that the loss of authority and control would impede any attempts to progress and move forward. Therefore, they tried to keep their control over their resources and strategies. To deal with this dilemma, they conducted intensive communications with different Israeli authorities requesting them to stop their intervention, and warning them of the consequences of continuing such policies and oppressive measures. For instance, in May 1981, an open letter (document 4) was sent to the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and many academics abroad, requesting approval from the military governor to allow IUG to function and to carry out its development plans.

On other occasions, the leadership rejected the Israeli intervention in IUG issues. A series of different messages were sent (documents, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 43 and 44) to the occupation authorities rejecting the limitation of the number of registered students, the ban on constructing of new buildings, rejecting the departure of some of the staff members and the ban on opening a new gate. It was not easy to reject the military orders as this jeopardised the personal security of the leadership and the continuation of the educational process. Some of these documents demonstrate how the leadership engaged and tried to convince the occupation to release restrictions on IUG: documents 16 and 17. Other documents defied and rejected the oppressive and illegal measures of the occupation as shown in documents 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 43 and 44.

This was confirmed by members of the focus groups:

> "*Many times when we open new faculties or specialisations, we were determined to take forceful actions and to evaluate the Israeli reaction and deal accordingly*" (Al-Hooly).

Taking forceful actions, while taking risks into account, are characteristics of the IUG leadership. Sometime the leadership was able to challenge these military orders and overcome the obstacles, while some other times they had to absorb the shocks although the price was relatively high. Therefore, in certain cases, the leadership had to freeze some decisions (for example opening the faculty of Nursing) for months. They absorbed the anger of the occupation, to avoid repercussions.

The pioneer employees at IUG realised these facts as there was a complaint among many respondents from both individual and group interviews that:

> *"The university suffered from the dominance of the occupation. For instance, the occupation was sizing the university and specifying the number of students. However, this did not prevent the leadership from completing the registration with the numbers they want"* (Asori, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The previous Chancellor confirmed that:

> *"The occupation threatened to close the Islamic University among other threats in order to force the university to retreat from the decision to establish the Faculty of Nursing. We did not know the reason behind the occupation's rejection, but to absorb their anger we had to freeze the decision for months"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

This point of view presented two main concepts; the deep understanding of the leadership when it should use a strategy of challenge and taking forceful actions and when it should use a strategy of absorbing the anger and the tough reactions of the occupation.

5.1.5 Financial Crisis

The evidence from documents, most of the interviews, focus group and participant observation acknowledged that the financial crisis is an old yet recurring problem which continues to plague the leadership and staff of IUG.

The previous Chancellor of IUG said:

> *"We know that the funding of all Palestinian universities at that time was by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Money was transferred by banks, but occupation curtailed transfer of money to the university"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

This prolonged problem of money transfer characterised the case of IUG. But in spite of this, some respondents gave examples of their ability to cope with these challenges and to sacrifice for the interest of the university.

One key respondent clarified that:

> *"In fact, in times of financial crises, all the extra work we did was charity for the sake of the university. Sometimes we didn't receive our salaries for 8 months and we still continued to work"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013).

Another example highlighted that:

> *"There were financial problems at IUG, and we have to sacrifice and deal with this problem. Furthermore, the support of Muslim institutions played a big role in facilitating the financial issue"* (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

These examples demonstrated the spirit of sacrifice, affiliation and commitment of employees, particularly in times of crises. Islamic charities in Arab countries, Turkey and Malaysia among others gave support and funding to IUG. Document analysis showed that in spite of this spirit of sacrifice, the leadership exerted more pressure on the occupation authorities and sent them a series of messages requesting them to ease financial restrictions (documents 18, 19, 23, 24 and 28). In the meantime, they spent efforts on fund raising to meet the urgent needs of the university. Furthermore, they asked the occupation (document 27) to allow delegations to travel abroad for fund raising for IUG projects.

The focus group members believed that this dilemma has intensified over the past three decades due to the economic decline under occupation (Abadsa, 2006) and the inability of students to pay tuition fees. Moreover, some of them highlighted the deficiencies of the leadership accusing them of not taking the required step to solve this problem instead of depending on financial support from abroad.

> *"We suffered from financial constraints, and the leadership still unable to find creative solutions to this dilemma"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

In summary, the observation as well as documents and interviews confirmed that the support from Muslim individuals, groups and institutions was of great importance in helping IUG to overcome this problem until the end of 2012. Thereafter, most of the support stopped, particularly from Turkish foundations, as they turned to support needy people in Syria. There was a widely held view among interviewees that the financial situation of IUG is one of the most difficult dilemmas that IUG leadership still has not been able to solve, due to many different reasons including the inability of more than 8000 students to pay tuition fees. In addition, due to the political division since 2007, the Palestinian ministry of HE excluded IUG from the financial support that the ministry is committed to giving to universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Another reason for the continuation of the financial crisis is IUG's inability to raise the tuition fees due to the harsh economic situation in the Gaza Strip since the breakout of the second uprising in 2000

By the end of 2012, the financial crisis has been exacerbated due to the previous reasons, and also due to the three different wars waged against the Gaza Strip in the last five years, coupled with tightening of the Israeli siege and closure. The literature (Iwasaki, 2014) confirms that the financial crises are significant factors that affect the survival of the organisation. This dilemma still plagues the leadership as well as the staff, and therefore, there is concern about how the leadership will be able to overcome it in the future. Moreover, IUG workers are now calling for their rights and financial dues just like their peers in Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa universities who earn full salaries smoothly every month while their colleagues at IUG receive only 50-70 percent of their salaries.

5.1.6 Political Conflict and Division

The existence of the Israeli occupation and its attempts to control universities created many political conflicts among Palestinian groups on how to stand against the occupation. It is impossible for Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip to distance themselves from the political environment (Sullivan, 1994) and ideological contexts in which they operate. The leadership had to cope with challenges and exploit the opportunities to thrive even under political risks (Henisz and Zelner, 2003). Political conflict can ruin the unity of groups and community and have a negative effect on the confidence, respect and trust among people (Hibbing, Smith, Peterson, Feher, 2014). Political disputes become even worse in times of crises and hazardous conditions. This was reflected in the emergence of political conflicts that, in some cases, developed into violence among the students.

Some respondents, particularly the pioneer employees at IUG, believed that the conflict was mainly about the identity and the culture of the university and to which political party it should belong.. For example, one respondent argued that:

> *"At the inception stage, there were division among stakeholders about the identity of the university and its culture. This was reflected in some violent clashes between different groups of students. But the result was the dominance of the Islamic culture and ideology"* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

At the early stages of the creation of IUG,, there was a serious debate among staff, students and political groups about IUG's political affiliation. The researcher witnessed this dilemma and its impacts on IUG staff, students and the community. The continuous political conflict in the Palestinian territories was a major obstacle confronting Palestinian universities as well as the leadership of IUG. Each political party wanted to force its ideology and philosophies on the university.

A female respondent argued that:

> *"Most of the employees have a political affiliation which helps them to withstand the hazardous situations"* (Najem, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The environment and the occupation forced the political conflict to rise to the surface between different political parties competing to control IUG.

> *"Some political affiliations have worked hard to govern the university, sometimes by using violence, but the leadership's wise management outlaws all these endeavours"* (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

The focus groups gave more explanation concluding that:

> *"Another challenge was flagrantly apparent which is having two parties competing to head IUG; Fatah and Hamas. That period was very critical since it inserted more conflicts and clashes. After the foundation of Al Azhar University which is affiliated with Fatah, the general situation has become less complicated. Moreover, the division has been occurring between brothers, Hamas and Fatah. This was a very complicated stage that may have led to many conflicts, but the university dealt with it sensibly"* (Focus group1, Jan. 2014).

The conflict of interests and the desire for dominance creates sometime an exercise of power among different groups (Hardy, 2015). The leadership exerted great efforts to keep the university away from such division and to prevent violent incidents. They held intensive meetings with staff and student representatives. In addition, they held numerous meetings with community and movement leaders until they reached agreement between the conflicting parties.

This was also confirmed through document analysis, as shown in documents 11, 12 and 40. These documents give examples of the bad effects of conflict on student and the educational process. While some respondents see the affiliation as a positive factor in ensuring the survival of IUG, others acknowledge the bad effects of this conflict which arose because of affiliation on the society in general and on IUG in particular.

These views of respondents are aligned with the approach of Bush and Saltarelli (2000) about the two faces of education in decreasing conflict and eliminating tension and violence among different groups of the society, and in creating an environment that increases conflict and violence among different groups. The results of the effects

of conflict in IUG confirmed the long-lasting effects that undermine their reintegration and overall safety of communities under wars and conflict (UNICEF, 2007). However, while leadership succeeded in calming down the situation sometimes, they failed to prevent some clashes between students which took place occasionally, and the leadership had to cope with the consequences. In these occasions, the leadership had to shut down the university for a few days in order to calm the tension among the rival parties.

5.2 The Factors Used by IUG Leadership in Dealing with Hardships and Challenges

The main question of this research was about how leaders can promote resilience in a HEI in an environment of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. Answering this question implies examining the manner of responses when dealing with and adapting to the challenges and obstacles IUG has faced throughout its history and how the leadership and culture interacted in building resilience. A diversity of characteristics of the leadership to achieve these goals emerged from this study. Professor Shehada Zourob is convinced that IUG is characterised by:

> *"First, the challenging circumstances created men with fierce and unique personalities that can excel and compete everywhere. Second, the limitless giving environment of the academic staff, students, and top management. Third, esprit de corps of the team and team work. Fourth, the desire to serve Islam and the nation. Finally, persistence and ability to work under hard circumstances"* (Zourob, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

In the environments of turbulence and conflicts, the university leadership needs to have a clear vision and mission. The points of Prof. Zourob summarise the positive effects of the challenges upon the leadership and staff. These include: creating strong and qualified people; teamwork abilities; commitment and affiliation to serve the religion and the community. Rearranging the priorities is one of the fundamental factors that helped the institution to succeed in facing the difficulties and challenges.

One respondent from the pioneers at IUG noted that:

> *"We believe that IUG's role was to keep going, resist, and work 24 hours to come up with solutions for challenges. For example, when a teacher is imprisoned we manage to find who fill his place later in the same day. If they close the classes we study in houses. The persistence of the leadership is what made the university stand against all odds. The major view of the Islamic University and the efforts of the youth*

and the staffs of the university are what make it succeed through their loyalty and cooperation" (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

5.2.1 Partnership between the Board of Trustees and the University Council

IUG leadership was characterised by both co-operation and tensions between the Board of Trustees and the University Council. Since the inception of IUG until 1992, the Board of Trustees as well as the University Council comprised members from different political groups and independents.

The individual interviews and the observation of the researcher stressed the positive impact of this partnership. Prof. Al-Ajez believed that:

> *"The Board of Trustees and the Chancellor were in continuous cooperation which made the Israelis turn the blind eye, particularly in 1980s and early 1990s, for a period that made us capable of establishing some buildings"* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

This partnership and co-operation of the leadership appeared strongly in challenging the occupation's oppressive measures because they gained the support of the staff, students and the community to stand against the occupier. Therefore, the occupation authorities sometimes turned a blind eye, such as at the opening of some departments or in the case of registering more students than agreed upon. This is because the occupation authorities were not ready all the time to escalate the situation with students and the community.

It was acknowledged by many respondents, and through documents and observation that there was a high level of co-operation and partnership between the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the Chancellor. Most of the respondents were convinced about the main role of the Board of Trustees.

> *"The role of the broad of trustees since the establishment of the university and until today is a positive role; for example, they were travelling to bring money and support the university and also were in contact with the teachers"* (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

From 1992 onwards, the partnership grew stronger, especially between the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the Secretary General of the board, and the Chancellor of the university. They performed as an informal team. This thesis argues that this distinctive relationship comes from the fact that Mr. Jamal AL-Khodary, the Chairman of the board, is a very charismatic person with special skills and very effective communication with different local and international groups and individuals. He attended at his office at IUG almost every day and met with the Chancellor of the university and different members and visitors. This is despite the fact that he was working on a voluntary basis and did not receive a salary. At the same time, Mr. Khalid AL-Hindi, the secretary general of the board is a key adviser to most of the IUG Chancellors. Therefore, both of them with the previous Chancellor, prof. Shoubair, who acted from 1992 to 2008 and thereafter with the current Chancellor, Prof. Shaath, who has acted since 2008, formed an effective team who used to manage many different issues that IUG has confronted since its establishment.

The previous Chancellor confirmed the co-operation between himself and the Board of Trustees:

> "*We used to have almost daily informal meeting with the Chairman of the Board of Trustees as we used to discuss different important issues and take decisions*" (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Document analysis provided evidence that reflected the strong co-operation, understanding and unity between the two partners. Both sides used to sign together many messages sent to the occupation authorities (documents 4, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 35 and 48). This exceptional partnership and participation presented a strong style of leadership as it gave them power, a high degree of control and authority, support and idealised influence upon most followers.

The focus group highlighted a different point of view. Despite the partnership and its fruitful results, there were tensions and arguments, particularly, in the discussions on campus and also expressed by some interviewees, about the relationship between the University Council and the Board of Trustees.

One respondent from the focus group said that:

> *"I think the dominance of the Board of Trustees was at the expense of the University Council and created conflict of the authorities of both sides"* (Focus group1, Jan. 2014).

It should be acknowledge that during the observations of the researcher, especially in the recent few years, there were some examples of internal, yet informal, criticisms about the role of the Board of Trustees and their unnecessary intervention in the daily issues of the university. They argued that this intervention diminished the role of the University Council for the interest of the Board of Trustees.

The researcher's own observation confirmed, in spite of some criticisms, the positive outcomes of this partnership. Most respondents gave examples supporting the view that the Board of Trustees have played a crucial role in supporting the university by all means possible, not the least with the stand against the Israeli oppressive measures, constructing permanent buildings and opening new Faculties and departments.

The researcher argues that in the early stages of IUG, the Board of Trustees played a stronger role in the university compared to the University Council as they represented the university in front of the occupation authorities. In the creation stage of IUG, the Board of Trustees, where representatives of different political and ideological affiliation sat side by side, has played an important founding role and securing funds to IUG. But in 1992, after the creation of Al-Azhar university, the Board of Trusted was restructured. Some of the newly structured Board are independents while others have Hamas affiliation. The role of the Board has changed and the confrontation with the occupation retreated to the consolidation stage of securing funds to launch new buildings and creating networks of communications, agreements and partnership with different universities and groups. During the fourth stage, the role of the Board was to secure scholarships for thousands of needy students and to rebuild what the wars of 2009, 2012 and 2014 destroyed. Hence, the role and the priorities of the Board have changed, but there is still serious debate and criticisms among some different groups of the staff member about the role of the Board of Trustees, particularly their intervention in the daily issues of the university.

5.2.2 Communications and Networks

IUG leadership communicated in two directions, external and internal. Externally, IUG made connections with other universities around the world. As part of these relationships, IUG has received local and international delegations, and sent delegations of its own to other universities. The evidence from document analysis provided some examples of these visits. For instance, the visit of the American Ambassador (document 55), the Qatari Ambassador (document 58), and the Egyptian Ambassador (document 60).

Also, the evidence from individual interviews gave support to the effectiveness of the communication networks at IUG. Some respondents were convinced that the communication of IUG was good enough to support IUG in different disciplines. For example, one administrator respondent from the pioneer females working at the registration office since 1980 said that:

> *"The university is keen to work with international institutions to provide scholarship to staff and students to achieve postgraduate degrees and come back to serve IUG and the community. IUG has always kept international relations with different prospects to offer scholarships and educational expeditions to its students to come back afterwards with high degrees"* (Abu Shaaban, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

This view was supported by the previous Chancellor who led the university in difficult and challenging times. He clarified that:

> *"The university has joined many Education Unions including Arab, Local, and International ones to serve the purpose of recognizing IUG and its graduates. Following these steps, we conducted different visits and communication and we signed numerous agreements. I believe that IUG has become more powerful in spite of being not recognized by the Israeli occupation"* (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

This diversity of communications and relations played an important role in helping IUG to find alternatives and solutions to some important problems they faced.

With regard to the internal communications, there was a view among some respondents that the leadership has had good communication and relationship with the staff. For example, Al-Jabier who worked at IUG in 1981 as an administrator and retired in 2012 agreed that:

> *"Generally, for more than 30 years, the administration has been in communication with the employees at the levels of working and social events. Moreover, the employees have a good relationship between each other based on respect and communication as one family"* (Al-Jabier, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

This left a positive influence upon followers giving them the feeling of partnership. In line with this view, another respondent from the administration staff said:

> *"I feel that the university appreciated and still appreciates and respects the needs of employees. It also works in harmony with them and provides them with what it can afford. IUG's leadership has always respected its employees and is always eager to offer whatever it could to meet their needs"* (Barhoum, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

The individual consideration and the close relationship between the leadership and staff inspired and stimulated many of the staff members to follow instructions as partners rather than just as employees.

This harmony and effective communication appeared strongly, particularly in times of crises and shocks. Gallagher, Fontenot and Kris (2007) stress the importance of communication particularly in turbulent times. In such situations, the relationship between the leadership and the staff becomes stronger which, in turn, helps in alleviating the pressure and overcoming the problems.
The evidence given by many interviewees has supported this view.

> *"The leadership of the university is in full harmony with the staff. There is high and reciprocal confidence. The leadership is considered*

> *to be a role model for staff, and the relationship between them is based on brotherhood. For instance, informational emails are exchanged daily between the leadership and staff. There is no barrier between the leadership and staff as it is easy for any employee to reach and meet with the president of the university himself. Employees can socially engage with* the *leadership in social events and visits to employees as well"* (Al-Rantisi, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The flexibility of communication built trust and confidence between the leadership and the staff.

There were some respondents, academics and administrators, who thought that these communications were not strong enough all the time, especially with regard to informing the staff about funding issues, such as salaries or the rewards system. One respondent from the focus group believed that:

> *"The absence of transparency and good communications with different levels of staff members created misunderstanding and a gap between the leadership and some employees"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

Communication networks were strong enough through the first three stages of IUG, but in the fourth stage the communications show some weakness. Communication became more difficult with larger campus and under conditions of tight siege and closure, and with salary problems which raised the tension between the leadership and employees' union at IUG.

In summary, through the interviews, documents and observations, it can be seen that the networks of communication and relationship the leadership built throughout the years at both external and internal levels have played a crucial role in solving different challenges and hardships to which IUG were exposed. The external communications helped in finding alternatives and overcoming many challenges, such as hiring graduates, guaranteeing scholarships to conduct post-graduate studies, fundraising for buildings and equipment and supporting needy students.

In terms of internal communications, the leadership tried, generally, to keep good communication with staff whether they were formal or social. However, sometimes the leadership did not communicate with all levels of employees or with their representatives. As the university grew, communication structures were not adapted or developed quickly enough to reach all levels of a large staff complement. The level of communication was not good enough, particularly in recent years when it is related to some personal interests of employees such as salaries. The conflict of personal interest with the organisational interests created occasional loss of trust and the communications with employees did not succeed in filling this gap all the time.

The communication networks between the leadership and the staff oscillated between strength and weakness. The networks of communication and relationship were good and strong enough in the first stage of IUG's inception particularly when it related to challenging the occupation measures. But in the second stage of closing IUG from 1988 to 1992 and the first years of the third stage of consolidation, the effectiveness of these networks was not good enough because of the shutting down of IUG and the risks of being arrested. In late 1990s and early years 2000s in the fourth stage, the communication improved as the leadership adopted and communicated a new system of salaries and rewards.

Confronting the policy of siege and closure and opposing the occupation strengthened communications and created a sense of affiliation. But the financial crises which appeared strongly in 2012 and beyond, created a loss of confidence and weakened the communications between the leadership and employee representatives and parts of the staff members. However, in spite of some weaknesses, the communication networks contributed in finding a basic ground of understanding in order to apply the strategies, policies and objectives the leadership aims to achieve.

5.2.3 Social Cohesion: Embracing and Protecting the University

The story of IUG demonstrates the reality and the value of social cohesion and to what extent it existed between IUG and the community. The occupation's practices against the university's staff and students developed a sense of unity and compassion and strengthened their steadfastness.

The evidence from interviews and participant observation shows that there was a widely held view regarding the efforts IUG leadership exerted to gain the support and trust of the community. For example, Professor Fatheya Al-lolo, a female who has worked at IUG since 1996, and currently acts as the Dean of the Faculty of Education stated that:

> *"The university seeks to serve the community and the administration of the Islamic thoughts. Moreover, it supplies the local community cadres, enlightens ideas to promote quality of life, and employs techniques in dealing properly with people"* (Al-lolo, individual interview, Dec. 2014).

This was echoed by other respondents, The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce said that:

> *"Social accountability is important because we don't only work for our own benefits, but also for our community which, as a result, cherishes our efforts and supports us. This is an indicator that the university exits to serve the community's needs which are the focal point and our main target to meet. We, as a community-based organisation, work to enhance the opportunities for our community so it prospers. That's why the community embraces us and we embrace it as well"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

Serving the community and looking after their needs is a pre-condition to gain their support and trust. IUG gained the support of the community. Opening classes beyond university venues showed social cohesion and support.

> *"The community helped us to held lectures at homes, Mosques and clubs"* (Zourob, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

Serving the community was crucial to gaining their support, and this is one of the main objectives of IUG that was confirmed by members of the community and academics who left IUG in 1991. Also, Dr. Mohamed Abo Jarad, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of HE in the Gaza Strip, who did not work at IUG confirmed that:

> *"IUG opened the University College for Applied Science to serve the community needs of practical specializations. Also, IUG graduates gain good reputation and they compete in different vacancies"* (Abo Jarad, individual interview, Feb. 2014)

Opening this college was important as it provided the community with the necessary practical specialisations.

Individual interviews emphasised the efforts of the leadership in serving the community and establishing a tight social cohesion. Baliamoune-Lutz, (2009) states that when social cohesion reaches a threshold level then positive effects might appear. Through the observations, the researcher noted that many different conferences, exhibitions, trips, cultural activities and graduation ceremonies were held for the benefit of students, staff and the community as well (e. g. graduation ceremonies two weeks after the war of July 2014).

Personal observation also confirmed the support of the community for IUG in terms of donating to the university. Palestinians, individuals and groups, played an important role in fund raising. In addition, the community has supported IUG many times during the demonstrations against the occupation particularly from 1984-1987. On these occasions, the confrontation turned to be between the people and the Israeli soldiers. These demonstrations took place in Gaza cities soon after the occupation besieged the university. Different groups, individuals, families of students and staff and youths participated in these demonstrations. Even more, some of the community leaders participated by asking the occupation to stop the siege and withdraw. This social cohesion put more pressure on the occupation to stop and leave in order to calm down and control the deteriorating situation on the ground.

However, conflict, as well as social cohesion, affected the community. One key respondent, who actually was a student at IUG in 1980 and became a staff member in

1985 and later a Secretary General of the Board of Trustees shed light on the difficulties which resulted from the political conflict among students in the 1980s. He said that:

> *"We suffered a lot from the conflict among us as students which turned sometimes to violent actions. But both parties with the help of the leadership of IUG and the community leaders tried to contain these accidents and we were back at work as soon as possible"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013).

The conflict between students has occasionally, in times of clashes, affected the community. During these times, part of the community who has the same Islamic political affiliation strongly supported IUG, while those who have different political affiliation such as secular or leftist were less supportive towards IUG.

Document 11 revealed that the leadership tried to solve the violent incidents between supporters of Fatah and Hamas which resulted from electing a new employees' union in 1983. Document 12 clarified how the leadership succeeded in bringing the two rival parties together and containing the tension in order to keep the educational process going after being disrupted for few days.

In addition, document 39 revealed the intervention of the Chairman of PLO, Yasser Arafat, to solve the problem between the rivals of the Islamic Trend and Fatah by accepting the results of the elections for the employees union and approving the appointments IUG asked for. The relationship between Fatah and Hamas played a paradoxical role in the social cohesion. On the one hand, with regard to challenging the occupation, particularly after the establishment of IUG in 1978 until the creation of the Palestinian authority in1993, the two parties were always trying to overcome their political disagreements in order to confront the occupation with some kind of unity and cohesion. From 1993 to 2005 the two parties in IUG experienced a period of calm. On the other hand, violent clashes took place in an exercise of power and control after Hamas won the majority in the free elections of 2006.

The researcher's observation confirmed that IUG suffered from this division. The social cohesion was strongly affected by this violence. In these incidents of 2007, IUG paid a high price. Some main buildings were partially burned by some security forces. Since then, the PNA stopped the financial support of the ministry of HE which was provided to IUG as well as other universities. The exclusion of IUG from financial support was a collective punishment to IUG. The political conflict between Fatah and Hamas was the main reason behind this dilemma, and IUG pay a price.

Despite the bad effects of the conflict on the social cohesion, it was striking that both sides were able to get their unity back. This happened many times, particularly in times of besieging the university or when students were captured or arrested during demonstrations, and when IUG was bombed in recent wars. The current Chancellor of IUG confirmed that by saying:

> *"After the destruction of 72 laboratories during December 2008 war, some equipment was saved from under the rubble, but the main equipment was repurchased. Laboratories of Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa universities were borrowed, in addition to the cooperation with the university College for Applied Science (UCAS)"* (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014).

The Palestinian community and its institutions demonstrated the ability to forget their domestic problems and competition and turned to co-operation and unity when confronting the occupation. This is because they believe that the main conflict and struggle should be with the occupation not against each other. The researcher observed that soon after the bombing of IUG, thousands of the people came to see the damage and to give solidarity with the university. The social cohesion with the university, whether among the population or HEIs, was high.

5.2.4 Spirit of Affiliation and Commitment

Affiliation and the commitment of employees is one of the important factors which help any organisation to perform well. The importance of commitment and the spirit of affiliation increases in turbulent and crisis times. Many scholars (Punamäki, 1996;

Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, *et al*., 2008) believe that commitment is a protective factor that increases the ability to cope effectively in highly stressful situations, and is regarded as a contributor to resilience (Hollnagel, 2007; Seery, 2011). This is because, in such hazardous conditions, the leadership needs the commitment of followers to take forceful yet rational actions, and sometimes change the goals and direction in order to deal properly with the new challenging events.

The individual interviews showed that there was a general agreement about the existence of the commitment and affiliation among the majority of the staff. For instance, Professor Jawad Wady said that:

> *"The affiliation of the leadership and staff was the critical factor of what the university has reached"* (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

This view was supported by a member of the top management who said:

> *"Honestly, under these circumstances, the leadership and employees were like one body. Also, the leadership along with highly trusted people is respected and well appreciated even in times of financial crises, and that was the main reason behind its success. One colleague have told me that they have been teaching for more than 25 hours per week while the average load was 12-15 hours, which means more than double the work; this example happens repeatedly. This means that in times of crisis, both the leadership and employees have to sacrifice"* (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

This commitment and partnership between the leadership and employees empowered the members and created a sense of affiliation among the staff. There is no doubt that the existence of the occupation and their oppressive measures against IUG were a motivator to raise the commitment and affiliation of the staff and to stimulate them to challenge the occupation and stand against the odds.

One female respondent from the administration staff stressed that:

> *"IUG leadership along with its employees was able to adapt with the surrounding circumstances. Also, they were able to carry on with the educational process according to the instructions of the leadership. The main reason behind the success in dealing with the circumstances is the commitment and devotion of the staff"* (Abu Shaaban, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

A similar example also provided by one of the pioneer employees at IUG who expressed that:

> *"We loved our university, we were ready to sacrifice and work under dangerous conditions. Sometimes we worked extra time with no compensation and we covered each other in these tough conditions. Simply, we were ready to work under various and challenging conditions"* (AL-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

Such commitment, sacrifice, affiliation and adaptation are important indicators which reflect the extent of resilience of IUG staff. Hoogervorst, De Cremer, van Dijke, and Mayer (2012) believe that sacrifice is correlated with belongingness of leaders or individuals. Having a spirit of affiliation created a sense of purpose and sacrifice. One female respondent revealed that:

> *"Of course there is a feeling of affiliation among the staff; they feel that they are the sons and daughters of the university and part of it"* (Al-lolo, individual interview, Dec. 2014).

The strong belonging, commitment and partnership was felt and confirmed even by those who have stopped working at IUG. One of the academics who left to work in Al-Azhar University in 1991 stated that:

> *"For us, there was a motivation to work in this university, and there was love, belonging, and loyalty to the university and the country, so the issue of salaries didn`t stand as a barrier to stop work at the university"* (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

The ability to work hard with no compensation and sacrifice was a good marker of affiliation and commitment which are important factors that helped the leadership to achieve the objectives of the university. This was also emphasised through the group discussion. Members of the focus group concluded that:

> *"Even nowadays, this can be shown deliberately, i.e. crises related to electricity, politics, strikes, or gas cannot take its way to stop the university. Actually, the secret is that; we have devoted committed employees supporting and helping this place"* (Focus group1, Jan. 2014).

Affiliation at IUG played an important role in strengthening the relationships and cooperation with those with the same ideology. However, it created tension among those with different political affiliations.

In summary, most of the respondents of individual and group interviews believed that the level of affiliation and commitment among the staff was high especially in confronting the Israeli disruptions. This was salient in the first and the second stages as well as in different events in the fourth stage, such as the bombing of the university in 2009, and in the war of 2012.

In times of political conflict, also, the affiliation was relatively high, but played a dual role for the sake of IUG on the one hand, and for the sake of political interests of Fatah and Hamas on the other hand. Importantly, in times of stability throughout the third and the fourth stage, the personal interests were raised and the demands of employees in terms of salaries and promotions played a negative role at the expense of the commitment of some members of the staff.

5.2.5 Retention of Employees

Employee retention in the institution is an important factor that keeps the institution stable, particularly those employees with special capacities. Most organisations are competing to hire and retain the most qualified employees (Mattox and Jinkerson, 2005). The retention of IUG employees was at stake during different times. The staff

was working in conditions of stress, risk and war. Many of them were exposed to arrest, humiliation measures, loss of their accommodation and deportation.

The researcher's own observation showed that the retention of the staff was very high in the first two stages of IUG till the creation of AL-Azhar university in 1991. This was the main reason behind a large number of the staff leaving to join the new university. One of those who left IUG later became the Chancellor of AL-Azhar University. He said that:

> *"The number of faculty members who have doctorate and masters' degrees in IUG before the establishment of Al- Azhar University was about 150; about 60 of them joined Al-Azhar university in 1992-1993 and the remaining members were the main core of IUG. Later on, they established the faculty of Engineering alongside many other colleges"* (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).

IUG lost about 40% of their qualified staff at this time. Political conflict played a dual role. It was the main reason to leave for part of the staff as well as the main reason to stay for the other part. This is in addition to the financial issue of salaries which played a role in the decision to leave. PLO stopped the support to IUG and stopped salaries for those who did not join the new university.

The general view of most of the remaining members of the faculties at IUG was similar to the faculty of Education which provided a strong example presented by a key member of the faculty who has worked as a staff member since 1980:

> *"In the Faculty of Education there were 17 teachers; seven went to pursue their HE, and four left to AL-Azhar University. Only six members remained. We managed to sort things out ourselves, and we employed some of our graduates in order to fill the gap."* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

In analysing the reasons for this dilemma, the Dean of the faculty of Commerce believed that:

> *"The goal behind withdrawing teachers from IUG and moving them to the new university was to cripple the educational process, but thanks to the right decision taken in the right time, this deficit was covered soon enough although the quality was affected"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

While some respondents argued that the remaining staff were able to fill the gap and, thus, students were not affected by this dilemma, other members argued that the quality of education was affected. This is because of the qualified staff leaving, 24 were PhD holders and 38 were Master holders and about 18 from the administration staff within a very short period of time. This disrupted the education process for a while and left negative effects on the quality of the teaching process. Hiring new graduates did not give the same quality of teaching. Nevertheless it was an attempt to keep the educational process moving despite obstacles.

The discussion in the group interviews asserted that such a big number leaving at once created an academic vacuum and it took time to fill the gap.

> *"Shifting many of the qualified staff to Al-Azhar was very difficult and challenging because it was combined with threats and fund restriction on salaries"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

In these hard times, the strategy of the leadership was to keep moving forward with the educational process and keep the staff motivated. Face-saving was important to IUG leadership and the remaining staff in order to demonstrate the ability to survive despite these crises. It was a real challenge to the leadership to demonstrate high levels of control and motivation of followers and to involve them in the process. It was strongly acknowledged that, apart from this dilemma of the creation of AL-Azhar University, there was a high level of retention of employees. They were ready to struggle and sacrifice as they saw IUG as a national project.

The current Chancellor stated that:

> *"Personally, I was never offered another job nor did I ever look for or think about another job opportunity. Even if I was offered another job,*

I would not accept as this my prior decision" (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014).

With regard to the main reasons behind the retention of employees at IUG, a key respondent said that:

I believe that the main reason behind staff retention is their affiliation and lack of job opportunities outside the university. However, many of the staff members wanted to sticks around because they loved the university, its ideologies, and its comfortable working environment" (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

One respondent summarised different reasons behind the retention of IUG staff:

"From my point of view, there are three main factors behind employees' retention in IUG:

1- *The position and weight of IUG as it's the first and oldest university in the Gaza Strip.*
2- *The working environment in IUG is comfortable financially, psychologically, and in many other aspects regardless of all the obstacles it faces.*
3- *The affiliation of the employees and their belonging to the university ideology"* (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

In summary, apart from the dilemma of 1991, the previous discussion indicated that the retention of IUG staff was relatively high. The ideology of IUG played an important role in the retention of employees. These results are aligned with the approaches of Chatman (1991) and Andrews, Witt, Kacmar (2003) that sharing the same thoughts and beliefs increase the rate of retention of employees. Most of the staff saw IUG as a national project that is worth challenging the occupation and sacrificing for.

5.2.6 Training and Development Programmes

Training and development programmes are important indicators of the progress of institutions. Literature provides a view that experienced and well-trained employees have the ability to deal resiliently with shocks and unexpected events (Furniss, *et al*., 2011). As the university was still emerging in 1978 and 1980s, it lacked research and

development programmes. This was due to the lack of resources (human, material, and funding) which were associated with the level of distress experienced by Palestinians (Hobfoll, Mancini, Canetti, and Bonanno, 2011). The main goal of IUG at that time was to keep operating despite all the hard conditions it went through. Nevertheless, after the PNA arrived in Gaza in 1993, many research programmes were initiated and encouraged by the leadership, giving the chance to large numbers of staff members to participate in conferences and conduct research around the world. This was confirmed by the focus group:

> *"There weren't sufficient training programmes till 1995, then it started gradually to target different levels of employees with diversity of programmes"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

In the first and the second stage of the development of IUG, some interviews in addition to the observations of the researcher clarified that the priority was not on training programmes, rather, it was keeping the functioning of IUG and providing the main service of teaching students and standing against the Israeli odds.

> *"There weren't adequate training programmes in the first years, just very few programmes such as using the pc and management programmes and theses programmes were offered to specific employees"* (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

After the consolidation stage, the leadership launched various training and development programmes. Individual interviews provided a view that many training programmes were held to raise the capacity of the staff members. For instance, at the academic level, one respondent from the faculty of Education explained that:

> *"The university gave a lot of motivation to its workers regarding this matter. The workers are generally attracted to these training programmes as they enhance their abilities and scientific background"* (Al-Rantisi, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

In addition, the Community Service and Continuing Education Deanship (SCED) has provided staff, students and the community as a whole with a diversity of training and

diploma courses in order to raise their capacity and to contribute to the development of the society.

The focus group interviews stressed that there were a lot of training programmes in the consolidation and the fourth stage of IUG history. They claimed that these programmes lacked understanding of the priorities of the staff.

> *"We noted in late 1990s and early 2000s that there was training programmes, but not attracted a lot of the staff"* (Focus group 1, Jan.2014).

The researcher observed that the quality and diversity of training programmes improved gradually to meet the needs of the staff members.

5.2.7 Recruitment of Employees

Recruitment standards based on qualification and competitiveness are indicators of good quality of institutions and contribute in building the society (Florida, 2002; Betts and Lee, 2005). IUG lacked qualified staff especially in the first two stages until 1993. To overcome this shortage, the leadership tried to recruit qualified staff from the Gaza Strip, West Bank and from neighboring countries.

Documentary evidence shed light on the attempts of the leadership to recruit qualified staff from abroad as Gaza lacked qualified staff. Therefore, a series of letters sent to the occupation during the 1980s (documents, 13, 19, 20, 28, 29, 44 and 46) showed the engagement and the attempts of the leadership to grant the acceptance of the occupation to recruit staff from the West Bank and from abroad.

The reflections and the observation of the researcher clarified that political loyalty played an important role in hiring candidates. It reflected most clearly in the recruitment process as every party (Fatah and Hamas supporters) tried, particularly at the inception stage, to give more weight to their supporters and recruit them in an attempt to control the university. This was, sometimes, at the expense of recruitment standards. The recruitment standard did not work very well particularly when hiring administrators and support staff. In the consolidation stage (1993 onward) IUG

recruited many qualified academic staff based, to a considerable extent, on qualification and competitiveness. Even more, after 2002, the recruitment process became more coherent and based on quality standards.

The individual interviews revealed that some respondents believed that there were mistakes and irregularities in the recruitment process. Others argued that it was crucial to recruit those who shared IUG vision, mission and Islamic culture.
One respondent illustrated this:

> *"The process of choosing the staff in the university is based on professionalism and the role of every individual who believes in the philosophy and message of the university and is willing to work on the success of its vision in order to achieve the university's goals"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

Sometimes the recruitment process gave more weight to political affiliation at the expense of certificates. Members of the focus group gave support to this view confirming that:

> *"Recruitment standards were not implemented adequately at IUG in the first years of its inception because the main goal was to hire those who shared IUG it message and culture"* (focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

This was one of the points the university was criticised for. However, the same factor might be the reason behind the strong feeling of affiliation, belonging and sacrifice for the sake of the university, as everyone shares the same goals and culture of the university.

In summary in the first two stages the recruitment process gave more weight to political affiliation and loyalty. But in the third and the fourth stages more weight was given to qualification, quality and transparency.

Chapter Six

6. Diversity of Strategies, Leadership Styles and Resilience at IUG

This chapter links the results with the literature review and answers the main question of the study about the role of the leadership in fostering resilience at IUG. Therefore, the chapter starts with analysing the strategies used by the leadership in dealing with different challenges. Then, the chapter classifies the characteristics and the styles of IUG leadership utilised in the four stages of IUG. Next, the chapter provides evidence about resilience at IUG. It unpacks the cognitive, behavioural and contextual markers of resilience. Finally, the chapter analyses the role of culture and ideology and its contribution in to the survival of IUG.

6.1 Strategies Used by the Leadership

In the previous chapter, the researcher analysed the factors used by the leadership in responding to the various difficulties IUG experienced. This section concentrates on the main strategies IUG followed through the four stages by utilising these factors.

Suikki, Tromtedt, and Haapasalo, (2006) and Yukl, (2008) assert that if organisations seek to survive and prosper in unstable contexts, they need adaptable leadership that can understand the obstacles which affect the organisation and deal appropriately with them. Shepherd, *et al*. (2000) believe that incompetent leadership is a crucial factor that might lead to failure of an organisation.

The results of this study show that the leadership succeeded in keeping the university surviving and the educational process moving forward despite hurdles. The individual interviews provided evidence that the leadership deployed different strategies throughout the four stages: challenge and defying, social cohesion, bypassing and absorbing, moving forward, and the exercise of power.

The Chairman of the Board of Trustees confirmed that:

> *"IUG working according to a clear vision; in those hard times, our main goal was to keep the educational process going whatever the price will be. We challenged all the internal and external disruptions and obstacles"* (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014,).

There was a widely held view among respondents that the survival of IUG was a consistent goal in the face of extreme adverse circumstances. For example, a female respondent who graduated from IUG in 1987 and started working at IUG in 1992 as administrator in the office of the Dean of Student Affairs was convinced that:

> *"Insisting on going on was the path of the university operations. This strategy was the main reason of its permanency, which helped IUG achieve its goals"* (Najem, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The main goal of IUG leadership was for the university to survive especially in the first and the second stages of its inception. to achieve this goal, the educational process needed to continue, regardless of the dangers and the price. Therefore, they engage, bypass and challenge the occupation orders in order to survive.

Tushman and Romanelli, (1985) believe that it is easier to survive and grow when the organisation's operations are relatively stable for a considerable period of time rather than constantly changing and turbulent . But although the environment has been turbulent, the first and the main goal for IUG was to survive and to carry on. Davies (2004) believes that adaptation is crucial to the survival of an organisation, and considered as a sign of organisational success (Beer, Voelpel, Leibold, and Tekie, 2005). Organisations seeking to survive need to attract, motivate and retain employees (Fitz-enz, 2010), and orient and adapt their behaviour to their particular environment (Suikki, *et al*., 2006). The leadership was able to adapt and cope with different kinds

of challenges. They was able to motivate followers and orient them toward serving IUG and sacrifice for this national project.

Another administrator was convinced that social cohesion was also a key strategy:

> *"The leadership has a clear vision that the university seeks to expand its relations with the society in order to provide the services they need"* (Al-Jabier, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

Serving the society and consolidating the social cohesion was a clear strategy that appeared many times. The view was acknowledged by many respondents that the goal of IUG leadership was moving beyond survival to thriving where possible. Professor AL-Ajez said:

> *"While we suffered lack of resources and staff, we opened different Faculties and created new departments. We aimed to build our university and serve our community"* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

The second goal was looking beyond survival to growth (Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011). Opening new faculties and departments in spite of all obstacles was part of the growth strategy of the leadership. Improving the qualifications of the staff was another indicator of growth. Improving the university environment by constructing permanent buildings with the required facilities and equipment also was important signs of thriving.

One of the strategies used by the leadership was the exercise of power between the occupation and the IUG, through alternately engaging, absorbing the anger of and bypassing the occupation. Although the literature does not give adequate attention to the exercise of power particularly in HEIs in turbulent times, it sheds some light on the exercise of power between different groups within an organisation and in business relationships. Rindt and Mouzas (2015) believe that the stronger party is likely to be able to dominate and exercise power and therefore, determine the process and its outcomes. At IUG the party which seemed the weakest: IUG leadership, nevertheless managed to prevail.

The exercise of power derived from coercive sources increases conflict and reduces trust and satisfaction (Leonidou, Talias, and Leonidou, 2008). Internally, the political division and the attempts to dominate IUG, in the 1980s by Fatah and Hamas increased the conflict and created an environment of less confidence and trust and therefore led to some violent clashes. Externally, the coercive military orders of the occupation increased the conflict and raised the national sense of struggle and sacrifice.

The leadership realised since the early stages of IUG that, on the one hand, the occupation sometimes had a lot of power to implement and impose their military measures: expelling the Chancellors of the university; imposing severe restrictions on movement and transfer of money; and shutting down the university. This is because the occupation authorities could impose their will and control over these issues more easily. At other times, their power was curtailed: they were not able to prevent the erection of buildings; the opening of new faculties and departments; and the increasing the number of registered students. This is because the control of the occupation upon these issues was relatively limited and put the occupation in a direct confrontation with thousands of students, staff and the community both in Palestine and internationally.

The findings confirmed that IUG leadership had at least four modes of dealing with the occupation: engaging, absorbing their anger, bypassing and defying. They engaged them; writing many letters to request permission to take in additional students, permission to construct buildings instead of tents, requests for recognition, requests for the release of restrictions on fund raising and transfers of money and requests for the release of restrictions of mobility of movements. They attempted to absorb the anger of the occupation, for example, by closing the university on national holidays to stop the Israeli forces from attacking demonstrating students. Also, this happened when freezing the planned opening of the faculty of Nursing. They defied the occupation authorities: for example, they constructed buildings when permission had been denied and they increased the number of registered students when the occupation attempted to limit the numbers of enrolled students. They bypassed the

occupation orders; for example, by seeking recognition elsewhere, and by opening job opportunities for graduates in different countries around the world.

This diversity of strategies confirmed that IUG leadership had a portfolio of alternatives with the ability to adapt and act in accordance with the situation. Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) argue that in order to cope with challenges and to adapt to a turbulent environment, resilient organisational strategy enables organisations to absorb uncertainty, develop situation-specific responses to threats, and ultimately engage in transformational activities so that they can capitalise on disruptive surprises that potentially threaten their survival. This is what happened at IUG

There were some criticisms that a formal and written strategy was not in existence for more than 15 years. In this regard, there were a number of respondents who thought that:

> *"Since the establishment of IUG and until the year1993, there were no clear written strategic plan, but there was certainly some procedural plans and continuous proceeding that follows up with the events through the specialized parties, in addition to the engineering plan that existed for more than 20 years, showing what the university facilities was aimed to be like"* (Abo AL-Roos, individual interviews, Feb. 2014).

The focus groups supported the sentiments of the individual interviews that the leadership deployed different strategies to overcome the challenges IUG faced.

> *"The leadership succeeded to deal properly with different internal and external challenges. If we want to evaluate the role of the leadership, we can say that they kept IUG survived and thrived for more than three decades. May be there was some deficiencies and ability to do better in some disciplines"* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).

A different point of view was presented by members of the focus group 1:

> *"In the stage of reinforcement, IUG started to establish its facilities based on correct scientific foundations, depending on a complete*

engineering plan that shows how the university facilities will look like in the next 20 years. This vision was written, clear, and executed to prepare for developmental programmes that enhance the university along with its facilities and staff. The staff was established and improved through preparation and training, new programmes emerged, and the university facilities were enhanced" (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

Through the deep discussion with the focus groups and interviewees it is clear that the leadership was proceeding with a clear work plan since 1993 (the consolidation stage) to thrive where possible. However, the members of the focus group argued about what could be done better to achieve more goals and objectives.

In recent years, particularly in 2005, IUG started to set up a formal written strategic plan for the next five years. Professor AL-Faraa, who acted as the Dean of Planning and Development Affairs and then as the Dean of the faculty of Commerce, revealed that:

"IUG was the first university in Palestine to set a strategic plan in 2005 for it has some qualitative cadres. This strategic plan includes deep consideration and analysis of the abilities and future vision of the university in the coming years" (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

One respondent from the management department in the Faculty of Commerce gave more details and explanation of IUG strategies in recent years arguing that:

"We have many strategies including the strategy of openness, the strategy of quality and the application of quality theories in 2002, in addition to the strategy of globalizing the university to offer its services to many foreigners. There is also a written and clear strategy set to clarify the position of the institution from 2005 to 2010 which includes evident working and execution paths and documents the working process and its proofs." (Al-Dajani, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

This flexibility and openness of implementing these different strategies enhanced the ability of leadership to achieve the objectives of the university.

6.2 The Characteristics and Styles of IUG Leadership

The literature describes transformational leadership as a style of adaptable leadership characterised by its adaptability to challenges and capacity to change direction, combined with the ability to inspire and motivate individuals (Burns, 1978; Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012)..

The four types of transformational behaviours, presented in Table 6 (page 80) are: idealised influence; intellectual simulation; individual consideration and inspirational motivation (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yukl, 2010; Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012). According to Yukl (2010:275) with transformational leadership "the followers feel trust, admiration, loyalty, and respect toward the leader, and they are motivated to do more than they were originally expected to do" .The study confirmed the adoption of this style in response to many different events over the four stages of IUG's history.

For example, since the early years and subsequently, they convinced followers that IUG is a national project for educating the new generation and opposing the occupation, which requires from the leadership and the staff a willingness to sacrifice and endure hardship. In addition, the leadership was able to share knowledge with staff and inform them about the challenges and obstacles the university faced.

The leadership shared knowledge and information with them. Also, training programmes, conferences, workshops and overseas travel have contributed to the intellectual development as well as the motivation of the staff.

In terms of idealised influence, the previous analysis of interviews, documents and observation revealed that the leadership had idealised influence upon followers. They were, generally, the first line in confronting the occupation; some of them spent years in prison or were deported (e.g. previous Chancellors, Saqer and Siyam) or were assassinated. They worked in conditions of stress, risks and wars. They sacrificed delaying their salaries many times.

In relation to inspirational motivation, the leadership was able to gain followers' trust and commitment. They motivated followers by rewarding them for achievements with financial rewards, free training programmes and appreciation letters.

With regard to individual consideration, the leadership gave great consideration to individuals' needs. As was explained in the analysis, the leadership was keen to raise followers' skills, strengthen the relationship with them and provide them with the required facilities.

In addition, through the four stages, the case of IUG confirmed the three characteristics of transformational leadership presented by Bass and Avolio (1990) which are: importance of outcomes; transcending self-interest; and activating higher-order needs. Therefore, it is clear that IUG leadership possesses characteristics which fit with transformational style.

In spite of this, it was striking that although the transformational style strongly existed and was implemented, there were additional characteristics of leadership behaviour in dealing with some events. Some of these characteristics are: power; face saving and rightness of decisions (Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012). These characteristics confirmed the style of heroic leadership which applied in dealing with certain events, particularly in opposing the occupation measures.

Other important characteristics displayed by the leadership included empowerment of followers, risk taking, participation and development of members. These characteristics belong in the category of post-heroic style of leadership which was

strongly used by IUG leadership on many occasions particularly in the consolidation stage and beyond.

These characteristics are indicators of the diversity of the styles IUG deployed in dealing with different events. Sometimes IUG leadership demonstrated a high degree of control and authority in dealing with some events. But, most often, they involved followers in the decision-making process which, it turn, increased their commitment (Zopiatis, Constanti and Theocharous, 2014). The situation on the ground and the nature of the challenges IUG faced dictated the pattern of behaviours in doing sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing. For example, the leadership behaved in a consultative manner on many different occasions such as when opening new faculties and departments and when opening a new branch in the South in times of siege which isolated the south of the Gaza Strip from the North. Authoritarian style of leadership was rarely used, apart from some specific occasions through the history of IUG. At these occasions, the leadership was not able to communicate and meet with followers particularly when they decided to challenge the occupation such as when constructing temporary buildings in 1983-1984, and when working underground during the first *intifada* in 1987. In responding to some specific events, Claeys and Cauberghe (2012) argue that the leadership has to respond very quickly instead of just informing stakeholders of what happened.

In summary, IUG leadership displayed different styles of leadership beside the transformational style such as heroic and post-heroic styles depending on the given situation. Due to security reasons and in order to protect followers, on some occasions they deployed an authoritarian style of leadership. By using this style, the leadership demonstrated a high degree of control and took decisions alone without consultation with others. These styles were used and manifested themselves at the four different stages of the history of IUG. The different challenges and shocks IUG experienced whether they were predicted or unpredicted, required different patterns of characteristics and responses.

The first stage of inception, 1978-1987, was characterised by transformational, transactional and heroic styles of leadership in order to confront the internal and

external challenges and difficulties. Usually, this implies consultation with followers, influencing them to gain their support and leading them to achieve the desired goals. Sometimes, the leadership displayed heroic styles to take quick and forceful actions to deal with some challenges.

In the second stage of closing IUG for four years, 1987-1992, authoritarian and heroic styles were used occasionally, which implies forceful and secret actions in order to teach students underground in risky conditions.

The third stage of consolidation, 1993-2000, was characterised mainly by transformational and post-heroic styles as it required constructing new buildings, opening new faculties and departments in addition to launching a communication campaign after years of closure and lack of resources. The fourth stage of closure, political division and wars, 2000-2012, was a stage of both consolidation and hazardous conditions. It was characterised by applying transformational, transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles. Closure and siege requires deploying both heroic and transformational style to take forceful actions, and meanwhile to gain the support of followers in order to perform at full capacity. The political division required transformational and heroic style to keep IUG functioning and away from being involved in this conflict. The two wars in 2008 and 2012 required heroic and post-heroic leaders, along with transformational style to keep IUG moving forward with the educational process.

6.3 Resilience at IUG

This study adopted Hollnagel's (2007, 2007, 2009) definition of resilience. Hollnagel defined resilience as the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain the operations required under both expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel, 2007, 2009, Hollnagel, *et al*., 2006, 2011). The study also adopted the definition of Lengnick-Hall, Beck, and Lengnick-Hall (2011:243) who believe that in adverse circumstances "only resilient, agile and relentlessly dynamic organisations will thrive in these turbulent, surprising, continuously evolving environments".

Resilience at leadership and individual level provides a useful starting place for defining resilient organisations, since actions and interactions among individual organisational members underpin an organisation's collective capacity for resilience (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999). Organisational leaders, as decision makers, are the motivators and facilitators for executing and implementing resilience capacities.

The documents, individual and group interviews, and the observations which were discussed and analysed in the previous chapters gave strong indicators of resilience at IUG. While some respondents, particularly from the top management, highlighted directly the concept of resilience in some answers, the majority of respondents highlighted indirectly the extent of resilience by providing examples of resilient behaviour at different levels within IUG in dealing with different events and hardships.

One female respondent from the administration staff stressed that:

> *"IUG leadership along with its employees was able to adapt with the surrounding circumstances and carry on with the educational process. The main reason behind the success in dealing with the circumstances is the commitment and devotion of the staff"* (Abu Shaaban, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce believed that:

> *"If IUG hasn't been resilient or dealt with resilience in many aspects, it wouldn't have succeeded till now"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

As an example of an indirect highlight:

> *"The leadership was characterized with flexibility and wisdom in facing big problems and that what kept IUG stand on feet"* (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013).

Flexibility and rationality (Masten and Reed, 2005; Walsh, 2012) are important markers of resilience. The diversity of responses of the leadership to the occupation measures at different times is a good marker of flexibility, which is one of the cornerstones of resilience (Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011; Steen and Aven, 2011). The evidence introduced by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees added challenging, adaptating, and finding solutions as additional factors:

> *"Our strategy of keeping IUG functioning under all circumstances was a great motivator to find alternatives and solutions to the obstacles we faced. We faced difficulties by challenging it, yes challenges were difficult* and *we suffered a lot, but we were able to adapt with them"* (AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014).

Providing other important markers of resilience, the previous Chancellor of IUG revealed that:

> *"We usually used to inform and consult with many of the staff members about our difficulties, particularly the big issues which, in*

turn helped us to take forceful and proper actions" (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Sharing knowledge with the staff raising their understanding of the reality of the challenges was an important step in building trust and sharing accountability, and thus gaining their commitment which is one important marker of resilience (Costella, *et al*., 2009).

Supporting this view, a similar example was also provided by an expert academic in the field of HRM who is working at the faculty of Commerce. He noted that:

"The leadership was keen to consult with staff members, and sometime they established crises management teams in order to solve big dilemmas" (Abo AL-Roos, individual interviews, Feb. 2014).

Sharing knowledge and accountability with the staff was an effective policy in diagnosing problems and finding suitable alternatives to solve them. Sharing accountability at any institution increases control of leadership (Goddard and Powel, 1994) particularly in turbulent times. Forming crisis management teams was crucial for IUG to respond properly and in a timely manner. Also, the commitment of the staff and the adaptation to the instructions and sharing accountability, besides following orders, played an important role in dealing with hardships IUG faced in a resilient and timely manner.

The literature describes different factors of resilience identified by key scholars in the field (Hollnagel, 2007; Ungar, *et al*., 2007; Costella, *et al*., 2009; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011; Dinh, *et al*., 2012). These factors have been summarised into Tables 10, 11 and 12 describing cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors with brief examples.

6.3.1 Cognitive Factors

Table 10: Cognitive Factors of Resilience at IUG

No.	Factors	Examples of Practical indicators at IUG
1.	**Flexibility**	- Finding alternatives to manage events (e.g. non- recognition, buildings). - Different forms of communication with the occupation authorities - Shutting down IUG to prevent violent political clashes between students. - Freezing the establishment of the faculty of Nursing. - Partnership with employees.
2.	**Open mindedness**	- Meeting and communicating with Israeli Defence Minister and other military authorities. - Consultation and participation of the staff in the decision making process. - Conducting a campaign of communication with other universities, individuals and countries
3.	**Expertise and learning.**	- Good experience of communicating and negotiation with the occupation authorities. - Absorbing the anger and tough reactions of the military troops and preventing them from storming the university and arresting students or staff members. - Benefitting from the experience of working underground in the second uprising and teaching at homes, clubs and Mosques.

		- Resuming the study programme in record time after the bombing in the war of December 2008. - Learning and experience with working under stress, crises and risk conditions.
4.	**Opportunism**	- Exploiting opportunities even under threat by opening new faculties and departments. - Raising the level of demands from the occupation to achieve the targets and goals (buildings, finance and qualified staff). - Using the troubles of the occupation to develop staff loyalty and community support
5.	**Creativity**	- Teaching underground at homes, clubs and Mosques. - Opening a branch for IUG in the isolated areas in 2005. - Relocation of teachers to teach students in the isolated areas. - Insistence to thrive despite hardships and threats (e.g opening new faculties and departments) - Providing the staff and students with scholarships for studying abroad. - Creating diversity of qualified staff from different cultures and continents.
6.	**Partnership**	- Full cooperation and partnership between the Board of Trustees and the University Council.

		- Consolidate the feeling of partnership and team spirit. - Involvement of community leaders in IUG's difficulties and challenges. - Partnership and twinning agreements with different universities abroad.
7.	**Relationship**	- Strong relationship between the leadership and staff (individual consideration). - Strong relationship among the staff members. - Working in a spirit of family and team-work. - Good network of relationships, local and internationally with universities, countries and individuals, creating opportunities for fund raising for buildings, equipment and scholarship.

Some of these seven cognitive factors are derived from the literature: flexibility and learning (Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, *et al*., 2009; Dinh, *et al*., 2012); relationship (Ungar, *et al*., 2007); opportunism (Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011); open mindedness (Werner and Smith, 2001; Tukl, 2008,2010). Other factors such as partnership and creativity were derived from the case of IUG. All these factors contribute to the creation of resilience. They indicate a strong sense of purpose, core values, a genuine vision, and a deliberate use of language.

6.3.2 Behavioural Factors

Table 11: Behavioural Factors of Resilience at IUG

No.	Factors	Examples of Practical indicators at IUG

1.	**Commitment**	- Working under risk and war conditions,teaching at homes and clubs. - Patience and sacrifice of salaries and working extra time. - Exposure to humiliation, arrests and deportation. - Waiting long hours at check points - Relocating their places to teach students. - Retention of staff
2.	**Awareness**	- Understanding the situation and challenges. - Expecting some of the events such as actions and reactions of the occupation. - Observing the development of events and minimizing their impacts. - Storing and saving data in safe places.
3.	**Acting quickly**	- Opening new faculties and departments. - Constructing new temporary buildings, teaching in tents. - Teaching underground.

		- Sending staff members and graduates abroad to study and work. - Keep functioning despite siege and closures. - Reopening IUG only one week after the bombing in 2009.
4.	**Robust responses**	- Rejecting occupations orders such as preventing construction of buildings, limitations on the number of registered students and requests for the records of IUG leadership meetings. - Obtaining recognition of IUG from international bodies. - Diversity of responses in dealing with different events.
5.	**Sharing culture**	- Sharing Islamic culture at the levels of staff and leadership and the organisations. - Strong affiliation, performance, sacrifice, and cooperation. - Faith, obedience and following orders.
6.	**Sharing knowledge**	- Meeting with staff members. - Workshops, leaflets, emails, conferences…etc.) to inform them about the difficulties and events and how to deal with them.
7.	**Personal networks**	- Good and open communication between leadership and the staff.

		- Social relationship.
8.	**Problem solving**	- Care to find appropriate solutions and diversity options and creating special crisis management team. - Solving the non- recognition dilemma. - Solving the lack of qualified staff. - Solving the lack of facilities and building. - Teaching underground. - Opposing the military orders and measures. - Studying in isolated areas. - Continuing the educational process soon after the destruction of the main buildings. - Cooperation with local and international universities. - Operating despite threats (opening faculties and departments).
9.	**Faith, sacrifice and struggle**	- Belief in destiny and obedience "*Altaaea*" of leaders - Working under risk and stress conditions - Working additional hours without compensation

		- Sacrifice with salary for months - Participation in opposing the occupation - Coping with humiliation measures - Sharing responsibility
10.	**Access to resources**	- Facilities of communication and networks. - Facilities to access to data and archives. - Facilities to access the library. - Facilities to procurements of equipment and tools. - Non-bureaucratic procedures of purchases and payments in times of crises.

Some of these ten factors are derived from the literature: commitment and awareness (Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, *et al*., 2009); acting quickly and problem solving (Werner and Smith, 2001); sharing knowledge (Collins and Smith, 2006); personal networks and access to resources (Ungar, *et al*., 2007). Other factors such as sharing culture, robust responses and faith, sacrifice and obedience are derived from the case of IUG. All these factors are strongly related to the mode of operations and actions, availability of resources and enabling conditions.

6.3.3 Contextual Factors

Table 12: Contextual Factors:

No.	Factors	Examples of Practical indicators at IUG
1.	**Social cohesion**	- Clarified in details in section 5.2.3 and 1.7.4
2.	**Developing interpersonal connections**	- Consultation and listening to staff, face to face meetings - Workshops. - Visits , team work spirit - Good relations among leadership, staff and between staff and leadership. - Social communication. - Developing personal skills of staff through training programmes.
3.	**Organisational orientation**	- Expecting events, changing direction and priorities

		- Finding alternatives. - Raising commitment and affiliation and sense of sacrifice and following orders. - Keeping the educational process going under adverse circumstances. - Opposing the occupation and serving the community and greater public good.
4.	**Sharing accountability**	- Sense of belonging and affiliation. - Success of IUG is a success for individuals. - The confidence that IUG is a national project. - Consultation and participation in decision making. - Sharing knowledge and information. - Coping with difficulties. - Working extra hours without compensation - Acceptance of working under risky and stressful conditions.

5.	**Building trust**	- Good personal relationship, individual consideration. - Participation in decision making. - Sharing knowledge and dialogue - Meeting and communications, visits, and social relation. - Staff facilities. - Rewards system. - Idealised influence.
6.	**Facilitative structure**	- Facilitative environment (building, offices and equipment) - Communication networks. - Entertainment facilities - Technology tools. - Flexible system of teaching and examinations in time of crisis

		- Scholarships and training programmes.

Some of these six contextual factors which support resilience are derived from the literature: developing personal identity and facilitative structure (Angar, *et al*., 2007); building trust and sharing accountability (Collins and Smith, 2006); organisational orientation (Freeman, *et al*., 2004; Suikki, *et al*., 2006). Social cohesion is derived from the case of IUG. These six factors are strongly related to the relationship and communication networks within and outside the organisation.

6.5 The Role of Culture and Ideology at IUG

The culture and ideology of IUG are fundamental factors in forming the vision and the mission of the university. Therefore, they have a great effect on the leadership and staff and can play an important role in the progress of societies (Zamini, *et al*., 2011). O'Reilly, *et al*., (1991); Schein, (1992); Tharp, (2009); Aktas, *et al*., (2011) all state that, in an organisation, culture guides and shapes the behaviours of the leadership, staff and the organisation. The Islamic ideology and culture of IUG shapes the patterns of relationships and behaviours characterising the majority of the leadership and staff.

The current Chancellor described the relationship between Islam and IUG:

> *"Since its establishment till now, IUG reinforces the Islamic values in the society, including dignity, sacrifice, selflessness, and holding on to our rights. And thus, the university was the mother that never stops giving, as these values were remembered and practiced by the students and workers in times of hardships"* (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014).

The argument of the Chancellor is not about adopting Islamic ideology at IUG, rather, it is about influencing the community and building its values and beliefs in order to sacrifice for the national rights and to oppose the occupation.

With regard to the recruitment of new staff members for IUG, ideological and political affiliation was one of the important factors that was taken into account particularly during the first years of IUG . Some respondents supported this view, for example:

> *"There is clarity in the culture of the university regarding choosing employees who adopt its vision and beliefs and are aware that the university is facing several challenges, so whoever is ready to adapt and deal with them is welcome to the university"* (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014).

These words support the idea of clarity of the vision and mission of IUG and the ability of the leadership and the staff to sacrifice and deal properly with challenges and difficulties. However, there are also dissenting voices:

> *"Ideology has played a crucial role in the survival of the university, but the price was very high and sometimes unbearable. It put IUG, all the time, under targeting and humiliation measures of the occupation. It also created conflict and violent incidents among students as each party tried to impose their ideology whether it is Islamic or Secular.* (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014)

O'Reilly, *et al*., (1991); Lim (2009); and Aktas, *et al*., (2011) all emphasise the important role that the culture and ideology can play, while Yun Seok (2007) describes the potential mutual influence of culture upon leaders and followers. Culture and ideology might play a dual role in the organisation. On the one hand, they may help to strengthen the affiliation, faith and sacrifice which, in turn, helps in coping with difficulties and hardships. Honderich (1995) found that ideology allowed individuals to distance themselves from personal prejudice and serves as a foundation for rational rule. More positively, Haveman and Khaire (2004) found that ideology has a positive impact on the survival of an organisation.

On the other hand, ideological culture might be a cause of disagreements and increasing conflict among individuals or groups. In this regard, Hsiaoa and Cheng (2006) believe that, although ideology aimed to help humans, the original meaning of ideology was gradually debased, and became associated with a negative form of social determination. Therefore, ideology may have the potential to play a positive or a negative role.

In terms of the university' environment, both approaches of the dual, positive and negative, influence of ideology are found in the literature. Glass and Jacobs (2005) suggest that religion can play a positive role in university success, and that religion will not decline or disappear as rates of HE increased (Briggs, 2011). In contrast, Marriott *et al*. (2011) argue that religion might be a source of discrimination and can be a fertile environment for the emergence and growth of such discrimination.

With regard to the negative effects of ideology upon students and staff, Aljardali, *et al*. (2012) found that the religious interests of some students and staff contradict Lebanese University interests, and Jones, (2002) and Kanagaratnam, *et al*., (2005) regard religion as a risk factor. However, the case of IUG showed, despite some criticism and the negative side effects, that ideology could play an important role in assisting the university to survive and in increasing the ability of the staff and leadership to cope with hazardous events.

The current Chancellor believes that:

> *"In IUG, Islamic values are always present in its facilities and among the administration and employees, and it's dishonorable to commit a deed that contradicts these values. Therefore, the university practices these values with personal differences between the individuals"* (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014, individual).

With regard to common culture and ideology and its positive contribution to the university, one respondent reveals that:

> *"Our values and beliefs of Islam play a crucial role in increasing our ability to sacrifice and cope with challenges"* (Abo Husien, individual interview, Dec. 2013).

Another respondent felt that:

> *"The Islamic spirit that prevails among us is the spirit of brotherhood, love and tolerance. We believe in our fate and destiny and that what motivates us to more patience and steadfastness"* (Shamieah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

The argument here is that the Islamic culture gave a sense of unity and willingness to sacrifice for the good of the nation and the university.

Most of the respondents were convinced that ideology was a motivator of staff to oppose the occupation, and helped the university survive whatever the price might be. It gave them a sense of unity, faith and belief in destiny. Most of the respondents experienced hardships such as humiliation, arrests, casualties and many different restrictions. Nevertheless, they were satisfied to be part of this struggle against the occupier and to serve their country and religion. One of the pioneer workers at IUG said:

> *"We believe that this university served the community by dissemination of Islamic culture that increases the affiliation and commitment of people toward their national rights to regain their freedom and their homeland"* (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).

It was striking that there was a widely held view, even from those who had a different political point of view such as those who left IUG to work at Al-Azhar University, that ideology played an important role in struggling against the occupation.

Because the Palestinian nation has lived under occupation for more than six decades, they are, generally, deeply interested in politics, as politics affects every aspect of their lives. This applies particularly to university students, and as a result. political conflict appeared among students in many Palestinian universities.

Individual interviews focused on the positive role of ideology and most interviewees did not talk about the negative role. However, the focus group talked about the contradictory, positive/negative, role of ideology.

> *"Ideology was a two face weapon, it created conflict and violent clashes sometime, but it was a crucial reason behind the survival of IUG and opposing the occupation and raising the national sense of commitment and affiliation"* (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014).

Participant observation and self-reflexivity by the researcher provided strong evidence that the conflict among staff and groups of students was mainly about the dominant ideology and who would control the decision-making process. This complex relationship fluctuated from co-operation to conflict and back to co-operation at different times, based on internal Palestinian circumstances.

There was diversity in the level of support for this ideology. While many employees were strong supporters, others were less supportive of implementing such ideology. Many of the respondents believed that this ideology was the major reason for targeting and bombing IUG by the Israeli forces. The observations and informal meetings with leadership and different levels of staff revealed that most of them believed that IUG is an academic institution that serves the Palestinian community and the targeting and bombing of IUG was always a revenge by the occupation on a successful Islamic institution.

In summary, the culture and ideology of IUG stems from Sunni Islamic concepts and regulations. This ideology played an important role in raising the affiliation, commitment and following orders, opposing the occupation, and creating unity among followers. In the meantime, the different political ideologies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cast deep shadows of conflict on universities. The ideology of IUG created a political competition among different political parties at the university which turned into occasional conflict and clashes among them. However, the positive role of ideology was more prominent in IUG as compared to its perceived negative effects. Thus, ideology played an important role in helping IUG to survive and in keeping the educational process in spite of all hardships and disturbances.

As discussed earlier, Islamic belief has its own impacts upon transformational leadership at IUG. Combining the usual characteristics of transformational style with consultation and obedience to leaders shaped a unique Islamic form of transformational leaders.

6.6. The Strategic Value of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence

Resilience, the ability to withstand shocks and disturbances (Horne and Orr, 1998; Balu, 2001; Gittell, *et al*., 2006; Netuveli, 2010), has become a subject to investigate in institutions as a key organisational requirement for prosperity and progress. This concept has been discussed in many organisations and in different contexts. However, it has been under-explored, particularly in HEIs operating in turbulent environments and war conditions.

The current research suggests the following definition of resilience in turbulent times: resilience is the ability of an organisation to capitalise on hardships, absorb shocks, recover and thrive where possible. Resilience gave the IUG leadership high reliability in confronting both predicted and unpredicted adversity (McManus, *et al*., 2008; Auerswald, *et al*., 2009) that might otherwise have had catastrophic consequences. Resilience provides leaders with alternatives in order to survive, adapt and exploit opportunities to thrive (Hollnagel, 2007, 2009; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011; Martin-Breen and Andries, 2011) and develop where possible. The study confirmed the approach of Ungar (2011) that resilience might enable an organisation to achieve good results despite war conditions and after adverse events (Dinh, *et al*., 2012).

Different strategies were deployed by the leadership. This research characterised the responses of IUG to a variety of hardships. These labels reflect the extent of resilience that exists at IUG. The findings of the study confirm that IUG succeeded in deploying both of the strategic approaches to resilience discussed by Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011). The first strategy is the coping strategy in order to survive (Horne and Orr,

1998; Balu, 2001; Gittell, *et al.*, 2006; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011). The second strategy was achieving the survival and growth (Weick, 1998; Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011) which sees resilience as a strategy for thriving. IUG was able not only to bounce back from adverse circumstances and regain its original shape, but also was able to capitalise on events and exploit opportunities to move forward and prosper under the continuation of such events.

A strong example of turning threats to opportunities was that the oppression of the occupation united support for IUG within Gaza, and activated donors. Another example was during tightening the siege and closure after 2000, the leadership capitalised on this situation by continuing the educational process, and they succeeded, at the same time, in gaining support from donors to create a new branch in the isolated area. Another example was after the bombing of IUG, the leadership was able to capitalise on this catastrophe and was soon back to the educational process. At the same time, they worked on two levels: the one was to cooperate with local universities; and the other was to communicate with donors to rebuild what the occupation destroyed. The study considers resilience as a process (Masten, *et al*., 1990; Rutter, 2007; Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009) that interacts at the level of individuals, leadership and system, rather than a single response (Pianta and Walsh, 1998).

This study looks at resilience as a way of describing, or labelling, behaviours or actions at different levels. The categories are not discrete, but they might be hierarchical. The research found examples of resilience at the levels of individuals (Lyons, *et al*., 1998; Werner and Smith, 2001; Maddi and Khoshaba, 2005), leadership (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011) and system (Hollnagel, 2009; Ouyang, *et al*., 2012). This was clearly demonstrated when the leadership, staff and the system responded positively to working underground during the shutting down of IUG in the first uprising in 1987. Also, when opening decentralised classes in the isolated areas during the tightening of the siege and closure in the second uprising in 2000, which required: relocating the accommodation of some of the staff members; circulating lectures via videos and emails; and providing additional facilities to

students such as flexibility of examination timetables. In such tough conditions, a university does not have to have a place, rather, a university is a set of activities which happen, even when a place as a unifying concept is absent.

To achieve the survival and thriving of the organisation, the leadership deployed resiliently both the anticipation or proactive strategy (Reason, 1997; Dyson, 2004; Dinh, *et al*., 2012), and the reactive strategy (Marcus and Nichols, 1999). On some occasions, the leadership took proactive decisions such as opening new faculties and increasing the number of enrolled students without the permission of the occupation authorities. On other occasions, the leadership tried to minimize the damage and recover but with a high price. One example of this which reflects flexibility and open mindedness of the leadership (Yukl, 2008, 2010) is freezing the establishment of the faculty of Nursing in 1985 to absorb the anger of the occupation and to stop the expelling of 36 academics abroad. Another example was the response to the Israeli ban on either permanent or temporary buildings. The IUG administration challenged this prohibition and built temporary buildings. These costly buildings were removed after a few years when IUG was able to construct modern buildings in 1995 when the Palestinian Authority took responsibility over the Gaza Strip, and the university had no need to ask for Israeli permission for anything.

Furthermore, there were unpredictable events (McManus, *et al*., 2008) and IUG had to deal with the consequences, such as bombing and destroying the engineering and science building and laboratories during the war of December 2012. The response of the leadership was aligned with the approach of Ouyang, *et al*. (2012) as it occurred through three stages: minimise the initial damage; absorb the impacts of the event; and recover on time and at low cost. The decision of the leadership was to return to the educational process after one week. The cooperation with Gazan universities (Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa) helped a lot in overcoming this dilemma as they opened their laboratories for IUG students. This diversity of coping strategies and responses reflects the extent of resilience at IUG and how it was able to exploit the emerging opportunities to move forward and prosper. The case of IUG reflects a strong evidence of some important attributes of resilience as it provide employees and

leaders with a sense of commitment, control and challenge (Maddi and Khoshaba, 2005).

The 23 markers of resilience which characterise the responses of IUG leadership comprise seven cognitive factors that were discovered, ten behavioural factors that enhance resilience and six contextual factors that lend support to resilience. Different descriptions appearing in the literature review were combined in these cognitive, behavioural and contextual categories. Some of these labels and markers were noted in resilience literature such as flexibility, awareness, commitment and learning (Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, *et al*., 2009; and Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011), access to resources, and facilitative structure (Ungar, *et al*., 2007; Dinh, *et al*., 2012; Wood Ntaote, and Theron, 2012). Also, there were markers that applied to the responses of the leadership such as open mindedness, acting quickly, problem solving (Werner and Smith, 2001), communication, building trust and sharing knowledge and accountability (Collins and Smith, 2006). Therefore, resilience covers the one set of behaviours and leadership covers the other. However, there are behaviours which were not described by either the leadership literature or the resilience literature and they appeared in a unique way in the context of of IUG which are: cognitive factors - partnership and creativity; behavioural factors - sharing culture, the spirit of faith, obedience, sacrifice and struggle, and the exercise of power; contextual factors - strong social cohesion and robust responses.

Chapter Seven

7. Findings and Conclusions

This study sought to derive both theoretical and operational insights pertaining to institutional survival and growth in turbulent and obstructive environments, and used a Palestinian University, the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) to derive these insights. This required the researcher to understand the responses produced by the university leadership to the challenges and hardship the university faced from 1987 to 2012, and the interaction between organisational leadership and culture in building resilience. The role of IUG beyond the production and transfer of knowledge was also examined, as well as the mutually shaping influences of university and society.

7.1 Discussion of the Findings: Actors and Processes

The Islamic University of Gaza grew from 25 men studying in tents in 1978 to 20 168 students in 2012, 63% of them women. The IUG leadership never employed the narrow vision of a small institution. Rather, a sophisticated and modern university was their aim. The leadership was able to transform IUG from a small institution teaching Arabic language and Sharia subjects to a modern university teaching a diversity of science and arts subjects. By 2012, the permanent modern buildings on IUG campus housed 11 faculties teaching 112 specialisations appropriate to a modern state. Any university, whether in a developed or a developing country, would face difficulties on such a rapid growth path over a short period of time. The story of IUG is a story of growth and stabilisation, rather than the sad tale of a victim of the Israeli oppression.

Because of the diversity of the challenges experienced by IUG, the researcher has divided the development of the university into four phases. The first phase has been labelled: Launching IUG among Rubble with Challenges, Ambitions and Dreams (1978-1987). The name given to the second phase was: Threatening the Survival of IUG during the First Uprising (1987-1993). The third phase has been called:

Launching a Consolidation Process (1993-2000). The label applied to the fourth phase was: Thriving despite Siege and Wars (2000- 2012). Each phase had its own difficulties and challenges as well as its own strategies and leadership styles to overcome them. Some themes run across all four stages. The outcomes of this organising process helped the researcher, and should help readers, to understand the external and internal challenges of each stage and the responses of the leadership in addressing them.

The study described the environment of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence which posed additional challenges for IUG alongside the general challenges facing HEIs. Over time, the Palestinian community has been exposed to different violent and shocking events, including the destruction of the social world; manipulation of history; disruption of education; theft of identity and culture; and destruction of values (Giacaman, *et al*., 2007). The study discussed the ways in which Israeli measures shaped the political, economic, cultural and educational life of the individuals, groups and the Palestinian community as a whole (de Santisteban, 2002; Smith, 2011). These measures range from loss of land, identity, dignity, authority and resources, to death. These factors affected the academics and the students and the functioning of universities.

This study shows that very specific issues and challenges affected IUG and made its development more difficult, from the non-recognition of IUG degrees and graduates for 15 years, leaving students with no hope of job opportunities, to storming and shutting down the university, destruction and bombing of buildings, restrictions of mobility and travelling of staff and students. This is in addition to the attempts to impose authority and control over every aspect of the day-to-day running and the growth and development of IUG.

The study found that besides the occupation oppression against HEIs (Sullivan, 1994; Nicolai, 2007), internal issues have strongly affected IUG since the early years of its inception. A political conflict to determine the ideological identity of IUG raged between the two big parties, the Secular trend (Fatah) and the Islamic trend (Hamas). This led to the creation of Al-Azhar University in 1991, supported and controlled by

Fatah, who enticed sometimes and sometimes forced their supporters at IUG to join the new university. The conflict also resulted in occasional violent clashes between students and staff members. Therefore, since its inception in 1978, IUG has been faced with external and internal threats and expectations of failure.. In the midst of ongoing disruptions at every level of the university's functioning, IUG did not just survive, it blossomed and grew. However, the survival and thriving of IUG was not easy to achieve, rather it comes at a steep price.

IUG is a resilient Islamic university with high academic standards in a developing country. It is a scientific institution with a network of connections in the academic world, locally and globally. IUG offers a pattern of scientific and cultural resistance of a university operating in turbulent times. It is a national symbol of opposing the occupation with the weapon of science and knowledge. The occupation succeeded in besieging the university and imposing severe restrictions on its path of growth and development. They were able to bomb and destroy its buildings and laboratories many times. They succeeded in destroying stones, but the university turned out to be something beyond buildings: an educational community that continued to function, and even function well, after infrastructure was destroyed. IUG became a national project and one of the cornerstones of teaching new generations both science and nation-building. It is now established as an important player in maintaining the Palestinian cultural and religious identity in the face of the Israeli dominance over all aspects of Palestinian life. The university came to embody a particular idea of Islam: that strict traditions could be preserved, in a way that was entirely comaptible with teaching scientific subjects to both men and women.

This research describes varying types of responses and strategies implemented by different styles of leadership throughout the four stages of IUG. Five strategies employed are: to absorb potential conflict by closing the university, to challenge by continuing to build and opening new faculties and departments, to concede by not opening the Nursing faculty, to bypass by gaining recognition from abroad. The fifth strategy manifests itself in the nature of the university which was created, and this nature was shaped in two steps. The first step was to employ people with similar ideology. So, step one was homogeneity rather than meritocracy, but step two was to

increase the qualifications, both administrative and academic of the homogeneous cadre. This led to a homogeneous and highly skilled staff complement. Both those steps are very important. Loyal staff strengthened commitment, but in a very strong way IUG uplifted their qualifications and skills.

An important decision was to retain and build political and religious ties right from the beginning by recruiting people with a particular religious/political affiliation, and commitment, which increased their ability to cope with stressful situations (Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, *et al*., 2008). The cost of this was substantial, as this specific choice elicited opposition and enmity externally from the Israelis, and internally increased the political conflict with Fatah, as well as initially affecting the quality of education offered. It also had benefits; it enabled the university to use the loyalty of staff and students, and the solid links with local and international communities community (Harris and Chapman, 2002) as a major tool for survival.

At the inception stage, the IUG lacked qualified staff, suffered financial constraints and staff and students worked in tents, however, the leadership had a strategic vision for the future. They opened new faculties and departments, and at the same time they sent members of the staff abroad to conduct their post-graduate studies. This growth in administrative and academic excellence kept pace with the growth and diversification of the university. The diversified skills of employees grew at the same time that the university itself was growing and diversifying.

A second important decision was to keep the teaching and learning going no matter what. So classes continued in mosques, sport clubs and homes because individual citizens, the teachers and students, were prepared to take the risk of hosting, teaching and attending these classes.. Lecturers continued without pay because they felt that IUG was a national project which should be served, even at a high cost. Teachers empowered their students and were inspired by their leaders who were in the forefront of the struggle. The case of IUG confirmed that teachers sense of power and belongingness increased their self-sacrifice (Hoogervorst, *et al*., 2012), and empowered their feeling about the future in order to accomplish their mission of creating a new generation of leaders. The head of the council worked every day

although he was never paid. This meant when the university reopened in late 1992, after four years of being shut down, it did not start from scratch. The important thing that was maintained through the period of closure was a rhythm of academic application which remained unbroken.

Although the university has grown to this size, the research and my current observations indicate that the university is now in a fifth stage which will require a different set of strategies, although many of the internal and external problems which initially beset the young university still face the mature university.

7.1.1 Documenting the History of IUG

Documentation is particularly useful for investigating social questions (Creswell, 2003), and reflects information from real life environments (Jack and Baxter, 2008). The researcher found that the university's history and experience has not been appropriately registered and documented. The only such attempt was that of AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer (2009). Their report assembled portions of the university's chronicle and things published about it through documents and university decisions, without discussing the factors and strategies used by the leadership in responding to these challenges and how they succeeded in moving beyond survival to thriving.

One of the important outcomes of this study is its contribution in documenting the university's chronology by reporting and classifying IUG history and experience over the past 34 years. This documentation will be translated into the Arabic language, to make these ideas of leadership and resilience available beyond the English-language academic world. This thesis could provide other Palestinian universities and HE planners with replicable lessons from IUG. It draws lessons from the Palestinian context of occupation and ongoing chronic conflict in order to support other HEIs working in similar conditions. This documentation could be useful for academics and scholars who are interested in examining the role of the leadership and the contribution of resilience in HE in turbulent times.

7.1.2 The Role of IUG Leadership in Turbulent Times

The study found that one of the characteristics of IUG leadership was that they combined long term planning strategies (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013) with short term crisis management. Taskov and Mitreva (2015) stress the importance of establishing crisis management teams at HEIs in order to embrace the changes and challenges the institution encounter. The leadership of IUG had the fortitude to pursue a better tomorrow against the odds. To accomplish the long term objectives of survival and thriving, additional short term strategies were used. To deal with successive and diverse challenges, occasionally, IUG established a small crisis team to tackle the

major crises and to act decisively in order to overcome certain situations such as the closure of the university during the first uprising or when the laboratories and other buildings were destroyed in the war of December, 2008. The leadership did not allow the crisis of today to deflect them from the ideal of a complex,, multi-faculty university in the future. Although they knew that the Nursing faculty would draw down particularly hostile opposition from the occupation they nevertheless forged ahead with a nursing department under the Science faculty.

The way in which the leadership resolved short term crises often contributed to the long term development of the university. For example, a short term crisis was a total absence of lecture theatres. Using the community to solve this problem meant that they had the support of the community later when they needed it in the closure of IUG in 1988 and during the tightening of the siege and closure in 2000. So, it was not just that they solved the short term crisis, it was the manner in which they solved the severe short term crisis such as the bombing of the university during the war of December 2008 which provided them with the resources, funding and support for achieving long term goals.

A divergence of opinions opens the horizon and provides organisational leadership with a portfolio of alternatives (McManus, *et al*., 2008; Aven, 2011; Azadeh, *et al*., 2014) which can be utilised in a specific situation. The leadership could not afford to have only one response to a situation, they always had to develop a variety of responses because the response to their strategies would be unpredictable. Therefore, when dealing with an unpredictable situation, leaders need to have several short term strategies that always feed into a long term strategy, so it was plan A and plan B for short term, and always plan C moving into the long term. By doing so, the leadership was able to overcome the challenges of the occupation over registration and accreditation, finance, invasions and national and cultural identity.

A transformational style of leadership has managed to adapt to different events, encounter challenges IUG faced, and lead the changing and challenging process toward the new emerging objectives within the framework of conformity and integration between leadership and employees (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1990;

Hamdhaidari, *et al*., 2008; Vega-Vazques, *et al*., 2012). Transformational leadership of IUG was able, in different occasions, to convey a clear vision of followers' goals, build their awareness and motivate them to struggle and sacrifice for the sake of the university.

The researcher argues in the literature review that what works in a Western environment may or may not work well in an Islamic contexts, and that the main difference between the leadership styles in these environments is the close attachment to religion (Faris and Parry, 2011). This attachment to religion has an important influence in the way that transformational leadership is expressed at IUG. Although obedience is not a feature of transformational style as described in Western literature, the case of IUG showed a transformational style combined with the obedience of followers.

On some occasions, such as the opening of decentralised classes in 2000 and after bombing IUG in 2009, IUG deployed a transactional style which was characterised by rewards and the exchange of benefits between leaders and their followers (Burns, 1978; Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012).

The case of IUG suggests that organisations faced with different challenges and shocks have the choice to deploy an appropriate leadership style to fit the situation. This study confirmed the approach of Burke, *et al*. (2012) who suggests that in turbulent environments, it is not easy to rely on one style. They suggest that a mixture of transformational with transactional styles might be appropriate to cope with the challenges HE might be exposed to. The study found that IUG deployed other styles of leadership - heroic, post-heroic and sometimes authoritarian, (Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012) - besides transformational and transactional style depending on the specific situations.

The leadership demonstrated authority and control and took forceful actions (Siewiorek, *et al*., 2012), so that they could respond swiftly and capitalise on specific shocks before things became catastrophic. For example, in the first stage, the leadership defied the military orders and increased the number of enrolled students.

Also, they refused to hand students' names to the Israeli security forces or to deliver monthly reports about their meetings and decisions. Constructing buildings under risks and in spite of the Israeli rejection and threats was another example of deploying the heroic style of leadership. In the second stage, leaders were responsible for ensuring that institutions simply kept operating, albeit on a slow timescale. The leadership of IUG demonstrated flexibility and creativity in decision making when they went teaching underground reflecting both transformational and heroic styles of leadership. This was a strong example of the struggle, insistence and creativity of the leadership. Here, the defiance strategy of IUG leadership was aimed at maintaining the educational process under all circumstances.

In the third stage, exploiting opportunities for thriving (Weick, 1998; Coutu, 2002; Hollnagel, 2007; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011) was the main strategy. In the fourth stage, the insistence on holding examinations one week after the bombing of IUG and holding graduation ceremonies two weeks after the war demonstrates the post-heroic style of IUG leadership. What was common between the different styles IUG deployed is combining some religious aspects such as consultation (*Shurah*) and obedience (*Altaaea*) which consolidated the sense of commitment and affiliation as followers were encouraged to obey their leaders as long as there is no disobedience towards God and the Prophet (Khamis, 2000; Faris and Parry, 2011).

7.1.2.1 Leading in both a Conflict and a Post-Conflict Zone

Conflict and post-conflict patterns occur simultaneously at IUG. To distinguish the situation between conflict and post-conflict is to move from destruction to recovery and development and from insecurity to stability and lasting peace (Heleta, 2014). The university has operated under occupation, oppressive measures, siege, closure and different wars. The study found that these measures have affected IUG directly and indirectly. All these measures are characteristics of a conflict zone (Amusan, 1992; Rahim, 2002; Heleta, 2014). In contrast to this, after signing the Oslo Accord in 1993 (Ramahi, and Davies, 2002; EPACBI, 2015), a new situation was created by transferring the authority on the ground from the occupation to the Palestinian

Authority. IUG exploited the opportunity and launched a consolidation stage of constructing permanent buildings, new faculties and a network of communication and relationships. All these reflected a post-conflict situation (Berdal, 2009; Heleta, 2014). Therefore, the university leadership is required to play two almost conflicting roles. It must play the role of leading a university in a conflict zone at the same time as it plays a nation-building role in a post-conflict situation.

After 1993, the leadership thought for a while that the Gaza Strip and IUG had moved from conflict to post-conflict situation. But a few years later they realised that conflict is still there and the Gaza Strip and the IUG were still under the attack and oppression of the occupation. The leadership therefore had to balance a complex situation., Sometimes the responses to conflict and post-conflict seemed to cancel each other out. When it was conflict, people did not mind in teaching in tents, they did not take salaries, they worked in risky conditions and taught underground. In post-conflict, IUG has modern faculties and buildings, then people ask for their salaries and rewards. This beautiful university looks like a post-conflict university, but it is operating in a conflict situation.

The study found that the first stage from 1978 to 1987, exhibited characteristics of a conflict area and IUG deployed transformational, transactional and heroic styles of leadership. The second stage 1988-1993, was characterised by a conflict situation as IUG was closed for four years by an Israeli military order and IUG deployed heroic and transformational styles of leadership. In the third stage of consolidation, 1993-2000, through the conflict situation, signing the Oslo agreement was one of the contributing factors in helping IUG to survive and thrive. Oslo changed the Israeli opposition as the PNA took responsibility inside the cities of the Gaza Strip. This stage exhibited a post-conflict situation with some characteristics of conflict such as restriction of travelling and importing equipment and materials in addition to some internal conflict. At this stage IUG deployed post-heroic, transformational styles of leadership.

The fourth stage, 2000-2012, exhibited clearly both conflict and post-conflict situation. Some conflict indicators are imposing siege and closure, wars of 2008 and

2012 with thousands of martyrs and injuries. However, because the Israeli troops relocated their position on the borders of the Gaza Strip, some indicators exhibited a post-conflict situation. The leadership was able to carry on as there was a space for IUG to open the faculty of Medicine and the Medical City. Additional new buildings were constructed and new partnership agreements were signed. At this stage IUG deployed different styles of leadership; heroic, post-heroic alongside transformational style of leadership.

In conclusion, trying to clearly categorise this particular situation was difficult because features of conflict and post-conflict overlap, and appear simultaneously. The case of IUG exhibits both conflict and post-conflict characteristics. The leadership dealt with conflict and post-conflict issues. Sometimes they played the role of leadership in a conflict situation and deployed a certain type of leadership, while sometimes they played the role in post-conflict situation with different types of organisational leadership. Interestingly, sometimes the leadership played a dual role of both conflict and post-conflict situation at the same time and deployed different and/ or a mixed style of leadership (transformational, transactional, heroic and post-heroic). The situation is simultaneously conflict and post-conflict and requires resilient leadership to shift and deploy a suitable type of leadership that fits with the situation.

7.1.2.2 The Exercise of Power

One of the important reasons behind the success of IUG leadership was adopting a national strategy of opposing the occupation and participating in the Palestinian struggle for freedom and dignity. This in turn gained the support of the staff and students and the protection of the community.

One of the tools the leadership utilised was sharing knowledge with the different levels at IUG and involving them in the decision-making process. The leadership tried to push things forward by creating new realities on the ground which made it more

difficult for the occupation to stop all these measures and confront IUG students, staff and the community. By doing so, the strategy of the leadership succeeded in minimising the Israeli attempts to impose dominance and control over IUG. However, the exercise of power and the attempts of IUG did not always succeed, and some actions and interventions ended in favor of the occupation.

The study confirmed the findings of Leonidou, *et al*. (2008) that internal exercise of power between political parties reduces confidence and increases conflict. Although the conflict to control IUG was resolved in favour of the Islamic trend, IUG paid a high price for this conflict.

7.1.3 The Contribution of Culture and Ideology to the Survival and Growth of IUG

In the context of HEIs, culture can play an important role in the progress of societies (Zamini, *et al*., 2011). The existence of the occupation created different views and a strong diversity of political affiliation among the Palestinian community and their universities ranging from Islamic, secular to leftist bodies. Many different reasons stand behind the ability of Palestinian universities in coping with the Israeli occupation and invasions and they managed to survive. Resisting the occupation and opposing their oppression, the national duty of sustaining the national and cultural identity and the national aspiration of freedom and the right of education are common factors that helped universities to survive under devastating circumstances. However, in addition to these common factors, in the context of IUG and due to the additional challenges IUG faced, ideological culture provided IUG leadership and members of the staff with a further important factor which consolidated the spirit of faith and sacrifice for the sake of the university.

IUG was formally established as an extension of Al-Azhar Institute for Religious Studies. The study findings provided strong evidence to support the approach of Altbach (1987) who found that HEIs have a widespread impact on culture, politics and ideology. The Islamic ideology differentiated IUG from other Palestinian universities. The curriculum IUG offers to undergraduate students, which comprises about 140 independent hours during the four years of study, includes 36 hours

covering a diversity of Islamic subjects (Al-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). IUG has developed from a small institution teaching only religion and Arabic language, to a university teaching a wide range of science subjects alongside Islamic subjects.

The literature review of chapter 3 clarifies that many universities have been created in different regions of the world with ideological roots whether these are Christian, Islamic or Jewish. The study found that Islamic ideological culture has played a dual and paradoxical role at IUG. Also, the feature of obedience as part of the dominant culture at IUG is open to factionalism.

One of the important effects of the ideology and political affiliation of IUG was that it enabled the university to gain support from different sectors of the community as well as different groups, organisations and countries abroad. At the same time it was the reason behind losing support from others.

7.1.4 Mutual Shaping of the University and the Society

Although the researcher started this research looking only at the behaviour of the top leadership at IUG, as the research progressed it became necessary to describe some behaviour at other levels, as this behaviour is both a consequence and a cause of leadership behaviours. In particular, because an early decision of leadership was to promote social cohesion, the community supported and shaped the university, and the university supported and shaped the community as well. Harris and Chapman (2002) describe the need for educational institutions to have solid links with the community and how these contribute to gain the community's support and affiliation, particularly in times of disturbances. This is what the leadership of IUG sought to achieve.

These solid links with the society were disrupted sometimes by political conflict and division among Palestinians. Palestinian political conflict cast deep shadows and negative effects over the whole Palestinian social, political, cultural life in general and HEIs in particular which still exist to the present. Political conflict has created strong supporters as well as opponents for the case of IUG. The approach of Bush and Saltarelli (2000) about the potential two faces of education in decreasing and or/

increasing conflict found a fertile environment in IUG which reflected the case of other Palestinian HEIs. This is in spite of the continuous efforts of the leadership to isolate universities from the negative side-effects of the political conflict and division.

One of the essential characteristics of the IUG leadership which played a crucial role in shaping the university and the society is the powerful social cohesion networks between the university and the community. The strategy of maintaining social cohesion played an important role in the survival of the university. Through visits, meetings, conferences, graduation ceremonies and other cultural activities, IUG leadership established a strong network of relationships with community dignitaries and institutions. The university leadership kept them all informed about the realities of IUG and the difficulties it encountered. These helped in obtaining the understanding and the support of the community in the face of the crises to which the organisation was exposed. This, in addition to directly serving the community, strengthened the support and commitment to IUG. Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, Cheung, and Levine (2008) stress the support of the community in providing resources to the organisation. Also, Staw, *et al*. (1981) believe that the availability of community resources may provide strength and encourage employees to confront threats. The case of IUG showed how the support of the community protected the university and provided resources and thus helped IUG to survive. Moreover, the international community, particularly the Islamic community, contributed to keep IUG not only surviving but also thriving. Both religious beliefs and political affiliations of the staff and students formed an important resource enabling IUG to survive despite hardships.

Another indicator of shaping the community was that IUG has a very positive attitude to women receiving higher education. IUG contributed in clarifying the fact that Islam does not prohibit women from education, rather, Islam encourages the education and achievements of women. The holy Quran stresses the importance of knowledge and learning:

"قُلْ هَلْ يَسْتَوِي الَّذِينَ يَعْلَمُونَ وَالَّذِينَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ إِنَّمَا يَتَذَكَّرُ أُولُو الْأَلْبَابِ" (الزمر:9)

> "*Say, Are those who know equal to those who do not know? Only they will remember [who are] people of understanding*" (Aa-Zummar :9).

Also, the prophet Mohamed says that:

> "*Seeking knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim, male and female*" (Hadith Sharief).

In spite of the provisions that bind societies, governments and individuals to the right of education for all, men and women, the reality in many countries in the world, including many Arab and Islamic countries, reflects facts that contradict this inherent right of education.

UNESCO statistics (2011) indicate that 16% of the world's population are suffering from illiteracy and that 67.7% of those who are illiterate are women. Confirming this, the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALESCO), clarified that, in 2011, the illiteracy rate in the world was 16% while in the Arab world it was 27.1%, 60% of those who are illiterate were female. This figure changed to 35% in 2013, 45% of those are females (ALESCO, 2013). The average ratio of illiteracy reaches to 66.6% in Mali, 63.7% in Afghanistan, 61% in Iraq, 55% in Sierra Leone, 42% in Egypt and 39% in Yemen. These high proportions are correlated with poverty, ignorance and the negative approach to women and their basic right of education.

In spite of these high proportions in different countries of the world, Palestine is considered by both UNESCO and ALESCO to be among the worlds' lowest illiteracy rates. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2013) confirms this and reveals that the illiteracy rate of Palestinian individuals, 15 years and over, declined from 15.7% in 1995 to 4.1% in 2012. The proportion of female education at schools increased from 77% in 1995 to 93.6% in 2012 and that the average ratio of educating women in the Gaza Strip is beter than women in the West Bank as it reached to 96.6%.

In this regard, the average rate of teaching women to men in Palestinian HEIs was 50% -50% in the academic year 2003/2004, but in 2011/2012 it increased to58% women to 42% men (PCBS, 2013). This increase was clearly demonstrated in many universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For example, as a secular university in the West Bank, the total number of Birzeit students in 2016 was 13 003, and 63.3% of them are female (Birzeit website, 2016). Another example of a secular university is An-Najah university in the West Bank with a total number of 20 452 students, 60.6% of them are female (An-Najah website, 2016). In the Gaza Strip in 2012, AL-Azhar university which is a secular university hosted a total number of 17 862 students, 46% of them are female (AL-Azhar website, 2012). In the context of IUG, the Islamic ideology of the university did not hinder teaching women. As the first and the only university in the Gaza Strip until 1991, IUG took the lead, and did not allow any opposition to teaching women from those with a narrow religious prospective. Furthermore, IUG gave some women a good academic position: The Dean of the Education faculty, for males and females, is a woman; and also the Dean of Quality and Development is a woman. Both of them participate fully in the meetings of the University Council.

The study found that IUG ideology encouraged the academic achievement of women, and that IUG led the people of Gaza in the view of the role of educating women in the Gaza Strip in an Islamic university, and the nation supported the university. While in the first year of IUG in 1978, there were no women registered, the number of women enrolled at IUG started to increase gradually year after year until it reached in 2012 to 12 874 female (63.8%) and 7294 male (36.2%). This development was part of shaping the national view in favour of the education of women and the importance of preparing woman for careers outside of the home. However, due to the Israeli restrictions (siege and closure), the decline of the Palestinian economy and financial problems of the PNA, job opportunities are limited not only for women but also for men. But in spite of the limitation of employment, Palestinian women insist to achieve their university's degrees.

IUG educates women, but does so on segregated campuses close to each other with the same teaching staff members. Although the majority of universities in the Muslim and Arab countries are socially mixed, the idea of teaching in segregated campuses is not new in the Islamic context. Some universities or institutions in Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey) adopted the approach of teaching in segregated campuses. For example, in Egypt the biggest institution in the Muslim world (Al-Azhar University in Cairo) teaches female students in many segregated colleges and campuses. Another example is the International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIUI), which was founded in Pakistan in 1980 as a mixed university, but in 2000 created a separate campus for 11 500 (38.8%) female students (IIUI website, 2016).

In Palestine, although IUG was the first university in Palestine to educate women in segregated campuses, in the 1990s and thereafter, some other universities and institutions in the Gaza Strip began to teach students in separate campuses or separate classes. Al-Aqsa University in Gaza (a government university) teaches 16 885 female students in segregated campuses and classes (AL-Aqsa website, 2015). Although students of AL-Azhar university in Gaza, male and female, study on the same campus, the university teaches students in separate classes. Some other institutions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem such as Hind Al-Husseini College for Girls/ Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, and Palestine Technical Colleges –Ramallah/Girls (PTCR website, 2015) offer separate classes for men and women.

Many parents and students, on the one hand, support the idea of segregation as they believe that educating women in segregated campuses is safer, more comfortable and gives more privacy to their daughters (Wajih Khan, 2014). They support their claims by arguing that the Prophet Mohamed used to teach men every week, and women asked him to make a separate day for teaching women. On the other hand many others believe that studying in a mixed campus is better for the integrity of the community, dialogue and competition between male and female (Gulzar, 2014). These views reflect the diversity of the political, ideological and cultural approaches of teaching women in separate campus. Hence, the issue here is creating an educational

environment that maintains dignity, freedom, privacy and achievement of students. The case of IUG clarifies that while Islamic rules regarding segregation were accepted, this did not hinder women from education, rather they were supported. Islam was used to enable these women not to suppress them.

The leadership succeeded in combining religion with nationalism and a modern state university. They have religious faculties besides modern science ones. This, in turn, shaped a wider Palestinian religious tolerance and view particularly in the Gaza Strip. So that, the citizens came to value science alongside religion as a worthwhile academic achievement.

The case of IUG confirmed the role of universities in participating actively in nation-building (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Douglass, 2010; Baramki, 2010) and serving the greater public good (Wass*, et al*., 2010), and can be a great motivator to advance citizenship and social justice (Harkavy, 2006).

IUG creates a wide diversity of specialisations and faculties to serve the community needs. The leadership succeeded in serving the community by creating different centres, projects and colleges. For example, IUG created the University College for Applied Science (UCAS) which offers a wide variety of Diploma and Bachelor programmes. Another example is the Community Service and Continuing Education Deanship (CSCED) which offers a range of one year diplomas and training programmes. In addition, IUG created the Irada project which aims to improve the capacities of 400 Palestinians with war injuries. The study found that the strong external and internal networks and the services they offer the community helped IUG to survive. Because of social cohesion, those activities undertaken by the Israelis to undermine the university, in fact strengthened it.

7.1.5 The Role of External Players

Because the Palestinian people have been living under the persecution of the Israeli occupation (Chenoweth, *et al*., 2007; Smith, 2011) for more than six decades, they have gained the support and the sympathy of many countries, groups and individuals

from the free world. The HE sector is one of the fields that gains support and funding from donors. IUG as HEI gained support and endorsement from external players.

Financial support came from Gulf countries and other Islamic sources (Sullivan, 1994), particularly from Sunni countries. While some players from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia and Qatar gave support and money to construct buildings, provided scholarships and helped needy students at IUG, others rejected the idea. The identity and the Islamic ideology of IUG has played a role in fund-raising. Those who have the same ideology were good supporters, while those with different political perspectives were not supportive. Some different countries and groups from Europe, Japan and USA gave support to this academic project regardless of political or religious affiliation. However, the fund often comes with golden handcuffs as the donors have their own interests. Therefore, the strategy of relying on donors is a doubtful strategy because of the strings attached or because of the changing of priorities such as stopping the Turkish support to 8000 needy students in order to support Syrian refugees.

One of the key players, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), refused to recognise IUG degrees or hire its graduates for more than 15 years. This might have been done under the influence of the occupation. It was contradictory that while the main mission of UNRWA is to provide Palestinians with appropriate services and work in health, education and relief sectors, they refused to hire IUG graduates claiming that they needed recognition from the occupation authorities first.

Signing the Oslo accord played a dual role at IUG. On the one hand, it created a deep rift in the Palestinian community which negatively affected the political conflict. On the other hand, this accord played a positive role in opening a window for the consolidation stage of constructing permanent buildings, new faculties and recognition of IUG degrees and graduates. Oslo changed the Israeli opposition, and new relationships, and partnerships were forged with many different universities and institutions across the globe. Soon after signing the agreement, the UNRWA took a different strategy and recognized IUG degrees and started to hire its graduates. Now

hundreds of IUG graduates are working in teaching, health and other different sectors of the UNRWA. Some IUG graduates have good positions in these sectors.

The study showed that, in spite of the great damage the wars of 2009 and 2012 left, the leadership exploited them to consolidate relationships with many external players. By doing so, they succeeded in gaining funds to rebuild what the wars destroyed. In conclusion, all those external players, donors and international community have played, despite deficiencies or the high price, an important role in the survival and growth of IUG.

7.1.6 The Role of SHRM at IUG

The literature review stresses the importance of Strategic Human Resource Management, particularly in turbulent times (Lepak and Snell, 1998; Skaggs and Youndt, 2004; Fernandez, 2009; Grimsley, 2010). SHRM is the provider of employee capacities to achieve organisational goals (Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler, 1997; Wright, 1998; Dessler, 2008). IUG has experienced successive crises since its inception and up to the present moment. Although the researcher argued in the literature review that the label of SHRM approach was not officially dealt with by IUG leadership as a coherent concept, nevertheless, many responses of the leadership to hazardous conditions showed that the fit and alignment, the contingency approach (Delery, 1998; Werbel and DeMarie, 2005; Demirbag, *et al*., 2010) of HR functions appears on some occasions at IUG. The way the leadership responded to some events indicated that in the IUG environment of turmoil and conflict, the contingency SHRM approach is more appropriate compared to the configurational or the universalistic approaches. This is aligned with the findings of many scholars (Youndt, Snell, Dean, and lepak, 1996; Fernandez, 2009; Demirbag, *et al*., 2010).

This was clearly demonstrated, although not within a formal SHRM approach, through many big events such as: shutting down IUG; when the occupation expelled 36 academics and the leadership had to freeze the creation of a Nursing faculty in 1985; when shutting down IUG in 1988; when more than 60 qualified academics, comprising 34% of the staff, left IUG to join Al-Azhar in 1991-1993; and when the

military occupation bombed IUG in the wars of 2012 and 2014. In these events, some functions and policies of HR worked in integrity, synergy and alignment toward keeping IUG surviving and the educational process moving forward.

These responses in the first three stages of IUG did not reflect a formal strategy of SHRM, rather, it was intrinsic abilities and experiences of the leadership in dealing with hardships. But in the fourth stage, IUG started to deal officially with SHRM. This required a different and a coherent approach for the future of IUG in order to improve the ability of IUG to overcome the future challenges.

7.1.7 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience

The concepts and regulations of the Islamic culture have a direct impact on the thoughts, actions and behaviours of the leadership and staff of IUG. The study showed that the national duty of opposing the occupation and maintaining the Palestinian traditional culture was an important dimension which was added to the Islamic culture of IUG to strengthen the trust, commitment and the support of the staff and the community. The commitment, struggle and the sacrifice of the leadership inspired, motivated and empowered the staff to comply with instructions which, in turn, enhanced the coping capacities of the university and improved outcomes for individuals and the organisation (Boyd, Lewin, and Sager, 2009).

Deploying cadres with cultural and political affiliation affected the mutual interface between leadership and culture. The strength of IUG culture and the context of the occupation affected the responses of the leadership to different harsh events. At the same time, it gave more power to the leadership to gain the commitment and trust of followers which, in turn, improved resilience capacities in dealing with difficult events.

Some scholars give importance to the relationship and the mutual influence between leadership and culture (Ali, 2006; Faris and Parry, 2011). Schein, 1992; Tsui, *et al*. (2006) give more weight to the effect of leadership upon culture, arguing that the leadership is the main shaper and builder of organisational culture. Teixeirra and Werther (2013) argue that the leadership reshapes the culture and can lead to a more

resilient organisation In contrast, O'Reilly, *et al*. (1991) and Yun Seok (2007) believe that culture can affect and shape the organisation. Haveman and Khaire (2004) found that ideological zeal positively affects the whole organisational life. It puts both the leaders and the followers in the right direction to influence the behaviours and performance of the organisation which helps the organisation to cope with shocks and events in a resilient manner.

Seery (2011) found that positive religious beliefs and commitment of employees may contribute to resilience in the face of stressful situations, whereas negative religious beliefs contribute to vulnerability. The study confirmed that IUG is a resilient Islamic organisation at the level of individuals, leadership and system. Both culture and leadership lead IUG to overcome severe challenges in a rational and resilient manner.

In this process, communications and relationships have played an important role in activating the influence between leadership and culture by raising the awareness and understanding of followers of what they need to do and how. This contributes to coping with and recovering from disturbances (Bartholomew, *et al*., 2000; Phillpot, *et al*., 2011) and can create the potential for profound growth and transformation (Prince-Paul and Exline, 2010). This enhanced the commitment and kept the IUG staff informed of what they need to do, how and why. The importance of this increased particularly in times of conflict and wars. This is because it helps in taking the right decision and providing a space for more consultation and gaining the trust and confidence of members.

7.1.8 The Value of a Degree in the Community: The Internal and External Value of IUG Graduates in Gaza

In spite of the severe Israeli political, economic and human restrictions, Palestinian universities have achieved a good academic record (Sullivan, 1995). The study showed that the first stage of development of IUG was characterised by a low ratio of PhDs and high loyalty by cadre deployment which means loyal political connections. In the second stage, IUG ameliorated the effects of cadre deployment by training their loyalists and by bringing in other qualified people. In the third stage, the leadership succeeded in overcoming the crisis of losing 40% of the academic staff to Al-Azhar

university by recruiting new qualified staff, and by motivating the local staff to work under stress with additional load of teaching hours. In the fourth stage, the qualifications and the capacities of the staff improved gradually until IUG became in 2012 one of the leading and the biggest Palestinian universities with 292 staff members holding PhD degrees, and 99 holding Masters degrees as shown in Table 5 (p. 48) in chapter two. IUG has developed to become a modern university offering a diversity of Bachelor, Masters and PhD programmes.

IUG graduates who are deployed in Gaza are doing well. Hundreds of them are working now in the public sector, and in the UNRWA. The interview with the previous Chancellor and the discussion with the focus groups highlighted that some IUG graduates are in senior positions in both of these sectors. In addition, some IUG graduates were elected into the Palestinian National Council in 2006 and 17 of them became Ministers in the tenth government. The Prime Minister of the tenth government Ismaiel Haniah was an IUG graduate. Many IUG graduates worked at the university and 32 of them became deans of faculties throughout the four stages of IUG history. The graduates who are now working overseas are also doing well. However, due to economic decline and the continuous siege and closure, many graduates are unemployed, some of them travelled abroad to conduct their postgraduate studies hoping to find job opportunities, and others have tried to manage their own businesses regardless of their qualifications.

Crises and turbulent environments have a negative impact on employment opportunities for graduates (Xiaohao and Changiun, 2013). The fluctuating economic and political climate in Palestine poses a tough question about a university that graduates thousands of qualified persons with very limited job vacancies. The importance of teaching new generations is nevertheless a high priority for the Palestinian community (Alzaroo, 1989; Baramki, 2010). IUG did not lock itself in a narrow vision, rather, looking beyond survival to thriving was a long term objective. IUG provides a pool of skilled graduates who will be ready and waiting to take up their places when freedom is achieved and when the wheel of the economy moves forward.

7.2 The Main Conclusions of the Study and its Theoretical Implications

The environments in which HEIs operate across different regions of the world are frequently turbulent, changing and challenging (Muthanna and Karaman, 2014; Dobre, 2015) because of political conflicts and war conditions. In these turbulent countries, the educational process has been suspended or seriously damaged (Seitz, 2004; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008). Many universities around the globe, particularly in the Middle East region have stopped their services to the community because of the inability to work and deal properly with hazardous conditions (Muthanna and Karaman, 2014). In such ongoing conflict and turbulence that faces many HEIs, the expectations are high while the resources are low and the hardships seem to be unbearable, and if the leadership cannot respond resiliently, then they might jeopardise the functioning of these institutions (Camillzts and Datta,1991)) and threaten their survival (Rutter, 2007; Furniss, *et al*., 2011).

HEIs are important in the social construction and development of societies (Bernardo and Baranovich, 2014; Massyrova, *et al*., 2015). They teach the new generation and

train the leaders of tomorrow (Alzaroo, 1989; Stephens and Graham, 2010; Hicks and Gidley, 2012). In addition, HEIs play an important role in consolidating the chances of peace (Baramki, 2010; Bernardo and Baranovich, 2014) and spreading an atmosphere of democracy (Betts and Lee, 2005; Marginson, 2010; Marriot, *et al*., 2011). Because wars and ongoing conflict have devastating consequences for communities and institutions, the reconstruction and development of HE becomes a high priority (Maclure and Denov, 2009) and needs to be reformed to meet the objectives of development of communities (Massyrova, *et al*., 2015). Hence the importance of enabling this sector to deliver the best services to students and the community in spite of the restrictions the external and internal environment presents.

The most important implication of studying the case of IUG is that it reflects the general difficulties and challenges facing all Palestinian universities and the HE sector as a whole. Closing the political horizon for achieving justice and freedom, and the complexity of the difficult political and economic situation has its own negative impacts upon all Palestinian universities. The situation has become more complicated after the political division in 2007 which has led to the imposition of the siege, closure and left high rates of poverty which made the life of Palestinians even harder. This is in addition to the political and economic difficulties facing the Palestinian Authority. All these factors in addition to internal management problems have increased the challenges and suffering of the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Therefore, the main problem behind researching this case study was the Palestinian turbulent environment within which IUG must exist and operate. The study examined the role of the leadership in HEIs through turbulent times. The main question of this project was about the role of the leadership in promoting resilience through the four stages of IUG history since its inception in 1978 to the end of 2012., It was important to gather information from different sources because it provides diversity of data and different points of view.. Members of these interviews have different political affiliation ranged from Hamas, to Independents to Fatah. This gave the results more credibility and trustworthiness. Through the discussion, points of agreement have been clarified, nevertheless, points of disagreement have also been raised.

The study confirmed the approach of Sporn (2010) that managing HEIs requires a set of actors and processes to achieve the desired goals and objectives. The case of IUG showed that management of HEIs integrate concepts such as strategy, quality and process in order to cope with hardship (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013). This underlines the importance of classifying and categorizing the enabling factors and strategies used by IUG leadership. The findings of the study provide insight on how organisational leadership managed the situation and responded to the challenges of conflict, post conflict and ongoing turbulence throughout the four stages of IUG history. It shows how IUG contributed to addressing the challenges facing the community.

The main findings of this study indicate that the chosen strategy, policies and practices in accordance with organisational culture (Aktas, *et al*., 2011) actively contributed and helped the leadership to reach the desired organisational goals despite the condition of instability or variability of the internal and external environments. The study found that IUG leadership deployed different strategies to keep IUG surviving and thriving. In relation to the occupation: compliance, partial compliance, bypassing, absorbing and defiance/challenge strategies were deployed to overcome the occupation obstacles and restrictions. In relation to the students: enabling (keeping classes going), challenging and moving forward (graduating 969 students during the closure of the university in the first uprising, and setting exams right after a bombardment), encouraging (graduation right after a bombardment) protecting (closing the university to prevent violence) are different strategies utilized in response to the challenges of the four stages of IUG history. In relation to the Palestinian community: service, development and challenge strategies were used in order to thrive. The strategy of challenge cuts across all the four stages, though in different ways. Also, the strategy of co-operation applies to community, external community and with local universities such as Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa university in different occasions.

The leadership has evolved and their resilience was the strategic key to adapt to the challenging and changing circumstances (Senior, *et al*., 2012; Mohammadi and Youzbashi, 2012). Therefore, new ways of leading were deployed and characterised

the behaviours of IUG leadership in coping with the situations of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. To ensure the survival and growth under these fluctuating conditions and turbulent times, diversity or a mixture of styles of leadership was of great importance to adapt and respond properly to different expected and unexpected challenges. The case of IUG confirmed what has been reported in the literature review: that transformational leadership style was the most used in management (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2008) and an appropriate style in conflict and war conditions (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010). Nevertheless, transactional, heroic, post-heroic and sometimes authoritarian characteristics of leaders demonstrated the behaviours of IUG leadership in many different occasions. Sometimes, the leadership used a mixed of transformational with transactional style. Sometimes they mixed transformational with heroic, or post-heroic styles. Some other times they deployed one of these styles to respond to specific situation.

The study identifies 23 different cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors of resilience some of which specifically pertain to the circumstances of Gaza and the case of IUG such as sharing culture and ideology, opportunism, faith, struggle and sacrifice. Some of these factors are derived from the literature as presented in Table 7 (p. 100) while other factors are derived from the case of IUG. All the 23 factors might be contextually appropriate in conditions of serious conflict and war conditions.

The evidence of the interface and engagement between leadership and Islamic culture through the four stages of IUG revealed that the concepts of followers' faith, consultation and obedience were added to the leadership styles, especially transformational style, and raised the sense of sacrifice and commitment of both leaders and followers. These factors clarified the apparent paradox of the traditional formulation of transformational leadership, and the different way it was enacted at IUG. In the context of IUG, the Islamic culture shaped leadership and the leadership gained the obedience and commitment of followers. This shed a new light on leadership theories, particularly transformational leadership theories, as more Western (Dimmock and Walker, 2000; Kabasakal, *et al*., 2012; Wang, *et al*., 2012) than has been previously acknowledged. Leadership is based on different cultures. In the case of IUG, leadership manifests in a particular way in an explicitly Islamic setting.

In spite of the success leadership has achieved in leading IUG and responding to many different challenges, they failed to respond properly to specific problems. For example, the insistence of opening the faculty of Nursing resulted in a serious lack of qualified staff as the occupation authorities deported 36 academics. Recruitment standards at the first stage lacked transparency and quality. The leadership was unable to fix the problem of absenteeism of the staff during the second uprising because of the checkpoints regime in the third stage. The dilemma of financial crisis remains unsolved and casts deep concerns over the university. Paralleling this, the personal interests of employees in terms of salaries and promotion rose to the surface in 2012 because IUG was unable to pay more than 60% of the salary of employees. This affected the morale, commitment and performance of some members of the staff. Leading a university amid a complexity of the environment and through a devastating of circumstances and risky conditions was never easy or without a price. The debates among some of the staff members whether or not to teach underground; whether or not to build Baraksat reflects the risky conditions and the dangers of being arrested, injured or killed. Hence comes the importance of raising the sense of struggle, sacrifice and affiliation and commitment for the sake of the community and for this national project. The leadership succeeded in this.

The leadership realised that some events and shocks are beyond control and cannot be prevented (Rutter, 2007; Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009; Furniss, 2011; Saurin, *et al*., 2012) such as siege and closure, wars and bombing of IUG, but leaders can change the way they react to them and contain their consequences by absorbing the damage and trying to recover and return to normal operation rapidly.

Sometimes challenges and threats are the key to new opportunities (Weick, 1988; Andrews, 1995; Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, *et al*., 2011; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011; Furniss, *et al*., 2011; Strunz, 2012) and open a new horizon for development and prosperity. This represents resilience at its utmost, where resilience should be a strategic approach and agreed upon by the organisation, leadership and employees. The leadership succeeded to turn the conflict with AL-Azhar university, which continued for years, to a good co-operation and relationship between the two neighboring universities.

Keeping control in spite of the complexity of the situation at IUG was an important indicator of resilience and long term objectives of survival and thriving. The leadership deployed several short term strategies that fed into long term strategies. The short term strategies ranged from engage, bypass and concede, to defy and challenge. Some of these strategies were proactive (Reason, 1997; Hollnagel, 2007; Fernandez, 2009) while others were reactive (Reason, 1997; Marcus and Nichols, 1999; Masten and Reed, 2005). These strategies served both long term strategies of resilience in order to achieve not only the survival, but also the thriving objectives (Hollnagel, 2007; Lengnick-Hall, *et al*., 2011). It is not sufficient for big organisations to survive, rather, they need to thrive (Max-Neef, *et al.,* 1991). By moving forward and exploiting any opportunity to thrive, IUG leadership was able to work as an a creative endeavour rather than just adopting survival goals.

One of the important forces that played a dual role at IUG was the Islamic culture based ideology. The literature review provides contradictory results about the role of ideology at institutions. Ideology has a positive impact on the survival (Punamäki, 1996; Khamis, 2000; Shamai, 2002; Haveman and Khaire, 2004; Punamäki, *et al*., 2008) and the success of universities (Glass and Jacobs, 2005). It gives a sense of purpose and works as a protective function in the face of hardships (Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; Laor, *et al*., 2006; Punamäki, *et al*., 2008). In contrast, ideology has a negative impact, it is a risk factor (Jones, 2002; Kanagaratnam, *et al*., 2005). Ideology can be a source of discrimination and fertile ground for developing it (Marriott, *et al*., 2011), and may often mar the decision-making process (Aljardali, *et al*., 2012). Despite the disagreement among scholars about the positive or negative effects of cultural ideology on leadership, employees and the organisation, the case of IUG showed that the Islamic culture based ideology was one of the important factors in promoting the survival of IUG and improving its ability to thrive. It provided followers with a feeling of commitment, partnership and a sense of enthusiasm toward achieving organisational goals and objectives especially in conditions of external threats. This ideological culture places a significant obligation on followers and believers to obey their leaders as long as leaders follow the rules of Islam (Faris and Parry, 2011).

As was discussed in the literature review, resilience can be configured in different ways. The Islamic culture of IUG influenced the way the leadership and staff behaved and acted by raising their faith, commitment, struggle and sacrifice which, in turn, improved their ability to cope with challenges and difficulties in a resilient manner.

Also, the interaction between the different actors and processes provided additional important findings. Some findings of this research were new in the context of HE in turbulent times. Firstly, the leadership has to play different roles in different situations, sometimes in conflict situations and sometimes in post-conflict situations. While other times they have to play their role in both conflict and post-conflict at the same time.

Secondly, the leadership succeeded in combining authenticity and modernity in terms of building a modern university under occupation while maintaining traditional culture and identity.

Thirdly, the leadership succeeded in exploiting the Islamic culture in a positive way that increased the sense of affiliation and loyalty, obedience and commitment, and raising the spirit of struggle and sacrifice for the sake of the university.

Fourthly, in spite of working in dangerous and risky conditions, and in spite of internal conflict and division, the level of social cohesion within the university, and between the university and the community, remained high. This cohesion has played an important role in supporting and protecting the university against Israeli oppression many times, and the community encouraged their youth to enroll at IUG despite risky conditions.

Fifthly, the case of IUG indicates that Palestinian universities are likely to reflect the traits of their dominant culture, whether it is Islamic or secular, and also reflects an exercise of power which should always be implemented with responsibly through ethical principles.

7.3 Recommendations

The environment in which many HEIs, including IUG, operate is still turbulent and full of challenges. This thesis was an attempt to identify the role of leadership in addressing these challenges to ensure the survival of these institutions and the best delivery of education amid these hazardous conditions. Therefore, the lessons and the experiences of IUG were worth searching and recording for the benefit of the future of IUG as well as for HEIs which operate in similar conditions. The recommendations of this study can be briefly presented in two sections: one is for IUG in particular, and the other for HEIs in general.

7.3.1 A Future Approach for IUG

Some of the past challenges which IUG experienced are still facing the new university. At the present stage, the university has developed to be one of the biggest universites in number of students with diversity of specialisations, and it is functioning as a predominantly modern university, that has combined science with religion. Now it requires the adoption of a more traditional human resources

management approach. The new generation of leaders with new relationships to the board and the community, new demands of employees and management structures should be appropriate to a more modern university. It is also no longer sufficient to rely only on religious dedication and cohesion.

This research suggests that in turbulent environments, building capacity for organisational resilience can be achieved through strategically managing HR to fit and align all the functions and practices of HR with the organisation strategy (Delery and Doty, 1996; Demirbag, *et al*., 2010) which supports the contingency SHRM approach in order to achieve urgent and emerging goals. Aligning leadership and employees with the organisation's strategy and objectives is important (Boswell, 2006) to overcome hardships. By doing so, skilled leadership will be able to capitalise on the disturbances, absorb the initial damage, recover and even thrive.

IUG needs to increase and maintain the sense of sacrifice and the struggle capital of both new leaders and the staff in order to improve their ability to cope with hazardous circumstances. Within a SHRM approach (Chadwick, 2005), using the tools of training programmes, workshops, and brainstorming meetings, the leadership needs to demonstrate the ability to lead and direct the discussion. This will allow a deeper understanding of the potential events and threats that the organisation may be exposed to in the future and the consequences of these. This will clarify the different possible scenarios of events and the possible alternatives and solutions to deal with them resiliently with more confidence and with no panic, and thus have an edge over others who are unable to do so (Walsh, 2012).

Leading a big university with financial crisis, political conflict and Israeli constraint and siege is a difficult and complex mission. In recent years after 2012, due to these problems, staff solidarity with the leadership has declined. This implies the need to improve the communication networks between the leadership and employees and between IUG and the community to increase their sense of commitment, sacrifice and solidarity.

The importance of social cohesion was crucial for IUG to survive. IUG has not moved to managerialism – universities run as a business, and students treated as customers, as this ethos might not lead to the social cohesion, trust and loyalty on which IUG depends to survive. Where the managerialist universities rely on a combination of high fees and government subsidies to survive, IUG must rely heavily on donors and investment. Due to economic decline and poverty in the Gaza Strip, IUG was not able to increase tuition fees. Students are part of the social fabric of the university. They protest against the occupation, not against the university. But with the current financial crisis, IUG will have to find alternatives to this dilemma and contain the objection of the Employees' Union of the university to reduce salaries.

It is important to keep IUG as a learning (Stephen and Graham, 2010) and adaptive organisation (Allen, Fontaine, Pope, Garmestani, 2011). Documenting the history and experience of IUG could help new leaders and the staff to benefit from this long experience in managing the institution and confronting hazardous conditions with more confidence and experience.

7.3.2 Reflections on HEIs in Turbulent Times

In a turbulent environment, the responsibilities and tasks of leaders, and the challenges HEIs encounter, increase. Leaders are responsible for policies and strategies; they reap the results as well as pay the price. Particular attention needs to be paid to the context when the leadership executes and implements decisions or strategies in the organisation (Brews and Purohit, 2007).

For deep understanding, and for more clarification about the influence of culture, particularly Islamic culture, we need a conversation round the concepts of both leadership and resilience.

The 23 markers of resilience might be a key starting point and useful for HEIs as they present a complex concept of resilience in a relatively simple structure. The suggested model can be used to identify the components of resilience, strengths and weaknesses, and to evaluate whether their policies and strategies are able to address hardships they

face resiliently. To be resilient at times of disturbances, organisations need to navigate through a set of diverse strategies that juxtapose effective planning with adaptability to changing and challenging circumstances, as IUG leadership demonstrated. Lengnick-Hall, *et al*. (2011) propose that "Firm's capacity for developing organisational resilience is achieved through strategically managing human resources to create individual competencies among core employees, that when aggregated at the organisational level, make it possible for organisations to effectively absorb uncertainty, develop situation-specific responses to threats, and ultimately engage in transformational activities so that they can capitalize on disruptive surprises that potentially threaten their survival".

Achieving these objectives might involve a plan of knowledge sharing, capacity and awareness building of who has what knowledge and who will perform if required in order to cope quickly and properly with hardships. This implies the integration of the SHRM with organisation strategy in order to concentrate on the emerging goals and to achieve the objectives of the institution. In such conditions, the importance of SHRM is increased (Boxall and Purcell, 2000) and could play an important role in the process of preparing those leaders with adequate knowledge and experience to improve their capacities in coping with disturbances and achieving the objectives of their organisation.

Tertiary education can be an agent of change (Hansen and Lehmann, 2006; Stephens, *et al*., 2008) and an engine of national growth, particularly in conflict-ridden societies.

7.4 Further Research

This thesis discussed the role of the leadership at the Palestinian Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) in the turbulent period from 1978 to 2012. Although IUG represents many of the difficulties and the challenges Palestinian universities are exposed to, using IUG as a qualitative case study might limit the generalisability of the results of the study. Therefore, it is important to conduct further studies to examine and confirm the results of this study.

Further studies need to be conducted to confirm the appropriateness of transformational style in turbulent times, and to explore if there is a real need for additional or mixed leadership styles which could be deployed in responding to different kinds of challenges and difficulties. These avenues of research should seek to specify how leadership styles might help organisations in general and HEIs in particular to bounce back and flourish after experiencing hazardous circumstances.

The study found that the Islamic culture of IUG has played an important role in the survival and growth of the university by increasing the sense of faith ,struggle and sacrifice of leaders and folowers for the sake of the university. Nevertheless, it also found that this culture has created tention, some violent clashes and supporter as well as opponnents for funding IUG. Therefore, additional studies should be conducted to clarify the positive/negative role of Islamic culture and ideology within the context of HEIs. Also, specific attention needs to be paid to see if it is possible to avoid the negative side effects of this culture and ideology.

Importantly, the interaction and mutual influence between leadership and culture needs to be investigated in different cultures and settings to clarify the extent to which leadership styles are culture–specific. Faris and Parry (2011) shed some light on this concluding that the leadership cannot be studied fruitfully out of context, and that context invariably is problematic for understanding leadership.

The interaction between leadership and culture in building resilience needs more research. The 23 factors which were presented as good markers of resilience in turbulent times need further interrogation to isolate the most important factors that contribute to institutional resilience. Also, these factors need to be investigated to see whether they have wider applicability or not, and if there are additional markers of resilience which can add value to the existing ones. These further studies might aim to create a hierarchy of factors that promote resilient leadership and organisation in conflict and post-conflict contexts.

This thesis discussed the concept of resilience at the individual, leadership and systems level, arguing that building capacity for organisational resilience strategy in a

turbulent environment requires a contingency SHRM approach. This approach needs more applications and tests in different turbulent environments of HEIs to amplify the results of this study.

Investigating these areas might enable the development of a coherent approach that allows HEIs in turbulent environments of uncertainty and turmoil to move beyond survival to thriving in spite of such extreme adverse conditions.

REFERENCE LIST

Abadsa, J. (2006). The industrial sector in the Gaza Strip on the verge of collapse due to the policy of the Israeli siege. *Palestinian News & Info Agency*. http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=3062

Aguilar, E. (2013). *Student engagement: Lessons from Nelson Mandelas' life and legacy*. http://www.edutopia.org/blog/lessons-nelson-mandela-life-legacy-elena aguilar? utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=blog-nelson-mandela-lessons-from-life-bday-image

Afana, A. (2009). Weeping in silence: the secret sham of torture among Palestinian children**,** *Torture,* 19, (2):167-175.

Aktas, E.; Cicek, I.; Kiyak, M. (2011). The Effect Of Organisational Culture On Organisational Efficiency: The Moderating Role Of Organisational Environment and CEO Values, 7th International Strategic Management Conference, *Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 24:1560-1573.

Al-Ajez, F. (1996). *Development of Public Education in the Gaza Strip*, Dar Alarkam Publications, Gaza.

AL-Aqsa University – Gaza (2014). *Deanship of Planning and development: Statistical Annual Book*. http://www.alaqsa.edu.ps/site_resources/sitefiles/Statistics_2014.pdf

Alawda-Mag. (2013). The terms of Oslo Agreement. *Alawda Magazine,* 9, (72):1-4 http://alawda-mag.com/default.asp?issueId=73&contentid=2843&MenuID=8

Al-Nabulsi, M. (2008). *RamadanTalks* http://www.nabulsi.com/blue/ar/art.php?art=1853&id=212&sid=650&ssid=651&sssid=652

The Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALESCO, 2017). *Statement of ALECSO on the occasion of the Arab Day for Literacy, 8 January*. http://www.alecso.org/site/2016-02-02-13-47-43/1401-8-2017.html

Al-Hasanat, A. (2013). Despite war: IUG students finished their year study. *Al Awda Magazine,* 6, (72): 8-9. http://www.alawda-mag.com/Default.asp?ContentID=879&menuID=8)

Aljardali, H; Kaderi, M; Levy-Tadjine, M. (2012).The implementation of the balanced scorecard in Lebanese public HE institutions. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 62: 98-108.

AL-Khaiatt, A. (2004). *The Political Syestem in Islam:Political Theory and Governance*, (2nd eddition), Dar-Assalam, Eygpt.

Allaire, Y.; and Firsirotu, M. E. (1984). Theories of organisational culture. *Organisational Studies*, 5: 193-226.

Allen, C.R.; Fontaine, J.J.; Pope, K.L.; and Garmestani, A.S. (2011). Adaptive management for a turbulent future. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 92:1339-1345.

AL-Sinwar, Z.; and Mouteer, R. (2009). *The history of the Islamic University of Gaza In thirty years from 1978-2008*, Dar-Alarkam publications-Gaza.

Altbach, P.G. (1987). *HE in the Third World: Themes and variations*. Sangam Books Limited, London.

Alzaroo, S. (1989). *HE in the Palestine occupied territories*: *A series of educational studies* (3), Association of University Research Centre, Hebron- Palestine.

Alzaroo, S.; Hunt. G. L. (2003). Education in the Context of Conflict and Instability: The Palestinian Case. *Social Policy and Administration*, 37, (2):165-180.

Amaratunga, D.; Baldry, D.; Sarshar, M.; and Newton, R. (2002). Quantitative and qualitative research in the built environment: application of "mixed" research approach, *Work Study*, 51, (1):17-31.

Amusan, t. A. (1996). Sources of conflicts in an organisation. *Journal of general studies in education*, 1, (1): 93-99.

Andrews, K. R. (1995). *The concept of corporate strategy*. Homewood. IL; Irwin

Andrews, M. C.; Witt, L.A.; Kacmar, M. K. (2003). The interactive effects of organisational politics and exchange ideology on manager ratings of retention. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 62: 357-369.

AN-Nady, F. (1999). *Principles of Governance in Islam*, Dubai, UAE

AN-Najah National University Website (2016). *Facts and figures*. https://www.najah.edu/ar/about/annu-facts/

Assaf, S. A. (2001). Existing and the future planned desalination facilities in the Gaza Strip of Palestine and their socio-economic and environmental impact. *Desalination*, 138:17-28.

Auerswald, P.; and Van Opstal, D. (2009). *Coping with Turbulence: The Resilience Imperative*. http://www.compete.org/images/uploads/File/PDF%20Files/INNOVATIONS-Davos-2009_Auerswald-vanOpstal.pdf

Aven, T. (2011). On some recent definitions and analysis frameworks for risk, vulnerability and resilience. *Risk Analysis*, 31:515–522.

Awaa, M.S. (2006). *The relationship between Sunnis and Shiites.* Al-Safeer international for publications.

Awad, M. A. (1983). *HE Sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Foundations and Development*, Rural Studies Centre- Al-najah University and Arab Society studies, West Bank.

Azadeh, A.; Salhi, V.; Arvan, M.; and Dolatkhan, M. (2014). Assessment of resilience engineering factors in high-risk environments by fuzzy cognitive maps: A petrochemical plant. *Journal of Safety science*, 68: 99-107.

Baliamoune-Lutz, M. (2009). Institutions, trade, and social cohesion in fragile states: Implications for policy conditionality and aid allocation. *Journal of Policy Modeling,* 31, (6):877-890.

Baramki, G. (2010). *Peaceful Resistance: Building a Palestinian University under Occupation*. Pluto Press- New York.

Balu, R. (2001). How to bounce back from setbacks. *Fast Company*, 45: 148−156.

Barney, J. (1986). Organisational culture: Can it be a source of sustained competitive advantage? *Academy of Management Review*, 11:656–665.

Barney, J. (1991). Firms resources and sustained competitive advantage. *Journal of management,* 43:837-853.

Bartholomew, N. G.; Hiller, M. L.; Knight, K.; Nucatola, D. C.; Simpson, D. D. (2000). Effectiveness of communication and relationship skills training for men in substance abuse treatment. *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment,* 18, (3):217-225.

Barratt, M.; Choi, T. Y.; and Li, M. (2010). Qualitative case studies in operations management: Trends, research outcomes, and future research implications. *Journal of Operations Management*, 29: 329-342.

Bass, M. (1990). From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to Share the Vision. *Organisational Dynamics,* 18, (3): 19-31.

Bass, B. M.; and Avolio, B. J. (1990). Developing transformational leadership: 1992 and beyond. *Journal of European Industrial Training*, 14:21-27.

Bathelt, H.; Malmberg, A.; and Maskell, P. (2004). Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation. *Progress in Human Geography,* 28, (1): 31–56.

Batniji, R.; Rabaia, Y.; Nguyen–Gillham, V.; Giacaman, R.; Sarraj, R.; Punamaki, R., L.; Saab, H.; and Boyce, W. (2009). Health in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 4: Health as human security in the occupied Palestinian territory. *Lancet*, 373: 1133-1143.

Baum, R.; Locke, E.; and Smith, K. (2001). A multi-dimensional model of venture growth. *Academy of Management Journal* 44: 292–303.

Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. *Journal of Political Economy*, 70, (5): 9-49.

Becker, G. S. (1964). Human Capital. *Columbia University Press*, New- York.

Becker, G.S. (1975). Human Capital. *Chicago University Press*, Chicago, IL.

Beekun, R.; and Badawi, J. (1999). The leadership process in Islam. A *Journal of Ideas, Leaders and Leadership*, 16, (2): 33−38.

Beer, M.; Voelpel, S. V.; Leibold, M.; and Tekie, E. B. (2005). Strategic management as organisational learning: developing fit and alignment through a disciplined process. *Long Range Planning*, 38: 445–465.

Bennis, W. (2007). The challenges of leadership in the modern world: introduction to the special issue. *American Psychologist, 62*, (1), 2-5.

Bernardo, M.A.C.; and Baranovich, D.-L. (2014). HE in the heart of conflict: The pivotal role of student affairs. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 35: 78-85.

Bethlehem University (2017). Mission and History https://www.bethlehem.edu/about/mission-history

Betts, J.; and Lee, C.W.B. (2005). *Universities as drivers of regional and national innovation: an assessment of the linkages from universities to innovation and economic growth*. In: Beach, C.M., Boadway, R.W., McInnis, R.M. (Eds.), HE in Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kingston: 113–157.

Bilville, BR; Willson, N. (2012). *How to Analyze a Historical Document*. http://www.wikihow.com/Analyze-a-Historical-Document

Birzeit University (2017). *Facts and Figures: Student Body (2016/2017)* https://www.birzeit.edu/en/about/bzu-in-numbers

Bontis, N. (1998). Intellectual capital: An exploratory study that develops measures and models. *Management Decision*, 36, (2): 63–76.

Boswell, W. R. (2006). Aligning employees with the organisation's strategic objectives: Out of "line of sight", out of mind. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 17, (9): 1489–1511.

Bowen, D. E.; and Ostroff, C. (2004). Understanding HRM–firm performance linkage: The role of the "strength" of the HRM system. *Academy of Management Review*, 29: 203–221.

Boxall, P.; and Purcell, J. (2000). Strategic human resource management: Where have we come from and where should we be going? *International Journal of Management Reviews*, 2, (2): 183−203.

Boyd, N., G.; Lewin, J., E.; and Sager, J., K. (2009). A model of stress and coping and their influence on individual and organisational outcomes. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour,* 75: 197–211.

Bramwell, A.; and Wolfe, D. (2008). Universities and regional economic development: The entrepreneurial University of Waterloo. *Research Policy* 37: 1175–1187.

Brand, L. (1991). *The Palestinians in the Arab World*, Palestine studies foundation, Beirut.

Brannen, J. (1992). *Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research*, Aldershot: Avebury.

Brews, P.; and Purohit, D. (2007). Strategic Planning in Unstable Environments. *Long Range Planning*, 40:64-83.

Briggs, D. (2011). *Religion and HE: The effect on faith of being smarter than a fifth-grader*. http://blogs.thearda.com/trend/featured/religion-and-higher-education-the-effect-on-faith-of-being-smarter-than-a-fifth-grader/

Britten, N. (2011). Qualitative research on health communication: What can it contribute? *Patient Education and Counselling,* 82: 384–388.

Bryman, A.; and Bell, E. (2003). *Business Research Methods*, Oxford University Press.

B'Tselem, (2010). *Gaza Strip*: *Background on the Gaza Strip*. http://www.btselem.org/topic/gaza_strip,

Burke, M.E.; Morris; G.J.; Tattersall, A. (2012). *University Leadership in Turbulent times: An Exploration of 'Urban and Edgy' Institutions*. Leadership foundation for Higher Education, University of Salford, Manchester.

Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. New York: Harper & Row.

Burrell, G.; and Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological paradigms and organisation analysis*. London; 7 Heinemann.

Butler, J. E.; Ferris, G. R.; & Napier, N. K. (1991). *Strategy and human resource management*. Cincinnati: South-Western.

Bush, K.; and Saltarelli, D. (2000). *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*. Innocenti Research Centre, UNICEF, Florence

Camillzts, J. C.; Datta, D. K. (1991). Managing Strategic Issues in a Turbulent Environment, *Long Range Planning*, 21, (2): 67-71.

Chadwick, C. (2005). The vital role of strategy in strategic human resource management education, *Human Resource Management Review*, 15: 200-213.

Chathotha, P. K.; and Olsen, M. D (2007). The effect of environment risk, corporate strategy, and capital structure on firm performance: An empirical investigation of restaurant firms. *Hospitality Management*, 26: 502-516.

Chenoweth, J.; Wehrmeyer, W.; Lipchin, C.; Smith, J.; Gazit, T. (2007). A comparison of environmental visions of university students in Israel and Palestine, *Futures*, 39: 685-703.

Choi, T.Y.; and Hong, Y. (2002). Unveiling the structure of supply networks: case studies in Honda, Acura and Daimler. *Chrysler Journal of Operations Management*, 20:469–493.

Christie, P.; Butler, D.; and Potterton, M. (2007). *Schools that work: Report to the minister of education, ministerial committee*. http://www.sbmmetsouth.co.za/Schools_that_work_ministerial_committee_report.pdf

Claeys, A. S.; and Cauberghe, V. (2012). Crisis response and crisis timing strategies, two sides of the same coin. *Public Relations Review*, 38, (1):83-88.

Collier, P.; and Hoeffer, A. (2004). Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies. *European Economic Review*, 48:1125–1145.

Colbert, B. A. (2004). The complex resource-based view: Implications for theory and practice in strategic human resource management. *Academy of Management Review*, 29:341-358.

Collier, P.; Hoeffler, A.; and Söderbom, M. (2006). *Post-Conflict risk*. www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-12text.pdf

Collins, C.; and Smith, K. G. (2006). Knowledge exchange and combination: The role of human resources practices in the performance of high technology firms. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49:544–560.

Collins, J.; Driscoll, M. (2008). *Corporate Leadership Training for Adaptability*. http://www.adapTableleadership.com/2008/11/corporate-leadership-training-for.html

Cortese, A. D. (2003). The critical role of Higher Education in creating a sustainable future. *Planning for Higher Education,* 31(3): 15-22.

Corrall, S. (2008). Information literacy strategy development in Higher Education: An exploratory study. *International Journal of Information Management*, 28 (1): 26–37.

Costella, M.F.; Saurin, T.A.; Guimarães, L.B.M. (2009). A method for assessing health and safety management systems from the resilience engineering perspective. *Safety Science*, 47, (8): 1056-1067.

Coutu, D. L. (2002). How resilience works. *Harvard Business Review*, 80, (5): 46−55.

Craig, E. J. (2011). *Meeting the Ethical Challenges of leadership: Casting Light or Shadow*, 4th edition, SAGE Publications, London.

Creswell, J. (2003). *Research Design*: *Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Sage Publications: London 2nd edition.

Creswell, J. W.; and Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into Practice*, 39, (3): 124-131.

Dator, J. (2005). Universities without quality and quality without universities. *On The Horizon*, 13, (4): 199-215.

David, M.; and Sutton C. (2004). *Social research: the basics*, CA: Sage.

Davies, L. (2004). *Education and Conflict: complexity and Chaos*. Routledge Falmer, New York, NY.

Delery, J. E.; Doty, D. H. (1996). Modes of theorizing in strategic human resource management: Tests of universalistic, contingency, and configurational performance predictions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39, (4): 802-835.

Delery, J. (1998). Issues of fit in strategic human resource management implications for research, *Human Resource Management Review*, 8, (3): 289-309**.**

Demirbag, M.; Tatoglu, E.; Glaister, K.; and Zaim, S. (2010). Measuring strategic decision making efficiency in different country contexts: A comparison of British and Turkish firms, *Omega*, 38: 95-104.

DeMunck, V. C.; and Sobo, E. J. (Eds) (1998). *Using methods in the field: a practical introduction and casebook*. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press.

Denison, D.R.; and Mishra, A.K. (1995). Toward a theory of organizational culture and effectiveness. *Organization Science*, 6 (2): 204-223.

Denzin, N. K.; and Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Derissen, S.; Quaas, M.; Baumgärtner, S. (2011). The relationship between resilience and sustainability of ecological–economic systems. *Ecological Economics*, 70, (6):1121–1128.

de Santisteban, A. V. (2002). Palestinian education: a national curriculum against all odds. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 22: 145–154.

Dessler, G. (2008). *Human Resource Management*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Devanna, M. A., Fombrum, C., Tichy, N., & Warren, L. (1982). Strategic planning and human resource management. *Human Resource Management*, 21: 11–17.

DeWalt, K. M.; and DeWalt, B. R. (2002). *Participant observation: a guide for fieldworkers*. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press.

Dimmock, C.; Walker, A. (2000). Introduction – justifying a cross-cultural comparative approach to school leadership and management. *School Leadership and Management*, 20, (2): 137-141.

Dinh, L. T.T; Pasman, H.; Gao, X. and Mannan, M. S. (2012). Resilience engineering of industrial processes: Principles and contributing factors. *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries*, 25: 233-241.

Dobre, L. (2015). Learning Management Systems for HE - an overview of available options for HE Organisations, *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences,* 180: 313-320.

Douglass, J. A. (2010). Creating a Culture of Aspiration: HE, Human Capital, and Social Change, *Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 2: 6981–6995.

Dyer, G.; and Dyer, M. (2016). Strategic leadership for sustainability by higher education: the American College & University Presidents' Climate Commitment. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 28 August 2015

Dyson, R. (2004). Strategic development and SWOT analysis at the University of Warwick. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 152: 631-640.

Easterby-Smith, M.; Thorpe, R.; and Lowe, A. (2002) *Management Research,* 2nd Edition, Sage, London.

Eisenhardt, K. M.; and Bourgeois, L. J. (1988). Politics of strategic decision making in high velocity environments: Toward a midrange theory. *Academy of Management Journal*, 31, 737-770.

Ellison, C. G. (1991). Race, religious involvement and depressive symptomatology in a south eastern U.S. community. *Social Science & Medicine*, 40: 1561-1572.

Endersby, F. (2012). *Building resilience in a time of turbulence*. http://solo-consultancy.com/2012/03/27/building-resilience-in-a-time-of-turbulence-written-by-fiona-endersby/

Enders, J. (2015). HE Management. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences*, 2: 845-849.

Enshassi, A. (2000). Environmental concerns for construction growth in Gaza Strip. *Building and Environment*, 35: 273-279.

EPACBI, (2015). *Palestinian Universities under Occupation*. http://www.bricup.org.uk/2015DelegationReport.pdf

Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. New York: Norton.

Faris, N.; and Parry, K. (2011). Islamic organisational leadership within a Western society: The problematic role of external context. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22, (1):132-151.

Farranah, H. (1985). *The reality of Higher Education in Palestine under occupation*, HE department (PLO).

Fernandez, A. (2009). Strategic Human Resource Management in a Challenging and Turbulent Environment: Aligning HRM Practices with Business Strategy. *Vidyasagar University Journal of Commerce*, 14: 67-76.

Fidler, B. (2000). Editorial: the need for a situational and contextual framework for school improvement. *School Leadership and Management*, 20 (2): 133–136.

Fiegenbaum, A., Hart, S. L., and Schendel, D. E. (1996). Strategic reference point theory. *Strategic Management Journal*, 17, 216–236.

Figueiro, P. S.; Raufflet, E. (2015). Sustainability in Higher Education: a systematic review with focus on management education. *Journal of Cleaner Production,* 106: 22-33.

Filipov, F. (2006). *Post-conflict Peace-building: Strategies and Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leone. Some thoughts from the rights to education and health*. United Nation publications, Santiago, Chile.

Fitchett, G., Rybarczyk, B. D., DeMarco, G. A., and Nicholas, J. J. (1999). The role of religion in medical rehabilitation outcomes: a longitudinal study. *Rehabilitation Psychology*, 44: 333-353.

Fitz-enz, J. (2009). *The ROI of Human Capital: Measuring the economic value of employee performance*. 2nd edition, AMACOM, New York.

Fitz-enz, J. (2010). The new HR analytics: Predicting the economic value of your company's human capital investments, AMACOM (American Management Association) New York.

Florida, R. (2002). *The Rise of the Creative Class*. Basic Books, New York.

Forbus, K. (2008). *Qualitative Modeling Handbook of Knowledge Representation* Edited by F. van Harmelen, V. Lifschitz and B. Porter.

Franzen, A., and Pointers, S. (2011). Calling social capital: An analysis of the determinants of success on the TV quiz show "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" *Social Networks*, 33: 79-87.

Freeman, S. F.; Maltz, M.; and Hirschhorn, L. (2004). The power of moral purpose: Sandler O'Neill and partners in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, *Organisation Development Journal*, 22, (4): 69−82.

Furniss, D.; Back, J.; Blanford, A.; Heldebrandt, M.; Broberg, H. (2011). A resilience markers framework for small teams. *Reliability Engineering and System Safety*, 96:2-10.

Gallagher, A. H.; Fontenot, M.; Boyle, K. (2007). Communicating during times of crises: An analysis of news releases from the federal government before, during, and after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. *Public Relations Review*, 33, (2):217-219.

García-Martínez, J. A.; and Vega-Redondo, F. (2015). Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism. *Games and Economic Behaviour*, 92: 74-105.

Georgetown University Website (2016). https://www.georgetown.edu

Gertler, M.S.; Vinodrai, T., (2005). *Anchors of creativity: how do public universities create competitive and cohesive communities?* In: Iacobucci.

Giacaman, R.; Abu-Rmeileh, N.; Husseini, A.; Saab, H.; and Boyce, W. (2007). Humiliation: the invisible trauma of war for Palestinian youth. *Public Health*, 121: 563-571.

Giacaman, R.; Mataria, A.; Nguyen-Gillham, V.; Abu Safieh, R.; Stefanini, A.; and Chatterji, S. (2007). Quality of life in the Palestinian context: An inquiry in war-like conditions. *Health Policy*, 81: 68–84.

Gittell, J. H.; Cameron, K.; Lim, S.; Rivas, V. (2006). Relationships, layoffs, and organisational resilience: Airline industry responses to September 11th. *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science*, 42, (3): 300−330.

Goddard, A.; Powell, J. (1994). Accountability and accounting: using naturalistic methodology to enhance organisational control: a case study. Accounting, *Auditing and Accountability Journal*, 7, (2): 50–69.

Glass, J.; and Jacobs, J. (2005). "Childhood Religious Conservatism and Adult Attainment among Black and White Women". *Social Forces* 84: 555-579.

Grandi, F. (2011) "*Tiptoeing away from UNRWA not an option*", Commissioner-General tells Fourth Committee, Annual Report. http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1492

Grimsley, S. (2010).*Contingency Approach of Management: Definition, Example & Quiz*. http://education-portal.com/academy/lesson/contingency-approach-of-management-definition-example-quiz.html#lesson

Grossman, J.H., Reid, P.P., Morgan, R.P. (2001). Contributions of academic research to industrial performance in five industry sectors. *Journal of Technology Transfer*, 26, (1–2): 143–152.

Green, J.; Thorogood, N. (2004). *Qualitative methods for health research: Introducing qualitative methods series*. London: Sage Publications.

Gulzar, A. (2014). *Advantages and Disadvantages of Co-Education system* http://www.studylecturenotes.com/foundation-of-education/advantages-disadvantages-of-co-education-system

Hadawi, S. (1968). *Palestine occupied*. Palestine Information centre, Beirut.

Hair, Jr., J. F.; Wolfinbarger, M. F.; Ortinau, D. J.; and Bush, R. P. (2008). *Essentials of Marketing Research*. New York: McGraw-Hill HE.

Hallinger, P.; Leithwood, K. (1998). Unseen forces: the impact of social culture on school leader. *Peabody Journal of Education*, 73 (2): 126-151.

Hamdhaidari, S.; Agahi, H.; and Papzan, A. (2008). HE during the Islamic government of Iran (1979–2004). *International Journal of Education development*, 28: 231-245.

Hansen, J. A.; and Lehmann, M. (2006). Agents of change: universities as development hubs. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 14:820-829.

Hardy, C. (2015). *Organisational authority and power*. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences (Second Edition), Pages 405-410.

Harkavy, I. (2006). The role of universities in advancing citizenship and social justice in the 21st century. *Education, Citizenship and social justice*, 1, (1): 5–37.

Harris, A.; and Chapman, C. (2002). *Effective leadership in schools facing challenging circumstances*, London: National College for School Leadership.

Hatch, M. J. (1993). The dynamics of organisational culture. *Academy of Management Review*, 18: 657– 693.

Haveman, H. A.; Khaire, M. V. (2004). Survival beyond succession? The contingent impact of founder succession on organisational failure. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 19: 437-463.

Heleta, S. (2015). *How to rebuild higher education in countries torn apart by war*. http://theconversationafrica.cmail2.com/t/r-l-zyhidtd-dluhqtdq-d/

Henisz, W.; and Zelner, B. (2003). The strategic organisation of political risks and opportunities. *Strategic Organisation*, 1, (4): 451–460.

Hibbing, J.R.; Smith, K.B.; Peterson, J.C. Feher, B. (2014). The deeper sources of political conflict: evidence from the psychological, cognitive, and neuro-sciences. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences,* 18, (3):111-113.

Hicks, D.; and Gidley, J. (2012). Future education: Case studies, theories and transformational speculations. *Futures*, 44:1-3.

Hilal, R. (2012).Vocational Education and Training for women and youth in Palestine: Poverty reduction and gender equality under occupation. *International Journal of Educational Development,* 32:686-695.

Hildon, Z.; Montgomery, S. M.; Blane, D.; Wiggins, R. D.; Netuveli, G. (2010). Examining resilience of quality of life in the face of health-related and psychosocial adversity at older ages: what is "right" about the way we age? *The Gerontologist*, 50, (1):36-47.

Hitt, M. A.; Bierman, L.; Shimizu, K.; and Kochhar, R. (2001). Direct and moderating effects of human capital on strategy and performance in professional service firms: A resource-based perspective. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44, (1): 13−28.

Hobfoll, S. E.; Mancini, A. D.; Hall, B. J.; Canetti, D.; and Bonanno, G. A. (2011). The limits of resilience: Distress following chronic political violence among Palestinians. *Social Science & Medicine*, 72:1400-1408.

Hofstede, G. (1984). National cultures revisited. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 2 (1): 22–28.

Hoogervorst, N.; De Cremer, D.; van Dijke, M.; and M. Mayer, D. (2012). When do leaders sacrifice?: The effects of sense of power and belongingness on leader self-sacrifice. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 23, (5) 883-896.

Holliday, A. (2007). *Doing and Writing Qualitative Research*. 2nd Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Hollnagel, E. (2007). *Why do we need resilience engineering*? http://www.sites.google.com/site/erikHollnagel2/whatisresilienceengineering%3F

Hollnagel, E. (2009). *The four cornerstones of resilience engineering*. In: Nemeth, C.P., Hollnagel, E., Dekker, S. (Eds.), *Resilience Engineering Perspective: Preparation and Restoration*. Ashgate, Aldershot.

Hollnagel, E.; Paries, J.; Woods, D.; Wreathall, J. (2011). *Resilience Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook*. (7th ed.), Ashgate, London.

Hollnagel, E.; Woods, D.; Leveson, N., (2006). *Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts*. Taylor & Francis, London.

Honderich, T. (1995). *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford Press, Oxford.

Horne, J. F. I.; and Orr, J. E. (1998). Assessing behaviours that create resilient organisations. *Employee Relations Today*, 24, (4): 29−39.

Hsiaoa, H-C.; Cheng, Y-S. (2006). The impact of ideology on the interaction between tutors and students in the education of industrial design: A case study in Taiwan. *International Journal of Educational Development,* 26:6–23.

Huang, H. C.; Lai, M. C.; and Lin, T. H. (2011). Aligning intangible assets to innovation in biopharmaceutical industry, *Expert Systems with Applications*, 38: 3827-3834.

Huselid, M.A.; Jackson, D.E.; and Schuler, R.S. (1997). Technical And Strategic Human Resource Management Effectiveness As Determinants Of Firm Performance, *Academy Of Management Journal*, 40, (1): 171-188.

IIUI (2017). *Female Campus: An Overview* http://www.iiu.edu.pk/index.php?page_id=28

IIUM (2017). *About IIUM: Vision* http://a.iium.edu.my/ar/about-iium/iium-vision

ISESCO (2004). *The Islamic declaration about cultural diversity*. Approved from the fourth Islamic conference for minsters of culture, Algeria. http://www.isesco.org.ma/ar/wp content/uploads/sites/3/2015/05/DivcultAR.pdf

Iwasaki, I. (2014). Global financial crisis, corporate governance, and firm survival: The Russian experience. *Journal of Comparative Economics,* 42, (1):178-211

IUG Website news (2012). *First in the Arab world: the celebration at the Islamic University of opening the UNESCO Chair in Astronomy and Astrophysics and Space Science*. http://www.iugaza.edu.ps/ar/Media/news.aspx?NewsId=11366

IUG Website (2012). *About the Islamic University of Gaza: Vision*. http://www.iugaza.edu.ps/en/About/IntrducingIug.aspx

Jabareen, Y.; and Camron, N. (2010). Community of trust: A socio- cultural approach for community planning and the case of Gaza, *Habitat International* 34: 446-453.

Jack, S.; and Baxter, P. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report*, 13, (4): 544-559. http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf

Jackson, S. E.; and Schuler, R. S. (1995). Understanding human resource management in the context of organisations and their environments. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 46: 237–264.

Javanmard, G.H. (2013). Religious Beliefs and Resilience in Academic Students. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 84: 744-748.

Jones, L. (2002). Adolescent understandings of political violence and psychological well- being: a qualitative study from Boznia-Herzegovina. *Social Science & Medicine*, 55: 1351-1371.

Judge, T. A.; Bono, J.; Illes, R.; and Gerhardt, M. (2002). Personality and leadership: A qualitative and quantitative review. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87: 765-780.

Kabasakal, H.; and Bodur, M. (2002). Arabic cluster: A bridge between East and West. *Journal of World Business*, 37, (1): 40–54.

Kabasakal, H.; and Dastmalchian, A. (2001). Introduction to leadership and culture in the Middle Eastern countries: Norms, practices and effective leadership attributes in Iran, Kuwait, Turkey and Qatar. Applied Psychology: *An International Review*, 50(4): 479-495.

Kabasakal, H.; Dastmalchian, A.; Karacay, G.; Bayraktar, S. (2012). Leadership and culture in the MENA region: An analysis of the GLOBE project. *Journal of World Business*, 45, (5):519-529.

Kahveci, T.C.; Taskin, H. (2013). Integrated enterprise management system for HEIs based on strategic and process management: the case study of Sakarya University. 4th International conference on new Horizons in education. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences 106: 1505 – 1513.*

Kanagaratnam, P.; Raundalen, M.; and Asbjornsen, A. E. (2005). Ideological commitment and posttraumatic stress in former Tamil child soldiers. *Scandinavian, Journal of Psychology*, 46: 511-520.

Katharaki, M.; and Katharakis, G. (2010). A comparative assessment of Greek universities' efficiency using quantitative analysis. *International Journal of Educational Research* 49: 115–128.

King Abdul Aziz University, KAU (2014). Our History, http://www.kau.edu.sa/Pages-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7.aspx

Kawulich, B. B. (2005). Participant Observation as a Data Collection Method. *Qualitative Social Research*, 6 (2). http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/466/996

Kevorkian, N. (2003). Liberating voices: The political implications of Palestinian mother's loss. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26, (5): 391-407.

Kevorkian, N.; and Khsheiboun, S. (2009). Palestinian women's voices challenging human rights activism. *Women's Studies International Forum,* 32: 354–362.

Khamis, V. (2000). *Political violence and the Palestinian family: Implications for mental health and well-being*. New York: Haworth Press.

Khamis, V. (2012). Impact of war, religiosity and ideology on PTSD and psychiatric disorders in adolescents from Gaza Strip and South Lebanon. *Social Science & Medicine*, 74: 2005-2011

Kilmann, R. H. (1985). Corporate culture: managing the intangible style of corporate life may be the key to avoiding stagnation. *Psychology Today,* 19 (4): 62-68.

Kim, J.H.; Kim, C. S.; Kim, J.M. (2011). Analysis of the effect of leadership and organisational culture on the organisational effectiveness of radiological technologist's working environments. *Radiography*, 17:201-.206.

Kirkhaug, R. (2010). Antecedents of risk in compliance enhancing organisations. *International Journal of Organisational Analysis*, 18, (4): 430-441.

Kitzinger J. (1995). Qualitative research. Introducing focus groups. *British Medical Journal*, 311, (7000):299-302.

Knight, M. (2012). *Changing times in UK universities what difference can HR make*? http://www.uhr.ac.uk/uploadedfiles/documents/Changing%20times%20in%20UK%20universities%20(print%20version).pdf

Koo, OH; Choi, OS. (2000). The relationship between the nurse's followership, job satisfaction and organisational commitment. *Journal Nurses Academic Soc.*, 30:1245-1264.

Koolhaas, J. M; Bartolomucci, A.; Buwalda, B.; de Boer, S., F.; Flügge, G.; Korte, S., M.; Meerlo, P.; Murison, R.; Olivier, B.; Palanza, P.; Richter-Levin, G.; Sgoifo, A.; Steimer, T.; Stiedl , O.; van Dijk, G.; Wöhr, M.; and Fuchs, E. (2011). Stress revisited: A critical evaluation of the stress concept. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews*, 35: 1291–1301.

Kotter, J. P.; and Heskett, J.L. (1992). *Corporate culture and performance*. New York: The Free Press.

Krueger, R. A. (2002). *Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews* http://www.eiu.edu/~ihec/Krueger-FocusGroupInterviews.pdf

King Saoud University, KSU (2015). *Girls Campus*. http://ksu.edu.sa/ar/colleges/female_colleges (Accessed on 14 Oct. 2015).

Kwiek, M.; and Maassen, P. (2012). *Higher Education in Turbulent Times. Concluding Reflections*, in National Higher Education Reforms in a European Context: Comparative Reflections on Poland and Norway. International Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt.

Laor, N.; Wolmer, L.; Alon, M.; Siev, J.; Samuel, E.; & Toren, P. (2006). Risk and protective factors mediating psychological symptoms and ideological commitment of adolescents facing continuous terrorism. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 194: 279-286.

Lee, M. (2014). Transformational Leadership: Is It Time For A Recall? *International Journal of Management and Applied Research*. 1, (1): 17-29.

Leithwood, K.; and Riehl, C. (2005). *What do we already know about educational leadership*? In W. Firestone and C. Riehl (ed.) A new agenda for research in Educational Leadership, New York: Teachers College Press.

Lengnick-Hall, M.; Lengnick-Hall, C.; Andrade, L.; and Drake, B. (2009). Strategic human resource management: The evolution of the field. *Human Resource Management Review*, 19: 64–85.

Lengnick-Hall, C. A.; and Beck, T. E. (2005). Adaptive fit versus robust transformation: How organisations respond to environmental change. *Journal of Management*, 31, (5): 738−757.

Lengnick-Hall, C. A.; Beck, T. E.; and Lengnick-Hall, M. L. (2011). Developing a capacity for organisational resilience through strategic human resource management. *Human Resource Management Review*, 21: 243-255.

Lengnick-Hall, C. A.; and Lengnick-Hall, M. L. (1998). Strategic human resource management: A review of the literature and a proposed typology. *Academy of Management Review*, 13: 454–470.

Leonidou, L. C.; Talias, M. A.; Leonidou, C. N. (2008). Exercised power as a driver of trust and commitment in cross-border industrial buyer–seller relationships. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 37, (1): 92-103.

Lepak, D. P.; and Snell, S. A. (1998). Virtual HR: SHRM in the 21st century. *Human Resource Management*, 8: 215-234.

Lepak, D. P.; and Snell, S. A. (1999). The human resource architecture: Toward a theory of human capital allocation and development. *Academy of Management Review*, 24, (1): 31-48.

Lim, CS. (2009). *A study on effects of organisational culture and chief executive leadership on the effectiveness of local governments*. Public Administration Graduate School, Keimyung University.

Lozano, R. (2006). Incorporation and institutionalization of Sustainable Development 'SD' into universities: breaking through barriers to change. *Journal of Cleaner Production,* 14, (9-11): 787-796.

Lozano, R. (2010). Diffusion of sustainable development in universities' curricula: an empirical example from Cardiff University. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 18: 637–644.

Lozano, R.; Lukman, R.; Lozano, F.J.; Huisingh, D.; and Lambrechts, W. (2013). Declarations for sustainability in Higher Education: Becoming better leaders, through addressing the university system. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 48:10-19.

Lyons, R.F.; Mickelson, K.D.; Sullivan, M.J.L.; Coyne, J.C. (1998). Coping as a communal process. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 15: 579–605.

Maclure, R.; and Denov, M. (2009). Reconstruction versus: Post-war education and the struggle for gender equity in Sierra Leone, *International Journal of Educational Development*, 29:612–620.

Maddi, S.R.; and Khoshaba, D.M. (2005). *Resilience at work: How to succeed no matter what life throws at you*. http://www.amazon.com/Resilience-Work-Succeed-Matter-Throws/dp/0814415954

Macfarlane, B. (2011). Professors as intellectual leaders: formation, identity and role. *Studies in Higher Education*, 36, (1): 57-73.

Maharey, S. (2011). *HE: challenges for developing countries.* http://www.cedol.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Steve-Maharey-article.pdf

Mahshi, K. (1978). *The situation of HE in the occupied territories and principles of developing it*. Berziet Publications.

Mamman, A.; Kamoche, K.; and Bakuwa, R. (2012). Diversity, organisational commitment and organisational citizenship behaviour: An organizing framework. *Human Resource Management Review*, 22, (4):285-302.

Manktelow, J.; and Carlson, A. (2013).*Leadership Styles: Choosing the Right Style for the Situation*. http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newLDR_84.htm

Marcus, A.A.; and Nichols, M.L. (1999). On the edge: heeding the warnings of unusual events. *Organisation Science*, 10, (4): 482-99.

Marginson, S. (2010). HE in the Global Knowledge Economy Procedia, *Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 2: 6962–6980.

Marriott, J.; Hooley, T.; Weller, P. (2011). *Religion and Belief in HE: The experiences of staff and students*. http://www.derby.ac.uk/files/arriott_j._hooley_t._and_weller_p._2011_religion_and_belief_in_higher_education_the_experiences_of_staff_and_students_appendix_3_literature_review.pdf

Martin-Breen, P; and Anderies, M. (2011). *Resilience: A Literature Review*. www.rockefellerfoundation.org/.../a63827c7-f22d-495c-a2ab-99447a88

Martinuzzi, B. (2008). *The Agile Leader: Adaptability, Do you "fit" your circumstances?* http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newLDR_49.htm

Marshall, C.; and Rossman, G. B. (1989). *Designing qualitative research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Marzbali, M.H.; Abdullah, A.; Abd Razak, N.; Javad, M.; and Tilaki, M. (2014). Examining social cohesion and victimization in a Malaysian multiethnic neighborhood. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice,* 42, (4):384-405.

Massyrova, R; Tautenbaeva, A.; Tussupova, A.; Zhalalova, A.; and Bissenbayeva (2015). Changes in the HE system of Kazakhstan. *Procedia-Social and Behavioural Sciences,* 185: 49-53.

Masten, A. S.; Best, K. M.; and Garmezy, N. (1990). Resilience and development: Contributions from the study of children who overcome adversity. *Development and Psychopathology*, 2, (4): 425-444.

Masten, A. S.; and Obradovic, J. (2006). Competence and resilience in development. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1094:13-27.

Masten, A. S.; Reed, M. J. (2005). *Resilience in development*. In C. R. Synder, and S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Mattalia, C. (2012). Human capital accumulation in R&D-based growth models. *Economic modelling*, 29:601-609.

Mattox II, J. R.; and Jinkerson, D. L. (2005). Using survival analysis to demonstrate the effects of training on employee retention. *Evaluation and Program Planning*, 28, (4):423-430.

Max-Neef, M. A.; Elizadle, A.; and Hopenhayn, M. (1991). *Human scale development: Application and further reflections*. The Apex Press, New York.

McClellan, J. (2006). Lessons for academic emergency and disaster management degree programs. *Journal of Security Education*, 1, (4): 39-49.

McKinnon, J. (1988). Reliability and validity in field research: some strategies and tactics. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal*, 1, (1): 34–54.

McManus, S.; Seville, E.; Vargo, J.; and Brunsdon, D. (2008). A Facilitated Process for Improving Organisational Resilience. *Natural Hazardous Review*, 9, (2):81-90.

Mellor, N.; Mackay, C.; Packham, C.; Jones, R.; Palferman, D.; Webster, S.; and Kelly, P. (2011). 'Management Standards' and work-related stress in Great Britain: Progress on their implementation. *Safety science*, 49: 1040- 1046.

Merriam, S. B. (2001) *'Case Studies as Qualitative Research', In Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

Miller, K. E.; and Rasmussen, A. (2010).War exposure, daily stressors, and mental health in conflict and post conflict settings: Bridging the divide between trauma-focused and psychosocial frameworks, *Social Science & Medicine*, 70:7-16.

Mintzberg, H.; Raisininghani, D.; and Theoret, A. (1976). The structure of unstructured decision processes. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 21: 246-275.

Mirkamali, S.M.; Thani, F.N.; Alami, F. (2011). Examining the role of transformational leadership and job satisfaction in the organisational learning of an automotive manufacturing company, *Procedia Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 29:139-148.

Moaddel, M.; Thornton, A.; Karabenick, S.; Young-DeMarcco, L.; de Jong, J. (2013). *The Arab Spring: What it represents & implications for national security* (Data from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, & Saudi Arabia) http://mevs.org/files/tmp/ArabSpring.pdf

Mohammadi, A.; Youzbashi, A. (2012). The study of the relationship between philosophic mind and leadership styles of managers of physical education offices in Iran. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 47:168-170.

Moretti, F.; van Vliet, L.; Bensing, J.; Deledda, G; Mazzi, M.; Rimondini, M.; Zimmermann, C.; Fletcher, I. (2011). A standardized approach to qualitative content analysis of focus group discussions from different countries. *Patient Education and Counseling*, 82: 420–428.

Morgeson, F. P.; and Hofmann, D. A. (1999). The structure and function of collective constructs: Implications for multilevel research and theory development. *Academy of Management Review*, 24, (2): 249−265.

Morrison, A.; Popham, M.; and Wikander, K. (1988). *Creating and Documenting Electronic Texts*. http://ota.ahds.ac.uk/documents/creating/cdet/chap2.html

Mowday, R. T; Steers, RM.; Porter, LW. (1979). The measurement of organisational commitment. *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, 14:224-247.

Mowery, D. C.; Nelson, R. R.; Sampat, B. N.; Ziedonis, A. A., (2004). *Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: University–Industry Technology Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act*. Stanford Business Books, Stanford.

Muller-Christ, G.; Sterling, S.; van Dam-Mieras, R.; Adombent, M.; Fisher, D.; Rieckmann, M. (2014). The role of campus, curriculum, and community in HE for sustainable development- a conference report. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 62:134-137.

Mumford, T. V.; Campion, M. A.; Morgeson, F. P. (2007). The leadership skills strataplex: leadership skill requirements across organisational levels. *Leadership Quarterly*, 18:154–166.

Muthanna, A.; and Karaman, A. C. (2014). HE challenges in Yemen: Discourses on English teacher education, *International Journal of Educational Development*, 37: 40-47.

Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook Online*8 http://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/content.

Neuman, W. (2011). *Social research methods, qualitative and quantitative approaches*, 6th ed., Pearson Education Inc., USA.

News Rescue (2011). World's First University: Timbuktu. http://newsrescue.com/worlds-first-university-timbuktu/#axzz4JdGpkIVj

Nicolai, S. (2007). Fragmented Foundation: education and Chronic Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. http//www.files.eric.ed.govfulltextED496177.pdf.pdf

Nikandrou, I.; and Papalexandris, N. (2007). The impact of M&A experience on s trategic HRM practices and organisational effectiveness: Evidence from Greek firms. *Human Resource Management Journal*, 17, (2): 155−177.

Ngo, H. Y.; Lau, C. M. and Foley, S. (2008). Strategic Human Resource Management, Firm Performance, and Employee Relations Climate in China. *Human Resource Management*, 47, (1): 73–90.

Northouse, P. G. (2013), Leadership: theory and practice, 6th ed., London: Sage Publication.

Notre Dame University website (2017). *About ND: Mission Statement* https://www.nd.edu/about/mission-statement/

Novelli, M.; and Lopes Cardozo, M. T. (2008). Conflict, education and the global south: New critical directions. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 28: 473–488.

Nofal, A. (2006). *The impact of the Israeli siege on the Palestinian labour force.* http://www.oppc.pna.net/mag/mag5-6/new_page_6.htm

OCHA (2011a). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-Occupied Palestinian Territory. *Easing the Blockade: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact on the Population of the Gaza Strip*, March, 2011. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_easing_the_blockade_2011_03_english.pdf

OCHA (2011b). United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory. *The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor*, December, 2011. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2012_01_19_english.pdf

OECD (1999). *The Response of HEIs to Regional Needs*. OECD, Paris.

Oklahoma Christian University, OCU (2015). https://www.oc.edu/

Offstien, E. H; Gnyawali, D. R; and Cobb, A. T. (2005). A strategic human resource perspective of firm competitive behaviour. *Human Resource Management Review*, 15: 305-318.

Ostlund, U.; Kidd, L.; Wengstro, Y; and Rowa-Dewar, N. (2011) Combining qualitative and quantitative research within mixed method research designs: A methodological review. *International Journal of Nursing Studies* 48: 369–383.

Oredein, A. O.; and Eigbe, M. (2014). Leadership Negotiation Skill as Correlate of University Conflict Resolution In Nigeria. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 112: 1237-1245.

O'Reilly, C. A.; Chatman, J.; Caldwell, D. F. (1991). People and organisational culture: a profile comparison approach to assessing person-organisation fit. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34:487–516.

Ouyang, M.; Duenas-Osorio, L. and Min, M. (2012). A three-stage resilience analysis framework for urban infrastructure systems. *Structural Safety*, 36, (37): 23–31.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Website "PCBS" (2007), http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics "PCBS" (2007). *Press Release on the Occasion of Palestinian Prisoners Day*. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah, Palestine.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics "PCBS" (2013). *Women and Men in Palestine: Issues and Statistics*. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah, Palestine.

Palestine Technical Colleges –Ramallah/Girls (2015). About the College. http://www.ptcr.edu.ps/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=3

Pargament, K. I.; Smith, B. W.; Koenig, H. G.; and Perez, L. (1998). Positive and negative religious coping with major life stressors. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 37: 710-724.

Parsons, T. (1951). *The social system*. Glenecoe III7 Free Press.

Patel, R. (2013). *Segregation on campus: Is it discrimination or inclusiveness*? http://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/segregation-on-campus-is-it-discrimination-or-inclusiveness-8620481.html
Independent Newspaper,

Patton, M. (2001). *Qualitative Research & Evaluation,* Methods Sage Publications: London, 3rd edition.

Paulson, J.; and Rappleye, J. (2007). Education and conflict: Essay review. *International Journal of educational Development*, 27: 340-347.

Peters, T. J.; and Waterman, R. H. (1982). *In search of excellence: Lessons from Americas best run companies.* Harper and Row, New York.

Pettigrew, A. M. (1979). On studying organisational cultures. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24: 570–581.

Pfeffer, J. (1998). Seven practices of successful organisations. *California Management Review*, 40, (2): 96−124.

Pianta, R. C.; and Walsh, D. J. (1998). Applying the construct of resilience in school: Cautions from a development systems perspective. *School Psychology Review*, 27, (3):407-417.

Polkinghorne, D. E. (2005). Language and meaning: Data collection in qualitative research. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 52, (2):137-145.

Popoveniuc, B. (2014). Self-Reflexivity: The Ultimate End of Knowledge. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural* Sciences, 163: 204-213.

Prince-Paul; and Exline, J. J. (2010). Personal Relationships and Communication Messages at the End of Life. *Nursing Clinics of North America,* 45, (3):449-463.

Punamäki, R. L. (1996). Can ideological commitment protect children's psychological well- being in situations of political violence? *Child Development*, 67: 55-69.

Punamäki, R. L.; Salo, J.; Komproe, I.; Qouta, S.; El- Masri, M.; and De Jong, J.M. (2008). Dispositional and situational coping and mental health among Palestinian political ex-prisoners. *Anxiety, Stress, and Coping*, 18: 1-22.

Raelin, J. (2006). Does action learning promote collaborative leadership? *Academy Of Management Learning &Education, 5*(2):152-158.

Rahim, M. A. (2002). Toward a theory of managing organisational conflict. *The International Journal of Conflict Management*, 13: 206-235.

Ramahi, N.; and Davies, B. (2002). Changing primary education in Palestine: Pulling in several directions at once. *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 12, (1): 59-76.

Ramos, T.B.; Caeiro, S.; van Hoof, B.; Lozano, R.; Huisingh, D.; and Ceulemans, K. (2015). Experiences from the implementation of sustainable development in HE institutions: Environmental Management for Sustainable Universities. *Journal of Cleaner Production,* 106, (1): 3-10.

Reason, J. (1997). *Managing the Risk of Organisational Accidents*, Ashgate, Aldershot.

Redden, E. (2014). *Keeping Sexes Separate*, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/01/31/clashes-over-religiously-motivated-gender-segregation-canadian-british-campuses.

Reuventy, R. (2003). Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli–Palestinian conflict. *Political Geography*, 22: 347–380.

Richards, R. J. (1993). Ideology and the History of Science. *Biology and Philosophy*, 8: 103-108,

Rindt, J.; and Mouzas. S. (2015). Exercising power in asymmetric relationships: The use of private rules. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 48: 202-213.

Robertson, S.L. (2010). *Challenges Facing Universities in a Globalising World*, published by the Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1JA, UK at: http://susanleerobertson.com/publications/

Rochet, C.; Keramidas, O.; and Bout, L. (2008). Crisis as change strategy in public organisations, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 74: 65-77.

Ruegg, W. (1996). A history of university in Europe: Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800) 2nd edition, editor: Hilde De Ridder- Symoens, *Cambridge University Press*.

Rutter, M. (2007). Resilience, competence, and coping. *Child Abuse Neglecting*, 31:205–209.

Saunders, M.; Lewis, P.; and Thornhill, A. (2003). *Research Methods for Business Students*, 3rd edition, Personal Education Limited, England.

Saurin, T. A.; and Carim Junior, G. C. (2012). A framework for identifying and analyzing sources of resilience and brittleness: A case study of two air taxi carriers. *International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics*, 42 (3): 312-324.

Schamber, L. (2000). Time-line interviews and inductive content analysis: their effectiveness for exploring cognitive behaviours. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science*, 51 (8):734-744.

Schein, E. H. (1992). *Organisational culture and leadership: A dynamic view* (2nd ed.). San Francisco7 Jossey-Bass.

Schein, E.H. (1996). Culture: the missing concept in organisation studies. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41 (2): 229-240.

Schein, E. H. (2004). *Organisational culture and leadership* (3rd edition). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Schuler, R. S.; and Jackson, S. (2005). A quarter-century review of human resource management in the US: The growth in importance of the international perspective. *Management Revue*, 16, (1): 11-35.

Schuler, R. S.; and Jackson, S. E. (1987). Linking competitive strategies with human resource management practices. *Academy of Management Executive*, 1: 207–219.

Schultze, U.; and Avital, M. (2011). Designing interviews to generate rich data for information systems research*, Information and Organisation*, 21:1-16.

Shamai, M. (2002). Parents' perceptions of their children in a context of shared political uncertainty: the case of Jewish settlers in the West Bank before and after the Oslo peace agreement. *Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal*, 19: 57-75.

Shirali, G.H.A.; Motamedzadeb, M.; Mohammadfam, I.; Ebrahimipour, V. and Moghimbeigi, A. (2012). Challenges in building resilience engineering (RE) and adaptive capacity: A field study in a chemical plant. *Process Safety and Environmental Protection*, 90:83–90.

Seery, M. D. (2011). Challenge or threat? Cardiovascular indexes of resilience and vulnerability to potential stress in humans. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews*, 35: 1603–1610.

Seitz, K. (2004). *Education and conflict: the role of education in the creation, prevention and resolution of societal crises consequences for development cooperation.* German Technical Cooperation Deutsche Gessellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).

Sengupta, J. (1995). *Dynamics of data envelopment analysis: theory of systems efficiency*. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Senior, M.; Martin, R.; Thomas, G.; Topakas, T.; West, M.; Yeats, R.M. (2012). Developmental stability and leadership effectiveness. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 23: 281-291.

Sevier, R. A. (2014). *Atop of minds: Review of the major challenges and issues facing HE*.
http://stamatsresources.com/pdfs/2014_Higher_Education_Challenges.pdf

Shepherd, D.; Douglas, E. J.; Shaniely, M. (2000). New venture survival: Ignorance, external shocks, and risk reduction strategies. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 15: 393-410.

Siewiorek, A.; Saarinen, E.; Lainema, T.; Lehtinen, E. (2012). Learning leadership skills in a simulated business environment. *Computers & Education,* 58:121-135.

Simons, J.; Pelled, L. and Smith, K. (1999). Making use of difference: Diversity, debate, and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42:662-673.

Skaggs, B. C.; and Youndt, M. A. (2004). Strategic positioning, human capital and performance in service organisations: A customer interaction approach. *Strategic Management Journal*, 25, (1): 85-99.

Smith, R. J. (2011). Graduated incarceration: The Israeli occupation in subaltern geopolitical perspective. *Geoforum*, 42: 316-328.

Sohn, D. W.; and Kenney, M. (2007). Universities, Clusters, and Systems: The Case of Seoul, Korea, *World Development,* 35, (6): 991-1004.

Sporn, B. (2010). *Management of and HE institutions*. International Encyclopedia of Education (Third Edition).

Stake, R.E. (1995). *The art of case study research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Stake, R. E. (2003). *'Case Studies*', In Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.), *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*, 2nd ed., Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, California.

Staw, B.M.; Sandelands, L.E.; and Dutton, J.E. (1981). Threat rigidity effects in organisational behaviour: A multilevel analysis. *Administrative Science quarterly*, 26, (3):501-524.

Steen, R.; and Aven, T. (2011). A risk perspective suitable for resilience engineering. *Safety Science*, 49: 292-297.

Stephens, J.; and Graham, A. (2010). Toward an empirical research agenda for sustainability in Higher Education: exploring the transition management framework, *Journal of Cleaner Production,* 18: 611-618.

Stephens, J.C.; Hernandez, M.E.; Roman, M.; Graham, A.C.; Scholz, W. (2008). HE as a change agent for sustainability in different cultures and context. *International Journal of Sustainability in, Higher Education,* 9 (3): 317-338.

Stephenson, A. V.; Vargo, J.; and Seville, E. (2010). Measuring and Comparing Organisational Resilience. *Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, 25, (2): 27-32.

Strauss, A. (2004*). 15 Methods of Data Analysis in Qualitative Research*. http://fycs.ifas.ufl.edu/swisher/6802_12/15methods_Qual_An.pdf

Strunz, S. (2012). Is conceptual vagueness an asset? Arguments from philosophy of science applied to the concept of resilience. *Ecological economics*, 76:112-118.

Suikki, R.; Tromtedt, R.; and Haapasalo, H. (2006). Project management competence development framework in turbulent business environment. *Technovation*, 26:723-738.

Sullivan, A. T. (1994). Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. *The Muslim World*, 2:1968-1988.

Sullivan, A. T. (1995). Recent Development in Palestinian Higher Education and the CEEPAT Programme. *Minerva*, 33: 37-43.

Sullivan, A. T. (2001). *The West, Mediterranean Islam and the Search for a New Beginning*. http://www.mediamonitors.net/sullivan1.html (Accessed on 3 May, 2016).

Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: symbols and strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51: 273–286.

Sylvester, M. H. (2015). The Impact of Resilience to Change on the Transformational Leadership Behaviours Demonstrated by Frontline Sales Professionals. *Journal of Management Research*, 25, (7):107-129.

Taskov, N.; Mitreva, E. (2015). The Motivation and the Efficient Communication Both are the Essential Pillar within the Building of the TQM (Total Quality Management) System within the Macedonian HE Institutions. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 180: 227-234.

Teixeirra, E.; and Wherther, W. (2013). Resilience: Continuous of competitive advantages. *Business Horizons*, 56, (3): 333-342.

Teixeira, P.; and Amaral, A. (2007). Waiting for the Tide to Change? Strategies for Survival of Portuguese HEIs. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 61, (2): 208-222.

Tharp, B. M. (2009). Defining "Culture" and "Organisational Culture": From Anthropology to the Office. http://www.haworth.com/en-us/knowledge/workplace-library/documents/defining-culture-and-organisationa-culture_5.pdf

de Boer, T. (2010). *Global user research methods*. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Burlington, USA.

Tourish, D.; and Pinnington, A. (2002). Transformational leadership, corporate cultism and the spirituality paradigm: An unholy trinity with work place? *Human Relations*, 55, (2):147−172.

Tsui, A. S.; Zhang, Z-X.; Wang, H.; Xin, K.R.; Wu, J.B. (2006). Unpacking the relationship between CEO leadership behaviour and organisational culture. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 17:113-137.

Tushman, M.; and Romanclli, E. (1985).*Organisational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation*" in L. Cummins and B. Staw, eds., *Research in* Organtional Behvior (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press).

UI Green Metric (2011). *UI Green Metric World University Ranking: World Ranking, 2011*. http://greenmetric.ui.ac.id/id/page/ranking2011

Ulrich, D.; and Brockbank, W. (2005). The HR value proposition. *Harvard Business School Press*

UNESCO (2015). *Timbuktu: Outstanding Universal Value* http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119

UNESCO, (2012). *UNESCO Chair in Astronomy, Astrophysics and Space Sciences (964), established in 2012 at The Islamic University of Gaza (Palestine)*. http://www.unesco.org/en/university-twinning-and-networking/access-by-region/arab-states/palestine/unesco-chair-in-astronomy-astrophysics-and-space-sciences-964/

UNESCO (2017). *Statistics for literacy* http://www.unesco.org/new/ar/education/themes/education-building-blocks/literacy/resources/statistics/

UNICEF (2007). *The State of the World's Children: Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equity*. UNICEF, New York.

United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, (2010). *Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries*. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-in-post-conflict countries/CD%20in%20post%20conflict%20countries.pdf

United Nation Resolution, 181, 29 November (1947). www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2/ares2.htm

United Nation, UN. (2011). *Palestinian loss of land 1946-2011*. http// ranujanu.com/tag/united-nations/

University of Sarajevo, UNSA (2015). http://www.unsa.ba/s/index.php

Ungar, M. (2011). The social ecology of resilience: addressing contextual and cultural ambiguity of a nascent construct. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 81:1-17.

Ungar, M. (2012). Researching and theorizing resilience across cultures and contexts, *Preventive Medicine*, 55:387–389

Ungar, M.; Brown, M.; Liebenberg, L.; Othman, R.; Kwong, W. M.; Armstrong, M.; *et al*. (2007). Unique pathways to resilience across cultures. *Adolescence*, 42, (166): 287-310.

Ungar, M.; Brown, M.; Liebenberg, L.; Cheung, M.; and Levine, K. (2008). Distinguishing differences in pathways to resilience among Canadian youth. *Canadian Journal of Community Mental Health*, 27 (1): 1-13.

Unger, J. M.; Rauch, A.; Frese, M.; and Rosenbusch, N. (2011). Human capital and entrepreneurial success: A meta-analytical review. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 26: 341–358.

UNRWA (2009). *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees*. http//www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/gaza/html.

UNRWA (2012). Gaza students graduate, but still face obstacles. http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1432

Vega-Vazquez, M.; Cossio, F.; and Martin-Ruiz, D. (2012). Does the firm's market orientation behaviour influence innovation's success? *Management Decision*, 50(8):1445–1464.

Veronese, G.; Castiglioni, M.; Barola, G.; and Said, M. (2012). Living in the shadow of occupation: Life satisfaction and positive emotion as protective factors in a group of Palestinian school children. *Children and Youth Services Review*, 34: 225-233.

Voon, J.P.; Ma, Y.C. (2014). Global financial crisis and perceptions of job insecurity: The China case. *Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Economics,* 53: 138-148.

Waas, T.; Verbruggen A.; and Wright, T. (2010). University research for sustainable development: definition and characteristics explored. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 18: 629- 636.

Wahaj Khan, M. (2014). *Co-eduaction in Islam*. http://www.academia.edu/11420260/Co-education_In_Islam

Walker, B.L.; Pearson, M.; Harris, K.-G.; Mäler, C.-Z.; Li, R.; Biggs, Baynes, T. (2010). Incorporating resilience in the assessment of inclusive wealth: an example from South East Australia. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 45:183–202.

Walsh, K. (2012). *Organisational Resilience: How to change before you have to.* file:///C:/Users/sa/Downloads/Organisational%20Resilience%20White%20Paper(2).pdf

Wang, H.; Waldman, D. A.; Zhang, H. (2012). Strategic leadership across cultures: Current findings and future research directions. *Journal of World Business*, 47, (4):571-580.

Warrilow, S. (2010). *Transformational Leadership - How To Successfully Lead People Through Change.* http://www.articlesbase.com/advertising-articles/transformational-leadership-how-to-successfully-lead-people-through-change-1797272.html

Webometrics (2011).'*Ranking web of world universities*'. http//webometrics.info/top100-contient.asp?cont=aw (Accessed on 15 Sep. 2011).

Weick, K. E. (1988). Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. *Journal of Management Studies*, 25: 305−317.

Werbel, J.; and DeMarie, S. (2005). Aligning strategic human resource management and person–environment fit. *Human Resource Management Review*, 15: 247–262.

Werner, E. E.; and Smith, R.S. (2001). *Journey from childhood to midlife: Risk, resilience and recovery*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Wesley, J.J. (2010). *Qualitative Document Analysis in Political Science*. T2PP Workshop, 9-10 April 2010, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam http://www2.let.vu.nl/oz/cltl/t2pp/docs/ws2010/papers/P2-Wesley.pdf

Wildavsky, A. (1988), *Searching for Safety*, Transaction Books, London.

Witten, K.; McCreanor, T.; Kearns, R.; Ramasubramanian, L. (2001). The impacts of a school closure on neighbourhood social cohesion: narratives from Invercargill, New Zealand. *Health & Place,* 7, (4):307-317

Wittmer, H.; Rauschmayer, F.; and Klauer, B. (2007). How to select instruments for the resolution of environmental conflicts? *Political Geography*, 26: 674–694.

Wolfe, D. A. (2005). *The role of universities in regional development and cluster formation*. In: Jones, G., McCarney, P., Skolnick, M. (Eds.), Creating Knowledge, Strengthening Nations. University of Toronto Press, Toronto: 167–194.

Wood, L.; Ntaote, G. M.; and Theron, L. (2012). Supporting Lesotho teachers to develop resilience in the face of the HIV and AIDS Pandemic. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 28:428-439.

World Bank (2004). *Four Years–Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis*. An Assessment. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/wbgaza-4yrassessment.pdf.

Wright, P. M. (1998). HR fit: Does it really matter? *Human Resource Planning*, 21:56–57.

Xiaohao, D.; Changiun, Y. (2013). A Study on the Employment of Graduates of Higher Education in the Context of the Financial Crisis. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences,* 77:164-168.

Yin, R. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 2nd edition, Sage, London.

Yin, R. (2003) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, third edition, Sage, London.

Youndt, M. A.; Snell, S. A.; Dean, J. W.; Lepak, D. P. (1996). Human resource management, manufacturing strategy, and firm performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, 39, (4): 836−866.

Yukl, G. (2010). *Leadership in Organisations* (7th Ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Yukl, G. (2008). How leaders influence organisational effectiveness, *The Leadership Quarterly*, 19: 708–722.

Yun Seok Choi. (2007). *Validation of Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument Translated into Korean*. North American Society of Sport Management Conference (NASSM, 2007).

Zamini, S.; Zamini, S.; Barzegary, L. (2011). The relationship between organisational culture and job burnout among the professors and employees in the University of Tabriz. *Procedia - Social and Behavioural Sciences*, 30: 1964-1968.

Zaytouna University/ Tunisia (2015). http://www.uz.rnu.tn/ar/Index.asp

Zhou-Ling, X. (2009). Optimal Human Resource Management Practices on Organisational Performance, *Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice* 29, (11): 112-122.

Zopiatis, A.; Panayiotis Constanti, P.; Antonis L. Theocharous, A. L. (2014). Job involvement, commitment, satisfaction and turnover: Evidence from hotel employees in Cyprus. *Tourism Management,* 41:129-140.

Appendices

Appendix A: The Acceptance of IUG Chancellor to Conduct Interviews

الأخ الفاضل / أ. سعيد أحمد النمروطي ... حفظه الله

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الموضوع: اجراء مقابلات فردية وجماعية مع عدد من موظفي الجامعة

يطيب لنا أن نهديكم خالص أمنياتنا بأن يوفقكم الله في انهاء رسالة الدكتوراة الخاصة بكم والتي تمس موضوعاً هاماً يتعلق بالمؤسسات الاكاديمية الفلسطينية بشكل عام والجامعة الاسلامية بشكل خاص والتي هي بعنوان:

"الدور الاستراتيجي للمرونة التنظيمية في الجامعة الاسلامية بغزة من العام 1978م وحتى عام 2012م"

ولاتمام انجاز الرسالة على الوجه الأمثل يسعدنا الموافقة على طلبكم باجراء مقابلات فردية وجماعية مع عدد من موظفي الجامعة وذلك ضمن المنهجية المتبعة لاستقصاء واقع الجامعة خلال تلك الفترة ووضع التوصيات المناسبة لارتقاء المؤسسي بالجامعة وفق الاصول العلمية المتبعة.

متمنين لكم كل النجاح والتوفيق في مساعيكم،،، وبارك الله فيكم،،،

د. كمالين كامل شعث

رئيس الجامعة الاسلامية بغزة

Mr. Said A. Al Namrouti,
Ph.D. Candidate at University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg/S.A
Upon your request, it is my pleasure to accept your call for questioning some of our academic and administrative staff, as part of your research titled:

"The Strategic Role of Organisational Resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 1978-2012"
Wishing you a successful mission and an enriching experience.
Dr. Kamalain Shaath
IUG President

Appendix B: message sent to the interviewees

Dear Sir/Madam……..

Subject: Individual interviews and focus group discussion for the requirements of PhD degree

With great pleasure I would like to inform you that I need to conduct interviews with you and many other academics and administrators as part of my qualitative research approach for the requirements of a PhD degree from the University of the Witwatersrand/ South Africa.

Research title: **The Strategic Role of Organisational Resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 1978-2012.**

Your acceptance to conduct the interview will be highly appreciated.

If you have any queries, please feel free to contact me,

Said ELNamrouti, Mobile: +970592666354

Email: snamrouti@gmail.com

Or contact either of my supervisors


Dr. Gillian Godsel, Mobile: +27832658829

Email: gillian@godsell.za.com

Dr. Manamela Matshabaphala, Tel. +27 (011) 717 3508

Email: Manamela.Matshabaphala@wits.ac.za

Researcher: Said Ahmed El-Namrouti



Wits School of Governance "WSG"

The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg/SA

Appendix C: Names of Interviewees and their Signatures

Names and Position of Interviewees

ID	Full Name	Year of Work	Current Job	Signature
1.	Prof. Fuad AL-Ajiz	1980	Dean of Science Research Affairs.	
2.	Dr. Yousif Ashoor	1981	Academic Staff	
3.	Prof. Adel Awad-allah	1996	Academic Staff	
4.	Mr. Khalid AL-hindi	1986	General Secretary of Board of Trustees	
5.	Mr. Jamal AlKhodary	1992	Chairman of Board of Trustees	
6.	Prof. Mohamed Shubier	1985	Previous President of IUG from 1993-2006	
7.	Dr. Kamaleen Shaath	1995	Current President of IUG	
8.	Prof. Majed Alfarra	1998	Dean of Faculty of Commerce	
9.	Mr. Yousif Shamiah	1982	Manager of Maintenance Department	
11.	Dr. Jawad Wady	1983	Vice Chancellor of Al-Azhar University	
12.	Dr. Rushdy Wady	1996	Academic Staff	
13.	Prof. Sanaa Abu Dagga	1999	Head of Department	
14.	Dr. Sami Abu-AL-Ross	1997	Academic Staff	
15	Ms. Majeda Annan	1986	Administration Staff	
17.	Ms. Khadija Alsoory	1981	Head of Department	
18.	Mr. Abed Alkareem jabeer	1981	Manager of Purchases "Retired"	
19.	Prof. Alyan Abdalla El – Holy	1994	Vice-President Academic Affairs	
20.	Prof. Asad Y. Asad	1995	Vice-President for Adm. Affairs	
21.	Dr. Khalid A. Al Hallag	1994	Asistant Prof.	

Names and Position of Interviewees

22.	Akram I. Samour	1995	Lecturer	
23.	Ahamad H. Barhoum	1987	Manager	
24.	Mahmoud M. Al – Rantisi	2001	Lecturer	
25.	Ahamad Oraby H. El – Tourok	1996	Lecturer	
26.	Fatheya S. Al – Loolo	1996	Dean of Faculty of Education.	
27.	Musa Abu Husien	1981	Manager " retired"	
28.	Boushara Abu Shabaan	1980	Administrator	
29.	Mohamed Abu Jarrad	2003	CEO at The Ministry Of Education	
30.	Prof. Shehda Zourob	1980	Lecturer	
31.	Monawar Najim	1997	Lecturer	
32.	Iyad Al – Dajani	1990	Lecturer	
33.	Jameel Al – Taharawi	1982	Lecturer	
34.	Prof. Riad Al – Khodary	1982	President of Gaza University	
35.	Omar Abu Taiem	1983	Vice-President for Admin. Affairs at Al-Azhar Unv.	
36.	Faried Al queek	2004	Vice-President for Planning and Dev. affairs	

Appendix D: أسئلة المقابلات

1. ما هي أهم التحديات التي واجهتها الجامعة
2. كيف تعاملت قيادة الجامعة مع هذه التحديات؟ أضرب امثلة
3. صف كيف استطاعت الجامعة الاستمرار رغم الظروف الصعبة والمعاكسة
4. هل استخدمت القيادة أية استراتيجيات في التعامل مع الأحداث
5. رغم العمل في ظروف الضغط والمخاطر, عدد قليل من العاملين ترك الجامعة, لماذا؟ ما الذي حفزهم على البقاء
6. ما هي أهم النجاحات التي حققتها القيادة؟ قدم أمثلة
7. ماهي التحديات والعقبات التي لم تستطع القيادة التغلب عليها ولماذا؟ قدم أمثلة
8. ماالي يجب عمله لتبقى الجامعة مستمرة ومتطورة؟

Appendix D: Interview Questions

1. What are the main challenges which IUG has experienced over the years?
2. How has the IUG leadership dealt with these challenges? Give examples.
3. Describe how IUG manages to keep going despite extreme adverse circumstances.
4. Does the leadership utilize any strategies in dealing with these challenges? Give examples.
5. Despite working under stress and risk conditions, few number of employees have left IUG. Why do you think this is so? What has induced staff to stay?
6. What are the most important successes IUG leadership have achieved? Give evidences.
7. What are the main challenges and barriers the leadership found themselves unable to overcome? Why? Give examples.
8. What remains to be done to keep IUG surviving and thriving?

Appendix E: Specializations and Degrees Offered by IUG

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
1.	Usoul Eldeen (Religion Foundation)	Usoul Eldeen (General)	Bachelor
2.		Islamic Studies	Higher Diploma
3.		Explanation and Quran's Sciences	Master
4.		Hadith and its Sciences	Master
5.		Islamic Belief	Master
6.		Hadith and its Sciences	PHD
7.	Sharea & Law	Sharia and Law	Bachelor
8.		Islamic Sharia	Bachelor
9.		Comparative Jurisprudence	Master
10.		Public law	Master

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
11.	Arts	Arabic	Bachelor
12.		Arabic language branch Journalism	Bachelor
13.		English	Bachelor
14.		Social Studies	Bachelor
15.		History	Bachelor
16.		Geography branch GIS	Bachelor
17.		Journalism & Media	Bachelor
18.		History and Archeology	Bachelor
19.		Geography	Bachelor
20.		Geography	Master
21.		History	Master

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
22.		Arabic	Master
23.		Journalism	Master
24.	Education	Psychology	Bachelor
25.		Psychological counselling and educational guidance	Bachelor
26.		Education branch Basic education	Bachelor
27.		Education branch Religion	Bachelor
28.		Education branch Studies Social	Bachelor
29.		Education branch Science	Bachelor
30.		Education branch Mathematics	Bachelor
31.		Education branch Arabic	Bachelor
32.		Education branch English	Bachelor

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
33.		Education branch Science and Technology	Bachelor
34.		Education branch Arabic and teaching methods	Bachelor
35.		Education branch English and teaching methods	Bachelor
36.		Education branch Physics and teaching methods	Bachelor
37.		Education branch Chemistry and teaching methods	Bachelor
38.		Education branch Biology and teaching methods	Bachelor
39.		Education branch Mathematics and teaching methods	Bachelor
40.		Education branch Computer and teaching methods	Bachelor
41.		Education branch History and teaching methods	Bachelor
42.		Education branch Geography and teaching methods	Bachelor

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
43.		Psychological Counseling	Higher Diploma
44.		Mental and Social health	Higher Diploma
45.		Educational management	Higher Diploma
46.		Educational Rehabilitation (General)	Educational qualification
47.		Mental and Social health	Master
48.		Curricula and teaching methods	Master
49.		Foundations of Education	Master
50.		Psychology	Master
51.	Commerce	Economics	Bachelor
52.		Economics & Political Science	Bachelor
53.		Economics and Applied Statistics	Bachelor

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
54.		Business Administration	Bachelor
55.		Accounting	Bachelor
56.		Banking	Bachelor
57.		Politics and Media	Bachelor
58.		Finance and Banking	Master
59.		Development Economics	Master
60.		Business Administration	Master
61.	Nursing	Nursing	Bachelor
62.		Midwifery	Bachelor
63.		Physiotherapy[1]	Bachelor

([1]) This program is a part of programs within the Faculty of Health Sciences (submitted for adoption by the Commission)

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
64.		Community mental health nursing	Master
65.	Information Technology	Computer Science	Bachelor
66.		Information Technology	Bachelor
67.		Software Development	Bachelor
68.		Multimedia Technology and Web Development	Bachelor
69.		Information Technology	Master
70.	Science	Mathematics	Bachelor
71.		Medical Laboratory Sciences[2]	Bachelor
72.		Mathematics branch Statistics	Bachelor
73.		Mathematics branch computer	Bachelor

([2]) This program is a part of programs within the Faculty of Health Sciences (submitted for adoption by the Commission)

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
74.		Applied Statistics	Bachelor
75.		Chemistry	Bachelor
76.		Chemistry branch Biochemistry	Bachelor
77.		Biotechnology	Bachelor
78.		Life sciences branch Medical analysis	Bachelor
79.		Biology Life branch sciences	Bachelor
80.		Life sciences branch Biochemistry	Bachelor
81.		Physics	Bachelor
82.		Geology	Bachelor
83.		Environment and Earth Sciences	Bachelor

No.	Faculties	Program Name (Specialization)	Certificate
84.		Medical optics technology(3)	Bachelor
85.		Vegetarian production	Bachelor
86.		Physics	Master
87.		Biology	Master
88.		Environmental Science	Master
89.		Biotechnology	Master
90.		Mathematics	Master
91.		Chemistry	Master

(3) This program is a part of programs within the Faculty of Health Sciences (submitted for adoption by the Commission)

Appendix F: A Table of the Documents used in this Research

No.	Name of Document	Date
1	Minutes of the Inception Meeting	08/09/1978
2	AL-Azhar's Approval on Establishing IUG	07/08/1979
3	Association of Arab Universities	24/11/1980
4	Message to Israeli PM and International Community about Acknowledging IUG	01/05/1981
5	Israeli Civil Administration's Approval of Commencing the Third Year in IUG	17/07/1981
6	Message to the Israeli Military Governor on Permitting Two Floors at IUG	03/02/1982
7	Israeli Military Order of Rejection of Building Two Floors at IUG	08/02/1980
8	The Israeli Response to Issues raised by IUG	08/10/1982

9	Egyptian Supreme Council of Universities Acknowledgement of IUG	14/12/1982
10	Egypt's Approval of the IUG Students Conducting their Postgraduate Studies in Egypt	16/01/1983
11	Statement of the IUG Board of Trustees about the Internal Conflict	17/05/1983
12	Statement of IUG Presidency about the Internal Conflict	12/06/1983
13	Message from the Israeli Civil Administration about Residency of 7 lecturers of IUG.	14/09/1983
14	Message from the Board of Trustees to the Military governor about Lecturers Residence.	18/09/1983
15	Message of IUG Chancellor, Prof. Saqer about Hiring IUG Graduates	01/10/1983
16	The IUG Board of Trustees and the University Council Meeting on the Israeli intervention and the Rejection of Order 380	19/10/1983
17	The IUG Memorandum of Rejection of Order 380	19/10/1983

18	Response of Board of Trustees, University Council and Staff Committee about the Objection of Expelling, and Confiscating of Funds, and Non-Recognition	19/10/1983
19	Message from the Israeli Military Governor about Expelling the IUG Lecturers, and Confiscating of Funds	19/10/1983
20	IUG message to the Israeli Ministry of Defense about Order 380, and Expelling of Academics	19/10/1983
21	IUG Message to the Israeli Coordinator about the Occupation Restrictions	05/12/1983
22	The Israeli Civil Administration Message Requesting Agendas' of IUG meetings	05/12/1983
23	IUG Message to the Israeli Civil Administration about Confiscating IUG Funds	12/12/1983
24	IUG Message to the Israeli Coordinator about Confiscating IUG Funds and Salaries	13/12/1983
25	The Israeli Coordinator Response about IUG Difficulties	17/12/1983
26	The Egyptian General Governor Message of	31/01/1983

	Acknowledgement of IUG Certificates	
27	Message to the Israeli Governor about Permitting IUG Board of Trustees to Travel Abroad for Fund Raising	22/02/1984
28	Message to the Israeli Coordinator about different Issues (Buildings, Recognition, Residence and Confiscating IUG Funds	22/02/1984
29	IUG Message Requesting Freezing the Israeli decision of Expelling Lectures	26/02/1984
30	Message from IUG Chancellor to General Manager of HE about Recruiting IUG Graduates	14/03/1984
31	IUG Message to the Military Governor Asking Permission to Open the Faculty of Nursing	01/08/1984
32	IUG Message to the Military Governor Requesting Permission to Construct Temporary Buildings	01/08/1984
33	The Military Response Rejecting Constructing any Buildings at IUG	05/08/1984
34	The Israeli Chief of HE Response about rejecting opening the Faculty of Nursing, Building permissions and Eliminating the Number of Students	05/09/1984

35	IUG Message to the Israeli Authorities bout recognizing it	23/09/1984
36	A Message to the Civil Administration about the Rejection of the order 380	23/09/1984
37	IUG Message about Meeting the Israeli Defense Minister	31/10/1984
38	IUG Board of Trustees Response to The Israeli Authorities about their Intervention in IUG Academic Issues Including Opening the Faculty of Nursing	05/11/1984
39	A message from the Chairman Yaser Arafat about the violent accents at IUG	17/05/1985
40	A Statement of the Board of Trustees about the Internal Conflict	05/11/1984
41	The Acceptance of the Israeli Civil Administration of Releasing some of IUG Money	17/01/1985
42	The Acceptance of the Israeli Civil Administration of Transferring Money to IUG	14/12/1985
43	A Message to the Israeli Civil Administration Asking Recognition of IUG	06/01/1987

44	A Message to the Israeli Military Governor Requesting New Permissions to some Lecturers	17/03/1987
45	A Military Order of Rejecting opening a New Gate for IUG	03/12/1987
46	Another Message to the Israeli Military Governor Requesting New Permissions to some Lecturers	14/02/1988
47	A Military Order of Shutting Down IUG	07/06/1988
48	A Meeting between the Board of Trustees and the University Council about Improving the relationship between IUG and the Egyptian Universities	29/12/1988
49	A Message from the UNRWA of not Recognising IUG	01/11/1990
50	The Acknowledgement of the Jordanian University of IUG	12/12/1982
51	The Acknowledgement of the UNRWA of IUG Certificate and Graduates	31/10/1993
52	A Message from PNA about recognizing IUG and its Graduates	19/06/1994

53	The Final Accreditation of IUG Certificates by the Egyptian Supreme Council of Universities	08/07/1996
54	Congrats of the Minister of HE Dr. Ashrawi to IUG in the 25th Anniversary of IUG	16/07/1996
55	Impressions of the American Ambassador in Tel-Aviv during his Visit to IUG	28/05/1998
56	A Cooperation Agreement with Illinois University, USA	20/10/1998
57	A Cooperation Agreement with the Russian University	20/10/1998
58	Impression of the Ambassador of Qatar during his visit to IUG	29/07/1999
59	A Cooperation Agreement with Nottingham University, UK	01/11/1999
60	Congrats of the Egyptian Ambassador during his visit to IUG	20/01/2002
61	A Cooperation Agreement with Durham University	08/11/2002

62	Congrats of Dr. Ramy Alhamd Allah, the Chancellor of Annajah University in Palestine	26/05/2003
63	Congrats of Dr. Gabi Baramki, the Chancellor of Bierziet University	10/06/2003
64	A Statement of the University Council about the Political Division	12/06/2007
65	IUG Leaflet about Bombing IUG in the War of Dec. 2008	02/01/2009
66	A Cooperation Agreement with TUM University, Germany	10/02/2009
67	Agreement with Islamic Bank of the Reconstruction of IUG laboratories	09/03/2010
68	A Cooperation Agreement with Al-Yarmouk University, Jordan	06/01/2011
69	A Cooperation Agreement with Dicle, Turkey	07/02/2012
70	Accreditation of the Ministry of HE of the PhD Degree Offered by IUG	05/09/2012

Appendix G: Requesting Statistics about IUG Development

إدارة مركز المؤتمرات Conference Hall Administration

Document IUG/HR/
داخلي: 2000
Wednesday, 15 September, 2015
الأربعاء، 03 ذو الحجة 1436

الأخ الدكتور/ عبد المجيد نصار حفظه الله
عميد التخطيط والتطوير
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

إحصاءات حول تطور الجامعة الإسلامية

حيث إنني أكمل دراستي العليا للحصول على درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة Witwatersrand Johannesburg, South Africa وحيث أن بحث الدكتوراه يتعلق بالجامعة الإسلامية وكيف عملت وتطورت تحت ظروف الإحتلال وإجراءاته القمعية.

وعليه فإنني أرجو التكرم بتزويدنا بإحصاءات وبيانات رسمية ورسومات حول الجامعة تتعلق بالآتي:

1. أعداد الطلبة منذ النشأة وحتى 2011 م.
2. تطور أعداد الخرجين منذ النشأة وحتى 2011م.
3. تطور الكليات والأقسام منذ النشأة وحتى 2011م.
4. تطور الطاقم الأكاديمي والإداري منذ النشأة وحتى 2011م.
5. تطور مباني الجامعة ومختبراتها منذ النشأة وحتى 2011م.
6. إحصاءات أو بيانات أخرى تتعلق بالجامعة وتخدم موضوع البحث.

مع رجاء أن تكون الأوراق والمستندات باللغة الإنجليزية

والله الموفق،،،

مدير مركز المؤتمرات

أ.سعيد أحمد النمروطي